Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation Evidence - Monday 9th May 2022 (1/2)

9 May 2022 · Theresa Brown (TMO Director of Housing), Counsel to the Inquiry · 3:02:39
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Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation Evidence - Monday 9th May 2022 (1/2)

Key moments

Full transcript

00:00:26 good morning everyone welcome to today's head ing uh today we're going to hear the first of a number of witnesses from the tenant management organization yes Mr yes Mr chairman good

00:00:38 organization yes Mr yes Mr chairman good morning members of the panel good morning to you I now call Theresa bran

00:00:51 please good morning Mr Brown welcome back I should say you're going to affirm I think right and the words should be on the screen in front of you sorry yeah so when you're ready perhaps you'd read

00:01:02 when you're ready perhaps you'd read them out for us okay I do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I should give should be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very

00:01:15 much that's it sit down make yourself comfortable all right very good thank you yes Mr mil when you're ready um m brown can I start by thanking

00:01:27 ready um m brown can I start by thanking you very much for coming to the inquiry yet again and assisting us with our investigations this time into uh the matters the subject of this module the aftermath of the fire um just a number

00:01:39 aftermath of the fire um just a number of pointers by way of introduction um first can I ask you please to try to keep your voice up so that the person who sits to your right and is typing there can get down everything you say very clearly also don't nod or shake

00:01:52 very clearly also don't nod or shake your head you have to have to say yes or no if any of my questions are unclear I can repeat them or or put them in a different way we can do that that's not a problem at all now you'll know that we

00:02:03 a problem at all now you'll know that we take breaks in the usual way mid morning and mid-afternoon but if we need a break at any other time then please just let us know there's no problem we can take a break all right now you've made six statements to the inquiry um and I'm

00:02:15 statements to the inquiry um and I'm going to I'm going to put them to you um they will appear on the screen um the the first is tm1

00:02:24 tm1 48960 dated the 21st of August 2018 we just have that up there page three

00:02:36 please page three of that

00:02:58 document don't worry it's it's it's coming yeah it always happens first

00:03:09 thing there it is um now there's a signature there under the statement of Truth and above the date can you confirm that that is your signature yes thank you next statement is your second

00:03:20 you next statement is your second tmo50 895 dated the 10th of January 2019 if we can turn please in that to page five

00:03:33 let's let's have the first page first page one first of all to identify it there it is page five next please there it is above the signature above the date is that your signature yes

00:03:44 the date is that your signature yes thank you third statement tm1 1

00:03:57 48982 that's your third statement date of the 15th of March 2019 if we can go to page 10 in that please is that your signature yes thank you fourth statement TMO 842

00:04:12 42 dated the 4th of October 2019 if we can go to page seven please is that your signature yes thank

00:04:23 please is that your signature yes thank you fifth

00:04:25 you fifth statement uh which is your second aftermath statement which takes in your first first aftermath statement that's at

00:04:31 at tm86

00:04:34 tm86 9990 date of the 20 4th of January 20120 and that's your fifth statement which I think is incorrectly identified as your fourth statement but you correct

00:04:45 as your fourth statement but you correct that later and if we can go please to page 18 in that document there's a uh there's a date and a 18 is the signature the date's on the next page

00:04:56 signature the date's on the next page but is that your signature that's definitely yep thank you and then finally uh your sixth statement which is your supplementary aftermath statement at TMO 89-

00:05:08 at TMO 89- 4124 date of the 15th of December 2020 and if we can go please to page 34 in it there's a signature above the date

00:05:19 in it there's a signature above the date is that your signature yes have you had the opportunity to read all these statements recently uh yes and particularly the last two on aftermath thank and can you confirm for us that the contents are true to the best of

00:05:30 the contents are true to the best of your knowledge yes thank you now you've given evidence to the inquiry as you'll recall I think on two prior occasions and on in phase one of the inquiry you gave evidence in relation to some of

00:05:42 gave evidence in relation to some of your actions on the night of the fire what I'm going to do today is ask you about your involvement in the immediate aftermath uh in the week after the fire can I deal with some background matters first uh you were the director of

00:05:54 first uh you were the director of housing at the TMO at the time of the Grandfield Tower fire weren't you yes that's right and you were in that role from February 2014 and you left it in June 2018 I think as you tell us that's right yes

00:06:06 think as you tell us that's right yes and while you were director of housing you were not a statutory director of the company the TMO were you no that's right and nor you were you on the board no nor were you were member of the executive

00:06:17 were you were member of the executive team that's right yes and you reported to Sasha jeans yes yes she was in the executive team yes and she in turn reported to Robert black that's right yes now in in relation to your

00:06:28 yes now in in relation to your professional background do I think you have qualification in housing and work for a number of arms length tenant management organizations yes yes that's correct and I think also local authorities yes yes and in the role of

00:06:41 authorities yes yes and in the role of management of Housing Services yes that's correct let's turn then to the first of the topics I want to cover with you which is about emergency planning and training at the TMO um you you'll

00:06:52 and training at the TMO um you you'll recall that the TMO had its own emergency plan you remember that yes yes and it's reference we don't need to go to it is at tm1 13898 now in your in your statement your

00:07:04 13898 now in your in your statement your fifth statement you say paragraphs 6 and seven that the TMO was not in operation the TMO plan was not in operation on the night of the granfield tower fire because it was designed for localized

00:07:16 because it was designed for localized incidents and not an incident as large as the grenfell tower fire is that correct yes that's correct yes and in paragraph 7 of the same statement let's have that up it's um fifth statement

00:07:28 have that up it's um fifth statement that's that is TMO 86

00:07:31 86 9990 page 2 paragraph 7 you say it was recognized that the TMO did not have the resources to be able to respond to such an incident and that in such

00:07:42 an incident and that in such circumstances the rbkc contingency management plan would operate as it did on the night of the fire further it was recognized that in such circumstances only one plan should be in operation

00:07:53 only one plan should be in operation which is what occurred from an early stage following the fire can you confirm that that's correct cor so let's look let's look then at the TMO emergency plan itself now

00:08:05 plan itself now tm11

00:08:07 tm11 3898 I'll show you the first page just to identify the

00:08:23 document and there it is and if we go to page two we can see the revision dates page three the revision dates there they are uh and you can see that it was last

00:08:35 are uh and you can see that it was last revised in February

00:08:38 2016 and before that in May 2015 uh if we go please to page 13 under the kctm emergency plan uh it

00:08:49 13 under the kctm emergency plan uh it set it sets out the roles uh and Under The Heading kctm emergency plan this sets out the roles and responsibilities within the kmo in the event of a major

00:09:00 within the kmo in the event of a major incident or natural uh or sorry major incident which is defined as and here's the definition a major incident or natural disaster resulting in either death injury or

00:09:12 resulting in either death injury or serious disruption to normal life which would acutely stretch the km's resources and which may ultimately overwhelm the kcm's capacity to manage without assistance from the council and just

00:09:23 assistance from the council and just emphasizing those last few words there without assistance from the council carrying on two paragraphs further down the plan says that the plan is primarily

00:09:35 the plan says that the plan is primarily for managing local kmo emergencies on within or surrounding our properties and Estates one which can be managed within the resources available to the kmo however this plan can also be used

00:09:49 kmo however this plan can also be used for large scale major events which would overwhelm the KCT tmo's ability to manage on its own and which would involve the rbkc council resources the difference being the scale of the

00:10:02 difference being the scale of the emergency and the number of people affected by it now I've read quite a bit of that to you do you agree looking at it that this emergency plan did in fact envisage a role for the TMO in the event

00:10:15 envisage a role for the TMO in the event of a major incident which stretched beyond the capabilities of the TMO but where the TMO would be expected to work alongside the council in that particular paragraph it it it seems to imply that

00:10:28 paragraph it it it seems to imply that yes yes and and if we go to page 28 of the TMO emergency plan from the fourth paragraph down it says ensure do you see the word ensure

00:10:39 says ensure do you see the word ensure there four paragraphs down ensure that residents primary needs I.E shelter food and warmth a met as quickly as possible you may need to open up a rest center consult the block details to see what

00:10:51 consult the block details to see what the most suitable location would be for this find out who the keyh holder is and make preliminary contact to advise that we may need to use the location as a temporary rest area when opening up a

00:11:03 temporary rest area when opening up a rest center ensure that it is made as welcoming and comfortable as possible I.E by turning on the lighting and heating arranging tea or coffee turning on a TV or radio for entertainment if available allow residents to use the

00:11:15 available allow residents to use the kma's mobile phone residents may be able to organize alternative accommodation by contacting their relatives or friends and then AR arrange for a roll call to be taken and identify any special

00:11:26 be taken and identify any special requirements EG special needs or possibilities put someone in charge of organizing Refreshments depending on the numbers involved two to three persons may be required to do this advise of any

00:11:38 may be required to do this advise of any known

00:11:39 known vulnerabilities uh advise of any known vulnerable less able-bodied residents that may come to your attention as needing assistance other than dealing with the immediate emergency you will

00:11:50 with the immediate emergency you will need to assess whether contractors need to be called for any making good boarding up security Works Etc as a result of the emergency now there's quite a lot in there but is it right that the TMO emergency plan envisaged

00:12:02 that the TMO emergency plan envisaged that there may be situations that required TMO staff to open up and manage a rest center yes yes but I don't think they applied to the scale of the emergency that we had on on the day the

00:12:15 emergency that we had on on the day the fire this is very much small small scale but are you saying that when a large event like the Grandfield Tower fire happened the TMO would not be expected

00:12:27 happened the TMO would not be expected to assist in or um participate in the opening up of a rest center I I I think we'd be um required to assist him but I don't think in in the instant of the scale of the of

00:12:39 in in the instant of the scale of the of the fire that we would have been expected to open rest centers in fact the council seemed to have already taken responsibility that their emergency plan was in operation and they had that

00:12:50 was in operation and they had that responsibility uh in the case of a major emergency did you expect to have to wait until called upon by the council who was the category one respond or did you expect to operate off your own bat uh

00:13:02 expect to operate off your own bat uh and then join forces with the council as the emergency developed um I would have expected the the the council to be in charge of the emergency and for us to

00:13:13 charge of the emergency and for us to sit in a supporting role within within that right when sitting in the supporting role though would you expect to be asked to support and be told precisely what the council wanted of you

00:13:24 precisely what the council wanted of you or did you expect to come in and volunteer um I think I think I think probably we we should have been asked to come in but I think we we also naturally

00:13:36 come in but I think we we also naturally because we wanted to do what we could do to help we CA we came in now even in the case of a an Emergency which is you say covered by this plan would you use the

00:13:48 covered by this plan would you use the rest centers listed in the rbkc Emergency Management plan where they're listed well I don't think that I'm saying that this plan cover covered the plan and I'm saying it

00:14:00 cover covered the plan and I'm saying it it dealt with more minor emergencies I didn't expect us to be opening our rest centers on a day um on the day of the fire because it would have been much more small scale we wouldn't have had

00:14:11 more small scale we wouldn't have had the resources to staff a um a rest center of the scale that was needed where it says in the paragraph I read to you when opening up a rest center ensure it is made as welcoming

00:14:23 center ensure it is made as welcoming and comfortable as possible which rest centers would you which which properties would you pick for for arrest Center would it be those in the um council's emergency plan or would it be others no

00:14:35 emergency plan or would it be others no it wouldn't be that the council emergency plan had um you know much larger scale um rest centers as I understand it ours were very small um resident Halls um that wouldn't have

00:14:48 resident Halls um that wouldn't have wouldn't have a large capacity at all did you have your own list of rest I'm I'm I'm pretty sure we did but I can't I can't say 100% now what they were

00:14:59 were now the as we can see the TMO emergency plan required TMO staff to undertake a number of roles including arranging role call for residents which would in turn include identifying special needs or

00:15:12 include identifying special needs or vulnerabilities um is it right that the TMO staff involved in an emergency response covered at least by this plan should have been adequately trained and equipped to undertake those roles if the

00:15:24 equipped to undertake those roles if the situation demanded it um

00:15:30 it um yeah I yes yes and we'll come to training in a second can we go to page 17 of this

00:15:43 document this is a Cascade chart showing who must be contacted in an emergency Cascade one during normal working hours and then Cascade 2 is on page

00:15:55 19 which is outside normal working hours and the normal working hours are 9:00 to 5 a.m. to p.m. and outside working hours is 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. as you can see um now if we go back to uh page 18

00:16:17 please um we can see that your name appears in the central green box director of housing underneath the customer service center oval in blue yes yes um is it right to say that you were

00:16:30 yes um is it right to say that you were familiar with this emergency plan and what was required in the event of an emergency such as the elements listed on the page we've looked at page 28 opening rest centers being aware of

00:16:41 rest centers being aware of vulnerabilities Etc so there were staff within our teams who were specifically trained on the out of ours rotor um so they're on the on the

00:16:52 they're on the on the um the other document that you you shed me um and I know that they all underwent um quite extensive training with our health and safety team um that they knew

00:17:03 health and safety team um that they knew how to call in things like bottled water or um many other things that we may need in a small emergency even maybe where people weren't evacuated but to you know deliver water to people so um they they

00:17:16 deliver water to people so um they they did receive training right but what about those on this document who are well some of those are the same people so um Karen and Martin um

00:17:30 Martin um they would have and hash they were they were on the out of ours team so they would have had that um that training right and we all would have had an overview okay well let's in terms of

00:17:42 overview okay well let's in terms of training if we go to paragraph three of your sixth statement TMO 8941

00:17:49 8941 124 page one

00:18:15 yeah if we go to paragraph three at the foot of the page you say I'm unable to recall receiving any specific training in relation to emergency planning and response during my employment at the TMO

00:18:26 response during my employment at the TMO is that right yes um so um if you were never specifically trained uh on emergency planning and response what what leads you to think

00:18:38 response what what leads you to think that others were because I know that they took um um um just trying to think of the word they had more of a a a main role in in

00:18:49 they had more of a a a main role in in responding to emergencies there were specific people who receive the training because they were more likely to be the people who were were called out during emergencies they were rotors um you know

00:19:00 emergencies they were rotors um you know they took on that role on a um permanent although a rotating basis and I know that they received training right but it's the fact I think that you never received any training about the TMO emergency plan even though your details

00:19:13 emergency plan even though your details were contained within it as a contact is that right yes I think that's right now in this

00:19:19 in this statement uh you tell us uh over the page Pi picking it up at the foot of this page and then going over the page you say um uh I'm so sorry can we go

00:19:30 you say um uh I'm so sorry can we go back to page one last line last half of the line you say however in my previous role at Turn the Page to page two Hammer Smith I had worked in departments

00:19:41 Smith I had worked in departments responsible for emergency planning and therefore was aware of how an emergency plan would be implemented and expressions such as Lelo bronze and silver were familiar to me um what was your role at Hammer Smith

00:19:54 me um what was your role at Hammer Smith oh so um when you when you were in that position I I didn't I must make very clear I didn't have a role for emergency planning at that I I was just part of the community safety team who also

00:20:05 the community safety team who also covered that role so you know I I picked up knowledge of those expressions but I didn't have a formal training of a council um emergency plan I

00:20:19 follow no um I think it's right therefore that at the time of the Grandfield Tower fire you had not received any training at all in ECT of first is this right how to manage or

00:20:31 first is this right how to manage or Provide support at rest centers no but I had had practical experience of of going to rest centers in my career before I had a knowledge of what was

00:20:43 before I had a knowledge of what was needed and what was expected right can you give us an example so um I had what um I had obviously been present some way

00:20:55 um I had obviously been present some way through the Adair fire and in in previous roles I had attended emergencies nothing obviously like the scale of of of the fire but um you know I had I had dealt with things like gas

00:21:07 I had I had dealt with things like gas out and electrics out yeah so practical experience but no training that's right now three other topics uh is this right no training on

00:21:18 topics uh is this right no training on identification and maintaining records of large numbers of displaced uh residents no specific training and and how to support large

00:21:29 training and and how to support large numbers of displaced residents and facilitate return to their homes um no specific formal training but I would say again you know having spent

00:21:40 I would say again you know having spent years in housing I have dealt with several emergencies that I think gave me you know some professional experience to draw on it was ader Tower the ader tower fire in late October 2015 an example of

00:21:52 fire in late October 2015 an example of that an example of that yes right were there other examples you could give of the same scale similar scale to the idea to

00:22:00 to fire um off the top of my head not but I I've worked in housing a long time and um I've dealt with many different types of emergencies but off the top of my head I can't I can't think but on

00:22:13 head I can't I can't think but on training I think also no training on the identification of the needs of residents with specific vulnerabilities and how those needs should be met in an emergency response no specific training

00:22:26 emergency response no specific training but um I I would like to say some some you know

00:22:30 you know practical um well some initiative I think that I drew on were there any learning points that came out of the Adair Tower fire in respect of those matters so dealing with displaced people

00:22:43 matters so dealing with displaced people facilitating their return to their homes and and identifying the needs of residents with vulnerabilities so I think um there was some specific learning that came out for

00:22:54 some specific learning that came out for for myself and Sasha um really who were in that um rest Center on the day is that that there was a lack of council um presence in that rest center the Lelo

00:23:07 um presence in that rest center the Lelo had only arrived very briefly and had left site and it was Sasha and I who were um working in a in a rest center that had been set up by volunteers so um you know and we had to work with

00:23:20 you know and we had to work with somebody to rehouse people remotely so um work with a council employee who was remote sorry I wasn't very clear um to help assist in in that sorry I'm

00:23:32 um to help assist in in that sorry I'm slightly lost and where I'm going what was the question well let's let's let's see if I can be bit more specific um let's look at rbk30

00:23:46 57975 um now this is a summary of a meeting on the 11th of April 2016 uh with contingency planning housing and the kctm to follow up on the

00:23:57 housing and the kctm to follow up on the Ada Tower fire yeah and you can see who was there David Kerry was there from rbc's contingency planning you had three people from rbkc housing including

00:24:08 people from rbkc housing including Amanda Johnson and CIA kisin uh and from the TMO there was you and Janice Ray um now um if you go please to page

00:24:21 Ray um now um if you go please to page three you can see there um homelessness as a result of the in incident and then an action point five bullet points down

00:24:32 an action point five bullet points down do you see action DK AJ TB JW and you're the TB there aren't you yes that's correct yes uh and what it um what it

00:24:43 correct yes uh and what it um what it says is in a future incident involving more than a couple of rbkc stroke TMO dwellings the Lelo or contingency planning team will attend the site form a scene Incident Management Group along

00:24:55 a scene Incident Management Group along with housing and TMO reps and then the second bullet point down says TMO will provide details of known vulnerabilities um did that proposal contemplate that the TMO would would

00:25:07 contemplate that the TMO would would provide a list of people with known vulnerabilities involved in the incident who needed help rather than generally across the whole tml estate yes I I took

00:25:18 across the whole tml estate yes I I took this to um to mean that we would we would be at the scene with our known list of of of of tenants and then we would work with the tenants and provide the information information to rbkc on

00:25:30 the information information to rbkc on whom the known V what the known vulnerability was so that we were capturing that live at the time right so the expectation was as you say at the scene you'd be able to have is this right immediate or reasonably immediate

00:25:43 right immediate or reasonably immediate access to a list of people in the relevant building with known vulnerabilities so that you could provide it to the council well we we would have known vulnerabilities and I qualify that as at the time they were

00:25:54 qualify that as at the time they were last reported and then we would add to that from um you know speaking to our residents and understanding their needs right just on the on the action point was the

00:26:05 was the action that you would prepare and collate these details in advance of the next incident or was the action point that at the next incident you would

00:26:16 that at the next incident you would provide the details so I understood it to be that at the next in incident we would provide them because if we just collated them a point of time they wouldn't necessarily still be um right relevant now from what from what

00:26:29 relevant now from what from what data did you have those details so that at the next incident you could provide them um so we we had on our capita system a a list of um all our our

00:26:41 system a a list of um all our our residents and known reported vulnerabilities so when we did our tency check Pro um our tency checks um there was questions in that around um

00:26:52 was questions in that around um vulnerability um and after those um checks have been completed that information would be loaded onto our capita system so that was the basis that we would draw on and from our um CRM

00:27:07 we would draw on and from our um CRM system yes the CRM system people will recall that from module 3 yes and and a question from module 3 again how often did you update the capita system or the

00:27:18 did you update the capita system or the CRM system so that you could be reasonably sure that the Sy the data pool was reasonably up to dat and accurate so um the CR CRM system we had

00:27:29 accurate so um the CR CRM system we had um a single viewer first sheet which was our resident contact details so um when people called into our customer service center we would try and verify the data on that so contact details um things

00:27:42 on that so contact details um things like that our main source for updating it would have been um aeny checks as I've just said or residents um reporting any um updates to us directly because

00:27:53 any um updates to us directly because obviously we rely on them to provide that information to us if their circumstances has changed and and then we would update our systems and did you do anything or to

00:28:05 systems and did you do anything or to your knowledge did Janice Ray do anything in response to this action point um I don't think more specifically than anything else that was taking place at the time so you know we were we were

00:28:16 at the time so you know we were we were progressing with tency um our tency check process and and obviously we worked very hard in the in the Years coming up to the fire on our CRM system so that we could have more um live data

00:28:28 so that we could have more um live data um about our residents

00:28:33 residents and you can see two bullet points down here that TMA will provide David Kerry with a copy of their emergency plan this plan gives details for each Tower block and estate including details of any identified

00:28:44 identified shelters uh now uh the date of this of course is April 2016 do you remember whether when considering this action point and acting

00:28:57 considering this action point and acting on it you or anybody else uh in the TMO looked at the emergency plan details for each Tower block and estate notice they

00:29:08 each Tower block and estate notice they were in some cases and in Grenville to's case 15 years out of date and and think to to bring them up to date um I didn't send over the emergency plan it was wasn't my role Janice took that role and

00:29:21 wasn't my role Janice took that role and um I I don't know whether she checked it I certain I certainly didn't was there a discussion at the time in response to this action point between you and Janice Ray about undertaking that exercise

00:29:33 Ray about undertaking that exercise no right do you know whether this action point was in fact acted upon I I know I know that she sent a copy of the emergency plan yes right what about the

00:29:46 emergency plan yes right what about the attached uh details per block and estate I I can't say um with any certainty but I I would imagine if she was asked for it she did right so can we take it then that this was a perfectly good

00:29:57 that this was a perfectly good opportunity to bring that emergency plan and its annexed uh set of details for each Tower block and estate up to date as of April 2016 yes it it wouldn't have been um my

00:30:11 2016 yes it it wouldn't have been um my responsibility to do that but yes yes but do you take can we take it from you at least that that opportunity was not taken um I'm assuming from what I've seen since that it wasn't yeah can you

00:30:23 seen since that it wasn't yeah can you explain why no I couldn't explain what was the proposed line of communication between the TMO and rbk's housing department to ensure that the information on vulnerable residents could be made available as soon as

00:30:34 could be made available as soon as possible in the event of an emergency sorry what was the first part that what was the arrangement yes what was the line of what was the line of communication contemplated between the TMO and the council's housing department

00:30:46 TMO and the council's housing department so I think that would been you know a physical presence or um an email version depending when and

00:30:56 where there more likely to be a physical presence as as we saw in a d i see and what about um other than at an incident was there a

00:31:08 um other than at an incident was there a line of communication where updated details on vulnerable people in a particular block could be channeled through to the council um no no there was no regular sharing of our data into the council in terms of um tency data

00:31:21 the council in terms of um tency data or right so would it work this way that you would you would wait for an incident and at an incident the council would expect you and you would expect yourselves to be able to funnel through to that whoever was in charge of housing

00:31:35 to that whoever was in charge of housing at the incident yes the relevant data yes yes I see I want to ask you next then about some of the roles that you and other TMO staff undertook in the immediate aftermath of the fire um if we

00:31:47 immediate aftermath of the fire um if we go back to your fifth statement please TMO 86

00:31:52 TMO 86 9990 page one paragraph 3 you say there I was heavily involved in many issues arising in the aftermath of the fire now that's right is it yes that's

00:32:05 fire now that's right is it yes that's right so you stand by that now is it right to say that there were that the key areas in which the TMO were involved uh were really threefold and I'll just I'll I'll count them out to you and tell

00:32:16 I'll I'll count them out to you and tell me whether you agree or disagree first Presence at rest centers yes yes yes second creating and maintaining lists of residents from grenfell Tower and the

00:32:27 residents from grenfell Tower and the evacuated walkway properties to identify who needed support yes and then third is this right facilitating the return of residents to walkway properties yes that's correct

00:32:40 that's correct yes I'm going to look at those or invite you to look at those with with me as we go

00:32:48 go um and let's look at rest centers now I think it's right isn't it and tell me if this is right or wrong that you became aware that rest centers

00:33:00 had been set had been set up um having been told of the fact by your colleague hash Cham Chun just after you arrived at the scene I think yes that's correct I um I was there very early on um we've

00:33:13 um I was there very early on um we've established at 3:50 in the morning and um yes that's when I was told by hash yes the rest centers were open now I think it's right isn't it that the TMO staff were not themselves involved with

00:33:24 staff were not themselves involved with with setting up any rest centers no no no formal role in setting them up uh and if we go please to um paragraph six of your sixth statement

00:33:36 paragraph six of your sixth statement page four of your sixth statement that's tm8 94124 page 4 paragraph 13 you say this I don't recall any direction being provided by rbkc on

00:33:49 any direction being provided by rbkc on the role that the TMO should play at the rest centers at this early time of the morning but I believe the Beck and rbkc off Amanda Johnson Laura Johnson and Rob Shaw were aware of what the TMO were

00:34:02 Shaw were aware of what the TMO were doing during the day as we were liasing with them so is it is it right that the TMO is entirely self-directed in this respect in the early stages yes definitely and uh how did you decide or

00:34:15 definitely and uh how did you decide or how did the TMO to your knowledge decide what the tmo's role at the rest centers was going to be so um I don't think the TMO as a group decided there was only

00:34:26 TMO as a group decided there was only myself Robert um hash and um three team leaders so I you know looking at what was happening around me decided that that was the most practical thing that we could do is to um go to the rest

00:34:38 we could do is to um go to the rest centers and and start to support residents and to try and collect information about who was safe and missing so that we could get that to lfb initially in real time right and um and

00:34:49 initially in real time right and um and then obviously there were other roles during during the day um do you want me to elaborate now yes please do yeah so our other roles during the day were to obviously take um an account of uh who

00:35:02 obviously take um an account of uh who was safe and missing and who required accommodation and we provided that information directly to rbkc so that they could assist with their housing obligation to to rehouse

00:35:14 obligation to to rehouse Residents um yes and in terms of your specific role on the 14th of June I think you went to the St Clement Church which had been set up as a rest center I did so I organized for the staff that I

00:35:26 did so I organized for the staff that I had at that time to go to different rest centers and I and I went directly to St James's and was that the only rest center you attended on that day yes that all or I ever right yes I see did you

00:35:38 all or I ever right yes I see did you just out of Interest did you work from the annex which I think is annex 14 to rbk's contingency management plan which had the list of approved rest centers on it no no no we didn't consult I didn't

00:35:50 it no no no we didn't consult I didn't consult didn't have time to look at any annexes or documents hash told me that they were that that was what was open because he would have had that information from the backc I assume or

00:36:02 information from the backc I assume or the Lelo I see and you allocated TMO staff to various rest centers I think which included St Clement's church latima Road or latima church um rugby Porto Bello club and I think also the

00:36:14 Porto Bello club and I think also the Westway Center yeah are you talking about immediately or during the course of the day I did during the course of the day we covered we covered them all uh during the course of the day not yes yes I see um how did you know that those

00:36:27 yes I see um how did you know that those centers had opened uh Hash Hash told me and we went around and found that to be the case whether they were formally opened or voluntary opens they were they were and who was hash Chun liaison at

00:36:40 were and who was hash Chun liaison at the council from who he would have got that information I don't know that but he was stood next to me so I assumed he had got outside the command unit so I assume he had got that information from

00:36:52 assume he had got that information from I actually I don't know who okay now what did you tell staff the TMO staff that their roles were be at the rest centers so I was very clear that they should go to the rest centers that they should collect information around who

00:37:04 should collect information around who was safe and missing who um who was there the names and addresses of people um and if they had any you know particular particular needs um and

00:37:17 particular particular needs um and accommodation and as far as you are aware do you know who had set these rest centers up was it the council or was it the community I I I think probably at this stage when I first went the

00:37:29 this stage when I first went the community let's go to TMO

00:37:37 869980 86 9981

00:37:59 yes this is a list of TMO staff allocated to various rest centers um and this Bears the time stamp on the left hand side of the First Column there 0530

00:38:12 hand side of the First Column there 0530 to4 1400 on the 14th of June it's entitled staff cover uh and we can see who was allocated to the Rugby Club St Clement's

00:38:23 allocated to the Rugby Club St Clement's church the back office at St Clement's church the Methodist Church Etc and at the bottom of the page you can just see it the Westway Sports Center um now um in in your sixth

00:38:36 Center um now um in in your sixth statement of paragraph 14 you you say you don't recall the exact date that it was produced but it was produced after the event compiled from people's recollection of which TMO staff went to which rest center on the 14th of June

00:38:49 which rest center on the 14th of June and also the communications from the WhatsApp groups is that correct yeah that's correct my um my PA did it she went to some of the rest center us on the day and um she had um knowledge and

00:39:00 the day and um she had um knowledge and also from the from the very things you said it was collected from that right now if we scroll to page two having seen page one which is rugby club and the others on the list page two um is400 to

00:39:15 others on the list page two um is400 to 2030 uh and again you can see Rugby Club St Clement's church St Clement's church back office Methodist Church West way Sports Center and then over to page three the Latin of a Christian Center

00:39:26 three the Latin of a Christian Center and they're the same as the rest centers in the earlier part of the day um we can't see any reference there to allocation of TMO staff to other community rest centers such as the

00:39:37 community rest centers such as the almanar mosque and the St Francis of aisi church is that correct uh yes I I wouldn't have known about them otherwise um you know these are the ones that I knew about right was there no means of

00:39:51 knew about right was there no means of uh cating information for those who had gone to the almanar mosque or or was it simply the case that no TMR staff were were sent there uh I didn't

00:40:02 staff were were sent there uh I didn't send any send anyone to those other places did you know about them no that's why I didn't send them to them but had you known about them you would have done oh absolutely yes um if we then um stick

00:40:15 oh absolutely yes um if we then um stick with this

00:40:17 with this document uh and go back to page one please we can see that in the time slot 8:30 a.m. to 1400 p.m. on the 14th of June next to Rugby Club it lists 18

00:40:31 June next to Rugby Club it lists 18 staff members starting with Mandy Warrior at the top of the list and going down to Robert speak at the bottom would it be right to say that this is a cumulative total yes I wanted to explain that this is I mean it says

00:40:44 to explain that this is I mean it says 5:30 but we were obviously there in some of in some of those much earlier than that but this is this is people who were there at some point of time for example um Maria actually isn't on the Rugby Club um but she was very much there from

00:40:58 Club um but she was very much there from about around 8:39 in the morning so um whilst I would say it's nearly you know 100% accurate because of its source people would have been moving through um

00:41:09 people would have been moving through um rest centers at different times during the day and that's very much in the um in our WhatsApp group we use that to move resources around the

00:41:21 day but these are the bulk of people in the periods of time yes yes I see

00:41:29 and and and taking the Rugby Club as an example how many TMO staff would have been there on average at any one time I think because this is this is the morning session so um I I know we had

00:41:40 morning session so um I I know we had Louise Mandy and Maria there and you know I would imagine this was the majority of people were there they won't have been there at 5:30 because they would you know we could have got them

00:41:51 would you know we could have got them there that early but they would have been there you know from normal work working office hours I would imagine yes and and um just taking that long list uh where where were they recruited from

00:42:04 uh where where were they recruited from and what what parts of the TMO organization did they normally work in so um so I managed um I managed nearly 100 staff so quite a lot of them would have come from my from my teams but um

00:42:16 have come from my from my teams but um from the we everybody across the organization was willing to come and help so you got people from all sorts of different um different teams here from

00:42:27 different um different teams here from our environmental services from Resident engagement all sorts of people across the organization right did you did you select them uh or did they volunteer um

00:42:38 select them uh or did they volunteer um so

00:42:40 so um uh I don't think we selected them I certainly um you know I think people just naturally came very willingly to try and do what they could to to help I don't think we needed to beg or ask

00:42:51 don't think we needed to beg or ask people you know our team leaders were there and you know got up in the middle of the night they they were very much driven to come because they wanted to I mean I obviously I did you can see in my evidence I I did ring um my heads of

00:43:04 evidence I I did ring um my heads of service and get them to come in um so I did ask them specifically to go to a particular place but and then because I had a team leader in every in in or a head of service in every um rest center

00:43:17 head of service in every um rest center they I think helped to organize greater staff presence during the day when people came into the office yes and did um did did you take any particular steps

00:43:29 um did did you take any particular steps to ensure that those who were familiar with Grenville Tower of the building and Grenville Tower the community in the building uh would be at a particular place or well I took um I took Nicola

00:43:42 place or well I took um I took Nicola Bartholomew with me first because um she was the team leader and St Clement um sorry she wasn't team leader my team leader of the of the neighborhood um

00:43:53 leader of the of the neighborhood um where grandfa was so I I took her her with me and actually um a lot of the local staff came to came to St L St Clement during the day right and did you did you select

00:44:06 day right and did you did you select particular TMO staff based on their knowledge of the community I I took Nicola with me because I knew she would know um the most about about the area I follow now Mark Sims who was chief

00:44:17 follow now Mark Sims who was chief executive of the P3 charity of which the rugby PTO Bell trust was a part uh has given the inquiry a statement uh and he says and that is there's no need to go

00:44:28 says and that is there's no need to go to it but it's at cfv 705 page 20 paragraph 93 and he says in terms there was no interaction with the

00:44:39 the TMO is that right to the best of your recollection well I I I mean I can't personally say I wasn't there but we had a substantial amount of staff in the Rugby Club when you read the statements

00:44:51 Rugby Club when you read the statements of my staff um particularly um Maria who was there um you'll be able to see if she had any direct um interaction with him but I know that she describes being

00:45:02 him but I know that she describes being downstairs in the rugby Porter um Bellow um Club um speaking to Residents and then directing them upstairs to um

00:45:13 then directing them upstairs to um upstairs to where rbkc were later in the day to be in re house so um that's what I

00:45:25 know is it possible that the TMO staff attending the Rugby Club were there but just didn't make themselves known to those who were managing the center so I think what I did and I I'm certain that

00:45:39 think what I did and I I'm certain that the other staff did this is we tried to have tables quite close to the entrance of the door so that we could catch people coming in that was a purposeful decision to um you know to make our presence known I do think people got

00:45:51 presence known I do think people got confused between whether we were rbkc or the TMO or volunteers I think you know that did happen right and you know when you think about the fact that there were so many displaced people during the

00:46:03 so many displaced people during the course of this day you know there were nearly a thousand people evacuated so um you know the area was very busy I I can't account for why people say we weren't

00:46:14 weren't there is it possible that one of the reasons is that you didn't have any kind of badge or tabard well I had my badge on from very early on all day but was it

00:46:25 on from very early on all day but was it visible did it say TMO yeah very clearly yeah it's the ID badge that we use I had it on all day but you were at St Clement's church in the back office what about those at the Rugby Club well I don't know specifically what they had on

00:46:36 don't know specifically what they had on I I I can't tell you um I don't know that I don't know if they were wearing them now um is it right that you didn't allocate any staff to the Salvation Army

00:46:48 allocate any staff to the Salvation Army Church Center in Port of B Road no that I didn't did you know that rbkc had established what is called a friends and relatives Reception Center or F

00:47:00 relatives Reception Center or F frrc in the in the lingo from 3:30 on the afternoon of the 14th I found that out later from communication that I saw that was you know informing us of of

00:47:11 that was you know informing us of of where to direct people for for support but I don't think I knew that right at the time

00:47:19 the time so I see I mean in yeah um now Adrien CLE who was the Grenville Tower emergency response lead for the

00:47:30 Tower emergency response lead for the Salvation Army has provided us with a witness statement can I just show you that that's at cfv

00:47:39 6059 if we go in it please to page three paragraph 2 he says our Salvation Army Church Center in PTO Road the center was specifically asked by the local

00:47:51 specifically asked by the local authority to open as a place of safety during the afternoon of 14th of June for individuals who were Direct ly affected by the fire and relatives of those who were awaiting

00:48:03 news were you made aware at any stage I think you say you were but when were you first made aware um that the council had opened that place as um a AR rest center

00:48:15 opened that place as um a AR rest center or Center for um those directly affected or awaiting news so I think I noticed that in um communication that was circulated bya our our um WhatsApp group

00:48:28 circulated bya our our um WhatsApp group that we passed on to our staff now I don't remember exactly what time that was it would be in be in my evidence but there was a a note um that I saw at some point about the Savage I wasn't told

00:48:40 point about the Savage I wasn't told directly by the council were you aware of a friends and family Reception Center being set up at any earlier stage so that so that somebody in the position of um for example nail chuker who's given

00:48:52 um for example nail chuker who's given evidence could go and get news or at least news that there was no not very early on I was just aware of the main the main

00:49:03 centers now let's then look at a slightly different topic which is or building on that topic which is informing residents about rest centers can we go please to your fifth statement

00:49:14 can we go please to your fifth statement and go to paragraph 18

00:49:28 that's tm86

00:49:32 9990 fifth statement page four page four paragraph 18 and it says this in the third line TMO staff were

00:49:45 this in the third line TMO staff were quickly mobilized to the rest centers as they opened and to where evacuees were directed I do not know what Arrangements were in place to inform residents evacuating grenfell Tower and the

00:49:56 evacuating grenfell Tower and the surrounding properties of where the rest centers were located I was not based within the police Cordon however my expectation would be for the Lelo to have inform the emergency services and for the Emergency Services to direct

00:50:08 for the Emergency Services to direct residents as they evacuated is it right to say that you you don't know if evacu evacuees were being directed and if they were where too so I I wasn't as I say

00:50:19 were where too so I I wasn't as I say here I wasn't behind the cord and apart from to go to the command units I wasn't allowed anywhere near the block so um I I just didn't know but what I did know was that the rest centers were were

00:50:30 was that the rest centers were were filling with evacuated people um I saw that as soon as I went into St James's right St

00:50:38 right St Clement right but in in the light of what you say here on what basis were you allocating staff to rest centers if you didn't know that residents would be looking for help well I knew that residents would be looking for help and

00:50:51 residents would be looking for help and um I knew that the rest centers were open so what I'm saying here is that I expected them to be directed to them by the Emergency Services as they left the building because I wasn't allowed to be

00:51:02 building because I wasn't allowed to be in you know that part of the estate I wasn't allowed to do that myself so all I could do was work from where I thought that they would be directed did you or any other TMO staff take any steps to

00:51:15 any other TMO staff take any steps to communicate with the lelow or lelow within the Cordon or anybody else within the courton to make sure residents were told or advised about where they could go so my understanding is that when we

00:51:27 go so my understanding is that when we decided to go to arrest centers we were by the command unit we were right next to the command unit the information had come from hash and that they would that you know the back or the people in the command unit knew that that's what we

00:51:38 command unit knew that that's what we were doing were you aware that while some walkway residents were told by police to leave their homes they weren't told where they could go um no I wasn't

00:51:49 told where they could go um no I wasn't and that's you know obviously not good if that's the case but I did know that um so from my point of view I knew that the walkway residents a lot of the walkway residents were coming to St James's so at that stage I probably

00:52:00 James's so at that stage I probably thought the message had had got to them that that's where they should go because that's where they were you know a large proportion were going yes I see and what time was that so I got there um I think

00:52:14 time was that so I got there um I think about quarter to 5 right so residents were already coming into St James's from the walkways even at that early stage yeah so you know when I first got to to the um to to the rest center I you know

00:52:28 the um to to the rest center I you know I made it myself and Nicholas's job was to go around the the people in the rest center to see how they were and you know a lot of those at that stage were from the walkway did you consider allocating

00:52:39 the walkway did you consider allocating some of your staff to work within the Cordon with the Metropolitan Police so that you could as it really both direct people on the streets to rest centers

00:52:50 people on the streets to rest centers this was a heavily controlled area we weren't allowed to go anywhere near the the the block I you know I had to come and in out of the Cordon to go to the command unit and I struggled sometimes

00:53:01 command unit and I struggled sometimes even with my ID to get through there as the morning progress were you aware of any visual signposts like posters or other messages in the area to direct people to rest centers or giving out

00:53:12 people to rest centers or giving out contact numbers for help um I I I wasn't aware of any posters but you know there may have been I was very focused on what I was trying to do I don't I don't remember posters let's look at the West

00:53:24 remember posters let's look at the West way then next um can we go to your fifth statement or stick with your fifth statement page seven paragraph 35 you say

00:53:37 there uh the situation about which rest centers were staying open changed during the

00:53:44 the evening uh since Clement's church chose to remain open but I believe this was on a voluntary basis as it was not an official overnight rest center the West way was the designated overnight rest

00:53:55 way was the designated overnight rest center that's correct is it yes that's my understanding and you say during the evening that's the 14th yes yes and by designated rest center which is the expression you used there do you mean that it became the Central and official

00:54:07 that it became the Central and official Center for support that would be run and managed by the council yes we got um you know we got communication during the course of the day that um we were to direct people to the West Center sorry

00:54:19 direct people to the West Center sorry the West way um overnight because that would be the designated bre Center were you aware that the Westway Sports Center had opened in the early hours of the morning on a voluntary basis um not an official rest center by the

00:54:31 official rest center by the council

00:54:33 council um I'm not sure if I knew that um at the time right do you know how the Westway Center became the designated rest center um I imagine that that was um the

00:54:47 um I imagine that that was um the council organizing that you know more formally during the course of the day later on in the light later on in the afternoon is what my view was because definitely the communication we got was from the

00:54:58 from the council and who at the council do you remember um I think it was a I think it was Amanda Johnson to start with and then I think it was um Rob Shaw and we communicated that to our staffs in the

00:55:10 communicated that to our staffs in the rest center you go on at paragraph 36 of your statement as you can see to say this there was some difficulty persuading people to move from other rest centers to the West way in part due

00:55:21 rest centers to the West way in part due to the ongoing generosity of people in the rest centers where food continued to be provided did donations of food and clothing had been generously flooding into all rest centers from the early hours of the morning the number of

00:55:33 hours of the morning the number of people turning up offering to help was also

00:55:36 also large is it right to say that some people chose to stay at rest centers being run by the community rather than moving to the West Way Center yes I think that's absolutely the case did

00:55:48 think that's absolutely the case did that cause problems um I think I think it was right for them to be where they felt it was best to be um I think think all we were trying to do was to um you

00:56:00 all we were trying to do was to um you know to direct them where the council has said was the overnight provision um because it had been set up for that but you know my feeling was very much is you know people people would choose where they feel most comfortable and as part

00:56:11 they feel most comfortable and as part of that sense that you had did you get a sense that in some way the evacuees prefer to be helped by community volunteers rather than by somebody in in

00:56:23 volunteers rather than by somebody in in an official capacity um well the council um I'm I'm I think people will you know can say that for themselves yes but did you get a a sense from what you

00:56:35 but did you get a a sense from what you could see um well I thought I thought a number of different centers were being utilized people you know people just you know chose whichever form of support

00:56:46 know chose whichever form of support that they I guess thought was most useful to them and they felt comfortable I want to ask you then about accounting for residents at rest centers can we turn please to your sixth

00:56:58 can we turn please to your sixth statement paragraph 29 did you say there at paragraph 29 foot of the page foot of your screen

00:57:09 29 foot of the page foot of your screen you say I recall that rbkc housing officers attended at St Clement's church on the afternoon of 14th June 2017 to provide direct rehousing to Residents my expectation is that they attended at all

00:57:21 expectation is that they attended at all rest centers on this afternoon to provide assistance to Residents identified as requiring rehousing Now by by all rest centers there are you referring to the ones

00:57:32 there are you referring to the ones listed on your your earlier list um we looked at earlier I think I I think I meant that um yes but I think actually they only

00:57:43 um yes but I think actually they only they only had three main centers that they went to which was St James's rugby and

00:57:53 Westway and and also you know a number of them closed during the day and people moved so they may have directed The the staff to the ones that we thought most people were there right what about the

00:58:04 people were there right what about the almanar mosque did can we take it that you didn't know whether and perhaps don't know still whether rbk staff attended other community rest centers such as the almanar mosque no I don't I

00:58:16 such as the almanar mosque no I don't I don't know I do know that they were at rugby um and that they were at St James's a later the West way I do know that okay now at paragraph 37 of your fifth statement if we can go back to

00:58:28 fifth statement if we can go back to that fifth statement tm86

00:58:32 tm86 9990 page

00:58:35 7 you say at the foot of your screen there um I believe that by late evening on 14th June 2017 rbkc had managed to place the majority of people in hotels or we had directed them to the West way

00:58:48 or we had directed them to the West way are you referring there to greenfeld Tower residents and or everyone who was evacuated including grenfell Tower residents but also including the walkways I think I mainly mean GFI Tower

00:58:59 walkways I think I mainly mean GFI Tower but I I did know that um uh by the end of the day they had house some people from the from the walkways as

00:59:10 walkways as well but I yeah right what was the basis of your information that rbkc had managed to place the majority of evacuees in

00:59:22 place the majority of evacuees in hotels um

00:59:26 so um we were obviously liasing with the with the council very closely during during the whole course of this night and and and day um and we knew that they were placing people we knew that they

00:59:37 were placing people we knew that they were placing Grantville Tower residents as a priority and then we knew that they were focusing on housing and people from the walkways who were vulnerable or

00:59:48 the walkways who were vulnerable or elderly or people with families um we knew that so I um had assumed that you know majority of those people had been housed and um they were also um set

01:00:02 housed and um they were also um set asking for yeah that's what I knew right well we'll come to the we'll come to the question of prioritization in a moment because I want to look at that in a little bit more detail with you uh but just on the question of of hotels uh the

01:00:15 just on the question of of hotels uh the inquiry has heard evidence from evacuees who were not placed in hotels on the 14th of June uh and in some cases for significant periods did you know that at

01:00:27 significant periods did you know that at the time

01:00:28 the time um I I do know that I knew that the next day because we followed up um our work on the Thursday with ring with phoning

01:00:39 on the Thursday with ring with phoning round people in grenfell Tower um I see I think some people some people weren't there obviously some people were away some people chose to go and stay

01:00:50 away some people chose to go and stay with other people so I knew that there was you

01:00:53 was you know not a demand for everyone to be house that first night if I'm putting that the right way I know there were some people that they wouldn't have been who wouldn't have asked for housing on that night was it

01:01:05 asked for housing on that night was it the case that people hadn't been contacted so that they could know what support was available at the rest centers so I know that myself and Kieran and other colleagues during the day

01:01:16 and other colleagues during the day tried to ring round everybody from um GRL T who we hadn't caught in the rest centers we tried to phone them on several occasions during the day so that

01:01:27 several occasions during the day so that we could give them advice about where to go and to check that they were they were safe right who did you try to phone um all the people who hadn't reported um to the rest center during

01:01:39 reported um to the rest center during the course of the day and you can see ev there's um there's a document um which is our tency list where we've matched basically those who we thought were safe and missing and on the left hand side of

01:01:51 and missing and on the left hand side of that document whatever it is there's um there's a column that shows where we were phoning around people to see where they were right and was there was

01:02:02 they were right and was there was there were there instances of people using rest centers that did not have an rbkc presence organizing accommodation sorry can you say that again

01:02:13 again yes was it the case that people were not put in hotels because they were using rest centers which were not rbkc rest centers I I don't know that but I know that some people were put in um now I I

01:02:26 that some people were put in um now I I don't I don't know the answer to that now turning to the question of of of prioritization can we go please to uh page six back a page of this statement and look at paragraph 28 and you say there

01:02:41 rbkc uh paragraph 28 U four lines down RB KC's housing team were focusing on booking Grenville Tower survivors into hotels

01:02:51 hotels initially that's right is it yes that's what you say um but if we go go however to paragraph 32 of your of your statement at page seven this statement

01:03:02 statement at page seven this statement page

01:03:03 page seven you say uh rbkc advised us to tell residents displaced in the cord andov areas including granfield walk hway walk teston walk barandon walk and treadgold

01:03:15 teston walk barandon walk and treadgold house to go to rest centers where they would be accommodated overnight if the Cordon remained in place overnight whilst those who were elderly stroke vulnerable stroke children were accommodated by rbk

01:03:26 accommodated by rbk teams on the ground were advised of this was there a strategy prioritizing Grandfield Tower survivors for emergency accommodation over residents from the area inside the Cordon other than the

01:03:38 area inside the Cordon other than the tower I think there was in terms of early in the day I think there was um the priority was housing grenfell um residents first right and how was

01:03:49 um residents first right and how was that organized the council organized that do you know how they organ what system they used well I know that they um they did a lot of bookings early in the morning of hotels and then I know

01:04:00 the morning of hotels and then I know that they came to the rest centers and we had been advising them through exchange of data during the day of um people who were safe and missing people who were in The Rest centers um and they

01:04:12 who were in The Rest centers um and they um then came to the rest centers and um did the physical booking of those um that that accommodation for the residents right and when they were doing that prioritizing the Greenfield Tower

01:04:24 that prioritizing the Greenfield Tower residents in the way you've described did they have upto-date data or so far as was possible upto-date data about who was

01:04:32 was vulnerable um they had upto-date data from um well they had the data that we had on our teny um teny database um and I know that they were making their own

01:04:43 I know that they were making their own assessments of people when they were doing bookings um they were checking they were doing detailed assessments of every individual when they were making bookings from the rest center and when they were making their own assessments

01:04:54 they were making their own assessments of people when doing their book KS what criteria were were they using to to the best of your knowledge I I couldn't tell you that I don't I don't know I mean do you know whether any attention was given

01:05:05 you know whether any attention was given by

01:05:06 by rbkc to whether the hotel accommodation being proposed for evacuees from Grandfield Tower was suitable for their for the particular needs of those evacuees um I I I don't know that in any

01:05:19 evacuees um I I I don't know that in any detail I do know that they were um trying to match it with the need of the people that you know from that they had sorry I'm not saying that right at all no understand

01:05:32 saying that right at all no understand you get the gist of it yes I think that's clear I think to be clear you so far as you knew they were trying to match uh Hotel accommodation with the

01:05:44 match uh Hotel accommodation with the vulnerability data that you thought they had no no no I'm sorry I'm not saying that so it's worth clarifying I'm saying is that we had given them that information and I thought that they were making their own assessments at the

01:05:56 making their own assessments at the point of booking people into the hotels about their particular needs so they were you getting their live data from you know how it was on the ground at the time I

01:06:06 time I see and was there any information sharing between the TMO and the council about vulnerable persons and their needs there there was um sort of constant information sharing so um we we we we

01:06:19 information sharing so um we we we we gave them the tency list which had a list of what we would had known as vulnerable outb stage and that was shared with them um now um Westway um can we go

01:06:32 them um now um Westway um can we go please to your sixth statement page 13 where you tell us paragraph 46 that you did not attend the Westway Center on

01:06:43 you did not attend the Westway Center on the 14th of June or during the subsequent period of its occupation um is it I think we've seen though that there was a rotor of TMO staff to provide support to the evacuated residents who were there

01:06:56 evacuated residents who were there yes yes I think that's a snapshot of the rotor though I think that's a rotor at a point in time because we had staff in the west way from you know from the day of the fire until when eventually we

01:07:07 of the fire until when eventually we were asked to leave attending given that the Westway Center had become the central place for support why didn't you attend on the 14th or after the 14th of June and I was busy doing a variety of

01:07:21 June and I was busy doing a variety of other things and um I uh we we had a rer of Staff who were very capable and confident to be there and I didn't think I needed to go there

01:07:33 I needed to go there right what support was provided to to the TMO staff that were assigned to the Westway Center to enable them adequately to support in turn the needs of the survivors and

01:07:45 survivors and residents um so we we had daily briefings back at the office I organized daily briefings to make sure that all our staff were um we were sharing information as we knew because everything was moving very fast um so we

01:07:59 everything was moving very fast um so we we made sure that we exchanged information on a regular basis um you can see that through our through our statements you see um well I'm sure we'll go there later but um so we

01:08:11 we'll go there later but um so we briefed our staff um and they were aware of the services of other um agencies within the Westway so they were aware of what who they could you know direct people to if they came to their desk

01:08:22 people to if they came to their desk right and and on the 14th at least what were the other services of the other agencies within the Westway um uh there was there was a list um I remember that

01:08:35 was there was a list um I remember that was um circulated on our um on a WhatsApp group fairly early on on um the day I believe and that listed the full

01:08:46 day I believe and that listed the full um range of services so um uh there was mental health support um uh I I'm sorry just gone blank um a full range of

01:09:01 just gone blank um a full range of services housing were down there rbkc housing were there um sorry just gone blank on that um I think it's right isn't it as you tell us in your statement your sixth statement

01:09:13 in your statement your sixth statement paragraph 47 that there was no physical TMO presence on Saturday the 17th and Sunday the 18th of June the first weekend following the fire so this is this is something I think I'm a bit

01:09:24 this is something I think I'm a bit confused on because I I I I think it's possible from reading the statements that Mandy Olivia or hash may have been there um it certainly wasn't intentional that we weren't there and we were doing

01:09:36 that we weren't there and we were doing a variety of other things but I can't say 100% if we were or not

01:09:45 right do you know how many evacuees were in the Westway Center over that weekend no I don't know that do you know who was protecting them or catering for their needs such as washing changing

01:09:57 their needs such as washing changing facilities grief prayer I know privacy I mean they were all the things that I should have been able to tell you we at the West way a minute moment ago but other other organizations were providing

01:10:10 other other organizations were providing that support we I we knew that Rob Bush was um sorry Rob Shaw was there as well and we were in telephone contact with people I but I can't say 100% that we weren't there do you remember whether

01:10:23 weren't there do you remember whether you or anybody else from the TM team was in contact with the HG the humanitarian assistant Steering group or anybody from humanitarian assistance at the Westway over that

01:10:35 assistance at the Westway over that weekend I I just said I I can't remember 100% whether we were did you have did you yourself at any stage have any contact with the Halo the humanitarian

01:10:48 contact with the Halo the humanitarian assistance liaison officer no I didn't

01:10:53 no had you heard of that role was that wrong no before nobody told you that um somebody called Sue Redmond from the London B of Hammer Smith and Fulham had

01:11:05 London B of Hammer Smith and Fulham had taken on the role of Halo from the 15th of June I don't remember that I don't remember that um no Mr chairman we're about to come to a new topic yes would you rather break at

01:11:18 new topic yes would you rather break at that point think sensible to break at that point if you can well um m brown that's obviously a good point to have our morning break so we'll stop there okay we'll um excuse me we'll resume

01:11:29 okay we'll um excuse me we'll resume pleas at halfast 11: and as you know I said it to you on the previous occasions please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it okay while you're out of the room all right thank you very much would' like to go

01:11:40 thank you very much would' like to go with the Usher

01:11:50 please thank you very much Mr Millet halfast 11 then please

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01:30:57 would you ask this brown to come back in please thank

01:31:09 you thank

01:31:12 you all right Mr Brown all all set to carry on yeah thank you very much yes Mr yes thank you very much Mr chairman um I now want to ask you about the safe and missing residents list that the thmo

01:31:24 missing residents list that the thmo created and maintained uh in the period after the fire and first I want to look at the um list of persons from Grenville Tower itself can we start with um your

01:31:35 Tower itself can we start with um your sixth whitler statement please which is open in front of you on the screen I think at the moment and go back in it to Page Six paragraph 19

01:32:12 page six please paragraph 19

01:32:27 yeah can we go can we please turn the page page

01:32:37 six thank you paragraph 19 you say there prior

01:32:42 prior to this is the second line prior to mobilization of TMO staff to rest centers I asked them to identify which tenants and Lease holders were present at their centers and to Cate information on those who were missing the the reason

01:32:54 on those who were missing the the reason why I did this was to try and provide information to the lfb to help them identify which residents remained missing so that that's correct is it yeah yes um was that task directed by

01:33:06 yeah yes um was that task directed by rbkc um no I don't I don't remember where it was um tasked from really but I don't think it was by them right given that that is or might have been the case

01:33:17 that that is or might have been the case that you weren't asked by rbkc to undertake that role why did you do it um because I think when I was standing in the command center it seemed um it

01:33:30 in the command center it seemed um it seemed a very practical thing that I could do to assist um I knew that it would be important um and and therefore I set about doing that I so you volunteered it I I think so yeah

01:33:45 volunteered it I I think so yeah did you get any kind of um Direction on the type of data that should be collected from the um survivors and those being

01:33:57 the um survivors and those being evacuated from the Tower or about how to Cate or organize and store that information I I don't remember getting any direction from anybody about it now just to be clear is it right that this

01:34:08 just to be clear is it right that this process was in relation to the grenfell tower residents as opposed to the residents who had been evacuated from the walkways and tread gold house yes at this stage yes at this stage now if we uh stick please with this

01:34:21 uh stick please with this page and go please at the foot of uh a little lower down to paragraph 20 um you say this information was initially recorded on pieces of paper brought to me at St Clem's church or in the

01:34:32 me at St Clem's church or in the vicinity of that area which I then related to the lfb at the command unit lfb photocopied the pages and gave them back to me Etc and uh then you explained that there

01:34:43 Etc and uh then you explained that there were handwritten lists provided to Kieran who put the information on spreadsheets on the laptop and then you say this information was shared via email with the Beck rbkc lfb and the

01:34:54 email with the Beck rbkc lfb and the casualty Bureau at met police amongst others at various times during the day as it was

01:34:59 as it was updated is it correct that initially this information was used to give to the lfb to help with rescue efforts yeah I I hand delivered the information on those who were missing to the lfb from a very

01:35:12 who were missing to the lfb from a very earlier stage and and was it the case that thereafter the TMO continued to update the safe or missing person's list and then circulate it to a number of agencies yes including rbkc that's

01:35:25 agencies yes including rbkc that's correct right and and for their purposes is this right to help them identify who needed emergency accommodation yes it was telling them who was safe and missing and also um yes

01:35:37 who was safe and missing and also um yes it was used to identify who needed accommodation do you know whether the casualty Bureau which had been set up at about I think 6:30 a uh was using those

01:35:50 about I think 6:30 a uh was using those lists to help them with their inquiries coming in from those who were looking for their loved ones I know that we certainly sent it to them I don't know what they did with it but we we updated

01:36:01 what they did with it but we we updated that list several times during the course of the day I think maybe five six times um and we did send that information um to casualty Bureau definitely and always to the back and

01:36:13 definitely and always to the back and rbkc

01:36:15 rbkc right and and yeah yeah did you appreciate when you did that that those agencies I call them agencies but the casualty Bureau the Beck the council would be relying on that information in

01:36:26 would be relying on that information in delivering their own emergency responses um I thought that they would be using it as a base and to a certain extent relying on it but I did expect people to you know during the course of

01:36:38 people to you know during the course of housing people and further conversations um during the course of a few days for people to use that as a base and add to it did you think at the time that it was a role best carried out by the TMO or did you think that it was

01:36:50 by the TMO or did you think that it was a role better undertaken by rbkc as the official responder well I don't think I I knew in detail about the Red Cross links and that the Red Cross were

01:37:03 links and that the Red Cross were um did have a system of collecting data themselves so I don't think I knew that at the stage that I started it looking back on it now uh is it your view that it it would have been a role better

01:37:14 it it would have been a role better suited to rbkc well I don't know um RV KC um I don't know they weren't there at the

01:37:26 I don't know they weren't there at the time they weren't there at the early hours in the morning they weren't there at quarter to um 5: when we started collecting the information so I thought it was best that we get on with it I think which was

01:37:37 that we get on with it I think which was most in my mind now you say in paragraph 21 that you were responsible for the process in terms of asking for the information to be collated by TMO

01:37:48 information to be collated by TMO staff were you satisfied that the staff you allocated to the various rest centers were equipped to deal with that task I think they they knew exactly what we needed i' communicated to the plan to

01:37:59 we needed i' communicated to the plan to them and um I think that they um and if you look at their statements to me it's very clear thankfully that we're all saying the same thing that we knew what we were doing there's a task in hand um

01:38:12 we were doing there's a task in hand um and whilst it was on pieces of paper there was definitely a process that we were going through to to upload those to the spreadsheet that process was it a PR pre-existing process or was it a process coupled together on the day but which so

01:38:24 coupled together on the day but which so far as you were concerned worked um well it was a process that um that that I directed on the day was there any training given to your staff

01:38:35 there any training given to your staff on how to undertake that process um not not specifically but you know they they they were used to dealing with residents obviously not in such awful circumstances but um no there was no

01:38:49 circumstances but um no there was no specific training about best centers specifically or collecting that but they were clear on what was being asked of them um I I just want to show you what Mandy Warrior has told the

01:39:00 you what Mandy Warrior has told the inquiry in her witness statement can we go please to t148

01:39:11 986 page four if we can go to that paragraph 17 she says Theresa instructed me to go to the Reception Center that had been set up at the Harrow Club when I I got

01:39:23 set up at the Harrow Club when I I got to the Harrow Club the manager of the club essentially abdicated all responsibility for the reception center to me I began greeting people as they entered the center making a note of who they were and what they needed I also

01:39:34 they were and what they needed I also made a list of any people who were allegedly missing and he carry she carries on at paragraph 18 I recall feeling like I wasn't the right person to be running the center as I had not received any training on running a

01:39:45 received any training on running a Reception Center however I had no choice but to carry on given the importance of the task to identify safe and missing residents why were staff members who were not confident in undertaking this

01:39:57 were not confident in undertaking this role as she apparently wasn't um asked to do so well I don't think she should have been asked to run a a rest center that's what isn't what I sent her there to do I asked her to keep a get a list

01:40:09 to do I asked her to keep a get a list of the the safe and the missing um right did did you have a conversation with her on the day or a later day about

01:40:20 with her on the day or a later day about her her um her perceptions that she reflects in paragraph 18 there um I don't I don't remember searly discussing her um I think she is if you look at all

01:40:33 her um I think she is if you look at all the other statements I don't think any of the other staff um had a difficulty with what they're doing Mandy had volunteered she'd came in in the middle of the night to try and do what she

01:40:44 of the night to try and do what she could do to to help um I did send her other resources um and I think that's all I could do at that time and obviously sent more people um later on

01:40:56 obviously sent more people um later on and she in fact moved to the she in fact moved to the um Port Bell Rugby Club so she would have been supported by more staff as as as the day went on yes and we saw her name certainly on the 5:30

01:41:09 we saw her name certainly on the 5:30 a.m. yeah, 1400 slot at the top of the list at at the rug Bell Club when allocating staff to rest centers and asking them to undertake this role of recording safe and missing residents did

01:41:20 recording safe and missing residents did you consider at the time whether they were adequately trained to do so do you know on the day no I did not think that at all they had they had come to um site

01:41:31 at all they had they had come to um site um because they wanted to do something to help I didn't I didn't question what you know they didn't question what they were doing they were willing to go there and do what they could to help so um

01:41:43 and do what they could to help so um this certainly wasn't the feedback I got from Mandy at the time she was you know she she worked tirelessly in many days and weeks following this as did other staff so um

01:41:54 staff so um um did were any of the staff deployed to rest centers trained as rest center managers no none of our staff were rest center managers that would have been an rbkc thing to be trained as a rest

01:42:05 rbkc thing to be trained as a rest center manager we we weren't formally trained right just to be clear um is the answer no they weren't trained but equally they didn't actually perform the role of rest center managers they

01:42:16 role of rest center managers they definitely weren't W Center managers it was rbc's Role to deploy W Center managers which they did in the evening and until the evening before the evening who filled the Gap well I don't think

01:42:28 who filled the Gap well I don't think that I saw my staff role ever to be rest center managers they were there to assist with collecting the information that I'd ask them to go there and to support residents I didn't ever see that

01:42:40 support residents I didn't ever see that they would be in charge of rest centers there were an additional

01:42:47 resource and we're providing the additional resource was it your view that they were doing so under the tmo's emergency plan or or just as a matter of voluntary conduct I I do you know I

01:43:00 voluntary conduct I I do you know I don't think I had time to think about which capacity they were doing it just that they were there doing what they could to assist now um let's look next specifically at the process of creating

01:43:12 specifically at the process of creating and developing the safe and missing residents list initially I think the information as you say was recorded by staff's handwritten notes you tell us that at paragraph 20 of your six

01:43:23 that at paragraph 20 of your six statement which we've seen and then your Kieran is this right Kieran your colleague Kieran sing arrived at St Clement's church and began recording it in a spreadsheet yes yes that's right I'd asked him to bring this the um

01:43:34 I'd asked him to bring this the um laptop yes now let's look at how that was done in detail can we look at his supplementary statement please TMO 89441 0 page

01:43:48 89441 0 page 1 paragraph 3A he says I originally received a full tenancy list for the greld tower from David Noble in the form of a spreadsheet I understood that this

01:43:59 of a spreadsheet I understood that this had been extracted from capita and detailed the names addresses and contact details of tenants the extracted list was used as the starting point for the list of safe and missing residents from Greenfield Tower does that Accord with

01:44:11 Greenfield Tower does that Accord with your understanding Miss Brown of how the spreadsheet was developed yes uh and if we go to your fifth statement tm89

01:44:21 tm89 8699 fifth statement page five paragraph 25 thank you you see there you exhibit tb5 this is just halfway down the

01:44:34 tb5 this is just halfway down the paragraph uh and you say that includes um any with an email attached with a list saying current resident list which he then emailed to the Beck casualty Bureau Essex police

01:44:46 the Beck casualty Bureau Essex police Amanda Johnson uh you and Robert black on the 14th of June of 1221 yes yes yes let's just go to that then TMO

01:45:00 86993 uh uh this from Kieran Singh to all those people including you subject current resident list High current list of safe and known missing residents of

01:45:11 of safe and known missing residents of Granville Tower this is a working document which is being updated constantly so we will provide further updates during the day and note the time 12:21 and let's look at the spreadsheet which is attached

01:45:23 which is attached as you can see resident list as an XLS which is a spreadsheet uh it's a tm86

01:45:31 tm86 9931 can we have that open please we'll need the native for that please that's tm86 9931

01:45:58 uh now you will see from the foot of the screen that there are four subtabs in the

01:46:05 the spreadsheet uh there's General there's safe there's missing and there's something called sheet four uh now um is it right looking at Kieran sing's evidence about how this list was generated that the general tab

01:46:17 list was generated that the general tab represents the extracted full tency list that he describes yes yes well yes that's right yes and and if we open General I think you can see it we just

01:46:28 General I think you can see it we just open General up uh and scroll down you can see or everyone can see what that list looks like now

01:46:40 um if we go please back to Kieran sing statement paragraph 3B on page 2 this is tm89

01:46:49 tm89 4410 page two paragraph 3B we're going to come back to this document in a minute so don't don't let it go too far away um he says at

01:47:05 3B on page two from my understanding this

01:47:09 this document reflected all known occupants of each property at the grenfell tower rather than just the the registered tenant as the data contained in this document had been extracted from the tmo's system it would have reflected and

01:47:21 tmo's system it would have reflected and recorded the exact information provided by a tenant about a change or update in their household occupants now that's what he says um can I next show you what hash Cham Chun says

01:47:34 I next show you what hash Cham Chun says in his statement tm1 48972 page four paragraph

01:47:48 12 tm1 48972 page

01:47:58 four he says we need page four please yes thank you paragraph 12 he says uh halfway through the

01:48:11 he says uh halfway through the paragraph uh he says TMO held details do you see that yep TMO held details of the registered tenants and Lease holder for each flat but it did not hold details of the occupants family members and

01:48:22 the occupants family members and visitors this information was constantly being updated as information became available and my understanding is regular updates were given by others to the fire brigade and police in order to identify those who remain missing now

01:48:34 identify those who remain missing now based on your understanding did the general list that I've shown you compiled by Kieran Singh contain details of registered tenants and Lease holders of Grandfield Tower or was it a list of

01:48:47 of Grandfield Tower or was it a list of all household occupants I think it was a mixture and I think it was dependent on when people probably end the um started their tencies so if you look back at the list some of it is just a tenant a lead

01:48:59 list some of it is just a tenant a lead tenant and sometimes it's the household um members you see it repeated um you know two or four might be three or four times if there were four occupants so it's a mixture of both and we would only

01:49:11 it's a mixture of both and we would only know the lease holders details not the subtenant details on that on that list so how right and was that something you knew at the time when Kieran sing was

01:49:22 knew at the time when Kieran sing was comp compiling his list yes we we we knew that yeah you can see so your start is this right your starting your Baseline then for identifying who was in the building on the night was not necessarily accurate so I think it's you

01:49:35 necessarily accurate so I think it's you know it's as as Kevin has said in his statements as Laura referred to last week our our information about our tenants is is only as accurate as the last time it was recorded it's it's a

01:49:46 last time it was recorded it's it's a snapshot in time so information is taken when a a tency signs up when you do a ten change when a tenant reports a change to you um and then you can update

01:49:57 change to you um and then you can update the information so at any point I think we we all understand that it's never going to be 100% accurate because it is also dependent on people giving information to you so so you might

01:50:10 information to you so so you might actually have a flat where the identity and um characteristics of the occupant was completely different from what is contained on your list um I wouldn't expect to see many

01:50:22 list um I wouldn't expect to see many occasions where it was completely different um I yeah I I wouldn't expect that to be completely different no it would be in the in the case of Le leaseholders I know that we did find you

01:50:34 leaseholders I know that we did find you know people had sulet their property and there were different occupants completely in the case of leaseholders were you confident at the time that the list the general list at least uh represented everyone who needed to be

01:50:45 represented everyone who needed to be accounted for um well no I think I think we understood that there would be people in the building on that night who weren't registered tenants who were either staying or you know we we knew

01:50:57 either staying or you know we we knew that there would be other people or we could use was the base that we had and it was taken from capita um on the day of the fire so it was the latest registered information that we had um

01:51:09 registered information that we had um can we go to TMO 1

01:51:16 35581 I think you probably answered this question but let's look at what's said um it's from Robert Shaw at rbkc housing to Kieran Singh and you at 1442 on the

01:51:27 to Kieran Singh and you at 1442 on the 17th of June which was the Saturday afternoon after the fire quick question do we know roughly how many residents not just lead tenants were in the tower been asked this by a Red Cross

01:51:38 been asked this by a Red Cross volunteer

01:51:39 volunteer um first presumably that was a question in your mind was it right from the start of the fire yeah that's why I was always concerned about the Reliance on just using the the tenants um list the tency

01:51:51 using the the tenants um list the tency list um because that wouldn't be the upto-date account of people who would then be in there it would be you know more or less right but there would be other occupants that night that would be people who are away the people who had

01:52:02 people who are away the people who had had children that weren't told about you know it's a fluid thing we wouldn't know at any particular point in time 100% who was in the tower on the night yes and indeed we look at the response to this email uh a few minutes later at tm1

01:52:19 35581 this is Kieran sings response to Robert

01:52:24 Robert Shaw at 1448 on the same day 17th of June and he says uh uh he says second email down 231 people tenant and household members not

01:52:36 people tenant and household members not any visitors that we were aware of from our it tency records this should be on the updated grandell safe list I sent yesterday obviously this is not likely to be 100% accurate as households have

01:52:48 to be 100% accurate as households have changed over the years and we have not always been told so I think that makes the point doesn't it that at the time you were aware that the safe and missing list was based on an inaccurate uh or

01:52:59 based on an inaccurate uh or incomplete complete not necessarily in yeah incomplete there's always that danger and it really is you know it is a partnership thing working with residents and isn't it to make sure that we have as much upto-date information as we can

01:53:12 as much upto-date information as we can yes did did it occur to you at the time therefore uh that the agencies who were being sent this list were relying on that information incomplete though it was to off for support to those

01:53:23 was to off for support to those affected well I think you know what we were also doing was identifying the this the safe and missing we and and we were trying to

01:53:34 missing we and and we were trying to collect information about sort of other other people who may have been there too but yes principally the list was um being matched against the tency list

01:53:45 being matched against the tency list that's right and do you accept therefore that that meant that there were residents who would not have been accounted for and therefore not contacted

01:53:53 contacted um yes but we could only work with um with what what we had at the time and we tried in various other ways to to to contact people not just using um the

01:54:06 contact people not just using um the data on this day what what what steps did you take in other ways to contact people other than in Reliance on this list I suppose we would have used it as

01:54:18 list I suppose we would have used it as a basis but we did go to the rest centers so if we became aware of anyone in the rest center um we would have um who wasn't necessarily on the tency data

01:54:29 who wasn't necessarily on the tency data um right yeah I I mean I do um you know I've looked at some of the evidence and I've seen for example lease holders um leaseholder who had

01:54:42 lease holders um leaseholder who had sublet to three people now we didn't know those sub Lees contact details we contacted the Le the lesie and saw if he was all right but he then had to make

01:54:54 was all right but he then had to make contact with the the sub tenants that was the only way we could do it I mean it is it is it is complex yes yes but using the the information from people in

01:55:05 using the the information from people in the rest centers so then you would how would it work you would find out who they were M try and match them with those on the the general list and then if they weren't on it what what would you do would you ask them questions who

01:55:17 you do would you ask them questions who else in the tower was was in the in the flat yes and and that was that was that was the point of trying to get the live data did you raise this problem about the incomplete nature of the Baseline list with rbkc so rbkc would have been

01:55:31 list with rbkc so rbkc would have been aware of that and I you know um Laura Johnson I I you know I saw her evidence the other day she's she's aware most people who work in housing are aware of this the complex nature of of keeping

01:55:43 this the complex nature of of keeping data up to 100% accurate did did anybody from rbkc contribute to the development or maintenance of this list of safe and r residents on or from the 14th of June so

01:55:56 residents on or from the 14th of June so there was a contant um exchange of this data even up until the um 20 21st 23rd of um June we were trying to match it eventually with who been placed in um in

01:56:09 eventually with who been placed in um in hotel accommodation and we were sharing that with the council um so I I also knew that they were um you know doing booking booking residents

01:56:21 you know doing booking booking residents in direct IR ly so they would have got additional information from from that process and added to um added to the information in tendency list now I want to ask you next about how this list was

01:56:34 to ask you next about how this list was updated during the course of the 14th to start with um can we go back to your sixth statement please sixth statement paragraph 22 on page uh

01:56:48 six and you say there that TMO staff at each rest Center were asked to bring the information to me initially and subsequently to Kieran so that this could be added into the spreadsheet to

01:56:59 could be added into the spreadsheet to ensure the information was Consolidated into one spreadsheet to avoid confusion I know the caretakers estate service assistants esas I think has been referred to elsewhere had a role in

01:57:10 referred to elsewhere had a role in bringing this information to us from the rest centers it is possible that staff emailed or phoned this information through to Kieran as well if they could not physically attend at St Clement's church Kieran also communicated with

01:57:22 church Kieran also communicated with staff via the WhatsApp group established now if we look um at paragraph 24 of your statement please on page seven you say there um in the last sentence three

01:57:36 there um in the last sentence three lines down there was no set format for recording this information rather staff used whatever resource was available in their rest center to do this now it said taking those together can we proceed on

01:57:48 taking those together can we proceed on the basis of what I've just read to you from these two paragraphs if your statement is correct um no set format for recording it as when we recorded on pieces of paper but

01:57:59 when we recorded on pieces of paper but um there was a plan for what was done with that right well let's then look at um a number of documents let let let me show you uh first tm1 35210

01:58:22 um is this an example of a handwritten note taken by TMO staff at AR rest center it it looks as though it is yeah yes uh and you've

01:58:33 yes uh and you've got uh Jessica 12 to13 20th floor abano Ramirez missing there yes uh and others listed uh let's look at another one I'm

01:58:44 listed uh let's look at another one I'm just going to show you two or three examples tm1 35236

01:58:53 tm10

01:59:02 35236 uh and uh you can see on that one halfway down 115 grfl Tower Zab Dean

01:59:13 Dean recorded what does the word recorded mean in each case so that means that we would have um put them onto the spreadsheet I see and then another one at tm1

01:59:30 35242 and you can see the names

01:59:35 there uh and somebody who needs rehousing you see Marin and me Marin mechanon and johanes test day needs rehousing flat 163 same with hu

01:59:47 163 same with hu Dagu and winom Tes gen uh and then last one tm1

01:59:59 35218 you can see next next of kin and

02:00:05 friends and who was missing and who was safe you see that uh in the right hand column missing and then safe safe safe yeah um did you have any concerns

02:00:17 safe yeah um did you have any concerns at the time about the accuracy of cating the information on on safe and missing residents in this way

02:00:27 way um no I thought well I mean when you're in those kind of circumstances there's obviously a margin of error but um I you know I thought we

02:00:38 of error but um I you know I thought we had a process um I thought staff were clear about what they were doing and um I I thought it was the best thing best way to collect it and who was it who who

02:00:50 way to collect it and who was it who who was reporting the missing these

02:00:53 these relatives it could have been yes relatives or or anybody else we're going into the to the contact into the sorry into the rest centers um and providing

02:01:05 into the rest centers um and providing the information to us and then if we go to your sixth statement again please page five say back a bit in your sixth statement page five paragraph 16 you say

02:01:17 statement page five paragraph 16 you say um you you correct a typographical error and then you say

02:01:25 I'm sorry um paragraph 16 I apologize I'm looking at paragraph 18 16 upon arriving at St Clement's church myself and Nicol Nicola Bartholomew began speaking with the residents who had

02:01:36 speaking with the residents who had gathered there introducing ourselves and taking details of anyone there there weren't many residents there to begin with but then I recalled that it really filled up we took details of residents as they arrived and we gave regular

02:01:47 as they arrived and we gave regular announcements asking all residents to register with us so we could account for them people also advised us of relatives and friends that they could not find and we added them to our list uh now You' confirmed that in in

02:01:59 list uh now You' confirmed that in in your evidence earlier this morning that it that this statement is correct so can we proceed on that on the basis that that's what you did yes yes now let's look at what CLA Richards says in her

02:02:10 look at what CLA Richards says in her statement uh she was chief executive of the Clement James Center at the time of the fire uh and you find her statement to the inquiry at cfv 6012

02:02:23 and if we go in that please to page

02:02:28 13 paragraph 89 uh which is a long paragraph and she says this the TMO staff wrote information on scraps of paper and they didn't appear to have a system they didn't seem to be capturing an accurate

02:02:41 didn't seem to be capturing an accurate record of everyone that was arriving at or leaving the site and who they were looking for I offered on a number of occasions for our staff to assist the TMO staff and the use of laptops to capture all the information on a

02:02:52 capture all the information on a spreadsheet they always turned down this offer I therefore asked some staff to go around the site ensuring we had had everyone's information on our spreadsheets including their address whether they were missing anyone and if

02:03:04 whether they were missing anyone and if they had somewhere to

02:03:07 stay and I asked the staff on the entrance to the church to note down who was entering and direct them to the TMO table and to make a note of anyone who was leaving a a member of the TMO staff saw that we were doing this and asked

02:03:19 saw that we were doing this and asked for our records as she said that only they should be collecting this information and it would it would be very confusing if there were more than one list we handed over all the records as the TMO continued to record their

02:03:30 as the TMO continued to record their information on scraps of paper with no clear system with the potential to miss residence I contined to offer the assistance of our staff team and laptops they repeatedly turned down this offer they didn't return our records from that

02:03:42 they didn't return our records from that morning now just looking at the last um two sentences there is that correct I don't remember being being um made office of laptops um what I do know

02:03:55 made office of laptops um what I do know is that um Kieran arrived at site at 8:00 in the morning so from quite early on we had a laptop um yes we were using I wouldn't call them scraps of paper we

02:04:07 I wouldn't call them scraps of paper we were using pieces of paper but we did have a method we did have a plan we would have not wanted to start recording um you know information on a different database I really felt that we needed to

02:04:20 database I really felt that we needed to put it onto the one spreadsheet so that it was you know the margin for error was minimized as much as it could

02:04:31 be and and what do you have to say in response to the the concern expressed here that the TMO was not capturing an accurate record of residents so so I

02:04:42 accurate record of residents so so I mean as I've said in my statement um we we went around the rest so we were there before CLA was to be fair um so you know we went around and the rest center we tried to catch people when

02:04:53 center we tried to catch people when there were enough numbers to do that individually that's how we started we then set up a um a table near the door so that we would be as close as we possibly could so that people couldn't

02:05:04 possibly could so that people couldn't avoid us um not that they would avoid us but they couldn't misses is the word I really mean um and you know after that we did phone rounds as well to try and

02:05:15 we did phone rounds as well to try and catch people so yes we may have missed some people you know despite our best Endeavors we may have missed some people but we I thought we had a process in place that

02:05:26 place that um could could you know was as efficient as it could be um and I think Kieran confirms that in his in his evidence too did you repeatedly refuse the offer of

02:05:37 did you repeatedly refuse the offer of assistance from The Clement James center for the use of laptops um yeah I wouldn't have wanted people to start recording things on different laptops because then we'd have had to amalgamate it all that would have taken more time

02:05:49 it all that would have taken more time just wanted the you know the system to to be quite clear and straightforward so that staff knew what was happening I see so you declined this offer of assistance because you wanted a single system that

02:06:00 because you wanted a single system that you could operate rather than a profusion well that's yes that was the intent I I I don't remember having personal conversation with her about that but that was that was what we were focused on one system one spreadsheet to

02:06:12 focused on one system one spreadsheet to minimize the confusion I see are you the person at the Clement James Center who asked for the records that the Clement James Center was itself creating I I and I don't remember that at all I

02:06:24 I I and I don't remember that at all I don't remember that conversation you don't know who it was who was no I'm sorry I don't I don't remember that now one of the concerns expressed by um the the particular member of Staff of the TMO or possibly by you was the

02:06:36 the TMO or possibly by you was the potential for confusion as you've just told us if there was more than one safe and missing list were you aware that other community rest centers such as the rugby Portell club we are also keeping a

02:06:48 rugby Portell club we are also keeping a list of safe and missing residents um yeah I've seen that in in our staff's statement and I think um I think somebody I don't know who it was somebody did come and visit um St James's at at one point and I told them

02:07:01 James's at at one point and I told them what we were doing I see and did you try and make sure that you had a centralized list of safe and missing residents across all rest centers yes so all rest centers were bringing their information

02:07:12 centers were bringing their information to uh to us at St Clement James and they knew to do that did they yes they knew to do that that was the clear instruction from when I sent first sent people off in different directions and I organized for the caretakers to you know

02:07:24 organized for the caretakers to you know come and collect that information um team leaders were really clear about that that was brought to me initially and then to kieren I see were they brought to you physically in in a in a physically they were yeah and that was

02:07:37 physically they were yeah and that was physically what I handed over to the lfb initially so to be clear other rest centers were physically delivering handwritten missing or yes accounted for lists to you at the St Clement that's

02:07:49 lists to you at the St Clement that's right that's the system we had in place right now let's then go back to to to the spreadsheet tm86

02:08:01 9931 this is the one this is the residence list circulated at 1221 we saw earlier and if we look at the safe tab please is it correct that the yellow

02:08:12 please is it correct that the yellow highlighted rows are supposed to indicate residents who have been reported as safe yes yes and if we look at the missing tab we open up the missing tab please um is it the case that those

02:08:25 please um is it the case that those highlighted rows indicate residents who have been reported as missing yep those are there's um a tab a key in it as well in sheet

02:08:34 in sheet four now if we um look at some of the highlighted rows in the safe tab please let's go back to the safe Tab and and look at that a little bit more closely um we can see a number of examples of

02:08:48 um we can see a number of examples of those reported as safe so if we go please to row

02:08:55 11 row 11 you can see Mr D Murphy flat 1111 that's Dennis Murphy he was reported as safe yeah Ro

02:09:06 51 we can see flat 143 Mrs K koui Kadija Ki reported as safe yes you see that and

02:09:17 Ki reported as safe yes you see that and then rows 104 to 107 if we look at that 104 to [Music]

02:09:24 [Music] 107 row 104 to 107 flat 182 um the elab reported as safe uh and another example at Row one

02:09:35 safe uh and another example at Row one row

02:09:38 136 you can see Mr s nater uh reported as safe now we know unfortunately that those people lost their lives in the fire do you know why they're listed on

02:09:50 fire do you know why they're listed on the tmo's list at this time is safe okay so um this this was one of the first of the

02:09:59 the um the list that we got um that we produced on the day there was a and and this was really based on information that was coming to us so

02:10:11 information that was coming to us so being given to us in the rest center there are further versions of this where we where we try and qualify you know information that we were given in the day and check it over the the course of

02:10:22 day and check it over the the course of of time during that day and over the subsequent days to try and you know verify it there's one spreadsheet where we say um they were reported as safe yesterday but now we we we can't contact

02:10:35 yesterday but now we we we can't contact them so we attempted to qualify this data um in the following few days I accept we won't have got everything right no no I just want to understand the process as it unra as it happened as

02:10:46 the process as it unra as it happened as it un unfolded if we this is the the safe list but if we also go to the missing list in the same spreadsheet at the same

02:10:56 the same time if we click on that please and uh let's look same highlight at uh row 11 you can see Dennis Murphy listed

02:11:09 11 you can see Dennis Murphy listed there and Ray 51 Mrs Kadija koui again listed there can you explain why they appear on kieran's spreadsheet as both safe and missing at the same time no I can't I

02:11:21 missing at the same time no I can't I can tell you that we did try and qualify the information as as we went on now if we go back to your fifth statement

02:11:33 statement please

02:11:35 please TMO yeah fifth statement and go please to page five paragraph 26 foot of your screen you say that um on updated copy an updated copy

02:11:47 that um on updated copy an updated copy of the list was sent by Kieran at 1308 to the same people Plus Laura Johnson at rbkc and you exhibit it as TV6 Kieran then sent it to Rob Shaw at rbkc at

02:11:58 then sent it to Rob Shaw at rbkc at 1344 for forwarding to rbkc teams on the ground as rbk sorry as tb7 now

02:12:07 tb7 now um is it right that the information contained in these lists was intended to be relied on by keep KBC RB KC's housing department well they knew that it would be it would be fluid information it

02:12:19 be it would be fluid information it would be changing all the time yes but nonetheless subject to that qualification I think you your answer is yes you knew it would be relied on by rbc's housing department but it wasn't

02:12:30 rbc's housing department but it wasn't the only time that they received the information yes now let's look at tb7 that you exhibit and this is the list that Kieran Singh forwarded to Rob Shaw at rbkc at

02:12:41 Singh forwarded to Rob Shaw at rbkc at 1344 on the 14th of June and that is at tm86 9954

02:12:52 [Music]

02:12:59 now take it from me uh that the same inaccurate information was recorded at Rose 1151 107 104 to 107 and 136 Dennis Murphy Kadija Ki the elw

02:13:13 136 Dennis Murphy Kadija Ki the elw habes and uh and um saona 136 line 136 do you know know why that still inaccurate information was being sent to

02:13:25 inaccurate information was being sent to rbkc I can't answer it any more than I could earlier right do you know was there a system for ensuring that those recorded are safe were not also recorded as missing

02:13:37 safe were not also recorded as missing and vice versa I mean obviously they should be cross checked to make sure that they're not that's that's you know really obvious to me yes if we if we look at the safe list

02:13:51 yes if we if we look at the safe list please in this schedule at at row

02:13:59 102 we can see at row 102 uh you've got flat 176 Miss Jay abano Ramirez she's on the missing list

02:14:11 abano Ramirez she's on the missing list sorry she's on the safe list yes you see that there yes sorry if we go back to one of the handwritten notes I showed you earlier 1

02:14:23 notes I showed you earlier 1 [Music]

02:14:40 35210 uh you can see at the top that she's recorded as missing yes yep can you account for the

02:14:51 yes yep can you account for the discrepancy so these pieces there's no time on this piece of paper there's no time on when it was input we may have been getting different information at different times um you know clearly

02:15:02 different times um you know clearly we're not going to get everything right I do think that I you know that the the judgment on that data should really be looked at a little bit later on to see you know

02:15:13 you know did we try to verify it later on to Cross Match it with information um is know from people who had been rehoused as well and then if we go back to your

02:15:25 as well and then if we go back to your fifth statement paragraph 27 you tell us that go back to fifth statement paragraph

02:15:36 27 uh you'd say that Kieran sent a further version to the same group at 1446 uh color coding for clarity at T that's TB8 and you say he updated it again at 1727 and you exhibit that as

02:15:49 again at 1727 and you exhibit that as tb9 let's just go to the covering email first of all at TB8 that's at TMO 86993

02:16:05 4 and he says hi all some confusion over the list and colors for clarity I have Amalgamated into one tab of all residents yellow reported safe pink known Stoke reported

02:16:19 reported safe pink known Stoke reported missing what was the confusion that Kieran Singh refers to here um I don't know what was in his mind at the time that he um sent that but it looks like he's trying

02:16:30 but it looks like he's trying to um perhaps correct what was um the previous

02:16:35 previous errors let's look at the updated list that he attaches which is tm86

02:16:45 9935 we need the native of that please

02:16:52 tm86

02:16:55 9935 uh and there you can see the color code yellow safe pink reported missing uh and uh if um we you click

02:17:06 missing uh and uh if um we you click please on the resident list which is the main list there you can see the the amalgamation um can you confirm that the same colors are used in this list as in the earlier list so yellow for safe and

02:17:19 the earlier list so yellow for safe and pink as he calls it or light brown for in yes um I can't remember what you just showed me on the code on sheet sorry there's a code on there there is but let's quickly flip on that it's sheet four if we click click on sheet four

02:17:31 four if we click click on sheet four there there they are there are the codes safe is shellow so it looks like the same so click back on the residents list and if we go down then to row 11 again we can see flat 111 Dennis Murphy yellow

02:17:43 we can see flat 111 Dennis Murphy yellow so he's reported as safe row 51 Kadija Ki reported as safe and take it from me the same with the elah haries at Rose 104 to 107 and sabona at 136 do

02:17:56 at Rose 104 to 107 and sabona at 136 do you know why those individuals have still been marked as safe this is at this is at the end of the day when they were in fact not safe well this is at 17 did you say 17 1727 that's not the end

02:18:08 did you say 17 1727 that's not the end this is the list this is the list to be clear this is the list circulated earlier this is 14 so this isn't the any by any means the end of the day and in terms of us cating information we did phone calls around in the afternoon we

02:18:20 phone calls around in the afternoon we did phone calls around late into the evening so there were fairly there were other versions um and the next day and as I say 21st of June so it wouldn't have been the final list it would be

02:18:31 have been the final list it would be information that we we had received on at that particular time let's go back then to your sixth statement page 8 paragraph

02:18:45 27 well you you explained there what I think in essence you've just told us but let's just look at in your words in your statement page 27 page8 of your sixth statement paragraph

02:18:58 statement paragraph 27 um you say there um information in relation to Res the residents that were missing and safe initially came from those registering at the rest centers but later involved a team of Staff

02:19:09 but later involved a team of Staff ringing all known residents of Grandfield Tower to pick up those who had not registered to provide them with support I'm unable to record when the exercise of telephoning residents of grenfell tower commenced but this was certainly underway by two p.m now just

02:19:23 certainly underway by two p.m now just taking that as red can we next look at tb9 which is the exhibit you referred to at paragraph 27 of your fifth statement and I'm sorry to jump around um between

02:19:34 and I'm sorry to jump around um between the documents but if you go back to your fifth statement page six paragraph 27 uh you see that you exhibit tb9 let's look at tb9 and can we go to

02:19:48 tb9 let's look at tb9 and can we go to tm86 998

02:19:51 tm86 998 3 I'd like to look at TMO 86 [Music]

02:20:01 9983 and here is a a further spreadsheet this is the one circulated at 1727 that you've referred to in paragraph 27 of your statement fifth

02:20:12 your statement fifth statement uh and you you confirm that neighborhood teams had rung every resident they hadn't heard from so if we go to row 11 in it please again we can see Dennis

02:20:24 see Dennis Murphy uh can you see row 11 there flat 111 Dennis Murphy still listed he's yellow therefore safe 51 R 51 Kadija

02:20:37 Ki from Flat 143 still listed as safe Rose 104 to 107 again the AL har listed as safe

02:20:52 uh and uh uh yes and now there are selected examples do you do you know why yet again the list of safe and missing residents continued consistently to

02:21:04 residents continued consistently to record at least these individuals by way of

02:21:07 of example as safe when they were missing um in in row 105 there is um a comment on that as well um all I can say is that that was

02:21:21 well um all I can say is that that was information we would have known at the time I can see um for example on um row 105 it's saying it is a safe color but there's a note on there Sun may be

02:21:32 there's a note on there Sun may be missing yes now row

02:21:36 102 uh we can see here again is Jessica uh uh well there's a redaction underneath

02:21:47 uh well there's a redaction underneath Mrs M Urbano uh against flat 17 six you see in row 102 there there's what is a redaction in fact the unredacted version take this from me it is um Jessica aano

02:22:01 take this from me it is um Jessica aano who is also marked as safe are you able to account for that no no I'm not um I can only repeat I would look at later versions as well this was on the day I'd

02:22:12 versions as well this was on the day I'd look at later versions and if it's still not correct I I you know all I can do is apologize it's very distressing I'm sure for everybody now um but I would look at later lists

02:22:24 now um but I would look at later lists now I appreciate of course that this was an evolving situation and this was what you were having at the time but given the as we can see in I Would S suggest to you inconsistent and and in many ways

02:22:36 to you inconsistent and and in many ways inaccurate information being recorded in this

02:22:39 this spreadsheet um do you accept that that could have led to family members being given the wrong information about their loved ones as we've heard happened for people like hanen wahabi and her family

02:22:50 people like hanen wahabi and her family yes it absolutely could so could have the lists that were up in the rugby Port Portell you know that the the margin of error was there yes definitely but we had a system in place to try and collect

02:23:03 had a system in place to try and collect the data we tried to verify afterwards obviously other PE other organizations would have cross referenced that data later on ours was a base Point yes I I can say we only got everything right and

02:23:16 can say we only got everything right and you do you understand the source of the or basis of the error how how come Jessica abano could have been reported as safe um all I can think is is that somebody did report her as safe in one

02:23:28 somebody did report her as safe in one of the rest centers I I I you know I can I can see that we've got people repeated and safe and missing I can see that but I I the source of the data was from people from the from the the rest

02:23:39 people from the from the the rest centers um so you know that's what we relied on as a say we did ver try to verify it later can we go to rbk 3012

02:23:53 043 now um let's look at page one of this just to identify the [Music]

02:23:59 [Music] document uh it's a crisis support team rest center act rugby PTO Center Wednesday 14th June 2017 uh lead officer Keith Robbins uh Crisis Support Service

02:24:12 Robbins uh Crisis Support Service rbkc uh and he sat within the contingency Management Group in rbkc are you familiar with this document no no I've not seen this before at all

02:24:23 no no I've not seen this before at all in the at the end of the longish paragraph in the middle of your screen there's a last sentence which says a full list of residents and actions taken listed

02:24:31 listed below uh and uh you can see if you go to page two of this

02:24:38 document it works by name and flat number uh and some details and the first one you have there is Sabah Abdullah flat 143 and in the third third

02:24:52 flat 143 and in the third third paragraph uh it says unfortunately he was informed by the TMO that his missing wife that's Kadija Ki she's identified in the first paragraph was reported as

02:25:03 in the first paragraph was reported as safe and well at the Clement St Clement rest center his son receiving a conflicting report from another TMO officer emergency responders Carl and Jordan went with his wife's sister to search nearby rest centers and were

02:25:16 search nearby rest centers and were unsuccessful uh can you account for how it could be that um Sabah Abdullah could be told by the TMO both that his wife

02:25:27 be told by the TMO both that his wife was safe and that his wife was missing

02:25:32 missing um no I I I can't and that must be very distressing and I'm I'm very sorry to hear that all all I can say is at at a point during the day we tried to

02:25:43 point during the day we tried to circulate a list to um to our staffs in the rest center so that they could see the L latest version of um information that we had um so that

02:25:55 um information that we had um so that they could use that as a basis but if it was inaccurate then it would have repeated in inaccuracy but that was an attempt to make sure that people were for informed of the data we had at a particular point but it was obviously a

02:26:08 particular point but it was obviously a a moving feast all the time did you become aware during the course of the 14th of June of the risk of inconsistent information being given to loved ones

02:26:19 information being given to loved ones about the safety or otherwise of those in the tower no I I I wasn't aware of it on on the day um no I wasn't so can we take it that

02:26:30 um no I wasn't so can we take it that you didn't take any steps to eradicate the risk of conflicting information such as this being given to family members seeking information about their loved ones in the

02:26:41 ones in the tower um I think all that I could have done was to um was to record what we were was coming in to make sure that that was sent round to the rest centers

02:26:53 that was sent round to the rest centers as I said we did pass on a list so that people had something to refer to um but you know

02:27:04 but you know people know I'm going to can't say any more than that I I I wasn't aware of it being a significant problem problem on the day obviously it's an awful thing to have happened I know that um you know uh

02:27:17 have happened I know that um you know uh residents have said they also got information that wasn't accurate from other sources and unfortunately when you've got that many people errors are going to be made and you know I'm I'm

02:27:28 going to be made and you know I'm I'm sorry if we played a part in that now you continued you tell us in your fifth statement parent 23 you continued calling Grandfield residents throughout the evening together with

02:27:39 throughout the evening together with your colleague Kieran Singh and here what you tell us from those that you spoke to what were you asking them sorry can you just say that again yes um you well let's let's look at your fifth

02:27:50 well let's let's look at your fifth statement paragraph 23 it's quite long but in essence you say you remember sitting just 3/4 of the way through it you you're I remember sitting you say with a colleague in the evening at

02:28:01 with a colleague in the evening at approximately 9:00 p.m. and calling all residents from Grandfield tower that we've been unable to get hold of during the day yeah um from those that you did get hold of what were you asking them

02:28:12 get hold of what were you asking them what what information were you seeking from them I think we were just trying to see at that stage if they if they were if they were safe to make sure that we knew where everybody was if we could account for everybody and if we had got

02:28:24 account for everybody and if we had got hold of people we would have given them an advice about where to go we'd have found out if there was anyone else missing in their household that's what we intended to do and what advice did you give them um I think it very

02:28:36 you give them um I think it very depending on on who they were who we could get hold of I remember doing it you know very late and about half past 8 and and to be fair there weren't very many people we could get hold of by that stage the voices were they were going to

02:28:49 stage the voices were they were going to voicemail yeah you say that in the next sentence a number of phones dropped into voicemail and there was no answer um for for those that remained uncontable what was the tmo's plan for trying to establish contact and offer support so

02:29:02 establish contact and offer support so the next day we um we did use the list and we did do another phone round of people who we hadn't been able to get hold of that's what I referred to earlier there is other versions of this

02:29:14 earlier there is other versions of this document where we've um we've made further phone calls in the coming days as far as you recall was anybody from the council taking any independent steps proactively to identify grvi residents

02:29:25 proactively to identify grvi residents and their needs for the purposes of emergency accommodation or other forms of support So as I as I've said before they were um obviously verifying everybody in as as they book them into

02:29:37 everybody in as as they book them into accommodation and my understanding was that they were um had Al were doing visits in the in the H house and um sorry what day are we talking about

02:29:49 um sorry what day are we talking about still on the 14 yes they weren't doing visits on the hotel Sorry by then but they were booking people in um and they would have an you know an understanding of their needs at that time and were you

02:30:00 of their needs at that time and were you aware of any rbkc staff being involved with maintaining a list of residents uh that you um that you and other TMO staff were trying to do or or

02:30:11 other TMO staff were trying to do or or make calls in the same way were they keep were they trying to make their own list I don't I don't know I don't remember remember that being discussed were they making their own

02:30:23 discussed were they making their own calls to evacuated residents to try to locate them I've no idea what they were doing I wouldn't have thought so I thought they would be I I don't know did you have a conversation with Laura Johnson about what steps they were

02:30:35 Johnson about what steps they were taking no Laura Johnson was very aware of what we were doing um because we were having conversations and and sending in regular

02:30:47 lists now I want to turn to a different topic which is the experience of evacuated

02:30:53 evacuated residents um from the surrounding properties not grenil Tower itself now you I think you tell us in your statement that there were a number

02:31:04 your statement that there were a number of properties around grandell Tower originally referred to as finger blocks but then later known as walkway properties yes and those are hway walk barandon walk teston walk and grenfell

02:31:16 barandon walk teston walk and grenfell walk they on the screen plus tread gold house and Bramley house yes yes yes uh and um this is a paragraph 63 of your sixth statement on page 18 um if we look

02:31:29 sixth statement on page 18 um if we look at those properties on the on a map can we look at that it this is I think the one you exhibit at TB 59 and yeah summarize here um it's at me30 is

02:31:47 8905 uh and you can see where they are they're all to the South uh and Southeast and Southwest of greld tower if you've got Hurst Way walk

02:31:58 greld tower if you've got Hurst Way walk to to the West the Western most the central is teston uh the W the um the one to the west to the of Greenfield Road but the most easterly is barandon walk to the

02:32:10 most easterly is barandon walk to the east of Greenfield Road you've got tread gold house and then Grille walk of the two blocks or two properties uh to the north of the walkways but to the South straight Southwest of the tower

02:32:23 straight Southwest of the tower yes yes uh now and you've identified at paragraph 61 how many flats in each uh uh now were all of those properties evacuated on the 14th of June

02:32:36 properties evacuated on the 14th of June um I thought that they were all evacuated yes that was my understanding because they were all within the Cordon right let's go all within the cordon and so the just to be clear for everybody The Cordon surrounds this entire set of

02:32:49 The Cordon surrounds this entire set of properties yes absolutely now let's go to your sixth statement again please page um 11 paragraph

02:33:02 39 you say uh there the request for information on who might need accommodation overnight did include Bramley house residents whilst it was originally thought that Bramley house

02:33:13 originally thought that Bramley house residents may need alternative accommodation I believe that this was not subsequently required on 14th June as residents of bring house were not evacuated from their properties for an extended period um now you say that

02:33:26 extended period um now you say that there proceeding on the assumption that that's correct as youve sworn it um let's go to tm86

02:33:34 tm86 9977 which is tb11 which you exhibit to this statement although not in this paragraph uh and this is an email from David Noble on the 14th of June at

02:33:45 David Noble on the 14th of June at 1735 so this is about 8 minutes after the last list has gone out uh of survivors uh stroke missing uh and um here is an email from David Noble and

02:33:57 um here is an email from David Noble and you say in your statement that that confirms uh that the potential number of residents evacuated was was 845 and we get that number I think is this right from the second page of this

02:34:09 this right from the second page of this email where he totals up all the evacuees from um the walkways and tread gold house and comes to a grand total of 800 45 as you can see at the top of your

02:34:21 800 45 as you can see at the top of your screen yes yeah yes and then you got disabled question mark multiple items underneath that um do you know why this was a

02:34:33 that um do you know why this was a number of potential evacuees rather than an actual number of

02:34:39 residents um because it it was it was a total list of of all the information we had so household information as well as you know it won't just be a 10 eight

02:34:50 you know it won't just be a 10 eight right teny a flat it'll be the the household information related to that so numbers of occupants I see so this this was a paper based exercise rather than a headcount of actual

02:35:01 headcount of actual evacuees yeah it's it's drawn from it's drawn in the same way the other list from capit right oh I see is my understanding so it's what's on the database

02:35:11 database [Music]

02:35:13 [Music] right now you also exhibit tb10 let's look at that this is exhibited to your fifth statement appar 30 it is at TMO 8699

02:35:25 25 this is an email from Robert Shaw right at the foot of the screen uh at 1705 on the 14th of June uh and if you go over the page he

02:35:36 June uh and if you go over the page he says uh hello Kieran Theresa that's at the bottom of page one so this comes to you and it says how possible is it to send over lists of tenants who reside in The Cordon area which I think are as

02:35:48 The Cordon area which I think are as follows and then then he sets them out underneath uh his name see that then he he says as you have seen we will look to place families with children vulnerable

02:35:59 place families with children vulnerable and older persons if they cannot return tonight which is likely and we'd a like to get an idea of how many we might have to map place as a Max B compare name strike aess with known vulnerable adults

02:36:11 strike aess with known vulnerable adults and children with colleagues in ASC and

02:36:16 FCS now paragraph if we go to your sixth statement please at paragraph

02:36:24 38 this is how you you characterize this document page 11 paragraph 38 of your sixth statement this is what you

02:36:38 say uh to my knowledge this was the first time direct advice had been provided by rbkc for residents within the Cordon until this point rbkc had focused their efforts on rehousing the

02:36:50 focused their efforts on rehousing the grenfell tower residents who it was known were unable to return home as the day progressed and The Cordon remained in place I believe that it became clear that other residents would also be affected and as such the overnight

02:37:03 affected and as such the overnight accommodation was extended to them were you concerned that about rbkc strategy to prioritize Grenville Tower residents for accommodation given the

02:37:14 residents for accommodation given the significant numbers at least on paper to be evacuated from from the surrounding properties well I think the situation changed during the day as to whether

02:37:25 changed during the day as to whether people would remain to be evacuated or not um I think you know there was a period that we felt that they the the people in in the walkways may be able to go back so um it seemed sensible to me

02:37:38 go back so um it seemed sensible to me that they were prioritizing the people that you know we knew couldn't go back can we then go to or back to the email I've just shown you tm86

02:37:51 9977 I picked this out if you turn please to the next page page uh two he identifies a total of 25 disabled as he calls it disabled

02:38:04 25 disabled as he calls it disabled people across the evacuated properties but you can see here that he doesn't provide any information about families with children or the elderly or any other vulnerabilities which is what Robert Shaw had asked for in his email

02:38:15 Robert Shaw had asked for in his email you've exhibited at tb10 the one I showed you before at 1705 my question is did David Noble see what Robert Shaw had asked

02:38:23 asked for I I really don't know I wouldn't been looking at emails that closely at that time Robert Shaw's I'm sorry I cut across

02:38:34 Shaw's I'm sorry I cut across you Robert Shaw's email went to you and to Kieran Singh but wasn't sent to David Noble did you pass it on to David Noble I don't remember do you know how

02:38:46 Noble I don't remember do you know how David Noble got the instruction to seek out the details of disabled residence

02:38:53 uh no I'm sure you're be able to show me no I don't I I don't know this is one of those questions to which I don't know the answer I think I think um Kieran asked him and it provided the

02:39:06 asked him and it provided the information and David just passed it on is what I think but I can't be 100% I think that's my recollection of emails that I've

02:39:16 that I've seen when you saw this were you concerned that the council had been provided with incomplete information about who required emergency Hotel accommodation

02:39:27 accommodation um no not not not at that stage no I mean there were other ways in which they were you know they would have got that information during the day so you know

02:39:39 information during the day so you know um they they did pass messages to us asking us to identify you know saying that they would House people who were vulnerable and families and children um that

02:39:49 that the you know a lot of people were in the rest centers so we communicated that information to them at the rest centers so they would have been able to go to the housing people there and book in for

02:40:01 the housing people there and book in for accommodation do you know whether the information about those were who were according to this list disabled was based on Resident self-reporting in the same way tenant information was based on

02:40:12 same way tenant information was based on what the TMO was told rather than being proactively sort out um so

02:40:20 out um so um the list would have been based on um what was reported but if you know people's needs were being identified within the rest centers you know rbkc were booking in people in the rest

02:40:31 were booking in people in the rest centers that and and they would have been picking that up there is my understanding so the numbers could have been far higher the numbers of disabled people let alone vulnerable people could

02:40:42 people let alone vulnerable people could possibly have been yeah yeah I I don't know that but yes did you go back to David Noble and tell him that the Quest was not only for disabled people but also for families with children the

02:40:53 also for families with children the elderly and people with other vulnerabilities and and to for him to give you that information I didn't do that at that time I I I don't remember

02:41:04 that at that time I I I don't remember doing it at the time but you know there were so many things going on at that time right did you did you note at the time that he he'd only given you some of the information which rbkc had asked for

02:41:16 the information which rbkc had asked for I don't remember that being um you know key in my my mind as a memory no I just don't remember that did the UTM have access to that information um they may well have done but you know rbkc were

02:41:28 well have done but you know rbkc were were checking vulnerable people in their own way they were searching known people um through social services and family and children's services there were other checks on identifying people now on that

02:41:40 checks on identifying people now on that point and this this is this links with some evidence that Sue Redmond gave to the inquiry uh a little earlier in this module

02:41:49 module um was there any way or any link between the adult social um care database and the um housing dat children care well

02:42:00 the um housing dat children care well and the children's database oh I don't I don't know that on the one hand and the housing database on the other so that they could be they could talk to each other no usually update they were completely separate systems I don't know

02:42:11 completely separate systems I don't know about social Ser um adult and children so that would be a counsil issue but our database was separate from theirs yeah is there any reason why the Mo database didn't speak to the adult social care

02:42:23 didn't speak to the adult social care database which I think was a triar database at the time I would imagine that's the same as any other Housing Organization and provider they're not linked into the local Authority

02:42:34 database was that a fact you knew at the time I knew we I knew we weren't linked into Social Services on family and children but you know what during the course of our regular work if if we

02:42:46 course of our regular work if if we needed to know information we would know to make contact you know on individual families and you know we have very good relationships with Adult and Children's Services but you know that's on a

02:42:57 Services but you know that's on a general day-to-day basis not during the emergency

02:43:00 emergency situation if we go to paragraph 31 of your fifth statement statement five please page seven you say uh at paragraph 31 there foot of your screen

02:43:11 paragraph 31 there foot of your screen David Noble you say provided uh summary details of the above to Kiran and myself in an email of 1735 which we looked at

02:43:22 at uh uh and if if you look at the email again um he well let's look at it this is tb12 which you exhibit lower down and he he it's a

02:43:34 he he it's a tm86

02:43:38 9945 uh he says there uh this is an email

02:43:47 1748 uh and what's Happening Here I should just I'm taking this a bit too quickly What's Happening Here is uh that um he Robert Shaw is sending uh a

02:43:59 um he Robert Shaw is sending uh a message to uh RB KC's housing internally uh at copy to you as you can see as the last copy e and also to Kieran Singh passing on the information

02:44:10 Kieran Singh passing on the information that he's been given I think from David Noble and he says in the second paragraph the bottom line is there are 845 residents tenants families and 25 recognized as as disabled by the

02:44:23 recognized as as disabled by the TMO we have stated we will accommodate families with children vulnerable people older people if they do not have an alternative place they would like to stay first of all it's correct to think

02:44:35 stay first of all it's correct to think from that isn't it that you could see at the time that rbkc was relying on the data provided by David Noble the TMO yes yes as far as you were aware was

02:44:46 yes yes as far as you were aware was anyone from rbkc taking any separate independent steps to identify evacuated residents and their needs for the purposes of the emergency accommodation and other support or were they simply

02:44:58 and other support or were they simply relying on what you were giving them yeah if if we could just go back a step and we we focused on only identifying and disabled people you also mentioned families and childrens in the list of

02:45:09 families and childrens in the list of tenants you can see um where there are households and when there are children within that list of tenants you you know rbkc even though we hadn't identified children in that list you can see on the

02:45:21 children in that list you can see on the tendency list who are the children in in a number of those households well wouldn't that depend you'd be able to see they were children at in other words under 18 I suppose at the time they were

02:45:32 under 18 I suppose at the time they were yeah you can see the H you can see the household composition and I think it's got ages on it right but that would be first of all out of date but you might be able to calculate it I suppose but you wouldn't know whether someone was

02:45:43 you wouldn't know whether someone was pregnant for example from that list would you no wouldn't I mean no would it wouldn't account for every sing circumstance that's going on it's not live data which is why I say um you know

02:45:55 live data which is why I say um you know they would visit the rehousing staff within the rest centers and Report upto-date data no but my question is to get back to it was

02:46:06 get back to it was um as far as you were aware was anyone from rbkc taking any independent steps to identify evacuated residents and their needs for the purposes of providing the emergency accommodation I

02:46:18 providing the emergency accommodation I don't know now um let's go back to your sixth statement paragraph 31

02:46:27 again you

02:46:33 say there uh after the reference to David Noble at the very bottom this was forwarded to Rob who circulated it within rbkc copy to Kieran and myself

02:46:45 within rbkc copy to Kieran and myself noting that there were 845 uh uh

02:46:52 residents uh tenants and families and from those locations within 20 with 25 recognized as disabled uh that's what we've just looked at now if we go to uh your sixth

02:47:06 looked at now if we go to uh your sixth statement

02:47:07 statement please page nine we could see how that then evolved further

02:47:24 you say there at paragraph 31 in the middle of your screen on the afternoon of 14th June Kieran Singh updated the TMO team that rbkc had advised that if the Cordon remained in place overnight residents in the area cordoned off

02:47:36 residents in the area cordoned off including grenfell walk hway walk teston and barandon walk Bramley house and tread house would have to be accommodated overnight we were advised that this accommodation would be provided at the Westway Center unless

02:47:47 provided at the Westway Center unless the residents were considered to be elderly or vulnerable in which casee hotel accommodation would be arranged the TM relayed this information to the residents in the rest centers now given the potential number that we've now seen

02:47:59 the potential number that we've now seen from David Noble um

02:48:03 Noble um 845 and the significant numbers of people in need of accommodation and and potentially vulnerable people too were you concerned about RB KC's plan to accommodate all those people at the Westway

02:48:15 Westway Center um I I mean the a number of them did go um to stay with relatives or or friends and I think they were also directed to do

02:48:26 directed to do that still uh potentially was it not the case that even leaving aside the disabled people and deducting 25 on those figures from the number you still had some

02:48:38 had some 8

02:48:39 8 820 individuals to accommodate potentially at the Westway Center yeah it was it was a huge amount of um evacuated residents yes did did did were you concerned about how the Westway

02:48:50 you concerned about how the Westway Center would cope um with like that I was told that the Westway Center had been set up um and I hadn't been there myself so I didn't really know how many

02:49:02 myself so I didn't really know how many beds or anything were available right um did you investigate I didn't have time to go and investigate things like

02:49:12 that at the time did you have a view about whether rbkc appreciated the magnitude of how many evacuated residents were affected they'd certainly be given the numbers

02:49:23 they'd certainly be given the numbers we' supplied them with the information they they they knew the

02:49:30 volume I don't I don't think they expected everybody to go to the Westway Center because you know I know that our ring around showed that quite a few people did stay with family and

02:49:41 people did stay with family and friends now you've say in the last sentence there that the TMO relayed this information to the residents in the rest centers were those the same rest centers to which you had allocated staff yes

02:49:52 to which you had allocated staff yes there were a lot of displaced walkway residents within the rest centers so really different right so that's just to be clear St Clement's church rugby Porto Bell Club noting Hill Methodist Church and the latima Christian Center yes now

02:50:06 and the latima Christian Center yes now given that you didn't have a presence at other community arest centers such as the almanar M Francis of AI church and other spontaneous community centers that had grown up offering help um it was is

02:50:19 had grown up offering help um it was is it right that the information to go to the rest center to go to the Westway was not communicated to evacuated residents who had gone to those centers for example I can't confirm what

02:50:33 centers for example I can't confirm what information was in those rest centers but no I I don't know what information was given to them there I mean did you appreciate that you might have residents from for example barand and walk who had

02:50:44 from for example barand and walk who had gone to the almanar mosque as a rest center but didn't get the information that they couldn't go back to their homes and had to spend the night at the

02:50:55 night at the Westway um I appreciated that we wouldn't have reached everybody in the various ways that we tried um you know that's that's inevitable when you've got that many people being evacuated but I

02:51:07 that many people being evacuated but I know that we took steps the next day to try and catch people by our phone arounds to you know make sure that everybody had been contacted and and knew where to get help and support an

02:51:18 knew where to get help and support an advice but on on the day um we would have missed you know collectively Council we would have we would have missed um people I recognize that you did you recognize it at the time no all

02:51:30 did you recognize it at the time no all I recognized is we were you know I had I had staff in the places where I could put them we were trying our very best to make sure that we captured as many people as we could I mean do you accept

02:51:42 people as we could I mean do you accept that many evacuated residents may not have been at the rest centers to receive the information that you were giving them namely to go to the West way um yes I I do accept that um and that's why you know when we have more time the

02:51:55 why you know when we have more time the next day we took the steps that we could to to make contact with those people so that we did pick them up it you know it was yeah may have been 12 hours after but we we did recognize it and try and

02:52:08 but we we did recognize it and try and um put something into place to deal with that yes and uh you we've seen in your fifth statement of paragraph 23 I think already that you've done a ring round at about 9:00 p.m. to

02:52:19 ring round at about 9:00 p.m. to Residence from grenfell Tower but but that that you had not been able to get hold of is it right to say that efforts actively to contact residents on the

02:52:30 actively to contact residents on the 14th of June at least were were in priority to grenfell Tower residents that's right in fact only to Grenville Tower residents you didn't do a ring round to anyone from the

02:52:41 a ring round to anyone from the walkways uh no I don't I don't think we did unless we did it from the office I don't think I don't think we did on the ground now other than telling people in the rest centers to go to the Westway Center is it right that there were no

02:52:53 Center is it right that there were no other attempts to communicate with evacuated residents on the 14th of June who were coming who were coming from the um the walkways such as for example the text burst facility that the TMO

02:53:06 text burst facility that the TMO had um no we didn't use that why is that um we were relying on the rest centers my view was you know I thought I thought people were being directed to the rest

02:53:17 people were being directed to the rest centers I thought that was their first p po point of contact and we thought that we would collect them there now other than telling people in the rest centers to go to the Westway Center uh there was

02:53:30 to go to the Westway Center uh there was no other attempts I think is this right to communicate with evacuated residents

02:53:36 residents um uh through setting up a hel line or or posters or any other form of dissemination on that day yes um we would have obviously had our um

02:53:49 um we would have obviously had our um contact center a call center TMO call center so anyone phoning into that would have been given advice and assistance and that was obviously um in operation

02:54:00 and that was obviously um in operation on the day so residents could have um been given advice that way around yeah now we've had evidence from a number of evacuated residents from the walkways that they were refused entry to the

02:54:12 that they were refused entry to the Westway Center when they got there were you aware that evacuated residents were being denied entry no not at all right did any of your staff members assigned to Westway report on the system in

02:54:24 to Westway report on the system in operation there how many how many evacuees from the walkways were coming

02:54:30 coming um I don't I don't recall getting that information during the day is it right that you didn't actually know which residents had been told to go to the Westway Center you had no list of

02:54:43 to the Westway Center you had no list of those people who had the information no but I knew that our process it was very clear that we' been given information by count by the Council on on how to direct people so our process was to let them know through the through the vest Center

02:54:56 know through the through the vest Center so I knew knew that we had been doing that we made announcements to that effect do you know how many people from the

02:55:03 the evacuated uh um walkway properties stayed at the the Westway Center overnight no I don't I know that there's about 25 in total but I don't know they make up whether they were grandf fell or

02:55:14 make up whether they were grandf fell or or um walkways I don't I don't know the detail let's go to tm1

02:55:20 tm1 35612

02:55:22 35612 please this is a series of emails on the 14th of June late in the evening

02:55:34 and if we go to page six

02:55:43 please there's an email at timed at 23:38

02:55:52 uh towards the halfway down the screen as you can see there uh and it's it it's quite close to the text from the email from you but it's from Robert Shaw can you see 14th June

02:56:06 from Robert Shaw can you see 14th June 2338 to Kieran Singh and to you Miss Brown yes yeah subject cordin area two families sleeping at Westway uh and we got um Ahmed Hajj

02:56:17 Westway uh and we got um Ahmed Hajj Ahmed Bron walk single man and Amina J barani Bar glennel walk and there are details which have been redacted um now it appears that only

02:56:33 redacted um now it appears that only well only two families were sleeping at the Westway Center on the 14th of June from the from the um surrounding blocks that can't be right can it I I don't know right now looking at

02:56:47 it I I don't know right now looking at your staff lists showing who was at which which rest center um you may recall you don't remember the numbers I'll I'll just tell you them that you had 10 members of

02:56:58 you them that you had 10 members of staff at the Westway Center on the 14th of June between 14400 hours and 2230 um we can look at it if you like yeah no I I remember yes um and you

02:57:10 yeah no I I remember yes um and you actually Identify some of them in your sixth witness statement of paragraph 43 as being there till 11:00 p.m. Shel Stewart Hill and Olivia Hutchinson did any of them or either of

02:57:22 any of them or either of them any of them or all of them report to you how few walkway residents were staying at the Westway Center um they didn't at the time no did any of them report to you any problems with

02:57:33 report to you any problems with evacuated residents being denied entry to the Westway Center as some have told us they were no I I I did you check in um um not not on the day but I knew that

02:57:44 um um not not on the day but I knew that um I knew that there were issues with people um gaining access to the walkways in in um days after when the police have had not allowed them back but um I don't

02:57:57 had not allowed them back but um I don't remember them being denied access to the Westway on that day did you check in with those individuals at the West when at the

02:58:08 individuals at the West when at the Westway from your staff to ask them about how many residents were using the center from the walkways no I didn't at this time this is half1 at night right

02:58:19 this time this is half1 at night right did you do anything during the course of that evening to do so any later than that I've been on i' got up at 2: in the morning I left sight at 10:30 I think by this time I might actually have been

02:58:30 this time I might actually have been going I went home at 10:30 so I wouldn't have been home yet I didn't do anym that night I got up early and came back the next day but I didn't do any more that night right uh

02:58:41 didn't do any more that night right uh Mr chairman it's just before 1:00 but I've just got one document just to ask the witness about before we turn to a different topic a different day in fact so it might be that would be convenient can we look please at rbk30

02:58:54 can we look please at rbk30 29413 which is an rbkc Beck log um in in a slightly different format from the one we were looking at with David Kerry um if you look at entry

02:59:08 228 which is now in the middle of your screen this is four uh 14th of June 2017 2030

02:59:18 2017 2030 in the

02:59:21 evening yes uh and uh it says Red Cross Christina contacted to say that Red Cross staff who are walking from RPC to Westway Center have seen people sleeping

02:59:32 Westway Center have seen people sleeping on the streets who don't appear to know about Westway being a relief center overnight Jack Dunton has asked Red Cross to share more precise information relocation and flag it with David kery

02:59:44 relocation and flag it with David kery Christina from Red Cross telephoned at 2340 to say that volunteers had spotted rough sleepers on Verity close were you aware that people were sleeping rough on the night of the 14th

02:59:55 sleeping rough on the night of the 14th of June no not not until no I wasn't are you able to help whether or not even on the basis of what you now know there were evacuees from either the Tower or

03:00:07 were evacuees from either the Tower or the walkways who should have been at the West way but were sleeping rough I know that you've covered that in evidence earlier this week of a few people you've identified

03:00:18 identified yeah but you didn't know that before is that right I didn't know that no otherwise I would have um hoped that we would have contacted them and given them advice and I know that definitely we did we did contact some of those people the

03:00:30 we did contact some of those people the day after and sign post them in to assistance for accommodation or to the West way did did your staff make any attempts at the time to make sure that residents weren't sleeping rough for

03:00:43 residents weren't sleeping rough for example having staff out in the streets directing people to the Westway Center no we had people in in in all of the in the um W centers but I didn't have people out on the streets on reflection

03:00:55 people out on the streets on reflection could you and other TMO staff have been more proactive in identifying and contacting evacuated residents and signposting them to the Westway Center on that night we could have all done more I guess more people more time but

03:01:09 more I guess more people more time but um I think we um you know we had a significant presence during the day we had thought the people being evacuated would be ch into the rest centers and we'd hope that we would catch them there

03:01:21 we'd hope that we would catch them there um going out in the street we didn't do that were you aware of any efforts by obkc did you have a discussion with rbkc about how they might prevent residents from sleeping rough for for want of any

03:01:32 from sleeping rough for for want of any better information about where to go I don't know what they did about it but they certainly had people you know they had Red Cross people they had staff overnight in the in the um in the west

03:01:44 overnight in the in the um in the west so so you know I'm surprised that if they thought that that was a problem if that's being reported in this log um you know there wouldn't be some coordination between um the back and uh the West way

03:01:58 between um the back and uh the West way and sending out some resources to go and um speak to these

03:02:05 people thank you um Mr chairman is that a convenient moment yes it is thank you very much well I think it's time we stop now for a break for lunch Mr Brown we'll come back at 5 2 please and please

03:02:17 come back at 5 2 please and please remember not to talk to anyone about your evidence over the break all right thank you thank you very

03:02:30 much thank you very much Mr milet five F two then please

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