Evidence from Watch Manager regarding bridgehead operations, FSG call management, and tactical decisions during Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017.
00:00:04 well could you ask mr. Google to come back in peace
00:00:25 good ready to carry almost Google and yes I thank you good thank you very much yes listen good well thank you for coming back to us and can I just pick up at one or two aspects of the evidence that you gave before the break and the
00:00:39 that you gave before the break and the first relates to the difficulties that you said that were presented by the geography of the building related to the position of the fire hydrant see the driver I riser the drys are outlets I
00:00:51 driver I riser the drys are outlets I use the word hydrants because it's a word you use if I can ask you to look at your second statement please but used
00:01:02 your second statement please but used elsewhere but if you look at the first paragraph of that statement you say the while I was posted to North Kensington back in 1997 I recall attending rental
00:01:15 back in 1997 I recall attending rental Tower for various reasons we would attend the usual types of calls there such as smell of burning in the lists rubbish chutes of light that type of thing I also recall carrying out dry riser there visits as well as it's there
00:01:28 riser there visits as well as it's there I mean I should be as well my question is in those early years when you visited the tower did you do you remember noticing the location of the dry riser outlets and and recording them or noting
00:01:41 outlets and and recording them or noting them as in the wrong place or in an inconvenient place no to them yes because we used to do fire safety inspections called G visits and part of those G visits were inspecting dry
00:01:53 those G visits were inspecting dry risers so he would have gone to H when we gone to the inlet on the ground floor we would have tested each outlet on each floor so all would have noted where they were but we wouldn't have known to
00:02:04 were but we wouldn't have known to whether they were in the wrong place right that would have been not the officer in charge if he felt something was defective and if there was an issue with the riser then the officer in charge back then I was a firefighter the obviously back then would have the
00:02:16 obviously back then would have the ability to report a defect right I don't recall any defects being reported on the night which was of course 20 years later and this may be a bit of a stretch but did you have any recollection of a
00:02:27 did you have any recollection of a problem that you yourself personally had experienced in your early days with the dry riser outlets a grand No another thing you told us before the break was about the need to do a
00:02:43 break was about the need to do a thorough search of the building to make sure you haven't missed anything in terms of shoots ducts exit routes at what point first was the decision made to have a thorough examination of that
00:02:56 to have a thorough examination of that kind
00:02:56 kind do you remember I can't I don't know what they did before and I'm pretty sure they were done three six season they would have sent people round but during
00:03:07 would have sent people round but during my period when I had a commander I asked for it to be done again right and just ferd you know we had such a difficult job I just needed to see what was
00:03:18 job I just needed to see what was available to us and that I'll just wait to check we haven't missed anything but we had him just taking this just a little bit more slowly can I ask you to look at high-rise policy 633 which was
00:03:29 look at high-rise policy 633 which was in force in June 2017 and turn please to Clause 6 point 3 this is in tap for Abbas policies bundle you'll find flaws
00:03:44 Abbas policies bundle you'll find flaws at paragraph six point three at the bottom of page eight I want to direct your attention to paragraph F on page nine it begins on page eight by saying
00:03:55 nine it begins on page eight by saying on arrival and it says what the incident commander should do on the six point three to establish effective command and control the IC should and then over the
00:04:09 control the IC should and then over the page of F just carrying it through you can see that it says establish the location and status of any fire control fire engineering and or fixed installation systems my question is when
00:04:22 installation systems my question is when you arrived at the incident did you take any steps to find out once you'd been briefed by an da Lachlan what the
00:04:33 briefed by an da Lachlan what the incident commander or incident commanders before him had done by way of establishing these matters not between myself and Angela luckily no did you make any assumptions
00:04:45 make any assumptions that this had been done or did you make no assumption yeah expectation as an IC will check all the things that are available them to use at their disposal
00:04:56 available them to use at their disposal when you decided to do it again as you told us who did you ask so when it was so the reason why Alex was because of the issues with water so because the
00:05:09 the issues with water so because the fire was so extensive generally we will take a firefighting jet from two different floors so you've got two firefighting Jets one jet used as a
00:05:20 firefighting Jets one jet used as a firefighting jet and one jet uses a backup jet and generally for most compartment fires that's more than adequate this was beyond anything I
00:05:31 adequate this was beyond anything I think I would ever imagine and two Jets off the dry wires there was going to be insufficient we managed to get two more Jets off the dry riser but at that point
00:05:42 Jets off the dry riser but at that point we've you know four big water jets off of one single dry riser at some point to get an adequate water supply for each jet you're going to overrun the supply that you're getting so what triggered us
00:05:53 that you're getting so what triggered us was what I was trying to look for more water and if I could get the turntable ladder up that would give us an another additional source of getting water so that was one of the big triggers for
00:06:04 that was one of the big triggers for trying to look for a different way that was the trigger my question was who did you ask to do that exercise a Gareth Cook sorry magic graphical ride was Tallis to go and see if it could get the aerial up to use it
00:06:15 if it could get the aerial up to use it as a dry riser and the task was given to him with is this right when you were on the third floor at the bridgehead no no at the ground floor we did that rubber so that was later I see okay and did you
00:06:27 so that was later I see okay and did you ask him to look inside the building or to do a 360 outside the building or both Gareth cooked went outside the building
00:06:38 Gareth cooked went outside the building at some point Nick Meyer feeds an internal search we've inside the building to see if there was any other means that we could use when do they report back to you yes I did it and at the moment when you
00:06:49 yes I did it and at the moment when you asked for that to be done you said the trigger for that decision was water supply problems does does that does that mean and correct me if I'm wrong that the part that part at least
00:07:02 wrong that the part that part at least of the strategy at that stage was still firefighting no simul taneous action so firefighting and search and rescue so the strategy at that stage still included firefighting to date absolutely
00:07:14 included firefighting to date absolutely because the way the weight of the fire was burning across multiple floors the only way to start to affect any try and rescue casualties was to put
00:07:26 rescue casualties was to put firefighters above fires which is unusual for a normal tactics we wouldn't put firefighters above the fire yeah so the only way out physically think of a plan to do that was using SDB a cruise
00:07:39 plan to do that was using SDB a cruise to protect access and egress so we put SD be a crew to firefighting Jets to protect the route in and out for crews that were going above the fire fire to try and rescue and we'll come back we may come back to this later but I'm just
00:07:51 may come back to this later but I'm just interested in that that last answer does that does that tell us that in fact you wouldn't be able to send search and rescue crews to perform that role unless they also had water sorry I understand
00:08:05 they also had water sorry I understand it means it's a question of different a different way does that mean from what you've told us that you would not be able to send a search and rescue crew to respond to a particular FSG call to a
00:08:16 respond to a particular FSG call to a particular flat on a particular floor unless they had water with them out general procedure is that we would always send files on fire fire media we generally don't send crews we've no
00:08:28 generally don't send crews we've no water above a fire to go in search for people right we generally have to protect them with a fire fire in media and I'll protect their access and egress you could be sending them sending them into a place where they'd never come
00:08:39 into a place where they'd never come back no so can you tell us this is a general question throughout the night but did the the reach of water the ability to get water to the high floors
00:08:51 ability to get water to the high floors did that dictate how far you could send crews up the building no because we went outside of policy and put fire crews above floors of without firefighting media but
00:09:03 firefighting media but water right while I'm still on or while we're still on six three three can I just ask a related question about it can I ask you to look at appendix one it's
00:09:15 I ask you to look at appendix one it's page 19 this is 72 D and I'm not going to ask you about 72 D visits themselves but I just want to ask you about this
00:09:27 but I just want to ask you about this shopping list here can I take it you're familiar with this policy and in particular this I call it a shopping list but yeah perhaps that's a bit colloquial these are the things which should be
00:09:38 these are the things which should be inspected by personnel on such visits and I want to just pick out one in the middle of the list which says floor layouts at any particular building construction features which may promote
00:09:49 construction features which may promote rapid or abnormal fast bread such as sandwich panels timber frame construction atria or voids my quick my question is have you personally been
00:10:01 question is have you personally been involved in delivering or receiving or quality assuring any training relating to the risks that which opposed by modern refurbishment or construction
00:10:12 modern refurbishment or construction materials we've done several training packages over my career certainly one that sticks out was poster the fatal fire for flora Lombard which she
00:10:23 fire for flora Lombard which she unfortunately died when she was fighting a fire because of sandwich panels sandwich panels can deliver extensive quick rapid fire spread hidden so yes
00:10:34 quick rapid fire spread hidden so yes I've done training whether it's two basic yes we've done some form of training during my career can you remember when those when was the fire in which flown on bond I can't many was
00:10:45 which flown on bond I can't many was some time ago flown on I do you remember would you remember when these training packages were delivered even roughly no but in our demo there's a number of training package in terms of a fire fight in building construction etc depth
00:10:58 fight in building construction etc depth that we do are ready unless I looked at my training booklet I've got room to dice it we've so it's a partner right and do you
00:11:09 so it's a partner right and do you remember yourself having any thoughts about whether that training package or the contents of that training package was any you see the decisions you made on the night of the ground filter fire
00:11:22 on the night of the ground filter fire I'll say that all the training I've had is common I eat in something that you can use operationally so yes right now can I get back to where I promised you I
00:11:33 can I get back to where I promised you I would start after the break which was your actual tasks on the third floor when you got to the bridge header when it was on the third floor did you have a
00:11:44 it was on the third floor did you have a conversation with group manager welch about what you should do yes and did he give you a briefing he gave me an overall view of the activity that was
00:11:55 overall view of the activity that was gone on the project at that point and can you briefly summarize that for us yes he said he's committed crews they're finding really difficult conditions he's
00:12:08 finding really difficult conditions he's got multiple FSGS at the time that he was dealing with and I start to say some of the things that I've seen we talked about how I could assist did he ask you to do anything
00:12:21 assist did he ask you to do anything specifically no he didn't ask me to do anything specifically but did you have any particular role so I said I'd come a night to take over the roles search sector commander right and in brief
00:12:33 sector commander right and in brief terms what would that involve Oh in that time there there we were going to then have to decide what part of the building that I could take some commander control
00:12:45 that I could take some commander control for and how we would split the building between us did you make that decision no we never got to that decision because we relocated the bridgehead right but you relocated the bridgehead I think some 30
00:12:57 relocated the bridgehead I think some 30 to 40 minutes later so when you first arrived at the third floor bridgehead when it was at the third floor this is what I'm focusing on yeah what was your specific role at that time so it took a
00:13:08 specific role at that time so it took a while for me to get to Richard because there was so much going on and the item allow something to play out and then by the time we got to a brief we had a quick overview of the
00:13:19 brief we had a quick overview of the incident and I gave him ideas some supporting tasks at that point there was some urgent pieces around posting some information to get some kit and equipment brought upstairs I can't
00:13:31 equipment brought upstairs I can't remember exactly but I'm pretty sure we needed some more bits of firefighting media some more phone imaging camera and getting some messages and crews and he just talked about a little bit but how
00:13:42 just talked about a little bit but how be structure was working so there's a period of time when I just supported what they were doing on the third floor and then got a brief about how we were going to make this operation work together right so would this be would
00:13:55 together right so would this be would this be right following from what you said that for the first period or part of the time you were at the third floor bridgehead you were simply assisting in an assisting role and then there came a time when you were given a specific role
00:14:06 time when you were given a specific role yes right and what was that specific role so by the time we got to the discussing about what the I was gonna take over their search sector and what flaws that would be that was when the bridgehead was compromised and we moved
00:14:18 bridgehead was compromised and we moved the bridgehead down and then we we delivered that on the ground floor not on the phone floor okay say so would it follow from that but actually you weren't actually given a specific task to perform while the British I was on
00:14:29 to perform while the British I was on the third floor for very long before it moved not right how long before it moved do you think you were tasked specifically I mean
00:14:43 you were tasked specifically I mean but itami relocated to the ground floor we you know we were halfway through debrief of what we were going to do anyway so the time I got to the ground floor we were we were in a in a place where we had kind of split the work and
00:14:57 where we had kind of split the work and then decided to start to split the tasks of each individual to ensure that the whole plan could come together all right well we'll come back to that in a moment
00:15:09 well we'll come back to that in a moment before we do can I just still ask you some third floor related questions did group manager Welch while he were on the third floor tell you or that he had a
00:15:26 third floor tell you or that he had a strategy in place for his operation did he explain the strategy to you he definitely explained his plan which was what so he stayed at that stage it was
00:15:37 what so he stayed at that stage it was literally taking FSG calls getting them processed and committing fire search search and rescue and fire fire there was a cert they would come in crews to do FSG calls and a number of crews of my
00:15:50 do FSG calls and a number of crews of my recollection had already been committed in addition to the firefighting crew but there was certainly conversations about what those conditions were like because there was concerns about FSGS going and
00:16:01 there was concerns about FSGS going and whether we had the water to be able to protect them against us a very in a fire so yeah he was doing an amazing job in a broad balancing act trying to do the FSG calls whilst we were trying to expend
00:16:13 calls whilst we were trying to expend those firefighting jets that were off the third and the fourth fourth floors open now in his statement to the inquiry and we'll explore this with him of course when he comes to give evidence he says in its page six of his statement
00:16:25 says in its page six of his statement that you worked with his designated FSG team to brief the be a cruise on solace on safety issues and also where they would be going do you remember that
00:16:36 would be going do you remember that being so I remember talk about a fish cheese but not not the detail you don't do you remember working with his designated FSG team as he's good as he
00:16:47 designated FSG team as he's good as he put it yes I remember working with Louisa DaSilva I remember working with Brian on O'Keefe they were but you can imagine inundated with work and I'll just wait to make
00:16:58 with work and I'll just wait to make sure when see how I could assist for a period of time what exactly did you do in that role assisting louisa and brian and so i asked about the process to get clarity of information from where they were
00:17:09 of information from where they were getting the efficient and how would i record him back if i can work or don't think that was long if it was a more than a minute or so before we had to relocate the bridget so by the time i got to that point i don't remember
00:17:21 got to that point i don't remember recording spending much time there before we went back down to the ground floor
00:17:25 floor i see so your recollection is that your work on FSG is happen didn't occupy very long now for you moved no right
00:17:35 did group manager welch indicate to you whether there was any kind of prioritization of FSG calls no get the
00:17:46 prioritization of FSG calls no get the FS she calls were the priority yes but but among FSG calls did you get any kind of instructional briefing from group manager welch as to how between themselves they were being prioritized
00:17:59 themselves they were being prioritized not sure well let me give you an example did anybody did anybody say did you discover that anybody had said well these FSG calls must probably
00:18:10 these FSG calls must probably prioritized on the basis of the nature of the occupants elderly children people with mobility difficulties no you don't remember FS geez were being prioritized
00:18:21 remember FS geez were being prioritized because that's where we knew people were trapped right and they were deploying crews to try and get those people do you know whether there was any system in place for deciding which ones to treat as no more urgent more pressing than
00:18:34 as no more urgent more pressing than others yeah at that time though was there any discussion while the bridgehead was on the third floor about the need to commit EDB a specifically i
00:18:46 the need to commit EDB a specifically i knew they went to committee DBA but i can't recall a discussion about it right do you remember whether there was any discussion or any any system in place for deciding whether to send EDB a cruise or SDB a cruise to particular
00:18:57 cruise or SDB a cruise to particular floors no but i recall making those decisions when we reach the ground floor yes
00:19:03 yes we'll come back to that do you know whose role it was well the bridgehead was on the third floor to decide or to make sure that you had enough EDB a
00:19:15 make sure that you had enough EDB a resources available in Richards system I know he was working with Nick Myer and Nick Mike was providing some support for him in terms of crews did there ever come a time when the bridgehead was on
00:19:27 come a time when the bridgehead was on the third floor that you ran out of EDB a wearer's sorry I don't recall that okay and now you told us before that you didn't see any FSG information being
00:19:39 didn't see any FSG information being written on the wall the third floor and we looked at that photograph can I just show you something else to see if it triggers recollection which is the forward information board its M et triple zero one eight seven four nine
00:20:00 this is a board not sure whether it's necessarily a forward information board but it's a board with FSG information on it does this look familiar to you yes it does
00:20:10 does can you help me what what is it that is to afford information board it is FS JSON and you remember seeing this forward information board with this information on it at any point in the
00:20:22 information on it at any point in the night I remember an FSG board we've it must have been that one right because I remember that that was part the
00:20:33 remember that that was part the conversation about ensuring that the FSG information was transferred from the third floor back to the ground floor and in a fit board was taken down and the information transferred onto the wall so
00:20:44 information transferred onto the wall so I would say yes but because of there was so much information I can't guarantee was this exact that's bold but why body
00:20:56 was this exact that's bold but why body looks at the information in yes do you think like it sorry buddy but just one looks at the information then yes it looks like it was was the board was that information board there on the third floor when you arrived at the bridgehead
00:21:07 floor when you arrived at the bridgehead there was a forward information board in use on the third floor right was it this board already couldn't confirm me from if it was this board or that board just
00:21:18 if it was this board or that board just looking at the details on them on that it just casting your eye down the lists of flats and floors is there any flat or floor that stands out in your memory words prompts a recollection of any any particular FSG
00:21:30 recollection of any any particular FSG call
00:21:36 no okay I remember we searched a flat and FSG flat on the third floor I can't remember if it was flat nine it was the last FSG
00:21:49 if it was flat nine it was the last FSG that came in as we was moving the the Bridget we can take that down and while you were on the third floor or while the
00:22:01 you were on the third floor or while the British F is on the third floor did you have your main screen radio with you yeah I did carry it with me did you use it to communicate with the command unit at all no you generally
00:22:14 command unit at all no you generally wouldn't use the main scheme relative to speak to the command unit because that would be transmitting on floor mops for which is between generally between control other SS coming or controlling
00:22:26 control other SS coming or controlling the incident commander right did you use but may be asking more generally did you communicate with the command unit at all right by radio while you were on the third floor yes I tried to but the radio
00:22:38 third floor yes I tried to but the radio traffic was was fast which radio did you use your fire ground radio right could you have used your air wave radio generally no general policies that we
00:22:51 generally no general policies that we instance unless you're paid a specific officer so our national integrator to gauge and officers use their Airways but generally at fires we we leave our airwaves and don't take them on to the
00:23:02 airwaves and don't take them on to the fire ground right we've had some evidence from Peter Johnson last week that he was confident he said that you
00:23:13 that he was confident he said that you were in communication with cu8 by air wave radio how does that stand with your recollection no I wasn't I spoke to the Cu via handheld radio I heard right yes
00:23:27 Cu via handheld radio I heard right yes and towards instant when we relocated to the ground floor where radio traffic was extensive and we couldn't get through we also use runners and also ort the
00:23:40 also use runners and also ort the officer review team which was GN Mick Mulholland and GM Matt Cooke they were also relaying messages to the command unit for us no you say handheld
00:23:51 command unit for us no you say handheld is that the fire ground right yes and you were in communication with the Cu just so that I'm clear which command unit was it was it seven or eight at the FSG unit or was the incident command
00:24:03 FSG unit or was the incident command unit I was speaking to the incident command I don't recall ever speaking to the FSG right so do we take it from that you actually never ask yourself received FSG information over the radio from a
00:24:15 FSG information over the radio from a command unit now an hour generally wouldn't wouldn't want to interfere in that process because they're sending risk critical information so once they're designated who's gonna get the FSG information you you generally once
00:24:29 FSG information you you generally once you happy with that process you leave it alone to ensure it doesn't get compromised okay now can I then take you to your statement the first statement and ask you to look at page three and go
00:24:45 and ask you to look at page three and go to the bottom of the page six lines up after the reference to the sketch you say we had also received a call to FSG
00:25:00 say we had also received a call to FSG on the third floor so while the bridgehead was being located to the lobby myself and cookie took an enforcer etc when you say we received a call do I take it from your evidence that that
00:25:11 take it from your evidence that that wasn't you personally but somebody else at the bridgehead yes I see okay
00:25:22 and that was well that whichever's being relocated from the third floor to get to the lobby right and do you remember how that FSG called because you've referred to it specifically do you remember how it came in paper or radio no I don't recall how
00:25:37 in paper or radio no I don't recall how it came in but I'm pretty sure it was Louise at the silver who called the FSG for the third floor and we just said that's it for relocating we will take it me and Gareth cook just that in my
00:25:48 me and Gareth cook just that in my statement care of cooker night so can you inform sir and not a door down and when in search let's move to the subject then of the move of the bridgehead down to the ground floor now we've had some
00:26:03 to the ground floor now we've had some evidence from watch manager O'Keefe the the movement of the bridgehead to the ground floor happened as a result of a a firefighter coming onto the bridgehead
00:26:14 firefighter coming onto the bridgehead and saying that the fire was around the bridgehead do you remember that no right and do you remember but this was also
00:26:26 and do you remember but this was also some evidence from Gareth cook that there was talk at least of the fire having got below the bridgehead did you remember that I don't recall
00:26:37 did you remember that I don't recall that I do recall the conversations between myself and group manager Welsh that the smoke condition in the bridgehead was untenable for Bridget and we had to read okay right so as far as
00:26:48 we had to read okay right so as far as you're concerned the reason for moving the bridgehead down to the ground floor was the presence of smoke at the third floor not far below the bridgehead yes right now you and we've just just closed
00:27:00 right now you and we've just just closed down the statement but it doesn't matter in the part of the statement I was showing you you exhibited a sketch I think of the layout of the ground floor
00:27:11 think of the layout of the ground floor once you move the bridgehead to the ground floor perhaps we'll look at that it's a meaty triple zero one five eight seven four that is that it that is your
00:27:22 seven four that is that it that is your sketch yes is now can we just get can we just go through this first of all the top of the diagram I think written entrance I'm interpreting your handwriting but sorry
00:27:35 interpreting your handwriting but sorry is that fair yes there Dale apologizes it's pretty clear and so can we take it at the top of the building is the top of the diagram is the south side yes and therefore to the to the left we've
00:27:47 and therefore to the to the left we've got the east to the right the west and to the on the bottom this at the North you then mark FSG next to that entrance with a ring round it you see yes then
00:27:59 with a ring round it you see yes then that is that to signify the recording of FSG information that was going on on the wall on the left as you go in yes we've station manager Pete Moore fronting with station manager Pete waterand and
00:28:10 station manager Pete waterand and anybody else you recall there was another watch manager there yes may have been Williams yes all right and Andy Walton was by that doorway well
00:28:22 and Andy Walton was by that doorway well you've marked Andy Walton as we can see that I think the writing says Andy Walton you say he was by that doorway what was he doing there do you know so a number of things probably at that time
00:28:37 number of things probably at that time he was organizing getting some resources in we implemented the one way system so by the bottom right-hand corner the back
00:28:48 by the bottom right-hand corner the back door yeah what we were doing was all the crews that were waiting inside and outside would come in via the back door and Andy Waltons was communicating with
00:28:59 and Andy Waltons was communicating with the watch manager on the other side so when Nick might needed crews Andy what controlled that but also and more importantly we needed to get the casualties out the short route and so
00:29:10 casualties out the short route and so when casualties were coming down the stairs there was a casualty handling crew at the bottom of the stairs they took the cash in each fruit a short route out the west way and down to catch a few clearing point right now we may be
00:29:21 a few clearing point right now we may be able to do this with the photographs so if we can keep the diagram on the on the screen please Paul and put up the photograph we looked at earlier this morning
00:29:28 morning inq 3 to 2 just so weak just so we've clearly got your evidence about the short route we can see in the photograph three two to three to two
00:29:39 three two to three to two there it is is you coming in the front door
00:29:43 door FSG on the wall and then there's a door with a sign next to it marked Graham filled our community room is that the door to the short route no that's the door to the back door that's the door to the back door is that's where you've
00:29:56 the back door is that's where you've marked backdoor is it yes and what was the short route just looking back at the diagram that the casualties were being taken out so the doorway that I'm walking through yes that is a doorway straight out towards the covered walkway
00:30:08 straight out towards the covered walkway yes you get to the covered walkway turn left walk gun the next a casualty clearing point right down there and what was the back door used for them so that was used for bringing our crews in I see
00:30:20 was used for bringing our crews in I see so and so crews coming in from crews coming out and the territorial support group that was supporting us at night and they converged at the back door to help crews come in and out their access and egress I thought so
00:30:32 and egress I thought so so edpa where as an SD BA whereas once this had come down to the ground floor would come in through the as it were the back door and but casualties would go out through the front yes that's how it worked it yep now you've got on the
00:30:48 worked it yep now you've got on the diagram two lines that run top left to bottom or mid right what are those she's
00:30:59 bottom or mid right what are those she's like my point okay yes so after Gareth cooker came back and couldn't because of the 14 debris and
00:31:11 couldn't because of the 14 debris and because of the conditions outside we couldn't use the turntable ladder as an additional stairwell and draw a riser we needed more firefighting Jets because of
00:31:22 needed more firefighting Jets because of the severity of the fire so I detailed Gareth to become the Dakota there for a water obviously job and and I said I'm functionally if you can't find a dry riser to give me a water you can have to
00:31:33 riser to give me a water you can have to run hose from the nearest fire engine into the building and up a stairwell which is a pretty difficult task so they found a nearest pump to their credit got
00:31:45 found a nearest pump to their credit got an additional water supply from a pump outside
00:31:48 outside ran it through the back door put a lightweight portable pump just by the exit because of the fumes we couldn't have the lightweight portable pump inside so the lightweight portable pump was left at the front door and then
00:32:00 pump was left at the front door and then they ran hose from the lightweight portable pump hold it'll off up to the mezzanine floor and then ran hose up the internal side of the building to give actual water jets
00:32:11 actual water jets do you remember roughly what time that was put in place was it after you came down to the ground Jakub activity took place on the ground
00:32:22 Jakub activity took place on the ground floor okay we may have an image on it so if you could just be shown very briefly inq three one seven
00:32:38 is that what you are describing yes right we may come back to that photographs you'll see continuing with your plot with your diagram if we can
00:32:51 your plot with your diagram if we can take that photograph down go back to the diagram you've got in the middle SD be a 20 against what I think we can all agree
00:33:02 20 against what I think we can all agree is the glass partition between the main lobby and the stairwell what does s tba20 signify so I requested from Nick Meyer that there must be 20 where is available at that holding area all times
00:33:14 available at that holding area all times at all times and related to that we have in the bottom right hand corner of the diagram EDB a in a ring with a 30 next to it
00:33:24 to it what does that signify so exactly the same brief I want to eat this 38 eBay where was available at all times right I see and with the with the SD be a wearers on the west side of the glass
00:33:37 wearers on the west side of the glass wall that was that where the queue for them yes and the EDB a where is sitting standing where they were in a side room actually I think that was the the lift
00:33:48 actually I think that was the the lift Lobby that's where they were right and who was you remember who was running the EDB age group no so Nick Meyer yes so where he circled that was a single door
00:34:01 where he circled that was a single door partition between the glass partition that took him into the stairs yes so Nick might had the door and when I required or Richard required resources we went to Nick and we all got our SD be a or IDI be a cruise right and once it
00:34:14 a or IDI be a cruise right and once it started to play Nick knew to go to Andy Wharton or another outside to ensure that they will replenish so we had constant cruise all the time I think so Edie VA whereas pool there FDB a word
00:34:25 Edie VA whereas pool there FDB a word whereas pool they're going back to Andy Walton which is where we started this what was his job so Andy Wharton was assisting the communications between requesting from
00:34:36 communications between requesting from the officer outside who was holding officers to bring them in and also assisting we've sorry assisting where we were moving casualties out I see okay now
00:34:51 did you know were aware of a station manager loft involved in any activity I know Brett loft right he but Brett
00:35:03 I know Brett loft right he but Brett enough stuff I I didn't work with him within the lobby that evening I'm pretty sure he was elsewhere doing FSGS command unit potentially but I had no direct contact with Brett that evening did you
00:35:16 contact with Brett that evening did you know who was in charge of beer but first of all did you know by the time you got down to the ground floor the bridge had got down to the ground floor but that be a something called be a main control had been set up yes on UPI main controller
00:35:29 been set up yes on UPI main controller sale but did you know who was in charge of be aiming no I can't remember the name of the officer if I suggested to you that it was Brett loft would that help yeah it would yeah makes sense no but did you know the involvement of a station manager Kipling yes thank you
00:35:41 station manager Kipling yes thank you yes what was he doing do you know uh I remember uh I fought he was helping with FSGS on a command unit right now when the v8 when the bridgehead came down to
00:35:53 the v8 when the bridgehead came down to the ground floor did you notice watch managers Williams and Watson they're managing FS G's in the place you've indicated now by the wall on the left is he come in yes you
00:36:05 wall on the left is he come in yes you did yes the first time you notice what they were doing yes and did you did you see what they were actually doing at that stage didn't
00:36:16 were actually doing at that stage didn't know the detail I just knew they were processing FSG calls did you speak to them no Richard Welsh spoke to them right so far as you know was that the first time Richard Welsh spoke to them
00:36:28 first time Richard Welsh spoke to them about FSG calls I really couldn't couldn't say if that was the first time they said well okay
00:36:42 now in your statement at page 4 your first statement at page 4 if you go to the second paragraph I showed you this
00:36:55 the second paragraph I showed you this earlier this morning now you say the lobby covers the ground floor and is set up as follows and then we've you've got the FSG being set up to the left you
00:37:06 the FSG being set up to the left you then say there's a separate room off the lobby which has a door leading to the outside of the grassed area we've looked at that and you then go on to say two lines up from the bottom i'm and the VA board which i positioned at the bottom
00:37:18 board which i positioned at the bottom of the stairs now i just want to focus on that bit of your evidence if I can can I ask you first of all just said we can work out what what what's involved to look at some photographs
00:37:30 to look at some photographs inq three to seven first of all I am q3 to seven now this is a photographed or
00:37:43 to seven now this is a photographed or CCTV shot taken on camera two with an adjusted time mark of oh three 1543 and first of all can you identify yourself in this picture yes I can and I'm the
00:37:55 in this picture yes I can and I'm the one pointing you're the one pointing so this is 3:15 so what is happening at this point can you help said sorry the
00:38:11 this point can you help said sorry the next picture is three to eight this is taken on camera
00:38:25 for an adjusted time mark of a three 1641 so not very long afterwards we
00:38:37 1641 so not very long afterwards we think we can identify you in this picture but perhaps you can help us I know you in this picture so I'm helping move one of the telemetry bolts yes and
00:38:48 move one of the telemetry bolts yes and well where you were moved where were you moving them from so I was just a bit concerned that I thought that area would have too much going on and I
00:39:00 area would have too much going on and I would be ATAR to be in a specific area to be able to manage the resources so I made a decision to split where the BI entry control was and where f SG was and
00:39:12 entry control was and where f SG was and where the SDP a and IDI be able pooling because there was just too much going on in that area right did you notice when you were doing this movement the three
00:39:26 you were doing this movement the three officers standing by the wall on the left by by the door we could see the two white helmets and the unhelmeted officer there yes on you over there you knew that yeah and did you know at this point
00:39:38 that yeah and did you know at this point so three 16:41 of what they were doing yes no dude they were processing their first G calls did you actually see do you actually see for yourself physically what they were doing yeah
00:39:50 physically what they were doing yeah they were processing and they were writing some bits down on the walls there were some bits of paper with FS J's that were being processed you saw that for yourself did you yes did you see anybody bringing them pieces of paper from the outside no did you see
00:40:02 paper from the outside no did you see how they were receiving FSG information from the outside no were they on their radios did you see I really don't know all right
00:40:09 all right but I know they were what they were receiving information and that was the key part all right and then if we go to
00:40:23 the next picture which is three to nine this is the adjusted time stamp camera - at 3:00 1648 this appears to show you setting up the entry control board
00:40:36 you setting up the entry control board at the bottom of the stairs the main stairs can you confirm that's you first of all oh yes it is me okay and is that what you're referring to yes is nice and clear they were in a
00:40:47 to yes is nice and clear they were in a place of peace that ain't you control when managing be a cruise is a really critical task for us and I wanted him to be in a place where they could operate effectively and also it just reduces the
00:40:58 effectively and also it just reduces the the distance they were at the bottom of the stairs because also what what was gonna be really key was not only the information we were getting from FSGS but what was the information we were getting from cruise as I was they were returning back at the bottom of the
00:41:09 returning back at the bottom of the stairs yes now just taking this a little bit more slowly it was it your decision just to separate physically the FSG
00:41:20 just to separate physically the FSG information you could see being received and recorded on the wall on the left of the lobby on the one hand and on the other the operation of the entry control boards on the other yes did you think at
00:41:34 boards on the other yes did you think at the time that you made that decision that that might create a risk of miscommunication that physical distance no I was I was more concerned that there
00:41:45 no I was I was more concerned that there was too much going on for the BAE to be effective so you had a number of risk critical elements that were right on top of each other at that point just because including the number of
00:41:56 because including the number of resources that are having to be pulled to be deployed and they needed to be some sort of separation the distance wasn't that great and the key was ensuring that the information got passed over yeah she did okay the key was ensuring that
00:42:12 okay the key was ensuring that information got passed over did it did you think however that the presence of a glass wall and a door and a doorway might create a barrier between the FSG
00:42:24 might create a barrier between the FSG information coming into the tower and being recorded by the watch managers at the
00:42:29 the barometric control board operation no door was open and allowed the edger control tur to operate as well now just
00:42:40 control tur to operate as well now just following up on the last answer but one you say the information got passed over can you once the board that the bridge
00:42:51 can you once the board that the bridge had came down to the ground floor could you describe for us the how that information went from the wash managers operating the FSGS by the wall to though
00:43:03 operating the FSGS by the wall to though to the bridgehead yeah so initially FSGS were deploying deploying crews to be a crews initially they they were on the ground floor the FSGS was doing the
00:43:16 ground floor the FSGS was doing the right thing they were trying to prioritize but they weren't get in the out the picture of what the conditions were and where we put in firefighting jets to do the rescues and my view was
00:43:27 jets to do the rescues and my view was in my tactical plan was that if the if the inter control and the FSGS and all the firefighters are there in in one place you end up having people with
00:43:41 place you end up having people with really important roles but doing other people's roles across pollinate too much and what it really needed at that point was people with specific tasks to focus on those specific tasks to be part of
00:43:52 on those specific tasks to be part of that but to part of that plan so the reason why Amelia is so FSGS could focus on getting clarity of FSG calls and bring them to the entry control who would log them because there was so many
00:44:05 would log them because there was so many FSG calls at that point and I moved to systemic searching to get each FSG because the conditions were were very
00:44:20 because the conditions were were very poor and wait that then meant it's because the FSGS was so sporadic that you could deploy a be a crew to an FSG to the 15th floor and in a second later and FSG coming for the 8th floor that
00:44:33 and FSG coming for the 8th floor that means you're walking be a cruise past FSGS we weren't methodical enough we would have been missed people it was clear from the information that was coming back that those people tasks certainly for upper floors we're
00:44:44 tasks certainly for upper floors we're not making the upper floors because I were coming across casualties and coming back right so at the start of the
00:44:55 back right so at the start of the operation of the bridgehead at the ground floor who was actually tasking the cruise with FSG information and destinations so originally when the
00:45:08 destinations so originally when the Bridget got moved back down Pete Wharf ndon and I'm speaking with Richard wells tasks some be a cruise to deploy to F H equals and how was that done in terms of
00:45:26 equals and how was that done in terms of providing information to crews what did people through them give crews pieces of paper I don't know I know they were briefed with FSGS and then deployed did
00:45:37 briefed with FSGS and then deployed did you at that time where were you standing when that was happening I think at that point we was that was when you saw me just organizing the ground floor and
00:45:48 just organizing the ground floor and then I had a conversation or a briefing with Richard Welsh decided them on what that looked like was what what it really meant was we we don't you extended jets to so far and where the fire now was but
00:46:02 to so far and where the fire now was but was you know pretty much from the six or six four onwards really taking hold across the floors it meant that those F those firefighters gonna toes FSG calls
00:46:13 those firefighters gonna toes FSG calls were go in without firefighting media and there was a there was a view that knowing of the conditions and the information that we were we were we would get him back from those crews is if we didn't put some sort of control to
00:46:25 if we didn't put some sort of control to protect their egress we could have deployed them and they may have got into difficulty when you made the decision to change the system so as to make it more
00:46:37 change the system so as to make it more systematic could you just tell us what change did you what change did you make yeah so at that period Pete was absolutely right to deploy those crews but as
00:46:46 but as dishes change the tactics have to change so well that then men is it was probably easy with that sketch that I drew you
00:46:57 easy with that sketch that I drew you had your pool of s DBA in your port of edpa Cruz s DPA were going to work up to the tenth floor they were going to do search and rescue and the floors that we hadn't cleared but they were also going
00:47:09 hadn't cleared but they were also going to protect that access and egress because we were still getting multiple FSGS there was certainly a couple of floors and I think I've mentioned a 16-4 19th floor where we knew information
00:47:21 19th floor where we knew information that someone of flats had residents have poured into and we were trying to get to those floors where we do know there was many casualties but I had to put the plan in place at EDP I could go and rescue them and a way to ensure that we
00:47:33 rescue them and a way to ensure that we protected the rescuing protects of them coming back out so we were pushing the EDB a crews up as high as we could as far as they could get so probably need
00:47:46 far as they could get so probably need to put some carry over the hunter I've just given you so what that meant in terms of process was people for those jobs change to focus on FSGS pass that over to where Louie's at the silver from
00:47:58 over to where Louie's at the silver from Brian O'Keefe were working on the bald Nick Myer was was delivering those crews and then myself and Richard wells were deploying crews and what we would do is
00:48:09 deploying crews and what we would do is we would look at the flaws that we needed to get to briefed those crews and in the waves of the silver wood and brown O'Keefe be a control would tell the crews what FSGS were on the floor they were going to and their view was to
00:48:21 they were going to and their view was to get all the FS cheese off of that floor because we had to ensure that there were fire fighting and doing search and rescue but doing it in a really methodical way house I'm going to unpack
00:48:32 methodical way house I'm going to unpack that's a long answer and there's a lot in it sorry that's okay it's going to unpack it slowly with you if I can but the first question is how long after the bridge had moved down to the ground floor did you make the decision to
00:48:44 floor did you make the decision to change the approach to FSG I don't I don't really recall how long it was based on the information that we were getting from the be a cruise and the
00:48:56 getting from the be a cruise and the information that I dark myself and Richard have got we as commanders went up and crews are telling us that the conditions were pretty unbearable so any information that we've got from cruising near the
00:49:07 that we've got from cruising near the ninth floor that it was white-hot and you can't get past it so you know at times we we went and checked we'll come back to that my next question is did you tell watch manager Williams and watch
00:49:19 tell watch manager Williams and watch mother to Watson that you've made a change to the way which be a wearers were going to be deployed no I didn't which is boasted right and that was a conversation that me which is Wilson and
00:49:30 conversation that me which is Wilson and Richie said I'll come and do it ok so we'll come we will come back to that now let's just take this in stages if I can first of all once the bridge had moved down to the ground floor can
00:49:41 had moved down to the ground floor can you explain how your role related to Louisa desilva's role who was recording FSG information on the green wall yes so I had control with Richard over the
00:49:54 I had control with Richard over the deployment and decisions of where crews were going to go and part of that was Louisa was Clayton the FSG information from FSG and between herself and Bryan
00:50:05 from FSG and between herself and Bryan O'Keefe I asked them to I'll designate a floor for a be a crew to go to and they would tell them all the FSGS on that floor also the reason would be
00:50:17 floor also the reason would be debriefing the crews as they come back to ensure that all the tasks were being done so as we deployed them to a floor they could check off the flat numbers they've been to and we could take them off of our list and I think you can see
00:50:29 off of our list and I think you can see on the list you start seeing some crosses go through as we start to work our way through it and what information did you have when you decided which floor to send crews to part of that was
00:50:42 floor to send crews to part of that was from the information from cruised when they debriefed us so if they've gone to the sixth floor which some crews did and they said we've gone in the fire still burning but we've checked all the floors
00:50:53 burning but we've checked all the floors and it's now clear then that would enable you to focus on other floors and what to what extent do you rely on information still coming from the wall as it were through peat Wolfington on
00:51:04 as it were through peat Wolfington on pieces of paper oh absolutely because that's tell anywhere that people are on the FSGS are and and that was the that was a difficult difficult part of the EDB I Cruz added an SD be a crew so even
00:51:17 Cruz added an SD be a crew so even though we were my father core we pushed edpa crews as hard as we could and part of that was saying to the EDB a cruise we've got multiple people trapped on upper floors I'm really sorry but it is
00:51:28 upper floors I'm really sorry but it is what it is tonight we're going to protect you practical firefighters going to keep you alive but you could have to go up up the fire flow I'm going to push you as hard as you can go and and none of them turn their back on that so we
00:51:41 of them turn their back on that so we pushed edpa crews up as hard as we could get but certainly at start the the seventh wasn't great the eighth was bad and then they were telling me in the early stages and the ninth was was just
00:51:53 early stages and the ninth was was just unpassable at that point and we knew we have to do some work on the ninth to then push on to try and get to those casualties on the upper floors we'll come back to that just just taking this in stages operationally did we you'd
00:52:05 in stages operationally did we you'd physically taking firefighter tallies off firefighters know who was doing that Louisa and Brian now in your statement on page four in your statement you refer
00:52:16 on page four in your statement you refer to lines up from the bottom two running an fib you say it's part of my dream if I also ran an fib forward information board Louisa Brian ran this to me and that's clearly Louise Louisa and
00:52:28 and that's clearly Louise Louisa and Brown yeah this was so I could note the location of the FSGS and where people were trapped what floors flat numbers who was allocated and so on and what's a that when people were rescued and crews were out I could mark it on the board as the FI bit and you go
00:52:41 it on the board as the FI bit and you go on as the fib was not big enough to cope with the volume of FS G's coming and I decided to utilize the wall so I could clearly see he was allocated where where the FSU's weren't who had been brought out just on all of that we may be able
00:52:55 out just on all of that we may be able to mark mark a time for that can I just show you a photograph inq 3:30 yeah I think when I've said I I think that's kind of the wrong way yes as the kind of team being because I certainly won't mark Evan all that was
00:53:06 certainly won't mark Evan all that was Louisa and Brian what I was going to ask you that
00:53:08 you that but to just go to this photograph i NQ 330 we can see this is camera to than adjusted time of 323 39 we think that's
00:53:19 adjusted time of 323 39 we think that's you in the center of the picture yes and you're talking that we think as Louisa on the left and that's the reason I click on the right is this before information started being written on the
00:53:31 information started being written on the wall do you remember no I think information was written on the wall at that point we had the BA boards in the bottom corner yes I think we also probably had a couple of crews at that
00:53:42 probably had a couple of crews at that point I'd come come down in a pretty exhausted state and we were put in a manner corner trying to get him rehab I see is that what's happening in the button on the left hand side I would have thought so I essentially and we
00:53:53 have thought so I essentially and we could see Richard Welsh I think on the right there in the white helmet yes yes it was the bridge head in operation at this point were those were those boards he had control boards that we see on the
00:54:04 he had control boards that we see on the left actually live the Bridget was in operational since we got to the ground floor that was appointment with deployed close right and then you as I've said to
00:54:16 close right and then you as I've said to you you the FIB wasn't big enough to cope so you used the wall did you personally write on the wall no that is the beater in Brian right was anybody else writing on a bribe yes I've just
00:54:30 else writing on a bribe yes I've just forgotten his name he was here before me it's pretty bad he was doing comms comes up right was more fluorescent more sickness it I thank you sorry okay if I
00:54:43 sickness it I thank you sorry okay if I was to ask you some questions about who wrote what on the wall would you be able to help I'm sorry no and then we'll save some time I suspect um do you recall whether at the FSG information on the ground floor wall was put on to them was
00:54:56 ground floor wall was put on to them was put onto the the walls only after you and the rest of the bridgehead team had moved down or was there some on the wall when you got there I've actually by
00:55:07 when you got there I've actually by which I mean the wall opposite the stairs the green wall um Luise de silver and Brian it came down and they were always going to transfer that information and they were down before the forests and they but they didn't
00:55:20 the forests and they but they didn't they
00:55:20 they we have that night so I'd be shocked if they hadn't already started transferring that information onto the wall yes okay are you familiar with the handwriting of wall handwriting of particular people
00:55:33 wall handwriting of particular people Society no let me try one thing I'm at risk of taking too long with it m ET triple zero one five eight one six are
00:55:47 triple zero one five eight one six are you able to identify who wrote any of that out there sorry no you're not alright now take that down do you
00:56:02 alright now take that down do you remember once the bridge had had started operating on the ground floor how FSG information was physically coming in to the bridge headspace yes um was most of
00:56:17 the bridge headspace yes um was most of it was coming in via face to face but they were being left also with with a physical piece of paper they would have been left who would have been left so information was being passed from watch
00:56:29 information was being passed from watch manager was coming over sometimes Williams and they were making contact we've mr. Morrison Louisa O'Brien and he's showing that that transfer okay do you remember which
00:56:42 that transfer okay do you remember which watch managed as it was he was bringing pieces of paper into the bridgehead no I don't I think it was a few of them or a few people were doing it right and and were they the same with watch managers
00:56:55 were they the same with watch managers who were who were managing or running the FSGS by the wall yes thing that was the main lobby yes and you know at some point they probably may have asked someone a favor to run it over sighs right okay
00:57:24 can i yes is I think now a convenient moment for a break for you miss please yes mr. Chairman I think the witnesses had an hour of me yes probably enough yes you're making
00:57:37 yes probably enough yes you're making quite a great attitude yes so could we could have certainly pulled out 10 minutes 10 minutes yes I cannot have attendance rate missed Google again defend for 21 batch or evidence one Iraq
00:57:48 defend for 21 batch or evidence one Iraq the room and will the deal with Templar 3
00:57:50 3 thank you
00:58:02 temple sweet
01:14:31 you
01:17:42 yes mr. millet yes brick seems to have got a little extended
01:17:51 Travis go go back yes let's have mr. Google back
01:18:13 I'm sorry to have kept you waiting mr. Google just something I'll never eat again okay let's go mom thanks for coming back when you took when you started operating the bridgehead on the ground floor who was ultimately responsible for deployments of BA
01:18:26 responsible for deployments of BA where's I was but with which about Richard Welsh right you were with him who made the who was the ultimate decision-maker between you two or did you agree everything now we didn't agree everything we just work together and
01:18:38 everything we just work together and spoke to him about what crews we were deploying right and you told us earlier that the information you use was a combination I think of information from debrief from crews arriving from within the building and information coming to
01:18:50 the building and information coming to you from the wall if I could put it that way in the lobby yes now the way which information came to you in the from the lobby was chips of paper did that continue to be the case throughout the time that you were operating on the ground the OP the
01:19:02 operating on the ground the OP the bridgehead on the ground floor yes information kept up coming from FSG obviously some of that information was face to face where people were passing them them over but they'd be backed up by by almost a hot copy
01:19:13 by by almost a hot copy and did you sometimes send etbi wearers or SD ba whereas two different flats or floors to the marked on the sheets of paper did I send idibia whereas at different floors marked on the on the
01:19:26 different floors marked on the on the shape I sent them to a number of flaws yes I would do right now turning then to this question of the change in strategy
01:19:37 this question of the change in strategy to a systematic search you say in your statement just to anchor it somewhere and this is page four fifth paragraph
01:19:48 and this is page four fifth paragraph first line you say as we were getting notified of FSGS on every every floor every floor I decide about systemic
01:19:59 every floor I decide about systemic searching and which forced to commit crews to at any given time at what point did you make that decision
01:20:09 I can't remember the exact time it felt fairly quickly after we moved to the ground floor but I really couldn't
01:20:20 ground floor but I really couldn't exactly setting the time right now the first deployment of EDB a cruise after the move of the bridgehead to the ground floor we have at about 329 would that be
01:20:32 floor we have at about 329 would that be right
01:20:32 right yes sounds right right now did you when you made your decision as to where to send the crews to did you select the
01:20:43 send the crews to did you select the floors in a particular order so for SDP a cruise yes so they were starting off at the floor of the first floor of fire that we had left to start knocking it down but I was
01:20:55 left to start knocking it down but I was deploying multiple crews so some crews had fire fighting in the floors but some crews had protecting the escape route and we pushed the EDB a cruise as high
01:21:07 and we pushed the EDB a cruise as high as we could how high was that so initially the 80 Bierko she couldn't get as far as tonight but after some firefighting they pushed on to the temp the 11th up to the 12th from 13 for some
01:21:18 the 11th up to the 12th from 13 for some point right did you know let me ask you this we all sit in an open way did you know where
01:21:30 sit in an open way did you know where the FS chief FSG floors were and put a different way was there a limit to below which there were no FSG cause we had a
01:21:42 which there were no FSG cause we had a list of all of the FS she calls and we were systematically working our way through to get all of those FS juice right did you know that once the bridge had had moved down to the ground floor the only active FSG calls were for the
01:21:54 the only active FSG calls were for the 11th floor and above at some point I knew because we were clearing those floors and also I knew at some point you're in it evening we had the information that all of the FS G's have stopped when the bridge had moved down
01:22:07 stopped when the bridge had moved down to the ground floor and started operating there what would you do with H it that said 18th floor for example we would hold the chip for the 18th floor
01:22:19 would hold the chip for the 18th floor because we knew that we had working depending what time of the night that was we knew that the 84 was a priority because it was an FSG but we also knew that crews couldn't get that
01:22:30 also knew that crews couldn't get that far so we'd always had that that group of EVB a where was our 30 so I knew there was cruiser we could send there but we had to do some work to get them there we do you know from recollection
01:22:46 there we do you know from recollection what the highest floor that you mentioned 13th but what the highest floor was to where you sent a needy be a crew yes so during parts of the night I
01:22:59 crew yes so during parts of the night I was really fortunate I knew a lot of the crews there personally I needed it needed experience fire fires to take some additional risks on the additional
01:23:12 some additional risks on the additional risks that were already taken so a few crews that I knew one was one from East Ham I asked him a specific tasks and I just asked him to push and take as much risk as you can and let me know how far
01:23:25 risk as you can and let me know how far you can get and they came back down the stairs in in a pretty difficult state and said that unless I get some unless I win the fight on the 11th floor they
01:23:38 win the fight on the 11th floor they pushed on to the 13th ducked into the 14th for a time and they said they were on the edge and they said if you push if you don't fix the 11 Florida and everyone who dies in terms of firefighters coming back unless you fix that right and do you remember at least
01:23:51 that right and do you remember at least roughly how soon that was after you started operating the bridgehead on the ground floor I couldn't recall but I pushed
01:23:58 pushed edpa crews a fairly regular intervals - we were getting decent updates back from the crews that we were sending to the worst points you know after we won the fire on the 9th floor we were pushing
01:24:10 fire on the 9th floor we were pushing hard on the attempt for the 11 the crews were coming back the 11th they were saying the 11th was just white-hot everything was a lie they were getting
01:24:22 everything was a lie they were getting to the stairwell trying to get into the lobby it was a fire just to get into the lobby
01:24:29 lobby in the mean time they were trying to work out a system and the system was working here are a couple of crews that were amazing for me that weren't MBA they were from Whitechapel in insure
01:24:42 they were from Whitechapel in insure ditch who were just helping with hoes and helping with casualties but what we had to do is because we still had residual fire in some of the floors and
01:24:53 residual fire in some of the floors and it's kind of hard to explain but because we were pushing crews in some of the lower floors it would then compromise the stairwell where the EDB a crews were anybody on the stair would have to be on their bellies because it would be too ferocious in there anytime
01:25:05 would be too ferocious in there anytime I had to casually the comms had to be pretty good and the system was good that they were speaking to each other shutting the door clearing a stairwell bringing people down I know it's off just taking a really complicated picture we were having discussions what we
01:25:17 we were having discussions what we didn't want to do is be trying to fight the fire in two floors but in compromising the only escape route that we had because we had one stairwell I kind of hope that complicated while you make sense just focusing on the
01:25:28 make sense just focusing on the communications about FSG if you did get at the bridgehead a chit or other information of an FSG call above the
01:25:40 information of an FSG call above the 11th floor but couldn't get above the 11th floor would you did you tell Watson or Williams or Wolf ndon that they
01:25:54 or Williams or Wolf ndon that they deployment so that floor couldn't be made no we kept the sorry FSG live on the board by the inch of control
01:26:05 live on the board by the inch of control but I didn't tell Watson and and more Ferdinand and probably in hindsight that should have gone back to them but we were just so busy we were focusing on trying to get those people crews to
01:26:17 trying to get those people crews to those floors were you able to communicate with either the command unit or the control room about the inability to respond to FSG calls above a particular floor at any point yes so the
01:26:29 particular floor at any point yes so the ort officers were doing lots of running for us trying to get messages away and also the operations commander at that point was an do Lachlan so he was coming in
01:26:40 in intervals to get briefings on how the progress was going the incident commander at that point was Andy row along with the commissioner who came in to get briefings for updates
01:26:51 to get briefings for updates so not specifically to the CEO but certainly to the command chain they they knew where we were going they knew the plan but also they knew the difficulties that we were facing
01:27:06 do you recall a heated or emotional passionate to get the adjective but you get the sense do you recall a discussion of that nature involving watch manager Williams and watch manager Wolf ndon and group
01:27:20 and watch manager Wolf ndon and group manager Welch about the subject about why was that FSG calls above certain floors were not
01:27:32 FSG calls above certain floors were not being responded to yes myself when we two spoke about that and yes they did have a fairly heated conversation but these are passionate officers in a
01:27:43 these are passionate officers in a really difficult day it's not unusual and not unexpected where we're all professional officers that are trying to do our best so we had no problem with having difficult conversations but
01:27:54 having difficult conversations but ultimately I and Richard had to make command decisions on the information that we had just just trying trying to pinpoint that in terms of timing can you
01:28:07 pinpoint that in terms of timing can you be shown a picture which is a and Q three three two
01:28:16 this is camera two adjusted time at three forty twenty so half an hour or less after the bridgehead came down to
01:28:27 less after the bridgehead came down to the ground floor and it shows the visa to silver I think on the bottom left and then three officers on the right can you identify them I can see me and Richard
01:28:38 identify them I can see me and Richard but I don't know who we're speaking to right we think that's what watch manager Williams and we've got a relatively reliable in identification of him do you remember this discussion is three-way
01:28:50 remember this discussion is three-way discussion at about this point no I don't remember the discussion can turn to the next picture which is taken at six seconds later 333 again can you
01:29:04 six seconds later 333 again can you identify the people on the right hand side of the picture there's you I think in Louisa and get that far I think we think that's watch manager Williams yeah I still still can't know sorry and then at three three four which is an
01:29:17 and then at three three four which is an adjusted timer 303 4104 showing watch manager Williams I think we note him
01:29:29 manager Williams I think we note him talking to Louisa de Silva and you I think are in the background on the right do you remember that incident about discussion no but I was read myself I'm
01:29:45 discussion no but I was read myself I'm rich and I was really clear we had information about where the firefighting and the protection was for his crews yes we also had the information that was coming back from those crews the fs
01:29:56 coming back from those crews the fs cheese didn't but the fs cheese were performing a really single function and that's how we split the room up to ensure that people to focus on specific tasks to make sure that we had the complete clarity and and if that was a
01:30:08 complete clarity and and if that was a conversation I have no doubt that that's what I was saying right um certainty just finishing up with this line does this help us or does this not help as identify the timing of
01:30:19 this not help as identify the timing of the what we've called the heated discussion but the discussion about yeah actually got my first G it looks that way so well does it trigger a recollection it's read my question I
01:30:30 recollection it's read my question I absolutely remember having the conversation with Richard that the we've agreed and we're going to transition that's the best tactic forward and that FSG shouldn't be deploying be a cruise
01:30:42 FSG shouldn't be deploying be a cruise on their own because the only way they could do that was to deploy them without the firefighting media and without knowledge of what was coming back and that was really clear and using these pictures and the timings does that help us recall how long after the bridgehead
01:30:53 us recall how long after the bridgehead came down to the ground floor that discussion took place yeah I'd agree well I don't want to push you into agreeing for the sake of it I mean does it trigger does it match a recollection III do recall I mean that I
01:31:06 recollection III do recall I mean that I do recall having the conversation with Richard about that very detail right so that does bring that back to me that Natalie was there in relation to this point specifically just pursuing it after that discussion was it your
01:31:18 after that discussion was it your impression that the officers on the other side of the glass partition Williams and Watson bodies Williams for a time being we're continuing to allocate specific FSGS to firefighters
01:31:29 allocate specific FSGS to firefighters as they went past and then firefighters are given were given different briefings by by you and group manager Welch when they got to the bridgehead on the other side of the glass wall no I'll be honest
01:31:40 side of the glass wall no I'll be honest about to stop why I didn't expect that just I didn't expect her to continue and Nick Meyer was insuring that no be a cruise with anything but specific briefings or going past that door right
01:31:51 briefings or going past that door right we have some evidence that a crew manager crew manager main who had a body called Lundqvist tallied out at 329 and
01:32:06 called Lundqvist tallied out at 329 and he says he was initially tasked by a senior officer to go to flat 1 1 3 in response to an FSG call but he then said that he was retasked by you to go to floor 4 and far fight does that trigger
01:32:19 floor 4 and far fight does that trigger a recollection and I've if it's an SD be a crew then yes I deployed SD be a cruise SD be a cruise at that point were
01:32:30 cruise SD be a cruise at that point were protecting accessing egress and firefighting another floors so if someone had given them a different brief then yes I would have reproved them because that wasn't in the plan the plan was that we were ensuring that
01:32:41 the plan was that we were ensuring that AEDPA crews we were starting to make progress but but progress meeting meant travel distance and travel distance then I needed to put edpa crews to ensure who
01:32:53 I needed to put edpa crews to ensure who would get in the crews with a longest duration to to start to make that travel distance an stbb air crews were supporting that on the lower floors right in fact I put this to you on the
01:33:04 right in fact I put this to you on the basis that it's Maine and Lundqvist and indeed it was then they were does this help they were a battersea crew wearing EDB a and not s DBA so just to repeat the question do you remember retasking
01:33:16 the question do you remember retasking an e DB a crew from Battersea who had originally been tasked to go to floor one one three with a new task to go to floor four and firefight no you don't remember that no I I I specific would
01:33:27 remember that no I I I specific would not have put an e DB a crew to the fourth floor right okay well okay so does that follow from that that when e DB that say what would you do with EDB a
01:33:42 DB that say what would you do with EDB a cruise would you call them off in response to particular FSG calls and ask them to go as high as they could towards it or would you just take an e DB a crew
01:33:53 it or would you just take an e DB a crew as it as it presented itself so when we were deployed when I was deploying a DB a cruise it was two upper floors and to go to FSGS on those floors what I hadn't
01:34:05 go to FSGS on those floors what I hadn't did done is I hadn't deployed crews above the floors where we were having difficulty getting past because there was no point I'll just make the stable stable congested right in regards to the lower floors
01:34:16 lower floors the fourth floor at that point in operation even though the the fire was of origin there it wasn't giving us any any issue so I wouldn't have deployed anybody there because all the activity
01:34:28 anybody there because all the activity was on floors above the fourth
01:34:36 now just pursuing that answer a bit further and anchoring it in your statement if you go to page five of your statement and look at the third paragraph on that page please you will
01:34:48 paragraph on that page please you will see that you say after having described the decision to put crews of four in s DBA to fight the file fourth and fifth floors you then go on to say this enabled me to push
01:34:59 enabled me to push EDB a cruise through to work the floors above the fire to the lowest floors where FG FSGS had been identified this strategy was outside policy there's purely practical firefighting
01:35:10 there's purely practical firefighting that is essentially what you told us earlier today I just want to focus on which floors were talking about which were the lowest floors where FSGS had been identified at that point remember
01:35:23 been identified at that point remember which at that point of the incident I mean the lowest floor that we had an effigy was deferred for all which we researched our search with Gareth cook very early on in the incident and there were FS she's on a number of lower
01:35:35 were FS she's on a number of lower floors but they were starting to be cleared relatively quickly as EDB a cruise or pushing on right in terms of the Tom nodding off kind of unsure I'm sorry during the time that you were
01:35:49 sorry during the time that you were responsible for or assisting with efforts deployments in response to FS G's at the bridgehead what was the highest floor to which you recall sending an e DB a crew in response to an
01:36:02 sending an e DB a crew in response to an FS g call once we can't assist make search in a print probably xiv do you have the recollection of that i remember sending the crew to the full team yeah
01:36:13 sending the crew to the full team yeah or that that's when i asked them to go as far as you can so it's back to my earliest statement where i was told that the 11th is is is bad beyond belief and
01:36:25 the 11th is is is bad beyond belief and i arks a crew that we had we had mounting effigies still that were live and there were a number of flaws that were particularly have stayed with me one wasn't a 16th floor one was in the
01:36:37 one wasn't a 16th floor one was in the 18th floor and I was I was desperate to get crews there I mean desperate to get crews area do you remember the flat number on the 16th I really don't I remember
01:36:46 remember numbers but as Tom's gone on I've kind of forgot those but I knew the floors and I knew they were talking around the building but those in particular because the information we would get in there there was multiple people in specific
01:36:57 there was multiple people in specific flats on those floors but we knew until we managed to get crews to be able to get that far and and to get water we were we were struggling to get to them so we were pushing them deploying as
01:37:09 so we were pushing them deploying as many cruises we could to try and resolve that to enable them to get to get further the bit that that you struggle with is if we if we didn't deploy a crew and you get a firefighter a emergent
01:37:21 and you get a firefighter a emergent seen you lose a crew it then suddenly diverts your firefighting effort to go and find those firefighters so we needed to keep that rescue operation is continuous as we could and really push hard to go to those upper floors just
01:37:33 hard to go to those upper floors just focusing on three floors you've referred to above the 11th you said 14th 16th and 18th
01:37:39 18th you said the highest I think you said the highest floor to which you recall deploying a mini DB a crew was the 14th versatile at that point at that point which point you talking about
01:37:51 which point you talking about so I staged it instant where where I'm still working s DB a crews were working pretty much at some point up to the 10th because as we started to win the floors it start to become a little bit easier
01:38:03 it start to become a little bit easier we were able to really to reposition some of the hoses out of the dryer Rises then to upper floors which then allowed us to extend a little bit higher but
01:38:14 us to extend a little bit higher but pushing on and that there were specific crews that either arcs to push on par sea level really outside of where they were to see how far they could get and they were saying they got to the 13th top of the 14th but couldn't get any further later on in the incident when
01:38:27 further later on in the incident when they started to win the fights for the 11th were able to push on further and do you recall which station the crew you deployed the to the 14th floor came from
01:38:40 deployed the to the 14th floor came from but the first one was a stag Fox shop 44 East home and how many four I think I sent in a crew of five and how far did they get they got to do so they pushed
01:38:53 they get they got to do so they pushed on posi 11th got to the twelfth Deneb course research race to the 13th they said and in on the 13th in the stairwell you do kind of five steps to do a kind of mezzanine and
01:39:05 five steps to do a kind of mezzanine and at that point they were they were pretty beat up and they felt they would not have got back so they told me there was some casualties which we knew later on
01:39:16 some casualties which we knew later on there was some some casualties in the lobby or the 13th before but they were clearly a deceased and they come back and gave me that information we've got a deployment of a crew of five from East Ham to the after 7:00 a.m. which is
01:39:31 Ham to the after 7:00 a.m. which is quite Layton into the incident does that does that seem right to you knows well before that okay did you say they got to the 14th today that's when I told me
01:39:42 the 14th today that's when I told me yeah do they affect the rescue there there was no risk they could they only poked their homes at the 14th it was too hot they were melting they said and that's when they came back and told me that it's just far far too hot for them
01:39:55 that it's just far far too hot for them to go without water to affect that rescue so they were the tactic at that point was in to push and try and calm the 11-4 down we were never gonna put it all out we needed to get to
01:40:07 gonna put it all out we needed to get to a point where it just made conditions better to push crews higher who was who was doing the debriefing when crews came
01:40:18 was doing the debriefing when crews came down as you were what about Richard Welch was he taking deeper yes and the reason to silver and Brian Akif around the entry control board did you all confer about particular debrief
01:40:29 confer about particular debrief each knew what every debrief involves I wouldn't say every debrief but certainly as debriefs came we would confer in certainty myself from Richard Walsh around tactics and progression right how was the plan working how far were we
01:40:42 was the plan working how far were we were we pushing crews what were the conditions against the EFS Jason and how far we could really push them but you know in between that time you know you had various systems going on on the
01:40:54 had various systems going on on the ground floor I had a firefighter he had bit round a corner because firefighters are coming down and collapse him if exhaustion we were trying to look after him and we had a casualty handling area on the other side where we were taking
01:41:05 the other side where we were taking casualties out so that's the fall team looking at the 16th you say you sent sent crews into the 16th floor do you remember when you deployed a needy be a crew
01:41:15 crew I'm assume you mean he D be a crew to the 16th floor no bait was coming towards my period in in command when we
01:41:26 towards my period in in command when we because we in we'd encountered a number of problems as well during that part so Quentin floor wasn't a wet rise it was a
01:41:38 Quentin floor wasn't a wet rise it was a dry riser which meant we had to connect our hoses to externally into the dryer eyes that inlet during a period of the night where the debris had fallen off it
01:41:49 night where the debris had fallen off it shot the hose in half which meant that we lost the delivery hose internal delivery hose which meant we lot lost water to the building it meant I to myself and Richard and Andy Wharton had
01:42:01 myself and Richard and Andy Wharton had to deploy crews underneath where the debris is falling to fix the hose to get the water pressure back on during another period on the 11th floor the the
01:42:12 another period on the 11th floor the the one of the 70 mil water jets burst so we had wore under pressure punching down the stairwell as you had those crews
01:42:23 the stairwell as you had those crews punching up waitwait men and you know to their credit they wanted to push on at some point I had to stop them because we were we were desperate to get
01:42:35 because we were we were desperate to get the FS jeez really desperate to get them but what happened was the crews are getting soaked before because of the jet as they were going up the stairs and then going into a fire compartment and getting boiled and they were still
01:42:47 getting boiled and they were still trying to push through to do that and in the end we just had to fix that water because they were just getting punished just to get back to my question do you remember when you deploy Danny D be a crew to the 16th floor sorry ok the same
01:43:00 crew to the 16th floor sorry ok the same question for the 18th floor do you have any recollection and no I don't think I ever got my in my come on I think I ever got to the 18th film okay so can we take it that 14th was the
01:43:13 okay so can we take it that 14th was the upper limit of the floors to which you actually sent the DBA crews yeah deployed yes because of the conditions that were first at the night from
01:43:25 that were first at the night from certainly then pushing the temp from xi xi was was particularly the one where crews were saying it was just too bad now can I just ask to ask you did we
01:43:36 now can I just ask to ask you did we show a picture which is M et triple 0 5 7 7 4 this is a picture of the wall in the lobby on the ground floor that says at the top above above 10 EDB a below 10
01:43:49 at the top above above 10 EDB a below 10 s DBA and Pete Wolf indoors told us that he wrote that up there do you have a recollection of a discussion about the
01:44:00 recollection of a discussion about the 10th floor being the boundary between s DB a and E DBA deployment yes what when was that discussion with Pete Wilson Dan no I didn't have that discuss I repeat
01:44:11 no I didn't have that discuss I repeat often Dan do who was it something I never taking the stages first of all who did you have the discussion with spoke to Richard and at this discussion we've Nick Kamiya who was looking after the
01:44:22 Nick Kamiya who was looking after the pool of resources and what he was doing was giving crews before I got a detailed brief and overly brief so I by the time they got to me they had an idea of what the plan was and Louisa to Silverland and Brian who were taking information as
01:44:35 and Brian who were taking information as crews were going to them with their floors and also as they were coming back to be debriefed and do you remember where the discussion took place between people Fenton and Richard Welch about
01:44:47 people Fenton and Richard Welch about about that no one I spoke to Richard but I don't know the discussion between Richard and Pete did he do you remember whether he went into the lobby from the bridgehead an area to speak to people's
01:44:59 bridgehead an area to speak to people's and do about that and we were all in the ground floor lobby so the number of discussions took place through tonight in that Lobby area where the crews were congregating so I would have expected
01:45:11 congregating so I would have expected they were the spoke there
01:45:15 right do you remember being party to the discussion about the division between between them et bien STP whereas at the 10th law I can't remember being party to it but I may have been right
01:45:37 and
01:45:41 would you like to break certain is that I'm gonna get articles I think I've been it's been indicated to me that it might help you yeah obsolete can we take five minutes certainly is that enough time I
01:45:52 minutes certainly is that enough time I should ask you yeah that'd be final things movin it's enough yeah well it will say until five to four
01:46:14 it's a minute before I leave you are you getting all right now fine we'll finish by for 30 years we have to finish my food if it turns out that you're not ready by yes I apologize
01:46:30 that you're not ready by yes I apologize for keeping witnesses sitting there wondering what's going on yes no quite right all right I was distracted brother that's right fact forges
01:54:21 McDougal Vaughn you happy to carry on yes if it any other stage you think you need a break just just do indicate you don't have to wait to be ours thank you
01:54:34 don't have to wait to be ours thank you for coming back can I just clarify one one thing that arises out of some questions I asked you about a deployment
01:54:47 to the 14th floor which was changed we talked about a deployment to flat one one three which was which was changed you said you didn't recall it I think
01:54:59 you said you didn't recall it I think and if it wasn't you who else could have made that change Richard Ross could have anybody else I wouldn't have expected
01:55:10 anybody else I wouldn't have expected that unless Louise O'Brien had some information but but they would have checked that off with either myself or Richard first right and where a change like that would be made so that a deployment as a result or instruction to
01:55:24 deployment as a result or instruction to a crew as a result of an FSG call let's say above the 11th floor was changed to it so that it would no longer happen and you held the chit as it were
01:55:36 why was that not communicated back to the guys handling the FSG at the wall and then back to eventually the control room so that the call handlers would no
01:55:47 room so that the call handlers would no I don't recall someone's brief being changed so you know I know he had a system in place we had Evo cruising is to be a cruise they were being deployed by myself or or
01:55:58 were being deployed by myself or or Richard now going back to this question of the 10th floor being the boundary between the s DBA and e DB air deployments was this around the same
01:56:11 deployments was this around the same time as what we've called perhaps unfortunately now the heated or passionate discussion between or with watch managers Williams and station manager wolf and and the bulletin done about deployment or was it a separate
01:56:23 about deployment or was it a separate occasion no it's just part of the tactical plan it was to enable a focus on on specific areas just to enable simultaneous working so we needed to
01:56:35 simultaneous working so we needed to plan to certainly work on the floors below the temp that was still alight that were still caught in us some issues because don't forget every time you went through a single door from a stairwell
01:56:46 through a single door from a stairwell into the lobby you don't compromise the stairwell with smoke so we still had work going on in there but still we're pushing hard to to certainly focus on those exceptionally bad floors to enable
01:56:59 those exceptionally bad floors to enable progress to upper floors knowing that we'd you know in the earlier part of the incident we'd had firefighters up to the top but now conditions were just so poor that we needed to to do some focus work
01:57:13 that we needed to to do some focus work on floors to enable progression do you remember any of the officers managing the FSG calls there this time wolf ndon and Williams expressing any concerns
01:57:26 and Williams expressing any concerns about the decision only to deploy EDB whereas above the 10th floor no you don't
01:57:39 once you've made the decision only to deploy need to be aware is above the 10th floor where crews continuing to present at the bridgehead carrying chits of specific FSG information for calls
01:57:52 of specific FSG information for calls above the 10th floor I don't recall crews presenting movement chips the the sheets of paper that were coming from FSGS who have been passed directly to the entry control the crews
01:58:04 directly to the entry control the crews were then getting their briefs so from myself or Richard to the floor they were going to and then they were getting the FSGS that were on that floor from entry control at that point it may
01:58:18 from entry control at that point it may be that louisa or brian gave them the pursuit of paper in case i wanted to carry it but they were getting briefs as well right because i thought we'd come to a position where at the beginning
01:58:29 to a position where at the beginning when the bridgehead was on the ground floor crews were coming into the into the into the bridgehead control with chips of paper with FSG calls on them very early so very early in that point
01:58:40 very early so very early in that point but that's the point where myself and Richard stopped FSGS deploying crews by themselves right so very early
01:58:54 let me take a question rising out of that and can I ask you please to be shown lfb quadruple zero one nine to
01:59:06 shown lfb quadruple zero one nine to nine
01:59:11 these are chips of paper which bear for most of them bear Pete wolfin Dan's handwriting all but two the two of the
01:59:25 handwriting all but two the two of the middle ones on the top and some of them arced 4 10 4 34 24 10 405 and they are all well you can see the floors some of them are for the 14th floor do you
01:59:37 them are for the 14th floor do you remember seeing these that piece of paper now watch manager O'Keefe gave evidence that he had found these in his tunic at the end of the night and handed them to the NFB after the incident do
01:59:48 them to the NFB after the incident do you remember yourself seeing watch manager O'Keefe receiving sheds like this from people from done or anybody else coming from the wall no you don't sorry now does it surprise you to see
01:59:59 sorry now does it surprise you to see these no I'm not surprised if FSGS are getting information it may be that he wrote those information down and time-stamped it right what wouldn't be sure is what activity occurred on the
02:00:11 sure is what activity occurred on the basis of what those pieces of paper were especially if Brian found the piece is a pocket if that evidence is right obviously we'll have to consider it but if that's right it does show you the chit's of paper were coming from the
02:00:22 chit's of paper were coming from the wall and being given to the bridgehead as late as 4:30 with FS cheese above the 11th floor my question is really first
02:00:33 11th floor my question is really first of all whether you know you knew about that and I think you said no so my next question is well who would know about it if not you sorry I thought the question was did I know about this specific sheet of paper which I don't there was a
02:00:45 of paper which I don't there was a number of bits of paper that would pass her I wouldn't I wouldn't know each specific one but I certainly know that the FS cheese were passing sheets of paper to ensure control so that's that's entirely correct right okay and then
02:00:58 entirely correct right okay and then what were you doing with the FSGS such as the one we see second on the second from the left flat 111 3 215 on the 14th floor what
02:01:11 flat 111 3 215 on the 14th floor what what allocations of EDB a or st ba were you were you making as a result of receiving that information it depends on so if that was at 4:10 I I really can't recall at what stage we
02:01:24 I I really can't recall at what stage we were in terms of the firefighting operation and how far we could get right so if it was at the period of the night where we we were unable to push those crews past the 11th then we would have held those FSGS waiting to ensure that
02:01:37 held those FSGS waiting to ensure that we were able to push those crews by looking back to fire on the on the 11th if it was further on where I was asking certain crews to push on then they would have been allocated those who we
02:01:48 have been allocated those who we allocated the 14th floor they would have been given that information by Brian or or Louisa and and pushed on if I'd allocated a crew to the 14th all right I think you did you know in general terms
02:02:02 think you did you know in general terms that this system was operating that the crew dirt people from that was continuing to bring chits in with FSG information written on them from higher floors and giving them to the bridgehead
02:02:14 floors and giving them to the bridgehead into action yeah we never stops we're trying to receive information from F from FSG right that that particular sheet of paper looks like an overall summary of some of the information
02:02:25 summary of some of the information they've got rather than some single pieces of paper which were I've got an F is G on exception floor so I would I would I would be shocked if we would have said I certainly wouldn't have expected or would have wanted to send
02:02:37 expected or would have wanted to send the crew we have a sheet of paper that details the 11th for the 12 for the 14th and the 15th and the temp on it that we just wouldn't deploy a crew in that way that's not too much work so you could
02:02:48 that's not too much work so you could and if you don't remember to say so but what would you or did you do at the bridgehead in response to that I think you said you would have held the chair back what would have happened to the
02:02:59 back what would have happened to the information right so you know knowing that was and I'm not too sure of the timing but if if it was the 11th floor I would have deployed which I did crews 11th floor and said to the NEPA crew
02:03:11 11th floor and said to the NEPA crew you're gonna go to the 11th there's a firefighting jet I think at that point when we was at lis 11th there was a firefighting jet coming from the 9th though I would have told him that there's sdp a crews protecting your
02:03:22 there's sdp a crews protecting your access and egress but you've still got serious fire below you and then they would have gone to the reader and the weasel Brian would have gone and you've got an FSA in fact 1 82 83 and 84 now in terms of flaws
02:03:41 1 82 83 and 84 now in terms of flaws we've got station manager wolfin turns evidence that he spoke to group manager Welch as a result of which group manager Welch told him that he would try to get
02:03:53 Welch told him that he would try to get to or possibly above the 15th floor my question is do you recall any such discussion yourself no it depends what time of the night so very early on in
02:04:04 time of the night so very early on in the night when we felt we could make progress because if I wasn't extensive we were pushing on as as high as we could and certainly it was talks of 1516 floor but the information we then got
02:04:15 floor but the information we then got back from cruises it the conditions have just deteriorated it's just too difficult so it's just around the timing of that right this is the question I should have asked you earlier but this
02:04:26 should have asked you earlier but this is a convenient moment to ask it earlier on in the night do you recall a specific discussion earlier on in the night about difficulties or struggling to get above the 15th floor no not specifically the
02:04:40 the 15th floor no not specifically the 15th floor but certainly heard crews struggling to who had gone to do rescue struggling to come back I can't recall what the floor they were from that certainly included have really pushed
02:04:52 certainly included have really pushed themselves into a place of difficulty and was struggling to come back to a place of safety going back then earlier in the night to the time when you first arrived at the bridgehead when it was on
02:05:04 arrived at the bridgehead when it was on the third floor do you remember any discussion about crews struggling to get up of the 15th floor at that stage so from 220 also sorry not specific in the
02:05:18 from 220 also sorry not specific in the 15th but I do remember a crew coming back and I thought they came back from the higher floor maybe the 20th who were saying it that they pretty much ran ran and jumped and fell back to the floors
02:05:29 and jumped and fell back to the floors it was they didn't think they was gonna make it okay but but specifically I'm asking specifically about the 15th floor at that early point the 15th floor as a specific floor didn't know sorry then
02:05:41 specific floor didn't know sorry then moving moving forward in time then can I show you a photograph m ET quadruple 0 5
02:05:52 show you a photograph m ET quadruple 0 5 7 7 6 now this is a photograph of the main lobby wall and it's not that easy
02:06:07 main lobby wall and it's not that easy to see but we connect we can magnify underneath or yellow wires just by the door jamb we can see that somebody has written Oh for 1301 of our 15th
02:06:21 does that help you recall any kind of discussion about about and not deploying crews above the 15th floor I don't recall I've not caused
02:06:33 I don't recall I've not caused discussion specific about the 15th floor but certainly requiring discussions about the difficulties and the fire spread on the 11th and upwards 11th or not was right okay people turned and said that he wrote
02:06:44 people turned and said that he wrote that up learned about 4th about 4:30 no one above 15th but you don't think you so you don't remember and you discuss sorry not at that time all right
02:06:53 do you remember any discussion that station manager Myatt had with you about that subject or any floor in particular
02:07:04 that subject or any floor in particular at about this time sorry now I remember having a number of discussions we have Nick but sorry I can't really the content of it right can I also ask you
02:07:16 content of it right can I also ask you them to be shown an exhibit of station manager
02:07:19 manager Egan's which is a meaty triple zero one three zero four nine which is fifth exhibit a meaty triple zero one three zero four nine
02:08:05 that's going to work those are amazing
02:08:10 you drive a difference
02:08:20 oh let's try it this is a different reference m ET triple zero one five six three four now this is a whiteboard from
02:08:38 three four now this is a whiteboard from Cu seven which records if you see on the in the black writing on the right-hand side of the whiteboard from SM Wolfington at zero four twenty-five be a
02:08:51 Wolfington at zero four twenty-five be a crews committed to 15th floor and then at 4504 forty five be a crews only committed up to 11th floor not 15th
02:09:03 committed up to 11th floor not 15th first of all at 425 do you remember a discussion either with Wolf endure or Richard Welch about not committing about
02:09:15 Richard Welch about not committing about committing crews to the fifteenth floor as recorded there no but that seems that the mesh is a tow for forty five is a clarification for the 100 for twenty
02:09:27 clarification for the 100 for twenty five which would parent confirm the 11th floor issue that we were is that your reading of that now is that a recollection of that would be my read of that okay so looking at those two pieces
02:09:39 that okay so looking at those two pieces of data does that help us time the decision whereby crews were limited only to go to the 11th floor yeah the timing indicates the difficulties that we were
02:09:50 indicates the difficulties that we were faced on what floors they were right and was that before or after do you think the decision was made early to commit EDB a crews above the tenth floor as recorded on the wall that we saw earlier
02:10:02 recorded on the wall that we saw earlier i would say that was probably afterwards because we were focusing this d bi below temp for protection do you have any recollection of station manager Egan coming to speak to you when the
02:10:13 coming to speak to you when the bridgehead was on the ground floor I don't remember speakers it's a Dan Egan all night do you know Danny I know Danny he gave evidence and he said that there was a discussion between him you
02:10:25 there was a discussion between him you and group manager Welch in which he expressed concern and I'm summarizing his evidence that too much focus was being put on putting far out and not enough on getting people out of the building that was thought it
02:10:36 out of the building that was thought it was his recollection do you recall that I don't remember seeing station manager you can or not okay did you talk to him at all during the night anymore night
02:10:49 at all during the night anymore night everybody you didn't see ever did you talk to him if I saw him what I talked to him no let me try this a slightly different way did you speak to station manager Egan by radio at any point during the night no not this p2 at all
02:11:01 during the night no not this p2 at all sorry okay and this is I don't I don't remember speaking to him for an answer okay now let me turn to a different
02:11:13 okay now let me turn to a different topic stay put in your supplemental statement on page three in second
02:11:24 statement on page three in second paragraph you say
02:11:33 that you are aware that and ero had changed the staple policy it's the
02:11:44 changed the staple policy it's the second paragraph you see that and you say the conditions within the building force that changed at that point had already begun system at exertion due to the sheer volume of people do you
02:11:55 the sheer volume of people do you remember roughly at least what time you learnt that and ero had changed the state of policy sorry no okay was it do you think it was pressing that was it
02:12:06 you think it was pressing that was it before or after the bridgehead came down to the ground floor that you learned that he changed the state for Policy it wouldn't have been when I was on the
02:12:18 wouldn't have been when I was on the bridge on the third floor so it would have taken place when I was on the ground floor but I really couldn't give a definitive time I saw the AC and yo
02:12:29 a definitive time I saw the AC and yo Lachlan and and ero periodically through tonight as so did Richard and we were passing information over our plan and the tactics and also there so but
02:12:41 the tactics and also there so but couldn't obviously tell you what time that once knew
02:12:45 so you think it was you think you learnt about any change in statehood advice when you when you were on the ground floor yes do you remember or know when and ero
02:12:57 yes do you remember or know when and ero actually changed that advice or authorized to change of that advice the exact time is already not know right do you know if anybody on the bridgehead was consulted by Andy Roe or anybody
02:13:10 was consulted by Andy Roe or anybody else about the decision to change the statehood advice yep potentially but I really can't remember I know that there was so much information coming in but I you know it could have been communicated
02:13:22 you know it could have been communicated I may have missed it I just really can't remember
02:13:28 now mr. Welch says in his supplemental statement and I don't need to take you to to this it's it's page nine he says
02:13:42 to to this it's it's page nine he says that he thought he became aware of the change to the statehood policy a staple advice around 8 a.m. do you remember
02:13:53 advice around 8 a.m. do you remember anything happening around that time of which would trigger a recollection about a change in the statehood advice in your mind no I was I was focused on other
02:14:05 mind no I was I was focused on other things at that time I'd I knew I still had a rescue to take place if I recall remem was us be refocused that we still had a casualty on attempt from the 11th and I was deploying crews to go and get those two okay where were you at about 8
02:14:18 those two okay where were you at about 8 a.m. still in the lobby still in the lobby like the bridgehead had appreciate where was he at 8 a.m. Richard Richard Welch in the lobby at the bridgehead yeah or around that area on the ground
02:14:29 yeah or around that area on the ground floor he could have been standing on the other side by the cruise or Nick mile or near FSA's but he was serving on the ground floor right ok but you don't remember him receiving that information at about 8:00 a.m.
02:14:40 at about 8:00 a.m. sorry no did the change in statehood advice as you recall it happening result in any change to the tactics or strategy
02:14:52 in any change to the tactics or strategy they've deployed being used at the bridgehead no we were at systemic searching at that point because we were dictated by the fire of how far we we
02:15:04 dictated by the fire of how far we we could go right slightly different topic can I ask you to look at the short incident log please
02:15:19 at page 22 and I want you to look at the time mark of o2 1736 you'll see there
02:15:40 that
02:15:50 at o2 actually a t-38 I apologize a to
02:16:00 38:21 you can see that a dangerous structure engineer was the subject of a service request do you remember that yes
02:16:11 service request do you remember that yes remember we had the discussion and requested or requested the IC but for the I seal already called for dangerous structural engineer we were worried about a stability of the building right and in fact if you look across to page 22 which i think is where I wanted to
02:16:24 22 which i think is where I wanted to start we see the I think the first request for that at o2 1736 which is a message of CUA requests dangerous structure engineer now at that point
02:16:38 structure engineer now at that point were you aware that a DSA had been called for do you recall that yes there was some discussion art by a cop look whoever it was exactly that time but we certainly called for a DSes normal practice here we had some real concerns
02:16:51 practice here we had some real concerns that their building that potential to collapse now you I think had only just arrived at this stage so this would be around about the same time as your arrival do you remember actually having any discussion with anybody at that time
02:17:03 any discussion with anybody at that time about about the need to call the DRC no I certainly had that discussion on the projector do you know why given that a DAC had been called for because of those
02:17:15 DAC had been called for because of those concerns at 217 36 stay-put advice was still being given to those on the building
02:17:26 no the cooling the DSC is long practice if you worrying about you're worried about and concerned about building stability hmm it doesn't protect you
02:17:37 stability hmm it doesn't protect you mean it's it's going to collapse you want an assessment to be able to make a decision about what your tactical plan is going forward right we knew we had a severe fire and obviously at that I doubt if I would have been privy to that
02:17:48 doubt if I would have been privy to that conversation at that point but certainly later on in the incident we was concerned about how stable to building laws would it be in accordance with policy or normal practice to continue to give callers statehood advice while at
02:18:02 give callers statehood advice while at the same time calling for a dangerous structures engineer because of the concerns you've identified yeah it could be and a lot of it depends on what you think and what part do you think is subject to collapse we're called a
02:18:14 subject to collapse we're called a dangerous structure engineer not because sometimes the partial collapse it may be that we we've got a concern about other structures it may be a walkway that might affect the operations and might collapse it might be something to do
02:18:25 collapse it might be something to do part of the Buddha that may deliver a partial clap so generally doesn't always mean that it's it's it's great we just want an assessment because of concerns with the fact that you had concerns
02:18:37 with the fact that you had concerns which led to a DSE being called not prompt you at least to consider the wisdom of continuing to give stated advice to callers I think there would have been a something for the IC to
02:18:48 have been a something for the IC to consider but it depends on what they called the DAC for in terms of collapse at that point no I know what we called the DSC for later on in the incident because we were we were concerned that
02:19:01 because we were we were concerned that the building was in grave that not in grave danger but we're just concerned that it was there was potential for collapse but we had to make a decision about whether we were gonna stay and carry on and we made a decision between
02:19:12 carry on and we made a decision between us they were still a persons reported fire it was still FSGS we were those people's last hope and if it was bad it was bad but we had to carry on trying to
02:19:23 was bad but we had to carry on trying to rescue them in general terms mr. Goulbourne he did did there come a point when it was it was obvious to you that rescue from the top floors of the tower
02:19:36 rescue from the top floors of the tower the higher floors of the tower would be impossible no no we never gave up hope at all not for out the whole of that operation and people do miraculous things in incidents
02:19:48 people do miraculous things in incidents and there was always a view that there could be someone in a void there could be someone hiding somewhere and and we were there hoping we weren't going to give up not not chance did there ever come a point when you thought that the
02:20:00 come a point when you thought that the evacuation was the only option
02:20:07 no what I always thought we were going to commit and get crews up to rescue people and again I probably just need to quantify that you know detailing how difficult evacuation was that the
02:20:19 difficult evacuation was that the conditions in the stairwell were really really difficult if I if I deployed it as I would multiple firefighters on multiple floors into that and then the
02:20:31 multiple floors into that and then the elements that combustion were in that stair which they were I had firefighters working for long periods of time was just on their bellies because they couldn't stand up you wouldn't have been able to evacuate people in those conditions you would have directed them
02:20:42 conditions you would have directed them to the death it would have made the operation fail I just got one more question which is to go back to
02:20:56 to go back to something you said this morning but reverse to first started talking about compartment ation and cladding and it was in the context of my questions about training and the fire in
02:21:09 questions about training and the fire in a high-rise in France and you said we hadn't really talked about what happens when it starts breaching each compartment up because if I'm perfectly honest that's something I don't think I've ever seen and didn't expect there's
02:21:22 I've ever seen and didn't expect there's a clarification question do you mean that you'd never seen and didn't expect a fire traveling up the facade of a building or do you mean you didn't expect it to enter in breach back into a
02:21:33 expect it to enter in breach back into a particular compartment yeah we've seen fires travel up facades for a number of reasons the the most common one is is balconies external balconies
02:21:45 balconies external balconies we've just had probably the hottest Sun we've had in a long while someone has a barbecue in an open balcony new sometimes you get fire spread quite rapidly and I think we've recently seen a fire in Camden that did exactly that but but but to breach the compartment
02:21:58 but but but to breach the compartment ation on multiple floors going that way I've never seen anything like that in my life when you see going that way do you mean from the outside to the inside yeah you know seen that before no yeah
02:22:10 you know seen that before no yeah we've moved into fires that of breach compartment ation put the potential on one floor it's come out of a flat into a lobby always come out flat into a communal here away or restore a stairwell
02:22:21 stairwell but even at multiple floors you would expect you would expect at some point a compartment ation should do what it does you don't expect multiple favors on multiple floors it's it's it's something that I'll never see it going from west
02:22:33 that I'll never see it going from west no that's a good one thank you very much I've been delighted to know those are all the questions I have subject to anything that you might potentially
02:22:44 anything that you might potentially emerge mr. Chairman I am I am as it were completed at 25 past four let it be noted and in the usual way there may be one or two questions that occur yes
02:22:55 one or two questions that occur yes to check that less than five minutes so I can let the witness go for 13 as I promised the school will sometimes happen that counsel need time to check they have them looking for questions and
02:23:06 they have them looking for questions and some so I'm gonna rise now but to also leave the room don't talk to anyone about of course and we'll get you back in no later than a possible thank you
02:23:18 in no later than a possible thank you there might be some more questions but I don't have to see them all right thank you very much
02:23:32 right all 30 already
02:29:25 yes mr. Knight yes first of all mr. chairman by saying what I said about their leaving five minutes I didn't mean to stop people on asking me to ask ask questions and they
02:29:37 asking me to ask ask questions and they have had that chilling effect I hope it hasn't but I think I'm really clear to you that if you need more time yes yeah but I think it has an extension of other people need more time quite say but I hate but had to Stephen had it me no Toby didn't have a silencing effect
02:29:48 Toby didn't have a silencing effect that's the last thing I want to want to achieve so let me make that clear there is there are two more questions I have so I can get the witness back office we have mr. come on Batman please
02:30:13 I think it was good and I think there are a few more curses okay I think you got very short it's really to follow our own to two things really you said at the end of your evidence that you never gave
02:30:24 end of your evidence that you never gave up hope does that apply to this is difficult to answer does that apply to those who are calling from floors above floor 11th floor 14 16 18 yeah we were
02:30:37 floor 11th floor 14 16 18 yeah we were never ever going to stop Shawna Rita so you know to a man and woman on every single crew there so people working on that at our command at that point we
02:30:49 that at our command at that point we were still keen to to keep on trying even when the FSG calls went quietly we kept on going given the conditions that you've described as were being reported to you by returning EDB a cruise in the
02:31:03 to you by returning EDB a cruise in the debriefs white-hot in huge amounts of heat and smoke what did you think was going to happen on those higher floors to allow you later to reach the corners
02:31:15 to allow you later to reach the corners there we were going to make the conditions better by tackling the fire on on off to each of the floors that were obviously feeding the difficult floors
02:31:25 floors once we got it to a stage I never say we got that under control we would get to a point where it was bearable we would have pushed on certainly as a commander I went up to the knife and you leave him
02:31:36 I went up to the knife and you leave him to check how bad it was for the crews and I'm certainly on my belly it was there were terrible conditions but we had to keep on going and and that's what those crews been especially as all those
02:31:48 those crews been especially as all those be a cruise due to they kept on trying to get to the point of making conditions bearable to to push on further in reality given the conditions that you yourself observed on those higher floors how could you in rate in reality of had
02:32:00 how could you in rate in reality of had any real hope that you would be able eventually to send crews to rescue people effectively it's in my 20 years in the fire service I've seen people survive all sorts and and you'd be
02:32:11 survive all sorts and and you'd be surprised that if you give up hope suddenly that you find them tucked away we've cruise rescue people within fridges and cupboards and all sorts of places that we find
02:32:24 places that we find we will not stop until we've searched every single broom every single cupboard every single door and two we're satisfied that we've got everybody and and that would have been the only time we would have stopped and what level of
02:32:36 we would have stopped and what level of personal risk were crews exposed to by virtue of their deployment to those higher floors we're still shocked at that we brought everyone home I think we
02:32:48 that we brought everyone home I think we were preparing for firefighters to die so shocked in a good way yeah absolutely we'd made a decision very early that we were going to push on China rescue
02:32:59 were going to push on China rescue people despite concerns so he late run about stability of the building and that was going back to my point that we were not going to give up hope certainly myself and Richard had that conversation
02:33:11 myself and Richard had that conversation and if I thought I still win just facts and at some point once you make a decision you move the emotion out the way and the facts are that those people will rely on us we
02:33:38 we take our responsibility really seriously it's a honor to protect your city and if it's an only particular City you're not going to give that up it's painful that we've lost 72 people that
02:33:49 painful that we've lost 72 people that evening but we would we were never going to give up on them mr. Google that's very clear I'm very grateful for that explanation and those are all the questions I have I think is to say thank
02:34:02 questions I have I think is to say thank you very much for for coming to us and assisting us with our investigations we very much appreciate it thank you certainly it's really helpful to ask to hear your account of what you were doing
02:34:15 hear your account of what you were doing during the night in question and very grateful to you for coming and I'm sorry if it's been a distress - find a difficult experience thank you anyway thank you very much need to a free to go now and you'd like to give her the
02:34:27 now and you'd like to give her the option okay
02:34:44 I'm gonna first minute mr. chairman I want to say just one or two things about the timetable if I meant there has been a little bit of behind-the-scenes work we've published the timetable for
02:34:56 we've published the timetable for tomorrow I know that you've been very kind in allowing me a 9:30 start as a result of me asking you because we've got quite a long day yes I apologize to
02:35:09 got quite a long day yes I apologize to everyone else in the room for that too I know it wasn't easy but we've published the timetable for tomorrow and for Monday we're calling for witnesses from the control room and one witness from
02:35:20 the control room and one witness from the control room of Northwest Northwest fire service we had provisionally indicated that we were going to be calling Sharon Lancaster from Essex Fire and Rescue Service but we are unable to call her tomorrow
02:35:33 but we are unable to call her tomorrow or Monday because of the timetabling we are going to call her on another day soon I want to give that assurance we do want to call that it is our intention to
02:35:44 want to call that it is our intention to do so that the difficulty is just fitting her in along with the other control room officers tomorrow and Monday it's just no room in the timetable for it because there are some important questions we want to cover
02:35:55 important questions we want to cover with her so I'm sorry about that but we will be we will be calling her as soon as we can so that means that for tomorrow the order is Alexandra Norman and Peter dotty and for Monday it's
02:36:07 and Peter dotty and for Monday it's Debbie real I should jabbin and Angie gods yes
02:36:14 gods yes good well thank you very much so we break now and starts tough nine that's grateful tomorrow I should also just say
02:36:27 grateful tomorrow I should also just say there's going to be a fire alarm test in eight minutes time and say I don't want people to be distressed about what that is it's the usual Wednesday for 45 tests but since we're just a little bit after a fourth or not I shall just mention
02:36:39 a fourth or not I shall just mention that thank you for reminding every year yes thank you how Fox 9 tomorrow then please