Commissioner Dany Cotton gives evidence about her role, training, and the stay-put policy. She admits never receiving training on cladding risks, not knowing about international cladding fires, and explains why the Tall Buildings Facades presentation on fire spread risks was only shown to specialist fire safety officers, not frontline firefighters.
00:00:02 Good morning everyone. Welcome to today's hearing at which we're going to hear evidence from the commissioner. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I now call the commissioner, please.
00:00:33 I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth shall be the truth the whole truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth
00:00:44 and nothing but the truth and nothing but the truth. Good. Thank you very much. Yes, Mr.
00:00:48 Yes, Mr. Commissioner, good morning. Can I ask you please to give the inquiry your full name? Danielle Amara Cotton. Thank you. Now,
00:00:59 Now, can I ask you please first to take your witness statement that you gave to the police on the 21st of February, 2018, and it's ME012492.
00:01:11 We have it there on the screen. You also, you may also have it there in front of you in a paper form, but the way we've been working is to work from the screens either at the back of the room or the monitor on your desk. Uh now
00:01:23 room or the monitor on your desk. Uh now there are a number of exhibits to that statement and I'll just read them into the record if I may. We have DAC1 which is your role profile for the position of commissioner and that's ME015759
00:01:37 DAC2 uh which is a Google map of the area surrounding Grenville Tower which is ME015758
00:01:46 DAC3 which are your handwritten notes of relevant aspects of the timeline which is ME015756
00:01:56 DAC4 Four, a type document entitled timeline Grenfell House ME015757.
00:02:05 DAC5, a typed document entitled transcript of decision logging and tactical coordination meeting minutes for incident commander Andy Row or what we've called the row log uh which is ME015755
00:02:18 DAC6 which is a print out of the calls you made from your mobile telephone on the night of June the 14th or morning of June the 14th 2017. ME015754
00:02:30 June the 14th 2017. ME015754 and finally DAC7 a hard copy of the photograph you took uh on your mobile telephone at 2:51 a.m. on that morning at me01576.
00:02:45 Now going back to your statement uh commissioner have you read it recently? I have. Yes. And can you confirm for us that its contents are true? I can. Uh, and have you discussed the
00:02:57 I can. Uh, and have you discussed the evidence in that statement uh or that you're going to give to the inquiry today with anybody anybody before coming here today? No, I haven't. Right.
00:03:06 Right. Now, if any question that I ask is unclear, I'm very happy to rephrase it or put a put the question in a slightly different way. Please don't hesitate to ask. And similarly, if you need any break at any time, please just say we're
00:03:18 break at any time, please just say we're going to work on the basis that we'll take hourly breaks. Thank you. So, Mr. Chairman, if that's not inconvenient to you. No, I think that's sensible. Thank you. Very good. Thanks. Now, can I start by asking you some some very basic details about your career,
00:03:29 very basic details about your career, commissioner? You joined the LFB, I think in April 1988. I do. That's correct. Uh, and you therefore thereafter progressed, as it were, up the ranks. Yes, I have. Yes. And in 2007, I think you were
00:03:41 Yes. And in 2007, I think you were promoted to area commander. I was. Yes, that's correct. And in 2010, promoted to the rank of DAC, deputy assistant commissioner. That's right. Yes. And in 2012, you were promoted to the
00:03:52 And in 2012, you were promoted to the rank of assistant commissioner or AC. That's correct. And in the rank of assistant commissioner, is it right that you were first assistant commissioner in charge of operational assurance? I was. Yes.
00:04:03 I was. Yes. What did that role involve? So that was a new role that was established um to combine a number of teams together to look at providing you know the term operational assurance. So the team was comprising um the health
00:04:15 the team was comprising um the health and safety department that previously had been a standalone department but combining it with um the OT team that I think you're familiar with. So using those two roles together. So not only
00:04:27 those two roles together. So not only did we have the operational assurance on the fire ground, then the health and safety team that used to do the investigations where things had potentially gone wrong, where we'd had accidents, near misses or those kind of events. to bring those two teams
00:04:39 events. to bring those two teams together to be able to look in the whole at the sort of operational competence of firefighters uh what happened on the fire ground learning lessons through the health and safety investigation process and combining wrapping that up as
00:04:51 and combining wrapping that up as operational assurance. Right. Had you any experience uh in HNS or OT?
00:04:57 or OT? No, I hadn't. So, uh, what I had was a very, uh, good team of health and safety professionals with full health and safety qualifications that worked for me, uh, and the operational response team, uh, run by a deputy assistant
00:05:08 team, uh, run by a deputy assistant commissioner. What my view was to be the overarching person who could look across the piece to both of those, not being the professional expert in either, but to bring the two together and combine that to be able to give some operational
00:05:20 that to be able to give some operational assurance to the organization, um, especially around things to do with lessons learned. I see. Okay. So uh you say especially around things to do with lessons learned. So would you
00:05:32 do with lessons learned. So would you say that you got sufficient or perhaps um some degree of grounding in looking at an incident and der and knowing how to derive lessons learned from it? Yeah. And what we also did was uh we
00:05:44 Yeah. And what we also did was uh we took the lessons learned and things like rule 43 actions from where other UK fire and rescue services had had those as a result of events that you know where people have been injured or where
00:05:55 people have been injured or where firefighters had lost their lives. and we took those into London and I used it to then be able to um look at London Fire Brigade and assess us against those rule 43s so that we could see whether or
00:06:06 rule 43s so that we could see whether or not effectively uh we would fall into any of the same areas or whether or not we could be assured for ourselves that uh London Firegate would stand up to be able to perform you know and not have those things go wrong effectively.
00:06:17 those things go wrong effectively. I see. And um that was of course as you've said after you were promoted to the rank of AC. Can you give us uh the dates during which you occupied the role in charge of operational assurance?
00:06:28 in charge of operational assurance? Cracky. So it was from the role the time I got promoted to assistant commissioner 2012.
00:06:32 2012. Yes. Uh until I got the director's job which was 2016. Right.
00:06:41 And did your role in charge of operational assurance involve responsibility for training? Uh no my next role is the director. So when I became uh the director of
00:06:52 when I became uh the director of operational assurance which was effectively uh a deputy commissioner post at that point I was then in charge of training. Right now as you've just said you became director of safety and assurance and that was in 2016. Yes.
00:07:04 that was in 2016. Yes. Can you tell us exactly when in 2016 you took on that role? Uh no no sorry not off the top of my head.
00:07:10 head. Okay. Was it was it before August or after August? Would have been uh very early in 2016. So I think I um I did the role of director for approximately a year 18 months before I got promoted to
00:07:21 months before I got promoted to commissioner and I became commissioner at the beginning of 2017. And could you tell us what the role of director of safety and assurance involved?
00:07:28 involved? Yes. So um the director of safety insurance contained training so uh being over responsible for training for the health and safety for OT for the operational policy department. Um so it
00:07:40 operational policy department. Um so it was so effectively London fire brigade is split into three directorates. One of them is the one that looks after fire stations, control and mobilizing and fire safety. One of them is looks after effectively the non-operational
00:07:52 effectively the non-operational functions. So things like procurement, transport, uh finance, uh and my department was the one that picked up the rest of the things that actually impact on the operational role but
00:08:03 impact on the operational role but weren't part of the frontline fire stations.
00:08:05 stations. Right. And again, uh did your role as director of safety and assurance uh involve responsibility for training? It did. Yes, it did. And in that role, can you tell
00:08:17 it did. And in that role, can you tell us in brief terms how you um discharge your functions in relation to training? Yes. So obviously uh we have an outsourced training contract to our training provider through Babcock. So uh
00:08:29 training provider through Babcock. So uh my role is I had a head of training. So the each one of my different areas of reference had a specific um head in charge of that. So my role would be to ensure that he was doing his job um and
00:08:41 ensure that he was doing his job um and to sort of performance monitor and manage him in relation to the target set out for training. We have some very specific areas that we uh at the time would report through to our board of members that we had at the time. So when
00:08:53 members that we had at the time. So when we were London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, so the authority members, there'd be certain things that would be my responsibility to report into meetings to them about performance against targets. Um and a lot of that was about ensuring that our training was
00:09:06 was about ensuring that our training was developed in a way so that as you can imagine training is something that has to evolve all the time especially in relation to the fire service you know new piece of technology new equipment in relation to things like recommendations
00:09:17 relation to things like recommendations and to make sure that our training could evolve um one of the things to understand London fire brigades is quite a big beast and to uh develop training packages and to assure that training for the large number of operational
00:09:28 the large number of operational firefighters we have is quite a challenge at times right um arising out of that answer. Did you have any responsibility for ensuring or qual quality assuring Babcock's delivery of training?
00:09:40 delivery of training? Yes. So not directly personally because I was overseeing it but through my head of training. Who was that? Uh Peter Groves. Peter
00:09:46 Peter Peter Groves. Groves. Peter Groves. Right. Uh and how did you personally oversee his management of quality assuring Babcock's
00:09:57 management of quality assuring Babcock's performance of their obligations to deliver training? So I would meet with him regularly as a one-to-one uh performance management meetings I had with all my heads of service. Uh and through that I would ask him questions.
00:10:08 through that I would ask him questions. We would look at statistics for people who'd been trained, the people who required training where we could see areas if people, you know, if we weren't up to maintaining numbers around specific skills or things like that. I
00:10:20 specific skills or things like that. I would challenge him as how we were going to make sure we addressed those shortfalls. So it' be regular meetings, regular monitoring and looking at statistics and data. right now. You were the interim commissioner I think as of 1st of January 2017.
00:10:33 think as of 1st of January 2017. I was.
00:10:34 I was. And following the statutory reorganization um under the 2017 Police and and Crime Act uh and the abolition of LFIPA, London Fire and Emergency
00:10:45 of LFIPA, London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority for one of a better word or set of words. You became the fire commissioner for London on the uh um when exactly the the meeting to uh ratify my
00:10:56 the the meeting to uh ratify my position. Um, initially I was the interim commissioner because it was going to be a very short time before the police and crime bill was enacted. Unfortunately, due to some delays, it was far longer than thought. So, the members of the fire authority decided
00:11:07 members of the fire authority decided they wanted to sort of cease that position and make me a permanent commissioner. And the meeting was scheduled and planned and actually took place on the 14th of June. So, you went from the fire to that meeting?
00:11:17 meeting? No, I wasn't required to be present. This was a meeting of the board of members who were to make decisions about me. So, no, I was still on the fire ground when the meeting took place. Okay. Now can I turn to the role and principal functions that you uh had to
00:11:29 principal functions that you uh had to discharge in your position as commissioner as commissioner in basic terms is it right that you run the brigade?
00:11:36 brigade? Yes, that's correct. Uh and on page um one of your witness statement
00:11:44 statement uh you describe those in a little bit of detail. You can just look at the foot of that page. You say basically everything that goes on involving London Fire Brigade is my responsibility. I could explain each in detail each role and
00:11:57 explain each in detail each role and core responsibility I have, but to assist I've handed DC Watson a copy of my job description. Uh and um you you um you explain what those are. Um I in uh
00:12:09 you explain what those are. Um I in uh in summary uh what are the basic areas for which you are responsible now or were as at the 14th of June um everything that London Fire Brigade
00:12:20 um everything that London Fire Brigade does to discharge its duties as a fire and rescue service. Right. So all functions that it's required to do both lawfully uh and those which we do to keep members of the public safe um
00:12:31 keep members of the public safe um everything from the fire safety functions through to ensure operational firefighters are competent um you know ensuring our money is spent in a wise way uh accounting for our budgets and basically everything that London Fire
00:12:42 basically everything that London Fire Brigade does I am overall responsible for
00:12:44 for right let's look at a little bit more detail with the with the benefit of a document um at DAC1 which is ME015759 9 Commissioner, we have a document
00:12:56 9 Commissioner, we have a document entitled Commissioner for Fire and Emergency Planning RO Profile and this is the document you handed uh to DC Watson and described as DAC 1 and we can
00:13:07 Watson and described as DAC 1 and we can see um the organagram there. You sit above deputy commissioner foreign emergency planning uh operational policy and training, director of resources and corporate services. And then it says the
00:13:18 corporate services. And then it says the main purpose of the job to provide strong effective corporate leadership and strategic direction to ensure that the authority achieves its vision, aims and objectives. Uh and the core responsibilities are then set out. Can I
00:13:30 responsibilities are then set out. Can I just turn specifically to page two which sits within uh that part uh of your core responsibilities
00:13:42 responsibilities and it says only applicable to an operational role to take command and major and manage major operational incidents as required. You see that?
00:13:53 You see that? I'll do. Yes. Uh, in your capacity as commissioner, have you ever or had you ever had cause prior to the 14th of June 2017
00:14:03 2017 to assume command at a major operational incident of the kind that you haven't?
00:14:11 And what about before you were promoted to commissioner? No. So in the um in the role I did when I was an assistant commissioner I would have taken command but from that role above um so the three operational roles
00:14:24 above um so the three operational roles above assistant commissioner are myself and now rename my two deputy commissioners and we predominantly go to the fire ground in the role of monitoring officer. Uh that role would give us the rights to take over if we
00:14:35 give us the rights to take over if we thought it was required but I've never known uh a principal officer of my rank as a monitoring officer to have to take over.
00:14:41 over. Right. You've never known it. Have you ever known it? Have you ever seen others do it?
00:14:45 do it? Uh, not to my knowledge. No, someone might have done. I' I cannot recall anyone ever doing that. Okay. Now, let's turn to training. And can I start with training on high-rise policy?
00:14:55 policy? Um, can I assume that as an operational firefighter in that part of your career, you personally received training in relation to high-rise firefighting? Yes, I have. And on incident command at a high-rise
00:15:08 And on incident command at a high-rise fire?
00:15:08 fire? Yes, on many occasions. Yes. Can you remember what was the last training you received on incident operational firefighting before the Grenfell Tower fire? So I haven't
00:15:19 Grenfell Tower fire? So I haven't actually received training for a while because in the role I uh am in now what I have done mainly is to undertake operational assessments of uh colleagues from assistant commissioner level rank where I've been assessing their
00:15:30 where I've been assessing their operational capability during high-rise uh scenarios and some of those I've been involved in the specific design of those scenarios to ensure they incorporate all of the learning that we wish to see that
00:15:41 of the learning that we wish to see that people you know demonstrate in an operational context. So I can't recall the last time I specifically had training.
00:15:48 training. Right. Does that tell us that it was quite a long time before the Granfield Tower fire? Yes, I would say so. Okay. Now just on the last answer, there's a point of detail I want to just follow up. Um you say that um you mainly undertaken operational assessments of
00:16:00 undertaken operational assessments of colleagues from AC level where you assess their operational capability during high-rise scenarios. Uh did you ever receive any training on how to go about conducting or designing
00:16:11 how to go about conducting or designing those assessments or scenarios? um not direct training that you could sort of correlate to training but um working with professional colleagues uh who have been doing that job for a number of years um working alongside it to quality
00:16:23 years um working alongside it to quality assure each other's operational assessments. I've received sort of the role of doing that but not sit not something you would say as a training package that you could uh you know then demonstrate you've done but more peer
00:16:34 demonstrate you've done but more peer support and peer assessment as it were. I see. And when was the last time prior to the Granville Tower fire that you uh conducted an operational assessment of an assistant commissioner?
00:16:46 an assistant commissioner? Uh I would suggest within the previous 12 months. Right. Do you know who it was? Um I think I did the operational assessment for a range of assistant commissioners. There were probably uh
00:16:57 commissioners. There were probably uh internal and external candidates applying for the assistant commissioner role. I can't remember specifically who I did because I've done a number of assessments since. Right. Uh now we may need to come back to that in in due course. Um can I just
00:17:09 to that in in due course. Um can I just continue with this then? Um overall as an incident commander, what experience have you had of a large scale fire in a high-rise residential block? Um so I've
00:17:22 high-rise residential block? Um so I've been to a number of high-rise fires and residential blocks. Uh the last one that I probably attended that involved a loss of life was a a 10 pump fire in Silvertown which was when I was a I
00:17:34 Silvertown which was when I was a I think a deputy assistant commissioner so probably about eight years ago um which was tragically lost two lives but uh it was an arson related fire right uh and did that involve multiple breach of compartmentation that
00:17:46 breach of compartmentation that no it didn't okay and I think you were involved in work after lackl to improve incident command is what you say in your statement at page two and Does that also include lessons learned for incident commanders?
00:17:57 commanders? It does. Yes. Um,
00:18:02 you just described the Silvertown fire and you were there as in your role as a DAC.
00:18:07 DAC. Um, have you what was the last was there a large high-rise fire that you you attended in your role as monitoring officer?
00:18:14 officer? Um, not for some considerable years. I will have been to a large I've been to a number of large uh high-rise fires. Um but not in the role probably not for about five or six years if not longer.
00:18:25 about five or six years if not longer. Right.
00:18:26 Right. Not one I can recall. And what rank does that mean that you were in the rank of assistant commissioner monitoring uh a group manager as incident commander? Uh assistant comm commissioner monitor
00:18:37 Uh assistant comm commissioner monitor deputy assistant commissioner. Deputy assistant commissioner. Right. I see. Okay. And what was that fire? Um
00:18:45 Um I can't recall where it was off the top of my head. Um it wasn't it didn't involve loss of life or breach of compartmentation. It was just a large number of resources because the fire was on a high floor. Right.
00:18:55 Right. Um so and it was very visual which tends to you know we encourage our instant commanders to ask resources early. Um and I think it was a fire that was very visual from a lot of distance but it
00:19:06 visual from a lot of distance but it didn't actually breach any compartment. It was extinguished quite quickly. Have you ever had training on how to carry out the role of monitoring officer at a high-rise incident? Not specifically at a high-rise incident. We uh give our incident
00:19:18 incident. We uh give our incident commanders training and how to perform the role of monitoring officer. Uh we don't make it specific to incidents because the role of monitoring officer is a generic role that you should be able to transfer to any operational incident. So we train people for the
00:19:31 incident. So we train people for the role not for the specifics. Have you ever experienced in any role at any rank in your career widespread compartmentation failure in a high-rise residential block? No, not personally.
00:19:43 No, not personally. Right.
00:19:45 Right. In terms of your personal experience of uh firefighting at a high-rise residential block, did you ever receive training on how to spot and handle fire
00:19:57 training on how to spot and handle fire spread over the facade of a high-rise residential block? No, not on high-rise residential block. I've only ever received training um for looking at fire spread in things like
00:20:08 looking at fire spread in things like sandwich panels. Um but not in a residential block. No. Okay. Does it follow from that that you've never received any training on cladding and fire spread up round or down cladding?
00:20:20 down cladding? No, not to cladding. Does it also follow that therefore you've never received training on the particular dangers that cladding poses? No.
00:20:29 No. Or how to respond? No, I haven't. Now, I want to ask you one or two questions about what has become known as stayput.
00:20:37 stayput. Um, can I ask you to look, please, at page 37 of your witness statement?
00:20:48 Um, you've set out at the bottom of that page
00:20:53 page a a heading, the stay put advice. Uh, and you you say, um, this is part of our advice and guidance about keeping safe in the event of a fire in a
00:21:05 safe in the event of a fire in a high-rise building. Stay put is just the specific bit of advice that we can relay to people in the event of a fire in a property.
00:21:14 property. It's it's not predominantly around high-rise as it depends on where a fire happens and where you are in relation to it. We make a decision about whether or not you're going to be safe safer if you
00:21:26 not you're going to be safe safer if you remain in your property or whether it's safer for you to try and leave your property.
00:21:31 property. Now, I've got a number of questions about what you say there. The first is this. Is it is stay put not simply normal standing advice to all residents in a high-rise residential block rather
00:21:43 in a high-rise residential block rather than what a control room officer specifically says to a caller. Yes. So the um this isn't particularly well articulated. I have to confess the answer here and it was in relation to a specific question that was put to me by
00:21:54 specific question that was put to me by the police officer who was interviewing me. Uh and it was more specific around fast guidance and stay put. But what has got transcribed is just as the stay put advice which sounds a little curious but it was a in relation to a question
00:22:06 it was a in relation to a question around that. So stay put is the extent policy for high-rise for all residents and high-rise. It's the absolutely correct policy because that is how a building should behave. The whole purpose of stay put is that what we
00:22:18 purpose of stay put is that what we would not seek to have at a fire and a high-rise is for all of the residents to self- evacuate um when they don't need to. You know, we we see in that that there's the the risk of us not being able to get into the
00:22:29 of us not being able to get into the building and the whole purpose of a compartmentation of a building is that it should stay contained for 60 minutes to give us as professional firefighters the opportunity to extinguish that fire
00:22:40 the opportunity to extinguish that fire within that time. So stay put is the generic advice for high-rise buildings uh and should is standing advice. It's standing advice. So it's more to do with the building than specific advice given by the brigade to a caller. right
00:22:52 given by the brigade to a caller. right now. Um, when a caller calls, just pursuing that a bit further. When a caller calls, that's normally, isn't it? Because they are affected by heat, smoke, or fire in their flat and they
00:23:04 smoke, or fire in their flat and they need advice as to whether they can safely leave. Um, not necessarily. Sometimes what happens is if you're in a high-rise building and there is a fire within that building, you might see the products of that fire traveling past your window. Um, so you might not
00:23:17 your window. Um, so you might not actually be affected by it. Some people will naturally phone. If you see if you are in your flat and you see smoke coming past your window, people will call us. So, it's not necessarily the case that everyone who phones in relation to a fire is affected by that
00:23:28 relation to a fire is affected by that fire. They might just be concerned by what they can see out of their window naturally. Okay. We'll come back to that then in a moment. Um, when somebody calls and says they're trapped, then is this right? They get FSG advice and they're treated
00:23:39 They get FSG advice and they're treated as an FSG fire survival guidance caller and are not advised to stay put. No, they've got no choice. No. If your if your compartment so your flat or the room you are in is affected
00:23:50 flat or the room you are in is affected by fire, smoke or any of those products, yes, absolutely. We won't advise you to stay put. That would be counterintuitive. So, we have three categories. Uh I think we've established um when would you
00:24:01 we've established um when would you actually or when would a CRO actually give stay put advice to a caller? So, if you were to phone and uh you were to express concern because you they believed there to be a fire in your
00:24:12 believed there to be a fire in your block of flats and you were a resident there, but the fire was not affecting you in any way, shape, or form. So, there's no heat, no smoke, anything traveling into your actual flat, we would advise you to stay in your flat because that's the safest place to be.
00:24:24 because that's the safest place to be. Right.
00:24:24 Right. And by leaving, you may well hinder the emergency services response. And would that caller um be given uh some kind of guidance or advice as to
00:24:35 uh some kind of guidance or advice as to how to go about making the assessment as to whether it was safe to leave or not? Absolutely. If they said there was no risk and there was no smoke or anything in their flats, they will be told to remain in their flats. But if those circumstances change, they will be
00:24:46 circumstances change, they will be advised to call back. Right. We may come to call backs and vice versa later on today. But um when would a a CRO actually tell or
00:24:59 when would a a CRO actually tell or advise a caller to stay put? If there was no impact in their flat from any product of fire, that would require, wouldn't it, a CRO,
00:25:11 that would require, wouldn't it, a CRO, control room officer, to be able to make a reliable assessment of uh whether it was genuinely safe for the caller to stay in their flat, wouldn't it? Yes. Yes. So the control officer can't
00:25:22 Yes. Yes. So the control officer can't physically make that assessment. They're not on the scene. But the question they will ask of the person who's inside the flat and making that call will establish that. So if they say to the person, have you got any smoke in your flat? Is there
00:25:33 you got any smoke in your flat? Is there any heat in your flat? Can you see flames in your flat? If the answer to all that is no, my flat is safe and I'm safe to be here, then that's when they would advise them to stay in their flat. What would happen
00:25:44 What would happen when the fire was very dynamic? So although for the moment the caller thought it was and was saying there is no heat, smoke or fire in my flat but the fire was developing very
00:25:55 but the fire was developing very rapidly. What would the CRO then advise? So the control officer wouldn't be aware the fire was developing rapidly and dynamic. They unfortunately you know can't see into the building at that time. They can only rely on the information that is being passed to them
00:26:06 information that is being passed to them by the caller. So you know the advice will remain that if your your flat is still unaffected you are safest to stay there. However, if that situation changes call us back. Does that not put quite a lot of burden onto the caller to
00:26:20 quite a lot of burden onto the caller to make an an assessment for themselves? But equally, if they were to be in a situation where the control officer were to say to them, "Leave your flat now," and there was nothing wrong with where they were, and the control officer could
00:26:31 they were, and the control officer could then be putting them in a position of danger where they were going into a stairwell that may be affected. Or by them leaving their flat, it may well put them at risk because they're going to try and hurry out of the building when
00:26:42 try and hurry out of the building when there's no need to do so might cause slips, trips, or falls or prevent us coming in and doing our job. Yes. And you've I put I asked you a question. You've said equally. So you've put the other side of the equation. So
00:26:55 put the other side of the equation. So there is an equation isn't there between two things just see if this is right. One the risk of leaving the caller in a flat which might become affected by smoke or fire or heat on the
00:27:07 affected by smoke or fire or heat on the one hand and on the other hand the risks inherent in putting them out into a potentially smoke logged exit route. Is that that's the balance isn't it? Absolutely. It's a balance. But I think we need to take that in the context of
00:27:19 we need to take that in the context of buildings are designed for the fire to stay within the compartment of origin for 60 minutes. And for the vast majority of those, they do that. Therefore, the balance is that it is much safer for you to remain in your
00:27:31 much safer for you to remain in your flat and to not open doors and become compromised by what's going on outside. And our experience as professional firefighters tells us that in the vast vast majority of cases that happens. So
00:27:42 vast majority of cases that happens. So that balance for us is about the callers giving us information. They are telling us what they can see and what's you know real to them at that moment in time. We as professional firefighters as professional control officers are making that judgment for them to make them the
00:27:55 that judgment for them to make them the safest keep them as safe as possible. And if the building behaves correctly and the you know it does not go beyond the compartment of origin and we extinguish the fire that's the safest option for them. Yes. Now in that answer there's
00:28:09 Yes. Now in that answer there's try and put it as a question if I can rather than a statement to you but is it right that in what you've just said there is a degree at least of assumption you said if the building behaves
00:28:20 you said if the building behaves correctly but what if the building doesn't behave correctly? Well in that case we have to rely on the information we are receiving that the control officer is being given by the person in the building. Unfortunately,
00:28:31 person in the building. Unfortunately, what we don't seek to do is to assume that every single building will fail because that would be catastrophic. Um, and if we were to make work on that assumption the whole time, it would make our jobs untenable because you would
00:28:42 our jobs untenable because you would just be constantly telling everyone to get out of a building that isn't suitable for the purposes of evacuating. And my concern then would be that if people were self-evacuating down a single staircase building, that what we
00:28:53 single staircase building, that what we would end up with is a significant number of crush injuries. And then you'd also get people who, you know, found it harder to evacuate who were being stranded and in distress. Does it follow from that that the stay
00:29:07 Does it follow from that that the stay put advice encapsulating all three elements
00:29:11 elements which we've discussed proceeds on the assumption that there will not be a whole block fire or mass breach of compartmentation. How reliable is that assumption? The
00:29:22 How reliable is that assumption? The vast majority of the time it's a very reliable assumption and we have to we have to believe that the correct procedures have taken place in the design of a building in the refurbishment of a building construction of it and the products used in it you
00:29:35 of it and the products used in it you know we have to rely on the fact that that's what the people doing their jobs do and that we come as professional firefighters to a compartment that will remain contained for 60 minutes and extinguish a fire as at the night of the 14th of June to
00:29:47 as at the night of the 14th of June to your knowledge were there any doubts in the brigade about the reliability of that assumption. No, because we'd never experienced an event like that. We've never seen such a significant failure of a building.
00:30:00 significant failure of a building. Can I
00:30:03 Can I ask you before I leave this topic and and pick up on that last answer, a slightly side question? Do control room operators or incident commanders have any training on
00:30:16 any training on how to go about balancing the risk of leaving the caller in a flat which might become uh compromised by smoke, heat or fire on the one hand with on the other the
00:30:27 the one hand with on the other the dangers of putting putting them into a a compromised exit route. So the the training they receive is about the questions they ask, the answers they receive, and making that balanced judgment as professional officers at
00:30:38 judgment as professional officers at that moment in time. Um, what we wouldn't seek for them to do is to try and undertake a risk assessment of every building where there's a fire because obviously the control officer doesn't have the advantage of being able to see into that building and understand what's
00:30:49 into that building and understand what's going on at that moment in time. Are there any scenarios you're aware of where control room officers or or incident commanders were ever faced with having to make that decision in circumstances where the fire was very
00:31:00 circumstances where the fire was very dynamic and they didn't know whether or not the the flat from which the caller was calling would remain safe. So not specific to my knowledge obviously we have the experience we had
00:31:11 obviously we have the experience we had of the Lacal house fire uh you know where the we had the experience and what happened there and the lessons we learned from that but I don't know um and I have never been on an operational incident where fast survival guidance
00:31:23 incident where fast survival guidance has been taking place before the night of the 14th of June. I have never in the many multiple operational incidents I've attended I've never been to a incident with fast survival guidance. It's not a terribly common event.
00:31:36 terribly common event. Okay. Can I just ask you, and we'll pick up this thread in a moment, but can I just ask you to go to page 35, please, Commissioner, of your statement, uh, in the second paragraph,
00:31:49 uh, in the second paragraph, you say,
00:31:51 you say, uh, also the smoke should never have gone into the communal parts of the building.
00:31:56 building. Uh now I I think to be fair to you this is in a section of your statement uh which starts on page 34 um which is entitled the building and factors that
00:32:08 entitled the building and factors that impeded our firefighting and rescue efforts.
00:32:10 efforts. Mhm.
00:32:10 Mhm. So it sits within that section and you've covered other things like wet rising and dry rising mains. Um and here you're dealing with leaking of smoke into communal parts of the building. So that's the context. Yeah. And you say um
00:32:24 Yeah. And you say um uh five lines down, buildings are supposed to have doors that then stop that smoke from traveling upstairs. There should be a door from the stairwell and the flats themselves will have front doors. So there should be sufficient barriers to stop fire and
00:32:37 sufficient barriers to stop fire and smoke spreading. Once there is thick black smoke in a communal stairwell, people will not go out and into that stairwell to come down. In fact, British buildings are not designed for people to
00:32:48 buildings are not designed for people to evacuate because they're designed for the fire to stay in the compartment for us to go in and put the fire out. I'm interested in smoke leaking out into the stairwell. Just focusing on that. Are you aware, and I'm assuming you are
00:32:59 you aware, and I'm assuming you are aware, but are you aware of the practice of high-rise firefighting whereby crews set in hoses into drying main outlets on the floor below the fire floor? I am. And are you aware that that would
00:33:10 I am. And are you aware that that would require the door to be propped open so that the smoke uh in order to let the hoses go up the stairs and into the fire floor?
00:33:16 floor? Yes.
00:33:17 Yes. That creates the risk that the smoke will escape into the stairwell. Yes, it does. What training have you received on the need to minimize the smoke leakage in that way to uh preserve the escape route? So that's part of the high-rise
00:33:29 route? So that's part of the high-rise training scenarios that we practice uh conversations around um because the reason we do that and we set in two floors below is that it gives the opportunity for the firefighters to start their breathing operators up in
00:33:41 start their breathing operators up in fresh air which is vitally important. It also gives the opportunity for the hose to be in a protected place and for us to be able to set bridge heads up in a safe environment. That's why that happens. If we set it up on the floor of the fire of origin itself, then we can't do those
00:33:52 origin itself, then we can't do those safety factors. But it is a balanced risk about how much you let smoke in. But the risk is that you want to get in there and put the fire out as quickly as possible following our safety procedures. Right. Well, my next question was, is it
00:34:04 Right. Well, my next question was, is it a safe practice? And is it? Yeah. Yes, it is. And have you ever had any difficulties with evacuating residents down a single stairwell where the doors have been propped open by hoses from lower floors?
00:34:16 propped open by hoses from lower floors? I've never evacuated residents down a single stairwell because we've never had a need to do so. Okay. Now then coming to the next issue which is which follows from one or two of your answers earlier.
00:34:27 of your answers earlier. Uh I want to look at the knowledge in the LFB or of risks posed by clatting. Now, you say on your in your statement on page two,
00:34:43 um, and it's the second paragraph,
00:34:50 uh, halfway down the page, halfway down the paragraph, exactly halfway down the page, you say, "Had I set up the fire at Granfield Tower as an incident command scenario, people would have said that it was unrealistic because it would never
00:35:02 was unrealistic because it would never happen.
00:35:05 happen. Now, I just want to look at at that sentence with you. What elements of the Granfell Tower fire do you say would never happen? Uh complete failure of building, the ability for a fire to spread across the
00:35:17 ability for a fire to spread across the external face of a building, the ability of that fire to then travel through the building, uh breach all the compartments, to travel across central communal parts and areas. um for the
00:35:28 communal parts and areas. um for the fire to spread as rapidly as it did, for it to involve as many people, for it to involve as many fire survivor guidance calls, I could go on forever. The whole of the system of that night, what happened to that building would have been deemed to have been a completely
00:35:40 been deemed to have been a completely unrealistic scenario. Uh that would never happen. Um before Granfell, June 17, were you aware of a fire at Garnuk Court in Scotland in
00:35:53 of a fire at Garnuk Court in Scotland in 20 in 1999? No, I wasn't. Were you aware of the parliamentary select committee's report into the risks posed by cladding following that fire? No, I wasn't.
00:36:05 No, I wasn't. Were you aware of a fire at the Mermos Tower in Rubé in France in May 2012? No, I wasn't.
00:36:14 Were you aware of the Tamwheel fire in Dubai in November 2012? No.
00:36:19 No. Or the Lacrosse building fire in Melbourne in Australia in November 2012? I'd heard of that one. You'd heard of that one? What had you heard? What had you heard about that? Uh just that it was significant fire, but it was in a very different building
00:36:30 but it was in a very different building that um had more than one exit staircase and had internal uh firefighting suppression means that we don't have here. So it wasn't a comparable building to buildings in London.
00:36:44 Do you know do you happen to know what the Australian legislative response to that fire has been? No, sorry. Didn't think you did. Um, do you know, maybe the answer is you
00:36:56 do you know, maybe the answer is you don't, that each of those buildings involved cladding on high-rise buildings which assisted external fire spread? No, I didn't. Can I ask you to look at
00:37:07 Can I ask you to look at a a document in our policy bundle which is GR
00:37:16 GR 3.2 two and this is LFB uh 1255 and we have it in our policy bundle at tab 7 and I'll just put the front sheet on the screen
00:37:28 just put the front sheet on the screen for you should have it there commissioner and this is a document put out by the DCLG department for communities and local government dated uh February 2014 and the entitlement is
00:37:40 uh February 2014 and the entitlement is GR generic risk assessments 3.2 to fighting fires in high-rise buildings. First question, are you are you familiar with this document? I am. Yes. Were you familiar with this document as at the night of the Grenell Tower fire?
00:37:51 at the night of the Grenell Tower fire? Uh
00:37:51 Uh I knew its existence. I wasn't familiar. It's not something that uh we use to develop or train any of our officers. It's something our policy department uses to develop internal London Fire Brigade policies. Therefore, I'm
00:38:03 Brigade policies. Therefore, I'm familiar with the London Fire Brigade high-rise policy, but not in detail. But I'm aware of the GR. Are you aware of its specific terms and contents? No, because we use that to translate to London Fire Brigade
00:38:14 translate to London Fire Brigade policies and that's what we train on. Right. But the role of transferring the GR into NFB specific policy would be something that would fall under your
00:38:25 something that would fall under your supervision, would it or not? Absolutely. But uh you couldn't possibly expect me to be aware of every single GR and every single policy document that is contained within the contents of uh training to the London specific ones. Yes. But the Gas themselves, that's why
00:38:37 Yes. But the Gas themselves, that's why we have an operational policy department that can translate those and uh into London Fire Brigade specific documents. That that I understand. Uh but uh are you do I take it that you're not
00:38:49 are you do I take it that you're not personally familiar with the detailed contents of this document? I have read it subsequently um because it was obviously something that was going to be of interest but previous to that no.
00:38:58 that no. All right. Well, let's see how we go. Um what I won't ask you is about language particularly necessarily but but some about some of the principles in it. Um can I ask you first please to turn to
00:39:09 can I ask you first please to turn to page uh 8 internally page 10 in the relativity reference.
00:39:16 I should ask you first of all I'm sorry I should have done did you know that this document was produced um I at least in part as a response to the lackal house fire in 2009?
00:39:27 house fire in 2009? Yes I was. Yes. Okay. um page 10 um uh under the title construction technique. Now this sits uh within a part of the uh GRA entitled
00:39:41 within a part of the uh GRA entitled significant hazards and risks which is on page the page before uh and the sub part is building height layout and design and under this it says
00:39:52 design and under this it says construction technique any building under construction may provide additional hazards and then the next paragraph combustible material in voids and cavities and poor quality
00:40:03 voids and cavities and poor quality construction can also contribute to the spread of fire and smoke beyond the compartment of origin. Now at standing away from the specific language as a principle as at the night of the
00:40:14 principle as at the night of the Granville Tower fire, were you aware of that as a general principle? Uh the principle of the fact that combustible materials in voids and cavities could spread fires. Absolutely. Because that's something that we train
00:40:25 Because that's something that we train our officers to look for and it's one of the reasons we have thermal imaging cameras to be able to detect fire spread through voids. Yes. Now focusing on poor quality construction is that also something that you train your officers to to look for?
00:40:37 you train your officers to to look for? Um unfortunately uh firefighters are not fire engineers and therefore we would be unable to make an assessment whether a building was of uh poor quality construction. Uh we have no reference point to understand what poor quality
00:40:49 point to understand what poor quality construction would look like and mean. And if I were to look at a building now covered in cladding, I wouldn't be able to make an assessment as to whether or not it was constructed poorly. Not least of all because part of that is about how
00:41:00 of all because part of that is about how something's applied to a building. So if you apply cladding incorrectly and leave a large void behind it, once the cladding's applied, there is no way of seeing behind there. Does that mean that poor quality construction, although a significant
00:41:11 construction, although a significant risk relevant to fire spread in a high-rise block with something on which you you didn't and couldn't train officers?
00:41:18 officers? It would be impossible to train officers to be able to recognize poor quality construction. Um, not least of all because as uh senior principal fire officers, we would expect a building to have been through several stages of
00:41:30 have been through several stages of building control and inspection before we come to interact with it in the situation in a fire. And we would expect that to be addressed at those stages. Um, and I would suggest it would be terribly difficult to try and train people to recognize all the potential
00:41:42 people to recognize all the potential pitfalls of poor quality construction. So, do you know what the perhaps you don't know, but what's the point of mentioning poor quality construction in a document such as this? Uh, no. To be fair, it's um a kind, you
00:41:53 Uh, no. To be fair, it's um a kind, you know, I could see why people would want to state that, but without then expressing how you would uh mitigate that risk, it's quite a bland statement really.
00:42:02 really. Right. Um well, let me just pursue that a bit more. Uh
00:42:17 if you go to page 16 internally, page 18 of the document, um I'm taking you to a long page with no real guidance in it as to what it's
00:42:29 real guidance in it as to what it's about. um this and what I want to show you starts at the top about familiarization visits and it sits within the section of this document under key control measures uh and the
00:42:40 under key control measures uh and the subheading is planning and that starts two two pages before and I'm happy to show you any of that if you want to but my specific questions are on page 16 or 18 um
00:42:50 18 um uh information to be gathered in relation to high-rise incidents should include and there's a long shopping list there
00:42:58 there uh and I just want to ask you to look at the fourth one from the bottom. There are plenty of others we could spend time looking at, but I want to focus on that if I can. Building construction features such as the presence and location of
00:43:10 such as the presence and location of mason style construction, sandwich panels, timber framing, cladding systems, surface mounted trunking, ducting and voids in addition to features which present a specific hazard such as asbestos.
00:43:21 such as asbestos. Now, as at the night of the Grenell Tower fire, were you aware that information to be gathered by those responsible for gathering that information should include building
00:43:32 information should include building construction features, including cladding systems at the national level? No, I would expect uh building construction to be the subject of something that you gather information on, but not specifics around cladding.
00:43:43 on, but not specifics around cladding. No.
00:43:44 No. Right.
00:43:46 Right. And do you know how do you know whether there was any training uh that you ever saw or were responsible for that would enable um your brigades officers to
00:43:58 enable um your brigades officers to gather information relating to high-rise incidents about building construction features?
00:44:04 features? No.
00:44:04 No. So we would um on our inspections we would look at certain features of a building. Um for instance uh the presence of sandwich panels um in large scale industrial buildings because we know the risks to firefighters posed by
00:44:15 know the risks to firefighters posed by those. Sadly firefighters have lost their lives due to those. In fact the first woman firefighter to die died as a result of sandwich panel fire. Um, so we'd look at those, but what you know, we wouldn't expect to give people
00:44:26 we wouldn't expect to give people training to understand looking at a cladding system to see whether or not that was a risk because it would be almost impossible to look at a building and ascertain whether or not the external parts of a building. So, for
00:44:38 external parts of a building. So, for instance, if you were to look at a building that had balconies uh that had wooden decking on those balconies, you would recognize that's a potential risk because we regularly have fires involving barbecues on balconies that then spread up through the wooden uh
00:44:50 then spread up through the wooden uh decking or now the living wall features. I'm not sure if you're familiar with those where people plant living walls and they are very flammable. We've had some significant very visual fires and external parts of a building involving those, but you know, looking at a
00:45:02 those, but you know, looking at a building and seeing it's clad wouldn't equate to risk in the eyes of a normal firefighter. It sounds from that last answer is if people just generally this is a very general question I think in response to quite a general answer but it sounds as if people go around
00:45:13 it sounds as if people go around collecting information looking at risks on the basis of of their own experience of past fires rather than looking at the the wording of a particular policy. Is that right?
00:45:24 that right? It's a a balance of both. As professional officers you will always use your own uh professional experience um and take that into consideration. We would expect that on every occasion. Um but bearing in mind that we have a range of experience across our offices then
00:45:36 of experience across our offices then they would look at guidance from documents as well. But what I'm suggesting is that it would be really difficult to have a look at any building and look at cladding and perceive it to be a risk because it shouldn't be.
00:45:49 Now just in case I'm accused of being unfair and putting to you a document you have said you're not familiar with can I assume you're familiar with uh LFB policy 633 high-rise firefighting. Yeah.
00:46:00 policy 633 high-rise firefighting. Yeah. And appendix one in particular 72D. Yes, I am.
00:46:03 I am. And we'll come back to this later on, but I just want to pursue this now. Can I ask you to be shown that please? It's tab four of our policy bundle uh floor lay sorry appendix one
00:46:16 uh floor lay sorry appendix one uh which is on page 19 internally.
00:46:23 Uh and I'm going to assume you're familiar with this text, but I'll just read it out because other people may not be. During 72D visits, personnel should ensure that they are familiar with the
00:46:34 ensure that they are familiar with the following and their impact on firefighting, search and rescue operations. Then if you look down this long list, uh you see about halfway down floor layouts
00:46:46 you see about halfway down floor layouts and any building construction features which may promote rapid or abnormal fire spread. And then there are some examples given. Now looking at the general, what
00:46:57 given. Now looking at the general, what training do you know officers had to go out on 72D visits and en ensure familiarity with building construction features which may promote rapid or
00:47:08 features which may promote rapid or abnormal fire spread. I don't think we've given people specific training around that. I think that would be very much around looking at building and experience and it will be around uh conversations around 72D but um we don't give specific training
00:47:21 but um we don't give specific training around that area. Right. C can you help me with a question? Um, we see there such as sandwich panels, timber frame, construction, atria or voids. Uh, it may or may not have escaped your attention
00:47:32 or may not have escaped your attention that the word cladding is not there. Do you know why? Because I would think at the time the document was drafted, cladding wasn't perceived to be a risk. Right.
00:47:43 Right. Okay. Let's um pursue that a bit. Um
00:47:49 can I start in pursuit of that by asking Paul to turn up please the LIPA briefing note
00:47:59 note uh sorry it's LFB uh two sorry LFB quadruples quintuple 0207
00:48:11 now uh there it is and this is the note prepared for a Lacnal House working group meeting on the 31st of March 2014.
00:48:24 group meeting on the 31st of March 2014. Mhm.
00:48:25 Mhm. Uh
00:48:27 Uh and I don't know whether this is something you were present at. No, it wasn't. You do you know you weren't? Um I know from the uh likelihood of the the meeting it went to that um I
00:48:38 the meeting it went to that um I wouldn't have been at that level at that time to have been invited to that meeting.
00:48:42 meeting. Oh, I see. Okay. And you say by because it was above your level or below level it would have been. Yes. So it would have been specific. So the people the information it says there was uh report by the director for operational resilience and training and the
00:48:53 resilience and training and the assistant commissioner of fire safety regulation. Uh I was neither of those people and uh in general that is a meeting of our uh members. So we there wouldn't be other people involved in that.
00:49:02 that. I see. Did at any time after you took over responsibility for fire safety uh or became commissioner did did you ever see this uh agenda? It is just an agenda
00:49:13 see this uh agenda? It is just an agenda there uh or or any document relating to it as part of your familiarization or briefing with your role. No, not to my knowledge. Okay. Well, let's see how we go with it. Um if you turn to page 8 internally,
00:49:24 Um if you turn to page 8 internally, please
00:49:30 uh you can see that uh there is a title at the top high-rise risk assessment and operational procedure review.
00:49:42 procedure review. You see that? And if you look at the second paragraph on that page, uh, it refers to the revised GR published in February 2014. That's what we've just looked at for one of the things we've just looked at,
00:49:53 of the things we've just looked at, commissioner, and incorporates all the lessons learned from the lackl incident as outlined by the coroner as well as the wider issues covered by the investigation. The revised GR incorporates newly identified hazards to
00:50:04 incorporates newly identified hazards to firefighters and the public that were exemplified by the lackl incident. Uh these and this is the important sentence I just wanted you to focus on. These include the potential for the rapid
00:50:16 include the potential for the rapid failure of lightweight UPVC wall panels and for fires to spread laterally and vertically in a downwards direction. Hazards which are not unique to the lacel incident but which are relatively rare and had not previously been recorded in the current version of the
00:50:28 recorded in the current version of the GR or rather relevant national guidance. Now my question is uh did you
00:50:39 did you uh know when the GR was published uh that that was its purpose? No.
00:50:47 No. Right. Uh had you received any training in any of the roles that you occupied uh after 2000 after March 2014 uh and uh before the Granville fire
00:51:01 uh and uh before the Granville fire relating to the risk of lateral and vertical fire spread? Yes, I have. Right. What training was that? That's in relation to the lackl house uh training package we did which was specific to the fact the uh the UPVC wall and window
00:51:15 fact the uh the UPVC wall and window panels failed significantly during lackl house fire and there was fire spread laterally during that incident uh and the risk the firefighters posed by that because there were complete breaches in walls so the firefighters
00:51:26 breaches in walls so the firefighters could have been at risk of actually stepping out and falling from the building so we had specific training around that yes you did uh now can I then take you to par page 33 three of your statement
00:51:45 where you deal uh in the second paragraph from the bottom and again this is under the heading two two paragraphs above my knowledge of the
00:51:57 two paragraphs above my knowledge of the initial fire and our response to it. Mhm.
00:51:59 Mhm. And you go on to say in the first line of that paragraph, it was a sorry, the next paragraph, it was a very severely developing fire in that it was consuming the outside of the of the building.
00:52:11 the outside of the of the building. It would have been very difficult for any fire officer standing on the incident ground to have understood what was happening to the building because buildings don't behave like that and we never see that type of fire spread. And then you go on to say a couple of lines
00:52:23 then you go on to say a couple of lines on from that, there's a building in Dubai called the torch, which is a huge high-rise building and it's caught fire twice in the last 3 years, but even though the fire went up the external part of the building, it actually went out within about 2 hours without ever
00:52:34 out within about 2 hours without ever imp impinging into the building. Are you referring there to the first fire at the torch building, which was February 2015, or the second one in August 2017? Uh, the second one, August 2017. And I
00:52:46 Uh, the second one, August 2017. And I actually spoke to somebody who was in Dubai at the time and witnessed the fire and the firefighting activities which was the 2-hour part. They said it was amazing. It was extinguished, done, and dusted and the crews have gone within 2 hours which was quite incredible.
00:52:57 hours which was quite incredible. But that's after Granville. That's August 17. So So are you referring here then, just to be clear, uh to the first of those? I was aware there had been a previous one. I don't know the details of the previous building, but I knew there had
00:53:08 previous building, but I knew there had been a fire there which had not impinged on the internal parts of the building in that significant manner that Graf did. And was that awareness something in your head when you attended the Granville incident on the night of on the night?
00:53:19 incident on the night of on the night? It was an aware. Yes. Yes. But it didn't equate in any way to what presented itself to me on that night. So I wasn't thinking in terms of that fire at all. Right. So you didn't take any comfort, did you then from the fact of failure of
00:53:30 did you then from the fact of failure of re-entry at the Dubai fire? No.
00:53:32 No. Right. What what detail did you know about that building? Which building? Sorry. The Dubai. The Dubai building that None at all.
00:53:39 at all. No.
00:53:40 No. Um
00:53:42 Um can you help me whether Prior to Granfell, there was an, as it were, an institutional assumption within the LFB that on the basis of the experience of the of these other fires abroad, and I
00:53:53 the of these other fires abroad, and I know you've said you don't don't know about them, um that that these fires on cladding pose no risk of re-entry. I couldn't make the institutional assumption about that because um I'm
00:54:05 assumption about that because um I'm pretty sure that vast majority of the operational workforce weren't specifically aware of those fires in other countries. Right. So, you weren't even in a position to make an assumption. I wouldn't seek to make an assumption. No. Well, you weren't even in a position to
00:54:16 Well, you weren't even in a position to make an assumption because you didn't even know about those fires. Is that fair?
00:54:19 fair? Well, no. I knew about some of them, but I wouldn't say other people did. So, when you say institutional, you're making a comment about the whole organization. So, I wouldn't be able to make that comment because I don't know what other people's level of awareness was.
00:54:28 was. All right. Were you aware of the Shepherd's Court fire uh on the 19th of August 2016? I was aware of that. Yes. Were you Did you attend? I didn't.
00:54:38 I didn't. Were you aware of what lessons were learned from that fire? Yes, sir.
00:54:42 Yes, sir. and uh what in brief can you tell us in brief were those lessons? Well, about fire spread um and dealing with the fire of those situations, but I
00:54:55 with the fire of those situations, but I wasn't involved in the fire on investigation of it. Can I ask you please to be shown a document LFB quadruple 03521.
00:55:10 Now, this is a um a slideshow produced by the LFB called Tall Building Facades. And although it bears the date of the 13th of July, 2016, it's clear from the
00:55:21 13th of July, 2016, it's clear from the contents of this document that it's it's about the lessons to be learned from the Shepherd's Court fire and therefore it postdates that fire. And we've been told that it's it was ultimately finalized in in October 2016. I'm not entirely sure
00:55:35 in October 2016. I'm not entirely sure when exactly in that month, but that's what we've been told. My first question is um did you see this slideshow at the time it was produced? No,
00:55:46 No, you didn't. Uh now in October 2016, I think you were still director of safety and assurance, were you?
00:55:54 were you? Uh yes, I was. Right. Uh would it follow that you don't know who prepared this presentation? Uh I believe I know now it was in relation to fire safety and specifically fire engineering department. So a very
00:56:06 fire engineering department. So a very specialized detailed department of fire engineers looking at those uh and it wasn't a presentation that was given for wider circulation. Well, you've answered a number of my following questions. Um do you know to
00:56:19 following questions. Um do you know to whom within the LFB that presentation was shown? I believe only to fire engineers. Okay. Uh
00:56:27 Okay. Uh do you do you know you say only to fire engineers? How many is that? I have no idea. Well, let me just show you a document. Um, if I may before the break, LFB
00:56:38 Um, if I may before the break, LFB quadruple0414.
00:56:49 Now, um this uh is the first of I think a two-page document um representing the circulation list
00:57:00 circulation list of those attended those invited to attend uh a presentation of this slideshow. Uh just running your eye down those names,
00:57:12 uh can you tell us in general terms who they are and what they do? They're my senior fire safety officers. They are senior fire safety officers, right?
00:57:22 right? And do do you know and I suspect the answer is no. Do you know whether this slideshow was actually presented to them?
00:57:29 them? I have no idea. Do you know who would know the answer to that question? Um I suspect that uh Dan Daly or someone in the far safety regulation team will be able to provide that information. Okay. Uh
00:57:41 Okay. Uh can I
00:57:43 can I show you since you don't since you you Well, let me ask you this. Have you studied this document since Granfell? The tool building. I've looked through it. Yes. I've not studied it in detail. I have looked through it.
00:57:54 I have looked through it. Right. Who asked you to do that? You know,
00:57:56 know, um once you'd shown it here in the inquiry, my natural curiosity led me to go and have a look at it. Yes. No. I thought that might be the case. Um did you then look at the general conclusions page 25? I did.
00:58:07 I did. Can we just just look at those please? Um I don't want to read them all out to you. Um they speak for themselves themselves. Um,
00:58:18 themselves. Um, does the My question is does the fact of this presentation and these conclusions show that there was an emerging consciousness in or by October 2016
00:58:31 consciousness in or by October 2016 within the brigade that facades of high-rise buildings created unknown uh or difficult risks of fire spread. I would say that would demonstrate that.
00:58:42 I would say that would demonstrate that. Um what I would say is uh as a professional organization London Fire Brigade will look at uh any emerging threat or risk to the people of London and we will therefore do further work.
00:58:53 and we will therefore do further work. So quite clearly last year one of the things that we did the most work around was terrorism because of the emerging threat to terror. So we'll have specialist departments that will compile information and presentations in
00:59:04 information and presentations in relation to specialist areas of risks. I would suggest that the fire engineering department quite rightly in relation to looking at those buildings put some information together to share with fire safety CNFR safety officers. Um I would think that's absolutely right and proper
00:59:16 think that's absolutely right and proper that you know my professional teams will be looking at potential risks across the piece in a wide range of areas. Do do you know whether further work was done on this presentation between
00:59:27 done on this presentation between October 2016 and June 2017? I have no idea. No idea. And again who would know is that Dan Daly? Dan Daly and the far regulation team. Okay. Uh,
00:59:38 Okay. Uh, if as seems from what you've told us that this presentation was only seen by a by an audience of specialist fire safety engineers, do you know how
00:59:50 safety engineers, do you know how knowledge of the risks we see on this page of this presentation involving cladding on high-rise buildings would be communicated to l to the brigade's frontline operational firefighters? Um I
01:00:02 frontline operational firefighters? Um I don't think it has been and uh because I've not I wasn't familiar with this document beforehand. Um but the normal procedure would be if there was deemed to be something that uh was risk that needs to be shared, it would be developed into a training package that
01:00:14 developed into a training package that could then be shared more widely. Obviously uh if that list was the people that were invited to attend, they're the senior fire safety officers who attend operational incidents in their capacity as a fire safety officer to assist with all kinds of measures of a building in
01:00:26 all kinds of measures of a building in relation to fire safety. Do you know why this wasn't rolled out into a training package so that watch managers who would be the first incident commanders at the scene had not seen it and been trained on it?
01:00:35 on it? No, I don't. Can you explain why this presentation was kept to a limited cery of LFB specialists so that even you didn't see it, Commissioner? No, I have no idea. Does that not indicate to you a
01:00:46 Does that not indicate to you a structural or cultural failure within the brigade whereby complex science of fire safety was not made simple and disseminated widely? No, I don't think it does. I think it indicates that the people who were
01:00:57 indicates that the people who were looking at that uh were quite rightly responding to some incidents that had happened. But um you have to base that against the fact that nobody would expect an incident like Grenfell where the building would fail so spectacularly
01:01:09 the building would fail so spectacularly and be covered in such a highly flammable product would be allowed to exist.
01:01:13 exist. We've been told by senior officers, I think as late as this week, that an operational firefighter would always expect the unexpected. Was this not the unexpected which you should be
01:01:24 unexpected which you should be expecting? Uh, I don't think that's a reasonable thing to say. We do expect the unexpected. We respond to what we find in front of us. You know, at the beginning of last year, you wouldn't have expected the attacks to have happened in London. We responded and
01:01:35 happened in London. We responded and developed and trained from those. We learned from every operational incident. But in the same manner that I wouldn't develop a training package for uh a space shuttle to land on the shard, you know, we would respond to it and deal
01:01:46 know, we would respond to it and deal with it in the same professional manner we do. That is a instant of that scale. So I wouldn't expect us to be developing training or response to something that simply shouldn't happen. My question and really it's a point is
01:01:59 My question and really it's a point is space shuttles on the shard or otherwise this slideshow demonstrated to at least a narrow band of experts specialists within the London fire brigade that this
01:02:10 within the London fire brigade that this was not such a risk that it could simply be treated as negligible. Is that fair? It's not a negligible risk, but equally, I think even if you had given the information to Mike Dow or any other first incident commanders that there was
01:02:22 first incident commanders that there was the potential for fast spreading outside the building, it would have made no difference to what happened on the night because there wasn't the facility to be able to extinguish such severely developing and rapidly spreading fire because it spread behind the cladding
01:02:34 because it spread behind the cladding and there was no way of putting it out. So even if they'd known what they were and they'd had this training, they would have just seen what unfold in front of them and still responded in the same way to the incident in front of them. So, I
01:02:45 to the incident in front of them. So, I understand your point that training is very important, but what we do is train our officers to respond to every single circumstance they come across on the fire ground. Um, but providing training and awareness and knowledge doesn't mean
01:02:56 and awareness and knowledge doesn't mean you're able to resolve an incident that should never happen. I'm really just seeking to see whether you're prepared to accept the proposition that when you say it should never happen, nonetheless, this risk was
01:03:07 never happen, nonetheless, this risk was on LFB's radar 9 months before the Granville Tower fire. Do you accept that? as with a number of other risks. Yeah, except that people were aware of that.
01:03:15 that. Right, Mr. Chairman, is that a convenient moment? Yes, I think it is. Well, Commissioner, we'll have a short break now for everyone's benefit. Um, I have to ask you please not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the
01:03:26 your evidence while you're out of the room and we'll resume at quart 11, please.
01:03:29 please. Thanks, sir.
01:03:40 11:15 then, please.
01:18:22 I'll just move that out of the way. Yes. You all right? Ready to carry on? Yes, I am, sir. All right. Thanks so much. Yes. Commissioner, thank you for coming back to us. Can I now ask you please to be shown uh a letter uh and it's a LFB
01:18:33 shown uh a letter uh and it's a LFB quadruple
01:18:35 quadruple um 685.
01:18:39 Uh this is a letter dated the 6th of April 2017. So only two or so months before the Granville Tower fire to Mrs. Laura Johnson, director of housing at
01:18:51 Johnson, director of housing at Kensington. Dear Mrs. Johnson, tall buildings external fire spread. And just looking at that and looking at the shape of the document, are you familiar with this?
01:19:01 this? No, sorry, I'm not. You've never seen it before? No, I haven't. Sorry. Right. It comes from Dan Dailyaly, as one can see from the second page, assistant commissioner, fire safety regulation. Uh, and if if you haven't
01:19:12 regulation. Uh, and if if you haven't seen it before, there there are only certain questions I can ask on it, but let me see see where we go. First paragraph, the fire spread at Shepherd's Court in Hannah Smith on the 19th of August 2016 received widespread
01:19:24 19th of August 2016 received widespread coverage in the media. in the main because the cause of the fire was due to a faulty appliance that was subject to a product recall, an issue which the London Fire Brigade has been campaigning on. However, I am also drawing this fire to your attention to highlight the
01:19:36 to your attention to highlight the external spread of the fire that occurred.
01:19:40 occurred. And then in the third paragraph, he says, "We've seen a number of cases where it appears on the basis of the information available to us that the level of fire protection to the external face of the building did not comply with the requirements of part B of the
01:19:52 the requirements of part B of the building regulations so far as they seek to limit the speed with which a fire can travel and spread over the external face of a building or may contribute to a fire." And then in the next paragraph
01:20:06 fire." And then in the next paragraph he discusses shepherd's court and says in the second sentence on testing it was found that panels may deform or delaminate exposing any combustible core
01:20:17 delaminate exposing any combustible core or constituent material resulting in the panel becoming involved in the fire and allowing the fire to spread and enter flats other than that other than the flat of origin. And then in the last
01:20:29 flat of origin. And then in the last paragraph
01:20:34 uh he says
01:20:37 says I would therefore strongly urge that you that's the council consider this issue as part of the risk assessment process for premises under your control. I suggest that you make sure all relevant information about any replacement window
01:20:49 information about any replacement window and facade schemes is fully available to fire risk assessors where no reliable information is available for a given property. It is our general expectation that a strategy to assess the risk and
01:21:00 that a strategy to assess the risk and when necessary implement short, medium, and long-term actions to address the risk.
01:21:05 risk. This assessment will need to Mr. Minute, just a moment. I I'm not sure we've actually had the relevant passage.
01:21:12 passage. I think we just go down. It's the last par. I'm so sorry. It's the last paragraph, Commissioner. I would therefore strongly urge you to consider this issue as part of the risk assessment.
01:21:23 risk assessment. Right, Commissioner, just cast your eye over it. how you can read it. Uh, sorry, sir. It's still not in front of me.
01:21:27 of me. It's still not on the screen, I'm afraid. It's It's the very last paragraph. You're quite right. If I I'm I'm sorry, Commissioner. We've got a If we can look at the last paragraph of the on the second page.
01:21:38 paragraph of the on the second page. That is the last paragraph of the whole letter.
01:21:40 letter. Thank you. There. If you just cast your eye over that, I would therefore strongly urge that you consider this issue as part of the risk assessment process for premises under your control. I suggest that you make sure that all relevant information
01:21:51 make sure that all relevant information about any replacement window and facade schemes is fully available to fire risk assessors. When a where no reliable information is available for a given property, it is our general expectation
01:22:02 property, it is our general expectation that a strategy to assess the risk and where necessary implement short, medium, and long-term actions to address the risk. And there's a verb missing. This assessment will need to take account of other fire safety measures already in
01:22:14 other fire safety measures already in place in the building as well as potential mitigation measures to ensure that any potential fire spread does not pose a risk to health and safety. Now, you told us you didn't see that letter, but my question then is for the purposes
01:22:27 but my question then is for the purposes uh of
01:22:29 uh of uh
01:22:32 uh training. Do you know what plans the LFB had in place to ensure that firefighters at all levels understood this the risk identified in this letter?
01:22:44 identified in this letter? Um, no I don't I'm sorry. I don't think we would have trained our firefighters in specific uh in relation to this risk because this was obviously talking about um people in local authorities assessing
01:22:55 um people in local authorities assessing the buildings in their possession. So firefighters um all received a training package from the Lacore fire um both right from people on watches as well as officers around the risks of external
01:23:06 officers around the risks of external fire spread but I'm not aware of any training we did in specific relation to this letter known right
01:23:15 right does that not indicate to you that an important risk uh around high-rise residential blocks was not being briefed to operate
01:23:26 was not being briefed to operate operational firefighters on the front line in your brigade. No, I don't think that's the case because I think this is the same as Lackl House. It's external fire spread unpredicted which was a training package that was developed. Um so although
01:23:38 that was developed. Um so although Shepherd's Court was a different fire, they still faced the same hazards effectively of failing panels, the risk of those falling, the risk of fire spreading. So this isn't a case of that
01:23:50 spreading. So this isn't a case of that what we um wouldn't seek to do. It' be very difficult that every single time there was a different fire uh we develop another training package for that because this is about the risk of external fire spread which was covered in that training package. Again,
01:24:02 in that training package. Again, Commissioner, doesn't this letter demonstrate that at least by April 2017, only two months or so before the fire, the risk of external fire spread as a result of uh uh exteriors being composed
01:24:15 result of uh uh exteriors being composed of combustible core or constituent material was well on the brigade's radar. Um yeah, very clearly it was on Bee's radar and we were asking local authorities to support us by checking the buildings they had in their
01:24:26 the buildings they had in their possession and checking the fire safety prevention measures and the mitigation in place because obviously it's the responsible responsibility of the responsible people and the local authorities to ensure those buildings are safe and fit for purpose for the
01:24:38 are safe and fit for purpose for the residents and also for us to be able to respond in the event of a fire which is very key because we always respond with an expectation of a building how a building is going to behave. So I would say absolutely it's on our radar. Um but
01:24:50 say absolutely it's on our radar. Um but the risk from that external fire spread uh was never something calculated beyond the scale of Grenfell and the extremities of that. We'll come to scale
01:25:01 We'll come to scale shortly,
01:25:02 shortly, but just in terms of the nature, the type, the kind of this risk, can you tell me why frontline firefighters were not aware of this risk in this way at the time of the Granful
01:25:14 in this way at the time of the Granful Tower fire? Sorry. Uh what I wouldn't say is they weren't aware. I would say that there had been understanding from things like shepherd's court and from lacel that was a possibility. Uh uh the question I think you asked from rigid was whether they'd had specific training around that
01:25:26 they'd had specific training around that which they had not had as I understand it.
01:25:29 it. And the question is why given that this risk was on the brigade's radar by as late as April 2017 why frontline firefighters had not had operational training on how to assess and deal with
01:25:42 training on how to assess and deal with the risk that this letter talks about. So um there's not can I can answer that in two parts if that uh would help. So the first part about being able to assess that risk firefighters, senior
01:25:53 assess that risk firefighters, senior officers, myself would not be able to assess that risk. So once again I go back to the point that I couldn't look at a building now with external cladding on it and assess whether or not that was combustible um because we don't have the ability to be able to do that. It's
01:26:04 ability to be able to do that. It's subject to obviously a flame and a panel test to conclude that. So we wouldn't be able to assess that ourselves. Um as to training. So as you'll understand London Fire Brigade and the area we serve and
01:26:15 Fire Brigade and the area we serve and the people we protect uh there are many many complex risks in London. There are different factors and different situations. Uh we try to provide the most upto-ate and professional training for all our firefighters balanced
01:26:26 for all our firefighters balanced against the actual risk to life and what we have to do to be able to save lives. So we would prioritize the training that firefighters would need to be able to deal with the highest risks as we see
01:26:38 deal with the highest risks as we see them and as we know them. Um so this would be a number of different risks. So um I would suspect that in any one of my professional departments right across the range of my organization there'll be different risks that we become aware of
01:26:51 different risks that we become aware of um that we look at and factor whether we provide training on. So you know if you look at the risks involving vehicles and hazards from vehicles. So we provide training to firefighters because new technology in vehicles and cars means
01:27:02 technology in vehicles and cars means that firefighters now have to approach cutting a car up in a very different way. That's an absolute risk because firefighters can get injured or killed and we can harm members of the public who are in a car. So, it's about balancing what that risk is, balancing
01:27:13 balancing what that risk is, balancing the need for training for firefighters and balancing who is best placed to receive that training. So, in this case, we're asking the local authority to assist us to do those inspections to
01:27:24 assist us to do those inspections to make sure the premises are safe and to make sure they're fit for purpose for us. It would be, you know, very difficult for us to then be able to go out and make an assessment of all those buildings. And I would find it that we would find it very difficult to train
01:27:36 would find it very difficult to train firefighters to be able to make any kind of professional assessment on that because it would take specifically qualified building engineers and surveyors to be able to do that. [Music]
01:27:49 [Music] Was it though not essential that watch managers
01:27:55 managers responding as incident commanders to a high-rise residential block fire would at least know of the risk
01:28:07 would at least know of the risk of of fire spreading across a cloud facade.
01:28:11 facade. So I think far watch managers were aware of that risk. We do uh information. We have a thing called a news bulletin, operational news bulletin where we share information. Um so there's a you know
01:28:22 information. Um so there's a you know for me there's a real big balance about being aware of a risk and knowing what to do when you turn up an incident, responding to that and being able to deal with it. Uh we train our operational officers to be able to respond and to do a risk assessment to
01:28:34 respond and to do a risk assessment to whatever is faced in front of them because you know as everyone's aware no two fires are the same. No two buildings respond in the same way. No two vehicle accidents are the same. So we train on basic principles of firefighting. We
01:28:45 basic principles of firefighting. We train on high-rise firefighting. We train on breathing apparatus and we train our officers to be able to put all those pieces of training together to respond to the detail they find in front of them.
01:28:54 of them. In your last answer, you said you think watch managers were aware of that risk. Um can you just help me what training or information or intelligence specifically identify the risk of spread
01:29:05 specifically identify the risk of spread across clad facads to operational firefighters in the take the six months prior to the Granful Tower fire. So I I don't have the detail of that to hand with the training packages that we provide to fire stations. Um in my
01:29:17 provide to fire stations. Um in my position I wouldn't be expected to know that what training we're providing to all our firefighters across a range of operational incidents. Uh I can definitely find that information out for you but I don't know it myself. Sorry. Can you I don't know whether you've been
01:29:28 Can you I don't know whether you've been listening to the evidence of the inquiry um as closely as I have. I'd rather doubt it. that um I I don't think we were able to identify any operational firefighter who attended this incident on the night who was able to stand there
01:29:40 on the night who was able to stand there underneath it and go I know what this is. It's a cladding fire. Why is that? Um because I don't think any operational officer would have expected a building to behave in that manner. I know myself when I turned up on the night I was
01:29:51 when I turned up on the night I was absolutely horrified and appalled by what I saw and I didn't expect that to happen. So I wouldn't have expected any of my officers to give a different answer than that. Exactly. Exactly. So, and that then takes me to the question, given their
01:30:03 takes me to the question, given their responses and given your own expectation, how do you tally that up with the fact that the risk of fire spread across cloud facads was on the LFB's radar by at latest April 2017.
01:30:17 LFB's radar by at latest April 2017. So, the the fact it's a risk and a known risk is a difference to how you mitigate that risk and how you respond to that risk. So, we know there's a risk. We're trying to mitigate the risk by asking
01:30:28 trying to mitigate the risk by asking the responsible people to do the assessments and ensure the risk is not there because that's their risk. It's those buildings uh and the internal uh response internal fire safety measures should be in place for those buildings.
01:30:39 should be in place for those buildings. That's why we wrote out that's why we responded to that risk and asked the people responsible to deal with that risk. When an operational officer turns up to an incident, you know what I would say is regardless of whether you were
01:30:50 say is regardless of whether you were very familiar with the specifics of that, it would not have changed the operational tactics that you would use to respond to a fire traveling on the outside of a building because you would make best endeavors to put that fire out. Unfortunately, right from the
01:31:02 out. Unfortunately, right from the moment that fire left the flat on the fourth floor and started traveling outside the building, there was no way that they could have extinguished that fire. So try as they may and try as they may to actually respond and deal with
01:31:13 may to actually respond and deal with that. It was an impossible situation they were put in. So you know although I could turn around and say yes we should train for that there are a number of other risks we train for to keep our firefighters current. What we would seek to do is to prevent the risk happening
01:31:25 to do is to prevent the risk happening by asking responsible people to remove the risk for us and for the people involved. H and how confident could you be between April and June 2017 that the responsible
01:31:37 April and June 2017 that the responsible people had understood the risk and we're going to act so urgently on it that you as the fire brigade could essentially eliminate it from something that firefighters had to consider.
01:31:48 firefighters had to consider. I couldn't be confident of that at all unfortunately any more now than I'm confident the fact that post the Grim Tower fire the responsible people have dealt with all the other buildings that we know are covered in cladding in London. M and in the absence of that confidence, therefore, was it not
01:31:59 confidence, therefore, was it not essential that firefight that watch managers receive training on how to spot and deal with clad fires, cladding fires and those 72 doing 72D visits should familiarize themselves with what they
01:32:11 familiarize themselves with what they were looking at so they knew of the risk that they might have to deal with if they attended an incident. No, I can't say that because my firefighters would never be able to recognize what cladding was flammable. That's the point for me. You know, any one of us cannot recognize what cladding
01:32:23 one of us cannot recognize what cladding is flammable because it shouldn't be flammable. They need to understand the risk of how to extinguish a fire. And that's what we train them for as professional officers to assess the situation and to put a fire out. And that's what they will do best endeavors
01:32:34 that's what they will do best endeavors to do and the circumstances of individual different ways of fire traveling. While we try and make them aware, we train them to respond to what they see, to make a risk assessment, and to put interventions in place.
01:32:45 to put interventions in place. But if they don't know what they're seeing because the risk hasn't been brought to their attention, how can they deal with it? Because they they will deal with what they see and respond. they saw a fire on the outside of a building and they will attempt to extinguish it. Even if they'd
01:32:56 attempt to extinguish it. Even if they'd known it was a cladding fire, it wouldn't made any difference to the response of how they were trying to extinguish it. The only means we have available is water. Unfortunately, when you spray water at rainproof cladding, it then becomes very difficult to extinguish a fire.
01:33:09 extinguish a fire. So, do I take it from all of what you've been telling me over the last 5 minutes that although the risk was on the LFB's radar was brought to the attention of local authorities that the London Fire Brigade didn't itself adopt or adapt any
01:33:22 Brigade didn't itself adopt or adapt any of its own training or information in order to be able to alert firefighters to the particular risk? No, we didn't. Now, can I then ask you please to turn to a
01:33:35 then ask you please to turn to a different document which is the London Safety Plan LFB uh 50225. There it is. And this is dated March 2017. Can I ask you please to go to page
01:33:47 2017. Can I ask you please to go to page 26 of that and on that page you'll see in the right hand uh column two columns right hand column a a heading uh understanding
01:33:59 column a a heading uh understanding complex buildings and in the third line if we could just have that blown up it says the brigade needs to understand
01:34:08 construction methods and possible failure mechanisms and to influence improvements in building design and associated fire safety measures.
01:34:19 associated fire safety measures. The design of a building and its layout can have a direct impact on firefighter safety and effectiveness and the brigade will continue to work with industry bodies and and sit on technical standards committees to gather
01:34:30 technical standards committees to gather data and promote firefighter safety as a key consideration in future developments. Of course, the focus there is firefighter safety, but the questions are intended to be more general than that. um for the purposes of carrying
01:34:43 that. um for the purposes of carrying out
01:34:45 out the purpose of understanding construction methods and possible failure mechanisms. Uh what plans did the LFB have in place
01:34:56 Uh what plans did the LFB have in place between March 2017 and June 2017 to ensure that firefighters at all levels understood construction methods and possible failure mechanisms as referred to here.
01:35:07 to here. Um so we had no specific plans during that time. It was just part of ongoing training. Um, this would relate specifically to the fire engineing fire engineering regulatory fire safety departments working in conjunction with
01:35:19 departments working in conjunction with industry bodies. Right. Does it follow from that that for the purposes of the 2017 London safety plan, the LFB had no plans in place to ensure that firefighters at all levels understood the risks posed by fires in
01:35:32 understood the risks posed by fires in in cladding on the exterior of high-rise residential blocks. I would say that um this was very early on obviously March 17 it was the when the London safety plan was first released uh it's a plan that extends over a number of years so
01:35:44 that extends over a number of years so the uh contents of this plan will be something that be addressed over the following years and currently now as well. Uh so ongoing training for firefighters in all aspects of firefighting responding to fires uh and
01:35:57 firefighting responding to fires uh and developing you know plans for that will be part of the ongoing training throughout this period of time of the lifetime London safety plan. So at as of March, April 2017, there was probably no
01:36:08 March, April 2017, there was probably no specific training in place, but it would be something that be picked up throughout the lifetime of that. But in specifically in relation to recognizing cladding, um, as I said earlier on, that wouldn't be something that we would develop a specific training package for.
01:36:21 develop a specific training package for. It would be as relation to a number of measures. So just that that's talking about firefighter safety first. So for instance, referring back to the lackl house fire, that was very key about building failure and the safety of firefighters because that actually meant
01:36:32 firefighters because that actually meant that there was a massive open space that our firefighters could fall through on a very high floor level that could result in a loss of life. So it's looking at those kind of aspects uh in relation to firefighter safety. Is there now training to understand
01:36:44 Is there now training to understand construction methods and possible failure mechanisms? No, but it was something that'll be worked on as part of uh so obviously directly as a result of the terrible events of the Grenell Tower fire. One of the first things I
01:36:55 Tower fire. One of the first things I did was to implement um a team to look at the events of the night to seek to identify any areas that we can make improvements in to look at areas and
01:37:07 improvements in to look at areas and understand what happened on that night. And as a result of that, when we fully understand what happened, as soon as we do that, we will then put steps in place to address those issues. And training will be one of those issues we'll be addressing.
01:37:20 addressing. We've been through overseas fires. We've looked at the toll building fire spread. We've looked at the March letter. We've looked at the London fire safety plan as at June 2017.
01:37:35 London fire safety plan as at June 2017. Commissioner, how would you summarize the LFB's understanding of the risks posed by cladding on high-rise buildings? I would summarize that my uh fire safety department uh were obviously aware of
01:37:46 department uh were obviously aware of the risks on the Shepherd Court fire, which is why they contacted local authorities uh in order to ask them to address the issues around cladding and fire safety in buildings. Um so the professional standards people who were
01:37:57 professional standards people who were the ones dealing with the local authorities were very aware of those. Um, but if you're asking about the detail and the level of firefighters specifically known about it, no, they weren't aware of that. Um, but I truly
01:38:08 weren't aware of that. Um, but I truly don't think it would have benefited anyone to have had any more detail knowledge about cladding to respond to the fire of Grenfell because it wouldn't have enabled them to extinguish the fire.
01:38:17 fire. Some people might say that that information was kept to the suits and not disseminated to the helmets. Is that fair?
01:38:24 fair? Uh, no. I don't think that's a fair accusation. I think there's large numbers of uh detailed professional advice that stays amongst professional officers. If we tried to impart all the detail around fire safety regulation to our firefighters, we would never be able
01:38:36 our firefighters, we would never be able to train them in the basics of breathing apparatus hose and ladder training because there's so much technical detailed information involved in such a highly specialist subject. That's a reason we have a specialist dedicated team for it.
01:38:47 team for it. Now, can I ask you to look at page 33 of your statement in light of that answer, please? Um and we were on it before uh under the heading my knowledge of the initial fire and our response to it.
01:39:01 initial fire and our response to it. Um you
01:39:04 Um you uh say in the second main paragraph um on that page um it was a very severely developing fire. You see? Mhm.
01:39:14 Mhm. And you say commissioner it you say that it was consuming the outside of the building. It would have been very difficult for any fire officer standing on the incident ground to have understood what was happening to the building because buildings don't behave
01:39:25 building because buildings don't behave like that and we never see that type of fire spread.
01:39:32 Isn't on what we've been discussing this morning. Isn't it the reality that by June 2017, the LFB had institutional knowledge of the risk presented by cladding, the
01:39:45 the risk presented by cladding, the potential for lateral and vertical fire spread, and the potential for re-entry and mass breach of compartmentation in a high-rise block. I would say that
01:39:56 in a high-rise block. I would say that we obviously had the knowledge about uh external cladding uh fire spread laterally but uh I don't think anyone would have anticipated the level of compartmentational breach and complete failure of all the safety systems within
01:40:08 failure of all the safety systems within a building. No, I don't think we had that knowledge at that time. Now on that even if an incident you say the level so you mean scale
01:40:16 scale yeah scale so across such a number of floors and with such speed but is it right though that even if an incident on the scale level as you you put it at Granville was unrealistic before June 2017
01:40:29 before June 2017 isn't it right that a significant incident caused by the risks we've been discussing was not unrealistic um I would say with hindsight now no it isn't unrealistic at the time it would have seemed unrealistic
01:40:40 have seemed unrealistic No commissioner with foresight with foresight but equally you know on the buildings where we it's happened it hasn't caused the spectacular catastrophic failures that we saw on the
01:40:52 catastrophic failures that we saw on the night of Grimville. So I don't feel that that would have been a realistic expectation of what would happen. Um you know it's it's really standing here asking those questions it's very
01:41:03 asking those questions it's very difficult because I would love to have had the foresight. I would love to have had the ability and the knowledge, but even if we'd had that, we wouldn't have been able to extinguish the fire. Um, so it's very difficult to stand here and
01:41:15 it's very difficult to stand here and say to you, yes, we could have done this and that because it wouldn't have made a difference the response on the night. And that's the point that I feel is really important that the building behaving the way it did, failing the way it did, causing the rapid fire spread the way it did, even had we known about
01:41:27 the way it did, even had we known about the cladding, the potential for that, we wouldn't have still been able to extinguish it. M see what I'm seeking to get at through these questions is the state of the brigade's knowledge of risk. Now I understand what you say
01:41:38 risk. Now I understand what you say about scale or level. I understand that. What I'm seeking to to to to explore with you on the basis of everything we've seen so far, and I have to put it to you, is that as at the
01:41:52 to put it to you, is that as at the night of that fire, there was sufficient institutional knowledge within the brigade to know that the risks uh which had been on that radar, the risks of external fire spread across a clad
01:42:04 external fire spread across a clad exterior
01:42:06 exterior uh were sufficient to make it clear that those risks existed and could cause trouble.
01:42:11 trouble. Yes.
01:42:15 Now, at what point in the development of those risk indicators as they built from 2012
01:42:25 2012 through to April 2017, at what point can you tell us does knowledge of a risk acquire a sufficiently critical mass as to require to be trained to operational
01:42:36 to require to be trained to operational firefighting crews? So from my point of view that would uh equate to um risk and probability. So you know there's always a risk of
01:42:47 you know there's always a risk of something happen but the probability and likelihood of it happening and the likelihood and severity of it happening all the things you factor into you know how you deal with a situation um due to the everinccreasing levels of challenge
01:42:59 the everinccreasing levels of challenge that organizations like London Fire Brigade face in responding to different risks. The risks we priority are risks to life quite rightly because that's our main function is to save life. Our main
01:43:10 main function is to save life. Our main loss of life happens in domestic fires. It happens to at risk and vulnerable people. So we prioritize our training, our resources and our community safety work to tackle that risk and to prevent
01:43:21 work to tackle that risk and to prevent fires happening in the first place and to educate the public. So we will always focus on the greatest life risk. So whilst we have technical knowledge of situations like cladding fires, we have
01:43:33 situations like cladding fires, we have to balance that against the risk of the likelihood of it happening and the scale of it. Unfortunately, we could not foresee the scale of what was going to happen on that night. You couldn't foresee the scale, but you
01:43:45 You couldn't foresee the scale, but you could foresee, I would suggest to you, uh, the eventuation of the risk that had been clearly identified over a number of years and was emerging within the LFB's institutional consciousness, couldn't
01:43:56 institutional consciousness, couldn't you? I say you could see the risk of a cladding fire spreading the outside the building. I don't think we could have seen the risk of the full-scale building failure that happened. Well, and did the risk it did you discount the risk the risk of of a
01:44:09 discount the risk the risk of of a significant incident caused by external fire spread over a cloud exterior? Did you discount that as something which wouldn't cause a threat to life? So, um, unfortunately at the time I wasn't the commissioner. I wasn't
01:44:21 wasn't the commissioner. I wasn't responsible for fire safety and the regulation of that in the job I did previously. So I was not the one accounting or discounting that risk at that time
01:44:29 that time from January 2017 then same question for the 6 months then no it wasn't something that was given to me as a risk that was likely to cause large scale loss of life no can I turn to a different topic
01:44:41 can I turn to a different topic commissioner which is FSG calls are you all right to carry on absolutely okay now have you personally ever trained for largecale high-rise block incidents involving multiple FSG calls
01:44:53 incidents involving multiple FSG calls no um sorry could not been difficult. What would you call multiple? Uh more than one. More than one. So we uh the nature of fast guidance is we train to anticipate maybe two or three. Uh I've never done
01:45:05 maybe two or three. Uh I've never done training on any more than that. No. Right. Uh have you ever had personal professional experience of incidents with what I call multiple FSGs? More than one.
01:45:15 than one. No, I haven't. Right. What I think you've answered my next question which was what were going to be what was the highest number of fire survival guidance calls you ever experienced at an incident prior to Grenfell I've never been an
01:45:27 prior to Grenfell I've never been an operation incident with far survival guidance calls never
01:45:30 never never
01:45:33 to what extent were you involved in the consideration of development of pol well let me ask you this are you familiar with policy 790 fire survival guidance I'm familiar with it yes yes and to what extent were you involved
01:45:44 yes and to what extent were you involved in the consideration of the development of that policy on the handling of FSG calls following the Lacano house fire. Not at all. Not at all. Right.
01:45:57 Uh now we we've had some evidence from uh a watch manager, Peter Johnson. Do you know Peter Johnson? Uh I know him. I don't know him well. I
01:46:08 Uh I know him. I don't know him well. I have met him on a couple of occasions. And he gave evidence uh to the inquiry on day 36. uh and just for our own references it's at uh it's at page 204 lines 7 to 12 and
01:46:20 at uh it's at page 204 lines 7 to 12 and he said this we were not forward thinking enough and we weren't able to anticipate that we could have multiple calls multiple FSGs greater than what was provided for within the policy which
01:46:31 was provided for within the policy which was greater than provided within the casualty information sheets alone which I think in total was seven um
01:46:40 um would you agree with that assessment that we weren't prepared and trained they not forward thinking enough and weren't able to anticipate that you could have multiple calls greater than provided by within the policy.
01:46:51 provided by within the policy. Um I find that hard to say weren't forward thinking enough. I think that um the experience we'd had and the developments we've made since lacel obviously resulting in the forward
01:47:02 obviously resulting in the forward information board and the ability to record that information. Um I I wouldn't say it's forward thinking but I don't think we anticipate as well as we could have done that we could have had very large scale far survival guidance.
01:47:14 guidance. Were you aware of a pilot exercise uh developed by watch manager Peter Johnson on who who was a command unit team
01:47:23 team officer who which demonstrated the operational difficulties that crews would run into the moment they had more than seven FSGs? No, I wasn't aware of that. Or even seven FSGs? No, no, I was unaware of that. Sorry. He
01:47:35 No, no, I was unaware of that. Sorry. He told us uh that uh even a seven fire survival guidance call exercise couldn't be coped with. Would you agree with that assessment? Um um I wouldn't be able to because um
01:47:48 Um um I wouldn't be able to because um I've never been experienced to see that happen or to see that fail. So no, sorry.
01:47:52 sorry. Right. Um do you know anything um about Mr. Johnson's FSG exercises and what happened to them? No, I'm sorry. You don't know whether they were deemed nec unnecessary or
01:48:04 they were deemed nec unnecessary or irrelevant or I was completely unaware that he developed anything of that nature at all.
01:48:08 all. Okay.
01:48:14 He he mentioned I should just tell you this that it was shelved out of a concern not to step over Babcocks. Um just a short question on that. You look puzzled. Um, what arrangements prior to
01:48:27 puzzled. Um, what arrangements prior to during your time as director of safety and then later commissioner, what arrangements existed in the fire brigade to to monitor uh and police what Babcocks were delivering to training
01:48:38 Babcocks were delivering to training officers
01:48:40 officers by way of training? We have a a very robust method of assessing what goes on. There's a difference between um a lot of the training we do with Babcock. ongoing station training where crews uh undertake training exercises either as
01:48:52 undertake training exercises either as small or large groups uh with each other isn't done by Babcocks that's done internally is responsibility of London fire brigade so ongoing familiarization training ongoing work around that is not something we would give to Babcocks to
01:49:03 something we would give to Babcocks to do that's something that we would instigate ourselves so bad BabC do a lot of the initial acquisition training for us uh and uh particular skills training like for instance urban search and rescue training breathing apparatus
01:49:14 rescue training breathing apparatus where they have the equipment but we have uh you know our own we expect our own watch managers station managers to develop training uh for local crews in relation to local risk. So um that's why
01:49:27 relation to local risk. So um that's why sorry the puzzled look about the Babcot bit was I wouldn't see that as particularly as Babcot's responsibility. What is what is uh you used an expression I'm not familiar with initial acquisition training is that like oh sorry firefighter training trainees. So uh when you want to become a
01:49:38 So uh when you want to become a firefighter we teach you the first skills about how to run hose out wear breathing apparatus pitch a ladder that's what we call initial acquisition. So the first time you learn a piece of training,
01:49:46 training, right?
01:49:49 right? Um 72D visits. Commissioner, what is the purpose of a 72D visit? So it's to familiarize our operational crews with the risks on their ground so that they are uh aware of the buildings
01:50:01 that they are uh aware of the buildings on their ground. They're aware of the water supplies. They're aware of the means of access, um layout of buildings, um what hazards might be in a building, um where they park on the initial
01:50:13 um where they park on the initial attendance, a whole range of things to allow them to be familiar. So, it's something they do across a range of buildings, not just in relation to high-rise. So, they do it in relation to industrial premises on their ground,
01:50:24 industrial premises on their ground, schools, swimming pools, anything where there's a risk that they need to be familiar with. Can I ask you to look at policy 633 again? We looked at this before. Um, and turn please to appendix one in that
01:50:36 turn please to appendix one in that policy.
01:50:42 It's there on screen. Uh, let's just look at that list and and before I do, read with me the um opening words of the paragraph. During 72D
01:50:53 words of the paragraph. During 72D visits, personnel should ensure that they are familiar with the following and their impact on firefighting and search and rescue operations. And then there is a very long list of of of matters
01:51:05 a very long list of of of matters including firefighting shafts, lifts, the and the likelihood of impact of fire spread beyond the compartment of origin, potential for multiple rescues, occupancy, use profile. We can see that. We can read it out. My question is,
01:51:18 We can read it out. My question is, would you uh expect in relation to a high-rise residential block that each and every one of these items would be considered on each visit?
01:51:31 considered on each visit? No, I think this you know it does say should ensure it's not a complete must. They don't have a tick box for it. Uh clearly some of those don't apply to all high-rise buildings. So only some of
01:51:42 high-rise buildings. So only some of them apply to each specific high-rise building. Um, but the amount of high-rise buildings and other risk buildings on each fire station's ground means that it would be terribly
01:51:53 means that it would be terribly difficult for every single firefighter to have detailed knowledge of every single item on that list. Um, but visiting personnel are required to ensure that they're familiar with the following. That's what
01:52:05 familiar with the following. That's what it says. And their impact on firefighting and search and rescue operations. So in your experience and your professional position as commissioner just help us understand in practical terms how that obligation is
01:52:17 practical terms how that obligation is carried out. Um so sorry
01:52:20 so sorry and specifically do do crews go round with that list and tick them off or or do they just uh look at the things that interest them? It's not about looking at things that interest you. This is about being professional firefighters and their
01:52:32 professional firefighters and their ability to understand buildings. So um so they uh handle heart 100%. The last time I did them they were confined to pen and paper and draw and plan line drawings. I think
01:52:43 and draw and plan line drawings. I think they have more technology around them now. Um but you know the specifics around that and a lot of this is as a result of uh previous instance we've had there you know where we're talking about
01:52:54 there you know where we're talking about um the difficulties in accessing a building potentially or finding where the water supplies are. So they do look at the majority of those, but I it's I would not be able to say they have an
01:53:05 would not be able to say they have an exhaustive list. They tick everyone off and search every one of them out because the time factor involved in doing that. If you were to take a ground uh say somewhere like Tower Hamlets, they've probably got something like 250 300
01:53:18 probably got something like 250 300 high-rise buildings on their ground. If you were to do that list in its exhaustedness, in its complexity, it would probably take you three or four hours. Um, unfortunately our firefighters are very busy with operational incident. They're busy with
01:53:30 operational incident. They're busy with training. They're busy with familization. So, the things they will definitely specifically look at are the things about how they get in and out, the water supplies, um, how to plug into dry risers, you know, locations, um, of
01:53:43 dry risers, you know, locations, um, of where they would park an aerial appliance, for instance, um, which isn't cited on there. So you need to understand that you know if you go on frontline fire engines that you need to leave space for an aerial appliance to
01:53:54 leave space for an aerial appliance to park all those kinds of things. Um some of those are very difficult to actually assess on a visit. So looking for a void is quite difficult if you don't know where a void is for instance and things like that. So yes it's a very exhaustive
01:54:05 like that. So yes it's a very exhaustive list. Um but I would not be able to say hand on hot every firefighter that goes to every building will look at every single one of those factors. How would a firefighting crew going to do a visit at a high-rise res residential block such
01:54:17 a high-rise res residential block such as Grenfell? Doesn't have to be Grrenfield. How would that crew go about deciding which items they were going to familiarize themselves with and which not? So it might be around the fact that
01:54:28 not? So it might be around the fact that they might be very familiar with the building already having conducted a number of home fire safety visits in the building or having attended operational incidents in that building previously which would give them prior knowledge of dry rising main firefighting shafts
01:54:39 dry rising main firefighting shafts lifts and access to those kind of premises those kind of factors. So it depends on a number of those and it depends on each firefighting crew the risks on their ground whether they've
01:54:50 risks on their ground whether they've had a sister block that they visited very recently. So there's a number of different factors that they would bring in to scale if they go to visit them where a building was under refurbishment for example and therefore changing.
01:55:02 for example and therefore changing. Yeah.
01:55:03 Yeah. Uh would you expect a visiting crew to uh identify the items in this list which were which um were relevant to that refurbishment and examine them
01:55:15 refurbishment and examine them thoroughly. So the uh issue would be about whether they knew about the refurbishment in the building because we aren't always informed about refurbishments. they could see it. Um, so we ask our uh firefighters as they go around their
01:55:26 firefighters as they go around their daily visits on their fire station ground to be vigilant and look at changes to buildings. So if they were programmed to do a visit at that building, there's refurbishment going on, they would look at what factors the refurbishment was impacting on their ability to fight a fire, to access the
01:55:38 ability to fight a fire, to access the building, to access the um means of uh plugging into dry risers and things like that. Do Yes, we we discussed earlier this morning, Commissioner, uh things like and it's a just above halfway down
01:55:50 like and it's a just above halfway down the likelihood and impact of fire spread beyond the Department of Origin and floor layouts and building construction features. Um how easy is it for a visiting crew to to familiarize
01:56:02 visiting crew to to familiarize themselves with those items and their impact on firefighting and search and rescue operations? I would say it would be extremely difficult to ask a firefighter to assess the impact of fire spread beyond compartment by looking at the outside of a building.
01:56:13 the outside of a building. So what do they have to do? I I think some of the things in that list are incorrect and shouldn't be there. I think they set up they're not the correct things for that they should necessarily be looking at because it would be you wouldn't be looking at a
01:56:24 would be you wouldn't be looking at a building expecting it to fail. You would look at a building for instance and say that on a floor of origin if there was to be a fire there what the likelihood would be you know how you would get into the central core to be able to rescue
01:56:35 the central core to be able to rescue people but you know so we know for instance during the summertime there's far greater likelihood of fire spreading up the outside of buildings through open windows so that crews understand that
01:56:46 windows so that crews understand that factor of it but I think it would be very difficult for any crew to look at a building and look at the likelihood of fire spread beyond the compartment on a normal building. H I see I'm I'm interested in that because we've seen the GR.
01:56:58 we've seen the GR. Mhm.
01:56:58 Mhm. I didn't show you the full list. We've seen the LFB list. Are you saying that as as a from a practical firefighting frontline perspective, some of those at least are completely impractical? I think so. Personally, I think that
01:57:10 I think so. Personally, I think that some of this list needs looking at it needs rewarding and a lot of factors. I think that now knowing what we know about what happened on the 14th of June that we will go back and revisit a lot of what we look at in relation to that
01:57:21 of what we look at in relation to that because I think that some of those are not realistic um and some of the things that we look at need different prioritization. If they're not realistic can you explain how they came to be in both national
01:57:32 how they came to be in both national policy and brigade policy? No, I'm sorry. I didn't have any involvement in the writing of national policy. Did anybody writing the national policy and the brigade or the brigade policy actually talk to frontline firefighters about this list and how in practical terms it was possible to carry
01:57:44 practical terms it was possible to carry out these familiarizations? I'm sorry. I'm not sure of that.
01:57:53 And and and I'm sorry this sounds like a an argument. It's not intended to be. But what doesn't the fact that they that these these points these the need to familiarize oursel with structural
01:58:05 familiarize oursel with structural things compartments spread beyond the compartment of origin building layout they're there aren't they because those drafting the policy uh have worked out
01:58:16 drafting the policy uh have worked out that these are that these can't be eliminated as risks and need to be looked at. Yes, I would agree they need to be looked at, but I would also argue that for my frontline firefighters that they
01:58:28 for my frontline firefighters that they don't have the technical knowledge or ability to be able to do some of those things. So, we can anticipate a building might have a sandwich panel and we know the risk to firefighters from travel fire traveling sandwich panels. You
01:58:39 fire traveling sandwich panels. You know, we know the risk of timber frame construction and buildings under construction because we've seen severe fires in those. So, those things are absolutely correct and right. I think some of the others are very difficult for firefighters on the fire ground day
01:58:50 for firefighters on the fire ground day in day out to be able to make a judgment on.
01:58:54 on. Now, can I move to the OAD, the operational risk database? Mr. M, if we're going to go to a slightly different topic and if we're going to have another break before, we should perhaps this would be a good
01:59:05 we should perhaps this would be a good time.
01:59:06 time. Yes,
01:59:07 Yes, certainly. Right. We'll have another short break now. Commissioner um again please don't talk to anyone about your evidence and uh we resume at 10 12 to go with the us
01:59:30 10
02:09:30 All
02:09:50 right, commissioner. Ready to carry on? Yes, sir.
02:09:53 Yes, sir. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Miller. Commissioner, thank you for coming back to us. Can I ask you please to be shown the OAD, the operational risk database for Grrenfell Tower? Uh, and we are led
02:10:05 for Grrenfell Tower? Uh, and we are led to believe that this is the OD entry as it stood as at the night of the fire. It's LFB uh quadruple 03116 and we have it there on the screen. I'm going to assume, tell me if this is
02:10:17 I'm going to assume, tell me if this is wrong that you're familiar with what this document looks like and is supposed to do in general terms. Yes, I am. Yeah. Uh now if I can ask you please to go
02:10:26 go uh to page uh four internally under the rubric tactical plan. Tactical plan uh we can see uh under the heading
02:10:39 uh we can see uh under the heading operational contingency plan uh we have plan name Granfell Tower with two W's. No number for the plan. Version one dated effective from 30th of October
02:10:50 one dated effective from 30th of October 2009. 30th of October 2009. Uh the question is is that it? Um I believe so. Is that a normal way of an OD presenting
02:11:04 Is that a normal way of an OD presenting a tactical plan for a high-rise residential block? No, it isn't. What is missing? a tactical plan uh actually detail around what tactics the firefighting crews would employ uh when
02:11:16 firefighting crews would employ uh when dealing with this incident. Right. Um so Mike Dowen and his crews when he attended this incident uh if that is all they had as it appears to be
02:11:27 that is all they had as it appears to be um how would that have hampered their ability to plan uh and create a strategy to deal with the fire that they were seeing?
02:11:35 seeing? Um not necessarily. Um I believe Mike Dell and his crew were very familiar with Grenell Tower having visited uh for a number of different occasions for both community safety events and uh previous operational incidents. Uh therefore
02:11:48 operational incidents. Uh therefore Grenville Tower in itself uh being a high-rise of a fairly regular pattern of high-rise. So central core staircase uh firefighting lifts drying main they would be familiar with those. So the
02:12:00 would be familiar with those. So the lack of detail around a tactical plan uh would not necessarily have hampered a professional officer like Mike Don's ability to respond to the initial fire on the fourth floor on that night. What about oncoming officers and
02:12:11 What about oncoming officers and appliances uh other than those from the immediately neighboring fire station North Kensington in this case? Um so obviously oncoming ones uh from the nearby area would have been there as
02:12:22 nearby area would have been there as part of predetermined attendances to um incidents in the tower but oncoming officers after that um don't necessarily relies heavily on the OD because they get detailed instruction when they get there from the incident commander about
02:12:33 there from the incident commander about the specifics of the role and nature of the intervention they want them to take. Uh and also I go back to the fact it is a fairly standard pattern high-rise and therefore you understand that there is a
02:12:45 therefore you understand that there is a central core staircase a dry rising man etc and all those other uh things in place in that tower. It's not ideal is it to have essentially no operational contingency plan in your OD is it?
02:12:55 OD is it? No not at all because that means that when you press the button on your appliance that brings up the mobile data terminal that is all you get.
02:13:01 you get. Yes.
02:13:01 Yes. Which is not of any help to anybody is it?
02:13:03 it? No not at all. Uh now can I um um then
02:13:11 um then just take you excuse me take you to the um LFB's IMP report on the incident uh which is LFB
02:13:22 report on the incident uh which is LFB 3114
02:13:26 which are the lessons learned. It's the IMP report. Uh, and look at uh the ninth box from the uh top of the page. I'm sorry. Sorry, page two.
02:13:41 Uh, it's halfway down the page one of two under development. You can see that it says the operational risk database OARDD accessed through mobile data terminals MDT did not
02:13:53 mobile data terminals MDT did not provide sufficient information on Grenfell tower in particular the tactical plan and floor plans and then there's a comment underneath review PN800 consider the training provided to staff
02:14:05 consider the training provided to staff in collecting and recording key information on the OD and ensure there is a suitable quality assurance process in place. So first of all, do you agree with the assessment that the OAD did not
02:14:17 with the assessment that the OAD did not provide sufficient information on Grenfell
02:14:20 Grenfell entirely?
02:14:20 entirely? Yeah. Uh and we'll come to plans shortly, but um the review that's referred to has that happened.
02:14:29 happened. The review of PN00 is ongoing at the moment,
02:14:31 moment, right? And what about training? Yes, the training will fall out. So uh we undertake the review first of all to find out the shortfalls and the areas of development and we then develop the training to address those shortfalls.
02:14:46 Did you attended the incident as we know on the night? Were you aware on the night itself that the OAD essentially had no operational contingency plan for this building?
02:14:57 contingency plan for this building? No, I wasn't. Did you try to find it? It's not something I can access. uh you have to access it via a computer or via fire engine. Uh and equally the role I undertake uh I would never be in a
02:15:08 undertake uh I would never be in a position to be accessing OD database information. That's because you were a monitoring officer.
02:15:13 officer. Uh just the seniority of my role and the role I undertake of across the wider piece of fire ground. Um there'd be people uh who would be accessing that at a far more junior level than me. Right. We'll come back to that uh in in due course if we may, but I think the
02:15:24 due course if we may, but I think the answer to my question is no. Um, were you aware going to the night itself of any attempts over the course of that night to obtain plans for this building? Yes, I was. Right. Um, just looking sticking with
02:15:37 Right. Um, just looking sticking with this document if we may, Paul. Just turn on two pages, three pages, I'm sorry, to plans and images. Oh, my fault. Can we go back, I'm sorry, to the OD tab 13.
02:15:50 Take the imp off the screen.
02:15:56 I'd like to go to page seven of that document, plans and images. Um, now that is all that the OD had for Grrenfell Tower on the night of the fire. It is an aerial view, not very large uh of the
02:16:11 aerial view, not very large uh of the building
02:16:13 building vertically downwards and some of the neighboring uh buildings. It looks as if it's uh taken uh with the uh east face to the uppermost part of the building.
02:16:24 to the uppermost part of the building. Um just in terms of what that shows, would that be sufficient information to enable any attending appliance uh to know anything about this building? No, not at all. No. And was woefully inade wfully
02:16:37 No. And was woefully inade wfully inadequate really. Indeed. Now on the subject of plans, did you know that um as he told us Andy Rose, incident commander had been
02:16:48 Rose, incident commander had been seeking plans for a long time during that night? Yes, I was present on several occasions uh when he asked for the plans. Would you expect plans to be part of the OAD so that they could be immediately
02:17:00 OAD so that they could be immediately accessible by attending crews? Uh to a certain extent, yes. But the level of detail of the plans that we wanted and we were seeking the local authority um not necessarily but you'd expect at least something to be available on the OD would you?
02:17:12 be available on the OD would you? I would expect something. Absolutely. Right. Um now did you know that there was no uh premises information box so far as we've been able to establish? Uh I wasn't aware um early on on the night. It was subject of conversation
02:17:23 night. It was subject of conversation later.
02:17:24 later. Right. There was no EPIP either. Do you know what an EIP is? I do know what an EIP is. Yes, there was no EIP.
02:17:29 no EIP. Electronic premises information. No. Did you know that on the night? No, I just was underway on the night. Now, can I ask you please to go to the London Safety Plan uh LFB
02:17:41 London Safety Plan uh LFB 50225
02:17:42 50225 and look at page 27
02:17:57 uh high-rise. This is the left hand column. uh of that page and I'll just show it to you. Uh from previous consultations,
02:18:11 you. Uh from previous consultations, London Fire Brigade also knows that some people may still feel vulnerable from fires and high-rise buildings. The brigade understands this concern and that is why it is one of the key concerns captured in the assessment of
02:18:23 concerns captured in the assessment of risk toolkit. The London Fire Brigade would like to reassure Londoners that it has effective measures in place for dealing with incidents in high-rise buildings and this includes a
02:18:34 buildings and this includes a predetermined attendance of four fire engines to any high-rise incident. The brigade has also developed premises information plates for residential high-rise buildings which provide vital information about
02:18:46 which provide vital information about layout, dimensions, dry riser outlets, hydrant locations, and whether the building has any lifts. These are available electronically to crews, enabling firefighters to familiarize
02:18:57 enabling firefighters to familiarize themselves with the building while on route and to get to work quickly on arrival.
02:19:03 arrival. Given the absence of the detail that we've seen in the operational risk database for Grenfell Tower and the absence of plans, any plans on those premises, do you consider that in the
02:19:15 premises, do you consider that in the case of Grenfell, the residents of Grenfell were justifiably reassured by this reassurance? Um, I would say probably not. um because obviously there was no EPIP in place and there were no plans. However, what they
02:19:26 there were no plans. However, what they could be reassured by was that the uh crews at North Kensington on the night were very familiar with the building and knew the layout, knew where the dry rising mains were, knew where the firefighting lifts were. So on the night itself, they provided the very best
02:19:38 itself, they provided the very best response in relation to knowing all those factors. But the actual absence of that would not provide reassurance to me if I lived in that block. No.
02:19:48 No. And was it not the brigade's responsibility to ensure having given that general assurance that Grenfell Tower had the vital information
02:20:00 Grenfell Tower had the vital information about layout dimensions etc available to the crews first attending? Absolutely. So that was a major failure was it not? Not a major failure. No, I would say it
02:20:12 Not a major failure. No, I would say it was a failure of procedure. We should have had them there, but it wasn't a major failure in the fact it had no impact on the crew's ability to be able to respond operationally on the night. You don't think? I don't think in I know because I know
02:20:23 I don't think in I know because I know how familiar the crews were with Grenville Tower and with the layout and where exactly all the facilities were. Can you did did I don't know whether you're familiar with the evidence that came out yesterday
02:20:35 came out yesterday which assistant commissioner Andy Row gave about a conversation he'd had around 7:30 a.m. where he'd been explaining that the absence of plans was a major deficiency which would be
02:20:47 a major deficiency which would be highlighted. Would you agree with his assessment? I would say the inability of us to be able to get plans to know the internal uh floors and the number of flats on each floor was problematic on
02:20:58 flats on each floor was problematic on the night. Definitely. Yes. A major deficiency. Yes, that's the words Andy used. And I'm suggesting to you that it's a major deficiency for which the London Fire Brigade was ultimately responsible.
02:21:09 Fire Brigade was ultimately responsible. Do you accept that? No, I don't because it's the time at which we wanted that uh the time, the information, and the layout. We would not necessarily always have that detail
02:21:21 not necessarily always have that detail uh either on an e-IP or on plans on the OD of the specific to the details we wanted on the night of the numbers of flats inside and also what we were seeking to try and get from the local authority was an idea about the
02:21:32 authority was an idea about the residents who were inside those flats which is knowledge that the frontline firefighters would never be able to access. Well, let's just take it slightly more slowly then. Going back to the reassurance which the LFB felt fit
02:21:44 the reassurance which the LFB felt fit to give Londoners in this document 2017 before the fire. The reassurance is that the that it that's the brigade has effective measures in place
02:21:55 effective measures in place and as part of that it goes on to say it's also developed premises information plates for residential high-rise buildings. Now, would you expect that in order to be able to make good on that
02:22:06 order to be able to make good on that assurance, familiarization visits conducted by crews would make sure that there were premises information plates or at least some means of of immediately accessing
02:22:20 some means of of immediately accessing the information set out there. That's what I would expect. Yes. Yes. And therefore, if crews doing familiarization visits did not uh check
02:22:31 familiarization visits did not uh check that the premises had those premises information plates and all the details set out there, that would be a serious failure. I wouldn't call it a serious failure. I would call it a failure because it didn't impact on the ability
02:22:43 because it didn't impact on the ability to respond on the night and to deal with the situation they were faced with because they were familiar with all of the things they were required to be that that information would have given them. So although it was a failure, the fact it wasn't on there, I wouldn't consider
02:22:55 it wasn't on there, I wouldn't consider it to be a serious failure and I don't think impacted on our ability on the night to do our very best to respond to a terrible situation that we should never have been placed in. So do you agree or disagree with Andy
02:23:06 So do you agree or disagree with Andy Rose's assessment that the absence of plans, however detailed, was a major deficiency? So I agree because the detail was what we were after. The detail of plans and who was living in
02:23:18 detail of plans and who was living in those flats to give us an idea of the people that were missing. So the idea of the plans was us to be able to cross reference that against knowing who was in there which is something that would never be contained on the OD on NEPIP.
02:23:31 never be contained on the OD on NEPIP. So you say it was a failure but not a serious failure. The absence of plans is that
02:23:35 that the absence of this plan the situation here described here was not a serious failure. The absence of the plans and the ability of the local authority to supply us the information on the night was a serious problem. Surely it would have been essential for
02:23:46 Surely it would have been essential for any crew arriving certainly early on in the incident to be able to know how many flats there were on each floor and how many floors there were in the building containing residents. Is that not right? But they were able to access that
02:23:57 But they were able to access that information. There was a plate on the outside of the building that said how many floors there were in there, I believe. Uh and also they were familiar with the layout, so they knew the flats on the floors. Right.
02:24:11 I I think what this discussion has perhaps thrown up is that you're saying that it didn't matter anyway. Is is that I'm saying that the the lack of the OAD
02:24:22 I'm saying that the the lack of the OAD database information and the lack of an EPIP on the night of the Grenell Tower fire did not impact on the first firefighting crew's ability to respond to the fire because they already had
02:24:33 to the fire because they already had prior knowledge of the building. The lack of us having the detailed plans and knowledge of the residents inside caused us significant problems. Um, you say they had prior knowledge of the building. Uh, how could any resident
02:24:47 the building. Uh, how could any resident living in Granfell Tire be confident given this blanket assurance that the that the that the crews who attended would happen to have intimate knowledge or any knowledge of the layout of the
02:24:58 or any knowledge of the layout of the building unless there was a premises information box available to any crew who attended. I'm not saying that I'm not saying the local residents could be confident of that. I'm saying I'm confident the response of my firefighters on the night
02:25:10 response of my firefighters on the night was not hampered by the lack of that. Very well.
02:25:16 In your role as commissioner, were you familiar with the brigade's obligations under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004? Yes, I am. You are. And the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 contingency planning regulations?
02:25:29 2004 contingency planning regulations? I am. Yes. You are. Have you you've had briefings and training on that? Have you? Uh not specific briefings and trainings, but I'm aware. Were you aware of the brigade's obligation to maintain a community risk register?
02:25:41 register? Yes, I am. Yeah.
02:25:42 Yeah. And that's a register which gets shared with other agencies. Is it? Yes, it is. Uh do you know whether the brigade kept such a risk register?
02:25:53 such a risk register? We have a community risk register that's managed by uh one of the teams in it. I'm not aware of the detail in it. No. Right. Do you happen to know whether it was an identical document or database uh to the P the premises risk assessment
02:26:06 uh to the P the premises risk assessment which is also kept? No, I'm not aware of that. You don't know whether it's the same or different or contains the same information? No. Do you
02:26:14 Do you right
02:26:16 right if well okay I if as far as Grenfell was concerned the community risk register carried the same information as the OD
02:26:27 carried the same information as the OD that we've we've seen would you accept that it was similarly deficient in the ways we've discussed? I'm really sorry I can't comment because I don't know what was in there. Let's turn to your attendance at the
02:26:38 Let's turn to your attendance at the night of the fire now so that we can understand the chronology. Commissioner, you were present uh as the duty well you were duty brigade manager on the night of the fire. I was. Yes.
02:26:49 I was. Yes. And that would mean that you would be mobilized uh the moment there were is this right? More than 15 pumps. That's correct. Right.
02:26:57 Right. uh
02:26:59 uh say that means is this right that a 16 pumps and above um an AC assistant commissioner takes command. That's correct. And then your job as duty brigade
02:27:10 And then your job as duty brigade manager is to be the monitoring officer. That's right. Right. Um, now can I ask you to go to your witness statement please at page five.
02:27:31 You say in the last paragraph on that page that you were made aware of the incident at Grenfield Tower as a result of a phone call from my then staff officer Keely Foster. This was at 0203
02:27:42 officer Keely Foster. This was at 0203 hours. Uh, where did you source that time from, do you think? Uh, from my telephone log. From your telephone log, I see. And do you know why you weren't notified at 15
02:27:54 you know why you weren't notified at 15 pumps?
02:27:55 pumps? Um, I believe the situation on the night because it was so dynamic and that the uh control room so very busy, I believe there was a potential delay in the notification of the staff officers. So I
02:28:07 notification of the staff officers. So I myself at that time didn't carry a pager. Uh we get notified by a staff officer who collects details and information and then phones us and tells us the information. Um so at that time
02:28:18 us the information. Um so at that time uh it was I had to wait for my the call from a staff officer before I was made aware. But I believe it's because how busy control were that that information wasn't relayed at the immediate time. M
02:28:29 wasn't relayed at the immediate time. M um did you know on well how soon after uh
02:28:35 uh 127 when pumps were made 15 did you know that pumps had been made 15 0203
02:28:41 0203 right and I think you left home at 0208 I did and what's the source of that time the source of that time was I checked my phone uh and I'm when I actually left um
02:28:53 phone uh and I'm when I actually left um I think I got a phone call incoming from staff officer Rob Davis who gave me the postcode for Grenell Tower as I was about to pull off my drive. I see.
02:29:05 I see. So, you took the call. Yes. I didn't have the postcode at the time, so I needed to know where I was going.
02:29:09 going. Right. Okay. Now, you then uh say uh that you arrived, this is page eight of your statement. Forgive me. Page eight of your statement. You say
02:29:20 of your statement. You say uh that you arrived at 249. That's at the very bottom of the page.
02:29:30 Uh, is that right? Yes.
02:29:32 Yes. And, uh, do you know the time source for that?
02:29:36 that? Um, yes. Uh, I was on the telephone to, uh, one of my deputies, Tom George. I also booked in with mobilizing control via the airwave radio.
02:29:47 via the airwave radio. Okay.
02:29:47 Okay. And then took a photograph all within space of 2 minutes. Right. Now, we'll look at the photograph that uh is uh um that's exhibited your statement. How did you know the time of that
02:29:58 did you know the time of that photograph? You've timed it at 251, I think. But how do you know that? Uh because it's time stamped on my telephone. Right now, can I examine with you your route very briefly? On page seven of
02:30:10 route very briefly? On page seven of your statement, you say that as you were traveling to the tower, you heard multiple FSG calls. Uh it's the top of page seven. You see that?
02:30:20 that? I do. Yes. Um,
02:30:26 did you hear the volume and intensity of FSG calls? I heard uh numerous relays of information from control to the fire
02:30:38 information from control to the fire ground saying they had fast survival guidance and giving details of people and flats. Did you did did you pick up any specific details about the location of the fire or smoke in the building?
02:30:49 of the fire or smoke in the building? So, I picked up the detail of the fact people saying they were unable to leave their flats due to smoke in the communal areas uh and they couldn't get out and they were trapped. I didn't pick up any details around floor numbers. I'm trying
02:31:00 details around floor numbers. I'm trying to balance listening to the radio to give me some situational awareness with driving on blue lights the incident which is uh quite a risky occupation in the middle of the night driving through London.
02:31:09 London. Yeah. Okay. And uh did you have any thoughts at that stage um about what strategy should be adopted in light of that volume and intensity of
02:31:21 in light of that volume and intensity of FSG calls that you could hear? No, because I wasn't aware of the strategy that was taking place on the fire ground. So I wouldn't seek to preempt um what was going on until I could get a view of the building uh and
02:31:32 could get a view of the building uh and an actual understanding of what crews were doing at that time. Uh and we I mean you've described I think in in colorful language. Sorry. uh notes. It's uh has the um
02:31:43 Sorry. uh notes. It's uh has the um flush of reality about it. But you've described in in colorful language what your thoughts were. Did you have any specific thoughts about whether there should be full or or at least partial evacuation of this building at that time?
02:31:53 time? No, none whatsoever. I wasn't familiar with the building, the layout, the number of staircases and means of escape. I know I wouldn't have thought about that. Did you have any suspicion at all as to what was happening? Uh all I knew it was a terribly significant incident. The speed of
02:32:05 significant incident. The speed of escalation of the makeups and requirements of additional fire engines based against what I could hear with fire survivor guidance led me to believe it was a very significant incident taking place. And did this have any bearing on
02:32:16 And did this have any bearing on anything? Did this had any did this have any bearing on anything you'd already you'd ever experienced in your career? Nothing. I've never experienced anything even remotely like it. Right now you were going there is this
02:32:27 Right now you were going there is this right to take on the role of monitoring officer.
02:32:30 officer. That's correct. Can I ask you to look at uh policy 424 which is LFB quintupal0531
02:32:41 which for those who have it is tab 16 of our um our policies bundle and there it is monitoring officer policy 424 issued in March 2006 and
02:32:55 policy 424 issued in March 2006 and reviewed as current as of the 18th of November 2014. 14. Uh are you familiar at least in general terms with this policy? I am. Yes. Right. Have you ever had training on
02:33:07 Right. Have you ever had training on this policy or any guidance from somebody as to how it works? Uh yes. As part of overall uh senior manager instant command training who trained in the role of monitoring officer.
02:33:16 officer. Okay. Now can I then ask you some questions about it? If you go to the second page of the policy uh there's a key point summary and although it's not it's not a very long policy. So the key
02:33:27 it's not a very long policy. So the key point summary is almost as long as the policy itself. But looking at the duties of a monitoring officer, first bullet point is to undertake remote monitoring of an incident. What would that involve?
02:33:39 of an incident. What would that involve? So that would be for instance uh if I had been informed uh of the fire when it was between 12 and 15 pumps, then I would have been able to be in uh situation where I could switch on the radio and listen. and I could
02:33:50 radio and listen. and I could potentially uh fire up my laptop, have a look at the details of the call, have a look at the building that was concerned, plan my route there if I was going to have to attend. So the remote monitoring officer is an additional layer where
02:34:01 officer is an additional layer where you're not attending the incident, but you're looking at the sort of strategic overview and actually in relation to what else is happening in London Fire Brigade. So if I was remotely monitoring that, I'd be interested to see whether we had any other large scale operational
02:34:12 we had any other large scale operational incidents taking part and that sort of thing.
02:34:16 thing. And and how did you perform that function on uh on the night remotely? I didn't at any point because the first time I was made aware this the fire was of such a significance that I wanted to
02:34:27 of such a significance that I wanted to attend immediately. Right. Um and then in the third bullet point, gather evidence of operational performance. This is to include observations on behavior, attitude and other relevant interactions. Is that
02:34:38 other relevant interactions. Is that gathering of evidence something that starts only once you've reached the incident ground or is it something that starts as soon as you're alerted to the incident as a monitoring officer? Uh so it can start when you're alert to the incident because you can be listening to
02:34:49 incident because you can be listening to the messages that are being passed from the fire ground and that would give you an indication of what's taking place. It would also give you an indication of the quality of the messages that are being relayed. So for instance, if the messages are very short and there's an
02:35:00 messages are very short and there's an urgency, you can get some sort of feeling of what's happening on the fire ground, but the vast majority of that takes place face to face on the actual incident ground. Right. Um, during your journey about to
02:35:12 Right. Um, during your journey about to take over the monitoring officer role, did you have your airwave radio on? I'm assuming you did. And you could hear every all the radio traffic coming from on on uh from control to the incident ground.
02:35:22 ground. So, you can't hear all of it because uh for large portions of the incident, you're driving under sirens, which actually pretty much exclude you hearing anything else other than sirens in your car. So, you can only hear parts of it when you're not operating your
02:35:33 when you're not operating your two-tonone sirens. Right.
02:35:36 Right. That's not terribly helpful, is it? And which would be more important? Uh, two-ton siren so people don't kill me. Um, otherwise I'll never get there. Right.
02:35:43 Right. So unless I alert other road users my presence, they won't let me through. I won't get there or worst case scenario having an an accident. Okay. I mean, did you hear any of the makeups or any of the um messages
02:35:54 makeups or any of the um messages relating to um FUS or um did you hear for for instance there was a major incident declared? Uh no, I didn't hear that. Uh I was aware it was a make pumps 40 before I left home. Right. So that gave me all I
02:36:06 left home. Right. So that gave me all I need to know about the scale of the incident to be fair. Okay. As you left home, did you know who was incident commander? No, I didn't. You didn't? No.
02:36:12 No. Did you want to find out? Uh, no, not particularly. I just wanted to get there. It would have uh so the fact that whoever was incident commander, I couldn't influence that. There was nothing I could do about it. I knew that on a make pumps 40 there'd be
02:36:23 knew that on a make pumps 40 there'd be a significant number of senior officers attending the incident. Um, so at that moment in time, it was of no use to me to know that. Hearing the intensity and the volume of the the FSG calls as so
02:36:34 the volume of the the FSG calls as so far as you could given the sirens. Uh did you make any attempt to call the control room? No, I'd already got a very clear indication from my staff key foster that the control room were under severe pressure uh and were handling a large
02:36:46 pressure uh and were handling a large number of fast survivor guidance calls. Me calling in interrupting there would have been no help whatsoever. Right. Well, we'll come back to the gathering of evidence in a moment when we look at the policy and and what you did. Um the next item is take command of
02:36:58 did. Um the next item is take command of an incident either if required or as necessary. Mhm. Uh in what circumstances would you as the monitoring officer decide to take command of an incident? So the rank I am now uh never I've never
02:37:10 So the rank I am now uh never I've never taken command as the principal officer. So I'm effectively the top level of officer that will ever attend the fire ground. This monitoring officer policy covers all ranks from the rank of station manager upwards. So for instance, a station manager will go out
02:37:21 instance, a station manager will go out and monitor a four pump fire. They may well take over if it's an experienced watch manager. Vice versa, a deputy assistant commissioner could go out and take over from a group manager. either if the incident escalated or if they felt it needed a greater span of
02:37:33 felt it needed a greater span of control.
02:37:36 Right. Just to unpack that a little bit, you I know you were commissioner from the 14th officially from the 14th of June by by coincidence I think but in
02:37:47 of June by by coincidence I think but in the period the six-month period prior to that when you taken on the essentially acting role of commissioner um had you any experience of taking command as as a monitoring officer? No. So I've never in the role I am now.
02:37:58 No. So I've never in the role I am now. So I sit on the same level operation as my two deputies. The three of us are considered the principal officers for the fire ground. And neither as a deputy commissioner or as commissioner have I ever taken over from an assistant commissioner.
02:38:09 commissioner. Right. And looking at the fifth bullet point ensuring a safe system of work. How did you um how would you go about discharging
02:38:22 um how would you go about discharging that function? So that would mean that uh in general or specifically in relation to Grenville, sorry, in in specifically on the night in relation to Grenville. So on the night that would require me uh attending the operational incident,
02:38:33 attending the operational incident, receiving a briefing from then incident commander, uh looking at the systems that are in place, um potentially having conversation with the senior safety officer, which I did, and speaking to the OT officers
02:38:44 the OT officers and looking at the sixth bullet point, which is the provision of support and guidance to the incident commander. In broad terms, can you explain how you went about discharging that duty on the night? Yes. So on the night what I did
02:38:56 night? Yes. So on the night what I did was to make sure that uh I was available to Andy Row that we could have conversations around um key risk critical decisions around plans around specifically conversations around things
02:39:09 specifically conversations around things like um one of the ones that comes to mind was when we had a conversation a very clear one the back of the command unit about the risk to firefighters and the risk to us continuing to commit
02:39:20 the risk to us continuing to commit firefighters into a very dangerous environment weighed against the risk of the lives that we believe we could save inside the tower. And that conversation uh was a very difficult conversation to have because we basically discussed the fact we were potentially and quite
02:39:32 fact we were potentially and quite probably risking the lives of firefighters and that we were potentially going to lose the life of one of our firefighters to balance against the risk of saving people inside the building. That's not a decision you want to take in isolation and that's
02:39:43 want to take in isolation and that's something that as an incident commander you absolutely need the support of monitoring officer to make. Now let's examine a bit more closely the ingredients of the role of monitoring set out in this policy. Uh if you go to
02:39:57 set out in this policy. Uh if you go to uh
02:40:00 uh the the third section on the second page of the policy
02:40:06 um monitoring so we're still under key point summary although I think the the rest of it is fairly similar. Um the uh
02:40:17 rest of it is fairly similar. Um the uh second bullet says uh
02:40:21 uh and let me look at the first bullet as well. The MO is is to apply the DMM as the decision-m model which I'm assuming you're familiar with the risk assessment process to the incident and compare their conclusions and risk assessments
02:40:32 their conclusions and risk assessments with that of the incident commander. So just pausing there, does that tell us that that you as the MO monitoring officer have to perform your own
02:40:43 officer have to perform your own independent risk assessment and then look at that and work out whether it's the same as the incident commander. Yes, but it's generally done in conjunction with the incident commander because I need the incident commander to tell me what their risk assessment
02:40:55 tell me what their risk assessment operational plans are uh and what they're actually doing because it'd be very difficult for me to conduct an independent one without knowing the actions that are taking place. So it's not something you sit and do in isolation. So the conversation around
02:41:06 isolation. So the conversation around the DMM is something that all our incident commanders do at the point of handover and have a conversation and we brief against that. It's a very good tool for ascertaining the key information and the process of evaluation. And
02:41:17 evaluation. And and is that because you in order to carry out your own risk assessment process to the incident need to be given all relevant information by the incident commander who's been there on the ground so far?
02:41:28 so far? Yeah. as much as possible in a time frame because clearly uh there's a large volume of information to impart but the key information about what's happening and the operational plan. Would you agree that it's necessary in
02:41:39 Would you agree that it's necessary in carrying out that role that you do your own independent assessment bringing your own expertise to bear rather than simply rubber stamping what the incident commander has done already? So it's not rubber stamping. So what I'm trying to explain by that is I would
02:41:50 trying to explain by that is I would have the conversations on the night I had the conversation very clearly with Andy Row. I then went out to the fire ground to look at the situation myself and to make my own assessment. Just just just sorry, let me put my question again. Do you so far as you
02:42:03 question again. Do you so far as you understand this role, it's not a rubber stamping exercise. It does require you to carry out your own independent assessment. Indeed.
02:42:11 Indeed. Yes. Uh and it needs to be robust on the basis of what you yourself learn. Definitely. Now under the second bullet point, having ascertained the IC's plan,
02:42:22 point, having ascertained the IC's plan, the intended tactics and communication structure, if appropriate, the MMO should tur the incident and evaluate the operational plan and feed back to the IC.
02:42:33 IC. Mhm.
02:42:35 Mhm. Does that mean that you would need to go out to each sector and find out what they're doing? Not specifically, no. Um it depends on
02:42:46 Not specifically, no. Um it depends on the actual incident that's taking place as to what you do but on the night of Grenfell it meant that I wanted to go into the tower to speak to the people. Um but a lot of that is done with the
02:42:57 Um but a lot of that is done with the assistance of the OT officers who accompany you quite regular as the monitoring officer because I can provide you a clear picture of what's been taking place and you go and get situational awareness yourself to be able to make that judgment. It doesn't
02:43:08 able to make that judgment. It doesn't necessarily mean visiting every sector does it not? No. uh we well we'll come to the sectorization shortly u but would it not be essential in in order to uh review uh
02:43:22 be essential in in order to uh review uh the intended tactics and communication structure that you should you should go and talk to the heads of the sectors who had been put in place by the incident commander just to find out even in general terms what they were doing.
02:43:33 general terms what they were doing. Um yes and I did that at certain points of the incident. You don't necessarily do it on your first foray into the fire ground and you rely very heavily on the professionalism of the OT officers who have done that for you and can brief you with that information.
02:43:44 with that information. Yes, I'd understand you'd want to rely on professional assistance of others at the fire ground. I understand that. But just in terms of what you yourself as monitoring officer needed to do, whether accompanied or otherwise, you
02:43:55 whether accompanied or otherwise, you would suggest need to go to talk to the people in charge of the fire sector or the search and rescue sector to work out even in general terms what they were doing so that you could carry out the evaluation of the operational plan.
02:44:07 evaluation of the operational plan. Uh no, not necessarily. my vast experience of operational command and the procedures and policies near the and the vast amount of times I've undertaken monitoring officer role, you make an assessment on the scene as to what information you need to gather at that
02:44:19 information you need to gather at that moment in time to make those decisions.
02:44:27 Yes. And one of the sources of the information you need to gather to make those decisions would I would suggest be those who were running the operational sectors. Yes, at a time which I did
02:44:39 sectors. Yes, at a time which I did early on I didn't visit them but at a time yes at a certain point in time you'll visit all of them but my initial assessment didn't involve me going to the bridge head on the fourth floor. No we'll we'll we'll come to that commissioner we will come to what you
02:44:50 commissioner we will come to what you actually did. I just at the moment just trying to get a feel for what the obligations are and how you go about doing the job you were doing. Can I just move on then in this document to uh page three monitoring which is um paragraph
02:45:04 three monitoring which is um paragraph 4.
02:45:13 It's it's entitled monitoring and and paragraph 41 says the process of monitoring is the measurement of the efficiency, effectiveness and where possible economic performance of
02:45:25 possible economic performance of individuals and the organization at incidents
02:45:29 incidents and simulations. It's carried out in two distinct ways either remote from or directly by attending the incident. Uh
02:45:40 would you agree that that is the substance of the monitoring officer's role?
02:45:43 role? Definitely. Looking at the substance of that role as set out there, would you agree
02:45:49 agree um that uh you would need to have some grasp of the detail of what was going on on the fire ground in all its different sectors to be able to measure the efficiency, effectiveness, and if we
02:46:02 efficiency, effectiveness, and if we need to get into it, the economic performance of the individuals involved. Yes.
02:46:08 Yes. Can I then take you to your witness statement, page nine,
02:46:18 where you say uh in the fourth paragraph down, it's the last paragraph in fact on the page.
02:46:26 the page. I was aware that I needed to find the incident commander. As monitoring officer, my role is to provide some reassurance, guidance, and support.
02:46:38 Uh I is that the complete description of your role? No, but uh that was the uh thrust of the first things I would need to do in
02:46:49 first things I would need to do in relation to recognizing the significance and the extraordinary events of Grenville Tower was that whoever it was in charge was going to need some serious reassurance, guidance and support at
02:47:00 reassurance, guidance and support at that moment in time. Obviously the clearly the the content of the monitoring officer uh policy is what the entire role is but that was my first priority.
02:47:08 priority. I understand that. I understand that you would want as a responsible commissioner to as it were deploy your soft skills but I just want to make sure that we're all clear that that that was not the
02:47:19 all clear that that that was not the totality of it and that there was some hard there was some hard calculations to be done as well. Absolutely. right now.
02:47:31 Did you do the monitoring officer role throughout the night? I did. Yes. Um, but as I explained in my statement, at a certain point in time,
02:47:42 statement, at a certain point in time, the role changed because uh due to the significance of the incident, you'll appreciate there were a large number of external factors that I needed to deal with. So for the point where uh up to
02:47:53 with. So for the point where uh up to and including probably I can't say what time was about half nine I was very heavily involved and close to Andy from that m time onwards although I was in close contact with him there were a number of other things I had to deal
02:48:04 number of other things I had to deal with press uh talking to the mayor of London and various other things that are also in my role as commissioner absolutely key I see so does that mean that in fact there were parts of the night when you
02:48:15 there were parts of the night when you weren't doing your monitor monitoring monitoring officer role I was still doing the monitoring officer role but I was doing other things in addition to it as well. Okay. Can I just show you the PRC notes um which we have
02:48:28 um which we have uh these are uh LFB 3112.
02:48:34 Um and just to set this in some context for you, these are handwritten notes taken at a meeting of the 24th of July 2017, the PRC meeting, which I think you attended. I was. Yes. Uh and I don't know whether
02:48:47 I was. Yes. Uh and I don't know whether you've seen these notes since or after that meeting. No. So these would have been made by Deputy Commissioner Tom George who was chairing the meeting and um probably should have a second occupation
02:48:58 probably should have a second occupation as a doctor because they're terribly difficult to read but um well yes. So no I haven't seen them there Tom George's notes. I've seen the outcomes uh of the development and the points that will end up but I've not seen these notes.
02:49:10 up but I've not seen these notes. Yeah. And uh can I just ask you please to turn to page 17 which I think is the very last page of the document.
02:49:20 Uh and four lines down from the top you say felt not doing monitoring officer role fully due to speaking to crews. Um
02:49:32 Um why do you say that? So uh just to set the context of uh where this is. So this uh the performance review of command we undertook there took 10 10 hours 45 minutes. So for 10 hours 45 minutes we'd
02:49:44 minutes. So for 10 hours 45 minutes we'd sat in a room with all the incident commanders uh in a very short time frame after Grenful Tower going through the incident on the night. It was a very difficult meeting. It was a very emotionally charged meeting. We'd had to
02:49:56 emotionally charged meeting. We'd had to pause it on a number of occasions where people had broken down and become very distressed. Um this was the first time a number of people had spoken openly about the events of the night. Um and the if
02:50:08 the events of the night. Um and the if you see the point above where it says staff in tears, I'd gone out to the fire ground uh on number of occasions and where normally you'd go out and just make an assessment of the operational plans and tactics. I'd spent a large
02:50:20 plans and tactics. I'd spent a large number of time talking to firefighters who'd broken down in my arms, firefighters I'd never met before, firefighters I didn't know. I've never seen a situation on the fire ground where firefighters are openly crying and
02:50:31 where firefighters are openly crying and distressed. Um, and I felt at that moment in time that I wasn't 100% performing the monitoring officer role according to the policy, but I felt that was a far more important place. And Andy Row assured me that all times he felt
02:50:43 Row assured me that all times he felt fully supported and he never in any point felt I wasn't performing my role. It was my personal reflection as a result of a very emotional situation that I felt I had been
02:50:54 that I felt I had been involved very closely with some very very distressed people and that was my priority at that time. There was absolutely no way I could have had a firefighter burst into tears and just walk away and leave them at that moment. Yeah. Would it have been helpful for you
02:51:07 Yeah. Would it have been helpful for you to have had another senior officer take over or perhaps share the monitoring officer role with you? So later on the incident uh my other deputy commissioner Steve Aptton did join me on the instant ground to take away the role monitoring
02:51:19 ground to take away the role monitoring officer so I could do the outward facing piece. I did that. Yes. Right.
02:51:22 Right. What time is that? I'm really sorry I can't remember but it'll be on the instant log to what time he arrived. Would it have been more helpful though to have somebody share that role with you earlier so that you could do what you've told us you were doing with crews?
02:51:33 crews? No because initially I was able to form the role of monitoring officer very clearly and give Andy the support he needed. This was uh during daytime. daylight. So it probably come into maybe about 9 8 9:00 in the morning when I was
02:51:44 about 9 8 9:00 in the morning when I was out doing that. What when you were out not performing the monitoring officer roy say not performing that was an emotionally charged statement. I just felt at the time that I was doing something more important but it wasn't I was still
02:51:57 important but it wasn't I was still contactable by Andy. I had a radio on me. He could still access me if he needed to and I was fully aware of what the operational plan was and I was standing very near the base of the tower so I could see the activities that were taking place.
02:52:10 So just that I'm clear in my mind about timing when you say felt not doing monitoring officer role fully due to speaking to crews. That's that's later in the incident is it? Yeah. So it wouldn't I did a lot of
02:52:22 Yeah. So it wouldn't I did a lot of speaking to crews on the night it was very essential that I provided some what I perceived to be direct leadership. Uh and the reason for that was that in my opinion the situation they were going into was life-threatening to them. I
02:52:35 into was life-threatening to them. I felt that if I as their commissioner went into the tower and spoke to them and showed that I was prepared to be in the same situation of risk that they were, it would give them the impetus to
02:52:46 were, it would give them the impetus to feel that they could carry on doing the tasks they were doing. And I I've had people subsequently say to me it made a complete difference to them. The fact I was in there and I was prepared to risk my life in the tower to be there and
02:52:57 my life in the tower to be there and support them. Um so although you can take the kind of the detail of the monitoring officer role as to how it is specifically my role in the night was far greater than that motivating supporting and showing my firefighters I
02:53:08 supporting and showing my firefighters I was there alongside them was absolutely key.
02:53:11 key. Yes. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I think now may be an appropriate moment for a break. Yes.
02:53:17 Yes. Uh I just want to make a trigger warning if I can. The next thing I'm going to go to, the next, well, I say that likely the next thing I'm going to go to is a
02:53:28 the next thing I'm going to go to is a photograph uh of the tower on fire. It's the photograph you took at 0251. It's been read into the record, but it's not, I think, available in the room. Uh it it is a photograph of the building on
02:53:39 it it is a photograph of the building on fire and so if people um people find that disturbing, then they should take steps not to be present during the first 15 minutes after we resume. Right. Well, well, I'm sure you're right
02:53:50 Right. Well, well, I'm sure you're right to mention that now, but I think it would be wise to mention it again after the adjournment because others may have come who haven't been here to hear you say that. Yes.
02:54:00 Yes. And I think they ought to get a proper warning as well. Very well, I'll do. All right. We're going to stop now so we can all have some lunch and we'll resume at 2:00. Again, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're
02:54:12 anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room and uh we'll resume them. Thanks, sir. If you'd like to go to the usher, she'll look after you.
02:54:28 Uh, thank you. 2:00, please.