Evidence from Patrick Utting (LFB) on Policy 790 (Fire Survival Guidance). Questioning reveals critical failures to plan for incidents with more than 5 FSG calls, despite evidence of previous incidents with 17+ calls.
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# Source: Local audio transcription (no YouTube captions available)
00:00:00 Thank you.
00:00:29 Good afternoon Mr. Using. Before lunch I had asked you to have a look at the draft version
00:00:56 of policy 790 in its form as it was circulated for the first management consultation. I
00:01:05 would like to go back to that if I may. It is at LFB00083447 forward slash 4 was the
00:01:14 page that we were looking at. Thank you. It was paragraph 6.6 in particular, so in exceptional
00:01:25 circumstances an IC may consider informing control that their advice to FSG callers should
00:01:30 be altered, i.e. to attempt to leave their property. Do you recall whether you gave any
00:01:37 consideration when you were drafting that specific provision in the policy as to any
00:01:42 potential training implications for instant commanders? For example, did you think about
00:01:49 were trained on when advice to callers should be altered? No, I think that would very much
00:01:58 depend on the situation and the information that was being passed. Yes, but in terms of
00:02:05 whether that provision raised a need for instant commanders to be trained on those types of
00:02:12 issues and how to go about making that decision, do you recall if that was something that you
00:02:17 gave consideration to? I don't recall it, no. Would it follow that you don't know whether
00:02:22 you had any discussion with Joanne Stibbards about anything along those lines? Honestly,
00:02:28 I've got no recollection. It was 10 years ago. A long time ago, understood. Sorry. Could
00:02:37 I ask you then to look at the next paragraph down, paragraph 6.7, which says the IC should
00:02:43 consider the early ordering of an additional CU, would that be command unit, to assist
00:02:49 in managing the FSG calls, especially if control is dealing with multiple FSG calls. Other
00:02:56 personnel may be required to manage information if a large number of FSG calls have been received.
00:03:02 Control has experience of handling up to five FSG calls relating to a single incident. We
00:03:09 know that this paragraph did not appear in the final published version of policy 790.
00:03:17 Is that something that you're aware of? Yes, this is obviously an early draft. The only
00:03:26 reason it would have been taken out is if in the terms of what we thought, I think it's
00:03:33 changed a bit because we came up with a mobilisation rather than people having to think about an
00:03:39 additional CU. We had a system whereby that would happen automatically so they didn't
00:03:46 need to think about it. It would be provided. I see. If there were multiple fire survival
00:03:53 guidance calls, which was multiple for me is two. I see. Sorry to interrupt you. Would
00:04:01 it be right to summarise that you were saying that essentially the need for that provision
00:04:05 was done away with when you introduced the automatic attendance? Yes, it just made it
00:04:11 a systems thing rather than a human thing. Could I ask you just about some of the language
00:04:18 that you've used in that paragraph? We can see in the first sentence of 6.7, you refer
00:04:27 to multiple FSG calls. That's at the end of the first sentence. Do you remember when you
00:04:34 drafted that provision what you meant by multiple FSG calls? I'll go back for you.
00:04:41 Multiple is two or more. I see. What about large number of FSG calls, which is in the
00:04:48 following sentence? Is that synonymous with multiple or does that mean something different?
00:05:04 A large number is synonymous with multiple. I'm not quite sure. Can you rephrase the question?
00:05:13 Of course. I'm not sure what you want me to answer.
00:05:16 Of course. I asked you about the use of the phrase multiple FSG calls. Yes. You said that
00:05:23 means two or more. Is that right? Yes. Does it follow from what you've just said that
00:05:28 when you're referring to a large number in the following sentence that also means two
00:05:32 or more? I think so because they're difficult to manage. If we said that they had experience
00:05:45 of up to five, if five is your maximum, then two to three is your large. I see. That reference
00:05:55 to control having experience of handling up to five, was that a reference, do you recall,
00:06:01 to the Lacknell House fire specifically? Not that I recall. That information must have
00:06:12 come from control. I see. The reason I ask you is that there were five FSG calls at the
00:06:19 Lacknell House fire. That is highly likely, but I don't know. Thank you. You received
00:06:27 feedback as part of this stage of the consultation in relation to the concept of multiple FSG
00:06:34 calls. I'm going to come on to that in due course. For the moment, could you explain
00:06:41 and the answer to this may be that it was something that came from control again, but
00:06:47 when that passage was drafted and the reference to multiple FSG calls was incorporated, do
00:06:55 you recall whether you gave consideration to the possibility of an incident occurring
00:07:01 that generated in excess of five FSG calls? I think yes, we did, whether you're talking
00:07:14 about simultaneous or throughout an incident, because I appreciate for the control handler
00:07:25 is dealing with one person at a time, but the recording of it might be, you would still
00:07:35 keep the records if that makes sense. That's why, for example, the sheets we used, there
00:07:41 were more than five, and again, there was the opportunity in whatever scenario you can
00:07:50 have a record of, say, 14 fire survival guidance calls for an incident starting and each call
00:08:00 being dealt with over an hour. I see. Perhaps if we take the first of those eventualities
00:08:06 first, if you said that simultaneous FSG calls rather than multiple FSG calls occurring throughout
00:08:15 an incident, do you remember considering or discussing with anyone the possibility
00:08:21 of in excess of five simultaneous FSG calls occurring at one incident? No. And what about
00:08:29 the latter, which was multiple FSG calls across the course of an incident? I think I've not
00:08:37 made myself clear. I'm talking about over a length of incident, you might have, so you might
00:08:46 want to start one call, so you've got one fire survival guidance call. Yes. That call is resolved,
00:08:51 so you've got no fire, and then you might get another one, but you would still keep that
00:08:55 information. So you would want to be able to record, say, 14 fire survival guidance calls.
00:09:01 I see. You could have, as was at Lacknall, five being dealt with simultaneously, so you've got five
00:09:10 operators tied up. Yes. And that scenario, that's what you say you don't recall discussing or
00:09:17 considering the possibility of those types of calls occurring in excess of five in number.
00:09:22 Not essentially, simply because control were limited to the number of people who they had there
00:09:30 who could answer the phone. I see. But that, of course, doesn't determine the number of people
00:09:34 who might call, would that be? No, absolutely. And then for me, that would be then control having
00:09:41 to come up with some provision of handling those extra calls. Yes. So it's really, it's that issue
00:09:48 that I'm asking you about, and control coming up with, as you say, a means of dealing with that
00:09:54 scenario. And it sounds like what you're saying, correct me if I'm wrong, is that you don't recall
00:10:00 ever being involved in a discussion of how, in fact, control might deal with that scenario.
00:10:05 No, I'd go back to my earlier answer about control. They very much managed what they wanted to do. Me,
00:10:17 as a policy station manager, wasn't going to have any influence on what they would do.
00:10:27 What they would do managing the calls, my influence was this is the information
00:10:36 I think you need to be passing to the instant ground and getting the manage a fire survival
00:10:42 guidance call. I see. So in terms of the number of fire survival guidance calls that might
00:10:47 potentially be received in the course of an incident, effectively that was controls remit,
00:10:52 as you saw it. Yes, I couldn't get more people to answer the phone. Thank you. And there are two
00:11:00 items of feedback that I would like you to consider that you received as part of the informal management
00:11:07 consultation process. And the first are some comments and some tracked additions from the
00:11:14 incident management policy and operations review team. And those are marked on a draft version of
00:11:20 the policy that was sent back to you. And that is at LFB00109485.
00:11:36 Thank you. And you'll see that that's a tracked change version. So that the tracks on their
00:11:44 are the comments that you received from that team. And if we could please look at page four.
00:11:53 Thank you. And it's paragraph 6.5. And you'll see that that's the same paragraph that we've just been
00:12:02 considering. And you can see at the very end of that paragraph, someone has added on in
00:12:09 tracked text, can you see that underlined sentence or part of a sentence in purple text,
00:12:16 but can handle up to. So that's an add on to the sentence control has experience of handling up to
00:12:26 five FSGs and someone's text on but can handle up to and three question marks. And then if we look
00:12:33 at the associated comment that's in the margin just to the right of that.
00:12:40 I'm sorry, it's not brilliantly legible text. I don't know if it will help if we zoom in slightly.
00:12:47 But the comment reads, see comment above, FSG calls, sorry, 17 FSG calls in progress.
00:12:56 And if we look above, which is back on page three of this draft document,
00:13:03 and at the bottom of the page, thank you. And it's the last comment there to which that other
00:13:11 comment that we've just been looking at was referring. And we can see that that reads,
00:13:16 at a recent 10 PF, that would be 10 pump fire, is that right? Yes. Yes. In Docklands, over 17
00:13:23 FSG calls were being processed. The dedicated officer was provided with CU for this specific
00:13:29 purpose. It might be prudent to mention the allocation of appropriate resources to allow
00:13:33 the dedicated officer to carry out this function. Do you recall receiving these comments as part of
00:13:40 the consultation process? I don't recall, no. Do you recall considering in general terms,
00:13:47 whether in fact there had been previous incidents at which more than five FSG calls had been
00:13:54 received by the control room? No. And again, the only people who would be able to define that would
00:14:01 be control. Right. Because they, because the definition is that the caller stays on the line
00:14:12 with the control officer, that is an FSG call. If it's a caller receiving stay put advice,
00:14:20 that someone might think that is a fire survival guidance call, but it isn't because the controller
00:14:26 don't stay on the line with them. I can't imagine how, if this is the word simultaneous isn't there
00:14:33 either, I don't see how control could have managed 17, because I don't believe at that time they would
00:14:42 have had that number of call handlers. I see. Unless they were, they had the system in place where
00:14:55 BT might be taking them or the police or another control or even fallback control. I see. But again,
00:15:04 the definition would be driven by control. There were examples whereby someone would say I had
00:15:11 X number of fire survival guidance calls and you go and get the information from control and they
00:15:17 would not categorise it as such. I see. And do you remember having any discussion with anyone in
00:15:23 control, be it Joanne Stibbitt or anyone else, about previous incidents involving fire survival
00:15:29 guidance calls in terms of the number of calls received, whether that was simultaneous or over
00:15:34 the course of an incident? No, because they would have had that information, they would have known
00:15:42 what they were capable of doing. I see. So that wasn't something that you would have expected
00:15:47 control to share as part of the creation of this policy? No. This policy was about establishing
00:15:57 a method of communication and a means of transferring and recording information
00:16:04 on the instant ground and then passing information back to control. Yes. And vice versa. It was like
00:16:14 a circle with at one point of it this person on the phone and the ultimate would be they can hear,
00:16:24 for example, a breathing apparatus crew coming to get them. And then that information from that
00:16:31 breathing apparatus crew would go all the way back to control so that you could say to control we have
00:16:38 rescued Mrs X from flat 10 and so you can stop that fire survival guidance call. That call should
00:16:49 have stopped because quite often, take this the right way, that BA crews might rescue the wrong
00:17:00 person, if that makes sense. So the information you would then get back from control is what we're
00:17:06 still talking to Mrs Smith in flat 10 so you need to re-evaluate your plan. It was all about,
00:17:14 in my head, not how they managed the number of calls they were managing, it was about how I
00:17:21 ensured that that information that they sent did not end up in someone's pocket. I see. So,
00:17:28 but would you still agree nonetheless that the number of FSG calls that control might expect
00:17:34 to receive at any one incident had a direct bearing on the nature and amount of information
00:17:41 that would be passed to the incident ground? Yes. And so it was still a relevant factor,
00:17:47 was it not, for policy 790? Well, it makes, yes it's relevant, but I suppose, and again this might
00:17:58 not be, well it's not clear in the policy, at some stage you have to re-evaluate your plan
00:18:07 and if you've got X number of fire survival guidance calls and you can't manage them,
00:18:14 then you've gone past the fire survival guidance policy process. You've then turned into
00:18:21 a multiple rescue scenario. Yes. Well, and the question that follows on from that is,
00:18:30 was that potential scenario something that you considered when you were working on policy 790?
00:18:38 No, because I didn't get the impression that that was likely to happen.
00:18:48 I was never given any information to say that if it gets past X, we can't manage.
00:18:59 I see. And you would have expected that information to come from?
00:19:03 It could only have come from control because I don't know what, off the top of my head,
00:19:08 what their establishment was likely to be. There was a lot of change going on at control.
00:19:18 The fire control project, I would not know their establishment. Did you think about
00:19:26 how many FSG calls the instant ground might be able to manage in terms of the information that
00:19:33 they would be receiving in relation to those calls? If you're asking me for a number, I'd say I wasn't
00:19:41 thinking of a number. I was thinking of what resources would you need to try and manage it,
00:19:49 which is where the command unit came in, the station manager came in, the fire plants came in.
00:19:55 And then also, you've got lots of other resources as well. Yes. If you need it, you ask for it.
00:20:05 And when you say you weren't thinking of a specific number, were you perhaps thinking
00:20:09 of a change or a maximum, for example? I wasn't thinking of a maximum, no.
00:20:14 And just looking back to that comment on page three of the draft policy that we were looking
00:20:19 at a moment ago in the reference to the fire in Docklands, do you know what that fire was?
00:20:26 No. We've seen a number of documents that may be the fire that's being referred to there. So I'd
00:20:34 like to take you to those if that's okay so that you can tell us if you know anything about them,
00:20:39 if they help with a recollection. Could we please look at the email chain that sets out
00:20:47 some of the details of this fire that we've identified? And that's at LFB00033196.
00:21:04 Thank you. And if we go to the very bottom of page three,
00:21:19 thank you. And we can see the beginning of an email there on the 12th of November 2010
00:21:24 from CSC admin with the subject daily bulletin 12th of November 2010. And if we could go on
00:21:32 to the following page, page four please, and again scroll to the bottom of that email.
00:21:41 And we can see there that there is a reference to a 10-pump fire with persons reported
00:21:47 at the Marriott Hotel in Poplar. Does that ring any bell for you? No. And could we look please
00:21:56 at the summary that's given for that fire which is at the top of page five which reads
00:22:05 hotel and private accommodation block of 32 floors, 60 meters by 60 meters, 5% of ground
00:22:11 floor and 100% of ducting from ground floor to second floor damaged by fire, two jets, dry rising
00:22:16 main, extended duration breathing apparatus, stage two entry control, thermal image camera, one adult
00:22:22 male rescued from 26th floor and one adult male rescued from 30th floor by breathing apparatus
00:22:29 crews via internal staircase, both suffering smoke inhalation treated at scene. One adult female
00:22:35 rescued from 15th floor and one adult male rescued from 21st floor by breathing apparatus crews via
00:22:42 internal staircase, both uninjured. One adult female and one infant rescued from 22nd floor
00:22:48 by breathing apparatus crew via internal staircase suffered suffering smoke inhalation
00:22:53 removed by LAS. Approximately 200 people left building before arrival of brigade. All persons
00:22:59 accounted for. It appears from that summary that there were casualties on multiple floors
00:23:09 of the building. Would you agree with that? Is that a fair appraisal there? Yes. And could we go
00:23:15 please back to page three of that email thread? I think it's the page up. Thank you very much.
00:23:27 And we can see there, there's an email in the middle of the page and this is assistant
00:23:31 commissioner Andy Hickmott to Scott Hayward, Dave Brown and copying in Peter Cowart, Rita Dexter
00:23:38 and Ron Dobson. And he says Scott, Dave, with regard to last night's 10 p.f. prompt fire,
00:23:46 as I'm sure you've been made aware, this was a particularly challenging incident for control
00:23:49 given the number and nature of fire survival calls they handled, some of which went on for over an
00:23:54 hour. Despite the pressures, the way information was passed to the fire ground enabling search and
00:23:58 in some cases rescues to be undertaken seemed excellent. And am I right in understanding that
00:24:04 Scott Hayward to whom that email was sent was at the time principal operations manager? Yes. Yes,
00:24:11 meaning that he had ultimate oversight of the control room. Is that correct? The way I understand
00:24:17 it, there was Joanne or a level of Joanne's and then Scott. Thank you. And if we can go further
00:24:25 up that thread, please, and to page two. Thank you. And we can see an email from Peter Cowart
00:24:37 sent on the 15th of November, 2010. This is the, yes, we've got it there, the first email on page
00:24:44 two. And this email confirms that the incident did indeed involve unexpected and significant
00:24:51 smoke spread over multiple floors. And he states there, dear all, with regard to the suggestion
00:24:57 below, please be advised that AC Hickmont has called a meeting to discuss some of the key issues
00:25:01 arising from the incident, including FSR issues, unexpected and significant smoke spread on most,
00:25:08 if not all floors. FSR would be fire safety regulation. Is that right? Yes. Thank you.
00:25:14 And communication, difficulties encountered with handheld radios, possibly related to premises
00:25:18 structure. I think the above two points and guidance for what should be done to effectively
00:25:23 handle fire survival calls from the point they received on the incident ground could
00:25:28 usefully feed into the revised policy 633. So we've seen that this fire took place in November,
00:25:34 2010. And that was around the time that you started work on policy 790. Is that right?
00:25:42 Draft 155, yes. 155 as it was then. Thank you.
00:25:46 Does that help with any recollection as to whether there was any discussion about
00:25:50 this incident involving a number of FSG calls? No.
00:25:57 I'm going to ask you please to look at another email chain into which you were copied. And this
00:26:04 is at LFB00033212. Thank you. And if we go to the bottom of page three, please, in this chain,
00:26:21 first of all. And we can see there that there is an email on the 29th of November, 2010,
00:26:30 from station manager Robert Penny to Scott Hayworth and copying in Peter Cowart. And he states,
00:26:36 Scott, I've been asked by DAC Pete Cowart to contact you to arrange, if possible,
00:26:41 a meeting at GVP with the relevant senior control officer concerning fire survival calls received
00:26:46 on the 11th of November, 2010 from a 10-pump fire at the Marriott Hotel Poplar. I was tasked
00:26:52 with dealing with the fire survival calls at the incident and would like to express my thanks to
00:26:56 the OOW, would that be officer of the watch? Yes. For the quality of information supplied
00:27:03 when requested. I've since discussed a number of observations with Pete concerning areas where
00:27:08 organisational benefits may be gained from further exploration of fire survival procedures.
00:27:13 It's been suggested that in order to have a fuller appreciation of the issues and procedures
00:27:17 employed by Brigade Control, it would be useful for Pete and myself to meet with the senior
00:27:21 control officer in charge at the time of the incident. I'd be most grateful if such a meeting
00:27:26 could be facilitated. And then if we go up to Scott Hayworth's reply, which is the bottom half
00:27:33 of page two, and apologies for reading more out. This is Scott Hayworth who replies,
00:27:41 good afternoon, Bob. Thank you for your email. I'm not sure whether you're aware, but since the
00:27:46 Lacknell incident in July 2009, myself and Joanne Stubbs have investigated, made and implemented
00:27:51 several recommendations with regards to FSG calls. This post action has also prompted us
00:27:57 to seek advice and assistance from our operational colleagues on improving the way that we pass and
00:28:01 receive information from the incident ground where FSG calls are taking place. A meeting was held
00:28:07 only last week with Joanne and SM Patrick Utting to discuss the formatting of messages and the
00:28:12 types of messaging that may be employed to provide valid information to and from the scene. If you
00:28:19 have made some observations, Bob, I would rather they were pitched to us. The work on your concerns
00:28:24 may have already been identified and considerations on improving those issues are underway.
00:28:30 The officer of the watch you were speaking to may not be aware of the other work that has gone on.
00:28:35 However, I can say that all control staff have received refresher training on FSG
00:28:39 and are now, we consider, better informed. And finally, Peter Carratt's reply is then at the
00:28:47 top of the thread which is on page one. And this is the final part I'll read out. And he says,
00:28:55 Dear all, I was unaware Pat was working on this and obviously I do not wish to do anything to cut
00:28:59 across or duplicate work that's already in progress. In my opinion, there are some issues
00:29:04 arising from the 10 pump fire at Poplar Marriott that need to be fed into the overall organisational
00:29:08 consideration of this key issue, of this key part of our work and an area which I'm conscious
00:29:13 currently have no written operational policy or guidance. That would be a reference to the fact
00:29:17 would it that there was at that time no operational fire survival guidance policy in place?
00:29:24 There was not. At that time. That draft 155, that's the first one. Yes, was the first version,
00:29:30 thank you. He goes on to say, I would also suggest that the information flows arising from fire
00:29:35 survival calls to the instant ground and from the instant ground back to control need to fit into
00:29:40 some wider work underway regarding operational search procedures as the information from such
00:29:45 calls will always be a key driver for how we need to prioritise search activities. It also needs to
00:29:50 complement and fit in with other policies such as high rise procedures and NICS. That's National
00:29:56 Instant Command, is it systems? Yes. And perhaps a meeting he says between BP, PT, PU, SH, JS and
00:30:06 myself would be a helpful way forward so we can A, feed in issues arising from this particular
00:30:12 incident, B, see how the work already referred to by Scott fits in with some of the related policy
00:30:18 work. That's a very long run up Mr Utton, thank you for bearing with me. The reference there at
00:30:25 the bottom of that email to a meeting between BP, PT, PU, SH, JS, do you think it's a safe interpretation
00:30:38 that PU is you in that context? Yes, I think that there were only two PUs in the London Fire Brigade.
00:30:45 I see. And JS would be Joanne Stibbards? Yes. And SH, Scott Haywood? Yes. BP, do you think that's likely
00:30:53 to be Bob Penny? Yes, he was known as Bob Penny. I see. And do you know who PT would be? PT,
00:31:02 Herb Hattorny. I see, thank you. And he was in control, is that right? No, he was in Ops Policy.
00:31:14 I see, thank you. And that doesn't help you any further with whether you recall any meeting or
00:31:22 discussion about this particular fire, does it? No, it does not. Thank you.
00:31:31 I'm now going to ask you to look at some feedback from the operational risk department on the draft
00:31:38 policy 790. And this is on a draft policy that we can see at LFB 00083509.
00:31:59 Thank you. And could we look at what is paragraph 6.7 in this version, please, which is on page 4?
00:32:08 Yes. And again, you'll see this is the same reference to receiving a large number of FSG
00:32:15 calls and control having experience of handling up to five calls at the same incident. And if
00:32:22 you look at the comment that's tracked onto the right-hand side margin there,
00:32:28 I use a D6. Yes. That states, is there scope within this policy to provide a scheme
00:32:37 slash process for search crews to hard mark search premises slash rooms in the event of
00:32:44 multi-FSG? This will prevent duplication of searches and missed searches in the pressurized
00:32:49 environment of an incident involving multi-FSGs. Do you have any recollection of receiving that
00:32:56 comment as part of the process? I don't recall receiving the comment. I do recall that R&D
00:33:07 were looking into how to mark doors because, again, what happens is that the door numbers get
00:33:16 burned off. When you start marking doors, the next BA crew that comes across will erase the mark.
00:33:26 So it is very difficult. And I don't know if or what solution has been found to that issue. But
00:33:36 it was definitely, it's like the hand-controlled dividing breaching that was an ongoing issue,
00:33:42 a high-rise bag. I see. Another always an issue. And do you recall whether that consideration
00:33:49 was in the context specifically of what is referred to in this comment as multi-FSGs?
00:33:59 I think that that's, for me, that's more about how do I record the searching of a premises
00:34:10 to reduce duplication and to have reasonable confidence at the end of an incident that you
00:34:17 can go, yes, we have searched floors 456. So is it my right and understanding that you would not,
00:34:25 you don't think that you would have interpreted that at the time had it come to you as getting
00:34:32 at the potential for an incident involving multiple FSGs, for example, in excess of the
00:34:40 five received at Lacknell House? That's not how it comes across to me. That's,
00:34:46 if people talk about duplication of searches, that the advantage of a fire survival guidance call
00:34:54 is that you have the opportunity to get very accurate information of where the person is.
00:35:01 You look at the list of information we asked from people, you would know, with reasonable certainty,
00:35:09 especially in a residential block of flats where people knew their own flat, what number they would
00:35:16 be in and what part of the flat they were in. So it actually reduced, so instead of having to search
00:35:24 the whole flat, go to the, come in the front door, turn left. Thank you. I'm going to move on to a
00:35:32 new subtopic of the review of policy 790, and that is in relation to the equalities impact
00:35:41 assessment that was carried out in June 2011. And there is an email thread that I'm going to
00:35:46 ask you to look at, please, which is at lfb00033372. And before we look at the content of that email,
00:36:00 could I ask you please to explain just in basic terms what an equalities impact assessment is?
00:36:10 It's one of the documents, again, that is part of the structure of the
00:36:20 process of putting together a policy. And that would be where you would look at
00:36:27 whether your policy either discriminated against anyone on grounds of sex, race, religion,
00:36:39 it's explained on the form, and you would have to make some sort of assessment yourself about
00:36:47 whether it was or whether it wasn't, and then you would present it to someone like Rebecca,
00:36:55 and occasionally you would get feedback. Thank you very much. And we can see that in this
00:37:01 instance, you did receive some feedback from Rebecca Howard, who is part of the equalities
00:37:07 monitoring and audit group. And if we could look please at the very bottom of page two,
00:37:15 and we can see there just the beginning of her email to you on the 9th of June 2011.
00:37:22 And going on to the following page, and she stated there, hi Pat, for once I have a question.
00:37:32 Do you control gather any information about mobility issues, evacuation plans, etc.?
00:37:37 Is this useful information to pass on to the crew? There is no point in telling someone to get out
00:37:42 if they physically can't due to disability age, and this may be something the crew should know,
00:37:47 or perhaps English is the person's second language, and there may be a communications issue.
00:37:52 If these things are already dealt with in other areas of procedure, it might be useful to note
00:37:56 that in your EIA screening. And your reply to that is on page two. And you say, we could go
00:38:04 back up there. Hi, Rebecca. Excellent point. I've tweaked it a bit. Any good? Do you recall what
00:38:11 tweaks you response to Rebecca Howard's comments? No. Am I referring to the equality impact assessment
00:38:24 or the policy? I don't know. Well, yes, that could be the case because we don't have an attachment to
00:38:31 that email. So unfortunately, we've not been able to trace through where those amendments are. But
00:38:36 that could be an explanation for it. You think that you might have made amendments to
00:38:43 the impact assessment form rather than the policy. Is that right? That's the impression I'm getting
00:38:49 from my email. If I've tweaked it a bit in that, I think otherwise I would have said the policy.
00:38:56 I see. I see. Because the final version of policy 790 actually doesn't contain any reference to
00:39:03 mobility issues or age or the possibility that English might not be the caller's first language.
00:39:10 Would you agree with that? Is that not on the form that's used to gather the information?
00:39:18 The control information form? Yes. So the form that is completed on the instant ground?
00:39:26 No. Yes, but that's the information that's passed from control. Right. We're going to come on to
00:39:31 that in a moment, actually. So if you'll allow me to, I'll park that for the moment and we'll
00:39:38 come on to it. Thank you. I'm now going to ask you about the Haygate Challenge exercise, which was an
00:39:46 eight-pump exercise in June 2011, which was intended in part to test the draft policy 790.
00:39:55 Yes. And is it right that the planning for this exercise was taking place around the same time
00:40:03 that you were carrying out your informal and formal management consultations in relation to
00:40:08 the draft policy, so earlier on in 2011, February to April 2011? Does that sound right? Yes.
00:40:16 And if we could go back to your witness statement, please, at paragraph 32, and this is at LFB 00118,
00:40:25 918 forward slash 8. And you say there, as explained above, on the 24th of March 2011,
00:40:36 I emailed SM Andrew Rowe after I'd spoken with Andy Snazzle about an eight-pump training exercise,
00:40:42 which I was told would be taking place on the 16th of June 2011. In this email, I told SM Rowe that
00:40:48 I was writing the fire survival guidance policy and that the exercise could be the first opportunity
00:40:53 to put it into practice. In the same email, I asked him to add me to the list of invitees
00:40:59 and shared the latest draft of the fire survival guidance policy. And we can have a look at your
00:41:04 email to Andy Rowe, which was sent on the 24th of March 2011, and that's at LFB 00109510.
00:41:24 And here you say, hi, Andy. Just spoken to Andy Snazzle, who says it's okay for me to come and
00:41:33 observe this exercise. I'm writing the fire survival guidance policy, and your exercise could
00:41:38 be the first opportunity to practice it for real. Could you add me to the list of invitees, please?
00:41:45 Now, is it right that this exercise was going to take place in a high-rise building?
00:41:49 Yes. And is that why you considered that it would be a particularly good opportunity to test the
00:41:57 draft FSG policy as well? Yes. And can I ask you now to look at an email from Andy Rowe inviting
00:42:06 you to a meeting, and this is at LFB 00118940. And this was sent from Andy Rowe. You can see at the
00:42:25 top there confirmation of exercise details, high-rise exercise, 16th of June 2011, and the
00:42:33 required attendees were Andy Snazzle, Chris Payton, you, Joanne Stibbard, Scott Hayward,
00:42:39 Ryan Osborne, and Andy Rowe. And Andy Rowe says, hello, all. The exercise scenario has been written
00:42:46 and agreed now. Could we meet again to agree on the index and facilitation from control?
00:42:51 I've invited Pat as he's writing the fire survival policy and may want some input on the fire
00:42:56 survival information. I'm not sure either Andy or Scott needs to come, but have invited you anyway
00:43:01 in case you did. Do you recall what input you had in writing the exercise?
00:43:08 I think all I might have helped with would have been the injects for the fire survival guidance
00:43:15 course. And could you explain in broad terms what the exercise involved?
00:43:31 It was a fire in a high-rise building. I'm sorry, it doesn't sound very enlightening that involved
00:43:41 fire survival guidance course. I can't remember the breadth of it. I know where the building
00:43:48 is or was at the top end of Walworth Road, but no, I wasn't involved in it. It was the creation,
00:43:56 I would say, that exercise of Chris and Ryan. It was their idea, I think.
00:44:09 And do you recall how many FSG calls were involved in the exercise?
00:44:13 No.
00:44:14 Do you recall whether the exercise involved
00:44:17 compartmentation failure within the high-rise building?
00:44:20 I don't recall, no.
00:44:22 Do you recall how many flats or floors were involved?
00:44:25 No.
00:44:33 It's fine. I am aware, as I said earlier, that these emails are from a long time ago.
00:44:41 We're aware that you're doing your best to help us.
00:44:44 I certainly am. I could guess. That block at the end, it was the end of Walworth Road.
00:44:51 Don't worry, Mr. Utting. I wouldn't want to ask you to guess. It's fine. Thank you very much.
00:44:58 I am going to ask you to look at some feedback from that exercise. That's at LFB 000384.
00:45:08 And just whilst that's coming up, this is feedback that was collated by Andy Rowe
00:45:22 based on what he'd been told by the people who carried out the exercise. And he circulated this
00:45:28 within the LFB at the end of June 2011. I'm going to ask you to look, please, at page 10.
00:45:38 And we can see that the bottom half of the table there relates to the fire survival guidance
00:45:43 policy. And we can see the final row, number four, relates to the section of the policy entitled
00:45:52 information gathered by control. And if we look at the final bullet point on the right-hand side
00:46:02 of the page, which reads, the consensus was that the carbonated form worked adequately for the four
00:46:09 flats as per the exercise, but would have been unmanageable for 20 plus calls as one CU, command
00:46:16 unit, had experienced at an incident the week before. So that would suggest that the exercise
00:46:23 involved four FSG calls, or at least calls from four FSG flats. Does that help jog any memory at
00:46:32 all? No. And regarding the reference to one command unit having experienced an incident the
00:46:41 week before that had involved 20 plus FSG calls, do you remember hearing anything about such an incident?
00:46:49 No. And the reference to the carbonated forms, I think that would be the control information
00:46:56 form to which we referred just a moment ago. Would that be a fair interpretation of what's
00:47:01 recorded there? Yes. And let's look briefly at that form please, which is, there's a template
00:47:09 in appendix two of policy 790, which is on page eight of LFB quadruple zero one two five seven.
00:47:18 Thank you. And as a reminder, this is the form, the operational personnel, so usually the individuals
00:47:36 in the command unit on the incident ground would be directed to use in order to record information
00:47:43 being passed to them from the control room. Is that right? Yes. And we can see here that the user
00:47:52 is directed to record if we read the rows from the top of the template form, the premises number,
00:47:59 number of persons within location, location within premises and access point, condition within
00:48:05 premises, heavy smoke, fire, etc., proximity to fire if known, advice to caller from control,
00:48:14 time received by control, time updated. Would that be if further information was received
00:48:21 in relation to an existing call? Yes. And additional information at the bottom.
00:48:29 At the time that you were working on the draft policy 790, do you remember having any discussions
00:48:39 with control or considering at all whether that amount of information was realistic in terms of
00:48:46 what you could expect operational crews to gather on the ground? You mean when you say gather,
00:48:55 you mean write down? Record, yes, absolutely. Sorry. And so was there talk of control whether
00:49:02 the incident ground could manage it? Yes. Did you consider either from a discussion with control
00:49:10 or just off your own bat whether that amount of information was realistic?
00:49:16 It is a lot of information. I wouldn't say that necessarily you would always gather
00:49:23 all that information all the time. I see. Simply because if you are lacking in resources,
00:49:35 you might only go for premises number, number of persons. If you physically cannot manage
00:49:45 gathering the information, it makes no point, it makes no sense if you've got
00:49:51 two fire survival guidance calls. You record all the information that you can about one while the
00:49:58 other person could be being rescued. There would still have to be some judgment about that is all
00:50:07 the information I can gather. And also that's the only information that control have got.
00:50:14 Yes. Control may not be able to gather all this information. And I think this is where
00:50:19 again it went back to if you say to a firefighter here's a form, here is the information you will
00:50:27 get given from control, they will go control give me the information that I'm expecting you to tell
00:50:33 me. Yes. And control may be going I'm dealing with multiple FSGs. I don't have the resources
00:50:44 to be able to do that. This is what I can give you. And if we could just go back to the point
00:50:50 that we were discussing in relation to the equalities impact assessment a minute ago.
00:50:55 And the reference to issues such as mobility issues, age or the possibility of a caller
00:51:03 not having English as their first language. Is that the form that you were referring to do you
00:51:08 think? Yes, for me. And if it's not explicit, I'll apologize. But that was where the additional
00:51:15 information comes in. Again, simply because to try and get a number of specific things like that on
00:51:25 top of the you would also be getting the firefighters to ask that for that information as well.
00:51:31 If control that's more about getting the information from control rather than
00:51:39 gathered from the incident ground. That's the information that control should be gathering
00:51:44 to give so it may not have explicitly gone in 790. It may have gone in the call management.
00:51:51 I see it might have done I don't know if it went in or not not not beg your pardon. It could
00:51:59 it was going to go anywhere it would go in the riff the reference information file.
00:52:03 I see. Because what I asked for was this information yeah to be put on their riff.
00:52:12 I see. So that matches up that if they can control will gather this information
00:52:20 and they will pass it to the incident ground who are expecting some or all of that information.
00:52:26 I see. But just to be clear, neither the riff which is the reference information
00:52:32 folder or file file that and that's a reference document that control operators use.
00:52:38 Yes.
00:52:38 Neither that nor policy 539 which is the policy on managing emergency calls. They would not have
00:52:48 been seen or used by operational personnel. Is that right? That is right.
00:52:55 Thank you. Can I ask you to go back please to the feedback from the exercise which is at LFB 000
00:53:04 3384. And if we could look please at page 11.
00:53:16 And the bottom row there relates to the section of the policy entitled recording of information
00:53:24 and the first two bullet points read the consensus and specific feedback from the
00:53:29 CUs was that even with only four FSG calls the CU staff riding as only two could not deal with
00:53:35 the workload associated with the FSG policy and their normal duties. And then the second bullet
00:53:41 point a suggestion was made that the first CU should be dedicated to FSG and the ICP
00:53:48 incident command pump would that be?
00:53:50 Initial.
00:53:51 Initial command pump thank you is maintained until a second CU arrives for general command
00:53:57 and control. And if we go over onto page 12 please and if we could look at the second bullet point
00:54:07 there it reads an individual suggestion was made that it would be an idea to mobilize
00:54:12 a specific FSG response as with the firefighter emergency policy at a multiple FSG call incident.
00:54:20 This would provide an additional two SMs for FSG, a CU and crews to carry out the recording
00:54:27 and specific search rescue tasks associated. CSS was used throughout and found to be very useful
00:54:33 in regards to FSG.
00:54:38 Do you have any recollection of discussion along those lines?
00:54:42 Yes, I mean that seems to me to match pretty much what I put into 790 in that point there was like
00:54:54 a dual attendance. One FSG you got X, two FSG you get Y. I do know that was altered, it was apparently
00:55:03 simply simplified into one attendance. But that broadly reminds me of my policy.
00:55:15 Thank you. And I'm going to ask you now to look at another document please which is the notes of
00:55:24 the debrief meeting following this exercise and those were LFB00056628.
00:55:42 And I'm assuming again Mr. Rutting that you don't have any particular
00:55:45 recollection of attending this meeting.
00:55:48 I don't recall actually going to it at all. I think I would have remembered.
00:55:55 Okay, you're recorded as being present.
00:55:58 Oh am I? In which case I was there. But in which case you can tell I've definitely got no memory.
00:56:04 Understood. I'll see how far we can get with it. If we could look at page four please.
00:56:13 And in fact we can see right at the bottom of that page that's your name there and you're
00:56:20 recorded as contributing to some discussion there. And if we can look a little bit further up please
00:56:27 under the subheading information gathering which is just slightly further up on the page. Thank you.
00:56:35 And if we look at page four please.
00:56:37 Information gathering which is just slightly further up on the page. Thank you.
00:56:43 And if we look at the third bullet point there and there's a comment coming from unknown which
00:56:49 is that the whole FSG recording was hard enough to manage with four flats it would be almost
00:56:55 impossible should you have 60 flats involved. Can this information not be sent to the MDT
00:57:01 and that's the mobile data terminal is it? Yes.
00:57:03 And that's the appliance that's fixed on pumping appliances and contains information about premises.
00:57:10 Yes like a computer on the front of the fire engine.
00:57:14 And if we look at the comment immediately below that which is that control cannot send FSG
00:57:20 information to the MTD as this would require the technician to install the capability on every MDT
00:57:27 in the brigade. Can I ask you first of all if you have any recollection of having any discussion
00:57:35 with anyone about the possibility of an incident involving 60 flats in terms of FSG calls?
00:57:42 No. And second in relation to the mention of the mobile data terminal
00:57:48 is it right that you and Joanne Stibbards had already discussed in fact in the very early stages
00:57:54 of drafting policy 790 whether it might be possible to pass information from control
00:58:00 electronically via the MDT. Oh absolutely. My last worst option was a carbon paper pad on a fire engine
00:58:14 and unfortunately that was where I got to because I was told that because of the system
00:58:24 it was not possible to be able to send FSG information to the MDT from control. And so I
00:58:35 don't know what would have had to have been done to achieve that but I was just told nice idea
00:58:42 doesn't work. And can you explain why you say that the use of the carbonated form was your,
00:58:48 was it did you say your last worst? My least best option. Your least best option.
00:58:55 Why and why was that the case? What were the drawbacks of that? Well it's difficult. It's
00:59:00 difficult on a bouncy fire engine, a bouncy command unit. It's hard work trying to, you've got to stop,
00:59:10 you've got to find the pad, make sure you've got the right pen, sit there. If you're on your own,
00:59:17 that could actually happen. You're trying to take the information and jot it down at the same time.
00:59:27 It's not easy. And you say you can't help as can you in terms of the technical reasons or reasons
00:59:35 otherwise why it wasn't possible to pass information electronically via the MDT? No, that's beyond my
00:59:43 knowledge of the MDT system. Thank you. And can I go back finally to the feedback received at
00:59:53 the debriefing meeting on the 16th of June 2011 and this is the point that you've picked up on
00:59:59 about increasing the PDA and if we could look at your witness statement again please which is at
01:00:06 LFB00118918 forward slash 10.
01:00:21 And if you look at paragraph 39 there
01:00:28 and you say the main change to the policy, this is to the draft policy, and you are,
01:00:35 just to be clear, you are referring specifically there to the feedback following the June 2011
01:00:42 exercise because you referred to that in the paragraph above at 38. Yes. And you say the
01:00:47 main change to the policy was the inclusion of a two-tier mobilisation such that one FSG call would
01:00:52 attract a person's reported attendance if there were two or more FSG calls received or one or more
01:00:58 calls from a high-rise building, this would attract a dedicated pump ladder command unit and station
01:01:03 manager in addition to the person's reported attendance. I recall that the changes were made
01:01:07 due to the fact that during the exercise individuals found it challenging to write down
01:01:12 and manage the FSG information as the number of FSG calls escalated and this is reflected in the
01:01:18 feedback Andrew Rowe circulated on the 30th of June 2011. And is it right, if I've understood that,
01:01:30 meaning that the additional attendance for incidents involving more than one FSG call was
01:01:36 intended to address specifically that problem that had been experienced at the exercise, namely command
01:01:42 unit personnel becoming overwhelmed with trying to record information that was coming through from
01:01:47 control? Yes. And that additional attendance meant that there would be one extra command unit on the
01:01:56 scene, is that right? Yes. And that would have two riders? Two or three in my recollection. And the
01:02:05 role of that command unit would be solely to manage information coming in from the control room, is
01:02:11 that right? Yes. And there would also be an additional station manager you've set out there?
01:02:15 Yes. And is it right that that station manager would also be assigned an FSG role? Yes. And what
01:02:24 about the additional pumping appliance? Do you know if the riders on that additional pumping appliance
01:02:29 would be tasked with FSG duties? Yes, they're extra bodies if you like, well to do whatever,
01:02:38 record information, runners, whatever is needed. Thank you. And were you, did you feel comfortable
01:02:44 that that increased attendance was sufficient to deal with the concerns that had been raised
01:02:50 about command unit personnel becoming overwhelmed with managing the information?
01:02:57 I don't know if that would always have reassured their concerns, if that's what you're asking.
01:03:09 It gave them, I think, a better chance than they had had before. And also it started to give
01:03:19 an impression that if you need more resources to deal with FSG, ask for more resources.
01:03:25 And again, in the times we're talking, to get an additional PDA was challenging, isn't the right
01:03:35 word, but a difficult thing to do when resources were becoming tight. Again, I haven't really got
01:03:45 numbers in my head on the thing, I tried to step away from that, but it's better more than they
01:03:52 had before. Thank you. I'm now going to move on to another subtopic in relation to the progress
01:03:59 of policy 790, which is the associated TCAP, please. And if we could look at paragraph 42
01:04:07 of your witness statement, which is just on the following page, page 11. Thank you. And you refer
01:04:14 there to TCAP number 0055B, Ops News 24 Fire Survival Guidance Policy, dated December 2012.
01:04:25 And just to be clear, by this point, Policy 790 had already been published, hadn't it? That was
01:04:30 February 2012. And do you recall whether you produced another TCAP for Policy 790, or indeed
01:04:39 a TCAP prior to its publication in February 2012? I don't, as I recall, I don't
01:04:49 remember there being a TCAP process when I wrote 790. Right. So this TCAP that's dated December
01:04:59 2012, do you think that that's, is that because the TCAP process has come in actually after?
01:05:06 That would be my understanding. I thought that that was when we went to Babcock 2012.
01:05:14 I see. That makes sense. So once they'd come in, however long after that, suddenly,
01:05:20 oh, there's a TCAP process. So here's an opportunity to get some decent training.
01:05:25 And do you think that TCAP 0055B was the TCAP for Policy 790, or was it not specific?
01:05:36 Without seeing it, but to be fair, I don't recall, I don't remember writing the TCAP,
01:05:44 and I don't remember getting involved at that stage in a TCAP process.
01:05:50 What I'll do, Mr. Rutting, is I'll ask you to look in the first instance at Operational News 24,
01:05:56 which is the Ops News that is referred to in the title of that TCAP. That might give you
01:06:02 some sort of idea, and that's at LFB 00118959. And we can see there in the top right-hand corner
01:06:13 that that edition of Ops News was published in March 2013.
01:06:18 And the section on Fire Survival Guidance Calls is on page 2.
01:06:25 Is that familiar to you at all? I will have written that.
01:06:29 You would have written that? Yes.
01:06:31 Would it be correct to say that what that seems to be is a fairly brief and high-level
01:06:39 summary of Policy 790 for the benefit of operational staff?
01:06:44 Yes. And if we can now look at the
01:06:48 accompanying TCAP, which is at LFB 00118980. Thank you.
01:07:07 And we can see on the front page that that's TCAP 0055B, Ops News 24, Fire Survival Guidance
01:07:14 Policy, and the date is just above that in the green box, December 2012.
01:07:22 And if we could look at page 4, please,
01:07:30 and box 1.2, and we've got the name of the commissioning officer,
01:07:37 AC Cotton, that's Danny Cotton in Operational Assurance, is that right?
01:07:41 Yes. And the client,
01:07:44 1.3, is Assistant Commissioner Dave Brown. Yes.
01:07:48 And you are named in box 1.4 as one of two TCAP stakeholder group members.
01:07:57 Yes. Could you help us with what the
01:08:00 TCAP stakeholder group is? They would be the people who would
01:08:08 probably be the subject matter experts on the topic.
01:08:17 I see. So you were one of the subject matter experts.
01:08:19 Well, I think I'm there because I wrote 790 and worked for Danny Cotton.
01:08:25 Yes. And Brian is there because he was a group manager in OPR.
01:08:31 That's GM Reardon, is it? Yes.
01:08:33 And does that mean that you are likely to have had a role in drafting this TCAP?
01:08:40 Possibly. And if we look at box 1.6,
01:08:47 which is just a little bit further down on the same page,
01:08:52 and that states, this TCAP is to affect the changes that resulted from the overall review
01:08:57 of training materials affected by Operational News 24.
01:09:02 Do you have any recollection of what the overall review of training materials
01:09:06 affected by Operational News 24 was? When I wrote a DIOT report for ODCB,
01:09:16 they would choose a list of topics that were to be discussed in Operational News.
01:09:23 Or along with that, they would decide or a decision would be made as to what training
01:09:32 packages would be associated with Operational News 24. And then that would go to, in this case,
01:09:43 must be Babcock now, and then they would pull whatever training materials they had,
01:09:50 and then either tweak or update, and then put them on the system so that they could be delivered in
01:09:58 some format. I see. So essentially this was to meet the training need that arose because of
01:10:08 Operational News 24. Yes, there was always,
01:10:12 um, it's always good with these things is to look at the back page. The back page is,
01:10:19 should list what actions were required. Some might be read the policy. Some might be, here's a nice
01:10:29 computer-based training package to do. It might be a lecture.
01:10:35 I wonder if it would help to look back at the final page of the Operational News
01:10:40 that we were just looking at. If we could go back to LFB 00118959, please.
01:10:53 It looks like that will be on page four. Thank you.
01:10:59 So we can see there's a reference to fire survival guidance. That's the
01:11:03 fourth row down in that table.
01:11:11 And could you assist the panel with what that means? Is the reference to training in the second
01:11:17 column and the word article appears? Does that mean that the training was
01:11:25 the article within Operational News or? No, what that means to me is that the
01:11:32 article is to be read and then, um, hang on, I might be giving you a bumstie. Policy 790
01:11:47 Fire Survival Guidance Calls Recording Reference Subject Lecture. See, for me that reads that's
01:11:52 a lecture about fire survival guidance calls. I see. So the watch manager on the station
01:12:02 would do a lecture on 790, or I beg your pardon, give a training input on 790 and then that's how
01:12:09 it would be recorded on step. Right. That's how I, I may be wrong, but that was my, you wouldn't
01:12:17 just read the article. The article was in a magazine that was given to everyone. Right.
01:12:22 So there would be associated materials. There wouldn't necessarily be associated with
01:12:26 materials, as you can see on aerial appliances, which again, I think that's one of my
01:12:31 TCAPs. It is, um, there would, there was a bespoke package done for aerial appliances.
01:12:39 Okay. Um, let's try going back to the TCAP maybe, um, which is at LFB 00118 980.
01:12:52 And if we could go to page nine this time, please. Thank you.
01:12:58 And box 6.1, which is said to set out detail of training packages affected and amendments made to
01:13:04 these packages following review. And the text there reads no dedicated training delivered in this area.
01:13:11 However, delegates receive input in IM courses. Would that be incident management courses? Yes.
01:13:17 And that means the same as incident command courses. Is that right? Yes. And it goes on to say
01:13:22 fire survival guidance policy is discussed with all delegates from supervisory management upwards
01:13:28 as part of tactical decision exercises. Incident management training includes fire survival
01:13:34 guidance as an inject to about 50% of station manager and group manager tactical decision
01:13:40 exercises. And within certain incident command exercises, supervisory managers also receive
01:13:47 emphasis on this subject area as part of their courses. And the control information form carried
01:13:52 on appliances is also discussed. All CU training includes discussion on forward information boards.
01:13:59 All IM management development training includes discussion on control information boards and
01:14:05 multiple choice questions are used to test this knowledge. What that text appears to be saying,
01:14:13 and please correct me if I'm getting this wrong, but it appears to say that there was no
01:14:19 specific fire survival training package for operational crews at that time. Is that right?
01:14:28 I think that's right. Yes. And that the concept of fire survival guidance was present in existing
01:14:34 incident command training materials. Is that correct? What are you saying is there's a training
01:14:42 package within incident management training or it was just? No, I'm saying that what this text
01:14:49 seems to suggest is that fire survival guidance as a concept was included in some existing
01:14:57 incident command training packages that weren't necessarily specifically FSG training packages.
01:15:02 Is that right? Yes. And did you consider when you created policy 790 the possibility of creating a
01:15:11 specific dedicated FSG training package for operational staff? I personally didn't. I mean,
01:15:20 that was part of the policy flow chart development. So the policy would be written, training would look
01:15:29 at the policy and then there would be a decision as to whether they did anything about it. So who
01:15:38 whose responsibility would it have been in relation to policy 790, which was an operational policy,
01:15:44 to take a view as to whether it would be helpful or necessary to create a training package
01:15:50 associated with that policy? Well, I thought it would have been whoever was in training at that
01:15:55 time. So a matter for the training department. Is that right? I think so. Would it not have been a
01:16:01 matter for the operational policy department? I don't recall that as to that was how it worked,
01:16:09 but I could be wrong. This was the second policy I wrote, so I wasn't familiar, familiar. And
01:16:23 I'd have to refer to the flow chart that was in at the time, whether it states explicitly
01:16:31 who does it. Thank you. I'll tell you I didn't do it. Thank you, Mr. Rutting. So it's just after
01:16:40 3.15 and I have a small number of questions left, Mr. Rutting, but I think they'll probably take
01:16:45 more than five minutes, so it might be a convenient time. Would it be sensible to have the break now?
01:16:49 I think so, sir. Yes, all right. Well, Mr. Rutting, we normally have a break about this
01:16:54 time in the afternoon and I think we would do well to take it now. So we'll break. We'll come
01:17:00 back at 25 to four, please. And as before, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence
01:17:06 while you're out of the room. I will not, sir. Thank you very much.
01:17:20 Thank you, Ms. Cudden. It sounds like you're getting on quite well. Very well, sir. Yes,
01:17:24 making very good progress. So I would hope to be finished comfortably before the end of today with
01:17:29 Mr. Rutting. Including the time required to collect questions and so on? I would hope so.
01:17:34 We've had a few in before now already, but so subject to that. Certainly my questions will be
01:17:39 finished I think quite soon after the break. Good. All right. Well, we'll see how we go then.
01:17:42 Thank you. Thank you very much. 25 to four, please.
01:17:59 Thank you.
01:18:29 Thank you.
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01:19:29 Thank you.
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01:25:29 Thank you.
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01:34:29 Thank you.
01:34:59 Thank you.
01:35:29 Thank you.
01:35:59 Thank you.
01:36:19 Would you ask Mr. Otten to come back in, please?
01:36:21 Thank you.
01:36:29 All right, Mr. Utting?
01:36:34 Yes, sir, thank you.
01:36:36 Right, on we go then. Yes, Ms. Curtin.
01:36:39 Thank you, sir. Mr. Utting, the final topic I'm going to ask you about from my questions
01:36:47 relate to operational exercises for FSG that have been referred to in some of the documents
01:36:53 that have been provided to the inquiry. And the first of those exercises is exercise Florian,
01:36:59 and you refer to this in paragraph 52 of your witness statement, the reference for which is LFB 00118918 forward slash 13.
01:37:10 And we know that this exercise took place in December 2012, which you refer to in the penultimate sentence there towards the end of the paragraph.
01:37:27 And you've exhibited a couple of emails that receive you, that you confirmed the arrangements for the exercise and a debrief session.
01:37:37 I don't need to take you to the content of those emails, but it would be helpful for the panel if you could provide some further details and background to the exercise.
01:37:48 Do you recall whether you attended exercise Florian?
01:37:51 Yes.
01:37:52 And in what capacity was that? Were you supervising or observing?
01:37:57 I was observing on a command unit.
01:38:01 And do you recall what the exercise involved?
01:38:05 It involved fire survival guidance calls.
01:38:08 Do you recall how many?
01:38:10 I don't know.
01:38:11 Do you know what the purpose of the exercise was? Was it simply about testing policy 790?
01:38:18 My understanding is that it was required by the LFB to demonstrate that we had met the requirements of the Lacknall Rule 43.
01:38:33 I see. So does it mean that the exercise took place in a high rise building?
01:38:39 No, it took place at Merton. Merton Control.
01:38:47 So that...
01:38:48 I see. Do you mean physically at a high rise building or the scenario of the exercise was a high rise building?
01:38:54 Well, both. If we start with the exercise scenario perhaps first.
01:38:59 I honestly can't remember the scenario.
01:39:04 And when you were saying was it taking place physically at a high rise building and you said no it took place at Merton Control Room?
01:39:14 Yes, I was parked on a command unit at Merton outside the control.
01:39:20 I see. So it was an exercise involving command units and their interaction with control.
01:39:27 Yes.
01:39:28 And you don't have a recollection if the hypothetical scenario, if I can put it that way, was a high rise building?
01:39:34 No. Martin Corbett would be the person to... he would definitely have that information.
01:39:46 So just so that we can understand this, you were parked up somewhere in the vicinity, perhaps just outside the control room.
01:39:53 Precisely.
01:39:54 You were testing the communications between the control room and the command unit.
01:40:00 Yes.
01:40:01 You of course... well I say of course, I assume you were not transmitting from the command unit to the incident commander.
01:40:09 There wasn't anyone playing that role, was there?
01:40:11 Yes, there would be an incident commander, yes.
01:40:13 Somewhere else?
01:40:15 Or on that... probably not on that command unit, on another command unit.
01:40:20 So that leg of the communication was involved as well?
01:40:24 Yes, it was... I think the exercise was designed to test the communications around Fire Survival Guidance Corps.
01:40:32 So you would have needed all those players from breathing apparatus teams, BA control, maybe stage two control.
01:40:43 So all those steps, so to speak, in the communications link were represented in one way or another, were they?
01:40:49 Yes, I recall, sir, yes.
01:40:51 Right, and were you testing the return of information back to control room from BA wearers or whatever?
01:41:00 Most definitely, there wouldn't have been any purpose not to have done it.
01:41:04 I know, I just wanted to make sure we understood.
01:41:06 Yes.
01:41:07 Thank you, sorry.
01:41:08 Thank you, sir.
01:41:09 Do you recall if there were any specific learning points that were identified arising out of the exercise?
01:41:14 I think the normal that you would expect in that it's difficult to gather, difficult to record the information.
01:41:22 And do you know if the same exercise was ever used on any other occasion?
01:41:28 I don't know the answer to that, no.
01:41:30 Thank you.
01:41:32 And the second exercise I'd like to ask you about, please, is an exercise that we've seen referred to as exercise Penfold,
01:41:39 and you don't refer to this one in your witness statement,
01:41:42 but Victor Bagnell, who was then a senior operations manager in the control room, provides some information about it in his witness statement.
01:41:51 And if I can summarize what he says, he states that the exercise took place in November 2013.
01:41:58 So in terms of your role at that time, you had moved to operational procedures, I think, by that point, would that be right?
01:42:05 That sounds like I'm in incident communications.
01:42:08 Right. Did you have any involvement in exercise Penfold?
01:42:15 No.
01:42:17 You've not heard of it before, have you?
01:42:19 I think I'd have remembered an exercise Penfold.
01:42:22 I see. Are there any other operational exercises involving FSG Policy 790
01:42:31 and the flow of information between the control room and the incident ground that you recall?
01:42:37 No.
01:42:39 Thank you.
01:42:41 Ms. Ratting, in that case, that comes to the end of my prepared questions for you.
01:42:47 So, sorry, that was a short 10 minutes.
01:42:50 Don't worry.
01:42:52 It might be a convenient moment to see if there are any questions from those watching.
01:42:58 Yes. Well, Ms. Ratting, you may know this, but when council gets to the end of her questions,
01:43:04 we always have a short break, partly to enable her to check she hasn't overlooked anything,
01:43:09 but also to enable others who are following the proceedings from other places to suggest additional questions that perhaps we ought to be asking you.
01:43:19 So we'll have a short break now. We'll come back at four o'clock,
01:43:25 and at that point we'll see whether there are any more questions for you or whether that's the lot.
01:43:31 Thank you, sir.
01:43:32 Would you like to go to the usher, please, and we'll see you again at four o'clock.
01:43:36 Thank you.
01:43:37 Thank you.
01:43:46 Thank you. I think it's just over a quarter of an hour. I think that ought to be long enough.
01:43:50 I think so, sir.
01:43:51 But if it isn't, you know that you only got to tell the usher and we'll be a bit longer.
01:43:54 Thank you very much.
01:43:55 Thank you very much.
01:43:56 Thank you very much. Four o'clock, please.
01:44:02 Thank you.
01:44:32 Thank you.
01:45:02 Thank you.
01:45:32 Thank you.
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01:46:32 Thank you.
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01:59:02 Thank you.
01:59:32 Thank you.
02:00:02 Thank you.
02:00:32 Thank you.
02:01:02 Thank you.
02:01:32 Would you ask Ms. Arting to come back in, please?
02:01:39 Thank you.
02:01:40 All right, Ms. Trotting, well, we'll see if there are any more questions for you.
02:01:56 Sir.
02:01:57 Yes, Ms. Curtin.
02:01:58 Thank you, sir.
02:02:00 Okay.
02:02:01 A few more questions for Ms. Arting, please.
02:02:03 Mr. Arting, we addressed earlier why it was that your gap analysis document did not make
02:02:09 reference to cladding systems, which appeared as a phrase in both the final version of GRA
02:02:16 3.2 that was published in 2014 and the draft version that was being worked on at the time
02:02:23 that you produced your gap analysis.
02:02:25 And could I ask you, please, to look again at that draft version of 3.2, which is at
02:02:31 LFB 00033971.
02:02:44 And the reference to cladding is on page 18.
02:02:54 It might be slightly further down.
02:02:56 Sorry, can we try page 19?
02:03:05 Page 20.
02:03:17 Sorry, Mr. Arting, bear with me.
02:03:18 All right.
02:03:25 If we could perhaps, whilst we're waiting, have up on the screen at the same time.
02:03:31 So if we could put it on the other side of the screen, please.
02:03:35 The final version of policy 633, which is at LFB 0001256.
02:03:45 Thank you.
02:03:54 And if we could go to page 19 of that document on the right-hand side.
02:04:04 Thank you.
02:04:05 And the reference for the document on the left-hand side is page 12.
02:04:17 Thank you.
02:04:18 And you can see there, if we could look at the second bullet point, first of all, on
02:04:24 the document on the left-hand side, which states, building construction features such
02:04:30 as the presence and location of Masonette-star construction, sandwich panels, timber framing,
02:04:36 cladding systems, surface mounted, trunking, ducting, and voids, in addition to features
02:04:40 which present a specific hazard, such as asbestos.
02:04:45 And then if we see the equivalent provision, as it were, on the opposite side of the screen,
02:04:52 this is in policy 633, and this is appendix 1, and if we look at the 12th bullet point
02:05:00 down, and that's the bullet point starting, floor layouts and any building construction
02:05:06 features.
02:05:07 Do you see that one there?
02:05:09 And that says, floor layouts and any building construction features which may promote rapid
02:05:12 or abnormal fire spread, such as sandwich panels, timber framed construction, atria,
02:05:19 or voids.
02:05:20 Now, you said earlier that you had been tasked by Peter Coutt to approach the updating of
02:05:25 PN 633 as a cut and paste task.
02:05:30 Bearing that in mind, my question for you is, do you know why it was then simply not
02:05:36 a case of copying and pasting what is set out in that second bullet point of the document
02:05:43 on the left-hand side of the page and inserting it into the document on the right-hand side
02:05:49 of the page?
02:05:50 Do you know why amendments were made, in other words, including removing the reference to
02:05:56 cladding systems before incorporating that provision into policy 633?
02:06:02 If you're talking about the specific bullet point in Appendix 1, this list is the 7.2D
02:06:13 list that I think should have been in Opno 800.
02:06:19 I see.
02:06:20 So this is almost a standalone.
02:06:27 That is driven by the Fire Service Act 2009 7.2D.
02:06:33 This appendix would have been compiled with the assistance, I think, of service delivery
02:06:42 and probably fire safety.
02:06:46 So it comes from Policy 800, you think, rather than GRA 3.2?
02:06:50 No, it doesn't come from 800.
02:06:52 I think that's where this should be.
02:06:55 This should be in 800.
02:06:57 And if you look quite hard at some of the email trails and some of my meetings, I did
02:07:08 meet Mr. Brown, and I cannot say that it was about this, but I did not want this in 633.
02:07:20 I wanted this in 800 because that's where it fits, because this is not about high-rise
02:07:27 buildings.
02:07:28 That is about gathering information about risks on your ground.
02:07:32 Yes.
02:07:33 Well, in that case, if we stick with high-rise buildings specifically and what is in GRA 3.2
02:07:42 relating to high-rise buildings, and that second bullet point in which there is an express
02:07:47 reference to cladding systems as well as other construction-related features, do you
02:07:52 know why, bearing in mind your evidence that you were asked to carry out effectively a
02:07:57 cut and paste on GRA 3.2, do you know why that did not end up in Policy 633?
02:08:05 I'll go back to my failing that the driver for the policy is the risk assessment.
02:08:12 If cladding had been a hazard in the risk matrix part, part 2 of GRA 3.2, it would be
02:08:25 in that list of 32.
02:08:27 It would have been 33.
02:08:29 I could not have done anything about removing any of those hazards from the risk assessment.
02:08:37 Thank you.
02:08:39 More generally, in relation to those construction features that are listed there in GRA 3.2,
02:08:46 do you recall if there was ever a discussion as to why those particular construction features
02:08:52 had been included there?
02:08:54 No.
02:08:56 You said earlier that if you were to put more detail into Policy 633 in terms of construction
02:09:03 features, and you were referring there specifically to Appendix 1, and you said then had you
02:09:09 put more information in, no one would have read it, can you explain a little why you
02:09:15 say that?
02:09:18 Just that amount of information put in a policy, it's building construction.
02:09:28 If you want to know about building construction, have a nice building construction package.
02:09:35 I appreciate the risks are different in a high rise than a bungalow.
02:09:43 The principle is the same.
02:09:45 The hazard is the cladding.
02:09:48 I do not, again, I know what it was like to be a watch manager, and I know we honestly didn't believe
02:10:03 that if we made this much longer than 27 pages, that people would A, want to pick it up, and then B,
02:10:12 be able to digest the relevant parts of it.
02:10:16 So in your view that was unrealistic in summary?
02:10:20 I believe it is unrealistic.
02:10:23 Was that as a result of the technical nature of the information, or just the amount of information, or both?
02:10:29 Both.
02:10:32 And finally, if I can ask you about the evidence that you gave earlier in terms of the issue of evacuation
02:10:40 being a matter for search and rescue and search and rescue policy specifically, could you explain a little
02:10:47 more about why you say evacuation would be a matter for search and rescue?
02:10:53 I just think that when you look at the range of existing policies, it just looked like a nice place for it to fit.
02:11:07 I mean, it's almost like what's in a name.
02:11:12 If you're wanting to evacuate a building, you may have to search and rescue every wardrobe in that block of flats.
02:11:26 Thank you.
02:11:29 And finally, Peter Cowup stated in his evidence to the inquiry that evacuation was a, quote, blind spot, quote, for the LFB and also for fire and rescue services generally.
02:11:43 Would you agree with that?
02:11:47 If you're...
02:11:50 If...
02:11:52 I...
02:11:53 For me, it kind of been a blind spot because we had a policy called phase evacuation of office buildings.
02:12:00 Our blind spot, for me, was around our trust of the standard of building construction.
02:12:13 And I'm not sure if it was a fear, but the difficulties of evacuating single story...
02:12:27 Single story.
02:12:29 Single staircase buildings.
02:12:34 I struggle why we allow that to happen.
02:12:43 Thank you very much.
02:12:44 Mr. Rotting, those are the end of the questions that I have for you today.
02:12:47 So it just leaves me to thank you very much indeed for coming and for giving evidence today.
02:12:54 You're very welcome. Thank you.
02:12:55 Mr. Rotting, I'd like to thank you very much on behalf of all three members of the panel for coming here to give us your evidence.
02:13:01 It's always interesting and instructive to hear from the person who actually drafted some of these documents.
02:13:07 So that's been a particular bonus as far as we're concerned.
02:13:11 And we're very grateful to you for coming here to explain the background of some of these things and giving us your time.
02:13:17 So thank you very much. It's been very helpful.
02:13:19 You're welcome, sir.
02:13:21 And now you're free to go. So if you'd like to give the usher.
02:13:23 Thank you.
02:13:24 That's it. Thank you very much.
02:13:31 Thank you, Ms. Gerson.
02:13:38 Well, now that must be it for the day, I think.
02:13:40 That's it for the day, sir, yes.
02:13:41 And of course, we don't sit tomorrow, but we shall sit again on Monday when we shall hear the next witness.
02:13:48 I think that's correct. So, yes, we've obviously made very good progress today.
02:13:53 And so I think some inquiries are being made as to what the timetable is going to look like for next week.
02:13:57 But I'm sure that will be announced as soon as it's confirmed.
02:13:59 Yes. All right. Thank you very much.
02:14:01 Well, we'll rise now and resume at 10 o'clock on Monday morning.
02:14:05 Thank you very much.