Evidence from Assistant Operations Manager Debbie Riel on LFB control room operations during Grenfell, stay put policy, FSG call handling, communication with command units, and challenges managing unprecedented volume of emergency calls.
00:00:04 [Music]
00:00:08 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing we're going to continue with control room stuff I think all right 15 yes it is right mr. Chen good morning I'd now like to call please assistant
00:00:20 I'd now like to call please assistant operations manager Debbie Riel yes thank you
00:00:56 thank you very much yes good morning miss Riehl can I ask first of all your to give us your full name it's Deborah Rebecca Frances real thank you thank you
00:01:08 Rebecca Frances real thank you thank you first of all thank you very much for attending today and assisting us with our investigations we're very appreciative of your efforts my questions are intended to be short and simple sometimes they're not so if
00:01:19 and simple sometimes they're not so if you need me to put the question in a different way or repeat the same question I'm very happy to do that similarly if you need a break at any time please just indicate where we can break okay all right okay now we've got
00:01:31 break okay all right okay now we've got your witness statement data the 23rd of October 2017 that you gave to the Metropolitan Police and that is M et quadruple zero seven six nine six have
00:01:42 quadruple zero seven six nine six have you read it recently I have this and can you confirm that it's accurate it is and that its contents are true yes and we have two exhibits to that which we don't I think need to put up necessarily yet m
00:01:54 I think need to put up necessarily yet m et triple zero 1 3 0 8 2 & 1 3 0 a3 are you content for your statement and as exhibits as well as what we're going to
00:02:05 exhibits as well as what we're going to tell us to stand as your evidence to the inquiry yes have you discussed your statement all the evidence that you're going to give to us with the with anybody before coming here today thank
00:02:16 anybody before coming here today thank you
00:02:16 you can I start them by asking you first of all some questions about your role in the lfb and your training and experience I think it's right that you've been at the lfb since 1991 yes I started as a
00:02:28 the lfb since 1991 yes I started as a temp in 1991 and then I took up a permanent role in ninety-two and at the time of the fire you were assistant operations manager in the control room is that right is that
00:02:39 the control room is that right is that still your role yes and you were promoted to that role in I think 2005 to 2006 yes turning to training following your promotion to AOM if I can use a
00:02:51 your promotion to AOM if I can use a shorthand in 2005 2006 did you have any training on the role of an AOM it was more on-the-job training and was was
00:03:03 more on-the-job training and was was there any training even in that early stage as to how to manage a control room where there are multiple FS G's coming
00:03:14 where there are multiple FS G's coming in now in your statement on page 6 of your statement at paragraph 2 if I could just ask you to turn to that you you say
00:03:26 just ask you to turn to that you you say that I've had previous experiences of fires in high-rise buildings such as Latin or house fire in 2009 well the day of Lakmal I was in a om and went over to
00:03:37 of Lakmal I was in a om and went over to a CRO who was taking an FSG called which I listened to as the AOM the caller sadly passed away whilst on the phone what was your role in the control room on the night of the lack an old
00:03:48 room on the night of the lack an old house fire can you remember so I was assistant operations manager a supervisor and do you remember how many FSG calls they were on that night and I don't remember how many and I guess I'd
00:04:01 don't remember how many and I guess I'd say maybe 8 or 10 what lessons with regard to the control room do you remember being learned as a result of the lack of house experience so
00:04:14 the lack of house experience so personally and the belief that once the fire brigade turns I had an incident the
00:04:26 fire brigade turns I had an incident the expectation that they would rescue people
00:04:30 people and was it didn't always happen right okay so you learnt is it can i summarize
00:04:41 okay so you learnt is it can i summarize what you've just said to me that as a result of blackmail your personal takeaway if you like was that it wasn't always necessarily the case that Cruz would respond to an FSG call that you were taking and be able to rescue the
00:04:53 were taking and be able to rescue the people did you have any specific training following lack normal and just FSG training just normal training that
00:05:06 FSG training just normal training that everybody else had right so does that mean that between two thousand and five six when he started and after lack of house you didn't have any training but as a result of Blackwell House you've
00:05:17 as a result of Blackwell House you've had FSG training we had FSG training and there was certain changes to FSG and guidance so we did refresher training
00:05:30 guidance so we did refresher training and I remember doing the workshop with the command unit right and when was that you remember the dates and so the last workshop I did was in 2016 with a
00:05:42 workshop I did was in 2016 with a command unit and that was a command unit was it was that a did the command unit crews come to the control room yes they did right we had some evidence about that from Alex Norman last week
00:05:55 about that from Alex Norman last week and anybody all familiar with that but she described a training session where command unit officers came to the control room and and and the FSG communications and call handling was was
00:06:07 communications and call handling was was trained on yes it was there scenario-based training right so 2016 have you personally been involved in any other fires in high-rise buildings other
00:06:18 other fires in high-rise buildings other than Latin or house where there have been multiple FSG calls not mult office gee all right what's the highest number of FSG calls that you've ever had to handle in your in your career from a
00:06:30 handle in your in your career from a single incident and so I would say like and all
00:06:34 and all nice okay did were you in the control room
00:06:38 room on the night of all day of the Adair fire I don't our Newton now at page three of your statement like just asked you to go back to that you say in
00:06:49 you to go back to that you say in paragraph one in the middle of the paragraph the system we now use is called vision it's the top of the page
00:07:06 I think I said paragraph two it's paragraph one the system we now use is called vision it's about two years olds and I've received training and using the system you'll receive very little refresher training there are occasional
00:07:17 refresher training there are occasional glitches when the system vision doesn't recognize the address given by the caller and you go on to explain what problems that causes and in your experience given the lack of refresher training as you describe here in your
00:07:28 training as you describe here in your statement have you ever experienced difficulties in practice in using the vision system yes what sort of difficulties and not being able to find addresses else seek vision is and works
00:07:41 addresses else seek vision is and works on postcodes right so difficulties when people don't know their postcode and inputting addresses and not being the
00:07:53 inputting addresses and not being the system not being not recognizing them right so address finding as one any other difficulties and there have been
00:08:06 other difficulties and there have been other issues when vision first came in
00:08:11 they seem to have been resolved on the night of the fire gran full fire in June 2017 do you remember remember having any difficulties using the vision system
00:08:22 difficulties using the vision system then you don't can I then turn to another topic which is FSG and stay put on you're on page three of your witness statement which was we're still on in
00:08:34 statement which was we're still on in the last paragraph on that page you talked about the statehood policy and you say in the second line there the standard guidance given to callers who
00:08:46 standard guidance given to callers who are inside a high-rise building it's to stay put if they are not affected by the fire they're just just pausing there how do you understand the word affected
00:08:58 do you understand the word affected there so if the fire is in their property that's how I understand it I should have asked you a question before that the way you've defined it
00:09:10 before that the way you've defined it there does that come out of your understanding of lfb policy yes right perhaps I should just show you that it's policy 790 obsessed very policies 539
00:09:23 policy 790 obsessed very policies 539 I'm so sorry 539 which is emergency call management which is a tab 3 of our policies bundle and if I can ask you to look at page 16 which is appendix 3 in
00:09:41 look at page 16 which is appendix 3 in the fourth paragraph there you say 4 it says you're usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire heat or smoke if the situation changes you should leave your premises and dial
00:09:54 you should leave your premises and dial 999 if you need further assistance now I'm just going back it's your statement staying on your statement and looking at the word effective in that sentence there how would a flat be affected or a
00:10:07 there how would a flat be affected or a house be affected by heat fire or smoke so my understanding would be that the fire had actually moved into their
00:10:18 fire had actually moved into their property from another flat ok what about what about smoke and again my understanding is if their property was
00:10:30 understanding is if their property was smoke-filled right the whole property was smoke-filled know this may sound a slightly vague question but how much smoke would use a control room operator
00:10:42 smoke would use a control room operator or a OM think was necessary to be in a flat before it was affected so that you were then no longer advised an occupant to stay put I don't really know to be
00:10:57 to stay put I don't really know to be honest right ok now you came back to your statement you also say in the same paragraph four lines
00:11:10 say in the same paragraph four lines down a change in the guidance can only be made by a senior manager in the control room or by a senior officer at the scene this decision is not made by an om or a om in the control room now
00:11:25 an om or a om in the control room now are you familiar with policy 790 London Fire Brigade policy 790 fire survival guidance calls and I would have to see
00:11:38 guidance calls and I would have to see it okay perhaps that can come up please it's in our policy bundle at tab 5 this is lfb policy 790 current as at June
00:11:51 is lfb policy 790 current as at June 2017
00:11:53 2017 do you does this look familiar to you I believe I have seen it ok do you think you might have had some training on on this yes right can I ask you then to look please at paragraph 8 point 7 which
00:12:07 look please at paragraph 8 point 7 which is on page 5
00:12:17 and it says in exceptional circumstances and I see may consider informing control that their advice to FSG callers should be altered for example to attempt to leave their property the IC should
00:12:28 leave their property the IC should remember that this advice may be contrary to national policy for control staff on FSGS and liaison with the officer in charge at control will be required for an agreement to change the prescriptive advice so when you say in
00:12:43 prescriptive advice so when you say in your statement that the decision would never be made by or not be made by an OEM or a OEM in the control room I just wonder whether that's really right in light of the policy here that we see and so it would come from the incident
00:12:56 so it would come from the incident commander at the scene yes they would have a discussion with whoever was in charge at control right and I believe the actual decision were to come from
00:13:07 the actual decision were to come from the incident I see so do I understand your evidence this way that a change in standing stapled advice would only be made with
00:13:18 stapled advice would only be made with the ultimate permission with the incident commander having spoken first to the controller then senior officers in the control room yes I see and that's true is it of a high-rise residential block is it yes yes yes
00:13:31 block is it yes yes yes prior to the night of the grünfeld tala fire how do you had any experience of any senior manager an AO m or o m in the control room changing the standing stay
00:13:43 control room changing the standing stay put advice for a high-rise residential block from stay put to get out no that's the first time right can we then turn to the night of the fire take take that
00:13:55 the night of the fire take take that policy off the screen for the moment can we first look at the photographs we've had last week of the Stratford control room in the red grey control report
00:14:07 room in the red grey control report which is page 175 and just to remind us all about that that's an L F be four seven nine zero and there it is can you
00:14:18 seven nine zero and there it is can you tell us where you were sitting to the best of your recollection is real on the night of Grenville tower this is this is a photograph of the Stratford control room so where the operations manager is sitting at there
00:14:31 operations manager is sitting at there in the middle at the back I was to their right-hand side looking yes that's correct
00:14:38 correct to the right hand side the right hand position you say the right hand side right hands on the picture on the P as you're looking at the picture I see okay and who are you sitting next to so and
00:14:49 and who are you sitting next to so and the operations manager Alex Norman okay and who are you facing so I was facing several control offices do you remember who they were and so to my left I had
00:15:03 who they were and so to my left I had Pam Jones and Yvonne Adams opposite me was Christine House and Sarah Russell
00:15:14 Angie guts and Sharon Darby I could see right so you could see that were you numbering from the left or from the right move in the list of names yes so
00:15:25 right move in the list of names yes so that was from my left from your left so from your left you had Pam Jones then Adam there live on Adams then Christine house and then Sarah Russell and in Angie cards and Sharon Darby and showing
00:15:36 Angie cards and Sharon Darby and showing them pictures only on the radio yes right and and could you in general terms here what they were what they were saying when you weren't yourself engaged
00:15:48 saying when you weren't yourself engaged on the call and so at the beginning of the incident I did hear a call that Pam took because she was to my left but as the incident
00:16:03 she was to my left but as the incident progressed I I didn't hear cause cuz is just so busy did you get up and move about much and I think I did get up a
00:16:14 about much and I think I did get up a couple of times just to check how people where but no I was just focused on and
00:16:25 where but no I was just focused on and what I was doing on page four of your statement you mention a television and you say in the fourth paragraph but down
00:16:37 you say in the fourth paragraph but down in the second line at Stratford Control there is a TV in the room behind the supervisors desk but I'm not sure if it was working that night and if it had
00:16:50 was working that night and if it had been working I function it functionable operable would it have been turned on and it could have been and it the
00:17:03 and it could have been and it the position it's in most people wouldn't be able to see it anyways right how often did you manage the control room at Stratford before the night of Greenville
00:17:14 Stratford before the night of Greenville tower I can't say how often no but roughly a year maybe once or twice okay sir so you've had enough experience of
00:17:26 sir so you've had enough experience of the room yes to be able to know what was usual not usual about it and would it be usual in Stratford to have that television on and it would depend on the watch if they decided to put it on did
00:17:39 watch if they decided to put it on did anybody ever tell you on that night that the TV wasn't working did you know that Joe Smith as she's told us ordered it that mean that it not be switched on so the crs wouldn't be distracted by it
00:17:56 did you have any kind of picture at all from the incident ground as to what was happening at the tower no did that hamper you and your work in any way just
00:18:07 hamper you and your work in any way just looked at generally no no because we were just getting on with our role our functions and and we didn't really have time to look at anything now
00:18:21 really have time to look at anything now on the night of the fire what was your role initially so I was supervisor assistant operations manager right assisting Alex Norman yes right and you were there from the start of the
00:18:32 were there from the start of the incident and you say on page five of your statement we can just look at that in the third main paragraph halfway down
00:18:43 in the third main paragraph halfway down you say I made the decision it's the paragraph and starts at oh one thirteen it's a third main paragraph you say halfway down I made we'll just below I
00:18:54 halfway down I made we'll just below I made the decision to deal with all the make ups carrying out mobilization and action plans just just pausing there
00:19:04 what's an action plan and you just help us and so it's an action that's associated with a particular address or
00:19:15 associated with a particular address or a particular incident type code so it's a further action that we would have to carry out after taking the call so can
00:19:26 carry out after taking the call so can you give me an example so for example if you took all two road traffic collision an action plan would be presented to order an ambulance and inform the police
00:19:37 order an ambulance and inform the police and to inform a station manager so further actions right can you give me an example of a further action or action plan in relation to this incident
00:19:48 plan in relation to this incident Granville Tower and so as the incident was made up there were action plans to page senior officers
00:20:00 to contact Thames Water Environment Agency police so each time the incident is made up we would then update police or some an
00:20:13 we would then update police or some an ambulance and would each time you did those things that you've described by way of example did that involve liaison with the incident commander or did you just do that anyway no like I see did
00:20:28 just do that anyway no like I see did your role generally speaking it did your role in mobilizations give you any awareness of the seriousness of the fire or the nature of the fire spread at Grenfell and so in the beginning it was
00:20:43 Grenfell and so in the beginning it was just you know seems a normal high-rise call which is standard to be made up to
00:20:54 call which is standard to be made up to a 6th pump fire but as it was made up so quickly yes it became apparent that you
00:21:06 quickly yes it became apparent that you know something had gone wrong something was not normal and did that as you've just said you became aware that
00:21:17 just said you became aware that something had gone wrong at some point become well becoming aware of that did you have your thoughts yourself about whether the advice to call us to stay put and await rescue was the right
00:21:29 put and await rescue was the right advice to continue to give and I think I'd had a conversation with Alex at some
00:21:40 I'd had a conversation with Alex at some point
00:21:42 point sort of saying you know we didn't know what was happening we didn't know if people were being rescued we were taking all these calls it was relentless and we
00:21:55 all these calls it was relentless and we weren't getting any information back whether people were being rescued so I think I remember having a conversation with Alex you know with some concern do
00:22:08 with Alex you know with some concern do you remember at what point in in the in the United - was it during the accelerating makeups or was it afterwards do you think it was during
00:22:21 afterwards do you think it was during maybe we'll come back to that in a moment
00:22:23 moment just came from the general question I asked you to the more specific at page five of your statement which we're on at the moment you you say in two paragraphs on down the page which
00:22:34 two paragraphs on down the page which you say I was aware of the large number of FSG calls that were being taken by the CR OS and at one point the om Alexandre Norman took two to three calls and I could hear her talking that she
00:22:46 and I could hear her talking that she was sat close to me when did you start to become aware of the large number of FSG calls do you think by reference to the none but do it by Oh tell me about
00:22:57 the none but do it by Oh tell me about records to the number of pumps and so on I believe it was looking back at timelines it was probably about half-past one right why do you say that
00:23:08 half-past one right why do you say that and because I've seen I knew at the beginning of the call there was only a few calls a beginning of the incident there was only a few calls and it seemed
00:23:20 there was only a few calls and it seemed to be quite some time before the influx of FSG call starts coming and I have seen evidence since the
00:23:33 and I have seen evidence since the incident that it was around 25 past have fun when at what point in time do you think you started to become aware that calls were coming in from all over the
00:23:44 calls were coming in from all over the building
00:23:45 building and I can't really remember sorry did you listen in to any of the calls at
00:23:56 you listen in to any of the calls at that stage at early stage um I don't think I do tonight right can I ask you to look at the operational response
00:24:07 to look at the operational response report version 2 at FB for 8 to 8 and turn please to page 87
00:24:29 now we have there it's on the screen you taking the time mark oh 139 a8 you take a call from som Smith who's calling for
00:24:41 a call from som Smith who's calling for an update and it goes on a Oh am real explains that they are taking lots of FSG calls from states that is now a 25 pound fire they say Anna Smith asks if there are only long call FSG calls where
00:24:53 there are only long call FSG calls where people are on the line and a OEM rail states that arrow normally is on the line to someone named Smith or will say checks if the system is coping and tells them real to prioritize the FSG calls
00:25:04 them real to prioritize the FSG calls over the resource management logistics notifications air service method confirms that she'll the attending Stratford now first question do you know
00:25:15 Stratford now first question do you know where Joe Smith was at the time you spoke to her as recorded there and I believe she was in the car on Hawaii enroute and it says she told
00:25:28 on Hawaii enroute and it says she told you to prioritize FSG calls over resource management calls do you remember what you thought she meant by that and so when I was on the phone to her and I remember stating to her that
00:25:40 her and I remember stating to her that you know we were really busy we were taking all these MSG calls and one of our roles is if there's a large incident we have to take over the resource
00:25:52 we have to take over the resource management logistics side of it and we have to notify senior offices of large incidents so I had mentioned to her on
00:26:04 incidents so I had mentioned to her on the phone that we were unable to do that because we were just inundated with calls and we had nobody free to do those notifications right
00:26:15 what did you do anything in response to instruction to prioritize FSG calls over and so that just means that Joanne said
00:26:29 and so that just means that Joanne said to just deal with the FSG calls rather than doing the logistics did that mean that there was a delay
00:26:41 that there was a delay perhaps in paging senior officers to get to the incident no so this is not to do with officers attending the incident this is like staff officers to notify
00:26:55 this is like staff officers to notify them that there's a large instrument going on
00:26:57 going on when you say staff officers can you give me an idea as they start the phone that represents the three top Isis the commissioner and assistant commissioners okay so we page their staff officer to
00:27:11 okay so we page their staff officer to notify them of a large incident as it's been made up person just to make them aware of it right okay so when you were
00:27:22 aware of it right okay so when you were prioritizing FSG calls is it are you saying that wasn't at the expense of paging opera frontline people at that
00:27:34 paging opera frontline people at that stage and we're looking at 131 139 also were you taking any steps to ensure that control room officers were making sure
00:27:47 control room officers were making sure they got all the required information from callers no I couldn't I couldn't and I was busy doing all the mobilizing and it was it was just impossible to
00:27:59 and it was it was just impossible to right support those control officers yes I see say was anybody in the control room to your knowledge making sure that control room officers were checking that
00:28:12 control room officers were checking that or making sure that they got all information to do with flat numbers conditions in the flat numbers of people in the flat there was nobody available to do that
00:28:25 there was nobody available to do that I see same same question about mobility issues elderly children no there was there was nobody no supervisor available to be able to do
00:28:36 supervisor available to be able to do that I see can I take you to a call summary the control room Adams received its page 52 of the control report full
00:28:51 and she
00:29:00 she she makes a call at 1:50 49 on the landline to a mobile phone allocated in command unit 8 I just look at the top of
00:29:14 command unit 8 I just look at the top of the screen there to pass on FSG calls and we can see from the text though what she does she passes on to details in respect to two particular flats 1 3 3 &
00:29:25 respect to two particular flats 1 3 3 & 1 8 2 and they're summarized there and then underneath it it says the command unit operator asks cro Adams if there is a priority for the calls being passed to
00:29:36 a priority for the calls being passed to them and asks control to indicate a priority by smoke density and then it continues about flat 182 that just focusing on that request to control room
00:29:49 focusing on that request to control room operator Adams if if there is a priority and and asks to asks control to indicate a priority of I smoke density first of all did you know that control room Adams
00:30:02 all did you know that control room Adams had received that message and that request you didn't do you know whether she would follow I suppose that you would not know whether she passed that on to others you didn't would you expect
00:30:14 on to others you didn't would you expect her to pass that on to you or Alex Norman in normal circumstances yes but at that time just everybody was just so
00:30:27 at that time just everybody was just so busy right now going back to your statement on page 5 please
00:30:37 in the sixth paragraph down probably easy to go from the bottom up it's the second last one you say during the morning I also answered it that gives a critical phone from other fire services
00:30:49 critical phone from other fire services and bTW they were passing me details of FSG calls that they were taking I took the details of the calls and passed the information on to the officer of the day I also answer the radio channel where police helicopter was passing
00:31:00 police helicopter was passing information on to us first of all is that line recorded their critical line yes I don't believe it is and you refer
00:31:11 yes I don't believe it is and you refer to the officer of the day who is that do you remember that was Jason Adams Jason olive and you I think you recall that he started setting up the whiteboard system in the control room at about 2:00 a.m.
00:31:22 in the control room at about 2:00 a.m. yes
00:31:24 yes did you pass on to him information that you got from the critical thing yes written it down on a piece of paper okay that was my next question you put on a piece of paper and then
00:31:36 you put on a piece of paper and then hand it to him okay and what did he then do with it do you remember I can't be sure what he did in it okay did you have any other discussions with other Fire and Rescue Services or with BT other
00:31:49 and Rescue Services or with BT other than details of FSG calls that they've taken any other discussion yes with any other Fire and Rescue Service all with BT and so they were all calls and that
00:32:02 BT and so they were all calls and that where they were passing through to our cephus Jenkins they're all FSG calls are they I see
00:32:12 now just before we leave that paragraph at the very end of that paragraph you say I also answer the radio channel where the police helicopter was passing on information to us is that channel
00:32:24 on information to us is that channel recorded it isn't what communications equipment with those radio messages come into the control room on it so that's the handheld radio handheld radio so who
00:32:36 the handheld radio handheld radio so who would have a handheld radio in the control room sir it's an area wave handheld I see and in the control room who had the air wave so it's just sitting on the desk it's is there what anyone or are there
00:32:48 it's is there what anyone or are there more than one I believe there's there's only one at Stratford there's one at Stratford and it's it's a loose piece and it's on and where does it sit just on their
00:33:00 where does it sit just on their supervisors disc suta so that was in front of Alex Norman was it at the beginning it was probably nearer to me so to you could you hear what was look and it was on the loudspeaker was it yes yes I see so you
00:33:12 loudspeaker was it yes yes I see so you could hear clearly what was coming out of it right I see and did you answer this radio channel by speaking back to the person communicating into the control room I did at times yes no times do you
00:33:24 did at times yes no times do you remember what you would tell them in general today so basically it was they were passing information what they could see and we were just saying received
00:33:37 see and we were just saying received right now we know you didn't have a heli tele downlink at Stratford which worked on the night did that hamper you in your work and
00:33:51 at the time of the incident I don't believe it did everyone was just concentrating on what they were doing [Music]
00:34:03 [Music] would it have been easier it's difficult with hindsight but would you would it have been easier to do your work knowing visually seeing visually through the heli tele downlink what was actually happening rather than relying on what
00:34:15 happening rather than relying on what you were being told over the radio it may have helped I don't know if we would have done anything different because it's not our decision to tell people to
00:34:32 you know our guidance is to keep people safe in their flat until they are rescued
00:34:39 rescued did you pass these radio messages you got from this radio channel - Jason Olaf at the whiteboard yes you did and so far as you know did he pass those
00:34:51 and so far as you know did he pass those on to the command unit yes I believe he was on the mobile phone right and that would have included communicating these messages that you had received by through this radio read everything that
00:35:02 through this radio read everything that came in to him he passed oh now can I ask you to look at page 120 of the control report back to that page 121 to
00:35:13 control report back to that page 121 to zero but we can see there that there's a time mark of a 306 48 and it says the
00:35:24 time mark of a 306 48 and it says the radio operator at Brigade control passes a message to command unit 7 charlie inform seven the police helicopter has informed us that they've got a thermal image camera on the southwest corner there's a heat source of people on the
00:35:36 there's a heat source of people on the 17th floor and second from the top also people on the 21st balcony do you have a recollection of taking that radio message on the on that radio channel
00:35:50 message on the on that radio channel no I don't remember that right were you aware generally that the police helicopter possessed thermal imaging capabilities did you get wind of the
00:36:04 capabilities did you get wind of the fact that the command unit was passing that the commanding it was getting these messages and I wasn't aware of that
00:36:16 messages and I wasn't aware of that message I was aware that all the messages with information was being passed over to a unit right do you have a recollection of this message or this kind of message coming into the control
00:36:28 kind of message coming into the control room
00:36:29 room which would indicate that the police from their helicopter could actually identify heat source identic persons high in the building and I don't
00:36:41 high in the building and I don't remember them talking about heat source the messages that I heard were talking about floors where they could see people right
00:36:56 and then page 1 to 5 of the control reporter a little further on time mark of oh 3 14 22 radio operator at Brigade
00:37:07 of oh 3 14 22 radio operator at Brigade control sends a formative message to command unit 7 charlie inform 7 further information from the police helicopter on the west aspect of the building multiple occupants are 3 floors from the top over again do you know who
00:37:20 from the top over again do you know who that radio operator was that burrito brigade control sending that message so the radio operator would have been Sharon Darby right ok she was like she was really operator all through the night so that would have been her do you
00:37:33 night so that would have been her do you know how she got that message from the police helicopter if not through the radio message on the air wave radio that you've just referred us to and so she wouldn't have been able to hear the
00:37:45 wouldn't have been able to hear the radio the air wave radio and so it would have been someone that would have passed her that message to pass over right - charlie inform 7oc now these messages go to see you 7 what about passing those
00:37:57 to see you 7 what about passing those messages over to see you 8 and I don't know if they got past us even did you were you aware I'm assuming you were
00:38:09 were you aware I'm assuming you were aware that at around 2:20 the see you designated to deal with FSG calls changed from CUA to c7 and I wasn't
00:38:20 changed from CUA to c7 and I wasn't aware it did he weren't no can I just ask you them to look just to make sure we've got this clear and the short incident long tap 23 of the documents
00:38:32 incident long tap 23 of the documents bundle
00:38:40 and turn to page 22 in the middle of the page at a time marker 22333
00:38:53 page at a time marker 22333 Sharon darbian puts a radio message which says key this is 22333 key cu7 run all FSG calls via cu7 were you aware
00:39:04 run all FSG calls via cu7 were you aware of that I wasn't aware at the time no and I was focused on and doing the mobilizing right did you have access to the vision log throughout the night if
00:39:18 the vision log throughout the night if that had been inputted into the into the incident log by Sharon Davi at the time is there any reason why you wouldn't have seen it I could have seen it but the logs would have been massive the
00:39:32 the logs would have been massive the amount of loss would a change in command unit dealing with FSG calls have been an
00:39:44 unit dealing with FSG calls have been an important matter though for the control room managers to know about and so it was more important for Sharon to know that so that she was aware any calls any
00:39:57 that so that she was aware any calls any messages that were sent via service requests with SSG information she knew that the command unit - was
00:40:08 that the command unit - was itwas it not also though important for you in your position as AOM to ensure that all the CR OS and yourself knew which command unit was handling FSG calls at the incident ground and it it
00:40:23 calls at the incident ground and it it wouldn't have made a difference really okay now can I go to page 6 of your statement and ask you to look at paragraph 1
00:40:38 you say that at the top at some point in the morning the decision was made to change the stay-put advice that we were giving to callers it changed to telling callers to escape and I'll just go on
00:40:52 callers to escape and I'll just go on with the rest of it I believe this decision to escape was made by som Joanne Smith along with the duty DAC Adrian Fenton and the OIC on the incident ground Joanne informed Alexandra Norman in this decision first
00:41:03 Alexandra Norman in this decision first and she she in turn informed both myself and Peter may I then made sure that all the CRS were made aware of this decision the caller's were told to get out of the tower by holding hands assist one
00:41:14 tower by holding hands assist one another and to make a run for it my feeling was that it should have been made sooner this decision it should have been made sooner so I have misread that last sentence I'll read it again my
00:41:25 last sentence I'll read it again my feeling about this decision was that it should have been made sooner now I've read that all to you I've got a number of questions that arise from it and
00:41:36 of questions that arise from it and first of all do you remember what time were about what time this decision was made no I don't know let me show you the
00:41:49 made no I don't know let me show you the debrief notes that we have just to see if that ties in with your recollection if you go please to lfb quadruple zero
00:42:07 if you go please to lfb quadruple zero three one one three they're there on the screen this is a manuscript version of a meeting of the PR PR C for control of
00:42:18 meeting of the PR PR C for control of the 24th of July 2017 and you can look down the list of attendees and you are the first one named there debbie real assistant operations manager do you remember this meeting yes you do now
00:42:31 remember this meeting yes you do now this note was taken by somebody present and it's signed by Andy Hearn it was the chair and if I can ask you to please at
00:43:02 first of all page three at the top it says calls coming in stay put advice given callers hang up and told to ring back if it worsens was
00:43:16 and told to ring back if it worsens was that was that generally with the position in the control room at the time on the night yes it was yes and then if
00:43:29 on the night yes it was yes and then if you go to page six a quarter of the way down the page there's a time mark of Oh two thirty-five stay put advise changed and then some detail underneath that
00:43:41 and then some detail underneath that does that help you what do you agree that that's about the time when the statehood advice was changed right and do you think that that
00:43:53 changed right and do you think that that was also at the time that you were told about it or became aware of it yes it would have been a more that time do you remember at the meet who at the meeting mentioned of the the time of 235 was it
00:44:05 mentioned of the the time of 235 was it you or somebody else I don't know okay now in your statement you say that you believe the decision was made by Joe
00:44:18 believe the decision was made by Joe Smith along with Adrian Fenton and the OIC on the incident ground were you privy to the discussions on this subject between Joe Smith and Adrian Fenton
00:44:29 between Joe Smith and Adrian Fenton no you weren't did you know whether they sought the permission of the incident commander before being able to change the advice what can you remember of the
00:44:46 the advice what can you remember of the involvement of the incident commander that you mentioned in your statement in the decision to change the statement advice and I believe they were on the phone to him
00:44:59 do you remember whether they made the decision and communicated it to him or whether it was a joint decision between the control room and the incident
00:45:11 the control room and the incident commander and I can't say for sure and I I can't say for sure I mean I believe Joanne was the instigator but right okay
00:45:23 Joanne was the instigator but right okay do you remember exactly what the new advice was that was to be given to callers so it was to escape to all get
00:45:37 callers so it was to escape to all get together to hold hands and to put wet towels and sheets over them all right
00:45:48 towels and sheets over them all right you don't have a brick yes you go with the Osher but don't talk to anyone about
00:46:00 the Osher but don't talk to anyone about your Hamilton's abuse all right
00:46:11 think I'm gonna make this a slightly longer break than I might audibly do yes I think the needs time to settle down and compares herself I think that's a very good I didn't say 11 o'clock
00:46:22 a very good I didn't say 11 o'clock very good all right
00:46:55 you
00:54:38 you
00:58:26 I do feel happy to carry on if you do need a break just okay thank you that's real thank you very much for coming back to us and this is not not
00:58:37 coming back to us and this is not not easy and I'm sorry I'm gonna have just to keep pursuing this line of questions see how far we go can I ask you if you don't mind to look back at the document we were looking at which is the control
00:58:50 we were looking at which is the control debrief notes page six and half way down the page and I should just say if you need another break and any other time just just say sorry if you need a break
00:59:01 just just say sorry if you need a break at any other time let me just just tell me and we can break again okay thank you okay and halfway down the page but it says advice wet towels over mouth hold hands stay together get out and then
00:59:12 hands stay together get out and then could be last chance now do you remember who said that in the meeting who referred to those words in the meeting
00:59:23 referred to those words in the meeting as the adults in the meeting right do you remember whether that advice that was CRS was word were told to pass on
00:59:34 was CRS was word were told to pass on was was in those terms could be last chance it was and did you do you recall
00:59:46 chance it was and did you do you recall going around telling people that that is the advice they had to give yes what did you do you remember what you told control room officers to say so it was
00:59:57 control room officers to say so it was that too if there was more than one person all get together let's try and stay together hold hands and it was the wet wet towels or sheets to cover themselves and to I think it was to run
01:00:12 themselves and to I think it was to run for it right and how did you can communicate that advice all that advice that had to be given how did you communicate that to the other control room staff so I did it verbally verbally
01:00:23 room staff so I did it verbally verbally he went up to them and said you must tell them to get out of all costs or these terms and did what did you tell them to say to callers if they had a caller who felt that whatever happened
01:00:36 caller who felt that whatever happened they just simply couldn't get out and it was that that advice I mean I just went up to them once to tell them that advice right at
01:00:51 once to tell them that advice right at that time when you were going round the control room telling people to change the advice and telling callers to get out did you yourself have any expectation that Cruise was would be able to rescue residents yes there's
01:01:03 able to rescue residents yes there's always that expectation were you ever aware that crews were struggling to get above the 15th floor
01:01:16 where there are enough supervisors in the control room at that point about 2:35 will say to get round all the CRA s to give them this advice we were able to
01:01:28 to give them this advice we were able to do it yes there was you there was Alex Norman and there was Peter may you all went round we were all able to go around and tell people right as it was important now going back to your
01:01:39 important now going back to your statement and we can take this note off the screen they've actual statement in the last sentence you said my feeling about this decision was that it should have been made sooner was that your
01:01:52 have been made sooner was that your feeling on the night and I think it was afterwards um in hindsight right because
01:02:07 afterwards um in hindsight right because of lack anon as well yeah it was in hindsight that I think given what you
01:02:19 hindsight that I think given what you told us earlier about the lessons learnt from lack and all that no longer to keep always assumed that crews could get to callers once the advice changed
01:02:35 what what did you what what assumptions did you have about the ability of crews to rescue quarters at the times I've
01:02:47 to rescue quarters at the times I've still wasn't aware that they were unable to get to the corners that was an it was that information you heard or was an assumption you were making an assumption right but in the light of Latin or the
01:02:59 right but in the light of Latin or the question is why were you making that assumption and because we weren't getting any information that they couldn't
01:03:08 couldn't [Music]
01:03:17 and it was still an expectation that they would be able to do you remember yourself making any efforts to get hard
01:03:29 yourself making any efforts to get hard information about the progress of particular rescues from the incident ground and I wasn't able to and due to the fact you know what I was doing mobilizing for appliances and I was just
01:03:44 mobilizing for appliances and I was just focused on on that role okay now can I turn to another subject which is callbacks now Joe Smith gave evidence to the inquiry back in July that as a
01:03:55 the inquiry back in July that as a matter of practice and the control-room never calls FSG called us back unless perhaps they get cut off and are on a mobile is that your experience yes yes
01:04:06 mobile is that your experience yes yes we would not call and someone back it's definitely not on a landline do can I just show you something then in the control report it's page 45 page 45 of
01:04:19 control report it's page 45 page 45 of the controller port 143 48
01:04:29 there is a summary of a call nwf see it's Northwest I'd take a call from a BT
01:04:40 it's Northwest I'd take a call from a BT operator in Nottingham we were passing on an abandoned call that is meant for the brigade the CRO says he will call the number back but do you know whether
01:04:51 the number back but do you know whether on the night buddy control room such as Northwest would would call people go back or did call people back I don't know you don't know what about when the advice changed do you know whether they call people
01:05:03 do you know whether they call people back at that stage I don't know you don't know turning to the question of the MPs and the LA s can I ask you to look at the control report at page 92 at
01:05:18 look at the control report at page 92 at the time mark of a 237 26 it shows that you made a call to the London Ambulance Service control room to inform them that
01:05:30 Service control room to inform them that a major incident have been declared by the London Fire Brigade first question is is that something that's routinely done when a major incident is declared called the LA s yes so as it was a call
01:05:44 called the LA s yes so as it was a call that I had already spoken to the ambulance
01:05:47 ambulance each time the incident is made up and the action plan would state to update an ambulance and police and so that was an
01:05:59 ambulance and police and so that was an update I see at what point in the makeups did that call requirement to the LA s take take over was it six or eight pumps or as so as soon as it's persons reported but an ambulance would be
01:06:11 reported but an ambulance would be ordered and then each time the incident was upgraded and you would go through to them and update them and was it you doing that yes right and that's part of your action plans
01:06:23 and that's part of your action plans that you described earlier is it a nice I see now if you go please to the short incident log
01:06:30 we can see that a declared in a declared major incident happened at o2 o3 and this is page 21
01:06:53 and at o2 o 638 you can see that s ad makeup I UPC away from GM well if this
01:07:04 makeup I UPC away from GM well if this is a major incident
01:07:15 had you called the LA s prior to that and so I'd spoken to the Elias on a number of occasions when the incident was made up pump wise and then when this
01:07:30 was made up pump wise and then when this message came in I would have picked up that message and then called the ambulance that was icy we're not upgrading the instrument and your first call was it I think you said
01:07:42 your first call was it I think you said was that when of his persons reported yes to the ambulance yes yes I said yes to the Anton London Ambulance Service may have a time mark of that of 128 40 is they need to look at that do you did you know that the London Ambulance
01:07:53 you know that the London Ambulance Service had called in at 150 256 all about them to tell the lfb that they themselves were making a significant
01:08:04 themselves were making a significant incident at now wasn't can I just show you that it's in the control report itself page 54
01:08:32 Oh 150 256 CRO got steaks a call from the London Ambulance Service who inform her that they're making the Granville town a significant incident did you know you didn't know about that no what would the expressions
01:08:45 no what would the expressions significant incident coming from the LA s mean in the control room it wouldn't mean anything to us there wouldn't be any actions for us to take and it was
01:08:58 any actions for us to take and it was before the Elias I see what was that what would be the point of telling the LF be that the LA s had had called this a significant incident it's it's just an update that they're also classing as it
01:09:10 update that they're also classing as it would you pass that on to the command unit and possibly I don't know if it was part right now
01:09:23 we saw at the control report at page 92 that Oh 237 26 you called the LA s to tell them that there was a major incident do you know why you waited half
01:09:40 incident do you know why you waited half an hour or so after group manager Welch declared a major incident to pass that on to the LA s was it half an hour well
01:09:51 on to the LA s was it half an hour well let me just show you if you go to the control yes if you go to page 92 of the control room report we looked at this
01:10:03 control room report we looked at this before
01:10:03 before Oh 237 26 that's your call to the London Ambulance Service and then if we keep that open on one side of the page and then go to page 21 of the short incident
01:10:18 then go to page 21 of the short incident log and time mark of Oh 206 38
01:10:28 if you had both of them up on the screen at the same time
01:10:53 two-thirty you can see that the that Oh 206 38 in the short incident log right hand side of the screen s ad makeup CUA
01:11:08 hand side of the screen s ad makeup CUA from GM welt this is a major incident but that message doesn't seem to be passed on to the London Ambulance control room until Oh - 37 26 as you can
01:11:23 control room until Oh - 37 26 as you can see on the left hand side of the screen
01:11:26 first of all is that right was there a half an hour gap between the declaration from the incident ground that this was a major incident and you passing that
01:11:37 major incident and you passing that message on to the London Ambulance Service control room and so it looks like the m iu p was owed 206 i'm not sure what time i picked it up and but i
01:11:48 sure what time i picked it up and but i was also carrying out mobilizing it says there i'd picked up her make command units for i believe i was still dealing
01:12:00 units for i believe i was still dealing with the mate pumps 40 with action plans
01:12:06 so i had a number of people to contact and page so that was possibly why the delay right when you made this call
01:12:21 where you were where at that time that they were that the MPs the Metropolitan Police Services were also taking calls from people trapped in the tower where to where we were where that staff in the
01:12:35 to where we were where that staff in the control room Adams and gots in particular we're providing FSG advice to the MPs you didn't know so can you does
01:12:47 the MPs you didn't know so can you does that mean you can't help me understand why the MPs weren't told that stage that the statement advise have changed I you can't help them to that right do you
01:12:59 you can't help them to that right do you know if the MPS control room were ever told by the NFP control room that the state would advise have changed I don't know okay
01:13:16 when a major incident is called as we've just seen at o2 Oh 638 what normally happens in the control room oh so from our point of view we would
01:13:31 oh so from our point of view we would upgrade the incident and majoring major incident declared and there would be a number of actions a number of people to tell a number of people officers to page are you supposed to call RB Casey are
01:13:45 are you supposed to call RB Casey are you required to or supposed to call our B Casey Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea or all the council and that may have been an action I do recall speaking
01:13:58 have been an action I do recall speaking to someone but I think that was possibly earlier on in the incident well let's have a look can I ask you to go to page 97 of the control report
01:14:13 at 2:42 38 we can see that you call London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Elbe Casey to report the major incident
01:14:24 Elbe Casey to report the major incident declaration the Elbe Casey operator says that they are aware and asks if the brigade need anything from them AOM rail explains that she is required to inform the borough duty officer the
01:14:35 to inform the borough duty officer the Elbe Casey gives the reference and there is the number it was that the first occasion on which the control room had called Kensington and Chelsea the council to report the major incident I
01:14:47 council to report the major incident I can't be sure I thought they possibly would have been contacted earlier I'm not sure right do you remember making any subsequent calls to Elbe Casey I don't remember all
01:15:00 calls to Elbe Casey I don't remember all right can I just ask you to look at one
01:15:09 at one entry
01:15:15 which is at oh three 48-56 well let me ask it to you this way were you aware of
01:15:27 ask it to you this way were you aware of a call made at about 350 so 10:00 to 4:00 in the morning where the operator tells the control room that they've been in touch with the council and they're
01:15:38 in touch with the council and they're not giving a number and won't give a number not aware of it okay finally can I just ask you one or two questions about a specific call can I ask you to
01:15:49 about a specific call can I ask you to turn back in the control room report to page 137
01:15:59 and look please at the time mark of 333 46 you take a call from a female caller
01:16:13 46 you take a call from a female caller in flat 133 on the 16th floor you cannot get out we may have the wrong you're
01:16:26 get out we may have the wrong you're quite right
01:16:31 it is the well not quite let's drink yes you take a call from a female caller in flat 182 on the 11th floor there are two calls and comments come in
01:16:42 calls and comments come in simultaneously but it's the bottom pick bottom page bottom of the page no thought if we get to the bottom of the same page
01:16:52 same page a 333 46 last paragraph there is no jury there are two same titles hmm the very
01:17:03 there are two same titles hmm the very bottom of the page there Oh 333 46 AOM real takes a call from a female caller in flat 82 on the 11th floor who reports that the fire is in her bedroom and
01:17:14 that the fire is in her bedroom and front room AOM real explains that the best advice is to leave the caller states that they will not be able to do it the caller says that there are two adults and her daughter who is six years
01:17:25 adults and her daughter who is six years old the caller says they've tried to get out but there is too much smoke and begs for help AOM really explains that she will tell Cruz again and if they definitely can't get out and they should stay together get on the floor and stay
01:17:36 stay together get on the floor and stay there for as long as possible I am real call us the call of what her name is and she says Natasha I am real gives her name and then she asked them her daughter's name in and encourages her to stay calm for her daughter am real that
01:17:49 stay calm for her daughter am real that repeats the FSG advice and tells an attached to that the brigade of trying to get to all the floors and she will pass on the details to the crews now I read that all to you do you remember this call ideas do and and you told them
01:18:06 this call ideas do and and you told them to as we can see from the summary that she will tell the crews again at that point did you have any expectation in your own mind that the crews were going
01:18:17 your own mind that the crews were going to be able to rescue the caller and to be honest I couldn't be sure which is why I was
01:18:27 why I was something like to get out yeah you say the best advice is to leave did you have
01:18:38 the best advice is to leave did you have or did the controller operators generally have enough information from the ground to be able to be to give very clear advice and no we didn't have much
01:18:53 clear advice and no we didn't have much information coming back right when it says that you told them they should stay together get on the floor and stay there
01:19:04 together get on the floor and stay there for as long as possible was that consistent do you think with the advice that you'd been given the CRA staff had been given to pass on to callers that in
01:19:15 been given to pass on to callers that in no uncertain terms they must leave yes yes so I had I had said on several occasions and that the best advice was to leave and like I say holding hands
01:19:28 to leave and like I say holding hands staying together but I do remember that she had said to me that she just could not get out so I wasn't trying to protect her and say you know just if you
01:19:42 protect her and say you know just if you if you think you need to stay to stay as long as you possibly feel you can but the advice was to go yes did you do you remember whether you assisted her to assess the conditions outside the flat
01:19:55 assess the conditions outside the flat it says to know whether she could make a safe escape or not and I didn't assist her I believed her when she told me that he couldn't get out so I I assumed that
01:20:06 he couldn't get out so I I assumed that she she had tried right you've seen that she tried you didn't you didn't go into the details with her normally would that be the job that a CRO would do to help the caller make an
01:20:20 CRO would do to help the caller make an assessment with the assistance of the CRA of whether Escape was possible well it's difficult because we don't know what the situation is like and outside
01:20:31 what the situation is like and outside so we could be saying to them you know if we said to them to open the door and you know more smoke came in we didn't I didn't know what the situation was in the corridor outside her front door she
01:20:44 the corridor outside her front door she had told me that she couldn't get out so I just assumed that it was so bad that she couldn't but like I say it's difficult to ask them to open the front
01:20:55 difficult to ask them to open the front door because you know lots more smoke may come in right do worse did you have any information from other sources about the conditions in the lobbies on that
01:21:07 the conditions in the lobbies on that floor or Lobby on that floor or in the stairwell no not from other sources would it have assisted you to have an information from the incident ground and it may have done but at that time the
01:21:19 it may have done but at that time the advice was was to get out
01:21:26 whatever the conditions yes yeah at that point it was this is real thank you very much I've not made further questions myself for you mr. chairman in the usual
01:21:37 myself for you mr. chairman in the usual way there may be one or two that may occur so I'm going to ask you to rise for fun yes it's also well we're gonna have a very short break now just so the council can consider whether there are any more questions that they need to ask
01:21:48 any more questions that they need to ask you all right see if you like to go to the Usher
01:21:53 thank you
01:28:14 mr. chairman just a few questions yes of course that's right
01:28:28 all right I think can still have a few questions for you mr. L thank you very much for coming back to to continue to help us there are a couple I skipped over which I should have asked you and
01:28:39 over which I should have asked you and didn't can I go back please first of all to the control report at page 45 which is the call from NW FC at 143 48 now
01:28:57 is the call from NW FC at 143 48 now it's not necessarily a call you know about but let me get your your evidence about it
01:29:02 about it it refers to an abandoned call being passed on that's meant for the brigade in general terms what what what do you understand by an abandoned call it's
01:29:14 understand by an abandoned call it's when someone would dial 999 and possibly speak to BT operator and when they transfer them to the fire brigade the caller has cleared the line the caller
01:29:26 caller has cleared the line the caller has cleared the line does is it always the caller who clears the line or might that line have been cut off in some way no it's a Bandhan call is the caller has cleared the line when you say that they've cleared the line does it mean
01:29:37 they've cleared the line does it mean they've pressed their phone so that they stock they've terminated the call as it's not some accidents of communication I see okay thank you
01:29:48 my next question is we were talking about communications with the LA s do you remember whether the LA s was ever told about the change to the stay-put advice you don't know okay now you were
01:30:04 advice you don't know okay now you were sitting I think as you so told us earlier in the control room on that night opposite control room officer Adams as she was she was to the litter your left okay how clearly could you
01:30:16 your left okay how clearly could you hear watch what she was saying to callers and I couldn't hear anything there was so much noise what you could not hear specifics what people were
01:30:28 not hear specifics what people were saying you couldn't have the specific so if I was to ask you about what you specifically learned from specific calls that she was dealing with you you could right then moving to a different topic
01:30:42 right then moving to a different topic communicating the change of statehood advice first of all do you remember who told you or instructed you to change that advice and so it was Alex Norman
01:30:54 that advice and so it was Alex Norman Alex Norman yes and did she give you a briefing herself about what to communicate oh yes she did yes how did she do that did she write it down no she just verbally said to me the advice did she
01:31:10 verbally said to me the advice did she tell you or give you an idea of how thoroughly advice must be given to callers that you have to tell the sierras to pass on and well she told me
01:31:23 sierras to pass on and well she told me the advice all right did she give you any indication of what kind of tone that CRA should use how uncompromising the language should be when you went round
01:31:36 language should be when you went round when you spoke to the CRA themselves what do you remember what you told them about the tone that they should use or how uncompromising their language should be I just told them the advice to give
01:31:49 be I just told them the advice to give right I didn't tell them how to say it you didn't write that so did you think you left her to the original individual CEOs as to how to pass on that advice I
01:32:01 CEOs as to how to pass on that advice I see was was there a way in which that change in advice or what should now be advised to callers could be broadcast
01:32:12 advised to callers could be broadcast more generally around the round the control-room like at an oil some sort of general communication system they wouldn't have been on the night because
01:32:23 wouldn't have been on the night because control officers were just constantly taking calls on the phone and so the only way was to go up to them personally and tell them because they
01:32:34 personally and tell them because they were still on the line yeah no I think you told me earlier that there are enough supervisors to be able to go around the room and make sure that we and give that advice to CRS to pass on
01:32:46 and give that advice to CRS to pass on at that point if that is so why were supervisors not able to check during the uh the earlier part of the night when FSG calls began to come in that CRA is
01:32:59 FSG calls began to come in that CRA is were were taking all information that they were supposed to take from callers because all the supervisors were busy right so when the supervisors went around the controller and telling
01:33:11 around the controller and telling control room operators what advice to give to that mean that they stopped doing what they were doing before and there were still actions that were still calls but it was important to get that
01:33:23 calls but it was important to get that information at that time that's it right I see
01:33:26 I see yes
01:33:31 it's real I have no further questions for you it just remains for me to say thank you very much for coming here and assisting us with our investigations we really do appreciate it so thank you thank you yes Adam I think there's mr.
01:33:43 thank you yes Adam I think there's mr. Miller it's very helpful for us to hear your own experience of that night and I'm sorry that it time that's been distressing together it again but we're very grateful thank you very much indeed so now you're free to go sure look after
01:33:56 so now you're free to go sure look after you thank you thank you
01:34:11 yes now mr. chairman our next witness is Aishah jadon who was a CRO from the Northwest Fire Service she's come down from Manchester especially to help us
01:34:24 from Manchester especially to help us today I just want to make sure that she is here and abled to give evidence but I don't want to ask very long so perhaps if we will rise until 11:45 that might
01:34:35 if we will rise until 11:45 that might things that need to be done well are there may be a few things I need to be done but I'm happy to I'm more than happy to take a shorter break it might be sensible if we took five minutes rather than the full nine that's gonna
01:34:49 rather than the full nine that's gonna make it difficult to keep it by the clock let's say close to 12 anyone knows exactly where we are very good thank you thank you of course to 12 years
01:44:23 [Music]
01:44:34 think you do saddam is to make yourself comfortable right yes mr. minute and mr. chairman could you please give us your full name I showed you bean they show jelly and can I just make sure
01:44:46 they show jelly and can I just make sure I pronounce your surname correctly it's jabbing is it Chi bean shebeen thank you can I start by saying thank you very much to you for attending today and
01:44:57 much to you for attending today and assisting us with our investigations we're very grateful to you now you've given us a statement which is a meaty quadruple zero eight zero two eight dated the 24th of November 2017 is
01:45:12 eight dated the 24th of November 2017 is that your statement of we see on the screen and have you read it recently yes you have and can you confirm for us that its contents are true and accurate yes yes are you happy for this witness
01:45:24 yes are you happy for this witness statement to stand as your evidence to the inquiry as long long with everything else you'll tell us today yes okay and have you discussed your statement or the evidence that you're going to give to us
01:45:35 evidence that you're going to give to us today with anybody before coming here no no now our questions are supposed to be short and simple I say this to all witnesses if you don't understand my question or you want me to rephrase it we're very happy to do that and
01:45:47 we're very happy to do that and similarly if you want to break it anytime just say and we'll have a break okay mr. bean your your role is a control room operator at Northwest fire
01:45:58 control room operator at Northwest fire service and I think you've been in that role since June 2014 that's correct yes have you had any training for how to handle a fire in a
01:46:09 training for how to handle a fire in a high-rise building a high-rise residential building it's all formed in part of the training when you first start you have a four week intensive course and that covers high-rise
01:46:21 course and that covers high-rise buildings plus every think and are you aware of something called the stay-put policy yes and it very briefly can you tell us what your
01:46:33 very briefly can you tell us what your understanding of the stay-put policy is my understanding of the stare pop policy is that particularly in high-rise buildings if there's a fire in the
01:46:44 buildings if there's a fire in the building that the occupants are to stare pop unless it's safe to leave but generally they're with the airport and the fire service will come and rescue
01:46:55 the fire service will come and rescue them right and have you had training about fire survival guidance calls yes can you tell us very briefly what that training involved so you simulate
01:47:07 training involved so you simulate incidents and we also have floor charts and paper sort of a work through that
01:47:18 and paper sort of a work through that you can go through questions or what sort of questions to ask and we have been trained on a PowerPoint before given a scenario and then what sort of
01:47:30 given a scenario and then what sort of questions you would ask what sort of advice you would give their fire survival guidance Mandy right and have you heard training as part of that training on how to deal with multiple FSG calls from a single incident not
01:47:45 FSG calls from a single incident not multiple but it would you fires father Gardens his fire survival guidance so you would give it to either one or multiple people and the training that you had was that at the beginning of
01:47:57 you had was that at the beginning of your employment at Northwest or has there been refresher training or regular training on our on step on FSG calls since then we have refresher training
01:48:08 since then we have refresher training every 12 months is there a policy at Northwest Fire and Rescue Services covering fire survival guidance there's
01:48:19 covering fire survival guidance there's a written policy what is there a document the NW FRS puts out so that controller
01:48:30 NW FRS puts out so that controller officers understand what they're supposed to do we have we have our own documents that we sort of use as their reference in terms of questioning and as
01:48:43 reference in terms of questioning and as far as an office file guidance is national so I'm not sure if there's a document directly for Northwest fire control right can I ask you to look at
01:48:54 control right can I ask you to look at page three of your statement
01:49:08 you
01:49:15 mention in the second paragraph on that page it's really the first main paragraph which starts as a as control room operators you said we made you a fast survival guidance this guidance is used when a caller tells us they cannot
01:49:27 used when a caller tells us they cannot get out of the building due to fire or smoke and then you go on to say a couple of lines down when a call initiates fire survival guidance I would amend the incident code on the system which then creates a flowchart of questions to ask
01:49:38 creates a flowchart of questions to ask the caller when you give some details there can I just see if we can identify that can you please be showing a meaty triple zero one eight two four five
01:50:02 a meaty triple zero one eight two four five
01:50:18 but that is a flowchart and is that the flowchart you were referring to in your
01:50:30 flowchart you were referring to in your statement I didn't use that flowchart on the night but yes that's generally what we would use right thank you okay we make we made these look about in details
01:50:41 make we made these look about in details later but in your experience is standing back from the detail um or in your experience as it was at June 2017 and
01:50:53 experience as it was at June 2017 and the ground felt our fire happened had you dealt with any live FSG calls not what I've had to give fire survival
01:51:04 what I've had to give fire survival guidance to a truck : or not the first time I've had to give my survival guidance was Sorrento was it right now
01:51:17 guidance was Sorrento was it right now on page two of your statement we're still on it you explained the overflow system this is this is the last paragraph on page two if we can just look at it you say we may require a
01:51:30 look at it you say we may require a receive a call from outside the Northwest area the Northwest Fire Service takes the overflow of calls from the London Fire Brigade if there is a delay of over five minutes in answering a call in London it will be forwarded to
01:51:41 a call in London it will be forwarded to at the Northwest control this tends to be done automatically by the 999 operators as they are aware of the overflow and tell us that the call is for London and the lfb could also call
01:51:52 for London and the lfb could also call us to make us aware now first of all I just want to ask you how this how this works you say that if there's a delay of
01:52:04 works you say that if there's a delay of over five minutes it gets forwarded and is that an automatic forwarding system or does that require somebody at bt or
01:52:15 or does that require somebody at bt or another call that handler to to send it manually it would be passed manually but the agreement would first have to be made by bt with London Fire Brigade okay
01:52:26 made by bt with London Fire Brigade okay when you refer to a delay of over five minutes does that mean someone has been on the call for five minutes and not getting an answer potentially yes I see can someone's call be passed on to a body
01:52:37 someone's call be passed on to a body control room like NW sooner than five minutes yes does that happen I'm not sure what the arrangements were that night but it could be a case where there
01:52:50 night but it could be a case where there could have been passed through if London weren't able to take them right and how would l FB make your control room and W
01:53:02 would l FB make your control room and W aware that they had a call for London sorry repeat that how would the operator the BT operate and make your control
01:53:14 the BT operate and make your control room aware that they were they've received a call they would announce a called passed and the contact number if there is one and say that this call is for London Fire Brigade right is there a
01:53:25 for London Fire Brigade right is there a dedicated line in your control room the rings where bt are passing that call to you if it's a nylon nine called they will pass it through the operators but
01:53:36 will pass it through the operators but to initiate the two so for example if they were going to let north of us fire control nor but bt were the first contact if north us fire control on the critical line to let them not on the
01:53:47 critical line to let them not on the critical line and and on page two and three of your statements you refer to the critical line looking at the bottom of page two you say after taking the information from the caller we would
01:53:58 information from the caller we would contact the London Fire Brigade control room using the critical line and pass on the information just just breaking that down a bit if when the call comes into
01:54:10 down a bit if when the call comes into your control room Northwest is there a critical line that BT rings saying we've got a call from a caller in London about a London incident what does it just come through on the ordinary it would come
01:54:22 through on the ordinary it would come through no it would come from the nine nine lights it would come up like any other call in the area in your own area would it I see so it wouldn't go automatically through to a an operations manager or assistant
01:54:34 to a an operations manager or assistant operations manager could come through to any control operator right so that's the call coming into your into your controller when you're referring to the critical line here in your statement you're referring to the line out from your control room
01:54:46 to the line out from your control room to the earthly right now on that line that he clarified that you you you you which line is that not in terms of number but there is there a specific number that you would call the NFB with
01:54:59 number that you would call the NFB with we had a dedicated number for London control that night right which was put up on the whiteboards to contact them with any information you'd put that up
01:55:10 with any information you'd put that up on the whiteboards I see would you by saying okay I said that everybody in the control room could see what nominal number to contact right and how soon after the first call that came in from
01:55:22 after the first call that came in from BT for London did the whiteboard system start operating in the northwest control room do you remember I'm not sure I was on a brick at the time I got recalled right who was running the northwest fire
01:55:36 right who was running the northwest fire control room on the night of the Granville town who was managing it we had two meters there two team leaders and then the operations manager was called in right and who was the
01:55:48 called in right and who was the operations manager hey Jed bussing could he send it again I'm sorry I didn't Jed busing batson I could use manager bussing passing okay now when the call
01:56:03 bussing passing okay now when the call came in from nine nine nine would you expect them to give you the details of the incident or the details of any particular call that they had already got or would they just pass the call
01:56:15 got or would they just pass the call over to you straight away the operator would pass the call off and advises it's for London right we would then proceed to take location details the nature of incident right we would you expect NFB
01:56:28 incident right we would you expect NFB to send you details and tell you about any details of the incident once you started taking calls from from BT in this instance we the duty team leader
01:56:42 this instance we the duty team leader was made aware by London control that there was a high-rise and building fire and we could potentially get some calls right do you
01:56:55 potentially get some calls right do you remember at roughly what time that call was made again I'm sorry I was on a break at the time so I'm not sure and do you have any in or did you have any information on your your system up it up
01:57:07 information on your your system up it up at Northwest fire control about the premises which were the subject of these calls no and did you have any means yourself in the control room to assess
01:57:20 yourself in the control room to assess the progress of the of the fire cause as operators we didn't know did you have any means to be able to contact the
01:57:31 any means to be able to contact the command units on the incident ground direct oh we don't have that information no no that's why we had the dedicated critical line to contact of Rights you so you wouldn't you don't have motion would have been passed through there
01:57:42 would have been passed through there yeah I mean to it they you say you wouldn't have used it but was there actually a system in place for being able to communicate directly with the incident ground no right
01:57:58 so the critical line is used by you as you say to pass information that you get over to London and that critical line is that a dedicated line linking Northwest
01:58:11 that a dedicated line linking Northwest with lfb that's correct it's a land line and is other contents recorded though the discussions recorded I'm not sure but if it was if it was called from an
01:58:23 but if it was if it was called from an operator station then yes it would okay is there any other means other than this critical line by which Northwest could pass call information to the lfb
01:58:34 could pass call information to the lfb possibly by mobile phones I made my phone was do you remember whether that was a method used on the night of the fire I can't remember but we do have mobile phones in control is there a way in
01:58:51 phones in control is there a way in which our Northwest CRO who is handling a 999 call or an FSG call to receive written information about the call about the incident about the progress of the fire to receive nation yeah we don't
01:59:06 fire to receive nation yeah we don't have that means no is there a way for a Northwest control room operator handling such a call to send transmit information that you get from the caller down to the lfb so that they could pass it on to the
01:59:18 lfb so that they could pass it on to the incident ground no it was all done through the dedicated number all done through the dedicated number right what about email would that be used it could be used right and can I just ask you to
01:59:34 be used right and can I just ask you to look at something which is NFB quadruple zero three six to seven
01:59:46 now if you could go please to page two of this document
02:00:07 that's it
02:00:15 if you look at the time mark of 3:17 19 which is the last but one entry it says after some code comment emailed to
02:00:29 after some code comment emailed to London FRS and I just wanted to ask you what that signified would signify that an email was sent with the instant details to London FRS right with that
02:00:40 details to London FRS right with that who would send that email well who did send that email to the best of your recollection or information looking at the position that the 0 3 would have
02:00:51 the position that the 0 3 would have been a team leader right I see could you go so what does caddis pnw yeah that's it's a position yeah a workstation who
02:01:03 it's a position yeah a workstation who works day at work station yeah what is it what does it mean it just means it's position number 3 right I see so you can tell exactly who sent that email would that be another wave know exactly who
02:01:14 that be another wave know exactly who bought I know it was a position 3 okay you know came from the episode we would emailing be a lot a normal way in which Northwest would would send information to control rooms handling an incident it
02:01:27 to control rooms handling an incident it can be done yes and sometimes inspect conditions as well and we do use the email there's a method of communication in general had you ever taken calls
02:01:38 in general had you ever taken calls through this overflows but a buddy system prior to the night of the Granville tower fire I'm trying to
02:01:49 Granville tower fire I'm trying to recall
02:01:49 recall [Music]
02:01:53 I can't recall prior to this and again it meant it's maybe outside your experience but let me just ask it anyway
02:02:04 experience but let me just ask it anyway if you're on a long call and you're receiving information during the call from the caller which updates your information when would you pass that updated information back to the main
02:02:17 updated information back to the main control room in this case in London would it be during the call or after it had finished to give you an instance of my call it was passed within the first few minutes because of the severity of
02:02:30 few minutes because of the severity of it generally if there is fire survivor guidance initiated we would pass that information as soon as possible yes well you say Michael you mean the call you had with the lady call on the
02:02:42 call you had with the lady call on the 23rd floor yeah yeah okay does the returning to a slightly different topic which is callbacks yeah as a matter of practice does the Northwest fire system
02:02:53 practice does the Northwest fire system automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers or 999 quarters as they come up on the system yes and how how does it appear how many numbers would appear on the system in front of you at
02:03:09 appear on the system in front of you at any one time it would be per call do you mean contacting this yes yeah you'd get per call so you'd get one you get one if you wanted to find out who'd called five minutes before ten minutes before could
02:03:20 minutes before ten minutes before could you scroll up and find out who that was or find out what the number was you could do an incident search because you'd log every call right okay um do
02:03:32 you'd log every call right okay um do you know whether North West has a practice of not calling callers back to update them with information or to keep
02:03:43 update them with information or to keep tabs on them if there's an abundant call or if the caller disconnects before being connected we would always ring them back you would and what what if it was what about other cases where it's
02:03:54 was what about other cases where it's not an abandoned call or the caller gets disconnected it would it would depend on if the resources are aware available to to be able to ring
02:04:07 aware available to to be able to ring somebody back we've never had to do it so I'm not sure what would you do if the advice the general advice which now had
02:04:18 advice the general advice which now had to be given to call as changed would you be able to call would you call them back in that instance if if I called yes if you could have you ever had I should
02:04:29 you could have you ever had I should have asked you this first have you had ever had experience of having to call back a caller to tell them that the statement advice had changed and they know how to get out no yeah so calling
02:04:40 know how to get out no yeah so calling the back has never arisen in your experience is that right and what about just calling the back to see how they're getting on would you ever do that again
02:04:53 getting on would you ever do that again it would depend on activity in the control room at the time right but I've never had to experience that let me see
02:05:04 never had to experience that let me see if I can help me with a specific example can I ask you please to be shown the control report page 45
02:05:30 now 143 48 mr. bean we see at the bottom of the page and WFC takes a call from a bt operator in nottingham we were
02:05:41 bt operator in nottingham we were passing on an abandoned call that is meant for the brigade the CRA says he will call the number back now the CRA is a male so it's it's not you but but can
02:05:53 a male so it's it's not you but but can I just ask you did you know whether on the night buddy CR OS like you like the end like Northwest would call people back where there was an abandoned call such as this that's right yeah okay
02:06:06 such as this that's right yeah okay now can I turn to the night of the fire you say that and I don't need to take you to this in your statement but you say that you remember Paula your team leader telling you about a 25 pump fire
02:06:19 leader telling you about a 25 pump fire in London do you remember what time that was roughly roughly around 25 past 1:21 you'd come out coming from your break at
02:06:30 you'd come out coming from your break at that stage of do you haven't had in yet yeah and now we know the incident was made pumps 25 at 131 so do you think
02:06:42 made pumps 25 at 131 so do you think that does that help you with your recollection in making it more specific not really okay do you know where your team leader had got the information from that it was a
02:06:53 got the information from that it was a that there was a 25 pump fire in progress enough to control right and did your team ever tell you anything
02:07:06 and did your team ever tell you anything else about the incident just that we would take in the worst field of calls and that it was a
02:07:18 field of calls and that it was a high-rise fire right that's all we knew at the time do you remember where the Northwest had started already to take over spill calls at that at the point you were told by Paulo that there was a
02:07:29 you were told by Paulo that there was a 25 pump fire in progress I can't recall if any of my colleagues were on the phone already when I walked back into the room now
02:07:40 the room now let's look at some records can I ask you please to be shown lfb quadruple zero four seven nine zero
02:07:59 this is
02:08:10 [Music] right I'm sorry page and say sir page 34
02:08:37 now
02:08:44 time mach1 3623 we see that glasgow bt operator passing a call a caller to Northwest the caller gives her name is marek Okoye suma Lewis and is in flat
02:08:57 marek Okoye suma Lewis and is in flat nine on the third floor she tells the BT operator that she could feel heat and it's smoky and you could see the rest of the details there I don't need to read them read them all out to you but my question is do you think that that do
02:09:10 question is do you think that that do you remember that call coming through to the control room from Glasgow BT if it wasn't me
02:09:19 wasn't me no let's see if we can move this forward then can I ask you please to be showing lfb quadruple zero three five nine eight
02:09:49 now this is when it comes something called an incident search and can I ask
02:10:01 called an incident search and can I ask you to look at page one
02:10:09 this is which is where it starts at one thirty five thirty two could you just tell us in broad terms what this document is or what this log is we go to
02:10:20 document is or what this log is we go to the second page so we've got the instant number there the instant type which was high-rise we've logged on there that
02:10:35 high-rise we've logged on there that London Fire Brigade are aware of the incident just twenty five pumps at the time and that the caller is on the third floor we've got the caller's contact number there what time the call was
02:10:48 number there what time the call was taken and what position it was taken up now turning to the second page which is page one in the document we could see the log starting the page two
02:11:08 well pet Leroy page that's it page it's page three and relativity page one of the document could you just tell us in general terms what that what that shows
02:11:21 it's called a crib just to help you it's called a chronology report for this for this incident and we've got lots of tying marks down the left-hand side yeah coming from various positions I think it is in the in the in the in the Northwest
02:11:33 is in the in the in the in the Northwest control room is each my first question is is each person are those different positions in the control room in putting into an electronic log yes and would
02:11:45 into an electronic log yes and would this log be available to everybody else in the control room yes I see can I just ask you to look then at
02:12:00 Oh one 47:12 comment CRO trying to keep the caller calm and give her fire safety advice but she is talking to other members of the family do you do you
02:12:13 members of the family do you do you remember who that cierra CRO was was that you know okay which which you said earlier that these different position
02:12:24 earlier that these different position numbers correspond to different places in the control room do you remember which was yours on the night eleven you were eleven okay who was at nine caddis P and W nine you remember I can't recall
02:12:38 P and W nine you remember I can't recall right now
02:12:49 so is it right that these entries would be typed in by the operator in real time that's correct and would all those entries be visible on all screens in the Northwest control room it's a lot if they click onto the
02:13:00 room it's a lot if they click onto the incident yes right what visibility with the LF behalf of that information do you think I'm not sure if they have access to that book right I'm not sure okay if
02:13:19 to that book right I'm not sure okay if you look at the top of page four which is internal page two you see a time mark of o1 4903 and it says comment no answer from
02:13:31 and it says comment no answer from London Fire Service did what does that signify do you know can you help us with that I'm not sure why it signifies and
02:13:43 that I'm not sure why it signifies and that looks like it was from one of the team leaders position but I would imagine it is that the tied to contact London Fire Brigade and couldn't get through at that time right and one 49:32
02:13:57 through at that time right and one 49:32 just a few entries down it says just before the end lfb are aware of incident 25 five incident caller is on the third floor and don't speculate if you don't
02:14:10 floor and don't speculate if you don't know this because this comes from a different position but is that does that mean what does that indicate I'm not sure well when the controller put lfb
02:14:23 sure well when the controller put lfb are aware of here incident would that show us that this particular person had spoken to the NFB or got information from the NFB it could signify anything
02:14:35 from the NFB it could signify anything it could mean that London Fire Brigade are aware that is a high-rise building fire not necessarily the details of this particular call
02:14:48 now if you go back to your statement mr. bean you and go to the bottom of page
02:14:59 bean you and go to the bottom of page three you start quite a long description of a call you say I sat down as straightaway I took a call I spoke with
02:15:12 straightaway I took a call I spoke with the lady I eventually knew to be called Debbie and I just want to ask you a few questions about that call she was on the 23rd floor now can I ask you to go then
02:15:23 23rd floor now can I ask you to go then to the brigade control report the doctor we looked at a minute ago and go please to page 41
02:15:39 and there's a summary of the long summary of it we can see at the bottom of the summary we just have that expanded the call duration is 40 minutes
02:15:50 expanded the call duration is 40 minutes and 23 seconds it starts at over 140 118 was the time log I've got a number of questions about it I just want to ask
02:16:01 questions about it I just want to ask you there but it's a would be better for me just to read it this to you it's a summary it's not a it's not the full transcript and WFC take a call from a caller stating there she is on the top floor of Grenville tower and that there
02:16:13 floor of Grenville tower and that there is thick smoke and she's in someone else's flat she explains the shoes in the bedroom in flat 201 on the 23rd floor and cannot breathe the NW FCC ro asks if the caller can get to a window
02:16:24 asks if the caller can get to a window to get some air but the caller says she cannot see because the smoke is too thick the caller then repeats that using someone else's flat and states that there are about ten of them the NW FCC
02:16:35 there are about ten of them the NW FCC RA passes on advice about blocking doors and keeping low at approximately 1:45 the NFC CRA states that she has passed on the information to the crews the
02:16:46 on the information to the crews the caller says her name is Debbie and that she was originally from flat 161 Debbie states that everyone is in the bedroom with the door shut but that everyone is being sick with smoke but around 153
02:16:58 being sick with smoke but around 153 Debbie is told the crews will get you out the NWA the nwf Co CRO asks if there are any children Debbie states that she thinks there are two but maybe more on baby in one school
02:17:09 two but maybe more on baby in one school child by approximately two or three Debbie says that the windows are cracking and flames are at the windows at 206 31 Debbie states that there the flat is on fire and that they must get
02:17:20 flat is on fire and that they must get out of the room the bear in there is a lot of commotion and shouting well Debbie tries to get out it is not clear why she can't get out of the room Debbie states that she cannot move or breed and that she is too hot and the
02:17:33 breed and that she is too hot and the NFC WC operator reiterates the advice to the caller to get out if she can now I'm going to proceed on the assumption that that's a sufficiently accurate summary of the
02:17:44 of the long caller you had the first question I have is having shown you read you the summary is there anything you want to say about that summary whether it's
02:17:56 say about that summary whether it's accurate or whether there's anything extra though you wish to add to it says it's not clear why she cannot get out of the room in the cold
02:18:09 the room in the cold Debbie did tell me that the reason they couldn't get out was because there's people outside on the other side of the room that they were trying to get out of and that's why she couldn't get out
02:18:20 and that's why she couldn't get out right and you remember that clearly dude yes sorry I should say right now it's
02:18:34 yes sorry I should say right now it's like do you need a break I'm trying to take this shortening as gently as like as I can when she told you in the third
02:18:49 as I can when she told you in the third line that she cannot breathe did you think that she was she was affected by by smoke so that it was new so that the advice to stay put would not now have to
02:19:00 advice to stay put would not now have to be examined yeah but there was no effort there was she couldn't get out so the
02:19:11 there was she couldn't get out so the best advice I could give her at the time was to stay low and cover her mouth yeah and say because she had told you about these this difficulty and physically
02:19:22 these this difficulty and physically getting out of the rooms did you go further with her and explore whether she could make a safe exit or or was that it
02:19:33 could make a safe exit or or was that it no I had advised her to see if she could get to a window well they couldn't get to a window cuz she couldn't see this the smoke was too thick and then
02:19:46 I'm not sure how long after but the flood caught fire the bedroom caught fire so that was no longer an option to her and at that point I asked her to leave ask them all to leave if they
02:19:58 leave ask them all to leave if they could but at that point she had attempted to leave it's just couldn't open the door yes when the call started or had to happen perhaps as soon after
02:20:09 or had to happen perhaps as soon after the start of the call did you think that this was an FSG call straight away no you didn't at what point in the call do you remember did this become an FSG call
02:20:20 you remember did this become an FSG call maybe about 2 or 3 minutes into the call as soon as she told me that they couldn't get out and there was a lot of smoking property right ok now originally
02:20:31 smoking property right ok now originally she didn't know the flat number but she did know the floor which is which is the 23rd floor that's right did that cause any any difficulties no
02:20:47 did that cause any any difficulties no because we still pass the details on to London Fire Brigade yeah it was a starting point even though we didn't know what flat it was at the time right I think you say in your statement that
02:21:00 I think you say in your statement that you asked your well that your that your colleague Brown was sitting next to you that's right and he immediately phoned London and told them that's right
02:21:11 London and told them that's right did you ask your supervisor to listen in on the call no they were already on another call ok just to go back to your statement and look at what you say about
02:21:24 statement and look at what you say about your colleague this is page 4 middle paragraph you say my colleague Brian was sat next to me had overheard the information I was taking regarding the
02:21:36 information I was taking regarding the 10 people trapped in the floor they were on and he immediately phoned London and informed them then you say by that point Debbie managed to tell me that what flat they were in and she told me she ran up
02:21:47 they were in and she told me she ran up from the 16th floor to get away from the smoke do you know who Brian called I'm not sure who he spoke to what's Brian's name cool name Oh Brian
02:21:59 what's Brian's name cool name Oh Brian Bradshaw brand Bradshaw okay and what is he a CRO or was he an oh my I am CRO sorry and now you we do have something
02:22:14 sorry and now you we do have something else going to show you can I ask you to be Shane page page 47 of the control report
02:22:32 and this is a time mark of Oh 1 46 exactly foot of the page AOM real takes a call for NW FC provide additional information from their call at 143 NW FC
02:22:47 information from their call at 143 NW FC confirm the location of flat 9 is being on the third floor and report a call from flat 161 on the 23rd floor where there are 10 people trapped in one bedroom and real combat confirms this
02:22:59 bedroom and real combat confirms this information and then WFC operator states they have someone on the line to the caller it should be noted that the flat 161 is not on the 23rd floor that's an addition to don't worry about that just
02:23:11 addition to don't worry about that just looking at what said there about the complement about that conversation and looking at the time does that help you with with your recollection as to what
02:23:22 with with your recollection as to what time
02:23:24 time Brian spoke to the control room in London if that call was passed by Brian then it would have been at that time okay do you know where the Bron called
02:23:39 okay do you know where the Bron called LF be back with any further information I'm not sure right let me just see if I
02:23:50 I'm not sure right let me just see if I can show you the transcript of that call because there's a couple of specific questions I think I should ask you can the the witness please be shown lfb five zeros six a nine
02:24:11 this is
02:24:16 if you look at the first page
02:24:27 if you look at the first page this is a call that lasts 50 seconds and comes from in WFC and then it's got a number
02:24:38 from in WFC and then it's got a number of pages the first page or page 2 of the relativity reference says fire brigade higher London high right it's north west fire control again we gate we give you
02:24:51 fire control again we gate we give you flat 9 and that's there and then and we've got flats one six one one six one on the 23rd floor ten people trapped you can see that on the rest of that page and then turning the page to page three
02:25:02 and then turning the page to page three two-thirds of the way down the caller says if we get any more definitive flatten numbers and people will come back to you okay all right thanks very much for vachs
02:25:13 much for vachs do you remember Brian telling London that if they get any more definitive flat numbers and people that you would come back to them I don't remember no
02:25:25 come back to them I don't remember no you were on the course focused on yeah that leads to the next question do you know whether Brian did call the lfb back once the accurate information about the
02:25:39 once the accurate information about the flat number it was given to you by the caller I'm not sure Brian wood enough and I was away in between Michael that it did take a couple of what the calls for London so I'm not sure now let's see
02:25:54 for London so I'm not sure now let's see if we can follow the progress of that updating through the log can I ask you please to be shown lfb three six one eight
02:26:10 and there's the first page just so you've got the details of that 140 707 and the closing idea of caddis pn w o3 and if you go to page 3 which is paid
02:26:24 and if you go to page 3 which is paid one internally we start with a time mark of 147 17 a third of the way down that
02:26:40 of 147 17 a third of the way down that page where it says flat 161 23rd floor 10 people in the flat in bedroom on a ball and then I'll just play the follow
02:26:51 ball and then I'll just play the follow this down it then goes on at 150 109 45 year old female struggling to breathe now that's come as have all of these so
02:27:02 now that's come as have all of these so far from 11 that's your position so is that you entering this as you're speaking that's right right okay and then at 150 148 instead of updated and
02:27:15 then at 150 148 instead of updated and then you add in unsure of flat number 23rd floor that's when I established that Debbie lived on the 16th floor right and went up to the 23rd and at
02:27:28 right and went up to the 23rd and at that point we were unsure what flat it was at 161 that was given to us earlier was her flat okay and then again under the next entry 150 234 you you go on you still go on to say I'm sure a flat
02:27:40 still go on to say I'm sure a flat number 23rd floor flat 201 and I think that's the first time in the log we see the actual flat number flat 201 where she's calling from and then somebody in
02:27:55 she's calling from and then somebody in position 5 underneath that writes unsure of flat number 23rd floor flat 201 do you know why Junie who sat a position 5 can't recall and you know why somebody
02:28:08 can't recall and you know why somebody would write I'm sure a flat number there having been told it's flat 201 I'm not sure then if we turn the page
02:28:20 I'm not sure then if we turn the page oh one 5309 position 11 that's you inputs 10 people in flat 201 23rd floor it looks like is this right looks like you were viewed by that stage quite sure
02:28:32 you were viewed by that stage quite sure that it was now sure that it was flat 201 is that right that's right then lower down you then say your input a flat at 201 13 we revert to unsure of
02:28:47 a flat at 201 13 we revert to unsure of flat number 23rd floor flat 201 do you know why you reverted to on a shore I'm not sure I reverted and I don't know why that's there so right because we then
02:28:58 that's there so right because we then see that in the next two entries also from position 11 up to a 201 and to a 253 on shore a flat number you can't explain that I'm not sure why that's
02:29:09 explain that I'm not sure why that's there okay now
02:29:19 I want to show you something that you may not have seen before which is the London Fire Brigades short incident log page 21 just tracing this through the
02:29:33 page 21 just tracing this through the London ended a page 21 at time mark Oh Oh - OH 143
02:29:53 so this is after you're writing in that it was ten people in flat 201 on the 23rd floor we can see the LF be entering
02:30:06 23rd floor we can see the LF be entering an entry in their log at 201 43 flat 161
02:30:17 an entry in their log at 201 43 flat 161 23rd floor ten persons and some other details now it looks from that as if and that that's all passed over as you can see to see you eight but approximately
02:30:28 see to see you eight but approximately 150 it looks as if the information being inputted at to 143 which had been passed over at 150 haven't caught up with the
02:30:39 over at 150 haven't caught up with the flat number 161 being actually 201
02:30:44 you're not responsible for that but my question is looking at that do you know whether Brian or anybody else in the Northwest control room ever called lfb
02:30:55 Northwest control room ever called lfb back and told them clearly that the flat number wasn't 161 but was definitely 201 I can't be sure if anybody called back
02:31:07 I can't be sure if anybody called back but I do recall when I provided my statement that somebody did call them back I'm just not sure who okay
02:31:27 and how would that of how would that call have been made on the critical line or another because this on the critical line or from the position whoever was free at the time as I said I was
02:31:40 free at the time as I said I was focusing on the call so I'm not sure if and when that call was made leprosy don't going back to your statement mr. bean if we can go back to page four that
02:31:57 bean if we can go back to page four that the end or just but just before the end of the first main paragraph on page four you say I told her the usual guidance get down low and as they'd already
02:32:08 get down low and as they'd already barricaded themselves and I just tried to reassure her as much as I could I kept telling her that the firefighters knew they were inside it would make their way up to them did you know that
02:32:20 their way up to them did you know that they're the lfb knew about the call by the time you gave her that reassurance yes you did how did you know that because it was prior to that that Brian had passed the call over and what did
02:32:36 had passed the call over and what did you know as a matter of fact about where the crews were I didn't know where they were did you know that the crews have actually been committed to her floor I
02:32:47 actually been committed to her floor I didn't know did you receive any information back from the lfb about the progress of the crews all the for the speed or progress or location of the
02:32:58 speed or progress or location of the fire and smoke not as control operators no I'm not sure if the team leaders were updated okay so what was the basis for
02:33:09 updated okay so what was the basis for your telling Debbie that the firefighters knew they were inside and would make them way up to them because the information had been passed to London Fire Brigade we would imagine that they would have
02:33:22 we would imagine that they would have passed it on to the instant ground right regarding chopped corners so is this fair that it was an assumption you were making rather than working on in fact it was more reassurance in an assumption I follow okay so when you say there's more
02:33:40 follow okay so when you say there's more of a reassurance than an assumption does that does that mean that you would give reassurances to people even though you weren't confident that there was based in fact it's not so much about not being
02:33:52 in fact it's not so much about not being confident generally when information is passed for trapped callers it's always passed to the instinct ground so that's what we expect that the information was
02:34:03 what we expect that the information was going to London and then they would have passed it to their instant ground because we don't have any means of contact in them I see we we then know from your statement also on page four at
02:34:17 from your statement also on page four at the very bottom of the page that you are told by paula team your team leader to tell Debbie to get out yes we can see that at the bottom of the page I told
02:34:30 that at the bottom of the page I told Debbie this straight away and she went to the door but because of his barricaded she could not get out she kept screaming and screaming that they needed to get out but they simply couldn't because of the barricade
02:34:41 couldn't because of the barricade did the barricade information do you think get passed to the NFB I'm not sure okay
02:34:52 the information was passed that a flood was now on fire yes but I'm not sure who made the call
02:35:13 now on page five of your statement at the foot of the page you say at that point our team leader told us that they
02:35:26 point our team leader told us that they had spoken to London and the advice had changed to callers they were now telling them to get out I think that this was between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m. but I cannot be sure when you say at that point you
02:35:40 be sure when you say at that point you given the time the time reference my first question is how was that change in advice communicated to you we were told
02:35:53 advice communicated to you we were told as a control room by the team leaders who shouted out to us that the advice had changed and stare pot was no longer in force and we had to tell the tell them to get out any way they could were
02:36:05 them to get out any way they could were you told face to face by not by not with a sign or anything like that yeah were you told how to give that advice in what terms will tone to use with callers we
02:36:17 terms will tone to use with callers we were told to advise to use wet towels erupted them over themselves and leave by any safe route Italy could find were
02:36:28 by any safe route Italy could find were you told by your team leader what sort of language to use to make it absolutely clear that callers had to leave I think
02:36:40 clear that callers had to leave I think I would have known to be assertive with with Matt all right but generally we were quite assertive with call handling so I don't think it was something that
02:36:51 so I don't think it was something that you needed to tell us and you then go on to describe a call from a male on the 16th floor you say I was very brief and
02:37:02 16th floor you say I was very brief and surprisingly very calm do you mean he was surprisingly very calm and he said to me he was trapped on the 16th floor I told him he had to leave and advised him to use wet towels and wrap himself in
02:37:13 to use wet towels and wrap himself in them and make his way out he said thank you and the calls very brief I found London in inform them of the call and passed on the basic details first of all do you remember how long
02:37:26 first of all do you remember how long before you took that call that you've been told by Paula about the change in advice I hadn't taken a call from London for at least about 15 or 20 minutes
02:37:37 for at least about 15 or 20 minutes right before that so it was before I took that call right but I couldn't tell you exactly what time it could have been 3:00 a.m. possibly just after all right
02:37:48 3:00 a.m. possibly just after all right let me just see if I can locate the call a bit more precise yeah if you look at the control report control room report at page one one eight
02:38:04 and look at the time mark please of oh three oh four
02:38:14 exactly and WFC make a call back to the number given by the bt operator reported down in a call a 303 48 the NW FC
02:38:25 down in a call a 303 48 the NW FC operated introduces herself and asks if the male on the line is in flat one two three on the 15th floor he Stacy's on the 16th floor and then says they are here then you give the advice you guys
02:38:37 here then you give the advice you guys on she explicitly he says explicitly that the person needs to get out he replies okay she asks how many people are there he says he just says cool and the call cuts off that looks like a
02:38:48 the call cuts off that looks like a callback do you know why that was oh why specifically you called that number back it came through to me as an abundant call okay so I would call that back if you remember that that was an abandoned
02:39:01 you remember that that was an abandoned call right I see and is that the call that you think you're at what that you're referring to in your statement is that is that called that I've summarized
02:39:13 that is that called that I've summarized there on the screen for you the call that you're referring to yes in your statement right did you call any callers back that you'd spoken to to tell them that the advice had changed at any stage
02:39:24 that the advice had changed at any stage no because I only took three calls one was Debbie's initial cold which was 40 minutes right the second call was a passerby and the third call was the male
02:39:37 passerby and the third call was the male right I didn't take any other calls do you know whether anybody else in the Northwest control room called then he called us back to tell them that the advice have now changed and that they should get out I can't be sure sorry
02:39:57 can I just ask you one small point of detail can I ask you to go back to three six one eight lfb three six one eight I
02:40:11 think I asked you run an email earlier if you look at page four of that log
02:40:27 at 3:04 30 position 3 says email sent to London FRS with details can you help us
02:40:38 London FRS with details can you help us any more with what that email was or whether it was what why it was sent down or what it would have said I'm not sure of the contents of the email I wasn't
02:40:50 of the contents of the email I wasn't aware that an email was sent and when this air details I would imagine it's just the updated details on the incident iPod
02:41:00 iPod were there any other emails that you can remember it's sent by in WFC to lfb in their control room with details a particular calls not June my timer called my love's and wanted Urbino
02:41:29 thank you very much and this should be a knife no further calls for you mr. chairman I've got no more calls but it may be that there are one or two things were looking after my notes I may just need to revisit yes or ask the witness
02:41:40 need to revisit yes or ask the witness there may be a short break would be convenient I've decided enactment is mr. Venus at possession mr. bean we might be sometimes almost invariably have a break at this stage just so that counsel can
02:41:52 at this stage just so that counsel can check those any questions that so again you asked you to leave us in just a moment
02:41:59 moment and we'll come back at ten to one and see whether there any more questions to you there all right I did talk to anyone about your evidence please when you're out in the room and if you now like to
02:42:10 out in the room and if you now like to go with the access you look after you thank you very much
02:42:23 right ten-to-one
02:49:11 you
02:53:10 yes mr. Milind a few more quest for us I do have a few more questions we can have the witness back please mr. junuh thank you
02:53:27 right mr. bean fielding questions I think yesterday mr. bean yes first of all at the beginning the Debbie call do you remember being told that straight
02:53:42 you remember being told that straight off pretty well straight away that she couldn't breathe not straight away no not that I recall okay I'm gonna have to show you just one or two things in the transcript then it
02:53:54 or two things in the transcript then it should I I'm not gonna show you the whole thing could he could the witness please be shown lfp four eight six and go to page three
02:54:16 which is there on the screen in front of you this is at the start of the call in fact we can start page two and this is
02:54:29 fact we can start page two and this is probably the best place to take both questions
02:54:31 questions it starts off hello hello it's the fire service here where are you we're on the top floor a Grenville tower please help us right listen listen to me what's your address
02:54:39 address inaudible thick smoke I'm in someone else's flat I'll come back to the someone else's flat point in a moment but looking at thick smoke looking down the page you say four lines up on the
02:54:50 the page you say four lines up on the bottom yeah w11 right are you able to get near a window we can't the smokes too thick and then over the then at the bottom of the page right so you're on
02:55:01 bottom of the page right so you're on the 10th floor did you say no the 23rd and then it goes on over the page and then in the middle of page 3 she sailed just but above the middle she said
02:55:12 just but above the middle she said caller I can't breathe now just at that point in the course oh just a minute or two in we can see that there's thick smoke in the in the flat and the caller can't breathe my question is did you
02:55:24 can't breathe my question is did you well why did you not seek to explore with her at that stage and he means by which she could get out because initially I needed the location and they
02:55:38 initially I needed the location and they just know where she was and I mean I've not listened to the call since I took it so I can't recall exactly maybe it was a
02:55:50 so I can't recall exactly maybe it was a moment of panic what I needed to know exactly where she was in order to be able to help her right and and then after that I mean previously I do ask
02:56:02 after that I mean previously I do ask her are you near a window before I caught out and but it's just processing a lot of information and in a small amount of time right it wasn't in any particular order right
02:56:16 now what once you did find where she was flat 201 we can look at page 16 internally at the transcript this is some way into the call
02:56:34 you see at the top of the page you're asking what is this flat number 201 you're in flat 201 yeah flap 201 23rd floor yeah yeah it looks like that's the
02:56:45 floor yeah yeah it looks like that's the first time you get that information my question now is at that point once you did know which flat she was on why did you not then seek to explore with her any means of getting out as we see we
02:56:58 any means of getting out as we see we see on that page yeah I can't recall as I say I can't recall the call since I took it all right but I think because to
02:57:15 took it all right but I think because to give me the impression that she was trapped maybe I I can't honestly say why I couldn't tell you yeah it looks it looks at the transcript as if she only
02:57:27 looks at the transcript as if she only found out she was trapped a little bit later on in the corn and so the question is why after finding out exactly where she was but before discovering she was barricaded in did you not explore with
02:57:39 barricaded in did you not explore with her means of get means of escape I can't remember okay no going back to the page
02:57:53 remember okay no going back to the page two
02:57:56 in the fifth line down she says thick smoke I mean someone else's flat and then go on to page eight of the
02:58:07 then go on to page eight of the transcript where she says the same thing in the middle of that page you ask her she says like you don't she says I don't
02:58:19 she says like you don't she says I don't know who these people are you say you don't know who they are right okay no so is it is it your flat no it's someone else's no no it's someone else's have
02:58:30 else's no no it's someone else's have you all sort of like gone into one flat yes but my question is at that stage why did you not seek to speak to the occupier to find out what the layout and the flat was so that you could find out
02:58:41 the flat was so that you could find out where the exit was and what was outside it given the situation at the time and she was in quite distressed state so I wouldn't have asked her to pass the phone to anybody else um I think I just
02:58:57 phone to anybody else um I think I just wanted to reassure her that help was on the way at the time and the the owners or to speak to the owner didn't even cross my head at that time okay
02:59:13 do you remember being told by the caller that she'd lost her friend they'd come from another flat and she'd lost her friend I can't recall as I say I'm not listened to the call or seen this
02:59:25 listened to the call or seen this transcript since okay taken it if you look at page 29 of the transcript
02:59:36 towards the foot of the page the caller says there's an elderly man here there's a woman here all women other than that I think I've lost my friend he's disappeared at anywhere he is we came up
02:59:47 disappeared at anywhere he is we came up together he's gone I didn't know where he is
02:59:53 is there a reason why is it appears you didn't ask for any any more details about about him I don't recall I can't recall hearing
03:00:06 I don't recall I can't recall hearing that okay so you can't help me get to the bottom of why you didn't ask for further details about the identity or identifying features perhaps of this
03:00:19 identifying features perhaps of this friend
03:00:22 I can't remember leaving that all right
03:00:29 just just more generally it is was there on the night the possibility for your control room to obtain some sort of visual coverage or impression of what
03:00:40 visual coverage or impression of what was happening at Grenville tower yeah we have the news streaming on one of the screens in control room my back was to it at the time and throughout my call
03:00:51 it at the time and throughout my call the first call to Debbie we had no visual it was maybe well shortly after
03:01:02 visual it was maybe well shortly after I've spoken to Debbie and the call had ended we had visuals and only because I heard my colleagues say oh my god and when I turned around that's the first visual I heard of it which was
03:01:14 first visual I heard of it which was maybe terminates after speaking to Debbie what was the visual on the herons build you know what was in the country what was it at was it the television in the control room yeah so someone did
03:01:27 the control room yeah so someone did someone put the control room television off the news is on streaming on on one of the screens let me just get this clear okay your page six ago statement in the third paragraph you say we just
03:01:41 in the third paragraph you say we just have that up on the screen you say throughout the night this is the third paragraph down throughout the night there was a TV on and in the room the Sky News playing yeah this is not
03:01:53 Sky News playing yeah this is not unusual and is standard practice in the control room so the TV was on but at what point do you remember seeing images of Grenfell tower on the television
03:02:09 it was after my call ended with Debbie and before I took the call from the male and 16th floor I can't tell you what time it was no were you able in your control room to
03:02:25 no were you able in your control room to connect well let me ask you this would was was there a heli tele downlink facility in the Northwest control room do you know what I mean by heli tele darling no a means by which helicopter
03:02:39 darling no a means by which helicopter footage can be downloaded straight into the control room so that the control room operators could see what's happening from the helicopters point of view no you didn't have a facility for that no no no right okay thank you
03:02:54 and you more generally how many staff control rooms staff other on duty on any given night shift 5 CR ELLs control room
03:03:07 given night shift 5 CR ELLs control room operators and two team leaders right okay and how many were on duty that night five control room operating two team leaders five and two okay thank you thank you very much mr.
03:03:18 okay thank you thank you very much mr. bean thank you very much I have no further questions for you I'm very grateful to you for coming coming here and assisting us with our investigations it's been very helpful and I'm very grateful to you so thank you very much
03:03:30 grateful to you so thank you very much yes I should thank you as well it's pretty been very helpful to hear your account of your experience that evening I hope it's not been too distressing and we're very grateful to you for coming to us thank you very much right you're not
03:03:42 us thank you very much right you're not for you to get back together the Astra
03:03:54 that is a convenient moment it is under German yes yes we should but yes right we'll break now five powers to please