London Fire Brigade Evidence - Wednesday 17th November 2021 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:00:25 would you ask mr george to come back in please thank you

00:00:38 right mr george all ready to carry on yes thank you sir thank you very much yeah when you're ready to come here thank you

00:00:45 thank you excuse me mr george can we return to the question of shift patterns and particular paragraph 39 of your report which we can find at lfb trouble

00:00:56 four slash 0-32826-4

00:00:58 excuse me

00:01:03 now if we look at the fourth line of paragraph 39 you said the following therefore the current shift pattern does not allow sufficient time for an om or aom to deliver regular meaningful

00:01:15 aom to deliver regular meaningful training to their watch outside the main control room a time period similar to strategic resource on a fire station is needed to achieve this and if we go forward to page 11 and

00:01:26 and if we go forward to page 11 and paragraph 47

00:01:32 we covered this earlier on but just to give you context again some staff feel that they are not adequately developed enroll or receive development to progress to a higher role the review has identified that maintenance of skills

00:01:43 identified that maintenance of skills training is ad hoc not planned in a robust manner whilst there is responsibility and onus on individuals to maintain their itrs correctly by manually entering completed training this is not often done and staff are

00:01:55 this is not often done and staff are seldom instructed to do so by their managers

00:01:58 managers and if we go back to paragraph 49 we can remind ourselves of one of the reasons you identified for that state of verse existing which

00:02:09 for that state of verse existing which is the lack of regular maintenance of skills

00:02:12 skills training has been the difficulty in getting the watch together away from the watch room now could we having set that context again could we go back in the report to page 9 and

00:02:23 go back in the report to page 9 and paragraph 25 excuse me

00:02:31 paragraph 25 i'm sorry which is sorry it's in a separate in the draft report sorry it's my fault which is lfb trouble zero eight three eight seven three four nine

00:02:50 we see paragraph 25 at the top

00:02:54 the comments on the right hand side are those i think made by dave brown is that right yes that's correct now if we look at paragraph 25 of the draft it says this

00:03:05 draft it says this some staff feel that they are not adequately developed enroll or receive development to progress to a higher role the review has identified that maintenance of skills training is ad hoc not planned in a robust manner and often

00:03:17 not planned in a robust manner and often not recorded on individuals training records it could be argued that the current shift pattern does not support the ability for individuals to easily undertake maintenance of skills training as there

00:03:29 maintenance of skills training as there is no facility for an om to conduct watch training or watch meetings away from the main control room in a way that station staff can do by utilizing the strategic resource facility as an example

00:03:41 facility as an example now dave brown commented on the section we've just looked at which we see in the third comment box from the top on the right hand side it's labeled b for bravo

00:03:52 right hand side it's labeled b for bravo 24.

00:03:53 24. he said this i would completely disagree with this comment

00:03:57 comment as the facility exists albeit local management amended it during the day when three shifts are at work we should tone it down a bit now first of all what did you understand

00:04:10 now first of all what did you understand mr brown's point to be i think he's referring to the

00:04:16 the um

00:04:17 um where the short shift overlaps that there was a four hour uh time period where training could be undertaken i think that was the original proposal when the shift changed in i think it was

00:04:30 when the shift changed in i think it was 2011.

00:04:32 2011. but as he's commented there albeit local management amended it that was

00:04:37 that was it was amended and the early short shift was brought forward uh two hours um

00:04:46 i think that's what he means there now seeing how you've phrased matters in your the final version the report that we looked at it's evident that you didn't

00:04:57 looked at it's evident that you didn't tone matters down why was that i think it was um a significant issue that needed to be said

00:05:06 said thank you

00:05:06 thank you can we now shift um forward better phrase onto another aspect of the shift pattern

00:05:12 pattern and that can be really for these purposes i'd like to go to paragraph 40 of your report which can be found at lfb treble zero 328 26 forward slash 10

00:05:32 and we can see in the second paragraph which is

00:05:36 which is started with the word action you recommended a discussion with staff side representatives to return to the original start time of the early short shift

00:05:47 shift however as you set out in your paragraph 29a of your second witness statement and we don't need to go to it unless you'd like to that it was decided that two training slots of two hours should be implemented

00:05:59 slots of two hours should be implemented as opposed to a single session of four hours

00:06:03 hours what's your the ultimate resolution effectively maintaining the status quo uh no the

00:06:11 uh no the decision to maintain the short

00:06:15 short early short shift as 800 start was not

00:06:20 was not not something that i suppose ultimately i did decide it was something scott put to me because he was having an issue with the unions in moving it

00:06:30 moving it at this time i just wanted training to take place and whether that was one four hour slot or two two hour slots each day at that time it didn't really matter to

00:06:41 at that time it didn't really matter to me i just wanted it prioritized that there was four hours training a day allocated for a time period when training would take place was a disadvantage of this court of the

00:06:52 was a disadvantage of this court of the approach you you took that it didn't really resolve the problem of insufficient time having been allocated for training would you accept that as a criticism

00:07:01 criticism possibly but it was four hours allocated for training albeit it was cut into two segments but there was no uh

00:07:10 uh at that time i just wanted the training prioritised and staff to be aware that they would be undertaking for us training a day just to flow on from that could could i take you to some contemporaneous email correspondence you had with scott

00:07:22 correspondence you had with scott hayward on this topic um the first exchange is may 2017 the second is in august 2017. can we go to the may correspondence first which is lfb trouble zero three

00:07:35 first which is lfb trouble zero three two eight three four excuse me

00:07:43 and we see on the far left hand side reference and if we go down three boxes to 40 which is the paragraph we've just been discussing the comment is this

00:07:54 the comment is this rather than introduce the four-hour slot we feel a better option will be to have two two hour slots in the morning and afternoon

00:08:02 afternoon and if we can go to the august correspondence which can be found at lfb trouble zero three two eight three four four slash 4

00:08:18 and if 40 could be expanded again we see the comment there is this

00:08:23 is this having discussed this with the training team and operations managers we agreed that it would be better to split into two hour blocks no change to start times complete

00:08:34 so in effect looking at that was the decision not to implement your recommended four-hour slot taken by scott hayward and the psalms or was it your own decision

00:08:45 decision it was

00:08:46 it was recommended to me by scott hayward that we maintain the status quo on those times and i approve that at this time and the reason being

00:08:57 and the reason being we would still have the two to our slots of training um i think the main issue that and i knew that the operations managers have been working with the psalms and the palm on

00:09:09 working with the psalms and the palm on this to discuss the issue that i'd recommended and i think the reason there was a reluctance and i didn't want to get into a battle with the unions on this one particular issue because there were lots of other things that needed driving

00:09:20 of other things that needed driving through the issue was uh

00:09:24 uh to return to the fort to create that four hour overlap meant staff uh starting their shift on at ten o'clock

00:09:33 o'clock as opposed to eight o'clock and staff came from all over london and the home counties to come to work and getting to work at 10 o'clock meant they have to leave very early so staff would rather leave earlier to get

00:09:45 staff would rather leave earlier to get it was easier to get there for eight o'clock than it was 10 o'clock so as i say my i agreed this because there was still going to be a four hour training uh taking place albeit it would

00:09:56 training uh taking place albeit it would be in two two-hour chunks thank you can we go to um assistant commissioner jonathan smith's briefing note that we looked at before the lunch break which can be found at lfb trouble zero eight

00:10:08 can be found at lfb trouble zero eight four zero nine seven forward slash two

00:10:16 and if we go to the final paragraph on that page and the end of the first line we can see assistant commissioner smith's conclusion that and i quote the entire

00:10:27 conclusion that and i quote the entire provision of training should be considered as a corporate risk close quotes and could we stay in this document but go back or go to page four and the second substantive paragraph on

00:10:40 and the second substantive paragraph on that page which starts with the words in addition

00:10:46 that sets out one of assistant commissioners uh smith's conclusions in relation to training thus the current use of the short shift is not facilitating the structure training as originally envisaged

00:10:58 as originally envisaged this is why one of the recommendations contained in the 2017 review of brigade control was to revert to the original shift pattern which would create an overlap of the early and late short

00:11:09 overlap of the early and late short shift of four hours every day 1200 to 1600 hours now it appears on that basis that assistant commissioner smith adopted your original

00:11:20 adopted your original proposal as a solution am i reading that correctly

00:11:27 i think at that time although

00:11:30 that the whole issue of shifts at control has changed significantly since the grenfell tower fire the whole reason for the short shift when it was brought in back in 2011 was

00:11:42 when it was brought in back in 2011 was to maintain a higher number of staff in the control room during the predominantly busy times for control so from around 8 in the morning through till 10 o'clock at night there will be

00:11:53 till 10 o'clock at night there will be much more staff than there would be in the middle of the night the incident uh grenfell highlighted that you know that establishment um and

00:12:04 that you know that establishment um and that shift pattern may be not appropriate and it may be better to have a more equal number of staff across the different hours of the day or night so i think the whole issue of the short

00:12:15 so i think the whole issue of the short shift has since changed is my understanding thank you now looking at it though assistant commissioner smith had pinpointed uh nearest dammit the same deficiency in training that you had

00:12:26 same deficiency in training that you had identified three years previously is that a fair reading that's fair can you help us as to why that deficiency had not been effectively addressed during the course of those three years um i've explained why i

00:12:40 three years um i've explained why i agreed that we would maintain the two hours and then the following two-hour slot

00:12:49 i can't say why that was

00:12:53 well the fact i agreed to it would be why the action was shown as complete

00:13:00 ideally i would have rather had the

00:13:03 the four hours continual slot but i felt it wasn't worth having a battle with the unions over this particular point

00:13:14 and was it the anticipation of problems with the unions that was a significant factor in your deciding to accept the two-hour division that was proposed to you by mr hayward

00:13:26 that was proposed to you by mr hayward um i think it was that that led scott to give me that recommendation that we stick with this the unions within control were quite a strong and forceful group

00:13:38 strong and forceful group and given the number of recommendations i wanted to see change given the

00:13:43 given the significant impact the role out of vision was having on control staff i wanted to maintain a very healthy relationship with the unions and

00:13:55 practice the common sense suggested you had to pick your fights sensibly and prudently exactly could i now turn onto a separate matter which is

00:14:04 which is using babcock to use easily accessible cbt

00:14:08 cbt training within big learning and to introduce new control specific training where necessary now one of your findings was that controls you'd use babcock to provide

00:14:19 controls you'd use babcock to provide easily accessible cbt within big learning which i think was the

00:14:25 the the training package generally and and introduced new control specific training when necessary what issues had you identified which uh justified this recommendation

00:14:37 justified this recommendation well the rest of the organization particularly the operational part of the organization was using big learning to

00:14:47 to as a tool for carrying out particularly cbt type training packages and i wanted to see control fall in line with that and it's for that reason rather than a an active preference for babcock over

00:15:00 an active preference for babcock over ost that motivated that recommendation is that right yeah ost trainers were very good and ost trainers still had a role but i i felt the cbt packages would be

00:15:12 the cbt packages would be better suited uh falling within the babcock contract and the big learning tool had had you identified any particular deficiencies in oct's provision that

00:15:24 deficiencies in oct's provision that played a part in your decision that reflected in the recommendation no that was not part of my decision making though

00:15:31 though um could we go to uh your second statement uh which is lfb trouble zero eight three double eight four four six and if we look at paragraph 29b again

00:15:44 and if we look at paragraph 29b again and it's the second bullet point

00:15:47 you explained that in the event uh training for brigade control that was to be delivered by babcock was use your phrase of limited value and you go on to say

00:15:58 and you go on to say um later at paragraph 41-42 we don't need to go to the task-specific training would be undertaken by ost so again was that effectively a decision

00:16:09 so again was that effectively a decision to continue as before

00:16:13 in terms of the very specific control training that required a considerable knowledge of the systems and by systems i mean the vision

00:16:24 and by systems i mean the vision mobilizing system the x system which was the integrated command and communication system i think and the gazetteer which was another significant part of

00:16:35 significant part of using vision for that type of training it warranted ost maintaining that training

00:16:42 training can i now turn on to another separate topic and it's something we touched on earlier which is the effective use of stars

00:16:49 stars now

00:16:50 now you identified in your report a problem with staff not using stars correctly

00:16:56 correctly which had an adverse impact for the provision of training was there also an issue with the effective use of the step system which is something you also referred to earlier in relation to the record keeping of completed training

00:17:10 the record keeping of completed training yes

00:17:11 yes what was the nature and extent of the problem you identified i think i touched on it earlier so step was intrinsically linked to stars um

00:17:21 step would effectively on on a fire station there would be something called a training diary which is effectively step so the watch manager could plan for a particular firefighter

00:17:32 could plan for a particular firefighter number of firefighters to undertake some training it would be there in advance the training would carry out and that after it's carried out you could click on that and confirm it had been done it would up populate immediately onto an

00:17:43 would up populate immediately onto an individual training record it was not possible to do that for control staff now step was in broad terms the system used by lfb operational staff to maintain training records is that right

00:17:55 maintain training records is that right correct

00:17:56 correct and control didn't use as you indicated earlier on the automated step system but kept their records manually not quite true so there were manual records kept

00:18:07 records kept and

00:18:09 and where possible there was a manual entry made onto an individual's itr individual training record that was either done by the individual once they completed the training or it was done by ost

00:18:21 training or it was done by ost or ost would forward details to the information management team to update it but it was done manually and was that manual element of the system the way it was done during your time as

00:18:32 the way it was done during your time as ac operational response yes now the lachlan board identified the need for controls training records to be aligned with maintained and recorded on step as early as june 2010 were you

00:18:45 step as early as june 2010 were you aware of that uh not specifically that no um you say not specifically were you aware of that uh identification in general terms no i wasn't aware of that

00:18:58 are you able to assist the panel as to why that

00:19:03 that recommendation had not been implemented whether it's a result of knowledge you acquired during a time as ac operational response or later as part of your work helping the gti rt

00:19:15 helping the gti rt it was before that so while i was carrying out my review it became obvious and apparent that

00:19:23 that control had fallen behind shall i say in terms of the rest of the organization particularly operational staff who were using a system for planning and recording training very effectively

00:19:34 and recording training very effectively and i was

00:19:38 and i was astonished really that uh it hadn't been in all of that time adapted and amended and adjusted so that it worked for control and we covered the your assessment of the reasons for that

00:19:50 your assessment of the reasons for that earlier now in his review group manager lindridge identified in january 2013 that stepp was not being used by the brigade and if we could look at mr linderich's review on this point which

00:20:02 linderich's review on this point which is action 16 he can be found at lfb trouble zero double three nine four three

00:20:09 three four slash fourteen

00:20:17 see action sixteen there in the second box on the page and it says this in the

00:20:27 major box on the right hand side under the heading proactive training plan including use of step step has not been used to create a proactive training plan due to technological limitations

00:20:39 technological limitations a two-year rolling training plan is being created on an excel spreadsheet and should be fully available by january 2013

00:20:47 2013 note

00:20:48 note information received in january 2013 indicates the step will be adapted to include control in the near future

00:20:58 now in mr lindrich's updated review in november 2013 the bracketed text i the note

00:21:06 note had been removed are you able to help us as to what had happened to cause the removal of that text based on your general knowledge no i've never seen this document before

00:21:17 i've never seen this document before and as i've said earlier today the changes to step that

00:21:25 that allowed control to use it in any meaningful way was not made until my intervention in i think 2018.

00:21:34 now just to clarify matters um could i ask you to go to mr hayward's first witness statement which can be found at lfb

00:21:42 lfb trouble zero double five one nine one forward slash 17 and paragraph 47 in particular

00:21:52 and if we look at the final three lines of paragraph 47 mr hayward said this this training delivered by ost is recorded locally and

00:22:03 delivered by ost is recorded locally and on a monthly basis is sent to information management in lfb for uploading onto step the system used by the lfb to allocate and record training what he appears to be suggesting there

00:22:16 what he appears to be suggesting there is that information needed to be collated

00:22:18 collated emailed to the lfb central information department to be uploaded now

00:22:25 now is that a fair reading of what he seems to be saying there absolutely now if we can go to page 25 in this statement i'd be grateful for your views on what

00:22:34 on what elsie says at paragraph 73

00:22:41 what mr haywood suggests here is that control was able to access manually the step system [Music]

00:22:50 [Music] now my question arising from that and bearing in mind your earlier answers is this did control have full access to step

00:22:57 step during your time as ac operational response first of all they had access to record training but it was a manual intervention thank you and

00:23:10 intervention thank you and was the need for manual intervention still required by the 14th of june 2017. yes

00:23:19 from the lay perspective again a system that relies upon the mechanism set up by mr hayward appears to be haphazard and potentially

00:23:30 appears to be haphazard and potentially prone to error as a general observation is that something you'd accept yes

00:23:39 what measures were in place to the best of your knowledge

00:23:43 knowledge to mitigate the risk of haphazard and possibly erroneous entries i think the ops managers were reminded of the

00:23:54 ops managers were reminded of the importance to make sure that their training records for their staff were kept up to date but as i say it was a manual process could we go back now to the

00:24:06 process could we go back now to the evidence of assistant commissioner jonathan smith and in particular his witness statement which can be found at lfb double zero one two double one seven one forward

00:24:17 one two double one seven one forward slash eleven

00:24:26 if we look at paragraph thirty four in the bottom half of that page and the fourth line of that paragraph in particular he said this controlled training did not have a robust system for quality assurance and

00:24:38 robust system for quality assurance and the recording of training was inconsistent despite some effective remedial actions being taken immediately following the grenfell tower fire which include increased managerial ownership of

00:24:49 increased managerial ownership of on-watch training and a more consistent use of station diary personal development page 12 records and individual training records further improvement was still required

00:25:00 required accordingly following my review i recommended that the control system of training assurance and professional development undergo a complete and systematic overhaul

00:25:11 systematic overhaul now as mr smith has expressed himself there

00:25:16 the clear impression is that little or no effective progress had been made between the date of your review and when he came to review matters first of all do you accept that

00:25:27 first of all do you accept that proposition and if you do are you able to assist the panel with an explanation as to why no progress was made yes i accept that uh what jonathan smith

00:25:38 yes i accept that uh what jonathan smith uh was saying you know he'd gone in there with a fresh pair of eyes and if that's what he found that's what he found

00:25:44 found in terms of why

00:25:48 i knew scott was having problems in

00:25:52 in with making the system changes because that was

00:25:55 that was partly out of his control it was it was an i.t system that was wasn't owned by control

00:26:00 control um

00:26:02 um but the in terms of the

00:26:06 the more structure to training plans and the carrying out training

00:26:10 training even without the it systems i was disappointed here to see that that still wasn't uh being addressed in any kind of robust manner did effective implementation require the

00:26:23 did effective implementation require the heft

00:26:24 heft of an intervention by a more senior officer to make sure that recommendations were properly fully implemented yes

00:26:33 yes so it would appear yes and was it your heft in particular that was required in order to achieve that given your responsibilities as ac operational response and ultimately as director of operations uh yes when i got involved

00:26:45 operations uh yes when i got involved and and

00:26:46 and and gave

00:26:47 gave group manager rob davies sent him down to martin for a week and leos of it colleagues uh he was going uh acting on my behalf is your enforcer effectively he was my

00:26:59 is your enforcer effectively he was my staff officer uh head of head of other departments knew that he worked directly to me

00:27:04 to me and

00:27:05 and you know that certainly made that particular issue go away um but pretty even prior to the i.t system being changed uh i think that i was being

00:27:17 uh i think that i was being given information from scott that things had improved you know from the actions from our monthly meetings and i kind of felt later from the information from the brigades

00:27:28 from the information from the brigades grenfell tower investigation review team and from what jonathan had picked up that perhaps uh all was not entirely what i was being told

00:27:39 told do you think in retrospect that having one

00:27:43 one individual reporting directly to you i.e hayward

00:27:46 hayward you had a restricted flow of information to you because you would depend upon the views of just one man

00:27:54 potentially but then every department in the organization had a head of service and scott was the head of service for control and i needed to have trust and uh

00:28:06 trust and uh you know in what he was telling me do you think

00:28:08 you think part of the risks that flow from having a single channel of communication would have been mitigated by you attending the brigade control management meetings for example

00:28:20 um potentially i read those minutes if i had concerns that i was

00:28:28 um being spun a yarn i suppose that i wasn't being given true and accurate information i would always do further digging and investigative work i could easily go to joanne

00:28:40 i could easily go to joanne or keith diamond or adam krinion because i pulled in another senior ops manager and i had

00:28:47 and i had uh even at cro aom om level uh anytime i could go and have an informal meeting with any one of those staff who drafted the minutes for the brigade

00:28:58 who drafted the minutes for the brigade control management meeting there were three um administrative staff based at merton that uh dealt with all sorts of issues property matters and the likes i think

00:29:10 property matters and the likes i think probably one of them and would they those minutes have been approved by mr hayward before they were circulated to you

00:29:16 you i think probably so yes so effectively had control of that source of information as well i think so did smith diamond or crinion ever say

00:29:27 did smith diamond or crinion ever say anything to you that gave cause for you to doubt the accuracy or completeness of the information you were being given by mr hayward in relation to the implementation of your recommendations

00:29:39 implementation of your recommendations no i don't think so

00:29:42 can i move on to a separate topic now which is the outcome and later consideration of your review by cmb now

00:29:49 now you presented your review to the lfb's central management board in early 2017. sorry

00:29:56 sorry corporate management corporate mouse board and before the meeting you produced the note summarizing your review and the progress made to date and if we could look briefly at the draft of that note which can be found at lfb

00:30:08 that note which can be found at lfb trouble zero double five zero four one

00:30:20 just come that's the draft i think and if we go to page five and six five first of all please which particularly dealt with training

00:30:33 so can i just give some clarity to this report hang on may well be the answer to the questions pose will flush that out

00:30:42 that out we see again comments on the right hand side

00:30:46 side b10 b for bravo and b11 were those comments provided by mr brown yes

00:30:53 now if we can go to page six and particularly the foot of page six

00:31:00 we see comment b12 thank you for expanding

00:31:04 expanding and this is a comment in which mr brown suggests uh the training section which in your draft note is two four pages was two day too detailed

00:31:14 bearing in mind that comment and seeing that you've dealt with the subject over the course of two pages could we go to the final version of your note which is lfb treble zero

00:31:25 lfb treble zero three two eight two four forward slash three

00:31:34 and here we see that the section of development and training has been curtailed

00:31:41 curtailed markedly

00:31:43 markedly to about half a page now given that the issues of training were important you'd identified problems which at the time you weren't aware were chronic and

00:31:54 time you weren't aware were chronic and systemic

00:31:57 systemic why were some of the significant issues you put in the draft not included in this final version i'm afraid that'll be a question you'd have to post to mr brown what i can say is when i finish sorry if

00:32:10 what i can say is when i finish sorry if i can just stop you there did he delete or did you delete them i would have deleted them based on the comments that you've just shown me in his track changes now we looked in

00:32:21 his track changes now we looked in previous context when you're looking at paragraph 49 you didn't tone it down when you were considering the shift related issues presumably therefore you accepted that

00:32:32 presumably therefore you accepted that you had put in too much detail in training is that the fair influence to draw here

00:32:37 draw here i think i put in as much detail as i felt was necessary in my report of july 2016 and i felt i was surprised that that report

00:32:48 i was surprised that that report as it was in july 16 wasn't presented to the corporate management board commissioner danny cotton started as commissioner in january 2017

00:32:59 commissioner in january 2017 and she requested that the outcome of my review was brought to the cmb and that's where this report came about you've hopefully led me up to what was going to be my question why the delay

00:33:11 going to be my question why the delay between july 2016 and february 2017 when it's finally presented to the cnb that would have to be a question today bro put crudely had he sat on it in the intervening period

00:33:23 intervening period i

00:33:24 i don't think he felt it needed to go to cmb

00:33:29 cmb did he say that expressly to you or is that something you read into his words and actions i think he did say that to me yes and did he give you a recent explanation for that

00:33:39 that no i was new into the ac position he'd been a director or certainly operating at that level for a number of years i'd never sat on the cmb

00:33:50 i'd never sat on the cmb and

00:33:51 and if if it was his decision that the report

00:33:55 report didn't need to go to cnb then that was a decision that was down to him what would be the advantage of it being reviewed by cnb it would bring to the attention of the

00:34:06 it would bring to the attention of the other directors and the commissioner the issues that i'd identified now you made your presentation ultimately on the 15th of february 2017. um

00:34:17 um in the intervening period had mr brown to your knowledge shown your report to anyone other than outside the department or anyone else senior in the lfb not as far

00:34:29 anyone else senior in the lfb not as far as i'm aware you received no comments or questions from anyone in the hierarchy no [Music]

00:34:37 [Music] did you receive feedback or any response at cmb about your recommendations insofar as they concerned training and in particular record keeping yes

00:34:47 yes i did the presentation on behalf of mr brown who was also there at the cmb and i recall commissioner cotton requesting a further update in six months time

00:34:59 update in six months time from that february can you remember or do you know actually do you know what prompted commissioner cotton uh to bring your paper to the uh attention of the cmb uh no i think she knew

00:35:11 uh no i think she knew as uh you know there was only five or six assistant commissioners and one of them had been tasked solely with working at control and one of their main tasks was to carry out a review i think she

00:35:24 was to carry out a review i think she thought it was surprising that the cmb had never been shown the outcome of that work

00:35:30 work how did her surprise manifest itself sorry a big one how did her surprise manifest itself what was your basis for you thinking that she was surprised that it had been brought forward sooner uh i

00:35:42 it had been brought forward sooner uh i don't recall it might have been in the conversation that i had with danny cotton directly could we go to lfb triple zero three two eight two nine

00:35:56 can we look at the second email on that page which is an email from you to hayward and smith sent it 10 20 hours on the 15th of february 2017. you refer there in the opening line to

00:36:09 you refer there in the opening line to your assessment the report had been received well and you also said that the commission had asked for a further update in six months uh to the best of your knowledge was that update given

00:36:20 was that update given uh no it wasn't and that's largely down to the fire at greenville tower in in that following the incident it created all sorts of additional work

00:36:32 sorts of additional work as you'd appreciate now

00:36:36 now can we go back to the report you submitted to cnb and really what i'd like to discuss with you now is the references to fire survival guidance calls and if we go to lfb trouble zero

00:36:47 calls and if we go to lfb trouble zero three two eight two four forward slash six

00:36:56 now you say in paragraph 22 there this a number of key improvements have already been made including and if we can look at the second bullet point developing a stronger link with l d such

00:37:09 developing a stronger link with l d such learning and development colleagues so that training courses are being more freely offered to control staff third bullet point additional familiarization training to all staff on

00:37:20 familiarization training to all staff on ncc and fire survival guidance now there is no reference to fire survival guidance in the main report

00:37:30 report why did you highlight fsg for the purposes of briefing cmb because i think in the 2016 period that i was carrying out the review the only training i saw taking place was

00:37:43 the only training i saw taking place was on vision and on fire survival guidance so i think that's why it got highlighted here

00:37:49 here what i apologize to the and on the ncc what was the gist of the discussion you had with cnb on fsg calls generally

00:38:00 calls generally when i presented to cnb on this paper i don't think um other than what you can see though i don't think i was questioned any further on it the reference and the third bullet

00:38:11 on it the reference and the third bullet point to additional familiarized training to all staff i'm assuming and please say if this is wrong that it's to all staff in control as opposed to all lfb staff definitely thank you

00:38:26 now um i'd now like to turn on to a separate distinct topic which is the work you carried out whilst you were basic control so 2016 predominantly and the first

00:38:36 the first topic i'd like to discuss with you is training in its most general forms now for this purpose could we go to lfb double zero double one three two three seven

00:38:52 now as you can see from its title these are minutes of the brigade control management meeting on the 18th of july twenty twelve can we go to page seven please and item

00:39:03 can we go to page seven please and item five

00:39:07 you'll see that item five concerns itself with training and in the first line the minutes record uh assistant commissioner chandler saying that and i quote he had attended a meeting

00:39:19 and i quote he had attended a meeting recently which spoke about the training commissioning and alteration process tcap which we've heard a lot about he stated that in the document there was nothing showing

00:39:30 nothing showing that control had carried out any form of training

00:39:33 training he went on to say that he spoke to control training to see if there was anything in place to show what form of training had been received by staff the ac asked if there was a training matrix

00:39:45 ac asked if there was a training matrix which control work to the response was no

00:39:50 no now isn't it right that by the time of your 2016 review so four years after this exchange there was still no structured training plan in place

00:40:01 structured training plan in place i think the ost had a structure to the training that they were involved in and there was certainly a structure to new entrance training um but i think for each ops manager for

00:40:12 um but i think for each ops manager for the for the day-to-day familiarization training that they were responsible for i think it was not very robust yes could we now go to lfb trouble 0028942

00:40:32 you'll recall we looked at this earlier this morning email from dave brown to richard chandler

00:40:38 chandler and you'll see in the first bullet point at the top of page two

00:40:47 that mr brown asks mr chandler to talk through the training plan for control

00:40:56 first question is this did you ever see a copy of that training plan no

00:41:03 did mr brown ever tell you that he'd ask mr chandler to talk him through a training plan no

00:41:11 could we turn on to the particular topic of fsg training now and for that purpose could we go to lfb quadruple zero one two double five forward slash 20.

00:41:30 just to orientate you in the document i should have taken you to the front page first of all this is gra 3.2 uh document with which i suspect you're well familiar now if we can go back to page 20 in the

00:41:42 now if we can go back to page 20 in the second paragraph on that page we can see that the gra required fire and rescue services to quotes have

00:41:51 have must also have effective arrangements in place to handle fire survival guidance calls from residents and others when they believe they are unable to leave the building

00:42:02 they are unable to leave the building due to disability poor mobility illness or the effects of fire we aware of that particular requirement

00:42:13 yes but not specifically from the gra

00:42:18 in terms of how the lfb implemented it was it your understanding that the lfb implemented that requirement by uh putting into place pn539 and pn 790. yes

00:42:32 putting into place pn539 and pn 790. yes and in that regard presumably you accept full responsibility um for the full and effective performance of that requirement in your capacity as ac operational response and later as director of operations yes

00:42:45 director of operations yes and you'd agree that the full and effective performance of that requirement set out in gra 3.2 must necessarily involve suitable training

00:42:53 training in the handling of fire survival guidance to allow staff to fulfill their job properly yes now if we can go to your second witness statement which is lfb trouble zero eight three double eight four forward

00:43:06 eight three double eight four forward slash eleven and paragraph thirty four you explain this and i quote to the best of my knowledge a new fire

00:43:17 to the best of my knowledge a new fire survival guidance fsg training course has not been implemented fsg training was established and included in the watch training plan as seen in the 2016 report and the 2017

00:43:30 as seen in the 2016 report and the 2017 corporate management board cmb report fsg was not identified as an area for development and so no further training was developed in relation to fsg

00:43:42 was developed in relation to fsg can you help us first of all as to why fsg was not identified either in the 2016 report or in the 2017 report to cmb as an area

00:43:53 or in the 2017 report to cmb as an area for further development well by further development i would read that as needing changes to a particular policy or procedure that control were working to

00:44:04 procedure that control were working to i was certainly aware that it was a requirement for control staff to undertake regular fsg training and i think i mentioned earlier that i was aware of the

00:44:14 the alternating years that one year would be face-to-face training on one year would be cbt training so i was not looking for the development of fsg training i wanted to make sure

00:44:26 of fsg training i wanted to make sure that the training was being carried out along with all other types of training but within 2016 and i think it ran into 2017 i did witness firsthand the fsg

00:44:37 2017 i did witness firsthand the fsg training was taking place um

00:44:40 um and i'd i'd seen that for myself and were you you were presumably content with what you saw um

00:44:47 um i i saw the training taking place uh i didn't

00:44:51 didn't you know embed myself in the actual training session and see the detail of it but i had absolute reassurance from christine sharp who was running these sessions at control

00:45:03 sessions at control and i had regular communication with christine face to face and in email communication on

00:45:10 on what was in the training sessions and i think i responded to her on one occasion just and scott hayward to make sure that it was planned i think and structured and recorded on the

00:45:21 and recorded on the control officer's itrt when you observed the fsg training first of all can you now remember how long the training course was in the sense of how long it was provided to the

00:45:33 long it was provided to the staff for

00:45:34 staff for um certainly a few hours i know that because i looked out my office window at button looked out onto the area where the commander and it's parked so you know from the amount of time that the command

00:45:45 from the amount of time that the command units were there it was three four five hours something like that and how long did you attend that session

00:45:52 session as i say i didn't attend the session i just knew that the sessions were taking place

00:45:56 place when i say i witnessed it i witnessed the command units i witnessed control officers

00:46:02 officers uh station managers from around the brigade and ort officers operational review team officers all being at merton whilst the training was taking place

00:46:13 whilst the training was taking place that's what i mean when i say i witnessed it i'd assumed when you said witnessed in the sense that you'd sat there observing what was going on is that wrong no apologies if i gave you that impression so when you say witnessed

00:46:25 so when you say witnessed does it amount to looking out of your office window and seeing the command units there and the relevant personnel that would attend an fsg training session is that what we're talking about yes

00:46:34 yes and on top of that the the information that christine sharp had shared with me both face-to-face and in writing on the structure of each session and the

00:46:45 on the structure of each session and the dates that the session were taking place and just for the avoidance of doubt you yourself had not neither read nor critically reviewed the course materials in terms of briefing packs and the rest of it and

00:46:57 briefing packs and the rest of it and i think i have seen them i don't recall for the areas that that uh where it was relevant for control some of it was very specific systems based

00:47:08 of it was very specific systems based information i think and i'm not a control officer so the sole source there are two sources that would appear for your views on the adequacy of fsg training

00:47:19 adequacy of fsg training that is the extent to which you witnessed activity looking at your office window and what you were told by chris sharp is that right and conversations with scott hayward and joanne that the fsg training was taking

00:47:31 joanne that the fsg training was taking place

00:47:32 place and i trusted in them that it was carried out in a structured meaningful and uh meaningful way we'll come on to your

00:47:40 your email exchange as the christine sharpe in due course but i just want to make clear the base upon which we understood you you've come to a view on fsg policy and training or training rather could we look at lfb trouble zero five

00:47:52 could we look at lfb trouble zero five two one nine four uh which are the agreed minutes of uh joint secretaries meeting which i think is the jcc meeting yes thank you and uh held on the 16th of

00:48:03 thank you and uh held on the 16th of november 2016. we can see that you attended you're the last attendee identified on the far left hand corner under the heading brigade

00:48:14 now your draft review of brigade control was discussed i think with staff side representatives is that right uh yes i think it was discussed on a few occasions and if we go to page six of this minute

00:48:25 this minute i

00:48:26 i would like to look at the second paragraph under the heading point 49 which is in the top part of this page which says this advise the mtfa

00:48:39 which says this advise the mtfa and fsg 2016 training has been completed for all those staff that were available and two ne courses have been completed now any presumably new entrant

00:48:50 completed now any presumably new entrant yes

00:48:51 yes mtfa what does that stand for that's marauding terrorist firearms attack thank you

00:48:57 thank you given there was no reference to fsg in the report why was fsg training and new entrance course singled out at this meeting can you remember

00:49:08 you remember new entrance courses i think was identified in the report as certainly in the actions i think in terms of bringing establishment levels up

00:49:18 levels up um

00:49:20 um whilst i don't think i uh specifically talked about fsg training i don't know why it's why it was discussed at this jcc meeting i'm not sure

00:49:31 sure can you remember now what was meant by the phrase and i quote all those staff that were available close quote

00:49:40 um i take that to read all staff that you know were on duty uh that weren't on leave or off sick or seconded elsewhere yeah what was

00:49:52 sick or seconded elsewhere yeah what was the format of the training that had been provided

00:49:56 provided were you able to assist us with that uh no the fs the only fsg training that i'm aware of in 2016 was the um

00:50:05 um command unit joint training that i um i've spoken about and the mtfa training i i'm not sure to be honest thank you can we go back to your 2017 report to the cmb which we

00:50:17 your 2017 report to the cmb which we find at lfb trouble zero three two eight two four four six

00:50:34 now if we look at paragraph 22 and the third bullet point we can see that fsg familiarization has again been identified as a particular topic we touched on this slightly earlier

00:50:46 slightly earlier where it says that a number of key recommendations have already been made including additional familiarization to staff on ncc and fire survival guidance

00:50:57 again the additional familiarization is staff just to control isn't it yes again can you help us why was fsg training singled out here

00:51:09 i think it may be me that put this in because that's additional training that i witnessed

00:51:15 witnessed uh or it may have been passed to me by scott hayward i'm sure when i put this report together for dave brown and then cmb in february um because it does have some updates in

00:51:26 um because it does have some updates in it that had happened since the july before i'm sure i would have leo's scott hayward on this now can we come on you you've referred to it into earlier evidence can we come on to the fsg

00:51:37 on to the fsg command unit workshops which i think were

00:51:39 were coordinated or supervised by christine sharp as you've indicated and i think they were conducted in april 2016. may have been the first one but my understanding was i think there were 16

00:51:51 understanding was i think there were 16 sessions i think well let's come on to that but i at least started thereabouts and for this purpose can we go to your first statement which is an lfb treble zero three two eight two three four

00:52:03 zero three two eight two three four slash eight

00:52:10 and if we can go to paragraph 32 and particularly at the foot of which is at the foot of that page and it says this as well as having several meetings with aom sharp between

00:52:21 several meetings with aom sharp between march and november 2016 i received several emails from her providing me with updates specifically on fsg training

00:52:29 training i received assurance that there were 16 fsg training sessions programmed return over the place to take place in 2016 which allowed for all six watches within

00:52:40 allowed for all six watches within control and the four watches at fire stations for the eight command units to receive the training now did uh aom shop assure you that there were 16

00:52:51 aom shop assure you that there were 16 fsg training sessions programmed to take place in 2016 along the lines you've summarized there yes did you verify thereafter that those

00:53:02 did you verify thereafter that those sessions had in fact been provided to staff

00:53:05 staff uh yes i think i spoke to christine on numerous occasions i think in fact two of them may have slipped into january 2017 is my recollection

00:53:16 january 2017 is my recollection now

00:53:17 now we can go to it but you say in your first statement that you didn't look at the detail of what has been covered in the fsg training you've also said in your second statement that you did not have direct knowledge of the training courses or

00:53:29 knowledge of the training courses or their implementation in 2016 and 2017 evidence which you've confirmed today

00:53:36 today that leads to this question which is as the person who is ultimately responsible for the effective training in relation to fsg's wasn't it both necessary and

00:53:47 to fsg's wasn't it both necessary and beneficial for you to require an understanding of how cros and supervisors were being trained about how to handle and what to say during the course of fsg calls i had to have faith in my

00:54:00 i had to have faith in my staff

00:54:02 staff and i put my trust in the principal operations manager for control

00:54:08 control that was taking place

00:54:13 could we go to lfb

00:54:15 lfb triple zero three five four two one

00:54:31 now you sent a brief email timed at 1316

00:54:37 1316 to aom sharp in response to an email she sent earlier on the 2nd of march which is timed at 12 18

00:54:45 18 about the third round of file fire survival guidance workshops and you

00:54:50 and you indicate that you would like to look in at the training aom shop was running now when i assumed earlier on that you'd attended

00:55:00 attended this was the basis of my understanding that you had looked in which gives rise to this basic question did you look in sadly not this was certainly one of my intentions

00:55:11 intentions this email to chris was on second of march i started in the position first of march and that was absolutely my intention

00:55:18 intention but as it became evident very very quickly

00:55:22 quickly uh i needed to deal with capital on the issues surrounding vision and i just didn't have an opportunity to go and look in much more detail the

00:55:34 go and look in much more detail the sessions that were being discussed here was attendance at the fsg cu training if i can call it that a form of fsg training for control staff

00:55:45 a form of fsg training for control staff in your view and that of christine sharp i was certainly led to believe it was now on the 11th of march 2016 so some nine days later you sent a further email

00:55:57 nine days later you sent a further email to aom sharp about the fsg workshops we can find that email at lfb 0032836

00:56:07 0032836 and i really want to look at the second email on that page

00:56:16 now in the opening sentence of that second email

00:56:21 you refer to the importance of ensuring quotes a solid structure around the planning and recording of training what had prompted you to raise that particular point so early on in your

00:56:33 particular point so early on in your time

00:56:34 time at martin and zayc operational response i don't think there's anything specific that made me say that i think i would i always wanted to see a

00:56:45 i think i would i always wanted to see a solid structure uh around the planning of training and i wanted to ensure it was being recorded as it should so statement of good practice as opposed to an expression of concerns you'd

00:56:56 to an expression of concerns you'd already started to feel yes could we now go to lfb trouble zero three two eight three six

00:57:10 and if we look at the top of the page see an email from chris sharpe 14th of march

00:57:17 march timed 11 35 and she'd emailed you to confirm her conversation with you that morning and she wrote in the second line this all command units are instructed to

00:57:28 all command units are instructed to enter their workshops in their station diaries

00:57:31 diaries we record controls control staff training in our spreadsheet which is then loaded onto our itrs what was the substance of the discussion you'd had if you can remember with aom

00:57:42 you'd had if you can remember with aom sharp that had prompted this email can you now remember i'm sorry i can't recall when miss shop refers to recording control staff training on a spreadsheet was that with specific reference to

00:57:54 was that with specific reference to recording the fsg cu workshop uh

00:57:59 uh yes i'm sure it is but that is uh the for any ost led training i think is this spreadsheet that they used to update could we now go to lfb 005208

00:58:21 now on the 5th of april you sent an email to a number of individuals within the lfb under the subject familiarization for senior offices

00:58:30 offices the paragraph of the email that is numbered

00:58:34 numbered one discussed aom sharps fsg training which you describe in the second line of that paragraph as being quotes primarily for control staff

00:58:46 control staff if the training was primarily for control and why were you seeking help from the operational side of the lfb can i just review this is saying this

00:59:13 so this was not solely around using station managers and group managers across the organization to undertake

00:59:22 undertake the fsg training this is more more around

00:59:26 a conversation i'd have with dave brown where we wanted to set up a day every couple of years for all middle managers so station managers and group managers to come to

00:59:37 managers and group managers to come to control at martin and spend some time looking at the work some of the work that controlled it it may or may not i can't specifically remember whether fsg would have been included in that

00:59:48 would have been included in that look at the rmc look at the national coordination centre and

00:59:53 and also

00:59:54 also looking at how to set up the bcc which was the brigade coordination center which is something that we would set up for things like major incidents thank you

01:00:03 you can we go on to a separate document now which is lfb trouble zero four zero five four one

01:00:19 these are minutes as their title indicates of an operations review team meeting on the 11th of january 2017. um if we can go to page two

01:00:30 you'll see the second subheading under item four is jos fsg

01:00:37 jos fsg training

01:00:40 first of all jos stood for joe smith presumably um i'm assuming so i'm not sure why the small o's there may be that someone else was there with a similar initials

01:00:51 similar initials now uh joanne smith reported in the second bullet point assuming it's her that the fsg training was quotes too focused

01:01:01 focused it is joe smith i should say if we go back to page one but we don't need to do that was too focused on cu and control just facilitating and the scripts would be rewritten

01:01:12 rewritten now would you agree that that comment suggests that even if fsg cu training was intended to count as training for control staff it had not been

01:01:23 control staff it had not been uh wholly effective if that statement is accurate that control are just facilitating uh

01:01:31 uh yes it would be accurate and i'll be very disappointed that's not the uh picture i was painted thank you um could we now go back to mr hayward's

01:01:42 um could we now go back to mr hayward's table of percentages of fsg training completion uh which we can find at lfb uh trouble zero double five one nine one forward slash 26.

01:01:58 [Music]

01:02:02 now you've expressed doubts already about the accuracy of the 83 figure in relation to staff for 2016.

01:02:12 is that undercooking the number of staff or is it

01:02:17 or is it overplaying it under under there was just over 100 staff i think

01:02:24 do you have any reason to doubt that the total number of trade staff trained was 38

01:02:30 38 i don't recognize any of these numbers i do know for fact that 83 was well below the total number of staff which is why i would have i wouldn't have any faith in any of

01:02:42 i wouldn't have any faith in any of those numbers

01:02:45 would you have scrutinized the relevant training records to allow you to form an informed view of the number of staff who are undertaking fsg training

01:02:56 who are undertaking fsg training sorry can you you don't have any faith in these figures and what i'm trying to establish is on what basis you would have reached an informed view of how many staff undertook fsg training

01:03:08 of how many staff undertook fsg training in say for example 2016. in 2016 i think the only did you did you sorry did you say specifically fsg training yes this is only concerned with fsg training i think in 2016 the only fsg training was that that was taking

01:03:20 fsg training was that that was taking place with the command units but on the basis of other than instinct there's no detail in terms of documents or anything you can refer us to uh to cause you to doubt or to

01:03:32 to uh to cause you to doubt or to doubt the number of 38 staff being trained on fsg uh handling as is set out there no nothing i can think of other than i'm

01:03:43 no nothing i can think of other than i'm sure ost would have an exact record of how many staff had been trained that year

01:03:47 year let's assume let's give mr hayward the benefit the doubt that it is 38 if the total number of staff was 100 plus

01:03:57 plus then the percentage of staff being trained is even worse than mr hayward indicates isn't it i would agree

01:04:04 now if we look at the 2017 figure it looks there as if only 34 out of 107 had received fsg training which is a matter of maths is 32 percent

01:04:16 which is a matter of maths is 32 percent of brigade control if that's right were you aware of these low figures of staff being receiving fsg training um i have no faith in these figures um

01:04:28 um i have no faith in these figures um but

01:04:29 but i know

01:04:31 i know that there was a significant lack of anything other than vision training taking place in 2016 apart from the training we've spoken about and that carried on into 2017 as well

01:04:43 2017 as well um

01:04:44 um as for the specifics of 2017 figures here i really can't say how accurate they are now

01:04:52 now were you aware and the weight of the evidence suggests this

01:04:57 this that no fsg training was provided uh in 2017

01:05:02 2017 at all before the 14th of june 2017. were you aware of that i was as i said i was aware fsg training alongside the command units was taking

01:05:13 alongside the command units was taking place

01:05:15 place but i'm not i couldn't say with any certainty at all whether any other training towards around fsg was taking place can i ask you a contingent question assuming that these figures are right

01:05:30 the picture they portray is that there is a consistent failure to provide fsg training if they are right would you accept that yes isn't that deficiency a chronic and

01:05:42 isn't that deficiency a chronic and systemic one first of all yes

01:05:45 yes isn't that something you ought to be aware of first of all as ac operational response

01:05:50 response yes

01:05:51 yes and also in your position as director of operations after march 2017. yes did anyone bring these matters to your attention

01:05:59 attention yes

01:06:00 yes and who did scott and joanne regularly updated me on the efforts that were being made around vision to put fixes in place

01:06:11 vision to put fixes in place and it was those fixes and the training everything that went alongside the changes to vision that needed to happen to free up the time for other training and again was the position that vision

01:06:24 and again was the position that vision crowded out the amount of space that people were able to devote the time and effort to other forms of training 100 could we go back to the summary of the audit presented to gpac we looked at

01:06:35 audit presented to gpac we looked at earlier which is a lfb trouble zero double four six four zero and a particular page twenty five

01:06:50 now you'll recall then the third column from the left at the foot of page 25 and turning over to page 26 the auditors or the authors identified a potential risk arising from a failure to

01:07:02 potential risk arising from a failure to effectively monitor receipt of fsg training

01:07:06 training and if we look at the second column from the right hand side at the foot of page 25

01:07:13 25 we can see a corresponding agreed action concerning that risk it's got responsibility senior operations manager there's the heading and it says this an independent record

01:07:25 and it says this an independent record of the provision of fire survival guidance training for all control staff will be maintained and monitored to ensure that all staff are in receipt of this training at least annually

01:07:36 this training at least annually a monthly report will be produced by ost providing the annual fsg training update and we will be directing oms to notify the training team if individuals are

01:07:47 the training team if individuals are nearing their annual refresher so we can get them on a refresher course did you ever see the monthly reports referred to there no were you aware that that was a an

01:07:59 were you aware that that was a an arrangement that had been proposed to gpac no

01:08:07 could i take you to a later iteration of this table lfb

01:08:11 lfb trouble zero five nine five nine seven and page two

01:08:23 now we see in the third column from the left the second row down

01:08:30 the responsibility for monitoring fsg training

01:08:34 training appears to have been assigned to som joanne smith and is marked in the far right hand column as completed did joanne smith ever provide to you a

01:08:45 did joanne smith ever provide to you a report about the extent of completion of fsg refresher training no

01:08:52 no did either smith or haywood indicate to you that they were having difficulty monitoring or notifying the operations managers that training was due

01:09:02 was due no

01:09:05 apologies for going back to it can we go back to mr hayward's table lfb trouble zero double five one nine one four seven

01:09:17 the figure for 2016 at least in part for that of 2017 fell within your time as ac operational response if this is right do you accept that the table suggests that fewer than half your

01:09:29 table suggests that fewer than half your staff received fsg training when you had responsibility for control uh if this table is right yes

01:09:37 yes can i just please caveat that with um

01:09:43 um during my time as i've said a number of times i did see the fsg training taking place with command units and

01:09:51 and i wouldn't want the inquiry to get the impression that there were a significant number of staff that had no fsg training all control officers had received some fsg training

01:10:03 fsg training it was featured it was included in the new entrance training

01:10:07 training and

01:10:09 routinely up to a point i accept there's a number of years where they haven't quite clearly but they will have all had some fsg training at some point

01:10:20 some fsg training at some point could we go to paragraph 20 or 30 sorry of mr brown's second witness statement which could be found at lfb trouble zero eight four zero two zero forward slash

01:10:32 eight four zero two zero forward slash thirteen

01:10:42 now in that paragraph mr brown said this scott hayward made me aware that when there were occasions when fsg refresher training was not being delivered in

01:10:53 training was not being delivered in accordance with agreed time scales this occurred when they were competing priorities in brigade control for example in 2015 to 2017 a considerable amount of time was invested

01:11:05 considerable amount of time was invested in training brigade cros on the vision mobilizing system which meant there was an impact on the delivery of fsg refresher training during that period the vision mobilizing system was a risk

01:11:17 the vision mobilizing system was a risk critical project which was crucial that the brigade delivered on time

01:11:24 now there may be an extent to which you can't help us on this but that paragraph suggests that hayward was reporting directly to dave brown during your time as ac operational

01:11:36 during your time as ac operational response

01:11:37 response were you aware of that

01:11:40 of that secondary line of communication no i'm not sure that's accurate for the time i was assistant commissioner scott reported to me and then i would report directly to dave brown i would be

01:11:52 directly to dave brown i would be surprised

01:11:54 surprised if scott had uh reported anything significant to dave without me being aware of it unless of course i was away on leave for maybe a couple excuse

01:12:05 away on leave for maybe a couple excuse me a couple of weeks or something

01:12:09 if mr brown was aware that fsg refresher training was not being delivered as he puts it in accordance with agreed time scales were you similarly

01:12:20 you similarly aware i was certainly aware during 2016 and 17

01:12:25 and 17 that the vast majority of training was being done on vision now where he refers to the competing priorities in the identifiers vision were there any other competing

01:12:36 were there any other competing priorities that was diminishing the time space resource available for training i don't think so now

01:12:51 um could we go to mr hayward's second witness statement which can be found at lfb trouble zero eight six two one three

01:13:07 and i'd like to go to page 8 if that were possible paragraph 40.

01:13:16 he's discussing here as you can see fsg refresher training he says in the second sentence this i did raise concerns about increased workload ost were taking on over this

01:13:27 workload ost were taking on over this period and asked whether we should consider outsourcing training in order to bring control into line with the operational training being delivered by babcock

01:13:36 babcock do you recall mr hayward raising at least with you a concern that ost was overstretched yes and i think i agreed to

01:13:47 to maintain the ost establishment at a higher number um i can't if that was a permanent or temporary thing i think that was i think i increased it to six aoms

01:13:58 i increased it to six aoms did you or mr hayward investigate uh the effectiveness or the practicalities of babcock taking over responsibility for training from ost yes we did consider that and we met with

01:14:11 yes we did consider that and we met with i think it was peter groves who was head of brigade training and i think angela hale i think and possibly jackie adams bonito all three of those were from the brigades training department and in broad terms what's the

01:14:22 department and in broad terms what's the up what was the upshot the decision was to

01:14:26 to apart from cbt type training and some more generic courses babcock were to deliver those but the specifics around training new entrants

01:14:37 entrants and some of the more system based training that needed to take place for control officers that would remain in house

01:14:44 house and

01:14:45 and presumably because that's where the expertise and knowledge lay that's correct i think the long-term view certainly my long-time long-term view

01:14:53 view would be that once vision had stabilized we would uh push for the

01:14:59 for the all of control training to go into apart from the day-to-day training to go into the babcock arena now in the in her own witness statement and we can go to it lfb double zero one two

01:15:12 go to it lfb double zero one two one two one nine forward slash twenty two

01:15:23 joe smith uh said this at paragraph 56 in the third line of that paragraph upon my return from see foe in 2015 i asked for a list of which control

01:15:35 asked for a list of which control members had fsg training outstanding now miss smith returned from her secondment in january 2015. after her return did she raise with you any concerns that

01:15:46 any concerns that control staff were not receiving their refresher training on fsg's i wasn't in control when she returned uh i came into control about a year after she returned but no the answer to

01:15:57 after she returned but no the answer to your question is no all these questions relate to your time in control i'm not asking you to speak to that time you or not

01:16:04 not thank you now if we can go to questions now about the vision system and if we go back to your first witness statement which is lfb trouble zero three two eight two three

01:16:15 trouble zero three two eight two three forward slash eleven

01:16:26 and if we look at paragraph 46 you say this

01:16:29 this a number of the training and development specific recommendations that i made in my report have been completed others have not progressed as expected

01:16:40 as expected the introduction of vision has been the main reason for this control staff spare time and capacity was devoted to training on vision upgrades and workarounds leaving insufficient time for the wider suite of

01:16:51 insufficient time for the wider suite of training recommended in my report the vast majority of staff and managers wanted additional training and dedicated time to indicate training unfortunately the priority had to be

01:17:03 unfortunately the priority had to be learning how to use vision and the continual stream of workaround solutions for system problems and upgrades

01:17:12 now in what way did the recommendations not progress as expected to use your euphemism

01:17:19 euphemism i think the majority of them did um

01:17:24 um i can't remember exactly which ones did and which ones didn't without looking at the

01:17:28 the updates from scott hayward

01:17:36 what steps did you investigate to see whether there were there was a workaround to prevent vision basically consuming all the time and

01:17:47 basically consuming all the time and resources that would otherwise be devoted to other aspects of training sorry can you rephrase the question yes what did you look to do to prime prevent or mitigate the

01:18:00 to prime prevent or mitigate the consequences of vision crowding out other time and resources devoted to training

01:18:07 it was extremely difficult just because the sheer volume of work to try and fix and overcome issues with vision and that was um

01:18:18 was um that was our priority to deal with that and it was taken to a very high level in terms of meetings with capita thank you

01:18:28 thank you can i go on to um a separate and distinct topic now which is the reviews and other considerations that uh took place after the grenfell fire so as it's a new topic as it's 20 past

01:18:40 so as it's a new topic as it's 20 past three that might be convenient yes i think it would thank you we'll have our afternoon break at that point mr george we'll come back please at 25 to 4 and uh while iraq please don't talk to

01:18:52 and uh while iraq please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it thank you very much

01:19:05 thank you very much 25 to 4.

01:36:54 would you ask mr george to come back in please

01:37:06 all right mr george yes thank you sir right thank you very much yes mr clinton thank you sir um miss george we're about to turn on to the post fire reports recommendations

01:37:17 recommendations now as we've touched on assistant commissioner jonathan smith was recruited by the lfb and in 2019 he reported on control now

01:37:26 now as you've

01:37:27 as you've indicated he was an external appointment from hertfordshire i think i'm right in saying that's correct and

01:37:33 and when he joined the nfb in 2019 you were then deputy commissioner and i think you were his line manager if you want a better phrase that's correct and it was you and commissioner cotton who instructed him to carry out quotes a

01:37:44 who instructed him to carry out quotes a root and branch review of control is that right yes now could we go to lfb double zero one two double one seven one forward slash nine

01:37:55 slash nine now this is um assistant commissioner uh smith's

01:37:59 smith's witness statement and if we go to the second sentence of paragraph 24 he said this as i was new to the lfb and had no previous involvement in the grenfell tower fire or the actions taken by the

01:38:11 tower fire or the actions taken by the lfb following the fire it was felt that i would be able to bring an objective perspective to this review was it your view that a newcomer's objective eye was what was required uh yes

01:38:23 uh yes now while your own review and that of ac smith identified many of the same deficiencies there are some differences between the two documents i'd like to explore with you this afternoon now if we can return to um ac smith's

01:38:37 now if we can return to um ac smith's report which can be found at lfb treble zero eight four zero nine seven forward slash 5.

01:38:51 and if we look at the first paragraph and it's the middle of the fifth line he says that the lfb should quote aim to bring control training

01:39:02 aim to bring control training under the remit of the central training department close quotes now you did not make that recommendation in your own review despite the various failings you'd

01:39:13 despite the various failings you'd identified at that time was it something that crossed your mind and that you dismissed or is it something you didn't think was necessary yeah i think i said it was my long-term plan or view

01:39:24 plan or view that control training would come under babcock and the reason i hadn't made that recommendation before was because the system was not stable now ac smith's review concluded that training at control required specific

01:39:36 training at control required specific attention

01:39:37 attention and if we look at page two

01:39:42 and the final paragraph at the end of the first line

01:39:48 this is something we've looked at before the entire provision of training assurance should be seen as a corporate risk

01:39:54 risk now ac smith review took place more than two years after you presented your findings uh in february to 2017 to cmb do you agree that by identifying

01:40:05 do you agree that by identifying training as a corporate risk ac smith viewed the defects in training as even more serious than you had identified back in 2016 2017

01:40:16 back in 2016 2017 uh i wouldn't say he identified it as anything more serious he

01:40:22 he suggested it was a corporate risk maybe from the way things operated in hertfordshire that he had different perspectives of what he would see as a corporate risk

01:40:33 see as a corporate risk but i think certainly the issues he raised were significant as as were those that i raised

01:40:39 raised now you've said that you monitored scott hayward in relation to the implementation of the actions following your

01:40:47 your review both as ac operational response and later as director of operations

01:40:55 looking back now do you think that the principal reason why there was no effective progress on implementing your recommendation lay primarily with mr hayward

01:41:07 lay primarily with mr hayward acting as pom not having sufficient resource within himself and available to him to make the necessary changes i wouldn't say that there had been a significant lack of progress i think if

01:41:19 significant lack of progress i think if you look at the actions i made particularly in relation to an enhanced suite of training i think much of that was done if we can go to page 16 in this document

01:41:32 if we can go to page 16 in this document which sets out ac smith's action plan

01:41:38 so it's a completely different document so that's my fault lfb trouble zero eight four zero nine two forward sixteen

01:41:54 thank you if we see

01:41:57 if we see here medium term actions item 2.6 ac smith proposed the introduction of the development and maintenance of operational professionalism democ

01:42:08 operational professionalism democ framework and process and its application to control now in his witness statement of paragraph 35 and we can go to that which is lfb if we can put this statement side

01:42:19 is lfb if we can put this statement side by side lfb double zero one two double one seven one forward slash twelve

01:42:35 we see paragraph 35 and it's the end of the third line ac smith stated this daemot preside provides all control room staff with a framework to deliver cyclical training on the knowledge and

01:42:47 cyclical training on the knowledge and skills required to maintain their role related competence in eight core areas those areas are fsg major incident emergency advice

01:42:58 major incident emergency advice secondary mobilizing mobilizing system radio communications systems and call handling now democrat been in existence i think since 2006

01:43:11 since 2006 can you help us to why it hadn't been introduced into control before uh 2020

01:43:20 no dump was a policy for station-based staff

01:43:25 staff i think just prior to jonathan smith starting there was discussion i think i had discussion with peter groves and the training team because there was

01:43:37 because there was a development of the the whole of the dam policy was being rewritten and i expressed my desire that control should fit into that as well as specialist

01:43:48 fit into that as well as specialist officers as well so phase one of the dam up review which i think is a two year pro two year project

01:43:54 project the first stage was for the firefighters and operational staff and the second stage was going to be for control staff and specialist officers and what did you see as the advantages

01:44:05 and what did you see as the advantages of the application of the democrat process to control well i've seen it firsthand for station-based staff it laid out very clearly what the expectation was

01:44:16 clearly what the expectation was for staff in terms of uh training thank you can we put both of those documents down and turn up ac smith's review which again can be found at lfb trouble zero

01:44:28 found at lfb trouble zero eight four zero nine seven forward slash two

01:44:38 and if we look at the second paragraph where he says this there is a discernible sense of decision inertia

01:44:46 inertia amongst the leadership team at the london operations center lack of direction coordination and a visible presence have been notable themes brought to my attention

01:44:57 themes brought to my attention do you accept that criticism of control

01:45:03 yes and as i've said prior to jonathan smith starting i made the principal operations manager position a redundant position and i

01:45:14 position a redundant position and i decided that an assistant commissioner would be more appropriate with those themes or problems matters which

01:45:21 which you'd identify during your time either as ac operational response and later as direct director of operations later as director of operations yes

01:45:32 later as director of operations yes why do you think the themes were more obvious to you when you were one step removed from control than when you'd been

01:45:39 been in more direct supervision indeed based at martin for a large part of it i think it was more that the time i was at merton

01:45:45 merton scott hayward's almost sole focus was on vision and once that had been sorted other problems came into sharper relief as that first summary that's fair and after

01:45:56 that first summary that's fair and after the grenfell tower fire other issues were brought to my attention

01:46:01 attention uh around control which i was not satisfied with could we go back to ac smith's statement which can be found at lfb double zero one two double one seven one forward

01:46:13 one two double one seven one forward slash ten

01:46:21 now if we look at paragraph thirty one in the bottom third of that page ac smith said this one of the key drivers behind the establishment of the new operational resilience and control

01:46:33 operational resilience and control department was to ensure that control was fully integrated in the lfb and to embed control in all aspects of operational response when you served as ac operational

01:46:44 when you served as ac operational response did you also gain the impression that

01:46:50 that the principal reason for training not been effectively rolled out was its separate and distinct status or its treatment as such i didn't think that was the reason

01:47:01 i didn't think that was the reason that training wasn't taking place no

01:47:07 i now want to leave behind control and i want to turn to operational matters and in particular operational risk

01:47:15 risk now the first thing as with control that i'd like to discuss with you is your particular role and responsibilities in relation to operational risk information in particular now

01:47:26 now you were dac for the southwest area between may 2013 and i think february 2016. yes

01:47:33 2016. yes and in that role you're responsible for day-to-day operations including fire prevention work in the eight southwest boroughs is that right yeah the day-to-day operations the day-to-day running of those stations yes

01:47:45 running of those stations yes and that put you in overall responsibility and control of fire stations in the southwest area yes

01:47:54 yes and that

01:47:55 and that does that is the logical consequence therefore that you had ultimate oversight of and responsibility for the collection of operational risk information by means of section 72d visits carried

01:48:07 by means of section 72d visits carried out by individual crews i was overall responsible for everything that took place at those stations yes and

01:48:14 and did all borough commanders within the southwest area report to you yes and station managers reported to their borough commanders is that right that's correct although there were two or three station managers that reported directly

01:48:26 station managers that reported directly to me as well and southwest area included the north kensington station is that right yes now in relation to your later role as director of operations uh we've heard from mr brown during module eight uh

01:48:38 from mr brown during module eight uh five rather what the nature and particular responsibilities of that role were now in summary it seems to entail overall responsibility for the lfb's operational

01:48:49 responsibility for the lfb's operational functions

01:48:50 functions ultimate responsibility for the management of all fire stations and ultimate responsibility for discharge of the lfb's statutory duties under section 7 of the fire and rescue services act 2004 is that right yes

01:49:05 now can we look at the process for the collection of operational risk information so essentially discharging the obligation under section 72d of the 2004 act

01:49:17 now am i right to understand that the principal means by which the lfb discharge its obligations under 72d was via visits conducted by cruz that's correct

01:49:28 correct and the completion of premises risk assessments based on information collected during those visits in accordance with the provisions of pn 800. that's correct and the information collected in these

01:49:40 and the information collected in these visits would then be recorded in the operational risk database is that right if the premises risk assessment pra was above i think it was 150 that's right now we heard from mr brown that the

01:49:51 now we heard from mr brown that the brigade's practical expectation during his tenure was that all high-rise premises would be recorded on the ord was that also your understanding

01:50:02 was that also your understanding um after a period of time yes that was my understanding once the change had been made in about

01:50:11 in about 2013-14 yes

01:50:15 and when you say a change had been made can you help us what was that particular change that you're referring to there so one of the actions

01:50:25 actions post lacanel was to create a an inspection regime targeted at high priority buildings and it was that particular action that i worked on along with the other three

01:50:37 worked on along with the other three area dax

01:50:38 area dax to produce a method

01:50:41 a method for stations and station managers borrower commanders to use so they had a a way of prioritizing the visits to take place in their areas thank you now the next topic i'd like to discuss with you

01:50:53 next topic i'd like to discuss with you is the operational risk database entry for grenfell tower itself and i'd like to have the benefit of your experience as the area dac to comment upon it now the ord entry can be found at lfb

01:51:05 the ord entry can be found at lfb quadruple 0-3116

01:51:16 presumably following the fire you are now familiar with this ord entry unfortunately yes um i'm sensing giving that answer that you're probably going to agree with me

01:51:27 you're probably going to agree with me what its principal deficiencies are but just for the avoidance of doubt i'd like to take you through them and first of all there were no plans of the tower despite the fact that the then station manager had noted that plans are

01:51:39 manager had noted that plans are required for the mdt is that right that's correct excuse me that's correct the only photograph of the tower was a small aerial image which gave no information about the building

01:51:50 gave no information about the building or access to the building is that right that's correct if we turn to page seven

01:51:58 we can see the photo that was provided

01:52:02 thirdly the incorrect number of flaws was recorded uh 20 floors is stated on page three under hazards

01:52:12 is that right yes and fourthly under the heading tactical plan on page four

01:52:19 uh the subheading operational contingency plan contains simply the blank box uh dated the 30th of october 2009 is that right yes now dave brown told the inquiry that

01:52:31 now dave brown told the inquiry that that is not the standard of entry that he'd expect um would you agree totally did you have a view or do you have a view either

01:52:42 view either given your experience as the dac for the southwest area or as a director of operations about the effectiveness of lfb's 72d visits as a way of identifying and recording relevant operational risk

01:52:53 recording relevant operational risk information i would have to say that this particular entry for grenfell tower is not um

01:53:00 is not um the standard certainly not the standard we expect and nor is it the norm uh the majority in fact all of the entries i've seen for other premises have been

01:53:10 have been more

01:53:11 more effective and give more information than what i've seen here so this is a particularly poor example totally

01:53:18 totally and so it would have been the responsibility of the station manager most directly to identify the deficiencies in this entry presumably yeah i'm shocked at one the information that's on there how poor it is

01:53:29 that's on there how poor it is and what it lacks and two how it's got past our quality assurance processes and you mentioned the station manager yes and that ultimately is where it lies in terms of quality assurance with the station manager doesn't it yes although

01:53:41 station manager doesn't it yes although i accept as the area dhc ultimately the responsibility would have been with me and with dave brown who oversaw the entire directorate could i now turn to the question of

01:53:52 could i now turn to the question of training on section 72d visits now the inquiry also heard from mr brown that

01:53:58 that training on 72d visits took place mr brown was taken to a particular training package and that can be found at

01:54:06 at bab quadruple zero double zero five six

01:54:23 is that package familiar to you i'm aware that there was a babcock 72d visit package that covered pn800 but i can't say that i've actually

01:54:34 but i can't say that i've actually undertaken that training myself thank you now to put this in some form of context mr brown thought that training was likely to have been the same training package that was referred to an edition of operational news 24

01:54:47 to an edition of operational news 24 which was published in march 2013. now mr brown was taken to the associated tcap form for this training package which appears not to have been signed off by there's no signature where you'd

01:54:59 off by there's no signature where you'd expect the signature to be mr brown however considered that notwithstanding the absence of an express sign off that the training was still delivered to staff

01:55:10 staff to the best of your knowledge are you able to assist the panel as to whether the training package we're looking at here was in fact trained out to staff i think

01:55:21 was in fact trained out to staff i think if it was a requirement sorry a mandatory requirement of operational news which i think it was then it would have been carried out do you know whether it was provided to all operational staff the operational

01:55:33 all operational staff the operational news was certainly for all station-based staff there were sometimes some elements for senior officers and more recently there were elements for control staff now

01:55:44 now what manager dean ricketts i don't know it's a name familiar to you but he was based at north kent the name's familiar at the time of the fire and he carried out section 72d visits at grenfell tower

01:55:56 out section 72d visits at grenfell tower now he said that he'd never received training on 72d visits now taking that evidence that 10 suggests that if training had

01:56:07 that 10 suggests that if training had been provided it wasn't wholly effective is that

01:56:11 is that is the ricketts experience something you've experienced elsewhere in your experience either as the dac for the southwest area or indeed higher up in the lfb

01:56:20 the lfb no because the mandatory requirement for operational news was

01:56:24 was was generally carried out it was it was mandatory and it was checked by station managers and borough commanders and even if an individual had not been at work on that on that particular date that the

01:56:35 date that the the watch was carrying out that training because of the way the step system worked as i've explained the watch manager would tick the individuals that had undertaken that training and then

01:56:46 had undertaken that training and then update the itrs if an individual hadn't been there it would they would be left as outstanding and then when the watch next come on duty it would be flagged up to the watch officers that that particular individual hadn't

01:56:58 that that particular individual hadn't undertaken that training because they've been on leave or they've been sick so and it wouldn't clear until a tick-up input against that individual so no it was not

01:57:07 was not commonplace for individuals not to do mandatory training when you were dac for the southwest area and later when you're director of operations did you have any cause for concern that crews did not

01:57:20 cause for concern that crews did not were not aware of what section 72d visits were meant to cover and how best to carry them out i was never concerned about that now now we've touched on it earlier and

01:57:31 now we've touched on it earlier and that's quality assurance of oid entries we heard from mr brown that there was a process to monitor the quality of ord entries and he relied upon service standard support officers who

01:57:43 service standard support officers who would carry out annual audits of how well stations recorded the relevant information now is that consistent with your understanding that it was via service standard seven and the service support

01:57:56 standard seven and the service support officers that that function of auditing quality assurance was carried out certainly once the service standards were published there was 11 service standards in total as you said service standard 7 was for

01:58:08 said service standard 7 was for operational contingency planning but once all 11 service standards have been published

01:58:13 published what went hand in hand with that was a number of different types of quality assurance checks and i think there were three or four and it was those quality assurance checks

01:58:24 checks carried out by the service standard support officers that provided the organization with that equality assurance role and

01:58:32 and are you able to help us with how those audits were carried out or is that a level of detail that you don't have no i i

01:58:40 no i i they're they the triple service standard support officers reported directly to me they were the station managers i said reported directly to me as an aerial dac and once those qa checks were

01:58:51 and once those qa checks were established they would have the dates of particular audits would be put into the fire stations and those station managers would attend those fire stations and carry out the

01:59:02 those fire stations and carry out the audits some of those were done purely with the triple so as we used to call them and some were done with the local station manager and i think some even with the local borough commander in your view how effective was this

01:59:14 in your view how effective was this audit exercise in identifying good points as well as bad points it was very effective which is why i'm so surprised that that particular

01:59:27 entry on the oid has slipped through the net

01:59:32 can i now discuss with you the flow of information between stations and the fire safety department

01:59:41 now we've heard from dan daley that the flow of information did not always work well now that's a very general way of putting it but as a very general description is that something that

01:59:51 that sounds familiar to you

01:59:55 certainly in the past it hadn't worked particularly well but there was efforts being made to improve that uh the transfer of information yes mr daley described the flow of information as patchy in the sense it would work better

02:00:08 patchy in the sense it would work better in some areas than in others because of the expertise or experience of the individuals who are responsible for communicating that information does that sound familiar to you as a prime floor impeding the effective flow

02:00:20 prime floor impeding the effective flow of information that's fair there was a you could say a lack of

02:00:24 lack of consistency when mr brown gave evidence first time to the inquiry he said that measures were put in place to address that patchy information flow specifically he said the narrative fire

02:00:35 specifically he said the narrative fire safety manager was allocated to each of the lfb's four areas who would then in turn liaise with the relevant dac to ensure that fire safety and operations spoke at a strategic level

02:00:47 strategic level and also that a fire and safety inspecting officer was assigned to every station

02:00:52 station so that there was a channel of communication that could be opened up between operations and fire safety at a low level that maybe didn't exist as well as it should have done again do those measures sound familiar

02:01:03 again do those measures sound familiar to you

02:01:04 to you each station had a point of contact in the fire safety department who they would go to if they had something they needed to discuss and

02:01:12 and the area fire safety manager was a group manager

02:01:17 manager and there was one per area and they they came to all of my area management team meetings along with my pirate commanders yes and what was your what's your professional assessment of the effect of

02:01:28 professional assessment of the effect of this of those measures in remedying the previously patchy flow of information yeah it was pretty effective yet did it eliminate the problem do you think

02:01:40 think uh to a large degree i would say yes sadly

02:01:47 sadly due to resources and budgetary constraints there weren't enough fire safety officers

02:01:54 you know ideally i would have had a fire safety officer based at every fire station but that just wasn't able to we weren't able to do that can i now turn to a separate topic which is the risks arising from cladding fires

02:02:05 is the risks arising from cladding fires and how they were fed into section 72d visits

02:02:10 visits now

02:02:11 now mr brown's evidence was that it was quotes not on his radar close quotes that crews needed to consider the presence of cladding on a high-rise building as part of the risk assess or part of the assessment

02:02:23 risk assess or part of the assessment process that was undertaken on section 72d visits is that

02:02:29 is that consistent with your understanding of the prominence or lack thereof of the risk posed by cladding oh yes it wasn't on cruise radar they wouldn't have known what to look for

02:02:40 for can you help us as to why it wasn't on the radar of either senior officers in the position of you and mr brown and those lower down the chain i don't think uh any of us envisions an

02:02:51 i don't think uh any of us envisions an incident

02:02:52 incident on the scale of grenfell tower um

02:02:57 um and it would have been very difficult for crews

02:03:00 for crews firefighters to

02:03:04 to look in any meaningful way at the flammability or the way that the cladding had been fitted to the building they wouldn't have really understood or known what they were looking for

02:03:16 known what they were looking for i think mr brown put it i think was the fact that it was outside the remit of operational cruise ability and training uh to identify cladding and the risk posed by cladding would you it sounds to

02:03:27 posed by cladding would you it sounds to me as if you'd agree with that proposition yes i would when you became the dac for the southwest area did you discuss the risks posed by facade cladding or facade panels with anyone no

02:03:39 anyone no did anyone try to have a conversation with you about the topic no

02:03:44 did you have any discussion about whether crew should have regard to the presence of facade panels on high-rise buildings at any stage no

02:03:54 did you have a view informed or otherwise about whether operational crews should be directed to have regard to cladding systems for example and facade panels on residential high-rise

02:04:05 facade panels on residential high-rise buildings when they carried out section 72d visits no

02:04:11 now when mr brown gave evidence in relation

02:04:15 relation uh

02:04:16 uh to a letter which had been sent by mr dobson ken knight about risks that had been identified by certain types of panels following lachnal he said that operational crews were not directed to have regard to the risk of

02:04:27 directed to have regard to the risk of facade panels because there were other measures that were in train to address this

02:04:31 this and in particular he said that borough commanders were well aware of the issues now having regard to what you've just said

02:04:40 said does it accord with your memory the borough commanders were well aware of the issues uh posed by for example non-compliant facade panels and other cladding systems no i don't think bar

02:04:51 cladding systems no i don't think bar commanders were aware of the issues

02:05:00 can i now turn to the specific lack of action that i think you were tasked to discharge and that was latin action 18b or 2b depending on what document you look at which was the creation of a

02:05:12 look at which was the creation of a targeted inspection regime now for that purpose can we start with your first statement lfb treble zero three two eight two three four seventeen

02:05:23 three two eight two three four seventeen and paragraph 69.

02:05:29 now in paragraph 69 you say this in november 2013 the third officer who is dave brown instructed me to carry out some work on a particular action from the lachnal

02:05:40 a particular action from the lachnal house action plan namely to create an inspection regime targeted at high priority buildings now you then refer to asking the borough commander from kingston to consider the action to which we'll return soon

02:05:53 action to which we'll return soon but before then you continue at paragraph 70 to say this there were two parts to action 18 of the coroner's rule 43 monitoring report action 18a was around the brigade

02:06:06 action 18a was around the brigade reviewing procedures for sharing information gained as a result of section 72d visits with crews both within the station in question and other local stations

02:06:17 local stations to discharge action 18 a policy note 800 p 800 the management of operational risk information was being reviewed by another officer action 18 b

02:06:29 action 18 b was to create an inspection regime targeted high priority buildings i was tasked with working on action 18b now if we can look at one copy of the rule 43 monitoring report to which you

02:06:41 rule 43 monitoring report to which you refer and we can find that at lfb 003106

02:06:53 and if we can turn to page 22 in particular at the bottom of that page and here we have action 18 and if we can go over to page 24

02:07:08 we can see action b

02:07:13 in the second row

02:07:18 create an inspection regime targeted high priority buildings and that's the the action point to which you were tasked is that right that's correct and to be clear as i adverted to when

02:07:29 and to be clear as i adverted to when opening this topic it's referred elsewhere as action 2b is that right i believe so but i only knew it as action 18b now commissioner dobson wrote to the

02:07:41 now commissioner dobson wrote to the latino coroner on the 23rd of may 2013 setting up the nfb's proposed actions in response to the recommendations that she'd made now we can find that response at lfb

02:07:52 now we can find that response at lfb treble zero four two zero eight nine

02:08:03 and if we turn to page four and the second paragraph

02:08:11 and it sets out there this it is recommended that the brigade review procedures for sharing information gained as a result of section 72d familiarization and home

02:08:22 section 72d familiarization and home fire safety visits with crews both within the station in question and at other local stations the commissioner stated in response that the brigade will among other

02:08:34 that the brigade will among other actions

02:08:36 actions you see this at the second bullet point create an inspection regime that targets high priority residential and non-residential buildings with a view to increasing the number of premises records which are available to the

02:08:47 records which are available to the brigade's operational staff on the operational risk database now did you see the commissioner's letter to the coroner at the time it was sent so may 2013 i don't believe so

02:09:01 2013 i don't believe so what was your understanding of what action 18b meant and what it required uh

02:09:09 uh i read that to create some method i think as i've alluded to already some method for crews

02:09:17 crews and their station managers borrow commanders to use to give them a steer as to the some sort of priority order in which they need to be carrying out their uh inspections 72d visits

02:09:28 uh inspections 72d visits in their communities how did you understand that the inspection regime referred to in this letter

02:09:34 letter related to worked with the existing arrangements under 70d i think when i was given the brief by dave brown that he when he tasked me with working on that particular action i

02:09:46 with working on that particular action i think

02:09:47 think that was shared then

02:09:52 now if we can go back to paragraph 69 of your first statement which is at lfb yeah

02:10:02 the recommendation was as you can see from

02:10:05 from the

02:10:06 the document on the screen brigade review procedures for sharing information obtained under 72d was anything done in relation to the sharing of

02:10:17 in relation to the sharing of information the sharing of information was once the

02:10:23 once the prioritization had taken place for the 72d visits then it would be by complying with policy note 800 crews of the officers at stations would carry out the premises risk assessment

02:10:35 the premises risk assessment and then if the score was above 150 that information would be shared by placing the information on the operational risk database which was available for crews on their mobile data

02:10:47 available for crews on their mobile data terminals so that was the method of sharing the information yes and that didn't really require any changes did it or did it in terms of the sharing no the the

02:10:58 in terms of the sharing no the the system was already there the the action in particular one i think was 18a was to update policy note 800 and 18b was to

02:11:09 update policy note 800 and 18b was to create that prioritization list as far as you know was there any difficulty in transferring the information that had been obtained from a 72d visit onto the ord and i don't

02:11:22 72d visit onto the ord and i don't believe there was any problem with that now

02:11:24 now thank you

02:11:25 thank you thank you

02:11:27 thank you could we go back to paragraph 69 of your first witness statement which is a lfb trouble zero three two eight two three four seventeen and you say this about the action third

02:11:39 and you say this about the action third line

02:11:40 line one of my borough commanders barack commander for kingston was already the lead officer for service standard seven operational contingency planning with a third officer's agreement i therefore asked the bc for kingston to

02:11:53 therefore asked the bc for kingston to consider the action and put forward a proposal on what could be achieved now the borough commander was john l well is that right yes um

02:12:01 um in a nutshell what were mr elwell's responsibilities as the lead on service standard seven he had full control of service standard seven in terms of

02:12:14 seven in terms of constructing it and creating the breakdown the subsections within that particular service standard what was it about that role in particular that made him appropriate for this task because

02:12:25 him appropriate for this task because service standard seven was operational contingency planning and by by the very nature contingency planning it fell uh well within his arena now on the 29th of november 2013 you emailed mr elwell and

02:12:37 november 2013 you emailed mr elwell and if we go to that uh chain uh confinder lfb

02:12:42 lfb trouble zero four double two five two forward slash two if we could look at the very bottom of page two if that's possible

02:12:56 there's the start of the email as you're the service standard lead officer

02:13:02 officer dave brown has and if we go over the page

02:13:07 and we see in the third paragraph on page three you come

02:13:11 you come to the key point

02:13:14 there are currently only 7 000 ord entries and the third officer feels there should be more he wants us to beef up our inspection program now what discussion had you had with

02:13:26 now what discussion had you had with dave brown about this action before approaching mr elba

02:13:32 mr elba i think he felt and shared at the principal management board meetings that he chaired which the four area dax went to i think he'd shared a view that seven he felt seven thousand entries did not seem enough given the

02:13:45 entries did not seem enough given the geography of london and he felt it should be more beyond the beefing up indication what other guidance or instructions mr brown give to you for onward

02:13:57 brown give to you for onward communication to mr elwell about what he was expecting the regime to look like at the time he gave me the uh or tasked me with that particular action uh he didn't

02:14:08 uh he didn't he didn't know i was going to go to john elwald so he didn't give me any other instruction that won that than what said in that particular action it was me that considered john l well to be a helpful person to assist me with that

02:14:21 did mr brown say to you why he thought that 7 000 entries was insufficient only that the size complexity and nature of london

02:14:30 of london he felt 7 000 didn't seem enough did you agree with that i i've as i said earlier throughout my career i focus more on the quality of information less on quantity

02:14:41 quality of information less on quantity quantity is important to a point but i wasn't so

02:14:44 wasn't so hung up on the number of entries that there currently were did you have concerns about the quality of the entries that you'd seen in relation to high-rise buildings um

02:14:56 um not particularly i don't think i'd ever seen anyone as bad as the one you've highlighted today no now mr elwell replied and we can see that at the bottom of page one of this chain and then going over to page two

02:15:10 chain and then going over to page two and he asked for a copy of the monitoring report saying

02:15:14 saying and also saying this and the final line could you also confirm the use definition of the term high priority buildings in action 18 b as currently this does not accord

02:15:25 as currently this does not accord with any terminology in pn 800 based on the premises risk assessments appendix 2 premises are rated as high risk

02:15:34 risk is this the same concept or does the action plan refer or allude to a different grading model now you reply to that in the email at the very top of page one

02:15:48 and in the second paragraph you say this i have no other d i have no other detail other than this have a look and if i still need to seek guidance on high priority buildings i will i will do but

02:15:59 priority buildings i will i will do but i'd read this as those that present the greatest risk to firefighters what was your understanding of the term high priority buildings at this time so

02:16:10 high priority buildings at this time so in november 2013 it was i'm not quite sure where the term high priority buildings came from it was an unhelpful term in the sense that it didn't accord with any of our policies

02:16:21 didn't accord with any of our policies and i know there was some discussion on this both me with john and myself with dave brown and we came to a view that we would use the term high risk buildings rather than high priority buildings and that was agreed by all involved

02:16:32 that was agreed by all involved and

02:16:34 and if it was

02:16:36 if it was those that present the greatest risk to firefighters how is that risk itself to be assessed or identified it was the based on the premises risk assignment risk assessment within pn800

02:16:51 did you discuss what in substance presented the greatest risk to firefighters with dave brown to flesh out the thinking slightly more no it was solely based on the premises risk

02:17:02 it was solely based on the premises risk assessment and the detail within that basically using the existing policy framework to inform and define the subsequent consideration for the purposes of discharging 18b correct not

02:17:16 purposes of discharging 18b correct not discounting the fact that pn800 was being reviewed now if we can go back to your first statement which is a lfb quadruple zero three two eight two three forward slash

02:17:27 three two eight two three forward slash 18 i'd like to look at paragraph 71

02:17:32 now there you exhibit the briefing paper that

02:17:36 that group manager elwell as he was provided to you on the 13th of december 2013. so roughly two weeks after you initially contacted him we can find that paper itself at lfb zero three two eight two five if we go

02:17:49 zero three two eight two five if we go to that please

02:17:58 now on page one uh mr elwell set out nine issues that he says are quotes implicit within the concern on numbers of ord entries

02:18:09 concern on numbers of ord entries and then he went on below that third paragraph to identify those nine issues and they were is the existing guidance pn800 fit for purpose to achieve the desired outcomes

02:18:22 purpose to achieve the desired outcomes b what other brigade data could be deployed to identify relevant premises for inclusion on the ord c are the 7 000 we have all relevant and in compliance with the guidance in pn800

02:18:35 in compliance with the guidance in pn800 d

02:18:36 d which premises are missing from the ord given the guidance in pn800 e

02:18:42 e what is the capacity of a station watch in terms of the number of ord entries that can be effectively entered and revisited with the existing guidance a pertinent point given the disparity of

02:18:54 a pertinent point given the disparity of the numbers risk and types of premises on different stations ground f is the quality of existing ord entries providing data to underpin safe systems at work g are our staff competent to

02:19:07 at work g are our staff competent to carry out the 72d visits and enter meaningful data and professional tactical plans h

02:19:13 h what are the existing performance evaluation tools to monitor performance and i what service standard is in place to quality assure the relevant extant policies

02:19:25 policies now taking the step back was mr elwell proposing a review of the fundamental adequacy of the brigade's existing operational risk information and management systems

02:19:38 information and management systems um

02:19:39 um not a fundamental change from

02:19:42 from at that such a high level i think from his recommendations it was a shift in practice in the way that we

02:19:51 that we particularly train our staff in putting information onto the ord certainly

02:19:57 certainly and just trying to bottom out that what's a shift to is it a more information driven risk aware process no a shift to

02:20:09 no a shift to sitting down with an individual and explaining the importance of the information that's on the ord and ensuring that they absolutely understand what information and how that

02:20:20 what information and how that information should go on to the rd rather than simply which had often happened in the past emailing

02:20:28 emailing policies and requesting staff familiarize himself with the policy john was suggesting and i agreed that due to the importance of this particular area it was important to make sure to

02:20:40 area it was important to make sure to make sure staff fully understood now can we look at the recommendations that mr elwell made and the summary of those eight recommendations can be set out in page five

02:20:51 out in page five of his report and if we go to that please

02:20:58 if we can look at recommendations two and three

02:21:01 and three uh both emphasize the importance of face-to-face meetings and workshops between managers station and borough commanders and that i quote the current practice of entering new policy notes onto the station circulation folder or

02:21:14 onto the station circulation folder or announcing the policy by email will not be sufficient to effectively explain the expectations required now that sounds given your previous answer you think that's a good recommendation that was worthy of

02:21:25 recommendation that was worthy of implementation absolutely

02:21:30 now when mr brown gave evidence about these recommendations um in october he said that face-to-face meetings were already normal business within the lfb

02:21:41 already normal business within the lfb and were already happening both as between dax borough commanders and station managers and crucially the levels below that between crews and their managers um

02:21:54 between crews and their managers um dealing with the more or the lower down the chain was it your understanding that those types of meetings were happening between

02:22:02 between for example crews and their crew commanders watch managers well watch managers would certainly undertake station-led training as uh regularly yes

02:22:15 and were the meetings happening higher up the scales that at your rank dac borough commander station manager type level absolutely but i think the recommendation here

02:22:26 but i think the recommendation here is and that what i was put into dave brown

02:22:29 brown was that there was a specific need to train or discuss the information around ord so yes those meetings were taking place but unless we actually forced it to be

02:22:41 but unless we actually forced it to be an agenda item we couldn't guarantee that the discussion around our id was going to take place did mr brown understand that was the point you were making that was the focus the aim of the recommendation yeah i think the aim was

02:22:54 recommendation yeah i think the aim was to have either workshops or certainly face-to-face discussions i think that's clear from the wording in the recommendations and dave understood that now recommendation five moving further down

02:23:06 recommendation five moving further down the page was that and i quote a review is undertaken of the disparity of risks across different station grounds and a methodology developed to determine the optimum number of ord entries for

02:23:19 the optimum number of ord entries for stations with high numbers of applicable premises

02:23:22 premises what was your assessment of the merits of that recommendation well it was this is certainly an issue and we needed a way of identifying what was appropriate the um

02:23:33 um level the difference in risk for instance in soho compared to stanmore is really really significant and this is why it was a recommendation on

02:23:44 this is why it was a recommendation on there because soho predominantly is one of the busiest fire stations certainly in the country if not in europe um so for crews from that station to undertake any meaningful visits within that locality was an issue

02:23:56 visits within that locality was an issue in itself especially then add on the complexities of the number of um

02:24:03 of um premises that needed in inspection now if we can go to mr brown's second statement which can be found at lfb uh trouble zero eight four zero two zero forward slash fifteen

02:24:15 forward slash fifteen and paragraph forty

02:24:24 now he says there there are thirty three boroughs across london there are significant variation between the built environment in each london borough some boroughs will have a large amount of commercial buildings whereas others with a height

02:24:36 whereas others with a height will have high percentage of residential buildings and some will have both all of which require an awareness of by fire station staff accordingly it was impractical to set fixed targets for the

02:24:47 impractical to set fixed targets for the number of section 72d visits that staff at each fire station should complete in high-rise residential buildings as it replaced an inequitable workload on some fire station staff it was not

02:24:58 on some fire station staff it was not placed on others especially when taking into account the range of other commitments such as training and community safety um it stands from your previous answer that you agree with mr brown's observation regarding the

02:25:11 brown's observation regarding the significant variation in the built environment across london yes it was a real challenge and when mr brown was asked about recommendation five um he said and i'm i'm paraphrasing i should emphasize that

02:25:22 i'm paraphrasing i should emphasize that the recommended review was never carried out because everyone was already fully aware about the disparity identified by mr elwell so the review would have served no purpose um

02:25:33 served no purpose um do you remember that being mr brown's view at the time

02:25:39 no because his view was we'd i don't think we specifically spoke about each of these eight recommendations he came back to me saying that the recommendations were useful

02:25:50 useful in their totality and then we spoke about what he actually was expecting yeah but he didn't say to you expressly this is already happening people know about

02:26:01 is already happening people know about the disparity so nothing more needs to be done no now mr brown also said that measures had been implemented to address the disparity namely something he called a strategic resource

02:26:12 strategic resource which he described as taking a large number of fire engines off the run and sending them out to carry out a range of activities on other station grounds including 72d visits a phrase he graphically used was

02:26:24 visits a phrase he graphically used was flooding areas which had a high proportion of high-rise buildings

02:26:29 buildings is that consistent with your understanding as to how the problem of disparity if i can put it like that was being addressed by the lfb no i think strategic resource was very rarely if ever

02:26:40 rarely if ever used for

02:26:42 used for 72d visits strategic resource was primarily used for training to take place maybe large scale exercises that type of thing for stations there was another system

02:26:53 another system that fell out of strategic resource which was called flexible deployment of resources

02:26:59 resources and that was but that was primarily used for

02:27:03 for um

02:27:04 um sending a large number of appliances into a housing estate shall we say to carry out home fire safety visits and this flexible deployment of resources was established by dave brown and the dac for the north west area near laubel

02:27:17 dac for the north west area near laubel and it was highly effective at putting um six seven eight fire engines into a an estate to carry out those but never for seven two d visits and i don't see it would have been particularly

02:27:28 it would have been particularly effective

02:27:29 effective for doing 72d visits because ideally you would you would want local crews to be carrying exactly local crews to carry out their visits in their local area rather than bringing in a fire engine

02:27:40 rather than bringing in a fire engine from the other side of london thank you um so that is a convenient place does it stop good thank you um right well we'll stop there in just a moment can you

02:27:51 moment can you give us any idea of how you're getting on with the witness um we are getting on very well we're almost at the close of his examination um it will take

02:28:02 will take i had been considering asking you to sit longer but actually given how long uh mr george has been i think the day has been long enough already but quite and i think we he's been allocated one and a half days for his evidence um we will

02:28:13 half days for his evidence um we will finish him well within the scope of tomorrow morning right well that was what i

02:28:19 what i thought that he would like to know anyway mr george i think you probably were

02:28:23 were already expecting to come back tomorrow were you not yes i was sir so that won't come as any great shock to you but you may be

02:28:30 may be uh pleased to hear that you should be away

02:28:33 away by lunchtime at least and that's a bit earlier than that too so we'll see how we go anyway we'll stop there for the afternoon and we'll resume please at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning and as before

02:28:44 o'clock tomorrow morning and as before please don't discuss your evidence or anything relating to with anyone else over the break thank you very much we'll see you tomorrow thank you

02:29:04 all right thank you very much mr king at 10 o'clock tomorrow

02:29:32 you