Alex Norman (LFB Operations Manager) gives evidence about control room operations. Describes learning her role 'on the job' with no formal training, handling 8-9 FSG calls at Adair Tower in 2015, and training focused heavily on new Vision mobilizing system rather than FSG handling. Admits no training on assessing whether callers should evacuate.
00:00:16 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing which we are going to start hearing from controllers stop I think yes mr. chairman we are and our first
00:00:27 yes mr. chairman we are and our first witness from the control room is Alex Norman where she can please be called
00:01:01 and repeat after me I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shot shall be the truth the whole truth thank
00:01:17 shall be the truth the whole truth thank you very much the producer done before to make yourself yes good morning miss Melanie can I start by asking you please to give
00:01:28 can I start by asking you please to give your full name to the enquiry Alexandre Louise Norman thank you and thank you very much I should say first of all for coming here today and assisting us with our investigations we're very grateful
00:01:39 our investigations we're very grateful to you for doing that my questions are and I say this to all all witnesses my questions are intended to be short and simple sometimes they're not so if you want me to repeat a question or put it in a different way and very happy to do
00:01:50 in a different way and very happy to do that
00:01:50 that similarly if you need a break at any time just signal and we can take a break okay okay thank you now first of all we have your witness statement dated the 15th of October 2017
00:02:01 statement dated the 15th of October 2017 and the reference to that is M et quadruple zero eight zero five eight nine it's in a blue folder in front of you on the desk or perhaps better and
00:02:12 you on the desk or perhaps better and it's also displayed on a monitor on your desk on your right we'll be looking at that yeah we also I think have another statement with no date on it which is M et quadruple zero five one nine nine
00:02:28 which is there do you remember when you created or produced that document yeah so it initially I started producing that
00:02:42 so it initially I started producing that a few days after the fire and took me about a week to actually write it up did anybody ask you to write that I was told I had to make a statement I can't
00:02:53 I had to make a statement I can't remember who told me it I know that the NFB wants his statements as well from people when when you did this one the second one did you use a document to refresh your recollection of the exact
00:03:05 refresh your recollection of the exact times that you've set out in me I use the instant report just to get the times of things that I've actually specific times in there right you say you use the incident report is that something
00:03:16 incident report is that something created by the NFB it's on the vision mobilizing system so I've got access to actually look at it I see okay we've got something called the short incident log and we'll be looking at that but is that what you mean yeah
00:03:27 at that but is that what you mean yeah it's a longer look than that yes the long incident all right now going back to your statement your your witness statement you gave to the police on the 15th of October 2017 my question is have
00:03:38 15th of October 2017 my question is have you read it recently yes I have and can you confirm that its contents are true there are some bits in there that I'm not that aren't quite accurate they're not they don't complete what I actually
00:03:49 not they don't complete what I actually should say this bits missing from it right maybe we'll come yeah we'll come back to those and as we go we can but subject to that can you confirm that the contents of that statement are true yes
00:04:00 contents of that statement are true yes okay thank you similarly with the statement that we've got on the screen that you did a few days later have you read that one recently yes I have and again can you confirm that its contents are true thank you
00:04:11 you have you discussed your statements or all the evidence that you're going to give to the inquiry with anybody without having here thank you can I start them by looking at your role in the NFB at the time you did your
00:04:23 in the NFB at the time you did your statement for the police in October 2017 I think you'd been employed by the lfb for 14 or so years that's right yep and at the time of the fire you held the rank of temporary Operations Manager
00:04:35 rank of temporary Operations Manager that's correct and what's your role now I am a substantive operations manager now so I've been promoted fully into the world and when were you promoted it was I went
00:04:47 and when were you promoted it was I went through a process in March that was from the 1st of April of this year 1st of April this year and before you were a temporary operations manager as you were at June 2017 I think you were an
00:04:59 at June 2017 I think you were an assistant operations manager that's correct yeah and before that a control room officer yes as at June 2014 how long had you been a temporary operations
00:05:10 long had you been a temporary operations manager June 2017 yes as of that date from the August 2016 and
00:05:21 turning then to the training you've had on page 2 of your statement if you could please go to that in the third paragraph down you start by saying I will now talk
00:05:32 down you start by saying I will now talk about training and you say that it's more on-the-job training as you can see there and you say for the operational
00:05:44 there and you say for the operational manager role there is no formal training but again learn through daily experiences with the help from the assistant operations managers on duty
00:05:55 assistant operations managers on duty now did you receive any training to be an assistant operations manager before
00:06:07 an assistant operations manager before you became a temporary operations manager there our training courses that I've attended sort of managing teams leadership roles and things like that but learning the role of assistant
00:06:18 but learning the role of assistant operations manager is experiential you learn on the job with other people supporting you and teaching you yes now in the paragraph that we're looking at in the second from last line you say
00:06:29 in the second from last line you say we've had training for fire survival guidance calls which was three monthly and based on scenarios our OST team know more around the training and development
00:06:41 more around the training and development just as an initial question what's the OST teams the operational separation of support team yeah yeah so they work within the control yes and and as at June 2017 you remember who was on that
00:06:52 June 2017 you remember who was on that or member of that OST oh there's a number of members on that team there's about five or six right then what their names well if you've got one or two of
00:07:03 names well if you've got one or two of them who led it oh I think Joanne Smith was actually in charge of OST and the number of assistant operations managers then work in that area right okay well
00:07:16 then work in that area right okay well maybe we'll come back to that I think later on I'm going to the more important question where you say you had training three months Liam based on scenarios was the training that you had three months really the same every three months or
00:07:28 really the same every three months or did it develop as your experience developed that's one of the parts of the statement aren't actually accurate so what I actually said at the time it was we did workshops with the
00:07:40 time it was we did workshops with the command units so we were facilitating their training more than anything and it was scenario-based so we would get together as a group and talk through an incident a scenario and what we would
00:07:52 incident a scenario and what we would want from them what they would want from us
00:07:54 us communication wise and that was on a rolling basis but that was more for them than for us I see and you say it was that was three monthly it was yeah
00:08:05 that was three monthly it was yeah regular was it the same kind of scenario the same kind of lessons yes it was it was just little different command units for more different watches so it was to cover all of them I see did you go
00:08:16 cover all of them I see did you go around London with this training no no they came to a second child yeah did they bring a control/command unit with them they would come on come on Janet yes okay so did you actually do the training on the command unit no we
00:08:28 the training on the command unit no we did in a in a trainee Suites at Merton Road but they would then go down and do stuff themselves on the command unit right I didn't ever get involved in any
00:08:39 right I didn't ever get involved in any of that okay so the idea was that they knew how you worked in you knew how they worked yeah yeah the lessons is try and get an understanding unit yes do just a couple of questions following from from
00:08:50 couple of questions following from from that how many command unit officers would you train or train with their duty before we did you have to command units up at the same time from the same
00:09:01 up at the same time from the same station or different stations only different stations okay it would depends how many they had riding but it was fourth sometimes maybe five but usually about four right and was there a formal package of training that you would share
00:09:14 package of training that you would share and take lessons from or or was it done on a more ad hoc basis it was a formal package I don't recall it all of it to be honest I remember we would have
00:09:26 be honest I remember we would have things like there's a firing a tower block X amount of people calling him it was there was only small amounts of people and sharing the information that we would be giving to them what we would
00:09:38 we would be giving to them what we would be taking from the callers what we want back from them when they were performing their duties what was the maximum number of facet what me ask it this way did you do any training based on scenarios involving fire survival
00:09:50 on scenarios involving fire survival guidance calls we did yeah what was the maximum number of our survival guidance calls that the training packages of training events that you did involved how many of those was my involved in know how many first survival guides
00:10:01 know how many first survival guides calls that a single incident did you two or three it wasn't it wasn't that long right it wasn't a can't remember completely to be honest and can you remember what the last training program
00:10:17 remember what the last training program or event like that was prior to the fire at grenfell I can't Lima the last day I was involved in it but and I think they were still ongoing not too long before
00:10:28 were still ongoing not too long before going failed I wasn't involved in those at the time and do you know who designed the training that you did or shared with the commanded officers it was an assistant operations manager who works
00:10:40 assistant operations manager who works in the control room at that time in an estate but who was that her name's Christine Sharpe Christine Shawn do you know his Christine sharps still employed
00:10:51 know his Christine sharps still employed by the LF feed you know now she's no she's not do you know where she is now she passed away this year I'm sorry right
00:10:57 right did did let me just go back to this question about documents in the months or perhaps a year up to grenfell was the
00:11:08 or perhaps a year up to grenfell was the training you've described contained in a package of documents or or or some kind of computer program I don't know if there was a computer program at all I think it was more paper-based I saw wasn't involved in them but I
00:11:21 I saw wasn't involved in them but I think it changed a bit and I think there were more scenarios because there was some station managers involved as well I believe I was sort of talking about their roles in it and things like that
00:11:32 their roles in it and things like that but as I said I wasn't involved so I can't really yeah so confirm really no
00:11:40 the training other than the training you've discussed where you trained with command unit officers was there any other training that you you did regularly in the months or years
00:11:51 you did regularly in the months or years leading up to the Grenfell tower FSG training or training in general training generally let's start with that in the few years leading up to the fire we were having a new mobilizing system so the
00:12:04 having a new mobilizing system so the majority of our training was focused on learning the new mobilizing system right is that under the mobilization policy this is the new Zeus a new system the
00:12:15 this is the new Zeus a new system the new system yes so we went from we went to a completely different mobilizing system so we had to have a lot of training in that to learn how to use it it was completely different to anything we had before the scientists took a lot
00:12:26 we had before the scientists took a lot of time right when you say system an enemy but just trying to create vision yes I see when when was when was the new vision system introduced you member it
00:12:37 vision system introduced you member it actually went live in November 2015 right and who delivered the training on
00:12:48 right and who delivered the training on the new vision system to to the control room and I actually assisted in delivering that I went into the training team for a few months to help that with that right and so it was the mainly the operational support team and I joined
00:13:01 operational support team and I joined them to assist in the training so the OST delivered it did any external provider have a role in designing or delivering yes initially we were given
00:13:15 delivering yes initially we were given training by a lady from capita who provided the circuit of the system to us it was kind of a train-the-trainer if you like so we were taught how to use it so we could then train the members of
00:13:26 so we could then train the members of staff right I see okay any other third party provider training did what you trained leaving aside the vision system were you trained on policy 790 and
00:13:41 were you trained on policy 790 and policy 539 which are in general terms fire survival guidance I was trained on 539 as part of my new mentions when I first joined which was 2003 and I have sort of been
00:13:57 which was 2003 and I have sort of been developing my own stuff new entrants with that policy 539 790 I don't think I've actually been trained on it we've gone through it in but I've wasn't I was
00:14:10 gone through it in but I've wasn't I was trained on it but I am aware of it right and since or after 2003 did you have any refresher training on policy 39 we had refresher training on in regards to fire
00:14:23 refresher training on in regards to fire survival guidance of it or in general well first of all guys yes we had quite a big training sessions I think it was 2011 2012 was that the last training
00:14:37 2011 2012 was that the last training that you had on FSG yes before Grenville yes but who delivered that training that
00:14:49 yes but who delivered that training that was the OST team again Christine sharp delivered that right did you deliver any FSG training yourself no I didn't know
00:15:03 do you and the seniors receive the training or is there a separate training on FSG for operations managers no we have the same training we all have the
00:15:14 have the same training we all have the same
00:15:17 were you ever trained on how to handle multiple FSGS from a single incident no
00:15:28 multiple FSGS from a single incident no not that I recall were you ever trained on how to assess whether or not a caller should evacuate
00:15:41 whether or not a caller should evacuate or should stay put
00:15:52 have you as a manager ever received any training on how to manage a control room in a large incident of for example 10 pumps or more no that's just been
00:16:06 pumps or more no that's just been experiential learning and would the same apply about training to manage a control room receiving multiple FSG calls yes
00:16:24 where you say and we covered this a moment ago in your statement you say you learn through daily experiences it's good to go back to that it's some third
00:16:35 good to go back to that it's some third paragraph on page two in the third line you say you learn through daily experiences does anyone ever evaluate or assess your your work that you do on a daily basis no no there's no there's no
00:16:49 daily basis no no there's no there's no quality assurance or feedback at your of your work this feedback my lai mangy was give me feedback she felt that I hadn't done something correct all I've done
00:17:00 done something correct all I've done something well I would get feedback from there but no evaluations no no evaluation and the feedback is that formal or informal is informal okay and and when it's informal is it recorded and escalated up through the
00:17:11 and escalated up through the organization or is it just one on one it's just one on one this this it's not recorded anywhere okay now can we turn to look at your experience at the bottom
00:17:23 to look at your experience at the bottom of page two of your statement in the penultimate paragraph second from the bottom you say being in the London Fire
00:17:34 bottom you say being in the London Fire Brigade for over ten years I have had many different experiences and being involved in a lot of fires and you go on to give some examples um and you say
00:17:46 to give some examples um and you say some requiring over 20 pumps yet appliances and multiple resources before the grenfell tower fire can you remember what was the highest number of FSG calls from a single incident that you experienced in any
00:17:58 incident that you experienced in any rank there was a fire at a building called Adair tower in I think it was 2015
00:18:06 2015 I believe it's when I was in training so it would have been around then and we had I think it was eight or nine FSG calls at that time and how many pumps were in attendance at
00:18:21 and how many pumps were in attendance at Odetta
00:18:22 Odetta do you remember it'll be a matter of record I think it was 12 possibly I think it was 12 and can you give us an impression of how the control room dealt
00:18:33 impression of how the control room dealt with eight or nine FSG calls yeah so we had a number of control officers taking the calls it was during the day so we had quite a lot of stuff on duty I was
00:18:45 had quite a lot of stuff on duty I was actually part of a training team but we recall start with a bug and alarm to alert people to come back due to high rates of calls and when that went off I came back and I came into the control room to assist the people were
00:18:59 control room to assist the people were giving the advice safer to stay where they were
00:19:03 they were I don't recall where the fire was to be honest in the building and the supervisors we set up a really good process of where I was creating the
00:19:16 process of where I was creating the information from the control officers and handing it to another AOM who was contacting he was in constant contact with the command unit on the scene and then we were writing him up on a
00:19:27 then we were writing him up on a whiteboard and every time I may were in constant communication with us at that time and we were told of each rescue when they were achieved and we were passing him off the board just say we're
00:19:38 passing him off the board just say we're done so there was yeah I mean a couple of things arising out of that it's very helpful was there a report an incident
00:19:54 helpful was there a report an incident report after a dare Tower which reported on the incident which specifically focused on lessons learnt about handling FSG calls yes so operations managers if
00:20:08 FSG calls yes so operations managers if we get a call that's eight pumps or above we have to fill out a debrief form which is used at the PRC's yes so yes there is one for that there is what's that and can you remember what the in
00:20:19 that and can you remember what the in general terms what the lessons learned from the Adair tower fire so far as FSGS calls are concerned what the FSGS themselves it was more about
00:20:32 the FSGS themselves it was more about that we learnt more about the communication how to communicate with the incident grounds and a process that works of recording for ourselves what was happening and keeping an open line all the time with the command unit which really works well right so the lesson
00:20:45 really works well right so the lesson the lesson you learned was keeping you say an open line with the command unit yes so it's constant information and it was it was two-way it was - I was I was going to come to that so you had no difficulties with getting information
00:20:56 difficulties with getting information back from the incident ground about the effect of the deployments not that I recall
00:21:01 recall I wasn't actually speaking to them the sister operations manager who was speaking to them was getting information back because I say we were crossing it off on the whiteboard when them those flats were cleared who was in charge of
00:21:15 flats were cleared who was in charge of the operate of the control room on that day it was an operations manger Elizabeth hims right
00:21:27 she put that promise there so into place if she sauce you know let's do this and do that and it worked really really well do you know how on that occasion that maybe you don't who the incident commander was no I don't sorry do you
00:21:39 commander was no I don't sorry do you know how who was running the command units yeah on that incident no tactical do you know how effectively the command
00:21:50 do you know how effectively the command unit was able to communicate with the bridgehead of that event no there's a tap lock I see him say there was a it was a tower block yes yeah so there was a bridgehead there yeah you don't know how the communications went between our
00:22:01 how the communications went between our unit of view we don't have any information about that we take we very rarely would get anything back about the communications with the bridge heads being there and do you remember whether
00:22:12 being there and do you remember whether the and I'm sorry to ask you to dig into your memory but do you remember in the case of a dare tower what the standing advice was to residents whether it was
00:22:23 advice was to residents whether it was stay put or evacuate or it was to stay in their premises it was yeah and do you remember whether that advice was changed at any stage during the incident listen do you remember what the basic thrust
00:22:35 do you remember what the basic thrust flavor of the evidence of the advice given to callers was v control room style if there was smoke OPEC affecting their property it was to block the doors
00:22:46 their property it was to block the doors to go children furthest away from the smoke at that point because we had a number of stuff on duty people were able to stay on the line with the corners all the time so they were assessing the situation constantly to see so they were
00:23:01 situation constantly to see so they were on the line on the line to the callers when the crew to be eight crews arrived to rescue them yeah I believe so yeah right and I saw what normally does happen with a fire Survival Guide school were usually on the line until they were rescued yes
00:23:13 rescued yes that was possible with 8 or 9 FS Jesus was it really from what I recall yeah I mean I I couldn't be wrong but I'm sure that is what happens I'm pretty sure did
00:23:24 that is what happens I'm pretty sure did a dare tower the event produce any further training or intelligence within the lfb and so how to handle multiple FSG calls from a single tower block incident and
00:23:35 incident and I'm not that unavailable I don't know you don't know you don't you don't you personally do it on time place they don't know no right you're personally not aware of any I'm personally not aware of any no okay
00:23:48 and I think you you described but your main lesson which was keeping the line open
00:23:55 open between the control room and the command unit that was the key was that the key principle that you two took away from yeah that for me that was yes yeah I'm
00:24:09 yeah that for me that was yes yeah I'm going to assume please correct me if I'm wrong that you and your experience have taken FSG calls yourself yes and and advise the caller yes and made the assessment about whether or not that person's it was safe to leave or
00:24:22 that person's it was safe to leave or not yeah okay I know you're aware I'm going to assume again you're aware of a fire in Southwark in London in 2009 at
00:24:36 fire in Southwark in London in 2009 at lack an old house yes were you involved in that incident no I was that were you involved in the review done by the NFB of the response were you aware have you ever seen the National
00:24:48 aware have you ever seen the National House report no I haven't okay are you aware of the conclusions in general terms in general terms in relation to a first year game yes in relation to FSG
00:24:59 first year game yes in relation to FSG and the only thing that I can recall from that is the advice to leave when it gets to the point where this right you can't keep people safe let me just see
00:25:11 can't keep people safe let me just see if I can ask you to look at that report its hom quadruple zero one one two four
00:25:26 and I'm just going to ask you very briefly about something one or two of its paragraphs it's a 1052 of the master documents bundle and I want you to go please if you were to page 50
00:25:44 [Music]
00:25:51 I just want to show you through just three or four paragraphs for first of all paragraph 293 expectation the
00:26:03 all paragraph 293 expectation the caller's would be rescued and stay put advice and just quickly looking at that it says cos have a clear expectation that fire crews would reach the corners quickly their experience was the fire
00:26:15 quickly their experience was the fire appliances are right quickly and the people are rescued by the brigade this is borne out by the fact that only rarely where FSG is given to people died in fires as rescues by crews were not immediate there was a question whether the co and all callers could have
00:26:27 the co and all callers could have assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat and whether the risk of moving closer to the fire but escaping was less than staying put and awaiting rescue and then this important sentence C has relied on advising callers to stay put
00:26:41 callers to stay put expecting that this would keep calls safe from fire now do you remember ever becoming aware that that was all those were there can some of the conclusions
00:26:52 were there can some of the conclusions from the national house fire I wasn't aware that that was the conclusion from the left and a house fire but that is
00:27:03 the left and a house fire but that is what we actually do expecting that is how we believe most of our fish gee cause that's how and we would you expect them to stay safe here
00:27:20 the question arises as it says whether the control officer or all callers could have assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat was that risk
00:27:33 escape from the flat was that risk something that you ever received training on after Lacan or house other words after 2012 in this case which is the date of the report not that I recall
00:27:47 the date of the report not that I recall looking at the next paragraph I'm trying to take this a bit more quickly many callers mentioned that there was smoke outside their flat or smoke in the corridor preventing escape this may have
00:27:58 corridor preventing escape this may have caused SEOs to move straight into the protect phase of FSG and not explore alternative escape routes who called there's a real risk in attempting a self evacuation from a building on fire but the occupant will move themselves into a
00:28:09 the occupant will move themselves into a position of greater harm rather than waiting for rating in a safe location for rescue that risk again did you ever have training on how to assess that risk after the life after lack of house or
00:28:21 after the life after lack of house or after the date of this report I don't recall having training on it but that is something that I am aware of right and then the next paragraph does pick it up
00:28:36 then the next paragraph does pick it up halfway down moving to protect advice with the intent of keeping the caller safe may not always be the best solution and the call should continue be continually reassessed right there may
00:28:47 continually reassessed right there may be a tendency to limit reassessment due to the protect ethos although there is evidence of some practical handling to take place did you ever have training post lacking house on how will the speed
00:29:01 post lacking house on how will the speed at which to move to protect advice and how you would continually reassess the situation the caller was here did you ever have training on that not that I
00:29:12 ever have training on that not that I recall
00:29:13 recall doesn't mean we didn't I just don't recall having a group and then finally paragraph 296 effective communication between the control and incident command and this may be superseded of course by your own experiences at a tower in 2015
00:29:27 your own experiences at a tower in 2015 but if you look at three lines down in that paragraph control supervisors regularly tried to obtain information about the progress within the incident particularly in relation to call as being given FSG in
00:29:40 relation to call as being given FSG in line with Pratt the practice at the time there was much less information being passed from the incident ground to control about the progress of firefighting and rescue efforts it is not clear of CAS that if Sears had
00:29:51 it is not clear of CAS that if Sears had been given information about progress that it would have influenced the advice given to call us my question is after lactose did you or other control and staff get training on how to get the
00:30:04 staff get training on how to get the best information and the most continual flow of information from the incident ground no not from the estimate we can take that down to in a very general
00:30:15 take that down to in a very general sense as an experienced operations manager as you were at the time of the fire what do you think changed if anything in the control room as a result
00:30:26 anything in the control room as a result of the lessons learnt at Lacan or what do I think changed yes I think that
00:30:37 do I think changed yes I think that would be very hard to say because of the night when Phil was I'm not unlike no other I think there was oh it was quite
00:30:48 other I think there was oh it was quite a tough question um let me try and put it a different way as I have infused it with the reference to Grenfell but leading up to grenfell town yeah if you ignore Brett the event of Graham filters remain in your mind okay if I was to ask
00:31:00 remain in your mind okay if I was to ask you this question on the 13th of June 2017 my question is as a lot as an experienced operations manager running a control room well do you think anything changed in terms of control and practice
00:31:11 changed in terms of control and practice as a result of lack in your house there is more reassessing in calls now I think that's something that's come across it's something we did we did we've always we
00:31:23 something we did we did we've always we assessed in it I think it's more so because of that and always store trying to find alternative escape routes it's something that came out of that and
00:31:36 it's something that came out of that and we'll come to this but you just mentioned I'm always trying to find alternative escape routes and that's something that very much appeared in the report we've just seen yes how reliant
00:31:47 report we've just seen yes how reliant would you be generally as a control room officer on what you are told by the caller about the ability to escape and the conditions in the escape route or
00:31:59 the conditions in the escape route or how much would you attempt to explore the realities with the caller and you have to rely on the caller because we can't see obviously we don't know where
00:32:10 can't see obviously we don't know where they are what they can see and so our information is all based on what the caller is telling us if they there is no means of escape in this situation is getting dire you will always say is
00:32:21 getting dire you will always say is there a back door if it's in a you know house is there a ground floor window you can get out of things like that just looking at means that they may not have considered at the time because if someone's panicking they won't they
00:32:33 someone's panicking they won't they won't think about that sometimes and how would you know what information to get out of the caller which would help you give the right advice about escape routes where the fire is where they are
00:32:45 routes where the fire is where they are in relation to the fire what sort of property they're in and because obviously if they're in high up flats you're not going to ask them to come out the window the layout of their building look questions like that really but also
00:32:58 look questions like that really but also obviously have severe the fire isn't where it's all getting worse and what about what about making an assessment jointly while you're on the phone about the conditions in the escape route
00:33:10 the conditions in the escape route itself that be part the conversation you'd be asking what the conditions are like you know the first thing you'll say is why can't you leave okay there's a fire wherever they are so is that blocking your exit yes it's
00:33:23 so is that blocking your exit yes it's blocking my exit what's looking your exit is it the fire is it the smoke if they're saying the smoke is really thick and it's blocking their exit we'll move them to a place of safety into another room and then start going through okay
00:33:35 room and then start going through okay you know the fiber gate I want awaits you they're coming for you it would also depend on how long that calls going for what the conditions are like when they were in there to what extent would
00:33:46 they were in there to what extent would you and giving that advice on the assessment of the escape route what extent would you also take into account or look for information coming back from the incident ground about the conditions in the in the escape route I don't
00:34:01 in the in the escape route I don't actually think we necessarily would we don't usually get information back on a fire survive and Gardens caught when they're actually in on progress to it we're giving them information first we know about anything like that we would
00:34:13 know about anything like that we would obviously tell them the conditions and where the corner is but the first thing we know about that is we actually usually if we're on the phone here them being going into the property breaking in calling out you know in the corner
00:34:24 in calling out you know in the corner that they're there and the call or normally would say they're here they're here if you weren't satisfied that you've got enough clear information from the caller about the conditions in the escape route would you as a matter of practice seek
00:34:37 would you as a matter of practice seek that information from the incident ground I never have done before no right would you be able to rely on what other callers in the control room by the
00:34:49 callers in the control room by the control isn't in the control room I think you've had noticeable calls you would take into account what other people are saying Yeah right but that would be by overhearing them would it all bite yeah oh oh what by what people
00:35:01 all bite yeah oh oh what by what people are telling you well I'll see what's the allies that are taking the calls the information they're given to you right about the colors they're handling in your experience and I don't know whether this happened that they're dare Tower
00:35:12 this happened that they're dare Tower was very a base a system or could there be a system whereby that information about developing conditions in this in the escape route or routes could be
00:35:23 the escape route or routes could be connected in one place and then disseminated to all controllers at the same time well how do you mean by asking the control room yes that would be difficult if they were still on calls and stuff all the time because you'd
00:35:34 and stuff all the time because you'd want them to be concentrating on their own calls so I don't believe that is something that we would do they may become aware because you do hear what's going on around you even when you want
00:35:45 going on around you even when you want to call you are aware of what's going on in the control room yes now can I turn to a slightly different topic which is the statehood advice itself and I want to begin by asking you
00:35:59 itself and I want to begin by asking you about policy number 539 which is in our policy bundle at ten three and can I ask you please to be shown page 16 of that which is appendix 3
00:36:18 if review please look at the third paragraph it says brigade control advise called us to get out and stay out
00:36:29 called us to get out and stay out however if a call is received from a high-rise building where fire heat and smoke and not affecting the caller LFP would advise that and then here is what
00:36:40 would advise that and then here is what it looks like the advice you are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire heat or smoke if the situation changes you should leave your premises and our 909 if you need further assistance then it goes on should the
00:36:53 assistance then it goes on should the caller be unable to escape an information file containing prompts are in place on the computer-aided mobilising system to assist the control room officer in providing guidance to assist the caller to safety providing
00:37:05 assist the caller to safety providing timely and relevant information to the attending resources provide reassurance to the caller the help and assistance is forthcoming I've read that all to you and but because it ordered you to see the full context but where it says
00:37:18 the full context but where it says you're usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire heat or smoke etc and do you agree that when you refer to stay put or the state would advise is that the advice to give yes
00:37:31 advise is that the advice to give yes and is your understanding that that is the basic standing advice in respect of most tower blocks residential turbulences if if any block had a
00:37:42 turbulences if if any block had a different standing advice which applied to it how would the control room know that what do you mean if there was an evacuation yes-man or something before
00:37:55 evacuation yes-man or something before the united grenfell i don't believe we would have known that and know yes we do know you do yes how how do you access that information so when we
00:38:07 that information so when we input and address into the mobilising system to vision if a premises has any comments on it or what we call the risk it comes up on the screen in front of you so there are a number of blocks that
00:38:19 you so there are a number of blocks that says evacuation plans in place they're already there for the building what those evacuation plans are we don't know and that was are you saying that wasn't the case priority no now in your
00:38:34 the case priority no now in your experience what do you what is generally understood by the word affected where you say affected by fire heat or smoke now just to be clear I'm not asking if
00:38:46 now just to be clear I'm not asking if your personal understanding of the word but what the general understanding in the control room would be if it's coming into your property right so if the fires
00:38:57 into your property right so if the fires coming into your property or if the heats becoming very intense or if there's smoke coming in through the doors or windows right and what if the smoke hasn't yet come into your property but is approaching and you can see it
00:39:09 but is approaching and you can see it coming towards you would you still think that that person was affected not at that time no not if it actually wasn't affected them their property itself and
00:39:20 affected them their property itself and how would you expect a control room officer to determine if the caller's premises are affected by fire heat or smoke through the questioning of the caller the first thing we say is are you
00:39:34 caller the first thing we say is are you able to leave and they will usually say no if they're not and give the reasons why so they say no there's too much smoke coming in there's smoke outside my door the fires here they're good so we
00:39:48 door the fires here they're good so we would we have questions that we would ask them you know what's stopping you getting the first thing is why can't you leave is that the first thing or would the first thing be are you affected no the first thing is why if the words would be why can't you live Rosi okay
00:40:00 would be why can't you live Rosi okay and to make a determination of whether the callers premises are affected by fire what information normally would you would you ask for is the fire in your
00:40:12 would you ask for is the fire in your property
00:40:13 property yes I know if it's not have you got smoke coming in and you were just the questions you would each question the answer but then later on to further
00:40:24 answer but then later on to further questioning prior to June 2014 what would a control room officer do if they couldn't form a clear picture in their own head about how badly the fire
00:40:35 their own head about how badly the fire was affected by fire heat or smoke in a high-rise in a high-rise we would ask
00:40:46 high-rise in a high-rise we would ask them to say there were two safer to remain where they were unless the actual fire was in their flat whose accident is that even if you even if the CRO couldn't actually form a very clear view about whether that person was affected
00:40:58 about whether that person was affected or not affected I believe so yeah so you defaults to stay put if you weren't sure yeah that's that's why I believe yes okay and would it be normal in your
00:41:09 okay and would it be normal in your experience for any control room officer to tell the caller well it's up to you I can't really advise you whether to leave or not
00:41:20 fire survivor guidance is a guidance so you cough it's not an instruction it's we're advising you that this is the safest option but we believe this is the safest option at this time if people
00:41:33 safest option at this time if people choose to leave it's it's not really normal 7th advise you I don't advise you
00:41:44 it is just it is guidance it's not an instruction yeah people do choose to ignore it and leave but that stands me do I take it from that that actually you're in your
00:41:56 that that actually you're in your experience the role of the control room officer is to assist them as best you can
00:41:59 can they can to make up their minds we will give them the guidance and that we can do the best we can to keep them safe and most of the time they did follow that guidance but yes yeah
00:42:15 guidance but yes yeah I'm turning to FSG are you familiar with at least in general terms policy 539 yeah and what about policy fight 790
00:42:26 yeah and what about policy fight 790 yeah can you help me then with the four principles this is look at the four principles which I think are escaped assess protect and rescue yeah I got
00:42:37 assess protect and rescue yeah I got that right is it escape protects assess and rescue well let's look at yeah that's the fall principles yeah okay what could be recess and it depends which we're talking we look at if you look lower down the same page escape assess protect
00:42:51 down the same page escape assess protect reassess say tell me with that it's first of all escape how would a call
00:43:05 first of all escape how would a call controlling off a second help the caller to assess the means of escape if if the control room doesn't have plans of the building so that would be by questioning
00:43:17 building so that would be by questioning of the caller do you know of any other exits are there any fire escapes would the CRO go straight to the protect phase which is to Dan without considering the
00:43:35 which is to Dan without considering the assess phase I think the assess them they protect sort of coming together so the question would be where is the fire
00:43:46 the question would be where is the fire as it says where are you okay can you move away from the fire so it was all the questions would kind of lead into each other right to move them away from it so dude so the escape phase is the
00:43:58 it so dude so the escape phase is the escape phase and then the assess and protect and are really well on the same thing is that we they need onto each other yeah yeah they're intertwined because it's question answer advice yeah yeah we could where's your you know no
00:44:09 yeah we could where's your you know no no but I'm summarizing your yeah yes Harold yes that's okay um would you ever move on to assess and protect though without absolutely having satisfied
00:44:20 without absolutely having satisfied yourself as a CRA that you have looked at all possible safe alternative escape routes yeah I think you probably would initially you
00:44:31 think you probably would initially you would okay can you get out now why can't you get out and I think the alternative escape routes this all kind of flows into itself it all it's all intertwined
00:44:43 into itself it all it's all intertwined no he'll answer the question slightly differently well in your experience as a control room officer would you move to assess and protect without having satisfied yourself that you looked at all options for a safe alternative
00:44:54 all options for a safe alternative escape first I think that would depend on the caller and the condition of the actual room or area they actually were in at that time because I think I might looking to get them into a safer room
00:45:05 looking to get them into a safer room initially if they were if there was a lot of smoke or fire and to protect them and then once we've got them safe for that time being - they're moving so further questioning about a tentative
00:45:17 further questioning about a tentative escape routes I see ok so the actual actual purpose of pre priority would be making sure the physically safe spaces continue to question emotion from advice yeah but but leaving that on one side
00:45:29 yeah but but leaving that on one side just to just press the point what one more time or question one more time would a CRA having made sure that the caller was safe for the moment with the CRA moved to assess and protect without
00:45:41 CRA moved to assess and protect without first absolutely having satisfied themselves from the information they had that a safe alternative escape wasn't available I think that would be on each individual call that would be judged to
00:45:52 individual call that would be judged to be perfectly honest
00:45:58 and then turning to reassessment it follows reassure the corner British or the corner and reassess the caller situation now we could see some example
00:46:09 situation now we could see some example questions about reassessment you ask those questions how often do you keep asking them in order to to reassess constantly until they rescued right
00:46:20 constantly until they rescued right and then finally rescue I said there were four four principles in fact they look like five actually leading to rescue you say I think what it says that
00:46:32 rescue you say I think what it says that controller officers will remain on the telephone with the caller and assist with rescue doesn't I think what you said earlier is that that requires a constant open line of communications
00:46:43 constant open line of communications with the incident ground so that would be us giving the instant ground all the information we had the layout of the building if we've been able to obtain it where exactly the caller is how many
00:46:55 where exactly the caller is how many people there are with them what window they're out where the windows facing if that assists in any way any information we can give to assist and to save time and that constant line of communication
00:47:09 and that constant line of communication but like why question is is it feasible when you have multiple FSG used to the same incident but you gave us some evidence earlier about about the about a dare tower yeah where is it right
00:47:22 dare tower yeah where is it right constant lines of communication were feasible in that in that incident yeah how were those lines of communication kept open at air tower yes it was an
00:47:34 kept open at air tower yes it was an assistant operations manager on the phone to a command unit the whole time if I survived a guidance command unit and what was the phone you know it was on our X on to I don't know what phone
00:47:46 on our X on to I don't know what phone they were when I believe it's a mobile phone on the command unit but it's on our communication system okay and were those recorded yesterday member yes okay so you didn't use Brigade mobiles never
00:47:58 so you didn't use Brigade mobiles never better not haven't like at your end Matt no I stand do you know whether the CSS on the command you was used at editor no I don't know you don't know you don't know I'm German
00:48:11 don't know you don't know I'm German which command units were deployed together so I have absolutely no recollection of that at all no sorry okay a general question with FSG calls
00:48:23 okay a general question with FSG calls what is your experience as to how information is used FSG information is used once it gets to the incident ground how do you mean well what it goes into
00:48:34 how do you mean well what it goes into the command unit yes what happens normally happens to it after that oh they'll pass it on to whoever's performing the rescues I don't know that would be obviously different it'd be a bridgehead if it was our high-rise if
00:48:47 bridgehead if it was our high-rise if it's a normal premises to be honest to come on June it would fully be there after the pumps have got to them to be honest the first machines would usually get pretty quickly owner normal dwelling fire can I just ask you look to look at
00:49:02 fire can I just ask you look to look at policy 790 which is at at Pfizer bar policies bundle pool and to go to paragraph 9 which is on page 5 and
00:49:17 paragraph 9 which is on page 5 and paragraph 9 one says it is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call the fact that control is aware of the actions being carried out in the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice being given the advice given to
00:49:29 advice being given the advice given to FSG callers informative messages from the incident ground should also contain an update on progress relating to those specific FSG calls by both a flat straight house number to avoid confusion and then 9 3 the outcome of every
00:49:41 and then 9 3 the outcome of every adversity call must be communicated to control I've read those three paragraphs to you in full or taking each one in turn
00:49:51 turn are you aware in your experience prior to ground felt Tower of any event weather could wear control wasn't kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call so as I said most
00:50:05 resolve each FSG call so as I said most FSG calls we actually are on the line to the caller and we actually do hear the crews performing the rescue so we know but they do come back to us pretty clay and tell us that they rescued as an
00:50:17 clay and tell us that they rescued as an informative message they'll give you know the words and then two people rescued one person rescued whatever so when you look at the next sentence the
00:50:28 when you look at the next sentence the fact that control is aware and indeed it gives on to discuss informative messages and then in the next paragraph is your experience that the messages that came back from the incident ground from
00:50:41 back from the incident ground from officers there rather than from the caller came via informative messages yes once the mess q-tipping done yes a word okay would you ever get any information in your experience its back from the
00:50:53 in your experience its back from the incident ground about the status of a rescue while it was ongoing and now I haven't done phone oh right ninety-two says informative messages from the incident ground should also
00:51:04 from the incident ground should also contain an update on progress relating for their specific FSG calls did informative messages ever in your expense experience contain an update on progress or where they only ever sent
00:51:15 progress or where they only ever sent after the rescue is completed after the rescues completed nine three says the outcome of every FSG call must be communicated to the controller and again
00:51:26 communicated to the controller and again I'm summarizing your evidence but am i right in thinking that those came by informative messages yes I see say I
00:51:37 informative messages yes I see say I think we could take from that that in your experience 92 was never complied with as a person as a matter of policy no no no in your statement you could put
00:51:53 no no no in your statement you could put that away at paragraph one on page three and I just asked you to look at that you
00:52:03 say in the fourth line what was if you start with the third line the CRO will raise their hand to notify a supervisor which would be the operations manager or assistant operations manager the supervisor would go and listen to the
00:52:15 supervisor would go and listen to the call via the headset whilst the CRO gives the advice yeah that's also you can also listen to it from our own positions we can monitor their calls from there as well I was going to ask
00:52:27 from there as well I was going to ask you to do with you needed it and that was very good so they can they can I see so you can sit where you're sitting and how do you do that mechanically we've done our weeks we've got buttons where
00:52:39 done our weeks we've got buttons where it's monitor calls and you can select the position they're sitting at and you would just be listening into their call you you can't speak or anything it's just listening it's just from just for listening purposes we do it quite a lot
00:52:51 listening purposes we do it quite a lot and where the CRO wants assistance with the advice given would you be able to do that from where you were sitting now you would know how to do that right yeah oh
00:53:03 would know how to do that right yeah oh sorry no finish your answer oh one of their colleagues were sitting next to them could assist them with it as well I was going to ask you you've used the expression the X the X is our
00:53:20 expression the X the X is our communication system it's an integrative communication system so that's where all of our calls coming on and where the radio works from it's kind of like a sort of switchboard if you like really
00:53:31 sort of switchboard if you like really is where everything comes in on it's a touchscreen so that's where everything comes in and that's where we things we called you to Andre thank you very much thank you so that contains vision visit as well it's a separate system is its
00:53:45 as well it's a separate system is its part of the vision system but it's a separate screen so we have two screens for our mobilising system and then this one touch screen which is on your left hand side of you that's on the other
00:53:57 hand side of you that's on the other screen the other two swings is your two screens got excellent so you have X on one screen and on the screen that's directly in front of you you have your
00:54:08 directly in front of you you have your instant we should called a core collection form will come up and it gives you the boxes where you feel the information in so it will come up with a callers telephone number if it's a landline or kamekona premises
00:54:20 it's a landline or kamekona premises detail but we still always question about the detail because it might not be correct and you put instant details and that's where the risks pop up as well so if any risks as soon as you put an
00:54:32 if any risks as soon as you put an address in the risk will come up in front of you to show if there's any situations in that location you need to be aware of as I say like mass evacuation and that's the control room
00:54:43 evacuation and that's the control room officer that's everybody in the control and to ask you this they're all the same they're all the same yeah right and if you wanted to access vision to see what was being inputted onto it as you went
00:54:54 was being inputted onto it as you went along would you be able to do that through one or other of these screens no I can't see the screens you can't see vision no it's only the eggs I can actually see at the moment so if anybody in the control room wanted to know what
00:55:05 in the control room wanted to know what message had been passed by the radio operator - - and you see that that's in the logs
00:55:10 the logs okay sorry so I thought you might know about the actual address they were putting in know most everyone can see you can see it in the Knox Western plain that's what that that's what I meant but I was I wrong when I refer to this vision now I thought when you meant
00:55:22 vision now I thought when you meant vision I thought you meant you were asking about when we're actually putting details okay same thing to say would you flip from which screen would you use if you wanted to move to look at the logs
00:55:33 you wanted to move to look at the logs you'd use your middle screen right okay sorry time to talk to you again you know refer to a middle screen justice how many of you got in total three right the
00:55:46 many of you got in total three right the X and the other two are the mobilizing system right okay so you've got the eggs on your left yes in front of you you've got what in
00:55:57 yes in front of you you've got what in front of you you've got your main screen so if you're not dealing with a call and incident you have the instant list in front of you which shows all the current instance that were going through at the moment and we have what we call in
00:56:08 moment and we have what we call in try to visualize in there the top right you have what we call it bingo card so it shows all our appliances offices that are available or whatever their statuses are and that's and there's a box next to
00:56:22 are and that's and there's a box next to that as well which is where the service request is going to which is in that top right hand corner and which if you wanted to access the vision or the log on using the vision system which screen
00:56:34 on using the vision system which screen would you use the middle image assuming one um you referred to other incidents going going through I think this is a question and no one has asked yet I'll
00:56:45 question and no one has asked yet I'll try it
00:56:46 try it obviously this is about Grenfell but without other on Siddhant in the control room that night which took from 1 a.m. onwards which with which staff had to deal and they were a couple not to be on
00:56:58 deal and they were a couple not to be on st but we were very very lucky that there wasn't anything else going on that night it was other than obviously grenfell there wasn't no it was quiet in the rest of London now that takes us
00:57:12 the rest of London now that takes us neatly into the night of the fire and I was going to start with the facilities in the control room but we've been going for an hour and mr. Chairman I think that might be an appropriate time for a break yeah that'd be great
00:57:23 break yeah that'd be great would you like a break no that would be really nice nice right can we afford 10 minutes yes thank you please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything related to it
00:57:36 sorry could you just I'm sorry could you just be quiet I'm addressing the witness and you gave the option now we're resuming 22
01:11:50 right could you ask Miss mom to come back in please
01:12:01 [Music]
01:12:11 great the ready to carry on yes yes yes mr. facilities in the control room
01:12:22 mr. facilities in the control room we know the control room was working from the Stratford fallback Center because of routine maintenance at Merton on the night of the fire yes that's correct and if we go to the
01:12:33 yes that's correct and if we go to the control report produced by the LF B which we have a tab 107 of our documents panel and this is lfb quadruple zero
01:12:49 four seven nine zero and I ask you please to go to page 75 in that
01:13:05 I'm sorry 175 in that we should be able to see a picture of the Stratford control room
01:13:24 now I'm just helped us with this control room can you just tell us where he looking at it where you were sitting on the night of the fire I was sitting
01:13:36 the night of the fire I was sitting where the TV is in that middle position just in front of the television show me to point to it yeah that would be helpful if you wouldn't mind it's okay
01:13:50 if the cursor can go to it so that people on live stream can see it you were sitting there and who did you have on your left I had IOM Debbie wheel on my left for
01:14:01 I had IOM Debbie wheel on my left for Debbie rails on your left and was only is there a seat or station on your right yes there was yeah Peter main was sitting there Peter May okay and which is the head table we've heard some evidence about a head table which was that yeah well it's the office of the
01:14:13 that yeah well it's the office of the watched position but we don't call it a head table but that's that's that position there that is that isn't that area there right when Jason Olaf arrived yes
01:14:24 yes where was he sitting or standing he when he was doing the white boards everything he shall point out again in that gap
01:14:37 he shall point out again in that gap what biobot looks like a radiator or window okay was that okay and the white boards were blocked well they against the blank wall they're always there we
01:14:50 the blank wall they're always there we use them for secondary mobilizing we have to use them right and we're just probably where was Sharon Darby as the radio operator sitting sorry we have to
01:15:03 radio operator sitting sorry we have to have to stand there for a bit
01:15:09 I see right and did she have special radio equipment there at that station which nobody else had to save everybody and at the two stations immediately in
01:15:22 and at the two stations immediately in front of us who were sitting there on the night and Angie Gus was on the one to the right Lonnie of Charon and to the right of Angie was Sarah Russell Sarah Russell Angie and Sarah right Missy and can you
01:15:35 Angie and Sarah right Missy and can you just help us who else was sitting where on the night for them to the best of your recollection okay couple of times epoxy was one on the right which seems to be half out of shot I was going to
01:15:46 to be half out of shot I was going to ask you about she was there right
01:16:01 I thought you said anything say either I'm confused I thought you said ng gots was on the right and soldiers and where
01:16:20 was on the right and soldiers and where is Heidi Fox general and what about there seemed to be one two perhaps three stations at the back of the room near
01:16:33 stations at the back of the room near the blind that we can see is it three stations they're talking about yeah yes
01:16:44 stations they're talking about yeah yes yes we've seen there was no one sitting there it was that they were vacant really yeah when we came on duty the ships that were on duty before was sitting there and they were this off as
01:16:57 sitting there and they were this off as a shift flips a switch shift so they they're like a cover shift to say they were there to ten o'clock which is why we didn't use those positions if either
01:17:09 we didn't use those positions if either of the operators in the absolute foreground wanted to communicate with Pete daddy he was sitting at the other sitting as it were one two desks beyond how would they communicate and it would
01:17:21 how would they communicate and it would depend on the volume of noise in the control room so if there wasn't too much noise I would just speak to him directly because it's actually quite small in there all they would go up and speak to him if they weren't taking a call at the
01:17:32 him if they weren't taking a call at the time
01:17:33 time no you helping the chairman understand the screens and the different screens that we have it we can see we just take the chair to the left
01:17:45 the chair to the left which I think with you said was occupied by so to correct me so Russell long but not yes so so there's Christine house and I think on
01:17:57 there's Christine house and I think on the night sitting there the left hand chair right in the foreground she's got there are three screens on the desk yes and just run us through which he thought each screen shows or others so the screen that's on the left that would be
01:18:08 screen that's on the left that would be the X the screen in the middle is the main mobile and main screen for mobilizing so that's where I call a collection forms to come on that's where
01:18:19 collection forms to come on that's where all our offices are our service requests so that's our main screen if you like and the screen on the right and that's where our Mac is it's where if we were
01:18:33 where our Mac is it's where if we were using in emails and things they would come up on that screen it's where the reference information files will come up on there and each operator has a headset
01:18:45 on there and each operator has a headset yes Alice and a microphone attached to the headset that's right what's that plugged into so there are or is it or is it reduced there are so you can't see in
01:19:01 it reduced there are so you can't see in that picture and the headset and microphone are they operable from the screams overly
01:19:12 keyboard or no you're just baked into them everything just comes into your head state you don't need your hands to use your headset you're just talkin No
01:19:29 if you wanted to pass a message to the radio operator sitting where Sharon Davi was and you explained she was in the middle on the left in a normal incident
01:19:42 middle on the left in a normal incident how would a control room officer go about passing a message to the radio operator to send to the command unit via a service request so we typed in to the to the system which system would it be
01:19:53 to the system which system would it be typed into by a CRA into the vision system into the vision system and then that would be sent and it was this right would pop up on it so service request a service request you'd you know you have
01:20:04 service request you'd you know you have an instant open and you there's a thing that says service requests have you got any pictures of the screens at all no no so if there's a tab that says service request so you click on there and it opens up a box and it's a message box so
01:20:17 opens up a box and it's a message box so you type in there initially rt4 and then you'd put the callsign that it needs to go to and type the message that you want to send and then you would press apply
01:20:28 to send and then you would press apply and that then goes into a list and then you would shout to the radio operator message on that last point I was interested in him going to the list would appear on the log yeah but you'd
01:20:39 would appear on the log yeah but you'd have to tell the radio operator that there was a service request is that you wouldn't normally tell them yeah it's just it's just practice that we do would the radio operator not be sitting there watching the vision system ready for the next service request so she could be
01:20:51 next service request so she could be taking another message from somebody else so so no not necessarily just watching the screener no you will come back to this page and in a moment - we
01:21:04 back to this page and in a moment - we don't have to take it away but just going back to your statement you say on your statement in on page two in the second paragraph that the strap for
01:21:15 second paragraph that the strap for control room was smaller and you say you can hear what's going on and it's better for working as a team I've read that out - you haven't gone back to the statement collection did those advantages assist
01:21:29 collection did those advantages assist you in your team on the night of the Granite Belt fire yes I believe they did because we could hear more of the conversations from our range about what the cause we're involving and maybe as a consist of basic
01:21:41 consist of basic and we can look at the layout of the Mersenne control room which is on page 174 that page before Paul of the of the control report that's is that Merson yes
01:21:55 control report that's is that Merson yes it is and so you can see the desks much further apart yes there and is it just a simple case of being closer together and therefore in Stratford and therefore being able to
01:22:07 in Stratford and therefore being able to hit yeah Matt's also got really really high ceilings and the wall of the back has got something when you have some sort of soundproofing so you do lose the noise a bit in there so if somebody on
01:22:19 noise a bit in there so if somebody on the back position was doing something I wouldn't be able to hear it at the supervisors position right now there are negatives which I think you say that it
01:22:30 negatives which I think you say that it has less equipment than Merton yes no no helicopter television or interactive maps that's right the helicopter television is that the helicopter is that the heli telly yes is yes which is the downlink from right and it is there
01:22:43 the downlink from right and it is there none at all at Stratford no it's not that it wasn't working just doesn't exist is that right I don't I don't think there's a link to it but I don't really know why there isn't one there
01:22:54 really know why there isn't one there but you know I've never known it to work there personally so is it is it that there it was there but didn't work all that wasn't there at all I believe it wasn't there and how would the heli
01:23:07 wasn't there and how would the heli telly normally help out at an incident to be honest we've don't really use them for instance they more useful when we've got large events say I mean I've found
01:23:18 got large events say I mean I've found it beneficial in Notting Hill Carnival has been going on for things like that so you can get an overview if there's any crowd problems or anything like that obviously affecting our cruising stations it's not something we use on a
01:23:30 stations it's not something we use on a regular basis right have you ever used information from the heli telly at a high-rise fire no yeah you mentioned interactive maps that
01:23:41 yeah you mentioned interactive maps that are present at Mercer the north of Stratford how well what would interactive maps have helped you on the night of the Grand Tour tasks that they would have helped us with our providing fire cover for the rest of London once
01:23:53 fire cover for the rest of London once we'd lost all of those appliances and also to look at what appliances we could move in to cover the area and potential
01:24:04 move in to cover the area and potential releases for the incident as well which we were pre planning now if we go to the middle paragraph on this very page page 175 of the control report we can see that there's also a reference to the fact that the Stratford site does not
01:24:21 fact that the Stratford site does not have access to the Brigades dynamic cover tool dct yes that's the interactive map that I was talking that's that's the interactive map I see
01:24:33 turning them to the food is one more question on policy I can before we move to the events of the actual night itself and going back to the question of
01:24:45 and going back to the question of training in your experience did was ever it was training ever designed or delivered which included dealing with people who don't have English as a first language no and what about people who
01:24:58 language no and what about people who come from immigrant or ethnic minority cultures and have perhaps a different cultural approach to how to deal with an authority no there's no specific
01:25:09 authority no there's no specific training for that now
01:25:14 when training is designed and delivered can you help me was there any any effort to factor in how to speak to people how to address
01:25:25 how to speak to people how to address people from different cultures and backgrounds yeah we do call handling techniques and how to sort of coax information out of corners and different ways of trying to train people herbs so
01:25:39 ways of trying to train people herbs so to speak to people so with someone who has a language barrier they've usually got a piece of information with them that may be an address they can give us a postcode formal a letter they can look at that
01:25:50 formal a letter they can look at that they can read out to us and things like that so we do have different call handling techniques but it's also experience sure but just focusing on I understand the experience point but just
01:26:01 understand the experience point but just focusing on training there's only formal training on how to how to go about addressing people from different ethnic or cultural backgrounds now either that just be part of call handling techniques really to be honest about coaxing
01:26:13 really to be honest about coaxing information from people regardless of their backgrounds regardless of their background right so there's no in the training technique okay and when you try to obtain information on calls it looks
01:26:25 to obtain information on calls it looks as if none of the policies expressly require controlling officers to examine whether people in the flat well the caller has but either the caller or somebody with the caller has any particular mobility issues or is is
01:26:39 particular mobility issues or is is elderly is that right no that's right yeah and with mobility issues that is something the caller would usually provide us with pretty quickly if they are if they believe to they're trapped in the fence right how's it but but
01:26:51 in the fence right how's it but but would the CRO actually go out and look for that information but would they say do you have any abilities yes is there a reason for that it would because I'm I don't know but it would usually come
01:27:02 don't know but it would usually come from the questioning of the caller when you say why can't you get out that if if it's not because of the heat and smoke or the fire and then it's it's you know it's at a level that's okay they will say because I'm in a wheelchair because
01:27:14 say because I'm in a wheelchair because I'm bed bound on mobility issues they would always come forward with that information themselves but in your experience they would with this yeah would you
01:27:24 would you in your experience have you come across people who are who wouldn't volunteer that information because they were either there wasn't some cultural question about it or they were embarrassed in some way I haven't
01:27:35 embarrassed in some way I haven't personally no is that a subject which is the subject of the dev any training not that I'm aware of that
01:27:45 turning to the incident itself you were the operations manager on duty at Stratford on the night wings and I think you had to a OMS with you and Peter Mae and Debbie rial yes is it I called the
01:27:56 and Debbie rial yes is it I called the real is that it no it's real it's real yeah and the rest of the watch I think were CRA s that's right yet were you the most senior person in the control room
01:28:07 most senior person in the control room at the start of the shift yes I was and who was if anyone who was your line manager so Johnny Smith is my line manager but she wasn't there no she wasn't at that time okay and at what
01:28:19 wasn't at that time okay and at what point did a more senior person to you arrived when John arrived back what question you say about quarter past two we'll come to that what about Jason Olaf
01:28:30 we'll come to that what about Jason Olaf and Jason only if it's a similar rank to myself so he's not senior to me right now can I ask you to kick to to go back to the what I'm calling the control
01:28:42 to the what I'm calling the control report
01:28:51 which is lfp four seven nine oh and go to page one seven six please on that
01:29:08 to page one seven six please on that page is set out very helpfully the staffing structure roles and responsibilities you can see them see it all there I just want to look at something with you just below halfway
01:29:19 something with you just below halfway down the page it says on any given shift the minimum number of staff on duty is eleven this is made up of a minimum of two supervisors and 9cr owes the om and
01:29:30 two supervisors and 9cr owes the om and AOM are colloquially referred to as supervisors now according to our records
01:29:43 supervisors now according to our records and this may be wrong but we have a record of 11 in the Stratford control room on the night but only eight CR OS but with three supervisors would that be would that be right yes that would be
01:29:55 would that be right yes that would be right so is it right that you were one CRO short on the night no we were up to our model staffing level so the eleven on duty is made up including the supervisors and the control officers yes
01:30:07 supervisors and the control officers yes so you would have three supervisors and then eight control officers yes bring your T or 11 yes it says minimum of two supervisors and nine see Ras that would
01:30:19 supervisors and nine see Ras that would tend to indicate that if you only had eight CRA as you were missing a CRO yeah we had three supervisors yeah so you there you had 11 the balance was more supervisors than CRA s I mean if you had
01:30:31 supervisors than CRA s I mean if you had one more supervisor than you needed and one less CRA than you know we have a supervisor on duty that's what we we target for not to well I think the real distress was the question maybe would one of the
01:30:43 question maybe would one of the supervisors at the CRO if circumstances required no no no no no they can do the role of the CIO is in taking calls yes I think yes yeah everyone can do the same
01:30:54 think yes yeah everyone can do the same role with need be but they were there as a supervisor superficially level right so just just pressing my question one more time okay the terms of what we see in the control
01:31:06 the terms of what we see in the control report where we're told minimum number of staff is 11 two supervisors and nine see Ras as a matter of fact I think you've agreed it you actually had three supervisors yes but it but only eight
01:31:18 supervisors yes but it but only eight CRA yes so it would follow that you were a CRO short according to this statement no because actually be eight CR owes three supervisors eight CRS yes instead
01:31:29 three supervisors eight CRS yes instead of nine you had eight so you're one short yes I think there's a danger of getting across purposes here I think what I understand the telling eleven
01:31:41 what I understand the telling eleven people yes which included enough people to handle all the incoming calls even if one of these so-called super glazes had to do the job of the CRM which we often
01:31:55 to do the job of the CRM which we often do with cool hands Ling but what we aim at on a night shift or a day shift is three supervisors and eight CR OS does
01:32:06 three supervisors and eight CR OS does that make sense doesn't it since sorry yeah yeah I was trying to take it in most in stages but I think that the eleven was enough yes that's what I'm trying to get at here is I think you accept that just as a matter of maths okay you were a suit you were you had
01:32:19 okay you were a suit you were you had not nine which seems to be the minimum about eight CRA yes so my question is did the fact that you had one supervisor over the minimum but one CRO under the
01:32:32 over the minimum but one CRO under the minimum matter right and why not because that's the number of staff we have and to be fair having an additional supervisor is actually more beneficial right and is that because one of the
01:32:46 right and is that because one of the supervisors picking up on the Chairman's question was able to do the CRS job or the extra CRS job and take up the slack yes so when we have a high number of calls coming in a supervisor will take
01:32:58 calls coming in a supervisor will take calls either myself or one of them i io am
01:33:01 am but we always make sure that is a supervisor that it's free to deal with things that go in the room as well right so what kind of sort of say I'll jump in and take that so the other person doesn't is it understand is it is it
01:33:13 doesn't is it understand is it is it common that there is that flexibility so you may be a CRO short but have an extra supervisor is it that flexible as it was a matter of routine if we have an
01:33:25 a matter of routine if we have an additional supervisor to the three that supervisor will sit on the floor and do the role of the CRO now moving well I think again I have question is is it
01:33:36 think again I have question is is it usual to have three supervisors and eight CR OS yes yes yes and would you ever have a situation where you have
01:33:47 ever have a situation where you have four supervisors and seven C Ras for example yes yeah so it what I'm trying to get at is how nice a flexible these boundaries are yes they are flexible you now at the top of page 4 of your witness
01:33:59 now at the top of page 4 of your witness statement you say oh 55 hours on that Wednesday we received a call from a member of the public telling us about a fire in a flat what were you doing at that point
01:34:10 that point do you remember I believe I was actually out of the room making myself a drink right at that time did you actually have a personal recollection of the call no right I see I think it would follow from
01:34:22 right I see I think it would follow from that that you wouldn't have heard the floor or flat number I've heard it since because I've heard the call but not at the actual time no I didn't and I think the as you say that it was CRA Pamela
01:34:33 the as you say that it was CRA Pamela Jones who answered the call took the mobile and took the information and mobilized the appliances did she communicate the details of the call she taken to you and you came back into the room no she did not now you've described you go on to
01:34:45 now you've described you go on to describe how the vision system got confused and treated thee their premises as a house and not a high-rise because it hadn't it had a flat number 16 and
01:34:56 it hadn't it had a flat number 16 and therefore got the wrong PDA which was then corrected my question is does the vision system often get confused in the way in which you've described it that um when we first went night with the system
01:35:08 when we first went night with the system we had a few issues with some address yes quite for quite a long time but that has improved greatly since so it did
01:35:19 has improved greatly since so it did sometimes happen with high-rise buildings so if you put the just the building name in it would recognize that it was a high-rise building but if you put a flat number in it wouldn't always recognize it right would you know what
01:35:30 recognize it right would you know what alerted Peter may to this issue and so that he would then as he did amend the PDA yes so when I came back in the room when this was actually going on we were discussing it and he I think he had an
01:35:41 discussing it and he I think he had an awareness of groennfell tower I think he will be dealt with an incident there previously I think also the fact that it was a tower made him sort of obviously think about what it was so he looked it up to confirm I think he looked it on
01:35:53 up to confirm I think he looked it on Google Maps I think and phone call right and saw how tall it was could I ask you them to look at the short incident log
01:36:04 them to look at the short incident log which is a tap 23 of our documents bundle and turn please to page 16
01:36:20 since our 17 page 17 and look at the time mark of o1 1602 where you'll see an informative message with the operator
01:36:31 informative message with the operator indicated there is s ad that Sharon Darby and here is an informative message sup from G 272 residential block of flats 20 floors 25 by 25 meters 5 room
01:36:43 flats 20 floors 25 by 25 meters 5 room flat on 4th floor 75% of light high-rises procedure implemented MDT in use tactical mode Oscar my question is did you see that informative message
01:36:54 did you see that informative message when it came up on the system yes it is dude and what was your impression of the incident at that time do you remember what do you think was happening I wasn't overly concerned about the incident at
01:37:06 overly concerned about the incident at that time its we have quite a few flats flat fires in high-rise buildings and quite similar to messages like that so the fact I've made it a six pump fire is
01:37:18 the fact I've made it a six pump fire is quite standard for a high-rise fire ok so that's that you've seen it was a heart you've seen them as a make up to six at 1:13 yeah but you know I have indeed seen the informative from the far ground
01:37:29 ground you weren't overly concerned at this point not on that right well you then see on the vision what while they have short incident log that the makeups
01:37:40 short incident log that the makeups increase and just looking down aerial ladders it is requested at 180 and then at one 1935 as a make up two pumps eight
01:37:52 at one 1935 as a make up two pumps eight and then up to 24 make up pumps 10 and it goes on down uh-huh at make up pumps 10 did you be what what
01:38:05 at make up pumps 10 did you be what what thoughts did you have about the way this was beginning to develop this incident I was thinking that maybe it was obviously spreading and they hadn't got it under control
01:38:14 control right that pumps 10 you say they hadn't got it under control did you have any thoughts that about
01:38:25 at that stage whether the standing stay put policy that you say you would have assumed was in place that Grenaa fell should be changed no I hadn't and I
01:38:36 should be changed no I hadn't and I don't know if we to actually receive any calls up until then had way inside I think maybe one or two but it was around that time that the course from people inside actually started coming in yes
01:38:48 inside actually started coming in yes that's the dude now moving forward then just going down the SI l to 129 53 which is they wide so except one 2809 actually
01:39:01 is they wide so except one 2809 actually is 15 and jumped ahead a little bit just because I think we can but we get at 129 53 at the top of the next page we can
01:39:13 53 at the top of the next page we can see mate pumps 20 yeah at that point at pumps 20 did you have any new thoughts or fresh thoughts or have your thoughts
01:39:24 or fresh thoughts or have your thoughts developing is about the incident as we see these times seen I knew something had gone back even right it was also sorry it was also the speed of it I've never known her makeup to be that quick
01:39:37 at what point in terms of pump acceleration the Eva that photo haven't yet got 25 or 20 at what point in that rate of makeup did you realize this
01:39:48 rate of makeup did you realize this incident was outside your experience I don't think at the point of 20 or 25 it was outside my experience to be honest I've dealt with 20 25 pump fires before
01:39:59 I've dealt with 20 25 pump fires before so but the rate of Intel mean the time of it going up oh yes that's the first time I've know of anything to do to happen that quickly yeah but at what point in the escalation you go over ten
01:40:10 point in the escalation you go over ten right I would say probably the 15 20 25 right as that was extremely quick no at 128 47 as we can see at the top of page
01:40:24 128 47 as we can see at the top of page 18 of the short incident alone 128 47 you can see persons reported yeah did you did that prompt any thoughts in your mind about what was happening
01:40:36 mind about what was happening this fire I was thinking that there was gonna be a lot of smoke affecting the floors because smoke will travel at obviously I was thinking it's probably traveling up my thoughts it was
01:40:47 traveling up my thoughts it was traveling up the stairs good and affecting people's properties going further up and people believe they wouldn't be able to leave did you think that the fire was still on the fourth floor yes you did yes
01:40:59 floor yes you did yes and what about by the time it got pumps 25 that low 131 as we can see just a bit lower down at a 138 148 did you still
01:41:12 lower down at a 138 148 did you still have the same thoughts that the farmer still contained in the original compartment I definitely know what I was thinking at that point to be fair and completely honest because there was so much going on then with processing the makeups I was shocked that he went to 25
01:41:25 makeups I was shocked that he went to 25 pumps and I was thinking you know what is going on we had no idea we had no other message or anything so I had no idea I was wondering if it was spreading
01:41:36 idea I was wondering if it was spreading to other flats on that floor right now in general terms we know that there are FSG calls beginning to come in at that stage did you have any thoughts as hops manager in the room at the time about
01:41:48 manager in the room at the time about what about what a stay put was the right advice to give no I did not know okay did the fact that these makeups were accelerating at this pace alert you to
01:42:00 accelerating at this pace alert you to needing to look at the stay-put policy and actually ask yourself whether it's making okay at that stage we're now at 25 pumps 130 148 did you expect to
01:42:13 25 pumps 130 148 did you expect to receive more information from the in the incident ground than just the one informative message that we saw it about 116 I was expecting something yes did you seek to win did you seek to contact the incident ground for more information
01:42:24 the incident ground for more information about what was going on no I didn't we were extremely busy in the control room and just didn't have an opportunity to to be honest right
01:42:35 now you've seen you said I was expecting something at any point so I and we would normally chase them after about half an hour to an hour after sort of 15-20
01:42:46 hour to an hour after sort of 15-20 minutes for message no you in the control report you can just go back to that can I ask you to look at page 32
01:43:06 we talked a moment ago about calls starting to come in here is a table of the calls beginning to come in from grenfell and we can see that the first one is time 201 21 24 from flat 195 on
01:43:20 one is time 201 21 24 from flat 195 on the 32nd floor and the robots are the smell of smoke and that is just after
01:43:32 smell of smoke and that is just after pumps were made eight and from that time we can see that the number of 99 nine calls starts to increase when were you
01:43:44 calls starts to increase when were you aware of the growth of volume of incoming calls from about that time yourself yes awesome and when that started happening in general terms what
01:43:56 started happening in general terms what did you do we were still processing the makeups and as the calls were coming in very rapidly expect a lot of course of
01:44:07 very rapidly expect a lot of course of people outside as well at this point I actually did actually take my a few calls myself yes miss Debbie and Pete with I'm taking up doing mobilizing resources diligent so I just wanna the
01:44:23 resources diligent so I just wanna the cause cuz I'm obviously people needing help is it's what we do so I took a couple of calls myself because I was concerned about people being trapped in their policies well we're going to look at one or two of those in a moment
01:44:38 before I ask you about those in general terms did you brief your CRO team about what was what was developing no I didn't know what was developing right did they
01:44:49 know what was developing right did they come a point at around 25 pumps when you thought to yourself gosh something something strange is happening I need to need to make sure i briefed my CRA team no that's not something we would normally do we would deal with what we
01:45:02 normally do we would deal with what we give them or as it goes wouldn't normally briefed them about that now you've we've got some examples but we'll look at that of you taking calls yourself well look at the details of that later but you why
01:45:15 at the details of that later but you why did you decide yourself to take 999 calls as I say Debian Pete were mobilizing I think they were both on the phone and possibly two offices can't recall exactly everybody was busy and
01:45:29 recall exactly everybody was busy and there were a number of calls waiting to be answered as a control officer aren't you a 999 call this what we do it's what you do yeah and did at that stage and I
01:45:40 you do yeah and did at that stage and I say at that stage 1 21 2 1 31 say the first 10 minutes did you did you supervise or listen to any 999 calls taken by other CRS no I didn't actually
01:45:51 taken by other CRS no I didn't actually do that on the whole night all right now can I ask you to move forward in the control report to page 31 sorry back to page 31 back to page 31 at and we can
01:46:04 page 31 back to page 31 at and we can see that at the timestamp of 135 24 at the top of the page you ring the team leader on the command unit 8 and you you say you need crews to go and check some
01:46:15 say you need crews to go and check some flats and we can see the detail set out there for the record the transcript references inq1 9 for but I don't need
01:46:26 references inq1 9 for but I don't need to go to that we can just look at the summary for the moment come on unit operator watch manager Daniel Marek explains he had control trying to reach g27 1 but they're in the process of taking over om Norman it asks him again
01:46:39 taking over om Norman it asks him again to get crews to go to checks and flats and he asks if the information has already been sent by radio when Norman replies saying she doesn't know and then confirms that the radio message is about a quarter on the 18th floor she then
01:46:50 a quarter on the 18th floor she then makes a reference to the large volume of calls being received the information subsequently passed a summarized below and then we can see information about three four floors with only two flat
01:47:03 three four floors with only two flat numbers given and numbers of people in three cases and same with remarks now like showing you that my question is why did you call
01:47:14 did you call CUA directly on the admin line rather using the radio message system I need the cu8 with their I think Shan was trying to call up golf 2 7 1 and she
01:47:25 trying to call up golf 2 7 1 and she wasn't with the priority and I don't think she was getting any response I vaguely remember that there was not a lot going on so I think I was I'm going to in the command unit and get this information over quickly were you aware
01:47:39 information over quickly were you aware watch which the incident command pump was at that stage I believe it was coffee someone of that age and was that the pump handling FSG calls on the incident ground to your to your
01:47:51 incident ground to your to your knowledge at the time if we had passed any to them earlier then that would have been yes okay and do you know why you only gave some floor numbers and not
01:48:02 only gave some floor numbers and not specific flat numbers that's all the information I was given ok did you ask the CRA is to obtain or be sure to obtain more specific information as per
01:48:14 obtain more specific information as per the policy about flat numbers and numbers of people inside no I'm sorry I didn't I didn't even occur to me at the time to be honest with you so I'm focused on getting my information over
01:48:26 focused on getting my information over as I say the control room was my client points always happy it was really good it's overwhelmingly busy even at that stage where you've only got four
01:48:37 stage where you've only got four examples didn't you didn't yeah but we did have all the course coming in from outside as well and other calls and also the mobilizing and everything to do everybody was fully involved in the tasks that they were doing yes
01:48:50 given that you were asking cu8 to ask the crews to go and check us in flats what was your impression of the fire by
01:49:02 what was your impression of the fire by this point but flats needed to be checked I was mild because it wasn't so much the fire was the smoke I was thinking that the smoke is affecting all the floors because those floors are quite you know you've got 14 20 18 it's
01:49:14 quite you know you've got 14 20 18 it's obviously going up a long way at that stage did you know yourself what information CR owes were would we're taking on their calls from callers from what I could only from what
01:49:25 callers from what I could only from what I could hear it was people were saying that they were unable to leave due to smoke but affecting their premises and they were telling them to sort of lock the doors and unfortunately couldn't
01:49:37 the doors and unfortunately couldn't stay on the line that you normally would because we were so many other course coming in and to call us back if their conditions worsened you could obviously only hear one side of the conversation yes I couldn't hear the cold side of the
01:49:49 yes I couldn't hear the cold side of the conversation at all and presumably there were multiple one-sided conversations the only ones that were there where I was at that point who was just who so I could sort of here Pam and Yvonne
01:50:01 so I could sort of here Pam and Yvonne Adams Pam Jones and even Addams Family Vonda and Pete dad yeah even though he was kind of further away up he's got quite a head voice I hear him and it's got it's got a clear voice - oh yes he
01:50:14 got it's got a clear voice - oh yes he has yes we'll find that out later he will now I think you've answered this before what others ask it again was there a system at any stage where particularly at that early stage for collating developing information so that
01:50:26 collating developing information so that each the RA would be able to get a better picture of the smoke spread or the fire spread yeah did it occur to you at that stage - because of the volume of
01:50:38 at that stage - because of the volume of calls and and and perhaps the fact that you weren't getting information about or about numbers of persons in the flats or the precise flat numbers that there was
01:50:49 the precise flat numbers that there was a need to make sure all CRS did obtain that information and collate it no I mean I would I I wasn't aware completely and and I've passed her over but I would
01:51:00 and and I've passed her over but I would expecting that if they were able to I mean sometimes the caller would just shout something and clear the line sometimes they're just not able to get that information I would have expected it to be it have been asked if possible
01:51:11 it to be it have been asked if possible right
01:51:15 now just looking back at pages 18 and 19 of the short incident log by you can start with page 18 131 238 there is a
01:51:36 message such as a service request created by Pete dg2 71 further call to say far on 20th floor also people trapped and then at 1:30 229 I'll just
01:51:53 trapped and then at 1:30 229 I'll just take two or three of these 132 29 persons on the 22nd floor smoke coming into flat
01:52:07 did you did you know that stage that there was there were repeated calls about smoke spread that high up in the building only when I was given that
01:52:21 building only when I was given that information to pass on to the command unit did that tech did the intensity of these calls from different parts high up in the building tell you anything about how far the smoke had spread and what the conditions were like wait told me I
01:52:33 the conditions were like wait told me I spoke to the top floor yes and there was smoke I wasn't aware of what the actual smoke conditions themselves were if it was like smoke or thick smoke just a way
01:52:44 was like smoke or thick smoke just a way that there was smoke traveling up no
01:52:53 by 135 we've had a number of early calls I just got to show you very briefly a number of these in the control report still on the same theme if you can turn
01:53:06 still on the same theme if you can turn to page 13 we start with the call at 123
01:53:17 to page 13 we start with the call at 123 50 taken by cro adams it takes a call from a female caller who reports that she's seen a whole tower block on fire whilst driving down the a40 obviously
01:53:28 whilst driving down the a40 obviously that's not an it's not an FSG call but because the person is outside the tower but the hope that the information is the whole tower block is on fire did you
01:53:39 whole tower block is on fire did you know that no I did not know and then let the next one is 120 408 same next called same page
01:53:47 same page Pete Dudley takes a call from a female caller reporting a fire in Granite Belt hour the caller reports there's a line of fire game right up there at the outside of it they again were you were aware of of that no I wasn't aware of
01:53:58 aware of of that no I wasn't aware of those calls and that 1:26 I had to connect you a handful of these 126 moving forward on page 17 of this of this report we can see that 126 54 Pete
01:54:17 this report we can see that 126 54 Pete daddy takes a call which is transferred from Nottingham female caller comes on the liner reports there's a fire in flat 186 Grenville tower she says as a fart in the whole building
01:54:28 in the whole building and when CRA Daddy asks if the caller is in the building she confirms that everyone is out the caller was advised to stay out not to get back in and there are a lot of fire engines already there again 126 do you think you were told or
01:54:40 again 126 do you think you were told or found out that the the fire was that far up the building the actual fire was that far up the building that 106 [Music]
01:54:50 and then 126 126 58 which is also the same page as them but next one Dan CRF Fox takes a call from a female reporting
01:55:02 Fox takes a call from a female reporting a fire in Greenville town the caller explained she's on the 12th floor ask some advice what to do and it goes on we're not always getting the same page that you seem to be now I realize
01:55:13 page that you seem to be now I realize full of jealousy then we lost it again it's my fault what time you want to look at it's it's 126 58 I'm so sorry mrs.
01:55:29 at it's it's 126 58 I'm so sorry mrs. Noland did did I I showed you one pretty safe okay I couldn't see it so I didn't have my glasses on so she's actually listening to what you say no it's my fault for galloping ahead I'm afraid a 126 58 we can see the cool take and ride
01:55:41 126 58 we can see the cool take and ride ever Fox sorry Heidi Fox and the court were explained she's on the 12th floor and asks for some advice on what to do CRA Fox clarifies the address and the
01:55:53 CRA Fox clarifies the address and the caller explains she could see the fart through the window and reports that her neighbor says that the fart is in her kitchen already the caller says the smoke is coming from the main door when CRA Fox advisors had to put wet towels
01:56:04 CRA Fox advisors had to put wet towels down to stop the smoke and it continued CRA Fox states that she will pass on the information to the crews the question on that is did you know at that stage that the fire had already reached the 12th
01:56:17 the fire had already reached the 12th floor no I didn't I was very involved in the mobilizing and what was going on the supervisors position I wasn't aware of those come to talk and it's just one or
01:56:30 those come to talk and it's just one or two more 1:30 this is page 23 page 23 at 1:30 exactly Big Daddy takes a call
01:56:44 from a female caller reporting that there is a fire in Grenville town and that they are stuck on the top floor and that the doors won't open the caller explains that there is smoke everywhere and the fire is in her house
01:56:56 everywhere and the fire is in her house on the 22nd floor she tells cro Dudley that everyone is now on the 23rd floor the caller further explains that the fire has broken into the flat kitchen of
01:57:08 fire has broken into the flat kitchen of her flat and has run into the neighbors of that she has run into the neighbor's flat FS she is given to explain how to try to prevent smoke from coming in did you were you aware by all act or shortly
01:57:20 you were you aware by all act or shortly after 1:30 that the fire had reached the 22nd floor the fire itself that reached the 22nd floor I think about 1:30 or just afterwards I think is when I started to becoming aware of we were
01:57:34 started to becoming aware of we were getting calls saying the whole block basically was on fire tell us what's in there did any of the CR OS tell you that not just a smoke but the fire itself had had spread up the
01:57:45 the fire itself had had spread up the building as far as the 22nd floor by 1:30 no like a mikono is that they may want to shout it out but we were there was so much going on but I don't recall
01:57:58 was so much going on but I don't recall you at all would you as om expect to be given that information by CEOs yes they might have come to find the supervisors am i spoken to them about it um it
01:58:11 am i spoken to them about it um it wasn't not to me right do you know why that is why you won't give me would it have been possible for any of the C Ras
01:58:22 have been possible for any of the C Ras knowing what was happening to alert the other CEOs in the room more formally by a message it on the system the vision system I don't think that would have
01:58:33 system I don't think that would have even cost anyone's minds to be honest with you everyone was so focused on just taking the calls as they were coming in you know one call clearing that one next one next one next one next one I think
01:58:45 one next one next one next one I think we were getting a picture that it was obviously the situation it was because I say the room was quite small so you could hear the noise was becoming very very loud very loud I think you yourself took a call at 1:30
01:58:59 I think you yourself took a call at 1:30 Oh - still on the same page it's the next one down it says Norman takes a call from a female caller he states that her husband three children including a
01:59:10 her husband three children including a baby they're in groennfell tower in flat 175 on the 20th floor and there is a fire in her building and he goes on the caller originally states that she was on
01:59:21 caller originally states that she was on the 17th floor and corrects herself Aaron Norman explains that the fire is on the fourth floor when the caller states there's smoke coming in to her flat did is it right then therefore you
01:59:34 flat did is it right then therefore you knew at that point but by that point that smoke had spread at least smoke could spread smokeless bojay I wasn't aware that the actual fire itself hadn't right so does that does that mean that
01:59:46 right so does that does that mean that you didn't hear or know what beep daddy had gleaned in the call that he was on now I hadn't know it looks it looks as if to be fair to you Pete daddy's call
01:59:57 if to be fair to you Pete daddy's call lasted two minutes and 37 seconds and that therefore you were both on the same you were both on the phone at the same time okay but you don't recall him
02:00:09 time okay but you don't recall him getting off the phone and saying it's gone to the top or Western anything no I don't know did you know even though Pete daddy had learned that the fire had gone to the top I thought
02:00:21 the fire had gone to the top I thought that that very high in the building 22nd floor at least that see ras were continuing to reassure rich or callers at the farmers only on the fourth floor
02:00:34 I don't recall if I really know that at the time I believe that's the case because I was saying the same thing myself
02:00:40 myself so that wouldn't surprise me exactly good Barsky that there's a next question did you at that stage consider telling CR OS to change the reassurance advice that they were giving to quarters such
02:00:51 that they were giving to quarters such as don't worry the the far is a long way away from the or it's only on the fourth floor things like that no I didn't know that time then is there a reason why that let us say I can't recall sorry at
02:01:05 that let us say I can't recall sorry at that point we were around one the 130 mark we can go forward in in time as well but at that stage did you have any thoughts about the wisdom of continuing
02:01:18 thoughts about the wisdom of continuing to give statehood advice no I still felt that it was the correct advice to give okay at that stage given what you could see about the volume of calls coming in
02:01:29 see about the volume of calls coming in to do did you think about speaking to a senior officer firstly not in the control room but remotely been asking him or her what to do no no at that point I didn't I was just focused on
02:01:41 point I didn't I was just focused on dealing with what we were dealing with in the control room at the time can I ask you to look at the document which is called the lfb control debrief notes now
02:01:53 called the lfb control debrief notes now this is the first time I think you live in showing this document it's lfb quadruple 0 3 1 1 3
02:02:15 and it's dated the 24th of July 2017 yes and we're on the manuscript version
02:02:26 and we're on the manuscript version which I this was a just to tell you what this is this is a manuscript note of a meeting I think you described these in
02:02:40 meeting I think you described these in your evidence earlier but this is the actual one dealing with the control room chaired by Andy Hearn and the attendees in role of debrief we can see the attendees and you are listed one from
02:02:52 attendees and you are listed one from the lastest before Adrian Alex normal operation manager oh I see control room do you see that yes do you remember this meeting yes I did okay
02:03:02 okay now if we look on in the meeting notes
02:03:08 it and I can pick it up at page 3 it says just two below halfway down a
02:03:19 says just two below halfway down a Norman advising CRS on advice now the time mark for that just looking a little bit up the pages Oh 131 MP 25 and I'll
02:03:30 bit up the pages Oh 131 MP 25 and I'll read the rest of it just down to where I've shown you speed of makeup unusual not dealt with like this before every control officer engaged in multiple activity incoming calls escalating
02:03:41 activity incoming calls escalating thankful the control room staffer experienced team a Demi are mobilizing a Norman advising CRS on advice do you remember whether that was something you told the meeting that you were advising
02:03:52 told the meeting that you were advising CEOs on the advice no I don't recall that at all is it correct I wasn't advising CIOs I was trying to get information from them and because they were giving their word giving their
02:04:05 they were giving their word giving their advice the state you know block the doors smoke etc I don't recall that at all so you say you
02:04:19 don't recall that at all so you say you were not advising but you were actually getting information from them how are you going about that going up and speaking to them going up to them and trying to get the flat numbers and the
02:04:32 trying to get the flat numbers and the premises where people were so you did do that oh yeah I was getting the information but I wasn't advising them on anything to do with the advice itself
02:04:43 on anything to do with the advice itself if that's how that rates okay is this is this the first time you've seen this document yes it is yeah so you were never asked to approve the notes of the meeting no that's all right
02:05:01 I don't remember advising them at that point at all there's a there's a typed version I say version it's only different also lfb three one one nine
02:05:16 different also lfb three one one nine triple zero one which is a slightly different document of any weather it's going to be we're gonna be able to share that to you but I just want to see if we
02:05:27 that to you but I just want to see if we can we can and if you look at that document it's a type is a version of the debrief meeting on the 24th of July and two thirds of the way down the page it
02:05:41 two thirds of the way down the page it says fire survival guidance FSG calls increasing etc and then it says just above that because it's the easiest ways to find it that way it says am the
02:05:52 to find it that way it says am the devices and supports control room operators CRO dealing with escalating incoming calls first of all is it is this a document you've ever seen before okay where it says advisors and supports
02:06:04 okay where it says advisors and supports control room operators CRO dealing with escalating incoming calls is that correct
02:06:08 correct um the advice bit again I don't recall supporting yes I was making sure that they were okay I see so it's very distressing calls that we're coming in
02:06:19 distressing calls that we're coming in so so I think from both of those documents now you've seen them would would I be right in summarizing or evidence that you were supporting and getting information from the CRS and advising them for not advising them on
02:06:30 advising them for not advising them on what advice to give I was later on but not earlier not that last one no I will come to later on okay in due course can I now turn then to a
02:06:42 course can I now turn then to a different topic which is information from the incident ground before I do this may be an appropriate moment to ask you and chair and indeed whether you'd like a break yeah that'd be great yes
02:06:53 like a break yeah that'd be great yes good idea yeah all right will we'll come back at 10 to 12 nothing and please don't talk turned on about your evidence linking the meeting to it
02:07:22 just a minute before I rise how are we getting on and we're getting on final lock they're not sure I can be more particular than that no no I just you know they should ask right thank you 10
02:07:36 know they should ask right thank you 10 stories
02:21:18 yes Jack Russells come in please
02:21:43 friend who have you gone this rule yes cuz there's not much thank you for coming back to us in your evidence just before we break I think you told us that you went around asking CRA s for
02:21:54 you went around asking CRA s for particular flat numbers is that right no particular flat numbers any numbers they may have that numbers they may have yes anything that they had written down or information about calls that they were
02:22:05 information about calls that they were taking right just pausing there were they writing down information on paper yeah are we talking about earlier or later later what point are we at what about 1:30 oh no no no at that
02:22:17 what about 1:30 oh no no no at that point that I saw her right so when you say you were going around getting flats numbers that they had was that that's a reference to later in the entities later yes Texas and can I ask you then to go
02:22:28 yes Texas and can I ask you then to go to a page five of your witness statement and look at paragraph two and you say in the middle of that paragraph and at the end of the third paragraph we we had in
02:22:44 end of the third paragraph we we had in the second paragraph you say we have little communications as to what was happening at the scene and at the end of the third paragraph you say there was no
02:22:55 the third paragraph you say there was no information from the crews on the ground and that paragraph starts with at O 140 so that might give you a time frame panic showing you that what information
02:23:07 panic showing you that what information did you expect to be sent from the crews on the ground during this during this time frame so between 130 or 124 and 140 I would have expected with that amount
02:23:19 I would have expected with that amount of makeups that we would have an informative message of the progress of what the actual incident was that was ongoing now could you have contacted cu8
02:23:30 ongoing now could you have contacted cu8 and get an ask for that information given that you were already in contact with with them to be quite honest with you I didn't I didn't actually think about it at the time I was more
02:23:41 about it at the time I was more concerned with getting the information about the flats and people involved over to them yes-no doing other things I mean it was literally sit down passed this information
02:23:52 information I have to do something else it was non-stop
02:24:03 if you go to your second state looked at the very start of this morning
02:24:16 I'd like to show you page two of that this is the statement ne T quadruple zero five one nine nine on page four of
02:24:30 zero five one nine nine on page four of that
02:24:39 all and it goes
02:24:51 I wonder with you put the reference well it's strange because yes I have you see that yes I have if three entries up from the bottom you see heli telly we did not have access to pictures from the
02:25:02 have access to pictures from the downlink of the heli telly meaning we had no images of how the fire was escalating and a lot of time was spent on the radio to MPs who are providing updates of the fire persons involved etc during the early hours of the incident
02:25:13 during the early hours of the incident and my question is how do you think seeing images that would have helped you and your CRS during that period if we've seen the helicopter images early on when
02:25:26 seen the helicopter images early on when they started radiating through to us we may have had more we would have had more of an idea ourselves of what was going on that the fire actually was not on the fourth floor and it was the entire block
02:25:38 fourth floor and it was the entire block entire side of the block we had no visuals so trying to imagine we've had a fire on the fourth floor in sort of half an hour is now the entire building was
02:25:49 an hour is now the entire building was very very hard to imagine and visualize yes it would have saved me spending so much time on the radio as well because I was on that radio a lot with the police
02:26:02 was on that radio a lot with the police taking information from them to pass to our crews and that took up a lot of time yes ahead of a lot of time yeah and with those messages passed to the
02:26:14 and with those messages passed to the crews also disseminated around the control room spread around the control room the messages I was receiving on the radio they won't disseminated around the control room though right now can I just
02:26:25 control room though right now can I just ask you to get back to the control debrief names at lfb quadruple zero three one one three
02:26:34 I just want to ask you about something on page three of that document
02:26:47 you say
02:26:59 that
02:27:08 and it's in fact page four I'm so so so sorry you say at the top of the page no visual representations or that representation at this time and the
02:27:19 representation at this time and the bottom of page three is where I started it looks as if it's after 131 so but it's any at any rate before 145 and then
02:27:31 it's any at any rate before 145 and then it goes on to say hello tele contacts control they're giving info via radio on fire spread so is it right that even at that stage before 145 you the control
02:27:45 that stage before 145 you the control room was getting radio messages from the police helicopter on fire spread I don't know the exact time they started coming up on the radio to be honest with you I I have no time scale for a lot of the
02:27:57 I have no time scale for a lot of the things that happened it was definitely before 2 o'clock yes then just below that it says 1:45 and then below that it
02:28:08 that it says 1:45 and then below that it says no access to TV link at Stratford are you able to help us with that that was the television was there
02:28:19 that was the television was there actually a television link in place at Stratford for their heavy tele yeah no for the television oh sorry I thought that was about the head he tell you and there was a TV in Stratford yes do you
02:28:30 there was a TV in Stratford yes do you know whether it was actually workable I believe it was yes but it wasn't working on the night I think it was working it just wasn't switched on that's what I
02:28:41 just wasn't switched on that's what I meant
02:28:42 meant oh ok no it was on can I help with that you say it wasn't switched on was that as a result of a decision by anybody it was later on it was discussed with
02:28:55 was later on it was discussed with myself and Joe and I believe Scott Howard as well about having whether it be beneficial or not to have the news on the time of that though it was it was a
02:29:06 the time of that though it was it was a bit later on ok is the television normally on or as a television normally off so that if you wanted it all you'd have to switch it on at Stratford yes very rarely work at Stratford and I
02:29:18 very rarely work at Stratford and I don't recall using it when I have been there okay is there a television at Merton there are two that Martin wrote and I think normally switched on or would they normally yeah you have to they are switched on yes yeah so so when
02:29:30 they are switched on yes yeah so so when you when you've been this shift started and the television was off did you try to turn it on or no was there a reason to that yes so the there were two TVs in
02:29:42 to that yes so the there were two TVs in the control and there was a large 145 inches possibly which she's always been there which I am aware wasn't it working this is in a Streisand screen yeah and there was a small one probably slightly
02:29:54 there was a small one probably slightly bigger than this and it was behind the supervisors desk so we wouldn't been out to view it because it was behind us it's like a portable size you'd have any bedroom maybe and where I was sitting or
02:30:07 bedroom maybe and where I was sitting or myself and Peter no one else would be able to see it so I felt early on there was no point in putting it on I'll start with the duty not junior night yes I see
02:30:18 with the duty not junior night yes I see okay let's try to put this to rest and see if we can identify where it was can I uh can I ask to be taken back to page 175 of the control report that's four seven nine oh there it is yes that's the
02:30:31 seven nine oh there it is yes that's the big the big one isn't working the big one is the big one doesn't work doesn't work so it's the small one which is that's it
02:30:41 that's it just below that yeah which nobody could really say if you're sitting in those positions and people have all sittin facing you you you're blocking the view of everybody so okay would it have
02:30:55 of everybody so okay would it have helped to have that television on so that you could get more information even if through the news channels about what was happening I don't think in the oh yeah it would have even been on legit really um I don't know what time the news helicopters got their own safe
02:31:07 news helicopters got their own safe running their reports so it's a tough one really in some ways yes but with the distress it would have caused on top of
02:31:18 distress it would have caused on top of the distress that people already were in receiving these calls we kind of waited up and decides it wasn't we need people to concentrate on the course that they want to focus on while I'm becoming to stress themselves
02:31:30 while I'm becoming to stress themselves were you party to that decision Alice yeah what time was that decision made how far into the incident I don't recall it must have been after half past two between help us to know where you positively I really don't remember it
02:31:45 positively I really don't remember it must have been a while into it because Joanne was there so yes
02:31:54 now going back to the control debrief document that we looked at the four three one one three can I ask you just
02:32:06 three one one three can I ask you just to look at that again and go to page four where we looked and we looked at
02:32:18 four where we looked and we looked at this a minute ago
02:32:21 Harriet any contacts control in giving info via radio on fire spread I think you told us that you did get radio messages from the police radio yes did
02:32:36 messages from the police radio yes did that help you in advising callers that information that you got back through that route we didn't use that information to advise corners at that point I think it would have caused more
02:32:49 point I think it would have caused more panic where there was already panic to be honest what specific information do you recall receiving through the helot any radio updates that assisted you in the advice your colleagues in the advice
02:33:00 the advice your colleagues in the advice that they could give don't think there was any assistance in with the advice that they could actually give I mean I can tell you what the helicopter was saying to me if that would help
02:33:11 saying to me if that would help well yes what okay so they were saying why can we call I mean there was quite a lot of radio traffic with them but they were saying that the fire was spreading from explore take a cut many of the
02:33:23 from explore take a cut many of the floors they said have little from flauta to the roof I believe there were people on the roof I think they said about eight or nine people at one point on the roof they were said there are people at windows flashing their mobile phones
02:33:36 windows flashing their mobile phones people making sheet ladders though I remember a conversation about so I'm making a sheet ladder to climb out of the window yes we're relatively high floor yes we have some details of those
02:33:47 floor yes we have some details of those we may we may come back to those at look but my question really is did that information actually enable you to call the control room more generally to get a clearer picture of the development of the fire we were getting an
02:33:58 the fire we were getting an understanding then that there was basically the whole block and was everybody in the control room party to that under could they share in that under
02:34:05 under would be able to hear that that radios on the loudspeaker it's all about spit yes so they'd better hear it okay that's helpful and then in the state on the same page it slightly decidely different topic but on the same page just a little
02:34:20 topic but on the same page just a little bit lower down stay put advise remains block vents moved other move to other people told to get out if they can as
02:34:32 people told to get out if they can as first question and then this control new firefighters were being committed to rescue expectation this will happen now
02:34:43 rescue expectation this will happen now which we're here taking this as accurate note of what was said at the meeting but is it right that firefighter the control did know that firefighters were being
02:34:55 did know that firefighters were being committed to rescues we did not know officially that firefighters were being committed to rescue it was we were expecting that this would be happening
02:35:06 expecting that this would be happening and that they would be going up to these flats that we did informed them off so when you say you didn't know officially does that mean it it's what we believed would be happening you believed it yes you weren't told it by the ground and
02:35:17 you weren't told it by the ground and that right and was the assumption that you were making that fact that crews were responding to the specific
02:35:28 were responding to the specific information that you were giving them yes yes because that is what wouldn't normally happen yep
02:35:37 and I'd had nothing to inform me that they weren't committing to rescue so yes
02:35:50 now on the foot of page 5 of your witness statement if you just go back to that
02:36:03 we looked at a moment ago but you say they're between 120 and two-ish all hell broke loose the calls were constant and even our critical Famers constant
02:36:15 even our critical Famers constant ringing with other services calling us it basically became a normal telephone by this point there was no one else to take calls the CRO we're overwhelmed and I ended giving and it giving the BT operators fire survival guidance advice
02:36:27 operators fire survival guidance advice to pass on to callers can we just look at the first calls that you yourself took the first one is and I think we
02:36:39 took the first one is and I think we looked at this a moment ago at control report page 15 at 125 60 go back to the control report and look at page 15
02:37:05 we look to this earlier that is there a summary of the call first of all do you have any particular recollection of this call and I have listened to it since
02:37:19 call and I have listened to it since I've listened to it since you've listened to it now I'm going to take you to the transcript of this call but before I do I just sort of give a trigger warning to people in the room that there are no images of fire or
02:37:31 that there are no images of fire or anything like that but it might trigger an unpleasant recollection or reaction in some people say I'll just give that warning now and if people want to leave
02:37:43 warning now and if people want to leave the room or turn their heads and ears away from the live stream then they should
02:37:50 should itself be Quint equals zero 308
02:38:06 and I just you know playing how are you I'm sorry you're going to play it no no pamphlet I'm just gonna show you the transcript this is son just say where this is a London Fire Brigade transcript if there's anything only that
02:38:19 transcript if there's anything only that you recall which you think is wrong and obviously please say so because we start with page one and we can see that this is time - oh one 25 16 on the top of the
02:38:30 is time - oh one 25 16 on the top of the page it lasts almost four minutes and it's about flat one one one and you're told on page two I'm on the 14th floor
02:38:41 told on page two I'm on the 14th floor it's coming past my window and see that and then you say right the fires actually on the fourth floor caller query it's on the 14th Corino it's on the 4th one two three four well
02:38:53 it's on the 4th one two three four well I'm on the 14th and on 114 now I'm alerting to the fact that we're not I think on page to say just it's the
02:39:04 think on page to say just it's the bottom part of that page you see I'm on 14 and then you say right the fires actually on the fourth floor caller it's
02:39:16 actually on the fourth floor caller it's on the 14th no it's on the fourth 1 2 3 4 while I'm on 14 and then over the page you see you are squat flat number are you 1 1 4
02:39:29 are squat flat number are you 1 1 4 query no i'm 1 1 1 I'm on the 14th floor grant felt our love and then there's some discussion about conditions and you
02:39:41 some discussion about conditions and you say at the bottom of page 3 if it's safe for you to leave then leave I'm not there so I can't see the situation and then over and there's some more
02:39:52 then over and there's some more discussion about that you asked him if you go to page 4 there's a discussion between you about whether there's smoke coming in
02:40:03 and he says third of the way down no there's fire inaudible all in my house all on my side I'm not burning and
02:40:17 house all on my side I'm not burning and you say no ok so what I'm asking is is there any smoke in your flat yeah I can smell it just just pausing there was it was it clear to you at this stage that the fire wasn't limited to the fourth floor as we saw as we saw you telling
02:40:30 floor as we saw as we saw you telling him at the beginning of the call on page 2 but actually had spread to the 14th floor which is where he was calling from was that clear to you from what he was telling you um at the time I actually
02:40:41 telling you um at the time I actually thought he meant smoke was outside his window bother then fire right it was it was quite difficult all he was obviously very panicking which I totally understand but I actually believed it
02:40:54 understand but I actually believed it was smoke that was outside his window not fire right and then he you go on at the foot of page 4 to say the safest thing for you to do for now is to stay where you are I will pass a message to
02:41:05 where you are I will pass a message to the crews saying that you're in your flat number one one one on the 14th floor and you make the same you make the
02:41:17 floor and you make the same you make the same assurance on page 5 if you just turn to that just 2/3 of the way down the page you say I'll let the crews know
02:41:28 the page you say I'll let the crews know that you're in there this is 2/3 of the way down page 5 and when they can they will get up and come and check on you okay all right all right I mean you
02:41:39 okay all right all right I mean you don't make the same point a couple more times call for the way down page 6 at the top of page 7 you say I'll tell the crews where you are
02:41:52 did did you do you think pass the message to the crews about this corner yes how would you how would you have done that I believe that's one of the
02:42:04 done that I believe that's one of the cause I passed to see you eight so you yourself took charge of actually passing that to CUA yes and did you learn from
02:42:17 that to CUA yes and did you learn from this discussion about the location of the fire and how it had spread no because as I said I still believed it
02:42:29 because as I said I still believed it was smoke rather than fire do you remember what details you did pass on to see you 8mm caller on the 14th floor 511 one person I smoke coming
02:42:43 14th floor 511 one person I smoke coming into the flat I believe and if you go back to the transcript he tells you it's
02:42:56 back to the transcript he tells you it's just page five
02:43:01 hmm he says at the top no love I can't even get out love on my right say stay right listen stay where you are he says I can't get out right you need to listen
02:43:12 I can't get out right you need to listen smoke I can't get out I tried I'm try to open the door there's a lot of smoke inaudible I can't get out right so there's no smoke coming in so you're safe when you're there for now
02:43:24 safe when you're there for now did it occur to you at that stage to ask him whether he had any mobility or health issues which might impede his escape no at all he told me he couldn't
02:43:37 escape no at all he told me he couldn't get out because of the smoke right that's the point where I would believe it normally somebody did have mobility issues they will tell you
02:43:58 having discovered that the from this call that the fire had now spread up to the 14th floor do you remember whether you told other people in the control room that the fire
02:44:09 people in the control room that the fire was no longer limited to the fourth floor where it had originated but it had spread up the building I don't remember discussing it I can't recall now the next call you take is at
02:44:21 recall now the next call you take is at 1:30 o2 and that's at page 23 of the control report
02:44:34 that relates
02:44:38 to flat 175 and we can see that halfway down the page on that page and there's the summary of it I just want to take
02:44:52 the summary of it I just want to take you to the transcript which is a tell fp3 one for one or two things in there if you you can see that it starts at
02:45:03 if you you can see that it starts at 1:30 Oh - if we go to page 2 it starts hello fire brigade hi there's a fire in
02:45:14 hello fire brigade hi there's a fire in my block it's right next door to my building and you say are you in which are you in Granville Tower Greville tower 175 Granville tower and at the
02:45:26 tower 175 Granville tower and at the foot of the page it says seventeenth floor it's actually xx xx you're on the 20th floor the fire is actually yeah and then you say on the floor on the floor
02:45:37 then you say on the floor on the floor below you
02:45:38 below you oh it's below us okay because smokes come over speaking coming into my flat what do I do and then you give some
02:45:49 what do I do and then you give some advice at that stage is it did you recall the previous call that you'd taken where you'd learned that this the
02:46:00 taken where you'd learned that this the fire was on the 14th floor I've got up that high and I'd recall that call because it wasn't long after but it was I still believed it was more smoke than fire at that point is that
02:46:11 smoke than fire at that point is that right even though you were told by the previous corner from one-one-one that the smoke was was was on that floor 14th floor yeah that was my feeling at the
02:46:22 floor yeah that was my feeling at the time from what I recall right
02:46:26 but it's strictly speaking accurate that the floor was on a floor below but do you think that well was there a risk do
02:46:40 you think that well was there a risk do you think that you were giving him an assurance that the fire was sufficiently far away from him that that he shouldn't be concerned yes what we know now yes of
02:46:52 be concerned yes what we know now yes of course and then you see on page four the top of the page caller 175 you say 175 and you say
02:47:05 caller 175 you say 175 and you say that's the 17th floor yeah how many over speaking no xx xx xx floor I'm sorry big upon xx how many are there in there of you as me my husband three kids and one
02:47:16 you as me my husband three kids and one baby so there's five of you yeah there's five of us and then at the at the end of the call on page eight you tell the
02:47:32 the call on page eight you tell the caller at the top of the page all right if it gets worse give us a call back okay but are they okay I'll let the crews know where you are did you pass on to see you ate the the
02:47:47 did you pass on to see you ate the the details all the details that you've gleaned from that call do you think so 175 on xx where there are two adults and three children I believe I passed that one same five
02:48:02 I believe I passed that one same five persons rather than separating into adults and children right is there a reason why you didn't alert and cu8 to the fair the children I was more concerned about the number of people than their ages at that point to be
02:48:13 than their ages at that point to be honest we met people that were there that they would need to get out too right did the fact that they were children not prompt an idea in your mind that they might have been a priority of some kind the priority would be we don't
02:48:28 some kind the priority would be we don't privatize in that way in the priorities the conditions in the flat he got to first so I thought five saying five persons was sufficient information at the time
02:48:48 there was so much going on it's really hard to remember exactly what was going through my mind
02:49:01 and we we can see in summary form the info the information you then did pass on if you go to page 31 of the control report at one thirty five twenty four we
02:49:18 report at one thirty five twenty four we can see you ring the team leader from cu8 you ask him to check some flats and then you say in the summary the line up
02:49:29 then you say in the summary the line up from the end youth she then makes reference to a large the large following the calls being received the information subsequently passed the summarized below and then it's summarized in the table there flat one one one floor fourteen
02:49:40 there flat one one one floor fourteen one person got smoke coming into the premises it looks as if you didn't pass on to the command unit that there was actually fire on the 14th floor no
02:49:51 actually fire on the 14th floor no because I said I believed it was smoke even though the caller had said to you the floor I may not may not have heard him there was an awful lot of noise so right and then as you said just now you
02:50:02 right and then as you said just now you passed on the number of people but not that not the children and and again
02:50:11 that is but you said that's because you didn't need to differentiate between them
02:50:18 what was that is there a reason why you didn't give as much detail as you possibly could to see you ate about the information you were getting from the calls I think with the
02:50:31 getting from the calls I think with the volume of course that were coming in it was more important just to get the basic information that we had to learn to I think the flat number the floor number and a number of persons and the smoke was size 20 the premises was sufficient
02:50:43 was size 20 the premises was sufficient information
02:50:55 No
02:51:01 it it looks as if before you ran the command unit at 135 you took a further call we received a
02:51:17 you took a further call we received a call about what flat 175 on page 23 at 1:30 Oh - we've looked at that and if you go on in the control report to page
02:51:29 you go on in the control report to page 27 there's a call you take of 132 51
02:51:36 here's a female caller outside Grenville town is very emotional and panicking and then you make your call at 135 24 which
02:51:47 then you make your call at 135 24 which we see on page 31 my question is why having up told to callers from two different flats that you were going to pass on their details to your command unit did you then take a another call
02:52:00 unit did you then take a another call rather than getting on to the command unit straightaway I can't remember that at all sorry
02:52:11 can I ask you about a different topic a generic topic about callbacks Joe Smith
02:52:23 generic topic about callbacks Joe Smith gave some evidence and I'm summarizing it very very broadly there as a matter of policy the control room doesn't call callers back and she explained why that was just just want to pursue that with
02:52:39 was just just want to pursue that with you a little bit Connie I ask you please to go to page 39 of the control report
02:52:48 at 1:30 9:15 on that page you take a
02:52:59 at 1:30 9:15 on that page you take a court you take a call from this caller a male in flat 204 on the 23rd floor whose author who's on his own and he says that there's a little smoke coming into his
02:53:10 there's a little smoke coming into his flat and you tell him to go to the room furthest away from the smoke and to call back if it gets worse I'm summarizing the summary at the end you say as you
02:53:22 the summary at the end you say as you see she advises him to call back if it gets any worse now if you then move on in the control report to page 48 you can
02:53:33 in the control report to page 48 you can see you at the top of that page at 1:46 Oh to make an outgoing call to the resident that she speaks to at 1:39 did
02:53:45 resident that she speaks to at 1:39 did you see this he reports that he's a flat 204 on the 23rd floor om Norman calls to check that he is still safe and you give it you continue to give advice there but
02:53:58 it you continue to give advice there but do you remember that specific callback you made I do and it was actually I didn't intend to do it I was I meant to call the coop so we have a list of
02:54:11 call the coop so we have a list of numbers that we can read our last numbers called and this for them and I put my finger on what I thought was the command unit number mobile number actually was this gentleman's mobile number
02:54:22 number so when he answered the phone I realized that I'd and we contacted that person I wasn't just gonna clear the line inside I just spoke to him I see okay so was it
02:54:34 I just spoke to him I see okay so was it a one-off yes I believe so
02:54:43 but in terms of policy on call back so we just ask you one or two questions
02:54:50 Arthur said okay are there circumstances in which the control room officers would call a quarterback and abandon calls from a mobile we would call them back from a mobile when they are not from a
02:55:03 from a mobile when they are not from a landline right I see would a change of circumstances such as for example deterioration in conditions or update of information that you're getting from the incident ground be a justifiable basis
02:55:16 incident ground be a justifiable basis to call back I can't say no because it would be a justifiable basis was a question on my part let me rephrase it in your experience have you ever
02:55:28 in your experience have you ever encountered an occasion when you've actually called callers back because circumstances have changed or no right now is it was there a policy reason or a
02:55:42 now is it was there a policy reason or a practical reason not to call callers back if your information got updated and about the conditions in the building I actually can't recall the time apart from that night when it would have been necessary to be honest but we it's a
02:55:56 necessary to be honest but we it's a historical thing that we didn't cook call us back with our special landlines
02:56:05 so if you same question where the stapled advice changes if for example you just told someone to stay put Cruz will come to get you and then
02:56:16 Cruz will come to get you and then you'll tell no stay puts off everyone's got to get out is there a reason why you wouldn't call that person back and say what I've just told you has just been updated you no need to leave okay so
02:56:29 updated you no need to leave okay so that's never ever happened before I think it would depend on the amount of callers that were needed to call back and the amount of calls that was still coming into the control room to be honest if you've got lots and lots and
02:56:42 honest if you've got lots and lots and lots of calls waiting to the answers and you've had you've taken hundreds of calls already it would be impossible to search through those every single call to find the telephone number to recontact them right but if you happen
02:56:53 recontact them right but if you happen to know what you're called yeah I think you told us that you did have at least a mechanical facility to press the screen and make a call back as we saw you did numbers that come up then it's like the last four numbers of dial to see it's
02:57:06 last four numbers of dial to see it's not it's not a long long list okay and if you needed to look at the earlier numbers which you have to scroll up you could go into the instant replay section on your screen on your ex cream there's
02:57:18 on your screen on your ex cream there's an instant replay where you can replay your recordings and it gives you telephone numbers that have called in to you yeah that'd be very time-consuming no exam out of course right are you aware of any other examples other than you by accident calling somebody back on
02:57:30 you by accident calling somebody back on the night I'm not aware than you know okay
02:57:33 okay was there any discussion in the controller about calling about calling people back at any stage now listen it wasn't okay
02:57:43 if the stay put as we advise changes as we know it did how else would call as we previously being called and told to stay put know that that advice had changed
02:57:54 put know that that advice had changed unless they've been called back by the control room I know that service that is a really hard one but the amount of course we had on that night that was still incoming and the amount of course
02:58:06 still incoming and the amount of course it was already received and the amount of people that we actually had available in the control room we weren't have been out to continue taking other 999 calls to recontact
02:58:18 taking other 999 calls to recontact those callers the hope would be this is my personal feeling that those callers would be calling us back to say the conditions were worsening so we could give them that advice I see so you were relying on them to call back in at that
02:58:31 relying on them to call back in at that point yes okay and we'll come back to stay plot changing in a moment can I just ask you one or two questions about overflow calls now you say in your statement on page three that you have a
02:58:42 statement on page three that you have a buddy system
02:58:51 and you have it give the northwest and West Midlands see that there dude did
02:59:04 West Midlands see that there dude did you receive any calls from West Midlands Fire Service on the night no so West Midlands we receive their calls in the buddy system as Northwest receive our calls when did you first become aware
02:59:16 calls when did you first become aware that other services were taking calls for you for this incident I can't leak all the time but the it was the same time as I was talking to the police helicopter because I was between
02:59:28 police helicopter because I was between the police helicopter on the radio and they said we've got a critical phone in the control room and they were coming up on that which was actually quite unusual but they also couldn't get through on the main for the 909 call system right
02:59:41 the main for the 909 call system right so they would cut me on calling up from their parts of information and what did you tell them I told them that the is what the incident was and the calls that
02:59:52 what the incident was and the calls that we were getting not individual but you know the range of cause of what people were saying to us and they were passing information practice but we told them the incident that we were dealing with routine with the 25 pump fire or 40 once
03:00:04 routine with the 25 pump fire or 40 once it was 40 yeah now we can see if you go back to the control report at page 50 that at 147 13 147 13 at top of the page
03:00:18 that at 147 13 147 13 at top of the page Christian house and takes a call from Kent FRS control she can take a CRA explains that BT of contacted them saying the brigade are very busy and the BT may want to pass on overflow calls to
03:00:31 BT may want to pass on overflow calls to them did you did you know that but at that time no not at that precise time though I do did Christine house and tell you about the cook that call afterwards
03:00:43 you about the cook that call afterwards she may well have done I just don't recall that right what what is in very brief terms is that what is the system can you describe it for us by which BT tip calls over to other buddy services
03:00:54 tip calls over to other buddy services so BT will obviously realize that there's a lot of calls waiting to the answer they will listen to some of the calls and understood what is happening knowing that we can't cope with the demands in a
03:01:05 that we can't cope with the demands in a control room so they will contact surrounding maids and explain the situation to them London have got this large fire can we pass calls on to you
03:01:17 large fire can we pass calls on to you right can you take some of the overflow cause I see is there a formal agreement in place for that to that effect between BT and the London Fire Brigade I believe there is a formal agreement in place but
03:01:29 there is a formal agreement in place but I couldn't tell you any more about that can I ask you to be shown page 42 please of the same report at 143 at the bottom
03:01:41 of the same report at 143 at the bottom of the page you set you take a call from the NW FC Northwest and summarizing it there you come to an agreement and to
03:01:54 there you come to an agreement and to see this at the bottom of the page the two operators agree that NW FC will only contact London if they have people trapped and they then go on to say they haven't have another call just going over the page
03:02:10 with five people in in flat 175 on the 20th floor but that's one of those we saw you'd already passed on to see you eight so this is another and not a call I want to ask you just about the
03:02:22 I want to ask you just about the agreement you reach did did you make any agreement of that kind with any other FRS other than North West know that I would call myself now how did you
03:02:33 would call myself now how did you implement the passing of information from other fire and rescue services to the control room I was that implemented how'd you main sigh well what did they
03:02:44 how'd you main sigh well what did they did those control rooms then calls for some specific lines in the control room or did they call in on the normal line no so they all have allocated lines and to come upon me and eggs but the calls
03:02:56 to come upon me and eggs but the calls that I remember taking most of them were actually on the critical line phone I see I think it's because they were bead held because they would be held in a queue behind all the other 999 calls on
03:03:07 queue behind all the other 999 calls on the X and when when the staple device was changed a subject we're going to come to very shortly when it was changed what did you do anything to ensure that the other control room such as North
03:03:18 the other control room such as North West were were contacted and told about the change no I believe that John Smith did that right do you know whether every control room was contacted I think that
03:03:29 control room was contacted I think that one of the control room is possibly sorry okay I don't recall exactly said that they would pass the information around together control rooms yes okay did you know on the night of the fire
03:03:42 did you know on the night of the fire itself that the police and the London ambulance services were also taking 999 calls from people in the building yes you did
03:03:48 you did how did you know that at that time I can't remember if I spoke to the police myself or someone told me that but I was aware with that yes you were and how
03:03:59 aware with that yes you were and how would the start with the LA s how did the LA s start how do they contact you they have allowing straight to us okay just one button you press so it just
03:04:10 just one button you press so it just comes straight through right now if you go back to the to control debrief notes LFP quadruple zero three one one three
03:04:21 and turn to page four
03:04:28 and against them manuscript version of that
03:04:40 just about four-fifths of the way down the page it says critical lines police and VT taking FSG did not know guidance other FRS did
03:04:54 FSG did not know guidance other FRS did know FSG guidance there's no reference to ambulance they're looking at the picking up police is that correct that the police didn't and BT didn't know the
03:05:07 the police didn't and BT didn't know the guidance no they wouldn't well yes I think I believe it is correct they don't deal with fire survival guidance BT just passed the calls on as
03:05:18 guidance BT just passed the calls on as a matter of course and the police obviously do what the police do but they don't deal with first of either guidance no did you did you know at the time verse the police and BT were ignorant of
03:05:31 verse the police and BT were ignorant of the guidance and we're asking well start with we're ignorant of the guidance did you know that it's not something I'd actually really considered until that night okay will you asked for any advice
03:05:42 night okay will you asked for any advice as to what to tell the police or BT by where I remember speaking to BT because they had an operator who was on the family somebody and I gave them some
03:05:54 family somebody and I gave them some advice to pass on to the person right what about the police I don't recall speaking to the police I may well have done it would have been the same I remember there was a conference call set out with the police with one of the
03:06:06 out with the police with one of the operators with Ballesteros right the cleat the police had a caller on the line and they asked if they could transfer and I think it was a conference
03:06:18 transfer and I think it was a conference call but I think it was even Adams I believe yes is if we have that I think at 1:46 18 so it's still it at that stage yeah and we also have a call to
03:06:29 stage yeah and we also have a call to 221 when the LA has call it and call lfb and and they they get Yvonne Adams did my question is did you then stay in contact with the police BTW or la s so
03:06:42 contact with the police BTW or la s so that you could communicate updates to them no is there a reason why not we just with we did we couldn't we didn't have the staff the resource to do that we were far too busy no now you say in your statement as you've just told us it's bottom of page five that
03:06:54 told us it's bottom of page five that you did end up giving BT operators FSG advice to pass on to the callers we just go to page five look at the very bottom of that page that's what you say do you
03:07:08 of that page that's what you say do you remember even roughly what time that was no because it was it after the statehood advice had been changed or before do you remember I think it was before it was before
03:07:18 before did you tell BT what to say I would have given the advice about how to to protect of course to protect themselves right did you ever get any any information back or feedback back from BT about
03:07:32 back or feedback back from BT about calls they had taken not myself personally did anybody ever sit in the control room I don't know well honestly don't know the answer to that did you
03:07:43 don't know the answer to that did you did you follow up with BT to find out whether they taken any calls no okay now Joe Smith says that she did speak to beating to tell them about this change in the stapler device does that accord
03:07:56 in the stapler device does that accord with your recollection yes it does did you hear her do that I don't think I actually heard the conversation by I saw her going over to a telephone yes right okay in roughly during what time that
03:08:07 okay in roughly during what time that would have been funny about 2:45 moving through but now do you know whether finally on this where the BT ever made
03:08:18 finally on this where the BT ever made any call backs themselves no I don't know II don't know no
03:08:26 on pages 5 & 6 of your witness statement we could pick it up right at the foot of page 5 where we've just been and go over to page 6 and say control room officers
03:08:37 to page 6 and say control room officers normally stay on the phone for FSG calls but my staff just couldn't stay on the phone for that long so we had to be efficient in giving advice then moving on to the next call as we had people waiting we couldn't follow the policy in these circumstances and there is no
03:08:49 these circumstances and there is no amount of training that would have prepared anybody for that it was an operational decision made generally not to stay on FSG calls it was advised that
03:09:03 to stay on FSG calls it was advised that sis will try and get all the information you can give the caller advice to protect themselves and to call back and then not stay on the phone and try and move on if possible because of the sheer
03:09:15 move on if possible because of the sheer volume of course that were coming in I know there were a few calls it did last a long time mmm but the majority of course we were just getting the critical information
03:09:27 just getting the critical information that we could offer them and they know but when I say it was an operation I asked you whether an operational decision was made do you mean from five rounds I mean no allow that sigh it was my fault I may have confused you was a a
03:09:40 my fault I may have confused you was a a general command decision within the control room made that Connecticut CRS would would not stay on or was it left to individual CRA s to decide for
03:09:51 to individual CRA s to decide for themselves to terminate calls oh I don't really recall to be honest with you I think I may have said I can't remember it's a bit of a blur but I think I may have said to some people to do what you
03:10:04 have said to some people to do what you can get all the information you can that's critical give the caller advice and call us back if the situation worsened now we've got examples of long calls that you've just referred to some
03:10:15 calls that you've just referred to some long calls I'll just give you three we've got Pete daddy's at 154 14 he was on a call for 40 minutes Sarah Russell's call with Jessica at 138
03:10:28 Sarah Russell's call with Jessica at 138 55 minutes and we've got Pam Jones's at 130
03:10:32 130 38 which lasted for 59 minutes and 40 seconds did you listen to any of those calls herself on the night yes you didn't do you know why those CRS did
03:10:45 didn't do you know why those CRS did stay on the line and not others I believe they felt that they I know specifically with Sarah and the record
03:10:56 specifically with Sarah and the record Jessica that because she was a child that she just felt that she could believe her she felt that she had to stay with her and what about the others Pete others and Pam James is long cause I think they just felt though they
03:11:08 I think they just felt though they couldn't leave them I think the callers wouldn't weren't prepared I think they were just begging them to stay on the phone really just wanted to stay with the somebody and have someone to talk to to help them so most of the call is when
03:11:20 to help them so most of the call is when you did finish just give them the basic advice to say to protect themselves but okay with you calling them back oh so then calling us back but some weren't
03:11:32 then calling us back but some weren't some were very reluctant so let you go understandably so turning to the next topic which is passing information to
03:11:44 topic which is passing information to the incident ground than the question of prioritization of FSG calls we know that Sharon dar being as she told us was passing information by radio message rt4
03:11:56 passing information by radio message rt4 and we know later that Jason Olaf once he got his whiteboard system working was on on his own mobile to Dan Mary can see
03:12:08 on on his own mobile to Dan Mary can see you age like you say on page 6 of your statement that you asked Peter may and Debbie real not to answer calls but concentrate on concentrate on mobilizing
03:12:20 concentrate on concentrate on mobilizing all resources and help you with management it's the second paragraph of summarizing it while I was passing information to the Cu in via telephone that's what you say there at the end of
03:12:31 that's what you say there at the end of that paragraph how are you passing the information to the see you
03:12:37 I had by what method by telephone the information I had with her was past him Divac to them but anything was that the admin line calls yeah was there any other means by which you passed information to see you ate or was
03:12:48 passed information to see you ate or was it just the end of myself no I just used a teiephone did you stop you sending information to the command unit at any stage only when Jason started speaking
03:12:59 stage only when Jason started speaking to them and then it was going to him right do you know where though did you see from what you could observe whether information was being passed both by Jason Olaf or you and by Sharon Darby by
03:13:12 Jason Olaf or you and by Sharon Darby by radio at the same time I don't believe it would have been the three of us at the same time because I gave Jason that role but I do and I have heard that yes it was going by the way Joe as well as
03:13:24 it was going by the way Joe as well as either the Cu and myself all right Jason and the radio so at some point there was an overlap of a lot of information lines yes I see radio and Olaf mobile you saw
03:13:36 yes I see radio and Olaf mobile you saw that for yourself did you know I've just known that subsequently oh I see yeah can I ask you to look at page 52 please of the controller board we can
03:13:47 please of the controller board we can see there on page 52 that there is a time mark of 150 49 where you see that
03:14:02 if all Adams makes a call on a landline to the mobile phone allocated to the to command unit eight in order to pass on FSG calls and you could see what's
03:14:14 FSG calls and you could see what's passed on to flats 133 182 did you ask her to pass days on no I didn't know what why would she have made that call herself then if you hadn't
03:14:25 that call herself then if you hadn't asked her to I don't know were they well they cause that she took herself from passed on well it says that she made a call on a landline to a mobile phone allocated to command unit 8 now I'm just wondering if they flats were cause that
03:14:36 wondering if they flats were cause that she had taken and passed on herself that's a good question but off the top of my head I'm afraid I can't I don't know if I can answer them I didn't know
03:14:47 know if I can answer them I didn't know my question is was really this wet weather contact with the cu8 was done through you as the OEM or whether individual CRS were also free to contact
03:14:58 individual CRS were also free to contact cu8 if they have information they wanted to pass on and there's no set rule at that point I mean you know it could have been passed on okay it would normally be
03:15:10 been passed on okay it would normally be the supervisors it would speak to the command unit so okay now I wonder if you can help me clear something up at page 83 of the same report we can see that at
03:15:23 83 of the same report we can see that at to 28 to 27 if all Adams rings cu8 passes on FSG information about flat 205
03:15:36 passes on FSG information about flat 205 on floor 23 seven adults firers of the living room they're flat but as the report says at to 2254 say some five and
03:15:48 report says at to 2254 say some five and a half minutes before that cu7 advises the control room to pass all the FS g information to them cRIO adams is at a call takers position dolls director cu8
03:15:59 call takers position dolls director cu8 do you know why cro Adams passed those FS g messages to see you said to see you eight and not see you seven
03:16:10 eight and not see you seven no I don't and I'm sure Jason Olaf was actually in place by then as well so now I don't know the answer to that right it
03:16:22 I don't know the answer to that right it was the fact that each individual CRA was free to call the incident ground was that responsible is not something we would normally do to be honest all the crs would call the incident ground no
03:16:33 crs would call the incident ground no they've Judy speaks them on the radio it tends to be the supervisor that was speech to the command unit that's about the question so it's normally the supervisors that speak to the see use the more fullest and that is were you
03:16:45 the more fullest and that is were you aware that the fact that CR owes were taking it upon themselves it seems to contact the incident ground with the cause of confusion or with a or anything like I wasn't aware of that okay now still on the subject of
03:17:00 okay now still on the subject of communication if you can give back in the report to one time mark of 150 49
03:17:11 the report to one time mark of 150 49 which you'll find on page 52
03:17:18 which we've just seen and I should have asked you this while we were on the page but it didn't follows I think the foot of the page the command unit operator
03:17:30 of the page the command unit operator asked CRA items if there is a priority for calls being passed to them and asks control to indicate priority by smoke density did do remember whether CRO
03:17:42 density did do remember whether CRO Adams communicated that request to you
03:17:51 no I don't recall that right she she may well have passed it's one for supervisors right would you expect her to pass it to you although it is better to pass it to somebody yes I see but now
03:18:05 to pass it to somebody yes I see but now the top of page seven of your statement in the first paragraph you say that the control room started to use white boards to list all of the calls flats floors and numbers of people and current
03:18:16 and numbers of people and current situations this was all too forward on to the command unit I didn't photograph the white board to show we had done but nad a say the DAC Adrian Fenton photographed it just so we're clear can
03:18:31 photographed it just so we're clear can I ask you to be shown a meaty triple zero one seven zero nine four
03:18:52 okay keep scrolling down that so that we get to the photographs I'm sorry my fault
03:19:04 to the photographs I'm sorry my fault and leave those on the phone me on the screen if you would Paul let me just ask you then generally about the whiteboards my question is did you see Jason earlier set the whiteboards up I believe that
03:19:17 set the whiteboards up I believe that was Adrian Fenton who said them up like a fakie we call Adrian moving them around anyway yeah
03:19:28 was there any other method of well let's look at them can I ask you to be shown at the same time triple zero one six nine one two
03:19:47 and also 169 0-6 that's a meaty triple zero one six nine one two and one six nine zero six
03:20:02 No
03:20:12 but what one loan is upside down well it's been rotated I could still ask the question those those the whiteboards you were referring to in your statement and they were popped who was mainly
03:20:23 they were popped who was mainly responsible for populating them do you remember attacker qualification was whiter than them and I know he was passing the calls he may well have been there was two other operational officers
03:20:36 there was two other operational officers in at that point Paul McKenna Cohen who is a station manager and I watched manger cotton think of his first name Maloney I think we're assisting him
03:20:49 Maloney I think we're assisting him they'd come in to be part of the BCC the coordination center but they became involved with this right and in general terms once this system started operating
03:21:00 terms once this system started operating with the detail that we can see in general terms how was the information in going from confirm CRO to white board what was the method of communication I was either going around and collecting the information from the control
03:21:12 the information from the control officers or I believe John did when she came in I think some of them were actually taking over themselves if they had a spare second but then there was one pieces of paper it was on pieces of paper now before the white board was set
03:21:26 paper now before the white board was set up by DAC Fenton with Jason Olaf what was the system by which information was collected by CR O's in order to be sent to the command unit it would be
03:21:37 to the command unit it would be collected when they take all the details when they take the call anyway all the information I believe some was still sent in service requests with the information on busy and some were
03:21:48 information on busy and some were writing it down but also logging on the system and passing it over and once the white board system came into play did the system change the system of communications down information without
03:21:59 communications down information without going over to Jason and it was on piece of paper because he has no access to service requests now we can go to the doc to the documents I wanted to show you MIT triple zero one seven zero nine
03:22:12 you MIT triple zero one seven zero nine four we can take those white board pictures down and then look at this this is a sheaf of paper or papers which were exhibited to DAC fentons witness statement m ET triple
03:22:24 fentons witness statement m ET triple zero one seven zero nine four and i just want to ask Paul to scroll through these page by page as we go just to see whether the kind of infant pieces of
03:22:36 whether the kind of infant pieces of paper are things you recognize they were gathered I should tell you from the control room on the night but just slowly going through them quickly going
03:22:47 slowly going through them quickly going through them and you can see there's a piece of paper flat one five two eighteenth floor flat two O floor top floor disabled and then two oh four top floor elves and you can't leave can't
03:22:58 floor elves and you can't leave can't something building then the next page you just look at that some information there about appliances and then some
03:23:10 there about appliances and then some further
03:23:11 further FSG information and then going down the next page i'm not going to run through them all these sorts of things familiar to you
03:23:20 to you what are mine that one's yours is it which is your writing at the top so I think that's information I was getting from the helicopter looking at that right okay face and accepts a sheet
03:23:32 right okay face and accepts a sheet lettuce yeah that was coming from the helicopter right and what did you do with that information when you got and you write it down on a piece of paper what did you then do with it I believe I passed it to the command unit right I can't be a hundred percent
03:23:45 unit right I can't be a hundred percent I would have passed it over I think I that's what I would have done back up now let's look at the next page or two here we see we see a piece of page three
03:23:58 here we see we see a piece of page three addresses on it three flat numbers what would that be
03:24:04 does that look familiar to you the the information not the actual physical information itself but yes then the notes right we want it as a document
03:24:16 notes right we want it as a document what is that why it's not a document as such as is it's a piece of paper with information on it to be passed over to the instant yeah okay is this a kind of example of pieces of paper written down
03:24:28 example of pieces of paper written down by control room officers and then passed to Jason Williford the yes right canal so you've looked at to specifically page 11
03:24:46 this is
03:24:52 the document says well first of all here's all right do you know whose handwriting that is it's mine yours flatline two adults three children with smoke coming in past 150 wheelchair user and then flat 175 20 floor five persons
03:25:06 and then flat 175 20 floor five persons inside past 150 that's you writing that down on a piece of paper what did you do with that piece of paper did you pass it to anybody else or did you use that for yourself the best I think at that time I
03:25:19 yourself the best I think at that time I would have passed the information on myself I think it was then put into the or the piece of paper that to keep them together afterwards when Adrian was
03:25:30 together afterwards when Adrian was collecting it and Jason was using it right so everything that had been done previously was passed over as well when you say past 150 what what is that a reference to that probably I think it's
03:25:41 reference to that probably I think it's probably related to the time I passed the calls but I might have squidward that later who's just making sure that I knew that I pass them on I'd send the information on right and if you look at
03:25:55 information on right and if you look at page 17 of the same exhibit I think we were getting familiar with your handwriting now there isn't it yes
03:26:07 handwriting now there isn't it yes they've got number 111 fourteenth floor number one 75245 persons in living room there's obviously a separate document did sit with but again with information about 175 does that does that share that
03:26:20 about 175 does that does that share that you got updated information about one-seventh no so that was after the original course when I was write them down and passed them on when I took presentative course I took early on all
03:26:32 presentative course I took early on all those calls are calls that I took that I wrote down and made should I pass them on right then you pass them on power to the come on Janet my phone by phone yeah okay and do you remember yourself taking calls and passing on the details to the
03:26:44 calls and passing on the details to the whiteboards at any stage or had you moved on to take anymore after that you didn't take any more of that okay when Jason Olaf arrived did you provide him
03:26:56 Jason Olaf arrived did you provide him with any sort of handover we explained to him what the incident was but we were now
03:27:02 now still at 25 pumps in I believe so yeah we gave him a an outline of what was going on I think he was aware anyway I think he's been listening on his radio right now in your statement you say that
03:27:14 right now in your statement you say that Joe Smith arrived at 2:15 and you said that again this morning in your in your evidence here how can you be sure of the time that is a time that has been talked
03:27:25 time that is a time that has been talked to me by him oh I don't recall when I gave my police statement I did actually say at the beginning of it at the time that I've put in I haven't been told
03:27:36 that I've put in I haven't been told since the incident not actually on there not memory there are times I've been informed of right okay um let me see if I can just ask one or two questions do you remember that hearing that a major
03:27:48 you remember that hearing that a major incident has been declared elicited and do you remember whether Joe Smith arrived before or after that time it was not long after that time very good now did you provide her with a handover yes
03:28:00 did you provide her with a handover yes she came straight to the office of the watch position and explains what the situation was where we were the amount of calls that we were receiving Joe and
03:28:11 of calls that we were receiving Joe and asked if anyone had been on the phone for a long time and I believe I believe she spoke to Pete me about that and he told her about some of the calls that had been ongoing for a long time right okay and what did she do in general
03:28:25 okay and what did she do in general terms as soon as she took command in the control room what was her first actions to your word to your recollection and she asked if there was anything we needed was everybody okay I think there
03:28:36 needed was everybody okay I think there was a big concern about the welfare of staff at this point as well and then the priority was about because I've been going on for some time you know some of them have been put new enough an hour
03:28:47 them have been put new enough an hour and obviously there was great concern about that that's kind of a cutoff point in our really with us because did your role change at all after Joe Smith arrived no no didn't
03:29:01 after Joe Smith arrived no no didn't now mr. chairman noted the time yes I'm not finished with this witness but I am really very close to the end and the door to make an estimate and be held to it
03:29:12 it well it might be more sensible to sit on the break because if you tell me ten minutes and it turns into but it's important that we you know make sure
03:29:23 important that we you know make sure we've covered every point of course so I'm going to ask us to rise now is that convenient to you yeah that's fine miss Mona thank you and can I get come back as usual tip two o'clock two o'clock
03:29:35 as usual tip two o'clock two o'clock very good thank you there's no one will have a break now says that we can all get some lunch okay and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with this was arrived at the road and will
03:29:46 this was arrived at the road and will resume at two o'clock please
03:30:05 took Jesus