London Fire Brigade Evidence - Thursday 18th November 2021 (1/2)

Full transcript

00:00:25 uh

00:00:31 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing

00:00:34 hearing today we're going to begin by hearing further evidence from mr tom george formerly of the london fire brigade so i'll ask mr george to come back in please

00:00:51 [Music]

00:00:58 good morning mr george good morning sir we're ready to embark on another round of questioning yes good thank you very much

00:01:05 much yes mr clear thanks sir good morning mr george good morning when we broke yesterday afternoon we were discussing the recommendations that ac smith had included in his report and i'd like to continue asking you questions about that

00:01:16 continue asking you questions about that this morning now for that can we go to recommendation 6 in ac smith's report which can be found at lfb three two 00328 two five four slash three

00:01:34 and we can see recommendation six at the very bottom of the page there and it says this further training is provided to all personnel with a role in the ord process to ensure they have the skills

00:01:45 process to ensure they have the skills to meet the competencies required and if we just look at the paragraph immediately above that recommendation it says this during the development of the service standard and recent incidents a number

00:01:57 standard and recent incidents a number of existing ord entries have been examined

00:02:00 examined a number of substandard examples were found this could indicate a poor understanding of the rationale and a lack of competency based on the above list in recording relevant risk and tactical planning information at all

00:02:12 tactical planning information at all levels of the process and he says watch manager station manager barrow commander dac to what extent was the reference to substandard ord entries a matter of

00:02:24 substandard ord entries a matter of concern at the time and in particular following ac smith's report sorry just confirms not ac smith's report this is john elworth's report i think we're dealing with

00:02:38 apologies oh well sorry sorry

00:02:41 sorry uh

00:02:42 uh so i can just repeat the question then yes of course to what extent was the reference to substandard ord entries a cause for concern amongst senior officers

00:02:50 officers i don't think it had been um given to me as an as a regular issue but clearly john hellwell in his role as the lead for service standard seven uh was working uh significantly on this

00:03:03 uh was working uh significantly on this particular area so i would suggest it's probably something he may have picked up because he would have reviewed a significant number of uh ord entries and would you agree with him i suppose there's a general observation that he

00:03:14 there's a general observation that he made that

00:03:16 made that substandard ord could indicate a poor understanding of the rationale uh and a lack of competency in relation to ord entries yeah i think that's a fair uh summary of

00:03:27 summary of that position yet having seen what group manager elworld produced in his report did you agree with him that further training on ord was required yes i think ord is clearly an important

00:03:40 yes i think ord is clearly an important matter it's important that crews on their way to and an incident have the most up-to-date inaccurate and meaningful information that is known to the brigade about that particular premises and i think

00:03:51 particular premises and i think i don't recall any specific detailed training really being given to crews on the importance of the information that went

00:04:01 went onto the ord system and if i can give an example of other systems when the system for training evaluation and performance step was introduced i was one of the station

00:04:12 was introduced i was one of the station managers tasked with going two stations every single watch to

00:04:17 to have a session uh to talk through the the introduction of that new system i don't think we'd ever done that as an organization with ord and given it's important i felt something similar to that type of

00:04:28 something similar to that type of workshop or process would be would be achievable did you discuss the recommendation for training with mr brown

00:04:36 mr brown i put the recommendations to mr brown

00:04:41 and i think i summarized by saying that i agreed with each of those recommendations and i think it was worthy of taking them forward yes and what was his response to you uh i believe initially it was an email response

00:04:52 initially it was an email response confirming that he felt the recommendations were useful but i got the impression it wasn't really what it what i was proposing was achieving the task that he'd given me i felt he

00:05:03 the task that he'd given me i felt he thought i think he was looking for something else did he recognize the importance of ensuring that crews were properly trained on

00:05:12 on how to gather the right information and then to complete the ord entries fully accurately and usefully i believe

00:05:20 i believe i believe so i think he probably put put more faith in the operational i think it's an option news mandatory training article that covered certainly 72 ds i believe and i

00:05:32 covered certainly 72 ds i believe and i think he was putting quite a lot of faith in that but i felt that that ops news article whilst it covered the importance of 72d visits it didn't necessarily cover

00:05:43 visits it didn't necessarily cover the inputting and the importance of what ultimately arrived at the mdt terminal an additional training was required to provide a more complete solution to the problem identified by mr ewell

00:05:55 problem identified by mr ewell i believe that was the best outcome yes can we now discuss the banding system uh that mr ewell had uh um sorry mr elwell elwell had raised sorry i now seem to have a mental block with

00:06:06 i now seem to have a mental block with his name for which it's my fault apologies um can we go to lfb treble zero three two eight double three which is your exhibit ptg fourteen

00:06:20 and if we can see from the email at the bottom of page nine in this chain

00:06:29 and we see it's an email sent on the 14th of december 2013 at 21.03 hours and that you sent a group manager l wells report to david brown uh with this comment in the final paragraph and i

00:06:41 comment in the final paragraph and i quote

00:06:42 quote you asked me to think about how we could improve on our 72d inspection program particularly for high-risk premises i believe john's report does exactly that and each recommendation should therefore be carefully considered in my

00:06:54 therefore be carefully considered in my opinion

00:06:55 opinion please let me know how you wish for this to be taken forward or i'll leave it to to you to raise that pmb unfortunately i'm not there on wednesday as i'm on leave rick is covering and we can see

00:07:07 leave rick is covering and we can see over the page that you list the recommendations of the report now just before we leave that can you help us pmb is it's excuse me the principal management board thank you now

00:07:18 principal management board thank you now mr brown responded in the email that we can see in the middle of page nine so if we go back one and he sent that email on the 16th of december so roughly two days after yours in the center 12 58 hours and he says

00:07:31 in the center 12 58 hours and he says this this is interesting and helpful and i'm sure we can use some of john's recommendations however it doesn't feel to me that any of the recommendations actually deals with the requirement to create an inspection regime targeted at

00:07:42 create an inspection regime targeted at high priority buildings or am i missing something

00:07:46 something now did you agree with mr brown that the recommendation did not actually address the action which was to create an inspection regime targeted at high priority buildings i felt that the recommendations would

00:07:59 i felt that the recommendations would improve

00:08:01 improve uh the process considerably and i i think i felt the inspection regime would kind of fall out of that but

00:08:10 but to be fair to mr brown he had been dealing with the actional uh the sort of lacking or house actions since uh they commenced he'd sat on the lake in our house board which i didn't

00:08:21 lake in our house board which i didn't so i kind of felt he probably had a better understanding of what the coroner maybe was looking for and he would have had conversations with the commissioner ron dobson that i wouldn't have had so i

00:08:32 so i you know i went with what he was saying the impression rising out of the el well report and your own consideration of it is that both you mr elwell saw it as a more complex mosaic-like

00:08:45 more complex mosaic-like feature in sorting out ord entries and their quality compared to mr brown who may well have taken a slightly more binary or simplistic approach what would be your response to that observation

00:08:57 be your response to that observation i think i was looking to as i said yesterday i was always looking to improve on the quality of things that we did and the ord entries would be something that

00:09:08 the ord entries would be something that you know i would include in that thank you if we can um look at your response to mr brown which can be found at the bottom of page eight on this chain so we can go back on again

00:09:19 and see your email at 1344 there at the bottom of the page you said this my view is the publication of the revised pn800 and ss7 so the service

00:09:30 revised pn800 and ss7 so the service standard seven of the 11 surface standards it is the closest to completion go hand in hand with the creation of an inspection program the policy needs to define what a high

00:09:42 the policy needs to define what a high priority building is with the required frequency for inspections and then the inspection program would fall out of that

00:09:49 that whilst i've made suggestions to andy bell on amendments to the policy i'm not sure how far away from finalizing we are some of john's recommendations that mr elwell

00:09:59 elwell could be implemented now others to be considered as more aspirational now you'd suggested amendments to andy bell to the policy just to be clear that policy was pn800

00:10:10 just to be clear that policy was pn800 is that right yes can you help us now what was the gist of the amendments that you proposed to mr bell i can't remember to be honest i know

00:10:20 know i believe i'd seen john elwell had also made some comments or tracked changes to a draft policy of pn800 at that time

00:10:31 policy of pn800 at that time uh it may have been in around that kind of time i don't remember specifically what i said okay can you remember now whether they were implemented in the sense that they were incorporated within the final revised version of pn800

00:10:44 the final revised version of pn800 not specifically no i'd be surprised if the comments i'm sure would have been taken into account now

00:10:51 now which of group manager always recommendations did you think could be implemented now to use the language you use in that email uh of the eight recommendations

00:11:02 of the eight recommendations without actually seeing them it would be difficult to tell you exactly which one i felt could be a quick win and which ones would be more longer term if you like would you like to go back to the recommendations it might be helpful they'd be useful lfb

00:11:15 might be helpful they'd be useful lfb trouble zero three two eight two five and i think they start at page two we shall soon find out

00:11:28 in fact they do so if we look at this top we have recommendation one the review of 800.

00:11:43 i think recommendation one is a statement that i would certainly agree with i think that was taking place really anyway number two

00:11:55 uh i agree as we spoke about recommendation to yesterday and i think three as well these were about face-to-face workshops so i think um

00:12:05 um yes they could have been done fairly quickly because all of those meeting types

00:12:09 types as we said yesterday were already taking place

00:12:12 place the

00:12:14 the improvements to ord was not an agenda item at those meetings and that may have been one way of doing it but there were other avenues as well as these one-to-one meetings or group meetings there were uh back to basics training

00:12:27 there were uh back to basics training which at that time was taking place every year over a number days for all crews

00:12:31 crews there were station manager forums in each area i think there were monthly or every couple of months where all of the station managers from one of the four areas would meet with the area dac usually and that was

00:12:42 with the area dac usually and that was an option for training there there were baro commander communication sessions which dave brown chaired with all the borough commanders of the organization so as well as these meetings there were a number of other platforms

00:12:54 platforms that john and i felt uh this workshop or this subject could be dealt with thank you and if we scroll down the page i think recommendations four and five are

00:13:03 five are on this page i just want to take this briefly uh recommendation for feasibility study that again seems to be something that could be initiated it could be i felt it

00:13:14 could be initiated it could be i felt it could be initiated fairly quickly uh it was not a quick fix this one that was probably a project that would take a bit longer to

00:13:22 longer to complete

00:13:23 complete because of the need to consider how the various

00:13:26 various data sets could be synchronized if that were possible technologically correct and it was a project that when i was director we i later commenced which is called the operational risk information

00:13:37 called the operational risk information project that between dan daly and andy rowe when he was ac for fire stations uh was a project that commenced thank you and if we can turn over the page and look at five and six briefly

00:13:48 look at five and six briefly again a review could be initiated fairly timelessly couldn't it yes and if we scroll down looking at recommendation six

00:13:55 six again

00:13:56 again uh similar to two and three thank you and if we turn over the page just for a second completeness seven

00:14:04 seven considering redefining kpis again that's not a time consuming process it's not without its complexities but it could be initiated that's correct and if we scroll further down eight

00:14:18 well i agree with that statement and yes that was kind of yes thank you now if we go back to um your email um which we were looking at just uh to

00:14:30 um which we were looking at just uh to give you the reference again lfb trouble zero three two eight double three four slash eight and at the bottom of the page

00:14:36 page thank you um which of having refreshed your memory which of mr elwell's recommendations um did you think were on the more aspirational end of the spectrum

00:14:49 i suppose the looking at the systems uh to integrate and pull information from more than just 72d inspections that i knew was going to be uh

00:15:00 be uh more aspirational i suppose essentially for the technical technological difficulties yes and i suppose the other recommendation of looking at um disparity of risk across the different localities of london thank you now in

00:15:13 localities of london thank you now in your first statement of paragraph 73 which can be found at lfb trouble zero three two eight two three four nineteen

00:15:24 uh you say this in december 2013 i suggested to the third officer mr brown that each recommendation be carefully considered i felt that implementing them would fully discharge action 18b

00:15:36 would fully discharge action 18b and significantly improve the process used to collate and share operational risk information and you go on to paraphrase the email that we

00:15:45 that we just looked at which you sent on the 16th of december apart from the emails we've looked at now what additional discussions did you have with mr brown about the merits of

00:15:57 have with mr brown about the merits of the recommendations and secondly how swiftly they could be implemented i think

00:16:03 i think following his email i believe we had it was a period of a couple of weeks over that period we spoke and i think we probably even met to discuss the recommendations to be

00:16:14 to discuss the recommendations to be honest i can't re recall the detail of that it was quite some time ago as you know

00:16:19 know um

00:16:20 um but he certainly suggested to me and gave me more direction i think on what he envisaged as would be sufficient to close off the action

00:16:29 action did you tell mr brown at the time that you thought implementing the recommendations would essentially discharge action 18b well i think i reinforced what i'd put in in writing in the email

00:16:41 in in writing in the email and suggested that i felt that by carrying out those actions i saw those recommendations that the

00:16:48 that the improve knowledge that crews and all those responsible in the ord process would have would by by their very nature lead to um a prioritization of the premises that

00:17:01 a prioritization of the premises that crews would visit in his evidence earlier in october mr brown said that his view of some of the recommendations was either they were being dealt with already

00:17:12 already they're about to be dealt with or they wouldn't work in reality did mr brown effectively relay that view to you when you were discussing these matters with him

00:17:23 matters with him i don't believe so i think we more spoke about what he was expecting and his expectation that your work would essentially work towards him and his expectations

00:17:34 expectations he made it clear that i think he was expecting some form of list of different types of premises so something slightly simplistic yes compared to the l world recommendations yes

00:17:47 yes could we go back to the email chain and apologies for jumping around lfb trouble zero three two eight double three forward slash eight and we can see um the email in the

00:17:59 and we can see um the email in the middle of the page is an email you sent on the 22nd of january 2014 at 08 to 12 hours

00:18:06 hours um

00:18:08 um what you say here is this apologies for the delay on this i was hoping to send this to you yesterday but then had the eight pf so pump fire please see attached i'm really not sure

00:18:19 please see attached i'm really not sure if this is the type of thing you're after but can you please have a look and let me know your thoughts and where you'd like further work to focus now we can look at that attachment which is a lsb trouble00838

00:18:37 there we go and if we can look at page two

00:18:47 thank you and we've got um a list of property types the preceding paragraph says this pn800 does not include a method for for prioritizing types of premises to be visited and whilst the system adopted it

00:18:59 visited and whilst the system adopted it needs to be flexible a list of types of property in a priority order would be deemed to be helpful the list below is not exhaustive and we see the list of 12 11 types of properties here coma is the uh control

00:19:12 properties here coma is the uh control of major accident hazard sites for those who are not aware now had dave brown asked you to produce such a priority list of building types in your discussions following the l world recommendations yes i think he

00:19:24 world recommendations yes i think he made it clear that he was expecting some kind of list and i think this was my first stab at that list and

00:19:32 was it express or was it implicit that essentially no further work was to be done in implementing the el well recommendations that he wanted you to focus on this uh i did no more work at that time on

00:19:44 uh i did no more work at that time on the overall recommendations i left that with dave brown and my focus was moved on to the list and following this first step then working with the other area dax on

00:19:55 with the other area dax on finalizing this list thank you if we go back to the email chain which is lfb trouble zero three two eight double three four seven

00:20:08 and we see

00:20:10 at the very bottom of the page an email from mr brown uh sent to the same day so the 22nd of january 2014 at 1949 hours um

00:20:21 um what he said was this in short the list is as below question mark can you assure that we make hmos so how's the multiple occupation clear in it and also share with the other dax for

00:20:33 and also share with the other dax for comment please and if we go to the top of the next page to page 8

00:20:40 he copied cut and paste the 11 properties that you had identified in your note now

00:20:48 now if we can go now to lfb trouble0042294

00:20:58 this is an email that you sent shortly afterwards at eight to twenty zero seven hours on the 22nd of january to an address described as fcs ops and

00:21:11 to an address described as fcs ops and mobilizing first of all to whom was the email sent that would be the mailbox for the four area dacs and i think the dac that worked in central

00:21:22 think the dac that worked in central operations now your email say said this and i'm looking at the second paragraph onwards i sent an email to dave this morning as you can see below along with the attach

00:21:33 you can see below along with the attach from his response it is clear he literally only wants a priority list of property types and has asked me to run the list below past you and has asked for your comments to me please he is

00:21:44 for your comments to me please he is asked to include hmos which i will do this is likely to come up in pmb tomorrow

00:21:50 tomorrow i'm sure that you like me will have real reservations about taking such a simplistic approach we will all have differing opinions on premises

00:22:00 premises we feel should be visited and risk scored and the way we prioritize them i hope my short attached summary puts my overall thoughts on the subject into some sort of context

00:22:12 some sort of context first of all what were your reservations about the proposed simplistic approach i think it would be very difficult certainly in central london stations to work through

00:22:25 to work through a simple list of premises uh and the promise i suppose my risk my fear was that the premises towards the end of that list would probably never get visited because

00:22:36 would probably never get visited because like say in central london the complexities of and the number of premises that were in the higher levels of the list would occupy all available time of those crews

00:22:48 all available time of those crews did the colleagues to whom you sent this email share your reservations about the simplistic approach yes i think they did and how did they communicate those to you was it in oral conversations or was there email correspondence there may have been some

00:23:00 correspondence there may have been some emails but we spoke regularly more than once daily usually the four of us were a very close group can you remember now did this uh approach

00:23:11 approach was it raised at pmb the day after i can't remember if it was raised the day after it was certainly raised it went between the four of us the aerodacts we tweaked this

00:23:22 we tweaked this we put the list of 11 premises expanded i think there was a few more and then between us as a group we banded them into groups one two and three as priority banding lists if you like

00:23:35 as priority banding lists if you like would mr brown have been ordinarily at pmb

00:23:38 pmb uh he chaired pmb did you and your colleagues say to him listen we have reservations about this simplistic approach i relayed a conversation to him that i'd had with my borough commander for

00:23:49 had with my borough commander for westminster because

00:23:52 because i'd shared with my prior commanders the tasks that i've been given uh and the work we were doing in fact one of the borrower recommenders as you know was john elworth so my bar commanders knew i was doing this bit of

00:24:03 commanders knew i was doing this bit of piece of work and uh daryl stroud my borrower commander for westminster and i had a long conversation about how it's going to be very very difficult for him to ensure his crews within

00:24:14 for him to ensure his crews within westminster we're going to be able to work through some kind of simplistic list and i certainly relayed that to mr brown and what was his response i can't recall specifically

00:24:25 i can't recall specifically um

00:24:26 um but i i think he he felt it the list

00:24:31 the list in this simplistic form would be what was needed to clear if you want for a better word a better word clear the action from the coroner

00:24:41 coroner now if we go back to the email chain we've been looking at lfb trouble zero three two eight double three forward slash six

00:24:56 now you replied to mr brown on the 28th of january 14 24 hours with the writing in red it's occasionally quite difficult to read

00:25:07 read being added by mr brown i think is that right that's correct the opening paragraph your email said this

00:25:14 this further to your response we have now discussed this as a group and expanded on the list of properties and discussed how the visits would be prioritized to ensure that local managers have an element of flexibility we would propose

00:25:25 element of flexibility we would propose banding the types of premises into three separate bands and c c list and bands below

00:25:32 below mr brown noted good band one

00:25:36 band one these properties will probably have already been visited and will probably already be on the ord and two

00:25:44 and two some of these properties are likely to have already been visited and some may already be on the ord band three these properties are unlikely to have been visited risk scored and are

00:25:55 to have been visited risk scored and are unlikely to be on the ord the proposal from the dacs is that properties within bandwagon are to be visited and risk scored in line with pn 800 first

00:26:05 800 first only when these visits are complete should properties from band 2 be visited and visits to band 3 properties will only commence after band 2 is complete even with adopting a band system there

00:26:17 even with adopting a band system there would still need to be an element of flexibility where it can be justified mr brown inserted the word agreed for example visits to farms is shown in band 3 however there are many types of

00:26:29 band 3 however there are many types of farm ranging from strawberry picking to major processing operations with grain silos etc

00:26:35 silos etc the local watch manager would be empowered to make the decision on visiting a property outside of the band system where their local knowledge of the risks warranted although the station manager will have the right of veto

00:26:47 manager will have the right of veto as to whether it finds its way onto the ord

00:26:50 ord similarly where a property has had previous fires we may require the property details and a tactical plan to be recorded on the ord

00:27:00 was this updated more calibrated approach one with which you were content or did you still have lingering concerns about the substance of the approach

00:27:13 the substance of the approach um i think it certainly was more what dave brown was looking for but if you're asking if i had reservations as to how effective it would be yes i did and did and as did the other three area attacks and the

00:27:25 the other three area attacks and the principal reservations were those you've already discussed and identified for the panel

00:27:29 panel that's correct and also that um all of the areas that myself and john elworth were trying to rectify in terms of the knowledge understanding and use of the ord system uh weren't being covered

00:27:41 the ord system uh weren't being covered here

00:27:42 here now can we go to your first statement which is lfb trouble zero three two eight two three forward slash 20 and paragraph 75 and 76

00:27:55 now what you say there is this 75 following our analysis of policy but mainly based on our professional experience and judgment we drew up a banding system that we felt might meet

00:28:06 banding system that we felt might meet that we felt met the aim of action 18b to create an inspection regime targeted at high priority buildings 76

00:28:15 76 the dax proposal was that properties within band 1 were to be visited and risk scored in line with p n 800 first only when these visits were complete should properties from band 2 be visited

00:28:26 should properties from band 2 be visited and visits to ban three properties would only commence after bound two was complete

00:28:31 complete officers also felt that there still need to be an element of flexibility where it could be justified whilst the banding system was intended to complete the lachlan action i along with my area dac colleagues were not

00:28:43 with my area dac colleagues were not convinced it was entirely achievable express this reservation to the third officer

00:28:48 officer and if we can take a fullness for your evidence on this point go to your second statement

00:28:53 statement which can be found at lfb 0083 83

00:28:57 0083 83 8 4

00:28:59 8 4 19 and paragraph 74.

00:29:05 it's at the bottom of this page and you say this

00:29:08 say this i express my reservations with that the review was quantitative quantitative not qualitative in conversations with third officer ac brown between december 2013 and may 2013

00:29:20 brown between december 2013 and may 2013 our discussions took place in one-to-one meetings and in the principal management board meetings i expressed that i did not think that creating a highly prescriptive inspection regime targeted

00:29:31 prescriptive inspection regime targeted high priority buildings that fall within a banding system would be achievable and it would be virtually impossible for crews to visit and undertaking meaningful inspection such a significant number of premises

00:29:43 number of premises especially for inner london stations

00:29:47 what was the essence of your concern about the review being quantitative rather than qualitative as i said before i was always one to look at the quality of

00:29:59 always one to look at the quality of what we did and i felt that the recommendations that john presented to me and that i concurred with and presented to dave brown i think they would have significantly improved the quality of ord entries um

00:30:12 ord entries um but dave felt that the that recommendation by itself did not meet the

00:30:18 the action from the coroner and i had to go with dave brown's view on that as i've said he he had been involved in the lacking house board um since his commencement i hadn't and uh so which is why we

00:30:31 and uh so which is why we went down the route we did now when mr brown gave evidence in october he said that he had no recollection of reservations being expressed by you

00:30:42 expressed by you or any other dac can you remember what was mr brown's response to

00:30:49 to the banding system as you proposed

00:30:53 and any reservations you expressed to on the back i i certainly remember relaying the conversation i'd had with dale stroud the bar commander for westminster around how inner london stations could

00:31:05 around how inner london stations could be expected to undertake and carry out the numb the sheer volume of meaningful 72d visits given they were the busiest of our stations as well and all the other activities that we were

00:31:17 all the other activities that we were expecting our crews to perform um i can't recall exactly how that conversation went if i'm honest and what his response was mr george can you just help me with this

00:31:28 mr george can you just help me with this there's obviously a distinction between the quality of the if you like the 72d visit and the information you obtained from it and the selection of the premises which

00:31:40 and the selection of the premises which you visit

00:31:41 you visit how was the selection of the premises carried out there was a huge amount this has been something ongoing it was very difficult for the brigade certainly

00:31:52 very difficult for the brigade certainly in terms of high-rise to even know the numbers

00:31:56 numbers of high-rise residential buildings in london but we did put an awful lot of faith in our local crews uh who did know their stations grounds and their local communities well that

00:32:07 and their local communities well that was that's a well-known world a thing that crews have done well and they still do to this day i'm sure so we left it in the large down to the watch managers

00:32:18 in the large down to the watch managers and station managers at stations to select

00:32:21 select which premises were and weren't visited based on risk and that stems back to the days of when the inspections were one one d inspections before seven two ds came out

00:32:33 inspections before seven two ds came out but i think what dave was looking for and what sounds like what the coroner was looking for was some means of uh giving

00:32:40 giving watch managers are steer in uh and the prioritization order in which way they conduct those visits i mean within the inner london borough i'm just i mean if you take westminster as

00:32:51 just i mean if you take westminster as an example you've got a lot of schools you've got a lot of high-rise or some high-rise probably a lot of high-rise buildings you've got hospitals you've got probably

00:33:02 you've got probably many if not all of the types of premises which were in the list we were looking at a moment ago um

00:33:13 what was it left to effectively to station managers then to decide um in what order one visited which of those premises uh yes and also with the borough

00:33:24 uh yes and also with the borough commander so um

00:33:26 um just the sheer volume as you've just stated and the types of premises and some of those inner london stations uh and when there's a call to some of those premises so for instance saint mary's hospital just around the corner

00:33:38 mary's hospital just around the corner it would be more than just the crews from paddington that attend that it would be crews from probably soho and lambeth for instance as well so the borough commander could and quite often did

00:33:48 often did use the other borough crews to assist in carrying out that 72d visit as a way of bringing resources other resources into assist but you would always ideally want

00:33:59 assist but you would always ideally want your local crews to carry out those seven two d visits because well for obvious reasons you didn't want to be bringing in crews from you know much further afield other than those that

00:34:10 further afield other than those that would be on the typical uh predetermined attendance and i suppose one problem you might have is that

00:34:19 not all premises falling into one particular category would be of the same degree of risk and you might have a relatively lower risk hospital but a relatively high risk school

00:34:32 relatively high risk school yes is that part of the difficulty absolutely and you know within the complexities and of some of the buildings now and the fire engineered solutions that are in those buildings

00:34:43 buildings crews would also uh utilize the experience and skills of fire safety officers and sometimes fire engineers so it was conducting the visits jointly uh as well so it was

00:34:54 the visits jointly uh as well so it was it certainly was a challenge thank you very much thank you yes i'm staying on the page which is on the screen looking at paragraph 75 you said this i would like to draw the gti's

00:35:05 this i would like to draw the gti's attention to the fact that the banding system was never incorporated into lfb policy and i was never asked to provide details the third officer of how stations were performing in this area

00:35:16 stations were performing in this area now by that do you mean that the banding system was not incorporated into policy 800

00:35:22 800 or any other policy correct

00:35:26 do you know why it was never included in policy

00:35:29 policy no i felt it strange if it was

00:35:33 effectively a policy because the communication had gone out from the director of operations to all station-based staff instructing them that this was a new means of carrying out

00:35:44 means of carrying out a prioritization of the seven two visits 2d visits they would perform um

00:35:51 um and i think crews would see that as a policy decision so it was a surprise to me that it didn't feature in any policy particularly pn800 did you ask why

00:36:02 did you ask why um

00:36:02 um i think pn800 at the time was being reviewed so i think it was an assumption i made probably that it would feature in the new pn800 um when it wasn't did you say

00:36:12 say what's going on um

00:36:15 um i can't recall whether i actually did or didn't

00:36:19 didn't when mr brown gave evidence in october even though the banding system was obviously not incorporated into pn800 or indeed any other policy he said it was still policy in inverted

00:36:31 he said it was still policy in inverted commas

00:36:32 commas in the sense that it was guidance that crews were expected to follow um what would be your response to that

00:36:42 um

00:36:46 i think unhelpfully often policy or changes to policy was often sent out to cruz by email which i didn't personally think was

00:36:57 which i didn't personally think was the best way of doing things if it was a change a significant change which this was

00:37:02 was i feel it should have been in policy in order to convey the message so people understood why they were being asked to do what they were being asked to do yes because and also because people would miss emails you know sometimes if a

00:37:15 miss emails you know sometimes if a firefighter or a junior officer on the station had been on leave or away for any

00:37:19 any length of time it would be all too easy to come back from a period of absence and miss the odd email whereas if it's in policy it's in policy and how would the policy or a change in

00:37:30 and how would the policy or a change in policy be communicated or should be communicated in your view there was on the brigades intranet site which was called hotwire there was a section for changed amended

00:37:42 there was a section for changed amended and updated new policies uh i think in the monthly

00:37:48 shout out it was called shout it was a news article for newsworthy items i think it featured in there any new or changed policies there were there were and there's a station circulation folder as well um the staff would be

00:38:00 um the staff would be if you'd been away you could come back and you could come to the station look through the circulation folder and it would generally have any anything of note that uh certainly what officers certainly and firefighters to a

00:38:12 officers certainly and firefighters to a point would need to be aware of and they could go to that to what extent was the banding principle being applied in practice by cruz uh so it was communicated out three or

00:38:24 uh so it was communicated out three or four months after um

00:38:27 um my draft to dave brown in april or may

00:38:34 and then i

00:38:37 uh i think i liaised with my borough commanders we spoke at area management meetings

00:38:42 meetings and i did

00:38:44 and i did suggest i made it clear to them that they needed to be monitoring it to make sure crews were complying with it and dave brown had been very clear with the 4-0 dax that he was expecting to see

00:38:55 the 4-0 dax that he was expecting to see an increase in the number of ord entries on the system and because i've been given the lead for working on this particular action i was working with colleagues in my area support team

00:39:06 support team who in turn were working with colleagues in the information management team to try and

00:39:11 try and introduce developer an it-based system that we could very easily monitor the improved month-on-month increase in the number of rd entries and

00:39:21 and was the development did it culminate in a an id solution that allowed you to monitor

00:39:26 monitor ord entries effectively i think we did get there in the end yes did mr brown ever ask you for uh a briefing on how effective this new

00:39:37 briefing on how effective this new system was proving in practice no did you ever seek to provide him with an update so he knew what was going on on the ground at least within your area i don't believe uh we discussed it again

00:39:50 i don't believe uh we discussed it again were you chased by anyone as to how effective this new banding approach was no

00:39:57 no um could we go to an email between you and kerry adams it's a chain which starts in may 2014 and we can find that at lfb double zero one two three zero

00:40:08 at lfb double zero one two three zero one zero

00:40:10 one zero am i right understanding that kerry adams was an area support team leader in the southwest area yes now if we can go to the foot of page

00:40:21 now if we can go to the foot of page three of this chain and really i want to look at what flows between pages three and five

00:40:28 and we can see here the uh the bottom as the first challenge first email in the chain was an instruction to all crews about the prioritization bands that were sent on dave brown's behalf on the 24th

00:40:41 sent on dave brown's behalf on the 24th of may 2014 is that correct reading of that email yes and if we look at the next email up in the chain which can be found at the very bottom of page two

00:40:57 is from you

00:40:59 from you to your south west group borough managers are those borough commanders by another

00:41:04 another name

00:41:05 name uh group manager was the rank uh and uh a bar commander will be a role um within that rank structure yes now the substance of your email is on

00:41:16 now the substance of your email is on page three and if we go to that i mean you say this in the second and third paragraphs of that email please ensure your station managers meet with the watch managers to put some

00:41:28 with the watch managers to put some structure and timetable to future inspections although the third officer has not set a time scale we will be monitoring the number of premises recorded on the ord would

00:41:39 premises recorded on the ord would expect to see a month on month increase did your borough commanders in fact set a structure and timetable for the implementation of this new approach oh yes i believe they did yes

00:41:50 yes i believe they did yes can you help us what was in essence the uh the detail of that structure uh it was to sit down with the watch managers there was a monthly or bi-monthly uh meeting of the four watch managers and the station manager

00:42:02 managers and the station manager and between the management team for that particular station i expected them to look at the new priority in the banding system and agree amongst the four different watch managers

00:42:14 different watch managers who was going to be doing what effectively thank you now if we can go to the next email up in the chain which we can find at midway on page two

00:42:25 and it's an email we can see that you sent to kerry adams on the 25th of may 2014 and you said this kerry with regards to my last paragraph is there a report you can already run

00:42:36 is there a report you can already run that shows the number of premises recorded on the ord per borough if so can you forward me the details once per month to include previous months also now is it correct that this was your

00:42:48 now is it correct that this was your attempt at monitoring the extent to which stations in your area were inspecting high risk premises on a more routine basis

00:42:57 basis yes

00:42:59 yes if we look at the next email up in the chain and it starts at the foot of page one and goes over to page two

00:43:09 email you've sent on the 12th of september and it seems to be you chasing carrie adams for a response and you say this kerry i haven't received anything from you all the teams since i sent this is there an

00:43:21 the teams since i sent this is there an issue in getting this info i would like to know how many ord entries were recorded for each station prior to this message then an updated list month on month since thanks

00:43:33 month since thanks and if we go apologies following through these email chains mr george but if we go to the next email and the thread which is the middle email on page one and it's kerry adams forwarding your

00:43:45 and it's kerry adams forwarding your email to ian dempsey you're not copied into it and asking him to provide you with an update who is ian dempsey she was uh sorry he was deputy to carry thank you

00:43:56 thank you and we can see from his um um

00:44:00 um can you help us why

00:44:02 why mr dempsey was the ideal person to provide you with the information you thought ian was very good with systems

00:44:10 systems and interrogating brigade systems to extract data for me as the area dac this wasn't within his gift really because it was i think i understood it to get the information i wanted

00:44:22 to get the information i wanted would be a report that information management centrally would have to create

00:44:27 create and manipulate the system to be able to get that information out now if we go to the very top email in this chain it's the top of page one is mr dempsey's response to you

00:44:40 is mr dempsey's response to you and he said this uh tom paul edie from i am so that's information management presumably yes has sent me august data from a new report that has been set up on station

00:44:51 report that has been set up on station diary the report is entitled premises risk assessments this new pra process has been in effect from april and the data from the completed forms has been placed on this

00:45:02 completed forms has been placed on this database the sw so southwest area support team don't currently have access to this report on station diary but paul said we can be granted access

00:45:13 but paul said we can be granted access if we need it is this the information you are after now we haven't been able to find a response which doesn't mean there wasn't one

00:45:23 one were you in fact provided with a report which answered your request so i don't think this particularly was what really what i was after that's not saying it wouldn't be helpful

00:45:34 that's not saying it wouldn't be helpful um but i believe i spoke to him and ian sat just outside my office when i was based at hammersmith and i think i i spoke to me on a regular basis about different reports and systems and i think i explained it more

00:45:46 systems and i think i explained it more clearly maybe not an email of what i wanted and i think he worked then with paul ledy and i am to make that happen thank you

00:45:53 thank you do you know if any other form of monitoring was carried out in the other areas of the lfb's operations so southeast north west and northeast oh yes yeah abso because i had been given the task of

00:46:05 because i had been given the task of working on 18b um

00:46:08 um i saw it as my role really to follow that through get the report built that we wanted and certainly that would have been shared with the other three area decks thank you um

00:46:17 um mr george um with final apologies for uh confusing ac smith with uh group manager elwell um that concludes my questions my prepared questions and sir may i ask for

00:46:28 prepared questions and sir may i ask for the usual indulgence for maybe until uh five past uh 11 now to see if there are any points yes very well well um just so you understand what's going on mr george

00:46:39 understand what's going on mr george when we get to this stage and council thinks he's asked all the questions he should have asked we have a break to ensure give him a chance to check that he hasn't left anything out and also to give other people who are following the

00:46:51 give other people who are following the proceedings from other places a chance to suggest further questions as well so we'll uh break now five past eleven do you think i think that ought to be sufficient yeah overnight as well right well we'll stop now we'll resume please

00:47:03 well we'll stop now we'll resume please at five past eleven and at that point we'll see if there are any more questions for you thank you so much thank you very much we'd like to give the usher please

00:47:20 good thank you very much

01:05:33 would you ask mr george to come back in please

01:05:46 right mr george well we'll see if there's any more questions for you yes mr kennedy there are no further questions which leads me to say um thank you very much for attending to give evidence it's been greatly appreciated thank you yes i'd certainly like to add

01:05:58 thank you yes i'd certainly like to add a uh

01:05:59 a uh gratitude to that uh we it's been really helpful and very interesting to hear what you have to tell us and we're very grateful to you for giving up so much time to come and give your evidence so thank you thank you sir thank you very much indeed

01:06:12 you sir thank you very much indeed and now you're free to go thank you very much thank you

01:06:24 thank you mr kennedy now we have another witness i think in a moment at least we do um

01:06:29 do um could i ask for some time just for the usual so house keeping arrangements in place and if we could notify you via the usher when we're ready to start that would be a sensible course wouldn't it yes very well we'll wait thanks thank you very much

01:20:57 yes so may call again david brown thank you

01:21:10 good morning again mr run you're going to affirm i understand that's correct well the words are there on the screen would you read them up please

01:21:17 please i do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence i shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much right you know the ropes

01:21:28 you very much right you know the ropes sit down make yourself comfortable please

01:21:38 all right when you're ready mr canoe good morning mr brown good morning mr kenny uh put simply you know the drill um just for those who may not have uh entirely uh considered your previous

01:21:49 entirely uh considered your previous evidence you provided two witness statements uh which are relevant to your evidence today the content the truth the contents of which you confirmed on the last occasion but just for the sake of the record your first statement is dated

01:22:01 the record your first statement is dated the 29th of january 2019 which is a lfb travel zero three two one double six and your second statement is dated the 16th of december 2019 which is at lfb

01:22:15 16th of december 2019 which is at lfb 0084020

01:22:19 we also covered previously the definition of your roles and responsibilities i hope you don't mind i'll just recap that so that people are familiar with the scope of your roles and responsibilities as they concerned

01:22:31 responsibilities as they concerned control specifically that's fine now

01:22:36 in june 2008 you were promoted to the role of assistant commissioner for service delivery uh northeast and northwest areas and mobilizing is that right that's correct

01:22:47 that's correct and um

01:22:49 and um in june 2012 the role of ac service delivery northeast and north west areas and mobilising was disbanded and a single role was formed to consolidate responsibility for all four areas north

01:23:02 responsibility for all four areas north south london mobilizing community safety and following that restructure the department was renamed operations prevention and response and you are the assistant commissioner who's allocated

01:23:14 assistant commissioner who's allocated to that department is that right that's correct

01:23:17 correct and so from june 2012 your title was ac operations prevention and response that's correct that

01:23:25 that role itself was later subsumed into that of director of operations a position which you held between april 2015 and your retirement in march 2017. is that right that's correct

01:23:37 that right that's correct now you previously explained in relation to each of those roles that your primary responsibilities included and i quote the strategic overview of the planning direction and delivery close quotes of

01:23:50 direction and delivery close quotes of the lfb's mobilizing service for the whole of london is that right that's right

01:23:55 right and that included control yes what did overseeing the planning direction and delivery of control mean in practice for you

01:24:06 so we had a a corporate plan and in that corporate plan we had strategic objectives so it would be my role to deliver on those strategic objectives

01:24:17 strategic objectives for example that will in terms of control that involve the alignment with london with the national coordination center it will be dealing with things such as the fire control

01:24:28 with things such as the fire control project the national fire control project

01:24:31 project there was a potential for outsourcing the control function with capita there were issues in terms of aligning certain roles within the organisation such as resource management

01:24:43 organisation such as resource management and

01:24:44 and uh call filtering etc so all these all these uh wireless strategic issues would be my role to ensure that control align themselves with

01:24:55 with um am i right in understanding that during your long career at the lfb you never worked control that's correct at the time did you feel that the absence of practical experience at control adversely impacted your ability

01:25:07 control adversely impacted your ability to oversee and manage control when you ultimately became ac and later director of operations i think that is one of the challenges that faces any

01:25:19 that faces any strategic officer because the higher up the organization you progress the wider the range of of units and sections and departments that you manage

01:25:30 sections and departments that you manage and you can't possibly ever uh be skilled in all the component parts so fire safety is is another good example that the principal officers will be managing

01:25:42 the principal officers will be managing a department they don't necessarily have served him but i think that's that's accepted but what you do have you have the management within that certain

01:25:53 have the management within that certain department that will have the skills so you bring the managerial leadership skills and combined with their sector competence the two should work

01:26:04 the two should work now if we can look at your first witness statement which can be found at lfb treble zero three two one double six forward slash eleven and paragraph twenty eight

01:26:18 just flows on from the answer you've just given mr brown the principal operations manager pom and the two senior operational managers soms supported by a number of operations managers were responsible for the

01:26:30 managers were responsible for the overall management of control prior to may 2012 scott hayward pong reported to me in the period between may 2012 and october 2013 the pom reported to ac

01:26:43 october 2013 the pom reported to ac richard chandler when control was a department in its own right between november 2013 and march 2016 the pond reported directly to me

01:26:54 pond reported directly to me after april 2016 the palm reported to the then ac tom george when again control was a department in its own right

01:27:04 right can you help us how did you manage and monitor the performance of control during the periods when uh palm hayward reported directly to you

01:27:15 so i used a variety of methods we held principal management board meetings which i would share and

01:27:24 and scott haywood would be invited to those principal management board meetings along with the area deputy assistant commissioners so it'll be monthly and i religiously held those meetings

01:27:36 and i religiously held those meetings monthly

01:27:37 monthly and always encouraged scott or his deputy to attend in addition to that i had monthly meetings with scott so

01:27:47 so and i deliberately did those intervening periods that means i would actually see him face to face roughly every two weeks on top of that i would have telephone contact

01:27:58 contact with scott and also i would i would see him for other meetings so there was a variety of other more strategic responsibilities that i had as i've referred to

01:28:09 had as i've referred to that would involve scott and various meetings there such as vision for example

01:28:14 example i would see scott there and looking at those monthly management meetings am i right in understanding that they weren't minuted and there were no agendas the performance management board meetings were very structured and were

01:28:26 meetings were very structured and were minuted with forward programmes the one-to-one meetings weren't minuted however

01:28:33 however they varied in terms of agenda so sometimes i would send an email to scott beforehand to say there's a list of issues i want to discuss but other than that they were more

01:28:44 but other than that they were more informal i would of course just add one other thing to that is the there was the staff appraisal system which i i used with scott as i did with all people who

01:28:55 with scott as i did with all people who reported to me thank you um scott hayward said in his evidence that uh the monthly meetings with you with you would be occasionally cancelled or cut short because of uh your role and your other

01:29:06 because of uh your role and your other commitments is he right in that sometimes they may well be i had uh i had a very busy agenda the the role that i was doing then was effectively

01:29:18 that i was doing then was effectively two assistant commissioner roles rolled into one so workload doubled overnight so it was very busy so there inevitably would be times i guess when that was

01:29:29 would be times i guess when that was correct

01:29:30 correct however

01:29:31 however these meetings were important and if if one did get re-cancelled it would be rescheduled how frequently did you find yourself having to cancel meetings with mr hayward no not very frequently

01:29:43 mr hayward no not very frequently not often can you in terms of on a monthly quarterly yearly basis

01:29:50 one in five but that that's just really a a guess

01:29:55 a a guess now tom hayward said in his evidence that only uh control specific or the only control specific reportable key performance indicator that he could remember was to answer 92

01:30:06 remember was to answer 92 of calls within seven seconds uh does that also accord with your recollection no there are a lot more than that a lot more than that control specific case yes yeah yeah

01:30:17 case yes yeah yeah now

01:30:18 now what where can those uh control specific kpis be found it's it's notable that mr hayward can only remember the one uh well they uh there was there were three that related

01:30:30 there was there were three that related to effectively call handling times so that the time that control spent handling the call and the time in which they answered the 999 call are they the indicators that have been called local

01:30:42 indicators that have been called local indicators yes yes and they would be in a quarterly performance statistics reported to corporate management board and quite possibly authority then there were there were sub

01:30:54 then there were there were sub indicators like another layer down which referred to the number of standbys so we were we were forever sending firefighters from one station to another beginning of the shift if i could interrupt you sorry mr brown my question

01:31:06 interrupt you sorry mr brown my question related to reportable kpis well they were these were all reportable i guess it's if you mean reportable to the authority then it would be those around call

01:31:17 then it would be those around call handling

01:31:18 handling it would also be around a number of automatic firearms the number of shut-in lifts because we were looking to reduce those and the performance of control was a key aspect

01:31:30 performance of control was a key aspect of reducing those calls and therefore the demand on the authority now we've not been able to identify any kpi

01:31:39 kpi however described as an indicator that concerned training at control are you aware of any kpi or any other form of indicator that was relied upon in relation to training

01:31:51 in relation to training uh

01:31:53 uh there

01:31:54 there there wasn't to my knowledge a performance indicator that related directly to training there was however a number of

01:32:05 there was however a number of performance indicators some of which i've just alluded to that would indicate that training was taking place because if these performance indicators were performing in the wrong direction

01:32:17 were performing in the wrong direction then that would be a clear indicator that training wasn't working and those kpi is predominantly concerned with response times described yes but also also issues such as what we

01:32:30 yes but also also issues such as what we called call filtering which was

01:32:33 which was filtering out calls to malicious false alarms and automatic fire alarms with a view to driving these numbers down to avoid station-based staff unnecessary

01:32:45 to avoid station-based staff unnecessary attending incidents did you consider introducing any training specific kpis following lachner um the the the issues following lacking

01:32:56 um the the the issues following lacking were really more about uh quality so for example quality of call handling

01:33:06 handling and so we look more closely at how we would deal with the quality and and uh the the problem that i always found with performance indicators and quality is

01:33:17 performance indicators and quality is quality is about process so to have an indicator on a process is is is very difficult to achieve indicators are very much about numbers and volume

01:33:29 about numbers and volume so so certainly we introduced qualitative uh tests and assessments of the lack and all

01:33:37 all mr hayward said there was no discussion about introducing a kpi which governed the management of fsg calls following lachna um does that accord with your recollection

01:33:53 mostly i guess the only the only discussion there was but this was something as far as i was concerned was occurring anyway is that every single fsg call should be

01:34:04 is that every single fsg call should be reviewed by management both operations manager and the senior team so as far as i'm concerned that was already the case but reiterated that after lack and all but it's not a kpi as such as no

01:34:23 and second statements is that your management style essentially involved the setting of targets and managing performance against those targets i've described it generally but is that a fair way to

01:34:34 generally but is that a fair way to describe your technique but that wasn't the only approach but that was uh that was something that was a key part of my approach

01:34:42 approach scott hayward said that the only target he recalled you setting for him was the target of answering emergency calls is that right no what other targets did you set him well

01:34:54 what other targets did you set him well well in addition to those around call handling times i've just mentioned there was also

01:35:00 was also targets around what we call operationally urgent calls because control used to get an awful lot of phone calls into control that weren't from the public and weren't 999 calls

01:35:11 from the public and weren't 999 calls they were internal calls from within the organization we wanted to control them because it wasted control officers time then there was also the number of stand buyers that we sent to stations to keep appliances on the run at the change of

01:35:23 appliances on the run at the change of shift and we introduced a new policy called indirect standbys and we want to do more of those and less of the uh standbys as firefighters turned up for their shift so he was all these were all

01:35:35 their shift so he was all these were all key things that scott would have had responsibility for so he had about nine performance indicators to uh to manage what statistics did you ask mr hayward to provide so that you're able to judge

01:35:48 to provide so that you're able to judge his performance as against these nine or so targets uh these will be daily statistics so some of them refer to the resource management center that's got it inherited i think in 2012.

01:36:00 inherited i think in 2012. so there will be daily figures there and if i can stop you there i'm assuming although there may be statistics relevant to a particular day is it right to say he would not afford

01:36:11 is it right to say he would not afford those statistics to you on a daily basis oh no they would have been collated on a monthly or quarterly basis presumably yeah and we would discuss them at our monthly meetings now

01:36:22 now you say in your statement that you found targets particularly useful way of managing scott hayward and because i think you put this euphemistically it encouraged him to be more proactive and better communicate

01:36:33 more proactive and better communicate with line managers in terms of progress against objectives um

01:36:38 um that observation 10 suggests that you didn't think he was being as proactive as you thought he could be is that a fair reading of your of your evidence on that point

01:36:48 it's slightly wider than that if i can if i can just briefly elaborate please do

01:36:55 do so control move to merton which

01:36:58 which geographically is very much in the south of london and headquarters is smack bang in the middle so in terms of being able to visit control it was very challenging very very time consuming

01:37:10 very very time consuming so i had to rely very much on on the performance management side of things more than the personal touch should we say scott was very very good in terms of

01:37:22 scott was very very good in terms of crisis so

01:37:24 crisis so we had 49 strikes unfortunately and control were were fantastic in supporting the brigade during that time and scott was a key part of that

01:37:35 and scott was a key part of that and during the olympics they were they were superb uh but so sorry mr brown my question was directed at what your concerns were effectively about mr hayward's

01:37:46 effectively about mr hayward's performance and i think the panel would be

01:37:49 be greatly assisted by your assessment of what reservations concerns you had about him yeah sorry i was i was trying to build the context that in terms of crisis uh i had no concern he obviously had some good qualities absolutely

01:38:01 had some good qualities absolutely absolutely day-to-day management was where more my concerns were in terms of communication with his peers and uh and with his his managers

01:38:13 and uh and with his his managers so i was very much trying to develop scott enroll and trying to bring some of these qualities that he clearly had into the normal day-to-day management of control which is one of the reasons why

01:38:24 control which is one of the reasons why i set so many uh performance indicators for him

01:38:28 for him and and encouraged him to come to various meetings and do various things to develop and enroll and bring forward some of the statistics and performance that i had been uh

01:38:39 that i had been uh using to managing did you raise his concerns directly with mr hayward oh yes can you remember when was it regularly during the monthly meetings or were there some during the forum of staff

01:38:51 there some during the forum of staff appraisal

01:38:52 appraisal staff appraisal uh was the with the key points and i made notes on his staff appraisal form and then we had quarterly meetings where we would discuss this it was best

01:39:04 we would discuss this it was best practice to unless there was a specific issue it's best practice to leave the developmental side of things to the appraisal meetings it's not good manager or practice to to spring something on someone during a

01:39:16 spring something on someone during a normal update meeting and unless there's good reason for it uh mr hayward said in his evidence that uh the only criticism that he can remember you making of him was that he didn't

01:39:28 you making of him was that he didn't communicate with you frequently enough what would be your response to that

01:39:34 well certainly that was an observation i made

01:39:37 made and and i did things to encourage him to do more of that but but it was wider than just me it was with his peers and uh and there were there were other times where i got a

01:39:48 there were other times where i got a distinct impression that things that i had discussed with him hadn't found their way to the people that should have known about it so it was a 360 communication issue in many ways

01:40:00 communication issue in many ways sometimes another point he mentioned in evidence was that because of the nature of your responsibilities and your broad remit

01:40:07 remit if he did want to speak to you by phone um he couldn't always get through to you um is that something that you recognized the difficulty of getting through to you directly by phone

01:40:18 directly by phone he wouldn't always have been able to get through to me but uh but the other reports i had the area decks i spoke to probably daily often more and i was very

01:40:29 probably daily often more and i was very much a 24 7 uh worker and uh so it was it was ample opportunity for us to talk maybe not when he wanted to but definitely ample opportunity nevertheless

01:40:40 nevertheless um can we go back to your first witness statement which can be found at lfb trouble zero three two one double six forward slash three

01:40:51 and it's really paragraph seven i'd like to look at in the final sentence of that paragraph and here you explain that when you took up the role of ac operations prevention and response and i quote in the period

01:41:04 and response and i quote in the period between may 2012 and october 2013 ac richard chandler was at my request incorporated into the managerial chain within operations prevention and response and took overall responsibility

01:41:16 response and took overall responsibility for control and mobilizing which became a department in its own right during that time ac richard chandler reported to me the first question which arises from

01:41:27 the first question which arises from that why did you decide to incorporate ac chandler into the managerial chain because

01:41:35 because at roughly the time that richard chandler uh was appointed into the london fire brigade it was more or less the same time when my role changed from ac service delivery north

01:41:47 changed from ac service delivery north and mobilizing to include south and community safety so as i alluded to my my responsibilities doubled overnight and i recognized with control now being

01:41:59 and i recognized with control now being at merton

01:42:00 at merton and the issues we've just discussed i really needed an assistant commissioner at control to be able to manage things uh more closely

01:42:11 be able to manage things uh more closely than i was able to do um did you have a for one better phrase a handover discussion with ac chandler in which you set out your perception of the strengths and weaknesses of control

01:42:22 the strengths and weaknesses of control management as it stood at the time absolutely richard was new into the london fire brigade he'd been promoted from another fire service so not only was he new to control he's new to the lfb

01:42:34 lfb so

01:42:35 so richard and i have visited control a number of times and i had long discussions with him about the various issues i'd like to focus on the handover was that one discussion was a series of

01:42:46 was that one discussion was a series of discussions it was a series of discussions during the series of discussions uh can you give the panel the gist of your analysis of the weaknesses in the management structure at control as you perceive them at the

01:42:58 at control as you perceive them at the time

01:43:03 i would have i would have shared with him the issues that i've i've just shared with the the panel uh i also uh would have discussed with him

01:43:15 discussed with him the

01:43:16 the because the the lachenal action plan was very much topical at the time and i used that as i as a an agenda if you like to take him

01:43:27 an agenda if you like to take him through

01:43:28 through the issues that were facing control at the time as a result of leckenhall and then also discussed with him issues around training and the fact that control

01:43:40 and the fact that control wasn't quite where i wanted it to be in terms of comparison with fire stations now if i could stop you there just breaking down the answer i think on two

01:43:51 breaking down the answer i think on two occasions you said you would have i'll discuss something i understand are you saying that you did discuss those topics with him yes

01:44:02 those topics with him yes now you said more positively you also discussed training with him if i can ask pressure on this what were the particular aspects of training that you wanted to bring to ac chandra's

01:44:13 you wanted to bring to ac chandra's attention before he started in post the fact that the the planning and recording of training wasn't comparable with fire stations and

01:44:26 wasn't comparable with fire stations and and i wanted them to be and what do you mean by that fire stations uh had a more

01:44:35 a more i'm trying to remember exactly what it was like in 2012 but certainly were ahead of the curve in terms of being able to plan and program training whereas control

01:44:46 whereas control and and other parts of the organization outside of fire stations were still very much

01:44:52 much uh using paper-based systems excel systems

01:44:56 systems and it really relied on the quality of the managers as to the robustness of training plans am i right in understanding that ac chandler was absent between late 2012

01:45:09 chandler was absent between late 2012 and i think april 2013. yes

01:45:12 yes to whom would scott hayward report during mr chandra's absence it returned to to how it was formerly i.e when ac chandler was present

01:45:23 when ac chandler was present how did he report to you about the performance of control in terms of the approach it was it was very much the same as i've described with scott although i spoke more with

01:45:34 with scott although i spoke more with richard

01:45:35 richard uh because richard was based uh at control so so scott kind of took one step back into control and richard replaced him at performance management boards and the

01:45:46 performance management boards and the monthly meeting so therefore i never had those meetings with scott during that period and did you have a sense that ac chandler had got a grip on the issues that you'd identified and been identified by the

01:45:58 been identified by the the lack of action plan yeah he was he was very enthusiastic and he certainly immersed himself uh into the issues unfortunately he wasn't there

01:46:09 he wasn't there long enough given the four-month break and the time he arrived in the time he left it it wasn't long enough to make the difference i was was hoping for i think i'm right in saying that he left in

01:46:20 i'm right in saying that he left in october 2013. that's correct uh at that stage did you consider whether it was necessary to install someone else in the rank of ac at that level i would

01:46:31 in the rank of ac at that level i would have liked to the reason that we used richard in the first place is we had an establishment of six assistant commissioners and there'd been a promotion round i think in in may uh 2012

01:46:44 think in in may uh 2012 and richard had been appointed as a seventh assistant commissioner over establishment and the reason being was to future proof in case uh other acs

01:46:55 to future proof in case uh other acs left at some point unfortunately ironically it was richard was the one that was left that actually left

01:47:02 left so then we had no spare assistant commissioners the remaining six were all in established positions there was no one to put in that role

01:47:11 that role did you consider whether it be possible to put someone in at control who may not have held the rank of ac but seniors a group manager dac something of that sort would that have been a

01:47:22 that sort would that have been a practical option available to you at the time

01:47:25 time it

01:47:26 it that would have been very comparable in in ranked terms with scott it really needed someone who was senior and and also at the time uh as as was indeed thereafter up until i

01:47:39 as as was indeed thereafter up until i left uh

01:47:41 left uh budget was such that we were under pressure

01:47:45 pressure to

01:47:46 to to justify every position particularly senior management positions so i would have to have created a new position

01:47:54 position so the the the deputy assistant commissioner for the south west area geographically covered control but i couldn't ask that deputy commissioner to take the responsibility

01:48:05 commissioner to take the responsibility on it would have been too much when you became director of operations in april 2015 um

01:48:11 2015 um did those same limitations apply which militated against the incorporation of another ac in richard chandler's shoes at control no because when when i

01:48:22 shoes at control no because when when i became doctoral operations there was a a management restructure and we managed to free up responsibility and and i requested that we have an assistant

01:48:35 requested that we have an assistant commissioner for operational response again uh

01:48:39 again uh and so that we could reinstate that position because i saw it as as key that we had that that responsibility so it took over just under a year before

01:48:50 so it took over just under a year before tom george came into post then after you became director of operations yes and what was the cause of delays a loaded word but what was the reason

01:49:01 what was the reason for

01:49:02 for it taking um some considerable number of months before you got the person you wanted in that particular post i think there was it wasn't just in control there was for example when when we established the

01:49:13 example when when we established the role of director of operations i had been managing the deputy assistant commissioners in fire stations directly and

01:49:20 and and it was such that the role for me would be untenable without assisting commissioner support because i'd also inherited fire safety regulation

01:49:31 inherited fire safety regulation so we agreed there will be an assistant commissioner for fire stations one for fire safety and community safety and one for control but we needed to go through authority-led processes to interview

01:49:42 authority-led processes to interview people to get these people into position and that was the reason why it wasn't instantaneous i never had an assistant commissioner for fire stations until later in 2015 either was there a change

01:49:56 later in 2015 either was there a change in the way you monitored control after you became the director of operations in april 2015 uh

01:50:04 uh yes because it then reverted to a similar model as when richard was there so tom george was then the assistant commissioner for brigade controller operational response

01:50:16 brigade controller operational response and so then again scott stepped back in terms of my interaction with him and i got all my information through tom looking back now

01:50:28 looking back now looking at the scale of your responsibilities particularly when you became director of operations were those responsibilities too much for one post

01:50:39 one post [Music]

01:50:40 [Music] no

01:50:41 no i think it was i think it was really important that we had and i was keen to call it directive operations and we had all operationally related things in one directorate so

01:50:52 related things in one directorate so so for the efficiency of the service it was for me essential but providing you had the appropriate support in terms of assisting commissioners then i think it was the right way to go

01:51:04 right way to go it was it was insane a very demanding job there was no two ways about that now um in your evidence um during module five um i asked you about your role of director operations and you said this

01:51:17 director operations and you said this because it was a role that involved the amalgamation of two assistant commissioner roles it was accepted from the beginning that it was an extensive role and closer to that of director when rita dexter left in 2015 that role

01:51:29 when rita dexter left in 2015 that role was elevated to that of director of operations this is really sort of subset of the question i've just asked you but did the fact that it was an extensive role

01:51:40 fact that it was an extensive role um adversely impact on your capacity to manage control and in particular being blunt scott hayward

01:51:50 yes that combined with the geographical separation with control being at merton that that is a fact that it shouldn't be understated although

01:52:00 although merten is a superb location for control and the right building that that played into the the issues as well one of the points that came out of mr george's evidence yesterday was that

01:52:12 george's evidence yesterday was that historically operations had been perhaps more closely tied to a particular fire station

01:52:20 do you think that historic closeness

01:52:23 closeness had greater benefits than the geographical separation that came to characterize matters from 2014 onwards or even before

01:52:33 uh it was beneficial so there were i think three control rooms around london so it was beneficial in terms of

01:52:42 terms of control and their interaction with with operations uh however there was it was an inefficient uh in my view approach having everyone together in one room was

01:52:53 having everyone together in one room was far more efficient and effective and then that was achieved initially at lambeth next door to control i remember however

01:53:04 i remember however back in the early 2000s when i was a group manager i was working in the best value unit and i did a study of controlling communications and an extensive best value review and

01:53:17 and an extensive best value review and back then i remember talking to control staff as part of my review and them telling me even then that they they weren't happy with the building they didn't like the

01:53:28 they didn't like the uh

01:53:29 uh the the the way that they was uh uh kept in the building because they it was difficult them for go out because obviously they need to be close by to answer calls and even then there was the

01:53:41 answer calls and even then there was the suggestion that they didn't feel part of the organisation necessarily so even when they were near control sorry near operations iefi station there was always

01:53:52 operations iefi station there was always there was always a feeling i think from control that they felt slightly outside the organization so we worked really hard to remedy that and i did a number of things when i was in charge to try to

01:54:03 of things when i was in charge to try to overcome that one of the points which both myself and the chairman asked questions of mr george yesterday was quite how this culture of separateness existed between control and other

01:54:14 existed between control and other aspects of the lfb and in his answer mr george

01:54:18 george identified geography as being a principal factor first of all would you agree with that or were there different or other reasons why there was this culture of

01:54:29 why there was this culture of separateness that's part of it also they they are a separate staff group in terms of terms and conditions so there's three staff groups in in the london fire brigade fire stations

01:54:40 london fire brigade fire stations control

01:54:42 control and what is uh what used to be referred to as main grade staff ie staff who don't attend incidents

01:54:50 incidents don't wear a uniform and each each are on separate terms and conditions and i think that in itself and it's separate unions as well gmb and unison so i think that combined with geography and combined sometimes with

01:55:03 geography and combined sometimes with with what they perceive to be a lack of understanding and of their role i think fostered this idea of of isolation and separation well i have to say that um

01:55:14 well i have to say that um looking at some of the documents and hearing some of the other evidence one

01:55:19 one got the impression that um

01:55:22 that um maybe that sense of separateness was historical but um

01:55:29 but um i wonder whether it really needed to exist i mean we heard for example that they were not brought onto the step i think it was recording program for training and and

01:55:40 recording program for training and and so on

01:55:41 so on uh when it was introduced was there a particular reason for that i don't think in terms of that particular question sir i i don't think it was an active reason not to

01:55:53 it was an active reason not to uh i think the focus was on fire stations and i think really organisation if we look back uh and i think with the three staff groups

01:56:05 staff groups probably organizationally it's something that we maybe should have done differently because i think by doing that it's it's a potential to alienate other staff groups not just control

01:56:17 other staff groups not just control and i think it has the potential to make other staff groups feel second best which they weren't and so so i think that that's something that we should reflect on really

01:56:30 that we should reflect on really uh

01:56:31 uh but but in terms of you the other part of your question no there was there was no need for for control to feel that way we we understand how that uh that thought process may have evolved but

01:56:42 thought process may have evolved but there was no no reason for that it certainly wasn't the case they were a valued group in the organization and we tried really hard to uh to to demonstrate and illustrate that

01:56:53 uh to to demonstrate and illustrate that to them to to try to break down this it's uh this feeling of isolation thank you

01:57:01 thank you just following on from the chairman's question i hope i put this fairly to mr george um

01:57:06 george um that he was surprised that the systems the chairman's referred to start step the rest of them he was surprised that they hadn't kept pace at control with progress and

01:57:18 kept pace at control with progress and other aspects of the lfb and he attributed that to essentially failings of historic failings of management to do so

01:57:27 to do so would you agree with that assessment or would you add more nuance or would you disagree with it wholeheartedly uh

01:57:42 as i say i think look i think looking back

01:57:45 back it's one of those things that that now reading some of the reports that are before the inquiry and realizing how long some things took to put into place

01:57:58 some things took to put into place i look back and think why why didn't we thump the table harder sooner on on issues but at the time

01:58:09 but at the time we we had ways of of dealing with with the issues at hand but but certainly i think that things have been allowed to go on for longer than they they should

01:58:22 go on for longer than they they should have done it wasn't for the want of trying but there were always good

01:58:27 good inverted commons reasons why things couldn't be done technological reasons and then it was a case of okay we'll wait for a new build we'll do this we'll do that

01:58:38 do that but i guess being so close to it you don't quite realize the the passage of time

01:58:44 time and now looking back i think it's something that really we should have worked harder on to make it happen quicker

01:58:51 quicker i don't want to put words in your mouth but the broad thrust of your answer seems to be you you agree at least the uh the essence of mr george's assessment i won't put it down to manage your failings i think that's harsh but i

01:59:02 failings i think that's harsh but i think it's i think there's uh not enough emphasis was maybe put in the right places at the right time thank you apologies diverting down these routes it's very useful having an officer of

01:59:13 it's very useful having an officer of your seniority to ask about matters of culture so i'm grateful for your help on that

01:59:18 that can i now go back to other matters about the

01:59:22 the realities of management um as we've discussed mr george was appointed i think in what due to start work on the first of april 2016 as ac operational response did you have a handover discussion from about a phrase

01:59:35 handover discussion from about a phrase with him in which you identified the strengths and weaknesses of control as you saw them at the time i did yes and was it one discussion again was it a series of discussions it was a series of discussions uh but then also

01:59:47 discussions uh but then also the context of this is that tom i i believe had been a deputy assistant commissioner of south west area since 2013 i think yeah so he had

01:59:59 area since 2013 i think yeah so he had been he'd been working closely with me for the previous three years and and with scott so he'd been at performance management board meetings we've been a yearly away days together he'd seen

02:00:10 yearly away days together he'd seen departmental plans for control he's seen risk registers for control so he was

02:00:16 so he was he was well versed in uh in in some of the issues for control which was one of the reasons why i was pleased that he could be the assistant

02:00:28 pleased that he could be the assistant commissioner for control because it was a good match i thought um doesn't quite answer my question if i can put the question slightly differently you knew you're mad

02:00:39 differently you knew you're mad what job of work did you want him to do in relation to control okay

02:00:43 okay so uh so the issues are highlighted to him uh he'd already started on a review of control which i'd asked him to do

02:00:55 him to do and i wanted to see that through i'd spoken to him about the shift system uh how we changed the shift system and one of the key reasons for changing the shift system was to accommodate training

02:01:07 shift system was to accommodate training his training had always been an issue in control the ability to be able to train staff

02:01:14 staff and i discussed that with him and how i wanted that looked at closely and also discussed uh the managerial issues that i had faced that that i've

02:01:25 issues that i had faced that that i've i've spoken with you this morning about and that he needed to be mindful of put differently did you feel that mr george would bring a firm hand in relation to the management of mr hayward

02:01:37 relation to the management of mr hayward that you thought was needed it wasn't so much of firm hand to the management of of scott it was more tom at that time was very much

02:01:49 was very much [Music]

02:01:51 [Music] i i saw as supportive of the performance manager approach that i was taking and i trusted and

02:01:58 and admired his approach that he used in the south west area and i thought that would be

02:02:02 be that will be very beneficial to control thank you

02:02:07 thank you so this may be an appropriate uh point for just a brief pause and then if i could ask for maybe five minutes yes well we have been we have been rather disruptive this

02:02:18 we have been rather disruptive this morning for all sorts of reasons but i think it's important that we have a short break at this point um if we said 10 past 12 would that be right i think so thank you we're going to have a short break mr brown you you understand that um

02:02:32 mr brown you you understand that um you must not talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room please

02:02:36 please and we'll come back at 10 past 12. thank you sir thank you very much

02:02:47 [Music]

02:02:51 thank you 10 plus 12.

02:10:37 uh would you ask mr brown to come back in please

02:10:51 all right mr brown ready to carry on yes thank you sir thank you very much yes mr thanks sir um mr barron i now want to turn to the latino house fire and the nfb's response to that fire now the lachnal house board was set up

02:11:04 now the lachnal house board was set up by the lfb in the aftermath of the fire is that right that's correct and its primary purpose was to investigate the cause of the fire as well as to assess the brigade's response yes and it was also directed to ensure that

02:11:16 and it was also directed to ensure that appropriate and timely action was taken to deal with the identified issues is that right yes and to make recommendations for change organizing organizational change even when necessary based on the

02:11:28 even when necessary based on the findings are rising out of the fire that's great now um on the basis of our review of the board minutes it seems that you didn't attend ten meetings which took place between december 2009 and december 2012

02:11:43 between december 2009 and december 2012 those meetings which we have minutes now if we go to lfb trouble zero three two one double six forward slash five

02:11:57 a possible explanation for those absences can be found at paragraph 13 of your first statement and i really want to look at the end of the fourth line where you say this i made an effort to be fully informed of

02:12:09 i made an effort to be fully informed of any issues concerning control arising at the meetings i did not attend i did this through my monthly one-to-one managerial meetings

02:12:17 meetings that i had with scott the lfb's appraisal system a monthly departmental management board meetings that scott and the area deputy assistant commissioners dax attended

02:12:30 how did that process keep you informed about control related matters that were discussed by the latino house action board

02:12:40 because i would read the minutes after the meetings and then if i had any immediate questions i would call scott but otherwise i would use them as an agenda

02:12:53 otherwise i would use them as an agenda as it were to discuss with him at the one-to-one meetings thank you now you've referred both here and in earlier answers to the departmental

02:13:04 answers to the departmental meet uh management board meetings now we haven't been able to find any minutes

02:13:08 minutes for an organization described as that is it possible that you're referring there to the principal management board it is yes thank you

02:13:19 although mr george touched on this who attended the principal management board meetings i would chair it there would be the four area decks scott hayward

02:13:30 scott hayward there will be a minute taker and

02:13:33 and then also there will be a representative from community safety which was also under my remit what issues were typically discussed at the principal management board

02:13:44 management board there will be a standing agenda and that would be they'll be general things so we would go around the room and we would talk about brigadier control issues operational

02:13:55 brigadier control issues operational issues community safety issues there will be also budgetary discussions and then

02:14:02 and then later on

02:14:03 later on i introduced as a standing item on the agenda the lachenal house action plan so that everyone attached to the department was aware of the issues that we were discussing at a

02:14:15 the issues that we were discussing at a higher level and would training form part of those discussions uh where necessary yes now before the inquest started in i think march or january 2013 the board

02:14:26 think march or january 2013 the board identified a number of lessons learned and organizational action points is that a fair summary yes and we first see those actions in an action plan which were appended to the

02:14:37 action plan which were appended to the minutes of the latino house board meeting of the 15th of september 2010 at page seven onwards and if we can go to them we see them at lfb treble zero double five one nine two

02:14:50 treble zero double five one nine two four seven

02:14:56 i think broadly said these were known as the lachnal preactions is that right that's correct

02:15:03 correct now the actions to which ac s sd was allocated lead officer in the fourth column and we look at action five for example those were actions assigned

02:15:16 for example those were actions assigned to you in your capacity as assistant commissioner service delivery is that right that's correct and if we look down the action plan we see that you were assigned i think 13 preactions

02:15:27 think 13 preactions namely actions 5 7

02:15:31 7 8

02:15:32 8 9

02:15:34 9 10

02:15:35 10 11

02:15:36 11 12

02:15:37 12 13

02:15:39 13 14

02:15:40 14 16

02:15:41 16 17

02:15:42 17 18

02:15:43 18 and 21 which is over the page i think

02:15:49 is that right yes

02:15:52 yes accepting action 21 the other 12 actions all concerned controlled is that right they did yes and in particular delivery of fire fire

02:16:03 and in particular delivery of fire fire survival guidance advice yes could we go to lfb trouble zero eight four zero two zero forward slash six

02:16:15 now this is your second witness statement mr brown and if we go to paragraph 10 and release seven lines from the end of that paragraph you say this however

02:16:26 that paragraph you say this however as i explain at paragraph 28 of my first statement dated 29th of january 2019 the overall responsibility for the management of brigade control rested with the former principal operations

02:16:38 with the former principal operations manager scott haywood in that capacity he was responsible for executing the actions arising from the board's action plan my role was to monitor that the actions

02:16:49 my role was to monitor that the actions were being undertaken and to provide any support that he required to complete those tasks did you delegate the 12 control related actions to scott hayward to complete yes

02:17:03 actions to scott hayward to complete yes notwithstanding that delegation presumably you accept that as ac for service delivery and mobilizing you were ultimately responsible for their effective completion yeah i was answerable to those actions yes

02:17:17 answerable to those actions yes you've touched on this already helpfully in your previous answers but how did you monitor mr hayward's work to complete the 12 control related actions it would be uh through the one-to-one

02:17:28 it would be uh through the one-to-one meetings

02:17:30 meetings and i would use the action plan as a an agenda

02:17:35 an agenda there was also a lack of house team that scott and joanne were part of i think tim cuthbill and tom davies from legal

02:17:45 legal and i would receive updates from tim in terms of how that was progressing so some of those actions involve that team more so so i had two ways of finding out what

02:17:57 so i had two ways of finding out what was going on did mr hayward ever ask you for additional resources in order to complete effectively the 12 control related action points

02:18:13 not directly

02:18:16 no not not directly there were later occasions when things that spun out of these actions caused increased workload that we discussed and

02:18:28 increased workload that we discussed and i increased establishment in certain areas as a result but not not directly for these night could we go to another document which is hom quadruple zero

02:18:39 document which is hom quadruple zero double one two four

02:18:44 now here we have the final version of the report entitled fire at lachnal havel street se5 on 3rd of july 2009 main report role and action of the lfb

02:18:56 main report role and action of the lfb control

02:18:58 control now this is what i think has been called the lachnal control report is that right yes

02:19:03 yes and this is dated as we can see november 2012 and it was prepared by the lfb for the purposes of the coroner's inquests which were due to start in january 2013. is that right yes

02:19:14 is that right yes and were you involved in the preparation and drafting of this document no not at all not in the preparation and draft on it no i would have seen it obviously

02:19:26 no i would have seen it obviously prior to going to the ball down at the ball but certainly not in the preparation and drafting though would you reviewed at least the final draft yes and would you have made amendments to the final draft or suggested amendments the final draft uh i may have

02:19:39 amendments the final draft uh i may have done whether i did or not i can't recall but essentially we can proceed on the basis that you are familiar with the contents and the recommendations of the report yes

02:19:53 now can we uh look at some of the individual pre-actions to which which were allocated to you and can we start with the first one which is pre-action 5

02:20:04 pre-action 5 which

02:20:05 which essentially concerned a gap analysis in the exclusion of 54-04 now in essence this was a pre-action that required a gap analysis to compare

02:20:16 that required a gap analysis to compare the applicable national guidance governing control with the lfb's own control related policy and guidance is that a fairly accurate broad summary now if we can go to your second

02:20:28 now if we can go to your second statement which is lfb trouble zero eight four zero two zero forward slash nine

02:20:37 this is your second statement mr brown and if we look at paragraph 15 you say this

02:20:42 this i did not have any direct involvement in undertaking this gap analysis this action was delegated to scott hayward to complete with the support of his management team

02:20:53 management team did you have any indirect involvement in the

02:20:57 the preparation of the gap analysis no who to the best of your memory had identified the need for a gap analysis to be carried out between national

02:21:08 to be carried out between national guidance and lfb's local guidance i think it was discussion at the la canal house board a lot of if not all of these actions were as a result of general discussion

02:21:20 were as a result of general discussion at the board so i think it would have been emanating from that discussion rather than one person having [Music]

02:21:31 [Music] stand up and saying i think we should do this i don't think i could really attribute it to one actual person thank you

02:21:38 you could we go to double zero double one eight two seven two forward slash one

02:21:48 now on the second of february 2010 uh dac cut bill sent you a copy of the draft gap analysis in advance of the upcoming latino house board meeting

02:21:59 upcoming latino house board meeting joanne stibberts who we know as joe smith

02:22:04 smith had sent the draft to him now could we look at that attached draft which is at lfb00107568

02:22:42 thank you presumably you read that document yes now in february 2010 when dac cut bill sent this to you

02:22:53 sent this to you were you familiar with the substance of the documents that were subject to the comparison and i'll take you through them

02:22:59 them fire service circular 10 1993 the training of fire control staff yes and specifically the fire survival guidance training program it recommended at its

02:23:10 training program it recommended at its appendix

02:23:12 appendix yes

02:23:13 yes secondly fire control personnel training package entitled keeping people safe published in 1994 which i think complemented service circular 10 1993

02:23:25 complemented service circular 10 1993 yes

02:23:26 yes thirdly the lfb's own policy note 539 on emergency call management dated november 2007 yes

02:23:35 2007 yes and in specifically appendix one of that policy entitled fire survival guidance yes

02:23:43 yes and finally the current control training materials on fire survival guidance were you familiar with those i was familiar with their existence that was going into a level of detail that i

02:23:54 was going into a level of detail that i wouldn't have had a great deal of connection with so no i wouldn't say i was overly familiar with those but the overarching policy documents which were the subject of the comparison you're

02:24:05 the subject of the comparison you're content that you're familiar with their substance 539 yes as well as the other the first service circle on the right yes it's not something i read on a daily basis but yes i was understood aware of

02:24:16 basis but yes i was understood aware of it yes

02:24:17 it yes now you've exhibited the final version of the gap analysis to your second statement as dsb 39 and we can find that at lfb

02:24:27 five 0084050

02:24:34 um do you remember when you were first sent

02:24:38 sent the final

02:24:40 version no i don't

02:24:47 it appears that the in the action plan appended to the minutes of the latter house board meeting on the 15th of september 2010 um that the gap analysis is marked as having been completed on the 7th of

02:24:58 having been completed on the 7th of april 2010. does that sound about right to you if you can't remember i i can't remember but it it doesn't appear to be out of sync with what would

02:25:09 appear to be out of sync with what would be appropriate now if we can go to page two in this document

02:25:18 if it could be expanded slightly thank you

02:25:22 thank you i'll just give you a brief opportunity to familiarize yourself with the layout of the document could you just expand the font slightly please

02:25:39 thank you is that enough yes just looking at the identified gaps and recommendations um it looks as if they're intended to be addressed by the

02:25:50 they're intended to be addressed by the corresponding prequest actions and is that a fair reading of it yes

02:25:57 yes now if we can go to page three of the gap analysis and i'd like to look at the fourth column on the second row and it's recommended there

02:26:09 and it's recommended there and we can see it it's the box which starts the recommendation is that consideration be given

02:26:15 given to updating national guidance in fast service circular 10 93 and fire service circular 54 04

02:26:26 04 to include further information on the various techniques that may be required to be used by fire control operators to extract information from callers regarding their situation

02:26:38 regarding their situation now looking at that reference to fsc 5404

02:26:43 5404 i think that's a reference to fire and rescue service circular 54-2 issued on the 8th of december 2004 and which concerned emergency call

02:26:54 which concerned emergency call management am i right yes were you familiar with that document in april 2010 for me of his existence yes but not

02:27:05 for me of his existence yes but not necessarily with its substance no

02:27:08 no now can we move forward in time now to the beginning of 2013 so just before the latin link quest for due to start and for that purpose can we turn up a document to be found at lfb

02:27:21 document to be found at lfb trouble zero eight five eight five three

02:27:29 now as we can see there on the bottom email on the 14th of january 2013 the then deputy commissioner rita dexter sent you a copy of the lindridge review

02:27:41 sent you a copy of the lindridge review carried out by group manager david lindrich from operational assurance which was entitled review of the latino house action plan that review was i think an internal

02:27:53 that review was i think an internal audit of progress with action implementing the pre-inquest actions is that right yeah readiness for the inquiry that's correct yes for the inquest

02:28:02 inquest for the inquest sorry yes now she says there in a brief email there seems a lot in here to be concerned about would you let me have your comments online please

02:28:14 online please and we see two days later on the 16th of january 2013 you reply with your comments and confirm in the second sentence that you discussed the report

02:28:27 discussed the report with dave lindridge to avoid any confusion

02:28:30 confusion can you remember now what particular aspects of his review that you discussed with group manager lindridge

02:28:38 well particularly the issues that rita had raised i think this was around the gap analysis so i'll certainly discuss those with dave

02:28:49 dave but

02:28:50 but but dave had been updating me regularly on the issues he'd been finding anyway so we'd had discussions in the round about all of the

02:29:00 the issues he'd found so i can't remember exactly what i discussed on this particular meeting with

02:29:06 with dave is it fair to say that on the basis of of that answer that the conclusions of the lindridge review were not a surprise to you when you first saw them

02:29:18 surprise to you when you first saw them no they weren't though could we look at what uh group manager lindridge uh concluded and we can find the reporter lfb trouble zero eight five eight five four

02:29:30 trouble zero eight five eight five four forward slash four

02:29:36 now i go through this directly because there is a useful summary described as key findings which are at the bottom of this page and go over and

02:29:47 and if we turn over the page to page four

02:29:51 sorry page five um there's section five entitled there's a heading action five in respect to the gap analysis and it says this

02:30:02 and it says this the gap analysis did not include fsc 5404 as part of the national guidance for consideration fsc

02:30:10 fsc 5404 introduced a three-staged call handling approach and included additional fsg questions for assessing the caller

02:30:21 the caller now we can see in the corresponding comment box that dc dexter

02:30:29 dexter asked in d1 why not your reply is i think in the red text in that first comment box and you said this fsc 5404 deals with emergency call

02:30:43 fsc 5404 deals with emergency call management only part of it actually deals with fsg and that is around age gender and mental physical disability based on that control concentrated purely on fsc 1093 and the training

02:30:57 purely on fsc 1093 and the training package

02:30:57 package for completeness though i instructed richard chandler to remedy this in november

02:31:03 november scott is dealing in richard's absence who in control decided to exclude 5404 from the gap analysis do you know i

02:31:14 5404 from the gap analysis do you know i don't think it was any one particular person i think it was the team that was evaluating this in in discussion decided not to include it in the gap

02:31:25 decided not to include it in the gap analysis

02:31:26 analysis did they notify you beforehand that that was what they were minded to do i don't recall that no do you remember whether it was discussed with you before they made that decision

02:31:37 with you before they made that decision to exclude 5404 i don't believe so did you approve or sanction that decision after it was made

02:31:48 i understood the decision when it was explained to me but nevertheless as i say in here for completeness uh i wanted them to revisit to see if there was anything in there

02:31:59 to see if there was anything in there that we had omitted when we shouldn't have done presumably because it was broadly relevant national guidance that ought to form part of the gap analysis yes

02:32:11 yes when you responded to rita dexter had you considered the substance of 5404 itself or were you relying upon a briefing

02:32:22 or were you relying upon a briefing given by others presumably including mr lindridge i was right relying more on the fact that there was guidance out there so it wouldn't hurt just to look at it to see if there was anything rather than me

02:32:35 see if there was anything rather than me thinking i know something particularly in 5404 that's been missed looking at your comment that only part of 5404 actually deals with fsg and that is around age gender and

02:32:47 fsg and that is around age gender and mental physical ability those particular factors may impact upon a caller's ability to escape or evacuate

02:32:58 escape or evacuate given that consideration wasn't it important that 5404 originally formed part of the gap analysis

02:33:07 analysis yes

02:33:10 [Music]

02:33:13 now um can we go to a separate document which is h o m quadruple zero double one two four forward slash fifty which is the an extract from the black north

02:33:24 the an extract from the black north control report

02:33:28 and if we could look at paragraph 295

02:33:33 and just to orientate yourself within what was a fairly lengthy document this is found in the section entitled conclusion about the handling of the fire

02:33:43 fire and under the heading assessment reassessment of the call caller paragraph 295 said this some cos control officers did repeat questions to find out what

02:33:54 did repeat questions to find out what was happening at different stages of the call including trying to find rooms with less smoke national guidance fsc 5404 suggests the model which has a review of

02:34:06 suggests the model which has a review of assessment initial decisions built into it although this was not included in lfb training materials moving to protect advice with the intent of keeping the caller safe may not

02:34:17 of keeping the caller safe may not always be the best solution and the calls should be continually reassessed there may be a tendency to limit reassessment due to the protect ethos although there is evidence some

02:34:28 although there is evidence some proactive call handling techniques did take place presumably you're aware of that particular conclusion yes

02:34:40 and you would have been aware that 5404 gave advice to cros on reviewing their initial assessment yes

02:34:52 yes can we take it that you are also aware therefore of the critical importance of cros reassessing the advice they were given

02:35:03 yes

02:35:06 why did you not draw that particular point to rita dexter's attention given the questions she posed to you in relation to the lindridge review

02:35:20 i'm not sure i didn't bring it to her attention so rita and i met very regularly and we would have discussed this we did

02:35:31 and we would have discussed this we did discuss this i'm sure i'd have brought it to her attention there the the whole point of the my email to her with the red text was really just to point to the fact

02:35:42 was really just to point to the fact that we

02:35:43 that we were going to look again at 54.04 so i think implicit in that would be that we would address that point in terms of reassessment and presumably

02:35:54 and presumably the comment box was necessarily a general response and if you wanted more details she would oppressed you for it yes but i i saw rita very very regularly

02:36:05 yes but i i saw rita very very regularly could we um go back to lfb trouble zero eight five eight five four forward slash five

02:36:20 now what had prompted you to ask mr chandler to revisit consideration of 5404 was it the information you were getting from david lindrich yes

02:36:39 was your instruction to mr chandler to consider broadly described to consider 5404 as part of the gap analysis or did you give any further direct or particular steer to him as to what you

02:36:51 particular steer to him as to what you wanted to see covered oh no particular steer it was just look again with 5404 in mind in terms of whether it's been missed from the initial analysis

02:37:02 initial analysis um

02:37:03 um when mr millett discussed this particular matter with scott haywood um he said he couldn't recall whether he was asked either by you or mr chandler to deal

02:37:13 to deal with consideration of 5404 can you remember now did you ask mr hayward to do anything in relation to that circular

02:37:23 i can't i i can't remember specifically uh but as i've i've noted here i've asked richard then richard has as was was on sick leave for a period of time

02:37:35 was on sick leave for a period of time and the fact that i've said scott is dealing

02:37:38 dealing to me that means either richard has previously told me he's got his dealing or i've then gone to scott i can't remember which it was though it was one i think

02:37:46 i think correct me if i've got this wrong mr chandler left in october 2013. yes but he was on sick leave for a period

02:37:55 period before christmas 2012 to about april in 2013.

02:38:00 2013. the reason i understood okay could we go to lfb trouble0083987

02:38:15 and on the 14th of may 2014

02:38:20 2014 uh group manager linda sent you a further version of his review which he had partially updated and if we can go to

02:38:28 to the attach report which is lfb trouble zero eight three nine double eight

02:38:37 that's the attachment the updated document and if we could go to the appendix

02:38:42 appendix which is entitled action log feedback which is found on page eight insofar as it concerns pre-action five

02:38:52 and we see under the column dedicated to review process findings the second paragraph on the right hand side says this

02:39:03 side says this dclg that's the department of communities local government confirmed that both circulars 1093 and 5404 are extant but fsc

02:39:14 5404 are extant but fsc 5404 was not included in this gap analysis

02:39:19 analysis fsc 5404

02:39:21 fsc 5404 covers the wider subject of emergency call management in which fsg is referred to in relation to pre-arrival safety advice

02:39:29 advice fsc 5404 neither provides a full explanation of fsg call management nor is it presented in the form of a standard

02:39:38 standard and for this reason was decided not to include it in this action now on that basis it appears to be clear that the gap analysis finally did not

02:39:50 that the gap analysis finally did not include a comparison with 5404 is that a fair reading of that paragraph

02:39:59 certainly that's what that paragraph tends to suggest my understanding was we've revisited that so so looking at it now

02:40:10 that so so looking at it now i'm not sure that is an accurate description of where we finally ended up

02:40:16 but but it certainly reads that way yes i accept that this is may 2014 yes mr chandler had left the lfb by this stage yes

02:40:28 were your communications with mr lindrich continuing um as part of his work updating the action plan audit so you had an idea of what had been done and what hadn't been done

02:40:39 done sporadically the the my interactions with dave lindbridge were very much around the period that he was undertaking the review so late 12 into

02:40:51 undertaking the review so late 12 into early 13

02:40:52 early 13 this this updated version less so although although dave did keep me updated put slightly differently you don't recall approving a decision to exclude

02:41:05 recall approving a decision to exclude 5404

02:41:07 5404 from the scope of the game absolutely not no

02:41:10 not no would you accept that 5404 was excluded from the gap analysis there was a real risk that the guidance it contained in terms of mobility and related issues

02:41:22 terms of mobility and related issues would not be captured by first of all control policy and secondly by control training

02:41:31 if it was excluded ultimately then there is that potential but if if i can just briefly add please do that

02:41:41 that i am not convinced it ultimately was excluded or i do accept that paragraph suggests it was and b

02:41:50 and b there are questions within the reference information file that would lead to control officers determining

02:42:01 determining the the physical status if you like or mental status of of a caller so i don't i don't think necessarily the whole issue of [Music]

02:42:13 [Music] some kind of disability not finding its way into the control dialogue because of 5404 is necessarily the case

02:42:24 if a decision had been made to exclude 5404

02:42:28 5404 are you able to assist the panels to who was likely to have been responsible for making that decision

02:42:36 not individually it was discussed in the the lack of house team so uh scott joanne tom davis and tim cuthbert would have would have been party to that discussion

02:42:49 would have been party to that discussion but you don't remember being looped in no

02:42:53 no can we now leave preaction 5 and move on to preactions 10 9 and 10. now in broad terms they were aimed at

02:43:04 now in broad terms they were aimed at revision of the reference information files which we've heard otherwise known as riffs yes which were provided to cras and also in relation to pn539

02:43:16 and also in relation to pn539 now

02:43:17 now could i first of all discuss with you your involvement in the revision of riffs and the review of pn 539 and for the starting point probably usually find in your second statement

02:43:29 usually find in your second statement and paragraph 15 which we find at lfb trouble zero eight four zero two zero four slash nine

02:43:43 now you say there this

02:43:46 this i did not have any direct involvement in the review of policy note 539 emergency call management this task was performed by scott hayward with the support of his management team

02:43:58 with the support of his management team my first question is what indirect involvement did you have in the exercise if anything sorry i can't actually see that on the screen i can see paragraph 15 in the top of 16.

02:44:10 of 16. i was only asking you about paragraph 15 you see that on yours i can see it on my screen

02:44:16 screen sorry 15

02:44:18 sorry 15 you've got refers to action 5 which we've just discussed

02:44:25 oh sorry yes you are right

02:44:28 i'll just double check that but looking at is this the second statement i think it is yes did you have any direct involvement in the review of 539 no

02:44:39 the review of 539 no did you review the revisions to 539

02:44:45 no uh did you ultimately approve the revisions to 539 yes by by virtue of the fact that my name is against the action and it

02:44:56 my name is against the action and it said complete then yes i i have by default approve them yes yeah and i think we can go to this we can go to lfb quadruple zero four seven three five forward slash one

02:45:16 that is 539 we see the owner as the head of service delivery and mobilizing that's you yes and so you're the owner of the policy um

02:45:26 policy um as part of that responsibility ought you not to have reviewed the substance of the policy before approving its revision it wasn't normal practice for the the

02:45:39 it wasn't normal practice for the the owners of the policy to read through them and

02:45:43 them and approve the changes the the owner of the policy is ultimately answerable and

02:45:50 and would make sure that the policy is being reviewed in timely fashion

02:45:56 fashion but i wouldn't normally read through it and compare the changes so if something was put up to you with the recommendation that would be approved

02:46:04 approved uh you unless of a strong contrary reasons you'd approve it yes and unless unless it was a result of uh

02:46:14 uh something that i had been dealing with specifically uh then i would i would uh take it as read that the people who have uh amended the policy would have gone through due

02:46:25 the policy would have gone through due process

02:46:28 process could we

02:46:29 could we would you not expect them to provide you with a

02:46:31 with a an amended version and some sort of no drawing your attention to the amendment uh

02:46:40 sometimes a track change version would have been provided uh other times with with this because this was part of a suite of actions that were happening uh

02:46:53 suite of actions that were happening uh a lot around in a relatively short period of time then that due process wasn't applied i don't believe i would i received a track change version of this

02:47:04 received a track change version of this right thank you could we go back to your second statement lfb trouble zero eight four zero two zero forward slash eleven

02:47:15 look at paragraph 23 which is what i was trying to take you to

02:47:21 to you see that i did not have any direct involvement in the review of policy note 539 i just wanted to take you to that so you knew what i was asking about but as you say you had no direct or indirect involvement in in the revision process

02:47:35 involvement in in the revision process um did you have any involvement in the revision of the riffs no

02:47:42 could we go to lfb trouble zero eight five eight five four four five

02:47:52 and if we look at what group manager lindrich said in his review and this is the january 2013 version about pre and quest action nine which is further down the page

02:48:06 thank you and the revision of the rifts in particular the riff has been reviewed and has been amended to comply with fsc 1093 the guidance introduced in fsc 5404 is

02:48:20 the guidance introduced in fsc 5404 is not included and then if we go over the page and look at the commentary in relation to action 10 and the revision of pn 539 mr lindridge says this

02:48:32 lindridge says this and apologies that the text is unclear mr brown

02:48:35 mr brown pn539 has been reviewed and it complies with fsc 1093 including making people safer control training guidance 1994.

02:48:46 guidance 1994. the revision of pn 539 emergency call handling does not include the entire details from fsc 5404

02:48:55 5404 goes on to say in the final paragraph this

02:48:58 this specific observations made as a result of this review have been fed back to the ac opr so that was you these will be considered in a forthcoming review of control fsg policy

02:49:15 now had you at this time so january 2013 discussed his review of pn 539 with mr lindridge

02:49:27 uh yes can you remember what the gist of those discussions were or was i should say the the conclusion of those discussions were that i asked dave lindrich to visit

02:49:40 were that i asked dave lindrich to visit control and talk to scott and quite possibly joanne to explain in detail the issues that he'd found so that they could consider these in any upcoming review

02:49:53 these in any upcoming review can you now remember what specific observations that are referred to here made as a result of the review have been made to you

02:50:07 i can't recall the specifics i'm afraid no

02:50:12 again coming back to the regard have to 5404 can you remember whether a separate decision had been made not to incorporate its guidance into pn539 and

02:50:25 incorporate its guidance into pn539 and the riffs

02:50:26 the riffs or was that simply a consequence of its exclusion

02:50:30 exclusion from the scope of the gap analysis if it was excluded i think it was a consequence of exclusion rather than a proactive decision to ignore it

02:50:44 given group manager lindrage's express finding that the national guidance in 5404 was not addressed or at least not addressed fully in pn539 and the rifts did you

02:50:57 fully in pn539 and the rifts did you take any steps to ensure that it was reflected in those two documents the steps that i took were

02:51:06 were what we've referred to recently

02:51:09 recently in terms of asking richard and then scott to look again at the gap analysis in terms of 5404 and anything that came out of that to

02:51:21 and anything that came out of that to apply accordingly there is a reference there to the forthcoming review of control fsg policy in the final paragraph what was that forthcoming review and

02:51:32 what was that forthcoming review and what was its scope i think

02:51:36 i think the the policy 539 uh i think was issued in 2007 sort of been a three yearly review cycle so it would have been up for that three

02:51:48 so it would have been up for that three yearly review cycle around about this time

02:51:52 time and i think that's what was being referred to to the best of your recollection there was no bespoke specific review of fsg policy being

02:52:03 specific review of fsg policy being conducted at the by the lfb at that time not at that time though not apart from the three yearly review

02:52:14 now can i turn to um a

02:52:19 a separate

02:52:20 separate matter and if we could

02:52:23 return to lfb

02:52:27 lfb trouble zero eight five eight five four forward slash five

02:52:35 and it's under the heading again action five this is the national control guidance versus lfb control policy gap analysis

02:52:43 analysis if we look at the second paragraph it says this

02:52:46 says this the gap analysis also identifies areas for improvement for the national guidance

02:52:51 guidance these recommendations have not been addressed or reflected in local policy and if we read rightwards we see the corresponding comment box dc dexter had asked why not

02:53:03 dc dexter had asked why not and again and you replied in red and your reply was this this isn't accurate the gap analysis mentions that national guidance could be improved through

02:53:14 guidance could be improved through inclusion of a stay put advice and b

02:53:19 and b better communication between control and the fire ground these have been addressed locally it also mentions c more flexibility over the four principles of assess escape

02:53:30 the four principles of assess escape protect and rescue d

02:53:33 d techniques that cos or control officers may employ and e fire behavior in different types of building

02:53:42 building these three have all been considered and adopted where relevant now in order to give the deputy commissioner a full response

02:53:53 response did you review the gap analysis against the existing version of pn3539 or did you ask someone else to carry out that work

02:54:02 that work i didn't review it myself no but i think when i wrote this i was also also had the letter that we were considering sending to dclg in mind

02:54:15 were considering sending to dclg in mind where we listed these issues i think those

02:54:19 those points there reflect the issues that we'd pointed out in that letter and again the same question in respect to pn790 you didn't review it yourself but presumably someone else at your

02:54:31 but presumably someone else at your behest had done yes and policy note 790 at that time uh

02:54:37 uh belonged in terms of authorship with operational policy i believe can you remember the identity of the specific person who reviewed 539 and 790 for you was it

02:54:49 reviewed 539 and 790 for you was it another team collaborative effort well five three nine uh would have been most probably scott and joanne scott and

02:55:01 most probably scott and joanne scott and joan stibbard smith 790

02:55:06 790 would have been ops policy so i would have probably spoke to peter carroll unless i would probably because that would have been the the process i would follow i don't remember a specific conversation

02:55:18 a specific conversation um looking at the substance of the deputy commissioner's question there did you discuss the answer with scott hayward before getting back to her

02:55:29 hayward before getting back to her yes

02:55:33 looking at points

02:55:36 points c d and e in your response which you said have all been considered and adopted where relevant did you mean that they had been addressed by the review and update of pn539

02:55:47 pn539 and 790 or were you referring to something else no i was referring to uh policy note 539 and most probably the associated

02:55:59 and most probably the associated uh

02:55:59 uh reference information files now looking at point c in your comment box there

02:56:06 box there which you refer to the four principles of assess escape protect and rescue bearing those in mind can we go to page 11 of the gap analysis which can be found at lfb

02:56:17 found at lfb trouble zero eight four zero five zero forward slash eleven

02:56:28 and if we could look at the fourth

02:56:31 fourth column

02:56:32 column under the heading recommendations it says this and if that could be amplified

02:56:38 amplified is the text sufficiently clear for you mr brown yes thank you it says this national guidance 1093 and lfb training material recognizes the importance of an

02:56:49 material recognizes the importance of an initial

02:56:50 initial assessment as the first stage of an fsg call

02:56:54 call however both documents do not convincingly explain the benefits of continual assessment or possible reassessment further into the call

02:57:04 the call to ensure the situation or individual circumstances has not or is not changing

02:57:13 now there is no recommendation there to addressing that particular issue in lfb policy ie pn539 is that right

02:57:24 in lfb policy ie pn539 is that right it would appear there's no recommendation yes now if we can go to lfb double zero double one double three nine four

02:57:40 this is i think the version of 539 that was in force when mr lindrich carried out his final or his

02:57:49 or his initial review i should say in january 2013

02:57:53 2013 if we go to appendix 3 in this document which is at page 16 and concerns fire survival calls generally

02:58:02 we see four lines from the bottom the foot of the page it says this reassure the caller and emboldened and

02:58:13 reassure the caller and emboldened and capitalize reassess the caller's situation and then it provides some example questions to ask

02:58:23 would you agree looking at that particular line that it doesn't emphasize the principle of continual assessment would you agree with that

02:58:36 i i would agree that it doesn't it clearly doesn't say continually reassess but

02:58:43 but if i could add i think

02:58:46 i think i think that is implicit within that so i think the whole idea of reassessing for me implies that you would reassess over and over would you accept that looking at the

02:58:58 would you accept that looking at the relevant sections of the appendix which is we're looking at now it doesn't quote convincingly explain close quotes the purpose of continual reassessment

02:59:20 i i would agree that it doesn't explain that

02:59:25 that but yet i would also think and also would offer the view that a control officer

02:59:32 officer bearing in mind their training skills and experience would would implicitly understand that

02:59:40 looking at how it's set out here what it appears to be is a situation in which a recommendation was made in the gap analysis which we looked at to improve national guidance not been

02:59:52 to improve national guidance not been reflected in the lfb's local policy would you accept that observation it isn't clear in there that's absolutely true yes

03:00:03 notwithstanding the terms of your response to the deputy commissioner did you ask anyone to verify that all the recommendations to improve national guidance

03:00:15 guidance were covered by control policy i i did ask richard uh upon his return from uh from sick

03:00:26 uh upon his return from uh from sick leave i think in around about april may time to go through the entire audit process

03:00:32 process and satisfy himself and therefore me that

03:00:35 that everything met the actions that we'd set out

03:00:40 out thank you

03:00:41 thank you um sir the clock has struck one that's a convenient place to stop yes very well it's

03:00:48 it's time to stop then mr brown will stop there so we can have some lunch we'll resume please at two o'clock

03:00:55 o'clock and as before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything relating to it while you're at the job thank you sir thank you very much [Music]

03:01:14 thank you very much

03:01:23 you