London Fire Brigade expert Dr Lane gives evidence on fire risk assessments at Grenfell Tower, emergency planning failures, fire lift compliance, and training program delays following the Lakanal House inquiry.
00:00:02 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing the first thing we're going to do is to complete the evidence of mr. Lawton
00:00:22 good morning mr. Lockley when is that already carry on yes thank you sir thank you yes we did it mr. chairman good morning morning mr. O'Laughlin money thank you for coming back to us we're very grateful can I start this
00:00:33 we're very grateful can I start this morning really where I left off last night and that is where you were coming to the end of your period in command as incident commander and during the
00:00:46 incident commander and during the entirety of the period you were incident commander do you remember telling anybody at control that crews were struggling to get above the 15th floor as into the command now I didn't speak
00:00:58 as into the command now I didn't speak directly with control and I wasn't aware of that at that point in time you guys were as he was in command we've had some evidence from DAC Fenton and operations manager Joe Smith from control that they
00:01:10 manager Joe Smith from control that they had been informed that crews were struggling to get above the 15th floor and that that had been an ingredient in their decision to change the statement advice can you help where might that
00:01:24 advice can you help where might that have information where did that if may income directly versity or may only the only contact I'm aware of directly control was either damn Merrick who was receiving information from control or from the fire survival guidance unit which I'd asked to make contact with
00:01:35 which I'd asked to make contact with control so my expectation would be has come from the first of all the guidance unit right it's the only place but I wasn't aware of his extent Ilana you weren't aware of it event as in a commander can I then take you to page 17
00:01:50 commander can I then take you to page 17 of your statement and ask you please to look at the bottom in the last paragraph there you say I was then informed by one of the command team that the stay-put
00:02:01 of the command team that the stay-put advice had been changed by control just pausing there can you remember how long before you handed incident command over
00:02:14 before you handed incident command over to Andy Road that you were informed that the staple device had been changed by control probably no more than two to three minutes two minutes do you remember who told you it was one of the watch managers who
00:02:25 it was one of the watch managers who come on to the command Janu so it it wasn't damn Marik or mark Enfield it was another watch manager another watch manager you know where he or she had been I don't know it been no it come on
00:02:37 been I don't know it been no it come on the Union and they've gone sit opposite where damn murica been sitting I think he'd taken over from Markham field as a team leader it spoke of me Markham field as well I think there in that time as well right had that knowledge have been on cu7 do you know I
00:02:50 knowledge have been on cu7 do you know I don't know if you've been on cu7 it came on CUA at some point during the time I was in charge right and he started doing work on cu8 do you know whether that watch manager had had him or herself been in touch with the
00:03:01 or herself been in touch with the control room or it got that information from somewhere else the information regarding stay put he had a telephone he was on telephone and he just put the telephone down he interrupted a conversation I was having with another
00:03:12 conversation I was having with another officer and said that he had something as a priority to tell me so he actually interrupted a conversation I was having and just just described the scene for me he was on the phone was he I think he'd just finished on the phone so heam hope
00:03:23 just finished on the phone so heam hope you had a mobile phone in his hand right and he stopped using that and he'd kind of interrupted he kind of he didn't cherish and a louder voice is it something I've got something as a priority so it means you have to I had
00:03:34 priority so it means you have to I had to stop whatever I was doing the conversation I was having right I asked him what he was and he just said state-controlled has changed stapler did you ask him who at control had told him that I asked him to do that for me I
00:03:45 that I asked him to do that for me I said find out who has made that decision at control and don't do that he had then at the phone control back did you do that the phone controlled by yes who did he speak to you Joe I don't know he spoke to he told me that
00:03:56 I don't know he spoke to he told me that it was decade reinvent him that I changed it and he clarified the state clarified it as well so so the first one it was just stay put as they said stay put has changed and the second conversation afterwards he said the
00:04:07 conversation afterwards he said the decade reinventing had changed it and they started to make fast a lot of guidance and they changed stay put for far some other guidance right
00:04:19 you say but next question were you to the best of your knowledge asked for your permission as incident commander at the time now to change stay put or you
00:04:31 the time now to change stay put or you just took it as a fait accompli from control I wasn't asked for permission it was correct came through as it had been changed by control and that's the reason I was to find out who had changed it now you say my first reaction was surprise
00:04:42 you say my first reaction was surprise as no one had spoken to me does that mean that normally you would be consulted on whether stay put the revocation of stay put would occur you'd
00:04:55 revocation of stay put would occur you'd actually instant commander should we can solve it on a decision like that I would and on the understanding of this incident there was an enormous amount going on I me on the fire ground and in control to the expectation if you like a normal instant would attend would be to
00:05:06 normal instant would attend would be to you too big to news and commander about the change of decision rather yes I think we covered this yesterday but in your experience had you ever been incident commander acid incident where you've happen you had decided to revoke statehood that not being someone that
00:05:19 statehood that not being someone that change paper so your surprise was was based on what so as far as was because they said stay put I fought them into what am expectation was I meant that people who are in unaffected flats so we'd be asking people in unaffected
00:05:30 we'd be asking people in unaffected flats if we could somehow communicate them so leave via the staircase which at that point in time I didn't know was clearest bike but that takes me to the next question what did you understand the advice would now be as a result of
00:05:41 the advice would now be as a result of the change that you speak of here in your statement so after the second phone call which was probably less than a minute later so he phoned to them back immediately and within 30 seconds he was speaking back to me and said it was
00:05:52 speaking back to me and said it was Adrian Fenton who made the decision right I knew control and therefore property agent Fenton was also in contact with the FSG unit so my expectation was that they got information in the issue FSG unit that I didn't yet have that
00:06:03 FSG unit that I didn't yet have that told them something about the conditions and the building meant that they could or they were going to change their advice for some people but when they talked about being first of all with guidance I thought well the people as far as sort of God says to tell people
00:06:14 far as sort of God says to tell people to leave if they can anyway so it felt like they were just going to reinforce in first of all the guards if you can leave you should leave but for me that was always part of our smaller Gardens anyway if you leave going around in the cycle while
00:06:25 leave going around in the cycle while checking again in the game if you can leave then it just meant they were it felt like they were going to reinforce it to people if they felt they can leave but materially it might not have actually made much difference because people who in flats and trapped by for
00:06:37 people who in flats and trapped by for example thick black smoke still wouldn't be able to leave did you ask the watch manager to go back to Adrian Fenton and clarify precisely what the new advice was to be in my case stay put I didn't
00:06:49 was to be in my case stay put I didn't know felt like they were going to say to me young man standing them was that if people and first of all the guidance were phoning up they were going to be told to leave which wouldn't be what I'd expect them to be told anyway and it
00:07:00 expect them to be told anyway and it seemed like we were talking about stay put when we should have been talking about for some other guidance so so it seemed confused which one they meant did you seek to clarify that can no that point in time why is that within I think
00:07:11 point in time why is that within I think 30 seconds or a minute of that came in the information from the FFG FSG unit regarding the number of casualties or number of people involved sorry and then following that and ero got on to the Union right so that all will happen
00:07:23 Union right so that all will happen within property three minutes I think maybe four minutes we're not a long time right you said a minute ago the last answer the one that your understanding was that if people on fire survival
00:07:34 was that if people on fire survival guidance were phoning up they were going to be told to leave which would be what I would expect me to them to be told anyway is that really right mr. O'Laughlin would you expect any FSG
00:07:46 O'Laughlin would you expect any FSG caller who says I am an FSG caller to be told to leave if in fact they would they were trapped well they only become an FSG caller once they say they are trapped and they can't leave their flats oh so if they phone up and say they've
00:07:57 oh so if they phone up and say they've been affected by smoke my expectation is they are told the best thing to do is leave of course in a block of flats that's more difficult beyond just putting in this one it was very difficult to ensure that their escape route was safe but if they've got smoke
00:08:09 route was safe but if they've got smoke effects in mall ready they'll still be safer to get away from their smoke when once they say they can not leave that's when it becomes the first of all the guidance cool yes and at that point the control officer should be assessing
00:08:20 control officer should be assessing their conditions if there's a new alternative means of escape and working out is there a way to get them out but if it's clear that that person is trapped by even the smokey or flames and they can not then that is a photo of a guy in school
00:08:31 then that is a photo of a guy in school and that's my expectation on them yes and that since those people are trapped and genuine FSG callers as opposed to people who are affected by smoke but might be able to leave would you not
00:08:45 might be able to leave would you not then need to assess or the caller not the operator not need to be able to assess the safety of the exit ruse but before that person could leave yes I mean I by that point I think that would
00:08:56 mean I by that point I think that would that's the coordination between the FSG unit and control we've got an individual calls so it's very difficult for the patrol officers to assess the conditions for them to escape right it was because
00:09:08 for them to escape right it was because they use stay put in the term when we talk about first of all the guidance it became unclear what they meant I think what my understanding at the point was they were going to try and encourage people on the first twelve garden schools to check again if they could leave which I was expecting them to do
00:09:19 leave which I was expecting them to do anyway I see so materially I wasn't sure was going to make a lot of difference actually because the first of all God schools you are trapped by thick black smoke or heat and flame you still can't leave even though you're told suppose so
00:09:30 leave even though you're told suppose so it was a is this right what you thought was happening by way of changing the stay-put advices you've been told was a reassessment of the possibility of exit rather than get out at all costs no I
00:09:44 rather than get out at all costs no I think it was that the bubbly a reassessment yeah so encouraging if you so that people who are saying they are trapped can you still leave my expectation still is that anyone else who's phoning up and says they're affected by smoke they'll be told to
00:09:56 affected by smoke they'll be told to leave the confusion was that because they put stay put in there it was people who were in a safe place we're going to be told to leave writes my thoughts were they've been speaking to the FSG unit and I hadn't had an update for some time
00:10:07 and I hadn't had an update for some time so that they may have had a better idea at that point in time with the conditions in the staircase and they may have known through a conversation with FSG unit what the conditions were name may have been safer for them some people
00:10:20 may have been safer for them some people to need ability up to that point just just taking it in stages there's take the category of people who are affected by smoke but I was trapped up to that point what was your expectation or knowledge as to the advice they were getting so if you are
00:10:33 advice they were getting so if you are in a flat and you're not affected by the heat your smoke then the expectation is you should be safe and stay where you are
00:10:39 are if
00:10:40 if you phone up and you are affected by heat or smoke but you can escape then you should try to escape difficulty in a block of flats is it could mean you are going into a smoke-filled lobby or smoke staircase but if you're already in a
00:10:51 staircase but if you're already in a smoke-filled environment you're better still try and get some whether it is safer and then the FSG is to find a one which actually someone says wherever they are normally in the flat in this case they can not leave that flat they can not escape that could be because of
00:11:02 can not escape that could be because of the conditions in the flap or it could be because the conditions in the lobby or but they can not get out say on the night I want to get your thought processes on the night rather than your understanding with the policy which I
00:11:13 understanding with the policy which I appreciate but on the night what was your understanding of how the change in statehood would affect first the category of caller who was affected by smoke but not trapped potentially I was
00:11:24 smoke but not trapped potentially I was a liitle as they should be as they should be so no change there then no right and the next category which is the people who are trapped what was the change in stay put so far as they were concerned to me it just reinforced the fact that we need to
00:11:35 reinforced the fact that we need to encourage them if they if they think they can escape then they should try to so it was almost the reinforcement of the FSG anyway it wasn't any material change by changing the stay put it felt like we the terms were getting confused
00:11:46 like we the terms were getting confused it went back to if an FSG caller thinks they can escape from what would be a very dangerous environment to that they should try to how is any of your understanding a change in stapler than any material sense I think they felt
00:11:58 any material sense I think they felt like the terminology was getting confused because when it first came through it was just saying stay put and the stay put for me at that point only affected the flats that were unaffected by the heat and spoke so it felt like there so that's why I wanted it checked
00:12:10 there so that's why I wanted it checked initially was that what does that mean for the people in unaffected flats potentially going into a smoke-filled environment but on the second phone call from the commanding officer he said that they mean the first wave of guidance people they mean they're going to tell
00:12:21 people they mean they're going to tell them not to staple and that was confusing because I wasn't expecting first of all the gardens to stay put to be used together first of all but God should beef they can get out tell them to get out so that second call back to
00:12:32 to get out so that second call back to the control room still left you confused slightly yes it was yes did you seek to sort that confusion out and not the following few minutes no because within those few minutes were handed over to Mandy
00:12:41 Mandy was it I'm just trying to get a feel for how you saw this in terms of importance was it not of absolutely critical importance to you to understand precisely now what the advice to FSG callers properly so called was it would
00:12:54 callers properly so called was it would have been yes as soon as I could get the opportunity to get there but within a few minutes I hand it over to Bendigo right okay well we'll come back to the handover in a moment you then go on to say in the same paragraph no new
00:13:06 say in the same paragraph no new information had come to me either by the far sector all the FSG sector as regards the need to change the statement advice and they had been in place for about 25 minutes by this point and just a point
00:13:17 minutes by this point and just a point of clarification mr. Lachman birthday or referring to is am I right to assume Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne now so
00:13:28 Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne now so that be Richard Welsh is the fire sector and then Tom good or was the fire so first of all Tom good okay so fire sector Goldwyn and Welch and FSG good so the two sectors had not got back to me
00:13:39 the two sectors had not got back to me whoever then I wouldn't expect it from them directly necessarily but I don't want to come back as a runner or anything like that was the update so do we take from that that you had been as it were sitting on the command unit CUA for 25 minutes with no information at
00:13:50 for 25 minutes with no information at all coming back from either of those sectors I hadn't gone updating that time now why did you allow that to happen the only option for me was to try and get the communications on the radios to get across them which is what I asked Dan and the other commanding operator to do
00:14:01 and the other commanding operator to do but they just weren't getting any information back from when that happens normally at fires it means that they've got so much going on they're just not getting the chance to get the updates to you so you would normally send out an
00:14:12 you so you would normally send out an officer to get a check on it or you'd send out your ort team but all those had gone out and still no information was coming back so what he was telling me was that the chances are they were dealing with so much they weren't getting the opportunity to get the information back to me during this
00:14:24 information back to me during this 25-minute period of silence at what point in that 25 minutes did you realise that the silence had become a yawning gap and a problem it wasn't silence as in the command unit I mean there was lots we were still trying to achieve they were still whole
00:14:35 trying to achieve they were still whole command structure to be sorry but I say silence what I mean is no new information during that 25 minutes question again what at what point during the 25 minutes did it become apparent to you that
00:14:48 and leave it this way did it become apparent to you during that 25 minutes that the lack of information from those two sources was becoming problematic for you in your role as incident commander it was cleared during that time that I
00:15:00 it was cleared during that time that I needed updates on how the fire was progressing what the conditions were and how we were doing DFS tree units yes so my only way to communicate through that the point was through the radio communications on the Union other than physically going back out again well
00:15:12 physically going back out again well that during that entire time I was still putting the command team in place and briefing the police and ambulance service yes that was a next question what why what was to stop you jumping off cu8 running up to c7 and just putting a head around
00:15:24 up to c7 and just putting a head around the door and just getting a quick snapshot as to what the position was so that was still putting the command team in place so by the point so Tom would have been probably put in place for 15 minutes before there and followed by Pat followed by Dave followed by Steve West
00:15:36 followed by Dave followed by Steve West followed by the police and Amplatz and all that took probably the 10 or 15 minutes that we're talking about so the so I'd have to stop - all the other officers that are going to run the incident for me or assist me run the incident whilst I'm trying to go out to
00:15:49 incident whilst I'm trying to go out to the fire ground and get the information that I need so it was important to go and get that at that point in time I still needed to put the commands in my place
00:15:54 place so the prime the primacy is this right just correct me if this is unfair or wrong but for your primary task was to put the command structure in place rather than to obtain information about
00:16:06 rather than to obtain information about what was actually going on on the ground oh so I'm still trying to get the information but that would have been through the radio communication so the comms officer on the unit so we're still trying to get the information and you're relying upon your comms on the unit to get that for you
00:16:17 get that for you but I still need to put a structure a team in place to help me put the fire out
00:16:21 out so without the without the team I can't put the fire out on my own I need those there supporting me so the so they were still trying to get the information but the way would communicate is via the radio and once I go out to the fire ground you almost you don't you're much
00:16:35 ground you almost you don't you're much more difficult to access and you're much more difficult to run the incident once on the fiber okay can I then come back to your the the contents of the stay-put change as you understood it we've covered that but I just want to show you something in your
00:16:46 just want to show you something in your contemporaneous note if you go to page 3 you'll notice at five-to-one 3 the Appendix A and in the middle of the page under the
00:16:58 in the middle of the page under the rubric issues not in time order you say our command team from duty dak Adrian Fenty lat control they were going to start till tell residents to start to leave the premises rather than stay cut I acknowledge this and felt that this
00:17:09 I acknowledge this and felt that this was a pro it was appropriate for the scale of the incident travel distances to firefighters and due to the building's integrity being so compromised my question is when you can
00:17:22 compromised my question is when you can see that the words would use the words start to tell residents to start to leave the premises is that when you wrote this was that intending to record that all residents should leave
00:17:35 that all residents should leave yes that's what it sound so because they changed stay put and they changed stay put in relation to past twelve of guidance unlike anyone who spoke to control was now going to be told to leave the building right so in in in
00:17:47 leave the building right so in in in light of that and in light of the answers you gave us this morning try to link link those together and does that mean that people who weren't trapped should be told to get out at all costs were Chapter II so sorry so it weren't
00:17:58 were Chapter II so sorry so it weren't who weren't trapped but were affected by fire heat and smoke if you're affected by the fire hitting smoke then yes you should try to get out right because you if the environment you can move into is better than environment you're in so if you're in a flat that starting to be affected by fit black smoke you'll be
00:18:10 affected by fit black smoke you'll be better off to move into a lobby or a staircase it's got less vicar black smoking for example right and and and and those residents who were as we've discussed before genuine FSG callers who were trapped they would be told you say
00:18:22 were trapped they would be told you say they would be encouraged but not commanded they should always be told to escape that's part of the cycle of getting them out if they can so is there an alternative means for them if it was amazing it is there another way they can get out for example right my expectation
00:18:34 get out for example right my expectation was you encourage them to leave or but but I would think that there are first of all guards and they're already saying I am trapped and I can't get out even with encouragement you can't really push yourself through the flames or fit
00:18:45 push yourself through the flames or fit black smoke it doesn't really wait for you to it's a very difficult environment to push yourself for okay so so when we see the word residents there in that note do we have to qualify that by
00:18:57 note do we have to qualify that by saying well so far as FSG callers were concerned they would be encouraged to leave but not as they were told to
00:19:06 I don't think says there talk to me to start to leave on I suppose encourage could be put in there for us I suppose now my but my question is given what you knew why had you not made that decision
00:19:19 knew why had you not made that decision as incident commander already so if regard to the first of all the guidance people my expectation is that control will go through the cycle of working out if there's a way that they can escape and keep reassessing their to
00:19:30 can escape and keep reassessing their to see if they can get out of it right but if they are if they are unable to do that then they are still caught in the cycle of being trapped up in their flats the people who are affected by smoke but can leave would that I would expect they
00:19:42 can leave would that I would expect they are being told to leave because if they can move to a safer environment so the lobbies or staircase that may have less smoke people who are staying put or staying in if that's because they are unaffected they were the ones that are I
00:19:54 unaffected they were the ones that are I wouldn't want today get them to go into a potentially smoke-filled staircase when they're actually at the moment unaffected by smoke at all now if you heard as you told us receive no new information over the past twenty five
00:20:05 information over the past twenty five minutes of previous twenty five minutes from either the fire sector or the FSG sector why was it at that point that you were able to agree that that change decision was appropriate so Adrian is a
00:20:19 decision was appropriate so Adrian is a fellow back he would have understood if he was speaking with the glass one guards you John I'd asked Tom to set up communications with the FS G with control at that point in time they would have had that went but he better
00:20:31 have had that went but he better information than I had about the conditions because he was speaking directly with the FSG so I had to trust that the communications that was going on between the two of them had identified that actually they could move people out into the staircase and or
00:20:43 people out into the staircase and or encourage people we were trapped in their flats to see how they could leave does that mean that but for what controller decided you wouldn't have made that decision at that point based on the information that I had so that
00:20:55 on the information that I had so that the three separate groups if you like the FSGS I would expect they are being told to escape if they can but clearly the reason they're in FS twos they can't people who are saying they've got smoke in their flats and they're being affected should be told to leave if they
00:21:07 affected should be told to leave if they can get to a safer environment such as a less smoke log staircase or corridor or Lobby the people who are staying in their flats because they were unaffected have kept them in their flats at that point in time until we could ensure that
00:21:19 point in time until we could ensure that the staircase was clear enough for them to come down safely right as far as they're concerned that had changed and my question I'll just put it again perhaps in a slightly different way is it the position that it was the
00:21:30 it the position that it was the information coming into control Adrian Fenton had that was the determinant of what advice to give occupants still in the building rather than information
00:21:41 the building rather than information that you had as incident commander I yeah I think Adrian would have had more information about the details of the calls coming into control than I had at that point in time and he was talking to the FSG unit which had information about
00:21:54 the FSG unit which had information about what was going on inside the tower because they couldn't communicate with the fire sector so see so would it be fair to say that you were blind as to what they could see not quite blind I didn't have as much information as they had right now Kuroda's asked you to look
00:22:13 had right now Kuroda's asked you to look at a development point it's in the InP incident report tab 30 of our documents bundle which is at lfb quadruple zero three one one four it's on page five of
00:22:28 three one one four it's on page five of that document
00:22:41 in the middle of the page
00:22:48 and it's one of four you see your name starts about a third of the way down in the left-hand column and then it's the third entry down one of four do you see it says the incident commander must
00:23:01 it says the incident commander must consider if the FSG stay put advise remains appropriate if the conditions within the building change it is clear that whilst on route and on arrival you did consider the information being shared as part of FSG it's the first
00:23:18 shared as part of FSG it's the first point I want to ask you about that do you know why that development point was created so that was a result of the PRC that we had yeah right I see so that's
00:23:32 that we had yeah right I see so that's why and when it says insolent kimono must consider if the FS do stay put advise remains appropriate is that indicating that it is preferable or
00:23:45 better thought the incident commander to make that decision rather than the control room no I think I expressed at the time when that was given to me though I thought it was confusing in
00:23:56 though I thought it was confusing in itself because it's putting FSG and stay put together so stay put should be the people unaffected in the building and first of all the guidance was the people who are saying they are trapped in their flat they're not being told to stay put
00:24:07 flat they're not being told to stay put so so I was confused when that was given whoever it was the FSG we were talking about or if it was the stay-put so the people in unaffected flats I see did you see this document in draft form before it went out I had a
00:24:20 form before it went out I had a discussion so the way the system works you have feedback at the PRC yeah so our discussion with Deputy Commissioner for that particular point before we then went into the meeting for the feedback and then it was provided in the meeting
00:24:32 and then it was provided in the meeting right
00:24:34 right so the expressions FSG stay put I think you say is a nonsense effectively I think he's not my understanding of it so my understanding would be stay put applies that people are unaffected and
00:24:45 applies that people are unaffected and the FSGS for people who are saying they can not leave their flat so when the two were put together I was unclear exactly what we were talking about at that point right now having been told by this watch
00:25:02 right now having been told by this watch manager that control had changed the statement advice did you then have any thoughts as to how the withdrawal of statehood as you understood it would be affected would be carried out so my
00:25:17 affected would be carried out so my first action was to get that message sent across the two sectors which I think I asked the comms officer to do it materially it may not affect what we were trying to achieve so they again coming back to the people who were trapped in their flats and could not
00:25:29 trapped in their flats and could not leave actually telling them to leave again might not actually help them at all because they are still trapped by the same smoke or heat or flames that was trapping them originally people who are being affected are still also should
00:25:40 are being affected are still also should be getting told to leave because they're getting smoke coming in and if I think they get out they should what it would change is the people who were safe in their flat and now had to go into a staircase that we didn't know the conditions of exactly that and that if
00:25:51 conditions of exactly that and that if that were a garden that I think I spoke to Richard when I got into the tower to say that them as the operations come on I'm sorry that you know there may be people now leaving their flats who will be I'll be going to the corridor so it would what's likely to occur is people
00:26:03 would what's likely to occur is people would not be where we were expecting them to be they could be in different parts of the building now because they're now starting to move around and also potentially people who were in flats were unaffected by heat and smoke are now moving into the staircase which
00:26:15 are now moving into the staircase which could be potentially heat affected by heat smoking right let's break this down a little bit was in terms of numbers did you do even a brief mental calculation
00:26:27 you do even a brief mental calculation about the numbers of occupants of the building that would now need to be evacuated so my estimate when I was at the bottom of the tower that'd be somewhere between one and two hundred people within a building it's probably
00:26:39 people within a building it's probably closer to 200 rather than 100 times they thought that did you yeah I mean every quick calculation it was 20 floors above the fire there's six flats on each floor there's a couple of people in each floor when my masters from gone wrong there
00:26:50 when my masters from gone wrong there you're getting towards between 150 and 200 right so a lot of people in the building yes and so a lot of those but with that said the only people who would be leaving flats that they are safe in
00:27:01 be leaving flats that they are safe in would be the ones who are phone in control because we don't have a system on the fire ground to actually do that so we can't there's no fire alarm system there's no tannoy system so so unless someone who is in a flat and is unaffected by smoke phone's control is
00:27:13 unaffected by smoke phone's control is then told to leave so I still wasn't expecting a mass exodus as you were I was still feeling that people affected by fire some other guidance would still be trapped in their flats anyone who's phoning up and saying I'm affected by smoke in my flesh would be
00:27:24 affected by smoke in my flesh would be trying to leave and I'd expect that yeah and then there would be some additional people who are phoning up who are unaffected who may originally have been staying in their flats but would now be starting to leave and play ahead and try to give a an estimate on what that would
00:27:35 to give a an estimate on what that would be but it meant we were gonna have an increased number of people going into the staircase than we originally may have fall which is going to affect our operations and also the rescues on the other floors and my question is did you
00:27:46 other floors and my question is did you do a mental calculation to work out how many people were going to be coming into that staircase not at that point in time now I didn't know and if we do the math now on the basis of 58 adults and 16 children at that point I didn't know the
00:27:58 children at that point I didn't know the 56 so that the 58 adults 16 children came about probably one or two minutes after the stay-put change was given to me anyway it's a lot of it's a lot of people and lots of people yes that's probably all we need for this purpose
00:28:09 probably all we need for this purpose the next question then is how would you communicate that change in stay put - all those residents it's not easily done so evidence so there's no mechanism at
00:28:21 so evidence so there's no mechanism at the tower for doing that such as we don't there was no fire alarm system there's no a tannery system so there's no proactive way of doing that we did have some people who were phoning I think speaking to people in their flats
00:28:33 think speaking to people in their flats on their telephones that was much later on as when I was operations commander and I think they may have been getting told to leave at that point yeah it was only be the people phone control that's says when people phone control that they
00:28:44 says when people phone control that they get told to stay put if they're unaffected so any one phone in control would be told to leave so so there was no easy way of communicating - anyone in - everyone in the building there's no easy way was there a way at
00:28:56 there's no easy way was there a way at all no there's no alarm system is no tannoy system so there is no mechanism for contacts in every individual flat in the building so do I take from that that you are completely reliant on control
00:29:09 you are completely reliant on control doing the job of communicating to each resident the advice to leave it will encourage the SOF SG callers to leave it's not the only method now so we're
00:29:21 it's not the only method now so we're also got leads so within the original plan was to send crews into the building to rescue people from fire from faster while for guidance and rescue people who may be in the building that they come across now it would be actually we're
00:29:32 across now it would be actually we're going to send crews to as many flats as we could to search them and rescue people from there so you've still got the you've still got the crews inside the building I'm still doing the rescue activity so you still got that going on control is just a separate part of it
00:29:44 control is just a separate part of it where they would now be telling people to leave who were safe at the UI so the main rescue is still going on from the firefighters entering the building but okay did you give having got that stay put change message did you give any
00:29:56 put change message did you give any instructions to Richard Welsh and Pat Goulbourne at the bridgehead now to start sending crews up into into the building to carry out that mass evacuation did you give that instruction
00:30:08 evacuation did you give that instruction as incident commander throws into the commander I've got the message sent out on the radios that they changed to stay put advise but when I went out as the operations commander and got a briefing from Richard and part of where we were with the operations inside the building
00:30:19 with the operations inside the building it was still putting a priority in place - who needs to be rescued first so he so in some ways it hadn't changed what we were trying to achieve you have to identify who your fault was most of risk and try to rescue and evacuate those people first and so that to effect some
00:30:32 people first and so that to effect some effect the plan was still the same there was no easy way of sending fire fighters in - so I wouldn't have prioritized sending fafa has totally unaffected flare to ask them to leave over sending fire fighters to a flap that we know
00:30:43 fire fighters to a flap that we know first of all the guidance is going on how did you have any thoughts at the time when you receive this message as to how exactly you were going to assist all
00:30:54 how exactly you were going to assist all those people to evacuate through through the building in circumstances where you had no knowledge or information about the conditions and the lobbies or the stairs
00:31:05 stairs so it still goes back to the original plan really which is that your prioritize the people in the building based on the northeast side of the building which is where the fire was at that point in time not as operations commander had spread by then and they
00:31:16 commander had spread by then and they fire so I have a guidance calls along with the top floors and then you would do a systematic search of the top floors downwards normally because that's where the likely you're gonna get the smoke blowing so to a certain extent the plan has changes they put doesn't directly
00:31:27 has changes they put doesn't directly change the plan what it does it has an impact on the plan is you can expect people who may have been safe in their flats that now be getting into the staircase and affecting the operations of sending firefighters to fast private garden school did you then in that short
00:31:40 garden school did you then in that short period you had conceived of all begin to formulate a particular plan as to how you're going to go about that how you were going to find the BA where is to get up to those floors how you were
00:31:52 get up to those floors how you were going to brief them and how you were going to that they were going to get people out into that stairway which was going to become increasingly congested it's a certain extent it was still the same rescue in evacuation plans and we now had 40 fire engines were four
00:32:05 now had 40 fire engines were four firefighter suits around 180 firefighters we had the 10 fi use again it's about the number 50 firefighters so the plan was still used as many of those be a crews to enter the building prioritizing who they could get to and
00:32:16 prioritizing who they could get to and rescue first and so it was to put as many breathing apparatus crews into the building to rescue people so effectively the plan is the same we're just having to prioritize who we can get to and again you would you would still go to
00:32:27 again you would you would still go to those you think is most at risk which in this case was fast while the garden schools rather than send people to unaffected flats what would you do within this plan you've described with all the people coming out of their flats
00:32:38 all the people coming out of their flats assuming they could be contacted at all get be able to get across the lobbies and getting into the staircase what would you do with them while you were rescuing the people who were affected by who were trapped they were proper FSG corners so so is
00:32:52 they were proper FSG corners so so is this people in so if they're in an effective flats so I think well I wouldn't expect the firefighters to do is move someone from an unaffected flat into a more affected environment so for example if their Lobby outside was full of smoke I wouldn't expect them taken
00:33:03 of smoke I wouldn't expect them taken from an unaffected flat into a smoke-filled environment so it was very difficult at that point in time to complete the rescued evacuation of everyone when you've got still
00:33:15 everyone when you've got still potentially smoking the lobby's of all the staircases where people have been directly infected and you need to get them out then the risk of taking them down the smoke-filled staircase or through a lobby is a risk you have to take because we have no other option forgive me mr. Allen I'm a
00:33:28 other option forgive me mr. Allen I'm a bit confused now the stay-put as you understood it was that even though those people that there were people in the building who were not affected by fire heat or smoke in their flats they were going to be asked to leave but are you
00:33:40 going to be asked to leave but are you now saying that actually when firefighters under this plan of yours would get up there and find people in their flats who weren't though would be told actually to stay in their flats they should be asked to leave if they can safely leave so if they if they can
00:33:52 can safely leave so if they if they can get into the lobby and they think the staircase is clear and they can leave then they should leave but I wouldn't expect for example someone who opens their door and finds this fixed smoke outside their front door to then go into their environment so so this the stay
00:34:03 their environment so so this the stay put change still doesn't mean that people can necessarily just walk out of the building because they have to try to get through there not being the staircase out of the building does this mean that just taking occupants of flats
00:34:15 mean that just taking occupants of flats that to your way of thinking were not yet affected by smoke fire or heat the change in staple it meant that they should leave but under your plan if it
00:34:27 should leave but under your plan if it wasn't safe they should stay is that as I think it means it so when they phone up control if they if they tell control that they can leave safely in other words there's no smoke in the lobby and they think they can go down the staircase then they should try to leave
00:34:38 staircase then they should try to leave but if they were speaking to control and saying there was no way to get out of their flat then effectively they they wouldn't be able to leave anyway and how would you be able to would what was your
00:34:50 would you be able to would what was your plan for getting all these residents occupants down that single staircase so that's just used as many fire fires as we could to assist and rescue the
00:35:01 we could to assist and rescue the casualties and carry them down as they did did you conceive of a systematic way of getting all these BA wearers up into the tower at the same time as evacuating all the occupants it was an enormous challenge so with a single staircase in
00:35:14 challenge so with a single staircase in a building that type with firefighters who are carrying large amounts of equipment and going into that staircase it was very difficult working with with him
00:35:23 him with members of public in there as well no I pretty sure it was an enormous challenge and it was no I suppose there's no easy answer to how we do that you send as many firefighters as you can they're experienced in high-rise fires and they would carry out the task as
00:35:36 and they would carry out the task as best they can and in a single staircase as compromised as this became it became a big challenges but we probably moved on to when I was operations commander at that point well that brings me to this
00:35:47 that point well that brings me to this question you we've talked a lot about the plans it really in the abstract my question is in that moment when you were told that the statehood had changed and understood and clarified how it had changed
00:35:57 changed did you actually conceive a formulated plan as to how you're gonna go about it did you actually sit down and go right I need same vba whereas I need to do this floor by that floor or in some ways the
00:36:10 floor by that floor or in some ways the plan still hadn't change so I didn't fit we have short to be aware I think I probably had more than 30 more than 200 450 bi wearers available to me at that point in time I couldn't physically fit 250 bi whereas in the building so I knew
00:36:21 250 bi whereas in the building so I knew I had enough ba wearers for a considerable period of time the plan was still to prioritize those people in the building so the first type of guidance schools and the people on the northeast side of the building who were most likely to be affected followed by the
00:36:33 likely to be affected followed by the people on the upper floors and then working systematically through the building so change a stay put is that if people feel they can escape then they should try to but it's not but I mean he's trying to tell people to go into a smoke-filled environment he's saying if
00:36:45 smoke-filled environment he's saying if you feel you can escape you should but I wasn't then sending firefighters to or wasn't planning to send fire fast to people in unaffected flats over sending people firefighters to flats that were directly affected and you know in
00:36:57 directly affected and you know in immediate danger if you like from a foster father on school but there was a limit to what you could do in amount of time now can I ask you to go please to page 18 of your statement where you say
00:37:08 page 18 of your statement where you say at the top of the page in the third line I knew this decision this is the change in stay put would have an impact on the FSG and the fire sectors as it would change their priorities and mean that
00:37:19 change their priorities and mean that people would be moving around inside the building and not be in places we previously thought so I asked for a message to be sent to each sector who did you ask at the Khans operator who I don't think was down by that point he would have been the the person who took
00:37:31 would have been the the person who took over from right did you see or hear the comms operator send that message we've done right did you did you check that it had been sent I I wouldn't have done I wouldn't have at the time say
00:37:42 done I wouldn't have at the time say right now you refer to changing priorities they're just comes back to boy dope just wanted to see with you
00:37:53 boy dope just wanted to see with you arising at what you said a moment ago
00:37:57 how would you expect those sectors FSG and fire to change their priorities what did you expect them to do so I think probably try to change the price to
00:38:08 probably try to change the price to change what they're trying to achieve so it just means that the people may not be where they were expecting them to be so if you are if you're not pushing and encouraging people who are trapped so first of all the guidance calls even more to get out they could end up not
00:38:19 more to get out they could end up not being in the flats that you thought they were in so that it makes for leaving a flat and still getting up in a smoke-filled environment and in somewhere else so they've not where you thought they'd be initially people who should be told to leave which they
00:38:30 should be told to leave which they should have always been they could end up so that doesn't change those or you does change is people who are staying in their flats may actually if they end up in the lobbies and staircases if crews come across those people when they are going in they are most likely
00:38:42 they are going in they are most likely to try to rescue them so so where you have sent the crew into a particular fire survival Gardens call on a particular floor if they come across people who are within the staircase of the lobbies who they feel need rescue
00:38:53 the lobbies who they feel need rescue they would have to most likely would have to stop the rescue they were a chat asked to and carry out a different rescue did you think all that at the time in that minute probably not no but as the operations commander its it was you know what it was what evolved if he
00:39:05 you know what it was what evolved if he like was that it would have it could have had a material impact on what happened yes I can see that that's how it might have evolved and but but in that moment my question is at the time
00:39:17 that moment my question is at the time when you say would change their priorities did you have any thoughts about how those priorities would change and in practice how the bridgehead would would reconfigure things I think in
00:39:30 would reconfigure things I think in particular it's going to mean that it's potentially more people coming into the staircase and if there's more people coming into the staircase that will affect the firefighters we're gonna need to carry out the rescue only for the first of all of God's call so they would have to either assist or escort some of
00:39:42 have to either assist or escort some of those people we'll make sure those people get out safely so so the risk is that you've got people who are in safe flats are now going into the staircase yes and those people now become the priority because they're now within the staircase and we have to get those out and that crews
00:39:53 have to get those out and that crews that happen to be retasked from what they were trying to achieve of reaching fast above Gardens calls penny on floors did you get as far as formulating a plan as to how to as to how to carry out those priorities so that those people
00:40:05 those priorities so that those people who were trapped would still get but still be so it's actually treated as a priority as they had been before so probably from this to the information coming in the first 12 Gardens call numbers 2 nd taking over was about three
00:40:16 numbers 2 nd taking over was about three minutes so I wouldn't say I'd reviewed the entire plan of what we were going to achieve I hand it over to Andy and told him what the plan was we had in place at the moment and then his operations commander I suppose Richard and Papp about how we were you know carrying out
00:40:28 about how we were you know carrying out but that was his operation tomorrow so you I do I understand your evidence really to be this is this right that the effect of the change in the staple it meant that the priorities changed so the FSG callers who were trapped would no
00:40:39 FSG callers who were trapped would no longer be treated as the priority because of the because people in the staircase would now be rescued instead
00:40:52 mr. millet is given to whether it is a particular way actually if you if you
00:41:11 particular way actually if you if you look at the transcript what I think the witness is being asked about is the effect of what he was describing on the
00:41:22 effect of what he was describing on the order in which people would receive help from the firefighters and I think the point the witness is being asked to deal with is would the influx of people
00:41:33 with is would the influx of people previously safe into the staircase where they may become they may become in need of assistance and firefighters detract firefighters from going to the flaps
00:41:46 firefighters from going to the flaps where people were known to be trapped by the fire and smoke and is that not a fair point well transcript it's not
00:41:58 fair point well transcript it's not really different from what mr. millet but anyway the perhaps way forward is to invite you to comment on my reformulations I think so it wouldn't have changed their priorities their priority was still the first one regarding schools
00:42:09 still the first one regarding schools and the people in the northeast corner what changes is the firefighters we've been tasked to go and carry out those rescues maybe may have to go to do a different task because they meet people in the staircases well I think that's
00:42:21 in the staircases well I think that's really the point - it was inviting you to deal with that they have the practical effect of the change in the advice could be maybe was this is where
00:42:32 advice could be maybe was this is where perhaps you can help to divert firefighters who've been tasked to go to known flats where people were trapped into rescuing people who had come from a
00:42:45 into rescuing people who had come from a relative place of safety a place of relative safety into the stairwell yes so the firefighters who have been tasked to go to a fast Walker garden school which is the highest risk then not
00:42:56 which is the highest risk then not through retasking French patrol or prior sector on the way into the building then come across people that they feel in the staircase of lobbies need to be rescued or help to evacuate and so rather than carrying out their original to ask they end up doing a different
00:43:08 to ask they end up doing a different task and I think some of those who've already given us evidence so we have described that situation of raising I think I've probably squeeze that lemon dry thank you very much that's very
00:43:20 dry thank you very much that's very locked in thank you I'm grateful to the Chairman and as always to mr. Walsh can I move then to the heavy handover with Andy Browns on page 18 of your statement
00:43:34 Andy Browns on page 18 of your statement you say and this is two-thirds of the way down we had started to fill in the headline board and it started recording the FSG numbers and priorities when AC and ero arrived just minutes later the
00:43:46 and ero arrived just minutes later the first thing he said to me was that we needed to change the statement advice I informed him that that decision had already been taken by Adrian Fenton and had put in place by control what was his
00:43:59 had put in place by control what was his response
00:44:00 response did he respond to that I can't remember responded to that I think he acknowledged it most likely so I'd say so he asked if it you need to change I said it already been changing he acknowledged now I very quickly then led
00:44:12 acknowledged now I very quickly then led him to the FSG numbers I'd written up on the wall right they were my priority okay now just in terms of timing if I could just pin this down with some precision if you go to the short incident log at page 23 please
00:44:32 you can see there Oh to 44:18 just after your message at OU 24250 about 58 adults
00:44:44 your message at OU 24250 about 58 adults and 16 children you see what's the limit CUA a cero is now IC incident commander does that accord with your recollection as to when he arrived and became a it
00:44:55 as to when he arrived and became a it was it was very quickly after I got that information about the 5816 children okay now going back to the passage in page 18 of your statement you say that he know
00:45:08 of your statement you say that he know that he a hero acknowledged the decision had been made did he tell you that the decision was won for him as incident commander or was he happy that had been made by control it wasn't that detailed
00:45:22 made by control it wasn't that detailed so he when he got on the unit he said something along the lines of we need to change to stay put advise and I said control has already changed that okay and then I had said this is where we need to look and this is that because that had just come to me that
00:45:33 that had just come to me that information and that number was so so high I knew that that needs to be the priority we were focusing on was was group manager Steve West on the control of the command unit at that point I
00:45:45 of the command unit at that point I think he was cuz I think got a Steve West to finish off the me phone message as well as asking him to take the role of sector commander can support so he was yes he was cuz I'd say our brief didn't take sex command command support
00:45:56 didn't take sex command command support but I'd said to him I didn't have a union for him at that point so stay on the unit and do what he could there before we found a union for him and then also to do the me phone message so he should have been in or around the unit somewhere was he involved in because he
00:46:09 somewhere was he involved in because he involved in the discussion about changing the state but advise you no not that I recall because I had given him sex command command support one of the roles is to take oversee the command units and how
00:46:21 take oversee the command units and how the command units operate right so it's possible that he was in the discussion with the watch manager who spoke to control that he would have been there and around but I can't recall
00:46:32 and around but I can't recall my question perhaps more personally was with Steve West involved in any discussion between control and and ero that you saw about stay put
00:46:44 that you saw about stay put not not ice or not okay did you ask Andy Rowe what he knew or what was driving his decision he made that changed that
00:46:56 his decision he made that changed that stay put should be changed no I didn't okay now you describe the handover you say that he informed me that he was
00:47:09 say that he informed me that he was taking over four lines down from that started that paragraph and you say i briefed him on the FSG numbers and the estimated number of those still inside the building was not just that put this
00:47:22 the building was not just that put this to you is that the 58 adults and 16 children which was just the subject of the message you'd sent moments before know so so there's 50 adults and 16 children was the FSG numbers yes my
00:47:33 children was the FSG numbers yes my estimated number of those inside the building would have been the original it's going out it's a high-rise buildings can be somewhere between one and two hundred people and so you can take those people out of that number and still identify a number possibly over
00:47:45 still identify a number possibly over 100 yes he's still involved in the building and and you say that he'd be you describe to him what I'd seen during my visit to the tower and detailed my sectors and their commander so that
00:47:57 sectors and their commander so that visit to the tower is that the visit to the southeast corner of the tower wing that's the only time until that point I had been to the tower yet for handover from andy Walton yes yes and you've detailed your sectors in their commanders and then you told him what
00:48:10 commanders and then you told him what you'd thought the makeups were and then you you say over the page that he asked you to perform the role of sector commander coordinator and he assigned me
00:48:24 commander coordinator and he assigned me to operations commander so with operation squanders there's a number of ways you can carry out one is that you end up with your own command you're almost like another incident commander if you like and then the original incident politics are sort
00:48:35 original incident politics are sort higher role like I wanted to be out on the fire ground and so the operations commander role came in puppy 12 to 15 years ago and before that was a similar role called set to command coordinator and it just meant you are
00:48:46 coordinator and it just meant you are much more on the fire ground and going between the sector's operationally okay so it's it's it's hot it's virtually no difference it's just I think our understanding was it where I wanted to be was physically on the fire ground and not within a union I think by explaining
00:48:59 not within a union I think by explaining it a second Monica or nay and II would have understood there and I understood it meant I want to be on the fire ground not if you like tied on to a union yeah they'd still be operations upon if I was still the operations wanted apart from
00:49:10 still the operations wanted apart from telling him about the FSG numbers 58 about 16 children and the estimated number of days decide the building one to two hundred as you clarified for us and the makeups is used as you explain
00:49:21 and the makeups is used as you explain there and your sector ization was there any other information that you gave them about what was actually happening on the incident ground so we've told him what I'm saying in the fire was but I would
00:49:33 I'm saying in the fire was but I would have said it was from quite some time ago cuz I'm not had a briefing from the fire sector for some time I then would have detailed that the FSG unit had been set up and that was taking calls and that was where that information had just
00:49:44 that was where that information had just come from regarding the number of possible of guidance calls but again I had another update from that for some time and then would have run through the hazards that I am aware of at the instant which was primarily the debris
00:49:55 instant which was primarily the debris falling and the the fire itself and we would have briefly covered gas and electric because they would have been involved at some point in the building but it was a that's normal for a hog for a fire and then we would have gone on to the structures and the priorities and
00:50:08 the structures and the priorities and the resources that we had had in place did you tell him that you had not had any information back from the fire sector or the FSG sector for 25 minutes
00:50:19 sector or the FSG sector for 25 minutes or so I wouldn't tell them 25 minutes I would have said some time but you know I've even said from the start of being here I would I would have made clear died not an update for a for a considerable amount of time
00:50:30 considerable amount of time what did he say to that if anything I think he would have acknowledged it I think and the author would understand that when you've got fires that are particularly dynamic and this one was extremely so it's the officers you've sent out are so busy doing the tasks
00:50:42 sent out are so busy doing the tasks they're trying to be you've given them they're not getting the time to get information back to you so he would have and he's probably been to incidents where that happens and that's where you try and chase up information comms team or sending over off my cell
00:50:53 comms team or sending over off my cell so and you would have understood that that was happening and that's why I wanted to get out onto the fire and find out where we were and what's daya's but to the best of your knowledge from what you could see in divine from what he was saying what did he know about the extent
00:51:06 saying what did he know about the extent of the fire spread and the development as makes better than my finger which way around we would have let it I'm not sure but I'd asked everyone who got on if they'd seen the fire because obviously just seeing it told you a lot and I'm certain and he had seen if I don't know
00:51:17 certain and he had seen if I don't know if that was him telling me seen it or I asked him but he hadn't been to the tower or that's not the impression he gave me I think he'd seen it similar to what I had from a distance and then I'd gone to the tower obviously I don't
00:51:29 gone to the tower obviously I don't think he'd had that opportunity here so he'd just seen it from a distance like all the officers actually arriving had well okay I'd like now to turn to your role as Operations commander or sector commander coordinator in terms of the
00:51:40 commander coordinator in terms of the time and timing of that briefing we can see from Andy Rose log we can just turn to that that you were briefed at o2 54
00:51:51 to that that you were briefed at o2 54 can I just ask you to look at his log
00:51:55 which is M et trip quadruple zero five four oh four and we'll be looking at this in in some detail this documents that we'll come back to it I called it the Rollag for shorthand so everybody
00:52:07 the Rollag for shorthand so everybody knows what we're talking about but just so you're clear this is a document created by we think Jackie McConnachie who was aneurysmal
00:52:18 Jackie McConnachie who was aneurysmal August
00:52:20 August based on Andy Rose who was there at these meetings now can I ask you first of all please to look at Oh 254 which is
00:52:32 of all please to look at Oh 254 which is the second entry sorry first entry Oh to 40:47 a cero takes over and receives handover from DAC a Lachlan and then it
00:52:44 handover from DAC a Lachlan and then it talks about the decision to deviate from FSG advice and then it says this fire sector is briefed to that effect do you recall how the fire sector was briefed to that effect
00:52:56 to that effect I can so I'd ask for the farside to be told when I found the information out of three or four minutes earlier through the columns officer I don't know if that was me telling Andy that a message have been sent out or if that's an additional
00:53:07 been sent out or if that's an additional action Andy's taken right so it's possible that's an additional action for it's the same action I don't know which one it is okay then it goes on to say Oh 254 a cero briefs DAC a lot and his operations commander with responsibility
00:53:19 operations commander with responsibility for fire and FSG first priority is to establish access and egress does that sound right to you as a summary of the briefing certainly the operations
00:53:30 briefing certainly the operations commander with the responsibility Hill aside the outside of the building so that is surrounding area right but then the first part would be in the access and egress doesn't doesn't open it was I'm not sure if that means access and egress to the overall incident which
00:53:42 egress to the overall incident which wouldn't have been mine because that would be the command support or access and egress to the building but at that point we were still using the south entry and there was no there was no issue for the access and egress on I'm
00:53:53 issue for the access and egress on I'm not sure about the access and egress part okay then the next line it says Oh 255 so any a minute later command channel 2 is to be established and a quick and dirty tactical coordination meeting to be held with police at the
00:54:04 meeting to be held with police at the earliest opportunity were you still on the Cu and an AC ro was talking about setting up command channel 2 Jim I expect I probably would I told him that the columns were not working very well channel 2 is what we'd want to use but
00:54:16 channel 2 is what we'd want to use but to do that you needed the command unit team to set it up for you right so in the time that I was in charge I didn't have anyone available to do that so went down miracle for example was so busy I couldn't have asked him to stop what he was doing and South come on channel 2
00:54:27 was doing and South come on channel 2 right if you go back then to page 19 of your statement where we were before and
00:54:38 your statement where we were before and I think you covered this but you say fully understand that you understood you had commanded the operational side of the incident and in the next sentence you say so I had the fire sector with
00:54:49 you say so I had the fire sector with richard welsh and kept at Goulbourne on the inside of the building the outside of the tower and the FSG unit
00:54:58 that was your total field of command were you then responsible back to Rick to Andi row as to what was happening within each of those sectors yes yes
00:55:10 within each of those sectors yes yes that's the role your pressures right and
00:55:16 you say in that sentence that you were responsible for tactical decision making very does that mean that you are responsible for the tactical decision
00:55:27 responsible for the tactical decision making in each of those sectors so inside the building outside the building and the FSG unit yes it does so the incident commander will give you an overall aim of what they're trying to achieve and then you will take that
00:55:39 achieve and then you will take that objective if you like and put the tactical decisions into place to achieve that and then you you won't change the objectives of what the incident commander wants to achieve but you'll use the tactics that you need to to make
00:55:50 use the tactics that you need to to make those objectives achievable and if at any point you're unable to you can go back to instant commander and clarify that you're not able to achieve his objectives okay you can put in different tactics okay well we'll come back to each of those sectors in turn before I do that
00:56:03 those sectors in turn before I do that can I just ask you to look at policy four three two which is
00:56:13 in our policy bundle its lfb five zeros 170
00:56:38 and I'd like you to go please or two
00:56:45 page four
00:56:50 responsibilities that's appendix one if we can just go to responsibilities which I think probably page three
00:57:04 I'm sorry it's my fault page five
00:57:14 now looking at item 1 information about task or event it says operations commander should assure the following information about
00:57:26 assure the following information about task or event establish and maintain information regarding number of casualties involved with it within each sector the tactical mode of each of the sector's the development of progress and
00:57:37 sector's the development of progress and progress of operational tactics and the effective incident and fire service operations to the surrounding environment did you discuss each or any of those with Andy roe on taking the
00:57:51 of those with Andy roe on taking the role of operations commander so we definitely discuss the number of casualties so nervous the first of all coins calls a tactical mode it was asked up which meant the whole building was
00:58:02 up which meant the whole building was what we call defensive mode and it means effectively that you are you are trying you were inside the building trying to carry out rescues as opposed to if there's two of about defensive means that you have so if you can think of something like a warehouse that's
00:58:13 something like a warehouse that's burning down there's no chance of it being saved you would and it's too risky to put firefighters into it the defensive mode is that you kind of stand back from it and perhaps use Ariel prices to put the fire out so it would mean that you're not trying to effect
00:58:25 mean that you're not trying to effect internal firefighting and or firefighting for even operators in it means that you're you've decided the risk is outweighs the benefit to actually put in firefighters at risk so
00:58:37 actually put in firefighters at risk so you'll be outside has its own effectively it was tactical mode Oscar for the whole incident which means every sector is a is operationally you know involved inside try and rescue ative right and did you discuss with Andy
00:58:51 right and did you discuss with Andy array what the overall objectives of your task were to be yes so i well i outlined my plan and it's a two-way discussion but my objectives that point
00:59:02 discussion but my objectives that point were they first of all the guidance calls and that we were trying to get to those first the northeast side of the building and then systematically the other floors had in the building as far as i recall and ii agree with that what that was and that continued is
00:59:14 that what that was and that continued is the operational plan okay now turning first to the FSG sector on page 19 of your statement halfway down the page you say onto the FSG unit and Tom Goodell was on
00:59:25 onto the FSG unit and Tom Goodell was on there how long after a Siro arrived at CU age did you leave to go to the FSG unit could you repeat the questions on yes how long after and ero arrived on
00:59:38 yes how long after and ero arrived on cu8 did you leave to go to the FSG unit which was cu7 we probably had quite a detailed brief so I expected was at least five minutes probably closer to seven to ten minutes it was there was a lot for me turned
00:59:49 it was there was a lot for me turned over to him I also knew one side left and he I wasn't likely to see him again for half an hour to an hour because he would be tied up on the Kalonji and I knew tied up in operations so I remember trying to hand over everything
01:00:00 remember trying to hand over everything that I knew when the plan that I put in place which takes some time and then for Andy to confirm my role so I'd say was at minimum five minutes and probably up to ten minutes like somewhere in between
01:00:11 to ten minutes like somewhere in between nice book were you were you on see you ate when a positive pressure ventilation system was requested by the father duty dak I by the duty deck duty that
01:00:24 dak I by the duty deck duty that wouldn't be on the names but it's something recorded in Angela rose log at 2:57 she do you have any recollection of that I don't have a recollection of it but if Andy asked for it would have been
01:00:35 but if Andy asked for it would have been a single sentence to an officer on there so it's probably something other than even the phone but he may have been I can't recall it no you say in your
01:00:47 can't recall it no you say in your statement three lines down from where we just were this is half way down page 19 I asked him what structure they had in place and he directed me to a table on the whiteboard this later grew to a much
01:01:00 the whiteboard this later grew to a much larger table which was subsequently photographed that did it Tom could all explain to you what the chain of communication of FSG information was at
01:01:11 communication of FSG information was at that moment from the command unit to the bridgehead it was fun as it was thinking I was trying to use the radios as well but the radios though I could tell was still too busy so it was predominantly Bryant's are thinking item the name Sam
01:01:23 Bryant's are thinking item the name Sam but I can't recall the name did you see the runners yourself that you're seeing firefighters moving back and forth between the building I mean literally running so so I saw a number of firefighters and during the night I became aware that people often Dan was
01:01:35 became aware that people often Dan was doing it and and the number of others but I saw firefighters going back and back and forth from the FSG unit to the building
01:01:42 building what would you remember what they were taking with them pieces of paper I can't recall the paper by have no doubt that was a piece of paper you would you wouldn't try to memorize it so you would write things down so there's no the expectation would be that it's been
01:01:53 expectation would be that it's been written down on the command unit DF c u7 and then it's been handed over to a run out to take into the building so I don't recall pieces of paper being seen but I have no doubt they were okay mr. Chen
01:02:05 have no doubt they were okay mr. Chen we've been game for more than an hour and I'd be interested it's tiring work for all of us perhaps a short break now maybe a prayer yes how you get normally little bits there the paper this morning but I've got it rubbers I'm gonna try
01:02:16 but I've got it rubbers I'm gonna try and speed up right now right well we'll have a 10-minute break now mr. Larkin please don't talk to anyone about your evidence what they're our server and we'll come back at quarter to 11:00 please thank you sure thank you
01:02:33 famous
01:02:40 course 311 in please
01:05:30 you
01:14:26 right mr. document really to carry on yes sir good Thank You mr. locket and thank you for coming back to us can I just revisit one or two aspects of the discussion we were having this morning very helpfully about the change
01:14:38 morning very helpfully about the change to the statehood advice and its effect particularly in terms of prioritization am I right in thinking and correct me if this is wrong is that all to put something to you this that's unfair but do I understand it
01:14:50 that's unfair but do I understand it there's your understanding was that the revoking of the statehood advice affected the unaffected flats so the people who were to your way of thinking in flats which weren't affected at that
01:15:02 in flats which weren't affected at that time by fire heat or smoke would now have to get out yes it would be because the the first message that came to me was but they changed the stay-put advice for me that only applies to the people in unaffected flats yeah and then the
01:15:14 in unaffected flats yeah and then the second phone call was that message saying talking about first of all the guidance calls in the same within the same context if you like so for me it felt like it was they included or did
01:15:25 felt like it was they included or did you have any understanding of how many flats were in fact unaffected which would now be producing all their occupants not for definite now so in my
01:15:36 occupants not for definite now so in my understanding at that point obviously I'm not seeing the fire for a while was it was the north east side of the building that was affected so it would be probably a quarter of the flats right and so you've got three quarters that potentially aren't and you'd have to take some of those out for perhaps the
01:15:47 take some of those out for perhaps the top floors where there's smoke clogging but you know you could look at the south west side for example I would expect to be unaffected and potentially in the northeast and northwest sides to also potentially be unaffected did you see a
01:15:58 potentially be unaffected did you see a lot of flats potentially quite a lot of flats potentially and the last information you had was when you'd seen the fire for yourself did you think to yourself at the time that the farm might have spread from the northeast corner as
01:16:11 have spread from the northeast corner as you call it elsewhere and that in the 25 or 30 minutes since you were out on the incident ground there's always a risk that fire can spread and that's why I required the updates or it could be that
01:16:23 required the updates or it could be that the fire within the flats has got worse so so it's it's always got the potential and one thing you'd get is as much information you can to try and establish that on what you did know about the detail of FSGS did
01:16:36 did know about the detail of FSGS did you realize that FSG calls were coming from right across the tower from floors 9 right up to floor 23 no I picked up some of the
01:16:47 floor 23 no I picked up some of the floor numbers on the way in originally and understood there was a large number of them but I didn't know one the specific floors at that point in time now by that stage that was 45 minutes
01:16:59 now by that stage that was 45 minutes prior to that yeah and I asked the first 12 guards called mayor to establish exactly how many flats were involved in where they were so is the answer to my question that at that stage when the staple it was changed you didn't realize
01:17:10 staple it was changed you didn't realize or didn't know that FS cheese were coming in from right across the tower from ninth floor up to 23rd floor I knew that the ref s G's coming in throughout the tower yes because I've heard the different floor numbers I think early on
01:17:21 different floor numbers I think early on I heard some high floor numbers and in addition to that I mentioned in some of the calls I heard originally they weren't FSG calls they were call saying there was smoke on this floor or smoke on that floor if I call it do did you
01:17:32 on that floor if I call it do did you know that they were coming from all sides of the building and not just the northeast side no I did not right did you take any steps to find out whether that was the case that was the
01:17:43 that was the case that was the information I wanted from the first of all the guidance union which was where are the where are the effective flats and what fats are affected so that's the information I would expect to get better than that
01:17:51 than that standing back and looking at that the effect of the change in stay put that Adrienne Fenton had told you had been the subject of decision act control did
01:18:05 the subject of decision act control did it occur to you at that stage on the basis of that information that compartment ation had failed throughout the building no it wouldn't occur to me
01:18:16 the building no it wouldn't occur to me the compartment ations fell throughout the building that's not something I'd experienced before not something I would have expected so again he would come back to that if you talk about the internal complementation it would be normally that people would leave their doors open when they try to escape and
01:18:28 doors open when they try to escape and that would take your compartment ation away
01:18:29 away I wouldn't expect failure of the internal compensation that's not something I'd experienced on on a scale like this well let me try the question in a slightly different way around did the fact that the staple it
01:18:42 around did the fact that the staple it was being changed so that even people who were in clean air in their flats were being told to leave did that not mean to you that compartment ation had failed throughout the building or was
01:18:54 failed throughout the building or was failing throughout the building no one so it still meant to me that complementation was failing what it meant was that the between control and the FSG unit they had information that told them that it was to tell some
01:19:05 told them that it was to tell some people to leave the building and that they must have known that the people could leave the Praetorian potentially safely so tanka but not compartment ation affair that well that wouldn't have told me that compartment ation was failing so to your way of thinking given
01:19:16 failing so to your way of thinking given that the advice was now to tell people even in even who are unaffected in their flats to leave given that what was it - your way of understanding them that meant they were in danger and had to
01:19:27 meant they were in danger and had to leave well everyone within the building I would expect we were going to rescue or evacuate so it's almost a continuation of that plan it's just bringing it onstage bringing it forward it's making it's getting some of those people out when I couldn't be assured
01:19:38 people out when I couldn't be assured that they were going to be Oh get out for a non smoke-filled environment but sorry let me just press this and maybe I didn't ask the question very well taking a person who was in a flat in clean air not affected by fire heat or smoke what
01:19:51 not affected by fire heat or smoke what had changed structurally in the building or physically at the building that meant that it was no longer safe for them to stay in their flats not nothing to my awareness definitely changed in that
01:20:02 awareness definitely changed in that building from the time I'd seen it from the outside so what was the logic to your way of understanding of asking them to leave their flats so I didn't understand the reasoning behind it my
01:20:13 understand the reasoning behind it my expectation is between the conversations if haven't with the with the Union in control is that you've got they acknowledge that you've got long travel distances that the it will be difficult for our firefighters to get to everyone in the building and if people feel they
01:20:24 in the building and if people feel they can leave safely and they could be encouraged to do so because the important of so far is I've got to be able to leave safely still you wouldn't expect them to go into a smoke-filled environment so so they may have more information and I have at that point in
01:20:35 information and I have at that point in time that people may be able to leave their flats safely did you ask yourself or indeed anyone in control what had changed
01:20:43 changed so as to prompt the change in the statehood advice now I didn't have the time to do it right did you did you ask yourself or control why that decision
01:20:54 yourself or control why that decision wasn't made at an earlier stage I didn't have the time to do that so within probably three four minutes I'd hand over to Andy on what you knew at that
01:21:08 over to Andy on what you knew at that stage do you think that the advice should have been Shane or did you think that the advice should have been changed at an earlier time I think for the people who are within their flats and I
01:21:19 people who are within their flats and I haven't yet had the chance to assess whether it's safe for them to leave until we know that this there's a lower risk for them to leave their flats then the opportunity wasn't there to change the advice and also there's no mechanism
01:21:30 the advice and also there's no mechanism to pass that advice on so having the people phone in control there's no mechanism for me to tell people within that building who I'm not phoning control they should leave other than sending firefighters to their flat doors and at that point in time the priority
01:21:42 and at that point in time the priority was send the firefighters to the first one regarding scores on what you later discovered during the course of the night do you accept that the advice to leave should have been changed at a much earlier stage earlier not when I was
01:21:54 earlier stage earlier not when I was instant client evening well on what you later discovered during the course of the night do you accept that the advice to leave the statement advice I should
01:22:06 to leave the statement advice I should say should have been changed at an earlier stage now if we the safer advice for the conditions we were dealing with when I was instant martyr and aware of stay put should have stayed people should have been safe in their flats you wouldn't expect the fire to spread
01:22:17 wouldn't expect the fire to spread around the building like it did on the outside and for it to fail so catastrophic Lee I'd never expected or anticipate that that would do that in the way it did and then similarly as you mentioned we would not expect the internal internal protection to fail so
01:22:30 internal internal protection to fail so badly as well sewing so my expectation with people who were safe in their flats should stay safe on their flats and the southwest side will be an example of that there's no reason to believe in people on the southwest side of that building should have been you know at
01:22:41 building should have been you know at the time but let me put the question again on what you later discovered during the course of the night do you accept that this the revocation of the stay-put advice should have happened at an earlier stage than it did I
01:22:52 an earlier stage than it did I don't think you could say that a decision could be taken earlier based on what I saw several hours later I mean the building was so horrendous several hours later they're having no one should have lived in the building but I'm starting to say that we should have
01:23:04 starting to say that we should have changed to stay put advise I don't think would have been reasonable based on something that happened with several hours later that none of us could have ever expected right now going back to you're taking command of the FSG you say
01:23:23 you're taking command of the FSG you say going back to page 19 of your statement
01:23:29 halfway down the page properly down the paragraph it starts I got onto the FSG unit you say Tom confirmed that they were prioritizing calls and sending this information on paper to the fire sector using runners they'd already set up a
01:23:41 using runners they'd already set up a direct line to control Sony to deal with FSGS that direct line did you see it in operation yeah there's one in the office I think it was possibly down miracle the mobile phone so it's probably Dan when he went across do you know who he was
01:23:53 he went across do you know who he was speaking to it control no it would have been someone within control right and did anybody tell you did Tom good I'll tell you what lines of communication had been set up to send messages from
01:24:04 been set up to send messages from control to the command unit from control to the command Genesis yeah is that not the same so do you mean the FSU Union or did you move yes it's the phone call
01:24:15 did you move yes it's the phone call that damned America's making yeah okay but did he did he give you an impression of any other methods of communication such as radio or not I recall now I said are you f---ing something like are you
01:24:27 are you f---ing something like are you speaking with controller we got concept in control and he pointed to an officer which I think was Dan Merrick who was on a mobile phone and said something like he's got a two-way conversation with control right thing that's all I recall that single link they still got the fire
01:24:39 that single link they still got the fire ground radio available that would still be on so there may be someone many meppen it was he said I've got a two-way conversation going on between him and control I didn't I didn't explore any further and he didn't have so you say you say that tom confirmed they were
01:24:51 you say that tom confirmed they were prioritizing calls did you understand on what basis tom was what and his crew were prioritizing calls so at that point in time that's when they had to list rather than the table and I think it was just subjective
01:25:03 table and I think it was just subjective based on what was coming into and the information they were getting in the wrist they four people were out right did you perform a review about what system they'll be using to prioritize I I'd probably never been in
01:25:15 prioritize I I'd probably never been in a situation where I fought we would have to prioritize individual first of all the guidance calls so I accepted that what they were doing was based on the information that they were receiving in their judgment who was most at risk they were saying they were the ones that were
01:25:26 were saying they were the ones that were the priority but I'd never I've never considered a position where we would have so many farce of of guidance calls in progress did we have to put one form of God's called above another and that never occurred to me that we'd have to
01:25:37 never occurred to me that we'd have to do that what did you find out what system they were using to prioritize calls I can't record a conversation it would have been based on risk for him I can't recall if you say based on risk
01:25:48 can't recall if you say based on risk what does that mean who you think is most at risk in that point in time and if what becomes subjective it would become based on what the first of all God's team are receiving and what control is telling them it's actually an incredibly difficult task there was no
01:26:00 incredibly difficult task there was no easy way for them to do them they say based on risk did you get to understand of any individual given call what factors meant that they were given a
01:26:12 factors meant that they were given a priority over other calls not at that point in time no but later on when they did the table they they'd attempted even more to try and break the table down into specific numbers of people involved
01:26:23 into specific numbers of people involved and or I think where they put peas on I think it was to do if if the if the person was getting more and more affected was something along those lines so it's based on how all of them
01:26:34 so it's based on how all of them obviously were at risk it was just subjective their thoughts about how they fought was most at risk yeah but as commander did you not take any steps to satisfy yourself that the way they were going about prioritizing these calls and was appropriate so that
01:26:48 these calls and was appropriate so that was later on though so yes when I went back to thee so the so separating the two out the information so priorities on the FSG unit was based on the information they were getting from control on who they thought was most at
01:26:59 control on who they thought was most at risk which was in effect all of them and then they have to somehow break those down into who they thought was the most immediate risk and they'd set up a table to show who they were including the numbers involved in the children to break it down further into
01:27:11 children to break it down further into individual elements I don't think we could have done a knowing is something we'd expect we never have to do and so I knew they'd put priorities in place based on their view of the information they were
01:27:23 view of the information they were getting from control about those calls but at that stage I'm just looking at that stage what do you say Tom confirmed they were prioritizing what I'm getting seeking to get a feel for is whether you've got an understanding of precisely
01:27:35 you've got an understanding of precisely what the factors are the ingredients in only given in any given call age disability at that point in time when I went on to that unit this is when I first took over operations commander I only had a brief conversation with Tom to make sure that they'd set up their
01:27:47 to make sure that they'd set up their systems as in communications with control that they had a way of identifying the FSGS which was the list they were producing but they had a way of communicating with the fire sector which was the runners and I think I also asked him about resources and he said he
01:27:58 asked him about resources and he said he had enough at that point up into a six of among then right and I actually left them to carry on well I needed to get to at that point was the fire sector so I didn't go into detail with Tom at that point about how they were going to prioritize those by saurabh of guidance
01:28:10 prioritize those by saurabh of guidance calls at that point I think they were treating them all was the priority later on they'd have to somehow put a priority on the priority calls which was an incredibly challenging task but at that point in time it was a fairly short
01:28:21 that point in time it was a fairly short discussion with Tom to see if he needed anything more for the FSG Union if and if the systems have been set up to make the system work effectively but didn't you need to understand how calls the
01:28:33 you need to understand how calls the bring prioritize subjectively in other words what their subjective thinking was as to who they would treat as a priority so that when you did get to the fire sector you would know and be able to
01:28:44 sector you would know and be able to quality assure that those priorities were actually being carried out through deployments from the bridgehead so at that point in time I don't believe that at the chance to prioritize the past well the guidance calls individually I think at that point the
01:28:55 individually I think at that point the first 12 garden schools were all treated as the priority and they were all being passed across to the fire sector for me to have got on to the key Union and with Tom break down those calls and establish how we were going to prioritize them at
01:29:07 how we were going to prioritize them at that point I think I would have got tied into the FSG you in it when I knew I needed to go into the tower and establish where we were I rescued you but you say in your
01:29:18 I rescued you but you say in your statement that Tom confirmed they were prioritizing calls maybe I misunderstood your authority calls are the FSG calls so the FSG calls are the priority so he's got other information coming in to
01:29:29 he's got other information coming in to him and the other sources but the priority calls were FSG calls and at that point in time that wasn't the time with the opportunity to break those individual FSG calls down into one being more important than another so did you
01:29:40 more important than another so did you think that cu7 was receiving calls from control which were not FSG calls they may have been I think they were coordinating all the information they
01:29:51 coordinating all the information they had so my expectation was any information they've got from any of the calls would be going to the FSG Union and they would coordinate and all of it I think even by this time some people had gone up to them walked up to the
01:30:02 had gone up to them walked up to the Union and so they were in fact they had worked up to the unica to my timers incident commander I'd had two people come up to me with telephones so they were getting information from more places than just control because those
01:30:13 places than just control because those calls wouldn't have been fast while ago at schools they were members of public talking to their families inside the flats right can I ask you to be shown please M et triple zero one five nine three zero
01:30:29 does this look familiar to you so I saw a list so so when I was talking to Tom there was a list behind him where he pointed to which he's most likely to be that but I didn't look at that in the
01:30:40 that but I didn't look at that in the detail of it that's the sort of thing it was that so I expect that he's the list right now we have a time marker for that photograph of to 259 okay would that be about the time that you
01:30:51 would that be about the time that you would have got all the cu7 and seen that I don't know if that's the time I got on to see you seven I mean I could like except that's the time the photograph was taken but I if that's right if if
01:31:02 was taken but I if that's right if if that's right and that's the time at which that photograph was taken does that not tell us that the does that not show the breakdown of individual
01:31:13 not show the breakdown of individual occupants of flats it needs to enable people to be prioritized it's it shows the breakdown of individuals in the flats I'm not sure it gives you enough
01:31:24 flats I'm not sure it gives you enough information to them prioritize those so to take each one of those flats and work out if one flat has to be rescued before another flat is and is an incredibly challenging task it's not something I'd
01:31:37 challenging task it's not something I'd consider we'd ever have to put in place before and so by that point of time I think they were treating all of those calls as priorities when they got the opportunity to do the the bigger table they then tried to put a priority on
01:31:49 they then tried to put a priority on those individual calls which in itself was incredibly difficult
01:31:57 now did you get a chance to quality assure the lines of communication from command unit 7 to the incident ground to the tower
01:32:06 the tower it was runners and I saw people going back and forth run they may well have had pieces of paper I don't recall looking at pieces of paper but there was definitely throughout the night junior officers and officers going back and
01:32:17 officers and officers going back and forth from the command unit to the tower in your role as Operations commander in charge of this sector if SG did you do anything to make sure even by spot-checking
01:32:28 spot-checking that an FSG call a piece of information about a particular flat got from the command unit to the bridgehead so
01:32:39 command unit to the bridgehead so different flats or when they got the table up so this was later on I had questioned to Tama on some of the individual flats particularly the ones that had high numbers of people involved so I think one of them had 10 people involved I remember asking how we knew
01:32:52 involved I remember asking how we knew that was so many people yeah I'm not sure some was certain if it was one family or if others had all collected together because I think by that point there was the possibility that people were moving into each other's flats and some had said people seemed to be moving around so I can't recall if that one in
01:33:05 around so I can't recall if that one in particular but I did that with a few flats and then when I think I got over to the tower I was then a different layout for the for the way they were listing things but the information was there or it seemed to be there that they
01:33:16 there or it seemed to be there that they had a system in place to record it and it seemed the same alongside that I checked in with the - ort officers so Matt Cooke and Mick Mulhall and particularly Matt Cooke about you know does the system for FSG seem to be
01:33:27 does the system for FSG seem to be working and he was he was assured that the information was getting across and it seemed to be getting across accurately right but did you do anything yourself personally to track a single or
01:33:38 yourself personally to track a single or perhaps an example lot of FSG calls on their route from c7 to the bridgehead to the torrent of deployment I was tracking the processes so far I was checking that the FSG calls that were written up on
01:33:50 the FSG calls that were written up on the Union were being communicated into the search coordinator within the building and how are you doing that how are you I physically look in the wall I wasn't checking off all the numbers so I wasn't checking every flat number that
01:34:01 wasn't checking every flat number that was listed in cu7 against every flat number that Glen had up what I could see was the officers were taking information across from sea seven passing across to the surgical coordinator who was writing that
01:34:12 coordinator who was writing that information up I wasn't cross-checking individual flap numbers that's not something I would have got into clearly the system was working there was no reason to think that they would be writing up the wrong numbers for example and then there was
01:34:24 numbers for example and then there was getting from the search coordinator to the fire sector commander into the bridgehead you say process they were following you say clearly the system was working there was no reason why they wouldn't have written up the wrong
01:34:35 wouldn't have written up the wrong number there's a lot of there's to what extent when you say the systems were working were you making assumptions it's not assumption I think it's it's not realistic that I would be able to check so for me to have checked them all
01:34:47 so for me to have checked them all individually I'd have to write all the numbers down myself so I'd about to copy it and then go across to the you to the building and then read it against the wall I think what you look to see as if the system you've put in place the work works effectively there's no reason for
01:34:59 works effectively there's no reason for me to think that a a flat number would be written up wrongly when it's taken from one unit into the building it's it's it's not something I would expect to go wrong the process of the system we had in place seemed to be working and
01:35:10 had in place seemed to be working and there was no feedback that it wasn't real cases we just ask you mr. different wait did you at any stage check that the system as you've described it was working by taking a sample flat on the
01:35:23 working by taking a sample flat on the up but most up-to-date FSG information looking at the grid or wall in cu7 walking following that information down to the tower into the bridgehead to the
01:35:35 to the tower into the bridgehead to the point of deployment of a crew to respond to that call did you check no that's not something I would have expected me to do and I didn't do that now you say you wouldn't be expected to do it but was that not your job as operations
01:35:47 that not your job as operations commander even loss of spot-check basis to ensure that that line of communication was operating from a to Zed my job was to make sure that struggling the system was in place and to make sure it was working I don't
01:35:59 to make sure it was working I don't think it was my role they were take an individual flat number and try and follow it through that route so I don't think that's that's not why I did and that's not I would have expected me to test it so you say you're your responsibility was to
01:36:15 make sure that it was working what did you do actually functionally do to make sure that it was working so I could see that the information from control was
01:36:26 that the information from control was coming in via the telephone handle radios and it was getting written up on the board within the FSG unit right and that information was going via runners across to the building most likely a piece of paper I can't recall the piece
01:36:37 piece of paper I can't recall the piece of paper and that that was them being put on so the building that the the table they'd written up with in the lobby area and then from the lobby area was going via the fire sector to the
01:36:48 was going via the fire sector to the bridge so so I checked that process was working and that they were all communicating each other and they understood their their roles and how it was working together oh I didn't do was take a flap number and then go through a
01:36:59 take a flap number and then go through a process of looking at the flat numbers in that chain ok now we'll come back to that line of communication in a moment
01:37:10 do you know who was writing the information up on the wall in the lobby I think it was Glenn Williams or Gilliam so certainly ever seen it I was doing all the writing himself I'll make sure but he was definitely there can I ask you to look at MIT quadruple zero five
01:37:21 you to look at MIT quadruple zero five seven seven four
01:37:27 did this is the white wall on the left of the lobby as you go in did you see this wall being inscribed in this way is
01:37:40 this wall being inscribed in this way is that the lobby on the ground floor yes it's it was writing on the lobby if that's what it was that's what it looked like I can't recall the detail of that baby looks it was written in tact it was written in a table format written in her
01:37:52 written in a table format written in her columns did you ask the people writing on the wall what how they were doing it and what the tics and the FS and the bas meant so at various times I had conversations with Glynn about the
01:38:03 conversations with Glynn about the information he was getting and how he was getting it which was from the runners coming across and then how he was passing that information on which was to Richard and Pat and then the Richard impact was giving it to the BI
01:38:14 Richard impact was giving it to the BI crews and the entry control and then my understanding of tics was the flats ateva been searched or they'd been rescued but that in itself got confusing because people I think were being found in different flats and they weren't sure
01:38:26 in different flats and they weren't sure which flats people were coming out of or they were rescuing people for example in the staircase and they just didn't know where those people had come from and they weren't able to check with them did you actually ask bloom Williams what the
01:38:37 you actually ask bloom Williams what the tick's meant or was that an assumption no I wouldn't explain I think but I can't recall the conversation so it's not it's not an assumption I today is an assumption probably I can't remember the conversation what his answer was but
01:38:49 conversation what his answer was but Mike we would have covered it cuz I think he's crossing them off as well so so I would have commerce and the same as I did on the eunuchs I think on the FST unit they had ticks against some as well yeah well what did the ticks me my
01:39:01 yeah well what did the ticks me my understanding is that they've been searched or cleared searched all clear all rescued so there was no one in right and then how does that tally up with the lines going through with deletions because you don't need to go to that
01:39:12 because you don't need to go to that flat anymore good so it just makes it clearer when you look down a column you can just look quite quickly at one that's crossed out to see you don't need to go go to it anymore
01:39:25 did you notice anybody at the white wall they're receiving information by radio at any stage they had their radios on I can't remember if the radios were clearer by then but there's there's a
01:39:38 clearer by then but there's there's a there's every possibility they were using their radios or Carmical did you take any steps to marry up the information that you saw on the wall with the results of particular deployments to those flats I wasn't cross-checking individual flats
01:39:50 I wasn't cross-checking individual flats I was making sure that that information was in the course to Richard and Pat and Dee and therefore the PA crews are being committed and they knows conversations have Richard and Pere about the flats they were trying to get to and how they were trying to get them did you know
01:40:03 were trying to get them did you know whether individual FSG rescues were six let me put the question differently did you take steps to satisfy yourself that in general FSG rescues were successful it became
01:40:15 FSG rescues were successful it became clear that lots of rescues were being successful but it wasn't easy linking up where the rescues have come from so some of them were clear that they've gone to a certain flat and rescued someone but
01:40:26 a certain flat and rescued someone but it was that they were finding people in different sections so as I described before we had started or the crews that started finding people in the staircases and lobbies when they weren't expecting them to be and a lot of the people they were bringing out they weren't able to
01:40:37 were bringing out they weren't able to ask them which flats they came from me because of their condition or because they needed to be taken to the ambulance crews quickly so it was clear that we were carrying out lots of rescues and there was lots of them carrying out but
01:40:49 there was lots of them carrying out but it wasn't as clear where that people were coming out from did you become aware when you went to the tower after having left cu7 how crews were being briefed so I
01:41:02 how crews were being briefed so I watched pat briefing a number of crews he was giving him very detailed briefs he was giving him specific tasks he was briefing them on the conditions inside the building he was briefing them clearly on the risks because we were
01:41:14 clearly on the risks because we were having to send him up there without necessarily water to protect them he was I could see his entry control officers checking them as in there they're safe there be a sets are on correctly their facemask and their fire hoods on
01:41:25 facemask and their fire hoods on correctly and then he was deploying them into the building I think there was watch managers with him as well and they were doing a similar to asked but I listened to Pat took me a couple of times
01:41:33 times and he was he was very far debriefing the crews in the tasks they needed to do and the risks that he was aware that they'd be exposed to and we're aware of the presence of a station manager wolfen
01:41:44 the presence of a station manager wolfen don't peek wolf until I was aware of people often done on the incident band yes were you aware that crew managers sorry ba crews were being briefed by
01:41:55 sorry ba crews were being briefed by watch manager Williams own station manager wolf ndon and then rebreathe by Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch at the bridgehead and now I wasn't aware of that my understanding was it was Richard and powder with deploying crews along
01:42:06 and powder with deploying crews along with the entry control officers and the watch managers support impact did you see for yourself Weather Watch manager Williams or station manager wolf ins and were handing pieces of paper to
01:42:17 were handing pieces of paper to individual be a cruise I didn't see piece of paper engine internet did you examine carefully the line of communication between Williams and Wolf ndon at the at the wall in the lobby and
01:42:31 ndon at the at the wall in the lobby and the bridgehead I mean by that point you're talking about probably 5 to 6 meters so you could you could talk to each other just by talking loudly so there was no issue with the line of
01:42:42 there was no issue with the line of communication I checked that Richard knew that Glenn was doing the board if you like the wall and that Pat was at that point on the entry control area so they were they were clearly communicating in all the times I went in
01:42:54 communicating in all the times I went in there was conversations taking place between them so communication was that close together that there wasn't an issue with their communication director yeah did you observe yourself their communications I saw interactions on a
01:43:05 communications I saw interactions on a number of times between clean and Richard and Richard and Pat and other officers within that area so it was not as if there was lots of communication going on how was happening were they shouting or were they sending each other didn't need to shout I think he could
01:43:17 didn't need to shout I think he could you it wasn't that it was noisy in the lobby at various times it was very noisy cuz obviously when the debris was falling it became extremely noisy but generally speaking you could talk a reasonable voice you don't generally
01:43:28 reasonable voice you don't generally shout when you're when you're at an incident if you can avoid it it kind of puts panic in when you'd rather not so so to be talking loudly I've no doubt but he wasn't shells did you observe of any stage a heat
01:43:40 any stage a heat passionate autumn enthusiastic discussion between people fundin and Richard Welch or anybody else at the bridgehead oh no I didn't see any heated
01:43:51 bridgehead oh no I didn't see any heated discussions or anything like that and you went during the incident did you see or observe any discussion between them about about the topmost floors beyond which they couldn't access no I didn't write how much time do you think you
01:44:04 write how much time do you think you actually spent in the lobby observing the communications between the white wall on the left and the bridgehead once it was done on the ground floor so my first entrance to build in I expect I
01:44:15 first entrance to build in I expect I was probably there five to ten minutes and then I went into the building lots of times after that I can't recall how often or winning so I just want one occasion I went into the building on a lot of occasions and spoke with Richard
01:44:26 lot of occasions and spoke with Richard path Glenn and others but did you on your first entry into the building where was the bridgehead breach it was on the ground floors on the ground Fieri's behind that glass encasement with the staircases right no
01:44:42 did you take any steps to satisfy yourself or check that the results of particular deployments in response to FSG calls were getting back to the command unit and from there back to
01:44:53 command unit and from there back to control so we would get in information back about rescues we were the people had been rescued but if in conversations with Tom was that he wasn't getting enough information back he told me there he was getting information about people
01:45:05 he was getting information about people having been rescued but he wasn't getting information enough information about which flats they were from and that was because we were getting so many rescues coming out of places we didn't know where they were from that although he was getting numbers he wasn't getting
01:45:16 he was getting numbers he wasn't getting the flat numbers so he understood that we were so much activity going on at the bridgehead to to carry out the rescues that they weren't able to get the information back to him that he would like so that discussion did take place
01:45:28 like so that discussion did take place so he was getting information back about the rescues being carried out but it wasn't always specific where those rescues had come from because there been some confusion about where some of the people had been rescued from yeah given given that what you've just said just
01:45:40 given that what you've just said just now and also what you told us earlier about people coming out from unaffected flats into the stairwell did you put any system in place to record weather deployments to particular flats have been diverted by crews rescuing people
01:45:53 been diverted by crews rescuing people they found that assistance getting expect from entry control would they'd record where the crews are and then there's they get updates they can record where as the crews are progressing - and then if the crews had had to retask
01:46:05 then if the crews had had to retask themselves you'd expect entry control to them record that so I was made aware that crews were getting to having to carry out other tasks on route to rescues but I didn't get involved in individual examples of this right you
01:46:19 individual examples of this right you say you would expect entry control to record where the crews are as they get updates did you check for yourself that they were actually recording where crews were getting to and I didn't go really
01:46:30 were getting to and I didn't go really information on the entry control boards that you didn't know right
01:46:36 now you on page 23 of your statement you say that after your conversation with group manager world she returned to the see you via the FSG unit and asked Tom
01:46:49 see you via the FSG unit and asked Tom Goodell to explain how he was organizing the FSG this is halfway down the page see that and then you saw other on this occasion or more likely a little later on I took two photographs which I
01:47:00 on I took two photographs which I identify as my exhibits a fol six and seven respectively well come to the photographs at the moment your question
01:47:12 photographs at the moment your question - Tom good all as to how he was organizing the FSG information what did you want to know from him so how they were identifying who the FSG where the
01:47:23 were identifying who the FSG where the FSG calls were coming from who was involved where they were the level of priority for them if we could and then others that were involved so wouldn't it be in just the FSG there would have been anyone that they were getting information on inside the
01:47:34 getting information on inside the building what had you seen if anything from your trip to the tower that prompted you to ask Tom girdled that question when you got back to the FSG you see you to check that what he was
01:47:46 you see you to check that what he was trying to put in place was being effective for him and where he needed any support from me to help him make it effective but what he seemed to be put in place seemed to be working effective as a recording of the information that
01:47:58 as a recording of the information that he was getting into that unit so effectively the table that they were setting up right did you have any discussion with him about the results of particular deployments so possibly not
01:48:09 particular deployments so possibly not on this occasion but we were throughout the night as I went to Tom one was talking about the rescues of her being carried out and that's where he was getting information about the numbers of people being rescued and sometimes getting flat numbers but he wasn't
01:48:20 getting flat numbers but he wasn't getting enough of it so because we didn't know a lot that's where the people had come out from so he had numbers of people rescued quite often but he wasn't able to link those to the flats they've been rescued from now we talked about the
01:48:31 from now we talked about the prioritization earlier and you said that on your first visit to the Cu we you know Tom Goodell had simply been prioritizing FSG calls as a as such when
01:48:43 prioritizing FSG calls as a as such when you went to the tower the first time before coming back to the CEO and talking to Tom Goodell on this occasion had you formed any view about how the bridgehead in affecting deployments was
01:48:54 bridgehead in affecting deployments was actually prioritizing FSG calls so the bridgehead is going to just prioritize those they think they can get to at that point in time so I didn't get into the
01:49:06 point in time so I didn't get into the detail of how they were going to do that it was that they would deploy people based on the information they're getting that deploy them to the ones they thought they could get to at that point did you not need to know what method they were using to prioritize one FSG
01:49:19 they were using to prioritize one FSG over another so that you could take that information back to Tom Riddle at that point in time again that took they were getting so much information at that point in time trying to break down individual FSG calls was incredibly
01:49:31 individual FSG calls was incredibly difficult for them so my expectation when they were doing it on what they believed they could achieve I wasn't interrogating them on how that was working I was trusting that what they were put in place was to prioritize those FSG calls which they were yeah
01:49:43 those FSG calls which they were yeah than those that they thought they could get to and they have to treat them one at a time I don't think that that went they were themselves trying to break them down into individual priorities as in one over another they were trying to work out what they thought they could
01:49:54 work out what they thought they could achieve so what did you observe as to the system of prioritization by the Welsh and Goulbourne at the bridgehead their prioritizes in his FSG calls but they've got huge obviously a huge number
01:50:06 they've got huge obviously a huge number of them to deal with and they were doing from one at a time we say one of the time as it first come first serve or did they I don't know at all if it was first come sir so I think it would probably be based on where they thought they could get the crews to at that point in time well you say that they probably but did
01:50:19 well you say that they probably but did you not explore with care yourself as to precisely how they were going about deciding which FSG to respond to before another FSG my to my wrist then was the
01:50:30 another FSG my to my wrist then was the day they would know that the floors they thought they could get crews to and that they would send the crews to those floors but they there wasn't breaking down at that point into individual priorities it was just what they thought they could get crews to did you have a conversation
01:50:42 get crews to did you have a conversation with either Richard Welch or Pat Goldwyn about how they decided between one FSG call in another FSG call now we just treated all the FSG calls equally and they tried to get to as many as they could right and I think they would have
01:50:53 could right and I think they would have done that one other time based on what they thought they could get to at that point in time and where they could get the crews to does that mean that where FSG information came to the bridgehead saying children or people with mobility
01:51:05 saying children or people with mobility issues they weren't given any kind of priority I can't record if we were break I don't think we were breaking down on that as a priority I think it was all of them were being treated as a priority all the FSG called the rope riot II and
01:51:16 all the FSG called the rope riot II and they were trying to get to all of them throughout the time they were there did you report that back to Tom Goodell that they were trying to get to all the FSG called Jesse he would have known they're trying to get to everyone no did you
01:51:28 trying to get to everyone no did you report back to Tom Goodall that the bridgehead there was no system of prioritizing one FSG over another based on any particular characteristics of the caller or the conditions in the flag don't think I had that conversation with
01:51:39 don't think I had that conversation with Tom them on page 24 of your statement
01:51:50 you say like the top of the page I got back to Andy on the command unit that cu8 briefed him on the changes to the fire and then in the third line you see
01:52:01 fire and then in the third line you see I stated that inside was working effectively but they had a lot of work to do
01:52:05 to do I also stated that I was happy with what the FSG were doing but the numbers were high did you tell him that you were
01:52:18 high did you tell him that you were happy and that in the way you described there it's happier word you used I don't know if I'd have said happy I think I would have said it I would have explained that what was in place so we
01:52:29 explained that what was in place so we explained that we had control passing the information on to the FSG unit the FSG unit was identifying where the FSG calls were coming from which floors because by that time they had the floor number so which floors they were on and
01:52:41 number so which floors they were on and that they were getting that information across to the fire sector and they were recording it within the lobby and that they were deploying crews to carry out rescues but it would have also explained that points on the volume of what they were trying to deal with did you tell me so I'm so sorry whatever
01:52:52 did you tell me so I'm so sorry whatever trying to deal with was enormous right did you tell Andy row that there was no sister from what you could see there was no system of prioritizing effort one FSG over another and though they were all being treated as a single priority as a
01:53:03 being treated as a single priority as a group I I think we by that I think later on they put in priorities on some of them where they put peas on to the table but it was gain it was subjective where they thought people were most at risk and it wasn't necessarily where the fire
01:53:15 and it wasn't necessarily where the fire sector thought they could get crews to so it would have come back to I don't recall the conversation with Andy about the prioritization it comes back to I don't think we'd ever expected to have to start prioritizing one fast well the clients call over another and then
01:53:26 clients call over another and then putting that in place and then how you decide that one person because of a reason he's prioritized over another I don't think that's something I'd consider we'd have to do before can I
01:53:38 consider we'd have to do before can I then take you then to the photographs you took and M et triple zero one five 703
01:53:50 yeah do you know can you remember roughly what time you took this photograph I think it was time-stamped I can't off the top made up it was after
01:54:02 can't off the top made up it was after four o'clock I think it was I think could you see from that the Tom Goodell at least and his crew in the command unit were using a system of prioritization yes I think this was a
01:54:14 prioritization yes I think this was a little bit later on and I think you were getting to the point now where these the priorities were becoming people who in their view were now if they weren't rescued imminent knew they were they
01:54:25 rescued imminent knew they were they were most at risk of not being rescued at all and I think he also I did not know if his photograph covers it but those people who the phone lines had now gone did so effectively what they were
01:54:36 gone did so effectively what they were thinking is that the prior is something by this point knows what we don't get to these people these people might not survive but at any rate at some point during your role as FSG sector commander
01:54:47 during your role as FSG sector commander you knew that Tom Goodell was was a effective prioritization that's between FSG Falls hence the peon in a circle yes and I think that's based on the history that those people are written they feel they're exposed to so all of those people when all of those calls are
01:54:59 people when all of those calls are exposed to the smoke and heat and flames they're at risk so all of them are a priority and then as it gets worse as the conditions were getting worse and worse for them I think that's how they were becoming more of a priority so it
01:55:11 were becoming more of a priority so it was based on the conditions of those people were suffering that the priority was put on rather than trying to put you know an individual person against another individual person it was based
01:55:23 another individual person it was based on the the forts on the command unit team about who actually was now most of risk based on the calls coming in did you understand that there to be any prioritization as between adults and children on that board I don't recall
01:55:36 children on that board I don't recall that I mean children are clearly much more vulnerable to the products of smoke but again I think it was purely based on who we thought was most at risk at that
01:55:47 who we thought was most at risk at that point in time and every one of those people was at risk so to then prioritize one against another would be incredibly challenging and difficult to do so I think it was who they fought was most at risk bearing in
01:55:59 they fought was most at risk bearing in mind that everyone there was a huge amount of risk did well let me just show you a different picture triple 0 m ET triple 0 1 5 9 2 4 which is a full picture of the of the grid on cu7 with
01:56:12 picture of the of the grid on cu7 with the table below it we could just blow that up you can see the table then it's been explained to us by Tom Goodell and other firefighters who've come to the
01:56:24 other firefighters who've come to the inquiry before mr. Lockley but you can see greener adults blacker kids and then with a ring P priority and there P priority and a square lines gone dead and then you can see the asterisk VA
01:56:37 and then you can see the asterisk VA have gone there did you ever gain an understanding of the prioritization system indicated by this grid at any stage during the night so if I recall I think every one of the calls it was treated as a priority they weren't put
01:56:49 treated as a priority they weren't put one against the other until the occupants were if you like in imminent danger of most likely dying and I think the step would go from the
01:57:00 I think the step would go from the priority to the priority with the square around it which is where we've now lost contact with them you say they were all treated as a priority I just wonder whether that's really correct because it for example one could pick an example at
01:57:12 for example one could pick an example at random 164 in the middle column has got a 1 next to it which is an adult because it's greed but no P no indication of any other kind of prioritization so just on
01:57:23 other kind of prioritization so just on that example is it really right to say that everyone all these callers were in first cheaper every FSG call was treated by priority so every everybody on that fire brown wooden only the FSG calls are because that's how we treat them what
01:57:35 because that's how we treat them what Tom's try to achieve there is then trying to prioritize those calls which is credibly difficult task to do and quite subjective based on what information you're getting through from that court so 164 is still a priority as
01:57:49 that court so 164 is still a priority as are all the other calls or they're identifying is where they think people are now you know an imminent danger or imminent risk of potentially dying they made it more of a priority but it's an
01:58:01 made it more of a priority but it's an incredibly job for them difficult job for them to a dominant yeah every one of those as far as while the guard schools was treated as a priority and every one of the music roaring right so you but you say someone treated is more of a priority well let's take them did you ever get to understand
01:58:13 take them did you ever get to understand how Tom Goodell was treating callers as more of a priority than the other priority FSG calls so is the risks they were exposed to so in simple terms I suppose if the smoke is getting worse and worse in their flat and directly
01:58:24 and worse in their flat and directly affecting more and more or if the flames are getting closer and closer to them if on the phone call the control officer can tell that actually this person now is starting to lose breath is talking to
01:58:35 is starting to lose breath is talking to state that that person is now you know imminent danger rather than just a danger which they all were obviously because every single first walk accordance called with someone in danger yes I see so you understand you
01:58:46 yes I see so you understand you understand that system at some point during the night that system I recall that at that point they were they were trying to work out how to prioritize first of all god in schools and it's almost impossible task to do to put a
01:58:57 almost impossible task to do to put a fast well guards call above another and to make it more important than the number other than in the risk that they were exposed to which is to say that if somebody is you know the phone calls of control officers are probably taken with people starting to lose their breath and
01:59:08 people starting to lose their breath and start it's not be not debrief right and they may have put that as a priority over someone else who is in a flat and unable to escape but it becomes quite subjective but did you actually ask some good all this is very interesting board
01:59:21 good all this is very interesting board tell me exactly how you are putting or why you are putting pee around someone not others do you actually ask him that question I asked in wider priority I think he said it was because they're the most at risk so I took that to mean that they were in imminent danger so so they're all in
01:59:33 imminent danger so so they're all in danger but these ones renewed in imminent danger of dying if they're not rescued soon that's how I took that to me at any stage in the night did you then check with the bridgehead whether those calls that were being given of pee
01:59:45 those calls that were being given of pee by Tom good or were being prioritized by deployment I checked if that information was going across to the bridgehead which it was sorry it was going into the
01:59:56 it was sorry it was going into the search coordinator so I was going into the lobby the issue with them became that the the entry control could only deploy to the floors they thought they could get to so there was a conflict
02:00:07 could get to so there was a conflict almost to a certain extent with regard to although these are priorities they might not be able to get to those floors so they were still focusing on the floors
02:00:14 floors thought they could get to and this this ranged on the night of you could almost get to higher floor sometimes because they were unaffected by heat and smoke and sometimes you couldn't get to a lower floor because it was so well alight so Pat and Richard both had a
02:00:28 alight so Pat and Richard both had a good understanding of where they felt they could send crews in that building based on what they conditions were and they were trying to get crews to those particular flats right mr. chairman it
02:00:39 particular flats right mr. chairman it may be appropriate to have another break at this point I'm not quite finished but I'm not far off the end yes I'm afraid well it probably would be a good point it seemed to lemon on the break mr. Lockley same as before please don't
02:00:52 Lockley same as before please don't speak to anyone about your evidence one arrives in the room and will resume at 22
02:01:08 those 2012
02:05:42 you
02:09:41 right we'll read it together soon yes sir Thank You mr. Lockley thank you for coming to coming back can I show you another picture of the grid on cu7 that
02:09:52 another picture of the grid on cu7 that was taken a little bit earlier in the night
02:09:54 night it's MIT quadruple zero eight six six three now this is a picture taken by watch manager Girling I don't know
02:10:05 watch manager Girling I don't know whether the name rings a bell with you on cu7 of this grid and the time period for that we don't have an exact time is between 3:15 a.m. and about 4:00 a.m. so
02:10:20 between 3:15 a.m. and about 4:00 a.m. so this is a photograph of this grid at an earlier stage do you remember seeing this when you came back to the to c7 having visited the tower I can't recall
02:10:32 having visited the tower I can't recall if that was a time I saw the grid for the first time I know they had changed relatively quickly from the list to the grid there's a good chance this is about the right time that could be going back there but I couldn't tell you if that's the time I saw the grid or the next time
02:10:44 the time I saw the grid or the next time I went on to the FSG Union right but it's about the right time but I can't recall if the second time I went onto the FSG Union the list was still there and they were starting a table as the table had been putting place so I can't
02:10:55 table had been putting place so I can't recall if that was the time when or did you notice at that stage that the grid contained a prioritization system P with a ring rounded I don't know if I notice is that stage because that stage I can't
02:11:07 is that stage because that stage I can't be certain that was when I was on I saw that grid but whenever I first saw the peas I'd conversation would have had with Thomas what's the priority there and I think it was that they are at the greatest risk and that was based on the telephone conversations they were having
02:11:19 telephone conversations they were having and it was on the fact that say my understanding of it was that they the control officers and the command unit crews fought that those people were most likely to die if we didn't if we weren't
02:11:30 likely to die if we didn't if we weren't able to get to them say right now going on to your rollers fire sector command commander
02:11:39 commander sorry sir I was not the fire sector plan we're not not far sector commander Operations Command is overseeing for the far sector itself that's more an accurate way of describing your role yes right what
02:11:52 describing your role yes right what responsibilities in that role did you have for tactical decision making so it's so I've designated the fire sector they've got the authority to carry out
02:12:04 they've got the authority to carry out the tasks they need to carry out what they need to achieve my role is to make sure their resource for it make sure that what they're trying to do is the objectives that I've set the more that the incident commander has set them and
02:12:15 the incident commander has set them and that's to check on the tasks that they're carrying out are meeting that so so I wouldn't change the tactics they're doing in the within there apart from if I'd default they needed to be changed with I didn't then they'd be they asked
02:12:26 with I didn't then they'd be they asked if the tactics they were using were sufficient so as an example they were sending crews above fires without fire five media which is a risk and they did check-in if they were able to do that and that's the sort of thing I would
02:12:37 and that's the sort of thing I would expect them to ask me and I agree with that approach and I got asked it I think I informed Andy that that was the approach we were taking and he understood that I see so they've got the delegated authority within the fire sector my role was to make sure they're
02:12:49 sector my role was to make sure they're trying to achieve the objectives and agree and the tactics they were trying to use and if they needed any further assistance whether its resources or a different approach I can support them in their right and does that mean that you
02:13:03 their right and does that mean that you yourself apart from the one example you gave about going above the fire without water
02:13:09 water apart from that does that mean that you didn't actually make any tactical decisions yourself it was delegated to them its delegated to them and then they would for me the decisions they tell me the tactics they're using to achieve the objectives
02:13:20 they're using to achieve the objectives they're trying to get to and then I would agree those tactics or if I didn't think those tactics were appropriate I could change our tactics I didn't have reason to change the sector using they were they were committing as many crews as they could to those they fought you
02:13:32 as they could to those they fought you can see this rapidly as they could no taking it in in stages once you had taken over of your your role as operations Operations Command or
02:13:43 operations Operations Command or overseeing this fire sector what were the tactics being adopted by the fire sector Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welsh
02:13:54 sector Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welsh I suppose it's simple terms they were sending as many BI crews as they could into the tower to rescue people both sdb A&E DBA and they were deploying them to the flats they fought they could get crews to at the same time they were they
02:14:06 crews to at the same time they were they were carrying out firefight connections of can't remember which floors at different times but sometimes the conditions on some of the floors were so severe that they had to protect the staircase from those conditions so they were deploying firefighting crews as
02:14:17 were deploying firefighting crews as well so they were sort of two primary ways they were trying to achieve their goal was to send VA crews in to rescue people and to use fire fighters to protect the escape route okay those are the goals or objectives understand that
02:14:30 the goals or objectives understand that my question perhaps was slightly more refined
02:14:33 refined what were the the tactics was strategies that they were going to adopt the methods you like by which to achieve those objectives so they would identify ba crew they would get that be a crew
02:14:45 ba crew they would get that be a crew briefed on what they were to achieve so they were given details of where they're expected to go who they're expected to rescue the conditions they might encounter how they could achieve it the
02:14:56 encounter how they could achieve it the challenges they were going to be faced with because we knew that was very challenging at that point in time they would then get a crew to book in with BA control and make sure that they understand the role they've got to make sure that they are safe from what they're going to be carrying out and
02:15:07 they're going to be carrying out and then those crews will be deployed into the building to carry out the tasks that they were given and then they would report back on their progress right it coming back to this question of
02:15:18 coming back to this question of prioritization I might have to take it from what you told us before that throughout the time you were in in command of the fire sector in your role as operational operations commander they
02:15:30 as operational operations commander they were responding to FSG calls or demands for rescue on the first of the first-come first-served basis once it was a first-come first-served now they were doing it on where they realistic default they could get crews to at that
02:15:42 default they could get crews to at that point right so in some cases they were pushing crews to very high floors yeah probably above the 17th 18th 19th if they get them there at the same time they were sending crews to low and often it was based on the conditions
02:15:53 and often it was based on the conditions the crews were encountering so they were sending it wasn't first-come first-serve and it was more where they thought they could get the crews to and they were deploying lots of them to achieve them did you become aware at any point that
02:16:05 did you become aware at any point that Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne had changed the system of deployment from what have been operating earlier on and changed him
02:16:16 changed him dumping the system have changed there was still that they would deploy fire fighters to rescue people and where we had to reduce fire fighting to protect the escape were you aware that they had changed a system and were now after a
02:16:29 changed a system and were now after a particular point deploying fire fighters at the building starting with the lowest floors clearing those and working up from there I don't recall that tactic being used and right do you were you
02:16:42 being used and right do you were you were wearing any stages they were sometimes sending EDB a wearers to the lowest floors and I my expectation nothing my recollection of it is EDB air crews were being sent to the higher floors because that's where they're
02:16:53 floors because that's where they're being most used right did you know that it wasn't until
02:17:03 what did you know that start with three o'clock or just after three o'clock in the morning that the third EBA crew which tallied out from the bridgehead at 303 which was a two-man TVB a crew of
02:17:14 303 which was a two-man TVB a crew of code and Joseph would just were deployed but didn't reach further than floor 10 did you know that for example I didn't have a detail of that crew now did you
02:17:25 have a detail of that crew now did you know that a forum personal crew tallied out 304 to protect egress on the 4th floor I didn't know that but if that was a task that needed to be done at that
02:17:36 a task that needed to be done at that time they would be deployed to do that task that was an IDI be a crew did you know that IDI be a cruise were being tasked at that time to protect egress on the 4th floor yeah I didn't check in
02:17:48 the 4th floor yeah I didn't check in what individual crews were doing my expectation was the ETA would be used for the higher floors and there may well have been a reason why that a DBA crew was used I don't know what that reason would be it was it was it a reasonable
02:18:00 would be it was it was it a reasonable firefighting strategy to use EDB a cruise to protect the egress on the 4th floor if the conditions were particularly difficult on the fourth floor and affecting the staircase for example at that point in time so if the
02:18:11 example at that point in time so if the conditions on the fourth floor untenable and then made the whole staircase untenable you'd want to deploy a crew to quickly deal with that fire if that meant that the crew available to you is e DBA you would want to deploy them
02:18:23 e DBA you would want to deploy them you'd want to employ a crew to deal with the fire so that the staircase doesn't become untenable so if my understand is what you said is the conditions they went to firefight because of the egress that would mean that the conditions on the 4th floor must have been significant
02:18:34 the 4th floor must have been significant enough that they needed to be dealt with and to try to protect the staircase for access and egress yeah my question is really where you were were you aware that that decision or that kind of decision had been made by Pat gourville
02:18:46 decision had been made by Pat gourville and Richard Welch I wasn't aware of where individual crews were being each individual crews being deployed to so I would have been aware Danny D be a crew of being deployed to the 4th floor but I was aware the crews were being deployed to us to protect the access and egress
02:18:59 to us to protect the access and egress okay because you say your expectation was that edpa crews would be sent to the higher floor that I understand my question really is did you ever learn anything which
02:19:10 anything which from which you understood that actually that expectation wasn't correct and the DD BA crews weren't always being sent to the higher floors certainly months 10 was the majority of a b d ba crews were sent to the high floors if others were
02:19:22 sent to the high floors if others were deployed to other tasks they would have may well have been good reason to do that am i understanding certainly in the time diversity Operations Squadron when I went in the building was that the EDB crews were going to the high floors did
02:19:33 crews were going to the high floors did you find out how pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch were dealing with the situation where a EDB a crew encountered
02:19:44 situation where a EDB a crew encountered a rescue in the stairs or in a lobby and was deviated from that from the deployment they'd been sent to how they were dealing with it so if an e DB a
02:19:55 were dealing with it so if an e DB a crew came across someone to be rescued my expectation is they would have to rescue that person they they wouldn't be able to walk past them for example so you have to trust the judgment of the firefighters that if they feel that person has to be rescued then it means
02:20:07 person has to be rescued then it means they'll have to stop the task they were trying to achieve and rescue that person right and then pass the information back to entry control and by the very nature it's a bridgehead and then most likely the bridge have enough to redeploy
02:20:18 the bridge have enough to redeploy another crew or if they're able to have redeploy that crew again yeah you say most likely my question is a bit more specific did you actually find out from your for yourself how Richard Welsh compatible were going about affecting
02:20:31 compatible were going about affecting getting that information from the crew which had been diverted and then redeploying afresh EDB a crew to carry out the rescue for which that original
02:20:43 out the rescue for which that original crew had been deployed so it was it was clear that during the night crews were carrying out tasks which have been hadn't been assigned because they were coming across rescues to carry out that was happening on a number of occasions yes that information where it was
02:20:54 yes that information where it was getting back to the bridgehead either by radio or by the crew themselves coming back there meant that crews had to be deployed again or that same crew redeployed to carry out the original
02:21:05 redeployed to carry out the original task so so when they were getting information back that the crew wasn't able to achieve their original task they were redeploying crews over to that same task or sending another crew did you discover that Cruz had gone to
02:21:20 did you discover that Cruz had gone to flats not been able to or not carried out the rescue from those flats and then till the occupants to stay where they were and that people were what crews
02:21:32 were and that people were what crews were going to come for them I wasn't aware of down the night now would that be something that you would have wanted to know in your role as Operations commander yes but there was there was so
02:21:44 commander yes but there was there was so much information going on within that bridgehead and within that rescue plan with all those firefighters they wouldn't have been able to tell me about every single individual deployment so yeah there's so much information going
02:21:56 yeah there's so much information going on at that point that I couldn't expect to have every single update on every single crew and every single action so it would have been useful for me to know it but there was so much going on that night you couldn't expect them to give
02:22:07 night you couldn't expect them to give me a brief on every single crews action
02:22:15 did you consider whether you had enough EDB a crews on hand to be able to affect
02:22:26 EDB a crews on hand to be able to affect the rescues that needed so I know I had originally ordered ten he'd fi use which would be around forty four forty five edpa wearers my understanding speaking
02:22:38 edpa wearers my understanding speaking to Andy properly when I took over afterwards as the operation ponder he's ordered I think he words where I've ordered all the EDB a in the brigade and then with Andy's agreement I think it was Andy's decision possibly or between
02:22:50 was Andy's decision possibly or between us we agreed that the ETA wearers who would normally only wear their sets once would wear their sets twice yeah so so if you like the that's all the IDI gay that we had available to us and we had it all there no point did Richard or Pat
02:23:03 it all there no point did Richard or Pat say they had run out of edpa or nor were we close to running out of EDP oh so right so we couldn't ask for any more there was no more available to us and so and it never came up as an issue that we
02:23:14 and it never came up as an issue that we ran out of edpa but we did need to ask them to wear their sets twice which is we don't normally do with EDB right well that's one of it you could explain something to us and if you go to the road log which is M et quadruples
02:23:27 road log which is M et quadruples they're in five four oh four I just wanted to ask you to look at time mark Oh 339 so this is only about forty minutes or so after I think you take
02:23:38 minutes or so after I think you take over the far you take over operational command with responsibility for the fire sector and it says there Pat Goulbourne PG in fire sector carried out a tactical
02:23:49 PG in fire sector carried out a tactical withdrawal of all be a and move bridgehead to ground floor media be a being committed to fourth floor for search and rescue and firefighting make up for a DBA requested from PG but do
02:24:04 up for a DBA requested from PG but do you know anything about that that requests for a makeup or VDB a by Pat global now I don't know it wasn't communicated to me but do you know what
02:24:15 communicated to me but do you know what can you give us a clue as to why that sort of thing wouldn't be communicated to you so it's quite possible that if it Saints from Matt Cooke Matt book was like my was going in and out of
02:24:27 book was like my was going in and out of the building quite a lot I might not have been available at that point I could have been doing another task and I said the radios we're not working I wouldn't have expected perhaps to delay that request I would have expected perhaps and want to get that to the
02:24:38 perhaps and want to get that to the incident commander as quickly as possible the incident commander has to order on the additional resources I can only request them so that would have known that I would have said it would never have said no to that so I think it's quicker to get the update to the
02:24:50 it's quicker to get the update to the incident commander as a request rather than wait to go through me if you like if I wasn't immediately available why was made aware of was that we were requesting all DDP aid that we had so
02:25:01 requesting all DDP aid that we had so the I'm guessing the result of that request was that all him all the EDB later we had a new brigade was order to the incident did does that mean that you were out of the communications loop relation to that issue radios at this
02:25:13 relation to that issue radios at this point was still overwhelmed so the communications that for me was direct contact with people so I wouldn't say it's a matter of being out the communications I think it's an understanding that if path needs those resources he goes straight to the
02:25:24 resources he goes straight to the instant client at her question I think of his come from Mac it probably means he's had to send Mac back to the command unit to request it I don't know why I'd have been doing it that particular time but it's a reasonable request to do it's
02:25:35 but it's a reasonable request to do it's even possible that I'm on the command unit because I have to give Andy a update on where we were so but as a request that's all request an officer would accept it's it's it's urgent and it can be done directly to the instant right
02:25:45 right okay I think your evidence is they want to summarize it unfairly you didn't know about this request for a makeup of EDB a wearers from pat Goulbourne no so I didn't know Pat had requested it but I knew that we had Rick or Andy had
02:25:56 knew that we had Rick or Andy had requested all of the year a TBI resources in that we had does it follow that you don't you can't help us as to why he requested it at that time I think by this time it was clear that so it was
02:26:09 by this time it was clear that so it was clear to the building fire was significantly worse than he had been when I first arrived so by this point the south side of the building is alike or the south face of the building I should say is alike the internal
02:26:20 should say is alike the internal building we it was clear now that we had fire on multiple floors not just on individual flats so would it become clear that we needed as much EDB a as possible right now can I ask you to get back to page 21 of
02:26:32 can I ask you to get back to page 21 of your statement where you deal I think with the the first time you briefed Richard well shan-pak Goulbourne in the fire sector
02:26:44 shan-pak Goulbourne in the fire sector and tell me if that's not right a third of the way down the page you say I updated him with a number of pumps me head of the incident and that Andy Wren had ordered all of the fr you and edpa
02:26:56 had ordered all of the fr you and edpa resources in the NFB I said that be a supplies should not be an issue for him
02:27:07 in fact we couldn't have physically got any more crews into the building as it just wasn't big enough and had to adopt a staged approach what is a staged
02:27:19 a staged approach what is a staged approach or what is the stage and what is the staged approach though you're referring to so we we physically had probably at that point somewhere between 300 to 350 firefighters on the incident
02:27:32 300 to 350 firefighters on the incident ground yeah the majority of which can wear a breathing apparatus you you couldn't physically fit 350 firefighters in breathing apparatus into that staircase
02:27:39 staircase so you would deploy them by the entry control in as high numbers as you can as quickly literally and in fact what they were doing was almost queuing up to go in and carry out the tasks and required
02:27:50 in and carry out the tasks and required and so you're effectively putting the crews in when you have been able to brief them and give them the task to carry out how do you decide what stages divisions between stages were I wouldn't
02:28:02 divisions between stages were I wouldn't say so it made me stage d'azyr is a confusing term that I think the point is you you've got as many firefighters as we could as we needed at the incident yes and you would deploy as many as you can into the building I putting with
02:28:13 can into the building I putting with being you can't deploy so as the EDB a being an example you wouldn't bring up the deploy so if there's 14 you know roughly around a hundred firefighters begins that building in one go so you'd deploy groups of them at a time and then
02:28:26 deploy groups of them at a time and then when they finished you redeploy other groups and that's normal operations at our fire in that you'd you'd commit Breen operators crews whether it's EDP IRS DBA and then you replace them with new crews and then you carry that on over the hours that you're at the
02:28:38 over the hours that you're at the incinerator you physically can't fit you know 100 200 firefighters injured a building at that stage when you were when you were briefing welts from Goulbourne as far sector commanders did
02:28:50 Goulbourne as far sector commanders did you suggest to them that they should send as many le ba wearers as they had on hand as high up in the building as they could and work down now at that point in time they were still focusing on the first 12 of God's causes a
02:29:01 on the first 12 of God's causes a priority and they were on different floors so they weren't all on the highest floors and so it was still deploying crews SDB a nd debate to all the floors is there any reason why you
02:29:12 the floors is there any reason why you didn't or couldn't have suggested to them at least ordered them to send as many edpa where as up as high as they could and work down and it's not the
02:29:23 could and work down and it's not the tactic we were employing employing the tactic that you knew where the people were who were the first of all gone schools they were your priority to get to them so it was deploying them to those particular to those particular
02:29:34 those particular to those particular flats and you could use both vests DBA and DD be a filler because s DB I can still they still gives you 30 minutes of air cellars so they can still be deployed into the building now you say in the next sentence I want I had wanted
02:29:46 in the next sentence I want I had wanted to speak with Pat but in the 5 to 8 minutes that I was there he was continually briefing crew so it just wasn't possible can you just tell us what did you want to talk to Pat about
02:29:57 what did you want to talk to Pat about so that's when I first entered the building so I had a conversation with Richard which I think we won't be covered and then I want to speak to Pat about how he was doing but he was he was
02:30:09 about how he was doing but he was he was so busy briefing crews that are about to interrupt him and to get a briefing from him and I'd had a good briefing from Richard so so it would have been nice to had the conversation with Pat and see
02:30:20 had the conversation with Pat and see what if he needed anything from mommy that point to him but actually Richard was the fire sector commander so I'd had an update that was sufficient for what I needed so it would have been a nice to do but it wasn't essential and it it certainly wasn't more important than the
02:30:32 certainly wasn't more important than the briefings he was giving to that point in time to the crews that were going him page 27 of your statement a third of the way down paragraph starts I would estimate I went in to speak with Richard and Pat at least 8 to 10 times if not
02:30:46 and Pat at least 8 to 10 times if not more they gave the same information again and again that they were still carrying out excuse did they ever give you any information about an inability to reach
02:30:58 information about an inability to reach certain floors so throughout the night there were some people that he couldn't get to because the conditions were so severe and that was on different floors so it wasn't always it was on the higher floor so I think I remember talking to a
02:31:10 floor so I think I remember talking to a watch manager at one point who'd come down and said something like the ninth and eleventh floors were going so you couldn't get in them don't try and send crews to those and then I remember he said something like the 13th floor is
02:31:21 said something like the 13th floor is clear and that felt like how it was all night that it was where you would just expect that the higher floors perhaps to be the ones that I he was random floors that were more severely involved they
02:31:32 that were more severely involved they were certainly trying to get crews to the highest floor as I possibly could I call Pat until virtually the end a target was the 19th floor where he was aiming to get crews to the highest I think I heard crews had got to was the 21st or 22nd floor and I think that was
02:31:45 21st or 22nd floor and I think that was at the early stages but I think even later on we were still getting up to I don't think we could get to the 19th floor towards him and we were getting up to the 16th or 17th floor I think as the night went on there was challenges but
02:31:56 night went on there was challenges but some floors they couldn't get into because addition conditions were just so severe did you learn of a decision at any stage and to deploy EDB a whereas
02:32:09 any stage and to deploy EDB a whereas only above the 10th floor and SDB were a whereas only below the 10th floor I can't recall that on the night as a decision but it would be a sensible decision so if it was taken I would have gone along with it and agreed of it I can't recall it and looking on the board
02:32:21 can't recall it and looking on the board where it was written out by I almost certainly would have known that I can't recall it on the knife but it's a sensible decision to make do you recall anybody from the tower telling cu7 that the decision had been
02:32:32 telling cu7 that the decision had been made not to deploy above the 15th floor now I don't recall that you don't know do you recall a decision the communication of a decision coming from the tower to see you seven not to deploy
02:32:45 the tower to see you seven not to deploy above the 11th floor there was points in the incident where we weren't able but they weren't I would send crews above certain floors and the tenth and eleventh when they went were severely involved became an issue so they had to deal with fire fighting on that floor to
02:32:58 deal with fire fighting on that floor to allow crews to get past it and it happened at least on one occasion possibly more where they had to deal with the fire which was breaking into the staircase I think so they had to do with the fire to stop them to allow the crews to get past
02:33:10 stop them to allow the crews to get past that particular point do you know man done a couple occasions I think did you yourself learn do you remember learning that there was a particular floor above which crews could not go about the
02:33:22 which crews could not go about the middle of the building rings a bell so the temple 11th floor around that area right did you take any steps yourself to tell control or to tell cu7 to tell control that there was an upper floor limit beyond which crews couldn't go it
02:33:36 limit beyond which crews couldn't go it wasn't a limit that we weren't we were still going to go past it we just needed to fight the fire at that time so it wasn't the way it stopped trying to get above that floor it wasn't that we weren't going to try to get above that floor it's just that for a period of
02:33:48 floor it's just that for a period of time they were gonna have to fight the fire and that were then allow the crews to go faster i didn't communicate that to control personally but at that point but it wasn't that they were going to stop trying to get above the temple 11 floors it was there for that moment in
02:34:00 floors it was there for that moment in time they needed to fight the fire to then allow crews to go past it right was it not important though his operations commander in command of both sectors fire NFS chief and make sure
02:34:11 sectors fire NFS chief and make sure that what you knew about maximum floor deployments in the fire sector was communicated back through cu7 FSG sector to control it was can you say the
02:34:26 to control it was can you say the question again was it not important given the old role is over as Operations commander commanding both sectors was it not important for you to ensure that the
02:34:37 not important for you to ensure that the fact that crews couldn't get above a certain floor was communicated back to control I don't think we'd have had the time to do that I think we were so busy focusing on getting the crews in for the rescues I think getting that information back to control I'm not sure we to being
02:34:49 back to control I'm not sure we to being able to do that at that point in time and it it was different floors of that affected so that particular one was a temp in 11th floor but there was times when there were severe fires on different floors that we weren't able to get into so you'd have to effectively
02:35:01 get into so you'd have to effectively try and give control at briefing on every every single time you've got a fire on a floor that you're needing to deal with in in that level of detail we wouldn't normally pass that amount of things
02:35:10 things did you give any consideration to the use of second set bags or spare ba sets for safe evacuation of residents it's not the purpose of those sets it's a difficult thing to you so they probably
02:35:21 difficult thing to you so they probably weigh in the region of about 18 kilograms so it's equivalent that pretty much your holiday suitcase well you would want to take one of those up a stairs or crew trying to carry their upper you know 10 20 flights of stairs
02:35:32 upper you know 10 20 flights of stairs is difficult it would affect your breathing rate then beam up to peruse it on a casualty they're not easy to use people are not used to having face masks on their face it's not a nice thing to do and then you'd have to assist or
02:35:44 do and then you'd have to assist or carry the casualty down with the set as well which you've still 18 kilograms so so it's not something that we'd used it for before I think I might be made aware on the night that it was used I understand it was used but but it's not
02:35:56 understand it was used but but it's not what we would normally use as a tactic to get people out of the building yeah you say I think it might have been you might to be made aware on the night that it was used more specifically were you informed that a crew had successfully
02:36:10 informed that a crew had successfully used spare ba sets to evacuate occupants I am saying where's that hangs on I probably definite if I know that from the night but if I know that subsequent okay Andy Walton says in his evidence
02:36:23 okay Andy Walton says in his evidence that he was aware of the particular instance its occupants of flat 65 on floor 9 and he didn't hesitate to authorize it do you do you recall yourself knowing that on that on the
02:36:35 yourself knowing that on that on the night what I wasn't aware Andy Walton had done that now is using spare masks in this way something that firefighters are trained to do now the only reason we
02:36:47 are trained to do now the only reason we use the spare masks is if the firefighter gets into difficulty so for example for firefighter runs out of air you can take that's the point of the set is you take the set in to rescue the firefighter firefighter is used to having a bereavement to use seven a face
02:36:58 having a bereavement to use seven a face mask on their face which is most people wouldn't like because it's quite cross to phobic they're quite used to breathing in a face mask which is again an unusual experience so they'd only the only purpose of it was for firefighters
02:37:09 only purpose of it was for firefighters and firefighter rescue did you actually on the night go through the thought process is yourself of asking yourself well why we use on this occasion second set the
02:37:20 we use on this occasion second set the second set bags or spare ba sets to evacuate residents now I didn't know
02:37:34 were you aware or were you told of a period of no deployments in response to FSG calls no not no deployments I was
02:37:45 FSG calls no not no deployments I was not aware of any time when we're not committing Cruz into the building to rescue people right can I just ask you to look then at the Rollag of page three and I just want to
02:38:00 Rollag of page three and I just want to look at two time marks with you in that phone for 422 first of all which is on page 304 22 and you see this is the row
02:38:19 page 304 22 and you see this is the row log recording Mick Mulholland mm gives update crews up to the tenth floor in e DBA
02:38:25 DBA s s DBA that should say fourth or fifth floors seventh eighth and ninth floor considering using aerial EDB a is being used quickly and then antia Lachlan no
02:38:36 used quickly and then antia Lachlan no active FSGS at this time and last were on seventh eighth and ninth floors crews in and out is compromised by debris drop down as several casualties jumping and
02:38:47 down as several casualties jumping and first of all what do you recall this discussion I risk or a discussion I had with Tom and it had gone effectively quiet on the FSG Union right I can't
02:38:59 quiet on the FSG Union right I can't recall the time I'm sure it could have been around that time and then I would have updated Andy on that yeah was this what what's recorded here is you saying something and it's recorded in this log was this at a meeting on cu8 do you
02:39:10 was this at a meeting on cu8 do you remember not so much a meeting no so I expect it's an update that I'm giving Andy possibly on cu8 by was talking to Andy on the instagrammed a couple of times as well right and obviously Jacky was recording our discussions were ok
02:39:23 was recording our discussions were ok were you talking to him over your air wave radio or over the every conversation that he was face-to-face that not because it was face-to-face yes okay so not by radio every conversation with Andy was face to face I see okay
02:39:34 with Andy was face to face I see okay and and when you say and I know this is not your this is not your words and writing but when it is said you said no active FSGS at this what does that mean so that means on the
02:39:46 what does that mean so that means on the FSG unit the conversations that were taking place with control all of those lines have effectively gone dead now it doesn't mean that there's not crews being deployed still we continued
02:39:57 being deployed still we continued deploying crews all night and into the next day so there was no giving up on those it was just that there the calls themselves now were there not they no longer on the line okay I just wanna
02:40:09 longer on the line okay I just wanna wonder if we can just look at a little detail on that can I ask you please to look at the control report at page 170
02:40:30 and update on the screen you can see that at the foot of page 170 we've got calls at 357 or a call at 357 28 from
02:40:42 calls at 357 or a call at 357 28 from flats 83 fluorine lever one adult caller is daughter-in-law and then over the top of the next page at
02:40:55 top of the next page page 171 we've got 400 102 call from flat 204 one adult daughter pulling on behalf of her father
02:41:06 daughter pulling on behalf of her father and then 4 33 which is after the time of this discussion you've had with Andy row in flat 82 at floor 11 we can see a a
02:41:18 in flat 82 at floor 11 we can see a a half an hour gap or so does that help you explain what you mean when when you say there were no active FS jeez is it that gap you're referring to now I
02:41:30 that gap you're referring to now I recall so I can't recall the time calls conversation with Tom on the FSG unit that effectively all of the FSG calls had finished there was no more FSG calls coming in there wasn't to say
02:41:41 FSG calls coming in there wasn't to say they didn't have other information either from members of public on the ground or other information coming in but the the active FSG calls to the point where the line is still talking someone my understanding was that that
02:41:52 someone my understanding was that that was finished at a point I don't recall the time of that but if Jackie's recorded it as oh for 22 then it's possible that was the time I can't link that into what that those callers are
02:42:03 that into what that those callers are and whether they are fast a lot of guidance calls or not right did you know or do you know what Andy Road did with that information information that there were no further efforts cheese and their active FS cheese I don't know what he kept saying
02:42:15 cheese I don't know what he kept saying to mention that secondly can I ask you to look at the time mark of 520 in Angie resonates which is on page 4
02:42:26 we're in the second line page 4 of the roadog 520 it says an dear Lachlan
02:42:37 roadog 520 it says an dear Lachlan bariatric fatal on 18th persons are still coming out persons seen on balcony
02:42:47 first of all do you remember giving auntie Rae that information I think I was told about two casualties on the staircase and there was one of them which shown very active probably I'm
02:43:00 which shown very active probably I'm sorry it's my fault my question was too vague focusing on persons are still coming out do you remember giving and you read that information I think that Polly means we're still carrying out rescues I expect I mean right yes like I
02:43:12 rescues I expect I mean right yes like I said the times of that I can't recall but if that's the recording I don't doubt that's what we'd agreed to rescued somebody at that point I expected what I'm saying right and you know whether they were live rescues I wouldn't have
02:43:25 they were live rescues I wouldn't have them a night rescue said O'Kane say when you said persons still coming out what did you intend to convey to aunty so I don't think that's the terms I term over to you so it's probably paraphrased so I think I would have said we are carrying out rescues or there are rescue still
02:43:37 out rescues or there are rescue still don't think like I said persons are coming out but effectively means we are still going they're still with the possibility there people in this building that are alive and we are still deploying crews to try and rescue them yeah
02:43:46 yeah and then you say persons seen on balcony did you not know by quite early on in the incident in fact I think on arrival as you told us yesterday that actually Grenville town didn't have any balcony I
02:43:57 Grenville town didn't have any balcony I know there were no balconies that's possibly I believer somebody had fallen from the building fell onto the balcony on the walkway to the side I don't know if that's the one I was talking I never saw that person
02:44:08 I was talking I never saw that person who my understanding is one that persons who fell from the building fell onto the balcony area of the neighboring building to the south side of the right they definitely were no balconies in the flat so it wasn't someone on a balcony in a
02:44:20 so it wasn't someone on a balcony in a flat right and the note goes on to say AR that's I'm assuming and ero is wet riser up and running was that a question that he asked you if it was there was no bed
02:44:31 bed so I don't recall the question but there was no where I don't know did you miss your about was talk at one point sorry my apologies there was talking one point about possibly using the Arial as an alternative rising main so whether that
02:44:43 alternative rising main so whether that is what he was referring to I'm not sure but there was there was no wet rise or so if that was a question I would have said there was no so your were thinking were you confident that Andy Rome knew there was no wet riser in this I think
02:44:54 there was no wet riser in this I think Andy would have known there was no way right well he would have known from my briefing that there was no rising on the horizon right can I just ask you what are two final questions first of all [Music]
02:45:05 [Music] your email air which you exhibit exhibit for to your statement which is M et triple zero one five seven zero eight
02:45:20 that email to self refers at 217 to DC gas electric DSC we've discussed gas
02:45:32 gas electric DSC we've discussed gas what does that refer to so that's request for the gas board and electricity board so again in a in a large structural fire where you know there's gas or electric that may become involved all by that point it could be
02:45:43 involved all by that point it could be confirmed involved you request the gas and electricity board in case you need to shut off the supplies to the building well that's a standard request right did you request that I requested that at the same time as the DSA was requested and
02:45:54 same time as the DSA was requested and you a standard request that you do it any structural fire where you've got fire fighters five okay and you say its standard did you have any specific information which meant that the gas needed to be shot off not the gas in
02:46:05 needed to be shot off not the gas in particular now so but my expectation was there be gas involved in that building it's possible it's an all-electric building that's very unlikely so at some point we may need the gas board to give
02:46:16 point we may need the gas board to give us not necessary shut it off to give us a price on the gas they don't always shy down and so to get them there early assists us if we need to shut the gas off at some point and the same applies to the electricity right if there's a
02:46:27 to the electricity right if there's a flat fire normally electricity will be involved in some way because the electrical freighters in there will catch
02:46:33 catch or be damaged I should say to me did you have any involvement with kaitland who were responsible for the gas supply above and beyond sending this message no
02:46:44 above and beyond sending this message no mic rotation that goes by the set schematic for an sport and they would have set up a structure to deal with that did you ever receive later on in the night after this any reports from firefighters about the involvement of gas in the fire no I think the only
02:46:57 gas in the fire no I think the only thing I found out shortly before I left was that the gas was in the basement of the building and I think it was supplied all of the estate it I think I might send the crew down to make sure it wasn't in any way involved because by
02:47:08 wasn't in any way involved because by that point you could expect water to be in the basement but it just it just didn't become an issue I think it was handed over to someone else to deal with and it was very much towards the end of my days operations come on can I then
02:47:19 my days operations come on can I then turn to the question of RB KC's response which we we touched on yesterday when you refer to them as a category one responded to a major incident do you
02:47:32 responded to a major incident do you recall seeing a gentleman called Shamoon so use an acronym sorry RC k wheezing lb Casey so I raw Borough of Kensington and Chelsea thank you I thought it was that
02:47:43 Chelsea thank you I thought it was that I just wasn't sorry sorry the council Nick out sort of a better word thank you do you recall at any stage seeing a or meeting or speaking to a gentleman
02:47:54 meeting or speaking to a gentleman called hash Shamoon if I pronounced that correctly who is the head of supportive housing for older people who arrived at the coordinate around 1:30 and came on
02:48:05 the coordinate around 1:30 and came on to the command unit at about two o'clock do you remember that do you remember the
02:48:16 do you remember that do you remember the lalo of sorry to use these acronyms the local authority in liaison officer and mr. Nicholas Layton coming to the command unit now I didn't speak with him he says he came at about two o'clock to
02:48:27 he says he came at about two o'clock to the command unit you don't remember him than that right
02:48:33 what about lightless Idolator in the in the in the night no I didn't I didn't do at the lado again I would have expected that go through the incident commander or more likely the sect commander command support I think my timing
02:48:45 command support I think my timing charged the two agencies are spoke to with the police in Hamblin's right now do you recall speaking to or dealing with a mr. Robert black who's the chief executive of TMO at any stage not right
02:48:59 executive of TMO at any stage not right and what about Theresa brown the director of housing for the TNA Gemma dealing with her at all okay
02:49:14 mr. O'Laughlin you'll be very glad to hear as I think with others that I have no further questions for you so that is the end of that is the end of my questions to you quite often there are
02:49:25 questions to you quite often there are one or two things which arise which I should just ask you so I'm going to ask the Chairman to rise for five minutes or so to see if there's anything else I needed to cover with you the subject is that those are all my questions thank
02:49:37 that those are all my questions thank you very much yes well it's usually convenient to have a short break now so counsel can take stock and sometimes are asking a few additional questions so we're rise now and resume at half-past
02:49:49 we're rise now and resume at half-past twelve and again
02:50:03 right those clothes
02:59:48 yes civility mr. chairman thank you if we can just have mr. O'Laughlin back briefly
03:00:03 I think there are a few more said mr. nothing really not very many at all and I skipped over them so forgive me the first is can I ask you please to go to the Rollag at page one and I'd like you
03:00:21 the Rollag at page one and I'd like you to look please at the second time mark there of Oh 254 where you where he says what it says a cero briefed DAC olat learners Operations Command there with
03:00:32 learners Operations Command there with responsibility for fire and FSG first priority is to establish access and egress the first is do you remember being asked to establish access and
03:00:45 being asked to establish access and egress as your first priority know that part of that sentence I don't recall at all access and egress to the building we had at that point in time it was through the south side of the tower still no
03:00:56 the south side of the tower still no access and egress for the incident we'd set up a rendezvous point a marshaling area so I'm that wasn't my first priority second question do you recall during the period you err incident
03:01:08 during the period you err incident commander instructing a senior fire safety officer to examine the smoke vent system I'm a conversation about a smoke
03:01:19 system I'm a conversation about a smoke vent system when I was in the lobby I think it was that it was on auto and somebody said it seemed to have a fault I didn't get drawn into it I think whoever I'd spoken to and it was one of the people in the lobby I said you know
03:01:30 the people in the lobby I said you know find the responsible person or get a fire safety officer to deal with it I'm not sure I got a chance to follow up after that or if I did I was told it wasn't working it was something like that do you remember who you spoke to in
03:01:42 that do you remember who you spoke to in the lobby who told you that it had a fault I can recall the officers in the lobby around that time but I couldn't tell you which one of them it was so Jim Williams was there Andy Walton was there Richard was there but I can't recall
03:01:54 Richard was there but I can't recall through the conversation with and you didn't take this the fault point any further forward is that right now I asked him to deal with it I think at that point it was still relatively early on it was probably even my first or
03:02:05 on it was probably even my first or second trip into the building you know it was it was important that I still had other priorities I had to deal with which was speaking with rich and impaired at that point did anybody ever come back to you and update you as to the status of the something I'm standing
03:02:17 the status of the something I'm standing on it wasn't working and that was that was kind of the briefing I thought that it just wasn't working that's how it is communicate to me that is that's my only recollection every German I was it wasn't working did you leave it at sound as if you left it at badass I did yes okay thank you very
03:02:30 badass I did yes okay thank you very much mr. Lockley I have no further questions like it just remains for me to thank you very much it's great our gratitude to you for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations we very much appreciate
03:02:41 investigations we very much appreciate it
03:02:41 it thank you thank you for me as well mr. McLaughlin I'm sorry that it's taken rather longer than we'd hope to hear all your evidence but you had a lot of very important evidence to give and I'm very
03:02:52 important evidence to give and I'm very grateful to you for coming along to give it and now you're free to go thank you very much thank you sir
03:03:09 yes mr. chairman thank you for your patience this morning and allowing me to go a little longer than I would have anticipated and I understand that assistant commissioner roe is ready to
03:03:20 assistant commissioner roe is ready to go but obviously need a five minutes or so to rearrange the furniture or maybe if we write rows for five minutes I think he's keen and I'm certainly keen
03:03:32 think he's keen and I'm certainly keen to get started and rise one o'clock let's do that yes all right well you come and tell me is send the ushers tell me when you fight thank you thank you
03:07:58 yes it's a minute mr. chairman I'd like now please to call the system commissioner and and ruh-roh yeah
03:08:29 I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the
03:08:42 the whole truth and nothing but the truth
03:08:42 truth thank you thank you very much mister thank you yes mr. Rey good afternoon huh sir can I say first of all thank you very much for attending the inquiry today and giving us your assistance
03:08:54 today and giving us your assistance we very much appreciate it my questions are designed designed to be short and simple sometimes they're not if you want me to repeat any of them in any way I will do or put the question in a
03:09:05 will do or put the question in a different way if you need a break at any stage just just indicate and we can take a break
03:09:10 a break thank you okay now can I ask you first of all to look at your first substantive witness statement date of the 16th of August 2017 and which is MIT called
03:09:22 August 2017 and which is MIT called Drupal zero seven five to zero yes have you read that statement recently I read it yesterday and I scanned it this morning
03:09:33 scanned it this morning right can you confirm for us that its contents are true yes I can confirm its contents of true you also I think gave the police a second substantive witness statement on the 17th of January 2018
03:09:46 statement on the 17th of January 2018 cycle row two of eight pages and that is me3 me2 triple zero one double zero six five have you read that statement recently I have that was a request to
03:09:59 recently I have that was a request to the police so they come back with some additional questions yes I yeah and can you confirm that the contents of that statement are true yes the contents are true now you've also I think given two
03:10:10 true now you've also I think given two other short witness statements the first one 16th of August 2017 which is a meaty quadruple zero seven five two one we just picked that out
03:10:23 have you read or seen that one recently yeah this was about the submission of the decision not which Jackie makhana kheer kept for me yes so yes I think it was acknowledgement that had been
03:10:34 was acknowledgement that had been submitted as evidence yes thank you and the second one is the 24th of July 2000 and
03:10:38 and seventy which is a meaty quadruple zero seven five to two yeah and I think this refers to my I think we were all asked as part of the process poses in to make our own notes something is refers to
03:10:50 our own notes something is refers to those been submitted as evidence yes can I next show you your contemporaneous notes which you've marked as Appendix A as M et quadruple zero five four zero five yes you confirm
03:11:05 zero five four zero five yes you confirm those are yours they seem to have been started if you look at the line just under the record of actions on the 15th of June 2017 and completed on the 21st
03:11:16 of June 2017 and completed on the 21st of June 2017 that's right I mean it took me some time to complete them excited to fit it in with my daily work of being an assistant commissioner so it was written over that time period
03:11:27 over that time period okay good was he when you wrote it did you use an underlying document or database elaborate I used more than more than one document because I was in command of the incident for approximately 10 hours I wanted to make
03:11:39 approximately 10 hours I wanted to make sure that why I was writing as as accurate possible based on the information that Jackie makhana kheer taken for me so the decision not which was it's all timestamps in its own way and also against the vision log because
03:11:51 and also against the vision log because I've made requests for resources multiple times across the span of the incident and I would have no way of being down to accurately recreate recollect the time I'd made those and I wanted to accurately reflect that in my
03:12:03 wanted to accurately reflect that in my statement and also if I wanted to give me a sense of the timing for my own understanding of the incident because I've been command for so long railing right okay thank you we'll call that
03:12:16 right okay thank you we'll call that your contemporaneous notes can I next show you
03:12:21 show you Emme t quadruple zero five four zero four five four zero four which is a transcript of decision logging and
03:12:32 transcript of decision logging and tactical coordination meeting minutes for for you we've called that the Rollag if you don't mind there's no advances when I doing it it was logged I think by
03:12:46 when I doing it it was logged I think by Jackie McConnachie is that right that's correct so one of my first actions on the night was I felt that an instant was of such it's actual nature and so significant I required someone to record my thought processes and decisions from the start
03:12:58 processes and decisions from the start because I was under no doubt that I would ultimately probably be in a process similar to this and I've always important to keep a record really for all of those people involved right and did she
03:13:08 did she Jackie Jackie write down in manuscript and then transfer it yes so she wrote my understanding she hand wrote well I know for a fact she Hamm wrote thirty four
03:13:20 for a fact she Hamm wrote thirty four pages of notes across the night and then transcribed them into this document but I believe the ham written notes have also been submitted as evidence and did you get a chance to check this version
03:13:32 you get a chance to check this version the typed version I guess you want to collab gotten the opportunity to look at both versions and I'm happy that those are an accurate reflection of what jackie had recorded on the night right au au n-- general terms happy not just
03:13:45 au au n-- general terms happy not just that it's an accurate record of what she recorded on the night but an accurate record of your of what you did and said yes absolutely although there are occasions when jackie wasn't with me because jackie remained on the command unit well i would have made decisions
03:13:57 unit well i would have made decisions and had conversations that are not recorded on that log okay and so much as jackie when i was present with her was recording my decisions and rationale absolutely yes right and of everything
03:14:10 absolutely yes right and of everything I've shown you since you went to that stand are you happy for all of that to stand as your evidence to this inquiry subject to the question of cycles flow yes thank you can I now begin with your
03:14:21 yes thank you can I now begin with your position and career now you've worked I think for the lfb for some sixteen years yes I joined the London Fire Brigade in January 2002 yes I'm just over 16 years
03:14:34 January 2002 yes I'm just over 16 years yes and during your career you've been a member of the ort yes I was a member of the operational review team for a period of about five years and what was your rank on the night of the Grenville tower
03:14:45 rank on the night of the Grenville tower fire I was an assistant commissioner right and how long have you been an assistant commissioner for at there so I've been an assistant commissioner for approximately yeah put me on the spot now I'm going to work it out coming up
03:14:57 now I'm going to work it out coming up to a year and a half so you were made an AC in about the business right the January of 2016 that's a 2016 no it'd have been 2017
03:15:13 that's a 2016 no it'd have been 2017 obviously or not okay you've now been a I see right as at the ninth floor until sapphire you've been you've been appointed you've been in you've been an AC I've seen a nice approximately six months I see and before that were you a
03:15:25 months I see and before that were you a DAC I was the Deputy Assistant Commissioner prior to that how long for for a period about a year and a half right and before that I've been a group manager for approximately five years I
03:15:37 manager for approximately five years I see okay now can you tell us what you did in your career prior to joining the
03:15:49 did in your career prior to joining the lfb I was a commissioned officer so I was a regular army officer in the British Army serving in the Royal Regiment of artillery right and when did you join the British Army I joined the British Army in 1996 and I left in 2000
03:16:03 British Army in 1996 and I left in 2000 social service regular Commission and what was your rank when you left the British Army I was a captain and at that point I was a second command of a battery so about 120 personnel and had
03:16:15 battery so about 120 personnel and had had you seen active service yes I've had a particularly active operational tour in Northern Ireland in 1998 well I'd been part of the response to the Omagh
03:16:28 been part of the response to the Omagh bombing have been involved in very very serious civil disorder had been blown up myself losing an eye you see colleague at the time unfortunately so I've been
03:16:39 at the time unfortunately so I've been involved in a number of critical incidents both shootings bombings serious civil disorder over the course of that operational - leaving approximately 45 soldiers at the time so
03:16:50 approximately 45 soldiers at the time so yes alright thank you and did you go into the lfb immediately after you left the armor not immediately actually I work with refugee children briefly while I waited to complete the
03:17:02 briefly while I waited to complete the process to join the London Fire Brigade actually takes a bit of time sometime late
03:17:06 late okay now um can I take you diving straight into your second witness statement page four and on page four at
03:17:24 statement page four and on page four at the very foot of the page you say the last time I did any I received any formal training around incident command I did the multi-agency gold incident
03:17:36 I did the multi-agency gold incident command course after December 2016 so you an AC at that time I may would have been successful in the process I'm not sure I've been appointed I can't remember the exact dates but it would
03:17:48 remember the exact dates but it would have been relevant to me whether I was a DAC or an AC in fact I'd run the previous major incident where the London Fire Brigade her privacy which was the croydon tram crash as a DAC so that
03:18:00 croydon tram crash as a DAC so that course is relevant to anyone operating that level and it's a course intended to instruct you in the the strategy of managing large complex multi-agency
03:18:13 managing large complex multi-agency incidents it's good good cause wait long right who delivered that you know it's delivered on a multi-agency basis so you have kind of expert speakers from both the fire service the police local
03:18:25 the fire service the police local authority the government so if the intent is really to expose people to the multi-layered decision-making that an instant like grateful he's likely to
03:18:36 instant like grateful he's likely to encapsulate were there any specific points you learnt on that training course which equipped you for command of at Grenville when you took it yes absolutely I think both that course and actually my
03:18:48 I think both that course and actually my previous experience having run Detroit and tram crash which was a significant major incident as well multi-layered many agencies involved unfortunately a large loss of life many similar
03:18:59 large loss of life many similar pressures I'd also been a National Flood advisor so I deployed out to Cumbria and had managed the lfb response out in two major incidents for flooding across a number of years and although it might
03:19:11 number of years and although it might not seem similar to Greg for actually all of those experiences prepared me for running a major incident because it's about the coordination multiple assets you know in a
03:19:22 multiple assets you know in a multi-agency environment and that course in particular I think exposed me to the challenge of ensuring that whilst you added to the key objectives that are important to you you took into account
03:19:34 important to you you took into account that the nature of the objectives that other agencies were hold that are equally important sometimes managing the tension between them ensuring that it's sound properly within a you know a recorded decision-making environment I
03:19:46 recorded decision-making environment I thought was a very good course now on page five of your statement set a second statement which is three lines down from the top you say I've had years of incident command training on the on the
03:19:57 incident command training on the on the middle manager training cycle which would have involved firefighting in a high-rise block as an incident commander yes so I've been kind of late so I'm
03:20:11 yes so I've been kind of late so I'm gonna ask you about that color does not ask a question and what did that training involve that you described that a variety of taught input so someone talking about national incident command
03:20:22 talking about national incident command for example specific lessons around how you might structure a certain sort of incident and then incident command exercises so placing you in a position of a simulated incident as the incident
03:20:33 of a simulated incident as the incident commander or as a significant role in that simulated incident right to give you that experience and how regular were those training sessions or courses and so I've been a middle manager since 2000
03:20:45 so I've been a middle manager since 2000 in a temporary role from late 2007 at least yearly and dependent on the cycle sometimes twice a year okay what you say use the expression middle manager what
03:20:57 use the expression middle manager what what rank Station and Amanda upwards okay and prop prior to June 2017 what was the last occasion that you yourself had incident command training for
03:21:10 had incident command training for high-rise firefighting I think he was at the very start of 2017 there must have been the last part of the assistant commissioner process where you have to take a realistic incident command assessment for the role I think I would
03:21:22 assessment for the role I think I would have been the last time so whilst not training per se it'd have been the last time I've been exposed to a challenging simulated environment right I'm also on page 5 just a little bit lower down you you say my role as at
03:21:38 lower down you you say my role as at high-rise buildings major incidence is more about the command of them and not the physical firefighting itself does that describe your role as assistant commissioner yes I would see my role as assistant commissioner in ensuring that
03:21:50 assistant commissioner in ensuring that the primary objectives of the incident were driven forward so the broad-brush objectives that I was managing the wider multi-agency political media environment in a pan London context thinking about
03:22:02 in a pan London context thinking about the wider ramifications of what would be a very significant incident and actually effectively putting in place a system and a structure at least and based on
03:22:13 and a structure at least and based on delegated command so I think it's very important to understand at my level you can't hold all the detail and if you try to hold all the detail you're likely to lose your focus on the primary objectives and therefore it's about ensuring the right people in the right
03:22:25 ensuring the right people in the right jobs based on their skills and experience to deliver against the core objectives trusting people to take effective decisions based on their own decision-making and their own experience
03:22:36 decision-making and their own experience that would be the model I'd be working on yes right okay in the next sentence you say I was a member of the ort and
03:22:47 you say I was a member of the ort and have attended large a large number of high res and incidents and there should be high-rise incidents I have years of experience of high-rise fires as a firefighter but also as a arty and you
03:23:01 firefighter but also as a arty and you go on to explain as I was here I had mobilized and advised on high-rise incidents at large fires all over London then you explained in some detail what some examples of that are and were you
03:23:12 some examples of that are and were you involved in the lack of house fire I wasn't involved directly in the lock on a house fire now you say directly were you indirectly involved no I was in the borough's shortly afterwards so I
03:23:23 borough's shortly afterwards so I understand the ramifications of the incident but I wasn't directly involved in you know were you and were you at Shepherds call and I wasn't at Shepherd school either were you involved in an indirect way and Shepherd school no no
03:23:34 indirect way and Shepherd school no no you know no although like everyone else I think of my level I understand the ramifications of that incident and the learning that came from it right I see it would the same apply to the high-rise incidents we've heard about
03:23:45 high-rise incidents we've heard about earlier in this inquiry adair tower and Trellick tower yes probably not in not so much detail but definitely Shep is caught and lacking out I think they were very significant right learning for the brigade from both
03:23:57 right learning for the brigade from both those what was the last large high-rise fire you attended prior to Grenfell either as a firefighter or as ort do you remember I can't remember the last
03:24:08 remember I can't remember the last significant one would be but the ones that stick in my mind and that's why they're in the statement will be a particularly challenging it's in a dolphin house and Deptford where sadly two members of the public lost their lives and where we've had fire spread
03:24:20 lives and where we've had fire spread from within the original flat and then a less challenging fire in Holloway in terms of the firefighting tactics but one that involved a substation in the basement that they made the instant
03:24:32 basement that they made the instant charging they're the ones that stick in my mind in your experience as you tell us about in your statement have you ever experienced widespread compartment ation
03:24:43 experienced widespread compartment ation failure in a high-rise residential block no and certainly not on the scale that I was presented with a crane for which I would consider to be if I'm Frank total building system failure that was what I
03:24:55 building system failure that was what I saw right when I walked in towards the incident did do I take it from that that you similarly had never been trained on widespread compartment ation failure in a high-rise residential block no because
03:25:08 a high-rise residential block no because because of the state policy because of the way their building regulations work it would be my expectation that we would not have to face a failure of compartment ation on that scale I mean I
03:25:19 compartment ation on that scale I mean I think the first rule of thumb as an operational officer and as an instant commander is you should always expect the unexpected but we certainly wouldn't train to that scenario because I think it would lead to perhaps poor decision-making and potentially because
03:25:31 decision-making and potentially because it might affect the way you took decisions I think it's very important that the stay-put policy which is based on a sound underpin set of building regulations is something that firefighters understand that we
03:25:42 firefighters understand that we generally I did too because all of our experience all the statistics tell us that that's what keeps people safe generally in a high-rise fire right we're going to come and unpack that later on it might surprise you to learn
03:25:54 later on it might surprise you to learn and just focusing a little bit more on your training can you tell us if you personally have ever had any training on how to spot a cladding fire not in the
03:26:07 how to spot a cladding fire not in the context of a residential high-rise no but I had received training on clad materials in a sandwich panels training package which I think are probably
03:26:19 package which I think are probably completed online I had undertaken some online training and probably deliver training around modern methods of construction and building construction
03:26:30 construction and building construction generally I think I'm privileged in the sense that I've worked with in our operational policy department so that that department is always entirely focused on thinking about operational practice and policy and how it might be
03:26:42 practice and policy and how it might be developed so I've probably got a greater awareness of the possible effects of different methods of building construction right the operational policy Department forgive me for deviating it is that a department
03:26:53 deviating it is that a department responsible for thinking up and drafting lfb policies yes right and the operational policy department what does that cover you can you tell us so it's
03:27:05 that cover you can you tell us so it's comprised of it's changed slightly in structure but at the time I was in it comprised of a team that was responsible for defining and developing operational
03:27:16 for defining and developing operational practice in regard to firefighting there was a separate team that I managed initially around technical rescue so urban search and rescue building collapse all of our specialist skills
03:27:27 collapse all of our specialist skills there was a hazmat team that dealt with hazardous materials actually that that was it at that point right did it ever expand beyond those it's now taken on a
03:27:38 expand beyond those it's now taken on a wider role for operational assurance so the department expanded so small it's expanded the remit right and it's changed its structure all right does that pillar open does that post grand film yes that's post
03:27:49 that post grand film yes that's post grateful okay no look what about FSG policy did that fit into your operational policy debate wasn't it wasn't my responsibility but it was held within the fire team and
03:28:01 it was held within the fire team and obviously I became deaf Assistant Commissioner for that department so I had overall responsibility I've overseen the day-to-day administration and management of the department under the overall leadership
03:28:13 department under the overall leadership of an assistant commissioner I see excite became assumes responsibility for all of the teams within the department right were you ever involved yourself in meetings about how to revise or improve or change the
03:28:27 how to revise or improve or change the FSG lfb policy in the light of latinum house no I wasn't that was well before my time okay
03:28:37 are you familiar with something we've called gr a generic risk assessment 3.2 published by the D CLG in February 2014 yes I am SAS the national generic risk
03:28:50 yes I am SAS the national generic risk assessment for high-rise firefighting are you let me just ask you to look at it
03:29:03 this is LFP quadruple zero one two five five and can I just ask you to look at
03:29:19 five and can I just ask you to look at one or two things than that in general terms they first of all I mean this document has been around since 2014 when
03:29:31 document has been around since 2014 when do you think you first became aware of it how the London Fire Brigade was responsible for helping shape and guide this so I was a group manager at the
03:29:43 this so I was a group manager at the time running technical the technical rescue team within operational policy right the other team the firefighting team was responsible partly for helping
03:29:55 team was responsible partly for helping draft and shape this so led by Assistant Commissioner of peak-hour who had the national lead for leading the working group on this LF B was central to the
03:30:06 group on this LF B was central to the definition and writing of this national generic risk assessment mmm-hmm now you you told us earlier that as an incident
03:30:17 you told us earlier that as an incident commander at your level yes you would be reliant upon where you trust the delegated decision-making an experience of those under your command my question is to what extent would you
03:30:28 my question is to what extent would you trust them or rely on them to have detailed knowledge of any of the guidance in this document I wouldn't expect my junior officers to have any knowledge of this document
03:30:39 have any knowledge of this document actually this is a policy document they set nationally and should be used within policy departments to develop the policy relevant to that Fire and Rescue service so I wouldn't actually expect
03:30:51 service so I wouldn't actually expect any of my officers outside policy departments who have read this what I would expect them to do is to read our high-rise policy upon which this is based
03:30:59 based and to understand how we take this generic risk assessment applies to the whole country and apply it within the specific circumstances of the London environment right so in a nutshell 6:33
03:31:11 environment right so in a nutshell 6:33 rather than GRA through facilitating right is that a convenient moment mr. chairman for lunch yes I think it is sorry to stop you is you've only just started giving us all so will Reisner
03:31:26 started giving us all so will Reisner begin resume at five past two and one you're out please don't talk to anyone about for evidence or anything related to it right except give the air show
03:31:37 to it right except give the air show back at five for two days thank you
03:31:46 it's tasty five first two men please