Dr Paul Grimwood, Kent Fire and Rescue Service's Principal Fire Engineer, provides evidence on high-rise firefighting tactics, stairwell protection strategies, and the RICE (Rescue, Intervention, Containment, Evacuation) command model. Grimwood critiques the inflexible TBF-15 procedure and explains how 100% of commanders failed training exercises before RICE was introduced. Key themes include the tension between firefighter safety and stairwell protection, building failure expectations, and evacuation prioritization.
00:14:19 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing today we're going to hear evidence from dr paul grimwood formerly of the kent fire and rescue service that right mr
00:14:31 that right mr kenya that's right sir a mayor called dr groomwood good thank you
00:14:50 good morning dr grimwood good morning sir i understand you're going to take the earth correct so would you take the testament in your right hand and read the words on the screen please thank you i swear by almighty god that the
00:15:02 i swear by almighty god that the evidence i shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much well please sit down make yourself comfortable there
00:15:12 thank you
00:15:22 yes when you're ready mr kennedy thanks sir um first of all would you mind confirming your name for the record please paul grimwood thank you thank you very much for attending today dr grimwood it's much appreciated um just
00:15:33 grimwood it's much appreciated um just before i start uh the examination today um i should say three things first of all my questions are intended to be short and clear sometimes it doesn't work out that way
00:15:44 doesn't work out that way if they're unduly long or unclear please say so and i'll rephrase secondly if at any stage you want a break please don't hesitate to say so there will be a morning break at around quarter past 11
00:15:56 quarter past 11 but if you need a timeout over and above that please say so finally please do keep your voice up that's so that the transcriber can capture everything you say and
00:16:07 capture everything you say and accurately and please don't nord uh to indicate yours or knows the case may be please indicate uh what your view is uh verbally
00:16:16 verbally now you have provided four uh rule nine statements for the inquiry and i'll just take you through those now um the first is dated the 24th of june 2020 which can be found at kfr
00:16:28 be found at kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero and is that your first statement
00:16:38 we can go to the yes it is and if we can go to kfr quadruple zero double zero five four it is your second statement of the 29th of
00:16:49 is your second statement of the 29th of january 2021
00:17:07 yes it is thank you and if we can go to kfr quadruple zero double zero five eight we should find your third statement dated the 22nd of february 2021
00:17:18 2021 yes correct thank you and finally your fourth statement dated the 12th of march 2021 is at kfr quadruple zero double zero six zero
00:17:29 that's correct and have you read each of those statements recently yes i have and can you confirm that the statements are true yes they are thank you are you happy for each of those statements to be taken as
00:17:41 each of those statements to be taken as your evidence this inquiry yes i am and your statements exhibit a total of 17 documents have you reviewed those exhibits yes i have thank you and have
00:17:52 exhibits yes i have thank you and have you discussed your evidence with anyone before coming today no i haven't thank you
00:17:56 you dr grimwood could we start by discussing your various roles and responsibilities during the course of uh your career um am i right in understanding that you were the principal fire engineer at kent and fire and rescue service from 2009
00:18:10 and fire and rescue service from 2009 uh that's correct and are you still employed by kent frs yes i am in that role yes thank you is the role of principal fire engineer a non-operational role
00:18:21 non-operational role very much so non-operational and
00:18:25 and as far as i can make out it has three principal parts first you oversee and support kent's building safety team of fire engineers who are responsible for reviewing
00:18:36 who are responsible for reviewing building plans and assessing fire engineering strategies is that right yes the second component is responsibility for discharging kent's functions in relation to building
00:18:47 functions in relation to building control consultations is that right correct
00:18:50 correct and finally as well as the fire engineering aspect of your role you've also developed written and delivered operational information notes technical bulletins and seminar training and the
00:19:03 bulletins and seminar training and the topics on which you've worked include high-rise firefighting and command strategy is that right yes it is thank you now we'll come on to the detail of those uh particular subjects in due course but am i right in understanding
00:19:14 course but am i right in understanding that you began your career as an operational firefighter at the london fire brigade in 1971 yes i did and you served there for some 25 years yes
00:19:24 yes and during your time as a firefighter with the lfb uh you were or you undertook a number of succulents to fire departments in north america is that right that's correct
00:19:35 that right that's correct one was new york city yes boston and chicago amongst several others yeah and am i right in understanding that you served as a firefighter on long island
00:19:46 served as a firefighter on long island new york in the mid-1970s yes i did and during your conference in the united states in particular you attended fires in some of the world's tallest buildings including the world trade center in new york and the sears tower in chicago
00:19:59 york and the sears tower in chicago correct
00:20:00 correct to what extent experiences of serving and observing operational practices abroad contribute to your understanding of and the approach to high-rise firefighting tactics in particular
00:20:13 firefighting tactics in particular well
00:20:14 well you know it was an ability or an opportunity to gain tremendous amount of experience over a period of years with some of the busiest fire services in the world
00:20:27 fire services in the world particularly in 1990 i was detached by london fire brigade for a period of two months where i've visited 10 cities specifically to study high-rise
00:20:39 specifically to study high-rise firefighting so
00:20:42 so yeah a vast amount of experience that you couldn't perhaps gain in in one one service and is it unusual for fire officers to
00:20:53 and is it unusual for fire officers to have similar opportunities to observing practices and tactics abroad um it used to be unusual um it's quite common now uh
00:21:03 uh fire services do uh sharing
00:21:07 sharing information and exchange visits um but certainly in the uh 70s 80s it was almost unheard of and how did those opportunities come your way
00:21:19 opportunities come your way well i was curious i was stationed originally in in central london and we quite often had american firefighters come in to visit
00:21:31 american firefighters come in to visit us
00:21:32 us and we we'd have other other fire services from europe come in
00:21:37 come in and
00:21:38 and i always wanted to show the firefighters around the station and ask them questions about their how they operated um
00:21:46 um and and they asked me questions that sometimes i couldn't give answers to and i was curious i wanted to find out those answers so uh i i start to you know research and study
00:21:58 you know research and study other services abroad just to see what i could learn from them thank you as i understand it you also have experience of acting as a training advisor to a number of fine rescue
00:22:09 advisor to a number of fine rescue authorities abroad including fire and rescue authorities in the uk yes that's correct and on what topics have you provided advice in the past um advice or training um
00:22:23 um advice or training um specifically mainly high rise compartment fire fighting techniques uh tactical ventilation a range of operational
00:22:34 a range of operational fire
00:22:34 fire uh
00:22:37 you know a particular research studies um but um
00:22:43 um but um you know it's been something i've visited south africa dubai
00:22:49 dubai canada um mainly to give that training thank you and you were awarded a phd in fire engineering by glasgow caledonian university in 2015 is that right that's correct and your phd thesis uh dealt
00:23:02 correct and your phd thesis uh dealt with firefighting water requirements in tall and complex buildings is that right yes it did and throughout your career you've researched operational firefighting strategy and tactics drawing on your
00:23:13 strategy and tactics drawing on your practical experience of firefighting both in this country and abroad is that right yes
00:23:19 and you've published four books on operational firefighting i think is that right
00:23:23 right yes uh three three books uh on firefighting tactics and one book on fire engineering and those books were um the intriguingly entitled fog attack in 1991 which
00:23:35 entitled fog attack in 1991 which explained the swedish method of firefighting with water mist is that right yes that's correct and then 3d fire fighting in 2005 which encouraged firefighters to take control of the air
00:23:46 firefighters to take control of the air track the flow path including by use of tactical ventilation and other means is that right yes and thirdly euro firefighter number one in 2008 yes and then um euro firefighter
00:23:57 in 2008 yes and then um euro firefighter number two in um 2017 yes and the publication of euro firefighter number two predated the grenfell fire is that right yes it did
00:24:09 so in broad terms all of uh all four books concern operational strategies and techniques that you consider can be deployed to enhance the performance of fire fighting fire and rescue authorities across the
00:24:21 fire and rescue authorities across the world is that right correct
00:24:25 can i now turn to the first substantive topic i'd like to discuss with you today and that stairwell protection strategy and the rice concept and by rice i mean r-i-c-e
00:24:36 r-i-c-e now first of all i'd like to ask you about the stairwell protection strategy that you introduced at kent and also about the related rescue intervention containment and evacuation
00:24:47 intervention containment and evacuation command decision making tool rice that you introduced during your time at kent now just so you understand the structure in which i'm taking matters to the extent i can i'm going to take
00:24:58 to the extent i can i'm going to take matters chronologically now in your first witness statement and we don't need to go to it unless you'd like to at paragraph six you refer to two serious wind-driven fires in kent in
00:25:11 two serious wind-driven fires in kent in 2001 i.e before your time in kent yes where heat and in one case fire entered stairwells through doors that been held open by hose lines is that right that's correct
00:25:22 correct can you help us the clue's possibly in the title but what is a wind-driven fire so a wind driven fire is where the outer skin or window of a fire
00:25:33 outer skin or window of a fire compartment a fire involved compartment is affected by wind that's blowing into that
00:25:40 that window onto the face of that building the faster the wind is the more severe the fire uh event occurs um and it's likened to a blow torch when
00:25:53 um and it's likened to a blow torch when it comes out the other side which would be a doorway a corridor or a stair stair shaft thank you now you also say in paragraph six that those two fires were the precursor to the introduction of
00:26:04 the precursor to the introduction of stairwell protection strategies at kent and you explain that first in one case the entire stairwell of a 15-story building was heavily smoke logged from a fire on the 10th floor was that the is
00:26:16 fire on the 10th floor was that the is it stana caught fire in ramsgate stanley court stanner thank you yes and at that fire there were residents who are unable to leave the building as a result of the smoke-filled stairwell and had to be
00:26:27 smoke-filled stairwell and had to be rescued by the fire brigade is that right
00:26:30 right yes
00:26:31 yes they were rescued by the fire service using exterior ladders external ladders and also the coast guard were able to rescue some people off the roof using a
00:26:42 rescue some people off the roof using a helicopter and unfortunately that fire resulted in one fatality is that right i don't believe it was that far recollection it would be
00:26:53 recollection it would be the arlington house fire where there was a fatality just turning onto the arlington house fire you say that was um a fire a flaming combustion entered the stairwell from the fire floor on the
00:27:04 stairwell from the fire floor on the 16th level of an 18-story building is that in broad terms right correct and arlington house fire was in margate is that right uh
00:27:13 uh yes
00:27:15 yes and again at that fire it was necessary for crews to go in and rescue residents who are unable to leave the building due to conditions in the stairwell is that a fair summary yes i mean in both situations
00:27:26 in both situations the firefighting uh you know the firefighting was was held up for delayed for quite some time as firefighters were
00:27:37 as firefighters were pushed off of the fire floor by the intensity of the fire and
00:27:42 and the staircase uh in one building it was a single staircase in the other building it was two stairs um and and it took some time before they were able
00:27:54 it took some time before they were able to reinstate rescue operations so people were trapped for some time thank you and the issue of stairwell doors being propped open by hoses occurs as a result of crews connecting to the dry riser on
00:28:07 of crews connecting to the dry riser on a different floor to the fire floor for example the floor below is that right correct
00:28:12 correct now is that practice what appears to be envisaged by the 2014 edition of the national guidance on high-rise firefighting generic risk assessment 3.2
00:28:23 firefighting generic risk assessment 3.2 yes it is
00:28:24 yes it is and if we can go to that relevant passage so people can see what we're discussing we can go to lfb quadruple zero
00:28:35 quadruple zero one two double five forward slash two eight
00:28:40 eight and it's really the third paragraph from the bottom of that page which says this hose lines must be laid and charged in an area unaffected by fire or smoke and behind
00:28:51 unaffected by fire or smoke and behind the safety afforded by a fire resistant structure or fire resisting doors and if we can look at the final paragraph on that page which says this branches should be supplied from the closest
00:29:02 should be supplied from the closest rising main outlet to the fire which has not been affected by fire or smoke those paragraphs summarize the relevant advice that we've been discussing
00:29:16 yes correct now in your experience is or are those two paragraphs interpreted by fire and rescue authorities as guidance that hoses should be connected on the floor
00:29:27 hoses should be connected on the floor below the fire floor at that time is correct when you look at building design going all the way back to the 60s
00:29:38 all the way back to the 60s sometimes the rising mains were inside lobbies um
00:29:45 um off of the stair
00:29:48 as design evolved over a period of time they were moved into the stair so originally firefighters would take one line off the
00:29:59 one line off the fire floor into a flat if they were able to do so
00:30:03 to do so but certainly by the time this document came out it was accepted practice that they would take the first line from probably below the fire floor on the second line from the floor below that thank you and if we
00:30:16 the floor below that thank you and if we just have a quick look at the lfb's policy note 633 which governed high-rise firefighting and which can be found at lfb
00:30:25 lfb quadruple 0-1256 forward slash 1-3 and paragraph 7.35 and really the second sentence
00:30:37 and really the second sentence it says this the initial ba so breathing apparatus teams charged branch should where possible be supplied from the rising main outlet one floor below the fire if this is unavailable the nearest
00:30:50 fire if this is unavailable the nearest available outlet below that should be used and that's an example is it of the lfb's interpretation of what gra 3.2 required
00:31:02 the procedure that was in place at the time of the grenfell fire yes that's correct
00:31:07 correct now is it your view that this approach the one exemplified by paragraph 7.35 immediately creates the risk that the stairwell will become compromised by smoke passing through the door of the
00:31:19 smoke passing through the door of the fire floor that is propped open by the hose
00:31:22 hose without a doubt that's true and it's actually expressed in the gra 3-2 that that may happen thank you now if we could go and look at your first statement at kfr
00:31:35 your first statement at kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero forward slash two and paragraph five
00:31:45 when you see it paragraph five you say this stairwell protection is and i quote a proactive strategy that is directed at protecting occupants who may already be self-evacuating whilst at the same time
00:31:57 self-evacuating whilst at the same time securing stairwells for an emergency evacuation should ever be needed the strategy is aimed at using all available missions tactics and resources to mitigate smoke infiltration into
00:32:09 to mitigate smoke infiltration into stairwells now the first question that rises out of that is um what do you mean by stairwell protection being a proactive strategy so it's a strategy that expects smoke
00:32:22 so it's a strategy that expects smoke will come into the stair if the rise in main is located in the stairwell and if we take hose lines from below the fire floor
00:32:33 fire floor it's inevitable that you will get in most fires some smoke seeping into the stairwell putting it differently how does that differ from a reactive response to a
00:32:44 differ from a reactive response to a fire so a reactive response mainly in in terms of reactivity is that firefighters will react to what they find but we're talking here about procedure
00:32:55 procedure um and it's it's specifically saying it's
00:32:58 it's something we expect we expect the building to be doing this we expect the building to be failing in terms of infiltrating smoke into the stair thank you now you say um that the
00:33:10 stair thank you now you say um that the strategy is quotes directed at protecting occupants who may already be self-evacuating whilst at the same time securing stairwells for an emergency evacuation should ever be needed
00:33:21 evacuation should ever be needed when the strategy was first introduced at kent
00:33:24 at kent was it recognized that in some cases it may be necessary for crews to carry out an emergency evacuation in a high-rise building with no pre-existing evacuation strategy
00:33:37 strategy for crews firefighters to evacuate yes
00:33:43 um i think in any building you know the potential exists for firefighters that they may have to have an emergency evacuation depending on the circumstances
00:33:56 so the answer was yes essentially yes thank you
00:33:59 thank you when you joined ken so back in 2009 um was it recognized that there may be situations or other actually think about getting to the point you make in slightly more
00:34:10 the point you make in slightly more detail
00:34:12 detail um if we look at the ken frs policy on stairwell protection from 2006 it's probably easier to look at this issue in a slightly more concrete example
00:34:22 example and if we go to your first statement on paragraph six which is on the page there
00:34:30 and in broad terms you explain that as a result of the two wind-driven fires in 2001 kent's practice was aimed at keeping stairwell doors closed as much as possible and maintaining the fire
00:34:42 as possible and maintaining the fire resisting protection of the stairs and that a kent high-rise strategy group developed a supporting procedure now you've exhibited a copy of that procedure and
00:34:54 exhibited a copy of that procedure and if we go to it we can find it at kfr quadruple zero double zero five zero forward slash one
00:35:05 now we can see in the top right hand corner the document's described as technical bulletin f for freddie 15 firefighting in high-rise
00:35:16 for freddie 15 firefighting in high-rise residential buildings now is a technical bulletin the same as a policy document yes it is
00:35:27 was this uh document intended to be kent's high-rise firefighting policy or was it intended to be a supplement to another policy no this was the fire fighting
00:35:40 no this was the fire fighting policy for kent in 2006.
00:35:45 in 2006. and if we can um look in the bottom right hand corner we can see that this technical bulletin was published in december 2006 is that right is correct
00:35:56 december 2006 is that right is correct now is that the first version of kent's high-rise firefighting policy that was published
00:36:02 published it's the first version we were able to find
00:36:09 and was this the policy that was in place when you joined in 2009 um yes
00:36:15 um yes and can is it safe to assume that you had no involvement in the drafting of this policy none no
00:36:22 no now i think this is uh documents called tbf15
00:36:26 tbf15 um are you content for me to refer to it as tbf50 absolutely now if we can go to page two and look at paragraphs three and four
00:36:37 paragraph three says this the basic principle adopted in the design and construction of residential high-rise buildings is based on the structural subdivision and compartmentation of each floor of the building
00:36:48 floor of the building this principle assumes that if a fire breaks out within a compartment the communicating openings are properly protected
00:36:55 protected theoretically this should limit the size development and spread of any fire originating within a fire compartment unfortunately these arrangements can be undermined by poor housekeeping lack of
00:37:08 undermined by poor housekeeping lack of correct maintenance or the inappropriate actions of emergency service personnel paragraph four goes on to say this experience has shown that fires in residential high-rise buildings behave
00:37:20 residential high-rise buildings behave in very unpredictable ways and can pose many problems to both the fire service and occupants in the building as such any operational deployment to a fire in a high-rise building must be
00:37:33 fire in a high-rise building must be taken with extreme caution using all available pre-planning now when you joined kent in 2009 what was your understanding of the
00:37:44 what was your understanding of the unpredictable ways in which fires may behave
00:37:48 behave well
00:37:50 well the building sometimes doesn't perform as it's designed to um
00:37:57 generally the design is good but the maintenance and upkeep of the building design fire safety features tend to fail and and aren't maintained
00:38:08 tend to fail and and aren't maintained well quite often that's becomes a problem for local authorities because in some areas there's vandalism uh fire doors are kicked through
00:38:19 uh fire doors are kicked through uh so you can expect some some sometimes that the building will fell uh uh purely through the the uh fire doors that have been damaged uh or poorly maintained um
00:38:32 uh or poorly maintained um to answer your question it does looking at the final um phrase in paragraph four you say the policy says using all available pre-planning would that include information gathered as part of
00:38:43 include information gathered as part of the 72d process yes it would um obviously 72d has become a a feature which is now being improved throughout
00:38:55 which is now being improved throughout the fire service when it was originally a 1-1-d it would be just a familiarization visit and the fire service would just look at
00:39:07 and the fire service would just look at basically access and firefighting facilities so they weren't really looking at the fire safety features of the building itself
00:39:18 itself as 72d which is the same follow-on from 11d as it has evolved it's becoming more prominent now that the fire service should look at the fire safety features
00:39:30 should look at the fire safety features and make sure that things like fire doors are
00:39:34 doors are are
00:39:35 are in place that they're serviceable and and access provisions are there and that's that's the kind of things that that we look at now one of the things that we were discussing last week
00:39:46 things that we were discussing last week was the extent to which um crews conducting 72d visits can be expected to pick up on differences of construction techniques
00:39:57 differences of construction techniques and materials used as a general proposition um would you be expecting crews given your experience to be picking up on differences of construction materials
00:40:08 differences of construction materials panels and the rest of it as part of the 72d process uh before the grenfell fire no
00:40:16 no um
00:40:17 um since the ground floor fire we are now taking it into our own hands to train firefighters certain uh things to look for but because the complexity of
00:40:29 because the complexity of the external wall for example um is so
00:40:34 um is so in depth
00:40:35 in depth it's difficult for firefighters to understand the level of risk that an external war would face would present thank you dr grimwood
00:40:47 would present thank you dr grimwood if we um
00:40:48 if we um now go into the detail of tbf-15 one of the first matters that's addressed in the document is the evacuation of occupants and in particular the importance of maintaining
00:41:00 particular the importance of maintaining the integrity of the stairwell in order to facilitate an evacuation now if we could stay in this document but move forward to page 5 and paragraph 20
00:41:13 page 5 and paragraph 20 which we see under the heading evacuation of occupants towards the bottom of the page it says this staircases as well as providing a means of escape for occupants or residents provide vital
00:41:25 occupants or residents provide vital access for attending fire crews it is important that the integrity of the means of escape is maintained at all times
00:41:32 times efforts should be made to keep doors from staircases to lobbies closed wherever possible this point cannot be overstated and then if we turn to paragraphs 21 and
00:41:43 and then if we turn to paragraphs 21 and 22
00:41:44 22 21 says this when a building has more than one staircase it is advantageous to utilize one for fire service purposes and the other as a means of escape for residents
00:41:54 residents however it is likely that evacuating persons particularly if panicked will use either staircase to use either staircase to escape before giving the order if we can turn
00:42:05 before giving the order if we can turn over the page and i think this is emboldened in in the text before giving the order to open up the affected compartment the ic the incident commander must fully risk assess the situation
00:42:17 assess the situation consideration must be given to the potential adverse effects on any evacuation strategy and the safety of occupants above the fire floor now
00:42:28 now flowing from this is it important to consider the potential effect of opening up the fire compartment on any evacuation strategy because entering that compartment may compromise the stairwell
00:42:40 stairwell it's an essential consideration um certainly in kemp we've taken it very seriously from from 2001 of the two fires that we've just discussed
00:42:54 certainly since the world trade center fires
00:42:56 fires we've found that people will more likely to be using the evacuation stairways even in the smallest of fires so we expect people to be in the stairs
00:43:07 so we expect people to be in the stairs almost at every fire we're attending a high-rise incident so therefore we need to make sure that that escape route is always there for them
00:43:16 them and
00:43:18 and an incident commander certainly should consider what effect opening the fire compartment would have on anyone in the escape routes at that
00:43:29 on anyone in the escape routes at that time does it flow from that therefore that it may be necessary in certain circumstances to implement some form of evacuation before firefighters enter the fire compartment
00:43:41 firefighters enter the fire compartment yes i mean that that could be a consideration because the incident commander should be thinking about that as a tactical option
00:43:52 that as a tactical option would it be better to hold the firefighting and clear the staircase uh or would it be better to tackle the fire immediately it's a balance but certainly if people are in
00:44:05 balance but certainly if people are in the stairwells or in the corridors evacuating uh it's almost a priority to make sure that they are clear before the the compartment's opened and and to draw out
00:44:17 compartment's opened and and to draw out another point would it be right to say that in emphasizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of the stairwell the policy was recognizing the prospect of self-evacuation and
00:44:28 prospect of self-evacuation and evacuation by firefighters yes um
00:44:32 yes um the policy evac considers more the the evacuation of residents than the evacuation of firefighters but it's certainly obviously going to serve the purpose for both sorry
00:44:44 purpose for both sorry it's evacuation by firefighters by firefighters absolutely yes now if we go further into the document tbf15 and go to page seven and paragraphs 36
00:44:56 paragraphs 36 to 40 and we see those paragraphs found under the heading protected lobbies and they say this and apologies for reading it out but it's it's easier for people following elsewhere staircases within high-rise buildings
00:45:08 staircases within high-rise buildings should be protected with fire resistant material and access to them be via self-closing fire resisting doors it is important that personnel are aware of the problems that can be encountered
00:45:19 of the problems that can be encountered if the protection afforded to staircases is compromised many high-rise buildings will have lobbies on all floors located off of staircases and which are fire protected
00:45:30 staircases and which are fire protected access can be made via a fire resistant door to the floor's main corridor and flats
00:45:35 flats the fs63 record should include planned details of lobby layout together with location of dry riser outlets just stopping there what's the fs6
00:45:46 stopping there what's the fs6 record okay so for specific risks uh in kent
00:45:51 kent um
00:45:53 um and almost every high-rise building they would
00:45:57 would go and do a 72d visit and then formulate a tactical plan and that would be the fs63 record
00:46:06 record so that tactical plan is specific to that building and that building alone because of the various layouts that they might encounter
00:46:17 going back to tbf15 paragraph 38 says this where an initial reconnaissance identifies that smoke has traveled into the lobby area on the instant floor the deployment of hose
00:46:28 instant floor the deployment of hose lines from lower floors up to the incident floor will have the effect of breaching the protection afforded by the stairwell and may compromise the means of escape for other occupants
00:46:40 of escape for other occupants incident commanders must carefully evaluate the risks of using this tactic particularly if the building has a single stairwell in such circumstances the incident commander may conclude that a full evacuation is necessary prior to
00:46:53 a full evacuation is necessary prior to firefighting intervention to ensure stairways are kept clear of smoke and the products of combustion doors from lobbies to staircases should be kept closed every effort should be made to set into
00:47:05 every effort should be made to set into a riser outlet in the lobby of the floor on fire and that last sentence is emboldened now bearing in mind what's set out there looking at fires where smoke has
00:47:17 looking at fires where smoke has traveled from the fire compartment and into the lobby area the advice in tbf-15 is that connecting the hose on lower floors will have the effect of breaching uh the protection
00:47:28 uh the protection afforded on the stairwell and may compromise matters just to be clear is that because the smoke that has traveled into the lobby would then pass into the stairwell if a hose were to be connected on a lower
00:47:40 hose were to be connected on a lower floor and brought up and through the lobby door of the fire floor to reach the seats of the fire yes that's correct and so the the practical problem is that the hose would be propping open two doors or at least two sets of doors yes
00:47:53 doors or at least two sets of doors yes and in that scenario would it be preferable for crews to still try to connect to the rise the rising main on the fire floor it would certainly in this situation and this is a 2006 procedure
00:48:07 this is a 2006 procedure it shows a lobby between the stare and the accommodation we don't always get that now because with more modern designs that have come up since 2006 they've basically removed
00:48:21 up since 2006 they've basically removed that lobby so now you come from the stairs straight into the corridor accommodation but we still run the same process um in in kent we've
00:48:33 in in kent we've had our buildings redesigned where they now place them in the new buildings the uh uh rising main outlet goes into the corridor itself rather than the
00:48:44 corridor itself rather than the stairwell
00:48:45 stairwell looking at this issue slightly differently what are the risks that flow from connecting to the rising main on the fire floor and why are those risks tolerable compared to connecting
00:48:57 risks tolerable compared to connecting on the floor below for example yes well
00:49:02 well i've never really understood why they've gone that way as i say way back when they had cp3 designed buildings in the 60s the rising outlet main rising main
00:49:15 the rising outlet main rising main outlet was in the uh lobby corridor itself right outside the flat doors and that's where we would uh
00:49:25 uh approach the fire from on the fire floor but over a period of time they've developed what's called a firefighting shaft or a firefighting stair which now gives protection to
00:49:37 which now gives protection to firefighters and i think that's probably because
00:49:41 because in the past there's been instances where firefighters have been overcome by wind-driven fires uh and so forth um
00:49:50 um the way we deal with it with that now is a risk assessed approach we may not even open the flat door if there is a wind-driven fire on the face of the building
00:50:02 on the face of the building you know of the compartment involved we may not even open it so that's one of the things the risk
00:50:10 the risk the tolerability of the risk has to be taken from uh uh you know certainly looking at it from balance
00:50:21 balance uh uh of the risk and and certainly whether whether the risk is worth taking um
00:50:28 um if we turn up and there's smoke in the uh
00:50:32 uh lobby
00:50:33 lobby we would probably go from the floor below
00:50:37 below that's useful to know now the need to consider whether a full evacuation is necessary before firefighting intervention is again addressed to page 12 of tbf 15 and if we
00:50:48 addressed to page 12 of tbf 15 and if we go to page 12 on paragraph 63
00:50:53 now paragraph 63 is under the heading fire compartment and i'd like to look at the first three sentences the first one of which is emboldened and says this
00:51:05 which is emboldened and says this the decision to enter a compartment involved in fire needs to be made having regard to the evacuation requirements of persons on and above the fire floor the opening of any fire compartment
00:51:17 the opening of any fire compartment particularly in the high-rise building is potentially extremely hazardous the decision to open a fire compartment must only be made by the instant commander and if we could just go further down in this page to paragraph 68
00:51:32 it says this the use of controllable dividing breaching will enable both the firefighting b18 and safety jet b18 to set into the dry riser outlet on the
00:51:43 set into the dry riser outlet on the same floor preferably the fire floor thus reducing the amount of hose required and the potential impact of products of combustion on non-affected floors
00:51:54 combustion on non-affected floors now
00:51:55 now taking the question of the dividing breach first in lay terms the dividing breach essentially splits the water flow at the dry riser outlet enabling you to connect
00:52:07 dry riser outlet enabling you to connect two hoses from the same outlet in broad terms am i right that's correct and this then means that the first two attack crews do not need to pull hoses in from lower floors and the stairwell
00:52:18 in from lower floors and the stairwell can remain closed that's correct i think as you see this was a 2006 procedure in 2006 at the same just before this procedure was published a fire service
00:52:30 procedure was published a fire service circular government circular was released home office circular released to the fire services uh based on experience of previous fires recent fires that
00:52:41 that now two lines should be laid uh one being a safety line to support the attack line and that's what it's there for it's therefore the purpose of protecting the attack crew on the first
00:52:54 protecting the attack crew on the first line so it may never be flowed but it's charged
00:52:57 charged and
00:52:58 and this was the first time that we were getting uh uh an instruction to lay two lines
00:53:04 lines so it required what had been before one line now to be divided and the only way we could keep that on the fire floor would be to take up a dividing breaching and that's it
00:53:15 and that's it distilled down both crews could connect on the fire floor and that's the advantage of the dividing breach absolutely correct now
00:53:23 now looking at dividing breaches and the ability to connect two hoses the same outlet could we go back to your first witness statement on page four paragraph ten and that can be found at
00:53:34 paragraph ten and that can be found at kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero forward slash four there we go and if we look at paragraph 10 um dealing with issue this particular
00:53:46 um dealing with issue this particular issue you refer to another approach adopted by kent and that approach in broad terms encourages or requests the incorporation of rising fire mains with twin hose
00:53:57 of rising fire mains with twin hose outlets in protected lobbies or corridors and buildings that are under construction it's a point you you touched on an earlier answer now paragraph 10 from the second sentence onward you say this
00:54:09 sentence onward you say this this particular approach enables any fire and rescue service to request rising 150 millimeter fire mains with twin hose connection outlets
00:54:20 outlets at each floor level to be located within the common lobby or corridor in some newly developed blocks of flats under regulatory consultation
00:54:31 these outlets are to be located common lobby side within one meter from the stair door for firefighter safety and this in turn reduces the likelihood that hoes must pass through open stair doors
00:54:43 hoes must pass through open stair doors the additional benefits in doing so are to reduce the amount of hose required when deploying from floors below the floor fire floor and therefore greatly reducing the levels of physiological
00:54:54 reducing the levels of physiological stress placed on firefighters and just so people can see what we're talking about can we go to kfr quadruple zero double zero
00:55:05 zero seven
00:55:09 and is that a photograph of the twin outlet you're referring to in paragraph 10. yes that's correct
00:55:18 now when you say that a fire and rescue service is able to request that these mains
00:55:23 mains be located within the common lobby or corridor in new newly built blocks
00:55:30 those requests are made within the context of building control consultations to which the fire and rescue service is a party is that right yes
00:55:38 yes so
00:55:39 so going back to 1976 there was a british standard 5306 part 1 which allowed the fire services to have a hundred and
00:55:50 the fire services to have a hundred and fifty mil main uh at their choice
00:55:55 choice um
00:55:57 um at that time they could have one or two outlets per floor uh it was an old standard that seems to have been lost over time
00:56:07 over time uh but there are certain standards that also deal with it which is um british standard treble nine zero and
00:56:17 and that also allows the fire service to up until 2015 when the standard was revised it would allow the fire service to choose
00:56:27 to choose what size main and where it would be located
00:56:30 located with the outlets in the accommodation that was
00:56:36 that was changed in the 2015 standard a treble 9-0
00:56:40 9-0 where it said they will now be in the stair to go in accordance with building regulations we anticipated this was coming again so we managed to get on the panel of the
00:56:51 we managed to get on the panel of the development of british standard 7974 part 5 where we reinstated that advice so there's an option there as you say for us to negotiate design standard with
00:57:04 for us to negotiate design standard with the building control thank you dr grimwood
00:57:08 grimwood from the lay perspective there appear to be two principal benefits from using this twin outlet approach and could i see whether i'm right in identifying those benefits
00:57:20 in identifying those benefits the first one appears to be by placing the mains in either the common lobby or in the corridor there will always be at least one door in between the stairwell and the connected hose so protecting the stairwell from smoke in broad terms on
00:57:32 stairwell from smoke in broad terms on my right that's correct and that was a requirement in the uh i think it was the gra 3 2 originally and the second benefit appears be that
00:57:43 and the second benefit appears be that by using twin outlets rather than just the one
00:57:47 the one that achieves the same effect as a dividing breach absolutely i mean the divide in breaching is a very heavy piece of equipment that firefighters have to carry out along with all their other equipment for a
00:57:59 with all their other equipment for a high-rise bridge head it's the heaviest piece of equipment that they carry and where we're able to have it designed into the rising main it saves a whole lot of physiological stress how
00:58:13 a whole lot of physiological stress how heavy is a dividing breach well i would say it's something like 35 40 kilograms thank you now if we can go back to your statement at kfr quadruple zero double zero four
00:58:25 at kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero forward slash four thank you
00:58:30 thank you and if we can go to um you say the
00:58:37 that in the first sentence on the first and second lines that this approach the twin outlet approach has been adopted by kent and at least one other known uk frs and who's the other
00:58:48 other known uk frs and who's the other frs or which is the other frs hampshire fire and rescue and did they adopt it for the reasons that kent did yes i did do you know whether any other fire and rescue services have begun to take the
00:59:00 rescue services have begun to take the twin outlet approach we've had um requests for information about it um certainly
00:59:10 certainly believe some some services have said they're going to take that route whether they have done so at this stage i can't answer thank you i now want to turn on to a separate
00:59:21 i now want to turn on to a separate topic which is the scenario based guide and the stairwell protection and pictures
00:59:26 pictures and for this purpose can we go back to tbf15
00:59:31 tbf15 which is kfr quadruple zero double zero five zero and page thirteen
00:59:40 thank you
00:59:42 now in broad terms what we have here is a scenario based guide which illustrates how the steps of the procedure should be followed in practice is that right correct and here
00:59:53 correct and here a scenario involves a report of a fire on the ninth floor of a residential high rise of 13 floors
01:00:01 floors with a single protected staircase that is unaffected by smoke and a fixed dry riser outlet which we can see within the lobby if we can
01:00:12 within the lobby if we can de-amplify
01:00:15 and we see the
01:00:18 fixed dry riser outlet i think i'm writing saying at the very bottom and the center of that plan is that right correct thank you and it's the little red rectangle
01:00:30 now the scenario guide breaks down the operational response into a number of phases and could i discuss with you those various phases and the first one of which can be found at page 14.
01:00:42 at page 14. and so the first phase is assessment and that's establishing the suspected location of the fire and once that is known identifying where the bridgehead can be established which is typically
01:00:54 can be established which is typically three-fourths below is that in broad terms correct yes
01:01:00 the second phase is illustrated at page 15 so overleaf
01:01:07 and that is the reconnaissance and evacuation phase is that right yes and that involves first of all maintaining access and egress stairwell integrity
01:01:18 integrity under which the initial team including the sector commander are deployed to reconnoiter the integrity of the stairwell
01:01:24 stairwell the proposed bridgehead and the suspected incident floor again in broad terms is that right yes and as part of that phase the lobby floors are checked on the way up is that
01:01:35 floors are checked on the way up is that right
01:01:37 right and using vision panels um and touch is that right yes it is and so the crews will not enter the lobby floors they'll just check conditions to the extent they're able to
01:01:49 conditions to the extent they're able to as they're going up yes and if smoke or fire is detected on any of the lobbies of the lower floors what would you expect crews to do if there was smoke on lower floors it
01:02:01 if there was smoke on lower floors it depended how much smoke there was certainly they would investigate if it was just a light haze of smoke um
01:02:10 um the intentions or the objectives of the reconnaissance team is to locate the fire
01:02:16 fire um
01:02:17 um and sometimes that's not so easy to do we might have reports of a fire on the 12th floor but the alarm panel says the fire's on the 14th floor
01:02:28 the 14th floor so
01:02:29 so the reconnaissance will check each floor as they go up and if if there's smoke on a lower floor they would check that because it may be directing them to the actual source of the fire
01:02:40 the fire um
01:02:41 um thank you
01:02:43 thank you just looking there on the page we're looking at paragraph 79 end of the first sentence
01:02:48 sentence it says the various means of identifying whether
01:02:52 whether there's smoke or fire spread on lower floors panels touch and tic i should have asked you what does tic mean so it's a thermal image camera thank you
01:03:04 now assuming no smoke or fire is detected on those lower floors or lobbies um the crews locate the incident floor and assess from the stairwell how safe it is to commit to
01:03:15 stairwell how safe it is to commit to the lobby area of the incident floor is that right that's correct and again crews will not be opening the stairwell door at this point they're merely trying to establish to the extent they can what the conditions
01:03:27 the extent they can what the conditions are like yes thank you now there appears then to be a second part of the reconnaissance and evacuation phase and that's dealt with at page 16.
01:03:38 at page 16. and that second phase is maintaining access and egress bridgehead integrity and first of all what is meant by the phrase bridgehead integrity
01:03:49 phrase bridgehead integrity so it's
01:03:50 so it's looking for basically where we are going to set up a bridgehead a command post a staging post for firefighters to base a safe
01:04:02 a safe uh
01:04:03 uh area with from which they can advance thank you now the initial team then enter the unaffected lobby and the sector commander monitors the conditions in the corridor through the vision panel
01:04:16 in the corridor through the vision panel for any deterioration in conditions is that right that's correct and an important element of this is that the sector commander does not enter the corridor is that right yes
01:04:27 corridor is that right yes and why does he not do that it may be obvious it's just a safety feature just to make sure that um uh
01:04:35 uh the firefighters should be the the first two firefighters should be equipped with breathing apparatus although they won't be wearing it at that time
01:04:44 that time um and he won't the these uh uh officer won't be this this is a 2006 procedure uh understood yeah but at this stage um of
01:04:55 understood yeah but at this stage um of the
01:04:56 the of the response what would you expect cruz to do if conditions deteriorated markedly
01:05:02 markedly so if they decided that it wasn't safe to enter then they would basically go back to the floor below
01:05:10 below and set up a bridgehead and accept that that's probably where the fires are originating from now as the sector commander continues to monitor conditions from the corridor the
01:05:21 monitor conditions from the corridor the crew set out their equipment ready to connect to the dry riser within the lobby is that right yes
01:05:29 yes and is it right that you would not expect crews to connect to the riser at this stage
01:05:39 which paragraph are we on we're looking at paragraph 82
01:05:48 yes i think that's correct and so throughout this time it's crucial that the door to the stairwell remains closed yes
01:05:57 now there is a third element of the reconnaissance and evacuation phase which is dealt with at page 17.
01:06:05 and that is focused on instant location and evacuation is that right yes
01:06:11 yes now it's at this stage that the first crew will enter the corridor with the sector commander from the protected lobby if conditions are considered sufficiently safe is that right yes
01:06:22 sufficiently safe is that right yes and if we can look at the diagram at the bottom of page 17
01:06:28 we can see that the crew is without any firefighting equipment at this point i think you've delighted to that in a previous answer is that right yes and the hose remains in the protected lobby and is yet to be connected again
01:06:40 lobby and is yet to be connected again is that right yes now when the affected compartment is located crews will at that stage immediately evacuate all unaffected flats or compartments on the instant
01:06:52 flats or compartments on the instant floor is that right yes and is it also right that this is before any intervention has taken place in relation to the compartment of origin correct
01:07:02 correct now
01:07:03 now in terms of how you'd expect crews to evacuate the fire floor would that simply be a question of knocking on doors yes it would and then escorting residents presumably
01:07:14 and then escorting residents presumably to the stairwell and if necessary outside
01:07:17 outside certainly to the safety of the stairwell yeah and and one would assume that they would make their own way out
01:07:25 how is that process adapted or made to fit circumstances where there are residents with vulnerabilities or limited mobility issues well
01:07:37 well this is a risk zone and by opening the fire compartment it will make it riskier
01:07:45 riskier more risky so certainly whoever is in that lobby in a flat will be asked to leave if there are vulnerable
01:07:56 if there are vulnerable persons in there they will be assisted out
01:08:01 importance is to clear the fire floor of residents one of the issues just whilst we're dealing with this point um you mentioned
01:08:12 point um you mentioned um
01:08:14 um previously the information that's collated for the tactical planning kent yes
01:08:19 yes when you're gathering information um or when you were gathering information at kent would you have identified first of all the number of vulnerable residents or those with limited mobility within the high-rise building
01:08:31 within the high-rise building in 2006
01:08:33 in 2006 um i can't say we would have before 2017 would you have done so uh
01:08:40 uh certainly even in 2006 it may be a local crew would ask that question of
01:08:48 of are there vulnerable residents in this building and would they ask where are they yes
01:08:54 they yes um would they um ask what types of vulnerabilities or limited mobility issues um affect the individuals in those flats yes but it would be an ad hoc basis at that time and kent's policy
01:09:07 hoc basis at that time and kent's policy would not direct visiting crews to collect that type of information no i think it would be probably the individual officers who were attending that would
01:09:18 officers who were attending that would show their concern for that sort of thing but i don't think it was documented at that time in your experience how frequently would that type of information be collected in kent
01:09:29 kent for the purposes of the tactical plan now but pre 2017. pre-2017 uh again i think it would be an ad hoc basis
01:09:42 but again no policy or no express instruction from the powers that be the crew should collect that type no i think there was good liaison with uh local housing authorities there
01:09:54 with uh local housing authorities there was always concern uh expressed in that way and i think officers uh uh you know operational officers we're told
01:10:05 officers we're told probably it's a good thing to go and make that part of your uh 72d visit but i don't remember any uh documentation on on that sort of thing
01:10:17 sort of thing thank you
01:10:17 thank you um would you ever expect crews to evacuate residents from more than one from more than just the fire floor yes
01:10:26 yes um and if i can stop using that in what circumstances would you expect that to happen okay well if if it's a confirmed fire
01:10:33 fire um
01:10:34 um and this was a training aspect
01:10:38 some people would do it some wouldn't but it depended on training that we would consider the flat immediate immediately above the uh fire flat to be evacuated as well
01:10:51 uh fire flat to be evacuated as well uh that was always a consideration as a risk zone to evacuate the whole floor above the fire floor is sometimes recommended but rarely done
01:11:02 is sometimes recommended but rarely done and why why is it rarely done for a matter of time i think and how would you expect the sort of the broader evacuation process to be carried out would it essentially reflect what's
01:11:13 out would it essentially reflect what's taking place on the fire floor itself um
01:11:19 yeah i mean if if we've confirmed that there is a fire in a flat um before we're going to make entrance
01:11:30 before we're going to make entrance in other words if the flat door is closed and we we might take a look through the letterbox to see the state of the
01:11:36 of the fire we might touch the back of the door but certainly if we've confirmed a fire in a flat we would clear the fire floor thank you in 2006 thank you and looking at paragraph
01:11:50 2006 thank you and looking at paragraph 90 just above this diagram we see that once the evacuation the floor has been carried out the crew will draw to the lobby again is that right
01:11:59 right that's correct thank you now there's a fourth and final part to the reconnaissance and evacuation phase which was withdrawing after reconnaissance and evacuation and that's dealt with at page 18 so
01:12:10 and that's dealt with at page 18 so again overleaf
01:12:14 and we can see from the diagram that at this point the sector commander and the crew are back in the lobby and the door to the corridor and the door to the stairwell are both closed is that right
01:12:25 stairwell are both closed is that right yes
01:12:26 yes now the crew then lay out two hose lines from the control dividing breach is that right yes and here the phrase layout here means to connect to the outlet is that right
01:12:38 to connect to the outlet is that right yes correct thank you and using the dividing breach means they're able to connect two hoses into the same outlet as we discussed previously yes correct
01:12:49 crucially they will not charge those hoses with water and they will not use the hoses at this stage is that right yes
01:12:57 yes but the idea is that the hoses will be picked up by later crews yes correct
01:13:03 correct and then once all that is done the sector commander and crew then return to the bridgehead wherever that might be yes
01:13:11 now the next stage uh is the intervention phase and that is dealt with at page 19.
01:13:20 now in broad terms the intervention phase
01:13:24 phase put this crudely is happening at the bridgehead while the initial reconnaissance and evacuation is taking place is that right um
01:13:37 could you rephrase that you've got the intervention phase is describing what's going on at the bridge head while the initial reconnaissance and evacuation phase has been completed
01:13:49 evacuation phase has been completed yes i mean cruz would be coming up to the bridgehead um which had been confirmed by by radio from the reconnaissance team uh advising which floor to set that up
01:14:01 uh advising which floor to set that up up on
01:14:02 up on and
01:14:03 and crews would be preparing there to for for an intervention thank you now at the bridgehead a minimum of four ba teams such breathing apparatus teams are briefed and ready to be committed
01:14:15 are briefed and ready to be committed under air to the far floor is that right yes
01:14:18 yes and we'll see in a moment two of those ba teams will will then enter the incident floor one is the first attack team and the other is back up is that right yes and the third team will be
01:14:29 right yes and the third team will be deployed in the stairwell and the fourth as the emergency crew at the bridgehead in broad terms is that right in broad terms yes now
01:14:39 now coming back to gra 3.2 the 2014 edition that was enforced at the time of the grenfell fire appears only to suggest that the use of
01:14:50 appears only to suggest that the use of two ba crews at this stage and if we go to what gra 3.2 says and i'd be interested in your views on this lfb quadruple zero one two double five
01:15:02 quadruple zero one two double five forward slash two eight and it's really the fourth paragraph from the bottom of that page and what that says is this a breathing apparatus team must only be
01:15:15 a breathing apparatus team must only be committed with extinguishing commit equipment that has been assessed as suitable and able to provide sufficient weight of attack and then if we can go to the second paragraph from the bottom it says this
01:15:28 paragraph from the bottom it says this an additional breathing apparatus team with a second jet must protect personnel involved in rescue firefighting operations as soon as possible now
01:15:40 as possible now am i right in reading gra 3.2 as only suggesting the use of two ba crews yes uh
01:15:49 yes uh there is the acting on on the uh fire service circular we talked about earlier the request for uh two hose lines
01:16:00 two hose lines one being a safety line one being an attack line should be laid in this case it says that the uh safety line should be laid as soon as possible
01:16:11 line should be laid as soon as possible so not necessarily uh
01:16:15 uh at the first instance so
01:16:18 so the kent configuration of a quartet for ba teams is that different from practices you've encountered being used in other fire and rescue services yes very much so um
01:16:30 yes very much so um i've
01:16:31 i've you know i've got to say i wasn't part of the formation of the 2006
01:16:39 2006 procedure
01:16:41 procedure there are aspects of it that i liked very much and there were aspects of it i didn't like and
01:16:49 and we on the high rise strategy group uh debated this over a period of time and and
01:16:56 and and what i would say is that in 2012 we updated
01:17:00 updated tbf-15 again thank you um which aspects did you like first of all and which aspects what didn't you like clearly i like the stair protection
01:17:11 clearly i like the stair protection feature i like the uh safe approach that they took and the prioritizing of
01:17:17 of making sure that a compartment fire compartment wasn't opened
01:17:22 opened before
01:17:23 before residents were clear of the stairwell
01:17:28 they kept the doors closed they attacked from the fire floor so that was another feature of protection to the stair um
01:17:36 um i like the idea that they were evacuating the five floor but i wasn't happy with the third line which was placed into the stair to protect the stair
01:17:47 protect the stair and you referred in an earlier answer to debating the advantages and disadvantages um internally account of the the four ba crew approach yes when tbf15 came to be revised in 2012
01:18:00 when tbf15 came to be revised in 2012 yes um did you stay with the quartet regime or did you abandon it in favor of something else so we had four firefighters on the five floor with two hose lines
01:18:13 on the five floor with two hose lines and that was the minimum we used the third line to approach the floor above the fire floor
01:18:24 the fire floor and protect the flat that was uh um immediately above the fire but that that was an addition that was uh um it wasn't an essential before we
01:18:35 uh um it wasn't an essential before we attacked the fire and those additional features go beyond what gra 3.2 appears to be advising is that a fair reading yes and that was something which you felt
01:18:47 and that was something which you felt was a necessary desirable addition absolutely thank you um the next part of the intervention phase going back to um tbf 15 um is
01:19:00 phase going back to um tbf 15 um is stairwell protection um by the first offensive team and if we go to kfr quadruple zero double zero five zero forward slash two zero
01:19:15 now we see the subheading there at the bottom of the page that says stairwell protection and if we see uh look at rather paragraph 100
01:19:27 paragraph 100 the first
01:19:28 the first caba team
01:19:31 caba team ca
01:19:32 ca compressed air brain apparatus will lay out and charge a covering jet from the floor above the bridge head up the stairwell to the entrance to the lobby of the affected floor is that right
01:19:45 yes thank you and the policy is clear that this crew must not enter the lobby of the affected floor as that would breach the integrity of the critical door is that right yes
01:19:57 door is that right yes and if we can turn over the page to page 21
01:20:02 again the diagram helpfully shows that the crew remain in the stairwell is that right correct that's the third line that i was talking about that we changed i spoke to us yeah
01:20:14 spoke to us yeah and um
01:20:16 and um their hoes so the crew that remain on the stairwell their hose is connected two floors below the fire floor and the door to the fire floor crucially is closed
01:20:27 floor crucially is closed yes thank you [Applause] now this cruise please sure if i'm putting this too simplistically this crew's sole function is to protect
01:20:38 this crew's sole function is to protect the means of egress within the stairwell is that right yes it's to protect the means of egress and to protect fire entering the stair
01:20:53 and so keeping the stairwell clear of smoke or fire in broad terms correct this this was the subject of debate of the
01:21:02 the strategy group for the 2012 update and what were the competing pros and cons
01:21:09 cons well i think they were responding to one of the fires that they had with
01:21:14 had with where in 2001 where fire had gone into the stairwell and in that situation we had the same floor layout here um but the uh
01:21:25 uh hose line was taken from below the fire floor
01:21:28 floor up through the doors into the fire floor and then fire came out of the flat from a wind-driven fire into the lobby into the stair
01:21:39 into the lobby into the stair and completely cut off the stairwell now we argued the fact that that may have been just one incident that to
01:21:50 that to have this situation where we are laying from the fire floor with the fire door closed would alleviate that risk um
01:22:01 um so
01:22:01 so we thought we could use the resources in a better way rather than just placing a hose line out there thank you could we um look at the bottom of page
01:22:13 could we um look at the bottom of page 21 so below this diagram and we see that the there's provision there for the second offensive team who are there to provide hallway in egress protection is that
01:22:25 hallway in egress protection is that right
01:22:25 right yes now this the second defensive team they enter the lobby on the instant floor and charge one of the two existing hose lines from the control dividing breach and then take it into the
01:22:36 breach and then take it into the corridor is that right correct and if we could turn over the page to page 22
01:22:43 it is that action which is shown in the diagram at the top of the page is that right yes
01:22:51 they then take the hose near the affected compartment but they don't enter
01:22:57 enter they don't enter the compartment or indeed open the door in any way is that right correct what they do instead is that they use their hose line as a protective spray or curtain in the corridor to maintain its
01:23:08 curtain in the corridor to maintain its integrity is that right that was the written objective i think more likely they were just there with a closed branch uh hose line just to
01:23:21 uh hose line just to add a safety feature they weren't running or flowing water at that time and really flowing from that their principle or sole function was to protect the means of egress to the stairwell for the attack team
01:23:36 would it also be the case that by maintaining conditions in the corridor of the fire floor that's making access the corridor easier for the third offensive team probably not um
01:23:49 probably not um if conditions were that bad we would be either
01:23:53 either coming back and approaching it from the floor below or or attacking the fire at that time i mean if they were there in that situation and the door was open
01:24:04 that situation and the door was open they would probably practically proceed into the open compartment but they wouldn't open it if it was closed thank you now turning to the third offensive team they're the entry fire fighting
01:24:16 team they're the entry fire fighting team is that right yes and if we go to the bottom of page 22
01:24:23 we see a description here of their role and function and in broad terms it's this third offensive team that enters the lobby on the affected floor and takes the second
01:24:34 the affected floor and takes the second hose that is set into the dividing breach into the corridor and they then move close to the fire compartment is that right that's correct
01:24:42 and if we turn over the page to the top of page 23
01:24:49 is that what the diagram is showing yes thank you and once the crew has secured approval from the instant commander they will enter the compartment and start firefighting activities is that right
01:25:01 firefighting activities is that right yes
01:25:03 yes [Music]
01:25:04 [Music] now finally as part and we're still dealing here with the intervention phase there is instant progression and support and we can find that addressed at the top of page 24 of tbf 15.
01:25:18 top of page 24 of tbf 15. and if we can look at paragraph 113 there's a direction there along the following lines a safety officer should be positioned in the stairwell at bridgehead level to monitor for any
01:25:30 bridgehead level to monitor for any downward smoke travel and we can see that safety officer in the diagram at page 25.
01:25:41 if that could be blown up thank you and the safety officer is on the other side of the lobby door on the bridgehead floor in the stairwell is that right that's correct [Music]
01:25:52 [Music] and again presumably that's to ensure that the integrity of the stairwell is maintained at all stages of the operation yes i think uh that's the case and that that officer there would
01:26:03 case and that that officer there would be particularly uh
01:26:05 uh relevant to the protection of the crews as well thank you and does it also flow that the safety officer will have the responsibility for ensuring the safe egress of occupants evacuating it would
01:26:16 egress of occupants evacuating it would serve that purpose yes
01:26:23 and is it also correct that the doorway curtains can be deployed at any of these stages of the procedure not at this time and why not we didn't have door curtains in 2006
01:26:37 we didn't have door curtains in 2006 when did they come to be introduced well they started in germany probably
01:26:44 probably around
01:26:45 around 2000
01:26:48 2000 but we didn't get them in the uk uh
01:26:53 we certainly certainly tried trialled them but they were considered too cumbersome at the time as we had enough equipment to carry up um
01:27:04 um so they weren't popular here can you briefly describe door curtains for us okay a door curtain is something made of fire resistant material it's
01:27:16 resistant material it's basically a a swinging curtain that has a frame that you can put into a doorway and extend so that it holds tight into the
01:27:27 holds tight into the doorway itself and
01:27:30 and it has a small opening at the base of the curtain allows the smoke to be kept within and firefighters to go in and out of that
01:27:41 firefighters to go in and out of that opening to fight the fire it's just an added protection of smoke coming back out
01:27:47 out you said they were cumbersome can you give the panel an idea how heavy was a set of curtains they're not particularly heavy but they are quite large so probably
01:27:58 quite large so probably uh
01:27:59 uh would be about a meter square um
01:28:02 um in its
01:28:03 in its folding uh container and
01:28:07 and again not heavy but cumbersome to carry so
01:28:10 so added with all the other equipment dividing breech and the rest of it that's right it was considered too much now when you did have doorway curtains um on which floors would you expect to use them
01:28:22 use them so you could use them on the fire compartment itself the main flat door you could use it at the stair door you could use it at the lobby door depends how many you had but you have
01:28:34 depends how many you had but you have extra layers the only thing with stair curtains is that they aren't guaranteed to stop a wind-driven fire so if the
01:28:43 the external window of the flat is broken and there's a high 20 mile an hour plus wind coming in it will bypass those curtains and smoke will travel into open areas dr
01:28:56 and smoke will travel into open areas dr greenwood thank you um sir with near immaculate timing um that comes to an end of this topic and may well be an appropriate time for it yes thank you well
01:29:09 yes thank you well as mr kenya said dr grimwood we have a break during the morning and i think this is a good time to take it so we'll break off now and we'll resume please at 25 to 12.
01:29:21 please at 25 to 12. and while you're out of the room please don't discuss your evidence with anyone else thank you sir all right thank you very much well at your own pace please go with the usher
01:29:56 thank you mr glitter 25 to 12. thank you
01:49:20 would you ask dr grimwood to come back in please yep
01:49:38 [Music] thank you
01:49:44 thank you sir all right dr rimwood are you uh ready to carry on absolutely good thank you very much yes mr kinnear thanks sir um can we now turn to the development of the rice command decision
01:49:55 development of the rice command decision making tool and in particular the influence and lessons you derive from your time in kuala lumpur now following the development of kent's guidance on stairwell protection in 2006
01:50:07 guidance on stairwell protection in 2006 you explain in your statement that you developed the rice model in 2008 when you're engaged in training high-rise firefighters in kuala lumpur and malaysia is that right that's correct
01:50:19 malaysia is that right that's correct first of all what was your role in kuala lumpur
01:50:22 lumpur so i was uh commissioned uh privately to uh
01:50:27 uh uh
01:50:28 uh train the
01:50:30 train the high-rise firefighting teams in kuala lumpur
01:50:33 lumpur over a six-week period and presumably and shout out if this isn't true kuala lumpur accurate kuala lumpur has a relatively high number of
01:50:44 lumpur has a relatively high number of complex high-rise buildings yes it has 450
01:50:48 450 super tall buildings uh and a large range of smaller buildings so it was a a really good learning experience for me as well um but certainly uh uh
01:50:59 uh interesting to see how malaysian firefighters approach the problems thank you now at the time of your work in kuala lumpur in 2008 the model that is now the rice model
01:51:12 model that is now the rice model was referred to as ice ice which was intervention containment evacuation explicit rescue component came later is that right
01:51:23 that right yes although rescue was included in ice but it was a subset so
01:51:31 so during a later strategy meeting we had in kent they wanted it raised to a primary consideration which it always was but it was just the way the
01:51:42 but it was just the way the flow chart was laid out so it became rice thank you now we don't need to go to it but at paragraph 13 of your first statement
01:51:49 statement you explain that the rice model serves as a prompt so that fire commanders are able to focus equally on the four primary strategic choices in a building fire now can i go through those four
01:52:02 fire now can i go through those four strategic choices with you um first of all rescue and the reference to rescue in this context is specifically to saveable life within the fire compartment is that right yes
01:52:13 fire compartment is that right yes correct
01:52:14 correct and the rescue component in the rice model essentially directs a commander to consider whether action needs to be taken as a priority uh to carry out a rescue from the fire
01:52:25 uh to carry out a rescue from the fire compartment before any other um the usual steps are taken such as setting up an initial attack b18 on the rest of it correct
01:52:34 the second stage is intervention and that refers to entry into the fire compartment to extinguish or control the fire there is that right yes and you would expect cruz and kent to do
01:52:46 and you would expect cruz and kent to do this following the procedure that we've just considered i set out in tbf15 is that right yes and so it's the kent quartet 14 formation yes
01:52:58 formation yes the third element is containment and that refers to the need to prevent the fire from spreading to surrounding compartments is that right yes and would that require
01:53:10 and would that require crews to be in place whose responsibility was to monitor fire spread and to take action if any spread occurred yes it would be certainly containment can be from
01:53:22 certainly containment can be from the exterior could be an exterior stream or it could be internally that was my next question okay um so thank you for preemptive so that would include monitoring for the external fire spread as well yes
01:53:34 as well yes and where would you expect those crews to be located dealing with containment well containment would be a tactical option um
01:53:45 option um it may
01:53:46 it may and to make it clear the rice mnemonic is not um something that has to be done in any specific order it's a case of again you preempted a later question okay sorry
01:53:57 preempted a later question okay sorry thank you um so so so in terms of containment it would be um something that they decided it might be a wind-driven fire for example that we're not going to
01:54:09 we're not going to open up the compartment at this particular time because of the risk to residents on the fire floor or in the stairwells so we would contain the fire by keeping doors closed
01:54:21 by keeping doors closed and there may be some external streams used if we've got access and there may even be some
01:54:31 approaches to direct
01:54:34 direct fog tactics into the compartment itself using piercing nozzles now obviously i appreciate that much depends upon the nature of the car the nature of the building yes and the rest of it but what action would you expect
01:54:46 of it but what action would you expect to be taken um where there was external fire spread from the compartment compartment of origin well if it's an external fire that
01:54:56 that quite commonly we would see going to the floor above not necessarily into the floor above but threatening the floor above
01:55:07 threatening the floor above containment action might be to deploy a crew to the floor above and enter the flat there with a hose line
01:55:16 but if we've got access to an aerial appliance we would use an exterior stream to control fire spread or we would use ground monitors i was about to ask about ground monitors yeah
01:55:27 about to ask about ground monitors yeah um how useful would they be in terms of containment of an external fire spread depending on the height of the building um
01:55:36 um very useful and of course in kent we're not london we don't have any buildings that are over 20 23 floors um
01:55:46 um but even at that those heights you you can be
01:55:50 can be hard-pressed to reach a fire at high level thank you the fourth and final stage is evacuation and is it right that this stage involves considering first the primary risk zones
01:56:02 considering first the primary risk zones yes
01:56:03 yes so we turn the primary risk zones as the uh areas that are most at risk for residents
01:56:11 residents or occupants and that would be the fire floor itself uh
01:56:16 uh certainly in in in those areas that's the primary risk zone it's immediate risk it's immediate risk um
01:56:24 um can you explain in a typical flat fire what the primary risk zone would be in a flat fire the primary risk zone would be mainly the
01:56:36 would be mainly the lobby area or the corridor serving the flats on the fire floor or the flat above the fire
01:56:44 the fire so it's not confined to the compartment of origin no and the secondary risk zones um presumably they're the more remote areas absolutely so we would consider secondary wrist sounds as the stairwells
01:56:58 secondary wrist sounds as the stairwells and then flats above and those are the areas where occupants ought to be protected for at least a limited period of time if there are adequate fire safety measures in place absolutely
01:57:12 now um probably be useful to go to it if we go to paragraph 15 of your first statement kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero forward slash 5 and it's paragraph 15.
01:57:29 and we see in the second sentence of that paragraph and it goes over to page six you say this it is important to emphasize that rice is not a policy or procedure but a
01:57:40 is not a policy or procedure but a command decision making tool it is primarily an aid memoir used to alleviate command stress and prompt a predetermined rapid analytical thought process
01:57:50 process where local or total building evacuation may be given earlier consideration prior to a firefighting intervention the model can be applied to all multi-storey building types covering a
01:58:01 multi-storey building types covering a variable range of occupancies and is not specific to just very tall buildings now taking that stage by stage what is the difference between on the one hand a policy or procedure and the
01:58:14 one hand a policy or procedure and the command decision making tool on the other
01:58:17 other so
01:58:19 so a command decision-making tool such as rice is purely an aid memoir to try and direct a commander probably first on scene certainly to
01:58:33 relate to the the most pro primary concerns in terms of the tactical options that he might choose he or she might choose um
01:58:43 um why is it important to stress that the the right model is a model and not a policy okay well interestingly is now a policy um in kent but
01:58:54 but uh during the process of evolution at the we we we developed the uh not the procedure the mnemonic um it was purely as i say only used
01:59:05 um it was purely as i say only used initially in training um and then it was used uh with a documented guide and then it was brought into a procedure where the different
01:59:17 where the different aspects of the tactical options relate to
01:59:20 to how many hose lines the crews must lay out before they do certain things for example
01:59:26 example now
01:59:27 now we
01:59:28 we can
01:59:29 can use one hose line to enter a situation where it's an are a rescue whereas before we would have to have three in 2006 and two in 2012.
01:59:42 and two in 2012. one point which was made by dr cohn hatton
01:59:45 hatton last week and i think professor torreira makes in his reports is that a decision model helps commanders in formulating their own plan and that will inevitably depend upon particular circumstances and
01:59:56 depend upon particular circumstances and will rely much on the instant commander's discretion whereas a policy will direct the incident commander what to do is that a distinction which you accept has been legitimate i
02:00:07 which you accept has been legitimate i would accept that absolutely certainly you could say that rice uh sits in the plan formulation uh uh part of the uh um
02:00:19 part of the uh um you know process that that sabrina coinhattan recently introduced now we've touched on this earlier but you said that rice does not require a mechanistic
02:00:32 rice does not require a mechanistic process through each of its components components can be taken out of order is that
02:00:36 that first of all i think that's right but could you explain why the decision making tool can be adapted in that way yes that's correct well it's a tactical tactical
02:00:47 it's a tactical tactical uh set of options and
02:00:50 and we try to keep it brief i've seen some flow charts of other mnemonics used which have been complex and difficult to
02:01:01 which have been complex and difficult to remember on on scene rice is a short sharp
02:01:06 approach it's based on risk assessment which is the the the most important uh
02:01:14 uh option to be taken at any particular time and so flowing on from our earlier discussions it's possible depending upon the circumstances of fire to take the e element i.e evacuation before any of the
02:01:27 element i.e evacuation before any of the other three absolutely yes when you formulated the model did you have in mind the sorts of possible circumstances that might require a commander to implement
02:01:38 commander to implement matters out of sequence if i can put it that way
02:01:41 that way well you know when we when we first or when i first introduced it it was it was a
02:01:46 a a simple compartment file tool in in house fires um
02:01:52 um so we had a series of house fires where firefighters would turn up and would uh respond
02:02:00 respond to the things that were most important to them which was firstly rescue secondly firefighting and
02:02:09 and there were a series of fires where firefighters lost their lives because they chose those options if they'd chose another option they would have perhaps had a better outcome
02:02:20 would have perhaps had a better outcome so
02:02:21 so that's where it was originally developed from and certainly in terms of evacuation in a high-rise building that's always been you know an important topic certainly in
02:02:34 you know an important topic certainly in commercial buildings i've never agreed with the fact that people should have a stay put policy i believe that a staple policy means that the escape routes should always be available to
02:02:47 routes should always be available to residents should they need them so evacuation was important really flowing on from the importance of evacuation um is it inherent in the rice
02:02:58 evacuation um is it inherent in the rice model
02:02:58 model that
02:03:00 that it encourages commanders not to assume that buildings may behave in one way it's encouraging them to assume that fires may behave unpredictably
02:03:11 fires may behave unpredictably well we teach firefighters to expect failure
02:03:15 failure we we expect a building to perform against the way it's designed to perform and and even if a building does perform as designed
02:03:26 as designed there are conflicts in the regulations we talked earlier about the position of rising mains in stairwells that's always going to be a conflict where firefighters want to attack a fire
02:03:38 where firefighters want to attack a fire quickly
02:03:40 quickly and are your kent or were your kent um firefighters specifically trained um to assume that fire may well spread outside a compartment of origin
02:03:52 a compartment of origin uh yes uh certainly um a situation could occur where a fire spread into the lobby that's why we prioritize the uh uh primary evacuation area the uh
02:04:04 uh uh primary evacuation area the uh lobby or the corridor itself and evacuate those flats before we enter
02:04:11 enter and
02:04:11 and certainly a fire could lightly spread up the face of a building to the floor above that's quite common um
02:04:19 um not always threatening to enter that that part of the building but but certainly it's a risk thank you now going back to the training that you're providing kuala lumpur back in 2008 uh when you first formulated the
02:04:31 2008 uh when you first formulated the rice concept what training were you providing at that time in in kuala lumpur well it was first of all one act to assess their
02:04:42 first of all one act to assess their level of knowledge and understanding so the first week was pretty much doing that to see you would expect where they have so many high tall buildings they'd be really efficient
02:04:54 buildings they'd be really efficient but uh there were areas where they could certainly receive training and we looked at for the first two weeks tower blocks flat fires basic uh what
02:05:07 tower blocks flat fires basic uh what firefighters would call bread and butter jobs just the one room flat fire on the fourth floor um
02:05:14 um that didn't come outside the compartment uh
02:05:18 uh the flatten itself and then we looked at some of the bigger buildings that they had in malaysia which were some of the very tall office blocks and how did you use the rice tool as part of this
02:05:29 use the rice tool as part of this training well the rice tool was mainly used in in the town block fires or tower block training because they weren't responding well
02:05:41 because they weren't responding well they had no uh concept of forming a plan they had no idea of anything outside firefighting intervention that was their
02:05:52 firefighting intervention that was their first and primary concern so the objective there was to try and show that there were other ways to approach a fire that may have better outcomes and presumably the training
02:06:03 outcomes and presumably the training addressed unexpected building failure uh
02:06:08 uh it really was basics
02:06:11 basics it was very much a basic approach uh taking uh building features building systems
02:06:19 systems uh and integrating that with their tactical approaches now once you've developed and deployed the rice model in kuala lumpur and it's right that you introduced it in kent by
02:06:30 right that you introduced it in kent by a series of nine high-rise training seminars is that right yes we introduced it after we'd had for the first two seminars where there were failures in
02:06:41 where there were failures in understanding and they were delivered to instant commanders in 2010 and 2011. is that right yes correct um did you prepare the context of the training yes i did uh i prepared 60 of
02:06:55 training yes i did uh i prepared 60 of it and who are the other authors can you remember the other uh assistant uh was steve glass he's uh a station commander he's now retired thank you now you explain in your statement that the
02:07:06 explain in your statement that the training included an assessment called the fire studio can you explain what that assessment involved okay so the fire studio is a computerized
02:07:17 the fire studio is a computerized training program that was uh commonly used uh back then it's not virtual reality but it's basically using a cinema screen with a fire scenario uh placed on the
02:07:31 with a fire scenario uh placed on the screen
02:07:32 screen uh the particular assessment that we gave with the fire studio was the end of the course it was a uh i think it was a two or three hour course uh uh
02:07:43 uh uh assessment where there was fire spreading up the outside of a building to
02:07:48 to it spread to five floors to involve five floors so
02:07:52 floors so officers could see what was happening on the screen we had other officers in another part of the building that were on the assigned bridgehead we had other officers who were doing lobby control
02:08:04 lobby control and they had radio interconnection so we try to make it as realistic as possible so it's basically a real-time exercise involving rapid external fire spread across eight stories absolutely
02:08:15 spread across eight stories absolutely five it was five to eight stories thank you um
02:08:19 you um and i think i'm right in saying there was a hundred failure rate in the first two seminars is that right absolutely um it was a situation typical of that we'd seen in in malaysia where
02:08:31 that we'd seen in in malaysia where firefighters were uh thinking only of the first option to fight the fire and of course with our three-line attack that was becoming uh quite a problem
02:08:43 that was becoming uh quite a problem we also found that the design the the the command teams weren't working or integrating well that when they were looking at the screen they were looking away to discuss things
02:08:55 they were looking away to discuss things about other parts of the building in the smoke control system for example and uh
02:09:01 and uh intervention was the only thing that they were thinking of and so after those two seminars where you had the 100 failure rate that the rice model was brought in yes now you've very helpfully provided as an
02:09:12 now you've very helpfully provided as an exhibit to your third statement um the powerpoint presentation that was delivered to commanders as part of the high-rise training in 2010-11 and we can find um that
02:09:24 and we can find um that presentation at kfr quadruple zero double zero five seven
02:09:35 and if we can skip to page 13
02:09:41 slides entitled facades and from
02:09:46 and from page 13 onwards you discuss in detail um the mechanism by which first of all what facades are and then the mechanism by which facade fires may spread and if we
02:09:58 facade fires may spread and if we see an example of that at page 15 1 5.
02:10:05 you explain that and then if we can go on to page 18
02:10:12 you have a slide that's uh focused expressly and solely on cladding system types is that right yes and then if we can go to page 21
02:10:23 uh you deal with a number
02:10:26 a number of facade fires and they those um photographs go through to page 33. is that right correct
02:10:35 correct now were you aware that facade fires presented a particular risk in respect of which commanders needed to be trained well in kent we were very aware since 2009
02:10:46 2009 uh before this course was put together that um we'd seen fires in europe particularly in germany spreading up the external walls
02:10:57 external walls and
02:10:59 and my line manager asked me to undertake uh a review
02:11:05 a review of which buildings might have that kind of hazard in kent at that time so we approached all the housing providers the local authorities uh over a period of time and
02:11:20 only one area came back and said that they had i think it was about a dozen buildings that were recently renovated with expanded polystyrene foam as insulation
02:11:34 expanded polystyrene foam as insulation so we took the pictures from europe uh and took the report to the high-rise strategy group who decided that we needed to train
02:11:45 who decided that we needed to train firefighters and fire officers rather in this potential risk so that's where the
02:11:53 where the uh training course came from originally like you mentioned the date 2009 on the fire was that a fire in fanet no uh the the 2009 was uh
02:12:07 no uh the the 2009 was uh i'm not sure if i sent an email to you as part of the evidence but the the email in 2009 showed how we'd approach the housing
02:12:18 how we'd approach the housing authorities and they'd cut thanit was a particular authority had come back and said that they have about 12 15
02:12:27 15 buildings with external walls with polystyrene insulation and if we i think that email correspondence is an exchange between you and rob lawson is that that's correct that's right and the 19th of
02:12:38 correct that's right and the 19th of november 2009 and we can find it at kfr quadruple zero double zero five nine
02:12:53 i think in the line you see that the very top the following properties have been overclouded with polystyrene foam and you said that email provides details
02:13:04 and you said that email provides details of our investigation into combustible external walls of tower blocks of flats in the phanet era of kent is that right that's correct
02:13:12 now you've gone through the process of investigating collecting this information what did you do with it next well as i say we took the photographs that we had from
02:13:24 the photographs that we had from fires in germany mainly where polystyrene foam had caused external fire spread up the outside of buildings
02:13:33 buildings and we took this information from this email to the high-rise strategy group in kent
02:13:41 kent and they decided that we would have a training course for all officers and that's where the two-day training course came from when we started that in 2010. and did that um training course indeed
02:13:52 and did that um training course indeed the rise training um was it aimed at preparing commanders to evacuate a high-rise residential block without a pre-existing evacuation strategy well the uh
02:14:03 well the uh we already had the stair protection uh policy in uh so that was that was our approach at that time from 2006 onwards
02:14:14 approach at that time from 2006 onwards the intention was to talk through the high-rise policy in kent
02:14:19 kent and
02:14:20 and to demonstrate the fact that there were risks with facades and this could happen in kent because we had this risk uh and certainly uh the as i say the
02:14:33 uh and certainly uh the as i say the final uh
02:14:35 final uh exercise that they had the the fire studio exercise was to test them to show them that evacuation was more important than firefighting in that
02:14:46 important than firefighting in that situation
02:14:47 situation and
02:14:48 and does it flow from that that there was never
02:14:50 never a test under which commanders carried out an actual evacuation it was all computer-based training it was computer-based training now you explain in your statement that the vast majority of commanders
02:15:02 the vast majority of commanders undertaking uh the assessment at the conclusion the first two seminars were failing to achieve satisfactory outcomes so we've discussed that now in those first two seminars where the commanders were not
02:15:13 seminars where the commanders were not performing well um the rice model had not yet been introduced is that right yes correct and so the commanders were just seeking to apply the guidance that they'd learned from tbf-15 yes
02:15:25 they'd learned from tbf-15 yes now you explain in your statement that commanders in those first two seminars performed poorly because they were directing the majority of on-scene resources to control and extinguish an
02:15:36 resources to control and extinguish an external wall fire as the fire continued to spread upwards involving five floors in the building in contrast to diverting staffing and prioritizing an evacuation now
02:15:47 now do you think the commanders responded in that way because the procedure set out and tbf15 was insufficiently flexible
02:15:56 flexible absolutely correct the procedure um and and this was the the subject of debate for several years afterwards since 2006 i know but certainly when i
02:16:07 since 2006 i know but certainly when i was there that it was an inflexible procedure it was very prescriptive and it didn't give commanders that much option to move away from what was determined part of the
02:16:19 from what was determined part of the course in fact the first day was to take the language in the procedure
02:16:26 procedure and try and change it to make it flexible so put emphasis on particular words like should must
02:16:34 must will
02:16:35 will may uh to change the language in a way that people or the officers could see that they could actually move away from the prescriptive process of the
02:16:46 the prescriptive process of the procedure
02:16:47 procedure um but even then with with that it was still difficult to do to do so and was one of the lessons um that flowed from this the need to prioritize the evacuation stage first rather than
02:16:59 evacuation stage first rather than focusing on extinguishment of the fire particularly in circumstances where there's rapid fire spread well
02:17:06 well evacuation was uh um not the primary concern protecting residents who were self-evacuating was the priority
02:17:17 was the priority so that's the first thing that we we would concentrate on containment might be another action intervention might be another action if we had enough doors that would protect
02:17:30 we had enough doors that would protect the staircase as well as be able to fight the fire at the same time we would try and achieve that thank you and just to illustrate the points you've been making and answers to these few questions can we go back to
02:17:42 questions can we go back to the presentation that we looked at earlier with the training seminars kfr quadruple zero double zero four eight four slash three one
02:17:57 that's it's a different password sorry a different presentation but here
02:18:03 you're identifying the flaws with the tbf-15 approach yes thank you
02:18:16 now following um the conclusion these seminars is it right that you prepared a report setting out your your views and assessment yes i did
02:18:26 did and
02:18:27 and we can find that report at kfr quadruple zero double zero three nine
02:18:35 and if we go to page two and paragraph 1.5
02:18:41 and you say that this it was demonstrated quite early on that when tb tb f15 high-rise procedure is used for guidance the task objectives that are actually achievable within the
02:18:52 that are actually achievable within the intentions of the document were not achieved due to the prescriptive nature and layout of the procedure itself as examples the need to prioritize wider evacuation over intervention or
02:19:05 evacuation over intervention or containment over intervention were often objectives that were hindered by a procedure that offers an abc approach to ensuring a series of stringent control measures are cited before intervention
02:19:18 measures are cited before intervention may occur
02:19:23 so drawing these various answers together at dr grimwood did the underperformance of commanders in the first two seminars lead you to believe that there needed to be a greater emphasis in training on the
02:19:34 be a greater emphasis in training on the need to be able to formulate an appropriate strategic plan in response the specific circumstances of an individual incident yes absolutely that's why we changed the
02:19:47 that's why we changed the later seven ep seminars uh in respect of introducing the which was then ice mnemonic
02:19:57 mnemonic and
02:19:57 and asking them to concentrate more on other tactical options that are available and
02:20:04 and that's where we saw some more more success than we'd had in the first two seminars and flying on from that you say in your statement that
02:20:14 that on the reference is a paragraph 14 of your first statement kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero four five you said that there were quotes outstanding improvements in the commander's ability
02:20:25 improvements in the commander's ability to identify the appropriate strategic decision at the right time following introduction of what was then ice absolutely yes
02:20:40 looking at that can you help us as to how specifically their performance was or how the improvements were outstanding well um
02:20:52 well um there was
02:20:53 there was lots of two-way debate in the course and
02:20:58 and we
02:20:59 we put a number of scenarios on what was not far studio but called simulator 6 which was a a less impressive should i say
02:21:11 a less impressive should i say computer training model where we could put several scenarios up very quickly and after each scenario we would debate with the officers what their options were they worked in
02:21:22 what their options were they worked in groups of three or four and some came out with different options to others so we debated what what would have been the best option uh and with that approach by the time we
02:21:35 uh and with that approach by the time we got to fire studio on the last day the improvements were great greatly seen thank you now following this you improved
02:21:47 improved the model and that's when it became rice and
02:21:50 and you exhibit a paper in which the proposed changes to ice to make it into rice were set out and proposed that paper is at kfr quadruple zero double zero five one
02:22:04 and if we go to page three in paragraph four 4.1
02:22:11 and you say that there are three phases detailed within tbf15 assessment reconnaissance and evacuation and then intervention and those are the the three phases that we've already been
02:22:22 the three phases that we've already been discussing earlier on this morning you go on at 4.2 to say this well these phases serve to give structure to operational decisions and actions there is a need to define flexible tactical
02:22:34 is a need to define flexible tactical options that can be employed dependent on the outcomes of the initial assessment and reconnaissance and then there is a diagram of the rice model just below and beneath that at paragraph
02:22:47 just below and beneath that at paragraph 4.3
02:22:49 4.3 it says this each of these options note sorry options not phases which infers that they must be undertaken in isolation and in a set order would be defined having these defined options
02:23:01 defined having these defined options would
02:23:02 would then you set out four principal benefits first allowed the ic the incident commander to implement effective actions relative to the circumstance they're confronted with far more quickly
02:23:14 confronted with far more quickly secondly remove the one fits all approach currently present within tbf15 thirdly allow more than one phase to be implemented at the same time as an
02:23:25 implemented at the same time as an example it would be feasible in certain conditions to evacuate whilst containing fire spread finally assist in defining accurately the resources required at developing
02:23:37 the resources required at developing incidents
02:23:39 incidents now does that approach
02:23:42 approach summarize the way in which the rice model is taught to incident commanders at kent now yes it does
02:23:51 what's been your assessment of the effects of a decade
02:23:56 a decade or so of rice training on the quality of decision making by incident commanders well
02:24:04 well it became a buzzword in kent rice everybody knew what rice was everybody referred to it and it was a snap question that you could ask any firefighter on a station
02:24:16 could ask any firefighter on a station what does it mean how do you relate to it
02:24:19 it how did how's it used in a fire um
02:24:22 um an example i could give was that we had a training exercise in a high-rise building where the incident commander was both appliances
02:24:34 was both appliances who were attending locally were uh still on the run but by what i mean by that is that they were still available for emergency calls unfortunately because of low resources at the time
02:24:46 low resources at the time there were another four pumps on this exercise
02:24:50 exercise well what happened was the first pump had already planned out what they were going to do as sometimes happens on exercises but they got called out the last minute to an emergency scene
02:25:01 an emergency scene the the second officer on the on the other pump who was a young officer very inexperienced suddenly became in charge of the whole incident
02:25:10 incident and was told right formulate your plan this is what we've got and you could see the virtual panic come across his face and the uh course coordinator said to
02:25:21 and the uh course coordinator said to him stop just think rice and immediately he changed in his uh approach to it you could see in his face that he knew exactly what he was looking for
02:25:32 for so that was one example where everything went smoothly just by thinking of the one buzzword so to speak stopping there on that particular example did the
02:25:43 on that particular example did the uh young instant commander take each stage in sequence i r i c e or did he take it out of sequence now again that it's very very much drilled
02:25:54 again that it's very very much drilled into them that when they use rice that they must choose the best option not necessarily the first option and they will go for the process firstly is anybody involved
02:26:06 is anybody involved uh in the flat and we have triggers to make sure that they're you know this is not
02:26:12 not a general report that we know that somebody is definitely in that flat and if that's the case then it's a rescue option and by what i said earlier it's now a procedure that would determine the
02:26:24 procedure that would determine the procedure that we use for the rescue which would be a single line attack now what does experience suggest are the disadvantages or weaknesses of the rice model
02:26:35 model disadvantages or weakness that's a good question i'd have to really think on that one because i don't see particularly any
02:26:47 because i don't see particularly any weaknesses in the
02:26:49 in the procedure
02:26:51 procedure put it differently have you received any criticisms from instant commanders at kent on the practical application of the rice model personally no it's now incorporated into all our
02:27:03 it's now incorporated into all our incident command training we have a command suite now which is uh beyond the cinema screen it's uh surround sound and uh you know virtual reality and rice
02:27:15 uh you know virtual reality and rice forms very much a feature of that from outside kent are you aware of any criticisms of the rice model not criticisms
02:27:26 not criticisms we
02:27:28 initially used it with uh when we went to a regional approach i'm not sure if you'll be coming on to that but
02:27:36 that but we will okay it's certainly something that we
02:27:40 that we introduce regionally not all fire services wanted to use it although most did in the region um
02:27:48 um i haven't heard any criticism of it personally but i've heard that some just think uh
02:27:54 think uh no
02:27:55 no we're not going to use that command decision makers must have the flexibility to make their own decisions well the flexibility is built within the system
02:28:06 system um
02:28:07 um currently at the moment there is another command mnemonic that's going around nationally which is maybe forming part of the
02:28:16 of the uh
02:28:17 uh national operational guidance still to be published and the discussions there were that it's uh i think it's a six or seven part uh mnemonic
02:28:28 uh mnemonic which leads to more information perhaps but um takes away the flexibility and is more difficult to remember thank you now in paragraph seven of your first
02:28:40 now in paragraph seven of your first statement and the reference is kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero four slash three and the first sentence of that paragraph um you refer there to
02:28:51 of that paragraph um you refer there to the introduction of the north american concept of rapid ascent teams during the training of kent's commanders in 2010
02:28:59 in 2010 and 2011
02:29:00 and 2011 and you state that the concept of rapid ascent teams was developed following a 2003 fire in chicago in which six people died in
02:29:09 died in a smoke-filled stairwell is that a fair summary absolutely correct was that the cook county building fire that references found elsewhere yes it was
02:29:20 was and that was a 37-story building where a fire broke out on the 12th floor i think yes and again smoke had filled the stairwell through doors being propped open by hoses is that again a fair
02:29:31 open by hoses is that again a fair summary yes it is um is it
02:29:34 um is it right to say that rapid ascent teams are assigned early in the incident and that their role is to use the fire protected routes including the stairwell and corridors uh to ensure the safety of
02:29:45 corridors uh to ensure the safety of occupants within those spaces who may be self-evacuating yes and in the important part of what you said there is early in the incident uh very early in fact almost on arrival
02:29:57 uh very early in fact almost on arrival and
02:29:58 and am i right in saying that the rapid ascent teams patrolled stairwells continuously during the course of an incident or is it confined to the early stages they're permanently assigned to the stairwells and the corridors are
02:30:09 the stairwells and the corridors are joining and that's to make sure that egress roots are safe and kept free of obstacles and nobody's in trouble up there
02:30:17 there and if someone was found to be trouble would the rapid ascent teams be responsible for bringing that individual out of the building yes they would they absolutely
02:30:28 absolutely communicate that to the bridgehead or forward command and they would be responsible for depends on their circumstances if it was somebody overcome they would rescue them if it was somebody who was
02:30:39 if it was somebody who was suffering from smoke inhalation they would perhaps remove them to a tenable area and the rapid ascent teams just flowing from the arts you gave would also be responsible for communicating back to the bridgehead their assessment
02:30:51 back to the bridgehead their assessment of prevailing conditions within the building exactly
02:30:55 now are those rapid ascent teams different from the stairwell protection teams that tbf15 referred to well
02:31:03 well rapid ascent teams was very familiar to me because this particular fire i was commissioned as an expert witness in chicago so
02:31:15 chicago so i i
02:31:16 i i became very aware of the developments of what what occurred in that fire and how chicago fire department dealt with it rapid ascent teams formed the first discussion in our
02:31:30 seminars in 2010-2011
02:31:34 and we had no formal
02:31:37 formal guidance or approach to how we would deploy firefighters uh above the bridgehead into stairwells uh it was very much an
02:31:48 into stairwells uh it was very much an ad hoc approach so i suggested that we discussed it and would it be a good idea there were some factors in tbf-15 as a procedure that would
02:31:59 tbf-15 as a procedure that would maybe hinder that and that's where we work with the language again of it but certainly it was a concept at the time that
02:32:08 time that officers accepted uh an organized approach done or con implemented early in an incident and it was a good idea thank you can i now turn on to a separate topic
02:32:20 can i now turn on to a separate topic which is the south east task and finish high-rise group i think operated between 2011 and 2012 and the standard operating procedure
02:32:30 procedure now
02:32:31 now i'd now first of all want to talk to you about your involvement in the collaborative regional high-rise task and finish group which you refer to in your
02:32:40 your first witness statement of paragraph eight now that was a group that included nine fire and rescue services from the south east region of this country apart from london is that right that's correct
02:32:51 from london is that right that's correct and it was an initiative um launched by the chief fire officers officers association is that right yes and the group was established in order to research and agree common operational procedures for responding to fires and
02:33:04 procedures for responding to fires and high-rise buildings is that right yes and ordinarily it's up to individual fire and rescue services to develop and implement their own local policies and procedures incorporating
02:33:15 procedures incorporating as they deem appropriate any national guidance is that right yes can you explain the rationale for these nine different frs's uh collaborating for these purposes well so
02:33:26 well so this was part of what we called the ways of working project which was uh around that time where they were going to uh
02:33:38 where they were going to uh reorganize the approach to fire fighting and fire command fire controls
02:33:45 controls in the uk where they were going to have regional controls uh so you would have a control in in guildford say for example that would accept calls from
02:33:56 accept calls from maybe uh nine fire services around the idea was to cut the number of controls and collaborate coordinate them together
02:34:07 and collaborate coordinate them together so this was part of the same project that we
02:34:10 that we were directed to formulate policy that would be
02:34:17 able to enable fire services to work together with the same procedures why was london not involved london were an area of their own in the same
02:34:28 their own in the same project was there any collaboration with london on the issues that you were discussing for example in the context of high-rise buildings um not at that time but certainly we were called in to meet with them uh
02:34:42 were called in to meet with them uh pre-publication of gra 3.2 in 2014. was that for the purposes of consultation or something else uh yeah it was consultation it was certainly um
02:34:54 certainly um we wanted to know what the gra was likely to say and i think london wanted to know what we were going to say and i think they were perhaps meeting with other areas as well
02:35:07 what was the precise role that cfoa that's the chief fire officers association what was their precise role in setting this up or in the in the initiative more broadly i should say so cfo was uh
02:35:18 i should say so cfo was uh the representative organization for chief fire officers would be the equivalent of the nfcc now and they would uh have various regional
02:35:30 and they would uh have various regional uh groups
02:35:31 uh groups uh that would organize uh and and arrange these uh particular collaborations between fire services thank you now if we can go to kfr quadruple zero
02:35:44 if we can go to kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero forward slash seven
02:35:48 seven and paragraph 19.
02:35:54 now you say in paragraph 19 in the first sentence third line that there had been an evaluation of stay put versus evacuation strategy in
02:36:05 stay put versus evacuation strategy in 2011 by this regional group now can you explain the background to that evaluation so
02:36:15 so stay put was always of concern whether it was a good policy or whether it was a bad policy but it was certainly a policy that was uh by design of the buildings
02:36:27 uh by design of the buildings but there were considerations from the fire service point of view that as much as people were asked to stay put that they should always have
02:36:38 that they should always have an egress route out of the building and there were disconnects which i say there disconnects between the building design and the firefighting procedures that
02:36:50 and the firefighting procedures that were
02:36:51 were being seen where they would put the rising mains in the stair uh and expect firefighters to uh fight a fire but still uh
02:37:02 uh allow smoke to enter the staircase what did the evaluation involve
02:37:11 the strategy group for the region was about 20 strong from the nine fire services involved and i would say probably at each meeting we
02:37:23 i would say probably at each meeting we would probably get about 12 to 15 um and the meetings were about once quarter
02:37:30 quarter um and the discussion on the day for stay put is difficult to recollect i know i was
02:37:41 is difficult to recollect i know i was there
02:37:42 there um but it was one of those uh solutions that was never resolved uh where do you stand or where did you stand in the debate between the advantages and disadvantages of
02:37:54 advantages and disadvantages of statehood well this was a a fairly early stage
02:37:59 stage with the regional procedures being formulated and from kent we were very strong in saying uh we want to protect the stairwell that's our priority
02:38:10 that's our priority um we want better design we want the designs to look at moving the rise in main
02:38:18 main then we had opposition from other fire services
02:38:21 services who would say no the riser main should stay in the stair because it's a firefighting shaft and firefighters are safer from a in approaching from that area
02:38:31 area um
02:38:33 um you know it was it was a it was it was a difficult one with so many opinions and there's no one there to arbitrate between the conflicting views is that right well i think uh the arbitration
02:38:44 right well i think uh the arbitration because the review panel for the the region was uh run by east sussex fire and rescue and
02:38:53 and their uh
02:38:56 their uh you know approach to it was understanding that this is a problem that's difficult to resolve we see both sides of the argument
02:39:07 sides of the argument but i think the general consensus was that we should be uh prioritizing that that's their protection and if if we couldn't do it by design
02:39:18 and if if we couldn't do it by design then then we would do it by procedure and so
02:39:21 and so i put this crudely kent's view was the generally prevailing one although there was no unanimity of agreement very much so yeah thank you
02:39:31 thank you now you've helpfully exhibited a copy of the standard operating procedure which is referred to as a sob and
02:39:39 and that you that was developed by this particular group and if we go to it it's a kfr quadruple zero double zero four nine
02:39:49 now i think you say in paragraph eight of your first witness statement that this procedure includes kent's stairwell protection strategies and the rice concept
02:39:59 concept and
02:40:01 and the document is recorded as having been issued in october 2013. is that right yes now did this document replace tbf-15 this document replaced for kent
02:40:14 this document replaced for kent uh
02:40:14 uh tbf15 2012 version
02:40:21 and so what can you help us is standard operating procedure is that identical to a policy or is it something below the status of policy it's the same
02:40:32 below the status of policy it's the same as policy or procedure it's a standard operating procedure and would you would a risk assessment be carried out of the substantive provisions of a sop
02:40:44 of the substantive provisions of a sop before it was promulgated absolutely yes and who would have carried out that risk assessment uh each fire service involved all the nine fire services would carry out their own risk assessment
02:40:56 own risk assessment uh
02:40:57 uh our own risk assessment in kent would be done by the various bodies such as the health and safety department the operations department
02:41:08 the operations department training department and certainly the fabric as union and
02:41:13 and i suppose
02:41:14 i suppose you would be on what you say there you would be kept outside of the risk assessment process would you me personally or your department uh yeah yes
02:41:28 can you explain what status this sop had in other fire and rescue services who form part of the group of nine so the
02:41:37 so the uh
02:41:38 uh main body of this would be exactly the same
02:41:42 same uh
02:41:44 uh there are a few additions i think on the end of it where we added some particular uh um
02:41:52 uh um information about flow rates and the importance of having adequate water uh to fight the fire and just flowing on from a question
02:42:04 from a question i asked uh some time ago um i think i'm writing saying that not all of the nine adopted this sop every fire service all nine adopted it
02:42:15 every fire service all nine adopted it but not necessarily the rice but not every one adopted rice correct and the reason for the resistance to rice was
02:42:22 rice was the anxiety to maintain the maximum degree of incident commander discretion yeah i think there was no resistance to it i think everybody because i i gave a presentation to the group and everybody
02:42:35 presentation to the group and everybody representing at that meeting loved it but it just didn't make its way into all of the procedures now um in broad terms i think i'm right in saying that the sop mirrored the
02:42:46 in saying that the sop mirrored the procedure set out in tb15 to a great extent it was almost a direct lift of the 2012 version 20 and just to illustrate that can we go through a
02:42:57 illustrate that can we go through a number of elements of it just so the point can be made good um if we can go to page 23
02:43:07 and we
02:43:11 there we have um three-line procedure the reconnaissance team who lay out the two hoses on the fire floor which reflected its predecessor i think yes what what you see here is a
02:43:23 yes what what you see here is a different floor layout um without the lobby that was one of the uh um you know uh problems with the original
02:43:34 you know uh problems with the original tbf-15 procedure that it showed firefighters that there was always going to be a lobby there um that that wasn't the case um some many buildings now
02:43:46 buildings now don't have the lobby between the stair and the accommodation just one door thank you if we go to page 25
02:43:56 we see there as in tbf-15 the stairwell protection team coming up behind them and remaining in the stairwell is that right
02:44:04 right that's the lobby approach procedure thank you and if we go to page 26
02:44:17 we see in that the diagram at the top of the page uh the fire floor protection team who take one of the charge hoses on the fire floor and responsible for maintaining the integrity of the fire floor itself
02:44:28 the integrity of the fire floor itself we see those displayed and that again reflects its predecessor is that right yes correct and then looking at the bottom diagram on page 26 we see here
02:44:39 bottom diagram on page 26 we see here the fire attack team and again that reflected its predecessor is that right correct now i think i'm right insane but please shout if this is wrong that the rice
02:44:50 shout if this is wrong that the rice model isn't explicitly set out in the sop
02:44:53 sop uh refers to a tactical framework um and it's that it's that phrase which is meant to refer the reader to the rice model it's the document that was cut
02:45:04 model it's the document that was cut yeah i think he pointed it out earlier um
02:45:07 um which was an incomplete version of the technical framework
02:45:12 thank you [Music]
02:45:20 can you help us was your rice model or indeed the concept of stairwell protection teams disseminated or discussed more widely outside the regional group of nine in the southeast
02:45:32 regional group of nine in the southeast um
02:45:33 um it was discussed at that time only by the regional team and also by london fire brigade um what was the lfb's response
02:45:45 what was the lfb's response to
02:45:47 to the rice model or the concept of stairwell protection
02:45:53 interest is the best way i could put it
02:45:58 we had a meeting with the deputy assistant commissioner and he uh showed great interest in it he
02:46:07 he held some concerns about the stair protection procedure in that it was moving away from what was
02:46:15 what was normal national procedure in terms of approaching the fire from the fire floor and not the flaws below thank you those are the discussions with dac cow up on there correct thank you
02:46:28 dac cow up on there correct thank you we'll come into those okay for understandably um in more detail yes um did the sifoa did that take any steps to disseminate the rice model or the concept of stairwell protection to
02:46:40 concept of stairwell protection to its various other members outside the southeast
02:46:44 southeast not that i'm aware of do you know why they didn't they may have because i think i think the way the the ways of working
02:46:55 ways of working uh project worked each particular region had a
02:47:01 a policy
02:47:02 policy to uh um develop so
02:47:06 so ours happened to be high-rise and i think it was probably chosen because we had lots to say in kent at the time um and there were lots of incidents around that time in in in
02:47:17 around that time in in in the southeast region but
02:47:20 but i think other areas other regions would have done things like um road traffic accidents and and policies for for other things so ours was high-rise firefighting and
02:47:31 ours was high-rise firefighting and whether it got um sent around because the project ended and the
02:47:37 and the you know the separate control regional areas never never developed the project whole project was closed thank you
02:47:46 thank you now
02:47:47 now you've adverted to these discussions with dac cowb um they were held in september 2011. is that right yes
02:47:54 yes and uh you say we don't need to go to it but you say in paragraph 23 of your first witness statement which is that kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero forward slash eight that the purpose of
02:48:05 forward slash eight that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss with the ac carb how the work of the regional task group might align with the work he was undertaking in updating gra 3.2 in broad
02:48:16 undertaking in updating gra 3.2 in broad terms is that a fair summary that's correct
02:48:20 at that stage what was your awareness of the state of revision of three of gra 3.2 we'd seen a draft
02:48:31 we'd seen a draft and
02:48:32 and um
02:48:33 um we considered it a a big step forward in terms of there was uh much more information than the previous 2008 version
02:48:45 2008 version um
02:48:46 um but there was nothing that that we would sign up for us so to speak because it didn't have anything of the stair protection
02:48:55 within that document so that's where the debate came thank you now following on from that may be useful to go to paragraph 24 of your first witness statement which is kfr
02:49:06 first witness statement which is kfr quadruple zero double zero four zero forward slash eight and you say that that you discussed stairwell protection strategies in the
02:49:17 stairwell protection strategies in the rise model with dac cow up and in the third sentence and this flows from an answer you gave earlier on mr carr pointed out
02:49:28 earlier on mr carr pointed out i think you put this euphemistically some disconnect to quote between the tactical approaches that you were proposing and those that had been used in london and elsewhere in the uk
02:49:39 used in london and elsewhere in the uk now can you help us what were the tactical approaches that concerned mr cap was it rice and the stairwell protection policy
02:49:50 rice and the stairwell protection policy more broadly no i think rice was just uh um
02:49:54 um it wasn't it conflict with anything it was just an interesting uh
02:50:00 uh introduction to mr cowa but he was more concerned with the stare protection approach that kent and the region were now taking in that we were prioritizing the
02:50:11 in that we were prioritizing the protection of the staircase stairwells wherever we could um
02:50:17 um and we were attacking from the five floor
02:50:20 floor instead of going from the floors below as
02:50:24 as advocated by gray 3.2 yes and did he give a reasoned criticism of your focus on the stairwell protection policy
02:50:35 policy i think it was firefighter safety was the main concern um
02:50:40 um you know there are several building layouts obviously the rise in maine may well be in the lobby itself and
02:50:50 and the view was that if firefighters go into that lobby uh they can you know open up the door and a wind-driven fire could come through and
02:51:01 wind-driven fire could come through and cause them problems and that was exactly the scenario that occurred in 2001 that caused kent to put into place a stair protection policy now earlier on we discussed the various
02:51:13 earlier on we discussed the various means you can take to mitigate the risk of connecting on the fire floor did you discuss those means of mitigation with mr cowab when you were debating these matters with him
02:51:25 you were debating these matters with him in september 2011. i think uh it's hard to recollect exact conversations but certainly
02:51:32 certainly the the basis of the conversation would have been about the uh
02:51:38 the uh regional approach which was all about steer protection maintaining integrity of the escape routes
02:51:46 routes um
02:51:47 um these were the important issues that we discussed
02:51:52 um did you have any view as to what guidance ought to be included in the revised gra 3.2 in relation to stairwell protection
02:52:02 well we we would like to have seen uh uh a procedure that had been accepted by nine fire and rescue services uh at least provided as an option
02:52:13 uh at least provided as an option um
02:52:14 um an optional approach did you propose that explicitly to mr cowab
02:52:20 i can't remember can you remember now and i'm mindful this is a decade ago yes can you remember now the gist of mr kaurup's
02:52:29 kaurup's response to incorporation the stairwell protection policy even as an alternative yes i i
02:52:38 yes i i i can't say that i remember putting that to him directly as an option um but it was something that we certainly agreed in kent in kent and and
02:52:51 certainly agreed in kent in kent and and the region that we would like to have seen it in some way written into the uh guidance
02:52:59 would it be fair to summarize matters this way that mr carp neither ruled it in nor ruled it out i think he ruled it out and
02:53:09 and you're clear that it was he expressly rejected it well to be fair mr cow wouldn't make that decision i think he would have taken it back to his own strategy group and that decision
02:53:21 own strategy group and that decision would have probably been made there but is your memory that his views were sufficiently negative
02:53:29 negative yes
02:53:30 yes thank you
02:53:32 did you discuss the evacuation element of the rice model with mr cowab um
02:53:40 um only from the point of view of rice that
02:53:45 that we explained certainly i remember talking to him about the training courses that we had run quite recently that uh um we'd use rice as a tactical
02:53:57 we'd use rice as a tactical uh decision maker tool and that it had great success and that
02:54:04 and that sometimes evacuation needs to be prioritized over intervention and what can you remember now what his response was to the lessons you'd learned in kent
02:54:15 learned in kent very response other than i think he was interested he didn't he didn't say no to rice
02:54:25 to rice because it wasn't at conflict with any procedural approaches did you encourage gra 3.2 to include for example um more advice on the various
02:54:37 example um more advice on the various means by which high-rise residential buildings might be evacuated if the need arose
02:54:42 arose well
02:54:43 well you know
02:54:44 you know i think we always have to remember that the gra's are risk assessments that they don't provide procedure that they provide
02:54:52 provide guidance that you should follow in some way or other and
02:54:58 and you know i think the points we were making and he had copies of our procedures uh that the integrity of the stare was a prime concern for us
02:55:09 prime concern for us um it wasn't an afterthought it was right up front there now you also say that you discussed the concept of operational disc uh discretion with mr carp is that right
02:55:20 discretion with mr carp is that right and you also discuss fire survival guidance calls is that also right that's correct
02:55:25 correct mindful this was a decade ago yes can you remember now the gist of that element of the conversation yes i can it was um
02:55:33 was um an important part of the conversation because
02:55:36 because uh basically we'd never really heard of operational discretion it was something that was quite new at the time
02:55:44 the time there was no documented procedures there were research papers about it uh
02:55:50 uh operational discretion seemed to excite mr cowa um he saw it as a major part of the gra the
02:56:01 the revision
02:56:02 revision and
02:56:04 and we discussed operational discretion what it meant to firefighters and i think there was a general view in the room that
02:56:16 instead of having operational discretion for foreseeable events because that that to us was something that could be foreseen in many areas
02:56:28 in many areas um that you should have a procedure written for it um and not something that was almost a get out clause
02:56:42 now we have an email exchange between you mr cap from august 2011 so a few weeks before you met in september and we can find that at lfb trouble zero nine
02:56:53 nine double
02:56:55 double and if we could go to the bottom of page two of that email chain
02:57:02 we see it's the very end of that page this is the trigger email that you sent to him on the 25th of august 2011. it's timed at 12 58 and you say hello pete so presumably you
02:57:14 and you say hello pete so presumably you knew him well yes i'm hoping all is well with you and if we turn over the page
02:57:21 apologies for reading this out but it's probably helpful for the record if we gave the page
02:57:30 [Music]
02:57:36 you as you see i am now working for kent frs as part of the technical fire safety team i'm also responsible for delivering high-rise command training and sit on the
02:57:47 the kent fire rescue service in southeast regional high-rise tnf groups tnf task and finish thank you in fact i believe we have a representative meeting with you on september the 15th at surrey
02:58:00 with you on september the 15th at surrey hq
02:58:01 hq peter interest me to meet with you again not simply because it's been a while but because i'm particularly keen to generate greater awareness within our service and region of the benefits and developing risk-based approaches that
02:58:13 developing risk-based approaches that coordinate with the aims and objectives of the national revisions of the gra that i know you're leading on it is my view that we need to address and coordinate fire growth potential fire load with suppressive capacity and
02:58:25 load with suppressive capacity and resource limitations and this is a topic that generates current discussion of some interest in simple terms taking environmental or criminal influence out a flat fire is likely to be more approachable than a developing fire in a
02:58:37 approachable than a developing fire in a large and unprotected office space now can you explain what you mean here when you said we need to address and coordinate fire growth potential fire load with suppressive capacity and
02:58:49 load with suppressive capacity and resource limitations so
02:58:52 so at that time this was a partic particular topic in kent and me personally because i was doing a phd in in
02:59:03 in matching fire load with the amount of water that's used
02:59:08 and it was concerning that we were discharging the same amount of water or deploying the same amount of water into a
02:59:17 into a flat fire as we were an office open plan office fire and
02:59:22 and the rising mains were set up as well in design in in relation to they would provide the same amount of water whether it was for an office uh or or a flat and the fire loads and
02:59:34 uh or or a flat and the fire loads and the compartment sizes are obviously different thank you i'll just go on to say that at that time the
02:59:43 the regional approach to developing our procedure was also for offices
02:59:49 offices it was a generic procedure but that was later cancelled because it was going to take more time and the project itself overall had been cancelled so we finished with a flat procedure just flats now in the third paragraph from
03:00:02 flats now in the third paragraph from the end of that email you say this the concepts of fire containment are now becoming critical and building design and legislation is not following pace with the potential for exterior fire
03:00:13 with the potential for exterior fire spread
03:00:14 spread now can you again explain what you meant when you said when you use that phrase
03:00:21 so this was 2008
03:00:26 going back to 2009 when we discovered that there were elements of external walls that were combustible in kent and surely everywhere everywhere else probably that
03:00:37 that it was concern that in 2010 we had uh directed the main bulk of our training towards external wall fires um and
03:00:49 um and you know i think i'm making the point there that building designing legislation is not keeping up with it and that's that phrase speaks for itself in your view yeah now did you discuss
03:01:00 in your view yeah now did you discuss the risks of external fire spread with mr carp at the meeting in september yes
03:01:07 yes can you remember now the gist of what you said to him and what his response was to you the conversation would have been uh around our training course how we had
03:01:18 uh around our training course how we had trained
03:01:18 trained fire officers we'd identified a risk we trained fire officers in the risk
03:01:26 we would like that to go in the gra um
03:01:29 um that would be the gist i can't remember his response when you say that would have been that would be are you saying that's what you said well it's difficult again to recollect what i
03:01:42 it's difficult again to recollect what i said
03:01:43 said but
03:01:44 but the whole conversation and i do remember having a conversation saying that um
03:01:51 um we've identified a problem that
03:01:55 that we've trained our officers in the problem
03:01:58 problem and that we were now training our firefighters in the problem and that uh you know something should be included in the gra
03:02:07 the gra thank you and the files you had in mind were those between i think pages 21 and 32 of the slideshow presentation yes you provided yes you mentioned there and training
03:02:19 you mentioned there and training provided to firefighters as opposed to instant commanders what was the substance of that training so as soon as we'd completed the two-year training of
03:02:30 two-year training of level one to four officers we uh decided on the strategy group that firefighters were the most important sort of part of the jigsaw that they
03:02:43 sort of part of the jigsaw that they should also be aware of uh procedures so we
03:02:47 we or i undertook training of most of our whole time fire stations between
03:02:56 between 2011 and 2015.
03:03:01 and really it's training on what to look out for and how to respond well the fact that external wall fires exist particularly in certain areas of the county
03:03:12 county that
03:03:14 that pictures same as as we saw there that was shared with firefighters and that you know rice becomes even more important when you think about evacuating occupants before we intervene
03:03:27 evacuating occupants before we intervene uh was any uh training given on different types of construction materials uh for firefighters to look out for i'm obviously thinking of clouding the same
03:03:38 obviously thinking of clouding the same presentation uh that you you've put on there
03:03:41 there was uh briefed down to uh i think it was a three-hour seminar which uh firefighters would have and that those slides were discussed uh
03:03:53 that those slides were discussed uh different types of wall construction with cavity wall cavities and range screens and underneath insulation to be fair we were never aware of anything like uh
03:04:08 we were never aware of anything like uh acm at that time but the slide you're thinking of is the one i think that was at page 18 of the slideshow which i took you two earlier on yes was headed cladding yes
03:04:19 and going back on an answer you gave evacuation was something on which not only instant commanders but also firefighters were
03:04:30 commanders but also firefighters were trained at kent is that right integrity of the stairwell an evacuation may become a priority thank you can we go back to this email chain and if we go back to page two in that email
03:04:41 if we go back to page two in that email chain we find mr carrup's response on the 26th of august right so the day after you sent the email it says paul thanks for your note
03:04:52 for your note i'm sure that you'll appreciate that the gra is a risk assessment rather than an operating procedure or training document so i would not anticipate that it will go into the detail of what you do or how you fight a high-rise fire
03:05:05 you fight a high-rise fire rather its focus will be on identifying all relevant hazards at such instance and outlining possible control measures it is then for each frs to undertake their own service specific risk
03:05:16 their own service specific risk assessment as a basis for that operational procedure and consequent training materials intervention no doubt these are issues we will discuss further in due course and then if we go to page one in this chain
03:05:30 you responded the same day nearly 20 minutes later thus
03:05:38 thus morning pete thanks for your response most certainly i fully appreciate the document is a risk assessment that offers guidance in identifying and dealing with typical hazards and implementing control measures however
03:05:49 implementing control measures however perhaps my case was poorly placed but in short i am suggesting that control measures vary according to fire involved compartment size and perhaps this might be considered in the gra
03:06:00 be considered in the gra the issue we're having in the southeast region that has caused some debate is that our procedure is time dependent that is it causes some delay while sufficient control measures are placed
03:06:11 sufficient control measures are placed this means that if we are dealing with a flat fire the likelihood is that it will not spread beyond the average 70 square meters compartment 60 minute box and therefore we can deploy
03:06:22 box and therefore we can deploy sufficient water to deal using a single attack hose line with safety lines and support
03:06:27 support if however we are dealing with a larger commercial compartments in high-rise the same procedural approach may allow fire to develop during the time we are setting up additional safety lines and yet we are still only going to deploy
03:06:38 yet we are still only going to deploy one attack line initially in such a case an earlier intervention may actually reduce the danger to firefighters where the fire size is smaller or more importantly vice versa
03:06:50 importantly vice versa our procedure does not acknowledge this fact so i'm wondering if you are planning to mention or identify the relation between prompt intervention and limitations or suppressive capacity of single attack hose lines
03:07:02 single attack hose lines now that's a long email but would it be accurate to say that what you're suggesting here is the operational response to a single compartment fire and a residential high rise may need to be different from the operational
03:07:13 be different from the operational response to a fire in a larger compartment for example in a commercial high-rise building that's correct and that is because you might expect fire spread to be better contained in the single compartment in a residential
03:07:25 the single compartment in a residential high-rise building that's what one would expect
03:07:32 can i now turn to the separate question of smoke hoods and smoke curtains which we touched on earlier on
03:07:40 the inquiry understands that since grenfell
03:07:43 grenfell kent has started using smoke hoods and smoke curtains as part of his operational response to high-rise fires is that right yes now in relation to hoods is it correct that these hoods are
03:07:54 is it correct that these hoods are intended to be used by members of the public who are being evacuated or assisted to evacuate correct and they provide a certain period of protection from noxious fumes and smoke
03:08:05 protection from noxious fumes and smoke yes
03:08:06 yes how long is the protection that's provided 15 minutes can you briefly explain for us how the hoods are used so uh the hoods are
03:08:18 so uh the hoods are basically just worn over the head and tightened up
03:08:24 they can breathe through a filter but the filter will only give protection for 15 minutes how effective have you found these hoods be in practice assuming they've been deployed
03:08:35 deployed they've been deployed several times i don't have the data on that
03:08:43 the firefighters
03:08:46 you know are really happy with them because they can take people through smoke laden areas
03:08:53 areas uh knowing that the persons aren't going to be harmed now if i can turn briefly to smoke curtains um how effective have you found them to be in practice where they've been deployed
03:09:04 been deployed again uh similar experiences feedback coming weekly almost from the use of of smoke curtains
03:09:13 curtains uh restricts the spread of smoke uh throughout the building for a good effect thank you dr grimwood sir i've come to the end of
03:09:24 dr grimwood sir i've come to the end of my prepared questions um just before lunch
03:09:29 lunch i'm in your hand sir as to how you wish to handle it clearly i'd be grateful for an opportunity to review um any further questions that may be required or to consider any further questions that are proposed
03:09:42 questions that are proposed might i ask you to rise until say quarter past two which gives people the opportunity to eat something and also to consider what further questions need would they would like to suggest well dr dr grimm would at this stage of
03:09:54 well dr dr grimm would at this stage of the proceedings we we need to have a break partly to enable council here to check that he hasn't left anything out that he ought to have asked you and also to allow the people who are not here but
03:10:05 to allow the people who are not here but who are
03:10:06 who are following the proceedings to suggest other questions that perhaps we should put to you um i imagine you had planned to be here for the whole of the day the entire day so
03:10:18 the whole of the day the entire day so yeah right well in that case i think it might be convenient if we uh stop now for lunch and
03:10:26 and to give council a chance to have lunch and consider the questions i think we will break as mr kinnear has suggested until quarter past two slightly longer than
03:10:37 quarter past two slightly longer than usual but there are things to be done in that time
03:10:40 that time and then at quarter past two we'll come back and see whether there are any more questions that we need to ask you thank you sir that's right that's fine and again while you're out of the room please don't talk to anyone about your evidence absolutely anything relating to
03:10:52 evidence absolutely anything relating to it
03:10:53 it all right thank you sir right would you like to give the usher then please
03:11:17 so
03:11:24 right mr well quarter past two ought to give enough time for various things that need to be done one would hope thank you thank you 215 please
03:11:46 you