Patrick Utting, LFB Station Manager, gives evidence about his role in reviewing Policy 633 (high-rise firefighting) following the Lakanal House fire. Key focus on why the policy failed to adequately address cladding risks, stay-put evacuation guidance, and training gaps that existed before Grenfell.
00:01:09 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing
00:01:12 hearing today we're going to hear evidence from mr patrick utting another officer from the london fire brigade yes let's go good morning may i please call patrick otting thank
00:01:23 may i please call patrick otting thank you
00:01:32 good morning mr rutting good morning sir uh i gather you're going to make the affirmation yes sir the words are on the screen can i ask you to read them hopefully
00:01:41 hopefully i do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence i shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much no please sit down make
00:01:53 you very much no please sit down make yourself comfortable there do you am i do my objective if i take my jacket off don't object at all no of course make yourself comfortable to see like
00:02:08 thank you all right
00:02:12 good when you're ready miss kirsten thank you sir could you please confirm your name for the record uh my name is patrick william hutting
00:02:21 hutting morning mr otting thank you very much for attending to give evidence today to the inquiry we're very grateful good morning my my questions are intended to be short and simple if you have any difficulty following what i'm asking you
00:02:33 difficulty following what i'm asking you please just ask me to repeat or rephrase the question and i'll do so yeah if you need a break at any time please just say yes and finally if you could try to keep your voice up for the transcribers and
00:02:44 your voice up for the transcribers and also if you could avoid nodding or shaking your head and just say yes or no just so it's caught by the script that would be very helpful yes thank you um and you've made two rule nine witness statements for the purpose of the
00:02:55 statements for the purpose of the inquiries phase two investigations and the first of those is dated the 20th of july 2020 and this is an lfb double zero one one eight nine one eight
00:03:09 is that it
00:03:11 that looks very much like it yes and there is a signature on page 22 if we could go to that yes that's your signature
00:03:22 yes that's your signature and your second statement is dated the 14th of june 2021 and that's at lfb double zero one two one one seven 173
00:03:35 yes and that's your second statement yes and if we could look at the signature on page four please yes and that's your signature is it yes thank you very much and there were a number of documents exhibited to both of
00:03:47 number of documents exhibited to both of those statements is that right i think 80 something in that order yes yes and you've read the statements recently have you yes and you've read
00:03:58 recently have you yes and you've read the exhibited documents recently as well yes and could you confirm that the content of the statements is true to the best of your knowledge please yes and you're happy for those statements to stand as your evidence to the inquiry
00:04:10 stand as your evidence to the inquiry yes and have you discussed your evidence with anyone other than your legal team prior to attending today no thank you very much i'd like to begin mr utting by asking
00:04:21 i'd like to begin mr utting by asking you about the roles that you held at the london fire brigade and you state in the first sentence of paragraph four of your first witness statement the reference for which is lfb double zero
00:04:33 reference for which is lfb double zero one one eight nine one eight forward slash one that you joined the brigade in may 1985 and that was in an operational role is that correct yes
00:04:44 that correct yes and you go on to state in the fourth sentence of that same paragraph that in 2000 you joined the officer development group which involved training crew managers is that right yes
00:04:56 training crew managers is that right yes and then following that in 2006 you moved to the incident management training team and your role there involved delivering training and facilitating training exercises and debriefings is that correct yes and is
00:05:09 debriefings is that correct yes and is it right that incident management is another term for incident command yes
00:05:15 yes so does that mean to be clear that your role in the incident management training team involved delivering instant command training specifically yes training and
00:05:29 assessments and exercises but yes training thank you and you state then looking at the very top of page two of your statement that in 2009
00:05:40 in 2009 you moved to the instant command command support team which later became known as the incident management policy policy team and it's correct there again that the init the incident management policy team
00:05:53 init the incident management policy team was the same as incident command policy is that right
00:05:58 it's fair to say that you can sometimes use management and command and you mean the same thing yes so would it be right to say that that that team was also focused on instant command is is that
00:06:09 focused on instant command is is that correct
00:06:11 correct absolutely yes and that team sat within the operational assurance department is that right it
00:06:18 it did um
00:06:21 did um there was always some reorganization of uh structure yes uh and i don't think we i don't think operation assurance was always there i think previously it was
00:06:32 always there i think previously it was incident management yes i see thank you and you go on to say further on in that same paragraph at the top of page two of your statement that in 2009
00:06:43 your statement that in 2009 the incident management and ort operational assurance team was created and you became part of that team is that right yes and is it right that you were a station manager by that time
00:06:56 a station manager by that time march 12 yes i was promoted in 2009 in 2009 and that remained an operational role is that correct yes and again does the incident management
00:07:08 and again does the incident management element of that team also refer to instant command yes
00:07:13 yes so were you continuing to work on matters relating to incident command is that accurate yes
00:07:21 yes and if we look at the bottom of the same paragraph you say that in april 2012 you moved to the operational procedures team incident communications section 2013 2013 yes
00:07:36 communications section 2013 2013 yes sorry yes that's right could you explain for the panel very briefly what that role involved please in incident communications indeed yes um i was the station manager in instant
00:07:48 i was the station manager in instant communications we were responsible for the policies that were associated with that
00:07:57 that department we were responsible for
00:08:03 breathing apparatus radio interface equipment are you familiar with terms like barry would you like me to just come out with the term right or do you want me to explain it i think you can assume that there's a basic familiarity with with
00:08:15 there's a basic familiarity with with terms like that so policy relating to communications issues would that be a fair summary yes thank you um and you say in the final sentence of that paragraph
00:08:27 that paragraph that you remained in that team until january 2015 when you moved to operational procedures operational policy
00:08:35 policy yes yes and it's correct is it that that was the department that was responsible for creating and amending operational policy
00:08:44 yes and you remained in that department for a short period of time before your retirement in april 2015. is that correct yes would it be a fair summary to say mr utting that um the roles that
00:08:56 to say mr utting that um the roles that you occupied during your time with the lfb had a focus on incident command specifically or is that not accurate
00:09:05 uh yes i mean apart from the
00:09:10 the nine years in training where i wasn't operational if that makes sense yeah yes it was 15 years on fire engines nine years in training six years as an
00:09:22 years in training six years as an operational station manager thank you very much
00:09:25 very much now your statements to the inquiry address two separate matters first your involvement in the development of policy 790 which was the brigade's policy on far survival guidance cause is that right yes and
00:09:38 guidance cause is that right yes and secondly
00:09:39 secondly your involvement in the review and amendment of policy 633 which was the policy on operational high-rise firefighting is that right yes and i'm going to ask you first of all
00:09:50 and i'm going to ask you first of all just so you know about your involvement in the review and amendment of policy 633 which follows on from the evidence that the inquiry has been hearing from peter cowep over the last three days um
00:10:01 peter cowep over the last three days um and i'll then move on to your involvement in the creation of policy 790.
00:10:07 790. so if we begin with with policy 633 and your initial instructions and the inquiries heard the evidence from peter cowaps that you were asked to take the lead on reviewing and amending
00:10:20 take the lead on reviewing and amending policy 633 to ensure that it fully reflected the new version of the national guidance on high-rise firefighting gra 3.2 which was under review in 2013
00:10:32 review in 2013 and then the final version published in 2014
00:10:36 2014 and you produced an email that you say is likely to mark the beginning of your involvement in the review of 633 and that email is at
00:10:48 lfb00118939 if we could look at that please
00:10:51 please thank you sorry did you say it was published in 2014. the gra 3.2 that's the card not 60. yeah absolutely february and 633 was published in june 2015 is that right yes
00:11:03 published in june 2015 is that right yes thank you
00:11:04 thank you um so if we could have a quick look at this email and this is dated you'll see at the very top the second of april 2013
00:11:14 and you'll see that that's an email from jim a court to you on that date with the subject line lachenal verdict and mr acort says
00:11:25 and mr acort says pat i've had a quick word with peter carp with reference to the high-rise gra and the lfb policy it's something that we will lead on for ops procedures and peter is likely to talk to you next week on your return
00:11:36 talk to you next week on your return from leave about it could you do some preliminary work on this and involve dave ii as he's carried out much of the assessment in terms of policy gaps based on national gras
00:11:48 policy gaps based on national gras is it right that at this time so april 2013
00:11:52 2013 you had just joined the operational procedures team is that is that correct i'd moved yes i'd move from incident management into incident communications thank you
00:12:01 thank you and
00:12:02 and we know that you had obviously had some considerable operational experience by this time would you say that you had any particular operational experience of high-rise firefighting specifically
00:12:14 high-rise firefighting specifically um
00:12:16 um well my time on fire engines if you like my education would have been at uh old kent road
00:12:27 at uh old kent road um so we we were fighting fires on the aylesbury estate hay gate estate and north peckham estate um and around new cross um
00:12:39 um and around new cross um so you're talking uh late 80s into the early 90s yes um and i would say we were busy with high-rise uh incidents
00:12:51 with high-rise uh incidents um
00:12:52 um following that all i'd say is that i i spent nine years in training so i i wasn't
00:12:57 wasn't hands-on
00:12:59 hands-on as it were but we were trying to educate firefighters to become crew commanders or crew managers yes or whatever period and to
00:13:11 whatever period and to try and give them some of the skills to be able to perform uh their duties on the incident ground thank you very much that's very helpful and we can see in that email that mr acor directed you to work with someone
00:13:24 acor directed you to work with someone called dave do you remember who that was i'm taking it and that's dave david eagling i see and and did you in fact work with dave eagling on the review of
00:13:35 work with dave eagling on the review of 633
00:13:36 633 i don't recall dave's uh
00:13:41 uh very
00:13:42 very huge sorry i don't recall a huge involvement that david had
00:13:47 david had thank you
00:13:49 thank you and then if we could look at another document please this one is a lfb triple zero eight six six seven six
00:14:01 and this is a meeting request and you can see that the subject here is given as lachenal verdict that's at
00:14:12 is given as lachenal verdict that's at the very top and the date is stated as the 10th of april 2013 and the required attendees are peter cowep jim acorte lee
00:14:23 are peter cowep jim acorte lee drawbridge phil morton and you and the organizer just above that is given as jim a court and just below the list of required attendees we can
00:14:34 the list of required attendees we can see the text to discuss lack of outcomes with reference to high-rise gra and lfb policy
00:14:42 policy do you have any recollection of attending that meeting no no
00:14:48 no no do you know if you were given instructions at any other time in that case about your reviewer policy 633 and what you were being asked to do specifically
00:15:01 you were being asked to do specifically no
00:15:02 no no
00:15:03 no do you recall peter cap having any conversation with you oh i would have i must have had conversations with with peter yes yes and
00:15:12 and in his evidence to the inquiry mr cowab said that he recalled telling you something along the lines that um the review of policy 633 was likely to be a relatively straightforward task
00:15:23 be a relatively straightforward task does that ring a bell i think
00:15:26 i think cut and paste rings a bell yes of the gra 3.2 of using
00:15:35 of using the gra
00:15:36 the gra to review
00:15:38 to review 633 and we can see in another document and this one is at lfb double zero 107 double zero five
00:15:52 thank you and this is philip morton to you on the 10th of april 2013 with the subject high-rise gre lachannel version
00:16:03 version 5th of april 2013 i think that probably is and we can see at the bottom of that thread
00:16:09 thread that
00:16:10 that philip morton is sending peter cap he says please find attached the latest version of the high-rise gra with the amendments that you requested so it appears that you were being forwarded the latest version of the draft gra
00:16:23 the latest version of the draft gra on the 10th of april 2013 so around the beginning of your involvement in the review of policy 633 and do you recall having any discussion with peter capp or
00:16:35 having any discussion with peter capp or indeed jim a court about the draft gra 3.2 at around the time that you started work on policy 633 i can't remember no no
00:16:46 i can't remember no no do you remember being told anything about what changes were being made to the draft gra 3.2 at around that time no but they would have been plain if when i looked at the gra
00:16:58 plain if when i looked at the gra because they i would imagine they would have been in track changes and is it the case that you were being copied in on on emails that concerned draft versions of the gra 3.2 and that's how you were
00:17:11 the gra 3.2 and that's how you were being kept in the loop no i i i think this this is the first time i saw the gra
00:17:23 this is the first time i saw the gra unless this is after the times that i went uh with phil to
00:17:31 to read it with read through it with peter but i think the occasion i'm thinking of is the the final version i see thank you that's helpful and we'll
00:17:43 i see thank you that's helpful and we'll probably come on to that um shortly you've stated in your witness statement and i don't need to take you to it unless you would like to go there the
00:17:54 unless you would like to go there the reference for the transcript is
00:17:58 one eight lfb00118918 slash sixteen and it's paragraph sixty-two and you say there that you were not responsible for reviewing policy six through three three in light of the lack of house inquests
00:18:11 in light of the lack of house inquests is that right yes yes
00:18:15 yes yes and
00:18:16 and we've seen that that lachnal was referred to in both the meeting requests that we looked at a moment ago and in mr acortz emailed to you of the
00:18:27 and in mr acortz emailed to you of the second of april 2013
00:18:29 2013 perhaps if we if we look back at those very quickly if we go first to mr acort's email which is at lfb00118939
00:18:41 thank you
00:18:45 and if we could look now at the very bottom of the thread so the the final email which is from the bottom of page one going on to page two
00:18:57 going on to page two and it looks like what was being forwarded to you was an email from leah clements
00:19:06 and you can see in the in the body of that email if we go to page two thank you she set out a link which appears to be to the lacanal verdicts and rule 43
00:19:18 to the lacanal verdicts and rule 43 letters she says so far rule 43 letters being the name that is given to the recommendations that are made by
00:19:27 by coroners arising out of evidence heard at inquests do you recall when you received
00:19:34 received that email if you accessed that link do you remember looking it was no i got no recollection of that link at all i see
00:19:44 i see um
00:19:45 um and if we could look again briefly to the meeting request of the 10th of april 2013 and that's at lfb triple zero 866 76
00:19:58 thank you and as we've seen if we just look at the the content of that meeting request which states to discuss lack of outcomes with reference to high-rise gra
00:20:09 with reference to high-rise gra and lfb
00:20:11 and lfb policy
00:20:13 policy and that suggests that there was a meeting
00:20:17 a meeting at which
00:20:18 at which the lachenal inquest and specifically the recommendations made by the coroner took place do you have any recollection of any such meeting or indeed any such discussions with anyone with whom you
00:20:31 discussions with anyone with whom you were working on the draft policy 633 no
00:20:35 no sorry
00:20:36 sorry no
00:20:37 no thank you
00:20:39 thank you can you recall if you were aware that one of the main reasons that the draft gra 3.2 was under review and and was being amended was because of
00:20:51 being amended was because of recommendations made by the coroner following the lack of inquests yes yes
00:20:59 yes yes and i'd like to look briefly please at the coroner's recommendations that were directed to the lfb and those are set out in a letter that can be found at lfb
00:21:11 can be found at lfb triple zero three two one five eight
00:21:19 and we can see that this is dated the 28th of march 2013.
00:21:25 is that letter familiar to you no
00:21:29 no you don't think that you saw it at the time that you were working on draft policy 633 no
00:21:36 no okay i'm going to ask you to look at a couple of specific points in this letter but mindful of the evidence that you've given that it's it's it's not something that's familiar to you but i'd just like to ask you some some general questions
00:21:48 to ask you some some general questions and and see how we go um
00:21:50 um and we can see just to orientate you um that at the very top of page one the letter is marked as coming from harana francis kirkham
00:22:01 harana francis kirkham deputy assistant coroner and it's addressed you can see at the top of the left-hand side to ron dobson at the lfb and could we now look at the top of page
00:22:12 and could we now look at the top of page 3 of the letter please
00:22:16 and this sets out the recommendations that the coroner made in relation to instant commands specifically and from the top of from the top line of page three
00:22:27 from the top line of page three we can see that the letter states it is also recommended that consideration be given to training of ics that's incident commanders and potential ics to enhance their
00:22:38 potential ics to enhance their performance in relation to the following and it then goes on to state if we can look at the third bullet point to anticipate that a fire might behave in a manner inconsistent with the
00:22:49 in a manner inconsistent with the compartmentation principle do you remember if there was any discussion in general terms with you when you were asked to start work on
00:23:00 when you were asked to start work on your draft policy 633 about that recommendation so in in general terms if if not in relation to the lachanol coroner's recommendations specifically
00:23:12 specifically no
00:23:15 um and i'm also going to ask you to look please at the rule 43 letter so the same type of recommendations that was sent by the coroner to the department for
00:23:26 the coroner to the department for communities and local government
00:23:30 and this is a hom triple zero triple zero one eight
00:23:39 is that letter familiar to you at all
00:23:44 no do you recall whether you were aware that recommendations had been made by the lacanal coroner to the department of communities and local government at the
00:23:55 communities and local government at the time that you were working on policy 633
00:24:00 not to s
00:24:02 s clg no i see um
00:24:06 um again i'm mindful of your evidence that you're not familiar with this letter but i'm just going to ask you a couple of questions about it and see how much you can assist the panel um
00:24:17 um could i ask you to look at the coroner's recommendations in relation to gra 3.2 specifically and those appear in the second paragraph of the second page of
00:24:29 second paragraph of the second page of the letter please and there it stated it is recommended that consideration be given to review of generic risk assessment 3.2 high-rise
00:24:40 generic risk assessment 3.2 high-rise firefighting to provide consolidated national guidance as to the following and if we read from the second bullet point awareness that fire can spread downwards
00:24:52 awareness that fire can spread downwards and laterally in a building awareness of the risk of spread of fire above and adjacent to a fire flat awareness that insecure compartmentation can permit transfer of smoke and fire
00:25:04 can permit transfer of smoke and fire between a flat or masonette and common parts of high-rise residential buildings which has the potential to put at risk the lives of residents or others
00:25:15 the lives of residents or others would you agree in general terms that any recommendations for matters that needed to be considered in relation to the new gra 3.2
00:25:26 the new gra 3.2 were also relevant to the lfb's review of its own policy 633 yes
00:25:34 and would you agree that one of the key features of the lack of house fire was the unexpected early compartmentation failure
00:25:50 i suppose my difficulty with that is that
00:25:53 that i'm not familiar with the outcomes of the
00:25:57 the lack of fire i see just by having been there i see
00:26:03 i see so did you would you say that you had any broad knowledge at the time that you were working on the draft policy 633 of what had actually happened at la canal not specifically no
00:26:16 would it be i'm going to to set out a brief summary of what the inquiry understands happened at the la canal house fire and please tell me if
00:26:27 canal house fire and please tell me if there's anything that you disagree with or indeed it may be just that that it's outside of your knowledge would it be correct to say that the lack of house fire started in a flat on the ninth floor of
00:26:39 started in a flat on the ninth floor of the building but then spread quickly to floors both above and below the fire flat where the fire originated that's familiar yes that's familiar and
00:26:52 that's familiar yes that's familiar and would you say that that was something that was familiar to you at the time that you were working on policy 633 yes yes
00:27:02 yes yes and
00:27:03 and in relation to the smoke spread that occurred at the lachnal house fire would you agree that there was significant smoke spread into
00:27:14 significant smoke spread into common areas both the corridors and the stairwell at the lachenal house fire it yes yes is that
00:27:25 is that sorry i'm saying yes because you look like you're about to nod yes and would you say that that's something that was familiar to you at the time that you were working on policy 633 yes
00:27:37 would you say when you started work on draft policy 633 that you had those specific features of the lack of house fire in
00:27:48 features of the lack of house fire in your mind or was that something that you were not particularly focused on
00:27:54 no they were definitely on our on my mind yes
00:27:59 mind yes and do you remember discussing those particular features of the latino house fire with n1 in relation to your review of policy 633 not specifically la canal no
00:28:12 do you remember discussing with anyone in relation to your review of policy 633 the need to be able to prepare instant commanders to be able to respond to an incident
00:28:23 to be able to respond to an incident involving rapid failure of compartmentation
00:28:30 sorry can you just repeat that question of course please do you recall having any discussion with anyone when you were working on the draft 633
00:28:41 draft 633 about the need to prepare instant commanders to be able to respond to an incident that involved rapid failure of compartmentation
00:28:53 it's the rapid the the that that's throwing me i i see i i'm with you all the way in the compar the fire spreading from a compartment yes it is the word
00:29:06 from a compartment yes it is the word rapid that i i'm i'm less familiar with understood so if we rephrase it perhaps do you remember discussing with anyone
00:29:17 do you remember discussing with anyone when you were working on the draft policy 633 the need to prepare incident commanders to be able to respond to an incident
00:29:24 incident involving failure of compartmentation yes yes
00:29:29 and there was another feature of the lack of house fire that i'd like to ask you about if i may and that was the presence of panels on the exterior of the building
00:29:40 the exterior of the building which had in part facilitated the fire spread and which were eventually found not to be compliant with building regulations again was that a feature of the lacanal house fire that
00:29:53 a feature of the lacanal house fire that was familiar to you when you were working on your review of 633 i was familiar that there was an issue with
00:30:01 with panels because i can remember standing there
00:30:05 there looking at it
00:30:09 my understanding and impression of it was the
00:30:16 was the part of the reason that the panels had failed was because of the length of time that the fire had been burning in the building
00:30:28 in the building i see thank you um i wonder if we could look back to your witness statement briefly please at paragraph 86 and the reference is lfb double zero 118 918 forward slash 20
00:30:42 double zero 118 918 forward slash 20 please
00:30:49 and you say there that you were not party to any discussions or information sharing regarding the risk of facade fires in high-rise buildings had the risks of facade fires or
00:31:01 had the risks of facade fires or cladding as a significant fire hazard been identified this would have been considered in the review of pn 633 and would have impacted significantly on the risk assessment so just to be clear
00:31:13 risk assessment so just to be clear does that mean that there was no discussion that you took part in with anyone as part of your review of policy 633 about
00:31:22 about fire spread over facade panels at the lacanal house fire or indeed generally there was no discussion thank you
00:31:34 discussion thank you i'm now going to move on to the next sub-topic of your review of policy 633 which is your gap analysis and you explain in your witness statement
00:31:45 in your witness statement perhaps if we have that on the screen it's paragraph 55 on page 14.
00:31:55 thank you and you say that you were supervising your work on the policy by jim acorte dac kevin hughes and ac peter cowap
00:32:06 dac kevin hughes and ac peter cowap and would it be correct to say that it was mr a court who was your immediate supervisor in relation to your review of policy 633 yes
00:32:15 yes and would it also be correct to say that mr cap had less direct involvement with 633 yes yes
00:32:24 yes and how closely did you work with mr a court on your review of 633 closely
00:32:33 did he undertake any of the drafting for example
00:32:39 i can't i can't remember jim getting hands-on as it were with the drafting
00:32:47 we we must have done some of it together
00:32:52 together okay thank you and what about mr hughes no i think kevin
00:33:00 was slightly back from this just because peter had
00:33:05 peter had so much having spent years on the gr he i didn't think i don't think there was any requirement for kevin's input which
00:33:16 input which might have been a mistake i don't know and in terms of how you got started if we could just scroll up slightly please in your witness statement and looking at the beginning of
00:33:27 and looking at the beginning of paragraph 54 which is on the same page thank you
00:33:33 thank you and you say that you worked with phil morton and you go on to say slightly further down in the same paragraph it's about halfway
00:33:44 halfway and the the sentence beginning we undertook yes you see that and you say we undertook a gap analysis between the risk assessment in section 2 of gra 3.2 and the version of pn633 x down to the
00:33:56 and the version of pn633 x down to the time of the review we cross referenced the gra 3.2 risk assessment at section 2 with the then current pn633 to check that every hazard that was in the risk assessment was also
00:34:07 that was in the risk assessment was also in pn633
00:34:09 in pn633 where we identified hazards and therefore risks and control measures that were not in pn633 we added these to the draft that we were working on and i
00:34:20 the draft that we were working on and i think when you refer to we in that passage that we've just looked at you're referring to you and philip morton is that right yes and you've helpfully provided a copy of that gap analysis as an exhibit to your
00:34:33 that gap analysis as an exhibit to your witness statement and i'd like to ask you to look at that for us please and that's at lfb double zero one two one
00:34:41 one one seven four if we could have that on the screen please
00:34:48 thank you that's your gap analysis is it i i think
00:34:55 i i think that is
00:34:57 that is part of the gap analysis i i i have a strong recollection of um
00:35:04 um a spreadsheet and this prose i would say it looked more like i'm sure you showed one the other day that was done by kevin hughes yes that sort of format i see um
00:35:19 hughes yes that sort of format i see um and this was where phil came in really handy because he was much better at that sort of stuff than i was so i i've always been expecting to see that and uh
00:35:30 and uh i
00:35:34 if that's the only version you've got and that was last edited in may then that that's the only version that there is i'm surprised
00:35:46 version that there is i'm surprised well that was yes going to be my next question because you've explained in your
00:35:51 your second witness statement which i don't think i need to to take you to bit but that's what you say in terms of the date that that document that we can see here was last edited you say may 2013. yes there are some uh comments
00:36:04 2013. yes there are some uh comments from me i think i see so it's from those that you've taken the idea yes
00:36:09 yes do you recall working on any type of gap analysis after that date
00:36:18 i don't recall it no
00:36:23 however i
00:36:27 there are emails somewhere in the system whereby between myself and phil where
00:36:39 phil thinks we've been asked by peter to review
00:36:46 a version of 3.2 and phil is trying to confirm with me whether
00:36:52 whether i think that's what peter means yeah and i think i go back to phil saying yes so that puts it in in my head that
00:37:05 so that puts it in in my head that and
00:37:05 and this this is how we would have worked if something changed we would have gone back to what we had done before try to identify those changes
00:37:17 try to identify those changes and then
00:37:18 and then if they were accepted if if that makes sense they we would have put them in and that should be um
00:37:28 um you should sorry you should be able to follow that trail if you we can't find that trail then
00:37:39 you would have to make the assumption that we didn't do it i i'm surprised that we didn't do it phil and i were not in the habit of not doing what our assistant commissioner asked us to do
00:37:51 assistant commissioner asked us to do [Music]
00:37:52 [Music] and also
00:37:55 and also when you're talking about the the final version and then there's a final final version if we'd been asked to look at the final final version this is the one
00:38:08 final final version this is the one you're talking about that came back just to be clear you're talking about the final version of the risk assessment or the the draft gra for 3.2 updates yes understood well
00:38:20 understood well if that had come back with changes if if
00:38:26 if if phil and i had looked at it and identified those changes unless we've gone well they're covered somewhere else which i would
00:38:37 somewhere else which i would we would have told peter yes
00:38:41 yes yes well that's very helpful thank you and and i was going to ask you about that that period of changes to the draft gra 3.2 about which we heard from from peter cowell um yesterday and the day
00:38:53 peter cowell um yesterday and the day before
00:38:55 before which
00:38:56 which um
00:38:57 um you may be aware it sounds like you may be aware took place over the period of july to november broadly speaking in um 2013. so after
00:39:07 after the date that that you've given in your statement as your gap analysis being finalized oh definitely so what i'm trying to convey to you is that
00:39:19 what i'm trying to convey to you is that i knew there were different versions because we the version was sent yeah and
00:39:26 and it came back and the impression i got was that peter was not happy
00:39:32 not happy with what he was being presented with i don't think i saw too much of the detail at that time yes and then
00:39:43 and then there will have been a touring and throwing at that sort of level and then i would have thought that if there were some substantive changes to it
00:39:52 it phil and i would have done something about it understood that's very helpful and and we are going to come on to um some of the changes that that were made so you will have an opportunity to to address the panel on those um but that's
00:40:03 address the panel on those um but that's very helpful i'm i'm going to again i'll be mindful of the evidence that you've given that that perhaps that there were updated versions or indeed other versions of the gap analysis document
00:40:14 versions of the gap analysis document but for the moment this is what we have got to go on i absolutely accept that yes so i'll i'll ask you a few questions on this and and by all means if you think that um issues that i'm raising
00:40:27 think that um issues that i'm raising were addressed in different versions of of the same document or indeed a different document please do say um
00:40:35 um now it's
00:40:37 now it's it's right isn't it um that there was an explicit reference to cladding systems in the version of gra 3.2 that was published in 2014 is that something that you're
00:40:50 2014 is that something that you're familiar with i must have read it yes yes and do you think that you were aware that there was
00:40:58 there was also a reference to cladding systems in the draft version of the gra 3.2 that was in circulation internally within the lfb
00:41:08 lfb um
00:41:08 um at the time that that you say you were working on this gap analysis in may 2013 well yes
00:41:17 well yes yes
00:41:18 yes i'm just going to ask you to look at that draft version of gra 3.2 for completeness so we can see and that's a lfb triple zero three three nine
00:41:29 three three nine seven one
00:41:36 thank you and so you're aware this is the draft version of gra 3.2 that was circulated internally by peter cowep on the 1st of february 2013 so indeed not long before you were asked
00:41:48 so indeed not long before you were asked to start working on your review of policy 633 in april 2013. yes and if we could look at page 11 please
00:42:00 and the last substantive paragraph there you'll see starts with the word it's a it's a line rather than a paragraph information to be gathered in relation to high-rise incidents should include
00:42:13 to high-rise incidents should include do you see that yes and if we go over to the following page please
00:42:19 and there the second bullet point reads building construction features such as the presence and location of masonette style construction sandwich panels timber framing cladding
00:42:31 sandwich panels timber framing cladding systems
00:42:33 systems and do you recall whether when you compiled the gap analysis
00:42:39 analysis you took a conscious decision not to include the reference to cladding that is there and the reason i ask that is because there is no explicit reference to cladding in the version of
00:42:50 reference to cladding in the version of the gap analysis that we've just been looking at yes
00:42:54 yes so do you think that that was a conscious decision not to refer to cladding or is that more likely to have been an oversight
00:43:04 i think when you when you look at the 633
00:43:09 633 it's light on building construction and i
00:43:14 and i i can think of upvc windows and you def timber frame buildings will have been in there but that was pete's that was definitely going to be in there apart
00:43:26 definitely going to be in there apart from that
00:43:27 from that it was quite light and i think one of the decisions that we
00:43:33 we made
00:43:35 made i think either consciously or subconsciously was this this policy was not about trying to describe all the different building construction features of all the high-rise buildings
00:43:48 features of all the high-rise buildings in london
00:43:50 in london i i i mean look out the window i if we put all that information in in detail no one would have read it
00:44:02 no one would have read it thank you
00:44:03 thank you mr rotting i'm now going to move on to the the next sub-topic of your review of policy 633 and this is the initial consultation process please and i'm
00:44:14 consultation process please and i'm going to ask you some questions about the process that was followed within the lfb
00:44:20 lfb um in those early stages of reviewing the policy and if we could look please um to your witness statement again at paragraph 65 so the reference is lfb double zero
00:44:32 so the reference is lfb double zero double one eight nine one eight forward slash seventeen
00:44:41 and looking at paragraph sixty five please
00:44:45 please and you explain there that you wrote to jim a court on the 5th of june 2013
00:44:51 2013 informing him that you were content with the draft of pn633 to be sent out for peer review and you then say that you can't recall whether this in fact took
00:45:02 can't recall whether this in fact took place and just to be clear peer review is one of the initial stages of policy consultation that that is is gone through at the lfb when creating or amending operational policy is that
00:45:13 amending operational policy is that right yes
00:45:16 right yes and
00:45:17 and mr kaup's evidence the inquiry yesterday was that the reason that he took the view
00:45:22 view that at the time that it was not necessary to carry out a peer review at that stage in the process was because of the work that had been carried out in relation to
00:45:33 carried out in relation to the review of policy 633 in 2011 and you had not had any involvement in that much earlier review of policy 633 in 2011 is that right
00:45:46 in 2011 is that right that is right and do you remember if you had a particular view either way when you sent your email to jim a court on the 5th of june 2013
00:45:57 june 2013 as to whether the draft 633 that you had been working on would in fact benefit from going through a process of peer review or do you think you didn't have a view either way
00:46:09 a view either way i wouldn't have sent it to him if i hadn't wanted it to go out for peer review
00:46:14 review so to be clear you did think that it would benefit from going through peer review yes and
00:46:22 yes and look at the flow chart the flow chart is there for a purpose so so you don't forget things yes and also because i'm not just thinking
00:46:33 and also because i'm not just thinking about that point there when you get to bjc hsw
00:46:39 bjc hsw yes
00:46:42 if it was me i would say there was a potential risk if you haven't followed the process yes that they might if they wanted to i'm not suggesting that they would go you
00:46:53 suggesting that they would go you haven't followed the process properly i see and could you assist the panel is maybe a very obvious point to you um but but what are the specific benefits of going through peer review when
00:47:05 going through peer review when developing um or amending operational policy well it would have gone to fire it would have gone to potentially
00:47:16 steve doodley um
00:47:19 um you would have you would have a group of the your normal peers and those people sitting physically sort of sitting around you but you would also have your little list of how can i put it
00:47:32 little list of how can i put it reliable people who would give you feedback because
00:47:38 because i'll be very honest sometimes the feedback sometimes you didn't get the feedback you would have expected to have got
00:47:49 you would have expected to have got but it sounds like the feedback was often useful would that be right there are
00:47:55 there are i did not know everything about high-rise firefighting
00:48:04 it made
00:48:06 made for me it made no sense not to do it especially when you think of it okay what what what what would it have been three weeks thank you
00:48:18 thank you now the next stage of consultation was the heads of service review have i got that right
00:48:26 yes and you refer to this at paragraph 66 in your witness statement so just the next paragraph down from the one we were looking at a moment ago and you state there
00:48:37 and you state there that the draft policy was sent for heads of service review by david eagling on the 1st of july 2013. and let's look at david eaglin's cover email which is at lfb
00:48:49 email which is at lfb triple zero two nine one five five please thank you
00:48:56 thank you and he states dear all please find attached operational procedure pn633 high-rise firefighting for heads of service consultation please be advised that this revised policy has been aligned with a new
00:49:08 policy has been aligned with a new national high-rise generic risk assessment which has been written by lfb and which is due to be published by clg shortly
00:49:15 shortly the final draft of the gra is attached both the gra and this revised pn incorporate lessons learned from both the shirley towers and lacanal incidents and this has led to additional material being incorporated within the revised
00:49:27 being incorporated within the revised procedure to cover scenarios and issues that the uk fire service had not previously experienced or planned for and we have the draft version
00:49:38 and we have the draft version that david eagling attached to that email
00:49:42 email and i i'd like to ask you to look at that please because there are a couple of parts of it um on which i think you may be able to assist the panel and that draft is a lfb triple zero
00:49:53 draft is a lfb triple zero three four one double six
00:49:59 thank you and the first part that i'm going to ask you to look at is the direction given in this draft version of the policy to the need to re-evaluate advice given to callers on
00:50:12 re-evaluate advice given to callers on fire survival guidance calls and this is in the section entitled fire survival guidance which is on page 15 if we could go there please and paragraph 7.50
00:50:26 i'll just read that out for the benefit of the transcript the advice offered during fire survival calls should be re-evaluated throughout an incident and this may require a change in the advice given in exceptional circumstances an ic
00:50:39 given in exceptional circumstances an ic may consider informing control that their advice to fsg callers should be altered eg to attempt to leave their property the ic should remember that this advice may be contrary to national policy for control staff on fsgs and
00:50:52 policy for control staff on fsgs and liaison with the officer in charge at control will be required for agreement to change the prescriptive advice see policy number 795 survival guidance calls which we're going to go on to later
00:51:02 later um
00:51:04 um would you agree that there is no explicit reference to stay put in that paragraph yes
00:51:13 yes and would you would you also agree or do you recall that there was no explicit reference to stay put at all in that draft version of
00:51:23 of policy 633 that was circulated for heads of service review without seeing the whole document i understand yes if you're telling me it's not in there then it's not in there
00:51:35 not in there then it's not in there yes indeed i appreciate it it's difficult to give an answer about something that's not there but if you do take it from me that there is no explicit reference to stay put there
00:51:46 explicit reference to stay put there could you assist the panel with with why at this stage in the drafting process so when the draft policy is is being circulated for heads of service review
00:51:57 circulated for heads of service review there wasn't an explicit reference to stay put in there do you recall if that was a conscious decision or not i don't recall it as a
00:52:09 i don't recall it as a conscious decision i i i i i'm sort of surprised it's not there
00:52:16 there because um
00:52:21 i mean i wrote fire survival guidance calls yes that um they're my words and i i i thought
00:52:33 and i i i thought that in there i'd made reference
00:52:40 i might be mistaken but if it's not theirs it's not there thank you um do you remember whether at this stage in the drafting
00:52:51 whether at this stage in the drafting process
00:52:52 process you had had any discussion with anyone or any explicit consideration as to the potential need for an instant commander to change state advice i.e to
00:53:03 commander to change state advice i.e to tell
00:53:04 tell callers in a high-rise building to attempt to leave their property yes that those are those are my words they're my words from 790.
00:53:13 790. and and that's an issue about which you you'd had explicit consideration at this time in your review of policy 633 would that be
00:53:23 that be a correct interpretation of what you're saying well what i'm saying is it was always there because i wrote i put it in i negotiate i negotiated it with control to to put
00:53:36 i negotiated it with control to to put it in
00:53:38 it in thank you
00:53:39 thank you now the other part of the draft policy that i'd like to ask you to look at please is the evacuation section which is on the same page it's just slightly further up
00:53:49 and you can see from the subheading evacuation and again i'll read it out just for the benefit of the transcript the ic should follow the evacuation plan devised as part of the occupier's fire
00:54:00 devised as part of the occupier's fire risk assessment unless the fire situation dictates otherwise firefighting operations can be adversely affected by the type of evacuation being taken the progress of the evacuation and
00:54:11 taken the progress of the evacuation and the number and type of people being evacuated
00:54:14 evacuated evacuation can be made more resource intensive if the occupants have an impaired ability to make their own way to safety for example disabled persons or those under the effect of alcohol or drugs may need greater assistance
00:54:25 drugs may need greater assistance the ic should consider a the effect of firefighting tactics on evacuation and vice versa b where it is safe to do so using other emergency service personnel to assist
00:54:37 emergency service personnel to assist with evacuation and that widespread evacuation may divert crews from the tasks they were briefed to undertake which may require additional resources and see the need to establish if appropriate separate attack and
00:54:48 appropriate separate attack and evacuation stairwells and again
00:54:52 and again there is no reference there to stay put explicitly or to the possibility that the state policy may become untenable is there
00:55:03 there no
00:55:05 no and we know that the potential need to evacuate a building with a staple strategy was eventually added to the version of policy 633 that was published in 2015.
00:55:16 in 2015. i'm going to ask the documents manager please if we could keep this version this draft version of policy 6 633 on the screen please and if we could have on the other side of the screen
00:55:28 have on the other side of the screen the final version of policy 633 as published in june 2015
00:55:35 2015 which is lfb quadruple zero one two five six
00:55:39 six and the relevant page of that final version is page 14.
00:55:50 and that will help us compare
00:55:52 compare the two
00:55:54 the two so if we look mr utting at the version on the right hand side of the screen and again that's the the final published version of policy 633 and we can see that a new paragraph 7.4 7.46 sorry has been
00:56:07 paragraph 7.4 7.46 sorry has been inserted into the final version which reads it may be necessary to undertake a partial or full evacuation in a residential building where a staple policy is normally in place do you see
00:56:19 policy is normally in place do you see that
00:56:21 that yes yes
00:56:23 yes yes and just for completeness there is also a new
00:56:25 a new if we look at the little paragraph b in relation to paragraph 7.47 on the right hand side of the screen that's a new sub-paragraph b which reads
00:56:37 that's a new sub-paragraph b which reads the resources required to support the evacuation or stay put policy and that's listed as one of the items that an instant commander should have under consideration do you see that one there as well yes i mean the the the pedant in
00:56:49 as well yes i mean the the the pedant in me
00:56:51 me would say it's a staple principle rather than a policy that's that's a mistake thank you um if we can focus on um the the
00:57:03 if we can focus on um the the differences in that final published version so those two additional um passages that we've just looked at do you recall how those explicit references to stay
00:57:16 how those explicit references to stay put
00:57:17 put came to be added to that final version of policy 633 before it was published is that something that you have any any memory of
00:57:28 no
00:57:30 we've already referred to the fact that there were discussions between peter caop on behalf of the lfb and the department for communities and local government in that period july to november 2013
00:57:42 november 2013 about
00:57:43 about stay put and evacuation explicitly and how those were referred to in the draft gra 3.2
00:57:51 gra 3.2 do you know if those discussions might be the reason why those explicit references to stay put ended up in the final version of policy
00:58:02 ended up in the final version of policy 633 i do not know that no thank you
00:58:09 thank you i'm going to ask you now in very broad terms about some of those discussions that took place with dclg and i'm mindful of the fact that you weren't party to them
00:58:21 now the inquiry heard from peter cowap that
00:58:25 that after dclg were provided with the draft version of gra 3.2 for the purpose of publication in july 2013 so this was the first time that the draft gre went to
00:58:38 first time that the draft gre went to them
00:58:39 them there was then a meeting between peter cowep and some officials from dclg on the 30th of july 2013
00:58:46 2013 and if we could look please at lfb triple zero eight four four six six
00:59:00 and this is an email from peter count you see at the very top there
00:59:05 there to
00:59:06 to les britsman and the inquiry understands that les britsman was part of the chief fire and rescue advisors unit within the department and you'll see that that email is dated
00:59:17 and you'll see that that email is dated the 31st of july 2013. if we could just look at the first paragraph please peter camp states dealers following our meeting yesterday i would confirm that we will make the
00:59:28 i would confirm that we will make the amendments discussed and agreed to the evacuation and fire survival guidance calls section of the high-rise gra on receipt of the information which you're going to provide
00:59:39 going to provide and it looks like you were blind copied into that email if we look at the section um that's referred to as tracking
00:59:50 that's referred to as tracking which lists the full recipients of the email and can you see your name is there second from the bottom yes but it's right i think to say that you did not attend the meeting that's being
01:00:01 did not attend the meeting that's being referred to here with with les britsman i did not attend that meeting thank you
01:00:08 following the meeting um peter capp also emailed you and philip morton on the 3rd of august 2013
01:00:17 2013 and i'd like to ask you to look at that email please it's at lfb 0084467
01:00:26 thank you and you'll see that the subject line of that email is gra 3.2 amendments and peter capps stated dear phil and pat
01:00:37 dear phil and pat with regard to our recent meeting with clg and agreed changes to the high-rise gra my record of the meeting is that they are confined to the section below and include number one
01:00:48 number one making more explicit the point that the advice given to occupants in residential high-rise buildings to stay put and keep doors and windows closed provided their dwelling is not affected by the fire heat or smoke may need to change
01:01:01 heat or smoke may need to change if fire heat or smoke is spreading the ic needs to ensure any worsening situation is accurately reflected in messages to brigade control so that appropriate advice can be given
01:01:12 so that appropriate advice can be given to occupants in affected flats and so they can be advised to evacuate if necessary
01:01:17 necessary number two the occupants of high-rise buildings may not always act as firefighters expect or in accordance with the building evacuation plan the occupants of commercial buildings can be expected to practice fire
01:01:28 can be expected to practice fire evacuation but the same may not be true for those in residential or mixed use buildings
01:01:33 buildings some occupants may be unfamiliar with the building and its layout and may be visiting for the first time the ic needs to factor these considerations into the operational plan and into assessing the resources needed to deal with the
01:01:45 resources needed to deal with the incident
01:01:46 incident please check the wording of number one with brigade control for accuracy and to ensure it accords with their understanding of this aspect of fire survival call procedure i think the remainder of the ports of the points made during the meeting are
01:01:58 the points made during the meeting are already covered in the extant text but when you make these changes and respond to whatever lesbi sends you you may need to change the order of the existing text and or amend it slightly to ensure it remains intelligible
01:02:12 to ensure it remains intelligible would it be correct to understand mr utting that peter cap was sending that email to you in order that you could ensure that any further changes to the draft gra were carried across into the
01:02:24 draft gra were carried across into the draft policy 633 that you were working on at that time yes
01:02:29 yes and
01:02:30 and in in paragraph one is numbered one of that email peter cap refers to the possibility of residents being told that they need to attempt to leave a high-rise building in the event of a fire rather than stay put
01:02:43 fire rather than stay put and by this time so the 3rd of august 2013
01:02:47 2013 we know because we've just seen that the draft policy 63 had already been circulated within the lfb for the heads of service consultation that was the david eagling's email that we've just looked at of the first of july
01:03:00 looked at of the first of july and we've already referred to the fact that that draft version of policy 633 that was circulated to heads of service did not contain any explicit references to stay put
01:03:13 to stay put and it also contained no reference to the need to evacuate a building with a staple strategy or to give any guidance on when and how that should be carried out is that
01:03:24 that should be carried out is that consistent with with what you remember this is the the draft version that we were looking at a moment ago that went to head a service yes now
01:03:31 now do you recall when you received peter cap's email on the 3rd of august 2013. i should ask you first of all do you recall receiving this email on the 3rd of august 2013. i don't recall it no
01:03:44 3rd of august 2013. i don't recall it no do you recall in general terms being made aware um of the the first issue um that that peter carrap is raising in this email namely
01:03:56 carrap is raising in this email namely the need to address explicitly the point that incident commanders may need to change stay put advice to residents and and tell residents to leave do you have any recollection in
01:04:08 leave do you have any recollection in general terms of discussions with peter cab or indeed anyone else around this time
01:04:14 time no because i thought i thought it already existed i see so your your recollection is that by the time you were circulating the draft 633
01:04:25 time you were circulating the draft 633 to the heads of service
01:04:28 for that part of the consultation process
01:04:31 process reference to stay put to the extent that stay put needed to be addressed in policy 633 was adequately addressed is that a fair summary of your evidence
01:04:42 of your evidence i think so but also
01:04:45 also again
01:04:46 again my failing is that
01:04:49 is that as soon as you start talking about fire survival guidance and stay put i i i go back to seven ninety eight because i i struggle
01:05:00 seven ninety eight because i i struggle not to
01:05:01 not to um
01:05:04 so
01:05:07 it was a long question i'm sorry absolutely yes understood and i i should say also i am aware that i'm asking you about events that were um quite a number of years ago now so it's it's it's perfectly fine to say that you don't
01:05:19 perfectly fine to say that you don't recall um if i could try rephrasing my question
01:05:24 question in a different way do you recall ever having any concerns at any point when you were working on the draft version of policy 633 that the issue of stay put
01:05:37 policy 633 that the issue of stay put and evacuation was not adequately addressed in the draft version of the policy i don't recall that and again i i can recall
01:05:51 and again i i can recall there
01:05:51 there [Music]
01:05:52 [Music] was
01:05:54 was conflict between the advice that we we were giving people
01:06:01 to either sensibly
01:06:05 sensibly um call the fire brigade and leave
01:06:08 and leave leave you your property and the stay put principle
01:06:14 principle and i can recall going to
01:06:18 going to definitely going to talk to community fire safety to to check what advice they were they were giving and coming back with with with the pamphlets
01:06:29 coming back with with with the pamphlets that they they were offering so there was this
01:06:33 was this uh
01:06:34 uh there was an awareness of the conflict and
01:06:39 and there was our underlying reliance on
01:06:44 on the state put principle in residential high-rise buildings and do you recall when you approached community fire safety what they told you in terms of advice given to residents
01:06:57 in terms of advice given to residents i i think it was that that advice to stay put what was the accepted advice in those types of properties i think thank you
01:07:08 thank you do you recall whether you gave any thoughts of whether the draft policy 633 that you were working on needed to address specifically
01:07:19 address specifically guidance as to when stay put advice should be changed by an instant commander not when no and what about how to go about
01:07:32 and what about how to go about implementing an evacuation in the event that staplet advice has changed
01:07:40 when you say how do you mean giving people a tactical plan of how to evacuate
01:07:47 evacuate a high rise residential block of flats if indeed that's possible to to give such advice yes well
01:07:55 well i would say it is technically it is possible to give that advice it
01:08:02 it i i would struggle to
01:08:05 to give you
01:08:07 give you a
01:08:09 a plan
01:08:10 plan that
01:08:11 that would fit
01:08:14 would fit every
01:08:15 every imaginable scenario i can think of in every imaginable building
01:08:24 building out there
01:08:26 out there and i would be pretty confident that had i given you that advice so say for example we'll go um right start five floor floor above
01:08:37 right start five floor floor above reasonable that might not be the right thing to do
01:08:43 thank you can i ask you also about the training implications do you remember when you were working on the draft 633 whether you gave any consideration to
01:08:54 whether you gave any consideration to the lfb's existing instant command training and whether that addressed that the matter that was set out in the policy 633 provision that we've just looked at
01:09:05 provision that we've just looked at about the need to change stateful advice
01:09:09 no there wasn't much what i think there was no well
01:09:16 i don't recall ever any
01:09:21 any training on evacuation and bear in mind that
01:09:24 that that's what i used to do i i certainly don't remember ever being sent on the evacuation training course yeah
01:09:37 what i do know is that
01:09:41 is that we used to run [Music]
01:09:44 [Music] assessments for
01:09:47 for station managers up to and including assistant commissioners and
01:09:53 and operations review teams who were had to pass an assessment at the level of assistant commissioner and i can
01:10:01 and i can vividly remember one of the scenarios that we did and i can vividly remember it because it was precisely about evacuating
01:10:12 evacuating a high-rise residential block of flats simply and i can remember it because the candidate
01:10:19 candidate pretty much early on went get me six fire rescue units so
01:10:26 so and to be fair that was an assessment what what i would then say is that we were not in the habit once we got a really good exercise of throwing that away
01:10:37 that away so i i
01:10:39 so i i i
01:10:40 i struggle a little bit personally with
01:10:45 with some people saying that they weren't they didn't know what to do to evacuate a high-rise residential building and
01:10:56 and if we focus on that if i can what i can call a gap in the in the existing instant command um training and in terms of
01:11:05 of no training on how to evacuate a building yeah would you agree with that yeah yes i mean
01:11:16 and i mean also as a as a firefighter i i i was trained how to [Music]
01:11:23 [Music] search a room search a flat search corridor
01:11:28 corridor um
01:11:30 um which is your your the bottom level of your evacuation if you if you're
01:11:43 um it's very difficult
01:11:47 difficult and it's very difficult to do
01:11:50 to do and it's very difficult to organize and
01:11:55 and i
01:11:57 i i've always had in in the back of my mind
01:12:01 mind about this uh i i can't tell you whether it's true or not i thought that evacuation was going to be addressed
01:12:13 was going to be addressed and i thought it was going to be addressed
01:12:16 addressed in the search and rescue policy now i i i may be wrong this may not be the the truth but that is my
01:12:28 not be the the truth but that is my recollection that because it fits beautifully in search of rescue for me anyway evacuation so i thought that someone was looking at it whether that
01:12:39 that whether i'm completely mistaken or or whether for other reasons that didn't happen
01:12:44 happen that's where i thought that was going to go and just picking up on that when you say that you thought that it was going to be addressed in the search and rescue policy do you know when you thought that was that when you were
01:12:55 you thought that was that when you were working on the draft policy 633 well it would have been after lachenar you were here
01:13:06 thank you um so we're coming up to 11 15 and i think that's a convenience is that a convenient point from your point for everyone else yes all right thank you i wonder if we could just
01:13:17 thank you i wonder if we could just before we have our break which we're going to take in just a moment um starting i wonder if we just could just go back for a moment to one of the documents we looked at earlier because i'm not sure that i
01:13:28 i'm not sure that i really understood what mr atting was telling you if you want some water please help yourself i think the document was lfb 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 6
01:13:40 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 6 stroke 14. it's the
01:13:45 it's the draft pn
01:13:46 draft pn 633 that's circulated to the heads of service
01:13:50 service i think so that may be the final version that's up there um but i'll find you the reference well we've got the one that i just wanted to check up on i think it's on the screen now
01:14:01 now and
01:14:04 i think that council asked you whether you knew how um
01:14:09 um 747 little b got into the draft
01:14:15 draft and i
01:14:16 and i my notes suggest that you said you couldn't recall how it got in there first of all did i understand you correctly
01:14:26 it will have got in there because of 3.2 yes but what i just wanted to clarify with you is this that um the impression i'm getting from your
01:14:37 the impression i'm getting from your evidence is that you were the master draftsman
01:14:40 draftsman as far as 633 is concerned it was your fingers on the keyboard if i can put it like that is that fair that's fair yes and you remained the master draftsman
01:14:51 and you remained the master draftsman throughout all the uh different versions of 633
01:14:58 i i didn't finish it sir oh well that might explain because if i can explain the reason for my question um
01:15:07 um it seemed to be a little surprising that if you were the master draftman with your fingers on the keyboard you couldn't remember how something like 747 little b got into the text
01:15:22 do you mean the process of how it got into the text or how it physically got put in i'm not sure well what it was that stimulated you to put it in and and
01:15:33 and i was surprised that you couldn't remember
01:15:36 remember apparently making uh that amendment or the reason for it so i spent six years writing policy i i i'm really sorry
01:15:50 if you get a list of the
01:15:53 of the london fire brigade policies i will quite
01:15:57 quite happily
01:15:59 happily show
01:15:59 show mark
01:16:01 mark the ones i wrote from scratch and the ones that i reviewed at least once so
01:16:13 and and so just just the the passing of time and not having been in the loop for the last six years
01:16:24 six years maya culpa i'm sorry no that's that's right i just wanted to make sure i'd understood it correctly so should we understand that
01:16:31 that um
01:16:32 um the probability is that you uh added the text to the document yes but you can't remember what what was the immediate reason
01:16:43 the immediate reason uh for doing so that's correct well that does clarify my understanding thank you very much all right
01:16:51 all right do you do you want to ask any questions arising out of that particular no thank you sir not at this moment thank you in that case mr i think we'll have our morning break now we'll we'll um resume please at 25 to 12.
01:17:04 resume please at 25 to 12. and as with everyone else i have to ask you please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it over the break i will not thank you very
01:17:14 much would you like to go to the usher then please
01:17:32 right thank you very much 25-12
01:36:17 would you ask mr asim to come back in please
01:36:34 right starting ready to carry on yes sir thank you very much yes let's go thank you sir um mr austin before the break i was asking you about evacuation
01:36:47 evacuation and
01:36:48 and you said i think i've got this right please correct me if i'm wrong that you thought that evacuation would be addressed in the search and rescue policy if i understood that correctly yes
01:36:59 yes and do you know if there was any review of the search and rescue policy carried out after the laknell house fire i don't know that now do you know who
01:37:10 i don't know that now do you know who would have been responsible for carrying out any such review of the search and rescue policy no i
01:37:18 no i i would assume [Music]
01:37:21 [Music] breathing apparatus makes sense thank you
01:37:26 you and we were also looking at um peter cowep's email to you and philip morton of the 3rd of august 2013 and i'd just like to get that back on the screen please just as a reminder that's lfb
01:37:38 please just as a reminder that's lfb triple zero eight four four six seven
01:37:49 thank you
01:37:52 and we were looking in particular at peter carp's first point in his recollection of what was discussed at his meeting with officials from the department of
01:38:03 with officials from the department of communities and local government and that was making more explicit the point that the advice given to occupants in residential high-rise buildings to stay put and keep doors and windows closed provided their dwelling is not
01:38:14 closed provided their dwelling is not affected by the fire heat or smoke may need to change and my question to you arising out of that is whether you were aware at the time
01:38:26 aware at the time that the secretary of state for communities and local government had made an explicit commitment to the lachenal coroner that
01:38:36 that the new generic risk assessment 3.2 would include advice to incident commanders to inform decisions on evacuation should it become clear that
01:38:48 evacuation should it become clear that the state policy or the state but principle i should say is no longer tenable
01:38:53 tenable is that mr pickles is that that's correct yes no no for completeness i'd like to ask you to look at the letter in which that commitment is set out and this is a hom
01:39:05 commitment is set out and this is a hom triple zero four seven seven four three please
01:39:16 thank you
01:39:20 and you can see there the top right hand corner that's coming from eric pickles and it's going to harana francis kirkham who's the lachnal coroner you'll remember
01:39:30 remember is that letter familiar to you no
01:39:36 and could i ask you please to look at the second page
01:39:43 and the third paragraph which reads on your other recommendations i can confirm that my department's generic risk assessment guidance on high-rise firefighting is under review at present
01:39:56 firefighting is under review at present and will be informed by all of the recommendations you have made in your rule 43 recommendations it will also include advice to instant commanders to inform
01:40:07 commanders to inform decisions on evacuation should it become clear during an instant that the staple principle
01:40:12 principle is no longer tenable now you've said that you were not aware that that explicit commitment had been made by the secretary of state do you recall if you were aware in general terms that the department were
01:40:26 general terms that the department were particularly concerned that gra 3.2 should include that specific advice i.e in relation to reversing stay put advice
01:40:37 in relation to reversing stay put advice by the department you mean dclg yes
01:40:46 and does it follow then that you were similarly not aware at the time that you were working on the draft 633
01:40:54 633 that
01:40:55 that dclg had raised concerns with peter cowep
01:40:59 cowep or indeed anyone else that that commitment was not being met by the terms of the draft gra 3.2 i don't recall that no
01:41:10 now the final version of gra 3.2 was eventually published in february 2014 and i'd like to take you to a number of passages in that final version please
01:41:21 passages in that final version please because i would like to ask you how those impacted on your ongoing review of policy 633 so if we could look please the lfb quadruple zero
01:41:32 quadruple zero one two five five and that's the published version of gra 3.2 there
01:41:40 3.2 there and if we could look first of all please at page 19. [Music]
01:41:46 [Music] and just to orientate you this is in the planning section of the of the gra and at the top of that page we can see the text contingency plans for
01:41:57 the text contingency plans for particular premises should cover can you see that yes and i'll just read the first two bullet points fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the potential for multiple rescues
01:42:09 rescues an operational evacuation plan being required in the event the state policy becomes untenable could you explain in basic terms what you understand a contingency plan to be
01:42:26 as soon as you say the word contingency plan i i'm taken to op note 300 they're they they're used sorry operational note 300s there used
01:42:38 sorry operational note 300s there used to be a raft of them that were places like southern cathedral might have been one the houses of parliament may well have
01:42:49 the houses of parliament may well have been one i mean do they just mean a plan
01:42:56 a plan well that's that's rather my my question um
01:42:59 um did you have an understanding do you remember um when when you were looking at this as part of your review of policy 633
01:43:07 633 as to what was meant um i don't recall questioning it at the time um
01:43:18 questioning it at the time um no i i probably have taken the word contingency away in my head just be because a contingency plan is of no 300.
01:43:30 is of no 300. do you remember considering those provisions specifically of the gra 3.2
01:43:42 it's hard to remember what what i would say is that if they're transferred from the gra
01:43:49 the gra 3.2 into 633 then yes if they're not
01:43:57 then no sorry you mean if if if provisions are replicated from gra 3.2 into policy 633 it must mean that you considered them at the time is that what you're saying yes
01:44:08 the time is that what you're saying yes i mean the line fast spread beyond the compartment of origin the potential for multiple rescues yeah that feels like a straight
01:44:14 straight lift if you like from 633 yes well perhaps if we if we go to policy 633 in that case because it would be very helpful to see how you carry through um these
01:44:26 how you carry through um these provisions into um 633 so i'm going to ask the documents manager please if we could keep that page 19 of gra 3.2 on the screen please and if we could have
01:44:38 and if we could have again on on the other side of the screen the published version of policy 633 and it's page 7 of that document so the reference for that is lfb quadruple zero
01:44:49 that is lfb quadruple zero one two five six forward slash seven
01:44:55 thank you and you'll see there mr rutting that section four on page seven is is the planning section in policy 633 and if we look at paragraph
01:45:06 and if we look at paragraph um
01:45:07 um 4.8 and if we go down a little bit just so we can see the first thank you the first subparagraph a the tactics and resources required to mount safe rescue and firefighting
01:45:18 mount safe rescue and firefighting operations should be assessed practice and confirmed where necessary for the building concerned this may include the following considerations a
01:45:28 a planning for fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the potential for multiple rescues so
01:45:34 so as you say that does indeed replicate precisely the first bullet point in gra 3.2 that we've just been looking at can you see that you agree with that yeah
01:45:46 with that yeah and then if we look at the the second bullet point in gra 3.2 so that's an operational evacuation plan being required in the event the staplet policy becomes untenable
01:45:58 becomes untenable there is no reference to that at least in that section of policy 633 that we're looking at is that would you agree with that yes do you recall whether that was a
01:46:09 do you recall whether that was a conscious decision to not replicate the second bullet point in 633
01:46:15 in 633 no
01:46:17 no do you know if that's likely to have been an oversight or is it just that you don't remember i can't imagine why we would have taken it out
01:46:25 it out deliberately it's
01:46:28 it's again the words are are familiar to me thank you
01:46:35 thank you can i now ask you please to look at the competence and training section of gra before before we leave these two documents
01:46:44 documents um if you cast your eye down 4.8
01:46:49 down 4.8 b c d e
01:46:53 b c d e and so on and a lot of them seem to reflect
01:46:57 reflect in some cases almost word for word the bullet points in the gra the only one that they they run out in the end um but
01:47:08 um but the one that seems to be missing is the one to which council's just drawn your attention it seems a little surprising doesn't it that that is the one that's missing
01:47:20 that is the one that's missing has it
01:47:21 has it been put in evacuation well i don't know um i can't answer that question perhaps you can't either but no we're not not off
01:47:30 off off the top of my head but if it's not if it's been taken from
01:47:34 from planning
01:47:38 the only other place i would you think it might be potentially see it may come up in evacuation all right well we'll have a look thank you if it would be helpful miss
01:47:50 thank you if it would be helpful miss rotting we we can look at the evacuation section
01:47:53 section of 633 would would that be helpful yes that would be helpful if we could perhaps um if i could ask the documents director please to go to page 1 of
01:48:05 go to page 1 of 633 so the document on the right hand side please which has the contents page
01:48:14 and if we could go to
01:48:19 if we could try page seven i think
01:48:32 sorry that's the section that we were just
01:48:34 just looking at isn't it
01:48:43 14 please thank you it's on the screen thank you very much
01:49:06 so are you wanting me to point out is there any specific provision in that section that that you consider implement that bullet point in gra 3.2 that we
01:49:17 that bullet point in gra 3.2 that we were just looking at and it's page 19 of gra 3.2 please i think it's at the top of the page thank you
01:49:34 so you're not taking it may be necessary to undertake a partial or full evacuation in a residential building where a state policy is normally in place
01:49:42 place well
01:49:43 well i mean that would be my question to you would you say that that is the equivalent as it were of that bullet point in gra 3.2
01:50:03 for me saying the same thing but the other way around i see well one is directed to planning isn't it yes and the other is directed to operational matters
01:50:15 operational matters well
01:50:17 well i mean
01:50:18 i mean all operational matters would need some sort of a plan well yes but um the point i was really seeking to
01:50:29 the point i was really seeking to make was that um in the gra the passages that we were looking at are directed to plans that you make before the incident occurs
01:50:39 occurs whereas
01:50:41 whereas the section in uh 633 on evacuation is really more directed to the practical aspects yes so if if you're going to make a plan
01:50:53 yes so if if you're going to make a plan beforehand um
01:50:57 um you would need or you would need an example of that would be your um 72d visits so within your 72d visits i i think
01:51:08 so within your 72d visits i i think there's a there's a list about
01:51:12 about planning for evacuation and also you've got the the parent document
01:51:18 document 800. so
01:51:22 800. so this could be i've done a cut and paste and mr i find that unlikely
01:51:30 unlikely um
01:51:31 um and or excuse me we we we've put it
01:51:36 put it for some reason and again this could be i know it might not not be the right time because it doesn't it sounds ridiculous trying to condense the policy if we
01:51:48 trying to condense the policy if we thought that that doesn't that doesn't sound right to me it sounds it looks like error rather than anything else rather than
01:51:58 than we think it's reasonable enough to put it in another policy so i i i'd probably potentially have to say that that could be a
01:52:08 be a an error
01:52:09 an error thank you well sorry to interrupt your flow
01:52:12 flow thank you sir um i'm now going to ask you if we could stick with those two documents on the screen please and if i could ask you to look at page 21 please of the gra 3.2 so
01:52:23 look at page 21 please of the gra 3.2 so that's the document on the left hand side please
01:52:29 and this is within the competence and training section of gra 3.2
01:52:36 and we can see the final paragraph where it's rather it's a line again at the bottom of the page
01:52:42 page and it's setting out guidance on training for high-rise incidents and it says
01:52:46 says training which will cover high-rise incidents must include and then if we go over to page 22
01:52:56 thank you and it's the eighth bullet point down which says evacuation and casualty removal tactics do you see that paragraph there incident commanders
01:53:07 paragraph there incident commanders should understand when a partial or full evacuation strategy might become necessary in a residential building where a staple policy is normally in place
01:53:17 place and then if we could look over the page we've already got page 14 of policy 633 up
01:53:23 up which sets out the evacuation section and the fire survival guidance section and would you agree that there is no references there in policy 633
01:53:36 references there in policy 633 to incident commanders being trained to understand when a partial or full evacuation strategy might be necessary in a residential building where a state
01:53:47 residential building where a state policy is normally in place so there's no specific reference in in which part of 633 well in in any part of 633
01:53:57 633 but we're on page 14 because i'm i'm assuming that's where you would expect it to be set out if anywhere because that's the evacuation section
01:54:11 [Music] yes i mean the nearest you get is b but that doesn't talk about planning to do it but again i suppose part of the planning would be
01:54:23 suppose part of the planning would be the resources you need to do it but no it's not it's not it's as specific as it's worded in in gra definitely not and and do you recall whether you specifically considered that direction
01:54:36 specifically considered that direction in gra 3.2 in relation to training of incident commanders
01:54:46 training for me is is is training rather than policy so i would have expected
01:54:56 in order to get an incident commander to understand something you you you've got to give them the knowledge and skills to give you the understanding to do that so that that's training i don't
01:55:09 so that that's training i don't that would be very difficult for me in a policy because it would be very difficult to evaluate i see so it's your evidence that it's likely would i be right in summarizing that
01:55:20 would i be right in summarizing that that specific reference to the training of incident commanders in policy gre sorry in national um guidance gra 3.2 does not feature in policy 633 because
01:55:32 does not feature in policy 633 because it's not appropriate for training matters to be included in operational policies is that right oh
01:55:41 i my view uh and don't get me wrong there were i've wrote some policies that were training documents yeah there's no
01:55:53 were training documents yeah there's no no doubt about it um
01:55:57 um i was always uncomfortable uh with doing that
01:56:00 that because
01:56:04 i believe and still do that
01:56:10 policies should not be about training for me policy should be about giving you the knowledge and then what we'll try and do is is train
01:56:21 train the skills and maybe the understanding as well into people i was always unc and it just made plus it just made them even longer than they were to start with
01:56:33 were to start with and
01:56:35 i know what it's like being a watch manager on on a busy fire station and you're asked to say
01:56:44 say do some training and sometimes it is especially my day that training was read the policy yeah
01:56:54 they're not a great read yeah and if you know if you know your audience um you would
01:57:01 you would i think instinctively as a watch officer give your
01:57:08 give your people what you think they needed to know
01:57:12 know and
01:57:13 and again from my own personal experience you would go right okay where in this policy where do i need to start okay
01:57:25 let's say we'll start planning because we do 72d let's start at planning let's get that out of the way but but but really what the the risk is right well whatever
01:57:35 whatever that the bells go down right on route we'll do that bit until and then where do we plug in what do we got to do that's it great we know if we can i just ask you to perhaps if
01:57:46 if we can i just ask you to perhaps if by way of recap if we just look back at those provisions that we were just looking at in the gra 3.2 so if we could go back onto page 21 please of gra 3.2
01:57:57 go back onto page 21 please of gra 3.2 which is the document on the left and again we saw at the bottom training which will cover high-rise incidents must include and if we can go over the page again please
01:58:10 page again please and just looking at the same paragraph there
01:58:14 there the eighth bullet point down evacuation and casualty removal tactics instant commanders should understand when a partial or full evacuation strategy might become necessary in a residential building where a staple policy is
01:58:26 building where a staple policy is normally in place would you agree that that is a very clear direction about instant command training
01:58:37 it's clear
01:58:39 clear and it's very difficult can you explain how you would expect the lfb to pick up on that direction in
01:58:51 the lfb to pick up on that direction in gra 3.2
01:58:54 gra 3.2 if if that was not if the high-rise firefighting policy was not the right place for it which it may well not have been
01:59:02 been how else would the lfb go about acting on that direction in gra 3.2 train them and and so could you explain in brief terms what
01:59:13 could you explain in brief terms what you would expect to happen who would be responsible for identifying that training requirement that set out in gra 3.2 i wrote the tcap for the high-rise firefighting policy
01:59:26 for the high-rise firefighting policy that is
01:59:27 that is 633 yes yes which we're going to come on to so does that mean that that the right place
01:59:33 place for that particular direction about instant command training to be picked up on would be the tcap for policy 633 i'm not just suggesting it would necessarily be the right place it would
01:59:45 necessarily be the right place it would definitely some there were there would be some reference to evacuation in
01:59:54 in the tea cap i think i mean as i recall the tea cap it's it's a long list
02:00:00 list of
02:00:03 of explain
02:00:04 explain yes we'll we we will come on to it in duke or so don't worry you'll you'll have a chance to to to address the panel on that as well i mean i suppose that doesn't mean that
02:00:16 it could have been in in 633 i just think it would have been would anyone have read it
02:00:26 could i ask you i'm just going to ask you one more question on this mr starting could i ask you to look again at 633 please so on the right hand side of the screen and paragraph
02:00:37 and paragraph 7.46 which is we've seen reads it may be necessary to undertake a partial or full evacuation in a residential building where a state policy is normally in place
02:00:49 do you recall whether you considered the
02:00:53 the impact of that provision on existing lfb training do you remember if you considered whether that direction there was catered for in
02:01:04 that direction there was catered for in existing lfb training
02:01:12 i don't recall it being
02:01:15 being a training package if that's if that's what you you mean by your question my question was more in your own mind
02:01:27 in your own mind whether you gave consideration to that do you remember thinking about what existing lfb instant command policy was what it consisted of um in light of of what's being set out
02:01:39 in light of of what's being set out there in in paragraph 7.46 which is that it may be necessary to undertake an evacuation in a building with a staple policy well you've got
02:01:50 with a staple policy well you've got there was policy on um
02:01:54 um office
02:01:55 office evacuation yes but there was never any policy
02:01:58 policy that i can recall about fully
02:02:02 fully evacuating or a residential block of flat yes yes and that that's consistent with what we understand from the witness statement of commissioner andy rowe if if
02:02:14 andy rowe if if because again i suppose again a lot a lot of the time training is different driven by policy so if there's no policy there's not likely to be training on something yes
02:02:25 likely to be training on something yes but broadly speaking but i suppose that we are looking at a policy here aren't we yes and there is a provision that says that it may be necessary to undertake a partial or full evacuation
02:02:37 undertake a partial or full evacuation in a residential building where a statement policy is normally in place and my question is just just very simply whether you recall giving that particular provision consideration at the time that you were
02:02:48 consideration at the time that you were working on the draft 633 in terms of how it impacted on instant command policy i can't no thank you
02:02:59 thank you i'm now going to move on to another sub-topic
02:03:02 sub-topic um and this is um the the the consultation process for 633
02:03:09 633 um and the the end of of that the final stages of that and if i could ask you to look back at your witness statement please which is at lfb
02:03:18 at lfb double zero one one eight nine one eight forward slash eighteen
02:03:27 and paragraph 75
02:03:32 and you state there that on the 8th of january 2014 you shared the then latest version of policy 633 with tom goodall and donna perry harkin for distribution to the
02:03:43 harkin for distribution to the operational sounding board for review and
02:03:49 and just to be clear we've heard some evidence from from peter cowell on the operational sounding board but just to re recap on that that was that was a part of the consultation process for
02:04:01 part of the consultation process for policy development is that right yes
02:04:05 and in broad terms the purpose of that stage is to ensure that the development of policies takes into account the views and experience of those who will be following operational policy on the
02:04:16 following operational policy on the ground is is that accurate yes yes
02:04:20 and as a reminder we looked at the previous stage of the policy consultation which was the circulation of the draft to the heads of service which was july 2013
02:04:32 2013 and now we're looking at january 2014 for the operational sounding board review
02:04:39 review do you know if there was a particular reason for that time lag between july 2013
02:04:45 july 2013 and january 2014
02:04:51 no i i'm sort of slightly you're saying that it went to osb after heads of service it appears to be that way yes that that doesn't sound like the right way around to me
02:05:03 way around to me however then i'm trying to think of any circumstances around the time there might have been a delay and peter was using the delay
02:05:15 and peter was using the delay or i said i was using the delay to
02:05:20 gather more feedback i see i can't recall what that delay
02:05:27 would have been okay were you involved in considering any of the feedback that was received as part of the operational sounding board part of the consultation
02:05:38 of the consultation i'd be surprised if i wasn't if i so
02:05:43 if i so yes i i'm i'm i must have been there's just one item of feedback that i'd like to to ask you about um fairly briefly please mr hutting and
02:05:54 fairly briefly please mr hutting and this was recorded in a spreadsheet that's been exhibited to peter cap's witness statement to the inquiry and the spreadsheet is that lfb double zero 102 537
02:06:06 537 and i'm going to ask the documents manager to please download that that spreadsheet so it may take a couple of moments
02:06:27 thank you and if we could look please at line 46
02:06:39 thank you can you see that one we're starting it's it's recorded as feedback from john button
02:06:44 button he's in the second column saying yes yeah and in column e
02:06:51 column e his feedback was recorded as in general i believe a subject matter as important as high-rise firefighting deserves a separate policy for commercial and residential i find the current and draft policy leaves a lot of
02:07:03 current and draft policy leaves a lot of questions unanswered especially concerning reconnaissance and where to set into if fire spreads to another floor
02:07:10 floor it's good for identifying hazards but does not give guidance on how to deal with them
02:07:15 with them it's good for dealing with a fully developed fire contained to one compartment flat without savable life involved however it is flawed for a small fire due to delayed attack leading to fire
02:07:26 due to delayed attack leading to fire growth
02:07:27 growth it's also flawed if a fire spreads beyond compartment and floor without the aid of a controlled dividing breach
02:07:35 breach has this policy been tested practically i'm in the process of organizing a combined high-rise exercise if you would like to utilize this exercise to check the robustness of the policy i'd be happy to accommodate and the response to that feedback is set
02:07:47 and the response to that feedback is set out in columns f and g immediately next to that and we can see in column f
02:07:56 f there is
02:07:57 there is the word reg which is probably short for rejected is that right yes
02:08:04 right yes and column g gives them more substantive feedback which is the national gra does not distinguish between commercial and residential having two policies would
02:08:15 residential having two policies would add confusion also which would you use at a multi-use building
02:08:19 building we're working on a policy called operational risk assessment it's like the current dra policy would that be dynamic risk assessment yes except it allows for operational
02:08:30 except it allows for operational discretion whereby you deal with a small incident as you described breachings are being looked into do you know whose comments and response those were in in that column g
02:08:41 that column g there'd probably be me
02:08:44 me and
02:08:45 and a another
02:08:46 a another about i couldn't tell you who that other person might be sure do you remember considering the feedback from john button at the time
02:09:03 i don't remember it no no would you agree with the point that he makes about the policy identifying hazards but not giving guidance on how to deal with
02:09:15 giving guidance on how to deal with those hazards um
02:09:21 to a certain extent i mean it's again it's not a it's not a training document it's a it's a policy document yes it is heavy on hazards
02:09:34 it is heavy on hazards and that's the the format of policy writing that had been agreed um
02:09:45 would you agree that the point that he is making
02:09:48 is making arguably applies to the way that the policy addresses the issue of evacuation of a residential building with a stay put policy in other words the policy identifies the potential need
02:10:01 the policy identifies the potential need for that to happen but it does not set out any explicit guidance on how an incident commander might go about managing that would you agree with that
02:10:12 would you agree with that i i don't
02:10:13 i i don't i think
02:10:15 i think the way i read it it it's more about dealing with fires rather than um evacuation and i started missing
02:10:26 and i started missing something yes it's it's it's it's correct that it's not specifically um about evacuation but i suppose my question was whether um
02:10:38 whether um you agreed that that is a criticism that could be made of the policy insofar as it deals with evacuation because the potential need for evacuation is there but
02:10:49 but there is no guidance specifically on how one might go about carrying that out no and i i go back to my my previous point that
02:10:59 that that's extremely difficult to write down in a document yes and i would always go back to whatever i wrote down the first time you use it it won't be the right right way
02:11:11 use it it won't be the right right way to do it yes that's that's why um
02:11:20 i was rather more interested in trying to empower people rather than tell them exactly what to do because if you keep reinforcing that behavior with people you will then get those behaviors that
02:11:31 you will then get those behaviors that you wish in which they will want to be told what to do and and also picking up on something that you said earlier which was that actually the place for that was training rather than
02:11:42 place for that was training rather than policy is is that is that another reason why you would say in in this context well at least within a training scenario i can give you an example of a fire i'll give you an
02:11:53 example of a fire i'll give you an example of a building we can discuss we can talk we can practice we can throw in the
02:12:00 the oh dear it's gone wrong yeah that
02:12:03 yeah that but to try and get all those factors in a policy
02:12:09 i'll admit would be beyond me thank you
02:12:14 thank you i'm now going to ask you mr using about the next stage of the consultation process
02:12:18 process so we know that the draft policy was eventually submitted to the brigade's joint council for health and safety at work in february 2015. isn't it committee
02:12:30 committee uh committee yes is that right rather than council sorry about the account i i have made the error
02:12:37 error myself but i think for accuracy it is
02:12:41 it is i i know i've made the mistake because i can show you a mistake where i've done it so
02:12:45 it so but for accuracy it's committed that's very helpful thank you um if i could ask you to look back at your witness statement please um which is at lfb double zero 118 918
02:12:57 double zero 118 918 forward slash 20.
02:13:02 and it's paragraph 85
02:13:06 85 and you say here on the 19th of february 2015 i shared the then reviewed and updated pn 633 with its accompanying risk assessment tcap sustainability impact assessment and equalities impact
02:13:18 impact assessment and equalities impact assessment for bjc hsw consult consultation with the bjc hsw administration group dominic johnson and der mcgreen and again would it be fair to observe
02:13:31 and again would it be fair to observe that there has been apparently some delay in between the previous stage of the consultation process so we've just looked at um the review by the operational sounding board which was january 2015. sorry january
02:13:44 which was january 2015. sorry january 2014
02:13:46 2014 and now here we have you sharing the reviewed and updated policy um with bjc hsw in february 2015
02:13:58 february 2015 is that is that kind of delay normal for development of policies of this nature no
02:14:05 no do you know if there's a particular reason for it yes could you tell us what the reason was that was because we
02:14:15 we used
02:14:16 used our
02:14:18 our risk assessment
02:14:21 to increase
02:14:24 increase the pda
02:14:26 the pda for a high-rise fire from three pumping appliances to four pumping appliances
02:14:36 that's that that's the bottom line so there were ongoing discussions about that increased attendance so so essentially a greater number of appliances to attend yes high-rise fires
02:14:47 appliances to attend yes high-rise fires i put in the risk assessment when you score a risk assessment you you come with a score and if that score is in the red you have to
02:14:59 is in the red you have to implement additional control measures and we worked it that we were in the red
02:15:10 and so the control measure we chose because of the rewrite of 633 and the roles that we were
02:15:21 roles that we were demanding effectively that that personnel would carry out i stress without doing any sort of time and motion study
02:15:34 deliberately we thought we could get the get our people an extra fire engine and increase the pda at a time off where ev everything else
02:15:46 ev everything else is being knocked down we thought we could do something really really good understood just focusing on on the on the issue of time though it's right isn't it that this is by the
02:15:58 it's right isn't it that this is by the time you are getting in touch with bjc hsw february 2015 that's almost two years after your initial instruction to start work on the review of policy 633 which was april
02:16:09 which was april 2013. do you remember if at the time you were concerned by that that that delay or time lag i can put it more neutrally
02:16:20 i wasn't concerned because i i was never going to sign off 633 bluntly
02:16:28 bluntly the advantage of it not being published was that
02:16:34 was that oh and to be fair we we couldn't have published it without the extra fire engine because we couldn't have met our own risk assessment we'd come up with the control measure so
02:16:46 we'd come up with the control measure so that the delay was we then had to write an odcb report yes explaining what we wanted
02:16:55 wanted and then we had to turn that into a cmb report
02:17:00 report and i i think to be fair to cmb that they saw the report in february and they went yes in february so and and just to be clear on what you've said they're starting when you said i
02:17:11 said they're starting when you said i was never going to sign off 633 do you mean there that that it was just in in terms of whose um ultimate responsibility it was that that didn't fall to you is is that's yes
02:17:24 fall to you is is that's yes that's what i meant but i suppose strictly
02:17:28 strictly well and in policy terms if i can't if
02:17:33 if if my risk assessments in the red yes you can't
02:17:38 you can't i can't progress i've got to come up with control measures thank you i've got to bring the score back down now you said in that paragraph of your
02:17:49 now you said in that paragraph of your statement that we've still got on the screen there that that one of the documents that you sent to the bjc hsw was the tcap for 633 and we've we've touched on this earlier already today um
02:18:01 touched on this earlier already today um could i ask you to look at that tcap form please and it's a lfb0051648
02:18:14 thank you and we can see that the title high rise firefighting is on page two
02:18:23 and the inquiries heard a lot about um the internal processes within the brigade for training development um so just very briefly as a reminder tcap is the formal request
02:18:34 as a reminder tcap is the formal request that a department within the lfb makes for
02:18:37 for training to be either developed from scratch or amended is that correct yes the tcap form is is the beginning of the process
02:18:46 process it is
02:18:48 it is and um
02:18:50 and um as was addressed with mr cow up yesterday
02:18:53 yesterday you were forwarding the tcap form to the bjc hsw at this stage but you would agree presumably that that did not in itself formally start the tcap process that was
02:19:06 formally start the tcap process that was not the trigger for the development of policy sending it to bjc hsw definitely not no no it would need to go to the training department for that is that right absolutely do you know if the
02:19:17 that right absolutely do you know if the form was ever in fact submitted to the training department no
02:19:22 no you don't know no
02:19:25 no um could we look please at page five of the tcat and you're listed as the author yeah that means you wrote the tcap presumably
02:19:36 that means you wrote the tcap presumably yes
02:19:37 yes and the date given there is the same date that you sent the documents to the bjc hsw so the 19th of feb 2015. does that mean that was the date that you drafted the the tcap do you
02:19:49 that you drafted the the tcap do you think
02:19:50 think it could have been
02:19:54 do you recall and and this is picking up on on
02:19:58 on on questions that i've asked you earlier today
02:20:01 today to what extent was it on your mind that the new policy 633 had introduced the need for instant commanders to be able to carry out an evacuation of a building with a staple
02:20:13 evacuation of a building with a staple policy
02:20:14 policy do you remember if that was on your mind at the time when you drafted the tea cap i don't think that would have been on my mind no
02:20:25 and just going back to the gap that we referred to earlier about that the gap in lfb training and the lack of training on how to carry out evacuation would it follow that that similarly was not on your mind when you drafted the tcap
02:20:38 your mind when you drafted the tcap that was not on my mind no not not that i can recall and can you explain in general terms whether
02:20:46 whether you
02:20:47 you uh in fact thought that there were any changes to lfb
02:20:51 lfb high-rise training or instant command training or indeed any other kind of training arising out of the new policy 633
02:20:58 633 massive
02:21:00 massive could you could would it be possible to give us a broad overview of of the the topics of training that you thought were identified by the new policy well
02:21:12 identified by the new policy well hopefully there'll be a a a a a a long list
02:21:16 list i think they will have objectives and just the the the the how can i post it the stan standard operating procedure had changed not not massively
02:21:29 had changed not not massively but but we were we were formally laying out roles
02:21:33 out roles part of the reason we got the fire engine was because we wanted people to go and do a full 360 of the building have a crew manager that have safety officers and that they were the reasons
02:21:44 officers and that they were the reasons we managed to get the extra fire engine so so within that you think i think well i've got
02:21:49 i've got okay right uh i might need a firefighter to be a safety officer right okay do we need to get some sort of uh qualification to do that the training to
02:22:00 qualification to do that the training to do that the sign off the evaluation etc etc so for me that the training implication of 633 bearing in mind
02:22:12 bearing in mind its birth where it's come from
02:22:20 as a training commitment for me and just uh sorry and the practicality and the difficulty of training
02:22:31 of training on high-rise i mean pete and i went up to west midlands and they built a lovely high-rise uh training facility we're now
02:22:43 high-rise uh training facility we're now there to to have a look at it uh you need you would need something like that to to practically give people effective training you know
02:22:54 you know you're talking about we've got to throw fire at them we've got to throw smoke at them we've got to go people
02:23:01 people coming down the stairs people not behaving which to be fair in some exercises we did do at morrison but but not very widely let's have a look through the policy and
02:23:13 let's have a look through the policy and and i'll see if i can ask some more specific questions of you about the training
02:23:17 training so if we could go to page 10 please and i think this is probably the section of the tea cap that you're referring to a moment ago and we can see there in box
02:23:29 and we can see there in box 4.1 what do you want this training to achieve
02:23:32 achieve and then in italics what does staff need to be able to do following completion of this training and
02:23:40 and would i be right in saying that it was you who drafted the text that's in that box there
02:23:45 box there that those are definitely my words thank you
02:23:49 you um and just for the benefits of the transcript i'll read that out staff will be able to explain the hazards associated with building height layout and design explain the hazards associated with fire behavior and
02:24:01 associated with fire behavior and development explain the hazards associated with firefighting and rescue operations describe the firefighting facilities and fixed installations available
02:24:09 available explain the need for planning describe the process of securing water supplies describe the process of securing and using a firefighting lift explain the process of establishing a bridgehead and fire sector list the items of equipment
02:24:21 fire sector list the items of equipment to be taken to a bridgehead explain the safe systems of work that need to be in place in order to be able to send high-rise implement implemented message describe control measures when committing crews undertaking search and
02:24:33 committing crews undertaking search and rescue evacuation fire survival guidance and ventilation list the considerations when undertaking a 72d visit demonstrate where possible applying high-rise procedure
02:24:46 would it be fair to observe about that text that we've just looked at that there is nothing explicitly there to indicate that incident commanders should be able to understand when and how to
02:24:58 be able to understand when and how to evacuate a building with a staple policy would would you agree with that yes can you help us with the reference to evacuation in the uh i think it's the third yes the third
02:25:10 i think it's the third yes the third point from the bottom so describe control measures when committing crews undertaking search and rescue evacuation fire survival guidance and ventilation do you know what you would have been
02:25:21 do you know what you would have been intending to encompass when you referred to evacuation in that context um i think to be
02:25:31 you you can see how those that
02:25:35 that this list of objectives has been compiled it's been done by starting at the top of the policy and working your way all the all the way through it it's not rocketry
02:25:47 it's not rocketry to
02:25:49 to to establish what the objective should be so if within evacuation there's nothing about stay put it's
02:25:59 it's unlikely
02:26:01 unlikely but possible that whoever did put the start of putting the training together
02:26:08 might miss it and
02:26:15 at the end of the policy and it's not
02:26:23 explicit but there is a long list of documents that does include the gra yes and for me
02:26:34 that does include the gra yes and for me if i was a trainer and i was asked to put together a training package around this subject i've got a really nice starting point
02:26:46 i've got a really nice starting point not not exclusive but that's going to get me rolling simply because that's where the people who wrote the policy well that's where their heads were in the sense of when you say you've got a really nice starting point in the sense
02:26:57 really nice starting point in the sense of gra 3.2 being your starting point as within all your long list of so if you if you if you're going to start doing a
02:27:05 doing a training presentation about um high-rise firefighting you might start off by going uh
02:27:12 uh basic introduction high-rise fire lac canal gra this is what gra is review led to
02:27:18 to this
02:27:19 this but was that not the purpose of this box here so box and that's not the purpose of that this is to give um the
02:27:29 um the a steer
02:27:32 early on what we what i thought they would need to consider to put together the training package
02:27:45 so if we if we think back to that direction about incident command training that was in gra 3.2 that we looked at earlier so that direction that
02:27:56 looked at earlier so that direction that that training should cover instant commanders being able to understand when a partial and full evacuation strategy might become necessary in a residential building where a state policy is normally in
02:28:07 where a state policy is normally in place so that clear direction that was in
02:28:10 in gra 3.2
02:28:13 gra 3.2 hasn't made it it's not explicit in box 4.1 and what i'm trying to understand is whether it's your evidence that that's not the purpose of box 4.1 and
02:28:26 that's not the purpose of box 4.1 and actually that direction in 3.2 ought to have been picked up on because it was referred to as a reference in policy 633 is is that what you're saying
02:28:41 i don't think i would have i think that's coincidence i don't i don't think that's that honestly that was my my purpose in in doing that your purpose in doing what sorry in
02:28:52 your purpose in doing what sorry in trying to get the bit about the evacuate the the training part of the gra into this yes
02:28:59 this yes um
02:29:01 um so
02:29:02 so i'm not 100 sure how
02:29:07 how and they stayed unless the training department were all over the gra which would have been unlikely how they would have got that specific instruction into training yes so if i can put it another way whose
02:29:19 yes so if i can put it another way whose responsibility would it have been to be as you put it all over gra uh that would have been ours as the the department responsible for putting together the tea cap
02:29:31 putting together the tea cap well and then by by um definition that the gra the policy and then
02:29:39 and then uh
02:29:40 uh the tcap which which drives the training i i mean the thing about this this tcap is it's
02:29:49 it's if you like it it's first evolution there's
02:29:54 there's the the tcat process is was
02:30:00 was notoriously difficult uh and i know that from experience i i used to
02:30:09 used to write t-caps because i wrote operational news and and and because of other things [Music]
02:30:17 [Music] um
02:30:22 you would have this and and then you would get get together and there would be discussions yes i mean this is not this is not the the complete article in my mind
02:30:34 my mind of what a tea cap should look like can i ask you then mr utting do you know if those discussions and subsequent meetings
02:30:43 meetings around this tcap did actually take place well i'm i'm pretty confident that there are emails
02:30:55 between myself
02:30:59 myself and damien who worked in the tea cap unless i'm thinking about a completely different um tea cap and and again i i dealt with a lot
02:31:10 dealt with a lot well the reason to be clear the reason i ask is because the inquiry hasn't been able to identify any notes of any meetings or any associated documents arising out of this tcap or indeed any
02:31:23 arising out of this tcap or indeed any other versions of this tcap that refine its contents in any way so you're telling me that there was no training
02:31:31 training i'm i'm asking you whether you had any knowledge of or any involvement in any subsequent parts of the process after this tcap was initiated
02:31:42 this tcap was initiated and who who would have been involved in that process from the lfb uh well everything was left with um jim because he he chaired um
02:31:54 um bj's
02:31:56 bj's oh i ate well partly he was my boss and he was physically at bj's chairing it would you agree that that direction
02:32:07 would you agree that that direction about training that that we looked at in gra 3.2 a moment ago so the direction that incident commanders should understand when a partial and full evacuation strategy might become
02:32:18 evacuation strategy might become necessary in a building with a staple policy
02:32:21 policy would you agree that that direction about training ought to have been picked up on in this tcap form
02:32:31 yes it it it may not have been at this stage
02:32:36 stage if that makes sense because as soon as you
02:32:40 you start doing a tea cap you you then the processes you you would then start talking to people and you would bring together
02:32:50 together um groups you would have subject matter experts from from babcock and and so on so it's not just you gave them a bit of paper they went away
02:33:02 paper they went away thoughts about this is what we think that they mean understood i'm just conscious mr writing that i it i i can't ask you to give evidence of course about anything that you weren't involved in and if you weren't involved in any of
02:33:13 and if you weren't involved in any of those subsequent discussions presumably you can't tell us about whether that direction about training was considered at that stage no i mean i'm gone in a in a couple of months and
02:33:25 i'm gone in a in a couple of months and to be had to be fair the the accuracy the truth about me writing this document was i i did it as a as a favor for jim i wasn't working i'd i'd i'd given everything away
02:33:39 i'd given everything away moved chairs not far but i'd moved chairs
02:33:42 chairs and
02:33:43 and just because of my relationship with jim i think he asked me to put a tea cap together and within a day he's got a tea cup whether whether he needed it in a day i don't know
02:33:54 needed it in a day i don't know the trust it would help me to understand um
02:33:58 um this
02:34:00 this can you recall now
02:34:03 now why that particular provision for training instant commanders to be aware of the
02:34:08 of the potential need for evacuation did not find its way into this
02:34:14 this tcap at this stage no sir i can't recall why
02:34:19 why there would be a a deliberate a mission unless we thought that if you're going to start talking about fire survival guidance and you're going to start training people on fire
02:34:30 to start training people on fire survival guides and high-rise policy that
02:34:34 that by its nature
02:34:38 that would be one of the situations that that you would consider but you can't remember a discussion with anyone of that kind or even turning that over in your own mind no this won't this wasn't discussed with
02:34:49 this won't this wasn't discussed with anyone i was asked to put a tea cap together on the the 19th of february uh and and came up with that is that what you want because it it it's
02:35:00 is that what you want because it it it's it's
02:35:02 it's it's it's nascents if you like and then from there hopefully someone will pick it up and run with it and again i've got
02:35:13 i have a recollection of um
02:35:18 um i think before this before doing this of speaking to
02:35:27 training and development where
02:35:31 where i was asking for a favor of
02:35:34 of would you look at this now
02:35:39 now i i know it's not got through bj's because they they've been burned before babcock about doing a lot of work goes to bj's
02:35:47 to bj's gone
02:35:49 gone so i i had a pretty good because i'd work with them so a lot i had pretty good relations with them so i could go along they knew me they trust they trusted me and i
02:36:00 me they trust they trusted me and i could give them the truth and say this is going to go this is going to run this is going to be big yeah and i think there was just a slight negotiation negotiation for members can we bring something else into it and we'll start
02:36:12 something else into it and we'll start working on it and i thought that'll do for me thank you
02:36:18 thank you can i ask you now to look at one of the other documents that was attached to your email to bjc hsw and that's the risk assessment for policy 633 and that's the lfb
02:36:29 and that's the lfb triple zero three zero three six eight
02:36:38 thank you
02:36:41 and would it be correct to say that the purpose of a risk assessment is to inform the content of a policy absolutely yes and you recall
02:36:52 and you recall when you put together the risk assessment for policy 633
02:36:59 if it helps if we look at page 2 there should be a date yes so it's it's dated the 19th of feb 2015 so the same same date as your email to bjc hsn that won't have all have been done on the same day
02:37:11 have all have been done on the same day no
02:37:13 no do you do you know if it would have been done at a much earlier stage for example right at the beginning of your work on how are you you start with a risk assessment i see so
02:37:24 we're back to the birth again because that's the first thing that you
02:37:29 that you do
02:37:31 do because you need to work out a whether you need the policy yes in the first place and b
02:37:38 and b [Music]
02:37:40 [Music] what what other hazards
02:37:43 hazards risks control measures involved with that process whatever it may be so do you recall in that case um not necessarily a specific date but but do you think that
02:37:54 do you think that you started work on this risk assessment policy at an earlier stage so as as one of the first items of work that you carried out in relation to your review of 633
02:38:05 relation to your review of 633 definitely i mean i think that that's explicit in my statement where we took the list of hazards
02:38:17 list of hazards from
02:38:19 from the gra yes and then [Music]
02:38:22 [Music] we had 32 and we came up with 38. uh and that's the risk ascendant risk assessment i'm talking about that was went to cnb and i see odcb i see got us
02:38:33 went to cnb and i see odcb i see got us the fire engine i see there are a number of ways in which this risk assessment does not reflect the final version of policy six three
02:38:44 the final version of policy six three three no and i that that would be because when
02:38:50 what what very rarely happens when you get to the end of a process that's however many years long your complete a finisher at the end of this
02:39:02 this project if you like goes all the way back to the beginning and goes right that's what we wanted that's what we've got
02:39:13 that's what we've got and there aren't many completed finishes in the london fire brigade so is it is it likely to be the case then that the reason why that risk assessment doesn't reflect the final
02:39:24 assessment doesn't reflect the final version of policy 633 in a number of respects is because it was it was actually drafted at an earlier stage and there were developments to the policy that didn't end up being reflected in the risk
02:39:36 end up being reflected in the risk assessment that's highly likely yes it's because
02:39:40 because um
02:39:45 in my head it's the risk assessment that drives the policy yes so um
02:39:52 so um if it's in the risk assessment it should be in the policy if somehow something gets into the policy that's not in the risk assessment it needs to be re really needs to be
02:40:04 it needs to be re really needs to be back in the risk assessment somehow but but that's a process that has to be carried out you know your our lovely flow chart process yes yeah it's not
02:40:15 flow chart process yes yeah it's not quite long enough so does it follow from what you're saying that you might expect to update a risk assessment at a later stage in the process well that risk assessment in my
02:40:26 that risk assessment in my my mind
02:40:28 my mind should have been looked at
02:40:31 the day before this policy was published i see i mean that the the times between
02:40:39 between the the the birth of that risk assessment and the policy coming out we could have had different colored fire engines in that time i'm just going to to
02:40:51 i'm just going to to ask you some specific points about um issues that aren't reflected in this risk assessment because i'm conscious that i'm asking you questions in the abstract at the moment so the first point that that does not appear to be
02:41:03 point that that does not appear to be covered in the risk assessment is this potential need for instant commanders to undertake an evacuation in a building where the stay put principle is in place
02:41:15 where the stay put principle is in place again do you think that's likely to be explained by the fact that the risk assessment was drafted before those changes were made to the draft policy and would that also apply to the fact
02:41:26 and would that also apply to the fact that there is no reference in the risk assessment to the need to re-evaluate advice being given to callers in a building including the potential needs to change stay put
02:41:37 potential needs to change stay put advice
02:41:39 advice yes
02:41:40 yes and also just on that point that that's something that would fit nicely into um fast survival guidance as well for me there there is quite often
02:41:54 a link so yes and
02:41:59 and finally there is no reference in the risk assessment to the need to plan for fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the potential for multiple
02:42:09 multiple rescues which was similarly referred to in the final version of the policy that that does surprise me that yeah [Music]
02:42:19 [Music] can you think of any explanation why that might not appear in the risk assessment no it does it again remember does it
02:42:26 does it it mentions fire spread between compartments
02:42:32 um that i think there are passing references to compartmentation but the specific
02:42:37 specific risk or the the specific need to plan for fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the potential for multiple rescues as a result of that fire spread
02:42:48 rescues as a result of that fire spread is not referenced in the risk assessment oh that's that's disappointing
02:42:55 thank you um i'm going to now move on to the second part um of the questions i'm going to be asking you so this is in relation to policy 790. um and
02:43:08 relation to policy 790. um and as we've referred to already this was the lfb's policy on fire survival guidance calls and it was developed directly as a result of the lack of house fire is that right yes
02:43:20 house fire is that right yes and
02:43:20 and just to be clear i'm afraid this is going to involve going back in time because as you've already touched on you were working on the development of policy 790 a number of years actually before your
02:43:31 a number of years actually before your your work on draft policy 633 is is that right 2010
02:43:37 yes thank you
02:43:40 thank you um
02:43:40 um if i could ask you to look please at your witness statement and the reference for that is lfb double zero one one eight nine one eight forward slash three please
02:43:55 and it's paragraph seven and you say in the third sentence there so halfway down in the paragraph i was asked to take the lead on the drafting of the policy by ac jim knighton who was in
02:44:08 policy by ac jim knighton who was in operational policy i worked with an instant management policy at the time and that was in late 2010 is that right i think that's what you say elsewhere in your statement so actually just
02:44:20 in your statement so actually just looking a little bit further down i believe so late
02:44:24 late 2010
02:44:26 2010 we started it was pretty much ready june july 11
02:44:33 11 and didn't come out until the 23rd of february 12. thank you and
02:44:43 and do you know why you were asked specifically to work on the creation of policy 790 did you have any particular experience with fsg calls or indeed communications with
02:44:54 fsg calls or indeed communications with control
02:44:56 control no
02:44:57 no um and can i ask you to look briefly at um the lfb's control report the lack of control report which is the report that was put together before the lachenal house inquest in november
02:45:09 house inquest in november 2012
02:45:11 2012 and which set out the learning points and actions taken by the brigade arising out of the control room's role in the response to the lack of fire and this is at hom
02:45:22 this is at hom quadruple zero one one two four
02:45:29 thank you
02:45:31 and you can see there it's entitled role and actions of the lfb control november 2012
02:45:38 2012 and if we could look please at page 54
02:45:43 and again to orientate you this is within the summary of conclusions and recommendations section of the report i should ask you first mr uttering apologies are you familiar with this report have you seen it before no okay
02:45:55 report have you seen it before no okay so if i could ask you to look at paragraph 319
02:46:02 and this summarizes one learning point that was identified this reads effective communication between control and instant command there is evidence of information passing
02:46:13 there is evidence of information passing from control to the instant ground this is on on the day of the lack of house fire and only one occasion when the details were flat with people trapped were not passed in a timely way control supervisors regularly tried to
02:46:24 control supervisors regularly tried to obtain information about the progress with the incident particularly in relation to callers being given fsg in line with practice at the time there was much less information being passed
02:46:35 was much less information being passed from the instant ground to control about the progress of firefighting and rescue efforts it is not clear that if cos had been given information about progress that it would have influenced the advice
02:46:47 that it would have influenced the advice given to callers do you know what cos refers to there is that control of operators conoffs control officers and
02:46:57 and would it be correct to say that policy 790 was created specifically in order to address the issue that was identified there that is the need for efficient and consistent flow of
02:47:09 efficient and consistent flow of information between the instant ground and the control room yes
02:47:16 now you refer in paragraph 10 of your witness statement if we could go back to that please the the reference is lfb double zero 118 918 forward slash four
02:47:33 and you state there that you were instructed by ac united to write an operational policy as at that time there was no extent fire survival guidance operational policy so just to be clear about what that
02:47:44 so just to be clear about what that means it was your understanding was it that 790 was being developed specifically as an operational policy so it was giving guidance and direction to operational
02:47:55 guidance and direction to operational crews on the instant ground rather than to
02:47:59 to control operators in the control room is that right yes it was all about um
02:48:06 um because there hadn't been any previous guidance before the the people on the incident ground what to do thank you
02:48:16 thank you and if we can look at paragraph eight of your statement again and that's just over on the previous page um page three thank you
02:48:26 thank you and if we could scroll down a little bit and you stay about halfway down there as brigade control already had knowledge of fire survival guidance and they are integral to responding to a fire
02:48:37 integral to responding to a fire survival guidance call i worked closely with som i think that senior operations manager is that right sounds right to me stippards throughout the drafting consultation and approvals process to
02:48:49 consultation and approvals process to ensure that the policy we developed worked with control systems and processes once the idea was developed i was responsible for the policy development consultation and eventual publication which took place in february
02:49:01 publication which took place in february 2012.
02:49:04 2012. could you explain how you worked with som joanne stippards as she went about creating the draft for example was there one of you that took the lead on the drafting or did you split it up between
02:49:15 drafting or did you split it up between the two of you i took the lead on the drafting and joanne i think
02:49:24 i think weekly springs to mind the control came to um hq
02:49:32 um hq in order to have a meeting and regularly around those i think wednesday mornings we would catch up and then the general premise of it was that
02:49:43 of it was that i would try and come up with a system of information recording and gathering and then go
02:49:54 and then go does this work is this achievable some some of my ideas were not achievable at the time um
02:50:02 um and you know the thing uh i starkly remember was me wanting to address the change of advice
02:50:14 address the change of advice because i i'd been there and i knew what what i knew around that the outcome when you say you'd been there
02:50:22 there i was at black and on right so that was that was coming out of your direct experience of the lack of a house fire third of july 2009. yes
02:50:33 did you want to carry on absolutely um so in the point about joanne um i wanted
02:50:41 i wanted our
02:50:43 our incident commanders to have the opportunity to change the advice because it hadn't worked and
02:50:52 and i came up with a form of words and
02:50:57 and when that form of words was agreed that that's what went into the policy but it was
02:51:03 was my original i can't tell you what my original form of words yes but that that paragraph yes was a negotiation driven
02:51:11 driven largely by control because they didn't it wasn't universally popular i don't think that but that was one of the ones where i sort of i i really want this
02:51:23 i i really want this um
02:51:24 um and that's how it that's how it happened yes and do you recall um what joanne stewart's views were when you first raised that need with her that the need for a change in advice
02:51:36 i think
02:51:40 the impression i got and i'm saying this is why it was difficult
02:51:44 difficult is that
02:51:47 is that um
02:51:50 control liked what they did that was impression that they were very very um
02:51:58 controlling if you like it it is that nominative determinism if you give an organization that that that's what they want to do they want it they want to run you
02:52:06 you and i think they they they were happy with how they worked and any any it felt like any change especially when you you might ask them
02:52:17 especially when you you might ask them to make a decision and i understand why because that they're not close um
02:52:23 um was sometimes not always well received or there was the thought that it would not be well received i see i i'm not not trying to
02:52:33 trying to that if you're asking for my feelings that that's what it felt understood yes thank you and there are a couple of emails that will come on to you actually so they might prompt some further recollection um
02:52:44 some further recollection um and just going back to the process you say in that paragraph that we've just been looking at that you were also responsible for the consultation is that is that right yes i i i
02:52:56 yes i i i at this stage that i don't think there was any there was any
02:53:02 was any the process you see later of an assistant commissioner's pa doing the the sending out i i'm pretty confident i will have been doing all of that yes okay thank you and
02:53:14 doing all of that yes okay thank you and we'll come on to look at some of that um
02:53:17 um and um just focusing on the point at which you were first asked to start working on policy 790 by ac nighting and you've stated as we see there in
02:53:28 you've stated as we see there in paragraph 10 um and this is looking at the the second sentence um that you
02:53:35 that you sorry we're not on the right page that's my fault what's page four
02:53:41 thank you
02:53:44 and you say there in the second sentence that you've not been able to locate any documents which set out instructions or the proposed remit of the policy does that mean that you were given verbal instructions by assistant
02:53:55 verbal instructions by assistant commissioner knighton do you recall
02:54:01 yes it would have been along the lines of write me a fire survival guidance policy do you remember if you were given any more specific direction as to what that
02:54:12 more specific direction as to what that might look like or what the objectives were
02:54:15 were no
02:54:17 no do you recall if joanne stibbs was present for any sort of instruction or briefing that you were given
02:54:25 given yeah she definitely wasn't
02:54:30 does it follow that there was no explicit discussion with ac knighton or indeed anyone else who was supervising you about the issues
02:54:41 supervising you about the issues that we've touched on earlier today that characterized the lack of house fire so if we take one example um the unexpected failure of compartmentation and fire and smoke spread as a result of
02:54:54 and fire and smoke spread as a result of that do you remember if that was part of any of the discussions that you had definitely not no um and um
02:55:03 um and um what about um any reference to the need to address the scenario in which control were receiving calls from people in flats other than the fire flat so
02:55:15 flats other than the fire flat so certain areas are outside of in other areas of the building aside from the flat of origin
02:55:24 no it it
02:55:25 it it was about and you can see what it was about from the from from the start of the the policy it defines what a fire survival guidance call is
02:55:36 guidance call is that that was what it was because as i said there was there was nothing before
02:55:41 before and that's how the information was lost yes
02:55:45 yes do you recall if there was ever any discussion or consideration about creating a fire survival guidance policy in relation to high-rise incidents specifically
02:55:57 specifically no
02:56:00 i'm going to ask you now um about the consultation process um that took place um and uh you refer if we can look at paragraph 13 of your statement please
02:56:12 paragraph 13 of your statement please and this is over the page on page five
02:56:19 and you refer there we can look it's it's it's actually the final
02:56:24 final sentence after that list of names to an informal management consultation and would it be correct to say by way of summary that this involved seeking
02:56:35 summary that this involved seeking feedback from a number of individuals in management positions in different areas and then proceeding to a formal management consultation yeah
02:56:46 yeah and have i understood it correctly that the informal management consultation was commenced in february 2011 does that sound right it sounds right yeah yes
02:56:57 it sounds right yeah yes and then the formal management consultation that took place after that was commenced in april 2011 from what we can see does that sound right sounds makes moving yeah thank you
02:57:10 makes moving yeah thank you um and i'd like to ask you to look at please the draft policy in the form that it was circulated for that consultation with management and this is an lfb triple zero eight three four
02:57:22 triple zero eight three four four seven
02:57:30 thank you
02:57:35 and just to be clear this was the draft version that was circulated for the informal management consultation in february 2011 but nothing turns on that um and could i ask you please to look at paragraph 6.6 which is
02:57:48 please to look at paragraph 6.6 which is on page four
02:57:52 thank you and this states in exceptional circumstances an ic may consider informing control that their advice to fsg callers should be altered i.e to
02:58:03 fsg callers should be altered i.e to attempt to leave their property and this is i think the passage that you were referring to a moment ago this was the passage that that came from you if i can put it like that yes
02:58:15 can put it like that yes now
02:58:16 now joanne smith who was at the time joanne stibbs
02:58:19 stibbs um
02:58:20 um has
02:58:21 has stated in her witness statement to the inquiry that it was she who recommended that this recommendation um
02:58:27 um be given in the draft policy
02:58:31 policy do you think that she might mean that it was a joint decision between the two of you or is your recollection very much that it was you who was driving it i i'm hand on heart
02:58:43 i i'm hand on heart which is why i put it and and there's other people who know i've put it like that i i thought because of my experience
02:58:55 because for me that i i
02:59:02 because it went so badly wrong
02:59:10 i might be wrong if if joanne says she did then then then i'll apologize but i don't
02:59:16 don't i
02:59:20 it shifted my paradigm a bit if if you like so but but if i'm wrong i'm wrong understood um i think i've probably got time to take you very quickly to an email exchange um
02:59:32 you very quickly to an email exchange um between between you and jim knighton on the 4th of february 2011.
02:59:37 2011. um so this is shortly before you commenced the informal management consultation on the draft policy and this email is at lfb 0049532
02:59:58 thank you and here if we could look at the the fourth and fifth paragraphs this is you to to jim knighton um and you're talking about
03:00:11 um and you're talking about following consultation with control and then
03:00:14 and then looking at the fourth and fifth paragraphs you say there are concerns about the generic advice offered by control for occupiers to remain in their premises which contradicts other community safety advice to lead premises
03:00:25 community safety advice to lead premises in the event of fire an option is to say that an incident commander can consider informing control of the advice to be offered to occupants ie yes stay in or no get out
03:00:36 no get out and i think this might be the issue that you were referring to earlier um about concerns would i be right to put it that way coming from control about the advice to give callers
03:00:50 yes i i mean there i i suppose the email it doesn't say who who those concerns are no quite and i
03:01:01 who those concerns are no quite and i was going to ask if you had any recollection no no
03:01:11 so it's just after one o'clock and i think yes is that a convenient point for you absolutely right well i think it's time we stopped for a break for lunch from threating we'll come back please at two o'clock yes and again please don't
03:01:23 two o'clock yes and again please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room i will not sir thank you very much you're right to give the usher then please
03:01:40 thank you very much two o'clock
03:01:49 you