Further LFB evidence (12 September 2018 Pt 1 of 2)

Full transcript

00:00:11 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing which we're going to hear from some more firefighter witnesses yes mr. chair good morning sir the first witness today is firefighter Michael wood thank

00:00:24 today is firefighter Michael wood thank you

00:00:25 you [Music]

00:00:48 I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God give evidence I shall give shall be the truth should be the truth the whole truth the whole truth the

00:01:01 the whole truth the whole truth the truth

00:01:01 truth Kerry - would yes good morning would you please confirm your name for the record my name is Michael wood good morning mr. wood may thanks for coming along today is much appreciated on the lectern there

00:01:14 is much appreciated on the lectern there is a blue folder yeah and if you open the blue folder and turn to the first tab there should be your witness statement dated the 29th of January of this year is that right I can't see the

00:01:28 this year is that right I can't see the date on it yet 29th and if you turn to the next tab yeah hopefully there should be your contemporaneous note the next

00:01:39 be your contemporaneous note the next tab run the next page I've got you in it

00:01:46 yeah there is yeah and that's your contemporaneous note yeah and if you turn to the final tab hopefully should find your exhibits for exhibits that you were appended to your police statement

00:01:58 were appended to your police statement is that right that's right have you read those documents recently yes and you confirm that contents are true yes and you contend for those documents to stand as your evidence this

00:02:10 documents to stand as your evidence this inquiry yes mr. wood if at any time you need a break police say so that's not a problem

00:02:17 problem secondly if any my questions are unclear at any stage police say so and I'll rephrase okay now before we start could I just ask you some basic questions of background first of all is it right that

00:02:29 background first of all is it right that you are a firefighter and it's time with the fire you were based at Brixton that's correct and that you became a firefighter in 2003 correct and that the callsign of the appliance you rode on

00:02:41 callsign of the appliance you rode on the night was Hotel 242 that's correct and as to timings the alleppey records indicate that you were mobilized at 0 to 0-5 you were mobile at zero to 0-8 and

00:02:53 0-5 you were mobile at zero to 0-8 and you arrived at the scene at 0 to 28 does that sound about right to you now the first topic of questions I'd like to discuss with you is be a entry

00:03:04 like to discuss with you is be a entry and deployment within the town now you had a number of entries into the tower so the first one I want to deal with it is the very first one Wow now when you went into the tower for the

00:03:15 now when you went into the tower for the first time is it right to say that the foyer was crowded and chaotic yeah was yeah and is it right that you waited there for between five and ten minutes around about that ten minutes yeah and

00:03:26 around about that ten minutes yeah and did you see any residents passing by you evacuating the tower yes can you member have many no can you remember what condition they were in as they left varied conditions and see if

00:03:39 they left varied conditions and see if you could describe to us that the range of conditions you witnessed some were being walked out some were being carried out what any being assisted out using second be a sets member now after some

00:03:55 second be a sets member now after some time you've shifted to a room on the left-hand side of the lobby which he thought was a community room is that right it was a lot of space yeah I don't know the partners have long room was and was it at this time when you were

00:04:07 was it at this time when you were waiting in the lobby that you saw it a small boy saying my brother died in there I can't remember the exact room it was somewhere around a little lobby area

00:04:18 was somewhere around a little lobby area right now was it around this time that you saw the alleppey Commissioner Danny cotton and a senior officer yes and is it right that the senior officer addressed the men who were in the men

00:04:31 addressed the men who were in the men and women who are in the lobby yes and is it right that the senior officer gave a speech in which you were told that first of all it was okay to work outside procedures and secondly he also

00:04:42 outside procedures and secondly he also said that if anyone didn't want to do that that was fine as well is that fair summary of what you were told that's a fair summary and what did you take him to mean by the phrase working outside

00:04:53 to mean by the phrase working outside procedures what did you think it meant in practice for you that it was going to be very difficult because of the nature of the fire and

00:05:04 because of the nature of the fire and that we probably have to do things above and beyond what we'd normally do within our safety procedures and WiiU content

00:05:15 our safety procedures and WiiU content to do that I was now as I understand it due to congestion that Lobby era you and others were sent outside the tower after a period of time is that right correct now

00:05:28 period of time is that right correct now how long can you remember now I think it's always I apologize it's always difficult asking questions about times if you remember how long you were waiting outside the tower before your second entry up to 20 minutes

00:05:45 second entry up to 20 minutes itzhak I can't say don't worry if you can't remember don't worry now if I can turn to your second entry into the tower and you went from the lobby to the

00:05:57 and you went from the lobby to the bridge head is that right that's right and again was it congested or not too congested the lobby in the bridge head

00:06:09 congested the lobby in the bridge head wasn't as congested as it was the first one they still paid quite a few people about and and was it congested with firefighters or firefighters and casualties evacuating from higher up the

00:06:22 casualties evacuating from higher up the tower the same more firefighters and casualties and in terms the casualties you saw are you able to describe for us what condition they were as they evacuated the tower again I can't

00:06:38 evacuated the tower again I can't remember life who was what cuz it was what's why I'm Tom were being carried out some were being walked up and again do you remember any evacuating whilst

00:06:49 do you remember any evacuating whilst assisted with a second be a set I can't remember

00:06:54 remember apologies for putting a particular rotation do you recall seeing two Taiwanese women leaving the tower whilst you were waiting at the lobby or the bridge head

00:07:06 now you move to the bridgehead can you remember on what floor the bridgehead was at that stage you've been moved it was on the ground or the first are you

00:07:21 was on the ground or the first are you sure are you sure about this at this stage not know and did you see a watch manager Morrison at last stage when you at the bridgehead yeah and is it right

00:07:33 at the bridgehead yeah and is it right that you were put into a queue with firefighter Lawrence and ahead of you were firefighters Swanson the Cuthbert correct and what briefed were you given at the bridgehead to clear deduct to

00:07:47 at the bridgehead to clear deduct to check the rooms the flats sorry on the fourth and a fifth floor and we also told to carry out a right-hand search that's correct and were you given any further detail by

00:07:59 and were you given any further detail by the watch manager before you were deployed not that I remember so no detail of any particular flats or any particular occupants of flats that you ought to be looking out for or

00:08:10 you ought to be looking out for or rescuing I can't remember now if I can talk to you about that deployment to the fourth and fifth floor

00:08:21 deployment to the fourth and fifth floor and first of all the conditions of the stairwell you tallied out at zero 347 does that sound about right I'll have to take your word for it I wasn't looking

00:08:32 take your word for it I wasn't looking at the time and is it right that you encountered a man on the stairs in the foyer who is in the frantic state saying he'd lost his wife that's correct now you continued with your task and

00:08:43 now you continued with your task and went up the towers that right that's what can you describe for us the conditions you encountered as you left the bridgehead and started to make your way up to the fourth floor yeah it's smoky and can you describe for

00:08:57 yeah it's smoky and can you describe for us the density half thick was the smoke got thicker as we won't throw on to the floor

00:09:03 floor and what color was it black now as you were going up is it right that you saw three firefighters come past you and you're not too short as either on the

00:09:14 you're not too short as either on the 2nd 3rd or 4th floors with a female casualty correct and looking back to internet back on it now are you able to be more precise about the floor on which you encountered with female casualty

00:09:27 you encountered with female casualty being brought down by the three firefighters on site as a fourth and you say that she was almost if not unconscious is that a fair summary of her condition that you witnessed she was

00:09:39 her condition that you witnessed she was yeah yeah and they were really struggling with her is that right yeah I have collapsing and you took the lady from them and carried her down is that right that's right and then you took her

00:09:51 right that's right and then you took her to the mezzanine and then is it right that you went back up the tower to regroup with firefighter

00:10:02 tower to regroup with firefighter Lawrence that's what I've done yeah and firefighter Lawrence had stayed up I do that for about the fourth floor whilst you took the lady dad yeah cuz he was still going up and as you were going

00:10:15 was still going up and as you were going up to see firefighter Lawrence you met another a man coming down the stairs is that right or casually yeah yeah and he was coughing spluttering saying and help me he was yeah and in your statement you

00:10:28 he was yeah and in your statement you described his legs giving way you know he collapsed well in any moment and then you describe him half fainting into your arms is that a fair summary sore thing and you carried him down I did yeah and

00:10:40 and you carried him down I did yeah and then did you leave him at the mezzanine or on the ground floor mezzanine cause then the people from the pin2 control could see us and I come running up and when you brought down the first lady and

00:10:51 when you brought down the first lady and then this gentleman did you brief anyone at the bridgehead as to where you'd found these individuals I can't remember I just got back up to do what I do okay

00:11:03 after you brought the man down to the mezzanine you then went back up to the the fourth floor is that right and that you met firefighters sunson Cuthbert who said they searched the fourth floor they

00:11:14 said they searched the fourth floor they had two more flats to go and suggested you went to the fifth floor is that right sounds about right yeah and so you went up to the fifth floor can you describe for us what you encountered on the fifth floor yeah it's

00:11:27 encountered on the fifth floor yeah it's really hot and smoky and we went in a room in a flat fun-ball was burnt off and just it was all full of fire just

00:11:38 and just it was all full of fire just checking if there was the only one in there but there's so I knew there'd be no one in no box checked it anyway just in case there was no one in there and can you describe the condition of the interior at the flat you went to cert it

00:11:50 interior at the flat you went to cert it was all on file it is really hot how far into the flat were you able to go right through so from the entrance door to the far wall with the window in yeah

00:12:04 how many of the flats did you search on the fifth floor Joe and then because of the temperature and the city on the circumstances you encountered is it

00:12:16 circumstances you encountered is it right that you went back down to the bridgehead yeah my air started one another and had your alarm sounded by the stage I think so I think so and you

00:12:27 the stage I think so I think so and you return to the bridgehead new tallied in at zero four zero two again is that something a precise time you can't remember now wouldn't all the time and did you brief the bridgehead of the

00:12:38 did you brief the bridgehead of the conditions you'd found on the fifth floor

00:12:40 floor yeah would have done but cotton member I said can you remember who you briefed at the bridgehead no now you had a third

00:12:55 the bridgehead no now you had a third third entry into the tower later on in the evening and is it right that you had deployed to the 10th the ninth or tenth floor to remove a body xi xi and in

00:13:06 floor to remove a body xi xi and in short you found the body of a deceased woman on the stairwell between is was it the 10th the 11th floor 11th now as far

00:13:17 the 10th the 11th floor 11th now as far as I remember and for we don't need to go into it but for a range of reasons and after some time you are unable to bring the deceased woman out of the

00:13:28 bring the deceased woman out of the tower is that right yeah we never got all the way done and how far down the tower were you able to take the casualty to the ninth floor mr.

00:13:39 take the casualty to the ninth floor mr. wood thank you very much those are all the questions I have for you at this stage I don't think there are going to be any further questions sir but if I may ask you briefly to rise just like Jeff few minutes just to check sir yes

00:13:50 Jeff few minutes just to check sir yes thank you story sometimes happens that although mr. Kinnear thinks he's asking questions he finds he has so we're going to rise for a couple of minutes now please don't talk to anyone

00:14:01 minutes now please don't talk to anyone about your evidence on your actual room and we'll come back in you need five minutes

00:14:06 minutes totally busted I think so thank you so come back at 20 past 10:00 archive and then we will see a more question destroyed all right all right let's give the option in please

00:14:23 right 24

00:17:37 you

00:19:03 mr. Keeney no supplemental questions sir so possibly it just leaves us to thank mr. woodruf so let's get mr. wood back in just to explain in position to him okay

00:19:29 I'm understood I'm pleased to say that there are no further questions to put to you so it just remains me - thank you very much indeed for coming to give your evidence and you're now free to go and the officer will look after I thank you

00:19:41 the officer will look after I thank you for coming thank you

00:19:52 yes okay so the next witness is watch manager Daniel Morrison who will be examined by Miss Curtin so there will be a changeover of both counsel and witness there's no need to change the furniture I'm told so I probably don't need to

00:20:05 I'm told so I probably don't need to right you don't need to rice that no very good thank you

00:20:45 I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth

00:20:57 thank you very much yes good can you please confirm your name for the record Daniel Robert Morrison good morning mr. Morris first of all thank you very much for coming along to give evidence today

00:21:09 for coming along to give evidence today it's very much appreciated I'm going to be asking you a series of questions about your experience at the instant if anything that I asked is not clear please say so and I will rephrase the question if you want to break at any

00:21:20 question if you want to break at any time that's absolutely fine just let me know

00:21:23 know can I start by asking me to look in the front of the blue folder that is in front of you and the first document there should be a copy of your witness

00:21:34 there should be a copy of your witness statement dated the 5th of January 2018 is that right yes that's correct and for the record that's met quadruple zero eight zero five eight six have you read a copy of that statement yes I have yes

00:21:46 a copy of that statement yes I have yes and can you confirm that the contents of true to the best of your knowledge in the edges thank you and behind the second tab should be a copy of your contemporaneous note yes correct

00:21:57 contemporaneous note yes correct and again for the record that's met quadruple zero five four one four and then behind the third tab we have your exhibit which is three separate hand-drawn sketches that you've produced

00:22:09 hand-drawn sketches that you've produced best approaches and that's met triple zero one five seven five three are you happy for those documents to stand as your evidence to the inquiry thank you very much we can just start

00:22:20 thank you very much we can just start with some basics you are currently a watch manager I believe based Beckenham I am indeed Asst and as up June 2017 you were based at Tooting fire station yes

00:22:32 were based at Tooting fire station yes and your rank there was a crew manager Plus yes the plus indicating that you can act as watch manager if requires yes but I think it's right that on the night of the incidents of the night of the

00:22:44 of the incidents of the night of the 13th of June you were in your capacity to managers that correct I was indeed although my collar markings still had my watch manager ranked on which I believe in previous witness statements is why

00:22:57 in previous witness statements is why I've been referred to as a watchman I said so if we see photographs as we made yes you will be wearing a white helmet I'll be wearing a yellow helmet but because we had our helmets off most of

00:23:08 because we had our helmets off most of the time it's denoted by the markings on your collar and so I have to still have more watch mind you arrange markings on okay thank you that's very helpful and and you were on the night driving

00:23:20 and you were on the night driving Teutons pump which is cool sign hotel 3-5-2 is that right I was in charge so I wasn't driving I was in charge of hotel three five two years thank you and the lfb documents that we have indicate that

00:23:33 lfb documents that we have indicate that hotel 350 was on the road at o2 oh nine and it arrived at unison OH - 25 - those times sound about right to you and you

00:23:47 times sound about right to you and you say and this is in your witness statement I'm looking at page 5 the second paragraph and this is eight lines down mr. Morrison all the documents I'm going to ask you to look at what will

00:23:59 going to ask you to look at what will come up on the screen you can see the big screen there there is also a screen to the right thank you which might be easier and you explained that on arrival

00:24:10 easier and you explained that on arrival we tried to find out where the be a staging area was and someone pointed towards the tower yes were you aware that by this stage in instant there was an initial be a

00:24:21 instant there was an initial be a staging area being set up by the leisure centre no no we went as I walked across the green with my crew I asked another firefighter where the be a gestation

00:24:33 firefighter where the be a gestation area was and they pointed towards there so that's where I said my crew okay and so you sent your pre to the tower and you then went to book in at the command unit is not right and you've

00:24:44 command unit is not right and you've marked the location of the command unit on your exhibits and I'm going to ask Paul the documents director just to bring that up briefly so that's at the bottom of the page that

00:24:56 so that's at the bottom of the page that looks like it's the command unit that was parked on gram file road do you know if that's right I wouldn't know the name of the road if we put it another way it wasn't the command unit that was on Bowmore road

00:25:07 command unit that was on Bowmore road which i think is where you say you'd parked roadies okay do you know if it was cu7 or cu8 do you remember who was

00:25:19 was cu7 or cu8 do you remember who was on it

00:25:20 on it when you went to hand in your ward no do you remember if FSG information was taken no I wouldn't and you then say and

00:25:32 taken no I wouldn't and you then say and this is the third paragraph of page five the third line down that a station manager directed you to go up to the entry control point on the third floor and so we're clear the entrant role

00:25:44 and so we're clear the entrant role point is located where the bridge head is is that right yes that's right and you entered the tower through the main entrance yes do you remember when you were in the ground floor lobby

00:25:55 you were in the ground floor lobby seeing watch manager Williams there at that point the the entrance lobby wasn't that congested I didn't take note

00:26:07 wasn't that congested I didn't take note of who was in am afraid did you see anyone transcribing FSG information onto the wall of the ground floor lobby no and and you then say this is over the

00:26:18 and and you then say this is over the page at page 6 of your witness statement and the first paragraph four lines from the bottom you say I saw to watch managers want this is once you're out in the bridgehead Brian no Keith from

00:26:29 the bridgehead Brian no Keith from Kensington I think that should be Brian O'Keefe is that right yes yes I knew either des Silvo yes with a crew manager and a firefighter whose names you don't

00:26:40 and a firefighter whose names you don't remember not do you remember anyone else being on the bridge head at this point it was very congested they seemed to be the only ones that were there in a

00:26:52 the only ones that were there in a managing capacity so I was going to ask who you understood to be in charge of the bridge heads of it my understanding that at that time was O'Keefe was in charge of the bridgehead and ludus silver was in charge of the

00:27:06 and ludus silver was in charge of the entry control do you have any recollection of group manager Welch being on the bridgehead at this point no what about quit manager Goulbourne no that time and and you explained and this

00:27:22 that time and and you explained and this is the last line of the same paragraph on page six you told them that you were there to assist them and you were told to take on the role of communications officer

00:27:31 officer yes I'm just moving down to the next paragraph you go on to explain what that role involves and you say the ba crews would be briefed by the office of committing them into the building and I

00:27:42 committing them into the building and I would be their point of contact via a dedicated channel on the radio in this case channel 6 I would pass on any information that needed to be transmitted or received to the entry control officer all communications would

00:27:54 control officer all communications would go through me just breaking that down who was it who tasked you with this role I don't remember it would have been either watch manager Keith or watch

00:28:06 either watch manager Keith or watch manager the Silvo but it was it was the next role that one officer would then slip into as part of the bridgehead team

00:28:18 slip into as part of the bridgehead team and was the person who briefed you whoever that was were they able to give you a briefing no it does come under one of the policies that that is what communications officer was dough so

00:28:30 communications officer was dough so there wasn't there wasn't a necessity to brief me were they able to tell you anything for example about how many ba crews had already been committed that

00:28:42 crews had already been committed that information wasn't passed on but it was easily visible having a look at the injury control boards you could see how many talents were in so it wouldn't

00:28:53 many talents were in so it wouldn't necessarily be information timely information that was necessary at that point and what about any information about any difficult

00:29:04 about any difficult that have been experienced up until that point with radio communications I don't remember anything being passed on mother could you give us an idea just so we're

00:29:16 could you give us an idea just so we're aware of the source of information that be a cruise once they are committed under air might need to be communicating back to the bridgehead via the commerce officer so they're as part of policy

00:29:29 officer so they're as part of policy they're supposed to inform us keep us updated with their air but they have left any dominant leg marks that they come across so if they've reached the

00:29:42 come across so if they've reached the floor that they're supposed to search they will let us know if they come across any casualties they would let us know if they're having any difficulties all that information would would be

00:29:53 all that information would would be expected to be passed back to their bridgehead or the edge of control and just so we're clear on the limits of the role of a communications officer would a communications officer also be involved

00:30:04 communications officer also be involved in briefing and crews before they're committed initially on the third floor no and as per the policy not generally but when we move down to the ground

00:30:17 but when we move down to the ground floor the logistics and the geography of where everyone was was positioned meant that I was the closest to the crews being committed and at the base of the

00:30:29 being committed and at the base of the stairs and so a lot of the time the briefs would be passed on for me we are going to come on to you yeah and and what about taking

00:30:40 yeah and and what about taking debriefings from crews who were returning from deployments if we just focus on your time at the bridgehead on the third floor does that's something that you were involved in yes they would come back again they would look normally

00:30:53 come back again they would look normally for the closest officer and generally that that was me so when I when I arrived there there were quite a few

00:31:04 arrived there there were quite a few crews already committed so as they were coming down and and tallying out there there was information being part of backing forward and and I now have just

00:31:16 backing forward and and I now have just a few questions for you about how radio comms were functioning and if we focus again at this point just during your time at the bridgehead when it was on the third floor yes and if I can ask you

00:31:28 the third floor yes and if I can ask you to have a look at page seven of your statement apologies for jumping around a little bit and this is the third line down where you say the radios were only

00:31:39 down where you say the radios were only functional up to a few floors and then the comms were lost as you went higher was that the case right from the start right when you took on the role of comms officer yes yes there there was

00:31:52 officer yes yes there there was initially maybe a five or six floor capability and that's soon dwindled down to just a few and to be clear that's

00:32:03 to just a few and to be clear that's five or six floors above the bridgehead all right so if the bridgehead is on the third floor G do you remember this specific floor would that mean that it was no no there there was as the crews

00:32:16 was no no there there was as the crews went higher we lost comms with them and after a few floors and did that remain the constant upper limit throughout the incident or do

00:32:25 do yes no I only came down from there and did you make the BA crews who were about to be committed aware of the

00:32:36 to be committed aware of the difficulties before they went under air there would have been discussions about comms and because of that we had

00:32:48 comms and because of that we had actually referred and reverted to writing information the reflective strips so that because there was no way of them double-checking where they were

00:32:59 of them double-checking where they were supposed to go if they had forgotten and just moving a little bit on in your witness statement this is staying on

00:33:10 witness statement this is staying on page seven second paragraph so it was early on that the big overload of information being passed about there were crews reporting they were bringing casualties down there were crews reporting they couldn't complete their brief as they found casualties on the

00:33:22 brief as they found casualties on the stairway that needed assistance to be clear this is BA crews who are committed under air communicating with you on channel 6 on the radio both on channel 6

00:33:33 channel 6 on the radio both on channel 6 and on their way past the bridgehead to take their casualties downstairs I see and specifically when a crew was

00:33:45 see and specifically when a crew was reporting to you that they hadn't been able to complete a brief either once they're in the tower and they're communicating on radio or when they come back down and what did you do with that information

00:33:56 information the it would have been stored written down with Iran on the forward information board on the wall and we would be looking to get another crew

00:34:07 would be looking to get another crew into and to complete that task and when you say that you'd be looking to get another crew in to complete it did you have any involvement then in selecting which crew would be briefed as a

00:34:20 which crew would be briefed as a substitute crew as it were or no it was it was the next crew available at that and were you involved in them briefing them and telling them where to go or was

00:34:32 them and telling them where to go or was that someone else I was involved in the brief itself because I would also be required to know their brief and so that communications between us if it was possible I was aware of where they're

00:34:43 possible I was aware of where they're going so in one way or another I was involved in the brief whether that brief had been passed down to me to relay to the crew or not remember and you say a

00:34:55 the crew or not remember and you say a little bit further on in your statement and this is the second paragraph eight lines from the bottom you say Cruz also reported that on a lot of floors they went to they didn't have water and

00:35:07 went to they didn't have water and conditions were too dangerous to progress to where they needed to get to do you remember which floor specifically had no water no I don't know and do you have any recollection of how long that

00:35:18 have any recollection of how long that went on for it was you know it seems to be continuously throughout the day hours I was at the picture I now have a few

00:35:30 I was at the picture I now have a few questions for you and again with focusing still on the time and the bridge is on the third floor on the FSG information that was coming in and I'm going to ask you to look back at page 6

00:35:43 going to ask you to look back at page 6 of your witness statement and this is the the bottom paragraph and you say when I arrived the FSG were being passed from the command unit to us at the bridge had to brief crews where to go to

00:35:55 bridge had to brief crews where to go to initially I didn't know if the FSG were being relayed by radio or by slips of paper and you then go on to talk about what was happening when you're on the ground floor which we're going to come

00:36:06 ground floor which we're going to come on to but sticking with the third group at the moment do you now have any clearer recollection of how information was reaching you when the bridge was not in the third floor no did you have any

00:36:18 in the third floor no did you have any involvement in receiving that FSG information when was on the third floor not to my recollection and did you have any involvement in recording the FSG

00:36:30 involvement in recording the FSG information as it came in I can remember writing on the wall I think well no I don't I know some of the information I

00:36:42 don't I know some of the information I wrote on the wall was information received by crews as to where they were going those but the actual FSG information I wasn't aware of right okay

00:36:53 information I wasn't aware of right okay do you remember Luiza - Silvo writing on the wall this is managing the earthmister information can I ask you just to look very briefly at one of her photographs of the third floor wall it's

00:37:05 photographs of the third floor wall it's ref met triple zero one five eight one nine and this is an exhibit one of the exhibits - Louisa to sell those witness statement is that familiar to you yes

00:37:20 statement is that familiar to you yes are you able to recognize any of that handwriting as your own not in that picture

00:37:33 the shortage and Lambeth look like my handwriting writing yes do you remember anything specifically about those

00:37:44 anything specifically about those deployments

00:37:47 I remember flat one one three being a constant target for us throughout and

00:37:59 constant target for us throughout and just having problems actually getting there okay do you remember anything more specific about platform three no not not

00:38:16 specific about platform three no not not anything okay and and you say and this is the very bottom of page six the last two words of page six be a cruise and then going every page at this time we're

00:38:28 then going every page at this time we're only dealing with FSG calls and I just want to clarify what you mean here are you saying that all the ba crews who were committed were only committed in

00:38:40 were committed were only committed in response to specific FSG information rather than firefighting to my knowledge yes so you don't have any recollection of firefighters being committed from the third floor to deal with firefighting do

00:38:55 third floor to deal with firefighting do you know if that was because someone at the bridgehead had made a specific decision to only use be a cruise for FSG calls or you just describing what was

00:39:07 calls or you just describing what was going on I wouldn't know the reasoning behind it the bridgehead was very very crowded and we still didn't have enough crews for the for the jobs been detailed

00:39:21 crews for the for the jobs been detailed for them so they were the priority for the VA crews

00:39:27 now going to move on to when the bridge had moved down to the ground floor and we have an approximate time for that of 308 or a little bit later does that

00:39:38 308 or a little bit later does that sound about right to you and again I just want to start by asking a few questions on comms and how those were functioning wants to be down on the ground floor and this is at page 8 of

00:39:50 ground floor and this is at page 8 of your witness statement the second paragraph in the last line you say I can't be specific with times that we were starting to struggle with communications above the fifth and sixth

00:40:02 communications above the fifth and sixth floors was this broadly the same situation that you were encountering when the bridgehead was on the third floor and you say this is the bottom

00:40:15 floor and you say this is the bottom paragraph of page eight that you placed a firefighter at the base of the stairs to relay communications but it wasn't working can you just explain what the firefighter was doing how was the firefighter relay in communications so

00:40:27 firefighter relay in communications so the firefighter we were hoping might act as a radio booster so we could pass the information to the firefighter and then if they

00:40:39 to the firefighter and then if they could then go five floors above then we were reached in the seventh year it just in the hope to to gain better communication so effectively acting as a runner where the radio yes at one point

00:40:58 I'm afraid I don't know her name but it was a it was a firefighter from Shoreditch and you also refer this is it again at the very bottom of page 8 of your statement to getting an aerial repeater

00:41:11 statement to getting an aerial repeater from the fire rescue units which is designed to boost radio signal can you say just over the page second line down they took a while to put them in place in the meantime all that could be heard

00:41:22 in the meantime all that could be heard on channel 6 was a high-pitched noise and this made hearing more difficult at the bridgehead did the high-pitched noise occurred just for the period you were trying to get the aerial repeater

00:41:33 were trying to get the aerial repeater installed or we know the repeater now the high-pitched noise occurred on channel 6 we looked to change channels and also give the repeaters put in place

00:41:46 and also give the repeaters put in place it just meant the high-pitched noise rendered the radios unusable right so would it be right that you were trying to install the repeaters in order to address

00:41:57 do you remember roughly what time this occurred I'm afraid I don't know and how long did it go on for do you know the high-pitched noise it only went on from

00:42:08 high-pitched noise it only went on from maybe 5 or 10 minutes because we had to turn off that channel because it just made yeah yeah miss ferry inaudiable so nothing could be heard I see and you go

00:42:20 nothing could be heard I see and you go on and this might lead us on to the next point which is just at the top of the same page of your witness statement you talk about channel 2 and you say a decision was made to change the channel

00:42:32 decision was made to change the channel 2 and a station manager told me that we needed permission from command unit I politely told him to go and check as we were already using channel 2 and we had committed crews using channel 2 does it

00:42:43 committed crews using channel 2 does it follow from the discussion we were just having about the high-pitched noise and channel 6 that we started using channel 2 and responds to in response to the high-pitched noise we we changed the channel 2 just so that we had a chance

00:42:55 channel 2 just so that we had a chance of some communication and it's a channel it's should be used by officers on the fire ground right but it was the only

00:43:06 fire ground right but it was the only one available for us to use and whose decision was it to start using channel 2 do you remember if a message got back to the command units that you were now

00:43:17 the command units that you were now losing

00:43:18 losing the stage the station manager who informed me I needed permission I told him to go in ask who he wants to ask but we were using channel 2 and so he went

00:43:30 we were using channel 2 and so he went off to just clarifying it do you know why he thought that permission was required policy states that permission is required I'm not too sure on the

00:43:41 is required I'm not too sure on the implications of use in different radio channels I'm going to ask Paul to bring up just briefly a passage from your contemporaneous notes and it's on the second page second paragraph four lines

00:43:54 second page second paragraph four lines down talking about this decision to start using channel 2 they were made a decision to change that the new cruise to channel to keeping channel 6 open for

00:44:06 to channel to keeping channel 6 open for cruise already in can you explain how that works how you're able to maintain coms with be a cruise over two separate channels at the same time by by using two different radios each radio

00:44:18 two different radios each radio everybody's handheld radio can be changed to a different channel and so everybody had the ability to have their radio on channel 2 or channel 6 because we already had crews under our in the

00:44:32 we already had crews under our in the building on channel 6 we kept one radio at channel 6 and then a separate radio at channel 2 for the new crews going in and was was that a manageable system

00:44:44 and was was that a manageable system it's not ideal but we managed did it assist with homes no because we still had the problem on channel 6 and we still had some black spots above the 5th

00:44:58 still had some black spots above the 5th or 6th floor and and you refer later on in your witness statement we don't need to go there but we know that you were relieved by a crew manager from Wandsworth later on in Houston and the

00:45:09 Wandsworth later on in Houston and the inquiries received a statement from him he referred to when he was being briefed by you you'd explained that the on channel 6 he mentioned that you might have been using channel 1 does that ring

00:45:20 have been using channel 1 does that ring any bells or does that no no no no points are using channel 1 that the radio traffic alone would have been too busy for the bridgehead to be using

00:45:33 busy for the bridgehead to be using channel 1 for B equation I'm just finally on the issue of comms when you're on the ground floor there are a couple of entries in what we refer to is the short instant logs that you might be

00:45:45 the short instant logs that you might be able to help us with or you might not and I'm going to ask Paul to bring those up it's ref Mets triple 0 1 3 8 3 0 thank you

00:45:56 thank you and you might have seen this document in the context of the inquiry already mr. Morris and it's a log of the key messages that were going back and forth

00:46:07 messages that were going back and forth between the instant ground and control and we have an entry at oh 3 4412 and again a similar 103 4420 and this is

00:46:19 and again a similar 103 4420 and this is cu8 which was the incident command unit at the time requesting urgent assistance by radio engineer to assist with channel 2 for fire ground and then we've got a

00:46:32 2 for fire ground and then we've got a little bit later on this is page 32 of the same document the same message again at Oh 5 18 and 2 seconds do you remember requesting technical assistance with

00:46:43 requesting technical assistance with channel 2 at any time do you think those messages have come from you know that that would be above my paygrade that would be further one the senior officers in the quand unit to facilitate

00:46:54 officers in the quand unit to facilitate any any medium outside what we carried do you remember a radio engineer assisting at any point naught naught okay and I'm now just moving on to FSG

00:47:08 okay and I'm now just moving on to FSG information again how that was being managed once you're on the ground floor and and if I can ask you to turn up your or Paul to turn up your statement again this is

00:47:19 this is page eight and that the second paragraph can you say as I looked towards the base of the stairs the green walls I was writing on were behind me with the ECB next to me I was writing the cool signs

00:47:32 next to me I was writing the cool signs of cruise going in and what we call them over the radio it's important that each port sign is individual and we have a procedure that your callsign would be the position where you'd be riding on your appliance and they were given a callsign it was by now that we were not

00:47:43 callsign it was by now that we were not sending up crews of two but crews of four and five with crews arriving and wearing edpa it was easier to have my own list of who was going in and to where I was physically speaking to them myself and

00:47:56 physically speaking to them myself and crossing them out when they came down just first of all is it usually the role of a communications officer to be making those kind of written records at a bridgehead no and we know we've already

00:48:10 bridgehead no and we know we've already established that Louisa DaSilva was also writing on that same green wall at the bridgehead and we're going to look at a couple of photos that she made that the information was collected there and but

00:48:22 information was collected there and but can I just start by clarifying whether the list that you say you were making so who was going in and who was coming out was separate to the list that Louisa DeSalvo was making or we both

00:48:33 DeSalvo was making or we both contributing to the same list no no real had separate sections of the wall I see and if I can now ask about the processes that were being followed in relation to the FSG information that was coming in

00:48:45 the FSG information that was coming in to the bridgehead and there's a passage in your statement that deals with this it's the page nine second paragraph just from the top the end of the first line

00:48:57 from the top the end of the first line you say I was getting the FSG calls from a station manager who was bringing them in the FSG was relayed between myself and the others at the bridgehead the crews were given the FSG personally by

00:49:08 crews were given the FSG personally by me and I asked if they understood the conditions they were going into in the tasks that was asked of them and to get there if they could just want to break that down again when you say that you were getting FSG

00:49:20 when you say that you were getting FSG calls from a station manager who brought coming in again do you have any recollection of what form the information was coming to you so they were coming on individual sheets from

00:49:31 were coming on individual sheets from firefighters notepad I see and it would be a name if there was a name the flat number the floor number and any other

00:49:43 number the floor number and any other details because of the geography of where we were all standing I was the first person that some that they were meeting so they'd be handing them to me

00:49:54 meeting so they'd be handing them to me and then I'll be passing that information on to to watch man did the Silvo and watch manager Keith and then we would be looking to send another crew

00:50:05 we would be looking to send another crew up and whilst they were annotating on the walls I I'd like the details of the course on the mine and briefed the crews where they were going and do you remember if that system so

00:50:18 and do you remember if that system so getting the information on individual slips from firefighter notepads was that in place right from the start when the bridge head was on the ground floor or was there any change at all from from

00:50:33 was there any change at all from from memory it took a while for that to progress to that I can't remember it being passed on in any other any other form I can only remember the no pets thank you and and I'm just going to ask

00:50:44 thank you and and I'm just going to ask Paul to bring up briefly just by way of example document lfb quadruple zero 1929 and this is an exhibit from mr.

00:50:56 and this is an exhibit from mr. O'Keefe's witness statement and these are slips that he says that he found in his tunic at the end of the night I'm not proposing to ask you anything about the specific information on there unless

00:51:08 the specific information on there unless there is something that you can recall but just as an example is that the kind of form in which you were receiving FSG information to your recollection no there's a bit more detail than that though they were

00:51:20 though they were a single FSG was on a single piece of paper so they were they were individual so would they have been not well you

00:51:32 so would they have been not well you talk I think you said firefighter notepads rather than control information form yes yes and so there would be the same size as those bits of paper I see

00:51:43 same size as those bits of paper I see but the information on the bit paper wouldn't have a list of flats like that it would be an individual flat and a floor in any details okay thank you and

00:51:58 floor in any details okay thank you and when you say that the station manager gave that information to you that was you personally as well as other people on the bridgehead or do you think you were the main Congress so the the

00:52:10 were the main Congress so the the physical piece of paper would have come to me because where I was standing closest to the door normally they would also be sharing out the information to inform all of us but then between the

00:52:23 inform all of us but then between the three of us we would then one was writing down the floor number one was writing down the flat number and at that time about the plans it was very difficult to know where on each floor

00:52:34 difficult to know where on each floor each individual flap was you couldn't say it you know it's the second door to your right because we didn't know so yeah it was it was literally just that

00:52:46 yeah it was it was literally just that information and then the crews would come in and again because I was the first one they were coming to it just evolved into me me telling them and briefing them do you remember who the

00:52:59 briefing them do you remember who the station manager here is bringing you the information was before does the name session manager wolf and only through the inquiry but personally

00:53:10 only through the inquiry but personally no do you have any recollection of slips of paper being brought to you by the VA crews who were about to be committed

00:53:22 crews who were about to be committed rather than through a station manager no I don't know

00:53:28 and who was making decisions about where to commit specific be a cruise to in response to the FSG information that was being received was that part of your

00:53:40 being received was that part of your role between the three of us it was a general discussion between three of us and then there were a few that became a

00:53:54 and then there were a few that became a little bit more of a priority because of the number of times they came up and also the people that were from so did you have discussions about how to

00:54:06 you have discussions about how to prioritize FSGS and deployments of be a cruise no it was

00:54:17 apart from people that came up and they became naturally a priority because of the amount of times they came up it normally was a we've got another one the

00:54:30 normally was a we've got another one the next crew in and it was just a conveyor belt I'm going to now ask you to look at a couple of photos that we have off the writing on the green wall on the bridge

00:54:43 writing on the green wall on the bridge said I was going to ask first of all you are before you do you've received these slips of paper yes on firefighter notebook

00:54:54 notebook yes she's what did you do with them did you have a systematic way of passing them to one of the other people at the bridgehead no once the information was

00:55:06 bridgehead no once the information was annotated onto the wall those slips became void and when I was relieved a

00:55:17 became void and when I was relieved a handful of them it was passed on right that you you you retained them while you were there yes carrying out your role yes and what you

00:55:28 carrying out your role yes and what you gave them to someone else when you left or later I can't remember past in the moment that they would have been passed on I mean miss Morrison are you okay to

00:55:39 on I mean miss Morrison are you okay to look at a couple of the photos of yes and thank you so I'm going to show you two exhibits again from Louisa two silvers witness statement I'm going to ask Paul to put them up side by side and

00:55:50 ask Paul to put them up side by side and the first one and Paul if you could put on the left-hand side of the screen as met triple zero one five eight two zero and on the right there it is that's met

00:56:01 and on the right there it is that's met triple zero one five eight one seven and we smart and the reason I've asked Paul to put them up like that is because Louise had still though said when she gave evidence that she thought that the photo that you see on the right was a

00:56:13 photo that you see on the right was a continuation of the information that you see in the photograph on the left yes so that large section in the photo

00:56:24 yes so that large section in the photo on the left yes not the grid on the left but the four lists yes they're all mine I see so that that section yes thank you

00:56:39 I see so that that section yes thank you and again do you remember anything in particular about this specific FSGS specific plants I need I need difficult

00:56:54 specific plants I need I need difficult to get into one but that was the only one that only one one three the the fact that it just kept coming up and but

00:57:05 that it just kept coming up and but there was no other flat and now I want to ask you about something that you say in page ten sorry before we get that picture you were writing down call signs

00:57:21 picture you were writing down call signs yes

00:57:23 yes could you just can we just look at an example I don't know whether it's possible to enlarge this and retain its legibility but I just like to see the sort of thing you were writing down oh

00:57:34 sort of thing you were writing down oh good

00:57:39 it's not difficult to

00:57:45 right is that because their whole column on the right-hand side of the enlargement there is that a list of call signs yes there was four four lists of

00:57:56 signs yes there was four four lists of call signs there yeah initially crews were coming as they were when they're an appliance yeah but towards the end it was because of

00:58:09 towards the end it was because of firefighters one wanting to get back in it was literally a who else can I go in with and so we were we were making up call signs just so that we don't

00:58:21 call signs just so that we don't duplicate them so you might have one from East Ham two from Shoreditch and one from Tooting going in and we would have to work out a call sign for them

00:58:32 have to work out a call sign for them and then we conceived some it's crossed out yes sir as they came out we'd put down how many were in the crew so the

00:58:43 down how many were in the crew so the circled times 2 times 4 times 5 would be how many when that crew there call sign and then any other details that we would

00:58:56 and then any other details that we would need and I suspect what don't think I know what it means but when you put a line through it it means they were out

00:59:08 thank you so now Miss Morrison I'm I'm going to take you to the first paragraph of page 10 of your statement which will come up on the screen and you say lots of the tactics and decisions were being made by commander Pat Goulbourne who was

00:59:20 made by commander Pat Goulbourne who was in charge of the bridgehead and again this is when the bridgehead is on the ground yes I only remember seeing the first one when we relocate to the bridge head down to the foyer and he was stood on the first flight of stairs our priority for a long time was to get

00:59:32 priority for a long time was to get crews in and deal with FSG fire fighters were getting to get into their FSG and coming down with casualties some however couldn't get to complete their tasks because they had come across casualties on the stairs or being told by other

00:59:44 on the stairs or being told by other crews that there were casualties and the flats that they just come out of decisions were made because the difficulties the crews will have in getting

00:59:50 getting the stairs and crews helping casualties downstairs a decision was made not to prioritize FSG calls but to start searching floor by floor just to be

01:00:01 searching floor by floor just to be clear here you refer to commander Pat Goulbourne in that paragraph yes was this it was the decision to start this systematic floor-by-floor search his decision or was that someone else's my

01:00:14 decision or was that someone else's my belief is that it was his decision but it was very late on it was very late on that morning when you say very late on do you have any idea how long after the

01:00:26 do you have any idea how long after the bridge had moved to the ground floor no no and when you describe the decision as one not to prioritize FSG calls did someone at the time say we're not

01:00:39 someone at the time say we're not prioritizing FSG calls anymore or you know it was just a change in tactic because of our inability to communicate with with crews our inability to in the

01:00:54 with with crews our inability to in the timely fashion send another crew up because they can't achieve their goal there was also cases where where FF G's

01:01:05 there was also cases where where FF G's were moving between flats the tactic was decided that maybe we should clear each floor floor by floor and worth work our way up and so we started in the lower

01:01:19 way up and so we started in the lower floors with s DBA and the upper floors with idibia and who was it who decided which floor a particular bakery would be

01:01:30 which floor a particular bakery would be committed to it was systematic so we started at the bottom we we almost put them at the tower into two sectors an e

01:01:42 them at the tower into two sectors an e DB a sector and an SD bi sector and we started from the bottom of each sector and worked up this might be linked to a passage in your content

01:01:54 passage in your content note if I can ask it to bring it up its page two and the second paragraph from the bottom you say s DBA Cruz started to

01:02:09 the bottom you say s DBA Cruz started to be committed to the lower floors and edpa floors - sorry eta two floors above floor nine are you talking about the same yes before that when we were still

01:02:22 same yes before that when we were still answering FSGS depending on where they were we would look at the ability of a crew to get to them so if it was an upper floor we would be looking at a DBA

01:02:33 upper floor we would be looking at a DBA course so it was a tactic that we used before changing to a systematic search so just to be clear on the decision the edpa would go two floors above floor

01:02:44 edpa would go two floors above floor nine is that part of that change in tactics as you've described it in a systematic or by clause that no no it was it was something we were using before with the normal FSGS just on the

01:02:58 before with the normal FSGS just on the realization that that the standard duration crews weren't getting up that high so if we have had an s FSG called higher we would be looking to commit an

01:03:09 higher we would be looking to commit an e DB a crew rather than s DB okay and at the time when you implemented this systematic floor-by-floor approach were you aware of anything going on on the

01:03:22 you aware of anything going on on the other side of the glass partition and the ground floor lobby in terms of management of FSG information there do you know if anyone ever communicators back to the command unit that there have

01:03:34 back to the command unit that there have been this change in approach

01:03:39 don't know what about the station manager who's they was bringing in slips of information I don't report I'm going

01:03:51 of information I don't report I'm going to ask Paul to bring your contemporaneous no back up please and this is same page third paragraph from the bottom and you say although the

01:04:04 the bottom and you say although the methodical approach have been implemented and I think there you're referring to the systemic floor-by-floor approach but say if that's not correct

01:04:23 if I'm honest I've done the cool you can't report I know we had them we did have an EDP a crew that won't miss him for a while and we had to send another

01:04:36 for a while and we had to send another query in to look for me but so do you know just focusing on the first part of

01:04:47 know just focusing on the first part of that sentence no yes yeah the methodical approach and then you say crews were still being redirected for FSGS it are you able to remember what you meant no

01:04:59 do you remember there ever being a discussion whilst you were at the bridgehead when it was on the ground floor between senior officers about who was in charge of where to commit be a

01:05:10 was in charge of where to commit be a cruise - no do you remember a decision ever being taken not to commit any cruise at all above a specific floor in

01:05:23 cruise at all above a specific floor in the building and finally miss Morris and I just have a few brief questions for you on on the supply of a be a wearers

01:05:36 you on on the supply of a be a wearers yes

01:05:37 yes and EDB a specifically and you you make one comment about this this is page 12 of your witness statement in the last paragraph four lines down you say I

01:05:52 paragraph four lines down you say I believes that if we'd had more edpa steps earlier on we may have been able to reach people trapped on the higher floors did you have concerns about edpa

01:06:03 floors did you have concerns about edpa resources specifically on the night of the incident itself as you progressed we did just because the inability for SD

01:06:14 did just because the inability for SD Blade 2 to reach effective floors do you remember and apologies again if I'm asking impossible questions do you remember a broad time of when that

01:06:26 remember a broad time of when that starters have become a concern for those who were at the bridgehead I would have said I was aware of it on the ground

01:06:37 said I was aware of it on the ground floor but it's something that didn't pass my mind on the third world and do you know if there were ever discussions between those managing the bridgehead

01:06:50 between those managing the bridgehead either when I was on the third floor or when it was on the ground floor about possibly committing EDB a exclusively in dispensing with s DBA there there was

01:07:02 dispensing with s DBA there there was discussions about sending in solely a DBA but at the time the manpower we still had s DBA that were able to reach

01:07:13 still had s DBA that were able to reach the lover fears which is why we we try to look at sending crews where they could get to me and with those discussions when the bridgehead was on

01:07:25 discussions when the bridgehead was on the third floor or on the ground on the ground floor do you remember who was involved in those discussions I don't Unferth okay miss Morrison I have no further questions for you it may be that there are yes so it all for five

01:07:42 there are yes so it all for five minutes

01:07:42 minutes yes I'm just wondering whether at this stage we might indulge ourselves by having this fight is on the break I think we ought to yes yes mr. Morrison does sometimes occur that additional

01:07:53 does sometimes occur that additional questions occur to counsel when they think they finished so we'll have a break now for about 10 minutes and then we'll see after that whether there are more questions they want

01:08:05 more questions they want right so while you're out the room please don't talk to in on about the content of your evidence and we'll resume at 20 past 11:00 and now perhaps you could go to the

01:08:16 and now perhaps you could go to the author as you look after all right thank you

01:08:26 twenty-five celebrities

01:22:51 well I miss cutting any more questions so just a few supplemental yes all right this office was tomorrow some to come

01:23:11 I think just a few more questions do this thank you very much and going to ask I'm afraid to look back at your witness statement just briefly this is page 3 and it's the bottom paragraph and

01:23:26 page 3 and it's the bottom paragraph and you're talking about training and high rise training specifically here and policy and you refer just wait for it to

01:23:37 policy and you refer just wait for it to come up on the screen so you can see the context this is four lines down you see the brigade has a high-rise black and white policy and what our procedures are and the question is simply do you mean

01:23:50 and the question is simply do you mean something specific by a black and white policy yes just that it's down in writing as regards to what our procedures are at high rises them so

01:24:02 procedures are at high rises them so there is a reference point and do you know which policy you were referring to specifically there so some of it some of what we use that night would come under the VA policy and some is a high voice

01:24:15 the VA policy and some is a high voice firefighting in high-rise buildings thank you very much and and then one question about when you first went up to

01:24:26 question about when you first went up to the bridgehead on the third floor and you say that you could see how many ba crews have been committed because it was obvious from the entry control boards could you tell us is it possible to tell

01:24:37 could you tell us is it possible to tell from the entry control boards whether crews that have been committed are e DBA or s DBA wearer's is that something that's shown on the board yes but that

01:24:50 that's shown on the board yes but that that Tom I don't remember seeing any DBA and just another question about what was on the bridgehead when it was on the third floor do you remember seeing a forward information board there yes

01:25:02 forward information board there yes can I ask Hall to bring that up that the document is met triple zero one eight seven 4:9 do you know if that's the same

01:25:17 4:9 do you know if that's the same forward information board that you saw I'm afraid I wouldn't know the contents of it I knew that it was being used but the contents of it was the other side of the entry control boards too though I

01:25:28 the entry control boards too though I understood okay you can see on that or that we've got the 14th floor marks and

01:25:40 that we've got the 14th floor marks and and we've discussed a little bit about flat 1/3 yes specifically and you said that at some point in the night it became a focus do you have any broad estimate of the time at which that flat

01:25:52 estimate of the time at which that flat might have become a focus for those in the bridgehead I only remember it from when I was on the ground floor and our inability to get to it so it would have

01:26:05 inability to get to it so it would have been later on that was my memory of that particular flow thank you and again when the bridgehead was on the ground floor yes I'm thinking about flat

01:26:16 ground floor yes I'm thinking about flat 1 1 3 were you aware at any point of a be a crew coming into the bridgehead with a slip of paper with FSG information on it for flat 1 1 3 whose

01:26:28 information on it for flat 1 1 3 whose brief was then changed to go in such a floor rather than go to a particular no it's not something you know before you know one final question on specific

01:26:40 know one final question on specific flats and if I could ask Paul to bring up those two exhibits from Louisa distill those witness statement side-by-side again so it's met triple

01:26:52 side-by-side again so it's met triple zero one five eight one seven to the left and then met one five eight to zero on the right and looking at the right

01:27:04 on the right and looking at the right hand photograph you might be able to see so about two-thirds at the bottom that that on the right hand side or that photo is marked flat 142

01:27:25 Who am I looking sorry so if you see I think it's just it might be just to the left of that wall

01:27:39 does the number one for to trigger any recollection for the freight not mine we were where if any crews were briefed to go to 140 no not from memory now I'm

01:27:51 go to 140 no not from memory now I'm fine you in this really is the final question when you were based on the ground floor you were obviously in a good position to see the sort of condition that returning firefighters were in when they were coming back from

01:28:02 were in when they were coming back from deployments and you talk about it a little bit in your statement I don't need to take you there and but one question has been asked is whether you can just describe what sort of condition

01:28:13 can just describe what sort of condition they were in when you saw them were there specific symptoms that you picked up on they we had guys that were being carried out by by our own crews due to

01:28:28 carried out by by our own crews due to heat stress and total exhaustion

01:28:35 obviously I was not there but the conditions were were brutal and the crews were being punished and pushing themselves beyond what any of our

01:28:47 themselves beyond what any of our policies state they should go to and yeah we had we had firefighters collapsing being administered oxygen

01:28:58 collapsing being administered oxygen right next to the engine control at one point the the whole four I was just covered in remnants of emergency aid

01:29:11 covered in remnants of emergency aid kits helmets floating about from where we'd literally stripped firefighters and carried them off it was it was really beautiful miss Martin thank you that's

01:29:24 beautiful miss Martin thank you that's the last of my questions so it just leaves me to thank you for coming today yes my dad my things that miss cousin mr. Morrison it's very helpful to

01:29:36 cousin mr. Morrison it's very helpful to us to hear your account of what you did that evening and we're very grateful to you thank you very much indeed thank you right tonight together the ocean building yes guys so there will now be a

01:29:53 building yes guys so there will now be a change of witness and a change of counsel right so it may be an appropriate moment to have another break if we have a change of furniture too and I believe not actually no right but it

01:30:05 I believe not actually no right but it would be convenient would it for me to rise from moment probably for a moment all right well I'll rise for as long as it is necessary and you can ask the usher to come and get me when you're ready

01:30:15 ready thank you very much thank you very much

01:35:56 yes it's minute mr. Chairman I now call group manager Patrick Goulbourne thank you

01:36:26 I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and

01:36:37 the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you thank you very much mr. Cooley yes mr. Willet mr Goulbourne could we begin by your giving us your full name please show Patrick Wayne a golden right

01:36:49 please show Patrick Wayne a golden right and can I say first of all thank you very much to you for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations we do appreciate it very much thank you my questions and I say

01:37:00 much thank you my questions and I say this to all witnesses my questions are intended to be short and simple often they're not if you want me to repeat it or to put the question in a different way I'm always very happy to do that so please just indicate and if you need to

01:37:11 please just indicate and if you need to break at any stage please just let me know and we can arrange one okay right can I please ask you to take your to witness statements which either in a blue file in front of you or we will

01:37:22 blue file in front of you or we will look at on the screen which is on the desk to your right or on the big screens at the back if you want now the first one is dated the 5th of July 2017 and it's met references M et triple zero

01:37:36 and it's met references M et triple zero one zero seven five nine the second one is dated the 22nd of February 2018 and it's met reference is triple zero one

01:37:49 it's met reference is triple zero one three one one one can I ask you have you bet read both of those statements recently yes I have right and can you confirm for us that the contents are true yes I can now you also have three

01:38:02 true yes I can now you also have three exhibits which are sketches which were made by you I think and those are Emmy T triple zero one five eight seven three one five eight seven four and one five

01:38:13 one five eight seven four and one five eight seven five there's no need to look at those now we may do in due course haven't you discussed your statements or your evidence that you're going to give to us today with anybody before coming

01:38:24 to us today with anybody before coming here no I haven't and can I start therefore with the position you occupied in June 2017 at that time

01:38:39 you occupied in June 2017 at that time were you a borough commander I guess I would say power commander of Tower Hamlets at the time in Tower Hamlets and is that the same thing as a group manager yes is right and that was your

01:38:50 manager yes is right and that was your rank in June 2017 is it your current role still no I'm currently Deputy Assistant Commissioner you're now a DAC yes I am where were you made a DAC first

01:39:02 yes I am where were you made a DAC first of November last year right and in the summer of 2017 in your role as borough commander did you have any other major

01:39:13 commander did you have any other major engagements in as well as Grenfell tower yes I had a really busy couple of weeks I was one of the first commanders for the London Bridge terrorist attack and a

01:39:25 the London Bridge terrorist attack and a few days later I was a commander for circuit Grenville and in five days later I was a on-scene commander at Finsbury Park terrorist attack right so when you made these statements that I've just referred to were you in the middle of

01:39:38 referred to were you in the middle of assisting authorities or on those events as well as Granville town yes I was and can you explain to us in broad terms what responsibility is a group manager

01:39:49 what responsibility is a group manager or borough commander has yes so the responsibility is all the staff in a borough including the buildings of property so internally you're

01:40:02 property so internally you're responsible for the fire brigade in that area and also have it delivers its services where would that be responsible performance and also it's a proactive

01:40:13 performance and also it's a proactive work so it's a community engagement is community safety and then as the external work which is working with partners so the paralyzer integral link ensuring working with the local

01:40:24 ensuring working with the local authority work with the chief execs working with the ambulance service to please the NHS ensuring that the full weight of the fire service can support all activities including things like youth engagement right and so being borough commander at Tower

01:40:37 and so being borough commander at Tower Hamlet's at the time did you have responsibility for overseeing the delivery of training to frontline firefighters in your borough so part of the training mostly about quality

01:40:48 the training mostly about quality assurance at that training to ensure its being delivered and certainly through what we call dam up to development development and maintenance of operational profession ISM that's supported by a central training program

01:40:59 supported by a central training program which is not the direct responsibility of a borough commander but as delivered by our training and development department right and as part of that function at that time June 2017 were you

01:41:12 function at that time June 2017 were you responsible for overseeing any training or on fire survival guidance I was seeing the trainer that stations quality showing it yes so we have eleven service standards that

01:41:23 so we have eleven service standards that we work to and a borough commander and a station manager can deliver service standard visits at stations so it's a quality assurance of the training and the activity taken so service standard

01:41:35 the activity taken so service standard two deals with operational matters so you I as a borough commander could go to any of my watches whoever planned or or unplanned

01:41:43 unplanned during quality short standard of training and what they're different and did you do that in relation specifically to the delivery of training on the subject of fire Survival guidance calls

01:41:54 subject of fire Survival guidance calls in specific to delivery of our survivors hold to say no but in the terms of our overall operational response which could include fire Survival carnosine yes right and what about high-rise firefighting yes absolutely

01:42:07 firefighting yes absolutely right now you say annual witness statement and if can I take you to the first of those it's page three of the first of the statements that's the one

01:42:19 first of the statements that's the one and that's dated the fifth of July 2017 can I ask you to go to the third paragraph in that statement

01:42:39 and you you say that as a rule you trained for high-rise quite a lot on the station now it's a short sentence what

01:42:52 station now it's a short sentence what do you mean by on the station so watch managers will look at what training these their watches require as the borough commander of Tower Hamlets and previously I'd only just gone to

01:43:04 and previously I'd only just gone to tell Hamlet's I was previously for the previous three years the borough commander for isn't in so inner-city stations we've lots of high-rise buildings you try and get those crews to to train quite considerably the the

01:43:16 to train quite considerably the the brigade also did a package called back to basics and the theme of back to basics which was one of the training packages we did across the borough has been high-rise firefighting as well mainly about on arrival tactics plans

01:43:28 mainly about on arrival tactics plans and certainly how you would operate at the initial part of an operational innocent that high-rise Indians in the year or so prior to the fire at Granville tower did any of the high-rise training that you oversaw the quality

01:43:41 training that you oversaw the quality assurance and respect of cover the question specifically of ignition or fire spread on a facade of a high-rise building no right so would I be right in

01:43:53 building no right so would I be right in thinking therefore that you never saw let alone delivered any quality assurance over any training on the on a slide show called the tall buildings

01:44:04 slide show called the tall buildings facade does that ring a bell of you know right do you know anything about training programs covering the question of the ignition or the fire spread on a

01:44:15 of the ignition or the fire spread on a facade of a high-rise building prior to Grenville tower on the facade no but we have training on fire extension fire spreading high-rise buildings right and

01:44:26 spreading high-rise buildings right and do you in the in the let's say that the two years will say leading up to grenfell do you remember doing any Quality Assurance or overseeing any training specifically on the subject of how to go about doing a full or partial

01:44:38 how to go about doing a full or partial evacuation of a high-rise residential block training and now we plan for evacuating and rescue quite considerably but in terms of utilizing the building

01:44:50 but in terms of utilizing the building resources to form partial evacuation we didn't train for right now and just meeting on from that

01:45:02 right now and just meeting on from that do I take it all say that that means that you would also not oversee the training for all deliver training for circumstances in which you would consider implementing an evacuation of a building which had a stay put policy in

01:45:14 building which had a stay put policy in place certainly we would talk around the operational tactics so if a decision and instant commander has to make high-rise is what to do with the people on the

01:45:25 is what to do with the people on the floor of the floor of the fire of origin so there's a decision to make whether you evacuate the whole floor if the fires in the flat or you can actually keep people to stay put so certainly

01:45:37 keep people to stay put so certainly those decisions are made yeah and in - just put a bit of context around the training free evacuation a lot that depends on the facilities that are building there's got to carry out

01:45:48 are building there's got to carry out evacuation and when many buildings just don't have the facility to carry out a full evacuation of a block and to your knowledge did you deliver training or oversee training on it's quite specific

01:46:00 oversee training on it's quite specific that's on the circumstances when you would expand the scope of evacuation beyond the immediate compartment of origin and surrounding compartments and

01:46:12 origin and surrounding compartments and not specifically not right I go to turn now to your mobilization and arrival at grenfell now on your first statement on page one at the foot of the page you say

01:46:26 page one at the foot of the page you say and this is four lines up from the bottom let's pick it up mid-sentence as at 1:45 a.m. on Wednesday 14th of June I received a pages message and call from

01:46:38 received a pages message and call from the watch now we have just pausing there a recorded mobilization time for you as just a little before that in fact quite a bit before that at oh one 1528 and the

01:46:53 a bit before that at oh one 1528 and the question is would that sound more likely oh one 1528 yes there was some issues around the my mobilisation that evening right well let's just dig into that a

01:47:06 right well let's just dig into that a little bit if I can ask you to be shown lfb and let's be it's 6-0 78 let me try

01:47:29 lfb and let's be it's 6-0 78 let me try a different let me try a different reference that's something I've said comes up on the screen --mush it shouldn't let me try this one which is lfb number two so seven zero zero two

01:47:48 now this is the mobilization spreadsheet but we have from the lfv and it's it's tab 17 of the master documents bundle for those who have that and it shows a

01:47:59 for those who have that and it shows a recorded time for your call with control as it says line 16 as oh one 46:52 and

01:48:16 as it says line 16 as oh one 46:52 and that's time mobile but time mobilized if you look to the left of that is o1 1528 and it shows group manager Whitechapel and f11 five being the call sign which i

01:48:28 and f11 five being the call sign which i think is you yeah so we can say can we take it from this record that you were actually mobilised Oh 115 28 yes I was and what were the problems around your

01:48:39 and what were the problems around your mobilisation okay so I wasn't actually on duty that evening right I performed a specific task the evening before right where I was recalled to duty I'm a

01:48:51 where I was recalled to duty I'm a National Interagency liaison officer so work quite closely if either agencies and I was recalled to do some specific tasks because it crossed over between the hours of midnight they because I was placed on

01:49:03 midnight they because I was placed on Rico and I was recalled they had to book me back on duty after I finished those duties I booked back off and he seemed by accident I was not booked off right so on on the

01:49:15 not booked off right so on on the evening I was not physically on duty that evening but you were in practice continued it be on duty so yeah because I'm the borough commander for tower

01:49:26 I'm the borough commander for tower hamlets

01:49:26 hamlets my base location is Whitechapel so even though I'd gone back to my call-out base which is my home because the system fort I was on duty it showed me at

01:49:37 I was on duty it showed me at Whitechapel but I was actually off to today evening right can I ask you at the time when you were mobilized at 115 28 according to this record when did you last been to bed I

01:49:50 record when did you last been to bed I was in bed when the pager went off are you out how much sleep do you had well go home quite like that even because I I've got a Cadet unit so even

01:50:01 because I I've got a Cadet unit so even though I'd had a late night I'd promised the cadets that I would go and see them so I worked with the cadets and young people till about eight o'clock so I got home about quarter past nine and and went to bed probably about 11 o'clock right now you came back to

01:50:16 11 o'clock right now you came back to your statement I can just take you back to the bottom of page one you say the control operator I spoke to sounded like she was distressed my first question is

01:50:28 she was distressed my first question is did you call the control room having been paged no so I didn't hear the pager and there's a there was a procedure that if a officer does not respond to a pager

01:50:40 if a officer does not respond to a pager message they get paid twice and if they don't respond to the pager message then control called oh because he's a welfare because you don't know if the officers in trouble so I actually responded to my

01:50:51 in trouble so I actually responded to my mobile phone the mobile phone that woke me up and that mobile was that your brigade mobile it was and the control room would have that number producer for you and that explains the end of the sentence before the call from the watch

01:51:03 sentence before the call from the watch now looking at the conversation you had you say she sounded like she was distressed do you know you spoke to know I don't okay and what when you say she sounded like she was distressed what why

01:51:15 sounded like she was distressed what why was that we know the control staff and personally in a amazing people so generally they're very calm and they are great at giving us pertinent information

01:51:26 great at giving us pertinent information about the incident the control operator that called obviously I hadn't responded to a pager they were obviously very very busy and basically said how are you going and because I just woke up I kind

01:51:39 going and because I just woke up I kind of have said dubbing to what and then she started giving me details at Hinson we've got 20 pump five we have multiple FSGS

01:51:48 FSGS I didn't said I'm actually not on duty but she it was clear that she was so busy she didn't have time to debate and actually are on hearing that and I

01:51:59 actually are on hearing that and I remember I was really fortunate I remember hearing some of the tapes to lack and all and remember some of the control operators during a colonel having similar conversations and I fought I'm

01:52:10 similar conversations and I fought I'm not gonna waste her time I must be still shout on duty it's experience I've never heard control operators that sound that distressed and I thought we needed help and there was no point to argue I must

01:52:21 and there was no point to argue I must go so I went can I just go off point for a moment to just ask you about what you just said about hearing the calls from Latin or will you at Latin or house now

01:52:35 Latin or will you at Latin or house now I was a staff officer during lack on wheels there's a staff officers to the Assistant Commissioner I see did you did you didn't attend the incident I didn't it's an innocent man what role did you have in the incident I saw postings and

01:52:46 have in the incident I saw postings and I assisted the Assistant Commissioner we've some an investigation and documents supporting staff etc I see and was it in that context that you listened to the control-room calls I heard it yes you heard a few did you

01:52:57 I heard it yes you heard a few did you hear some did you hear FSG calls no I didn't hear 15 cups Martin what kinds of calls but you did you listen to his product that exercise most that was just been caught between officers just a

01:53:08 been caught between officers just a assist the Assistant Commissioner get the information about the investigation for officer's actions did you have any input into the compiling or drafting of what turned into the Latin or House

01:53:20 what turned into the Latin or House report no just assisting in gaining information and passing it on to the relevant correct people okay go back to the bottom then of page one of your statement you say that the controller

01:53:32 statement you say that the controller officer told you no you're on duty there's a 20 pump fire multiple FSGS Grenfell tower we can just to put a time mark on this we know that there was a

01:53:43 mark on this we know that there was a make up to 20 pounds at oh one 29:46 that was the service request in response to have come from the fire make pumps

01:53:54 to have come from the fire make pumps 2001 29 does that help new time this call you had with the control room was it around that time or was it perhaps a little later than that I I would have or

01:54:05 little later than that I I would have or slightly later and I think the the request for Mike pumps 20 would have triggered mobilizations because I hadn't responded to the pager message I think there would have been some process that would've taken it up

01:54:16 some process that would've taken it up even have taken that long maybe five or ten minutes later okay I see now she you have in your statement that she said to you that there were multiple FS geez were those her words or is that your

01:54:28 were those her words or is that your description of what she said from what I can recall I'm pretty sure that's what she said to me right did you ask her about FS geez when she told you that no okay what did you

01:54:39 she told you that no okay what did you take from that um it's it's not so much taking from the information because it was just the tone and she was fairly

01:54:50 was just the tone and she was fairly distressed in her tone and it's a lot to say it's rare but you just don't often hear you know control operators take difficult calls every single day it

01:55:01 difficult calls every single day it takes a lot to get him flustered and for me there was no point in adding to her stress it sounded like I needed assistance and I'm an officer and I was gonna go so I went right now and you

01:55:13 gonna go so I went right now and you went how soon after that discussion do you think there's you know 40 I know my way around London pretty well so I Mike it's already pretty much in the bag ready to go so I just got some clothes

01:55:25 ready to go so I just got some clothes got my uniform on and I'll probably would have been out the house in under five minutes right and now we've got your status two times or mobilization time to in mobile to incident time as oh

01:55:37 time to in mobile to incident time as oh one 46:52

01:55:39 one 46:52 which is in the shortness of that log page 13 if I can just ask you to look at that

01:55:49 Oh 146 52 and it's your the second entry down under officers f11 five Goulbourne Patrick shows us a site assigned at a 115 28 as we saw before and then mobile

01:56:01 115 28 as we saw before and then mobile at 146 52 my question is does that sound about right for you yes it does now we did have a recorded arrival time for you to the incident so I've got to try and work through with you to see

01:56:12 try and work through with you to see where we get to so you set off how long after booking status - do you think oh I was seeing my car traveling status to Ontario so a few minutes so did you book status - before you left all after you

01:56:23 status - before you left all after you left

01:56:24 left I know it book status - on the telephone get get changed pick up your kit and then leave right generally if you don't know your way you spend a little bit of time looking at the geografía just to be sure that you know the route that you're

01:56:35 sure that you know the route that you're about to take right especially of senior officers we travel some distance so you don't want to try and get going an intron work your way it's best to start to plot your room on the road so you don't make any mistakes I know my way around London pretty well

01:56:48 I know my way around London pretty well so I know I used to be stationed at Norfolk instance in our new green fuel tower so I knew the route I was about to take okay and did you but I think when you say you've booked over the telephone status - was that during the same conversation with the controller oh yeah

01:56:59 conversation with the controller oh yeah yes so we can time that conversation too - to that that mobilisation what communications equipment did you have with you in your car on route so

01:57:11 with you in your car on route so standard officer air wave radio which allows me to monitor the main scheme radio channel so I could hear the control operators calling up individual

01:57:23 control operators calling up individual call signs giving them information or receiving information and I could also hear the controller off site operator passing FS J's I also had a personal fire ground radio which officers

01:57:35 fire ground radio which officers generally turn on as soon as you get in your car it won't give you any information but the closer you get to the instant you better start to pick up the fire ground radio traffic how interesting how close do you have to

01:57:47 how interesting how close do you have to be to start picking up the fire and the air traffic you probably need a radio engineer I'm unsure but you know probably just under a mile and I would say depending on the geographic

01:57:58 say depending on the geographic of the building if it's clear line-of-sight probably a little bit further hmm right I don't want to mislead you on detail but you know as you get closer you will start to pick up radio traffic

01:58:09 you will start to pick up radio traffic and it's really useful because it it gives you a feel of what you're about to go to now in your statement and just again just picking up on something you've you said isn't reserve able to go about hearing individual call signs and

01:58:22 about hearing individual call signs and information coming in in your statement you say in the first main paragraph on page two you you say in the third line

01:58:37 page two you you say in the third line of that paragraph the volume of calls was phenomenal the controller was reeling off lists of calls from people who were trapped you see that now just

01:58:49 who were trapped you see that now just before we look at some detail other any that stand out particularly in your memory in terms of FSG calls yes no what stands out for me was just the volume I've never heard anything like it

01:59:00 volume I've never heard anything like it the moment I turned to my rage I won it was alive and it was it was like that until I got to Hinson it was just called after call so I can't I already couldn't

01:59:12 after call so I can't I already couldn't tell you any any detail I was probably more missing out for instant messages instant messages from incident commanders make up messages informative

01:59:23 commanders make up messages informative messages to tell me what was going on to the incident had you and your experience ever heard that volume and intensity of faster survival guidance information over the radio on route to an incident

01:59:34 over the radio on route to an incident I've never heard anything like it ever what thoughts or did you have any thoughts on route as to what kinds of strategy or tactics the incident commander at the scene should be

01:59:46 commander at the scene should be adopting on route no I was just trying to get some situational awareness of what we were going to because I know

01:59:57 what we were going to because I know Greenfield town and there's a higher voice I heard a makeup so when officer in charges are giving assistance messages you think there must be something really

02:00:08 you think there must be something really significant going on on row I remember coming up traveling up the Marriott Marylebone Road and I think as I kind of

02:00:19 Marylebone Road and I think as I kind of turned past Madame Tussauds and started going towards the elevated section of the West way at that point I saw I saw the building and it was a complete shock but I kind of professionally hoped it

02:00:33 but I kind of professionally hoped it was I have a scaffolding I was hoping it was a building under construction and generally sometimes we we see some quite spectacular fires like that but its scaffolding with netting which gives you the fire extension but the closer you

02:00:46 the fire extension but the closer you got to the job is the more sightseeing people out on the street and you know just the whole thing covered up I knew that you was attending something that was quite extraordinary in your in your then 20 years experience with the as a

02:01:00 then 20 years experience with the as a as a firefighter with the LMB had what was the maximum number of FSG calls you had experienced at a single incident and

02:01:11 had experienced at a single incident and it's an odd I've been to here no more than two obviously most people know about black and all and I think he'd went into seven maybe a little bit more than that but life takes is active I can

02:01:22 than that but life takes is active I can remember it was seven or eight or nine maybe but that was the highest I've never heard the number of calls were receiving and just if we can just get a

02:01:34 receiving and just if we can just get a picture from the contemporaneous evidence of the kinds of calls you might have been hearing can I ask you please to go to page 19 of the short incident log the s il given that we've got you

02:01:48 log the s il given that we've got you mobile to incident at 146 52 if we look at page 19 and look we can start with halfway down that page at 143 19 service

02:02:00 halfway down that page at 143 19 service request RT for people stuck in flats on 10th floor just cast your eye down the page and we can see the minute-by-minute pretty much there are our T 4 which is

02:02:12 pretty much there are our T 4 which is radio transmission calls coming out of the control these are recorded on the vision system does this just looking at the page does this give us an impression of the of the calls you were hearing yeah absolutely

02:02:24 calls you were hearing yeah absolutely right so that when it says Artie for that has broadcast over the radio could you hear those calls yes so you were tuned into Artie for yeah so north

02:02:35 tuned into Artie for yeah so north Kenny's on on our radio channel which is Phillips for four miles for ya right did you were you able at that stage to form an impression as to whether the the

02:02:46 an impression as to whether the the information being given on those written those radio messages was sufficiently detailed to be able to help the incident ground start to affect rescues yeah

02:02:58 ground start to affect rescues yeah we've got a policy and a process for FS G's and I had no doubt that they were probably processing those FS geez and getting that information off to the bridge ID as soon as possible and deploying crews right did you have any

02:03:09 deploying crews right did you have any particular thoughts about it at the time as to whether they information that was being communicated was sufficiently detailed night my thoughts are I heard radio transmissions that were perfectly in in tune with the things hell's that

02:03:21 in in tune with the things hell's that you'd give an F s GE was just a volume that was very different right I'm just taking and this isn't really so much a question for you but I just want to see if I can get get it get a a specific

02:03:33 if I can get get it get a a specific answer looking at the one at 140 390 which is a radio transmission or rather a Soviet service request from PD which is I think Pete duddy in the control room he says people stuck in flats on

02:03:46 room he says people stuck in flats on 10th floor we don't see any addresses there do you remember having any thoughts about whether the absence of an address a flat number was a problem no I

02:03:58 address a flat number was a problem no I didn't have any fault because I was I'm not even too sure what 1:43 I was no mobile and if I was on scene and I received that information and knowing that it was people stuck on attempt

02:04:09 that it was people stuck on attempt Flores would have been more information than I would have had anyway no it would have been very useful now and in your and is going back to your journey in your statement on page

02:04:20 your statement on page - you say in the fourth paragraph that

02:04:31 - you say in the fourth paragraph that you pulled into the Mariner Minh road

02:04:39 and you you recall hearing rocky Welsh take over as incident commander rocky is that's best Richard Welch yes is

02:04:51 that's best Richard Welch yes is nicknamed is it right we have a time for that as oh oh oh for and just for the record that's the short incident on page

02:05:02 record that's the short incident on page 21 we can just see it if you like does that kind of time ring a bell with you the n2o4 right and you say you also heard it called for tea pumps I heard it

02:05:14 heard it called for tea pumps I heard it called make pumps for tea you say and you also say this was a major incident my questions are did you hear a calling of a major incident yes I did fired a

02:05:27 of a major incident yes I did fired a rage oh right and where were you at that point when you heard it called a major incident I am I was not far from saying I I didn't got the Westway because I

02:05:39 I I didn't got the Westway because I kind of knew my way around the back so I was kind of traveling some side roads between where alpha 21 Paddington is and we're back to the scene of Gwen 4 so I

02:05:52 we're back to the scene of Gwen 4 so I was in there some kind of some back road run them around the area I thought okay so you still hadn't yet arrived no I hadn't arrived yet but I was probably no more than six or seven minutes out if that right say we've got

02:06:04 minutes out if that right say we've got a time of the calling of the major incident at o2 o 638 48 we've got it in the short in so that long at page 21 given that that's the time of that six

02:06:16 given that that's the time of that six or seven minutes later would would take you to about 214 would that be about the time you arrived yeah I think that's probably about right yes right okay I

02:06:27 probably about right yes right okay I know it's difficult to be exact but we're just trying to pin it down yeah I tried to book in via the arts I was gonna book him by the RT but it was so much radio traffic and actually myself booking status free was probably the

02:06:39 booking status free was probably the least important bit of information that would have been on that radio so I left it alone

02:06:42 it alone books on in the command unit ensuring that they could do their FSGS and speak to fire engines that were mobile right now in your statement on page two in the

02:06:56 now in your statement on page two in the paragraph third from bottom I like it it's it's difficult to navigate one's way around the chronograph numbers but it starts straightaway I had my business head on and this is on but this is on

02:07:08 head on and this is on but this is on route so we haven't yet arrived the father's from bottom to top and vertical and lateral spread I remember thinking is it the face here is it scaffolding is it netting I then saw them as it was not a building under

02:07:19 them as it was not a building under construction and does that mean that you discounted in your mind the possibility of a scaffolding or netting related fire yes well I didn't see any it wasn't a

02:07:30 yes well I didn't see any it wasn't a good another construction right yes so having worked out that it wasn't a building under construction what did you think was the light I was unsure did you

02:07:42 think was the light I was unsure did you consider the possible ask it this way had you heard of cladding fires in the past at that time yes well you know we've watched you know as officers you chew on kind of really investigate and

02:07:54 chew on kind of really investigate and see what happens around the world there was a fire in of he was Dubai that was that's been quite famous we so seen officers work on rotor groups so you kind of talked through tactical plans

02:08:05 kind of talked through tactical plans and things that you see so we've talked about natural fire spread and detected that we do sonic right yes what sort of tactics would you use would have come out of those senior officer discussions about lateral fire spread

02:08:16 discussions about lateral fire spread well a lot of it would be a boundary sources because something is tactical decision would be what what the priorities for you and what resulted you would need you would work to to policy so we've got a high-rise policy we would

02:08:29 so we've got a high-rise policy we would work to that be able to be you know what sort of resources and how you would plan to tackle a fire that was actually traveling that far I remember some of those discussions because certainly

02:08:41 those discussions because certainly there was one in France where it moved from balcony to balcony but it never it went vertically but never it never breached a compartment ation so you still had the difficult fire but we

02:08:53 you still had the difficult fire but we hadn't really talked about what happens when you start to preach in each compartment up because if I'm perfectly certain with some big oaf don't think I've ever seen I didn't expect to see these discussions you tell you're

02:09:04 these discussions you tell you're talking about who were they with so senior officers working on a rover group we often we work together so we often meet certainly member on duty for weekends and we will sit and we'll talk

02:09:15 weekends and we will sit and we'll talk not only about instance we've gone to together and probably debrief them but we sometimes we do physical tactical decision-making exercises just to run through command for ourselves just as a

02:09:26 through command for ourselves just as a refresher these rotar groups who would be on them normally so every shifts every day in London and the London Fire Brigades senior officers at station

02:09:37 Brigades senior officers at station manager group manager level they sit on particular vocal groups so at that time I was an office or an or throat - - sewn or throat - has a number of officers that it needs to be on shift per per day

02:09:49 that it needs to be on shift per per day a number of station managers a number of group managers so you're the same group that to follow this kind of satan' shift pattern almost like a watched us these discussions would they be noted down so

02:10:00 discussions would they be noted down so there'll be a written record of these discussions no they're generally informal generally us getting together as professional officers and just talking about operational tactics right and what can you give us a flavor of

02:10:13 and what can you give us a flavor of what kind even if in short terms what kind of strategies tactics you would adopt when faced with a fire on the exterior such as Dubai or France well

02:10:25 exterior such as Dubai or France well that will be about what external firefight you can do what resources you'd need what internal firefighting on what actual building construction what fixed installations could help you you

02:10:38 fixed installations could help you you know certainly I think in the Dubai they were they they had sprinklers so it stopped the internal actual fire spread so we talked about the management of of that or that looks like so a kind of a range of tactics you would

02:10:50 a kind of a range of tactics you would talk about some of a range of changes that you might face you know a large innocent sometimes you you need to just consider about sorting of appliances and movement of people and with these

02:11:01 movement of people and with these discussions that you are having it although they were informal as you say today did they lead anywhere do they lead into any specific consideration of training or ensuring that frontline

02:11:13 training or ensuring that frontline firefighters were aware of the things that had to be considered and no I mean officers have their regular accordance incident command training where we go to

02:11:24 incident command training where we go to which is central their training and there's a there's a whole incident command process that does that anyway so when you're a take a command role and certainly incident command role you're

02:11:35 certainly incident command role you're subject to the PR OPR see process at the performance review of operations or the performance review of a command where there's an independent chair they will review all of your command decisions at

02:11:46 review all of your command decisions at at incident you'll be awarded development points or be boarded positive points depending on your performance that will get placed onto the your individual training records

02:11:57 the your individual training records which will then decide whether you get development or notable performance and also your performances monitored by a monitoring officer so whenever your incident commander there's always an officer one rank above you that's

02:12:09 officer one rank above you that's monitoring your performance and also the operational review team who monitor organizational performance so when I talk about our tactical decision making exercises they're kind of informal between us but they just supplement some

02:12:21 between us but they just supplement some of the things that we we learn through the formal process anyway what I'm really what I'm really trying to feel for is how widespread intelligence or discussion about external fire spread

02:12:34 discussion about external fire spread through cladding such as the Dubai experience was in the London Fire Brigade prior to grenfell was it limited to these senior groups informal discussions or was it more widespread than attempt to push the experience as

02:12:46 than attempt to push the experience as it were downstream into operational into the operational line and that's really hard for me to say ah I know what we used to talk about and officers discuss instance all of the time we we attending the census wrote

02:12:57 time we we attending the census wrote the groups together and share information but there that's kind of in addition to sort of formal process of just described coming back to the facts

02:13:08 just described coming back to the facts of the night then when you saw the fire on the exterior and discounted netting or cladding or and or scaffolding did

02:13:21 or cladding or and or scaffolding did you think back to Dubai if - no I just wanted to get to the command unit because I thought I needed more people and they needed assistance and and if I was in that position I would expect it

02:13:32 was in that position I would expect it every single officer to get there as soon as possible could you did you have any thoughts at the time about whether this was a fire or could you see whether this is a fire only on the outside or could you see whether it had penetrated

02:13:43 could you see whether it had penetrated into some of the flats by that stage no I've seen that there was some natural fire spread into some of the flats but again I didn't know where it actually pretty sort of the compartment ation you

02:13:55 pretty sort of the compartment ation you generally get you know I've been so I've been a firefighter in central London stations for most of my career you will pick up high-rise fires from experience some will spread some will spread

02:14:06 some will spread some will spread outside and go through windows and it looked like someone's gone first to create an up through some windows but at that point I didn't know whether it had breached the compartment ation and into

02:14:17 breached the compartment ation and into the communal areas right okay did you have any thoughts at that stage when you saw the fire first about whether there should be full or partial evacuation of the building no I wouldn't afford that

02:14:32 the building no I wouldn't afford that Green for Tower you know in terms of building construction for me I knew the tower it was a classic 1970s block of flats its concrete floors concrete ceilings fire

02:14:43 concrete floors concrete ceilings fire doors partitions you generally don't get fire spread in buildings like that so I would not have expected it at all you say you knew the tower did you know that it had been the subject of a large

02:14:55 it had been the subject of a large refurbishment in 2016 no so I was stationed at North Clinton's him between 1997 and I think mm and I've been to Crenna fuel tower for a range of incidents whether they be shutting Leafs buddy ins some fires some Bing shoot

02:15:08 buddy ins some fires some Bing shoot files and it was a 1930s block of flats we've now had him and I when I saw it now I didn't transfer to Tottenham and I didn't go back to quintal town so the answer is you didn't know about the

02:15:19 answer is you didn't know about the refurbishment no no I'm moving on if I can take you then to page two of your statement to look at the second last paragraph which starts I went to the command unit you

02:15:31 starts I went to the command unit you say that you went to the command unit and Dave O'Neill was being briefed by Andy Andy Lachlan is that Andy a Lachlan yes who was the incident commander and

02:15:42 yes who was the incident commander and at the foot of the page you you you say that I would say that from my turning up and getting to the command Ian it was less than five minutes so if you've got you coming at about arriving up just

02:15:54 you coming at about arriving up just before two fifteen or so you would it be right then that you get you tell me you get to the command unit about 220 or so yes but did you hear idea Lachlan what did you hear any message broadcast over

02:16:07 did you hear any message broadcast over Thomas floral or on the fire ground radio that Andy a Lachlan had been made I see I really can't remember here in it no okay how did you come to know that he

02:16:19 no okay how did you come to know that he was I see exactly I need up but I spoke to Ben in the command unit and he was standing there not and I opted him as he who taken over from Richard Welch from my boys would have been have you taken

02:16:30 my boys would have been have you taken over from Rocky and he said yeah um I see right and it's not discounting that he probably did send that message y'all just didn't digest didn't hear it I

02:16:41 just didn't digest didn't hear it I might have been at my car at that time and and walking because I had some distance to walk from where I parked yes and to be clear was this command unit well where was this command unit I

02:16:52 well where was this command unit I really can't remember I remember asking some firefighters where's the command unit and then pointing me in the right direction and I walk down a couple of streets but couldn't tell you where I was right you don't know whether it was on Bowmore Road on I'm really sorry now okay well when you

02:17:04 I'm really sorry now okay well when you arrived was was it handling fire survival guidance messages no it wasn't

02:17:17 now again just another time marker we have an arrival time for Dave O'Neill of o2 12 and just for our reference that's and the mobilization spreadsheet at 9:44

02:17:30 and the mobilization spreadsheet at 9:44 said we have all the transcript so your arrival at the command unit would be as I think we've established a little a little bit after that

02:17:40 do you remember DAC or Lachlan sending a message at 216 to make fr use 10 no I

02:17:52 message at 216 to make fr use 10 no I didn't hear that message you didn't now you described as we've just seen in your statement on page 2 second paragraph from bottom going to the command unit

02:18:04 from bottom going to the command unit and hearing the briefing and you say in your statement that sector safety had been given to Dave see if you see that and then you say I asked who was doing

02:18:15 and then you say I asked who was doing the search sector and fire sector I was told that rocky as Richard Welch had both fire and search can you explain first of all what sector safety means

02:18:27 first of all what sector safety means what is that so when we split a fire ground or an incident ground into operational spans of control we also will put not only a commander maybe a

02:18:40 will put not only a commander maybe a sector commander in place but we put a safety officer in place to work with a sector commander to control sector with us sorry safety within a within a specific area what we generally will do

02:18:51 specific area what we generally will do then is put a and overarching senior sector safety to ensure the coordination of all of the safety officers in each sector

02:19:01 sector so when pertinent information that may be found that may be central that can get disseminated via sector safety name and they will coordinate coordinate that on behalf

02:19:10 on behalf generally of an incident commander and far sector who need to pay well that is so the far sector commanders that the person who when the incident certainly a high rises sector ice so where to fire

02:19:22 high rises sector ice so where to fire is it's generally the floor above and the fourth floor below the fire but that's depending on the geography of the building you know I know North Kensington very well and we've got

02:19:35 North Kensington very well and we've got a multitude of different types of blocks of fascist trading tower which is on North Kent ground is very different one one balcony feeds three different floors you can get a floor flat going up a

02:19:48 you can get a floor flat going up a floor in a middle and a flat going down at the same floors you wouldn't be able to do one floor above one floor below with that type of building construction so as a general rule the fire sector commander or sit at the Bridget but

02:20:01 commander or sit at the Bridget but we'll have the operational control of the fire sector which is generally one floor below or one from about the five depend on the geography of the building and search sector so the search sector will be the floors above the fire sector

02:20:14 will be the floors above the fire sector right so who could get in fire extension as someone to control the operations above the file following on from that when you arrived at the command unit to your knowledge had control command beam

02:20:27 your knowledge had control command beam split into spans of control into those three areas or did that happen after you arrived well while he were arriving I couldn't really say whether I would

02:20:38 couldn't really say whether I would expect that they would have been split and it's not unusual that as incidents progressed in size then you increase the rank of the officer that has been a sector commander did did you get the

02:20:50 sector commander did did you get the impression they when you arrived that those spans of control had already been created okay not for I hadn't really heard because you don't pick up the fire

02:21:01 heard because you don't pick up the fire ground radio traffic in to hear about a minor way and so I wouldn't have known who was that being detailed they was being detailed to take over from so I really couldn't answer that but

02:21:13 really couldn't answer that but certainly when I asked Andy I keep saying rocky sorry have to apologize Richard was the fire sector commander as GM so I offered myself as search sector

02:21:27 GM so I offered myself as search sector as a group manager to take an important role in incident well I wonder if that's quite right in your statement you say you asked who was doing the search sector and first sector I was told but rocky had both fire sector and search

02:21:39 rocky had both fire sector and search first of all who told you that and you're looking right and it looks as if in fact he he had been given both sectors is that right or had he only

02:21:50 sectors is that right or had he only been given fire and it was wait was said he was managing the Brigid at the moment so I think at that point and he was changing the sector ization so because officers come it allows you those

02:22:02 officers come it allows you those officers available to be I deliver those tasks and I was one of those officers yes now he wasn't he hadn't been there very long as we know that did you get the impression from that that rocky had actually been given both far and search no because the fire was so extensive I

02:22:14 no because the fire was so extensive I think week Rocky was given fire because right unfortunately it was most of it was on fire well absolutely but what about search was that separate or given to somebody else at that stage all no I

02:22:25 to somebody else at that stage all no I didn't take over search sector from anybody I see so who was running search sector so technically because the fire was from the top to the bottom it was it was all file so generally there's

02:22:37 was all file so generally there's there's no fire in the search sector the search sector is there for smoke spread and searching and generally casually reassurance but because there why the

02:22:48 reassurance but because there why the termites are not there's certain fire from around the fourth to the top it would have been harder to connect delineate a search sector when you came into the command unit and had this

02:22:59 into the command unit and had this discussion with DEA Co Lockley where was Richard Welsh at that stage do you remember do you remember no he wasn't honest he wasn't one to see you Mike now

02:23:10 honest he wasn't one to see you Mike now you say in the same paragraph in the last line because I knew the ground and though the crews I wanted to be in there so I got myself put in with rocky does that mean that it was your

02:23:21 does that mean that it was your suggestion to take up a role on the bridgehead yeah I offered it to Andy I'm going to help like any office of woods I offered

02:23:30 offered did you say what did you say to him I said I'll go and support Rocky sorry Richard and he said us there's a lot

02:23:42 Richard and he said us there's a lot going on the fires extended and he said that's fine and I said you know we'll put fire and search we talked about putting pharma search together because it was quite quite complex yeah so you actually suggested your l2d SEO

02:23:54 so you actually suggested your l2d SEO Lachlan rather than him telling you what he wanted you to do no it was a kind of discussion he talked about roles that were available and I was quite keen to to try and assist him say oh I'm more

02:24:05 to try and assist him say oh I'm more than happy to go and help that did you in this discussion with dears DSA Lachlan discussed the nature of the fire spread no did he brief you

02:24:21 spread no did he brief you or did he brief anybody about the fire being on the outside of the building only so I overheard some of his brief two-day vow renewal talking about fire

02:24:32 two-day vow renewal talking about fire spread and talking about safety outside but like most commanders you would you don't up in you don't interfere in a briefing cause he's delivering important information - - Dave O'Neill right did

02:24:46 information - - Dave O'Neill right did you know which floors be aware as were being committed to at that point no did you know whether there'd been any discussion about committing EDB a

02:24:58 discussion about committing EDB a whereas at that point I saw EDP I wear was on the ground and I knew they were committing but at that point I wouldn't have expected to get that information and I've got information from the ICAO

02:25:10 and I've got information from the ICAO Lachlan that which it was in charge of the bridgehead and also that the project was on the third floor right did you have any did well did you know anything did you learn anything from DAC a locking about what fire survival

02:25:21 locking about what fire survival guidance information was coming in and being coordinated now I'd heard the FSGS obviously your own room yes and I knew there was a separate command unit delivering the FSG information so I

02:25:33 delivering the FSG information so I didn't have a discussion with the ICL Lachlan okay and you did you have any discussion with him about that calls that you'd heard being reeled off by the control room as

02:25:45 being reeled off by the control room as you'd heard on route no moving then on to your going to the tower this is the next topic can I just ask you you

02:25:57 next topic can I just ask you you alright to continue or continue to break it on fire thinking alright now you then make your way to the tower and on the foot of page two you you say you recall

02:26:10 foot of page two you you say you recall passing a pump and the paddington turntable ladder and a group of firefighters under the Westway waiting to go in just to be clear when you say Westway do you mean the Westway there

02:26:22 Westway do you mean the Westway there well it was the yeah elevated section of the of the roadway above right do you remember whether that was well which side of the building was that in

02:26:33 which side of the building was that in relation to the entrance so the the main entrance the way the Westway kind of faced it and the firefighters were underneath there waiting to to go in

02:26:46 underneath there waiting to to go in right and to be cording i think most people call the elevator section the walkway rather walk - yes west way is actually the a40 yes yeah see just so we're getting the time guide you all right but do you remember how long that

02:27:01 right but do you remember how long that was when you got to the tower after arriving first at the command unit an debrief day first that would have

02:27:12 an debrief day first that would have probably took a minute or so he briefed me afterwards and then I made my way from the command unit so I would be 2 or

02:27:23 from the command unit so I would be 2 or 3 minutes maybe that were longer but well I would have said before it will be under five minutes right I should have asked you before I asked that question how long will briefing with DAC unlocking into it but abuse adding I think you say

02:27:37 two or three minutes yeah there was so much going on it was it wasn't the long briefings it was to the point sighting points and and try and get in to get to work no now can you give us an

02:27:48 work no now can you give us an impression at the time you arrived at the entrance to the tower how many firefighters were waiting outside the tower we know that there was a group of waiting outside the tower at

02:28:00 a group of waiting outside the tower at that stage how big was that would you say really hard to estimate 20 or 30 a fair a fair amount of BA where was were waiting to to go in could you see how

02:28:11 waiting to to go in could you see how the VA wearers were being marshaled at that stage yeah there was a watch manager their watch manager had comms and it seemed that they were the system that when it was almost being used as

02:28:23 that when it was almost being used as like a staging area so when the bridge aides or whoever was up upstairs I didn't really know at that time wants you to cruise it seems that they were just radio down a number in the neighborhood spot the man walking did

02:28:36 neighborhood spot the man walking did you know that a station manager had been a task to oversee that group of firefighters as part of a be a main control exercise not at that point not did you have come to know that data yes

02:28:49 did you have come to know that data yes yes when was that when did you think he came to know that roughly I really wouldn't want to guess so I knew that we

02:29:00 wouldn't want to guess so I knew that we had that system in place and certainly when the bridgehead was rededicated to the ground floor we had a process that was supported by Nick Meyer where IARC

02:29:11 was supported by Nick Meyer where IARC Stanek Meyer to get me a number of a DBA where was ready a number of SDB IU's ready and we'd kind of split them so we could give them briefings I always wanted a pool of 28 EPA and 15 s DBA

02:29:25 wanted a pool of 28 EPA and 15 s DBA ready and he must not let that de pinna Sh so as we were moving and using be a cruise he was working I think we've Andy boughten to ensure that the people outside in a staging area things

02:29:36 outside in a staging area things supplemented the people in the holding area downstairs on the ground floor but that was a that was a little bit later after relocating at the point when you enter the tower could you gain an impression of how many EDB a whereas they were available there

02:29:49 EDB a whereas they were available there no there were 80 be able I couldn't tell you how many at that point okay could you could you see them yes family could you see do you think oh I definitely saw a crow and generally

02:30:01 definitely saw a crow and generally those writing fire risky units will go together so it was over a crew of four or five right and we're then the queue with everybody else or was there a separate queue for EDB I never had a clue of everybody else I see because it

02:30:12 clue of everybody else I see because it was been but because access was difficult the access was controlled by to watch manage it because you had to be spotted to get in of something like

02:30:23 spotted to get in of something like felling ahead right okay well come to look at this in a bit more detail in a moment taking you to your statement page 3/4 line down you say the lobby itself was pretty quiet there were firefighters

02:30:35 was pretty quiet there were firefighters and kit there I continued walking up and as I did say people were walking down down sorry their eyes streaming fully blackened faces screaming crying now and

02:30:48 blackened faces screaming crying now and you then go on to say a few lines down in this instance the bridgehead was situated on the third floor again just trying to get a precise time on this I

02:30:59 trying to get a precise time on this I think we can can I ask you to be shown first of all please inq three to two

02:31:14 this is a photograph taken from camera Falls of grenfell Towers CCTV there were a number of cameras on the ground floor we'll be looking at some of these

02:31:25 we'll be looking at some of these pictures in the course of your evidence this is the first one and this is camera four with an adjusted time mark of Oh two 28:12

02:31:34 two 28:12 can you identify yourself in that picture yes I'm standing in the door no thank you

02:31:40 thank you now if we pan back out again you will see that on the right in the photograph but on the left as you come in Group managers left if you see what I mean

02:31:52 managers left if you see what I mean there are there are two firefighters doing something on the wall did you notice what they were doing when you came in no did you notice anybody there

02:32:05 came in no did you notice anybody there at all no it did you didn't go on your radar

02:32:08 radar no okay now

02:32:20 if the next picture is oh it is inq quintuple zero three two three we can just quickly look at that this is an adjusted tuck this is camera two which

02:32:33 adjusted tuck this is camera two which is at the foot of the stairs behind the glass partition with an adjusted time mark of a two twenty eight twenty so this is eight seconds after you first

02:32:45 this is eight seconds after you first enter the tower we see you going upstairs

02:32:48 upstairs where were you going where are you headed to the project to meet Richard Walsh right and on page three game back

02:32:59 Walsh right and on page three game back to your statement if you go to the first main paragraph on that page which starts the lobby covers the ground floor you

02:33:11 the lobby covers the ground floor you say and I could probably take this quickly that the the FSG that you say as you enter that door the FSG was set up

02:33:22 you enter that door the FSG was set up to the left and then you go on to describe the rest of the lobby when you say in your statement the FSG was set up

02:33:36 say in your statement the FSG was set up to the left and going back to my question is that something you learn later after you did this statement or or is this something you actually recall from the night have you spotted the

02:33:47 from the night have you spotted the passage mister go no say so that makes two of us well I'm sorry okay I'm getting better I'm getting it to know right now I it's my fault in fact

02:33:59 know right now I it's my fault in fact I've given the wrong reference but it's page four I'm so sorry page three mr. Jenna thank you that that paragraph

02:34:10 mr. Jenna thank you that that paragraph starts the lobby covers the ground floor and is set up as follows and then he it says there is a door leading into the block the face of the west way towards the west way as you enter that door the FS you were set up on the left my

02:34:21 FS you were set up on the left my question is is that something you remember your from the night independently or is that something you learnt after you did your statement

02:34:36 so I remember that but that was later on in evening so when I first went to the bridgehead FSGS were being handled upstairs later on that evening when we

02:34:48 upstairs later on that evening when we relocated the bridgehead where those firefighters were in that picture that's where the FS shoes were being taken before I just get back to what you said before when you first went into the tie you didn't notice them there no right

02:35:00 you didn't notice them there no right then that's clarified that then coming back to page three in the stomach I mean page three the second paragraph goes on to say just three lines up from

02:35:12 goes on to say just three lines up from the end of it in this instance the bridgehead was situated on the third floor did you do you remember how you knew the British head was on the third

02:35:24 knew the British head was on the third floor yes and yo Lachlan when I got my brief told me the bridgehead was on the third floor and then I made my way into the tower and went straight to the bridgehead and found it on the third floor and who

02:35:35 and found it on the third floor and who was in charge of the bridgehead when you arrived there which Welsh anybody else Nick might was there Gareth Cooke was there but I was unsure what their roles were but they were

02:35:46 what their roles were but they were performing some roles on behalf of Richard Welsh I remember seeing Louise at the silver and Brian and Keith and they were around the be a board there was a comms

02:35:57 the be a board there was a comms operator with names gone sorry yeah that's who I remember on the project at that time it was I mean the bridgehead

02:36:09 that time it was I mean the bridgehead was unbelievably busy and there was lots and lots of firefighters and all sorts of are used to be on the red watch so I know lots of those firefighters so so I saw lots of faces I knew but there was

02:36:21 saw lots of faces I knew but there was lots of people there be a crew some MPA some not people passing kit in equipment etc there's a matter of general impression did you get her did you get a sense that there was order or was it

02:36:32 sense that there was order or was it chaotic I mean it was all done in terms of Richard Walsh was desperately trying to deploy crews but there was there was so much to do

02:36:45 so much to do you know we were the geography the building weren't great for a bridgehead but that's that's what we had to work with someone I've got it was very very busy but you imagine us be a cruise coming in bloke who's coming out and

02:36:57 coming in bloke who's coming out and information coming in casualties coming in various states pass the pass to Bridget it was it was a difficult scene but which it was really clear that he was definitely trying to pump be a cruise upstairs and there were FSG calls

02:37:10 cruise upstairs and there were FSG calls being taken crews being deployed right just breaking that down then first of all did you see how individual ba crews were being given their deployment

02:37:21 were being given their deployment instructions now Richard Volks was briefing and crews were coming right now we've had quite a bit of evidence before today that there was a system at that stage whereby to

02:37:33 was a system at that stage whereby to summarize it FSG information was coming into the lobby recorded on the wall after 2:15 and then they watched manager watch manager Watson was was essentially

02:37:45 watch manager Watson was was essentially writing them down and then giving written instructions on sheets of paper to individual be a cruise did you see did you see that in operation yourself at that time not at that time but that's

02:37:56 at that time not at that time but that's that process was done later on when we relocated the bridgehead okay so when the Bridget of react relocated downstairs we split in certain areas into individual tasks it will come to

02:38:08 into individual tasks it will come to that but when you first arrived at the bridgehead on the third floor did you see the process by which Richard Welsh was giving instructions deployment

02:38:20 was giving instructions deployment instructions to be a wearers now Richard I'm pretty sure he said that FSGS are coming in and they they were being taken I think by Louie Louie's at the silver but I may be wrong it was someone around

02:38:31 but I may be wrong it was someone around to be able that was taken and FSG calls and which Abbas was deploying crows when you say taking FSG calls you mean actually receiving them from outside the tower or somewhere else in the town

02:38:42 tower or somewhere else in the town because I just got to the bridgehead I really won't know where they were coming from but at the bridgehead they were receiving information and deploying crews did you see how the information was arriving at 9:00 did you notice

02:38:56 was arriving at 9:00 did you notice whether it was on a paper piece of paper by radio no sorry okay do you recall seeing anybody recording FSG information

02:39:08 seeing anybody recording FSG information at the bridgehead when it was on the third floor when you first arrived there I think at an early stage I saw a fit board in use but whether the fit board was any good because of the volume of information I don't know I was at that

02:39:21 information I don't know I was at that point because I'd come on as a second commander I was focusing on meeting briefed Richard through the crowds to get a brief and then we could start to split and understand what each other's tasks would be yes and the fit board did

02:39:34 tasks would be yes and the fit board did that have what can he go as an impression of what you saw to the best of your memory on the fit board no because at that point I've just been

02:39:45 because at that point I've just been introduced to the incident I didn't have a command role so I wouldn't have interfered because I would have been interfering in something that was ongoing my primary focus was to get a brief off of Richard and once that I've

02:39:56 brief off of Richard and once that I've received that brief then I would have been clear what my role was gonna be going forward yes did you notice any

02:40:10 going forward yes did you notice any fire Survival guidance calls being recorded on the wall of the bridgehead while it was on the third floor I don't recollect information going on a wall no

02:40:23 recollect information going on a wall no no

02:40:25 no let's see if I can prompt a recollection I ask you to go to [Music]

02:40:43 yeah

02:40:53 M et triple zero one five five nine six four

02:41:12 this is one of a number of photographs which are all quite similar and this was taken that around about 308 though 308 as the bridge had moved on from the

02:41:23 as the bridge had moved on from the third floor to the ground floor and it's possible we've had evidence before that it's FST information which had been inscribed on the wall by the reason to silver do you remember seeing that no

02:41:35 silver do you remember seeing that no but I remember discussion around ensuring that the information of FSGS was transferred when we relocated the projector right how much time did you do actually spend at the bridgehead on the well it was on the third floor I'm sorry

02:41:53 well it was on the third floor I'm sorry I probably only roughly estimate but over for you it was probably 30 minutes right - 540 minutes max and during that time you never is this right you never noticed any officer inscribing fire

02:42:08 noticed any officer inscribing fire survival guidance on the wall well in the time of getting to Richard I got my brief around how we were going to operate together and it was I think

02:42:21 operate together and it was I think there were a couple of things that we needed in terms of organizing some firefighting Jets etc which I resolved on his behalf I remember he was quite

02:42:32 on his behalf I remember he was quite early we had a conversation that the bridgehead was compromised and we should move it down and and the conversation then was about ensuring that all of the information was required move down to the bridgehead and I remember we had a

02:42:45 the bridgehead and I remember we had a conversation around there was still be a crews being deployed and we both didn't want to leave the a crews upstairs on their own knowing that they were coming

02:42:56 their own knowing that they were coming down in quite difficult States to be inclusive casualties and sudden they come back to an empty project so we were having a conversation about who was gonna stay one of us had to relocate the

02:43:07 gonna stay one of us had to relocate the bridgehead down I I remember I'm pretty sure he was rocky went downstairs and ensured that crews are being deployed and I stayed with Gareth Cooke

02:43:19 and I stayed with Gareth Cooke for short time because as we were relocating the bridgehead an FSG call came through for a flat on the third floor yes so we decided to break the door down and search that flat and then

02:43:31 door down and search that flat and then wait for the firefighters to come down so I remember shouting to the firefighters to to come back so we've relocated Bridget and you you saying that that I think that the answer before actually that you were at the bridgehead

02:43:43 actually that you were at the bridgehead while I was on the third floor for probably 30 minutes 3540 minutes max were you there continuously during that period or did you come and go no I think

02:43:54 period or did you come and go no I think I popped downstairs before for something I can't remember what it was whoever I assisted a casualty I'd do something so I wasn't continuously at the Bridget where were you standing for

02:44:05 the Bridget where were you standing for most of the time in relation to the entry control boards when the bridgehead was on the third floor do you remember so at the onset I was nearer to the stairwell the entry

02:44:18 nearer to the stairwell the entry control was further in where where which it was and they were quite a number of be a crews in there I loved for some activity before I kind of forced my way through to to Richard I

02:44:30 of forced my way through to to Richard I see 16 could you actually see the entry control boards being used yes you could you can see the information going on them yes and I have certainly overheard talks of FSG I that information was

02:44:44 talks of FSG I that information was definitely there because he's there but I really can't remember we call him physically seen it yourself now going back to your statement at page 3 of your

02:45:00 back to your statement at page 3 of your statements

02:45:05 at about a quarter of the way down the page the paragraph starts in the bridgehead is the BA board you see that this shows which crews are deployed with

02:45:17 this shows which crews are deployed with breathing equipment where they are how long they've been deployed and so on I could see from the board that we had ba crews committed to the third and fourth floors now is it right the ba board is

02:45:28 floors now is it right the ba board is the entry control board is it yes right

02:45:32 and you say I could see from the board we have BA crews committed to third and fourth floors does the B there's the edge of control board identify which floors crews were committed to so the

02:45:43 floors crews were committed to so the entry control officer once the BA crew get their brief will annotate the ball not only used to be about the time of whistle etc how much air they've got but would also detail where they're going right how much detail did you observe on

02:45:56 right how much detail did you observe on the edge of control boards per crew just general with that I can remember just floor they were going to are certainly

02:46:07 floor they were going to are certainly source of initials about right hand search left hand so it would be written in kind of an acronym and coms Chun comes right did you see any details of

02:46:20 comes right did you see any details of that particular flat numbers being recorded on the entry control board I can't remember by room I do remember the conversations and in the briefings that

02:46:31 conversations and in the briefings that people were talk about effigies and floors do you remember seeing any details about numbers of persons trapped you know in each flat or any flat not at

02:46:43 you know in each flat or any flat not at that point but certainly when they when we relocated the bridgehead downstairs there was really clear information coming of what flats and what floors I run and there was a number of flats I

02:46:55 run and there was a number of flats I think it's probably in people statement sir certainly there was a flat on a 16th floor and I felt on that 18th floor that I was I was desperate to get to because I'm with the information we got from the FSA's but there were a number of

02:47:07 FSA's but there were a number of residents that had gone into one flat and we knew they were priority and we'll come to that just inter just fixing the moment though on on what details being recorded on the ECA ECA

02:47:19 details being recorded on the ECA ECA boards to control off for supports while it was on the third floor I think the answer I just press that again it was there any detail of numbers of

02:47:30 it was there any detail of numbers of people in the flats and particular flat numbers or was it just just floors I really I mean my my look after be able it was really cursory in just a quick glance our crews committed a few bits of

02:47:43 glance our crews committed a few bits of pertinent information and I was off briefing and doing other jobs yes missing did you gain any impression during the 30 to 40 minutes you said you were at the bridgehead while it was on

02:47:55 were at the bridgehead while it was on the third floor about numbers of EDB a whereas being committed no right did you

02:48:07 whereas being committed no right did you you don't know you can't help us with whether there was an increasing number of e DBA where is at that stage or whether there were none or lots can you help us with that no I don't recall at that point the ADP ie where is on the

02:48:20 that point the ADP ie where is on the board right now

02:48:28 in your statement you go on to say I spoke to Rocky this is immediately after what I've just

02:48:41 this is immediately after what I've just shown you this is a third of the way down page three just to get back there I spoke to Rocky who had been to see what was going on his eyes were streaming from the smoke just just

02:48:52 streaming from the smoke just just pausing there was this smoke at the bridgehead or or or was that smoke somewhere else in the building so we relocated the breacher that was because

02:49:04 relocated the breacher that was because of Bridget was compromised because of smoke whether he's Irish were streaming and I really don't know well I strictly eyes streaming from Spain had he he'd been to see what was going on do you know how I thought he got up the

02:49:15 know how I thought he got up the building no but uh but you know I know Richard a warden as a good obviously you'd always want to try and have a look to see what exactly what it is you're committing your crews to so I would have thought he would have took a cursory look right did he tell you how far up he

02:49:28 look right did he tell you how far up he got no did he give you any kind of impression of what sort of conditions he'd seen on his visit up the tower yes what terrible terrible in what sense

02:49:40 yes what terrible terrible in what sense it was difficult he said that I remember him talking about the smoke condition is pretty heavy and the conditions are pretty poor um you go on to say he told

02:49:52 pretty poor um you go on to say he told me there were what we call snatch rescues taking place on some of the upper floors with crews making their way down with people some as the Sun had gone up as far as the 20th floor but were unable to connect hoses to the

02:50:03 were unable to connect hoses to the outlet Rises due to the fire was any of that information apparent from the be a board or be a boards not that I come to

02:50:17 board or be a boards not that I come to call it that's not saying it's not it wasn't there right like I said my look at the be able to is quite cursory at that time I see okay and when you say snatch rescues are you referring to

02:50:30 snatch rescues are you referring to rescues carried out where the firefighters are deployed to respond to particular fire survival guidance calls or

02:50:38 or something else the early parts of incidents far far as sometimes in BA or without BA can be deployed just just to push to see how far they can get to make

02:50:50 push to see how far they can get to make as much effect they can get in the quickest time possible and sometimes they're just what we call as snatch rescues generally policies that we should have a preserve to two floors

02:51:01 should have a preserve to two floors below to fire and deploy be a cruise sometimes in ocean that sees crews do try and do snatch rescues and when you say some had got up as far as the 20th

02:51:13 say some had got up as far as the 20th floor but were unable to connect hoses to the outlet rises due to the fire number of things first of all is that something that Richard will have told you is that there's that's you're recalling his telling you that is it I

02:51:26 recalling his telling you that is it I really can't recollect we must have talked about where we can where we can sit into a riser right do you remember being told anything about weather be

02:51:40 being told anything about weather be aware is going to the 20th floor was a single occasion or on repeated occasions no we talked about what crews were committed and at that point some crews

02:51:51 committed and at that point some crews had already done those naturally whose people have been brought down from my understanding and now the fire would but that was obviously a little bit earlier and now where the fire had taken hold

02:52:04 and now where the fire had taken hold you know crews were now going into compartments on the on what I thought was the fourth and fifth floor right was the at that stage was it still the idea that be a crews would be committed to

02:52:16 that be a crews would be committed to the 20th floor in order to fight the fire and know at that point Richard had got some crews committees and we were talking about what the conditions were

02:52:27 talking about what the conditions were and how difficult they were he also mentioned about the difficult we've got multiple FSGS what it seemed like was that when the fire was so severe that when the crews

02:52:40 fire was so severe that when the crews had to we we need to put some context behind it so the geography of the building was really difficult because you know favorably as a firefighter you'd want a dry riser out

02:52:51 firefighter you'd want a dry riser out there somewhere near to stairwell somewhere in a protected lobby that would make a life far easier unfortunately the dry riser out there was in the lobby at the furthest point away from the door that mean that any

02:53:03 away from the door that mean that any lobby that was compromised by fire I mean that we couldn't set in unless you put that fire out and then that's time-consuming so we were I remember conversation about the crews had to find

02:53:14 conversation about the crews had to find a floor where they could get to the riser then to set in which means you have to run the hose up the stairs and then once you went into a compartment you are then going into a compartment it's involved but unfortunately those

02:53:25 it's involved but unfortunately those elements of combustion that have breached the fire separation are going to end up in the stairwell and that's what that's what seems what happened is where you had such a severe fire when Bo

02:53:37 where you had such a severe fire when Bo Cruz the first can't say the first but those bi crews at that point had gone in it seemed that the smoke had gone into the stairwell and the bridgid and the third floor got compromised just

02:53:52 third floor got compromised just continuing on the theme of the bridgehead on the third floor being compromised as you just mentioned when you first arrived at the third floor bridgehead was the air clear there or was it smoky um it wasn't clear but it

02:54:04 was it smoky um it wasn't clear but it was enough it was enough for us to to do work you know we were it was a point where we would we would just work for it yeah and before you move down what were

02:54:16 yeah and before you move down what were the conditions like they just worsened there pretty quickly right and where was the smoke coming from that made it worsen on the third floor you remember well I know ba crews were committed so

02:54:27 well I know ba crews were committed so you know generally you would think that it was where we had to commit a crew into some upper floors where fire was in that Lobby and then you know it would have made itself into the stairwell and probably pushed its way down but I

02:54:38 probably pushed its way down but I couldn't confirm that but no crews were committed in this and the bridgehead was compromised so we had no choice but to move it right so this was smoke coming onto the third floor log into into the

02:54:52 onto the third floor log into into the lobby from what Dan was through the stairwell is is that is that what you're yes right did you ever come across that before that phenomenon yes right not suddenly I went to a what was the 12th

02:55:04 suddenly I went to a what was the 12th pop fire at door inton point buh much the same we Bridget got compromised Bridget was on the fifth it's unusual but it does occur and there are

02:55:15 but it does occur and there are occasions where we have to move Bridget's it's not ideal preferably we get Bridget set and we were able to do firefighting and search-and-rescue operations but every now and again geographies of buildings way fire

02:55:28 geographies of buildings way fire spreads we have to move Bridget unfortunately it's not we had to yes do you remember whether there were

02:55:39 you remember whether there were firefighters being sent up without any firefighting media at all while the bridge under that law during the time I was at the third year no but I know at

02:55:55 was at the third year no but I know at certain points during evening I sent firefighters after about fire fire media right now later on in your statement new and this was when the bridgehead was on the ground floor you

02:56:07 bridgehead was on the ground floor you say in its page five of your statement if I can just show you the third with the fourth paragraph there page five

02:56:20 you

02:56:25 say that we were still using the outlet rises on the floor three and four just to pick it up say we used extension Hayes's to allow the fire to be fought

02:56:36 Hayes's to allow the fire to be fought at higher up this allowed the hoses up as far as the floor seven and eight this meant that everything was protected up to the sixth floor but I wanted to get another extended jet and you're going to say you couldn't achieve that what sort of time

02:56:50 couldn't achieve that what sort of time what was that that you were still using outlet rises on the third and fourth law and then extension hoses well that was

02:57:01 and then extension hoses well that was clearly once you've got down to the ground floor but how long after that do you remember you know I saw I really couldn't guess I know it was an issue that we that we tried to resolve a number of ways so and that's when we

02:57:16 number of ways so and that's when we were down on the ground floor I asked a number of people to carry out specific tasks for me to resolve it so I one of the reason one of their ways was I remembered tasking Gareth cook to go

02:57:29 remembered tasking Gareth cook to go around the building to see if we could get a TA a turntable ladder up so a turntable ladder not only connect as a rescue platform but it's got a fixed

02:57:40 rescue platform but it's got a fixed line which can act as a another Joya riser so what what I asked was to Gareth to see if we could get a tail up we could get the tail up to around the ape smash it through a window that would

02:57:52 smash it through a window that would also be an another means of escape and we could get jets off the tail so if we could do that that means we could get an additional water source so that was kind of one plan and another plan was to also

02:58:04 of one plan and another plan was to also go around and just just double check you know I was an ideas conversation with Richards were just really concerned that we covered all bases was there a bit of

02:58:15 we covered all bases was there a bit of fixed insulation we could use was there another secret stairwell around the building was there you know was there a void we could use so we tossed someone to pretty much go around every single

02:58:27 to pretty much go around every single cupboard every single door we didn't want to be at this job in two hours and kind of someone when that are Meester yeah so we pretty much tried everything just came back to my point

02:58:39 everything just came back to my point about water though does the fact that you we're using extensions up to the floor 7 & 8 mean that you weren't getting water above those floors internally now and there's a reference

02:58:53 internally now and there's a reference later on in your statement statement to getting hoses attached to risers on the ninth floor but that was that later in the interview how much later in the incident so that was purely dependent on

02:59:09 firefighting and knocking down those floors to able to enable us to get to that riser which was in the lobby so it was you know an an unbelievable amount

02:59:21 was you know an an unbelievable amount of work and you know the firefighters you know did some incredible work just to get us to so able to use those risers now I'm going to come I'm looking at the time got to come now to look specifically your role while the bridge

02:59:33 specifically your role while the bridge head was on this that the third floor mr. chairman that might be a convenient moment for a brain yes mr. Goodwin we're going to have a break now so we can all get some lunch please don't talk to

02:59:46 get some lunch please don't talk to anyone about your evidence when they are out and we'll resume at 2:00 o'clock thank you

02:59:52 thank you I'd like to give the Auto Show

03:00:03 are you getting around mister minute oh very well we'll finish well within the afternoon what would it mean anyway good thank you to talk