Further LFB evidence (27 September 2018 Pt 2 of 2)

Full transcript

00:00:24 all right happy to carry on commissioner yes sir good thank you yes mr. Mishima thank you for coming back to us and can I just go back to a couple of things that we looked at this morning before we go on with the story

00:00:35 morning before we go on with the story and you said a number of times this morning during our evidence when we were discussing training and specifically training on cladding fires and facade fires the well it wouldn't have mattered

00:00:48 fires the well it wouldn't have mattered have I got this right because Mike Darden wouldn't have been able to extinguish the fire and my vibe summarized your evidence fairly yes you have right would it not be right that

00:00:59 have right would it not be right that because Mike Duggan was not trained on the risk of a cladding fire he therefore wasn't able to understand how the fire would perform once it had got into the cladding and therefore how you should

00:01:11 cladding and therefore how you should respond I don't believe so and I think that's because the nature of the cladding and the way that fire sprayed meant that the fire had got behind it

00:01:22 meant that the fire had got behind it and obviously the front face of the cladding is by its very nature rain proof so that even the understanding of the cladding itself would have meant his response would still have been to try and put water on to the outside of it

00:01:33 and put water on to the outside of it which wouldn't be able to penetrate the rain proof cladding so for me the issue is that even if he'd had a very detailed you know engineered knowledge of cladding his response to the actual

00:01:44 cladding his response to the actual trying to contain the fire would have been the same so you're saying this is a unextinguishable fire from the start I think from the time it got out of the flats of origin and then when the

00:01:55 flats of origin and then when the firefighters believe that extinguish the fire in the flats of origin and by the time we got into that cladding and behind there they weren't going to be able to extinguish it was that not critical information or an understanding that might garden should have had

00:02:07 that might garden should have had ideally he would have had it but I generally don't believe it would have made a difference on the night so the actions he took because there was nothing he could have done to prevent that spreading at that point but it

00:02:18 that spreading at that point but it might have made this difference commissioner it might have meant that knowing he was now faced with an unexpired

00:02:25 unexpired once it had got into the cladding he should immediately switch to looking for a plan B such as full or partial evacuation of the building but in the context of the cladding fire

00:02:37 but in the context of the cladding fire bearing in mind and the examples we've talked about earlier with cladding fires in different countries they would still have been the expectation that it would not have penetrated through all into all of the internal compartments that would

00:02:49 of the internal compartments that would have remained on the outside of the building and I believe and obviously I can't know what was in my kelvins mind at that time but for me if he had then instantly switched at that point in time

00:03:00 instantly switched at that point in time to trying to do full or partial evacuation of Granville Tower what you would have had resulted in was a number of people panicking trying to get out of a single staircase and I'm not sure how

00:03:12 a single staircase and I'm not sure how many people obviously the people who live in the tower very familiar of how narrow that staircase was and the prospect of trying to evacuate those people down with us then trying to get in because barring that point we were still extinguishing the fire on the

00:03:23 still extinguishing the fire on the fourth floor and while we're then getting fast of our guidance calls telling us that there are people having fire coming to their flats are imperative at that point is to then get to there and try and extinguish that now

00:03:34 to there and try and extinguish that now there are two parts of that answer I want just to push a little further on the first is where you said that bearing in mind the examples about discussed earlier about 10,000 different countries

00:03:47 earlier about 10,000 different countries there would be the expectation it would not have penetrated into all of the internal compartments now it's not right is it that the LF B's expectation of a cladding fire as at June 2014 was that

00:03:59 cladding fire as at June 2014 was that it would not penetrate into compartments I believe was our expectation it was never our expectation and five that nature will penetrate into every compartment I don't think that we'd ever

00:04:11 compartment I don't think that we'd ever considered that now sorry let me try this one again there was no instant understanding within the lfb that if a cladding structure ignited and fire

00:04:22 cladding structure ignited and fire spread rapidly across it that nonetheless it would not penetrate into individual compartments I'm sorry so you're saying that we would we did know

00:04:34 you're saying that we would we did know that or we didn't know that we try it again

00:04:35 again sorry we tried once more sitting there as at June 2014 nobody in the lfb expected that if they were faced with a cladding fire it wouldn't burst back into a

00:04:46 into a once we didn't anticipate that would happen no nobody would reason anticipate that that was happening nobody would reasonably anticipate that the occupants of a building which was that the facade of which was on fire

00:04:57 that the facade of which was on fire would be safe well obviously for buildings on fire the facades on fire I can't make the estimate they're safe unless you're there and seeing the premises and at that point in time no

00:05:08 premises and at that point in time no one had the anticipation of how that fire would spread and wrap around that building and travel into all the compartments I think you agree with me that in fact as at June 2017 the lfb did

00:05:19 that in fact as at June 2017 the lfb did not have sufficient learning to be able to be confident or at least have the expectation that if there was a cladding fire nonetheless it wouldn't break back into the building no I don't think anyone would have that I think is just

00:05:30 anyone would have that I think is just London Fire Brigade No and so so it's not it wouldn't be right to say would it that night Darden could reasonably expect that when faced with the cladding fire he needn't worry because it wouldn't break back into the building

00:05:41 wouldn't break back into the building not only did Murray sorry if that's the impression I gave that he wouldn't anticipate that would happen if it was burning up the outside of the building and bear in mind that from the first images that were seen it was very clearly burning up straight up there so

00:05:52 clearly burning up straight up there so I'm not saying that he would be sure it wasn't going to go back in but I wouldn't anticipate that he'd be thinking automatically that was going to happen well let me put it with it slightly differently but once more it was not a safe assumption for any

00:06:04 was not a safe assumption for any firefighter met to make once they'd seen at the fire had got into the cladding that it wouldn't break back into the building's no now turd and attorney for the second part of that of that aren't

00:06:15 the second part of that of that aren't so you talked about evacuation my question is really but because Mike Darden did not understand what he was faced with once the fire got into the cladding he wasn't even in a position to be able to evaluate a plan B of

00:06:28 be able to evaluate a plan B of evacuation I think that's probably fair to say because you didn't understand that but equally I think it's very important to understand that that building is not designed for evacuation therefore going to plan B in thinking

00:06:41 therefore going to plan B in thinking about evacuation that is not something that would naturally happen because we have full understanding that a single staircase building of such a nature with no means of alerting the residents simultaneously is not designed for full

00:06:53 simultaneously is not designed for full or partial evacuation no need but if Mike Dowden or any other watch commander attending after this incident that was seeing a fire break into the cladding and move as rapidly as

00:07:04 into the cladding and move as rapidly as it did would want at least to know and you would want as his commissioner or her commissioner to know that that watch manager at least had a plan B and was able to assess the plan B whether or not

00:07:15 able to assess the plan B whether or not it was a useful plan B I think that there probably was plan a B C and D because it was such a rapidly evolving dynamic incident in fact I think the actions Mike Dowden took in ordering the number of resources he did in a very

00:07:27 number of resources he did in a very short period of time demonstrated that he was making a risk assessment making a plan getting sufficient resources there in large numbers to be able to make a plan B I'm just going to suggest this to

00:07:40 plan B I'm just going to suggest this to you that the fact that Mike down did not have the training on the risks the claddings like this predict posed in respect of fire spread over the facade

00:07:52 respect of fire spread over the facade of this high-rise block the fact that you didn't have that planet that training meant that he was not put in a position to work out what to do in place of firefighting I think that he did

00:08:04 of firefighting I think that he did exactly that I think that he God's large numbers of resources and sufficient numbers to be able to get people into the tower to help to rescue the people in there so I think he did enact a plan B and I think he did that exceptionally well for an officer of his rank and that

00:08:17 well for an officer of his rank and that because he didn't have the sufficient training or any training on the risks of cladding he wasn't able to think that he needed to get people out much sooner I think he was and I think that even if

00:08:28 think he was and I think that even if you trained people on the wrists and cladding you know I think that understanding what happened on that night the dynamic nature of it and the speed with which it happened it's very difficult to say that if you'd given him

00:08:40 difficult to say that if you'd given him training to understand that it would have made that he meant that he made any different decision it may not have done but it would have at least equipped him to know whether to make a different decision wouldn't it I think there's a very professional fire officer and a

00:08:51 very professional fire officer and a very experienced one at that by actually seeing what was happening he did do a dynamic risk assessment and made a decision and made a plan and he to act he did that based on what he saw which was the most relevant and

00:09:03 which was the most relevant and up-to-date information at that time but we know that he didn't set about examining the possibility of evacuation even at that early stage once the fire got into the into the cladding what I'm suggesting to you is that had he had

00:09:14 suggesting to you is that had he had training on the unpredictability of fire spread he would have done what could have done but equally even if you had training on the cladding itself what he wouldn't have anticipated with a significant building failures inside the

00:09:25 significant building failures inside the premises that allowed the fire to travel through all the compartments and his experience and knowledge as a professional fire officer would have told him that's trying to evacuate a number of residents in the middle of the

00:09:36 number of residents in the middle of the night down a single narrow staircase is a very odd thing to do and in fact we do know that subsequent to Grenfell that members the public who have been very understandably alarmed and distressed during high-rise fires have taken some

00:09:49 during high-rise fires have taken some extraordinary steps to evacuate themselves in inappropriate circumstances with no reason to and caused themselves severe harm and life-changing injuries so his professional knowledge would mean that

00:10:00 professional knowledge would mean that he would want to make the best judgment call for keeping people safe so you're saying you that the fact that my dad had no training on cladding fires made no difference

00:10:11 difference that's my so much yes what the Chairman too concluded yes right now can I get back to the Ord we discussed plans and

00:10:26 back to the Ord we discussed plans and I'm not going to get back over that can I just ask you to get back to it please it's to have thirteen of our documents bundle and I just ask you to look at

00:10:39 bundle and I just ask you to look at page four

00:10:46 some other aspects of this at the foot of page 4 under site details sorry the middle of page 4 under under site details we can see water supply and

00:10:58 details we can see water supply and nothing there about the location of dry rising main outlets within the building would you expect to see at least some information about the location of dry

00:11:10 information about the location of dry rising main outlets within the building on an RD so that's a deficiency is it yes yes let bottom of the page fixed installations group other systems building facilities types smoke

00:11:22 building facilities types smoke extraction systems description negative pressure smoke ventilation system in lobby area afar floor plan or panel located main entrance to building slightly side question is if you ever

00:11:33 slightly side question is if you ever come across a negative pressure smoke ventilation system in your career I'm sorry not knowingly not knowingly right so that's an effective you know no I might come across one but I I have never

00:11:45 might come across one but I I have never been made aware of ones you wouldn't know one when you saw one no no do you think that that description of the smoke extraction system which an arriving watch manager and crew would encounter

00:11:56 watch manager and crew would encounter was sufficient to enable them to operate it without knowing what the information was on the panel where it says clean their panel location manage the building I can't comment on that because it might

00:12:07 I can't comment on that because it might be in some very clear direction on the panel as to what that meant which would be sufficient information we don't want people to write chapter and verse on the Ord because it's something that comes up on the far engine they can read and I do see a pup that it doesn't make mention

00:12:19 see a pup that it doesn't make mention the Tri rising main as well yes but not the locations we've established and then it is just keeping the smoke extraction system would you at least expect to see some kind of direction in the Ord as to

00:12:30 some kind of direction in the Ord as to how a watch manager such as Mike garden would have been able to find instructions as to how to operate this make vent system no because I would anticipate they would know that they've been structured at the panel location

00:12:41 been structured at the panel location the managers of the building which is where when the smoke extraction systems and various other fixed installations if you go to the point where the panel is that's where the instructions will be mmm

00:12:50 mmm right so you saying so I understand it that this indicates to any much manager reading this on the way to an incident that instructions will we'll be on the panel I would assume that's where they'd go if I read that swatch manager on a fire engine I would

00:13:01 swatch manager on a fire engine I would go to the panel right now if the if the panel didn't have instructions on it would that make this than a deficient entry it would make it not entirely useful it would be deficient she'd know there was a system but it wouldn't make it all right the most detailed

00:13:13 it all right the most detailed information I would anticipate that if there were wasn't instructions then there was a fault with the building looking at on-site action you can see at the bottom of the page and emergency

00:13:24 the bottom of the page and emergency contacts would would you expect there's emergency contacts to be kept up-to-date at all times no I wouldn't it's very difficult building owners change responsible people change the information is very much like an MOT only good at the moment you put it on

00:13:36 only good at the moment you put it on there we regularly get people change and sometimes it's very difficult to get the name of the contact number a responsible person right would you expect so that the cell body is useful that that the

00:13:48 the cell body is useful that that the building owner would do their best to ensure that that but that information was kept up-to-date you would hope they would but what we generally would do in the events like this where we know it's a local authority I'm building is a very

00:14:00 a local authority I'm building is a very early-stage requester tens of the lay low who will then provide us with that information would you expect the local station responsible for this Ord entry to keep on at the local authority to

00:14:12 to keep on at the local authority to make sure that these details were up-to-date no I wouldn't why is that because of the sheer volume a number of buildings and our D entries on their ground they haven't even got capacity to do that but let me see if I can

00:14:25 do that but let me see if I can understand this better is it not essential information that the emergency contact information is kept up-to-date it's useful information I wouldn't say it's essential on the grounds and the fact that even when we have got contact information it doesn't mean the person

00:14:36 information it doesn't mean the person will answer the telephone or we can get hold of them at 3 o'clock in the morning which quite often what happens even when you have got up state information people don't answer their telephones or they only work business hours so it's far more use of us to call the on-duty

00:14:47 more use of us to call the on-duty on-call lay low to come to the scene right so you don't think that it's important that the emergency contact information is kept up to speed it's useful not just critical it's useful or not critical

00:15:01 and what if as we see these people actually were not part of the local authority at all they were there were building contractors representatives I'm

00:15:12 building contractors representatives I'm sorry well if those people had identified there under that entry we're not actually local authority people at all that would make the emergency contacts entry positively misleading in

00:15:24 contacts entry positively misleading in one sense because those people would not be not available at all it would depend more information you wanted from to be fair so the you know the contact information of a receptionist I'm not quite sure what useful information we'd

00:15:36 quite sure what useful information we'd be able to glean from her so it would depend the nature of the information that you wanted from the emergency contact yes and you wouldn't and nobody would know that until they were on their way no you wouldn't know that but to be

00:15:49 way no you wouldn't know that but to be you know in my experience considerable experience to be fair every single incident where you've wanted support and information it's the lay low you need predominantly because what you mainly want is to have

00:16:01 because what you mainly want is to have somewhere where you can set up a rest center for displaced residents from a building

00:16:14 and you would also want today wouldn't you on the Ord that the building had a functioning firefighter lifts the OID wouldn't be any of any use down whatsoever that's again in any Goods

00:16:25 whatsoever that's again in any Goods name odd and MOT the file if could be functioning Monday and as we quite regularly find a lot of fixed installations they either break or are tampered with or become defective through various reasons so saying it was

00:16:37 through various reasons so saying it was on the Ord with meaning use just whatsoever right can I then go to your first view of the fire now you arrived

00:16:49 first view of the fire now you arrived at I think I've seen it just before 251 and you took a photograph and we have that at MIT quadric triple zero one five seven six zero I was perhaps I should

00:17:00 seven six zero I was perhaps I should just give another warning and I'll wait 30 seconds or so this is a photograph for those who've joined since the break of the building on fire at 251 there may be people who find it distressing and say I'm just I think say that if you do

00:17:12 say I'm just I think say that if you do then either leave the room now if we are in here or in the streaming room or avert your gaze there's no there's no soundtrack that accompanies this at all so far so I shall leave at 30 seconds or

00:17:23 so far so I shall leave at 30 seconds or so mr. chair from a short pause to see if anyone wants to move or you know

00:17:39 there's let's have that up it's a meaty triple zero one five seven six zero

00:17:59 first of all Commissioner where was this taken from do you remember from the location where I parked my car just look at my notes to remind me where it was so it was actually making from me standing

00:18:10 it was actually making from me standing at the back of my car while I was getting rigged in my operational uniform so that's on the map I make my first charge of temporary company knowing the road right do you know which orientation

00:18:22 road right do you know which orientation this was taken from is it which side of the tire that is the southeast is the side looking from the leisure center where the trees were most probably than

00:18:38 where the trees were most probably than is that the north side or the east side is difficult East I think that answer point are the legislature is to the north the Northeast and the trees are on the east yeah so it's the it's the side that is the East where the trees were

00:18:49 that is the East where the trees were right so what did this view tell you at the moment you took the photograph about this fire that we had a spectacular

00:19:00 this fire that we had a spectacular complete failure of a building where all floors were alights my first thought genuinely was this is like nothing I've ever seen it looked like something from a film where somebody set it up like

00:19:13 a film where somebody set it up like towering inferno or something like that and my first thought was this can never happen to a building in England but it did tell me that bearing in mind the knowledge I then had of listening to the first of our garden schools and looking

00:19:24 first of our garden schools and looking at the building as it was there that there was going to be significant loss of life that night and at that moment what were your thoughts initial thoughts

00:19:36 what were your thoughts initial thoughts on what strategy should be adopted to save life so my initial thoughts were I needed to get to the meet the OIC and to

00:19:47 needed to get to the meet the OIC and to have a conversation about my actions and what plans are taking place I think looking at a building like that what you can need to understand is that there is no strategy in place that is going to resolve that fire so I was not at any

00:19:59 resolve that fire so I was not at any point thinking that we were going to be able to extinguish the fire bearing in mind that from a dry rising main at best you can supply make two maybe three firefighting Jets understanding the number and level of floors on fire at

00:20:10 number and level of floors on fire at that point extinguishing the moans not an option and it was how best we were going to be able to try and make efforts to get into the building to rescue as many people as possible right now is it fair to say

00:20:23 possible right now is it fair to say that at that stage on arrival you had already decided not to take on the incident command role no not till I was never going to make that decision until I'd had a conversation instant commander and I was assured that he was

00:20:34 and I was assured that he was undertaking his role and that he wasn't overwhelmed by it so you make that assessment once you've gone and done your initial risk assessment had the conversation are assured of the operational plan say the first thing you

00:20:45 operational plan say the first thing you did is this right was to go to find the incident commander I did yes did you know who that was no I didn't how did you find that out I went to the command unit so I went from there and to be fair that is I was it

00:20:57 there and to be fair that is I was it Clarendon Road I mean let's come back to me it's on a bend basically parked outside something called safe store a shore store or something so I made my way from there it was a considerable distance reasonably away what you can't

00:21:11 distance reasonably away what you can't see is in front of the white van is a fire plant part which is blocking the road which is why I chose to stop there so I couldn't actually proceed any further towards the incident so I've got as my car I got myself ricktum

00:21:22 as my car I got myself ricktum operational uniform and I then ran and for those firefights and we never run on the fire ground because running can cause panic and distress to people I figured that wasn't going to make any odds on the night and I wanted to get

00:21:33 odds on the night and I wanted to get there as soon as possible it was quite a complicated route I chose to get though I had to find myself to get around the exits through a housing stage I went down a road called Verity close which I landmarks because I realized I'd have to some point come back and find my car I

00:21:46 some point come back and find my car I then made my way I found myself standing with the legend at my back I took stock of the tower for maybe 10 seconds to get myself a full understanding of the situation I then went down towards the

00:21:58 situation I then went down towards the side where I encountered one of my quad unit staff in a red check of debarred I'm not sure who it was and I asked him whether he command unit was he then asked me if I wanted to go to the first

00:22:09 asked me if I wanted to go to the first survivor gardens command unit or the incident command one and I said the incident commanders I wanted to find out who the incident commander was right thank you

00:22:17 thank you now you say on page 10 of your statement

00:22:22 in third paragraph there I then saw assistant commissioner and ero and understood he had assumed the role of incident commander that's on the CEO is it

00:22:31 it yes cu8 yes okay and then you say in the next parent the last paragraph on that page first line you say I know auntie

00:22:45 page first line you say I know auntie very well as I know all my officers very well we had a relatively short conversation then and you go on to say in terms of you said was a two-way conversation and he said I'll give you a

00:22:56 conversation and he said I'll give you a brief update and a full update afterwards see that and then you you and when he gave you a brief update I think

00:23:07 when he gave you a brief update I think and you summarized that at the foot of page 10 he then said we've got the 40 pumps they're here we've got multiple survival guidance calls we're fully committed in ba into the tower making best endeavours to reach as many people

00:23:19 best endeavours to reach as many people I'm about to get an update from all the sectors as to where we are with what's going on and I said okay is there anything you want me to do while I'm out and he said just tell me what you see now that's a version of your

00:23:33 now that's a version of your recollection you gave to the police when you did your statement is that as best you remember it now no now from the footage you showed and you various there I know that's not a it was my memory but

00:23:44 I know that's not a it was my memory but that's not in the right order all right could you then reorder it for us so I now have reason to believe that I got to the command unit I know I checked in like everyone on board at which point I

00:23:56 like everyone on board at which point I believe and he must have been leaving to go to the tower because we went to the tower together you showed footage yesterday of us being in the base the tower about 301 so that's a very short time order from me

00:24:07 that's a very short time order from me putting my fire gear on running to the command unit do thing and Andy and I getting back into the tower so I believe we had the conversation initially as a walking brief together walking to the tower and we both went into the tower

00:24:19 tower and we both went into the tower together I follow now those just focus on the briefing am i right in thinking that that briefing that you've described in your statement it is still correct in your recollection as a walking brief yes

00:24:31 your recollection as a walking brief yes rather than on the commander okay now just summarizing it were you given any details by Andy row as to the number of FSG calls no were you given any details of his tactical plan not at

00:24:44 any details of his tactical plan not at that time did you discuss stay put not we did discuss they put very early on so he told me the state had been revoked

00:24:55 he told me the state had been revoked but I'm not sure the timing of that but it was very early on right so I encounter okay he told you it had been revoked did he tell you when he provokes it no he just said he had sorry I should

00:25:06 it no he just said he had sorry I should have asked you who revoked it he he told you you told me he had and he didn't give me a time frame as I remember right did you did he tell you what did you get the impression that it was the first

00:25:17 the impression that it was the first thing he did when he arrived yes because I also knew that he had not been there that's much time before me right he did say he hadn't been there long did he tell you that he did in fact decided at

00:25:28 tell you that he did in fact decided at least contingently decided that he was likely to do to do so to revoke the stay put even before he arrived no he didn't did you ask him why the advice to residents had not been changed earlier no I didn't was that because at that

00:25:41 no I didn't was that because at that moment in time it was far more important to collect the information with the ongoing situation to rescue as many people we have plenty of time after incidents to do debriefs and discuss orders and plans the priority at that

00:25:52 orders and plans the priority at that point was to save life right was it not important for you to get a full overview as to what had been happening on the incident ground even from the start at least an outline that

00:26:04 from the start at least an outline that was why I went with Andy to the tower with the OLT officers so we could walk and talk I could understand what happened to that point and what was happening was the forward plan which was the most the most critical thing at that moment in time was understanding there

00:26:16 moment in time was understanding there was a bit of building fully involved in fire with the number of people still trapped in there and my priority has remained throughout the night was to rescue people yes just came back to my my point what was it not important for

00:26:28 my point what was it not important for you to establish why it was it was an tiro who'd revoked stay put when he arrived only a few minutes before he did say rather than finding out why it hadn't been revoked during them not in the slightest

00:26:40 revoked during them not in the slightest at that moment in time it's been no benefit to me whatsoever to understand historical information my priority was the future the reason I ask that is because in order to be able to carry out your evaluation of the operations on the

00:26:51 your evaluation of the operations on the ground as monitoring officer would you not want to know at least an outline how the fire had developed from the start yes I was okay I want to know that but the information about decisions that have been made historically is something we explore fully in the performance

00:27:03 we explore fully in the performance review of command and that we can have as a debrief afters knowing that information would have been no benefit to me whatsoever we were you not keen to find out at what point compartment ation had had had

00:27:15 point compartment ation had had had failed or mass basis as you could now see no not in time I really need to impress that moment in time I have a building fully involved in fire with a large number of people in there I have a

00:27:26 large number of people in there I have a large number of my firefighters so I am putting in to risk critical environments and all I want to do is get some many of them in there it's a rescue the people as possible the whys and wherefores of decisions that have made previously can

00:27:38 decisions that have made previously can come a later date at that moment in time you have to understand the pressing priorities to save life and that's what we were doing you know I understand that and I'm just seeking to explore with you to what extent you as monitoring officer with an obligation in that role to

00:27:50 with an obligation in that role to evaluate the incident commanders plan asked him why it was left to him so late to revoke statehood and why I hadn't

00:28:01 to revoke statehood and why I hadn't been done earlier yeah I'm sorry there's no interest to me at that moment in time if you monitoring officer role so States that the information is fed into the PLC for review afterwards that's absolutely critical information for PLC in order for us to enact our

00:28:13 for PLC in order for us to enact our operational plan save lives wasting time talking about a time a decision was made is no benefit to me at that moment in time well at that moment in time but do you even know today why the incident

00:28:25 you even know today why the incident commander all the incident commanders prior to Andy Rove had not changed that advice for the almost two hours or so following the outbreak of the fire course I know now it's something we explored at the PRC what is what's the

00:28:37 explored at the PRC what is what's the answer because they're very clearing the fact that it was a single staircase in fact there was no means of contact and the people in door inside all of those flats a lot of the people were shocked by the nature of the smoke so the actual

00:28:48 by the nature of the smoke so the actual communal stairs were not safe to evacuate people into and they were making best endeavors to rescue the people who were trapped in the fire bringing people out of that moment in time who were not involved in

00:28:59 moment in time who were not involved in fire or smoke would have added to the congestion on the stairs would have increased the number of casualties and would have delayed the response of my firefighters getting into the tower and just look at look at that from a

00:29:11 just look at look at that from a slightly different angle I think you accepted this morning that the stay-put advice proceeds on the assumption that there would not be a whole block fire or mass breach of compartment ation yes of

00:29:24 mass breach of compartment ation yes of course yes yes and would that mean that once there was a whole building fire or mass breach of compartment ation then stay-put was no longer viable clearly

00:29:36 stay-put was no longer viable clearly yes yes

00:29:37 yes yes and therefore visit not was it not essential for you at some stage to know when that point was during the PRC absolutely yes and when was that you gave me the day I

00:29:50 and when was that you gave me the day I think there's about 10 days off they're not the PRC at the moment in the night when stay-put were cut became untenable because there was mass breach of compartment ation building I don't know it was consumed considerable time before I got there so I'm not sure what time

00:30:01 I got there so I'm not sure what time that was that took place you don't know not the specific timing though you say it was some considerable time before you got there does that mean harvest hour right I'm just tricked I don't what I'm seeking to do really is

00:30:13 don't what I'm seeking to do really is to work out why it was left so long to revoke stay put so that's what I'm trying to do absolutely understand that is the real tenant of this but for me to speculate on what the incident commander at the scene could see at the time were

00:30:24 at the scene could see at the time were the information they had and the actions they were taking would be improper we have had a review of that conversation where I've been part of that very clearly but for me they've been absolutely very adamant and clear that those people who were in flats that were

00:30:36 those people who were in flats that were unaffected by smoking Heat were safer at that moment in time to stay where they were because to bring them out into an environment where we know it was untenable on the stairs because the people in fire survivor guidance were telling us they could not leave their

00:30:48 telling us they could not leave their property safely at that moment in time all we would have done then is bring people who were in the parent place of safety into a place of danger and potentially kill them that's why they made that decision that time also with

00:31:00 made that decision that time also with the full knowledge that it's a very narrow staircase which now has numerous numbers of firefighters in breathing apparatus with hose going upstairs and bringing additional people down into that space would not have been a benefit for us to

00:31:11 would not have been a benefit for us to go and rescue the people who were most at needs who are having fast survival guidance and really what I'm seeking to find out from years Oh even after the the meetings we had after the fire to

00:31:22 the meetings we had after the fire to the best of your knowledge at what point in the night did stay put as advice become untenable because of mass breach of compartment ation I don't know the exact time I'm sorry is it not something

00:31:34 exact time I'm sorry is it not something that you as commissioner need to know no what I need to know is the fact that my officers were making decisions based on the information they had at the time on

00:31:45 the information they had at the time on the fire ground and the fastball the guidance calls coming in and they were the best place ones to make those decisions it's not to me to speculate the information they had in the decisions they made at that time they were based on sound information and what

00:31:57 were based on sound information and what they had in front of them no but would you accept that it would be for you to work out and then tell us why it was that stay put wasn't revoked until it was I think I've just explained that but I'm happy to go through it

00:32:08 that but I'm happy to go through it again if you like about why it wasn't revoked no I take I think I've understood that answer and then we put it a different way we did not be your role to work out more precisely in the night at what point the stay-put became

00:32:20 night at what point the stay-put became untenable on the basis of what was known to those on the scene no because I think they made the decision based on what they knew at that moment in time did you discuss with Andy row his plans for the

00:32:33 discuss with Andy row his plans for the evacuation of the tower on this walk to the tower we discussed our that his plans rescuing the people who were trapped and now under fast father guidance yes and what were those plans

00:32:45 guidance yes and what were those plans those plans were he gave me the information about how the information was coming into the first of our guidance unit how that was being relayed to the tower to the bridgehead and that crews were being briefed on that information to go up and rescue

00:32:56 information to go up and rescue residents and can I ask you to then turn to page 10 of your statement and look at

00:33:09 the fourth paragraph six lines down sorry six lines up from the bottom of

00:33:20 sorry six lines up from the bottom of the page and you've seen that and then I'd go on if you were to page eleven at the top you say the rent you would

00:33:33 the top you say the rent you would describe the road of monitoring officer there and you say in the fourth line I concluded it was pointless me sitting on his shoulder for a TCG meeting listening to him and the other agencies talking about everything it's far more useful if

00:33:45 about everything it's far more useful if I go out to the fire ground to make an assessment of what he thinks is happening and then I can double-check that for him I think the reality is that as you say in order to fulfill your role

00:33:57 as you say in order to fulfill your role as monitoring officer you had to find out for yourself what was happening on the fire ground is that a fair description and then you say as you do at page 11 in the first main paragraph

00:34:12 at page 11 in the first main paragraph at the end of where we've just been looking I left it was very important because of the significance of the event that I went and looked at the building and went into the building and spoke to

00:34:23 and went into the building and spoke to people so that I got a really good situational understanding of what was happening that's right is it it is yes no it's also right I think and correct

00:34:36 no it's also right I think and correct me if I'm wrong that and Eero said to you go and look no that's probably not correct now knowing I know because we went together right so later on he did ask me to do that while he was conducting the TCG slightly later in the

00:34:47 conducting the TCG slightly later in the morning okay so you're you're both off the CEO before you left the see you together

00:34:55 together do you recall a call coming through from control that was taken by Baraka on the West that expressly sought the your advice to change the stay-put no you

00:35:07 advice to change the stay-put no you don't know okay now you go out on to the incident ground as you say in order to get a quotes really good situational understanding was happening and then I think you go

00:35:18 was happening and then I think you go into the tower now I think in your statement same page page 11 in the second last paragraph you estimate that you went into the tower probably at about 312 to 315 I think you were about

00:35:32 about 312 to 315 I think you were about to tell us earlier on just this afternoon that's not quite right no that's not right now I know from the picture you showed and yesterday that was considerably older than that yeah well let's just get that picture up it's inq quintuple 0 3 9 2 this is the

00:35:46 inq quintuple 0 3 9 2 this is the picture of a 302 which we looked at yesterday and he identified himself because he was the one with his arms outstretched can you identify your cell phone yes the standing facing picture

00:35:59 phone yes the standing facing picture right now in your statement you say at that stage and this is page 13 on in the third paragraph I say you say at that

00:36:12 third paragraph I say you say at that time so we could take the picture down at that time I understood the breathing apparatus entry control point was located at the bridgehead on the fourth

00:36:23 located at the bridgehead on the fourth floor I also knew that the two officers in command of the bridgehead were Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch you did you

00:36:35 Goulbourne and Richard Welch you did you talk to them at that point no they were on the fourth floors on the ground floor now who told you that they were at the fourth floor I believe it was either

00:36:47 fourth floor I believe it was either Matt Cooke on Mick Mulholland right in fact we've established during this inquiry that the bridgehead was on the third floor at this time and about to come down to the ground floor did you know that at the time presumably not no

00:36:59 know that at the time presumably not no no no it's nothing that happened not long after I left the tower to be fair but you sure in your mind that macmail Holland and Matt cook told you that the British chair was at the fourth floor no that's why recollects at the time but

00:37:11 that's why recollects at the time but they could well have said the third floor and I'm just a few choosing to indulge my thing the my memory of the night it's my recollection and I as number of other people some of the events are not recollecting the right order I have some very large memory gaps

00:37:23 order I have some very large memory gaps which I have reason to believe is due to the trauma of the night I have been having counseling for the PTSD I have but I have large chunks of memory that are still missing and things that are out of time I've tried to do my best to

00:37:35 out of time I've tried to do my best to make a recollection of what I know but I think that there's severe trauma for me of the responsibility of that night the personal stress and pressure that caused me has caused my memory to be not as I

00:37:47 me has caused my memory to be not as I would wish it to be to be able to recall facts in a clear order right okay well we'll we'll do our best and substantive [Music]

00:38:00 in your statement of page 30 which we're on if you look at this last paragraph you say I deliberately did not go to the fourth floor at that moment now can we substitute fourth floor for

00:38:14 now can we substitute fourth floor for third floor or third floor for fourth law do you mean you mean the bridgehead yes indeed because I'd only gone to get a small situational awareness to then

00:38:27 a small situational awareness to then return back to Andy and do a briefing with him yeah it looks from that as if you'd separated from Andy because I think you're now telling us and looking at the picture you were with Andy all the time during this visit is that one

00:38:39 the time during this visit is that one date yes I know I genuinely had no recollection of Andy being there when I went into the town until I saw that photograph right I mean that to me that was a bit you know computer shop yesterday the photons and I went there

00:38:50 yesterday the photons and I went there and it just goes so the levels of trauma and the impact that has on the night because I genuinely I remember being in there with Matt's couldn't make my homes but the fact that Angie and I went there together in fact the fit the speed with

00:39:02 together in fact the fit the speed with which I was in the tower I'm very pleased I went there that quickly to get the awareness but it was quite a surprise to me yesterday mm-hmm yes when you say and this may be your

00:39:14 yes when you say and this may be your recollection play claim tricks with you Jai understand that you say you wanted to get a situation small situational awareness to then return back to Andy and do a briefing with him given that you were with him that's now turned out when were you going to do the full

00:39:25 when were you going to do the full briefing with him so obviously my in my mind I think I'm going to get situational manners and go back to the commander in fact I think what we obviously did at that time was we went together so that Andy could

00:39:36 we went together so that Andy could brief me as we went he obviously also wanted to get some further situational awareness and we then went back to the command unit where he then briefed me on the structure using the information on the command unit and given your responsibilities as

00:39:48 unit and given your responsibilities as monitoring officer and the need for you to gain what you described here as a as a situational awareness or earlier on as a really good situational awareness situational understanding as page 11

00:40:01 situational understanding as page 11 I've given your need to do that was there not a need and possibly a compelling need to go directly to the bridgehead and get first-hand information even if

00:40:12 and get first-hand information even if not in detail but a first-hand impression from the bridgehead commanders themselves as to the present state of the conditions in the building no because I was able to attend that from Matt Cooke and Mick Mulholland who

00:40:23 from Matt Cooke and Mick Mulholland who were with me who there are two officers right what did they tell you they told me that they the fast valving garden schools are being respond to I think at that point they were under the impression that we would have to move

00:40:34 impression that we would have to move the bridgehead at some point because there was smoke was coming down into the stairwell and at that point we were committing as many crews as we could up into the tower but the circumstances were exceedingly challenging we'd have issues with burst hose and water

00:40:46 issues with burst hose and water supplies obviously we were they also informed me that time that we were committing fire fighters and crews without water which is completely contrary to everything as a professional

00:40:58 contrary to everything as a professional officer we would ever do because of the risk to firefighters and they gave me that briefing while we're in the base of the tower so that moment in time I didn't feel the need to go to the full throttle conversation did you ask either of those officers Matt Cooke or or Nick

00:41:13 of those officers Matt Cooke or or Nick Mulholland whether deployments in response to specific FSG calls were successful or not no is there a reason why not because at that point that level of detail was not abused to me because I

00:41:25 of detail was not abused to me because I had been given the understanding that although that people go into specific flats to search them that when they got there sometimes the people went in there and had moved and the level of detail knowing which numbers and flats was not

00:41:36 knowing which numbers and flats was not going to help me with understanding what I need to do at that moment in time no maybe early on and and maybe this is an early question but did you understand at that stage what and eros primary objectives were

00:41:47 and eros primary objectives were absolutely which were what save life by doing what by commissioning as many breathing upright screws into the tower as we physically could maximizing rescues indeed right didn't you need then a full briefing from if not the

00:42:00 then a full briefing from if not the bridgehead commanders then make Mulholland and Matt cook so that you could brief yourself and grasped for yourself the challenge is that the

00:42:11 yourself the challenge is that the bridgehead faced and then apply your experience and leadership in your monitoring officer role to assess what Andy Rowe was planning I didn't need any detailed briefing to understand the challenges standing in the base of the tower speaking to firefighters speaking

00:42:23 tower speaking to firefighters speaking to Matt and Mick seeing the situation understand the first five ago garden schools I didn't need more detail than that to understand that we were up against impossible situation with a fully developed fire inside several

00:42:34 fully developed fire inside several flats with people trapped in their detailed knowledge of numbers and where people are going would not have helped in my mind my mind and his plan was absolutely right and proper that we were committing people as many as we could is

00:42:45 committing people as many as we could is that how to respond to fast fire garden schools did you get a grasp at that time of what kind of order or priority crews were being dispatched to what flaws in order to respond to walk now I just knew

00:42:56 order to respond to walk now I just knew that information was coming into the tower going up to the bridgehead and being used by the people at the bridge heads to dispatch crews did you make any inquiries at that stage to establish the conditions in the stairwell yes I did

00:43:07 conditions in the stairwell yes I did and which is why I've been given the information that they might have to move the bridgehead down because the smoke was starting to penetrate to low floors right did you find out what the conditions were like in the stairwell higher up the building from very brief

00:43:18 higher up the building from very brief conversations with math and wit from the crews they said that the conditions are exceedingly difficult in the stairwells there are some areas that are very hot and very smoky did you make any inquiries as to what the conditions were

00:43:29 inquiries as to what the conditions were like in the lobbies no so they said they called in the communal parts to be fair which is stairwells and lobbies so I understood it to be completely impacting did you make any inquiries as to the measures that could Liam it could be

00:43:40 measures that could Liam it could be implemented to improve conditions in the common parts as you put it sadly I don't think there were any conditions that could have improved that on the grounds the fact we didn't have fire fighting media to be able to take to those floors

00:43:52 media to be able to take to those floors we couldn't extinguish the fire therefore

00:43:54 therefore proving any conditions in there was virtually impossible did you ask whether there was a ventilation or smoke extraction system within the building no I didn't I think conversation came up later on right but at that moment in

00:44:07 later on right but at that moment in time with all the compartments breached no smoke extraction system in the world was ever going to compete with that did you consider the deployment of some kind

00:44:19 you consider the deployment of some kind of tactical ventilation we had a conversation and tactical ventilation but there risks around tactical ventilation putting a fan in is that it also pushes the products from combustion throughout the building and we had absolutely no way of identifying whether

00:44:31 absolutely no way of identifying whether or not that was feasible possible would it were some situations to different people so we had a conversation but it wasn't something we enacted is that the conversation did you have that conversation at this stage all day no I think it must be later but look may come

00:44:43 think it must be later but look may come back to that and while you were in the tower did you seek to establish whether there was a systematic search and rescue system in process so as you might be able to avoid repeat deployments of be a

00:44:54 able to avoid repeat deployments of be a cruise no and to be fair what I knew that the two officers who are conducting who at the bridgehead so Pat Golborne and Richard Wells are both both very experienced officers and I would be very happy that they were enacting the most

00:45:06 happy that they were enacting the most suitable plan to respond to the first valve garden schools using the firefighting resources we had at that point so this is your trip to the visit took to the table at 3:01 did you ask Matt or Mick if I can call them that or

00:45:19 Matt or Mick if I can call them that or an tiro how high up in the tower crews were reaching I went yes every time I went to the town every conversation I had I asked that what I can't recall the moment is what floor they told me at that time and then can you remember how

00:45:31 that time and then can you remember how long you stayed in the tub of at that time before you have acted the commander minutes three saw minutes maybe he was just in after to have an understanding and as much as anything to present

00:45:42 and as much as anything to present myself to the firefighter surrounded I was on the fire ground there supporting them right mr. Chen we've had 45 minutes and I've been told it's an appropriate length of time yes should we have a

00:45:53 length of time yes should we have a short may be we have a short break yes we could have a short break you might well

00:45:56 well but we'll do that and we'll come back with three o'clock empty so hombre they're talking again about their evidence if you don't mind and thanks thank you right three o'clock Memphis

00:52:24 you

00:53:13 you

00:59:58 alright ready to carry on yes sir Thank You commissioner thank you for coming back to us can I then just finish off your first trip to the tower and then pursue the your path

01:00:10 the tower and then pursue the your path as it were from there and did did you gain on your first visit to the tower any situational awareness of the system of communication of fire survival

01:00:22 of communication of fire survival guidance information within the tower and to the bridgehead no not that time right then you left the tower and I

01:00:33 right then you left the tower and I think went back to see you ate yes did you go to see you seven no I didn't - that time why did you not go to see you 17 because I wanted to get full of

01:00:46 17 because I wanted to get full of briefing from Andi so the structures he had in place and the officers he had doing various roles and we needed to go back to see you seven to do that sorry I'm so sorry

01:00:58 seven to do that sorry I'm so sorry no sir back to the main command unit not the FSG unit that's good number so I need to go back to the main command unit with Andy to be able to understand the structure and to look at the officers he have in position right did you later go

01:01:09 have in position right did you later go to see you seven I did briefly and put my head round the door right do you remember roughly even when that was I'm terribly sorry I don't all right okay we'll explore that you go back to

01:01:20 okay we'll explore that you go back to see you seven and at page 15 of your statement you say you've got back there at 3:35 if you just turn to that it's the second last paragraph you say I

01:01:32 the second last paragraph you say I think I got back to see you ate at 3:35 now I I just wonder whether that's correct in the light of the photograph we've seen in the timings we've established the song and I believe it is

01:01:44 established the song and I believe it is because Angelo I think then went back to see you to have the tactical coordination group meeting that we had discussed and at that time I made a number of phone calls while standing on

01:01:56 number of phone calls while standing on the corner of Bommel Road did okay did you catch the end of the TCM the tactical coordination meeting that was in place no I think it just finished in people leaving the command units all

01:02:08 people leaving the command units all right back right is that where you got the 335 from I think so I think it was from the as we're lovingly calling the road look alright well it's just very briefly look at that I don't to take up time on it

01:02:20 at that I don't to take up time on it but just just just to be clear so we're all clear if you go to that which is MIT trip quadruple zero five four zero five we can see that the tactical

01:02:32 we can see that the tactical coordination meeting number one which is three twenty halfway down that page a cero introduces himself and shares briefing where were you at three twenty

01:02:45 briefing where were you at three twenty when that started outside making phone calls you were outside making fajitas I see okay so you come back from the tower he'd gone in and you are outside yes I was how long were you outside making phone calls for I would estimate

01:02:57 phone calls for I would estimate probably maybe so fifteen minutes it wasn't entirely making phone calls I did speak to some members of the public while I was outside right so you okay and then at three thirty nine we see

01:03:10 and then at three thirty nine we see sitrep

01:03:11 sitrep which we worked out yesterday was situation reports yes with Matt cook just before halfway down the page were you there for that I was yes right so you've got on to the sea at some point before three thirty-nine indeed now at

01:03:25 before three thirty-nine indeed now at page 17 of your statement if we can go back to that please you say in the second paragraph that you had a

01:03:37 second paragraph that you had a conversation with Andy and you say Andy relayed to me the information he had and we had a discussion around the tactical plan and now I've asked you about that

01:03:48 plan and now I've asked you about that at this point in your statement because it it's two pages after the 3:35 time up but tell me is that conversation the one that happened at that time I believe so okay and you go on to say we had a

01:04:00 okay and you go on to say we had a discussion around the tactical plan I asked him what the command structure was who was reporting into who which officers were in which situation he explained all of that to me and further explained who was in charge of each sector who the safety officers were and

01:04:12 sector who the safety officers were and what their briefings were and then you go on to say gave me the opportunity to ask him questions and also to be able to identify if there were any air of problems that I needed to highlight

01:04:23 of problems that I needed to highlight with him I've read that all to you because I have a number of questions about much of it first of all was this the first was this what you would call the proper briefing the full briefing with Andy Rowe I believe so how long did

01:04:37 with Andy Rowe I believe so how long did that discussion take do you think maybe 10 minutes maybe not that long it was it was as much of a motor we needed to share at that time and not to interrupt

01:04:50 share at that time and not to interrupt the flow of what was taking place right now you say you had a discussion around the tactical plan you can see that in the first and second lines there what

01:05:01 the first and second lines there what did you understand the plan to be once you've discussed it with him so understood the plan was but we were committing as many resources into the tower into response to the faster fire

01:05:12 tower into response to the faster fire guidance calls they were being deployed through the bridgehead where Richard brush and pack all of them were and that on leaving the tower the firefights were having a debrief and the information was

01:05:23 having a debrief and the information was being recorded I knew at that point we were unable to record the information on forward information boards and the information was being written onto the walls of the tower hand side I

01:05:35 walls of the tower hand side I understood that the priority was to commit as many crews as possible we had a conversation on a DBA and the requirement because of the travel distance to use a DBA for the higher

01:05:47 distance to use a DBA for the higher floors but that there were issues with the heat barriers and smoke in some of the areas and that we were unable to contain the fires or extinguish them but we were trying to make best endeavours

01:05:58 we were trying to make best endeavours to do so to not only protect the access for fire fighters but the egress for firefighters and residents at that stage did you discuss did you gain any understanding of the methods being

01:06:10 understanding of the methods being adopted to brief crews at the bridgehead no did you gain only any understanding about the system of deployment of crews at the bridgehead at that time only that

01:06:23 at the bridgehead at that time only that the information was being brought from the fast fire gardens unit to the bridgehead and PACA burn and Richard we're in charge of that deployment did you understand or perhaps assume

01:06:34 did you understand or perhaps assume that Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne at the bridgehead were acting on the fibers of fire survival guidance information being brought to them at that time I did you did at the time you did did that change later later I went and verified

01:06:46 change later later I went and verified for myself because I went back into the tower into the base of the tower and I could see what was happening firsthand right we'll come to that I'm just Park that in for the moment can I just then take you to page 34 of your statement and ask you to look at something there

01:07:02 and ask you to look at something there this is the second from bottom paragraph and it's under the heading it's not that

01:07:14 and it's under the heading it's not that easy to see because it hasn't got underlining the building and factors that impeded our firefighting and rescue efforts that's near the top of the page but that's there just in the at the end of the second last paragraph you say we

01:07:28 of the second last paragraph you say we were never going to get jets on to the on to the floors to fight it it was an impossible task because there was no way of dealing with it mm-hmm now that view

01:07:39 of dealing with it mm-hmm now that view was that a view that you've formed well let me ask it this way when did you form that view during the night its moment ago after my cough right so you thought this was an unviable far from the start of your involvement on the fire ground I

01:07:51 of your involvement on the fire ground I knew it was you knew it was it

01:07:56 what were you briefed by anybody regarding stay put only the state but advise had been revoked which and you wrote over write as you're in your role

01:08:11 wrote over write as you're in your role as monitoring officer what was your view of the decision to withdraw the stay-put advice my view is it was maybe the best information at the time and that's what we were acting on right

01:08:27 did you ask who made the decision and you bro told me he had right - I'm sorry - get back over this really goes back to

01:08:38 - get back over this really goes back to them - the briefings do you remember observing or receiving a telephone call from control room about the question of withdrawing the statement advice no not at all

01:08:50 statement advice no not at all right do you know did you know on the night whether an deer had been asked for permission from control to change the stay-put advice no did you

01:09:02 change the stay-put advice no did you know on the night that control had in fact decided themselves to change the statehood advice no I didn't when did you discover that did you ever discover it I did discover it I definitely knew it at the PRC and

01:09:15 it I definitely knew it at the PRC and probably potentially in a conversation in the days following but not on the night right during this briefing or in or this is the second briefing once you're back on the Cu ordering them the

01:09:27 you're back on the Cu ordering them the mobile briefing you had a shorter one with an tiro during either of those did you discuss any plan by him as to how to go about effecting an evacuation no we

01:09:38 go about effecting an evacuation no we didn't talk about in terms of accusation we talked about in terms of rescue because that's what it was it wasn't an evacuation evacuation implies an orderly process where you're going to be able to contact people and ask them to leave what we really a rescue phase for people

01:09:50 what we really a rescue phase for people who were trapped in a burning building right when was the first time you were told that the single stairwell was the only escape route very early on I think walking to the tower with Angie I was made aware of that what was your

01:10:01 made aware of that what was your impression of that what impact did that have on you so it was going to be a very difficult task to be able to not only get firefighting crews up there in numbers but to be able to bring

01:10:12 numbers but to be able to bring residents out of the tower and I also knew at that point that by the time you have add hose lines into that and so you know when firefighters are wearing fire gear and breathing apparatus they take

01:10:23 gear and breathing apparatus they take up a bit more space so I knew from that point a very small staircase was going to provide a huge challenge for us did you discuss the difficulties posed by smoke congestion obstacles and to eighth

01:10:34 smoke congestion obstacles and to eighth person flow yes very early on and as and what strategy or plan did you form in your head as a result of knowing those facts we're going to do our very

01:10:46 those facts we're going to do our very best endeavors to be able to commit people up there sometimes bringing people out there is no way of having one-way traffic or an orderly process in that because you know you've got teams of firefighters going up then meeting a team of firefighters bringing three or

01:10:58 team of firefighters bringing three or four people down with them so it's a case of making you know the priorities to bring the people rescued out but the same time the priorities to commit more firefighting that's conduct further rescues what equipment was available to

01:11:12 rescues what equipment was available to the brigade to assist residents to get down the staircase as part of that rescue plan I'm sorry I'm equipment I don't think there's any equipment to pop and firefighters let me ask the question

01:11:25 and firefighters let me ask the question of focusing on second set breathing apparatus did it occur to you to think of using even improvising second set breathing apparatus to assist occupants of the building to come down now the

01:11:37 of the building to come down now the second step breathing approaches have provided for firefighters for you some rescue and fire fights the trapped it's extremely heavy piece of equipment if I cumbersome and we only carry a very limited supply of them therefore there

01:11:48 limited supply of them therefore there was no way it was feasible knowing the numbers of people in there to even think about trying to take those up and effect rescues with them in addition to which carrying any additional equipment into the tower was so physically demanding

01:11:59 the tower was so physically demanding for the firefighters who were already walking up numerous flights of stairs in extreme heat wearing firefighting equipment I wouldn't of sorts do anything that would slow them down equally try and persuade people to put

01:12:10 equally try and persuade people to put face masks on remember the public is extremely difficult our best bet was to get to them and get them out quickly and how would you get them out how would you bring them through a smoke long

01:12:21 bring them through a smoke long staircase as quickly as possible is the only way of doing it there is no suitable way trying to keep them no advise them to have wet towels and things around their face but actually the best bet of that moment in time is for us to be able to actually physically

01:12:32 for us to be able to actually physically encourage them to go very fast and move them out right so I think is the answer my question there was no equipment available to the brigade to assist with their respiration or movement no there isn't

01:12:43 isn't we've covered a second set the ice one more question on that did were you made aware on the night the fact that at least one risk you had been made of of residents in the building with a second set ba no I

01:12:54 building with a second set ba no I wasn't aware of that until I think potentially the next day I see what did you think of that when you learnt it it's great for another life saved to be fair did now we talked about plans this

01:13:08 fair did now we talked about plans this morning did you yourself asked to see any plans of the tower so to be able better to understand the strategy and any structural difficulties that might have emerged no and denied a conversation around plans and he made me

01:13:19 conversation around plans and he made me aware there weren't any plans so there was no very me asking to see them you discussed plans to give it a - he's done could you describe well can you describe what your view was about not having them

01:13:32 what your view was about not having them it was very unhelpful right

01:13:43 I think you approved tactical ventilation to be brought to the fire ground at some stage didn't you it is that PPV it is yes if we go to the road log I think we can see that in an early

01:13:54 log I think we can see that in an early that was at an early stage and just try and get that for you and this open at the time you arrived can you go please to page one of the row log you can see

01:14:09 to page one of the row log you can see that at o2 57 PPV positive pressure ventilation requested by duty dak were you on the Cu Cu eight by that time do you think I might spin briefly but

01:14:22 you think I might spin briefly but that's request by the duty deck was remote from the fire ground so that would have been at the control center where Adrian Fenton was right did you know about that request when you got onto the sea you know I was know when

01:14:35 onto the sea you know I was know when did you first become aware of that a tactical ventilation system had been sought when somebody and in fact it was a time when Andy was off the command unit and somebody spoke to me about wanting to get ventilation there and

01:14:48 wanting to get ventilation there and asked for my permission to order it so I made that decision whatever time that's recorded as part of the row look that was the first time a conversation was head around tactical ventilation to be fair at that moment in time I'm happy to

01:15:00 fair at that moment in time I'm happy to get resources mobilized and comers the incident I did not anticipate it was going to be able to be used right and just looking ahead did you get resources there

01:15:08 there I believe the PPV came but we couldn't use it didn't use it because we were unable to use it not we didn't okay I was going to ask you was it tried we couldn't so in order to ventilate something you need an accent or you need

01:15:20 something you need an accent or you need a point where you put the fan in and then you need to understand where you're going to push the gasses to and we had no way of being able to do that in a meaningful way without potentially making the situation worse with people inside the tower right at what point did

01:15:32 inside the tower right at what point did you abandon the PPV was I don't think I ever really thought it was a feasible option it was just a case of getting on the road in case there was a a means by which we could use it right now I'm gonna get back to this question of stay

01:15:44 gonna get back to this question of stay put if I may and they've got a number of questions about it but the but as a more general question can you tell us first of all whether you've ever had any training or experience

01:15:55 training or experience of revoking stay put no I haven't right this is no training and no experience for us you're personally concerned do you know whether in the brigade there was as at the 14th of June 2017

01:16:06 there was as at the 14th of June 2017 any training on how to go about revoking stay put I was aware of for me and could you tell us and maybe you can't but could you tell us from your own experience what factors you as an

01:16:17 experience what factors you as an incident commander would take into account on in the control in the on the incident ground as to whether or not stay put should be revoked absolutely so

01:16:28 stay put should be revoked absolutely so the factors I would look at would be the feasible means of being able to evacuate people safely from the premises the reasons why you would see fit to remove people who appear to be in a safe environment in to potentially risk

01:16:40 environment in to potentially risk environment the ability to be able to contact those people the numbers of firefighters if it's a physical evacuation that you need in place to do that the impact that if you change that then you took people away from

01:16:51 then you took people away from potentially FSGS or fighting a fire the impact that would have on the operational incident there'd be a huge range of factors you need to take into consideration before you made that decision bearing in mind that all of our

01:17:02 decision bearing in mind that all of our building construction all of our high-rise firefighting is predicated on stay put when you evaluated as opera as monitoring officer and Eros decisions did you have yourself familiarize

01:17:15 did you have yourself familiarize yourself with the factors that Andy Rowe had taken into account in deciding to revoke the stay put no I didn't is there a reason for that yes because the decision had been made and my priority was to work out how we were going to get the people who are trapped in the building out right and

01:17:28 trapped in the building out right and would this be right that the effect of revoking the stay put which had happened only just before you arrived meant that the building was now going to be fuller

01:17:41 the building was now going to be fuller perhaps in the stairways of people trying to get out than was otherwise the case before indeed and that would present a particular tactical challenge would it yes a massive all right and

01:17:52 would it yes a massive all right and were you able to assess whether or not in fact it was better for them to stay in their flats rather than present that technical challenge or did you not from what I could see if the building at that time I wouldn't want anyone to try and

01:18:03 time I wouldn't want anyone to try and in there right now were you aware of how the changed advice or the change in advice if you like to get out as I'm so let me ask a prior question in fact and

01:18:18 let me ask a prior question in fact and Errol had changed the advice and let's just go to the road log if we can and his advice is recorded there 247 if we can just have it up as advise people to make efforts to leave the building and

01:18:31 make efforts to leave the building and is that how you understood the decision to have been made I think Andy briefed me that I think his person on lines have you seen what's happening you seen the

01:18:42 you seen what's happening you seen the fire we just not need to try and tell people to get out if they can right so you know understood that the advice was is this right that they should get out if they can indeed okay and do you now

01:18:53 if they can indeed okay and do you now have that that new advice to get out if you can was communicated to residents well the only way of communication that would have been if they were on the phone to control right what about

01:19:06 phone to control right what about residents who had been on the phone to control told before the change to stay put in their in their flats but didn't call back how would they be told that the advice have changed and they should

01:19:18 the advice have changed and they should know leave the only way would be if we physically got firefighters up the flats knock on their floors on their doors there's no other way of doing that control were not in a position in any way shape or form to start scrolling

01:19:29 way shape or form to start scrolling through instant logs trying to find mobile numbers and phone people back because the volume of calls they were still receiving in the fire survival guidance is the priority absolutely rightly was what they were dealing with mmm are you aware has Joe Smith told us

01:19:41 mmm are you aware has Joe Smith told us of a custom and practice in the control room of not calling callers back unless they're cut off absolutely right even on mobile phones indeed did it cross your

01:19:52 mobile phones indeed did it cross your mind that that customer practice should the depart should be departed from in this particular incident so that those people who had previously been given staple to advice should now be called

01:20:03 staple to advice should now be called back and be told it's changed get out if you can no because I was fully aware that all the staff in the control room were engaged with first of all the guidance calls and they were clearly our priorities because these were people telling us they were trapped in there

01:20:14 telling us they were trapped in there in the flats by fire and smoke so at that point they become the priority and we need to manage them first does that mean that you didn't actually have a conversation with aunty row about that no right well you briefed by Andy row as

01:20:26 no right well you briefed by Andy row as to when and how the decision to change the advice to get out if you can was communicated to the bridgehead no he just told me the decision had been made right did did you find out as to how and

01:20:40 right did did you find out as to how and and when the change in advice was communicated to the bridgehead no I knew it taken place prior arrived that's all I knew I see so you bet during your

01:20:51 I knew I see so you bet during your first visit to thee to the tower were you essentially assuming that those that the bridgehead knew that the advice had changed yes and to be fair it wouldn't have made any huge amount of difference

01:21:02 have made any huge amount of difference to their tactical plan because their plan was still to respond to fire survivor guidance what they would make very anticipated seeing was large numbers of people come down the stairs but that would only have been if the people had callbacks control them and given that advice so you know that

01:21:14 given that advice so you know that moment in time I'd expect the information to be passed to them but I would absolutely expect their main focus was to carry on with the FSGS did you investigate whether there was a need to communicate the change in advice to

01:21:25 communicate the change in advice to other control rooms and bt who are taking calls from residents under fallback arrangements no I was unaware that we have another controller was taking another course at that time I see nobody briefed you on that no that

01:21:37 nobody briefed you on that no that moment in time and fundamentally I wouldn't made any difference to attack scope and on the fire ground that was a situation that control and the duty debt would be dealing with in control were you aware that there are instances of other control rooms calling residents

01:21:50 other control rooms calling residents back and getting hold of them you're not

01:21:55 in general terms would you agree that there was nonetheless a need to keep other control rooms updated more generally so that they could continue to give accurate and useful FSG advice to callers who got through to

01:22:06 FSG advice to callers who got through to those control rooms if there were control operators available to do that however I think the main priority that moment and time was continuing to answer and speak too fast of our gardens callers are you aware again will

01:22:19 callers are you aware again will generally of any training or or system in place to facilitate the communication to other control rooms of a change in statehood advice so that they could give up-to-date FSG advice

01:22:37 are you aware that the surrey control room which was taking a fair number of calls I think the total was ninety was only informed of the change in advice at

01:22:49 only informed of the change in advice at 308 I wasn't aware of any interaction with any health control room right does it surprise you to learn that they were only told of the change in advice at 308 when the decision to change had been

01:23:00 when the decision to change had been made at latest 247 with the volume of calls that control were dealing with no that doesn't surprise me

01:23:11 during this briefing we're talking about coming back to it at 3:39 or thereabouts did you discuss with Andy Ray whether you should assume command yes I did

01:23:22 command yes I did and what was the result of that discussion staff that discussion was that I was very satisfied that Andy road was conducting the role of incident commander in an appropriate manner that he had a sound operational plan and that

01:23:35 he had a sound operational plan and that I had no need whatsoever to take over on him I was also aware due to the scale nature of the incident that there were wider implications for London that I would need to be managing such as speaking to the Mayor of London and

01:23:47 speaking to the Mayor of London and various other issues that I knew I would have to pick up had I assumed control at that point and taken over that would have tied me into that and I would know I'm able to fulfill the rest of my roles that I needed to do right now can I then

01:23:59 that I needed to do right now can I then turn to page 15 of your witness statement and look at the last paragraph on that page

01:24:11 you say they're at the bottom of the page and over the top over the page to page 60 you had a conversation with

01:24:27 page 60 you had a conversation with Angie Rowan Mac cook and then you say the other senior officer in this role was make Mulholland and then you say this at the top of 16 their role is to

01:24:39 this at the top of 16 their role is to fold that at a large-scale incident such as the fire at Greenville tower one of the ort officers what follows the incident commander conducts a Quality Assurance on what command decisions are being made well the other ort officer is

01:24:50 being made well the other ort officer is out actually on the Instagram looking at policies procedures and safety with regards to at the actual firefighting do you know who carried out that Quality

01:25:01 you know who carried out that Quality Assurance function on the night no I'm sorry I'm not aware and actually as I do say later on the although those are they sort of laid down ways that are watts you normally work on that night because the exceptional nature of the incident

01:25:13 the exceptional nature of the incident they did work in slightly different ways and were involved in other situations as well so they were working as a team and briefly as a team I'm not sure whether they specifically individually have those roles on the night poison was it

01:25:25 those roles on the night poison was it part of the monitoring officers function to oversee or quality assure their role no not at all right how different is their role from the monitoring officers

01:25:38 their role from the monitoring officers function fundamentally very different my role is specifically around the support of the incident commander and the role that they're undertaking the o our T's is far wider because they're going out looking at all of the sectors looking at

01:25:50 looking at all of the sectors looking at the instant that's happening on the operational ground so they have a far wider remit and go into more detail mine is very specific around Andy okay so does that mean that they are the

01:26:01 does that mean that they are the officers who carry out the assessment of the implementation of policies and procedures in the sectors indeed I see and they report back to the incident commander today so I can report back to the incident commander or they could

01:26:12 the incident commander or they could they would come and tell me or the incident commander so it's quite common they could give me a briefing advantage although instant commanders busy at that moment

01:26:18 moment okay and with that assessment then informed incident commanders decisions would you expect yes quite regularly and then you would then monitor those decisions in light of this that information would you in a sort of cold

01:26:30 information would you in a sort of cold line-drawing way that wasn't what happened on the night choose exceptional circumstances but that's the theory part of it you've been in a cold line-drawing way would it work this way that if in fact they'd be any a departure from policy that the ort s

01:26:43 departure from policy that the ort s have picked up they would report that to the IC he would tell you about it and then you would assess his his performance in the light of that departure yes and they did regularly they informed us numbers of departure

01:26:54 they informed us numbers of departure policy and I think they did it when Andy and I were together so it was in case of him telling me it was a case of us receiving a briefing at the same time of a number of things we did that completely outside of policy and quite extraordinary exceptional now let me

01:27:06 extraordinary exceptional now let me turn to a different topic which is different for related topic which is the strategy and deployments at the bridgehead first of all I'd like to see if we can explore your understanding of what was actually happening at the bridgehead if you turn to page 13 of

01:27:17 bridgehead if you turn to page 13 of your statement and go please to the last line of that statement up to the up to the top of page 14 you say and I think

01:27:32 the top of page 14 you say and I think this isn't your first visit because you just you say I deliberately didn't go to the fourth floor at that moment beginning of the paragraph you say however on my understanding my understanding at that time to the fourth floor bridgehead which I think read

01:27:43 floor bridgehead which I think read third floor bridgehead was that were deploying resources throughout the building

01:27:46 building predominantly tasked to search and rescue the tasks were based on information that was being related them by the FSG command unit and I'll show

01:27:58 by the FSG command unit and I'll show you that and then can I show you page 19 there are two bits of evidence we need to put together page 19 paragraph 2 on that page where you say the plan at that point

01:28:13 you say the plan at that point it's the second main paragraph the plan at that point was to get as much EDB a into the building as possible in order to conduct search and rescue and to access those flats that we knew were involved in FSG now we've talked about

01:28:26 involved in FSG now we've talked about your your first trip after you're full of briefing with an and erode did you then go back to the bridgehead and talk to the bridgehead commanders about what they were doing not for some time later I don't believe I believe it's a while

01:28:37 I don't believe I believe it's a while later the information I was getting was being relayed to me by Matt Cooke and macmail Holland who were giving me updates right so just break that down so you hadn't done that in the period you

01:28:48 you hadn't done that in the period you do your first trip into the tower so just after 3:00 a.m. to about 320 yes yes that's correct yeah and you didn't do it I think in the next period because

01:29:00 do it I think in the next period because you were on the commander unit do you know even roughly when you went to the bridgehead have had a conversation with Richard Richard Welch and Pat Goodwin no I have no idea of the time I know that

01:29:13 I have no idea of the time I know that for a period of time I didn't go back to the tower and one of the main reasons I didn't know back to the tower was on entering the tower I believed him the first time I had a very close miss of

01:29:24 first time I had a very close miss of nearly being killed by a large piece of debris and I didn't think it would facilitate running the incident terribly well if the Commissioner got killed on the fire ground so I thought it is probably better for me to be remote from that while decisions were being relayed to me by other officers right okay can

01:29:37 to me by other officers right okay can you give us a I know it's difficult but can you give us even a vague timer which you did go to the bridgehead no I'm sorry I can't was it was it getting light you think I'm just a have no idea I'm sorry if I could help you I would by genuinely this is part of my problem

01:29:49 genuinely this is part of my problem with memory recall I'm sorry okay do you remember a time when there were you were you were told about difficulties getting above the 15th floor

01:30:00 above the 15th floor I remember having that conversation I remember having conversation very specifically with Pat Golborne about the fact that he wanted to try and reach the 18th floor and at that time we were unable I think we weren't making

01:30:12 unable I think we weren't making progress past the 12th at that point I have no idea what time that was but he said the heat and smoke and the conditions on that above the 12th floor was so untenable that we are unable to get crews to access beyond that and

01:30:24 get crews to access beyond that and also had a conversation in the intervening period with several ba crews outside of the tower who had related conditions inside the tower right okay well that was an attempt to see if we could put a time mark on on when you

01:30:36 could put a time mark on on when you spoke to them we'll come back to that 18th floor 12th floor point later can I just ask you this did you'd any stage take any particular steps to ascertain how in detail the bridgehead would

01:30:47 how in detail the bridgehead would deploying crews no right so does that mean that you never found out how the bridgehead or whether the bridgehead was adopting a strategy of prioritization of particular FSG calls I knew they were adopting a strategy because I the

01:30:59 adopting a strategy because I the information relayed to me by mass or Mick whoever the boss wouldn't give me the information what I didn't do is physically go in there and look at what they were doing until later on what did Matt and Mick to all make tell you about that any system of prioritizing well they told me that the

01:31:11 prioritizing well they told me that the prioritization was to get to the floors that were affected by far survive guidance calls that the calls were coming in from the FSG units being relayed by runners predominantly to the fire ground that information was being fed to the bridgehead who were then

01:31:22 fed to the bridgehead who were then briefing crews to go up to the affected flats so the priority was always to manage the people of our survival guidance I was unaware whether there was any prioritization of the actual par survival guidance calls themselves at

01:31:34 survival guidance calls themselves at that moment in time with the situation the conditions inside the tower in my view every single human life than there was a priority right okay so does that mean to cut a long story short that although policy would require an IC to

01:31:46 although policy would require an IC to prior to decide how to prioritize calls in fact that policy was departed from I think it was departed from because of the nature and the volume of the calls and we understood the people moving

01:31:57 and we understood the people moving around in flats so it wouldn't necessarily been helpful to do that and for me every single life in that tower was a life Danita so be sure and within that every

01:32:11 Danita so be sure and within that every single life were you aware of any effort to sub prioritize elderly people children or people with mobility issues no I wasn't aware of that right did you think that that was something that

01:32:22 think that that was something that should be prioritized at that moment in time when you're faced with the tower that's on phone you know people calling for our help you won't save everyone in there I think it's quite difficult to make a judgment call on whose life is more

01:32:34 judgment call on whose life is more valid

01:32:41 did you investigate whether prior to your arrival understand what you're saying about what you saw but did you undertake any investigation about whether prior to your arrival there had been a system of

01:32:52 your arrival there had been a system of prioritization no I didn't why's that because at that moment in time I just needed a scale and volume of the numbers of people involved and the impetus was to get as many firefighters in there as possible to affect the rescues that we could did you

01:33:04 affect the rescues that we could did you want did you come to understand any system of collecting information about the success or failure of particular ba deployments I understood as firefighters were exiting the tower that information

01:33:15 were exiting the tower that information was being collected from them where possible I also knew and saw for myself that some of the firefighter Xing that are unable to speak and we're in a situation of heat exhaustion and the collapsing so we might not got information from them there were I saw

01:33:27 information from them there were I saw some exceptionally far fight sounds exceptional dress and strain yes but did you at any stage concerned about the about any difficulties in obtaining

01:33:38 about any difficulties in obtaining information about the success or failure of deployments so that failed to because failed deployments would mean that people were still in in flats no I understood the firefighters were going to the flat where they believe people

01:33:49 to the flat where they believe people were sometimes they weren't there but then other times people were being deployed and encountering people on the stairs that need rescuing them or priorities then at that point did you did you look to see whether there was a system of recording those kinds of

01:34:00 system of recording those kinds of deployments and their results no I saw a lot of systems on the wall at the bridgehead for marketing but I didn't go into detailed that because there were sufficient senior officers managing that situation and I had a far wide agreement

01:34:13 situation and I had a far wide agreement than that right did Andy Rowe at any time give you his view that the building was lost the priority was to rescue people and not stop the fire spread we had that conversation very early on we

01:34:24 had that conversation very early on we were never going to stop a fire spreading we were never going to put the fire out and our priority was only ever to get to as many people as possible right can you please go to page 22 of your statement wish

01:34:36 has in the second main paragraph I'm sorry top paragraph in the last two lines something by you you say at this time at Grunfeld tower we continue to

01:34:50 time at Grunfeld tower we continue to firefight offensively inside the building as we believe there to be savable life could you just assist me given that the building was lost and the priority was to rescue people and not stop its but for the spread of the fire how does that

01:35:02 for the spread of the fire how does that sit with you saying that you continue to firefight offensively because the fire fightin was necessary to try and subdue their fire at some of the lower floors to enable crews to proceed beyond that

01:35:14 to enable crews to proceed beyond that to gets the faster fire guidance and equally for the crews that are gone above the fire to actually maintain a safe egress for them if they bring casualties out so if we just done absolutely no firefighting whatsoever then anyone who is in the building was

01:35:26 then anyone who is in the building was never going to get any further and quite potentially would have lost large numbers of firefighters who've been able to make any rescues right just continuing with the topic of this rescue strategy you say and I think we've

01:35:39 strategy you say and I think we've discussed already today the tactical decisions at the bridgehead are not for the incident commander therefore the therefore the sector commanders is that right absolutely and is this right the bridgehead makes the tactical decisions

01:35:50 bridgehead makes the tactical decisions the operations commander who was Andy O'Laughlin after my area took over was responsible for those ultimately and and then the incident commander gets told about them indeed right and your roles

01:36:02 about them indeed right and your roles of monitoring officer visa vie the incident commanders decisions do you monitor the incident commander or do you also monitor the operations commander as well to make sure that the incident commanders getting the right information

01:36:13 commanders getting the right information no my produc my primary roles amongst the incident commander and provide the support and guidance to him I'm obviously aware of the information he's receiving we'll have conversations around it but I don't have a wider role of monitoring other officers on the fire

01:36:24 of monitoring other officers on the fire ground because my main focus and especially on that night my main focus was to support and it right did you talk to Andy Lachlan I believe I did I don't recall what the conversations were about I know I spoke to him on the nights but

01:36:35 I know I spoke to him on the nights but right did you see on detail you didn't have a detailed briefing with him right now

01:36:41 now you we discussed earlier any visit you made to the to see you seven first of all do you remember when you know all birdstrike this way how long after your arrival at the incident did you do think you visited Caesar I genuinely have no

01:36:53 you visited Caesar I genuinely have no idea that's one of the things I recall open the door I recall seeing Tom Goodall I was seeing recall seeing large numbers of information being written on the board

01:37:03 the board I recall an absolute sense of urgency and commitment and it was a very dynamic and busy environment what I would not seek to do at that point is to intrude on that environment start asking

01:37:15 on that environment start asking difficult or awkward and detailed questions of them because I knew they had already supplied that information both to the IRT offices and was supplying information to the bridgehead there are times and places where it isn't useful to ask for people to play

01:37:26 isn't useful to ask for people to play your detailed information when they've clearly very task focused and very busy

01:37:32 I ask you to look at the InP report on on the incident which we looked at earlier today it's tab 30 of the documents and I'll ask you to look at

01:37:48 documents and I'll ask you to look at page 3 of that please

01:38:07 and this is the fourth item down one of two control did not receive regular updates from the incident ground you see that it's been high control did not

01:38:18 that it's been high control did not receive regular updates from the incident ground on the progress of dealing with fire survival FSG calls however the number of FSG calls being processed was unprecedented there for review of PN 790 to deal with

01:38:31 there for review of PN 790 to deal with this do you agree with that it says there for review to deal with this specific point is not doing necessary one or two is unfortunately you can only put certain out text into those boxes so that is one sentence okay yes so it's

01:38:44 that is one sentence okay yes so it's saying it's not yeah I mean we wouldn't review a process on that the point I do agree with is that we need to ensure a 2:05 information goes back to control to inform them the situation okay on the

01:38:56 inform them the situation okay on the night were you aware the control is not receiving regular updates from the incident ground on the progress of FSG goals you weren't aware of that is that something that as a monitoring officer you should have been aware of no absolutely not that would have been the role of the father Gardens command unit

01:39:08 role of the father Gardens command unit to pass that information back to where that isn't something launching up so that's completely separate sector so that would not fall within my remit okay just following that as you call the hard line that would that not be something

01:39:19 line that would that not be something that the FSG commander should have reported back to the operations commander obviously he was the one who the information wasn't coming from there so he would not be aware of the control well I think this came from control so

01:39:32 well I think this came from control so we had Johanna at the debrief so I don't think he was aware the information wasn't going there because it's controlled who had the frustration with it right okay it in this line of command we're not obviously looking at the

01:39:44 we're not obviously looking at the incident ground what where does the control room fit into that it doesn't really fundamentally that's you know that is the thing the control room are sitting as a separate entity they've got a Deputy Assistant Commissioner who's

01:39:55 a Deputy Assistant Commissioner who's Adrian Fenton on the night who goes in there to provide support and sort strategic operational advice to them and the obviously they liaised with far survived Gardens unit in relation to that but they don't sit in the overall

01:40:07 that but they don't sit in the overall command structure of an operation incident on the fire ground okay no and that does that mean that any particular problems or changes in fire survival guidance which are dependent on

01:40:18 survival guidance which are dependent on feedback from the incident ground and may not necessarily get fed back to the incident ground I think very much on the night that was the case due to the

01:40:29 the night that was the case due to the extreme volume of calls due to the two-way information that the information wasn't being relayed back to them that night no and is one of the reasons for that that the control room sits outside

01:40:40 that that the control room sits outside this information pyramid no I don't think so because on any normal operational incident the you know we're relaying information to him from control continuously and the problem that night

01:40:52 continuously and the problem that night was of course the fact that the vast majority of control officers were very heavily resourced dealing with the survivor guidance and there were lots of pressing priorities so normally control are in a two-way conversation with us on

01:41:03 are in a two-way conversation with us on the command unit on a regular basis okay I think it would follow from that but well we asked you this way did you review the arrangements for management of the FSG calls absolutely not if you

01:41:14 of the FSG calls absolutely not if you say absolutely not as if it's wrong so I'm not in a position to abandon command decisions that are being taken by specific sector commanders that would be completely inappropriate for me to do that right yeah they said is this right

01:41:31 that right yeah they said is this right that you weren't aware on the night even though you were reviewing Andy Andy raids incident come on decisions you weren't aware on the night that the information loop was not being closed so that results of deployments weren't came

01:41:43 that results of deployments weren't came back to the control no because I'm not sure the far ground we're aware of that so Andy wouldn't have been aware either so I can't review something around who doesn't know about either

01:41:54 was it not essential in order for FSG FSG calls to be responded to properly and the results of deployments then to

01:42:06 and the results of deployments then to be fed back that that information leave was closed so the control did get that information that would be the ideal but normally when that post is written it's in response to us maybe dealing with two

01:42:17 in response to us maybe dealing with two three or four fire survival guidance calls when we're dealing with in excess of a hundred trying to find that information loop back tying up further time there's obviously very difficult on the night obviously it's ideal that everyone has as much information as

01:42:28 everyone has as much information as possible did you investigate how the incident commander and indeed you were kept abreast of developments regarding particular FSG calls or even in general

01:42:39 particular FSG calls or even in general so therefore she calls and the updates policy going through the bridgehead they had the information that was not individual specific ones but the whole concept of how that was working was being monitored by the our rtm by and

01:42:51 being monitored by the our rtm by and our Lachlan as the operations commander right in your capacity as monitoring officer were you satisfied on the night that it was it that the system of

01:43:04 that it was it that the system of responding to FSG information was sufficient i was satisfied we're making every endeavor to commit operational crews into the towers response those calls right mr. chairman there may be an

01:43:17 calls right mr. chairman there may be an appropriate moment for an another short break yeah well I was going to ask you you in visit taking up most of the recipe after Miami is well then this ought to be the time you break up yeah

01:43:28 ought to be the time you break up yeah we're gonna have another short break now until five to four please and they're talking about your evidence but around the world

01:43:36 the world all right I'd like to give the a show that'll be thank you very much

01:43:46 all right so I've deformities

01:54:11 you

01:54:42 all right Commissioner ready to carry on yes sir thank you thank you for coming back to us um can I just ask you about your visit to see you seven first of all how many trips to see you seven the FSG

01:54:54 how many trips to see you seven the FSG unit do you think you made during the course of the night potentially two right potentially I mean you say is that you can't remember to or you may have made two or so I definitely recommend

01:55:05 made two or so I definitely recommend one and I think I went one other time but I have no way of verifying that right now and it's difficult do you remember roughly how long after you arrived that you went to see you seven

01:55:17 arrived that you went to see you seven Noahide okay do you know how long you spent in Cu seven not long at all you said you put your head around the door yeah so I the door was open I converse with them I didn't step into their space and intrude them what they were doing

01:55:28 and intrude them what they were doing less than a minute listen what was the purpose of your going to see you certain as much as anything to support them to you know to give him some encouragement because they were doing an incredibly

01:55:39 because they were doing an incredibly difficult job and just to let them know I was there and to get a brief overview of what they were doing but not a detail one right in your role as monitoring officer to tur the incident and evaluate

01:55:50 officer to tur the incident and evaluate what was happening was it not important to you to have a bit more than a minute and actually investigate in greater detail what they were doing no not at that time they was so very busy they were dealing with such a dynamic situation that an interruption of that

01:56:02 situation that an interruption of that would not have been beneficial for the supply of information from there up to the bridgehead which was my priority right now I've used the word tour the incident because I think that's the expression that's used in the policy FA

01:56:13 expression that's used in the policy FA the monitoring officer monitoring officer policy for - for and it's it's paragraph four point six I've ended it up I'll just read it to the in the mo having it having ascertained the icees

01:56:24 having it having ascertained the icees plan intended tactics and communication structure if appropriate the mo shelter the incident and evaluate the operational plan and feedback to the IC and the light available obligate policy

01:56:35 and the light available obligate policy obligation did you as part of that tour go to see you seven and evaluate its operations as part of the operational plan evaluated it by speaking to them

01:56:46 plan evaluated it by speaking to them but more important than by speaking to math and Mick who were doing that role any duplication of that by me going I'll stand further questions was an unnecessary option into their extremely important role at that time right so you evaluated

01:56:59 role at that time right so you evaluated what the DFS g-unit was doing as it were at secondhand yes that's quite regular practice Tuesday loyalty officers that's you know they are doing that there are certain other set of eyes and ears on the fire ground right the obligation in

01:57:11 the fire ground right the obligation in the policy though is to tour the incident and does that not mean that you would actually go to the different sector heads and actually talks to them about what they were doing no the to the incident means for me to get the situational awareness to go around the instance see what's going on

01:57:22 around the instance see what's going on it doesn't mean I have to join to the level of detail with each sector commanders to what their role is of what they're doing that's the role of the operations commander in the incident commander and when you got to see you seven in order to evaluate the operational plan would it not be

01:57:33 operational plan would it not be involving more than giving them support but actually just finding out even in broad terms what they were doing I did find out broad terms that's a conversation I have with him but enough than enough of a brevity of conversation

01:57:44 than enough of a brevity of conversation to not impact on the important role they were doing I follow who did you speak to Tom Caudill we spoke to did what did he tell you he told me how they're receiving calls they still had he had numbers on the board which I don't I

01:57:56 numbers on the board which I don't I didn't dot write down a recollect he told me how they're receiving the calls and they were using runners to relay the information to the bridgehead did he say anything to you about prioritization of calls not at that time now did you have a look inside to see you briefly yes did

01:58:08 a look inside to see you briefly yes did you see a chart I didn't study in detail right okay did you even though you didn't study it in detail did you observe that it had a system of prioritization now I didn't you didn't

01:58:23 now we touched earlier on prioritization of the bridgehead did there come a time when you had a conversation about prioritization with Richard Welch and and Pat Goulbourne now the time when I

01:58:35 and Pat Goulbourne now the time when I had a relatively in-depth conversation with Pat Golborne who was about we had a conversation around the safety of the building we had a conversation about the exceedingly difficult it was getting firefighters above I believe the 12th

01:58:47 firefighters above I believe the 12th floor at that time and the conversation we had was him saying please don't make me stop committing firefighters to higher floors which was never our intention and he had an absolute

01:58:58 intention and he had an absolute pressing desire to keep trying to commit crews to the 18th floor and I told him I trust his judgment we will carry on committing crews but I did believe that our firefighters were a severe risk at

01:59:09 our firefighters were a severe risk at that time right and I think in fact you cover this and just look at that now if we made a post page 27 of your statement you I think cover this tell me if this is wrong but in the second paragraph on

01:59:22 is wrong but in the second paragraph on that page you say at some point I had a conversation with Pat Goulbourne outside the tower about the structural integrity of the building that's the conversation you're referring to Nancy's yes okay and then you say committed crews were doing

01:59:33 then you say committed crews were doing work after the 12th floor couldn't get any further because of the heat and fire spread it was very focused on trying to get to the 18th floor and then he's saying he had something in his mind a piece of information I didn't ask in the detail but I suspect

01:59:44 I didn't ask in the detail but I suspect he had received from information about a family and/or children he was obsessed with trying to get the eighteenth floor but at that point I knew we could not get beyond the twelfth do you can you

01:59:57 get beyond the twelfth do you can you remember when you were told this was this on your first trip to the tower it was a subsequent trip right and you say that he was obsessed with trying to get to the 18th floor but you knew you say

02:00:08 to the 18th floor but you knew you say you couldn't get beyond the 12th he was the one who told him we couldn't get me on the 12th right I see okay and how did you think he was going to get to the 18th floor he just wanted to keep on with every ounce

02:00:20 just wanted to keep on with every ounce determination trying to commit crews to contain the fire and then commit crews to go beyond the fire to get up to the 18th I see okay

02:00:31 18th I see okay were you aware weather control is being formed informed either generally or even specifically as this example as per this example of the decision not to commit

02:00:42 example of the decision not to commit crews above certain floors it wasn't a decision not to commit crews it was an inability for crews to be able to proceed up beyond there so it wasn't someone said we're not going to do that because there was the endeavor to do

02:00:54 because there was the endeavor to do that at that moment in time was physically impossible to get beyond the heat barrier on that floor all right were you aware put the question slightly definitely just following that were you aware that weather control was ever informed either

02:01:06 weather control was ever informed either generally or specifically about the inability to get about so now wasn't aware of that we have some examples inability around 425 to get above the 15th floor does that ring a bell with you no it doesn't 11th floor at 4:45 now

02:01:19 you no it doesn't 11th floor at 4:45 now I know I don't know specifics re well you informed at any point of a the adoption of a strategy at the bridgehead of a floor-by-floor bottom-up deployment I was aware there was conversation

02:01:30 I was aware there was conversation around trying to do a floor-by-floor clearing process yes what was your view of starting on the lower floors given the number of fire survival guidance calls which are coming from higher up in

02:01:41 calls which are coming from higher up in the building I was aware that we were still trying to get to the high floors we are unable to get that so in the meantime trying to clear lower floors with Emily sensible things to do because there may well have been so people lives on those floors at what point did you

02:01:56 on those floors at what point did you appreciate the importance of deploying EDB a cruise to rescue residents from the higher floors very early on straightaway yeah straight away it was a very clear that due to the intense fire

02:02:07 very clear that due to the intense fire and heating the nature of that that the SDB a was being used up very quickly an EDP a would be the only means of accessing the top floors and if you go to page 21 of your statement I think we can pick that exact point up

02:02:18 can pick that exact point up commissioner you say that it's probably better to pick it up at the foot of page 20 so we have a full context in the

02:02:30 20 so we have a full context in the third line up from the bottom you say we don't as a rule re wary DBA because it's a longer physical duration of time to under air however because of the exceptional circumstances of the fire at Granville tower because we don't have as

02:02:42 Granville tower because we don't have as much a DBA as we do s DBA the question was asked whether firefighters could wear could re weary to be a I believe this question came from Pat Goulbourne who was in charge at the bridgehead and committing idibia into the building he

02:02:53 committing idibia into the building he came in basically saying we need more a DBA can we get more now before that request was made had you discussed with my with Angie row whether there was a

02:03:04 my with Angie row whether there was a sufficient number of EDB a crews at the incident handle thought that would never have been a sufficient number we had what I knew was that we'd ordered a large number of our rescue units which Rob's our frontline appliances to carry

02:03:15 Rob's our frontline appliances to carry a DBA so I knew we'd ordered those but I knew that we would need to have to maximize the amount of need to be overhead in the fire ground right so this wasn't the calculated decision is it's just because it just we just need

02:03:26 it's just because it just we just need as many as we can get indeed were you dependent on updates from the operational Operations Command at all the bridgehead in deciding whether there

02:03:37 the bridgehead in deciding whether there was a sufficient number of EDB a crews know the crest came in while I was in the command unit I believe Angie was on the fire ground at the time the request came in to say can we get all of the EBA

02:03:48 came in to say can we get all of the EBA in the fire brigade which I authorized and had the message sent via mobile I was in control and at the same time in the meantime can be re where AEDPA and I made a command decision on the command unit to allow that to happen

02:03:59 unit to allow that to happen and we can see this I think in the row log but before we go there in your witness statement page 21 which we're still on in the in the third paragraph down you say that by this time roughly

02:04:14 down you say that by this time roughly around 3:45 is that the time that the decision was made to order all the a DBA in the brigade I always have to refer back to the of the row log or the

02:04:25 back to the of the row log or the shortened my head sorry that's okay did you get that from the roll or do you think I would think so yes it would appear time I'd remember to look at that then and if you go to the rail log which is a meaty triple quadruple zero five

02:04:37 is a meaty triple quadruple zero five four zero four and go to page two

02:04:47 we have a at 3:39 which i think is the time you come back to see you eight just after your trip to the tower you'll brief trip to the tower that's correct and then phone calls you've made we

02:04:59 and then phone calls you've made we could see Pat Goulbourne and far sector carried out tactical withdrawal and then the next sentence make up three DBA requested from PG were you in the policy you and he made that request I was and I

02:05:11 you and he made that request I was and I actually believed that the the time when the decision was sent from the command unit I was definitely on the command you know I'm not sure if Andy was still there right I think Andy then left he told us yesterday and that he left you

02:05:24 told us yesterday and that he left you and essentially in command on the command unit he did yes so you did take partial command I do yes yeah and then the 358 Commission a command decision that edpa can be rewarm do you see that

02:05:36 that edpa can be rewarm do you see that howdy yes ollie DBM Brigade to be ordered to the incident

02:05:45 so it is that about the time do you think that the that order was made I was think so yes

02:05:56 now you can see as I've shown you that there'd been a request for a DBA or make up Reedy Bay at 3:39 it may not be terribly long but can you explain the gap between that question being raised

02:06:09 gap between that question being raised by Pat Goulbourne in the situation Rep and discussion of 339 or after 339 and the actual command decision being made at 358 no I'm not sure how many additional be e DBA

02:06:24 sure how many additional be e DBA whereas were in fact brought to the tower as a result of your command decision to summon all the eb e DBA whereas in the brigade so the command decision wouldn't have brought any further AEDPA whereas it would walk

02:06:35 further AEDPA whereas it would walk further physical a DBA resources from the store at our protective equipment group and various other places so it wasn't a physical people it was a physical basis that we're coming to

02:06:46 physical basis that we're coming to instant grant and is that more fruisé or no no they would come on a I think they came on a van from the protective equipment group right and I was the

02:06:57 equipment group right and I was the question again how many leaving the side there's quite the wearers how many EDB a kits were brought to the tower as a result I was doing it was it enough my view it would

02:07:08 doing it was it enough my view it would never be enough I don't know it was sufficient they used them all and it was as many as we had was there a reason why you didn't well maybe you did did you consider requesting additional EDB a

02:07:19 consider requesting additional EDB a kits from surrounding rescue services who believe we had a conversation around it but there was an issue a of the fact that a lot of other pharmacy services don't have a DBA and if they do it's in

02:07:30 don't have a DBA and if they do it's in very limited numbers guessing the resources there and then there's issues around compatibility of breathing apparatus sets they're not all the same throughout the country but at that time to actually physically get any large numbers from another farm Rescue Service

02:07:42 numbers from another farm Rescue Service I had no idea who would have those resources but we did have a conversation about I had a conversation was recorded about speaking to external farm rescue services which went in I believe to Adrien Fenton right and do you know

02:07:53 Adrien Fenton right and do you know whether there was a conversation with those external FRS I have no idea no now we've looked the moment ago we'll get back to it the decision to rewear that I think if you

02:08:06 decision to rewear that I think if you go to 358 that looks like that was the time you made that decision come on decision are you able to help us

02:08:18 come on decision are you able to help us were you being asked retrospectively to approve a practice which is already in use in other words there was already rewear any news or was this forward-looking to approve what haven't

02:08:29 forward-looking to approve what haven't yet happened I believed that they wrote requesting permission to do so I wasn't aware their daughter undertaking that okay and do you know whether the request for re words was made because of a shortage of e DBA on the ground at the

02:08:41 shortage of e DBA on the ground at the time I would imagine so that would be the circumstances a story where what did you explore because this was a departure from policy did you not want to know why there was gonna a departure from policy was justified well I assumed they need

02:08:53 was justified well I assumed they need more AEDPA whereas at that moment in time otherwise they wouldn't faster everywhere I wouldn't have needed to explore

02:08:58 explore Pat Goblin's extremely experienced officer who is a need to be aware of himself so by asking for that it wouldn't meant he needed that resource at that time right who didn't explore further with him I wouldn't need to even

02:09:09 further with him I wouldn't need to even though in fact you were on that decision acting I see indeed now were you aware of earlier requests for additional ba equipment what sort of the equipment

02:09:23 equipment what sort of the equipment sorry well let's start with standard were you aware of earlier request for makeups of s DBA well the mic helps would have come on the 44 engines that came that's s TPI arrives on the fire

02:09:34 came that's s TPI arrives on the fire engines do you know whether extra e DB a cylinders were ordered first and the call for all e DBA whereas has made later I'm not worthless a sequence that

02:09:46 later I'm not worthless a sequence that event sorry

02:09:52 do you know whether there were enough firefighters on at the incident who were actually trained in the use of EDB a we had all our operational fire fights of a

02:10:03 had all our operational fire fights of a train because we had all our fire risk units there there for all of our a debate capability and they may well have been other support pumps where there were a DBA trained firefighters on those

02:10:14 were a DBA trained firefighters on those was the re we're generally motivated all driven by the absence deficiency of numbers of EDB a train where as or was it KITT it would've been KITT okay is

02:10:28 it KITT it would've been KITT okay is there is there any reason why all lfb firefighters shouldn't be ewo trained yes there is this moment in time a DBA training is very arduous very physically demanding role they are so there is a

02:10:42 demanding role they are so there is a circumstance we wouldn't use for normal firefighting because it puts extra physiological demand on the body and there's been lots of studies into recognizing those demands so we wouldn't seek for everybody to be have those

02:10:53 seek for everybody to be have those facilities to use that it's specialists kit that we normally use for longer travel distances we don't use it for extreme duration firefighting shall we say would it have helped on the night if et ba had been part of the predetermined

02:11:04 et ba had been part of the predetermined attendance at least in some numbers it would have been sick Hammond fire rescue units which are part predetermined attendance on makeups for for the initial predetermined attendance for a high-rise known for high-rise there non

02:11:15 high-rise known for high-rise there non initial predetermined attendance no you had to have a number of fire rescue units on that predetermined attendance because one fire rescue unit would only give you money to be a crew because you don't have to have the second one safety crew yes so would it have helped on the

02:11:27 crew yes so would it have helped on the night to have had a requisite number of FI use as part of the predetermined attendance potentially but you have to pay that against the risk of the number of calls we get to high rises that would mean the additional driving across

02:11:38 mean the additional driving across London off our rescue units and the risk that poses to the public of additional non are nine blue light journeys I think that with time we ask them to get them there it's you know meaningful time one

02:11:51 there it's you know meaningful time one of the things we are looking at as a result of this as a part of our replacement breathing apparatus is new technologies to see whether or not there are sets that give us an extended duration that aren't necessarily as are

02:12:02 duration that aren't necessarily as are just zdb a so something will always look at new equipment and new source as it becomes available new technology and part of that new technology means there are potentially lighter breathing operator

02:12:13 potentially lighter breathing operator cylinders that means that the wear and tear on the firefighters body is not as great pretend a different topic FSG recording on the wall in the tower did you observe that for yourself I saw

02:12:24 did you observe that for yourself I saw it as a overall snapshot view of it I did not take details down right what was your impression of its use that we had no option other than to write on the walls use the volume of it right did you

02:12:35 walls use the volume of it right did you observe the extent to which officers working in that sector were able to obtain the results of of rescues and then inscribe them no I didn't know and ero said yesterday you and I suggested

02:12:46 ero said yesterday you and I suggested it to him that the post lack and all policy for capturing rescue information in the forward information board which is captured by policy 820 Post Latin all had been tested to destruction and found

02:12:57 had been tested to destruction and found wanting on the night would you agree with that assessment and nature of incident to ground felt our demonstrated that although we've made considerable recommendation since lacking on taking those up the the events of that night

02:13:08 those up the the events of that night will weigh over and beyond that hmm radio communications can you remember what come on channel was in when you you used no right would you have expected a

02:13:21 used no right would you have expected a dedicated command channel to be set up at the time of arrival potentially if it was working or if the never unable to get come on channel radio channel traffic call radio traffic through we've

02:13:33 traffic call radio traffic through we've had some there's some evidence about difficulties in setting up channel twos the command channel were you aware on the night that that was a common problem I was aware that a radio engineer had been ordered to the far ground because

02:13:44 been ordered to the far ground because of problems with communications thank you but were you were we're on the night that it was a common problem there Linux that had been subject of previous experience yeah I know we sometimes I've received with murder communications

02:13:56 received with murder communications right were you aware of any steps to try to resolve this ongoing problem on the night that was why we all to the radio engineers to far ground and did they turn up I believe sir did they help I don't think so was that do you know I

02:14:08 don't think so was that do you know I don't know did you we've also had some evidence about the airwave command channel that was later set up did you use that I gave my air wave radio to I believe it was

02:14:20 my air wave radio to I believe it was Peter Johnson on the command units as his need was greater than mine to be able to have a communication and you know why the wave radio command channel system wasn't set up at an earlier stage it's not something we use the standard

02:14:32 it's not something we use the standard practice the and also air wave radios on carried by every single fire fighter there any issue to officers was it a problem on the night that the command units don't have or didn't have air wave channels which meant that you had to

02:14:44 channels which meant that you had to lend yours it made the communication mode seizure once I did yes right to say can we put that down as a problem on the knife I think was a problem on the night and I think that it's something that was

02:14:56 think that it's something that was assisted by me so my idea once you'd let your personal a way radio to the CUA crew how did you monitor the command channel or did you not know well at the times I had a metal Mick with me who had

02:15:07 times I had a metal Mick with me who had the Aveiro of radios on so the information I could hear that through that right was it very satisfactory that you as monitoring officer were actually

02:15:18 you as monitoring officer were actually dependent on other people's radios not so ideal but the more pressing the need was for the command unit to have my radio that I understand and I spent a lot of my time on the command unit so I was physically able to monitor what was

02:15:29 was physically able to monitor what was going on

02:15:30 going on and Eero also told us yesterday that the air wave radios ought to be used on the incident ground notwithstanding any security concerns sorry well auntie Rae told us yes DNA that one of the problems

02:15:42 told us yes DNA that one of the problems was that the senior officers leave their air wave radios in the car it's all incident grounds and are dependent on fire ground radio and he I think agreed

02:15:53 fire ground radio and he I think agreed or certainly offered that the evidence that air wave radios should be used on the incident ground notwithstanding any security concerns that surround their use I agree with that you agree with that I do yes did you ever become aware

02:16:08 that I do yes did you ever become aware of communication problems between the bridgehead and those outside the tower whether in the command unit or elsewhere on the incident ground yes I was aware of the communication problems that's why we were using runners right would it be

02:16:19 were using runners right would it be would it be normal to use runners quite often we use runners ensures the information is guaranteed to be relayed and if the radio channels are very busy what it ensures is a reliable flow of information hmm

02:16:30 information hmm it seems like a rather primitive system to have individual firefighters running around the incentive ground with pieces of paper there's an a better system you could have deployed on the night no that was a most effective system right would airwave radios if used between command

02:16:44 airwave radios if used between command unit and the bridgehead have assisted in resolving or mitigating the communication difficulties that were experienced potentially if we had sufficient air wave radios on the fire ground at that time now Richard Welch

02:16:57 ground at that time now Richard Welch suggested that the overall effect of the lack of communication or difficulties in communication was at the bridgehead commanders were making decisions without strategic direction from the incident commander so certainly at the early

02:17:10 commander so certainly at the early stages of the incident would he be correct in that in that assessment I don't know I wasn't there at that moment in time but I would suspect and to be fair both Pat and Richard a very

02:17:22 fair both Pat and Richard a very experienced fire ground officers therefore if they were making decisions at that moment in time it would been right and proper thing to do so yeah were you aware of particular communications within the building itself I was aware we had problems

02:17:33 itself I was aware we had problems communication with firefighter had been committed into the building and that resulting us having situations where every class it's far far to emergency where we had lost communication many of the firefighters who were deployed into the building under be under breathing

02:17:45 the building under be under breathing apparatus who had a Barrie set complained that the barriers weren't very efficient is that something you know about on the process of replacing our VA mobile communications you are are

02:17:57 our VA mobile communications you are are you indeed okay and did on the night did you have a brigade awareness of the inefficiencies in the use of those Barrie sets it was already an ongoing project look at replacing the technology we have was what was available at the

02:18:08 we have was what was available at the time we purchased it thankfully technology's moved on and you've now got the ability to have wireless communication rather than having something that's got cable tied to it right

02:18:16 right CSS failure the InP report classifies the CSS is having failed on the night and we've had some evidence about that and not sure it's necessarily important

02:18:27 and not sure it's necessarily important to go back to it you say in your statement and it's page 10 show you page 10 in paragraph 2

02:18:49 you say

02:18:55 we are at this is third line down we're in the process of replacing the electronic one because it's not always reliable

02:19:02 reliable and it went down at 4:03 hours on the night and I think that's a reference to the road log that's correct it was like were you there when it went down

02:19:13 were you there when it went down I can't recollect do you rate it's a regular occurrence that the CSS files do you recollect it ever been up was it ready to be honest with you I was mainly looking at the white board that has the

02:19:24 looking at the white board that has the information written on it right now you say it's not always reliable it isn't that something of an understatement given the evidence that we've heard in this inquiry it's it's

02:19:35 we've heard in this inquiry it's it's definitely not always reliable it's not something it's not something I as an insta command Roman officer rely on in its the practice that we back it up with information written on the whiteboard which is what I tend to use we've got a

02:19:46 which is what I tend to use we've got a actual printing and capsulated sheet where we write all the information on that stuck on to one of the boards on the command unit I mean looking at added on the night was it really acceptable that a modern Brigade should be reliant

02:19:57 that a modern Brigade should be reliant on the use of pens and white boards and how outdated equipment that wasn't reliable I found the pens and whiteboards extremely efficient and effective and do the job we needed to do we are in the process of replacing it

02:20:09 we are in the process of replacing it it's not an effective system yes and ero was suitably impolite about the CSS would you agree with him in what right

02:20:24 water you say on page 18 of your statement if I can just take you to that

02:20:40 that night we had water issues second paragraph and you explained the difficulties and you say the water off a water officer role was assigned to address these issues and was that Gareth

02:20:53 address these issues and was that Gareth cook I have no idea who designed that wrong

02:20:56 wrong Percy do you remember any briefings briefings from him whoever it was the the water officer to the incident commander yourself no I've no recollection of that I was just made

02:21:08 recollection of that I was just made aware of the fact that the hose was compromised on a number of occasions by falling debris right would it have helped have had a specialist water expert advising the incident commander on various options to deploy when these exceed if achill tees were experienced

02:21:20 exceed if achill tees were experienced we did have one I believe we had a block major advisor who's all just instant but it would make no difference whatsoever there was never going to be enough water to tackle the fire it wouldn't made any difference whoever we had on the far Graham's deal

02:21:31 whoever we had on the far Graham's deal with that and is that not just because of the the puncturing of various phases because of falling debris but the the layout of the building and the dry riser in the building at that and the fact

02:21:42 in the building at that and the fact that you need to firefighting Jets / floor and when you've got a building that's completely alights there's never going to be enough water supply 40 firefighting jets even with thames water

02:21:53 firefighting jets even with thames water on full pressure no fact even with temps also on maximum pressure in we're like on normal high rise buildings get two to three jets gas where was there a time

02:22:05 three jets gas where was there a time when you became aware of the involvement of gas in this fire I believe I was aware of it and was did you think that a representative of cadent who are the

02:22:16 representative of cadent who are the suppliers be invited to the tactical coordination meetings now they would have been as past that group I wasn't particularly where than being there were you involved in any of that I don't believe so and were you involved in any decisions to shut off the gas supply no

02:22:29 decisions to shut off the gas supply no I wasn't right

02:22:35 42 meter ladder from Surrey we had some evidence from Andy ray about that yesterday and you Ray said that London does not have a 42 meter ladder and he

02:22:48 does not have a 42 meter ladder and he was surprised that sorry did yeah I'm quite surprised sorry we did but obviously they had a replacement project on their aerial appliance that enabled them to buy some of the new technology and have a extended height ladder I was

02:22:59 and have a extended height ladder I was going to ask you why did sorry have one in London not we're in the process of equally replacing alternative ladders at the moment part of the issue around it is the fact London's streets are a lot narrower London's bridges have weight loadings on them 42 meter aerial

02:23:11 loadings on them 42 meter aerial appliances up until now have been extremely heavy and had wide chasis and haven't been appropriate for use in London now the sorry aerial appliance arrived I think at about 19 minutes past 8:00 a.m. good steps have been taken

02:23:26 8:00 a.m. good steps have been taken what promptly do you think to secure its attendance at an earlier time in the incident you could have done between many difference getting there earlier because we already had our own aerial appliances that we'd had to take away

02:23:37 appliances that we'd had to take away from the buildings ever catching fire so having a taller aerial platform there earlier on would have made no difference in fact we used it very satisfactorily for the dangerous structure engineer to be able to have a closer assessment the

02:23:49 be able to have a closer assessment the building later on but as a result of using it earlier in response to firefighting or rescue it would have been impossible

02:23:59 you just give me one moment please commissioner

02:24:18 yes Commission ID you'll be glad to know come to the end of my questions I do have one final question we've discussed during the course of your evidence today quite a lot about what the Brigade is now now doing would you be willing to

02:24:32 now now doing would you be willing to come back and assist us if necessary by giving further evidence in settling any any questions about urgent interim recommendations which the Chairman might think was necessary of course I will I'll be happy to help me anywhere I can

02:24:43 I'll be happy to help me anywhere I can that's very helpful mr. chairman I get to ask you to rise now in the usual way just to see to check my notes to make sure is the cool thing

02:24:50 thing well sometimes happen excuse me in fact I would could say almost invariably happens that there are one or two additional questions that need to be asked so we'll break now until 25 to 5

02:25:03 asked so we'll break now until 25 to 5 I'm sorry we're going to overrun our usual deadline but not by much I hope and then when you get back you'll see if there are more questions thanks give the option

02:25:20 right 25 to 5

02:29:10 you

02:36:26 you

02:37:09 Thank You mr. millet will not tell us whether there are any further questions there are one or two I think probably five to be fact further questions say a commission I am grateful for your

02:37:21 commission I am grateful for your patience the first is this and when you first arrived at the incident ground and you did your your turn what was your

02:37:32 you did your your turn what was your understanding of the plan at the bridgehead to rescue people on higher floors in the building for example the 18th floor which you referred to earlier yes I wasn't aware of the specifics of the detail of any flaws in that plan at

02:37:44 the detail of any flaws in that plan at a time what was your understanding of the of the plan to rescue people on high floors and particularly now my understanding was just that the bridgehead was committing breathing

02:37:55 bridgehead was committing breathing uprights of crews in response to fast waffle guidance calls right so does that mean that you were on your understanding was that they were just getting where they could no no I understood that they were just committing my down understand

02:38:06 were just committing my down understand with what the system was at that time my first - okay now the inquiry has seen transcripts of calls to the control room where people have told the control room

02:38:17 where people have told the control room operator that they were were were trapped or where they were smoking their apartments and were told to stay put do

02:38:29 apartments and were told to stay put do you think that was the right advice so the normal advice if you are saying that there is far within your compartment where you are is if you can leave - making us to leave that's what

02:38:40 leave - making us to leave that's what people are that's what the first of all Gardens note says that if you know if you're talking about there being something actually impacting where you are you should be told where you can where possible to make efforts to leave would you expect the control room

02:38:51 would you expect the control room officer to go through some detailed questions and answers with the with the caller to help the caller ascertain whether or not it was safe to leave in this yes I would expect on so a range of questions about whether there was a

02:39:02 questions about whether there was a means by which they could leave where there was another exit where they get out of the stairs those type of questions now knowing what you now know

02:39:13 questions now knowing what you now know do you think that the stay-put advice should have been revoked at an earlier stage

02:39:17 stage now as I mentioned earlier on I think that it would be very difficult for me to make any judgment on what the officers at that time could see in the information they had by also I'm very

02:39:28 information they had by also I'm very fully aware from very early on they were dealing with multiple facets of our garden schools those people clearly had to be our priority and that by asking people who were in unaffected areas to take up valuable space in the stairs at

02:39:39 take up valuable space in the stairs at that moment in time would not have necessarily benefited anyone in there are there any particular lessons that you've learned from your experiences of the night that would enable the decision to revoke the stay-put to be taken

02:39:51 to revoke the stay-put to be taken earlier no I don't think so there's nothing particular I think that the officers on the night acted with all the information they had in the best interest of the people at that time

02:40:02 interest of the people at that time which brings me to my my final question similar to the one I asked and ero yesterday

02:40:08 yesterday Commissioner if there was one aspect of the London Fire Brigades response to the fire that you could go back and change what would it be I wouldn't change anything we did on the night so I think

02:40:20 anything we did on the night so I think without exception my firefighters my officers and my control staff performed in a fantastic way given the incredible circumstances they were faced against they were put into an untenable

02:40:32 they were put into an untenable situation in a building that behaved in a way it should never have done that put the residents lives at risk and without a shadow of a doubt I personally was responsible for committing my firefighters to their

02:40:43 committing my firefighters to their potential death in the pursuant of rescuing as many people in that building as possible Commissioner thank you very much I just want to express my gratitude to you for coming here and answering my

02:40:55 to you for coming here and answering my questions today and assisting us with our investigations thank you it's might add my thanks to those in just a minute they were grateful to not only for coming here to give your evidence which is obviously very important but also for

02:41:08 is obviously very important but also for making available so many of your officers to coming of evidence the inquiry at times that may have suited our schedules but I suspect ensue cause at all so thank you for that - thank you thank you very much you like to go with

02:41:20 thank you very much you like to go with the Asscher pretty good thank you

02:41:33 yes just a minute mr. chairman I do have about five minutes of housekeeping if I can call it that which I just want to raise with you and with yes oh it's present right I want to look ahead for a

02:41:44 present right I want to look ahead for a moment if I may to the next tranche of oral evidence which with the inquiry will be receiving at the procedural hearing in December last year the inquiry invited the bereaved survivors

02:41:56 inquiry invited the bereaved survivors and residents of BS RS to submit witness statements to the inquiry we have received some 265 BSR statements and the inquiry would like to express its

02:42:08 inquiry would like to express its gratitude to each individual who has felt able to make such a statement it cannot have been easy and we do not and we must not underestimate the value of this written evidence to us those

02:42:21 this written evidence to us those statements have been prepared specifically for the inquiry with the assistance of experienced legal representatives who are known personally to the witness in each case and those

02:42:32 to the witness in each case and those preparing the statements have tried as far as they can to ensure that the statement covers all factual matters relevant to phase 1 comprehensively we've seen that and often witnesses have

02:42:43 we've seen that and often witnesses have felt able also to address matters which will arise for consideration in phase 2 the result of that is that the inquiry now has a significant body of evidence from the bereaved survivors and

02:42:55 from the bereaved survivors and residents which makes a very significant contribution to our understanding of the developing conditions within the tower on the night of the fire turning to the

02:43:06 on the night of the fire turning to the oral evidence then the inquiry has considered all the witness statements on Wednesday next week the 3rd of October we will begin to hear oral evidence from the first of a number of the survivors of the fire that evidence will continue

02:43:19 of the fire that evidence will continue through to early November and that's an estimate that we make the witnesses whom we have asked to give oral evidence mr. chairman at this stage are those who appear likely to have the greatest

02:43:31 appear likely to have the greatest insight into the conditions in the tower on the night and particularly in relation to a number of specific matters which I'll tell you about in just a moment but as we proceed with the oral

02:43:43 moment but as we proceed with the oral record the written statements of the as witnesses not called will be put into the record there's no question about that I want to just make sure that everybody understands that I'd also like

02:43:54 everybody understands that I'd also like to make it clear that in deciding who to call the enquiry has not been influenced by any considerations as to what an appropriate number of BSR witnesses

02:44:05 appropriate number of BSR witnesses should be and equally has not been influenced by considerations about the timetable nor are those who have been asked to attend being asked to come along and just read their statements the

02:44:17 along and just read their statements the question of whether to ask somebody to come and give oral evidence has followed a review of that person's individual account in respect of those matters which the oral evidence will seek to

02:44:28 which the oral evidence will seek to address and those are number one early decisions to self evacuate to the entry of the fire into the flat six at

02:44:39 of the fire into the flat six at different floors following that number up the building third the conditions in the lobbies and stairwell particularly between 120 a.m. and 247 a.m. as we now know the stapled advice was at latest

02:44:52 know the stapled advice was at latest revoked

02:44:53 revoked fourth events on floor 14 which I know is it very important to summon some be SRS and certainly very important to us as the inquiry to looking looking at the

02:45:05 as the inquiry to looking looking at the matter in the round fifth evidence of goodand conditions at the very highest floors in the tower and sixth and finally evidence from residents trapped on different floors but who shared the

02:45:16 on different floors but who shared the common experience of being trapped in the tower for a prolonged period of time and after the state of policy had been abandoned lastly on oral evidence questions are going to be limited to

02:45:28 questions are going to be limited to phase one issues that means that no decision has been made as to oral evidence for phase 2 it remains possible that those who are not giving evidence for phase 1 in the next few weeks could

02:45:40 for phase 1 in the next few weeks could be invited to give oral evidence in phase 2 and the same applies to those who are giving oral evidence as well against that background mr. chairman can I turn to the question of the timetable

02:45:52 I turn to the question of the timetable for the next few weeks our initial list of those to be called was issued with caveat the warning that there would be additional witnesses we also invited written representations from core

02:46:04 written representations from core participants and we've responded to those representations we have invited a number of further witnesses to give oral evidence and we're awaiting clarification of the position of some of

02:46:15 clarification of the position of some of those witnesses from their respective legal representatives once responses are received by us from them we can then issue a an updated list of those to be called to give all oral evidence and I

02:46:27 called to give all oral evidence and I can only urge the legal representatives concerned to try to progress matters as quickly as possible and to consult with the inquiry team if concerns arise the inquiry will sit subject to you of

02:46:38 inquiry will sit subject to you of course mr. chairman Monday to Thursday starting at 10:00 a.m. each day in the usual way subject to any applications from the advocates to sit earlier and the evidence from the be SRS will be

02:46:49 the evidence from the be SRS will be heard from the third third to the 18th of October to start with feedback from individual legal representatives and prospective witnesses is that worthy inquiry to sit in the week of the 22nd

02:47:01 inquiry to sit in the week of the 22nd of October a half term week then that could cause difficulties not only to those asked to give evidence but also to those who wish to attend the hearings we want to make absolutely sure that all

02:47:13 want to make absolutely sure that all our Witnesses are able to give the best evidence they can with the minimum of distraction and interference in their domestic lives and the inquiry will therefore not sit in that week where we

02:47:24 therefore not sit in that week where we would invite you to invite you to direct that the inquiry would not sit in that week but to resume hearing evidence on the 29th of October the inquiry will then use the break in the evidence to continue to ensure that appropriate

02:47:35 continue to ensure that appropriate support is put in place for what the witnesses that are yet to come and that will include progressing the program of familiarization visits which have been offered to witnesses so far and will of

02:47:46 offered to witnesses so far and will of course continue to be offered on the question of support as I think mr. chairman you know the the view of the inquiry team as always that witnesses

02:47:57 inquiry team as always that witnesses are best supported where we can engage in dialogue with the witness or their legal representatives we've provided witnesses and their legal representatives with a written briefing which details the support that's

02:48:08 which details the support that's available

02:48:09 available for during and after the giving of oral evidence the package already in place includes familiar ization visits that I've mentioned which are proving very

02:48:20 I've mentioned which are proving very useful in explaining the work of the inquiry and the hearing process it includes our safeguarding as best we can the privacy for those witnesses who want it and finally for the sake of clarity

02:48:31 it and finally for the sake of clarity the support available has always meant that no witness has given evidence having given evidence is limited to using public transport to return home taxis will be available where needed and

02:48:46 taxis will be available where needed and now the schedule for next week's witnesses will be disclosed tomorrow I have already said that so far as the last firefighter witnesses are concerned those will be taken on Tuesday and they

02:48:57 those will be taken on Tuesday and they will be in no particular order mr. O'Neil mr. Ricketts and mr. Davis that subject that mr. chairman that is water don't what I wanted to say about the

02:49:09 don't what I wanted to say about the future further progress of the evidence in this phase well thank you very much I'm very happy to endorse everything you said and it would probably help everyone if I were to make it clear here and know

02:49:21 if I were to make it clear here and know that the inquiry will not sit during the week of the 22nd of October and if that assists people in making arrangements for family matters or any other matters well so much the better

02:49:33 well so much the better but there it is we sharts it for that week we shall break now and resume on Tuesday 2nd October to complete the evidence of the firefighters and look

02:49:45 evidence of the firefighters and look forward to hearing the first of the bereaved survivors and residents witnesses on Wednesday I'm grateful yes good thank you very much