Evidence from London Fire Brigade witness regarding fire control training, fire survival guidance procedures, and the response to the Lakanal House fire recommendations.
00:20:26 would you ask mr hayward to come back in please thank you
00:20:39 all right yes indeed thank you it's good thank you very much yes mr william mr chairman thank you mr hayward i now want to
00:20:46 to ask you some questions about the general review of control which was pre pre inquest action 16. can we go please to your uh first witness statement of page eight
00:20:58 witness statement of page eight and look at paragraph twenty uh and on that page within paragraph 20 we are going to be looking at um the second bullet point in relation to
00:21:09 in relation to uh
00:21:10 uh action 16. uh and it's the second non-indented bullet point and it says sm kelly who is within the lfb station training support and performance team
00:21:22 training support and performance team completed a review of control training in 2010.
00:21:25 in 2010. is that the same sm ned kelly report of the 3rd of august 2010 we've seen in your evidence earlier yes it is and that was the one that was marked as complete wasn't it in the action plan appended to the minutes of the latino
00:21:37 appended to the minutes of the latino house board meeting of 4th of february 2011 we saw maybe two days ago now the the the review had been done yes yes uh just for reference purposes it's lfb three zeros
00:21:48 reference purposes it's lfb three zeros eight three eight four zero three four if you want we can look at it um but i think you've confirmed it um could we look then please that the latino control report hom four zeroes one one two four
00:22:01 hom four zeroes one one two four page fifty two
00:22:11 now uh here we have uh the uh lachlan control report november 2012 recommendation three uh and that says
00:22:23 uh and that says co training should be kept under review with formal periodic reviews such reviews should include officers from outside control who can advise on the specialist content of training eg fur
00:22:34 specialist content of training eg fur safety
00:22:35 safety and then if you look at action 3 below that it says initial audit completed this is to be an ongoing process and we saw this yesterday and you'll recall what's said there yes and then the a b and the c
00:22:47 there yes and then the a b and the c annual refresher training uh in role plays b is b and c more proactive annual training plan um did you take any steps to put in place an ongoing audit process audit
00:22:59 place an ongoing audit process audit process uh for control training yourself no why is that because
00:23:05 because this was
00:23:06 this was when this report completed again please november 2012 november 2012 so um
00:23:13 um the ellen of the training um sorry london fire brigade training team um would have provided that audit babcock weren't contracted to audience
00:23:24 babcock weren't contracted to audience and
00:23:25 and i didn't know who else would be able to order our training uh
00:23:30 uh right so when it says initial audit completed
00:23:33 completed this is to be an ongoing process just breaking that up is the reference there to initial audit completed the ned kelly report yes it is if i can put it that way and then this is to be an ongoing process um as at november 2012 which is
00:23:47 process um as at november 2012 which is two and a bit years after the kelly report
00:23:51 at that point what had been done as part of an ongoing process by way of internal audit
00:24:00 nothing i'm aware of right and when it says this is to be an ongoing process what was proposed uh nothing i'm aware of that i can recall
00:24:13 there was no one to audit our our training after it was outsourced to babcock are you able to explain why this report says and tells the coroner uh that there was
00:24:24 and tells the coroner uh that there was to be an ongoing process of audit because at the time this was this was delivered that was the intention right now you say that was the intention do you remember
00:24:35 you remember uh whether do you remember how that intention was um manifested i don't i don't recall did you see a document proposing an ongoing audit process or
00:24:46 proposing an ongoing audit process or did you go to a meeting where that was i did not that i can recall right um who would it be within the brigade who would be able to answer that question
00:25:00 um i i don't know
00:25:07 to all intents and purposes though you have never seen any any periodic audit or review beyond the documents we've been looking at no
00:25:20 can we then go again please to lfb3060701
00:25:27 this is uh the email we've now seen twice which you received from ac chandler on the 28th of june passing on to you what
00:25:38 to you what uh he had sent to ac brown that day and if you go to page 2 please
00:25:50 and look in the middle at item 16 you can see it says control general review of training and it says this completed 22nd of june 2010
00:26:03 completed 22nd of june 2010 yes in part the planning and recording of general control training has improved however the training syllabus for control needs a fundamental refresh and needs to be brought into the mainstream training
00:26:15 brought into the mainstream training provision applicable to the rest of the brigade
00:26:18 brigade we should give consideration to control training being subject to independent scrutiny and assessment recommended action a fundamental review of controlled training should be undertaken in 2015 stroke 16
00:26:30 in 2015 stroke 16 training for control should be brought under the training contract currently in place of babcock explore the options for independent external peer review or audit of control training
00:26:41 audit of control training so clearly by that stage uh and of course the date of this as we know um was june 2013 the day so six months after the
00:26:52 the day so six months after the seven months after the november 2012 control report there was no ongoing audit because it was the subject of a proposal is that a fair a fair inference for us to draw from basically chandler yes yes now um
00:27:05 from basically chandler yes yes now um uh
00:27:06 uh first what did you make of the finding here
00:27:09 here that was sent to you that control training needed a quotes fundamental refresh close quotes
00:27:17 um i didn't disagree because one of these recommendations is training for control should be brought under the training contract currently in place of babcock which i absolutely agree with which i raised in 2012 and 2016. so i
00:27:29 which i raised in 2012 and 2016. so i don't disagree with that at all right when you saw this as we have to assume you did because it was sent to you the same day did you were you shocked or surprised or unsurprised to see that uh ac chandler considered that the
00:27:42 uh ac chandler considered that the training syllabus for control needed a fundamental refresh no i don't think i was surprised particularly did you discuss did you discuss this topic
00:27:52 topic and this particular recommendation with ac chandler after you'd seen this email i don't recall but probably probably can you remember what was discussed
00:28:01 discussed no just the fact that the the the i agreed about the training contract with babcock i can't it's a long time ago i can't recall exactly did you know what his rationale was for recommending
00:28:12 what his rationale was for recommending placing control under the babcock training umbrella
00:28:18 uh well the fact that we could be we could audit babcock for our training i mean it just made and we could tell babcock what sort of training we wanted i could see the benefits of it because obviously operationally they do that's
00:28:30 obviously operationally they do that's what they do so the benefits of it out while you're not doing it yeah and you also might get access to see the cbt not quite right would you know what his rationale was
00:28:41 would you know what his rationale was for subjecting control training to independent scrutiny and assessment uh
00:28:48 no i would you know being subject to independence but it's in the very last line yes
00:28:54 yes so so the further review after sm kelly's report i would i would assume based on what he said there now it's the independent there isn't it um subject to independence scrutiny an
00:29:06 um subject to independence scrutiny an assessment not yes uh assessing itself yes exactly so so as it's as it stood then we mornington's purposes marked our own homework so the idea having someone
00:29:17 homework so the idea having someone independent coming like sm kelly would identify issues if there were any well why was some kelly independent he was part of the brigade but it was external to control so he wasn't aware of control
00:29:28 control so he wasn't aware of control training right but how did you then understand uh ac chandler's suggestion when he said subject to independent scrutiny did you understand that to be someone outside
00:29:39 understand that to be someone outside control or someone outside the brigade altogether um
00:29:46 well outside of control because control is its own is its own training team isn't it did you agree with the recommendation here i didn't disagree with it and i i i say
00:29:58 i didn't disagree with it and i i i say that but i don't recall the conversation but i wouldn't disagree with that
00:30:05 now i mean view of the serious deficiencies that can with the control training exposed by the lack of house fire
00:30:11 fire and the actions taken internally by the brigade thereafter and in the evidence given to uh the coroner um was it not a good idea to have
00:30:22 to have an independent scrutiny and assessment of control training
00:30:31 well i think i think sm kelly did do that that review if we talked about training as a whole i think i think on the whole
00:30:42 think i think on the whole um
00:30:42 um new engine training was um was delivered because we had positive results and new entrants who went on to be control officers i mean regard you know an ffg
00:30:54 officers i mean regard you know an ffg um we did get someone independent although within a brigade they had no exposure to how um control trainers train so i think that was that was scrutinizing and of
00:31:05 that was that was scrutinizing and of state he did pick up um issues with it yeah sm kelly had done the uh the report we've seen in yes in august 2010 uh and that was almost three years
00:31:16 uh and that was almost three years before this and this is proposing for the future uh consideration being given to control training being subject to independent scrutiny and assessment my question is simply
00:31:27 simply wasn't that a good idea at the time given what had emerged from the latino house fire yes yes what did you do yourself with that recommendation can you remember uh so this is the fundamental real control so 2015 2016 um
00:31:41 control so 2015 2016 um again as i state obviously 2015 was was a difficult year so probably nothing at all but as i said after the review with uh mr george i raised the issue again about the training
00:31:53 issue again about the training requirements and the fact that we should be
00:31:56 be bought under the i bought under another contract an external contract which would address the concerns um
00:32:03 um about control training now of course this email is sent in june 2013. do you know why
00:32:09 know why uh ac chandler was proposing that the fundamental review should not be undertaken for another two to three years thereafter i have no idea sorry it's right to think though that that
00:32:20 it's right to think though that that fundamental review of control training did not take place in 2015 or in 2016. no not that i'm aware of no why's that
00:32:31 why's that because 2015 and 2016 was the focus was purely on introducing vision into the into the control room
00:32:41 mr hayward we're now you'll be glad to hear coming to the end of your evidence um but i have some concluding questions for you
00:32:48 for you um and there are a number of them and they range over the last ten two two and a half days of your evidence first do you agree that the pre-inquest lacking on actions in respect of fsg refresher training
00:33:01 in respect of fsg refresher training actions 8 12 13 and possibly 17 were not fully carried into effect
00:33:08 can i just see those if i may to refresh myself right for that we are going to need the assurance
00:33:22 report i don't want to go back over old ground it's lfp404801
00:33:37 and we're going to if we want to look at actions 8 12 13 and 17 we can certainly do that
00:33:55 action 8 page 13
00:34:03 just read i'm not going to read it out know you these are concluding questions based on the generality of what we've seen but by all means look at it again please
00:34:18 i would suggest in part because fire safety officers were um were or did deliver fire con firefighter guns training certain to all new entrants and to
00:34:29 new entrants and to um existing staff in 2010 in 2012 they did some but not all
00:34:37 not all yes action 12 page 14 do you agree that that pre-inquest latin election in respect of fsg refresher training was not fully carried into effect i do agree with that and then if
00:34:48 effect i do agree with that and then if you go please to page 15 action 13 draft a letter to the dclg for clarification on national guidance we haven't been through the documents on
00:34:59 we haven't been through the documents on that particularly but but i think you can you know from your own knowledge that letter despite being drafted by you uh was never sent a grade uh
00:35:09 uh and
00:35:10 and 17 uh which you'll find on page 16 just read that to yourself and that also was never fully carried into effect
00:35:26 can i just say that from my understanding uh i believe that we did provide enhanced training for supervisors to provide
00:35:37 supervisors to provide fire survival gun support for control officers
00:35:40 officers um
00:35:41 um if yours if the suggestion is um supervisors dealing with a um a large fire in that way then i would agree with that thank you
00:35:52 agree with that thank you do you agree that the gap analysis that you completed in april 2010 failed to reveal departures from national guidance in the lfb's policies that were therefore never remedied
00:36:07 no i believe that the gap analysis was the gap analysis was against an extent document
00:36:13 document which i believe we implemented do you accept that the departures from national guidance that it did reveal were never fully or consistently addressed in the lfb fsg refresher training for example not providing callers with a full sense
00:36:25 not providing callers with a full sense of reassurance ensuring role play was carried out ensuring there was fso input yes
00:36:31 yes do you agree that the weaknesses identified in the national guidance were deliberately never brought to the attention of the government despite initial plans to do so that's action 13.
00:36:43 initial plans to do so that's action 13. can i just have a quick look at action 13 for michael's page 15.
00:36:54 on the basis that we didn't the debtor wasn't sent yes do you accept that the latino control report of november 2012 was in part misleading or incomplete so far as fsg policy and refresher training was
00:37:05 policy and refresher training was concerned
00:37:07 in the ways that we've been through yes in part i do and that the promised fsg refresher training was in fact never carried out and certainly never carried out in the way contemplated it wasn't carried out
00:37:19 way contemplated it wasn't carried out the way we anticipated to be known but there's the mitigation reasons for that do you agree that the latino house board and later the lack of house working group were never told that the assurances given to the coroner about
00:37:31 assurances given to the coroner about fsg refresher training were not being fully implemented um
00:37:38 um they weren't told by me whether they were told by by those above me i don't i can't answer but i didn't go to the board and say that thank you do you agree to the best of your knowledge that the lessons learned
00:37:50 your knowledge that the lessons learned from the latino house incident as identified in the latino control report were never embedded in policy or in training or in practice for the benefit of control staff i i disagree i think i think that
00:38:02 staff i i disagree i think i think that the
00:38:03 the the um
00:38:04 the um that they were and i i did highlight the fact about um exchange of information between the fire ground and um and control the enhancements to the reassess and the
00:38:16 the enhancements to the reassess and the bonding so i i do believe that we did
00:38:22 do you accept that there were never any training exercises that allowed control to test whether the procedures and the training implemented after lachnal adequately prepared control staff control staff to respond
00:38:35 control staff control staff to respond to an incident like lachnal
00:38:41 um i'm not quite sure the question are we talking the the incident as a whole are we talking the control the control itself handling controlled call handling
00:38:53 itself handling controlled call handling i i believe i still believe that the training in the training we uh enhanced after la canal did provide control staff with those enhancements in that training
00:39:04 that training you do do you i do yeah do you agree that there was never a training plan for control
00:39:11 uh there was no never effective training plan at that stage yes do you accept that there was no way for senior management to monitor consistently and ensure that control staff were receiving the necessary
00:39:23 staff were receiving the necessary training
00:39:24 training because there was poor record-keeping um
00:39:29 it was difficult to monitor training uh the record keeping was poor um but it was because of the system we were using the manual system when we weren't set up to be on the brigade
00:39:40 weren't set up to be on the brigade uh recording system so in part yes but i i don't think that's a control i think that's a brigade issue and that was contributed to by
00:39:51 and that was contributed to by the failure fully to implement the training but but also the absence of any kpis performance indicators uh there are there are performance indicators but not specifically for fsg
00:40:03 indicators but not specifically for fsg training or training generally do you agree that at least of november 2015 there was no way for senior management systematically to monitor the performance of cras and implement improvements
00:40:18 in what respect to fire survivor guidance yes yeah but there was no there was no training and despite the reviews by
00:40:25 by station manager kelly in 2010 group manager lindridge in 2013 and ac george twice july 16 and again in february march 2017 those responsible for
00:40:36 march 2017 those responsible for training in control never got to grips with the criticisms and recommendations in those reports about training not fully uh well i think not not not earlier on but i think they did by you know the first report from
00:40:49 know the first report from um ac
00:40:51 um ac george ac george uh we were making headway and we were early aging learning development to establish epdrs and to establish a proper training program for
00:41:02 establish a proper training program for control but the first step of that was to get a um a performance development record which captures the training that they require and do you agree that there was no effective peer review or audit process
00:41:15 effective peer review or audit process in place ever certainly not on an independent basis not not by the time i'd left no do you agree that the only time existing staff received uh the fsg refresher training that complied with national guidance was
00:41:27 that complied with national guidance was in 2010
00:41:28 in 2010 um
00:41:30 um yes but in part in 2012 as well and the fsg training never fully incorporated the learning from the national guidance documents even after the gap analysis
00:41:41 the gap analysis i think we've established that as well in in what can you clarify that uh we've seen for example uh role play missing
00:41:51 missing yeah okay yes i agree that's an example we've also seen fso missing do you accept
00:41:57 accept that the conclusion combined with the lfb's own findings in the latin control report about the lack of structured regular fsg training revealed
00:42:07 revealed and i have to suggest this to you that lfb's fsg training for control staff over the course of a 23-year period from 1994
00:42:17 1994 after 1093 was introduced and the night of the grenfell tower fire on the 14th of june 2017 was systematically deficient
00:42:27 deficient no i think i think we did learn from from
00:42:31 from la canal i think we did implement a a series of training to address those issues although as you've already established not always in line with with the policy
00:42:44 not always in line with with the policy and i think the mitigation which i've i've
00:42:47 i've laid out in my three statements and spoken about these past three days um
00:42:54 um it answers why we couldn't do the training we wanted to do and and we did want to do it um but i think uh you know the other vision particularly uh and the other
00:43:06 vision particularly uh and the other issues that all come together at the same time meant that we had to prioritize and put that and put that vision training first mr hayward thank you very much you've
00:43:17 mr hayward thank you very much you've been extremely patient with my questions and you've given us a great deal of assistance over the last two and a half days we're extremely grateful to you i've come to the end of my prepared questions and i'm now going to ask the chairman to take the customary break to
00:43:29 chairman to take the customary break to see whether there are any further questions i need to put to you or whether there are others who would uh suggest such questions to me thank you sir
00:43:37 sir thank you mr miller well as mr millett indicated we normally have a break at this stage partly to enable mr millet to check that he's not left anything out but principally to allow others who are
00:43:49 but principally to allow others who are following the proceedings but not from this room
00:43:52 this room to suggest questions which perhaps we ought to put to you so we're going to stop now we'll come back i think caution are ought to be long enough mr will it given that we've just had the lunch break um i would hope that one would
00:44:03 break um i would hope that one would hope so certainly but we'll we'll resume it twenty to three please yes and then when you come back we'll see if there are any more questions for you okay so thank you thank you very much
00:44:23 thank you twenty to three then please
01:07:46 would you ask mr haywood to come back in please thank you
01:07:58 all right miss taylor well i'm sorry we kept you waiting longer than i'd indicated sometimes that happens and uh we'll see if there any more questions for you
01:08:06 for you yes sir yes thank you mr chair chairman yes mr there are one or two further questions for you um the first relates to the number of fsg calls um we looked at the florian exercise which i think we
01:08:19 at the florian exercise which i think we saw was limited to three fsg calls yes exercise penfold to four fsg calls and the haygate challenge from june 2011 uh to four fsg calls similarly we saw those
01:08:31 to four fsg calls similarly we saw those in the materials yes and i i i think you also said uh on day 199 two days ago that the limits of fsg training and the numbers of fsg calls selected for
01:08:43 numbers of fsg calls selected for training purposes was in essence predicated on the number of call handlers and supervisors available to deal with them that was the gist of what you told us i think uh i i don't think that i think i was saying that we
01:08:56 that i think i was saying that we what we're looking at is the fact that if there are five if there are five fsg calls then that would take ten potentially ten staff up i don't i'm not sure
01:09:07 sure that's why the number is predicated i don't know why four was chosen particularly but when we look at multiple we look at you know up to five fsg calls but but in reality if if we were to have five concurrent fsg calls
01:09:20 were to have five concurrent fsg calls and potentially there could be ten people who engaged in that in that yes but we could study the transcript i'm not going to spend time with you okay
01:09:29 okay but um can i then in light of that go to the lack of report of november 2012 please um lfb four zero seven four four seven two four
01:09:41 four seven two four it's also at uh another reference but if we go to that please and go to page 53
01:09:55 and if you look together page
01:09:58 page 53
01:10:00 53 paragraph
01:10:02 paragraph 310 it's right at the very foot of your screen under conclusion about the handling of the fire and it says workload i'll read it to you at the time of the latino fire control was busy taking other emergency calls
01:10:14 was busy taking other emergency calls and dealing with operationally urgent messages there were no other significant incidents in progress before or immediately after the initial latino call control resources were dedicated to dealing with three fsg calls at the same
01:10:26 dealing with three fsg calls at the same time during the period 1635-1650 this would have made overall call handling more complex given the need for a supervisor or another co to be available to support the co dealing with
01:10:37 available to support the co dealing with the fsg call and increase both workloads and the personal pressure on the staff involved in his statement cc simmons said during my many years service i've experienced
01:10:48 my many years service i've experienced other major incidents involving similar levels of focus commitment and volume of work however the unfolding and deteriorating circumstances experienced by the trapped persons who are communicating with the control room
01:10:59 communicating with the control room created an intensity that i've never previously experienced and placed my staff and i in a unique position now that was one of the conclusions
01:11:10 one of the conclusions from the latin house fire given that do you accept that one of the consequences of the fire where there were five fsg calls uh should have been the implementation
01:11:22 uh should have been the implementation of a control policy or training which mandated that as soon as there were too many fsg calls for control to handle effectively then the control room should tell the incident commander
01:11:41 okay so we tell the control commander but then but then i'm not sure what happens after that i mean the thing is we haven't had a situation where up to up to uh grantham where that had
01:11:52 up to up to uh grantham where that had occurred
01:11:53 occurred so
01:11:54 so i'm not saying that that wouldn't be that wouldn't be something we would do um
01:11:59 um it's just never that's the first time i've heard it put that way so um yes it could you could you could do yes and what i'm suggesting to you uh is that it
01:12:09 that it was essential for the incident commander to know that the control room was at capacity with fsg calls because had the con incident commander had that
01:12:21 had the con incident commander had that information then that information could could be used by the incident commander to decide to revoke wholly or in part any stapler policy
01:12:35 wholly or in part any stapler policy um
01:12:36 um that could have been a consideration yes my question is why didn't
01:12:41 didn't the findings from the lack of house fire contained in this report and elsewhere not prompt training of the control room
01:12:52 not prompt training of the control room such that when it was at capacity or even nearing capacity the incident ground should be told that fact
01:13:00 fact i i don't know why that wasn't done do you agree that it should have been i it's certainly in hindsight now and and talking about it now since the first time it's been raised it's certainly worth the
01:13:12 raised it's certainly worth the consideration to do that and do you also agree that none of the policies facilitate or even anticipate the management of fsg calls particularly concurrent fsg calls at
01:13:24 particularly concurrent fsg calls at scale or what should happen in the event that fsg calls exceed the control room's capacity
01:13:30 capacity that there's nothing that i'm aware of up to the time i left that that indicated that note and that therefore one of the lessons that came out of lachenal uh was never learned
01:13:42 uh was never learned as at the date of the grenfell tower fire
01:13:45 fire um yes but the lesson wasn't clear here though
01:13:49 though what i'm saying is that this that's the first time that question has been put to me
01:13:53 me so in in hindsight yes it would be a good idea to let the the um instant commander no well not in hindsight that's what i'm putting to you mr hayward if you look at
01:14:04 putting to you mr hayward if you look at paragraph 3 310 the problem was clear from the report or at least clear enough from the report wasn't it overall call handling was more complex
01:14:13 complex because of the workload with three concurrent fsg calls
01:14:19 uh not hindsight
01:14:23 no but the but you're said your suggestion that the instant commander should be informed is is something that's new that i haven't heard before well i'm suggesting to you may be new as a suggestion but
01:14:35 to you may be new as a suggestion but there's the cons that is a consequence of a circumstance and what i'm putting to you is that the circumstance namely
01:14:42 namely uh the control room being overrun even by three
01:14:47 by three that's fsg calls concurrently was not was not a hindsight point no but but the the they weren't overrun they could have been but they they were not they they dealt with with the incident on the day
01:14:59 dealt with with the incident on the day and just to be clear about it what i'm putting to you is that the situation whereby
01:15:04 whereby the control room uh
01:15:06 uh is uh
01:15:08 is uh uh in difficulties because of the number of concurrent effigy fsg calls coming in was a situation uh which was not a hindsight situation it was a situation that the nfb knew could occur
01:15:20 that the nfb knew could occur uh and they knew it could occur from the night of the latino house fire okay it's the first time i've heard it put that way so i so nothing's been done since since that time to the time i left
01:15:31 since since that time to the time i left that i was aware of right i wonder why it's the first time put that way given that that is essentially what what
01:15:38 what what paragraph 310 on the screen is saying well i i think i think control commander simmons is he's highlighting the fact that it was a an incident that he'd
01:15:49 that it was a an incident that he'd never he'd never experienced before rather than the fact that um you know it was something it was something new to him which which is why he found it so intense as all the staff did on on the day
01:16:01 did on on the day um
01:16:03 um you know and and whilst it's highlighting that that they they could be at capacity with three i think i think
01:16:09 think mr simmons is really just highlighting the fact that it is the first is the first time they've dealt or they've had a situation that's actually intense i'm not quite sure how i can i can respond any more than that i mean you
01:16:20 respond any more than that i mean you know like i say from that point too when i left that that wasn't a discussion that i was aware of
01:16:28 aware of let's then turn to a different topic which is gra 3.2 which
01:16:34 which we looked at yesterday and you told us yesterday that you were not aware until uh reading in for this inquiry i think about generic risk assessment 3.2 revised in february 2014. look i was
01:16:46 revised in february 2014. look i was aware of the document but i don't i don't believe i'd seen it yes now um do you remember being alerted to the existence of gra 3.2
01:16:56 3.2 and its relevance to fsg calls in june 2013 at a time perhaps unknown to you but at a time when gra 3.2 was being revised
01:17:07 revised i i know i believe that dac co-op was doing a revision to gra 3.2 that that's what i know let's look at
01:17:19 let's look at lfb3029007 please
01:17:32 uh and uh this is an email run which i think should start on page four and we'll work our way up to page one if you go to page four
01:17:47 you can see that this is an email that well an extract of a document or email that has come to the sender of this email to you uh it's difficult to know what this
01:17:59 uh it's difficult to know what this precisely is but if you um if you look at page three you perhaps can help at the foot of page three is an email from you to vic bagnall 4th june 2013
01:18:09 2013 subject high-rise issues importance high morning vic can you elaborate on the two points below please and return to me by wednesday
01:18:17 wednesday and then if you scroll down please into page four you can see what looks like an extract from a document
01:18:24 document at the top of the screen it says uh review the training given to control staff in relation to recent gras including gre 3.2 high-rise firefighting yes a general general review of control
01:18:37 yes a general general review of control training was undertaken following the latin house fire note lfb have recently reviewed the high-rise firefighting gra gr-1 that says in square brackets
01:18:50 and then there are other things below that which may trigger a recollection first um my first question what is the text that you are sending to uh vic bagnall
01:19:02 vic bagnall in june 2013 for his comment i i i don't know
01:19:07 know right um we've seen that you've asked him for comment or elaboration and return if we could then go up please uh to
01:19:17 uh to page two
01:19:19 page two we can see his response
01:19:24 4th of june to you
01:19:26 to you hi scott sorry to say this but i don't think i can answer these questions without knowing what we're talking about here does this document come from the rule 43 for the hampshire incident or is it something internal still following on
01:19:37 it something internal still following on from the latin election plan the subject-heading high-rise issues sounds more like this is about the hampshire incident than our incident i don't know what the high-rise gras are generic risk assessments so difficult to
01:19:49 generic risk assessments so difficult to elaborate on the first point control staff are not trained or educated on the dark art of firefighting well we are only ever given the very loosest of understandings it's probably more accurate as part of our fsg training for
01:20:02 accurate as part of our fsg training for staff we provide input from a fire safety officer fs officer about the triangle of fire uh and building construction stroke fire protection but i don't know if this is something that comes out of gra 3.2
01:20:16 for the second point whilst we developed that supervisor training pat that supervised the training package it was a general one rather than specific or targeted at fsg or high-rise incidents was this because we were criticized for not giving supervisors any development
01:20:28 not giving supervisors any development at all prior to latino the policies created there will not directly translate into those training packages for supervisors happy to have another thing tomorrow and you respond
01:20:39 thing tomorrow and you respond uh
01:20:40 uh uh
01:20:42 uh at the top of email at the top of page one but before that happens there's a further email at the foot of page one from vic bagnell the next day to you
01:20:51 to you and if you go over to the top of page two he says scott hi scott just so that you know apparently richard rang into control yesterday asking staff what they know about high-rise gras
01:21:02 what they know about high-rise gras nationally spoke with him but don't know of any others the answer was no anyway regards vic and then if we go to page one please first email in the chain you to him same day fifth june 2013. thanks
01:21:14 to him same day fifth june 2013. thanks vic i've responded to the questions being posed on the basis of what you sent i just elaborated on the second point i'm speaking with richard today so we'll find out what the issues are now
01:21:25 now um we've seen what you've said to each other in that chain um at that point do you agree that you had been alerted to uh the fact that gra 3.2 was relevant
01:21:38 to uh the fact that gra 3.2 was relevant to the brigade's approach to fsg calls well i think i think that richard chandler had rung run control to ask about
01:21:47 ask about and obviously richard that emailed me and asked me to ask control which is something he used to do to answer those points the response is that we that whilst we may have been asked about gr
01:21:59 whilst we may have been asked about gr 3.2 we didn't know anything about gr32 at that point and it was under revision so i i presume that was why he was asking the question let me put it this way from this point
01:22:11 let me put it this way from this point on looking at this email run can we can we
01:22:16 we um
01:22:17 um can we conclude that the
01:22:19 the uh the gra 3.2 was on your radar on control's radar i've said i was aware of gr 3.2 but not the detail of it but it was on your radar as relevant in
01:22:30 but it was on your radar as relevant in relation to fsg calls yes well no it's it's all about high-rise issues so it's not specifically fight survival guidance so so
01:22:39 so so so for
01:22:41 so for yes i'm aware that um gr a 3.2 is in existence richard was asking some questions i asked control for the responses
01:22:53 for the responses and the response to that particular question is no we don't know anything about it
01:22:57 about it and and as um
01:23:00 um i will speak to you today to find out what those issues are i probably did speak to richard that day but i don't know where it went from there right
01:23:09 do you agree that an adequate response to this conversation would have been to investigate further the significance of gre a 3.2 to controls functions
01:23:20 gre a 3.2 to controls functions if if that's what richard directed me to do then yes i would have done do i take it that he didn't and you didn't i don't i i i don't know it was a long time ago yes
01:23:33 so the answer was no so your staff knew nothing about high-rise gras and am i right in thinking it was left like that there was there was nothing after june 2013 that would educate your cras i i
01:23:47 2013 that would educate your cras i i 3.2 well 3.2 was under revision at this point so i i'm again i'm making the assumption that the ac cup asked ac chandler as the
01:23:58 that the ac cup asked ac chandler as the control to ask about what control knew about it i don't know where it went from there right thank you very much mr haye would i have no further questions for you thank you thank you and then he remains for me to thank you
01:24:10 and then he remains for me to thank you very much for for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations we're extremely grateful to you thank you very much thank you thank you yes and ms david i'd like to add my thanks on behalf of all three members of the panel you've given us a lot of your time
01:24:22 panel you've given us a lot of your time you've asked answers a lot of questions and you've told us a lot about things which we needed to know and understand so we really are very grateful and your evidence has been very helpful thank you very much thank you thank you
01:24:33 thank you very much thank you thank you very much for coming and now you are free to go thank you very much thank you very much
01:24:49 thank you mr millet well um no other witness today i think no other witness today and tomorrow morning uh first thing we will begin hearing evidence uh from som joanne
01:25:02 hearing evidence uh from som joanne smith good right thank you very much well at that point then we'll close for the day and we'll start again tomorrow at 10 o'clock thank you very much 10 o'clock tomorrow morning thank you very much
01:25:36 you