LFB Control Room Operators give evidence. Angela Goats (CRO since 1981) explains she felt uncomfortable telling people to stay put after Lakanal, only had 4-5 FSG calls in 31 years, and received minimal training on high-rise evacuations. Describes how she would not make the stay/go decision for callers after 'make pumps 25'.
00:00:09 mr. millet I understand yes you won't see miss you mean yes miss mr. chairman I'm going to recall mr. bean there were one or two very short topics I just
00:00:20 one or two very short topics I just wanted to cover with her which I should have covered and I aware he didn't
00:00:33 mr. Biren sorry that we've had to ask you to come back again but I didn't take very long please consider yourselves to launderers yes I go to ask the chairman
00:00:44 launderers yes I go to ask the chairman of the witness whether it's necessary to Reese where mr. bean I don't think so very understand position I'm sorry to ask you to come back and I hope I haven't inconvenienced you Oh smegging there were some questions which I'm
00:00:55 there were some questions which I'm afraid I overlooked at the very end of your evidence the first question is is this after the grenfell tower event an incident was was was over was there a
00:01:06 incident was was was over was there a debriefing session in the Northwest control room about the incident yes there was
00:01:13 there was can you tell us how soon after the incident that happened I can't recall exactly the date but it was within the first few days of Grandville I would say maybe two or three days after did you attend it I did attend yes
00:01:25 attend it I did attend yes do you remember whether it was documented in any way whether the meeting was recorded I'm sorry I can't recall okay and costing your mind back to that meeting can you tell us from the
00:01:36 to that meeting can you tell us from the best of your to the best of your recollection what the takeaway messages were lessons learnt from the incident
00:01:45 I'm not to be honest I can't recall that we had any feedback majority of the time was discussing so we all discussed what
00:02:00 was discussing so we all discussed what obviously what sort calls were taken and how we'd pass the messages to London and but whether there was any feedback at that time and I don't recall as a result
00:02:12 that time and I don't recall as a result of that control debrief do you remember whether that there were any decisions to improve or change the systems in place at Northwest in the aftermath of Grimm
00:02:23 at Northwest in the aftermath of Grimm fell yes I think Northwest fire control taking calls for maybe Manchester high-rises the predetermined attendance was increased just for the high-rises I
00:02:36 was increased just for the high-rises I believe any other changes that you remember
00:02:41 not not that I recall just so the predetermined tendencies were changed and so there was a greater attendance and a special appliance mobilized at the same time and there is again a floor
00:02:55 same time and there is again a floor chart we can use as soon as we identify it's a high-rise to establish how many floors there are lots more the fires on etc and just going back to your memory of the debrief meeting what was the main
00:03:07 of the debrief meeting what was the main focus of the of the meeting in terms of how the control room at Northwest acted on the night do you remember from what I
00:03:19 on the night do you remember from what I recall the feedback was quite positive and I don't recall any any negativity and at the time northwest fire control
00:03:30 and at the time northwest fire control did all they could and to assist in answering the calls or passing the details to and fro to London Fire Brigade but other than that I'm not I
00:03:41 Brigade but other than that I'm not I don't recall any sort of negativity and you know all in all we believe that it was handled as well as possible given the circumstances okay can you just tell
00:03:53 the circumstances okay can you just tell me who is currently the operating manage the operations manager in charge of the Northwest control room I have a number of operations managers do you mean a senior operations manager that would be
00:04:06 senior operations manager that would be Tessa Tracy Tessa Tracy Tessa Tracy Tracy as in tra CY that's correct
00:04:15 correct thank you very much okay just one more topic um just to get back to the call with Debbie that lasted for 40 minutes just close to 40 minutes we looked at this morning you you recall and we
00:04:30 this morning you you recall and we looked at the summary that after a period of time she told you that the window was being cracked because of fire correct and that's something like 20
00:04:41 correct and that's something like 20 minutes into the call or just over um is the risk of fire spread due to the passage of time during a call one of the factors which you as a CRO were taken to account when evaluating the kind of
00:04:53 account when evaluating the kind of advice to give in this scenario I couldn't possibly comment because I didn't know what Debbie was up against
00:05:06 didn't know what Debbie was up against or what any of the trapped callers were and I couldn't possibly comment right notice if I can get it this way during a long call yeah I'd be the first one
00:05:18 long call yeah I'd be the first one you've ever done so perhaps your experience is limited but what do you think that you would have to keep listening out for changes in smoke conditions fire conditions heat condition says to modulate change your
00:05:29 condition says to modulate change your advice off the back of that again it would depend on the individual circumstances of the calls so if they told me that it was getting smoky or if
00:05:40 told me that it was getting smoky or if it was getting hot then the advice might change yes but in that circumstance on that night the only advice I could give her was from what she had told me and
00:05:54 her was from what she had told me and costing your mind back to your training on handling FSG evils is that kind of monitoring listening out changing the advice in response to changing conditions something that you were trained to to do churning advice is not
00:06:07 trained to to do churning advice is not something that control room operator would instigate that would come from the fire ground okay but in terms of the advice to the individual caller as to how to keep himself safe would that change as you get got further in and better
00:06:19 get got further in and better information about the conditions that's right yeah and the flag and you were trained to do that where you press the point you were okay it's part of your initial training when you have special training initial training gives you the
00:06:30 training initial training gives you the basic guidelines of what's the fire survival guidances the what the what the reason why we use fires final guidance at what point we would use it do
00:06:41 at what point we would use it do refresher training you would touch upon if it was more complex Corp or as I say again it's something like that you could never train yourself all right do you have any specific
00:06:53 all right do you have any specific training on how to listen out during long calls for changes in conditions not particularly yes it's based on circumstances of the call and the information that you get at the time and
00:07:05 information that you get at the time and when Debbie told you that fire was cracking the windows did that trigger anything in your mind about how to change the advice or change the kind of help you were giving her I did tell her to get out of the flood immediately
00:07:19 to get out of the flood immediately unfortunately she couldn't and so my advice at that point would just have been fair the fire survival guidance because you couldn't get out thank you
00:07:32 because you couldn't get out thank you very much mr. bean I have no further questions for the follow-up questions I should say for this witness so that's you know confident that there are no other questions that again have you
00:07:43 other questions that again have you suggested yes I am well mr. bean thank you very much I'm sorry as I say we had to keep you here longer than you might have wished but you're not free to go to
00:07:54 have wished but you're not free to go to go and catch a train run again thank you thank you
00:08:07 yes mr. Sherman our next witness is CRO control room officer Angela goths yes
00:08:28 [Music]
00:09:16 maybe thank you very much miss goes down make yourself comfortable there
00:09:24 good afternoon miss goes can I please ask you to start by giving us your full name mrs. Angela goths and would you prefer me to address you as mrs. Gould's or miss Coates mrs. Jenkinson
00:09:38 or miss Coates mrs. Jenkinson nice can I just say first of all thank you very much for attending today and helping us with all right I'll try and speak up thank you very much for coming
00:09:50 speak up thank you very much for coming today and assisting us with our investigations we're very appreciative of that if my questions are too long or you don't understand them or can't hear them or you want me to ask it in a
00:10:02 them or you want me to ask it in a different way I'm happy to do that if you want to take a break at any stage and we'll say very happy to take a break we can do that can I ask you first to look at your statement which is a meaty quadruple
00:10:14 statement which is a meaty quadruple zero seven six nine four and that's the statement you gave to the Metropolitan Police on the 11th of October 2017
00:10:25 Police on the 11th of October 2017 can I ask you have you read it recently probably back in June right back in June from what you recall of your rereading it are its contents true yes have you
00:10:39 it are its contents true yes have you discussed your statement all the evidence that you're going to give to the inquiry today with anybody before coming here today no right now can I start with your role at lfb you're a control room officer a CRO and you've
00:10:51 control room officer a CRO and you've been a CRO I think since 1981 that's right yes right and you also say in your witness statement and I don't think I need to show you that you could also take on the role of radio operator yes
00:11:02 take on the role of radio operator yes and you monitor the standby module which organizes all the stations across London is that right were the firefighter to cover yes
00:11:12 cover yes and is it right that you undertook both of those roles on night so module standby module and CRO yes and after call started coming in
00:11:26 yes and after call started coming in from Grenfell tower I think you stopped doing standby module and concentrated only on taking calls I think I finished standby module about midnight right okay oh now maybe but maybe I think I was
00:11:38 oh now maybe but maybe I think I was doing that between 12:00 and 1:00 ish
00:11:42 no mr. Scott so you completed your training to be our CRO when you first started that's when you say in your statement what was could you just tell us what was that training what we're not
00:11:55 us what was that training what we're not in Italy joined yes very briefly if you can remember the radio procedures and courts call taking and getting the correct information and also updating
00:12:07 correct information and also updating appliance availability right and that was a course you did in when you first started is it yes right and that was in 1981 yes between 1981 and June 2017 did
00:12:21 1981 yes between 1981 and June 2017 did you ever did you have any further training on new systems right and a couple of fast survival guidance training sessions you did when were
00:12:32 training sessions you did when were those do you remember 2010 and 2012 and who delivered days you remember and looking at the 2012 one was that in
00:12:43 looking at the 2012 one was that in response to the fire at lack of house yes it was and were you trained specifically on policy 794 survival guidance calls not beliefs are yes right
00:12:56 guidance calls not beliefs are yes right and what about policy 539 emergency call management ESS and what about the what we call the reference information files I think you've referred to in your statement did you get training on those
00:13:07 statement did you get training on those now you just now sort have to look those up okay
00:13:13 did you at any stage ever receive any specific training on how to handle 999 calls from a high-rise residential block this all comes under the umbrella of the
00:13:26 this all comes under the umbrella of the fire survival guidance training I don't think in that training session it was disgusting no particular type as
00:13:37 disgusting no particular type as high-rise as we're talking about that night but certainly blocks of flats on the side have you ever had any training on or advice about how to gather the best information you can from a 999
00:13:50 best information you can from a 999 caller what's the same as every single 999 call that you would take be the same what about well a call becomes an FSG call fire survival guidance have you
00:14:01 call fire survival guidance have you ever had any training on how to extract the best information from someone in that situation not specifically really obviously a lot of calls that we take people are in stressful situations so
00:14:12 people are in stressful situations so right and it's all the same really now the 2012 training you said was in the LA in the aftermath of the Latin house fire what was your main takeaway from that specific training session do
00:14:23 from that specific training session do you know
00:14:24 you know can you remember again have you had any specific training in how in in evacuation strategies how to help the
00:14:37 evacuation strategies how to help the incident ground evacuate have you had any training in what to do when the building has only a single emergency exit room so will you follow that you've
00:14:49 exit room so will you follow that you've also had no training on what advice to give where the single exit route is smoke logged I can we call right now in your statement we can look at it as page
00:15:00 your statement we can look at it as page four
00:15:04 in paragraph two which is below halfway down you say in my experience I have dealt with a few FSGS but not many perhaps only four or five when you say
00:15:17 perhaps only four or five when you say you were present at Lacan all you go on to describe that experience is when you say four or five is that four or five at a single incident or four or five in a
00:15:29 a single incident or four or five in a total of 31 years yes so that's an average of one FSG call every six years in a 31-year career did
00:15:41 every six years in a 31-year career did your training cover ever cover what to do if numbers of FSGS rise beyond one or two even after lack of house I remember
00:15:54 two even after lack of house I remember what was the do remember what the number of FSG calls that you handle at lacking awards FSG I had one you had one oh
00:16:06 awards FSG I had one you had one oh that's okay
00:16:11 and after Lakmal house were you involved in the review done by the NFB of the LF B's response to that fire you weren't were you aware of the conclusions in a
00:16:23 were you aware of the conclusions in a report that the lfb produced I thought that it was mentioned that we should have plans more of of the buildings but
00:16:36 have plans more of of the buildings but pops now I can't remember I did read the report at the time I do remember specifics right so when the report came out which is in 2012 you remember reading is being inquiry to be
00:16:51 remember reading is being inquiry to be honest rather than I think right I just said seem to remember that we it was advised we should have plans but right you said okay you said you read the
00:17:02 you said okay you said you read the report let me just see if we're talking about the same thing okay I asked you to be showing hom quadruple 0 1 1 2 4 this
00:17:14 be showing hom quadruple 0 1 1 2 4 this is a report produced by the NFB dated November 2012 is this a report you're thinking you're you remember regional it's quite long okay let me see if I can
00:17:27 it's quite long okay let me see if I can take you to some conclusions
00:17:38 if you go to page 50 please in that document
00:17:44 document I'm not going to grind through every paragraph with you but just just looking at paragraphs in 2 9 3 2 2 9 6 headed expectations that callers will be rescued as stated advice escape
00:17:55 rescued as stated advice escape alternative escape routes assessment reassessment of the caller caller effective communication between control and incident command those four parent paragraphs do you remember at any stage reading those no did you ever get any
00:18:09 reading those no did you ever get any training post Lacan or on any of those four topics take your time to just scan your eye down them again
00:18:28 sorry what was the question again please but my question was having looked at those four topics there did you ever get any training after Mackinac on any of those that you can remember it might
00:18:42 those that you can remember it might have been mentioned in the 2012 I'm not sure right okay and as an experienced CRA what do you think or what do you remember changing if anything in the
00:18:54 remember changing if anything in the control room as a result of lack no house just on a personal yeah
00:19:08 I suppose it's after lacunae I realized that people aren't always rescued and you might be very mindful of right so when you say that do you mean that the assumption that crews would always reach
00:19:19 assumption that crews would always reach callers was not always reliable that's your personal you take away it was it okay did that change and I know we're
00:19:30 okay did that change and I know we're not talking about very many FS cheese but did that change the way you did or would handle an FS g cool after that you know well no another one I had the
00:19:41 know well no another one I had the people were rescued and it was a successful outcome that's that's that's what I think I've said in my statement and they look they head out their heads out through the skylight yeah why were rescued I see okay now on page four of
00:19:55 rescued I see okay now on page four of your witness statement that we're still on the foot of pay of that page you say normal advice for calls to high-rise buildings has always been to stay and
00:20:06 buildings has always been to stay and this is based on the understanding that the construction of the building should allow about one hours grace in which the fires contained and should allow plenty of time for the caller to be rescued once the firefighters of attending which usually takes between four to five
00:20:17 usually takes between four to five minutes
00:20:23 just to see if I can understand your understanding of staplers can I ask you please to be shown policy five three nine which is tab three of our policy bundle and go to appendix three this is
00:20:44 bundle and go to appendix three this is on page 16 appendix three is headed far survival guidance and a third of the way down so i three paragraphs down it says
00:21:02 brigade controller Begay control advice called us to get out and stay out however if a call has received from a high-rise building where fire heat and smoke are not affecting the caller LFE would advise that and then it says you
00:21:15 would advise that and then it says you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire heat or smoke if the situation changes you should leave your premises in down nine nine nine if you need further assistance and there's a there's a quick knock at
00:21:27 and there's a there's a quick knock at the end there in my question is it is that advice what you understand by the stay-put advice and was that your
00:21:39 stay-put advice and was that your understanding on the night of the fire
00:21:46 and so would it be right that your understanding is that you're usually safest to remain unless you're affected by by fire heat or smoke how did you
00:22:04 by by fire heat or smoke how did you speaking generally in your in your experience didn't go about determining if a callers premises are affected by fire heat or smoke how do I develop yeah
00:22:18 fire heat or smoke how do I develop yeah how would you go about determining whether the premises are affected right and what sort of information do you need to make your own assessment as a CRM
00:22:31 to make your own assessment as a CRM about whether those premises are affected by fire heat or smoke what information do you need just to give us I think we could we got a problem with
00:22:42 I think we could we got a problem with you
00:22:43 you microphone too close too far away
00:22:57 so should I ask the question again okay um we're looking at the question whether or not premises are affected by fire heat or smoke and my question is you as
00:23:08 heat or smoke and my question is you as a control room operator with your many years of experience what information would do you need to get from the caller to be able to make the assessment as to whether the caller is affected well I
00:23:20 whether the caller is affected well I presume they don't exactly always know where the fire is so it's very difficult to work that that out really so how do
00:23:33 to work that that out really so how do you go about getting that information
00:23:44 the fire survival as I said to the people that you know there was no choice and with the ones I was telling you about with the head were there at the skylight that smoke billowing up from
00:23:56 skylight that smoke billowing up from below and they could not get out at all it's it's very difficult to know what direction the smoke is coming from where
00:24:08 direction the smoke is coming from where would be safest to go
00:24:11 are you reliant entirely on what you're being told by the caller as when you make your assessment about whether the caller is affected by fire he's or smoke well first of all I suppose we're going by the calls that we've received you
00:24:22 by the calls that we've received you know previous calls and if we've had any informative messages right and so I'd also use that right would you also use in addition to informative messages
00:24:35 in addition to informative messages information that you were getting from other si Ras in the control room around you
00:24:43 you in some situations yes but on that night because too many calls will come back couldn't get detail we'll come back to that you mentioned informative messages they come from the incident graph how
00:24:57 they come from the incident graph how often would you expect messages to come from the incident ground which would update you so as to enable you to assess whether the particular caller was affected by fire heat or smoke not
00:25:10 affected by fire heat or smoke not familiar with the exact time means that there is a now supposed to send them every so often but I'm not sure the timings of that what other information would you expect to come back from the incident ground apart from information
00:25:22 incident ground apart from information in informative message of assistance messages systems missing or stopped messages you flag dealt with the fire right what's an assistance message can you just tell this would be a makeup of my pump 6:18 right in your in making
00:25:38 my pump 6:18 right in your in making your assessment about whether it is safe for a caller to stay or whether they're affected by heat or smoke or fire did you ever get any training whereby you would use information which you didn't
00:25:50 would use information which you didn't get from the caller but from elsewhere either
00:25:53 either the control room or from the incident ground and use that information I'll never had training on never time I mean if I know I haven't it's raining right now on page 6 of your witness statement
00:26:04 now on page 6 of your witness statement if we can go back to that you say that
00:26:23 you say that
00:26:29 and this is the top of the page I've tried to find the right place to introduce it at the top of the page in
00:26:41 introduce it at the top of the page in the middle of the incident you say I remember thinking oh my god this is worse than the top of the page and then in the first main paragraph you refer to the fact that a friend of yours was
00:26:52 the fact that a friend of yours was blamed for advice at lack and all that she gave and that's all set out there and then you say the blame was all put on her this is in the middle of the paragraph and then you say there since
00:27:03 paragraph and then you say there since then I have not been comfortable with telling people to stay put in their flats I will tell the caller what I care and I will certainly pass all of their details flat number floor number number
00:27:14 details flat number floor number number of people and location to the firefighters but I will not tell them to stay I would assure the caller that firefighters know exactly where they were but it was to be their own personal decision as to whether they decided to stay or go
00:27:25 stay or go it was not a decision I would make for them now I just want to just understand that a bit better when you say you weren't comfortable telling people to
00:27:37 weren't comfortable telling people to stay in there they stay putting their flats what was that a view that you had on the night of the fire and not I mean I think it's it's not working terribly well but after I heard make pumps 25 and
00:27:52 well but after I heard make pumps 25 and I knew that something had happened and I didn't know where the people were in relation to the fire why the fire was
00:28:04 relation to the fire why the fire was spreading
00:28:05 spreading I just didn't know it was for them best a better story better for them to stay or go
00:28:10 or go I just couldn't make the choice for them no well we'll come to that cuz like that but answers in general terms the question I've got a few minutes time but before we before we get there this is
00:28:21 before we before we get there this is God's can I just ask you in general terms when you say since then since lack and law I have not been comfortable with telling people to stay put in their flats but my question really is this at
00:28:32 flats but my question really is this at the on the night of the Grenville tower incident was that discomfort that you described in your statement something that you had then yes it was a until
00:28:44 that you had then yes it was a until make pumps 25 I think I was telling people to stay in there what do you mean are we to understand from what you say in your statement here and if it's wrongly worded then please say but it
00:28:57 wrongly worded then please say but it are we to understand that you you think the advice is generally wrong no I'm just not because of it didn't work out so well it like oh no I was I'm not
00:29:08 so well it like oh no I was I'm not going to I just I say I'm not comfortable I wouldn't tell them to
00:29:19 comfortable I wouldn't tell them to start but I'm just not happy within myself because of you know things that happen before all right is that feeling that you you had about giving people that have by
00:29:30 had about giving people that have by something you ever raised with senior management in the NFB so this is just a personal feeling of your own okay did you kept it yourself did you yes I just
00:29:41 you kept it yourself did you yes I just felt terrible inside yeah okay and then you also say in the same paragraph I I've read it to you that you would assure the caller that the firefighters
00:29:52 assure the caller that the firefighters know exactly where they were where they are and you say there's to be their own personal decision as to whether they decided to stay or go was that your own personal practice at
00:30:05 was that your own personal practice at the time of the grenfell tower fire that you would always assure the court I couldn't I didn't feel I could decide for them right and I know I was alone in that but I just couldn't not when you
00:30:19 that but I just couldn't not when you say I would assure the caller that the firefighters knew exactly where they were it was that was that an invariable practice of yours at the time you would always say they know I hope site right would that all would there always be an
00:30:32 would that all would there always be an information basis for giving that assurance they don't always pass the information on so they're far grander but when you assured callers that the
00:30:43 but when you assured callers that the firefighters know exactly where they were as you say I tried to I hoped I'd but my question is would you would you give that advice even though you weren't you didn't have any factual basis for
00:30:54 you didn't have any factual basis for knowing that the firefighters knew where they call us were well the information was being passed over to the the fire ground so does that mean that us you would always assume that the
00:31:06 would always assume that the firefighters would know where they were as soon as the information was passed over to the fire yes right Eva laughter can I just know what I'm understanding from what you're saying is that whatever
00:31:18 from what you're saying is that whatever information you got you've passed on to the fire ground is that what you are intending to say no does that meet your question or you look what I do industry but have it is assuming that the
00:31:29 but have it is assuming that the information was passed on through fire would you or would you also then go on to assume that it had been acted on by the by the crews so the crews were actually going up to rescue PE you would and is that so even after that your own
00:31:42 and is that so even after that your own personal lesson learned at Latin all that the assumption that people would always be rescued if I've understood this right it wasn't necessarily correct we've always got to heart they're gonna be rescued so it's a hope no
00:32:00 well again I'm sorry to keep interrupting you mr. Melamed am i right in understanding that you passed on the information you assumed that it would be
00:32:11 information you assumed that it would be acted upon and you hope that the action would be successful but in the circumstances you couldn't tell whether it would be won't know and you may or
00:32:22 it would be won't know and you may or may not have been told all right yes yes you may not have been told whether it was or not but in those circumstances and we'll look at some examples in due
00:32:33 and we'll look at some examples in due course but if just generally I want to get a feel for your prac your your your practice you would give the assurance is this right but because you you knew the information was passed to the instrument
00:32:44 information was passed to the instrument ground you hoped that it would be acted on by device summarize this fairly as ever haven't somebody will complain but you didn't know that the crews were there or on my way when telling people
00:32:56 there or on my way when telling people another unseen so that's all we could do at that point that's all okay I'm just trying to get a feel for when you say in
00:33:07 trying to get a feel for when you say in your statement I would assure the caller that firefighters know exactly where they were just trying to get a feel for how I'm confident you were that that was actually happening when you gave
00:33:18 actually happening when you gave assurances to call us no I don't definitely know but because I'm not unseen but that was what the expectations that's right now at the top
00:33:30 expectations that's right now at the top of page four of your statement you explain what an FSG call is and you say very short an FSG call is a call in which a caller has said that they are trapped and can't get out
00:33:46 now just to look at the policy if I can can I ask you please to be showing policy 790
00:34:01 and to turn in that please to paragraph 2.1 which you'll find on page two
00:34:18 and it says a an FSG call is received into control where the caller believes that they are unable to leave their premises due to the effects of fire and where the control officer remains on the line and that's emboldened providing the
00:34:31 line and that's emboldened providing the appropriate advice the call continues until either the caller is able to leave by their own means is rescued by the fire brigade or the telephone line is cleared it should be noted that a caller may clear the line after the FSG process
00:34:42 may clear the line after the FSG process has commenced but that will not necessarily mean a cancellation of that process now when it says in the second
00:34:53 process now when it says in the second line they're unable to first and second line unable to leave their premises due to the effects of fire well what do you understand that to mean due to the
00:35:05 understand that to mean due to the effects of fire well the effect so far is the smoke so they're unable to leave they were due to fire or smoke blood okay and is it for the CRO to determine
00:35:20 okay and is it for the CRO to determine in your experience in understanding is it the CRO for the CRO to determine if a call is an FSG call yes it is and what
00:35:32 call is an FSG call yes it is and what information would you use to assess whether the call hood become more had started out as an FSG call well when I tell you they can't leave a property and
00:35:43 tell you they can't leave a property and it's being affected by smoke or fire right so it's it's the key information that they think they can't get out that's what makes it of FSG call is it
00:35:54 that's what makes it of FSG call is it yes yes now if we look on in the policy paragraph eight point one from page side
00:36:08 it says advice to fire survival guidance corners control officers will always use the four principles of escape assess protect and rescue to provide guidance where SG callers and if we look down the
00:36:21 where SG callers and if we look down the page the requirement is first to assist the caller to identify a safe
00:36:32 the caller to identify a safe alternative escape that's 8 - mm-hmm firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe alternative escape route
00:36:43 identify a safe alternative escape route for them to leave their premises now that's the policy in your experience mr. Scott so how do you know how do you find out whether there is a safe alternative
00:36:54 out whether there is a safe alternative escape route what do you do to find that out I didn't remember that part of the policy on the night of the fire remember about finding out that an attorney -
00:37:05 about finding out that an attorney - escapement did you not right [Music]
00:37:11 [Music] did you use the it's too busy you're too busy did you remember the did you
00:37:27 busy did you remember the did you remember the out there the contents of the RAF in general terms general but it was just we were overwhelmed with calls there's just 20 calls writing at all times sure in the normal case where you
00:37:40 times sure in the normal case where you haven't got multiple calls would you normally be able to use information about the caller being trapped coming from other sources or do you only ever rely on what the
00:37:51 or do you only ever rely on what the caller was telling you sorry but I rely on the call life thing would you ever rely on other in from other sources of information other than what the caller was telling you about
00:38:02 what the caller was telling you about whether it was safe for them to get out we're normally onan FSG call you have the in a supervisor or another colleague come over so that does relieve quite a lot of the pressure because it's quite
00:38:13 lot of the pressure because it's quite pressurized leading with those calls right so if you've only got two or three FSG calls
00:38:20 FSG calls you can have a colleague with you it's very difficult type in listening being aware what else is going on in the room all at the same time so if it was only
00:38:31 all at the same time so if it was only two or three FSG calls at a time we could apply the the policy to the four probably right so because it may say that that move at a time in are you
00:38:43 that that move at a time in are you saying that in general terms without all the calls you got on the night you didn't go about examining safe routes of escape where the callers were telling you they were trapped
00:38:54 you they were trapped even though it was in policy 790 and I did you remember I didn't remember that part of the policy or
00:39:11 yep the RI f was that easily accessible to you on the back I think it as soon as you type another dress in the map goes up it then disappears all the time right
00:39:22 up it then disappears all the time right so you just a matter of she's really clicking on it now you said a couple of times that you didn't remember that part of the policy did you also not remember well let me
00:39:35 did you also not remember well let me ask it differently did you remember the part of the policy that requires you to go into the next stage is reassure reassess and then rescue well that the
00:39:48 reassess and then rescue well that the calls were lost in about 90 seconds each because of the multiple numbers coming in so now or possibly didn't go into as much detail as maybe I would have on
00:40:00 much detail as maybe I would have on another occasion right now came back to your statement this is God's you say at the top of page four very top in the event of an FSG there are certain things
00:40:12 event of an FSG there are certain things we have to do for example we have to inform a supervisor immediately usually by waving our hands so they can listen to the call as well on nights however this is not always possible because our team numbers can be smaller
00:40:27 is it the invariable practice with FS cheese that you would always raise your hand and get a supervisor to listen do yes did you manage to do that on the night of the fire did you try to
00:40:38 night of the fire did you try to everyone was overwhelmed with work even at the start yes you you refer to the team being smaller you say it's almost
00:40:50 team being smaller you say it's almost like however it's not always possible because our team numbers can be smaller well is that a problem on the night of grand vitara well there's 11 on duty that night sometimes they run on 9 or 10 right I don't think they're looking to
00:41:01 right I don't think they're looking to drop the number to 10 anyway no so so team numbers being smaller wasn't itself a problem is this right I think and on that night with 11 you can do 2 or 3 FSG
00:41:17 that night with 11 you can do 2 or 3 FSG calls it a time and perhaps keep to the policy right right now also on page 4 of your statement 1/3 of the way down the page you say and it's about halfway
00:41:29 page you say and it's about halfway through the first main paragraph it is also very important that we get how many people are reported to be inside and have that information passed over the
00:41:43 have that information passed over the collection of names is not something that would be routinely done in such calls speeders of the essence and what we really need to know is the address where they are and how many people are inside so you've got those pieces of
00:41:56 inside so you've got those pieces of ever there's three would you say those three were the most important address where they are and how many people are inside when collecting details from corners obviously yes the
00:42:11 details from corners obviously yes the address where and where they are in the in the building how many people inside I mean that's probably this you know yes I would say it's quite important but the
00:42:23 would say it's quite important but the address and where they are is simply the most important and why is it important to have all that information so firefighters know where to go right now can I just take you back into policy 790
00:42:36 can I just take you back into policy 790 and I'm sorry to keep jumping in and out of it and ask you to go to page 3 paragraph 5 point 5
00:42:52 it says there we can look at it together missus God's control will attempt to gather all the information on the control information form and relay this information to the incident as and when it becomes available and then you've got
00:43:03 it becomes available and then you've got eight bullet points is it on the shopping list number of flat house number of persons involved location of caller within premises and access point condition of their location ug heavy smoke slight smoke proximity to fire if
00:43:15 smoke slight smoke proximity to fire if known latest advice given by control time of FSG call and time updated do you
00:43:26 time of FSG call and time updated do you usually when you've done FSG calls in the past do you usually try to obtain all that information yes obviously in a high-rise as high as that night and
00:43:38 high-rise as high as that night and proximity to fire if not is not right now the poor people didn't know where they were where the fire is to trust to work out their props and proximity from
00:43:49 work out their props and proximity from their point of view everything we do is timed anyway and I think I think the the
00:44:03 timed anyway and I think I think the the condition of their location they're heavy or light slight smoke is dancer an individual's interpretation of the amount of smoke yes would you would you
00:44:15 amount of smoke yes would you would you interrogate the caller interrogate perhaps a strong word would you would you investigate with the call of what kind of smoke they were experiencing when they called if I didn't have twenty calls waiting maybe odd possibly all
00:44:27 calls waiting maybe odd possibly all right I see can I just ask you to look at the far survival guidance operator what you call the reference information file which I think you said you didn't
00:44:38 file which I think you said you didn't have in your mind on the night of the fire
00:44:46 if you go to the last page there's a reference under paragraph 2.3 to a
00:45:02 reference under paragraph 2.3 to a similar shopping list of information to be collected and and it's the last page
00:45:30 that's it and under the rubric two point three control information form you get a similar shopping list premises none the name of corner etc and then at the bottom it says any additional
00:45:41 bottom it says any additional information if provided or requested from incident other information may include age gender and capability of those involved would you normally ask
00:45:52 those involved would you normally ask questions of the of an FSG caller about whether or not they had mobility issues or what they were elderly or they had children present and in all my experience and people normally volunteer
00:46:05 experience and people normally volunteer that in that information right it's not not something I don't think I've ever needed to ask they tell you and yes I would ask or maybe explore that if we
00:46:18 would ask or maybe explore that if we only had two or three of course to deal with right in your experience prior to grant fill town did you do you remember ever handling a fire survival guidance call where you where you asked questions
00:46:30 call where you where you asked questions such as are there any elderly people or children present or people present with mobility difficulty Michael like an older lady told me she was disabled but she volunteered that is yes is there a
00:46:41 she volunteered that is yes is there a reason why you don't actively go out and ask for that information so as to assist you build a picture of the caller well as I say if we only had two or three
00:46:50 calls coming in we can deal with all those points but when you're overwhelmed as we were that night I think the calls were last in 90
00:47:02 I think the calls were last in 90 seconds each yes would it be would it not be differently would it be an important matter for you to know when deciding how to give advice or what
00:47:13 deciding how to give advice or what advice to give to know whether there were children or elderly people in the particular flat who attract firefighters would rescue whoever they they found in
00:47:24 would rescue whoever they they found in the flat I wouldn't I would rescue them everybody they could you know yes also see I understand
00:47:36 others might need more help on that night time was pressured if you did get
00:47:48 night time was pressured if you did get information that somebody had mobility issues or what bed-bound or but how would you pass that on to the far ground yeah you would if as I say but if you've only got two or three calls coming in
00:48:00 only got two or three calls coming in yes and then you get more it's more of a conversation with the corner side and just sticking with the RAF at the moment it says on page three under paragraph
00:48:21 it says on page three under paragraph one point six in the middle of the page record advice and this is this is under the rubric of protecting corner providing FSG and here's the advice
00:48:33 providing FSG and here's the advice explore possibility of caller moving to a safer room etc record advice passed on vision and communicate I see including the premise number unique identifier of caller were you aware on the night of
00:48:47 caller were you aware on the night of lack note that you you should be doing that recording the advice that you were giving on vision and sending it to the IC I think a couple of calls that I took I may have passed the information they
00:48:58 I may have passed the information they didn't you click eight quick enough and so whilst they were still I made sure the information went across there may
00:49:09 the information went across there may have been a couple of course that didn't get accepted by the because I had another call come in so there may have been two or three that were not recorded
00:49:24 been two or three that were not recorded on vision it was just pure trying to duplicate the call and not duplicating it in time for taking the next call but
00:49:36 it in time for taking the next call but I know that those flat numbers went over and how would that advice normally been communicated to the to the incident ground from the control room I create service request
00:49:47 control room I create service request sends it to the appropriate radio channel right so by radio yes normally I say I see and would you also record information that you got from callers on
00:49:58 information that you got from callers on a control information form on that night didn't have any control information form no but normally normally usable we never used one in 31 years right let me just
00:50:09 used one in 31 years right let me just dump it I've seen them but I haven't used one right you just show you what I mean so that we're talking about the same thing can I ask you to be shown
00:50:20 high rise sorry FSG policy 719 appendix - this is the policy which was live as
00:50:32 - this is the policy which was live as at the night of the Granville Tower fire and appendix - was there on the is page 8
00:50:43 it's a quadruplicate information form white yeah a blue copy there green copy a just to be clear you saying that you've never used one of these in your ivory
00:50:53 ivory I won't on the tape but now we're not Stratford that not know would they be at Merton normally I think there are some on the desks yes I've never used one you've never used one have you ever seen
00:51:04 you've never used one have you ever seen any colleagues using one don't think so now right
00:51:13 Oh staying with policy 790 that takes me to asked some questions about paragraph 9 on page 5 communication with control
00:51:30 on page 5 communication with control paragraph 91 says it is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call the fact that control is aware of the actions being carried out on the
00:51:42 actions being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to FSG callers normally leaving a side Grenfell for the moment would you expect to be kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve FSG
00:51:53 the actions being taken to resolve FSG calls from the incident round
00:52:03 I mean that that Lacan or it were we didn't have anything the only other one I've said you about them people at the skylight the stop message was received and it was mentioned I knew they've been
00:52:16 and it was mentioned I knew they've been rescued because I'd heard it until the night of Grenville I hadn't
00:52:28 I haven't been made you know but I haven't really been in the situation where I would have been updated apart from like an O or Grimm feel right okay with this policy postdates
00:52:39 with this policy postdates okay so this is a okay so this was one of those things that were supposed I think we'll find out later now I can't let Graham reflect lacking the house
00:52:50 let Graham reflect lacking the house only another time when I was then I was on a radio when we had FSG cause so I was in a different position right let me ask him more generally as at the night
00:53:03 ask him more generally as at the night of the Grand Vitara fire were you aware of the of the principle encapsulated in paragraph 9.1 that it was vital the control was kept informed of the actions
00:53:16 control was kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve I wasn't me aware of that you weren't right okay
00:53:30 now
00:53:34 we saw you know just worth going back a moment paragraph 2.1 of policy 790 and I
00:53:48 moment paragraph 2.1 of policy 790 and I showed you the words in bold that we're age FSG call is happening the control officer remains on the line providing appropriate advice you you say in your
00:54:01 appropriate advice you you say in your statement if I can just then turn to that page seven
00:54:11 in general terms that you would you would know if people got out you said in the middle of the page I know that some
00:54:23 the middle of the page I know that some people got rescued my question really is this did you before Grenfell did you ever handle FSG call where you didn't
00:54:34 ever handle FSG call where you didn't stay on the line right now Akron fellas will come to see there were many many calls where you didn't stay on the line and therefore this popped up therefore paragraph 2.1 at the policy wasn't
00:54:46 paragraph 2.1 at the policy wasn't adhered to is there a reason for that in general terms just because we're overwhelmed with calls and no I can tell I think against that background of your
00:54:57 I think against that background of your experience to the light itself and look first of all at the role and team structure on the night paragraph one on page five of your statement page five
00:55:08 page five of your statement page five you say on the night of the 14th of June we were working the night shift and you say what you think there were 11 CRA is working along with three supervisors
00:55:21 Debbie Rael Peter May and Alex Norman if I think I think we've established they were actually eight CRE yes making 11 in total right you say
00:55:37 CRE yes making 11 in total right you say on page five a little lower down that Hoagland in the next line no one above the rank of om was present is that usual
00:55:53 the rank of om was present is that usual is it usual the Senior Operations Manager is not present on the night shift
00:55:58 shift no one above the rank of om om is the highest rank or night duties I see okay so Alex Norman and Alex no one was the OEM yes and that's normal that I follow
00:56:11 OEM yes and that's normal that I follow now we know that the control was working from the Stratford fallback as you say because of routine maintenance at Merton can I just show you a picture of the control room you've got at strap that is
00:56:23 control room you've got at strap that is page 175 of the control report book and there it is using that photograph and we'll blow it up a bit more so you can
00:56:35 we'll blow it up a bit more so you can see it more clearly can you just tell us where you were sitting on that night opposite Alex Norman in the middle bank opposite middle of the bank opposite so we know
00:56:50 middle of the bank opposite so we know what we think we know Eric's Norman with it there's a red line going through the screen I think that's where obviously a red line war from control of the screen yes the middle the middle bank now I see
00:57:02 yes the middle the middle bank now I see so that there are three arrows left midland the middle arrow is going through a screen yes that's where all cities so you were there on the left of the picture the picture that was your
00:57:13 the picture the picture that was your chair over there would you like to point it out as you can
00:57:21 can right so your your screen is not where the arrow is actually finishing but the middle one thank you very much it pretty much immediately opposite Alex Norman good huh yes yes yes and who was sitting
00:57:36 good huh yes yes yes and who was sitting next to you on your right Sam Russell so Russell on your left Sharon Darby turned our be operating the radio right
00:57:55 you say in the same paragraph the control room is much smaller than Merton mm-hmm was that the help on the night or hindrance I think so I think it was a help because why is that because
00:58:06 help because why is that because everybody sits so far apart at Merton we work as a team a lot of teamwork I mean so you could sort of hear you know I
00:58:17 so you could sort of hear you know I knew people were talking about 17th floor you know sort of smoke traveling so I was aware already of what was going on in the room so you could actually
00:58:31 on in the room so you could actually hear what other people were saying well whole conversations just snips really right they say did you ever have any discussions between calls with with your colleagues sitting either near or even
00:58:44 colleagues sitting either near or even not so near you about particular calls not discussions now too busy too busy you also say that you don't have access
00:59:03 you also say that you don't have access to the National Police air so it's downlink there's no heli tele link it's a you said sorry it's in the control report but that that's right I think
00:59:14 report but that that's right I think there's no access to the heli Tony link no would that have helped you on the night you think I thought not really is that a tool you ever use as a CRA not it
00:59:27 that a tool you ever use as a CRA not it isn't right
00:59:30 so seeing the downlink doesn't assist you is that right with the with these sort of advice that you would give a caller I I don't know if it would have
00:59:41 caller I I don't know if it would have helped looking back really what do you usually have a 24 hour news television feed it's normally on at Stratford sorry
00:59:52 feed it's normally on at Stratford sorry do we have you what's normally on at Merton but there wasn't anything on it Stratford no and do you know why the television wasn't running at Stratford no I don't know did you make did you inquire would it be normal not habitus
01:00:04 inquire would it be normal not habitus Apollo Stratford listen I don't think people are worried about having to tell you on reading right would it have helped do you think having a TV with 24-hour news showing during the night
01:00:15 24-hour news showing during the night that particular night and I honestly couldn't say I was quite later on in the
01:00:26 couldn't say I was quite later on in the night before I saw a picture of what was happening right did anybody turn the television on at some point I don't think so right now
01:00:38 on page 5 of your statement if we look at it in the middle you say the night began like any other and then you say
01:00:49 began like any other and then you say just below halfway down the page I remember whilst walking out from my break the initial call for Granville Tower and I was aware of Pete May discussing the attendance required do
01:01:00 discussing the attendance required do you remember what he said he said something along the lines of we had this the other day and he didn't mean a call for grenfell tower he meant that where
01:01:15 for grenfell tower he meant that where the address had been put in flat 16 Greenfield Tower then the system because that was the address and that we had an address record for 16 when Phil tower it had taken off the high-rise attendants
01:01:28 had taken off the high-rise attendants and made it I think three pumping appliances right so he noticed that Grenville was a high-rise and it should have a high-rise attendants on it which
01:01:39 have a high-rise attendants on it which I believe at the time was for pumping appliance
01:01:41 appliance and Pete they manually put on the other machine the other fire appliance to make it before for high-rise attendants and
01:01:52 it before for high-rise attendants and you go on to say shortly afterwards I heard a bang on the door from Pete May he stated that there was a 10 pump fire and persons reported and we needed to make our way back to the control room due to the influx of calls you heard a
01:02:06 due to the influx of calls you heard a bang on the door which what was the door he banged up but I think the recall hadn't worked recall what's that mr. button as soon as there's multiple or
01:02:17 button as soon as there's multiple or major incident or multiple calls coming in they press the recall so anyone who's on break come straight back yeah but do you have a no no it should be a buzzer throughout the building right but I'm
01:02:28 throughout the building right but I'm guessing that didn't work because he went and the corridor and I was I was getting changed and he banged on the door said Tim pump for I come back I see ok so he he left the control room came
01:02:40 ok so he he left the control room came down the corridor was blank on the changing room door and wait could you back in effectively right so after he called you back in you started taking
01:02:51 called you back in you started taking calls that straightaway yes right now we've got a record of about 70 calls that you took between 1 26 27 and 614 47
01:03:04 that you took between 1 26 27 and 614 47 and we haven't been able to identify any obviously long gaps or or breaks did you take a break at any point during the night it's the toilet once right to try
01:03:17 night it's the toilet once right to try and work out that when that was at the early stage did you record the information at the early stages of these causes they started to come in did you
01:03:28 causes they started to come in did you recall the information you were given by the corner where I was sending messages to Sharon on the radio right so just talk us through how you would do that
01:03:39 talk us through how you would do that you get a call and then you would what would you do next with the information that I got from the call well I would duplicate the course I attached it to the main body of the incident log right
01:03:52 the main body of the incident log right then create a service request right headed up to Channel four so Sharon knew it was for her first of all probably would have dressed it to golf to seven
01:04:03 would have dressed it to golf to seven one but once a command unit gets in attendance you'd address that they're headed up to them right and then I'd pass anyhow people were reporting you know they're on the eighth floor whether
01:04:14 know they're on the eighth floor whether from and how was the information that you gave to Sharon Darby in those early stages past to the incident ground do you know she passed it by voice right
01:04:26 you know she passed it by voice right did they come a time when you were aware that a whiteboard system was implemented who by do you remember I think the station manager I live was over in the corner doing that and you on
01:04:39 over in the corner doing that and you on page six of your statement we see you say something about that you say it was quicker to write the messages by hand this is at the very foot of the page
01:04:50 this is at the very foot of the page after you refer to Jason Olaf it was quicker to write the messages by hand on pieces of paper than it was to type them and wait for the system to send so I would write them and take it straight to
01:05:01 would write them and take it straight to the whiteboards in the end I think everyone was doing it that way
01:05:08 I just want to investigate with you a little bit about how the system worked
01:05:14 what were you writing on I had a large pad at the flat numbers and I was also passing them over I was putting a line through them I see okay there was no way
01:05:26 through them I see okay there was no way once station manager Olaf was running the whiteboard there was no other way to give him the information because he wouldn't pick up the service request or
01:05:37 wouldn't pick up the service request or anything like that that was the most expedient way really of getting over to him going over there or and parsing the information that way right were they on a four pieces of
01:05:48 right were they on a four pieces of paper or I had a pad and as I was telling him I was putting a thin line through all my those flat numbers and I
01:05:59 through all my those flat numbers and I was going over to him not after every call I think I was having a few and then going over wanna see okay
01:06:07 see okay so I'm not sure whether he wrote them down on another piece of paper or some of them he already had on the whiteboard quite a lot of them I think he already had on the whiteboard
01:06:18 had on the whiteboard how did you know to use that system did somebody tell you to or do you think it was just you know pass these calls to the station manager and I wasn't announced in the room right I think I'm
01:06:29 announced in the room right I think I'm not sure I just knew to do it right how soon after State started to take calls did you did you did you start writing FSG information on pieces of paper and
01:06:40 FSG information on pieces of paper and taking my map example right was it immediately the whiteboard started or sometime after that do you think probably the whiteboard started I would think I don't know what time that was that okay
01:06:50 that okay and did that mean physically leaving your desk and going up to the whiteboard yes well I would seem it wasn't far no okay but you have to leave your desk yeah so you couldn't shout you know take
01:07:01 yeah so you couldn't shout you know take your headphones off and yes physically walk around to him handing the piece of paper and then walk back it's a couple of steps that wasn't fun right okay do you think that system started before
01:07:12 you think that system started before Jason early have arrived I don't know you don't know we've heard some evidence from Jason Olaf and his time of arrival
01:07:23 from Jason Olaf and his time of arrival seems to be about between 150 and 150 5 a.m. so and my question is would that correspond with your recollection I really couldn't say yes okay
01:07:36 really couldn't say yes okay were you able do you think to get sufficiently detailed information about the calls to Jason Olaf yes it's what my flat numbers the most important where people are right
01:07:47 people are right what about numbers of occupants trapped and the conditions in flats did you get information to him about that do you think no not that I remember and the disabilities ages of occupants
01:07:58 and the disabilities ages of occupants Sam you mean
01:08:01 did you send any messages - Sharon Darby after the Olaf whiteboard system was implemented I'm not sure okay I'm
01:08:15 implemented I'm not sure okay I'm conscious mr. chairman that we've been going for an hour and yes these questions are quite wearing yes perhaps we should take a short break well would you welcome back yes I probably wouldn't you yes all right well we'll have a brick can we
01:08:27 all right well we'll have a brick can we afford give us those 10 minutes yes right develop some ten minutes or actually over so if you like to go with the usher I have to ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence and so
01:08:39 to anyone about your evidence and so money arrives in the room thank you and we've come back at 25 past
01:08:49 right 25:14 please [Music]
01:20:49 all right avid caveat I have to carry on good mr. Scott's thank you for coming back to us and helping us you described in your statement and as you did before
01:21:00 in your statement and as you did before the break that you come into the control room at the point when the fire is a 10 pump fire before that am i right in thinking that you weren't involved in the grandfa incident at all now I was on
01:21:13 the grandfa incident at all now I was on the radio until one o'clock and I think the call came in just before 1:00 right and then one o'clock I went to break oh I see
01:21:25 I see and then Sharon relieved me on the radio and then so when Pete called me I was thinking call taking basic how long are your breaks normally at that time of them an hour night an hour okay now we
01:21:37 them an hour night an hour okay now we have a time for make pumps 10 as one 24 34 that's page 17 of the short incident log I don't need to show you that that's the time when it was when it was made to
01:21:49 the time when it was when it was made to 10 according to that and say it would follow with it that you came into the incident of the control room after after that after 124 also do you remember a
01:22:00 that after 124 also do you remember a person's reported message being being made from the incident ground yes oh they do what did you make of that does that mean anything to you but there were
01:22:11 that mean anything to you but there were people on the fire ground they were confirming there were persons reported right what does that mean if people inside the building needing rescuing needed rescuing okay what did that tell
01:22:22 needed rescuing okay what did that tell you about the fire the nature of the fire seriousness of the fire well even a small fire you can have the persons reported messages so didn't tell you didn't on its own wouldn't tell me the
01:22:33 didn't on its own wouldn't tell me the the the capacity of the fire if you like now the first you then start taking calls and we have the first call that
01:22:45 calls and we have the first call that you took mm-hmm at 1:26 27 there are three more and then you take your first call from inside the tower at 1:30 thirty-eight just in general terms is
01:22:56 thirty-eight just in general terms is that sort of timing does that accord yes it must be Pete called me 10 Mike panting yep okay between between coming back into the control room and taking your first call do you remember
01:23:07 taking your first call do you remember what the acceleration of the makeups was how fast it was nah you don't okay well let me just tell you what what happened 128 persons reported but 129 53 make
01:23:20 128 persons reported but 129 53 make pumps 20 and at 131 make becomes 25 do you remember that remember that speed of acceleration our cop foots all morning you'll be I'm afraid there but you just
01:23:31 you'll be I'm afraid there but you just do you have a general impression of and it's a Quaker things but what did that what did that tell you about what that acceleration of makeups tell you about the nature of the fire or is spread
01:23:42 the nature of the fire or is spread before I hadn't been contained in its compartment so they thought we've got quite a problem got quite a problem okay what kind of problem did you think you were gonna have to be dealing with well probably residents I think I knew by then it was
01:23:54 residents I think I knew by then it was quite a tall building so I didn't know where the fire was going to go so okay now on the top of
01:24:06 going to go so okay now on the top of page 6 of your statement you could just just look at that do you say it altered rock bottom of page 5 you say it all
01:24:17 rock bottom of page 5 you say it all turned into a blur I think I took a call from a man on the 8th floor and told him the files on the 4th and he would be safer he was he seemed to be happy with that information at the time I think at some point there was an incident up
01:24:28 some point there was an incident up great top of page 6 and I cannot remember you say if it was then a 15 or 20 come fire but I remember thinking oh my god this is worse than LACMA now at
01:24:40 my god this is worse than LACMA now at that point when you have that thought oh my god this is worse than lack and all what did you think in terms of the scale of the fire or speed of fire spread at that point
01:24:52 well obviously I only ever deal with these incidents from the office not actually on scene so it told me that this was a huge going to be a huge incident right at that stage huge
01:25:04 incident right at that stage huge incident did you have any concerns with the advice that you were giving or beginning to give because the lack and all thought was in my mind yes I was very worried about obviously the people
01:25:16 very worried about obviously the people inside and whether what the best thing for them to do was did you raise those concerns will worry with your supervisor busy right
01:25:35 now can I ask you to look at the control debrief notes which you may not have seen before
01:25:45 this is lfp three one one three
01:25:57 these are notes of a meeting which don't took place for a controlled debrief on the 24th of July 2017 and it doesn't appear that you were present of that meeting I'm not going to ask you
01:26:08 meeting I'm not going to ask you anything about what happened at the meeting but if if you look at page three of the document it says at the top of
01:26:25 of the document it says at the top of the page calls coming in stay-put advice given callers hang up and told to ring back if it worsens now that is early on in the incident
01:26:36 in the incident do you remember whether you were told to give that advice now that remember right were you told ever were you told by anybody ever to to
01:26:48 ever were you told by anybody ever to to hang out but not stay on the line once he'd established it was an FSG call was I told by anybody yes No
01:27:02 and then on page 4 this is after 1:45 we can see just three lines down from the top of the page it says stay put advise remains blocked vents move to other
01:27:17 remains blocked vents move to other rooms etc people try to get out if they can or told to get out if they can as first question control new firefighters were being committed to rescue
01:27:28 were being committed to rescue expectation this would happen now difficult with tiny but at or before 1:45 and that first 20 minutes or so you
01:27:39 1:45 and that first 20 minutes or so you were involved did you know that firefighters were being committed or did you expect that would happen just expect to I didn't know you don't know ok while
01:27:55 to I didn't know you don't know ok while we're on that page doesn't prevent me having to come back to it if you look at the foot of the page and this is after Oh 206 so a little bit later it says no info coming back from incident ground as to progress stroke
01:28:07 incident ground as to progress stroke rescued strike stroke flats cleared was that your experience that there was no information coming back from the incident ground no well I wasn't told
01:28:18 incident ground no well I wasn't told anything right so you do you agree with you with this note to you there was no information in to the best of your recollection yes right did you ever
01:28:30 recollection yes right did you ever receive any information from the incident ground about the conditions within the building none nothing nothing about fire spread smoke spread no heat were you ever asked to
01:28:45 spread no heat were you ever asked to prioritize FSG calls in any way no I don't think so okay do you remember being told or asked
01:28:59 okay do you remember being told or asked by anybody in the control room to indicate or disorder to indicate a priority by smoke density no you don't remember anybody asking you to find out
01:29:10 remember anybody asking you to find out what the smoke density was within a particular flat yeah right can I just
01:29:21 particular flat yeah right can I just ask you to look at the control report please and turn to page 53
01:29:35 I think this is the first time I've shown you this document this is a report published by the left recently which is a minute-by-minute timeline of what
01:29:46 a minute-by-minute timeline of what happened in the control room and at the top of that page perhaps I should start
01:29:59 top of that page perhaps I should start at the bottom of the page this is it starts at 150 49 and it's Yvonne Adams calling cu8 to handover into a pass over information and at the bottom of page 52
01:30:12 information and at the bottom of page 52 so if I could just take you back to it sorry it's not on your screen bottom of page 52 which is where we should start with this it says the command unit
01:30:26 with this it says the command unit operator just so you're clear in your mind mrs. got scissors at 150 49 so you've been involved in the incidence incident for about 25 minutes or so the
01:30:37 incident for about 25 minutes or so the command unit operator asks ERL Adams if there's a priority for the calls being passed to them but asks control to indicate a priority by smoke density CRA Adams explains that the quorum 182 is
01:30:49 Adams explains that the quorum 182 is quite panicky and then over the page the smoke and the flattened is still on the phone the command unit operator summarizes that the smoke is heaviest on the 21st floor of a question let me show
01:31:02 the 21st floor of a question let me show you that is and were you made aware that the smoke was heaviest on the 21st floor
01:31:11 I want to ask you now if I can a few questions about some specific calls that you took now first of all in your
01:31:22 you took now first of all in your witness statement on page five and we saw this very briefly as we passed it a few minutes ago the bottom of page five you refer to a call from the man on the
01:31:33 you refer to a call from the man on the eighth floor and you say I told him if I was on the fourth do you remember any further details about this call
01:31:44 no I think I passed some information over by the radio to tell them that there was smoke on the eighth floor right that we don't seem to have a record of that but just I want to get
01:31:55 record of that but just I want to get your recollection do you do you remember what point in the night or by reference perhaps to the level of makeups they were that you took that call nothing
01:32:06 were that you took that call nothing that's shortly after I returned to the control room right I'm not sure
01:32:22 well at what point in the night did you think you were told that the fire was on the fourth floor and the initial call that we were still in the control room at that point I think you said yes we will break mmm and they yet I'm not sure
01:32:39 will break mmm and they yet I'm not sure if it was an informative or if I just if it said that there is a fire and fourth floor giving you a false a false lead if
01:32:52 floor giving you a false a false lead if you go to the short incident log at page 17 let's see if we can trace this through one 1602 its two-thirds of the
01:33:04 through one 1602 its two-thirds of the way down that page you can see an informative message sup from G 272 residential block of flats 20 floors 25 by 25 meters five room flat on 4th floor
01:33:16 by 25 meters five room flat on 4th floor 75% alight high-rise procedure implemented MDT news tactical mode Oscar now at oh one sixty you are I think out of the control because you only came in
01:33:28 of the control because you only came in at pumps 20 was pumps 10 and we can see lower down that's a 124 or so when you came into the control room you went back to your station did you look at the vision log and Sharon would have posted
01:33:42 vision log and Sharon would have posted that up on the service request lines so it would be sitting up there we headed up sup but I'd be able to read that I see as I sat down so as you sat down I'm gonna need to see
01:33:54 so as you sat down I'm gonna need to see that that was the message sent I see okay right so it is that way you've got the information about the fire originally being on the phone yes it
01:34:05 originally being on the phone yes it must be okay now on page 6 of your statement if you just go back to that in the third paragraph but this may be
01:34:17 the third paragraph but this may be jumping ahead in the night you say over the course of the night I think I took something in the region of about 80 calls I was later told I did not really remember them I remember one man I spoke to a father of five say that the father was coming in
01:34:28 five say that the father was coming in through the walls of his flat I felt totally useless as there was nothing I could do
01:34:32 could do to help these people I told them there was nothing I could do it he was better off with his family I ended the call by saying I would make absolutely sure the crews knew where he was it was just horrible
01:34:41 horrible now that's their statement and again we are having difficulty finding a record of this specific call do you can you help us now do you remember anything else about that call I think father of
01:34:56 else about that call I think father of five is wrong I think there were five people right two adults and three children I think right maybe and you
01:35:07 children I think right maybe and you remember roughly what sort of time in the night that was I think that was quite late on quite later okay would you remember whether the call he made to you
01:35:20 remember whether the call he made to you or the call you had was this first call or subsequent believe them not to come over to Jason's bald a Jason saw his station manager Olaf and the black
01:35:31 station manager Olaf and the black number was already up there was already out there so there's a later cool I think it's about I believe so yes and have you any recollection as to roughly which floor it was in the tower I mean
01:35:43 which floor it was in the tower I mean in did you do you remember whether you actually told him to leave get out he said he could I told him to keep a wife
01:35:54 said he could I told him to keep a wife get away from the fire I think he was just blocked in by the fire and he told it was just coming through the walls he had nowhere to go all right did you explore with him actually what the exit routes were like
01:36:06 actually what the exit routes were like so you could satisfy yourself that he genuinely it sounded like it was past any extra crates to me right no let's come back earlier into the night we'll
01:36:18 come back earlier into the night we'll look at the first call you actually took from the tower itself which is at 1:30 38 and I'd like to go if I can but first of all to the control report page 26
01:36:36 and I'm going to do this with all the with all of these I need to show you and I'm not going to show you all set all 70 mr. Scott
01:36:43 mr. Scott but I'm gonna show you the summary first and then we'll look at the transcript in part this is at one thirty thirty eight and it says CRA gots takes a call from
01:36:59 and it says CRA gots takes a call from the female caller who states she's in her neighbor's house on the 22nd floor of Granville Tower and they can smell smoke
01:37:08 smoke CRA gots advises the corner to get fresh air from the window and confirms that the fire is in the fourth floor caller asks if they should stay in the flat the C REO gots responses she's unable to advise the call of it will let the crews
01:37:19 advise the call of it will let the crews know that the caller is on the 22nd floor call duration one minute 22 seconds now the transcript of that is
01:37:30 seconds now the transcript of that is lfb 3 1 1 and we're going to ask you one or two questions about the actual detail of that I made
01:37:43 and we start with the first page and this will become more familiar to you as we go through these are these are lfb transcripts at the top they under event connects to event we can see the time of
01:37:56 connects to event we can see the time of Oh 1 30 38 is the second number from the right that's how we know it's 30 it's that time that's the lfb time they've put on it if we turn to page 2 you can
01:38:07 put on it if we turn to page 2 you can see the text of these call fire brigade hello it's it's from Grenville tower yeah and 22nd floor you're on the 22nd and then caller yes and there's all
01:38:19 and then caller yes and there's all smoke now yeah we are you need to get to the window and get some fresh air okay yeah I'll let them know you're up there so can you make sure we're yeah over
01:38:31 so can you make sure we're yeah over speaking like can you actually do you actually do you know actually which floor it's a fire there's a fire and then you say it's a block a flat on the fourth floor alight now just just
01:38:42 fourth floor alight now just just pausing there that's the opening part of the discussion you you you then go on on the next page page three if we just look at that
01:38:53 page three if we just look at that quickly just to establish what floor it is and half way down the page you see the caller says 22nd floor 22nd 22nd yet alright okay and then over speaking and
01:39:07 alright okay and then over speaking and then we are there all right I let them know thank you and I've come to the rest of it in a moment but we don't see anywhere in this call you actually taking a number for the flat can you
01:39:21 taking a number for the flat can you help us why is that
01:39:25 because this is quite early on yes right I'm going back to the second page - you're told that we've just looked at it
01:39:36 you're told that we've just looked at it a third of the way down there's all smoke now and you say you need to get to the window and get some fresh air we don't I think see you exploring with the caller the whether there's a way of
01:39:47 caller the whether there's a way of safely getting out and getting into the exit routes is is there a reason for that
01:39:52 that no I thought this pole was still on the fourth floor right so I thought you know it's just maybe some smoke traveling up okay but you didn't you didn't explore the detail with the caller I think she really and when you say as you do is the
01:40:07 really and when you say as you do is the bottom of the page the flat on the force law is alight is what was the basis or source of that information within the informants here vomiting okay did you
01:40:19 informants here vomiting okay did you hear anything around you in the control room that might suggest that the fire had traveled higher up the building than the fourth floor I think I've heard smoke mentioned but not fire particular right okay um you then you look at the
01:40:37 right okay um you then you look at the top of page three the caller says yeah well our neighbor told us is actually from somewhere inaudible and you say oh I see okay yeah well we're there and I'll let them know you're on the 20th
01:40:48 I'll let them know you're on the 20th but you've just got some smoke up there you're okay but my question there is do when you say oh I see what did you see what did you understand the caller who
01:41:00 what did you understand the caller who told you
01:41:06 I don't know I can't remember I can't remember the course I don't mind right did you know we'll pick up from around you that Peter Duffy was on a call at the same time to a caller from flat one
01:41:20 the same time to a caller from flat one nine six he'd taken the call 30 38 seconds earlier which is next door where the caller had told him that that flat was on fire no I didn't know I didn't know that if you had been told that a
01:41:32 know that if you had been told that a fire was on the 22nd floor would it have made a difference to the advice that you then went on to give it to me she said she's got some smoke up there I didn't know the fire was up there but at that
01:41:44 know the fire was up there but at that point I don't believe right are you sure your own line that you fully understood what she was saying to you
01:41:54 maybe I didn't I I thought so at the time maybe I did in either through that I understand it was just some smoke traveled up there yeah I know it's difficult to recollect yes I can't really remember the call so I was gonna
01:42:06 really remember the call so I was gonna ask you do you have any recollection of any communication difficulties language difficulties things like that no I don't remember any problems like that okay and did the caller to your mind appear lucid
01:42:19 did the caller to your mind appear lucid and comprehensible well yes I mean understands of that call they they sound as though they are but again I can't actually remember the call so now looks
01:42:30 actually remember the call so now looks from this transcript also that you didn't get a number a number for the number of occupants in the flat you know they didn't is there a reason for that
01:42:41 they didn't is there a reason for that right now you think I want to say over the page you're asked do we stay in the flat this is paid for and your answer is
01:42:52 flat this is paid for and your answer is well obviously I can't really but I let the family know you're there okay what what information do you think you were missing from the caller which meant
01:43:04 were missing from the caller which meant that you couldn't advise them what did you need I don't know that their escape route that would be more hesitant no whether it's better for them to stay in the flat at that point with the smoke up
01:43:15 the flat at that point with the smoke up there
01:43:16 there but could you have asked them for that information Thanks so that you could have advised them maybe but she just sounds like she's saying this some smoke up there it might be worse smoke further down you that you just don't know what
01:43:27 down you that you just don't know what you're sending them into Nazi for now and it's very difficult to know you know where the smoke is worse if you're better up there you could send them down
01:43:39 better up there you could send them down into smoke it's just so hot it's a hard thing to call it really is a hard thing to call yes if we see the extent to which you explored the thickness of
01:43:50 which you explored the thickness of smoke and any possible exit routes which isn't a great deal is the reason why you didn't press the caller well maybe I should have done it's very different
01:44:01 should have done it's very different looking at it here to listen to in it listening to it on the night at this point 1:30 were you aware of how serious the fire spread had become what make up
01:44:17 the fire spread had become what make up messages doesn't miss a thing well we were at 20 at 120 knots it's quite bad fire spread oh yes yes and so putting that information next to the information you got and
01:44:28 to the information you got and understood from this call yes I can't we can't ask you a question on the far right
01:44:38 I'm telling to the next call which is at 138 37 and the South African the control room report at page 37
01:44:57 foot of the page
01:45:02 and this is a call the summary of which reads as follows CRO God's takes a call from a very calm male caller who reports a fire in gruntal tower and asks what to
01:45:13 a fire in gruntal tower and asks what to do because the fire is spreading he asks if you should say if he should stay put because the fire is in the next or kitchen the caller asks if the brigade is on site and CRO confirms that there are lots of them and she will let the
01:45:24 are lots of them and she will let the crews know she that he is there caller says he's in flatten 95 on the 12th floor and there are children in the flat he's advised to try and get some fresh air from the window and block anywhere where smoke is coming from they it's
01:45:37 where smoke is coming from they it's linked to a another call at 126 58 and the duration of the call is 1 minute and 19 seconds now we can see and we start
01:45:50 19 seconds now we can see and we start off a thing with this course looking at page 19 if we can at the short incident log just to compare the detail of the call of the message and the page 19 we
01:46:10 call of the message and the page 19 we can see that Sharon Darby at one forty and forty seconds
01:46:19 yeah
01:46:22 AG that's you I think yes create a service request service request created to ch4 as channel 4 or RT for g27 one
01:46:34 to ch4 as channel 4 or RT for g27 one person's trapped in flat on 12th floor
01:46:43 that's the service request you created
01:46:50 you didn't I think add anything about smoke or fire on that floor is there a reason for that
01:47:07 no I don't know
01:47:14 when you created that service request did that mean that it went to Sharon Darby that's right yes okay and we can
01:47:25 Darby that's right yes okay and we can see that at 1:45 15 just lower down the page Sharon dobby creates that request as a service request completed you see
01:47:36 as a service request completed you see that person's trapped in flat on 12th floor enables I mean that means she successfully passed it over so she's completed it yeah does that mean that the extra information about far on the floor and
01:47:47 information about far on the floor and children in the flat wasn't passed over to the incident graph now she just passed what I sent to her right would it would it have been important for the incident ground to know so that they could if they wanted to prioritize calls
01:47:59 could if they wanted to prioritize calls would it would it be important for them to know that there was that they were trapped and that there were children involved yes it possibly would have done but they want to rescue everybody yeah
01:48:11 but they want to rescue everybody yeah okay now going on in the control reported the next chord is a page 45 143 19
01:48:30 this is where you take a call from flat ATT on the 11th floor the caller has previously incident number of 120 826 called previously the caller talks about
01:48:42 called previously the caller talks about her husband at state she has a daughter but his unclear if he's in the flat the caller explains that this is her second call to the brigade and confirms that they cannot get out because of the smoke outside the door the call lasts 1 minute and 21 seconds well look at the
01:48:58 minute and 21 seconds well look at the transcript in a moment but just just looking at that summary know you're told they can't get out because of the smoke outside the door would that be an FSG call straight away then yes
01:49:12 call straight away then yes looking at that summary would you need to ask for the number of people involved in the flat it looks like this 3 but all
01:49:24 in the flat it looks like this 3 but all right it looks like this 3 did you have an understanding of that from ah I can't remember the call to be honest so right well let me let me show you the transcript so so that we have to have the whole thing this is transcript
01:49:39 the whole thing this is transcript number 3 number 3 to 3
01:49:51 and you can see from that it's time that 143 19 and
01:50:03 on page two halfway down you're told I'm ringing from Grenville tower I know you know but there's smoke coming in my house now so they're affected by smoke
01:50:16 house now so they're affected by smoke and and then you say can you block at the bottom of the door stop the smoke coming in yeah we blocked the bottom of the door here we've done all of that ok please send someone at least get me out the window way anyway please over
01:50:28 the window way anyway please over speaking what floor are you on 82 they know I've rung already sorry what floor xi xi okay well I can just let them know again there's a few people
01:50:40 let them know again there's a few people caught in flats there can you get some fresh air from the window and it continues on down the page and at the bottom of the page no the stairs will be completely full of smoke now left and then over the top of page 4 they're
01:50:52 then over the top of page 4 they're filled with smoke are they yeah okay I'll let them I let them know and halfway down page 4 please can you find out please how long they're going to be I need to get out please I've got a
01:51:03 I need to get out please I've got a daughter okay and you're on the 11th floor it doesn't look as if you explored alternative escape routes with the corner er no I didn't think to do that I didn't remember that action now you were
01:51:17 didn't remember that action now you were told that the caller had a daughter did you did you pass those details to the incident ground straightaway either over to Jason I will such story station
01:51:28 to Jason I will such story station manager I will if on his right board yeah through the radio channels right no justice look at the V whiteboard it's M et triple zero one six nine zero six
01:51:39 et triple zero one six nine zero six let's just get that up on the screen is to make sure we trace this through
01:51:49 if we can have that the right way around great now that's one that's 80s we're looking at 82 we're very tall 11th looks
01:52:03 looking at 82 we're very tall 11th looks like dead front door to our I was one child outside outside so it looks as though not the number of people have been obtained you don't know when that was passed over to the incident ground yeah okay
01:52:21 do you remember how Jason only have got that information up on that whiteboard not in C okay the neck next call is at page 51 of the control report 147 49
01:52:44 where you take a call from inside Grenville tower corner asks how they're going to get out Sarah gots confirms the floor number of the caller states they're on the tenth floor the caller then repeatedly states
01:52:55 floor the caller then repeatedly states they are going outside the phone is handed to a young child he states there's smoke in the corridor but other residents are leaving caller asked for advice on what to do of cro gots advises they block the doors off and she will tell firefighters where they are however
01:53:07 tell firefighters where they are however she's unable to advise the best thing as she's not there CI regattas advises the fire started on the fourth floor now that's the summary if we look at the
01:53:23 that's the summary if we look at the transcript this is number 330 and again time is a one forty seven forty nine as we can see from the top right hand corner it's quite a quick it's quite a
01:53:36 corner it's quite a quick it's quite a quick call so we could probably see the whole thing but it sort of focus on one or two parts of it on page two it starts hello Fire Brigade please we are still inside how we're going to go out what Florio on tenth tenth floor please and
01:53:49 Florio on tenth tenth floor please and it's Grenville tower and it continues but if one looks through the whole of that call we don't see you getting the
01:54:01 that call we don't see you getting the actual flat address anywhere is there a reason why you didn't you didn't do that just the speed of taking the calls up right I would say and nor do we see you
01:54:13 right I would say and nor do we see you getting the number of persons in the flat I had the same again is that right speed if knowing how many calls writing and just pressure of work really right
01:54:24 you you you could see straight away that they say ask you how we're gonna go out and again and I'm sorry these questions are becoming rather repetitive but is there a reason why you didn't explore with these callers why what the
01:54:37 with these callers why what the conditions in the escape route was what the thing is that they're on so that went on the tenth floor and the conditions on that floor be very different to all the way down so
01:54:50 different to all the way down so yes exactly you know we don't from where I am of where they are they don't know that the conditions all the way down it's very it's a very difficult thing to call I understand but is there a reason
01:55:02 call I understand but is there a reason why with this call you didn't ask them to explore with you to see what because the conditions could change depending on where they were in the building whether there was actually an escape route well because I think I just felt I
01:55:15 well because I think I just felt I couldn't have stayed on the phone that long maybe they've so many calls waiting right
01:55:20 right was it not important though given that they were telling you that there was essentially stuck not to see with them whether they were actually stuck and could get out or tour as opposed to
01:55:31 could get out or tour as opposed to taking them at their word as I did rather tighten that they were and I'm still hoping the firefighters would look out the 10th floor you you get told
01:55:46 out the 10th floor you you get told about the conditions in the flat and you give this some advice about blocking the smoke and you say halfway down just
01:55:59 smoke and you say halfway down just below halfway look 3/4 of the way down page 2 well it's up to you sorry caller 1 says we're gonna go outside and you say well it's up to you I'm not I can't advise you to do that and then you say
01:56:12 advise you to do that and then you say is there smoke all in the corridors that's a question and the caller says caller 1 says can't advise you to do that can't advise and then you operators
01:56:23 that can't advise and then you operators I can't advise you know obviously I'm not there there seems from that to be a bit of confusion where you're actually asking is this making the corridor and
01:56:35 asking is this making the corridor and don't get an answer can I decide is there a reason why you didn't follow up on that question is there smoke in the corridors no I can't remember the course I'm sorry I can't say no
01:56:51 given that it was clearly an FSG call because they were trapped well let me ask him do you accept that was a an FSG call because they said they were stuck I said they were stuck yes and that was
01:57:02 I said they were stuck yes and that was bad made it did that make it an FSG call yeah yeah given that is there a reason why you didn't stay on the line with them until they were rescued not that I should have done but again there's so many calls coming in we're just
01:57:14 many calls coming in we're just overwhelmed right did you did you think to call her supervisor over and know everybody was working flat-out right and
01:57:28 on page four you asked that just above halfway no so you're on the 10th are you yes and then you say it was on the fourth and then it was on the fourth
01:57:42 fourth and then it was on the fourth question operator it was on the fourth it started but I let them know you're there by this stage did you have any updated information about the spread of the fire up and smoke up the building I
01:57:53 the fire up and smoke up the building I mean you still think it was on the fourth I didn't have any update no okay you only have one informative I think yeah could you not hear other people in the control room taking calls from higher up the building yes smoke does
01:58:05 higher up the building yes smoke does travel yes throughout a building not necessarily that the fire has spread everywhere the smoke came travel
01:58:17 now the next call is it to control report 55 page 55
01:58:29 where you answer a call at 154 23 the summary is short CRO God takes a call from a female caller in flat 205 on the
01:58:41 from a female caller in flat 205 on the 23rd floor he states that the fire is starting to rise and they have nowhere to go
01:58:45 to go the caller explains that the crews already know already but the flat is now full of smoke and there are seven of them in there the caller says that the fire is going to come through the window and they do not know what to do CRO God's checks with the caller they
01:58:56 CRO God's checks with the caller they cannot get out of the flat and says you let them that crews no urgent the the transcript is of lfb 333 it's a very
01:59:11 transcript is of lfb 333 it's a very short call looking at the top right it's a 154 23 as we can see so we'll just have it there it look it looks as if
01:59:24 have it there it look it looks as if this wasn't the first call from flat 205 did you know that do you think when you took this call a lot coming right in
01:59:35 took this call a lot coming right in general terms just standing back from the detail of this call how would you normally manage a change of information about a flat that had already come in and was in the system and where the
01:59:46 and was in the system and where the details had already been passed over to the incident ground we were so overwhelmed we all just did our very best
02:00:01 I don't know that our updates as such were passed I don't I don't know that information if they were passed updates how would you normally normally if there
02:00:14 how would you normally normally if there is a normal get convey the development of the information about a particular call to the incident ground and if we had only a manageable amount of calls coming in it's very different situation
02:00:26 coming in it's very different situation they could be updated continually right but on that night it just was not possible now was this the first occasion when he realized that the farmers no longer contained on the fourth floor but
02:00:38 longer contained on the fourth floor but was was high up in the building or rising up the building oh I can't I can't say it's made definitely honest no they say on page two
02:00:49 they say on page two two-thirds of the way down we're stuck
02:00:54 you see that the caller says there's no way where the flats already for the smoke can't go out well with where we're stuck operator now so we're telling them
02:01:05 stuck operator now so we're telling them again and again where the people are and they're trying to send people up okay but the fast coming up to the floor what are we going to do and you ask the fires
02:01:16 are we going to do and you ask the fires coming through the door and the answer is that it's going to come through the window in a second and in the end you go
02:01:28 window in a second and in the end you go on to say I'll let them know and half way down page three you you say I can just let them know that you're there they know they know we're here we just need someone to hurry and come yeah I'll
02:01:40 need someone to hurry and come yeah I'll reinforce that for you please please the urgency that's flat 105 please yes flat 205 it's like a fire mr. Riddler please yes flat 205 yeah yeah what floor 23rd
02:01:51 yes flat 205 yeah yeah what floor 23rd right at the top the 23rd okay let them know all right yeah okay please okay thank you bye-bye now what would you do to let the crews know
02:02:03 what would you do to let the crews know urgently and that there was an urgency about this particular call what what did you do
02:02:09 you do I think I'll just check that oh we had the information over on the whiteboards right
02:02:14 right was there a quicker way of getting the crews to know that there was a very very urgent call that was the quickest way for us right having told the occupants about 2:05 that you would reinforce the
02:02:27 about 2:05 that you would reinforce the urgency with the crews what did you actually do to do that do you remember just went over and checked that the further information had been sent right
02:02:39 further information had been sent right and had it I passed it over whether as far as I'm aware yes
02:02:58 that the next call is at two 1507 which is controller for page 73
02:03:23 page 73 and this is a call at 2:15 Oh seven I'll just read the summary see arias takes a call from a male caller who begins by apologizing for calling
02:03:34 who begins by apologizing for calling again but reports me very scared and states that they're on the twelfth floor he explains that when they opened the front door there was a lot of smoke and CRA God says that she was unable to advise but if the caller thinks that it's safe to try and leave and that's
02:03:45 it's safe to try and leave and that's their choice however normally the Brigade would suggest blocking up anywhere that smoke can get in seorak God's reassures the caller that the brigade is there and will come and find them
02:03:53 them the caller states that they can't breathe so CRA Goss asks if there's a window in the flat that might provide some fresh air the caller states there are fire balls falling past the window and that there are three people in the flat Sierra God
02:04:05 are three people in the flat Sierra God suggests they try and block it up a bit more or go to the window to get some fresh air if they are unable to get out cierra Gosling confirms that the crews are aware that they are on the 12th floor called Eurasian three minutes - 39
02:04:16 floor called Eurasian three minutes - 39 seconds and the reference for that is lfb three four six which is the transcript just before we go to the transcript you're just looking at the
02:04:27 transcript you're just looking at the summary you're told by the caller that the flat the fire is in a flat well sorry
02:04:37 sorry let me start my question again you're told that the caller is in a flat on the 12th floor but it looks as if you don't seek to get the flat number from the
02:04:48 seek to get the flat number from the corner again is there a reason for that nice okay now we've seen a number of calls where
02:05:00 calls where you didn't do that and just came back to your statement on page 7 you say in the
02:05:11 your statement on page 7 you say in the fifth line down I constantly made sure I had the flatten numbers to pass over to the command unit looking at the calls we've looked at do you think that's not no it's not really that's not correct
02:05:22 no it's not really that's not correct correcting the statement you did it no okay thank you
02:05:29 now can I just show you the transcript of that call which is three four six
02:05:54 the halfway down page - you haven't got the floor you say okay I mean is it that there's lots of smoke outside your place
02:06:05 there's lots of smoke outside your place as well call us several inaudible words when you go outside the door you can see just smoke and outside I mean is it I can't advise you you say if you think it's safe to try and leave it's up to
02:06:17 it's safe to try and leave it's up to you but I would over speaking and and then normally we block we say block up that when we're this makes coming in no just pausing there you're told there's
02:06:29 just pausing there you're told there's smoke outside we don't see you again there's the same question we don't see you exploring with this corner means of escape where they're actually the smoke is something that he could get or she could get through why is that I didn't
02:06:42 could get through why is that I didn't remember about the fur that means it escaped it's the same question same honest review decision right and then you say at the top of page three yes
02:06:56 you say at the top of page three yes they the firemen are there they know you're there they're going to come and find you okay there's just lots of floors isn't there that's the trouble did you have any specific information to
02:07:09 did you have any specific information to be able to assure that caller that the crews actually knew that that caller was there awaiting rescue I think they they knew there were people trapped on that
02:07:20 knew there were people trapped on that floor do you know so but but you didn't have any updated information nothing to be able to tell him that no
02:07:37 halfway down page five the caller says fireballs fireballs there's fireballs
02:07:48 fireballs fireballs there's fireballs they're falling down on us what's falling down fireballs and you say fireballs are falling down what passed your window yeah oh you'll have to keep away from that you did say you had a
02:07:59 away from that you did say you had a window and you go on to explore that on this fireballs question did what what did you what impression did you get at the fire at this point when when the
02:08:10 the fire at this point when when the caller told you there were fireballs falling down I had no idea what that could be right did you relay that information on to anybody else in the control room that there were fire balls falling glue right is there a reason why
02:08:22 falling glue right is there a reason why you didn't do that they'd have seen the unseen presumably there's fire balls falling down that was more you know something they would know unseen I
02:08:33 something they would know unseen I thought that was enough information really I think no that I didn't think it would make any difference to anybody in the control room that there were fire balls okay
02:08:49 [Music]
02:08:53 just going back to page three after your you give them the assurance that the crews know you're there the top of the page you're asked by the caller is it
02:09:05 page you're asked by the caller is it all right
02:09:06 all right and you say pardon is it all going well and you say I can't hear what you're say is the fire being something yeah they're putting the fire out they're trying to put the fire out
02:09:17 put the fire out okay okay did what information did you have to be able to answer his question is it all going well with it with what
02:09:30 is it all going well with it with what you tell him yeah they're putting the fire out they're trying to put the fire out what information did you have from the fire ground about that no it's just an expectation with experience fire crews on scene right so the assurance that you gave him were you satisfied in
02:09:42 that you gave him were you satisfied in your own mind that it was reliable I knew the firefighters would be doing their best right is that quite the same thing as saying they're putting the fire out maybe not but it's all I could say
02:09:53 out maybe not but it's all I could say at the time okay
02:10:00 did you have any thoughts in your own head about whether this fire could be tackled at all by this stage I've know I know I had I'm not firefighter I've no
02:10:11 know I had I'm not firefighter I've no idea of the process of it all we see a number of these assurances being given by you and other control room operators
02:10:22 by you and other control room operators at the time and my question really is how could you be sure to give these assurances where you didn't have any solid information back from the fire ground that's just what we do as a
02:10:33 ground that's just what we do as a service there are best to save life extinguish fires and rescue people yes
02:10:47 do you know we'll have a recollection of giving assurances to people which weren't which didn't turn out to be right which meant that they stayed in their flats longer than I thought I
02:10:58 their flats longer than I thought I should have done I don't know can I turn to a different call which is you taking a call from the London Ambulance Service this is control report 54 page 54 - page
02:11:10 this is control report 54 page 54 - page 1 sorry at 150 256 so page 54 at 150 256
02:11:26 1 sorry at 150 256 so page 54 at 150 256 CRE Oh God takes a call from the London Ambulance Service who inform her that they're making the green filter for a significant incident do you have a recollection of that no okay did you pass that information on
02:11:39 no okay did you pass that information on to anyone that the LA s were making the Grenfell tower a significant incident I wouldn't have thought so now why is that we we would go by our own if we declare
02:11:53 we we would go by our own if we declare it ourselves a major incident that's what we'd act upon the ambulance service made significant as already major I presume from our point of view so I
02:12:04 presume from our point of view so I think nearly everything from the London Fire Brigade was attending anyway so
02:12:19 but can I ask you to look then at the second hour o RR which is lfb for 8 to 8 page 139
02:12:40 I want to just show you a call taking the o2 a 925
02:13:00 and they said CRO God takes a call at Brigade control from the MPS control room reporting that they have received an abandoned call from a female to his trap with her son in flat one one five
02:13:11 trap with her son in flat one one five and states that she does not know where the exits are the MPS CRA gives a CID reference number of five four three the MPS CRA informs erm gots that his supervisor is reporting that they're
02:13:23 supervisor is reporting that they're getting lots of calls from people trapped in the building and asks if there is any advice that they can give to callers Sierra got States to close windows block up doors but if windows offer hair than open them the MPS
02:13:34 offer hair than open them the MPS confirmed that the brigade and not directing people to fire exits the co gots explains they do not know where the exits are that she has spoken to a few people who have left but have been but have had to return to their flats because of the amount of smoke Ciarra
02:13:47 because of the amount of smoke Ciarra gots explains that as far as unpredictable the breguet do not generally tell people to leave but if they think they can leave safely then they should do so the MPS CRO asked Sara Goss if she can arrange for the brigade CRN supervisor to speak to the NPS
02:13:59 CRN supervisor to speak to the NPS supervisor in the NPS control room so he already got says she will try but says it's very busy at the moment now first of all do you have any independent recollection of that call no I don't you
02:14:13 recollection of that call no I don't you know you're being asked by the Met for what safety advice to pass on
02:14:26 and you say you don't know where the fire exits are this is now 212 so well over an hour into this escalating incident is it right really that you didn't know even by this point that
02:14:37 didn't know even by this point that there was a leus a single exit route out of the building down the main stairs or the only stairs no I didn't know you didn't even an hour into this incident you didn't know that okay we don't see
02:14:51 you didn't know that okay we don't see you or anybody else in the control room pressing the command unit for updated information as to what the conditions were in the stairs and lobbies at different levels is that something you
02:15:03 different levels is that something you thought of doing at this stage when you were asked by the met as to what advice to give callers not something I would have thought of doing do you know whether anybody else did no I don't know right
02:15:13 right did you consult with a supervisor in the room or anybody in the room about what advice to give them at when they asked no I can't remember I would've thought I
02:15:24 no I can't remember I would've thought I would have said to someone that met wanted information but I can't remember if I did or not under normal circumstances I would have done but I can't remember if I did on that occasion now we know that group manager Welch
02:15:38 now we know that group manager Welch declared the fire a major incident but 2:07 also learned about them did you know that at that time or roundabout at that time okay
02:15:53 would you have been able to see it on the vision log yes if I'd time to look at it right I didn't go through the log if it was up on the service request on may you have noticed it Sharon possibly
02:16:06 may you have noticed it Sharon possibly would have shouted that out right but again I don't know if I was busier than something else I might not hurt do you do you have any recollection of changing your advice or approach now I can't really remember the night that's all to
02:16:18 really remember the night that's all to be fair right now can I tend to a slightly different topic which is the change in the stay-put advice if you go to your witness statement at page 7 missus course you say in the first main
02:16:35 missus course you say in the first main paragraph there initially the advice to give residents was to remain I remember at some point in the night someone shouts that the advice was to get out I do not know what time this was said
02:16:54 on the transcripts we've seen you were in fact telling people to get out if they felt they could do so safely so why did you do that if the advice was as you said to remain so if I was telling
02:17:13 said to remain so if I was telling people to get sacked I could do suicide do so safely we've seen a number of transfer you've set you in various different ways you say well I can't really advise you you know if you can get out get out but here you say the
02:17:25 get out get out but here you say the initially the advice to give residents was to remain just does that mean that you weren't telling people to remain or you were initially well it wasn't it
02:17:41 you were initially well it wasn't it before make pumps 25 for me I see so initially means right at the very start when it changed soon after that I me for me I I don't know what everybody
02:17:52 me for me I I don't know what everybody else was can I just ask are you speaking here about what you was saying to people or what the standard advice standard really I think I see okay now
02:18:04 standard really I think I see okay now still on page seven of your statement you stated the second paragraph at the end you say you say by that point in the night FSG advice was pointless and what
02:18:16 night FSG advice was pointless and what point in the night are you referring to there much later on awesome right much later what do you say much later was that after the advice had changed from sleep now I mean much much later after
02:18:29 sleep now I mean much much later after dawn do you think possibly yes right could you see door do you have an exterior window so you could see he does he did right I don't remember you know all the sudden we realized it was like
02:18:45 now the control debrief notes that we looked at before say and I didn't necessarily need to take you back to that say that the advice was changed at 2:35 a.m. does that accord with your
02:18:56 2:35 a.m. does that accord with your recollection no idea no idea do you remember whether the change in statehood advice was communicated to you I just remembered somebody sign tell
02:19:08 I just remembered somebody sign tell them to get yourself cuz it told to you personally I I thought someone just walk past me and said yeah I'm not sure it'll read to me directly or if it was a
02:19:19 read to me directly or if it was a general announcement and do you know who that was do you remember who that was not no not a hundred percent no did anybody come up to you with a piece of
02:19:30 anybody come up to you with a piece of paper saying change the advice to stay put no no no piece of pipe you sure about that I don't think so did anybody advise you as to what to call what to tell the
02:19:41 as to what to call what to tell the callers I don't remember that happened right do you remember being told to give advice to put wet towels over mouth hold
02:19:53 advice to put wet towels over mouth hold hands stay together get out could be last chart right okay and just sorry to press the point do you remember ever being told to tell people to get out at all costs or come what may
02:20:06 to get out at all costs or come what may or it could be their last chance I can't remember do you remember being told that firefighters were having any kind of difficulty rescuing people or getting to people above a particular floor
02:20:21 I think I heard someone say that they're not going to get to them all something along those lines you know who said that wrong
02:20:30 wrong remember roughly when that was no idea okay now let me just put a 1 put one or two calls to you control report page 96
02:20:56 which is a call you took up to 240 to 14
02:21:12 with persons in flat 183 on the 18th floor and if we get the summary up its
02:21:28 to 42-14 CRO God's takes a call from a male caller who asked for a helicopter to rescue them as they're going to die he states that there are nine people in flat one five three on the 18th floor and that one five two is a light Sierra
02:21:41 and that one five two is a light Sierra got asks if the caller can move away from the side of the flat next to one five two and suggest that the call of blocks like where the smoke is coming in the caller states that they are trying but no one is helping them and that they need to be evacuated the caller says
02:21:53 need to be evacuated the caller says that smoke is coming into the flat and CRO got States's if they cannot leave then they will need to block up the smoke he's a block up where the smoke is coming in from Sierra Goss explains that she will pass the information to the
02:22:05 she will pass the information to the crews the caller says thank you goes off the line call duration three minutes 38 seconds just noting the timestamp of to 42-14 wisconsin I know it's difficult mr. Scott's to remember do you know if
02:22:18 mr. Scott's to remember do you know if by this time you'd been told about the change to the stay-put advice I don't know when I was told you find out that they're in flat one five three and there are nine of them and that one five two
02:22:32 are nine of them and that one five two is on fire and you also find out that nobody is trying to evacuate them and then you discover that they're on the
02:22:43 then you discover that they're on the 18th floor
02:22:48 is there a reason why you didn't tell them to get out at all costs or they might die I can only assume that it sounded to me as if they couldn't you
02:22:59 sounded to me as if they couldn't you know right did you know by this time that crews were having difficulty getting above the 15th floor you say Miss even see this
02:23:15 15th floor you say Miss even see this from the summary that you explained that you will pass information to the crews
02:23:22 what did you have in mind that you were going to do in order to get alert the crews to the situation well just go over check what the information has gone over right did you do that yes all my calls I
02:23:35 right did you do that yes all my calls I wouldn't check that the information went over right how did you do how did you check when either to the station manager made sure these calls gone through to the command unit right what did you look at to check it's white board and spoke
02:23:47 at to check it's white board and spoke to him he was on the phone a lot as well you know at the same time did you speak to Jason Olaf while he was on the call to reinforce the urgency apples you said
02:23:59 to reinforce the urgency apples you said you spoke to him say well yeah I did speak to him during the night but is whether about that specific one or not no but in general terms did you interrupt his call and speak to him while he was on on earth it's erupted his calls exactly but it okay
02:24:14 oh and when you
02:24:21 yeah
02:24:26 did you have any idea at this point only for money idea at this point as to how realistic it was that Cruz would be able to go up to the 18th floor this is now 242 no definite knowledge that that
02:24:40 242 no definite knowledge that that weren't going to get out there so again was this an assumption that they would do all they could yes I always do know
02:24:51 do all they could yes I always do know if I can know I'm looking at the time mr. chairman great so I'm not quite finished I have a few questions to ask but I'm not sure that we're going to finish with them
02:25:02 that we're going to finish with them within five minutes what's realistic I think probably about 15 or 20 minutes more and then then there may be no further further questions I'm anxious
02:25:16 further further questions I'm anxious not to ask you to sit late it may be no but you see should we find out you've
02:25:28 but you see should we find out you've heard counsel hasn't quite finished asking questions no the alternatives are that we have a few minutes break because you've been giving evidence for another hours say without a break so we have a short break and then we continue for
02:25:40 short break and then we continue for another 20 minutes and finish your evidence well it's the perhaps more realistic half an hour and we finish our evidence tonight the alternative is that
02:25:51 evidence tonight the alternative is that you we have to ask you to come back tomorrow do you have a personal rather finish tonight that's something I'm not surprised to hear you say that right
02:26:04 right this is Jonah I'm in your hands I personally prefer to finish tonight I think we've probably also witness who's an important witness but I've seen important ways who needs a bit of a break yeah right so we'll have five minute break to go in
02:26:17 we'll have five minute break to go in the action and let's not talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room could you come back 25 - or just after
02:26:37 mr. millet I'm prepared to sit on a bit but I think that we are reaching that time in the day when yes everyone's concentration is beginning to be a bit text well I agree and that's why I was
02:26:48 text well I agree and that's why I was suggesting a rising now but I'm it's convenient well it's always important that the witness is comfortable we get the best everything you said 15 to 20 if
02:27:03 the best everything you said 15 to 20 if I can be 15 minutes then that will allow a little bit of time but I don't want to rush know the process and I think in fairness to everyone we ought to have some sort of cut off words people can
02:27:14 some sort of cut off words people can work to it and I think that's gonna be five o'clock very good absolutely others who may see obviously want to consider about supplementary questions will
02:27:26 about supplementary questions will obviously go through the usual process give you a chance to raise them in mister minute but we've all got to work with in a sensible deadline decisions okay alright so I'm going to sit again
02:27:37 okay alright so I'm going to sit again at 25 to all very shortly after they're good and we'll regard a five o'clock as a deadline all right
02:35:03 alright see God thank you yes this is God's thank you for coming back to us and I'm just going to ask you one or two questions are one or two more calls first can you please go to page 57
02:35:16 calls first can you please go to page 57 of the control report which is earlier on in the night a little bit earlier on the night that way we got to 150 745 you
02:35:29 the night that way we got to 150 745 you take a call from a caller who reports that they've tried to get out but it's full of smoke and they cannot breathe CR Agha's asks the caller to confirm they cannot get out several times which the caller confirms repeatedly Sierra
02:35:41 the caller confirms repeatedly Sierra got sense suggests that the caller block the doors to try to smoke stop the smoke from getting in and double checks that the caller cannot leave the flat she says the best thing to do is to stay where he is and try and block the smoke Sierra got asked the flat number and the
02:35:52 Sierra got asked the flat number and the caller States is flat in 92 which is on the 12th floor Sierra got send confirms that this message will be passed over the brigade we'll get to them as soon as they can
02:36:00 they can then the kadhi call lasts two minutes 14 seconds um do you remember this call particularly ma okay do you remember taking a call from a child at any point
02:36:12 taking a call from a child at any point no you don't know right no recollection of taking a call from from anybody it was a child said they were a child no I don't really get next page is page 106
02:36:27 don't really get next page is page 106 in the same report no
02:36:41 this is a call at 251 38 where you make a call to a number given by sorry FRS at 2 48 49 we need to see that male answers
02:36:55 2 48 49 we need to see that male answers the phone and is very distressed and shouts that the flames are coming from next door say arya gots covers tells him to cover himself with wet towels and get out he asked us she is serious and states that he's 67 years of age Sierra
02:37:08 states that he's 67 years of age Sierra got asks if a neighbor can help him but the caller says is no one up there and the call cuts off did you pass information on to Jason early for the
02:37:23 information on to Jason early for the whiteboard and therefore on to the can the incident ground that this was a caller who was elderly and therefore unable himself to exit without assistance no I don't remember sign
02:37:39 assistance no I don't remember sign about anybody being elderly right at all during the note I don't remember that call I don't generally speaking do you remember taking calls from people who
02:37:51 remember taking calls from people who were who were unable to exit without assistance because of their age or other difficulties I don't remember and being told that I don't remember okay
02:38:04 on a similar theme if I can ask you to go back to the call we looked at earlier at 154 from flat 205 you remember we
02:38:16 at 154 from flat 205 you remember we looked at that that's so transcript 3 3 3
02:38:27 we looked at this earlier on house is better just to go back to the transcript so you've got it in front of you
02:38:52 there it if there it is and you're told in the first third of that page yeah we're in the building we're in the building everyone knows
02:39:03 we're in the building everyone knows we're in 205 there's seven of us here the fire starting to rise to 205 now and we've got nowhere to go and then two-thirds of the way down the
02:39:14 and then two-thirds of the way down the page or halfway down the page you're told we're stuck caller there's no way where the flats already full of smoke can't go out where we're stuck now we've
02:39:25 can't go out where we're stuck now we've seen that you didn't explore means of access with them did you did you when people told you that they were stuck did you think at the time that it was
02:39:36 you think at the time that it was important to establish why they were stuck because of the amount of calls the fact that I was stuck he's all I needed to know I felt at the time can people be
02:39:50 to know I felt at the time can people be stuck for the purposes of FSG for a number of reasons not just the conditions but also because of their own mobility issues or age or matters of
02:40:01 mobility issues or age or matters of that nature no I I don't really know I didn't explore that as you know I assumed he just he just meant as I say they normally mentioned that themselves
02:40:13 they normally mentioned that themselves yes was it in these circumstances was it relevant or important to establish with the callers whether it was mobility issues or age matters of that nature
02:40:24 issues or age matters of that nature which were causing them to be stuck maybe it could have been but the amount of calls and the speed of which we were working is just immense and the mates
02:40:36 working is just immense and the mates workload could have explored it more afraid I didn't now coming back to the timing of the statehood advice I'd like
02:40:49 timing of the statehood advice I'd like you to look please at the same report control report page 102
02:41:00 and at the foot of that page you could see a call at two 4849 you take a call from sorry FRS who have had another call from the daughter-in-law of a resident who's trapped on the 22nd floor the
02:41:12 who's trapped on the 22nd floor the sorry CRA passes the mobile phone number of the resident and asks of CRE Oh God's could give him a ring Ciarra gots confirms that we have just been told to tell people to put wet cloths over their
02:41:23 tell people to put wet cloths over their mouths mouth and try to get out and the sorry CRA responds by explaining that the resident is 70 years old incident number and then kill duration 1 minute 43 seconds now it's a timing question
02:41:36 43 seconds now it's a timing question I'm after your your you say that we have just been told to tell people to put wet cloths over their mouths and try to get out and the time there is
02:41:47 and try to get out and the time there is to 4841 can we be sure therefore that by that time at the latest you have been told you about change in advice yes a
02:41:58 told you about change in advice yes a muscle okay did you know if sorry was aware of the change in advice already where before you tell them about that
02:42:08 then let's look at another call you took after that some seven minutes later page 239 of the second hour or hour
02:42:19 239 of the second hour or hour transcript this time so not the control report but the second our IRR for 8 to 8 page 239
02:42:36 mr.
02:42:47 and this is at 2:55 38 so bottom of the page
02:42:52 page CRA gots takes a call from a male caller in flat 183 on the 21st floor who states that they cannot get out because it's too smoky
02:43:00 too smoky cierra Goss says that they need to put wet towels over themselves and leave the flat but the caller explains that they cannot cierra gots then it asks if they can block up where the smoke is coming in or get to a window that can provide
02:43:11 in or get to a window that can provide fresh air and the caller states that that is what they're doing that there are three kids three adults and one heavily pregnant wife cierra gots confirms and states that she will let the crews know the call duration woman is 17 seconds now my question is having
02:43:25 is 17 seconds now my question is having shown you the summary mrs. Scott's given that you'd been told by 247 as we've just seen to tell the occupants to get out can you help us with why you told these callers once they said they
02:43:37 these callers once they said they couldn't get out to block up the smoke or where this mate was coming in instead of spelling out to them that they must make all efforts at all costs to leave I think I took their word that they explained they cannot get out you took
02:43:51 explained they cannot get out you took them at their word you didn't see didn't see to it maybe should have repeated it again did you did yes did you understand fully what the effect of the change of
02:44:02 fully what the effect of the change of advice was that you were supposed to pass on to callers but they must get out it's their only child yes I should have said it more forcefully maybe did you seek or help you seek help or advice
02:44:15 seek or help you seek help or advice from a supervisor as to how to handle this call given that the advice was get them out
02:44:20 them out tell them to get out but they were telling them telling you they couldn't explain that what they needed to do and they said they couldn't I took them that they weren't there the fact that they
02:44:31 they weren't there the fact that they couldn't no I understood them to know the situation outside better than me I'm afraid and by that time did you know that or were you told that crews weren't
02:44:44 that or were you told that crews weren't accessing the higher floors I don't know when people talk about and again same question as before when you told them that you would let the firemen know what did you have in mind that you
02:44:57 know what did you have in mind that you were that you were going to do checking that the information had been passed over
02:45:00 over right did you did you pass they checked everything had gone over and who did you check them check with station manager hold it
02:45:12 now there's a call to turning to a later call but call it 308 56 from flat 193 on the 22nd floor and can I take you to
02:45:25 the 22nd floor and can I take you to that summary on page 22 of the controller 122 on the control of the control report
02:45:39 at the top of the page this is the summary and we'll look at the transcript at the top of the page CRE of gods and says takes a call from the corner in flat 193 on the 22nd floor reporting
02:45:50 flat 193 on the 22nd floor reporting that they are burning the caller asks if they can escape through a big window on a helicopter and CRO God's explains the brigade is sending big ladders the caller says they can get out of Sierra God sends a helicopter while the 20
02:46:02 God sends a helicopter while the 20 people will die the CRO God's tells the caller that she will let the crews know the caller keeps screaming and shouting Sara God's repeatedly tries to get the caller to leave the building covering themselves with wet towels now I'd like
02:46:18 themselves with wet towels now I'd like just to look at parts of the transcript with you it's lfb 406 and as you can see
02:46:30 with you it's lfb 406 and as you can see from the top right it's a call at 300 300 856 the transcript runs to some 6
02:46:42 300 856 the transcript runs to some 6 pages or so except just over 6 pages if I can show you page 2 first of all
02:46:57 you're asked a third of the way down can we escape to a helicopter to leave and then there is and then say why are you
02:47:08 then there is and then say why are you able to get some air from where there's no the side where there's no fire no nobody something inaudible words sorry several inaudible words helicopter I can see the helicopter can we escape from the helicopter please no
02:47:21 we escape from the helicopter please no well we're coming up to you inside they're sending ya some further big ladders okay sorry yes yes yes we can they're sending more
02:47:32 yes yes yes we can they're sending more ladders so what flat number are you in what one nine three one nine three from the window we can escape can you send us the helicopter please okay what floor
02:47:43 the helicopter please okay what floor are you on and there's a discussion about about the floor now but just on that exchange big ladders were coming
02:47:57 that exchange big ladders were coming did you have any information in your hands when you made when you took this call that the lfb was actually sending big ladders which would be able to
02:48:08 big ladders which would be able to access this high floor no I don't know why I said that right so does that mean that you didn't have a basis for telling
02:48:20 that you didn't have a basis for telling them now afraid not not right
02:48:35 at the time of this call so it is 308 the advice to track residents have been changed to immediate evacuation did you know whether this family had
02:48:47 did you know whether this family had previously been given any advice to evacuate nah didn't know you didn't did you consider the impact that telling these callers that ladders were being
02:48:58 these callers that ladders were being brought would have on any earlier advice which might have been given to get out
02:49:06 now we've seen a little bit of a discussion about helicopters discontinuing on page three top of the page I've just shown you that you're
02:49:18 page I've just shown you that you're asked can you send us the helicopter please okay you say what floor are you on
02:49:23 on and then you've discussed the floor 22nd floor okay I'll let them know and then you say if you need that okay but if you if you're sure you can't get out the
02:49:34 if you're sure you can't get out the other way yeah yeah then there's discussion about towels and then at the bottom of page four helicopter helicopter 20 people are dying please
02:49:45 helicopter 20 people are dying please and then there's further discussion on page 5 and then on page 6 after they're sending all ladders but in the meantime
02:49:58 sending all ladders but in the meantime try and soak all your towels and then in the middle of the page of quarters yes yes if you send a helicopter we can escape and you say ok alright well I'll pass that over please to let them know
02:50:09 pass that over please to let them know where you are ok now you've seen all or most of the transcript you the last words or discussion about helicopter are
02:50:22 words or discussion about helicopter are if you send a helicopter we can escape ok all right with our past
02:50:28 did you did you mean to leave them with an impression that the helicopter would come and save them not really now attack me did you what did you actually think would happen with a helicopter
02:50:40 would happen with a helicopter well the helicopter rescue was actually realistic I didn't know I assumed it wasn't because it tends to fan the flames though right is there a reason why you didn't tell
02:50:52 is there a reason why you didn't tell these corners look you're not gonna be rescued by a helicopter so forget that you've got to get out I don't know I suppose I just didn't want to send them
02:51:05 suppose I just didn't want to send them in too much of a panic but because they seemed to think that was their only but maybe I should have pressed more with the whip tails
02:51:20 right
02:51:26 this is God's thank you you've been extremely patient with my questions I have named up no more questions for this witness mr. chairman well do we need to take a few minutes and theater than it is sensible to do that I think so yeah
02:51:37 is sensible to do that I think so yeah music got it it's just possible there may be one or two more questions so it will arise for two or three minutes
02:52:00 as minutes I say no more than five minutes you will understand that if it's less I should be pleased
02:55:29 Thank You mrs. goose I don't know whether there are more question there are a couple more good there I hope pretty support first of all can I ask you to be shamed please page seven of
02:55:40 you to be shamed please page seven of your witness statement and in the middle of the page at the end of the paragraph you say I also remember there was a red
02:55:52 you say I also remember there was a red phone that rang incessantly I think it was bt advising us there were calls outstanding you say you think it was bt can I ask you this red phone where does
02:56:03 can I ask you this red phone where does it sit in the control room it's Sal I think it's like between Debbie reel and Alex Norman right now do you know what it does normally I've asked since because the noise was
02:56:15 asked since because the noise was terrible
02:56:16 terrible right and I think it's the beats a critical 9bt critical but it was ringing all the time did you know that on the night or was not it's just awful and you say it rang incessantly what did people
02:56:27 say it rang incessantly what did people ever answer it yeah I believe they did with them free right did you see that for yourself no I wouldn't be looking at like your mom's doing okay you say it rang incessantly all night does it mean it was it answered incessantly all night
02:56:39 it was it answered incessantly all night reality what aren't Sippy of course having to ring in quite a while everybody's really busy but whose responsibility was it to answer the beating the supervisors right did you and you didn't see who that was now can
02:56:54 and you didn't see who that was now can I just ask you then about two calls one at 3:12 56 in one of 333 46 which is in the control room report we've got at
02:57:06 the control room report we've got at pages 1 to 4 and 137 I'll take the first one because it's probably the simplest page 1 2 4 and at 3:12 56 you take a
02:57:23 page 1 2 4 and at 3:12 56 you take a call from a male caller in flat 133 on the 16th floor there's a smoke alarm audible in the background Ciarra gods asks if he's tried to get out the caller says he's nearly fainting
02:57:35 out the caller says he's nearly fainting Sierra got repeats the advice to cover themselves with wet towels and get out Saragossa keeps trying encouraged him to leave and asks who he is we don't who is with corner replies that he's in the flat with his wife the
02:57:47 that he's in the flat with his wife the corner is struggling to breathe and says they've tried to leave twice and Sierra got asked as he's blocked everything up Sierra got says he will tell the crews but repeats the advice to leave at that stage 3:12 that's long sometime after
02:58:00 stage 3:12 that's long sometime after the de statehood advice has changed did you believe at that time that the firefighters could actually get to the 16th floor I didn't know you didn't know
02:58:13 16th floor I didn't know you didn't know did you did you think that at that stage rescue from the 16th floor was unlikely at best I didn't know he didn't was it was it obvious to you that you should
02:58:24 was it obvious to you that you should have told him that he's got to get out at all costs they had to get out at all cost and I have told him a few times to have a certain yep did you know we've had some evidence
02:58:37 did you know we've had some evidence from Peter Dudley last week that he was telling people after 242 there are a number of instances that he was giving very clear advice to get out in his in
02:58:49 very clear advice to get out in his in his way
02:58:50 his way did you hear him do that did you hear him tell callers assertively that come what may they have to leave no you didn't right
02:59:06 mrs. God's I have no further questions for you they're all the further questions I had then he remains to me - thank you very much for enduring my questions and assisting the enquiring we're very very grateful
02:59:18 the enquiring we're very very grateful to you and I'm sorry that we've kept you late yes okay thank you very much thank you very much for coming into Dawson just said I'm sorry we've kept you and everybody else from the latest evening
02:59:44 well I'm sorry to have kept you all even later than I said I would but that's the end for today and we'll resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow Terra Gotham all right thank you