Control room operator gives evidence about FSG calls on the night, the stay-put policy, decision-making on advising callers, the change to evacuation advice, and resource constraints in the control room.
00:00:17 yes would you ask me to come in
00:00:38 all right have you to carry on yes good thank you there's Norman and thanks for coming back there I just wanted to further questions I've got which arise out of some of the small things evidence
00:00:49 out of some of the small things evidence which I've had a chance to think about over lunch so bear with me first of all and is there to your knowledge or was there at the night of grenfell a policy
00:01:00 there at the night of grenfell a policy in the controller of not taking people's names callers names that's not policy it's more of a personal choice right so it's a personal choice you mean it's up to any CRO to
00:01:12 choice you mean it's up to any CRO to get the name or not yeah some people take name some people don't and I will only ten state names with children it's kind of a parent-child thing if you speak to them they react to you a bit
00:01:23 speak to them they react to you a bit more if you use their name right and would it is it helpful in your experience to have the name I think it can be on a prolonged call I think it
00:01:34 can be on a prolonged call I think it can be helpful because you build up a sword repertoire with the person that you're speaking to you okay now we talked in terms when I showed you the stay-put policy in appendix three of
00:01:46 stay-put policy in appendix three of five policy 539 about what stay put is and how you then move from stay put to FSG yeah as part of the question about
00:02:00 FSG yeah as part of the question about assessment of whether or not somebody can get out or not yeah I think you said you don't normally ask questions about
00:02:11 you don't normally ask questions about disability or mobility issues or the age or health of the caller no would it not be helpful though to know about those things so that when you're assessing the
00:02:23 things so that when you're assessing the the chances of exit if you like you would be in a better position to have that information I understand what you're saying and I don't disagree with that but we tend to wait for the
00:02:36 that but we tend to wait for the caller's to give us the information they was because when we say why can't you get out they we usually say because they have mobility issues or because they're elderly and have trouble walking etc etc they they
00:02:48 have trouble walking etc etc they they it's very rare for them not to give that information to us right can I ask you them to look at the call we looked at earlier at 1:25 16 from
00:03:00 we looked at earlier at 1:25 16 from flat 111 which you took and it's NFB 308 NFB 308 it's first of all on page 2 we
00:03:17 NFB 308 it's first of all on page 2 we can just look at it you're told in the fourth entry down there's a fire going on in grateful tower I'm in the tower
00:03:28 on in grateful tower I'm in the tower blog and then you're told by the caller just by over halfway down I'm on the 14th floor it's right on it's coming right past my window from the next door you say right
00:03:41 window from the next door you say right the fires actually on the 4th floor and he says it's on the 14th and you say no it's on the 4th he's one two three four and he says well I'm on the 14th and then you go on over
00:03:53 I'm on the 14th and then you go on over the page to talk about flat numbers at that stage in the conversation why were you what lissa did you think you had more information about the fire than the caller did no I didn't think I
00:04:08 than the caller did no I didn't think I had more information I just I think it was I was finding it very hard to comprehend how the fire at that time could have reached his floor I see okay so it's from past experience come past
00:04:20 so it's from past experience come past experience I've never known anything like that to happen so right I follow would you normally seek to correct a caller who was telling you that the father's on his floor we would normally
00:04:31 father's on his floor we would normally tell the caller where the fire is if they're in a high it's also - it might be love them into a false sense of security but she's probably what's happened here but these I want a panic a color that's panicked
00:04:43 I want a panic a color that's panicked even more if you do know that that's the situation at that point right okay so do i so can i summarize her evidence that on this particular passage it was your sense of disbelief that led you to
00:04:54 sense of disbelief that led you to correct him and say he was there and you weren't I couldn't believe that the fire was actually on the 14th floor no no um he then goes on to say have you got an
00:05:05 he then goes on to say have you got an answer to your question have you got smoke coming up into your property this is a page at 3:00 it's right outside my window and then you have a discussion about whether they smoke inside the flat
00:05:17 about whether they smoke inside the flat and on page 5 which is what I want to focus on with you you say you say come
00:05:28 focus on with you you say you say come they can get they will get up to you when they can they will know love I can't even get out love on my and then you say right so stay where right listen
00:05:39 you say right so stay where right listen stay where you are I can't get out now is there a reason why you didn't investigate more with this caller why he
00:05:50 investigate more with this caller why he couldn't get out
00:06:02 you know that I can recall no was had he said to me before about the smoke coming in or was that after that's powerful he said look looking at the page before on page four you he tells what you say in
00:06:17 page four you he tells what you say in the middle of the page well I'm Lib to start above that he's he says there's no this fire inaudible all in my house all on my side I'm not burning no okay so what I'm asking is is there any smoking your flat yeah I can smell it you'll be
00:06:30 your flat yeah I can smell it you'll be able to smell it because there anything else no right so in the safest thing for you to do for now is to stay where you are I'll pass the message to the crews to say that you're in your flat number one Mormon on the 14th floor yeah yeah
00:06:41 one Mormon on the 14th floor yeah yeah and let me get this passage about but I can't get out and then we see that I'll give you the context afterwards you say third of the way down page five right
00:06:52 third of the way down page five right you need to listen smoke I can't get out I'm trying to open the door and there's a lot of smoke I can't inaudible I can't get out so you then say write this so there's no smoke coming in so you're safe where you are
00:07:03 coming in so you're safe where you are for now okay and later on on page six just so you know it and says there's smoke coming in my flat now and you say
00:07:14 smoke coming in my flat now and you say stay where you are and he says it's coming from the landing now my question really devote directed to this part of the call is is is there a reason why you didn't investigate with him that the
00:07:25 didn't investigate with him that the nature of the exit routes and what was actually stopping him getting out I
00:07:32 wasn't actually giving him fire survival guidance advice I was saying he was safer to remain in his flat that was probably coming soon key case if I was actually giving him fire survival guidance advice but no I don't I don't
00:07:44 guidance advice but no I don't I don't really recall for me on this right you say you weren't giving FSG at that stage no I've said is f SJ you were giving so what advice was it that was essentially stay put it was to stay where you are
00:07:55 stay put it was to stay where you are safer to stay where you are as I said I I didn't believe that the fire would spread that far no just continuing on the theme of giving him stapled advice if you look at the bottom of page six
00:08:06 if you look at the bottom of page six it's not
00:08:07 it's not and I just mentioned this to come back to what you say after your question how many people 3/4 of the way down how many people are in your flat just me the smoke coming in my flat now all right
00:08:19 smoke coming in my flat now all right all right stay where you are just those two exchanges when you're told this smoke coming in my flat now does that mean that he was affected by smoke yes it does and that's why I told
00:08:31 smoke yes it does and that's why I told him to block the doors yes but given that he's now been affected by smoke my question is is it appropriate still to give him the stay-put advice or or would it be actually right then to move to
00:08:43 it be actually right then to move to examining the exits and what whether he could make a safe alternative exit I
00:08:54 believed at the time that was the correct advice to give him and for him to call us back if it was getting worse because it was only it ain't just started coming in and locking the doors
00:09:05 started coming in and locking the doors we were hopeful that they would become Scott to him what I'm seeking to get a feel for is is it's not just your personal understanding but whether there's a general understanding and control in your control room about at
00:09:17 control in your control room about at the moment when you move into stay put not being appropriate and we've seen the policy yeah you stay put unless you're affected by smoke heat or fire yeah and I'm really just trying to get from you
00:09:29 I'm really just trying to get from you what your understanding is as someone in that control room you see that this corner is affected by smoke but you still tell him to stay put yeah it's my question why is that yes because the smoke had only just started coming into
00:09:40 smoke had only just started coming into his flat initially when he called there was no smoke so I was hopeful that he people locked the doors that the smoke he would be able to prevent the smoke coming any further that's why I asked
00:09:51 coming any further that's why I asked him to call us back if it did become any any worse for him would you in your own mind or a distinction between smoke and fire but if you'd said my flats on fire
00:10:02 fire but if you'd said my flats on fire what would you what would you have said we would have gone through if so many other means of escape and further protection for the caller let's look at one other call just say we
00:10:13 let's look at one other call just say we can get a broader feel for that three one four which is flat 175 which is a call you handled it 130 Oh - we
00:10:30 is a call you handled it 130 Oh - we looked at this before morning but looking at page three you're told three lines down okay oh it's below us query
00:10:43 lines down okay oh it's below us query okay because the smokes over speaking coming into my flat what do I do and again you you say okay you need to is it if you the best thing you can do for now is if you stay in your flat unless it's
00:10:55 is if you stay in your flat unless it's safe to leave I don't know whether still what the stairwells and things are like lock the doors now just just on that exchange quite early early on in that court mmm what why would why were you
00:11:08 court mmm what why would why were you why did you not think or perhaps did you thing but why did you looks like you didn't think that the caller was affected by smoke within the meaning of the policy
00:11:28 she said that she her husband had already blocked the doors didn't she um [Music]
00:11:34 is it's the same previous cold we discussed I feel that right it was it was if we could lock the door and everything and she they've gone to moved away to a further room so but given that
00:11:48 away to a further room so but given that you're told that smoke is affecting them my question is why didn't you then move to investigate the whether there was a safe means of exit I don't know I had I
00:12:04 safe means of exit I don't know I had I hadn't gone into full fire survival going to advice with them so and then can I then take you to see call you made with cu8 where you'd passed on the information about these calls which is I
00:12:20 information about these calls which is I in its inq1 nine four where you're handing over the list could I start by taking you to the very start of this call peps you can clear something up for us which has been a mystery for a while
00:12:32 us which has been a mystery for a while you use do you know who you were speaking to on cu8 night oh right and then you say on page three three lines up in the bottom or three entries up
00:12:44 up in the bottom or three entries up yeah but they're all trapped by the smoke okay so you know that one seven five and one on one or trapped so they can't get out so that's that's them then you go on to
00:12:56 so that's that's them then you go on to say on page 194 in the middle we've got one on the 18th floor hold on eighteenth floor
00:13:02 floor oh my god this so many top floor adults of eight eight adults and eight children smoke coming in I don't want the number that is and then at the end of then at the end of the call you say there's one
00:13:13 the end of the call you say there's one on the 18th floor but we don't and then you say it's going to be every floor that we need to get to that that's page five the top of page five
00:13:24 five the top of page five I'm just repeat that there's one on the 18th floor but we don't it's going to be every floor but we haven't got a number for that either now
00:13:36 just did that mean to you that the entire tower block was affected at least by smoke from what I could hear going on in the background with the calls that
00:13:47 in the background with the calls that people were taking I was hearing froze from the top to the bottom top right down that those floors are being affected by smoke so yes I didn't believe it was a good film and would that mean did you think at that time
00:14:01 that mean did you think at that time that that meant that you then had since everyone was affected by smoke at least above the fourth floor you then had to move into everyone had to move into examining carefully the exit routes and
00:14:13 examining carefully the exit routes and conditions for anybody who called that would have been an ideal situation but we just did not have the time to do that we have so many calls coming in I think
00:14:25 we have so many calls coming in I think we were more on the protecting the caller with stopping the smoke coming in than going into full fire survivor guidance I mean we were saying to move two of them away from the fire away from
00:14:36 two of them away from the fire away from the smoke sorry to stop the smoke coming in to the room that you're in and obviously contact us if the smoke becomes denser in your property did it occur to you to tell the entire control
00:14:49 occur to you to tell the entire control room by this point or perhaps slightly after afterwards everyone's affected by smoke don't tell them to stay put don't assume it's stay put everyone should now examine it very closely with each caller
00:15:01 examine it very closely with each caller the exit routes so that they can work out we can all work out whether they can get out no it didn't because I had absolutely no confirmation of the
00:15:14 absolutely no confirmation of the conditions inside that building we could be sending them into more toxic and worse conditions and they actually were in their flats where at that point they were able to block the doors and not
00:15:26 were able to block the doors and not over being overcome by smoke as such not knowing what we would be sending him out to felt more of a risk to me yeah yes we're not to argue with you about but he put it put us put it put it for
00:15:38 but he put it put us put it put it for this to you that in making that assessment but right this way you say that you had no confirmation of the conditions inside the building that you
00:15:49 conditions inside the building that you could be sending them into more toxic and worse conditions did you do an assessment to work out whether that was the case or wasn't the case with each caller no no I didn't because it made me
00:16:04 caller no no I didn't because it made me very may not work depending on where you are in the building as to whether the exit routes were safe or not yes of course no no I didn't do it okay now can I turn to the change in stay put on page
00:16:15 I turn to the change in stay put on page seven of your witness statement in in paragraph four on that page you say
00:16:27 paragraph four on that page you say after the time mark of 2:45 at the beginning that just after that Scott Hayward arrived followed by Adam quinion and J Smith came up to you and told you
00:16:38 and J Smith came up to you and told you that the advice was now to get out and self evacuate see that in the first three lines would your sir would you time your being told by Joe Smith about
00:16:51 time your being told by Joe Smith about the change in statehood to after 2:45 I have no recollection of the time to be honest to do as I said previously a lot of the times were given to me after I
00:17:03 of the times were given to me after I believe it was earlier you believe it was earlier than 240 yes I do you write do you know how much earlier roughly 10 15 minutes okay do you recall being
00:17:16 15 minutes okay do you recall being involved in any discussion about changing the statement advice no the discussion had been previously about how long some of the course had been going on and as I say we were coming to that
00:17:28 on and as I say we were coming to that our point on some of those calls which is when we know that the comp the compartment is no longer as secure as we believes it would have been earlier did you have that discussion with Joe Smith
00:17:39 you have that discussion with Joe Smith we talked about the our line yes and what that meant do you recall having any discussion with anybody but including Joe Smith before 245 about crews struggling to get above the 15th floor you don't do you remember
00:17:53 the 15th floor you don't do you remember any discussion at all about that about I did here I don't recall the time the crews were unable to get past a certain level but I don't recall what level that was right and there were difficulties
00:18:04 was right and there were difficulties later in the night of 10th 11th Lewis yeah is that perhaps what you were recalling the 11th floor rings a bell okay yeah now you say in a statement in
00:18:15 okay yeah now you say in a statement in the third line I believe she liaised with a DAC Adrienne Fenton and and the on ground commander handy ray that's why I thought yes did you see or
00:18:26 that's why I thought yes did you see or hear any discussion between Joe Smith and Adrian Fenton no I saw them talking I didn't actually hear what was being said right did you were you did you
00:18:38 said right did you were you did you observe or just were you party to any discussion with Andy row about changing the statement advice no I didn't speak to a gentleman I self how did you what is the basis of your belief that Joe Smith liaised with Angie row about
00:18:50 Smith liaised with Angie row about changing the state what advice and I remember John and mentioning about speaking to the incident ground and Adrian so I thought it was Angie whoa well I think because I think he was on
00:19:03 well I think because I think he was on scene or around that sort of time like I said I got my timings out of it I see okay does the name Steve West mean anything to you yes it does who is he he's a quick manager he was shadowing the ort
00:19:14 shadowing the ort people that night right do you know your own recollection whether he had any involvement on the on the incident ground in the decision to change the statehood advice no I don't know what now when the state would advise changed
00:19:26 now when the state would advise changed you say as you do on page seven of your start look at the statement that she lines on I immediately passed this information on to all of my control room officers by writing on a piece of paper and showing it to the CRA s yes and then
00:19:41 and showing it to the CRA s yes and then Mike the writing was simply telling my CRS that we were now telling people to get out of the building putting wet towels over their heads now do you remember what exactly you wrote on the
00:19:52 remember what exactly you wrote on the note
00:19:54 note was it not in the back I'll take it wasn't in the bundle of papers to shame it it was all callers to self it to
00:20:05 it it was all callers to self it to evacuate tell coolest commonly accepting but tell callers to put what tells over their heads to cover their faces and to hold hands right to leave and that's well that's from recollection is it I
00:20:17 well that's from recollection is it I made clear late you know you wrote that on a piece of paper yeah how's that did you go round it was like a four piece of paper towards going at man's and I was sort of tapping in the controller offices because they were very involved in their calls read this
00:20:29 very involved in their calls read this have you read this do you understand I say I saw was confirmed that they understood what I was saying to them one person said well all floors I remember that yes I'm frozen right okay did you did you give any other advice other than
00:20:42 did you give any other advice other than what you just don't know I let initial time now did you give advice later um I was going around helping people with some advice yes specific on specific calls and yes so Pete daddy was taking a
00:20:53 calls and yes so Pete daddy was taking a call and the caller's seemed very reluctant to leave because they couldn't see so I was sort of saying to him that just say to them think about how you where do you what way do you turn when
00:21:05 where do you what way do you turn when you leave your flats walk down to the stairs just close your eyes and just think about that and just do what comes on too much okay now J Smith said in her witness statement and she confirmed this in evidence when she came to the inquiry
00:21:16 in evidence when she came to the inquiry in July twelfth of July that CR A's were advised to use more forceful and blunt language to emphasize the necessity to evacuate the building do you remember that advice being given yes I did who
00:21:28 that advice being given yes I did who gave that advice I think Joanne initially and I did it as well how did you give that advice would you say them you have to tell them that this is what they have to do they have no choice really now what I meant was did you
00:21:40 really now what I meant was did you write it down no I spoke to them you spoke to me as she spouts them them do you speak to all each of them individually or did you make an announcement no there was no announcement which they wouldn't have heard to announcement they were so involved in their cause I actually went
00:21:51 involved in their cause I actually went up to people individually right did you interrupt calls at any stage or did you wait for the CRS to finish their call before giving this advice no I was listening to what the seer eyes were telling them and I could on some of them that people were very reluctant and I'm sort of just saying
00:22:04 reluctant and I'm sort of just saying over them you tell them they have they have to go they have to go now they have to leave right they have no choice how confident were you at the time that all CRA has got that message on board to
00:22:15 CRA has got that message on board to give clear unequivocal advice to leave its confidence anyone can be really amazing if you can't pretend but I think each call would be different in her that was handled right
00:22:33 did you become aware or where you were aware at the time that even after that time but let me back up a little bit roughly how long after the decision was
00:22:46 roughly how long after the decision was made to change the statehood advice did you go around telling people telling CRA is to advise people come what may they must leave I think it was ongoing for a while to be honest with you it was quite soon after right okay do you know from
00:23:01 soon after right okay do you know from your own knowledge whether CRA s abate that completely or whether there were calls that kept going where they gave continue to give callers option an option I don't know you don't know at
00:23:14 option I don't know you don't know at the foot of page 7 you say this was the first time I have ever had an instruction like this to be honest I had
00:23:25 instruction like this to be honest I had felt that for some time we needed to get people out I had not seen the tower but I'm only saying this by the details of the calls you received from people inside the tower and at what point before the stay-put advice was changed
00:23:37 before the stay-put advice was changed did you think that it needed to be changed I think it was coming up to that hour mark I've spoken about that the instantly been going on for now we still were getting lots and lots and lots of
00:23:49 were getting lots and lots and lots of course for people that were trapped and some of the calls have been ongoing for a while and I was becoming very very uncomfortable with it much more so than I had been only one right so about an
00:24:00 I had been only one right so about an hour after the incident started would take you take take one to about about 2 a.m.
00:24:04 a.m. roughly well I can't confirm the time no but the hour mark is important yeah mark is important what does that tell you well that's the when you feel that
00:24:15 well that's the when you feel that compartments are safe you're safe to stay in your flat for up to an hour so as we were approaching that hour so I think it might be something slightly later than two to be honest because it wasn't actually too long before jarring caming did you have any discussion with
00:24:29 caming did you have any discussion with anybody in the controller about changing the statehood advice before Joe Joe Smith came into the control room I have a vague recollection of talking to people I can't member who was
00:24:40 talking to people I can't member who was though about we need to get them out but I can't remember who that was right was it somebody senior to you or was it a CRA no I don't recall how it was I just have a vague recollection okay and
00:24:53 just have a vague recollection okay and how did that person react do you another are they equated they agreed right it was it was a discussion that we both agreed on I don't recall who instigated the
00:25:05 I don't recall who instigated the conversation either to be honest yeah did did there come a time prior to the change of the statement advice that you were aware or you thought that the fire
00:25:16 were aware or you thought that the fire was out of control probably around that time at that - ish because right you know you've been going on for a long time then he'd be gone an over an hour and we have but we still
00:25:28 over an hour and we have but we still had nothing back from the fire ground so we still had no confirmed details of what the actual what actually was going on know then else is my next question
00:25:39 on know then else is my next question which is did you learn that from the fire ground that the answer isn't I think no and so the next question then is did you seek to find out yourself proactively from the incident ground so around this time Jason was in and he was
00:25:51 around this time Jason was in and he was on the phone to the command unit constantly and I actually asked him we need to know what's going on are they actually able to reach people have they got anyone for can you find out what's going on did you or anybody in the
00:26:03 going on did you or anybody in the control room seek to speak to the incident commander at that time no I didn't know that time is there a reason to that I felt that because Jason was on the phone to the survivor guidance command unit he would have they would
00:26:15 command unit he would have they would have more personal information
00:26:22 so thinking that the fire was out of control by about 2:00 a.m. did you take any action on the basis of what you thought did you cheat in terms of the advice being given to us to call us not
00:26:35 advice being given to us to call us not at that point now as I say we didn't know what the signifier was what the situation was in the building didn't want to start sending people out and said possibly more toxic conditions now you've told us a little bit about
00:26:48 now you've told us a little bit about fire survival guidance calls and have generally women stay on the call with the the caller until it was until they were rescued and that didn't happen on them as we've seen in terms of the
00:26:59 them as we've seen in terms of the decision or the discussion about about stay put
00:27:03 stay put once the decision to evacuate had been been made and CRS have been told to pass that on in no uncertain terms two corners where they told also to make
00:27:18 corners where they told also to make sure they stay on the call with the callers to guide them out know some people cleared their line straightaway as soon as they were given that they were just going to basically run I think some people did to stay on the calls
00:27:29 some people did to stay on the calls with people that were going down the stairs yes yeah that wasn't there was no instruction with that at all why is that I don't know would it not have been
00:27:40 I don't know would it not have been important to ensure that because you were giving as it were mobile fire support guidance yeah helping is that something that what I think is it something that could have been done it
00:27:52 something that could have been done it could have been done but it would have also meant that if we had stayed on the line with every single caller that we wouldn't have been able to speak so any of the other callers and give that information to evacuate well you could only do and most eleven well that's a
00:28:06 only do and most eleven well that's a time she was about seven or eight at that time with you matters control officers that were available to do that same even more powerfully since it's the only handle seven at a time yes would it
00:28:17 only handle seven at a time yes would it have been helpful to have more control room officers manning the phones because you clearly had space for it of course it would have been that any more resources that we could have in the control room would have been extremely helpful
00:28:28 helpful that is a staffing level and I don't know how many control officers would have been would have worked it would have been an awful lot we'd probably have about 30 people to be honest with
00:28:40 have about 30 people to be honest with you we were so inundated with information and calls yes was there any discussion do you remember on the night about whether to beef up the number of CR over so Joe had a conversation with
00:28:53 CR over so Joe had a conversation with Joanne about seeing if we can get some more staffing which you've never done before either so you had a conversation did you Joey and I had a conversation what was the upshot of that and that we
00:29:05 what was the upshot of that and that we would try and call people that were relatively new to Stratford control and were coming on duty the following day to see if they could come in and assist us and did they to digis who were they
00:29:17 and did they to digis who were they Kate Manson and Pauline Warner right both ioans at what stage in the night to their right um I think Kate arrived about quarter past hoppers for right Pauline a
00:29:28 quarter past hoppers for right Pauline a bit later I'm not sure the time completely but that was all only two yeah while in Moore couldn't get hold of them right I suppose they were asleep their phones weren't switched on other
00:29:40 their phones weren't switched on other people did call in but later about coming in to help with the day shift people stood that would just left messages for people and things like that so people did when they started getting up to offer assistance who was in charge
00:29:52 up to offer assistance who was in charge of nerves seeing if you could get more CRS into the control room I think Joanne spoke to Adam quinion and I think he was making those phone calls right now and to your knowledge did he stay at that
00:30:05 to your knowledge did he stay at that task thoroughly and incessantly through the night or did he just did he did it come and go oh I think he tried only one he thought would be available
00:30:26 now in your supplemental statement well five one nine nine for us asking about different topic page two you say that
00:30:40 different topic page two you say that halfway down that page approximately 145 I answered a call on emergency services airwave channel and they discuss that
00:30:51 airwave channel and they discuss that and then you say I informed them that I did not have access to the head a deadly downlink which was very frustrating and when I then when asked I could not confirm if any lft command units on the
00:31:02 confirm if any lft command units on the scene had access I later discover that they did not have the access for some time now that's access to the heli tele this is okay did you know which command units didn't
00:31:14 did you know which command units didn't have access to the heli tele I think it will see you eight how did you find that out I thought somebody would have told me but I don't recall who that was do
00:31:25 me but I don't recall who that was do you know how long CUA didn't have access for now I don't and you go on to say as we've seen this before this was very time-consuming yes and if we've had light access to the live images from the
00:31:36 light access to the live images from the helicopter would not necessarily have been required how much time do you think was lost by having to pass on helicopter radio messages rather than seeing the live messages through the night yes
00:31:52 probably over an hour I would imagine right but especially early on there it was constant it was just non-stop when did that what what effect do you think
00:32:05 did that what what effect do you think that had on other tasks that you could have been doing all the other see our other members in the control room staff could have been doing I could have assisted CEOs with calls try to get more
00:32:18 assisted CEOs with calls try to get more information about the course and passed them on maybe quicker but it's hard to say there was so much going on in the control room that night but I was
00:32:29 control room that night but I was answering now and then I was answering the critical phone literally one after the other
00:32:42 mr. Norman thank you very much I've got no further questions for you in the usual way there may be one or two that that come out in the short break I'm going to ask the Chairman to have saying
00:32:53 going to ask the Chairman to have saying I'm gonna say thank you very much for the time being and thinking well we have to be able to release you yes well it does happen that counsel find there are more questions that need to be asked so we're gonna have a short break nothing
00:33:06 we're gonna have a short break nothing to come back and see us
00:33:09 so could you leave us now I don't talk to you about your evidence we'll resume that 20 to 3
00:33:32 22 Sweden
00:43:04 yes miss minute where are we well mr. chair there are I think two questions which I confess I should have asked and forgot to say right well could
00:43:15 asked and forgot to say right well could be our system this moment come back
00:43:19 [Music]
00:43:32 thank you very much I think this tonight has a couple of days yes I have two or so questions for you the first is we talked about the vision error earlier
00:43:45 talked about the vision error earlier this morning the desert difficulty with the vision system which led to an initial mobilization of only three pumps as opposed to four do you know whether that glitch as it were has been rectified since yes there's been the bad
00:43:58 rectified since yes there's been the bad work done on that yesterday how's you you'd have get hurt okay were there any other difficulties that you recall on the night associated with the vision system no no what's on the nightmare before Grenfell did you ever
00:44:11 nightmare before Grenfell did you ever have any reason to think or fear that crews would not successfully be able to rescue any FSG caller no it's not something I've ever experienced so no I would always have the expectation that
00:44:23 would always have the expectation that they would be able to rescue them yes right okay and then one more question which which I I've been tempted into asking had you had full access to the heli telly in the control room on the
00:44:35 heli telly in the control room on the night from an early stage which would obviously have been of the exterior of the building yes do you think that would have assisted you and your team and the advice that you could give control room are there two corners we would just
00:44:49 are there two corners we would just still felt that it was safer to keep people in their flats only because we couldn't see as you say the interior so we would have no idea what the fire was doing inside but there would have been a
00:45:00 doing inside but there would have been a lot more awareness of where the fire was affecting on the outside so we would have known that it wasn't on the fourth floor it was the entire top to bottom and that then leads into the next and
00:45:12 and that then leads into the next and last question which is given that you needed information about what was happening inside the tower did it ever occur to you to get on to see you a tour or to come up and the incident commander
00:45:23 or to come up and the incident commander and say I need a full picture from you now as to what the conditions are like inside the building I did occur to me yes and
00:45:31 yes and to be honest every time I thought about it a few times but every time I went to do it something else happened and I got taken away from what I wanted to do as I say
00:45:39 say we took morph a survival guidance calls that night then in the previous ten years so it just was just trying to do too many things at once there's normal
00:45:54 too many things at once there's normal thank you very much I did those all my questions thank you so it just remains me for me to say thank you very much for your patience in in listening to and answering my questions I'm extremely grateful to you for coming here and
00:46:05 grateful to you for coming here and assisting us with our investigations thank you there's a semaphore signal I'm
00:46:16 thank you there's a semaphore signal I'm getting from mr. Walsh and what Ryan so mr. Walsh if you want to say
00:46:40 and say sorry mr. Albin and
00:46:45 educational get here as well is that technology is that technology I think if there is a burning anything if there if there is a real real need for me to ask
00:46:57 there is a real real need for me to ask this this question and it's come from the source I think it's come from I think it could be dealt with in a different way so okay sir thank you very
00:47:09 different way so okay sir thank you very much thank you I can't eat before you leave mr. Schue content
00:47:29 no I have no further questions for me thank you okay there's normal thank you very much indeed for coming to give you our evidence it's been really very helpful
00:47:40 evidence it's been really very helpful to hear about how the control room was working on the night very grateful thank you and feel free to go now if you'd like to give the usher thank you very much mr. chairman we're going to need I
00:48:01 much mr. chairman we're going to need I think a slight break for a scene change Bragi call the next witness which is good see all right daddy well I'll rise for as long as it's necessary to get things organized yes
00:48:13 necessary to get things organized yes thank you Darcy option to get me assumes you already yes absolutely thank you
00:52:01 yes mr. Jeff can I call my next witness please which is control room officer Peter daddy yes thank you
00:52:42 thank you very much yes mr. daddy can I ask please you for you to give the inquiry your full name Peter Ciaran Datuk right and I want to say first of
00:52:54 Datuk right and I want to say first of all thank you very much for coming to the inquiry to assist us with our investigations we do very much appreciate it my questions are supposed to be short and simple often they're not if you want me to repeat them I will do that if you want me to put the question
00:53:06 that if you want me to put the question in a different way I'm happy to do that and if you need to break at any time just to signal okay you actually got quiet there I'm sorry struggling to hear you about there sorry oh sorry if you
00:53:17 you about there sorry oh sorry if you need to break at any time just let me know thank you right now can I take you to your witness statement dated the 20th of October 2017 that's of M et quadruple
00:53:28 of October 2017 that's of M et quadruple zero seven seven eight seven do you recognize that as your winner statement yeah have you read it recently yeah and all the contents true yes and have you discussed the or evidence that
00:53:39 have you discussed the or evidence that in that statement all that you're about to give to the inquiry with anybody before coming here today no right you are a control room officer with the lfb yes yes and you've held that position at
00:53:50 yes yes and you've held that position at least you had as a there's an October 2017 for about two years yeah just on the three nine right and was that when you were first employed by the NFB not in 2015 yes September 15 yeah right
00:54:01 yeah right and in terms of training you say in page 2 of your on page 2 of your statement may need to go to it that you've had about nine weeks of training at the start is that right yes well as I said then it became OB but disjointed so I
00:54:12 then it became OB but disjointed so I ended up with tan told oil were you trained on policy 790 FSG calls current has at April 2014 FST cause of lead with on an afternoon
00:54:23 FST cause of lead with on an afternoon session on yes right and where you trained on emergency call management policy 539 yes there were you trained on how to use the RAF the reference
00:54:34 how to use the RAF the reference information file for operators yes or as you
00:54:37 you okay and you from are you familiar can I take you you're familiar with appendix 3 - policy that 539 which is far survivable guidance well couldn't say it word for word but I'd be ok familiar yes
00:54:48 word for word but I'd be ok familiar yes did you ever receive any training on how to handle 999 calls from a high-rise fire not specifically a raise but Nene 9 Clause yes no no no calls and what was
00:55:00 Clause yes no no no calls and what was the last training session you attended prior to the grenfell fire into June 2017 Oh mark regards the fire fall Hanlon initial training nice lanterns
00:55:13 Hanlon initial training nice lanterns trainer ok did you ever have any training on what advice to give or how to gather information in when doing an FSG call yes donut day and training yes
00:55:25 FSG call yes donut day and training yes but not after that nuts and snow so did you never attend any refresher training and were you ever trained in how to draw all information together from an FSG
00:55:37 all information together from an FSG caller or a 999 caller when deciding how to give advice yeah well the questions that we asked would have been something we were trained on yet the questions we should ask was a song in the gentlemen okay
00:55:49 ask was a song in the gentlemen okay were you ever trained specifically on how to assess the safety of exit routes when a caller said that they were affected by heat smoke or fire well we
00:56:00 affected by heat smoke or fire well we would have been trained more if the caller says they can't get out we wouldn't have had specific train and I'm going through assassin well there's three or four possible thufferin exit
00:56:11 three or four possible thufferin exit routes no right were you ever given any specific training on how to communicate with a caller who had a who didn't have
00:56:22 with a caller who had a who didn't have English as their first language we would have been trained on or well we have a reference setting up a language line if it's not the first language has not
00:56:34 it's not the first language has not specifically trained on how to did without but there is a rough there available if we want to set up - like did your training on FS G's ever factor in how to speak with people from different
00:56:44 different cultures or different ethnic or religious backgrounds no did your training ever cover how to obtain information from callers about whether
00:56:57 information from callers about whether any persons in the flat or house or whether the caller had any disabilities any mobility issues or health health problems no it's not particular case what have been trained on Towers not
00:57:09 what have been trained on Towers not right now can I then turn to the stay-put policy in your statement on page two halfway down you say in essence
00:57:21 page two halfway down you say in essence and FSG called us to give advice for as long as necessary to keep someone alive before crews get to them and then about halfway down the page you say general advice for high-rise buildings is to
00:57:33 advice for high-rise buildings is to stay put in the flats as the fire should be contained within the flat as it's in it is in it that is if all the doors and windows are closed if there's smoke we would advise the caller to leave so if
00:57:46 would advise the caller to leave so if there is smoke we would advise the caller to leave is that advice that general advice advice you give to any caller from elsewhere in a building and
00:58:00 caller from elsewhere in a building and I'm particularly a high-rise building if you know the fire is contained within the flat of origin yes what advice do you give if you don't know whether the
00:58:11 you give if you don't know whether the fire is contained within the flat of origin suppose we would give the same advice assuming that it as if we were told it it wasn't contained and I
00:58:25 told it it wasn't contained and I thought was supposed to be taken advice from somebody in charge of what we want to tell would you see would you does that mean that you would find out from elsewhere within the control room perhaps a senior officer more accurately
00:58:38 perhaps a senior officer more accurately what the conditions were in the building if possible right if you knew that the fire had spread beyond the the flat of origin but you didn't know how far what would you do then we would
00:58:52 would you do then we would we were probably given the same advice stay put stay put right you know I focused with you a moment ago on the sentence that says if there is smoke we would advise the caller to leave where
00:59:05 would advise the caller to leave where would the smoke need to be before you would advise the caller to leave effect than there are and the roads are flat when you say affecting can you tell us what you you think you mean by that well
00:59:16 what you you think you mean by that well as we said it of its effect of their flats effect that by fire heat through smoke a thirst efforts on their flat if it's in their flat yeah right so smoke in the flat that means effect it does it
00:59:27 in the flat that means effect it does it in your mug yeah if it's continuing to come on yet even after titles and stuff have been put around cracks and doors right as a CRO
00:59:38 right as a CRO Canada zosky what information do you you would you have used as at the date of the fire June 17 to make your own assessment of well as to whether the flat is affected by smoke heat or fire
00:59:52 flat is affected by smoke heat or fire well depends on what the caller would have told us right so you get the information from the caller would you also seek to get information from the
01:00:04 also seek to get information from the incident ground as well as the caller in making that assessment we wouldn't necessarily seek information from incident growing different formation was there we would use it how often would
01:00:15 there we would use it how often would you expect messages to come from the incident ground about the conditions on the outside or the inside of the building believe it prompts on evolvers 60 minutes per informative could be
01:00:29 60 minutes per informative could be wrong enough but I think I believe that's what it is right per informative message so you'd be relying on informative messages to come from the fire ground at particular points would
01:00:40 fire ground at particular points would you yourself go out and look for information specifically in order to work out what was happening on the incident ground so that you could advise callers as to what to do not as a call handler if you're on the radio and
01:00:53 handler if you're on the radio and you're the one taking the informative messages if you know you haven't had one in a while you might prompt the ICP for an informative message to be sent or if somebody senior request for you to ask
01:01:05 somebody senior request for you to ask or to prompt for an informative write did you seek to do that on the night that's on the radio no so just by radio is it they would just be the radio operator that will be taking informative messages yes when you you make your
01:01:19 messages yes when you you make your assessment about whether it's safe for a caller to stay in their flat were you ever trained to use information that you had which was from elsewhere in the control room but not from the caller
01:01:32 the control room but not from the caller themselves don't believe it was specific training we would have had but we would use any information available so the answer is is it do you would but not as
01:01:44 answer is is it do you would but not as a matter of training but as a matter of practice and experience basically how would you go about getting information about an incident from other other control room officers well you well you
01:01:56 control room officers well you well you wouldn't be able to walk over them usually if you're on the line you could show it over to them or if somebody in charge was coming around passing on information moving on to our survival
01:02:07 information moving on to our survival guidance at the foot of page two of your statement you say I've never had any dealings with Grenville tower before nor have I dealt with multiple FSGS within a high-rise I have dealt with a couple of
01:02:19 high-rise I have dealt with a couple of FSGS before but they were four houses and both were resulted satisfactorily
01:02:27 with those two separate incidents or were they a case of multiple FSG calls from the same incident no they were two separate incidents okay so before the night of grand fell did
01:02:38 so before the night of grand fell did you ever handle had you ever handled multiple FSG calls from a single incident not before but that a few nights after right
01:02:51 now on page two of your statement above where we've just been looking for lines down from the start of the second main paragraph you say that FSG is to give
01:03:05 paragraph you say that FSG is to give advice for as long as necessary to keep someone alive before the crews get to them at the same time there's a need to transfer as much information to the crews as possible this would include you say this
01:03:18 this would include you say this information would include the type of fire its location and the type of building and where the residents are so that the crews can rescue them the crucial element to the classification of an FSG is whether or not the caller cannot get out if they
01:03:30 not the caller cannot get out if they say they cannot get out ET is an FSG call that's very clear but can I just look at one or two paragraphs in the pot in Paulo in in the policies and policy
01:03:42 in Paulo in in the policies and policy 790
01:03:49 can I ask you to look at paragraph 2.3
01:03:57 paragraph 2 is fast survival guidance called information and 2.3 says responsibility rests with control to determine that FSG is taking place and
01:04:09 determine that FSG is taking place and not the fire ground the fire ground will determine whether an incident should be treated as persons reported not control now just focusing on the first sentence that have that responsibility rests with control to determine that FSG is taking
01:04:21 control to determine that FSG is taking place how do you how does control or you as a CRO make that determination well if they say they have no way out of their flat that's affected by fire
01:04:33 flat that's affected by fire ain't there smoke do you ever do you ever explore when you make that assessment you ever explore with the caller whether it's really right that they can't get out or do you just take them at their word
01:04:44 them at their word no you wouldn't you would take them out the word that what they're saying is correct you would ask them if you like obviously not a race there's not going to be a back door but it was a normally should say backdoor bedroom window
01:04:55 should say backdoor bedroom window any other way what do you do you take them at their word yeah would you would you not then ask them about what the
01:05:06 you not then ask them about what the means of escape were and what the conditions in the escape route were so as to be able to make your own assessment as to whether actually they could get out or would you just simply leave it to the community yeah well there one of the questions you would ask
01:05:18 there one of the questions you would ask when we say they can't get out yeah what's stopping you if it's fired the front door they can't get out or if it's the stairwell that they can't get down would be one of the questions you
01:05:29 down would be one of the questions you were asked to determine right if it's FSG or not so say would you then that does it follow from that that you as a CRO would actually seek to satisfy yourself from what the caller had
01:05:40 yourself from what the caller had observed and told you that actually there was no way out or in fact there was well we can only go off what they tell us yes you can go any go what they tell you but with the assessment be made
01:05:51 tell you but with the assessment be made by you or with the assessment be made by by the caller well the assessment will be made by us based on what they yes okay and in order to make that assessment I think you're telling us you would explore a bit with them as to
01:06:02 would explore a bit with them as to precisely what the problem was you know density egress things like that is that right yeah that's right now a paragraph three point one three point
01:06:13 paragraph three point one three point one it refers to principles of escape assess protect and rescue a South on a policy 539 I can take you to that we put
01:06:26 policy 539 I can take you to that we put put 790 away and go to 539 you'll find that at the tab 3 of our abundant I ask you please to look at page 16 which is
01:06:37 you please to look at page 16 which is appendix 3 and we could see the four principles in fact there are five principles actually set out at the bottom there's escaped assess protect
01:06:50 bottom there's escaped assess protect reassess and rescue the rescue is over the page on that page under the first
01:07:04 the page on that page under the first principle of escape if you look at that it says control room officers will or just above it I'm so sorry it says controller officers will always use the four principles of escape assess to
01:07:15 four principles of escape assess to protect and rescue to provide guidance to these callers firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe alternative escape route for them for them to leave their premises if this is not possible
01:07:26 not possible then assess the situation by calling by asking the caller direct questions so the first thing to do is to assess the the safety of an alternative as escape
01:07:40 the safety of an alternative as escape route you've told us a bit about that would you expect to have plans of the building available to you in the control room in order to assist you with that assessment no you wouldn't know it's not something
01:07:52 no you wouldn't know it's not something we have none other than information provided to you by the caller what else would you have to be able to make your assessment you just have what they're
01:08:03 assessment you just have what they're saying
01:08:06 and it goes on in terms of assessment which is the next thing you assess the situation by asking the call of direct questions and you can see what those are but I think you're all says is it is it
01:08:18 but I think you're all says is it is it right that you're also asking the call of direct questions when assessing whether there's a safe alternative escape yeah it's a dialogue yeah all right and then in you go on to the
01:08:31 right and then in you go on to the protect phase below that you see it says you see it says begin to protect the caller by providing the current fire safety advice to attempt to keep the caller safe is that does that mean that
01:08:43 caller safe is that does that mean that you're understanding that you're giving the caller advice on how to protect themselves from the fire or smoke yes or heat yes and then it says you reassure the caller and reassess the caller
01:08:55 the caller and reassess the caller situation a couple of questions on that in terms of reassuring the caller is the idea here to reassure them based on facts known to you and which of which you're confident
01:09:06 you're confident yeah well it's to reassure the caller that there are crews on the way to get them that they know where they are and they're going to come forth and when you say that the crews are on their way
01:09:17 say that the crews are on their way would you ever say that where you weren't completely confident that that was the case well we would assume that as the kiss usually when we take care feste calls it's from their national
01:09:29 feste calls it's from their national call so that we would be mobilizing as well as taking the FSC so the crews are more often than not on the road to the incident right obviously grandfa we had a lot of common and after crews are
01:09:40 a lot of common and after crews are already in attendance or apartment to the command unit would you ever but then we would assume that once we pass that information it's being dealt with and that there are there is a plan in place
01:09:51 that there are there is a plan in place to get these people would you ever give reassurances to callers knowing that the reassurance had no basis such as telling caller callers of crews were coming when you knew or suspected that they weren't
01:10:04 you knew or suspected that they weren't that's not something I've ever been and okay now can I just ask you to get back I'm sorry to toss around to get back to policy 790 tab five and go please to
01:10:20 policy 790 tab five and go please to paragraph 5.1 information transfer to
01:10:31 paragraph 5.1 information transfer to the incident it says there as soon as
01:10:42 the incident it says there as soon as controllers confirmed and FSG called is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details and then if you look on at paragraph five point five you can
01:10:53 on at paragraph five point five you can see that control will attempt to gather this is over the page five point five control will attempt to gather all the information on the control information form and relay this information to the
01:11:04 form and relay this information to the incident as and when it becomes available and there's a list there you can see some eight bullet points on the page just looking at that list which is
01:11:15 page just looking at that list which is it is it important for a CRO like yourself to obtain this information as soon as you can from every 909 corner yeah and how easy is that
01:11:30 yeah and how easy is that in your experience of your limited experience of FSG calls pre Grenville to obtain that information all that information depends on the caller and
01:11:42 information depends on the caller and right I cam they are if they're panic that can be difficult to get information and if you had personal experience of obtaining that information and then passing it to the incident ground yes how would you have passed it to the
01:11:54 how would you have passed it to the internal ground because part in your experience pre Grenville well we have the ref that will come up with prompt T and she we the questions we would usually put that on to either a
01:12:05 we would usually put that on to either a service request that would be sent over the radio or we would have an AO M or in our CRO that would be slowed down less than tears and as we're talking and asking
01:12:16 asking questions they would tell the radio operator who would then pass it the crews on the way all right and just looking at the list of things that you have to obtain and pass over to the incident ground you've got the
01:12:27 the incident ground you've got the number of the flat the number of persons involved and also things like condition of their location for example heavy smoke or slight smoke and latest advice given by control so where you were were
01:12:42 given by control so where you were were you alive or aware of the need to get that information from all callers who called in to the control room yeah we're getting that for pricing yet is there any particular reason in general why you
01:12:53 any particular reason in general why you wouldn't seek to go down that shopping list and get all that information from the confirm the caller I can't say any specific reason you wouldn't do it right
01:13:05 specific reason you wouldn't do it right and would you expect to be updated by the incident ground on the progress of each individual rescue they usually were in the way of informative yeah by by wavin formatives right and in your
01:13:19 wavin formatives right and in your experience the foreground fell had you ever had a situation where you had to chase or you didn't have the informative message about the progress of a rescue well not on my previous ones I was on the phone with them to the point of
01:13:30 the phone with them to the point of rescue right so I believe the firefighters came on the phone to me and said we've got them so I knew that way but another formula the message would stole the follow leader and is that because it's normal to stay on a call
01:13:41 because it's normal to stay on a call which is which is a faster overall guidance call properly so called yeah
01:13:48 would you be expected to be told the outcome of a at FSG call or crew deployment or would you get that because you were on the phone until rescue well you were if you're on the point to on
01:13:59 you were if you're on the point to on the form Toller point of asking you know but you would expect that in a form of yet they would usually say the flat number and then rescued in their condition right now going to the night
01:14:11 condition right now going to the night of the call do you remember receiving an informative message at about 116 about the e fire early on in its development
01:14:22 the e fire early on in its development no receiving their father but we'll move ahead do you remember being aware that the fire at grenfell had to have escalated it was escalating
01:14:34 had to have escalated it was escalating very rapidly through pump numbers 10 15 20 25 yeah it was aware that the makeups for c'mon yeah when it reached pump 25
01:14:45 for c'mon yeah when it reached pump 25 which it did at 131 55 did you have any particular thoughts yourself about the nature of the fire spread orbit or smoke spread at the scene it was the biggest
01:14:57 spread at the scene it was the biggest fire the biggest pump attendant said I've been working first so I thought that was a nice about fire yep right and did you get an impression that the
01:15:08 did you get an impression that the fibers was spreading no you didn't I didn't what did you think was causing the rapid accelerating this acceleration of makeups in this way it doesn't think what would have been cause I thought
01:15:19 what would have been cause I thought maybe one floor above but it doesn't I wasn't thinking of I fired a taxi hard spread did you Deker to you that v that compartment ation had been breached in
01:15:30 compartment ation had been breached in the original flat of where the fire started and was starting to spread through the building I was aware that it may have done or doesn't have any confirmation and didn't have any information of how far I was aware of
01:15:42 information of how far I was aware of the possible of it but didn't have confirmation right now we know because we've seen it that you were on calls from before this time before pumps were may 25 and did the accelerating makeup
01:15:56 may 25 and did the accelerating makeup that you could see effect the advice that you were giving callers know was that we would stuck with their advice
01:16:07 that we would stuck with their advice for trying to do and talk and this were told other ways which we were later on on the night I see did the did you or any of your colleagues think that
01:16:18 any of your colleagues think that because the makeup 225 had been so rapid about 30 minutes or so view that you needed information from the incident ground as to exactly what was happening
01:16:29 ground as to exactly what was happening at the scene so as to be able to give more targeted advice to callers can she have fought that I was going to go ahead and look for information the
01:16:42 go ahead and look for information the information come on we would have been made aware of what right did you have any thoughts about whether it was wise to continue to tell residents to stay put given the just what you could see about the acceleration of the makeups no
01:16:55 about the acceleration of the makeups no now you started taking nine line nine calls before we look at some of those specifically at the start of your getting calls do you how did you go
01:17:08 getting calls do you how did you go about recording the information that you received from the callers would have been on our equation system on vision c-type today is that right yeah would
01:17:19 c-type today is that right yeah would you have written it down on a piece of paper at some points we would have done but that not the initial calls and when you've typed into vision what would happen to it would it would it be sent
01:17:30 happen to it would it would it be sent to anybody else in the control room no it would be we would create it as she's made created as a chip of the the first attendance right to say that we've
01:17:41 first attendance right to say that we've had more than one call to the same answer right can I ask you to look at the short incident log and go to page 18
01:17:55 you'll see that on that page halfway down just below the reference to area ladder make up at 1:30 1:21 there's a
01:18:06 ladder make up at 1:30 1:21 there's a time mark of over 130 138 PD service
01:18:18 time mark of over 130 138 PD service request service request created our t4g 271 further call to safe are on 20th floor also people trapped I think this is the first entry on the short incident
01:18:32 is the first entry on the short incident log for and I'm on nine core FSG actually because people are trapped do you remember what would happen with that you may create a service request
01:18:46 that you may create a service request and what do you then do with the service request we would put it on there's on our middle screen on the top right-hand corner is where all service requests a cold fill would code over to the radio
01:19:00 cold fill would code over to the radio operator that there's a nasty son RT for and they would pick it up from the same box in the right hand corner I'm passive terracing and who would pass it to the
01:19:13 terracing and who would pass it to the scene the radio operator the radio operator delay CP right and would you know from the vision system that that service request had been
01:19:24 that that service request had been passed to the incident grant by radio yeah whenever it's put on the screen person on the radio can change the status on that too and progress and then
01:19:35 status on that too and progress and then completed right plus you can also hear them
01:19:43 and then we looked at we've just looked at the one two at 131 38 if you look at the one at 130 411 on 34:11 just a bit
01:19:54 the one at 130 411 on 34:11 just a bit lower down the page service request updated from RT for further call to save fire on 20th floor this is you again PD also people trapped - Artie forty g27 one further call to save fire on 20th
01:20:06 one further call to save fire on 20th floor flat 82 also people trapped and what are the circumstances in which you do a service request update like that if you receive further information on
01:20:17 if you receive further information on the same basis right if I was listening to her and knew she hadn't passed the message if I could add on to the message and make her aware that it's been updated I see I've just taken those two
01:20:30 updated I see I've just taken those two lady service requests do they reflect calls that you had just received yeah just tape on yeah right and would you ever enter a service request from in relation to a call or
01:20:41 request from in relation to a call or some other cro had taken not unless I was asked to for some reason how soon after the call did you enter the information on the vision log as a service request well if you're not doing
01:20:53 service request well if you're not doing a - you're on the call of a bid on immediately afterward you see it would be done it was that you're invariable that's all I'm not generally though yeah what you generally do but was that
01:21:04 what you generally do but was that you're a variable practice on the night yeah
01:21:11 now your page 3 of your statement in paragraph 2 you say that the first FSG
01:21:27 paragraph 2 you say that the first FSG oh remember taking and this is dealing with this is five lines down from the start
01:21:33 start first FSG area remember dealing with width was a family that were on the twelfth floor advised them to stay put as per normal but they but then they said that the father's in the flat next door to them my initial thought was that they must
01:21:45 my initial thought was that they must have been panicking and had seen some smoke this is not uncommon with fathers and people naturally assume the moment that they see smoke that the fire is with them when in reality that is not the case and it is actually some distance away now I'm just ask you just
01:21:58 distance away now I'm just ask you just about timing of that first of all that that call is help me with this if you
01:22:09 that call is help me with this if you look at the time market if you look at the time mark of oh one forty five forty four on the short incident on the page 19a 144 a one forty five forty four I'm
01:22:21 19a 144 a one forty five forty four I'm so sorry
01:22:31 beautiful
01:22:34 it's a service request created further fire started on 12th floor flat 96 first of all is that actually the Husky I've put I've put these two - but is that the
01:22:46 put I've put these two - but is that the call you're referring to
01:22:49 yeah I think it would be yeah and now we see that you recorded that in the vision system at O one 45 44 the call itself is
01:23:03 system at O one 45 44 the call itself is lfb three to four which starts we don't need to go to it straight away but it starts at a 144 33 so it looks as if
01:23:15 starts at a 144 33 so it looks as if from that you did you've entered it straight away afterwards
01:23:30 would that be right yeah looks like it let me try and do a bit more helpful to you I'm being I'm afraid if you look at
01:23:41 you I'm being I'm afraid if you look at it could be shown to use the control room report at FB 4 7 9 o at a time mark
01:23:54 room report at FB 4 7 9 o at a time mark of 14443 this is page 46
01:24:08 this looks like it's the calls flat 95 12th floor and the summary is there it starts at 1 44 43 it finishes well it
01:24:20 starts at 1 44 43 it finishes well it lasts as you can see called Eurasian 3 minutes 33 seconds so sometime 101 48 it finishes and we go back to thee we go
01:24:32 finishes and we go back to thee we go back to page 19 of the short incident log we could see you entering the service request for that flat at 1:45 do we get from that that in fact you were on the call while entering the message I
01:24:44 on the call while entering the message I must have been yet right
01:24:54 do you do you remember that a system involving whiteboards on the night yeah they were directly behind me probably closer than me in the Chairman they were
01:25:05 closer than me in the Chairman they were what the records were named me what were they for do you remember it was two station managers recording information on air fares jeez did anybody tell you to start sending messages to the
01:25:17 to start sending messages to the officers operating the whiteboard imagine some point somebody would have done but it I can't recall somebody specifically directing us to do that no
01:25:28 specifically directing us to do that no we've heard some evidence about the whiteboard and about Jason Olaf being present in the control room and using his mobile to speak to the command unit my question is well that was happening did you yourself pass any further messages to the radio operator to send
01:25:41 messages to the radio operator to send by radio probably whenever the whiteboards are set up and Jason Olaf and the other station miser upon the clown hand I was passing a lot of information just directly to them as
01:25:53 information just directly to them as they were close by it was quicker and easier now we looked at the question of how you've got information in light of the developing picture I'd
01:26:04 in light of the developing picture I'd like now to look at some information you you are also receiving from specific phone calls from those outside and inside the tower can I start by asking you to look please first of all of the control reporter
01:26:15 first of all of the control reporter page 13
01:26:24 and I want you to look at one 24:08 this is where you take a call from a female caller reporting a fire in Greenville tower a caller reports there's a line of
01:26:36 tower a caller reports there's a line of fire going right up the outside of it CR Oh daddy informs the caller that the brigade is in attendance and additional resources are on their way
01:26:45 do you remember that call know when you were told by this caller at this time 124 that there was a line of fire going
01:27:00 124 that there was a line of fire going right up the outside of it did you have any thoughts about fire spread breach of compartment ation what if I was doing the specifically quite a
01:27:13 if I was doing the specifically quite a lot of time the information you get from callers can be inaccurate that can be sometimes the smoke can look worse there's no keeping it up it's not like to the fire right so it would have recorded it as a chip that could call
01:27:25 recorded it as a chip that could call but I wouldn't have thought specifically on the way a fire spread that at that young did you report what you were being told by this this corner to anybody in
01:27:38 told by this this corner to anybody in the control room or and anybody and not going to recall it would be very difficult they reported every call it's every control room after to an AO m or
01:27:53 every control room after to an AO m or operations manager we wouldn't return report every call to them no did you try did you seek to pass this information on to Alex Norman I don't recall taking the calls from not sure but pass it on very
01:28:04 calls from not sure but pass it on very much at that point one 24:08 or say have you heard any other calls in progress in the in the control room yeah I was aware that there was a lot of calls going on and we were all heavily
01:28:15 calls going on and we were all heavily involved in coughing yes and we could see from the two previous calls higher up that page that one 22:16 Kristine house and had taken a call and a minute
01:28:27 house and had taken a call and a minute later Debbie rail had taken a call
01:28:31 that on medication from Thames Water could you hear what was going on around you in the control room at about this point couldn't hear clearly every word
01:28:42 point couldn't hear clearly every word that was been saying but you could pick up on some things yeah particularly people who were closest to you who's closest to you well would have been Sharon on the radio right who else
01:28:58 sure the control room or operator call where everybody was sitting that night so okay moving on then to page 17 you
01:29:09 so okay moving on then to page 17 you receive a call at 1:26 54 which is transferred to you from the BT operator in Nottingham a female caller comes on the Lian reports there is a fire in flat 186 gruntal
01:29:22 there is a fire in flat 186 gruntal tower you see that yeah and she says there is a fire in the whole building and when you ask if the caller is in the building she confirms that everyone is out the caller is advised to stay out
01:29:34 out the caller is advised to stay out not to get back in and there are a lot of fire engines already there do you have any recollection of that call Anna do you know at that stage what floor flat 186 was on no did you have
01:29:50 floor flat 186 was on no did you have any thoughts at that stage about how the fire might have spread from the fourth floor to flat 186 none of them know did
01:30:02 floor to flat 186 none of them know did you have any thoughts about what the speed of makeups by this point was telling you about the speed of spread of this fire
01:30:09 this fire no I doesn't think directly on the spread of fire was more focusing on these underwear cause or came at me right then turning onto page 21 you can see 128 26 you receive a course is just
01:30:27 see 128 26 you receive a course is just two minutes later from flat 82 on the 11th floor female caller explains that she's stuck on the 11th floor and does not know how to get out CRO daddy asks if there is any smoke in her property to which the
01:30:39 any smoke in her property to which the caller stated there is no smoke in her property but that there like in the landing see our Italian visors had to keep the doors and windows closed now again do you remember this particular call or not there's very few
01:30:51 particular call or not there's very few calls I remember from that night to be perfectly honest with you I couldn't tell you how many I took now she told you that she was stuck on the 11th floor hmm can I just look at the transcript
01:31:04 hmm can I just look at the transcript with you
01:31:06 with you it's 307 LFP 307
01:31:29 and it starts page 2 you can see the time of the coin 1 26 32 / 128 for 26 and top of page 2 fire brigade yeah hi I
01:31:40 and top of page 2 fire brigade yeah hi I live at 82 Grenville tower there's a fire you're in attendance but I'm stuck on the 11th floor and I don't know how to get out and there you go right is there any smoke coming onto your property not at the moment but if I able
01:31:52 property not at the moment but if I able the door this smoke on the landing there smoking the landing ok what floor are you on
01:31:56 you on and then you give some advice keep the door closed keep the smoke out just pausing there did is there any reason
01:32:07 pausing there did is there any reason why you didn't ask her why she was stuck on the or she thought she was stuck on the 11th floor well so soon she would have said she was stuck on the 11th floor if there was smoke on the London
01:32:18 floor if there was smoke on the London right but she doesn't say the smoke was coming on to her flat so her flat was not directly involved we don't in this call but well let's look at the rest of
01:32:29 call but well let's look at the rest of it you go on to say sure there's smoke on the landing ok what floor are you on I'm on the 11th you're on the 11th okay right just keep your door yeah it's on closed yet shut but I've gotta keep your
01:32:41 closed yet shut but I've gotta keep your door closed keep the smoke out of your property okay yeah okay what what flatten number are you at 82 I think the fire is like on the fifth or sixth floor like I can see it out of the window but
01:32:53 like I can see it out of the window but obviously you know where it is but yeah I just don't have how to get out to be honest and you say right I'll let the crews know where you are okay on 82 yeah the 11th floor yeah okay all right
01:33:03 right all right thank you so keep the doors closed okay you win those photos to cover up any smoke okay oh yeah right cool thanks and then the call ends of use of the corner saying all right cheers thanks bye
01:33:15 cheers thanks bye we don't see you exploring with the kora in that call any as to how she might have been able to get out of the flat she just says I'm
01:33:27 get out of the flat she just says I'm stuck and you take that at face value it seems is that ya rijal sit there was there was no smoke on her property if property wasn't directly involved in the fire based on what was said there okay
01:33:40 fire based on what was said there okay now what you can see at the end because I read it to you say I'll let the crews know where you are okay
01:33:48 did you do you think if I said that I would have thought so yeah how would you have done that could have been a service request Orioles rating that dying piece
01:34:00 request Orioles rating that dying piece of paper and passing that member of on Adams was cornrowing collecting pieces of paper at that stage right of levels and flat numbers and then she was passing that always one group to the
01:34:12 passing that always one group to the scene right just just to go back to this question of not exploring a statement I'm stuck she tells you there's smoke on the landing we don't see you saying all
01:34:24 the landing we don't see you saying all all right but how thick is it how dark is it is there a neutral plane or is it can you can you crawl across the land is there a reason why you didn't explore the conditions on the landing with her
01:34:37 the conditions on the landing with her can't think about a particular reason other than she said the flat was on effect that slap was unaffected she said she was stuck say looking thinking of the policy that we looked at earlier which is that you have to assess whether
01:34:51 which is that you have to assess whether or not there's an alternative safe means of escape my question is is there a reason why you didn't you didn't make that assessment of precisely the conditions in the escape route with not a fact of any reason why not run you
01:35:05 a fact of any reason why not run you then receive a call at exactly 1:30 and this is page 23 of the control report
01:35:17 it is summarized there I take a call from a female caller reporting there's a fire in Gretel tower they're stuck on the top floor the doors won't open
01:35:28 the caller explains that there is smoke everywhere and the fire is in her house on the 22nd floor she tells you that everyone is now on the 23rd floor
01:35:39 everyone is now on the 23rd floor the caller further explains that the fire has broken into the kitchen of her flat and she is running to the neighbor's flat FSG is given to explain how to try to prevent smoke from coming in the line is very poor and keeps
01:35:50 in the line is very poor and keeps cutting out I don't think I need the rest to read out aloud we can see it there um again do you have a particular recollection of this call no okay did you have any
01:36:02 this call no okay did you have any thoughts when you got this call we're told that the fire is in her house on the 22nd floor did you have any thoughts about how it had got there from the fourth floor well if probably would've
01:36:15 fourth floor well if probably would've been assuming at that stage that must have been required about a fire spreader for what she was saying was great yeah thought of thought spread quickly so by now did you or did you is it right that
01:36:28 now did you or did you is it right that by now on this information the fire was not only on the fourth floor but had spread all the way up to the to the to the top of the building well based on that but that's also possible for burning embers to come up and catch a
01:36:40 burning embers to come up and catch a curtain or some wood isn't directly mean that the the whole side of that Boldin right
01:36:44 right there's a light no let's look at the transcript of mechanists it's lfb 3/10
01:37:04 and we could see the call starts three lines down with a caller saying we're all stuck on the top floor the doors are not open and that's repeated and then you say right is there any smoke where
01:37:16 you say right is there any smoke where you are and you say well the whole place inaudible smoke is there any smoke where you are now yes there's smoke everywhere you need to get right to the top the fires in our house and I'm on the 22nd floor everyone's on the 23rd and then
01:37:28 floor everyone's on the 23rd and then you say ok the fires on the 5th floor so you're well away from the fire egg no it's not it's in our flat we ran out of our flat it's broken into our kitchen right is there a fire on your floor or
01:37:40 right is there a fire on your floor or as it's smoke yes exclamation like there's a fire there's a fire or 20th floor as well inaudible okay right so no just pausing there is there a reason why when you were told
01:37:53 there a reason why when you were told the fire was on the 22nd floor you corrected the caller to say it's on the 5th floor
01:37:59 5th floor and then have a little bit of an argument with the caller about where the fire was well quite often that they do you believe in the upper floors at the fires with them if they see the smoke at that point we still believe the fire was
01:38:10 that point we still believe the fire was on the 4th so it wasn't aware that it had spread there except that you had been told because we looked at these calls earlier that there was a fire on
01:38:21 calls earlier that there was a fire on flat 186 and the there was a line of fire up the whole building so in the light of those earlier calls I'm just just wondering with you really why you
01:38:32 just wondering with you really why you you thought it right to correct the caller and and say the fire was on the fifth floor well because I stole the information we were given we had no confirmation that the fire had spread as I said earlier sometimes information you
01:38:43 I said earlier sometimes information you get is inaccurate yeah I just wonder if that's really right though given that at 12:21 2654 you were told that the the flat at 186 was affected by fire and flat 82 on the
01:38:58 was affected by fire and flat 82 on the 11th floor was affected by by far too well by smoke on the landing at least it was clear by that stage I'm suggesting to you that that it was entirely possible that the fire had got all the way up to the top so my question what
01:39:11 way up to the top so my question what did you accept that except that's possible but it's just not something that we hadn't confirmed okay except it's possible but we've done know for definite moving on with the call you
01:39:22 for definite moving on with the call you go on on page three to investigate with with the caller the hap whether they can keep the smoke out I think I'm
01:39:33 keep the smoke out I think I'm summarizing it there and then over page on page four after the hello hello you say message on for possible on the something floor as
01:39:45 for possible on the something floor as well right are you able to stop the coming into the flat and then inaudible hello hello we're going to get somebody to come up and help you okay hello hello hello operator is this line Oakland that's how it finishes when you're to go
01:40:00 that's how it finishes when you're to go back to the beginning of the call when you're told that the by the caller that they're all stuck on the top floor did you in is there a reason why you didn't investigate with them whether
01:40:11 didn't investigate with them whether there was any safe route of exit at that point no I can't think about the reason though no we've looked at this
01:40:23 though no we've looked at this transcript line by line well always line by line and we can look at it again if you like but you don't appear in this call to ask how many people are in the flat you told we're all so there are
01:40:37 flat you told we're all so there are numbers or number of them but you don't ask how many there are is there a reason for that I can only imagine something I would have been doing or planning and just getting more
01:40:48 doing or planning and just getting more information at that state and then the call cut off it can only imagine that would have been asking before our plan as a call to cut off okay thank specifically why not no and you got cut off did you was it able were you able to
01:41:00 off did you was it able were you able to ring back and get that further information that you didn't get in the first part of the call yeah I don't recall if it was a landline or wasn't a call back right
01:41:10 was there any reason why you didn't seek to establish whether there are any children in that flat or whether there were people with mobility difficulties or or elderly people no did you inform
01:41:27 or or elderly people no did you inform Alex Norman as the then senior operations manager in the control room that you had discovered that there was serious smoke spread as far as the top
01:41:38 serious smoke spread as far as the top floor
01:41:39 floor trapping occupants up there well remember well as you say want to show that a message on four would have passed up to this scene I don't remember specifically speaking the earlier two
01:41:51 specifically speaking the earlier two their lamps I remember speaking up with something at some point but I can't remember which one I spoke there which particular call it was so can't clarify that I definitely spoke with them on
01:42:02 that I definitely spoke with them on this call no would it have been important to you having having discovered that there was fire on the 20th floor and in fact fire on the 22nd floor as you were told on this call to tell Alex Norman that the fire had got
01:42:13 tell Alex Norman that the fire had got there far up but would have would have told somebody oh what am i doing but I can't recall it I remember speaking with somebody about fires but I can't
01:42:24 somebody about fires but I can't remember who it was I'm which particular call it was right
01:42:32 was anybody at this stage supervising your calls to ensure that the advice that you were giving and the information you were eliciting from the caller was
01:42:43 you were eliciting from the caller was was correct or appropriate thought Brooke all of it was at that time I'm not sure of time and at all so right now I'm going to jump over a few of the other calls that you received I want to
01:42:55 other calls that you received I want to look at a specific one if I can with you at one thirty four fifty and it may be that now may be an appropriate moment to have a break if you want to diagram type
01:43:06 have a break if you want to diagram type things
01:43:14 all right we'll have a break now please don't talk about your evidence or anything relating to 21 during the break and mr. millet you better keep this to
01:43:26 and mr. millet you better keep this to five minutes I think we'll have to yes okay so leave us now and go with yup sure please and come back to start at 10:00 to 4:00
01:43:42 intense focus
01:51:28 mr. daddy that yes thank you
01:51:44 all right mr. daddy thank you yes daddy thank you for coming back to us can i I'm going to jump over a few calls I just want to look at three particular ones and then and then move on the first
01:51:57 ones and then and then move on the first one is at page 30 of the control report time 201 34 50 which is the transcript
01:52:10 time 201 34 50 which is the transcript for which is at 3:00 LFP 3 1 5 and this is a call from a lady who said she was trapped in flat 192 on the 22nd floor no
01:52:25 trapped in flat 192 on the 22nd floor no I'd better to go from the transcript I think can I ask you to be shown the transcript which is lfp three one five
01:52:36 and it starts yeah we're trapped in 192 Granville tower yeah we're actually there okay what's that we do we can't get down the stick stairs because the stairs is full of smoke and then you go
01:52:47 stairs is full of smoke and then you go one more floor what floors of you are now just at that stage did you realize either from this call or from other calls that you'd have been receiving in the past 20 minutes or so about 15
01:52:59 the past 20 minutes or so about 15 minutes or so that there was any one staircase in Grenfell tower don't remember receiving that information though did there come a time when you did learn that there was any one staircase afterward maybe at some point
01:53:13 staircase afterward maybe at some point at some point in the night all after the night no after the night they don't remember receiving that information on that night oh really okay say did you receive any information about the fire safety protection
01:53:29 about the fire safety protection measures within the building on the night itself now that I remember or not you didn't learn is it but it follows from that that you didn't learn anything about what the exit routes were well we
01:53:40 about what the exit routes were well we would have just assumed like any Boldin a staircase but we don't I don't remember receiving any specific information on ground for not right um where any of the supervisors
01:53:51 um where any of the supervisors listening in on this call or helping you with whatever advice to give at this stage to remind you it's oh one 3450 so just about 25 - 2 - I would and they see happened to be passing by or what they
01:54:03 happened to be passing by or what they don't know now given that what we've already looked at this afternoon from earlier calls which we saw about smoke and fire spread up the building we looked at that call 22nd floor fire in
01:54:14 looked at that call 22nd floor fire in the flat barricade can you explain something you go on to say in the middle of the page right ok the fires on the fifth floor so there could be some smoke
01:54:25 fifth floor so there could be some smoke coming up you need to close your doors and windows ok can you tell us why you told them that the fire was on the fifth floor when you
01:54:37 the fire was on the fifth floor when you had been told in the call at 1:30 that the fire was in a flat on the 22nd floor well I send the floor can I imagine I was thinking of the force I don't know
01:54:49 was thinking of the force I don't know why I said even assuming we read 5th as fourth is there any reason you can you can give us as to why you told these
01:55:01 can give us as to why you told these callers that the fire was on the fifth or fourth floor when four minutes before you'd started a call in which the caller had told you that the fire was on the
01:55:12 had told you that the fire was on the 22nd floor no I can't give any reason not now you go on to say and there's a discussion about where the smokes coming from in the middle of page three you say
01:55:26 from in the middle of page three you say okay keep the smoke out of your flat okay we've got people coming up to you to the 22nd floor okay and did you did you know that for a fact well that's assumption would have made
01:55:38 well that's assumption would have made once we pass information to the scene that there's a plan in place to go and get them which there was right but you didn't does it follow from that that you didn't actually have confirmation from
01:55:49 didn't actually have confirmation from the incident ground that crews were on their way to - to the 22nd floor no he doesn't have confirmation that soon sorry just to
01:56:07 confirmation that soon sorry just to press this is intended to be critical but what was the basis on which you were providing this corner with that reassurance that people were coming up to you on the basis that if we pass
01:56:18 to you on the basis that if we pass information that a flat needs check that they'll go on do it on the basis that you had passed the message on already or were going to about - oh I had a past at
01:56:29 were going to about - oh I had a past at that stage or was going to but it would have been passed and that it would have been dealt with that would have been their assumption right and just to get
01:56:41 their assumption right and just to get back to a point I've asked you about on other calls when you're told they're trapped in your tol we couldn't get down the stairs because the stairs is full of smoke is there a reason why you didn't
01:56:53 smoke is there a reason why you didn't go on to ask them some detailed questions about smoke density in the stairs or the conditions in the lobby outside the flat and how difficult it was actually to reach the stairs and get down them not as much what suffer reason
01:57:05 down them not as much what suffer reason would have been taken out the word that the smoke bush stopping up right can I look at another call it's control report page 36 I think it's
01:57:17 it's control report page 36 I think it's the next one you take it's a cool time 137 58
01:57:39 which is I think the next call that you take and the summary says the female say 113 hello CR irresponsive hello
01:57:54 113 hello CR irresponsive hello fire brigade the caller sounds distress that is speaking very quickly a smoke alarm is sounding in the background and the caller states that there is smoke coming through the letterbox CRA duddy confirms that she is calling from
01:58:05 confirms that she is calling from Grenville tower and asks which floor the caller is on to which she replies the 14th CRA Dadi advises the caller that fire is on the fifth floor the caller says she doesn't know what to do and as
01:58:16 says she doesn't know what to do and as a baby in the house she explains the occupants have tried to run out but there is smoke in the corridor and the whole corridor was black so they run back into the house she also explains to see erudite very smoke coming through
01:58:27 see erudite very smoke coming through the door and filling up the hood of the house see Eridani advisors had to block up the doors to keep the smoke out he says he will let the crews know where she is
01:58:35 she is do you remember that call particularly not a particular corner do you remember noting that this was someone calling from flat one one three
01:58:49 someone calling from flat one one three no I don't remember going back can't remember flat number two spoke there and nothing now she'd given you quite a lot of information about the smoke in the corridor and how they tried to escape do
01:59:03 corridor and how they tried to escape do you think it was that enough for you to be able to know confident that either wasn't there wasn't an alternative escape route he has heard again please
01:59:14 escape route he has heard again please let me put in a different way why given the information that you were given is there a reason why you didn't seek to explore her more precisely what what the
01:59:25 explore her more precisely what what the smoke density was what the conditions were like in the lobby or in the stairs Frank we were just been taking the assumption that's that it was bad smoking just Tecna dies as the word just
01:59:38 smoking just Tecna dies as the word just keep my mind there's probably 15 20 calls that are Whitten to get through this
01:59:45 this psoriasis process as many calls as possible now you see that we can see from the summary that you told the caller that the fire was on the fifth floor again it was the same question can
01:59:59 floor again it was the same question can you help us understand why you told her that the fire was on the fifth floor when we as we've seen from the other calls it had spread two floors higher in the building two calls from two separate corners on the floor 22 where there was fire no moving on
02:00:15 fire no moving on in the same report to page 46 this is a call at 144 43 and the transcript
02:00:28 call at 144 43 and the transcript reference is LF b32 Falls just look at the summary yeah you take a call from a male caller who says that he's stuck in flat 95 on the 12th floor and says he has two children cro daddy explains that
02:00:40 has two children cro daddy explains that the fire is on the 4th floor and the caller informs him that embers have come up and the win and in the window and have started a fire in the kitchen of flat 96 next door he also says there are the people trapped in on the 11th floor
02:00:52 the people trapped in on the 11th floor the caller reports that it's very smoky and asks for help cro daddy informs the caller the crews will be sent up to him co owner Danny advises him to get to the room farthest from the fire so that's the summary can
02:01:05 from the fire so that's the summary can I just ask you to look at the transcript which as I say is that a lefty three to four
02:01:18 and again we see it starts we're stuck in flat 95 ok I'm speaking please help us I've got two children and then you a
02:01:29 us I've got two children and then you a little bit lower down after having asked for the floor floor 12 operator the twelfth right you're well away from the fire that's on the fourth floor no just
02:01:41 fire that's on the fourth floor no just just pausing there but but this time you heard have Isis think we've seen a number of of calls from callers who were telling you that the fire was not
02:01:52 telling you that the fire was not contained to the fourth floor but had spread as far as at least the 22nd floor and I'm sorry to repeat the question but but why did you tell this caller that she was well away from the farm which
02:02:03 she was well away from the farm which was on the fourth floor I can't thank way I've just been going on the confirmation that never had something with no confirmation from saying that it was spread no again you're told that
02:02:17 was spread no again you're told that she's stuck and I'm sorry it's the same question but she's stuck in the flat we don't see her who don't see you exploring what the conditions are in the exit route says to be able to make an assessment of whether she could safely leave is there a reason is there a
02:02:31 leave is there a reason is there a reason for that
02:02:49 just one or two other questions about different calls not going to go to the transcript of this one but if you go to page 55 of the transcript sorry I'm so
02:03:03 page 55 of the transcript sorry I'm so sorry 55 of the report the control report you can see that you answer a call at 154 14 from a male caller in
02:03:16 call at 154 14 from a male caller in flat 95 on the 12th floor he says it's getting worse and there's a there's a summary there and you can see that the
02:03:27 summary there and you can see that the call duration is 40 minutes do you remember this call in particular I remember that one because it was because
02:03:39 remember that one because it was because it was so long yes and the fell at there on the other end iPhone I just remember he was an incredible account some way we stood out justin is there a reason why
02:03:52 stood out justin is there a reason why you stayed on the line with that caller but not with the others earlier that we've looked at can't give particular reasons because I can't remember there must have been something I keep my mind
02:04:04 must have been something I keep my mind is just gone off what people are sandy like it's easy they read off a transcript night but you're just a I'm a con the best guess as people are screaming I see and show it not see in
02:04:15 screaming I see and show it not see in there the worst situation of their lives you're just trying to make your best guess I suppose as we can did you have a supervisor listening into that call at
02:04:26 supervisor listening into that call at any point no not that I recall now as you can see in the summary it says oh - 33 36 just 2/3 of the way done so CRO daddy says to the caller right
02:04:37 so CRO daddy says to the caller right we're going to tell you to leave but you need to stay on the phone who is the we well her assuming that would be me telling them okay at that time to 33:36
02:04:52 telling them okay at that time to 33:36 do you know or can you remember whether statehood advice have now changed I'm guessing that must have been around that time if I'm Sam when they tell you
02:05:03 time if I'm Sam when they tell you belief right
02:05:08 do you remember whether at this time by which I mean Oh to 33:36 you are getting any information back from the incident ground about the progress of the rescue
02:05:20 ground about the progress of the rescue you've been on the call by that stage for about forty almost forty minutes so do you remember whether towards the end of the call you've got any information back from me it's not as basically a
02:05:32 back from me it's not as basically a Blaine talk but there was right somewhat on the way to get them yet did the fact that you you weren't getting information back from the incident ground it give you any infant further
02:05:45 ground it give you any infant further information yourself about what was happening to deployments and whether they were succeeding and getting into the tower no don't remember having that
02:05:58 the tower no don't remember having that thought right
02:06:02 did he did you the experience of that 40-minute call it assists you in giving advice to later callers well if that's
02:06:15 advice to later callers well if that's the time we start a chit 233 if that's the time we start to change and then that advice would have been yeah consistent with next calls so it's mojeid would have been yes now let's pick up that theme the change in the
02:06:26 pick up that theme the change in the statement advice in your statement on page four you can just go to that in the second paragraph you say at about 2:40
02:06:42 second paragraph you say at about 2:40 a.m. everything changed the advice we'd be giving to people was completely altered then you say Senior Operations Manager Joanne Smith told me the change she said we needed to tell people to get
02:06:54 she said we needed to tell people to get out and make their own way out and then you go on to elaborate a little bit lower down the page before I get to that
02:07:07 lower down the page before I get to that part can I just ask you about that first sentence I read to you about what the advice was do you remember exactly what J Smith said I can't remember the exact words just where's the fact of just tell
02:07:18 words just where's the fact of just tell them they have to get out right can't remember exact word nor the exact time but okay now there's a control debrief note which I could take that ought to
02:07:30 note which I could take that ought to take up time taking you to but it says advice was to put wet towels over mouth hold hands stay together get out could be last chance does that trigger any recollection in your mind about the kind
02:07:42 recollection in your mind about the kind of advice you should be giving to people yeah believe that as something that say to callers yeah do you remember being told by Joe Smith to tell callers that it could be their last chance I was
02:07:55 it could be their last chance I was first effect of yeah that's basically the only chance I have you were you told that firefighters were having difficulty getting above a particular floor at this stage don't remember a thing information were you told that
02:08:07 information were you told that firefighters were having difficulty in affecting any rescues due to the difficult conditions at this point don't remember seeing them when you say that the advice was completely altered as you do in the first line of that paragraph
02:08:18 do in the first line of that paragraph does that mean that at no stage before that were you telling people to evacuate even if they could I don't remember saying that long before the advice was
02:08:30 saying that long before the advice was changed do you remember giving any advice to somebody saying get out not that I recall right I certainly wouldn't said this someone it was their last chance before that not know but living
02:08:43 chance before that not know but living inside the last chance point do you remember before the advice has changed yourself giving advice to callers to say well let's let's go get out not that I recall
02:08:51 recall okay now you then go on halfway down the paragraph to elaborate on what your what advice you were giving you say I remember well perhaps I should show you to be fair to Deline before to be
02:09:03 to be fair to Deline before to be suddenly telling people that they needed to get out and get down the stairs was totally alien to us and we were suddenly in an unprecedented place I remember telling trying to tell people that what they needed to do get wet towels around
02:09:15 they needed to do get wet towels around their faces feel for the walls and make their way to the fire escape a lot of people were simply too scared to leave and actually refer that lee refused to go i was left pretty clueless as to what to do so did the only thing i could
02:09:26 to do so did the only thing i could think of that might get them to go i tried to scare them with nothing left to say i told people that they had absolutely no other option than to go and if they did not go they would die in that flat it was there any chance it may
02:09:38 that flat it was there any chance it may seem pretty strong to have said that but i was left with no choice and the people on the end of the phone certainly had no choice i think for some i managed to change their minds and they made all
02:09:49 change their minds and they made all efforts to get out but i'm not sure if they made it out or not
02:09:57 that advice that tone of advice did anybody tell you to use that that tone uncompromising language like that I
02:10:08 uncompromising language like that I remember having a conversation along those lines with John Smith but attempt recall exact wording of what we discussed but it was along those lines right what if people told you that they
02:10:21 right what if people told you that they just couldn't leave they tried everything these couldn't leave what would you do then well Frank on that kisser
02:10:29 kisser it was probably no chance as we were saying that was the last chance had you ever received any training I think we covered this but just to this room having looked at this precise advice
02:10:40 having looked at this precise advice have you ever received any training on what to do if the stay put changed in the way it did on that night no you say that you felt pretty clueless we've just
02:10:52 that you felt pretty clueless we've just looked at that yeah why did you why did you feel clueless well maybe clueless isn't what they better described as helpless helpless right is that did anything in your
02:11:07 right is that did anything in your training or experience prepare you to handle these the this change of advice and now give this advice the Joe Smith and ask you to give no
02:11:22 can I ask you to look at an example of one of these calls its page 96 of the control report the call time of 240 208
02:11:41 and this is you taking a call from the female caller flat 94 12th floor and I
02:11:54 female caller flat 94 12th floor and I just want to pick up the advice here at 250 it's a call that lasts 10 minutes and 49 seconds but a 250 you say this is
02:12:06 and 49 seconds but a 250 you say this is 4 lines up from the bottom if you don't do what I tell you you are going to die in that flat the caller session will try no more is heard from the corner and the BT operator comes on that Island confirms the caller has cleared the line
02:12:19 confirms the caller has cleared the line is the question is is that the kind of approach that you took for the rest of the night probably not in every call I would have been supposed to be a bit
02:12:33 would have been supposed to be a bit more diplomatic about it but as you see that call was 10 minutes so it was probably 10 minutes of convincing them and that's a dramatic way of you have to try and get out but at that stage as I
02:12:46 try and get out but at that stage as I said earlier there's more calls queuing up yeah that we still need to tell them the same thing so it was just a case of that's what the reality of a situation was right
02:12:55 was right did you hear your any other control room officers taking the same approach or taking a different a more gentle approach not that I recall know where
02:13:07 approach not that I recall know where the supervisor is assisting you in any way as to what as to how to couch the advice or will you just left to decide for yourself how how to put it they don't the best they could the cameroon
02:13:18 don't the best they could the cameroon encouraged us and now for advice but they had just a hell of a lot they do themselves so they weren't constantly standing over a shoulder telling us what to do
02:13:27 to do did you or did anybody else that you know of take it try to take account of any cultural differences or ethnic differences which might affect the way the caller might respond to being
02:13:40 the caller might respond to being advised in the way you were advising them
02:13:43 them no when the advice changed were you still passing all the details of the callers to Jason Olaf at the white boards say that he could inform the
02:13:54 boards say that he could inform the incident ground yeah I remember that we were still recording calls right up until I went home at mornin but have seven I've been Hank came on remember so many continue ringing Anna buddy iron
02:14:05 many continue ringing Anna buddy iron lives we continually made a note of every flat and floor number that we spoke about
02:14:25 there's a call at 308 and I just want to take you to the summary at page one - one of the control report where you take
02:14:40 one of the control report where you take a call from a caller who states fire fire while coughing the caller states that they're in flat 190 on the 12th floor sorry flak 92 on the 12th floor
02:14:52 floor sorry flak 92 on the 12th floor I'm sorry and CRA daddy advices the caller to get to the staircase as it is there any chance there is one I've out in two children and the call is a long call and I'm glad to say that it ends
02:15:06 call and I'm glad to say that it ends well do you have a particular recollection of that call oh that's not that call last week yet and you stayed
02:15:18 that call last week yet and you stayed on the on the line through that call I help them out I'm told they were on the staircase so from what I remember yeah not the hallway don't don't say totally we're on the staircase I think they may have made
02:15:29 the staircase I think they may have made contact with crews on the staircase is that a good example of the successful efforts that you yourself took on the night to rescue people but as much as we good day in
02:15:49 I've got one or two questions about callbacks Joe Smith gave some evidence that the control rooms don't as a matter of call callers back is that your
02:16:01 of call callers back is that your experience not a landline if he if they're on their way out and you bring the landline they hear the phone ring the dangers might go back and they pack it up right but a mobile if that's on
02:16:13 it up right but a mobile if that's on their person then we would call back on the web after the advice to stay put change
02:16:21 change did you call people back when calls were dropped or they ended to tell them that the advice have changed about that I remember doing so now it would have been very difficult they find the calls
02:16:35 did you ask anybody how callers were going to find out that the advice had changed if you didn't call them back no is there a reason for that I think we're
02:16:47 is there a reason for that I think we're just so focused on calls come on right now there is a an example of a pull back and I just wanted to know why that was it
02:16:59 it it's a call from flat 153 on the 18th floor where the call had come from the control room at Essex do you remember that I only remember it from dimension than this enquiry before the summer I
02:17:11 than this enquiry before the summer I don't remember it from that I'd know right
02:17:17 do you remember calling anybody else back on the night so it was a one-off is it that's why do you remember I don't recall Conan about it that's right based on what you said I must have done yes
02:17:32 don't see how much you do remember do you remember speaking at about 3:00 a.m. to the Essex control room no you don't
02:17:49 to the Essex control room no you don't do you remember being told about to call a man in flat one two five three and being given the number to call
02:18:00 being given the number to call now don't remember only know off at 3:00 invented this inquiry I don't remember it from the night done right on moving
02:18:14 it from the night done right on moving on to a final topic what on page five of your statement you said in the second paragraph that halfway through
02:18:26 paragraph that halfway through throughout the night there were no TVs on in the control room however at some point I remember being shown images of the building on someone's phone on Sky News or something to me it looked like was something from
02:18:37 to me it looked like was something from a film the disaster movie or something I could not believe that it was real and it was actually happening there and then cut early amazed that firefighters managed to get up there and get anybody out do you remember at what point of the
02:18:51 out do you remember at what point of the night you saw images of the building on someone's phone it would have been as the call starting to quiet and dying previous that wouldn't have had a chance
02:19:02 previous that wouldn't have had a chance they look at and I think if you had seen pictures of the tower on fire in an earlier stage might matter did would
02:19:13 earlier stage might matter did would that have assisted you in terms of the advice that you were giving to callers do you think wouldn't have assisted in advice cuz it's not my decision to make she changes her voice so don't believe
02:19:25 she changes her voice so don't believe it would have assisted me personally I know but would it have assisted you in getting a clearer picture in your in your mind as to smoke and fire spread so that you can't give callers clearer more fact-based advice yourself
02:19:36 fact-based advice yourself that may have done I can't say for definite let's turn them
02:19:55 mr. Dudley I'm gonna say thank you very much for your evidence I have no further questions at the moment there may be one or two more than occur to me so I could ask the Chairman to rise for a few minutes just to make sure I've covered them all mr. chairman is that convenient
02:20:07 them all mr. chairman is that convenient yes well it does have a mr. daddy that on reflection can't sort of finds questions that should as they're asked so we'll have a breakdown for half plus four and your evidence and then when you
02:20:21 four and your evidence and then when you come back we'll see was there any more questions
02:20:24 questions all right thank you you like to go to the auction please
02:20:34 my toughest order
02:29:17 yes well mr. grateful for the break we won't be long I don't think there are a number of questions I have to ask yes I thought they were they long for new hands could we have mr. dally bag ma'am please
02:29:43 all right mr. Dhoni a few more questions mr. Dudley first of all I put a call to you from page 96 of the control report at 240 208 from a female caller flat 94
02:29:58 at 240 208 from a female caller flat 94 on the 12th floor I've been asked to make it clear for the record to say you know that the caller survived and it was rescued thank you that's on record
02:30:09 rescued thank you that's on record secondly I have a question about the call at oh one 5414 which if we go to
02:30:23 call at oh one 5414 which if we go to the control reporter page 55 comes from a male caller in raw in flats 95 on the 12th floor we looked at that just before just before he rose so the one that
02:30:35 just before he rose so the one that lasted 40 minutes remember yet call you say you do recall it and the summary says that you were told that he has two
02:30:48 says that you were told that he has two children aged 8 and 12 and can hear the fire the flattening in the flat next door Mike the question is did you stay on the phone with the caller for the full 40 minutes until the firefighters
02:30:59 full 40 minutes until the firefighters arrived and rescued the occupants yes what did you try to do to reassure the caller during this call well to reassure they just I just spoke about earlier
02:31:11 they just I just spoke about earlier telling them that there's people on the way to get them right and then they're asked the times get everybody in a single room it's just as far away from smoke as possible right cover cracks in
02:31:22 smoke as possible right cover cracks in the doors they don't look off your faces for fire wear tiles right so that was the reassurance that you gave during the course well the reassurance was probably more the fact
02:31:33 reassurance was probably more the fact of somebody on the way to get you right now
02:31:38 there's cool
02:31:52 that you took at 308 oh one and just to go back to the control report with that 308 zero one is a page we didn't look at
02:32:09 308 zero one is a page we didn't look at it so this is what I be asked to ask you about one
02:32:24 yes 1 2 1 3 Oh 801 CRA daddy takes a call from a caller who states fire fire whilst coffee but I did take you to this my fault
02:32:33 my fault 92 12th floor and this lady was in her flat one I doubt two children now again
02:32:46 flat one I doubt two children now again this was a good news story in the sense that your help with your help she was she was rescued I think you said when I asked you about this before that that you've got them to the stairs but not
02:32:57 you've got them to the stairs but not down the stairs I think it's right and we can see this and certainly we get it from the call that you're on the phone while she gets down the stairs to the second floor
02:33:09 down the stairs to the second floor where the firefighters are do you remember that no I don't remember staying on that long all right the past which 12 minutes 52
02:33:21 all right the past which 12 minutes 52 seconds and she's coming from the 12th floor do you recall that she keeps going back she tries good to get back because of the smoke and you keep telling her to move to move on and keep going down do
02:33:34 move to move on and keep going down do you remember that I've kept nervous for Suffolk's Pacific part of it no I remember speaking just continue you have to make your way out than then but I've
02:33:47 to make your way out than then but I've done relays was on the phone to the hallway down the second floor to be honest not
02:34:02 No
02:34:05 nonetheless this is I think an example of you staying on the phone and guiding somebody out through the smoke yeah you remember
02:34:14 remember yeah these broad terms you remember that yes okay
02:34:21 can I then ask you about the call from flat 193 22nd floor that let me just see
02:34:34 flat 193 22nd floor that let me just see if I can go through this with you first of all just a bit of background there are two previous calls that are call that the caller makes to Yvonne Adams of
02:34:46 that the caller makes to Yvonne Adams of 237 and 243 and then there's a second call at 305 in which you tell them to leave or to show them the control room
02:34:59 leave or to show them the control room report for that 305 oh nine page one one nine
02:35:07 nine oh all of the control report I'll just put the summary to you for that call
02:35:16 it's
02:35:20 at 3:00 at 5:09 Sierra da dick takes a call from a bt operator who has a caller on the line in flat 193 on the 22nd floor a male caller then comes on the line and CRO daddy passes the advice that they must cover themselves with wet
02:35:31 that they must cover themselves with wet towels or cloths and get to the stairwell the caller says they cannot get there because they cannot see in is full of smoke CRA daddy explains that it's alien it's the only option they should feel their way along the corridor
02:35:42 should feel their way along the corridor the caller states at the stairs of full of smoke at CRO Donny repeats is there any option and they must get to the staircase so you can say your you're giving your customer ly clear and unequivocal advice you told us before
02:35:54 unequivocal advice you told us before that's the background and there's there's a third call as it were there is a third call to you from that address and also a second call made from another
02:36:05 and also a second call made from another family at 304 24 I just want to show you that and that that transcript is of lfb four to two it's not too good
02:36:16 four to two it's not too good just have a look briefly at parts of the transcript if I can hello we are trapped in 193 you're in flat 193 yeah we
02:36:32 in 193 you're in flat 193 yeah we couldn't get out we try but the smoke couldn't even let us move on meter and then you go on to say you need to cover your face of anything you can find we tried we tried we can't and then halfway
02:36:44 tried we tried we can't and then halfway down the page you continue to say you need to listen to me this is your only chance okay you need to cover your face with whatever you can find cover it with water and make it into the staircase there's firefighters in the staircase okay we can't write inaudible chance of
02:36:58 okay we can't write inaudible chance of getting out we tried we can't send a helicopter or a ladder or something in order to try okay we couldn't we couldn't and it continues in that vein halfway down page three you say this is
02:37:09 halfway down page three you say this is your only chance and then on page and that's at the same point and the caller says well we can't there's no way you
02:37:20 says well we can't there's no way you can't say the helicopter or anything you can't listen there's no other way that's pretty clear and then over the page you ask how many people are with you of the minute second or third entry
02:37:31 you of the minute second or third entry damn sorry we can't we can't how many adults of you with you children how many other selves how many children there are five three five seven seven seven people
02:37:42 five three five seven seven seven people together no seven children at about 12 adults seven children three I don't know 12 12 hours and 7 children 12 adults twelve one two yeah he'll open a fire is
02:37:54 twelve one two yeah he'll open a fire is coming and we are inaudible side and then it goes on now just just pausing there
02:38:03 did you remember whether this is a man or a woman that is that you're speaking to if that's a column Franken Arthur was a woman you think it's a woman
02:38:14 a woman you think it's a woman the family members would listen to the tape and say that it's it's a man in hindsight do you think notes that's right that could be right them not sure I'm doing let's think about know D if
02:38:28 I'm doing let's think about know D if you go onto page 8 page 6 you say listen to me this is 2/3 of the way down you
02:38:39 to me this is 2/3 of the way down you understand you have no other choice this is your only chance you have to try and get to that staircase I can't even move to the other side we can't see we can't breathe how do we go and you ask them to feel it well on the wall and then on
02:38:51 feel it well on the wall and then on page 7 you say and it continues in this vein if the 2/3 of the way down the page right listen to me you're gonna die in that fire unless you make your way to that staircase ok do you understand that
02:39:03 that staircase ok do you understand that shall we try shall we try something would die if we don't try right are you making your way there yeah I think we shall try yeah you have to try ok I think they're making their way there now right are you on your way there yeah but
02:39:15 right are you on your way there yeah but again it continues in that vein please try and we're trying we can't and then same on page eight we're on the 22nd floor 193 right you
02:39:26 we're on the 22nd floor 193 right you need to get to that staircase and it continues and on page 9 the ends with this is your only choice okay I'm gonna
02:39:37 this is your only choice okay I'm gonna have to clear the line you have to do this okay well we can't we tried now my question is given that there are are other instances when people actually
02:39:49 other instances when people actually managing to get into the stairwell as we've seen from do other calls I showed you the success stories do you know why
02:40:00 you the success stories do you know why you weren't ate that well they weren't able to to get out of their flats across the Dom being into the stairs some just there was bad on that floor
02:40:11 there was bad on that floor alright did you get any impression from what they were saying we looked at quite a bit of the transcript as to what made them different and why they couldn't get out nah don't remember that just
02:40:24 out nah don't remember that just remember that it was literally the only chance only choice do you remember whether there was any language difficulty or perhaps misunderstanding between you and the
02:40:35 misunderstanding between you and the caller about how urgent it was an essential that they should actually need not that I recall thank God was my FICO I was fairly clear I don't know did you consider anything
02:40:47 I don't know did you consider anything that you could say to persuade them to leave well I think I'd say you're gonna die on that flat if he don't isn't that on their transcript no you say I'm gonna have to clear the line you have to do
02:40:58 have to clear the line you have to do this okay where we can't be tried in the call ends why did you why did you clear the line then because there was calls might not we
02:41:11 because there was calls might not we still had all our caller States answer and I just doesn't Frank I was gonna change your mind I told her I'm sorry if you said I'm her hair I'm not can't recall I told the caller just repeatedly there's only
02:41:22 caller just repeatedly there's only choice such as doesn't think it's gonna change your mind I could have spent an hour dinner when I could have spent an hour answering more calls than as he said we did have a couple of success stories which hopefully there might have
02:41:33 stories which hopefully there might have been in that next time I'm not sure if there was but when when you ended the call were you completely satisfied in your own mind that there was nothing more you could do to persuade them to try to leave yeah what did you call I
02:41:50 try to leave yeah what did you call I stayed Walkman I'm sorry
02:41:57 we'll just take take
02:42:08 I just for me that night I call this the worst part of the whole bite I can hope was the worst decision I've ever made
02:42:16 nicely done from it
02:42:28 let's Joe have any got one more question they'll be precise I didn't so nobody's like yeah okay yeah all right yeah I'm granddad okay thanks I think one more question okay that is
02:42:40 I think one more question okay that is do you remember what you did immediately after that call with the information you had on it the information that would have still been passing the flat number
02:42:53 have still been passing the flat number the number of people we would have stole been following a procedure passing that through the scene but then straight after us back on the same again just mr.
02:43:04 after us back on the same again just mr. Donnie thank you very much I have no further questions for you can I say thank you very much to you for coming along with giving evidence to us today we really appreciate it and it's helped greatly with our investigations thank
02:43:15 greatly with our investigations thank you thank you mr. Daly can I just add nice thanks ooh there's a mr. Minetti it obviously was a very difficult and distressing experience you taking all those calls as you've made perfectly
02:43:27 those calls as you've made perfectly plain and I'm sorry we've had to ask you to get through it again it's very helpful to us to hear your account thank you very much thank you right you like to give the options
02:43:46 yes just a minute well there's there it is
02:43:50 is that ends the evidence for today yes mr. Chen are grateful for your sitting 15 minutes or so later than we would it's been a long day I know bitter runs tired but it was important to finish that's witness a particular indeed now
02:44:02 that's witness a particular indeed now we have three witnesses next on Monday also control room and the of the also control room right so we will proceed with that I'm not at this stage I think
02:44:15 with that I'm not at this stage I think going to take the plunge of asking for 9:30 start I think on a Monday morning that would be difficult not just for you mr. chairman before for others who wish to attend so I can ask for a 10:30 10
02:44:27 to attend so I can ask for a 10:30 10 o'clock start you got lucky there 10 o'clock start amiss you know granted your wish so there it is telling us if I
02:44:38 your wish so there it is telling us if I can ask for that back well thank you very much well we were breaking their I'm smarting the option is gone little longer than we normally do but it was important to complete mr. Daly's evidence and we'll then we'll break
02:44:49 evidence and we'll then we'll break their and resume at 10 o'clock on Monday thank you very much