Evidence from London Fire Brigade Incident Commander regarding crucial operational decisions during the Grenfell Tower fire, including delays obtaining building plans, bridgehead movement, and breathing apparatus deployment.
00:00:09 I'm mr. Oh happy to continue closer thank you very much when you're ready mr. millet yes and this rope welcome back thanks for coming back to us can I just show you still on
00:00:20 back to us can I just show you still on the subject of plans a passage in a statement which is already in evidence in the inquiry from Peter Johnson and I wonder if that could be got up onto the screen at pages 14 and 15 and it's a
00:00:35 screen at pages 14 and 15 and it's a meaty triple zero one three two three five
00:00:45 and if we go to page 14 at the foot of the page
00:00:52 he says soon after that it's not exactly easy to find out to see precisely when that is he says there was another
00:01:03 that is he says there was another tactical coordination group meeting between various organizations such as the police housing TfL Water Authority Council and others during this meeting AC red asked the council to provide plans at the building including the
00:01:14 plans at the building including the internal layout it is vital we have plans as mentioned when I was talking about seven 2d visits there was no detailed and go over the page
00:01:23 informational comprehensive notes of the building layout from a London Fire Brigade aspect all we had was a recent photograph and if you just go down three lines down its he says the female representing the council said that she
00:01:37 representing the council said that she would get the internal layout plans for ISM was working on it about 45 minutes later I went onto the Instagram and spoke to the same female asking for an update on these plans she told me she had not yet found the plans
00:01:49 told me she had not yet found the plans amell's and were still working on it at a TCG meeting later that morning AC ro asked the female for the plans again and they still were not present a zero
00:02:00 they still were not present a zero expressed that this will be a big thing that when asked for one thing the council could not provide it this is slow the crews down and accessing the incident now I've just shown you I show you a lot of that and partly for context
00:02:12 you a lot of that and partly for context but but also because there's quite a bit in it do you remember a female employee of the council telling you that new plans were not yet
00:02:28 telling you that new plans were not yet available I don't remember it specifically being a woman but I do remember as I said earlier repeatedly asking for plans to represent this to the council and becoming increasingly if
00:02:39 the council and becoming increasingly if I'm honest irritated by their inability to give them to know so I felt it was something I wanted to close to have we're just trying to identify the person you spoke to you see and I just wondered if you could help us with that I'm so sorry our car in the context of how many
00:02:52 sorry our car in the context of how many people I spoke to that night which was considerable no one's do you know the names of any particular council employees you spoke to other than what's recorded in the log I can't I don't hold the detail of specific
00:03:04 I don't hold the detail of specific names I think probably the one the one they match you the dust stick in my mind is John the DSC who's I had regular contact with him yes and I definitely asked him for pans as well actually so I'd asked him if he could get access
00:03:15 so I'd asked him if he could get access to plans in his role as the dangerous structures engineer right okay all right can I then ask you to be shown two short
00:03:30 can I then ask you to be shown two short clips of videos and I should just say for everyone these these do not show any fire on the outside of the building if these are clips which was taken from body warm footage of the police that
00:03:42 body warm footage of the police that we've got and these particular clips are clips of meetings inside cu8 and if we could just play the first of those we may have to play it twice it's about two minutes long but but I will
00:03:53 about two minutes long but but I will have some questions about it and the best thing to do is to see it all the way through first and we'll need the volume up on full I think
00:04:12 and you're looking at it from the second to the 24th floor alive and really that's the XP is now going to a brief [Music]
00:04:20 [Music] encounter we can't do that now because this is well beyond those numbers of what do you can breathe you Natalie write something about the planet that's per floor there's six per floor
00:04:31 that's per floor there's six per floor okay from the Sun on the floor reach the fourth floor opposite to the floor below
00:04:42 fourth floor opposite to the floor below that right as well and we have been asking this for very long time that we have been given plans you know I think
00:04:54 have been given plans you know I think this year starts on the way that the tie for the - yeah as for planted on his thigh winner and was repealed
00:05:24 I'm telling you now
00:05:37 [Applause]
00:05:51 right I've shown you that in full without any adornment but we're gonna look at it again and I'm going to ask questions
00:05:59 questions I pulled to stop and we'll ask some quite hard some questions as we go won't take too long first of all I should tell you and everybody else looking at this at the time mark on that needs to be put forward one hour so this is at 729 into
00:06:11 forward one hour so this is at 729 into 730 the clip in fact is from as adjusted 7 2906 to 713 54 that's the main period we want to look at the second thing is as you can see it's body worn footage
00:06:22 as you can see it's body worn footage from the police and the police officers head as you can see is on the left of the screen this is clearly taken from his footage on his shoulder and this is
00:06:33 his footage on his shoulder and this is inspector Thatcher so if we can just start that again Paul please now I'll ask you to stop and ask I'll ask questions as we go
00:06:49 I was there was pausing are you asking the questions how many floors I can't tell you because I can't see the context of the rest of that meeting it seems
00:07:01 of the rest of that meeting it seems like a mid sentence or midst question yes I'm very sorry about car no okay we'll see if we can identify the people in this first of all who is the gentleman in the bottom right-hand
00:07:12 gentleman in the bottom right-hand corner with the gray hair I don't know his name if you were to ask me now but he was the representative from the local authority so I'd recognize him as the lay low the local authority liaison officer and the officer with the place
00:07:25 officer and the officer with the place Li cropped haircut and the glasses on his head no stars like Tom Goodell yeah so sorry so Tom Kasongo doll with the glasses on these perched on somebody's head is definitely Tom good or but close
00:07:37 head is definitely Tom good or but close I've asked him to write yes commander
00:07:49 I've asked him to write yes commander okay let's just continue that because
00:08:04 okay let's just continue that because well beyond those numbers if your body completely anatomy frank also that is that you speaking yes right continue please mister floor there six per floor okay from the sump on the
00:08:18 from the fifth floor three to the fourth floor up a signal Florida the third ring close below that right can i just--can as well and we have been asking this for
00:08:29 as well and we have been asking this for her enormous on fact we have been given plans back through local authority you know I think this year starts on the way that the tie for the tier
00:08:41 that the tie for the tier has compliance hi Rena and was looking to make proteins
00:09:08 I'm telling you now okay we can stop the
00:09:36 I'm telling you now okay we can stop the natural end and just a couple of questions that the first is you can hear Tom Goodell giving some detail about the floors and flattens per floor was that the first time you'd heard that detail no not so loud had detail around the
00:09:48 no not so loud had detail around the disposition of the block and how progress within it from almost the start of my tenure in command or the incident right no sorry apologies then your go on to say that
00:10:00 apologies then your go on to say that you didn't want this recorded in the minutes but the absence of plans was a major deficiency and would be highlighted later why didn't you want it recorded in the minutes because I wanted to explain the gravity of what was
00:10:11 to explain the gravity of what was happening I wanted to record the I suppose at that point the instant I wanted to give them a chance to get us the plans but I felt they weren't listening to me because I've been asking repeatedly over time
00:10:23 repeatedly over time and I just wanted to understand he should understand this er context because of the nature of that incident that people would be held accountable and absolutely rightly so that's the whole point of this process and I felt
00:10:34 whole point of this process and I felt that they have been entirely deficient in not making those plans available and
00:10:42 I think we see from the next clip which
00:10:53 I think we see from the next clip which is a second clip we've got oh this is also body-worn footage also wanna just sit forward an hour mr. row it's timed at 8:50 5:45 and it runs until 855 24:54
00:11:15 [Music]
00:11:24 I'm just a very short clip I'm sorry I was trying to play backwards notice we should just play it again right now it's
00:11:43 should just play it again right now it's not that clear but I understood that you understood I'm saying thank you for the plans and I think we've recorded that we've received them is that why I'm saying that right well would you listen to it one more time yeah right now having heard that I
00:12:08 time yeah right now having heard that I think three times can you confirm that that is you thanking whoever it was who provided them the full and yeah that's me thank him for having a complete leader action right now two questions
00:12:19 leader action right now two questions that arise from that first of all who provided them in the end do you know I can't tell you it was a representative from the local authority I can't tell you the individual do you know where they got them from no because again that
00:12:30 they got them from no because again that wasn't my concern I just wanted him now we've seen the time mark here of 855 and the clip starts at 45 and runs to 54
00:12:43 the clip starts at 45 and runs to 54 it's just 5 to 9 in the morning how long before this time do you think those plan arrived to your knowledge I can tell you right - II know I can I genuinely can
00:12:56 right - II know I can I genuinely can tell you that point who told you that they'd arrived you remember no okay now coming back to the the your progress
00:13:09 now coming back to the the your progress on the night I want to take it up at the bottom of page six of your first statement please and the last paragraph
00:13:28 statement please and the last paragraph starts with 339 Matt cook and Andy O'Laughlin got onto the unit and gave me an update face to face and just to match that up with your contemporaneous note
00:13:40 that up with your contemporaneous note that is a page five page four of that and says pretty much the same thing at the bottom of that page you say after describing what you discussed with those
00:13:52 describing what you discussed with those two officers I decided I needed to go to the tower lobby and make a decision as incident commander as to whether the continuing rescue effort was tenable in the face of such significant internal
00:14:04 the face of such significant internal fire spread and such a significant external risk of partial collapse and the resulting debris now had anything happened between the time you took over
00:14:18 happened between the time you took over and then made the decision that the advice to those within the building should be changed until this point 339 and after that anything changed so that
00:14:31 and after that anything changed so that you felt you now needed to make a decision as to whether the continuing rescue effort was tenable yeah it was the movement of the bridgehead that concerned me because to move a bridge it's a significant thing to do that bridgehead it needs to be a stable
00:14:43 bridgehead it needs to be a stable environment where we continue to connect people into the building to move it has a profound effect on the operation of search and rescue itself because you're having to move the whole apparatus so to do so is not he's not a small to decision that told me that something
00:14:55 decision that told me that something must have deteriorated inside the building
00:14:58 building I'd already come to the conclusion that the entire building system had failed that we were put in fire five a very high risk even just to get them into the building to now find that not only perhaps where we're not progressing
00:15:09 only perhaps where we're not progressing in the way I hoped but the bridge headed shifted downwards I really wanted to confirm myself exactly where we were at with our matters and you'd still hadn't I think got a DSC on site at that stage
00:15:22 I think got a DSC on site at that stage we may well have done I can't remember okay now you then go to the tower but
00:15:33 okay now you then go to the tower but like you say in the next paragraph on page seven the Commissioner arrived on the unit and I briefed her is that before you I'm assuming from the way this has laid out in your statement that you arrived on the unit and you briefed
00:15:45 you arrived on the unit and you briefed her before you left to go to the tower to make the decision that you described is that right I'm not sure without seeing me the order of things so is this after I've gone to the tower
00:15:57 so is this after I've gone to the tower and come back out well that's really what I'm asking you now I can tell from the that happened quite quickly I can't see from the overall statement okay well let's just look at the contemporaneous notes this may clarify page four we have
00:16:11 notes this may clarify page four we have the first chunk of text 339 where you say as you do in a statement that you needed to go to the tower to make a decision and then in the next last block
00:16:23 decision and then in the next last block on that page you say the Commissioner arrived on the unit I gave her a situational brief and my question was did you did she arrive on the unit before you left at the tower to make the decision that you say you wanted to go and make yes I think she did right and
00:16:35 and make yes I think she did right and apologies I think I understand your first question about do you know that and you then left for the tower [Music]
00:16:48 and you left essentially left her on the unit as you say for continuity while he went out on to the incident ground did your luggage stay in cu8 yes exactly stayed on cu8 because in
00:16:59 yes exactly stayed on cu8 because in leaving the CU and having the commissioner arrive as the monitoring officer effectively she was acting as the caretaker incident commander at that point because it would have been
00:17:11 point because it would have been difficult for me to communicate effectively as the incident commander from out in the incident ground I needed someone to be in the place where all communications were coming in to to be able to maintain an overall view of the
00:17:23 able to maintain an overall view of the incident while I went in sense checked my situational awareness that's a normal practice and items are that wrong okay now let's see if we can get a timing on this go to your log please if you would
00:17:36 this go to your log please if you would your ro log as I call it and you see that on page two you say I've just built a half way down still under the time mark of a 339 AR that's you Alex I'm
00:17:50 mark of a 339 AR that's you Alex I'm assuming that's you it explains the command structure to end MC and Commissioner and MC I imagine is Matt
00:18:01 Commissioner and MC I imagine is Matt Cooke that's correct did you not know the struck the Kalon structure at that stage I think that's just the way Jackie's noted it I see so I would have briefed the Commissioner so I'll be directly briefing the commissioner so this is the first moment
00:18:12 commissioner so this is the first moment I'm aware the Commissioner is on the command unit with me yeah and I am briefing her because she's my monitoring officers to the structure of the instance so she can validate my decision-making confirm whether she's
00:18:24 decision-making confirm whether she's comfortable with the objectives I've set and the structure we were using to meet those objectives then Matt's an ort officer standing next door and he would have received the same brief and actually would have provided a degree of
00:18:35 actually would have provided a degree of objective right critical challenge to it as well potentially excessive a role regardless of rank actually so you leave after that briefing you leave to go to the tower and that you leave Jackie McConnachie with the Commissioner on
00:18:47 McConnachie with the Commissioner on this on cu8 you can see the next item is 355 DT super gold Commissioner FSA to get to police to get out do you think you were on the command unit at that point or had you already gone I think
00:18:58 point or had you already gone I think I'm off at that point because I think that refers to the blocks adjacent to the terrain for tournament apologize that Barrington
00:19:10 tournament apologize that Barrington walk or trade build house yeah one of those I think from what I remember I came back onto the elation I don't aware that's recorded to be told that the Commissioner had had a conversation with
00:19:21 Commissioner had had a conversation with the police representative and that information was about residents in there by blocks being at risk my and she had taken the decision that those blocks should be evacuated okay and then at
00:19:34 should be evacuated okay and then at 3:58 you can see she makes a commands decision the EDB able you reward and I'm assuming she what she was on the see you and you weren't at that stage no but I was having that and actually I find some
00:19:45 was having that and actually I find some reassurance in this in the sense that I was separately having that conversation I think about this time with Pat Colvin and I had to come to the conclusion that
00:19:56 and I had to come to the conclusion that edpa would need to be reward nothing became to the same conclusion separately I can't tell you what information gave the Commissioner reason to take that decisions I wasn't on the unit but I
00:20:08 decisions I wasn't on the unit but I find some reassurance in the fact that our thought processes were the same having you know subsequently read down record when I've returned to the unit okay then just I'm just just trying to get a feel for when you get back onto
00:20:20 get a feel for when you get back onto the unit looking down the log 406 they are sitrep on incident ground now Jackie wasn't with you on the Instagram as
00:20:32 wasn't with you on the Instagram as you've told us so how did that come to be in the log of 406 no that's just the way she's worded it I think I'm back on the I think I'm back on the you and I think that refers to a situational report about the Instagram I wouldn't
00:20:43 report about the Instagram I wouldn't she would not have been at no point was Jackie with me on the instant ground so for her to record that that must have taken place back on the unit I follow so can we it turns of a spread of time can we take it on the basis that you left
00:20:56 we take it on the basis that you left the command unit at a before three perhaps just before 355 to go to the tower but were back on the commanded by 406 I think I might have left slightly
00:21:08 406 I think I might have left slightly earlier than 355 potentially because I'm not sure he had taken me that long to give the initial brief to the commissioner because I at that point because of the news I've had around the
00:21:22 because of the news I've had around the bridgehead coming down I would have wanted to get out there and see that so I think that would have been fairly quick but it is certainly between 339 or 406 I've got off the unit and I've spent
00:21:33 406 I've got off the unit and I've spent some time off the unit to improve my situational awareness right okay so at least we've got a spread of time when we know you're off the you absolutely the most you say it's between 339 a little bit after that and 406 when you come
00:21:44 bit after that and 406 when you come back on yes all right yeah now during that period I think you went to see you seven is that right I can't remember exactly I probably
00:21:56 I can't remember exactly I probably would have to refer back to my statement yeah what was thought I did because if I'm going to parsley holder taking the opportunity to stick my head into Tom Goodall and see how that was going I would have wanted to take the opportunity enroute to the tower yeah
00:22:08 opportunity enroute to the tower yeah and we've covered this earlier this morning it's page five and it would don't get back to hot it's just in terms of what what you did on that tour you go to see you seven and just say to be fair
00:22:19 to see you seven and just say to be fair to you I'll take you back to it again page five of the contemporaneous note third item down as we passed through seven
00:22:29 a third item down as we passed cu7 I stepped on to take a short brief from Tom Goodell how long do you think that brief lasted probably a minute or two
00:22:40 brief lasted probably a minute or two minutes it wouldn't have been a long brief no no we discussed that yesterday yeah which is where you said you were happily with the older sister but you know the word happy wasn't right no and then you went I think to be a control
00:22:51 then you went I think to be a control because that's what we have next dan Kipling and Nick Saunders where was be a main control so be a main control was on a grass area in front of the tower right and did they give you any
00:23:03 tower right and did they give you any information about the sufficiency of EDB a supply at that point I can't remember the detail of the conversation but what was clear to me that there was an obvious system in operation to
00:23:16 an obvious system in operation to prepare wearers to be committed into the tower that there was clear holding points where people were either returning being refreshed being got
00:23:27 returning being refreshed being got ready to be committed and that there was a system under operation I didn't question them about I don't think about turnover of edpa at that point but to be fair I don't remember the detail of the conversation
00:23:39 remember the detail of the conversation I had thinking following your tour where the next sites are done you said I then moved I then went to the base of the tower and you've got a brief from Dave O'Neil on safety you see that now I
00:23:54 O'Neil on safety you see that now I think we can pin this down with some CCTV image which I think you might be able to help us with can I ask you please first to be shown inq 387 this is
00:24:09 please first to be shown inq 387 this is a CCTV image taken from the grenfell lobby camera three at adjusted time of 350 44 and can you see yourself in that
00:24:21 350 44 and can you see yourself in that picture I can I am standing near the signage it says grateful to our community room talking to an officer with their helmet off and that what
00:24:32 with their helmet off and that what would is an I'm pointing to the right yes do you know that is I think I looks like people phoned in from behind yes I think we
00:24:40 think we agree with you but right does that help you identify the time at which you went into the tower on this tour well I would suggest that it was moments before that I got into the tower because you had to
00:24:52 I got into the tower because you had to sprint to get into the tower although what I would say is that I'd been ready to go into the tower earlier than that obviously the incident involving the poor gentleman who had jumped from the tower had delayed that someone I'd had
00:25:04 tower had delayed that someone I'd had to deal with the immediacy of that as well
00:25:06 well I follow okay and then the next picture is at an adjusted time of oh three 5554
00:25:18 is at an adjusted time of oh three 5554 which is some inq
00:25:28 I've taken this slightly out of order action I think the better order would be to show you and so sorry to show you 388 i NQ 388
00:25:43 now can you see yourself in that picture yes I can
00:25:47 yes I can and where are you I'm not entirely short to be honest even the layout with that floor I might that might be the point where I can the picture so sorry in the picture well apologies on to the far
00:25:58 picture well apologies on to the far right and I believe that is Richard Welsh and pack old when I'm talking to right I see and who is wearing the red
00:26:09 right I see and who is wearing the red checkered tab on that be someone from the command unit indeed and who might that be do you know I have no idea no okay does the name mark Kentfield ring a
00:26:21 okay does the name mark Kentfield ring a bell no it doesn't it doesn't ring a bell for me because my focus would have been on talking to the sector commanders because they held the situation on information the update I needed and was
00:26:32 information the update I needed and was responsible for the PA operations is very important to me that I got that information from them and you could own I'm assuming that you could see what we can see from this picture which was that the bridgehead was now down at the foot of the stairs on the ground floor there
00:26:43 of the stairs on the ground floor there yes
00:26:44 yes that was bi entry control that was the vah control point yes yes now if we go on to three sorry I in q3 nine one
00:26:57 you're still in the tower at this point and this is at an adjusted time of three 5554 do you think you can see you yourself in that picture I think I'm leaving the tower at that point and I'm
00:27:08 leaving the tower at that point and I'm walking past Pete Wolfington going out through the ground floor tower past perfect a community room sign right yes thank you say on the basis of those time marks coming in at before 351 but not
00:27:21 marks coming in at before 351 but not long before for 351 as we've seen sorry 350 as we've seen 350 44 and then leaving at an adjusted time of 350 554
00:27:32 leaving at an adjusted time of 350 554 does that help us identify the time span more or less that you were in the term I would say it's an accurate reflection as in there four or five minutes I've got the information I needed there in our company now right won't that out going
00:27:43 company now right won't that out going back out right that's helpful during that period of four or five minutes you were in the tower did you have a briefing with Pat Goulbourne and Richard
00:27:54 briefing with Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch
00:27:55 Welch yes I did you did and where did you have that briefing I can't tell you exactly where I can't locate myself exactly in the base of the tower and I don't want
00:28:06 the base of the tower and I don't want to say it's at the base of the scale thing because you've shown me that photo it's the first time I've seen that photo or might assume that all I know is either face to face briefing with Pat home Richard in the tower right now KY
00:28:18 home Richard in the tower right now KY then having established the time see if we can establish the content of that briefing can I ask you please to go to page 8 of your first witness statement and look at the second paragraph there
00:28:35 you say just just a sec missing in a wider context this is this is in the part of your statement dealing with this tore out of the command unit you I had received a quick update from Pat
00:28:46 received a quick update from Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch you were running in the fire sector and you go on to say they told me they're cleared as best as possible up to the eighth floor and we're having to fight hard have de
00:28:58 and we're having to fight hard have de fire fight hard to get beyond that but had crews earlier in the incident well up beyond that to possibly the 20th and 21st floors they were both calm and
00:29:10 21st floors they were both calm and focused with an immediate aim to fight through to the 12th floor despite having intermittent issues with water supply due to burst branch stroke hydrant lengths as a result of falling debris or hoses getting burn through and then you
00:29:24 hoses getting burn through and then you go on Pat confirmed we needed more a DBA and I explained I'd asked for every EVP a asset in London we discussed the stability of the building and at that point we'd receive no reports of issues with concrete superstructure columns or
00:29:36 with concrete superstructure columns or floors it's quite a lot in that I just want to unpack with you first of all was your impression that this time from this briefing that Pat gooble and Richard
00:29:49 briefing that Pat gooble and Richard Welsh were doing a systematic search of each floor from the bottom up are commonly the exact detail of the brief for my views that they were working their way systemically of the building
00:30:01 their way systemically of the building because that was the nature of the questions I asked them and the information I received back so I was very focused on clearing as best we could floor by floor pushing up
00:30:14 best we could floor by floor pushing up the buildings he's clear we've been pushed back down do you know whether that was a system that they already started no I don't but I know that I needed them to push as hard as possible
00:30:27 needed them to push as hard as possible back up the building clearing as they went right do you know roughly when they started that sister's systematic bottom-up approach do you mean prior to
00:30:39 bottom-up approach do you mean prior to my command prior to your take well prior to your arrival in the building inside the building no I don't okay but I what I would say is that the brief I'd had
00:30:50 I would say is that the brief I'd had from Andy O'Loughlin was that he had Pat and Richard in there and they were attempting to make progress as far as possible up inside the building and that would have meant to me that they were
00:31:02 would have meant to me that they were clearing floor by floor because that was generally the approach and working simultaneously on the fire survival guidance causes information gay came in what did you understand the EDB a
00:31:14 what did you understand the EDB a wearers were being used for to project as high as possible into the building because of travel times but also for specific tasks where needed were do
00:31:25 specific tasks where needed were do you're understanding from this briefing where crews being committed to respond to particular FSG rescues or was this just being done floor by floor no they were definitely being specifically tasked what would you find out what
00:31:38 tasked what would you find out what would happen we're at FSG call had come where if history details have come to the bridgehead for a floor above here let's say the 8th floor what were they
00:31:51 let's say the 8th floor what were they doing with that information at the bridgehead so for us emergency well I don't know if this was then because at the end of C I was in come on for a long period and had many conversations but I do remember having a conversation about
00:32:02 do remember having a conversation about crews on the basis of a risk assessment if necessary being pushed above a fire floor without fire extinguishing media which I found extremely concerning but felt I had to trust Pat and Richard you
00:32:14 felt I had to trust Pat and Richard you know in terms of their professional judgment experience of having to do that to make best efforts to rescue people I've
00:32:19 I've that did happen so if that that may what have happened in that conversation I don't whether he did or whether that was a later conversation but my expectation would be that actually sometimes people were being pushed beyond where we were
00:32:31 were being pushed beyond where we were you know reasonably expecting to be able to control the fire did you in that I know it was not a particularly long period of time you were there but during that period did you find out how FSG
00:32:43 that period did you find out how FSG details were coming into the town from outside at that point well I knew that already from the system that tongue headings showed me explained to me from
00:32:54 headings showed me explained to me from my own observation because it was clear that sheets were coming in with me as I went into the tower came back out the tower is very clear there was a kind of linear system to bring them into the bottom of the tower it was clear that information was being documented on the
00:33:06 information was being documented on the wall it's clear that people for them for example was involved in that as was a watch manager who I now know to be clean Williams oh I didn't know his name it was nothing she did not satisfy there was a passage of information in right
00:33:17 was a passage of information in right did you look closely at the linear system when you say closely no more than that I was comfortable I could see sheets coming in being given to crews an element of briefing happening and that
00:33:29 element of briefing happening and that then those crews were progressing to the bridgehead so I was comfortable with that and actually again I didn't wanna get involved in that level of detail I was more concerned about fact that bridge had have moved that that raised a
00:33:41 bridge had have moved that that raised a greater question for me about the firefighting conditions internally and most importantly my decision around the risk as placing firefighters right that was if the greatest concern to me at that point was I still able to commit firefighters reasonably into this
00:33:53 firefighters reasonably into this building taking into account the conditions yeah can I pick something out of your last answer you very helpfully said that you you could see sheets coming in being given to two crews could you just
00:34:07 given to two crews could you just explain what you saw sheets of paper with what FSG on them yes our template sheet so I remember being outside yes lining up to go to the parapet just before Shaun Murphy was hit by the
00:34:19 before Shaun Murphy was hit by the gentleman who jumped law remember to my left someone collating sheets and then someone bringing I remembered I just remember seeing the sheets and then I remember seeing sheets
00:34:30 sheets and then I remember seeing sheets inside you know I remember the information written all and that there was clearly communication between all parties involved in that kind of linear delivery of information did you see the what watch managers the
00:34:44 did you see the what watch managers the officers at the wall giving sheets of paper with FSG information on them to crews I can't remember in the exactitude of that detail but my memory is that
00:34:55 of that detail but my memory is that that information I must have some memory because I've memory that in from that I've seen that information inside the tower yeah yes okay and do you remember and that's difficult do you remember the
00:35:08 and that's difficult do you remember the crews holding those pieces of paper when going to the entry control I would just not have been looking at that level of detail
00:35:15 detail I couldn't tell you faithfully that I do remember that but what I do remember for definite is the information going into the tower there being a method of recording and that there were sheets
00:35:26 recording and that there were sheets inside the tower and do you remember who was holding them I'm sorry I can't I can't remember exactly do you remember discussing with Richard what Richard weld shot or Pat Goulbourne whether
00:35:39 weld shot or Pat Goulbourne whether those sheets that you saw were being used for briefing crews by them no I didn't delve down into that level of detail because my primary concern at that point was why we had to move the bridgehead are we now operating in
00:35:51 bridgehead are we now operating in conditions that becoming increasingly untenable
00:35:53 untenable what is your resourcing requirement how far are we able actually to push up inside the building what is the likely rate of progress as well and if I'm honest to be absolutely clear in my
00:36:06 honest to be absolutely clear in my intent that we continued regardless of the difficulties to carry out be a search and rescue conditions despite you know operations despite the difficulties and to impress on them my desire that
00:36:17 and to impress on them my desire that they push momentum as hard as possible it was a conversation more in that context it was the big picture which is Pat Richard are you able to continue operations have you got any specific information about the stability of the
00:36:28 information about the stability of the building where are we in the building why'd we move the bridgehead we need to drive that back up and we need to move back up the building right it was about maintaining because my great fear
00:36:39 maintaining because my great fear throughout the incident is that people were scared people were traumatized here was a massive logistical effort to keep the operation going you know my primary focuses we had to maintain progress
00:36:50 focuses we had to maintain progress progress was not a given progress had to be driven and motivated through the leadership of individual officers through the courage and tenacity of firefighters themselves and actually that had to be my focus it had to be the
00:37:01 that had to be my focus it had to be the big picture to drive that moment and drive the progress through so I'm there to set strategy my command officers are there to define the detail of the tactics which in some aspects I would
00:37:13 tactics which in some aspects I would have to validate and the firefighters are there to deliver the tactics and that's kind of how the incident command structure works in effect so for me it
00:37:24 structure works in effect so for me it was more important to me that we were meeting our broad strategic objectives that incident which is we must continue to drive process and progress inside the tower despite the difficulties my knees
00:37:35 tower despite the difficulties my knees haven't had all conversation about whether it was safe to do so yeah recognizing the very great moral dilemma that would put me and if I decided to remove crews from the building right and just looking at what you said in that
00:37:47 just looking at what you said in that last answer about the command officers defining the detail of the tactics did you question them about those why when
00:38:00 you question them about those why when designing those tactics they hadn't already pushed the EDB a resources they had as far up into the building at an earlier stage than now I don't know whether I had a conversation about a DBA
00:38:12 whether I had a conversation about a DBA then or later but there was certainly a point in the instant where I wanted to know why we weren't balancing the use of SCBA and IDI be a different you know I think I had that conversation on the unit and ask you the message to be passed back so I wanted to know why we
00:38:24 passed back so I wanted to know why we weren't pushing EDB a as far as we could up within the building back filling with SD VA to the point where if it's limit of exploitation was exhaustion so I definitely had that conversation at some
00:38:35 definitely had that conversation at some point in the incident Jumma the wind I'm really sorry mr. Miller are down right
00:38:43 and you know what happened to that suggestion that you made yes I think that either Matt Cooke or Mick Mulholland took that and and took that to the fire sector because I'm sure I
00:38:55 to the fire sector because I'm sure I asked that her more than one occasion and the result of that request was was what some clarification about how we were using a DBA and why we needed the EDA resources which was to push up as
00:39:07 EDA resources which was to push up as far as we could into the tower and at some so at one point we were only using a DBA that's what prompted that question actually so that was the point of which asked it there was a point in the instant when we were only using EVP a I was given some rationale for why that
00:39:19 was given some rationale for why that was but my answer to that was that's fine if that's what you think is required at this moment in time due to the circumstances the conditions but are the earliest opportunity I'll do
00:39:30 the earliest opportunity I'll do remember having this conversation and I'm sorry I can't exactly remember the location is that we needed to get back to a place where we were using a DBA with maximum efficiency and pushing s
00:39:41 with maximum efficiency and pushing s DVA up from behind it do do you remember being told about deployments of EDB a to low floors for example the fourth floor
00:39:54 low floors for example the fourth floor may well have been that wouldn't necessary of concern me if it was focused on undertaking a particular task because b DBA isn't just about distance to travel
00:40:02 to travel it's about duration of wear so you know there are certainly tasks on the instant ground where you don't want a constant rotation of crews but actually that is always balanced with the effects of heat
00:40:13 always balanced with the effects of heat and fire on our own crews you know it's a delicate decision to take because you don't miss any one of over suppose people either but I would again I would be trusting packing the my new shy or Richard into my new shy of those
00:40:24 Richard into my new shy of those decisions if it was task-focused as a general principle I was very clear that we needed to use s DBA as far as possible to reach the upper floors of the building and drive s DVA in behind
00:40:36 the building and drive s DVA in behind it do well can I ask you to be shown a picture which is M eet
00:40:48 five 774 there she is a close-up why I think the best picture we've got of the lobby wall which is there on the screen
00:41:01 lobby wall which is there on the screen now and can I just ask you to look at the top of that his people fund and rate on that above 10 EDB a below 10s DBA can
00:41:12 on that above 10 EDB a below 10s DBA can you tell us anything about that well I don't remember reading that the only thing I could say about that wall and the balls inside the FSG command unit was that I'd asked them to be photographed repeatedly as information came to act as a record yes so that
00:41:24 came to act as a record yes so that actually you know there would be an opportunity to question it later date and and see if there's any learning coming up all right do you remember make assuming a command or one of your one of the sector's
00:41:37 or one of your one of the sector's assuming a command and telling you about it that that above 10 EDB a below 10 SD be a although remember the specific numbers but I do remember more than one conversation about use of SCBA in a GPA
00:41:48 conversation about use of SCBA in a GPA and where the limits of exploitation for each worth I don't remember the specifics of the floor numbers because these things Everton flows continuously over the duration of the incident right
00:42:04 and do you remember anybody writing a grid on the wall but at that later stage in the evening showing what floors have
00:42:16 in the evening showing what floors have been cleared I can't say I remember the exact detail of what was written on the wall but I remember a range of information being written on the wall and just reflecting that actually this
00:42:27 and just reflecting that actually this was a sign of how extremely difficult things have become because the very processes we put in place post a canal to prevent that ever happening again has seemingly not been adequate well and I'll come back to that in a minute if I
00:42:39 I'll come back to that in a minute if I may cause I'm interested in that answer but before I do that just just following your tour I think after the as we've seen after this brief visit four or five
00:42:50 seen after this brief visit four or five six minutes or so to the tower you go back to the command unit is that right that's correct and I think you you then go back to the tower again at four twenty and the reason I suggest that to you is that you say that in your
00:43:01 you is that you say that in your statement of page nine last paragraph of four twenty I went back inside the tower to the lobby I was briefed by Pat and Richard I asked them to start using s
00:43:12 Richard I asked them to start using s DBA to follow behind the EDB a cruise to make the best use of resources now that that is the you've got that as a separate discussion at four twenty do you think that's right that's obviously
00:43:25 you think that's right that's obviously what I recollected right now let's just see if we can pin this down with right
00:43:37 see if we can pin this down with right that's what you recollect I don't think we've got CCT image of you coming into that stage it doesn't matter are you sure that that's not part of the same discussion you heard earlier in the
00:43:50 discussion you heard earlier in the tower the one we talked about I can't rank eleventh what I do know is that I absolutely had that conversation because that's the converse and actually reading that that's the conversation one of the conversation I'm referring to right which is that I needed SCBA
00:44:04 right which is that I needed SCBA because I I was concerned that we were asking Evie be a where as to where twice you know I accepted that we had to do that but I wanted to minimize the repeated wearing of edpa because of the duration of the set and it was just the
00:44:15 duration of the set and it was just the most efficient way to use our resources we had a greater number and greater availability in terms of relief or bringing additional machines on of SD PA and therefore I wanted to use it to use that as efficiently as
00:44:26 use it to use that as efficiently as possible to its maximum level of usage and reserve a DJ for those tasks that are absolutely vital 3 DBA to be useful yeah
00:44:36 yeah the reason I'm asking you this rather arcane question is because if you go to your statement if they're on page nine you say that this is the 4/20 briefing
00:44:48 you say that this is the 4/20 briefing that you have it you say halfway down the page I put there was one watch manager who was writing up FSG information on the wall he was close to tears and tried to apologize for doing so I put my arm around him and gave him
00:45:00 so I put my arm around him and gave him reassurances now we do have a picture which I just want to show you which is inq 390 this is camera 4 inq 390 port
00:45:15 inq 390 this is camera 4 inq 390 port which is camera 4 in the lobby with an adjusted time mark of oh three fifty five forty seven so that's during the period of your first trip we looked at
00:45:26 period of your first trip we looked at before and if you look at well let me help me with this can you see you in that picture and I've got my arm around someone are now like speak Lynn Williams right and I can I can definitively
00:45:37 right and I can I can definitively remember that conversation because he was distraught he was having to write things on the wall right and I just felt pulled for him because he's was clearly a professional officer who's trying to do his best and was trying to you know
00:45:50 do his best and was trying to you know make excuses for his own actions in the face of what was just incredible pressure and I wanted to know that as the incident commander I news doing his best and then he was making every effort to record information in the face of a
00:46:04 to record information in the face of a system that are basically failed him I have one more question then we can take a break
00:46:09 a break I may just ask it given that you've identified that as the conversation to do you think now that the time mark in your statement of 420 on page nine is in in fact that he must because I didn't
00:46:21 in fact that he must because I didn't have that conversation more than one so I can only reflect that that's the case it must have been all part of the same ice journey into the tower yes I see thank you very much mr. chairman I think it is appropriate we take a break now yes I'm doing very well
00:46:45 thank you sir I think we're probably safe to say three o'clock on generous yes thank you sir no
00:46:57 o'clock on generous yes thank you sir no discussing your evidence so why do you like to give the
00:47:11 the trade-off
00:59:33 right tour ready to carry on I'm sir surface right guy can I just ask you to go back very very briefly to one or two
00:59:45 go back very very briefly to one or two things we're talking about earlier before first of all in terms of asking for plans at the point at which you took over were you aware whether control or anybody else in the brigade had asked RB
00:59:57 anybody else in the brigade had asked RB Casey for plans or not I wasn't know similarly on related topic were you aware whether anybody in the control at
01:00:08 aware whether anybody in the control at control had asked are V Casey for a dangerous structures engineer I think I was aware of the dangerous structure engineer have been requesting something else part of idea lock-ins briefed to me
01:00:19 else part of idea lock-ins briefed to me yes I believe that Andy had made that request right that's what that's why I recollect so I was I was confident a DSC agreement requested okay going back to the discussion about strategy which just
01:00:30 the discussion about strategy which just before the break you very helpfully told us was the one that the your during your visit to the TARDIS before 3:00 a.m. or around about that time did you have any
01:00:41 around about that time did you have any discussion with Richard Welch or Pat Goulbourne about the need to make sure that firefighters when they got two floors knocked on all the doors on the floors to alert any occupants who
01:00:52 floors to alert any occupants who remained in their flats now again I think I danced that level of granular data in terms of tactical delivery for me it was the biggest strategic question which was can we maintain this rescue
01:01:03 which was can we maintain this rescue operation in the face of the conditions inside the tower it was very you know in a very real sense can we continue to commit crews and if we are continuing to commit crews how far can we get them
01:01:15 commit crews how far can we get them that was the question I needed answered at mine at all yes and there is also just one thing I just need to clarify with you in your evidence us after noon and the moment it's on the electronic version of the
01:01:26 it's on the electronic version of the transcript at page 156 line 24 you said you needed II D s DBA as far as possible to reach the upper floors did you mean a
01:01:37 to reach the upper floors did you mean a DBA EDB a yes so EDP a would been used for the the furthest penetration you could set a higher floors and SCBA following up behind now um you have described in your
01:01:50 now um you have described in your witness statement at page nine which is where we I think left off and we've clarified the time mark there but just came back to the substance of the discussion page nine last paragraph you
01:02:06 discussion page nine last paragraph you discussed the FSG writing up writing on the wall there can I just ask you to look at the PRC notes which is lfb three
01:02:18 look at the PRC notes which is lfb three one one two and go please to page five
01:02:29 now in the middle of the this is back to the discussion that you were having on that day as part of the review in the middle of that page it says not so happy
01:02:41 middle of that page it says not so happy with China graph writing on walls indication couldn't get on fi bees and indication of where we'd got to um I just want to explore what that is about
01:02:53 just want to explore what that is about what were your concerns about China graph writing on wall I think exactly what I've described previously which I saw it as an example of a system we've put in place to address a previously
01:03:05 put in place to address a previously identified point of learning post lack and all having not been sufficient to deal with the fire survival guidance calls in the volume you're receiving them and obviously I mean that was what drove me to ask Tom and whatever offside
01:03:18 drove me to ask Tom and whatever offside did ask inside the tower to repeatedly photograph the balls because my great concern with china graph on walls in a firefighting environment where there might be water in an environment where you have a lot of people is you can
01:03:29 you have a lot of people is you can start to erode that information and you run a real danger of that danger you know of that have that information being robbed by someone in averted lis of losing it in some way so that really
01:03:40 losing it in some way so that really concerned me that that's exactly why we wanted to have the football system so that people didn't have to resort to writing information on walls was your concern that we're not using the football system also was it to do with
01:03:54 football system also was it to do with the amount of information that wasn't being recorded but let me put the question slightly differently start starts at the ticketed stages under the FIB bald sister which was brought in which i think is policy
01:04:06 was brought in which i think is policy 820 do you remember that there was an is an appendix which sets out a template with a whole lot of detail about what should go on to a fib yes absolutely so that the good thing about football is it
01:04:18 that the good thing about football is it gives you a structure on which shall record the information and I'll see at the point that you're deviating from using the fit board and you know and again so these are people are under high stress very high volume of information
01:04:29 stress very high volume of information they are now having to write on the wall that information you know they haven't got the you know just the visual structure of the fit board to work to uh you know I'm fairly sure that he would
01:04:40 you know I'm fairly sure that he would have tried to recreate it on the wall however though there is a there is a risk that actually it's not going to be done in such a structured way I think that that is inevitable when you're writing things on a wall they lived on
01:04:51 writing things on a wall they lived on their absolute best so there is no intended criticism of the junior officers involved they were doing their best in a context of a great volume of information with the fit boards not only had the space well no I know I would not
01:05:03 had the space well no I know I would not be happy in that context okay let's just see if we can get a little bit more granularity on that answer can I ask you to please to be shown a policy eight twenty which is lfb one
01:05:14 policy eight twenty which is lfb one eight eight it's a tabs nineteen of our policy bundle and go go to page 9 of the relativity reference which is figure
01:05:26 relativity reference which is figure three in appendix one and this is some way into the document now mr. Roy tell me if you're not familiar with this no I am familiar with the casualty
01:05:38 am familiar with the casualty information right template I don't know whether this can be blown up so that you can see the detail on the left-hand side it's not terribly clear but there's a lot of detail down the left-hand side for my purposes you don't need to know
01:05:50 for my purposes you don't need to know what it is it was your concern about using the China graph that this particular detail wasn't being captured on the wall / FSG no not to the level of granular detail cuz actually in the
01:06:01 granular detail cuz actually in the context of the volume of calls they had actually I'm not sure they've been able to capture the full range of information this template in it's just the simple fact that this is neat he's ordered if there are columns
01:06:14 neat he's ordered if there are columns you know you can clearly read across whereas inevitable if you're writing freehand on a wall with China graph and in the volume of information that was going on there are we I think I just had
01:06:25 going on there are we I think I just had I was very concerned that we got to that point they told me I suppose from my perspective example is I'm always looking at my perspective from the story of you know the biggest story of the incident and what it told me was that
01:06:37 incident and what it told me was that how systems have been outstripped by the volume of information coming in right and my officers were having to improvise in a way that I didn't find entirely satisfactory that they had no choice because realistically there was nowhere
01:06:49 because realistically there was nowhere else to record that information in terms of space and the equipment they had available so therefore they were doing their utmost best to capture vital information that was gonna help progress the rescue earth right but the concern
01:07:02 the rescue earth right but the concern was the specific concern was was what that it would be the information would be deleted or not captured in some way I don't think it's as specific as that it's just that you know I think by any
01:07:14 it's just that you know I think by any measure having to write something on the wall in regard to casualty information people coming out of the flats it's just not going to be it's not gonna be captured in as clear and as neat away
01:07:26 captured in as clear and as neat away and in a way that is so he was more likely to be erased for a start that was my reason for asking for repeated photos to be taken in case even within the compass of the incident like they might have had to
01:07:37 incident like they might have had to have gone back to find some information if that was required okay so would it be would it be fair to describe your concern here that the post lack and all policy had been tested to destruction and found wanting absolutely absolutely fair absolutely
01:07:51 absolutely absolutely fair absolutely fair description of where we've got to okay now you then I think go back just to see you ate and we you helpful II assistance with that at 4:06 we're there
01:08:03 assistance with that at 4:06 we're there its page two of your log and and you then have a meeting
01:08:12 I'm so sorry let me find it myself you don't have a TCM I think that was initially chaired by Commissioner cotton at 4:34 if you go to your log you'll see
01:08:24 at 4:34 if you go to your log you'll see that and it's just below halfway down
01:08:36 that and it's just below halfway down the page do you see you see that it's page 3 so I think we're on page 2 here we are
01:08:43 we are shortly we should be on page 304 34 tactical coordination meeting commissioner introduces and establishes priorities in a our absence now it's the
01:08:54 priorities in a our absence now it's the absence I just want to first of all to clarify with you going back one page you told us earlier on to page 2 that by 406 you've come on to the sea you because you had that sitrep about the incident
01:09:07 you had that sitrep about the incident ground that was why it was logged by Jackie yes yes yes and then then you give a brief to Li drawbridge it 411 yeah and then for 12 there are various
01:09:21 yeah and then for 12 there are various other entries and same at 422 you're not it appears referred to after 412 or between 412 and for 34 so we're
01:09:35 between 412 and for 34 so we're Commissioner introduces an established priorities in a our absence my question is well though you came back onto the see you at forest before 406 when did you leave again because who clearly did I went to briefly drawbridge
01:09:47 I went to briefly drawbridge I think that's when I went to brief lead Rory told me to look ma'am I'll just look back through the timeline because I remember briefing the commissioner yes
01:09:58 remember briefing the commissioner yes and then wanting to go and speak to Lee Lee drawbridge in person it was very important to me I spoke to Lee in person so I had to get over to see you one where he was going to be I see
01:10:09 where he was going to be I see it's a briefing face-to-face right so we complain about part of the incident let me help you with that we can pick this up I think at page 6 of your contemporaneous note at the bottom of the page of 411 you're told that's they
01:10:20 the page of 411 you're told that's they leave Lee drawbridges on cu1 and then at the top of 7 you go to see you one yeah so I think that period reflects me going to see Lee and my recollection was
01:10:32 going to see Lee and my recollection was that I went into the tower on the way back right but I think the footage you've shown me because I think this is the point where I'd said I'd put my arm around Glyn Williams but clearly I've done that at 3:58 okay
01:10:46 but clearly I've done that at 3:58 okay whenever the timestamp was of that write ich euler visit to the tower okay but to be fair to you because it's not that clear and we're just trying to piece this together not absolutely understand why you need to do you see you and I on page seven of your contemporaneous note
01:11:00 page seven of your contemporaneous note you say I made my way to see you one and then in the third item down you so I walked back to see you eight via the tower I once again got a quick situational update from an dear Lachlan
01:11:12 situational update from an dear Lachlan now did you go into the tower to have that situational update from and y'all met outside I didn't have a Khalid the guard a conversation with Andy inside got it
01:11:20 got it so ok so then we you then so I waited for an NPS officer went back into the lobby and that's 4:20 that briefed by the passenger engine so I we've
01:11:31 the passenger engine so I we've obviously got a question of recollection here really the question is is your recollection that you've given us today correct or of these contemporaneous notes the more reliable I think I can tell you genuinely because I think I was
01:11:43 tell you genuinely because I think I was in command of the incident for such a long time that I've tried to piece together my memory of the incident based on the timings that were recorded for me decisions that were recorded for me whether it was ordering on resources my
01:11:55 whether it was ordering on resources my memory says that I walk back from the towel walk back from the Cu one where I've spoken to Lee via the town my memory says that I went into the tower by Carnegie with the CCTV footage T CCTV
01:12:09 by Carnegie with the CCTV footage T CCTV footage I've seen for the first time today so the truth is I can't quite piece together how that has happened now my memory still tells me I went into the Tattler but your CCTV tells me that the
01:12:21 Tattler but your CCTV tells me that the actions our thoughts are carried out in the tower at that point and had in fact occurred perhaps as part of a previous visit I think that's probably just a function of memory and of having been in charge of a very complex incident over such a long period of time and doing my
01:12:32 such a long period of time and doing my best to remember yeah but now going back to the
01:12:37 to the Rollag Oh for 34 page three
01:12:53 I'm sorry I'm so sorry that there's something I want to cover with you before that at 4:22 macmail Holland gives update do you see that up there should cover that with you first actually cruise up to 10th floor in EDB
01:13:06 actually cruise up to 10th floor in EDB a SDV a fourth or fifth floor seventh and eighth and ninth floors considering using aerial idibia is being used quickly and here Lachlan no active FSGS at this time and last one seventh eighth
01:13:17 at this time and last one seventh eighth and ninth floors cruising and out is compromised by debris drop down and several casualties jumping now I've this is 422 do I take it that you weren't on the see you at that time and not privy
01:13:28 the see you at that time and not privy to that discussion no because I came back onto the unit at the point the Commission had started to chair the SCT I came literally just as she was starting it she done the introduction she laid out some priorities probably
01:13:42 she laid out some priorities probably based on that sitrep to be fair in the conversation I've had with her before I left right and then I took over the carrying of the TCM so she could resume her monitoring officer duties and
01:13:53 her monitoring officer duties and actually also pick up some other functions which are beginning to bring some pressure to bear on the incident okay did you get any information from Andy or Lachlan or anybody after 420 to
01:14:06 Andy or Lachlan or anybody after 420 to the at 4:22 there were no active FSGS I didn't have that information at that point but I think I got onto the Union at the point that the Commissioner was
01:14:19 at the point that the Commissioner was giving an update and also I'd come I pick I'd picked up on some information somewhere on that journey that's why I think I went to the tower because I remember that CCN and talking about
01:14:31 remember that CCN and talking about progress now whether I've picked out from the brief Andy and Lachlan had given me that may well have been the case because that that brief was face to face right I think we're and ear Lachlan
01:14:43 face right I think we're and ear Lachlan is referred to there I don't know whether he's on the unit at that time because he's done the briefing with me and then moved on or whether that's Mick passing Andy's information on because I wasn't on the unit I don't know where that was just Mick on the unit speaking
01:14:55 that was just Mick on the unit speaking on behalf of Andy so passing his update on I have no idea because obviously Paul's in there right now it looks from your contemporaneous note that you went back to see you a via the tower
01:15:09 back to see you a via the tower possibly went into the lobby again went back to see you eight and on the way back checked on be a main control did you do you think go in to see you seven
01:15:20 you do you think go in to see you seven on the way back to see you eight I think I did because wherever possible I would I would seek my heading to see seven see our FSG was doing yeah and the one thing I do remember is speaking to I'm fairly sure I spoke to large numbers
01:15:31 I'm fairly sure I spoke to large numbers of the eight crews again coming through be a main control well let me see if something's familiar to you and can I ask you please to look at em et triple
01:15:43 ask you please to look at em et triple zero one five nine three six now this is a whiteboard on cu7 we've heard quite a lot about and I just
01:15:56 we've heard quite a lot about and I just want to look with you at the black writing a third of the way down on the right hand side where it says from F M Wolfe ndon at 425 be a crews committed
01:16:07 Wolfe ndon at 425 be a crews committed to the 15th floor and then underneath that it says at 4:45 crews only committed up to 11th floor not 15th floor taking each in turn do you remember finding out either then
01:16:19 do you remember finding out either then or after then the four twenty five crews were being committed to the 15th floor I've been picking that information up of cu7 at that point because I've delivered
01:16:30 cu7 at that point because I've delivered information from wherever I've gathered it differently inside the TCM so if I've seen that information and registered it and then walked a very short distance from c70 CUA I would have used that set
01:16:44 from c70 CUA I would have used that set against the timings but I mean actually up I don't see if I think about the timings of the TCM that doesn't seem to square with the timing sorry you've
01:16:55 square with the timing sorry you've confused me slightly here because the first one would be really relevant the 425 but not the 445 because I think I've started the TCM by 4:30 was it 435 well
01:17:06 started the TCM by 4:30 was it 435 well if we go to you page the tradition literally was at the start of it I've got back on well yes it's for 34 if we go to page 3 of the row log I'm just asking you about
01:17:17 the row log I'm just asking you about the first one for 25 okay sorry I just want to clarify that it's my understanding no fair enough and my question really is did before coming back on to see you 8 and seeing and engaging in the start of the next
01:17:29 and engaging in the start of the next TCM at 434 did you pass cu7 and i'm just trying to work out whether if you did whether you saw the whiteboard I would have looked to the system rather than the details on the whiteboard I would
01:17:40 the details on the whiteboard I would have interrogated it I would have been more interested in FSG numbers progress of the FSG operation how was Tom how was he how were his staff how were they coping with the demands of
01:17:52 how were they coping with the demands of that system that would have been the line of questioning and whether he thought we were still maintaining a clear line of communication into the be a cruise right turning to a different
01:18:05 a cruise right turning to a different topic a little bit later on in the night if I could take you them to the row log page for at 5:20 we see a number of
01:18:23 page for at 5:20 we see a number of things but four lines down you say AR is wet riser up and running did you think that there was a wet riser in the building no it's clear from the start there's a dry riser do you know why it
01:18:35 there's a dry riser do you know why it says wet riser I have no idea no you know I was quite busy throughout the night John I probably made a chromatic Alera but I was very clear as a dry riser because one of our issues was a continuing challenge of augmenting it in
01:18:47 continuing challenge of augmenting it in the face of hose lines being cut continuously by falling debris yes and we may look at that in just a moment but just before I leave this wet riser point it can I ask you to look at page five at
01:19:01 it can I ask you to look at page five at the top of the page and it's I think ten minutes later like half an hour later 550 550
01:19:10 550 550 Tom Goodell wet riser is poor were you present for that when he said that dealing and I can't remember that sentence but again you know obviously no doubt it was
01:19:21 again you know obviously no doubt it was a dry riser it was a dry rising system do you remember any sense of perhaps confusion on the night as to whether there may have been a wet riser in the building no not from my perspective it
01:19:32 building no not from my perspective it was very clear as a dry riser because we were lulled menteng supply and actually we had intermittent problems with water supply because of the challenge of hose lines been cut the volume of water we needed and the ability of terms' water
01:19:43 needed and the ability of terms' water supply sufficient pressure through the main system to supply those needs right now
01:19:50 now also 550 just immediately under that we see that there's the next tactical coordination meeting I'm a CEO co-chair that feisty if it doesn't say otherwise yesterday and by then you've got crews
01:20:03 yesterday and by then you've got crews up to the 14th floor danger for our crews no water there may be a decision not to commit above 14th floor due to risk and then you get an update of FSG
01:20:15 risk and then you get an update of FSG which we looked at before this morning and then you say bit lower down
01:20:27 115 unaccounted for very difficult to establish exact numbers due to self evac now that self evac problem can I just
01:20:38 now that self evac problem can I just explore that with you and did you know that people were were exiting the tower even in the early stages of the incident without a record being taken of which
01:20:50 without a record being taken of which flat or even which floor they'd come from yes at what point did you learn that I think from the start the instincts it was obvious that people have been leaving that building as you would absolutely expect residents to
01:21:02 would absolutely expect residents to have done so the minute they had any cognizance of how serious the fire was yeah did you take any steps to put in place a system for recording that information from either from crews or
01:21:15 information from either from crews or from residents who were able to give that information as they exited as they came out of the tower during my time in command I would have expected a record as far as was possible to be kept or
01:21:28 as far as was possible to be kept or anyone coming out of the tower that that is encompassed within FSG system whether they were
01:21:32 they were skewed themselves in effect walking out of there or whether our crews guided them out I would see them as someone incorporated within the FSG system so that 115 I think I do remember the
01:21:43 that 115 I think I do remember the detail of this this is a conversation where I was trying to press tongue for what you know who we thought was unaccounted for within those numbers and
01:21:54 unaccounted for within those numbers and I think that was his my recollection is that was his best estimate but that was very difficult to come to because of the issue around people having come out prior to not just me taking over but
01:22:06 prior to not just me taking over but throughout the entire kind of compass of the incident because of the nature of the tempo of operations in the the gap I've already highlighted in returning information we were chasing that
01:22:17 information we were chasing that information that whole incident right so but my question was did you take any steps to put in place a system for recording that information I wouldn't
01:22:28 recording that information I wouldn't have expected anyone to be coming out of a tower that they did that that again is a tactical decision that I would have expected when we're following our processes and following our fire survival guidance processes so we've
01:22:40 survival guidance processes so we've recorded the names and disposition of the people coming out of the tower and I suppose the fallback to that is I would expect those people also to be picked up
01:22:51 expect those people also to be picked up at some point within rest sensors within the you know the system to gather casualties once they come out of the tower beyond our Corden's as well so
01:23:02 tower beyond our Corden's as well so there was a number of sources of information where I felt we could have all been working together as agencies to start piecing that information together yeah sorry Maps I'm not being very clear given that you knew from the start that
01:23:13 given that you knew from the start that identifying who was coming out which flat they were coming at which flat they were coming from which floor they were coming from was was difficult my question really is knowing that it was difficult did you put in place or try to
01:23:24 difficult did you put in place or try to put in place a system for recording that information that that is the FSG system so what I'm saying is my my belief in the crews were doing their best to do so is that as part of the FSG systems
01:23:36 is that as part of the FSG systems anyone coming out of that building we needed to make a record of anyone coming out of that building having put that system in place what was their record so the record would have been on what Glynn is writing on the wall
01:23:47 what Glynn is writing on the wall because this is the information of anyone exiting the building whether we're carrying them how or whether they've been able to walk down themselves or whether it be a crew has assisted them out anyone leaving that building there was only one point of
01:23:58 building there was only one point of entry or exit I would have expected that information to be recorded as part of a single system if we put in place a separate system to collect that information that would have made things even more complicated so it's in comfort
01:24:09 even more complicated so it's in comfort within the whole fire Survival guidance system has laid down in our policy what was clear to me was that was very very very difficult and that is how we'd ended up in a place where information was being written on a warning china
01:24:21 was being written on a warning china graph but I would have expected that returns part of the return loop we've discussed previously and I think it follows from your last answer but was the system working not in entirety because of the volume of calls because
01:24:33 because of the volume of calls because of the level of BA operation because of the stress and level of effort that firefighters and officers were under and the length of time they were having to undertake those duties I think I had to
01:24:45 undertake those duties I think I had to be realistic that with the scale the complexity the awful nature of the incident things were not always going to go exactly as I wanted it and my job as an instant commander was always trying
01:24:57 an instant commander was always trying to come back to drive progress and to try and close the gaps where we could kind then turn on to a different topic which we find on page 14 of your
01:25:09 which we find on page 14 of your statement first statement foot of the page you say 642 BC C regain control
01:25:20 page you say 642 BC C regain control offered me a 42 meter aerial appliance from Surrey FRS I accepted the I think office offer I should say it has asked it to mobilize this was at with a view
01:25:31 it to mobilize this was at with a view to replace our ALP which only has a 30 meter reach I just want to focus on that for a moment did you know before BCC told you about it that Surrey have a 42
01:25:42 told you about it that Surrey have a 42 meter aerial no it did not come as a surprise to you yes did he come as a surprise to you that the lfb did not have one no because I know how our aerials operate how many we've got into
01:25:53 aerials operate how many we've got into what high they operate - right do you or did you know whether any other FRS is within like within the m25 or
01:26:04 FRS is within like within the m25 or just outside the m25 have a had a 42 metres 11th no it didn't and to be fair when I was off at this again I suppose it's the general approach which is actually
01:26:15 general approach which is actually having been offered a I might have found a utility for it I didn't see at that point any reason to turn the offer down he wouldn't have been used for external firefighting because that wasn't how concern at that point while I thought it
01:26:27 concern at that point while I thought it might for me is some advantage in terms of be able to look at the external condition of the building height and might be able to offer some flexibility with that over a 30 meter aerial ladder
01:26:39 with that over a 30 meter aerial ladder powerful yes and you say some flexibility with it for doing what with in terms of just being able to get higher perhaps the way we positioned it you know I hadn't seen them machine so I
01:26:50 you know I hadn't seen them machine so I wasn't sure how it's going to be cited its way that we could get it in because see we don't have it as a piece of kit again it wasn't something I was going to refuse because I only been offered it and now I found out the one did exist
01:27:01 and now I found out the one did exist hmm I could see that we might have a use of it so I welcomed the offer and asked for it to come right what effect would a the presence of the 42 meter ladder such
01:27:12 the presence of the 42 meter ladder such as saira had had had on exterior firefighting had it attended at an earlier stage of the incident what happened you started the incident again I think it's very difficult for me to answer that in hindsight but my gut
01:27:24 answer that in hindsight but my gut feeling is absolutely none because I think the way that that fire spread it was it was almost like a petrol fire you know that there was something very wrong about the way it's spread externally I'm not sure that the water supplied through
01:27:36 not sure that the water supplied through a single aerial appliance would have been sufficient to stop the progress of it actually I very much doubt that because it was it was spreading vertically laterally and downwards because of the nature of the you know
01:27:47 because of the nature of the you know the clad material so I'm not sure it would have made a huge difference right did you actually observe yourself the effect of the exterior Jets on the progress of the fire at any stage of the
01:27:59 progress of the fire at any stage of the incident yes when I walked about and it was negligible can you just explain why you say it was manageable because the way the well I can only explain it in the scale of the fire so the Jets were hitting the building but
01:28:10 the Jets were hitting the building but they weren't noticeably reducing the spread or the ferocity of the fire as I saw it what was obvious to me was there was going to come a point when the combustible material had burn itself out
01:28:22 do you okay turning to the question of fire lifts
01:28:39 turning to the question of fire lifts the bottom of your second page seven of your second witness statement let me ask you to go to that you
01:28:59 you refer their to and spent half way down the Peregrine B paragraph earlier in the incident the fire lift and smoke management system if functioning would have assisted in addressing the incident
01:29:11 have assisted in addressing the incident I just want to asked to focus on the fact the fire lift what assumptions or thoughts perhaps is a better word did you have about whether this building actually had what you refer to as a fire
01:29:22 actually had what you refer to as a fire lift oh well it's a requirement in a building of that kind that we would have access to the lift that we would have sole control of for the purposes of moving people and equipment and obviously on the building the scale of
01:29:33 obviously on the building the scale of Grenville that's invaluable in getting our sources to a point as quickly and as efficiently as possible without people having to exhaust themselves carrying it up many you know in particular many
01:29:44 up many you know in particular many flights of stairs do you know what point in the incident the fire lift would have ceased assisting if it had been working no I think it's impossible for me to
01:29:55 no I think it's impossible for me to judge that because I would have had to have been present at that stage of the instant to judge the point of which actually the fire lift would no longer really have been a factor in progressing the incident and nor actually do I know what point in found I just know that
01:30:07 what point in found I just know that when I came and took over the fire lift was not in operation and actually I have to say even if it had been I'm not sure we would have been using it because I think the changing conditions on every
01:30:18 think the changing conditions on every floor was such they you know you're making the judgment about using the fire lift to arrive off a floor probably a floor below where you want to attack the fire whereas actually I think the nature
01:30:29 fire whereas actually I think the nature of that fire internally and externally in the way it was spreading moving changing was it had been very difficult to judge where you were safely sending firefighters to the only way really to safely progress through that building
01:30:40 safely progress through that building was up through the stairs judging conditions as um obviously if you're in a fire lift even though that's a protected shaft and lift you run the risk at the point where you've got fire spread to the extent of Grenville of
01:30:53 spread to the extent of Grenville of getting out into a very very dangerous situation so I'm not sure would have been using the light the fire lift very much anyway at the point I took over even if it had been functioning okay can
01:31:04 even if it had been functioning okay can I then ask you about field telephones now they look puzzled no reason I also been Mattel telephone yes system where that's the your on to it connected ask
01:31:17 that's the your on to it connected ask you is there a practical reason why those weren't used on the night to connect the insert to connect the command unit either cu7 or cu8 with the bridgehead I think the likelihood of
01:31:30 bridgehead I think the likelihood of that system operating effectively would be unlikely and I have to admit I thought we had stopped carrying those on the command unit by Mattel telephone system what led you to think that I
01:31:42 system what led you to think that I can't tell you nothing wrong but what led you to think that it's just something I remember but I also do remember having used them in training and my experience of them would have been that would have been an extremely tricky environment to run a field
01:31:54 tricky environment to run a field telephone system you would have effectively been having to run it into the building by the same route we were making access they said it's a long run you're upstairs it represents to a
01:32:06 you're upstairs it represents to a degree a trip hazard in what is already a very crowded environment so I'm not sure that would have been a suitable solution to that issue right not when we
01:32:17 solution to that issue right not when we had mobile phones which people were using as well okay leaving aside that the trip hazard of the physical difficulties of laying the liners you
01:32:28 difficulties of laying the liners you described if it had been available would it have helped you in assisting the communications reliable clear communications no in my opinion no what we needed to do was make better use of
01:32:40 we needed to do was make better use of available airway so I'm not having it locked in people's cars to have had channel to set up and working and where where necessary make best use of mobile phones I think those are all more
01:32:52 phones I think those are all more effective forms of communication and the mattel field telephone system right
01:33:07 right yes
01:33:17 and just one or two questions on the DSC we've just tell a little discussion about that before we'll just have a little bit more can I ask you please to be shown the InP the incident report to
01:33:31 be shown the InP the incident report to master Docs 30 which is lfb
01:33:48 and if you go to page two please we've looked at this earlier this morning in the context of the heli ten if we look again at page two four entries up from
01:34:05 again at page two four entries up from the bottom of the page still under development we can see that the author has put in one of three items relating to the dangerous structure engineer
01:34:17 to the dangerous structure engineer dangerous structure engineers DSE could not provide an adequate assessment on risk areas and there was a delay in them arriving at the incident work with local authorities London resilience forum etc and there's some other recommendations
01:34:29 and there's some other recommendations there as well we don't need to ask you about what I won't do want to ask you about is did the DRC's delay in arriving
01:34:40 about is did the DRC's delay in arriving at the scene affect your plan or knowledge regarding the stability of the building no it didn't and the reason for that is because whilst we have a DSA
01:34:51 that is because whilst we have a DSA system which is useful in some aspects my experience of more extreme incidents is that even the best dangerous structural engineers are coming from a building control and building construction background and therefore no
01:35:03 construction background and therefore no reasonable dangerous structure engineer is going to tell me that it was all right to put people into that building they simply won't make that call they always reverse through our professional judgment on the basis of our own understanding of building construction
01:35:14 understanding of building construction they're likely to offer some specifics about how long a material structure might last what the possible effects of fire on it might be although again I have to say my experience of danger
01:35:26 have to say my experience of danger instruction engineers incidence II is inconsistent because some will be able to offer some judgment on that some will actually refuse to offer judgment on that and others will actually be well
01:35:38 that and others will actually be well informed it's very much I kind of mixed bag in terms of the information you get there's not I would suggest a particularly consistent standard in terms of the information we receive from DCs at times I think it's a system that
01:35:50 DCs at times I think it's a system that could be improved actually for the benefits of firefighters and offices as a general point and I think that's that's really what the thrust about is about okay you you express that
01:36:01 about okay you you express that some skepticism said the right word there but just looking looking at your own experience on the night if I could just show you two things in the in your log page five first of all under the
01:36:13 log page five first of all under the time mark of oh six thirteen we can see that the DRC is there DSE districts are there did six thirteen DRC district
01:36:28 there did six thirteen DRC district severe could not get high enough no floor collapse pancake frame building max fire resistance four hours FF shaft two hours if columns spool not saying will collapse if no people let it
01:36:40 saying will collapse if no people let it burn and we talked about plans earlier and then if you go on to the bottom of page six a later meeting at 7:13 TCM
01:36:52 page six a later meeting at 7:13 TCM which is introduced introduced by you three entries up from the bottom john allen district severe confirms superstructure will not come down other parts corners slabs will drop down it
01:37:03 parts corners slabs will drop down it looks from this as they john allen did give you a pretty unambiguous piece of advice about structural integrity is that fair and I think that's the
01:37:14 that fair and I think that's the summarization of a more complex conversation so he was he was not as definite as to say slabs will drop down no he just said there was a very real possibility it might happen I'll I've been alive to that possibility from the
01:37:25 been alive to that possibility from the moment by taking the incident over actually so it was just a continual professional judgment as to you know how we were going to continue to commit crews into the building and also how
01:37:36 crews into the building and also how we're going to use information from the crews themselves only it's a reference in one of my statements to some generic information coming back from use of thermal image cameras so understanding the ambient temperature of walls and
01:37:48 the ambient temperature of walls and structures as to whether that might lead us to believe that there was a degrading of the concrete I mean that that is a very subjective call but that after always what I get paid you know my wage for I suppose that that's our decision
01:38:00 for I suppose that that's our decision because we're prepared to operate in a situation is perhaps more risk Laden than a district surveyor he's going to and and they're not going to give us the
01:38:12 and and they're not going to give us the assurance that we would necessarily want but
01:38:15 but to be fair to them it's not their profession and I think that's the essential kind of tension between the advice that DC sometimes give you is focus very much on sort building site
01:38:26 focus very much on sort building site safety well at the point where you had the numbers of people trapped inside the building that I had and our crews had and the extent of fire spreads I've fully accepted that there was the
01:38:37 fully accepted that there was the potential for partial collapse it was just a continuous judgment as to how close we were to that based on my own experience my own understanding a building construction the advice from someone like Dave only on our safety
01:38:48 someone like Dave only on our safety officer very very experienced urban search-and-rescue operative you know the lead for technical rescue in the brigade you know years of working with DC's understanding the effects of catastrophic collapse and having those
01:39:01 catastrophic collapse and having those conversations my experience of the SES is and is rightly says that they're invariably cautious because that is the nature of their work but that's not always helpful to us because I'm I was
01:39:12 always helpful to us because I'm I was making decisions in a different context which is how I was balancing I suppose at a strategic decision-making level I was balancing the human rights of those
01:39:23 was balancing the human rights of those people inside the to her against the human rights of my own people and what the decision I'd come to was that the people inside the team because they didn't have PPE were not expecting the
01:39:34 didn't have PPE were not expecting the situation they were in had no training as to how they would try to resolve that situation were a greater priority at times than my own people I'm afraid so
01:39:45 times than my own people I'm afraid so whilst they were also have the greatest priority to me in terms of wanting to ensure I didn't you know risk them in an unmanaged unconsidered way actually because they did have PPE they did have training and because we have a duty as a
01:39:58 training and because we have a duty as a public authority to support that part of the Human Rights Act I felt I was justified in taking that decision particularly cuz it's enshrined as part of our statutory duties and also there's further guidance in documents such as
01:40:09 further guidance in documents such as the HSE s document heroism in the fire service which accepts there are times we may compromise the human rights of our own people to protect those of the public in a perilous situation
01:40:23 yes mr. a thank you I have one more question for you that Mitch does this stage well it's this looking back on the
01:40:37 stage well it's this looking back on the night and the period during which you attended his incident commander is there any aspect of the brigades response to this father that if you could go back
01:40:49 this father that if you could go back and change you would at that point in time no because I think there is always room in big organizations for improvement to systems to improve training I think there's always room for
01:41:01 training I think there's always room for improvement to the underlying conditions in which our people operate virtually in terms of the response of the nya I could not have been prouder to be a London firefighter nor lead the men and women of the London
01:41:15 nor lead the men and women of the London Fire Brigade because I felt that they operated in the best traditions of our 150 year history and put themselves enormous risk for how after hour after hour and that we were battling against
01:41:27 hour and that we were battling against what was frankly an absolute failure of the building system and that they had done their absolute best in intolerable circumstances I have nothing but praise for my junior officers and my crews who
01:41:40 for my junior officers and my crews who performed well beyond you know what was acceptable in terms of their physical and mental capacity and actually in some numbers have paid the price consequently it was a privilege to lead
01:41:51 consequently it was a privilege to lead them and I'm very proud of what they did mr. Roy I have no further questions viewing that isn't to say that there won't be any further questions for you which I might consider over a short break which I'm going to ask the Chairman for now subject to that thank
01:42:03 Chairman for now subject to that thank you very much mr. chairman thank you so thank you we will have a short break now mr. Robley because sometimes further questions research so we all come back at 10 to 4 and then we'll see we need to
01:42:17 at 10 to 4 and then we'll see we need to ask in the meantime if you'd like to go with the usher sugar coffee thank you thank you very much
01:42:35 good 10 to 4 please
01:50:41 a few questions justin hays mr. chairman your usual way
01:51:02 and I think just a few more questions so yes we deliver this Ralph keep the I'll keep this as brief as I as I can um fine lift we looked at that very shortly before we raised just now and I
01:51:13 shortly before we raised just now and I just want to get back that was one or two there were one or two questions I did want to ask you did you know from the time you took over command that the lift key for the lift the fireman's lift
01:51:24 lift key for the lift the fireman's lift key had never worked or didn't work on the night I didn't I didn't know the detail of why the file if wasn't working by I was told categorically that the fire lift was not in operation and was not working right and therefore couldn't
01:51:35 not working right and therefore couldn't be subjected to firefighter control again I didn't know the specifics of why we didn't have control of lift I was just told that the lift couldn't be operating the way we wanted to it wasn't in operation right and if it wasn't
01:51:46 in operation right and if it wasn't working in the sense that it couldn't be brought under firefighter control would you've expected crews to take steps on what steps they could to disable the lift so that it couldn't be used by residents no I'm not sure I would have
01:52:02 residents no I'm not sure I would have done but because they weren't using it but ideally we would want to secure we would run secure the lift and also I'm not aware of the nature of that building and where the lift motor room was so I have to say it's not something I'll
01:52:14 have to say it's not something I'll considered right as a matter of practice as at the night coming back to that's where we started yesterday it seems a long time ago now as a matter of practice would it be your experience
01:52:25 practice would it be your experience that where a firefighter arrived at a high-rise block and found that the fire lift or firefighters lifted depending on which it was wasn't capable of being brought under control they would isolate it so that it couldn't be used by
01:52:36 it so that it couldn't be used by residents no I wouldn't expect that because actually if we're not going to use it because we can't bring it under control then actually I wouldn't seek to deny that necessarily to a resident can
01:52:47 deny that necessarily to a resident can it depends on the nature of the incident itself now something like Grenville where every floor is aligned I suppose you could have considered that because it may well be that you didn't want a resident to step into the lift and then
01:52:59 resident to step into the lift and then come out into an environment that wasn't safe for them so that could have been a consideration other incidents if you aren't able to control it you know generally we don't want people to use lifts at all in terms of evacuation or
01:53:10 lifts at all in terms of evacuation or leaving the building we want to use the stairs because as the safest most control way of doing it or when they're so expensive fighters to go and then isolate that lift as a task no you and no right and
01:53:24 lift as a task no you and no right and only in this particular case one of the difficulties we've got is that the lifts weren't brought under control and that had certain consequences the question is is as a matter of safety in your
01:53:35 is as a matter of safety in your experience is it not better was it not better to keep the lifts out of the control of residents so that they didn't find themselves in a lift and expelled into a full floor filled with smoke I
01:53:46 into a full floor filled with smoke I have to say I've never been in a situation where the the use of a little we've had that effect and it hadn't been a consideration to me prior to you stating it now right okay
01:53:58 stating it now right okay different topic were you aware during the course of the night now and this is a point of detail but let's see if we can see if I can prompt a recollection were you aware during the course of the night that there was a survivor
01:54:09 night that there was a survivor surviving occupant who'd come down from the 22nd floor after 3 a.m. is this the gentleman we eventually rescued at 8:25 in the morning no it's
01:54:20 rescued at 8:25 in the morning no it's somebody who came down after 3 a.m. from flat 193 without any BA or without any protective equipment does that something you knew on the night no because that's why I asked the question it's the only the only real feat and I hope it's the
01:54:32 the only real feat and I hope it's the last person we brought out chopping cotton he was at 8:25 meaning yeah were you aware that FSG callers had been calling on several occasions but into up
01:54:44 calling on several occasions but into up to 2 hours into the fire they hadn't yet been rescued we aware of waiting times of that Magnus I wasn't where is the detail of it but that does not surprise me at all because it would have been
01:54:56 me at all because it would have been dependent on their location and our ability to reach the floors so I wouldn't say that surprises me no I think that's again a reflection of the extreme nature of the situation we found ourselves in right you say it wouldn't
01:55:07 ourselves in right you say it wouldn't surprise you and can I just ask you about the ability to rescue people from the roof and this question I'm asking you just to lay and he could have any
01:55:18 you just to lay and he could have any public suspicion about it did you ever consider evacuating residents from the roof by use of helicopter at all no because I think you'd have
01:55:29 at all no because I think you'd have been impossible without the use of a helicopter so in a non-fire scenario actually having been had a technical rescue did quite a lot of work with the marine and Coast Guard agency and Coast Guard rescue helicopters so so within
01:55:40 Guard rescue helicopters so so within the capability using you know our contacts Pam London to call in an MC a search-and-rescue helicopter and you would be able to take people off a roof
01:55:52 would be able to take people off a roof if you needed to actually they've got that capability to do it in the London airspace it would take some time for them to arrive because they're coming from the coast in the context of brimful although I consider it our foe is
01:56:03 although I consider it our foe is reasonable to consider it as a resource that we had you know I was fairly certain we were never going to be able to use it because of the effects of downdraft on the fire actually the the
01:56:14 downdraft on the fire actually the the difficulty of the rescuer being on a winch potentially going down into a very hesitant well I would just be the difficulty of the pilot to judge the
01:56:25 difficulty of the pilot to judge the products of combustion in the likely effect it might have on the airframe there are lots of reasons why I just don't think that was a viable rescue option I just don't think risking any one from the roof was you know viable if
01:56:39 one from the roof was you know viable if I just just follow that up a little bit if I may just briefly if you go to to page 12 of your first witness take you
01:56:53 yes you save at 5:40 Nick Mulholland came back to the unit and then halfway down the paragraph you say I considered
01:57:06 down the paragraph you say I considered the possibility of requesting maritime and Coastguard Agency search-and-rescue hello support as London does not have a winch rescue capability my reservations with this option with a 45-minute minimum arrival time and the possible
01:57:19 minimum arrival time and the possible effect of downdraft on the fire whilst we had so many people trapped and firefighters inside and what prompted you at that time 5:40 hours to consider the possibility of requesting a helicopter rescue because if I did have
01:57:31 helicopter rescue because if I did have people on the roof I was prepared to consider anything again as a possible reasons so it's about getting things moving my sense was that I was never going to use it but being told that we
01:57:42 going to use it but being told that we had at that point you know there was there was information that we had people trapped on the roof of the building I considered the possibility I rang up Dan
01:57:53 considered the possibility I rang up Dan daily so this prompted phone call to Dan Dailey who was the AC been holding AC one color because Richard Mills had gone to the land of operations remember
01:58:04 to the land of operations remember Metropolitan Police and I said that I needed a message passed in to SOR so that operations room where the request for helo support we they just to warm them up to the possibility because if we
01:58:15 them up to the possibility because if we work in using if I took the decision that we could use them obviously you wanted them alive to the possibility we needed them and therefore they were ready to go right that that was my sole consideration here I rang dan I told him
01:58:27 consideration here I rang dan I told him that we might want them warm them up and then very quickly discounting it discounted it because because I think the effects on the fire would have been profound with the downdraft I didn't
01:58:38 profound with the downdraft I didn't think it was a tenable rescue methodology because of the risk to the rescuer and also because of the way that the building was engulfed in flame frankly and what would it have taken to
01:58:50 frankly and what would it have taken to rescue people from the top floors oh we did roof we'd have had to get firefighters up onto the roof and bring him down through the internal staircase no there was no other method no again so as the lead for technical rescue in the
01:59:01 as the lead for technical rescue in the brigade you know we could have considered some use of lime rescue but you're not able to rescue so I wrote rescue effectively in a heat and smoking but you know in a hot environment because they're nylon ropes
01:59:12 environment because they're nylon ropes and they're gonna melt and obviously there's no way of bringing them down the outside of the building in an environment where most of the outside of the building is aligned so the only two
01:59:24 the building is aligned so the only two things available to me were either rescue from above which is halo search and rescue helicopter which I've seen use and it helped plan the use of the major floodings outside of London so I
01:59:35 major floodings outside of London so I understood it quite well as a capability or bring them down the internal staircase neither one of those were particularly viable option so I felt fairly you know anxious about the fact
01:59:47 fairly you know anxious about the fact that we had people in the roof to be frank when someone told me so I thought that was going to be almost impossible to resolve yeah you you say that the downdraft was the problem and was it that that eventually made you ultimately
01:59:58 that that eventually made you ultimately made you discount the rescue helicopter I think it's a combination of all the factors so the effective downdraft and not really been able to quantify what effect that will have on the fire and
02:00:09 effect that will have on the fire and our crews and the residents that might be left in there so you'll be very hard to judge what the downdraft would do if you were then winching you know some dancing and proximity to which someone down so it affects a number of rescues
02:00:22 down so it affects a number of rescues you are going to get that they produce a considerable downdraft I think the fact I also thought having seen that system in use actually it was going to be almost impossible to put someone on the
02:00:34 almost impossible to put someone on the end of a winch to get someone out let alone you know effectively drop in a line into a fire environment there was just too many you know impractical the impracticability z-- to overcome so that
02:00:47 impracticability z-- to overcome so that there was lots of reasons why I would escape it okay um finally gas gas supply mm-hm can I just take you to your first statement which we're still in and go to page 17 in the
02:01:00 we're still in and go to page 17 in the middle of the page there you refer to the National Grid presenting at the sea you having been requested as part of the major incident and that's all that's at or after a ten and if we
02:01:13 if we go to the road log at page 7 just at the foot of the page you can see in the second entry code on gas former
02:01:26 the second entry code on gas former National Grid that should be cadent I think gas will isolate three separate locations that will isolate building Grenville Tower and other one on the building question is what steps did you
02:01:38 building question is what steps did you take to secure the attendance of cadent before that and I knew that the attendance of the utilities have been requested because and you look I think
02:01:50 requested because and you look I think Andy look and it briefed me to that effect but he had requested the attendance of utility companies I felt that there was like two begets supplying involved in the building but it wasn't a
02:02:04 involved in the building but it wasn't a priority you know in the first part of the incident to chase that wasn't my top priority my main priority was the overall kind of fire really but it was
02:02:15 overall kind of fire really but it was something I was going to have to come to I think that was chased on more than one occasion in terms of their ETA all right again I can't be sure of that it would have been something because it's a matter of course it's a it's a
02:02:26 it's a matter of course it's a it's a process thing that all officers in command are likely to want to know about to request to chase if they haven't attended yeah but that that is fairly consistent with my experience of utilities attending yeah well they don't
02:02:38 utilities attending yeah well they don't turn up and they can't take some time so see they're not a blue light service and they will need to identify a team that has the skills to be able to isolate supply particularly in something like
02:02:50 supply particularly in something like the context of Grenville where it's not going to be as simple as just item isolating a single domestic supply or something to a small building no you didn't particularly surprised me no okay well we can look at the short incident
02:03:01 well we can look at the short incident log and phone numerous entries for that as we go that's a matter of record just going back to your statement in the last sentence in that same paragraph you say
02:03:12 sentence in that same paragraph you say I was sure burning gas suppliers in the flats were adding to the difficulties for firefighters at what point in the night did you learn or come to the burning gas supplies in the flats
02:03:24 the burning gas supplies in the flats was causing difficulties for firefighters to be frank I've made that assumption fairly early on myself because my experience of these blocks is there very often a gas supply in them I actually
02:03:36 often a gas supply in them I actually had had it in my head that it may have been one of the factors as to the fire spread that something had become involved I can't remember exactly but I think I've had some reports back that there was likely to have been
02:03:47 there was likely to have been involvement of gas supply so actually it would have been one of the things that I would have considered very early on because of the nature that you know have been one of many variables in relation to fire spreads and the ferocity of the
02:04:00 to fire spreads and the ferocity of the fire and actually some of our difficulties in extinguishing the fire at times so I felt with the level of destruction that was being visited on the building I would have been entirely surprised if all of the utilities
02:04:12 surprised if all of the utilities electric and gas hadn't been involved in some way right okay and just in terms of the difficulties for firefighters what what difficulties are those that gas
02:04:24 what difficulties are those that gas presented well they're difficult to extinguish it continues to burn you know it's not just a simple task risk hanging out with the Jets of water yeah yes I see
02:04:32 see okay mr. ray thank you very much those are all my questions my extra questions that I that I had I think it just remains for me to thank you very much for your patience in answering my
02:04:44 for your patience in answering my questions I've kept you there a long time I'm very grateful to you for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigation so thank you very much thank you so and on behalf of the inquiry I'd like to thank you very much
02:04:55 inquiry I'd like to thank you very much as well I'm sure you only too well aware how important your evidence is for us and we're very grateful to you for coming along and giving it I'm afraid at rolling great lengths but you understand
02:05:06 rolling great lengths but you understand that can't sometimes be avoided but thank you very much indeed thank you
02:05:28 mr. chairman that's the business for the day yes we now have the Commissioner tomorrow and I'm not going to ask you to sit at 9:30 10 o'clock should do it good
02:05:40 sit at 9:30 10 o'clock should do it good very good well in that case wheel right now and resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow and look forward to hearing from the Commission of them very good thank you thank you very much we've done at
02:05:51 thank you very much we've done at auction all right please
02:06:16 you