Evidence from London Resilience Group on emergency planning frameworks, identification of vulnerable persons, and coordination between agencies. Focus on rest centers, survivor reception centers, and data sharing challenges.
00:00:24 did you ask mr hetherington to come back in please
00:00:36 right mr etherington ready to carry on yes certainly thank you very much yes mr smith yes mr chairman thank you mr heatherington um on the subject of the national risk register that we discussed before the break um do you accept that
00:00:48 before the break um do you accept that by its very name the national risk register considers national risks uh but that london risks may be very different
00:00:56 different uh yes i do but i think there's a there's a flow between the national risk register to uh more localized risk through the local risk assessment guidance so the risk that you saw in the codings the h
00:01:08 that you saw in the codings the h and the numerical coding thereafter and hl represented the the hazards and the hazards local so uh the hazard is a national applicable risk uh hazard local is one that's been determined in the
00:01:19 is one that's been determined in the local area and referred up to the national risk register for inclusion so that there is a mechanism by which lrfs share that kind of understanding and knowledge on those kind of risks and their locality and is
00:01:32 kind of risks and their locality and is it right that the responsibility locally for identifying risks
00:01:37 risks to go on to the local risk register and perhaps thereafter the national risk register is that of the category one responders yes and in london that would obviously be each of the las as well as other
00:01:49 each of the las as well as other uh other category one responders but it would also be when it came to fire is this right the lfb yes um
00:01:58 um so
00:01:59 so who
00:02:00 who well can you recall anybody in the lfb reporting risks to
00:02:06 to you the lrg in the process of revising or updating the london risk register no other than those risks that they already had the lead responder responsibility for
00:02:18 which include the wildfire if you looked at that right yes i see you they did but they didn't include uh tower block fire so who who's so to answer your question no belief to
00:02:29 so to answer your question no belief to my knowledge raised an expected risk of a tower block fire from any category one responder to the london risk advisory group for inclusion in the london risk register now you were employed by the lfb for a period at
00:02:41 employed by the lfb for a period at least uh
00:02:42 least uh tell me who within the nfb would have been responsible for reporting the risk of clatting fires to
00:02:50 to the to the lrg so there was a representative of london fire brigade a uniformed officer who would sit on the london risk advisory group
00:03:00 group that was either somebody from the operational resilience department or uh the strategy and risk group and can you remember who it was i can't after 2015. i can't at that time
00:03:12 i can't after 2015. i can't at that time it should be included in the minutes to the london risk advisor group who the who that member was right but you don't recall anybody from either of those uh departments or sections of the lfb ever reporting the risk of cladding fires to
00:03:24 reporting the risk of cladding fires to you no right
00:03:30 now i want to ask you about borough risk registers i think you accept that the borough risk forums forum also have a duty to conduct their own risk assessments because they are category one responders
00:03:41 one responders so they have a duty to publish a risk assessment yes yes
00:03:51 in fact the cabinet office recommends that they develop and maintain their own borough risk registers yes yes now i want to ask you about pan london plans and looked at the assessment of
00:04:02 plans and looked at the assessment of risk and how that comes about and how the partnerships underpinning capabilities are developed by the london resilience forum subgroups now i want to look next at the plans themselves um if we go to your first witness statement please page
00:04:14 witness statement please page 7 paragraph 20 you describe three types of plans there first multi-agency plans produced by the lrp second plans in relation to the regional local authority response
00:04:26 regional local authority response arrangements local authority london lateral authority gold and plans in relation to london resilience groups lrg emergency response arrangements now um let's deal first with the
00:04:38 now um let's deal first with the frameworks the multi-agency plans i think
00:04:42 think they are i think produced as and maintained by the lrp yes yes yes and how are those plans if you can explain it briefly how are those plans developed so there is a lead agency with a senior
00:04:54 so there is a lead agency with a senior responsible owner as a member of the forum they will then typically come
00:05:01 bring together a group of multi-agency partners to consider all the relevant guidance in relation to the capability framework that they want to produce acknowledgement to the risk assessment planning assumptions that are produced
00:05:13 planning assumptions that are produced any learning from previous incidents or exercises
00:05:17 exercises and then compile the london framework that then goes through a consultation period
00:05:23 period to to all responders through the london programme board and then is ultimately approved at the london resilience right uh and
00:05:35 right uh and at the time of the fire i think you say there was some 25 frameworks yes in place and you explained that 10 of them
00:05:42 them were formally activated or described arrangements which were deployed yes uh yes i think um uh
00:05:52 um uh as a result of the fire i mean in other words the grenfell tower fire triggered i think
00:05:56 i think um ten frameworks yes i think that's correct right um now let's look at the the first of these which is the humanitarian assistance framework
00:06:07 assistance framework this is at lfb triple zero six one one seven two
00:06:15 and it's dated april 2017 as you can see and i think was in fact a draft even though it's called version five uh yet to be approved by the lrf uh on the 28th of june 2017. yes uh yes
00:06:29 uh on the 28th of june 2017. yes uh yes that's correct so it was due to go to the forum in june 2017. yes now notwithstanding that it was it was a draft at the time i think is it right that a decision was made to use this version of the framework when responding
00:06:40 version of the framework when responding to the grenfell tower fire yeah so so as it had been worked upon over the previous months those that were brought in to support the humanitarian assistance group had an intimate knowledge of this framework and
00:06:51 intimate knowledge of this framework and wanted to utilize the most up-to-date information in response to the fire right and who made the decision to use this plan do you know i don't know right and
00:06:59 and and
00:07:02 and it's right i think that the lead responder for humanitarian assistance is the local authority that's correct so in this case um rbkc yes that's correct right now um if we go to page eight in it please
00:07:15 we can see a table uh and it's described as a model i think
00:07:21 i think uh if you go to the bottom of the page table two model of phase provision you see
00:07:26 you see after air a2 2006. and on the left-hand side we can see the time scale and along the top the responders now within the immediate and first few hours
00:07:37 first few hours it's i think it is planned that frontline and operational responders should deliver physical and psychological and emotional support at designated rest centers
00:07:50 support at designated rest centers yes uh yes yes um for example operational responders would be local authorities wouldn't they yes a series of centres potentially not just
00:08:01 series of centres potentially not just rest centers but could be through a number of facilities that were made available to uh survivors i.e a survivor reception center or friends and families or a reception centre just just tell me
00:08:12 reception centre just just tell me looking at the second column from the left
00:08:16 left the
00:08:17 the phased provision is divided into these phases
00:08:20 phases the first of which is called the heroic phase
00:08:23 phase and then the tunnel vision phase and then the honeymoon phase and then the disillusion through adjustment acceptance recovery what is the source of those divisions those ideas uh so as you can
00:08:36 divisions those ideas uh so as you can see in the the table two uh model phase position after anaer is a national leading expert in humanitarian assistance so this will be a model that she will have derived or
00:08:47 model that she will have derived or potentially utilized and those uh officers who were discharged to bring together this framework on behalf of a partnership will have incorporated her thinking her kind of
00:08:58 thinking her kind of uh uh
00:09:00 uh uh experience into uh describing some of those phrases right i think that generally follows the change code as well the the cobo ross style uh change curve where
00:09:12 cobo ross style uh change curve where you go through the different periods um in relation to change
00:09:19 and if you um if you go to page 20 in this document you can see that the immediate first few hours of the hero the heroic phase has broken
00:09:30 the hero the heroic phase has broken down into options trigger decision lead secondary plan reference and if you look under the second row there rest center under the option column
00:09:40 column and then um looking the next column trigger significant number of displaced people the lead there is la isn't it yes absolutely and voluntary agencies are
00:09:51 absolutely and voluntary agencies are secondary yes so does that reflect the way in which the london resilience framework regarded the role of the local authority when it came to rest centers and responsibilities for them it would be the local authority
00:10:03 them it would be the local authority would take the lead but secondary responsibility to the voluntary agencies yes yes
00:10:09 yes yes and if we go to page 24 in this document if you if you would and look at paragraph 8.13 under the heading rest center
00:10:16 center it says the purpose of a rest center is uh and then it goes on to provide immediate shelter for persons who have been evacuated from an area or otherwise in need of emergency accommodation
00:10:28 in need of emergency accommodation following an incident to provide initial light refreshments to enable details of evacuees to be maintained in the center for reference to provide for the well-being of the evacuees and to offer support services
00:10:39 evacuees and to offer support services and information on a wide range of welfare related subjects and to provide evacuees and survivors with updated information about the incident and its possible effects upon them directly
00:10:50 them directly now
00:10:52 then if you go to 8 15 immediately below that
00:10:57 that it says the responsibility for the setup and running of rest centers lies with the local authority supported by voluntary agencies who would activate arrangements as outlined in their rest center plan the decision to set up a rest center
00:11:09 the decision to set up a rest center will be made by the local authority often at the request of the police or fire brigade so can we take it that it was anticipated that a local authority should be taking charge of setting up a
00:11:21 should be taking charge of setting up a rest center within two to three hours of
00:11:25 of um
00:11:26 um an event yes yes and indeed that figure is in the next sentence of the next paragraph at 8.16 yes yes yes um so then moving on to uh the second
00:11:37 um so then moving on to uh the second framework that you list which is the identification of the vulnerable that is lfb triple zero six one one seven four
00:11:46 so sorry is is it is it possible to go back to that framework yes absolutely there's a there's a diagram and schematic which sets out uh how we expect some of the things to take place in relation to each other so i think
00:11:57 in relation to each other so i think here we are focusing solely on the rest centers there would be an expectation that there would also be other centers established throughout the course perhaps in greater immediacy that would support those and i talk of the survival
00:12:09 support those and i talk of the survival reception center and the friends and family receptions well that's absolutely you're right and i i noticed as we were just leaving the document that there's a that's a topic that's kind of been covered with other witnesses but let's go back to page 23 of the of the
00:12:20 go back to page 23 of the of the document paragraph 8.4 under overview this is survivor reception center and then it sets out
00:12:33 the purpose under 8.6 yes yes uh and if you go to 8.8 at the top of page 24
00:12:41 24 it tells you who sets it up um
00:12:44 um it says
00:12:46 it says the src will be set up immediately at a location as near as practically possible to the incident site as determined by a police tactical commander the police are responsible for opening an src supported by the local authority
00:12:59 supported by the local authority and the idea is that it's initially run by the src and then sorry run by the police and then taken over by the l.a yes yes
00:13:07 yes yes and did you want also to look at the um the friends family and friends reception center at the foot of page 24. yeah i think it just provides a wider context of the type of
00:13:17 type of facility that we would have expected to be set up on the morning or in the early hours in the morning uh well i'm taking that then let's just run through them uh starting
00:13:29 uh starting with the survivor reception center are you saying that you would have expected the survival reception center to be set up and rest centers and friends and family reception centers at the same time
00:13:40 at the same time uh or in close uh proximity to each other so a mall through a survival reception center into a rest center with a friends and family reception center running in parallel to provide the breadth of information there's a there's
00:13:52 breadth of information there's a there's a schematic somewhere in this this diagram which uh displays it quite neatly and kind of goes through as a passage of time which might be useful just to refer to sorry
00:14:11 uh right well i'm not sure i'm able to magic that up but if someone can find that then that would be helpful maybe page 18 is what you're looking for
00:14:27 age 18 so that's where we would expect information to come from and you can see that's a color-coded uh
00:14:35 uh diagrammatic so so so this isn't the the diagram i'm looking for i think it's slightly further on in the uh document but this is where we would expect those sources of data around those who have been in fact affected um or involved in
00:14:48 been in fact affected um or involved in the infrastructure but let's try page 11 then
00:14:54 exactly that's that's the diagram that's the one yeah uh and
00:14:58 uh and uh how does that right um so uh
00:15:03 so uh so in terms of the talk us through it but that might be talking through it in the operational part those those evacuated and who require support because they are no longer have access to their accommodation directly
00:15:16 access to their accommodation directly we would expect to go to a rest centre which provides their initial needs in terms of those who've come out via a search and rescue operation will go into a survival reception center because they are survivors by their very nature and
00:15:27 are survivors by their very nature and that allows for a capture of information from them
00:15:30 from them uh to be coordinated and you see there's a kind of dotted blue line across there which which corroborates the the friends and family reception center the uh survive reception center uh under the
00:15:42 survive reception center uh under the auspices more widely of the the casualty bureau
00:15:46 bureau so that there is a triangulation of information of those being displaced by an incident and then that kind of would morph more widely into the the shelter the rest center which historically i think was derived for
00:15:58 historically i think was derived for people who don't have access to their accommodation and therefore was seen as a place of safety in the immediacy after an incident uh to be provided kind of out of the elements a kind of a place for registration and
00:16:11 a kind of a place for registration and longer term consolidation but looking at this
00:16:16 the plan looks as if there is a separation between rest centers which come from evacuation
00:16:25 and i'm looking at the operational part of it
00:16:28 of it on the one hand and survivor reception centers
00:16:32 centers on the other they don't appear to be linked
00:16:35 linked why is that they don't the the the terminology then goes on to describe how a survivor reception center would most likely morph into a reception center afterwards once that kind of information
00:16:46 afterwards once that kind of information had been gathered but it was the the place of safety for those directly affected by an incident to be directed to after uh as you can see from the search and rescue element to be taken to that
00:16:58 rescue element to be taken to that survival reception center right um so what i'm trying to say is it's not just we wouldn't have just expected rest centers to be in place at the time there's also the provision within this plan for the utilization of
00:17:10 within this plan for the utilization of survival reception centres uh a friends and family reception center which then help support the triangulation of all of the information for those displaced as a result of the fight but now you've got me interested in it i mean looking at it
00:17:22 me interested in it i mean looking at it uh
00:17:22 uh you could go from search and rescue into the casualty clearance but from casualty clearance you can only go to hospital major incident plans you can't go back to a survivor reception center no because you
00:17:34 because you you'd be a casualty ah okay but so the casualty clearance would triage those who are
00:17:40 who are are injured and require further assistance to the las but what if you didn't require any further less assistance you were triaged out uh so if you if you only had extremely minor wounds or
00:17:51 wounds or such like then you would most likely go to the the shelter for a rest center right and similarly if you get sent by search and rescue to the survivor reception center that then takes it straight to the hac
00:18:03 that then takes it straight to the hac uh or possibly to the friends and relatives reception center but not through not to the shelter rest center la lead
00:18:10 la lead not directly but i think that when described in the text thereafter from the survival reception centers it does uh talk about morphing which is why the the local authority is considered the secondary responder in a survival
00:18:21 the secondary responder in a survival reception center because that those facilities once identified and having corralled people in them can morph then into a survivor arrest center themselves but i mean
00:18:32 but i mean somebody opening a rest center someone told to go and open a rest center or someone who was told there is a rest center open what is open is it a survivor reception center or is it a
00:18:43 center or is it a a rest center uh
00:18:46 uh or or is it a friends and relatives reception center so each can have a different purpose depending on the needs of those going to them right who makes the decision within a
00:18:57 who makes the decision within a um a local authority as to whether a venue
00:19:00 venue should be a shelter or rest center or a survivor reception center so the savara reception center is is more a function of the police to amass information as i said that kind of
00:19:14 amass information as i said that kind of blue
00:19:15 blue uh almost horseshoe-like dotted line around it it is meant to encompass that all of that information is triangulated between the survival reception center friends and family so that you can piece together those elements alongside the
00:19:28 together those elements alongside the information from casualty bureau which is taking wider information from people calling in and can link it to the body recovery and disaster mortuary through the family liaison offices and the dvi process right disaster victim identification
00:19:40 right disaster victim identification process right but if i'm a if i'm a relative looking for a loved one in a disaster like this um i'm somewhere outside the horseshoe i don't know where to go do i go to a rest center or do i go to a survivor reception center or do i call the
00:19:52 reception center or do i call the casualty bureau where do i go you
00:19:56 you you would probably call the casualty bureau if you're a distance away but but ideally be pointed towards the friends and relatives reception center which is its intention is is for those who are searching looking for to go to to find a
00:20:09 searching looking for to go to to find a single source of information around those who've been displaced right so that there is a methodology to keep those who are survivors and their needs separate to those who are searching for
00:20:21 searching for information right now these management arrangements are contained in
00:20:28 this document which
00:20:31 which is
00:20:32 is the
00:20:33 the um humanitarian assistance framework
00:20:37 but they don't only apply to the humanitarian assistance arrangements do they they apply across the board to the entire
00:20:44 entire uh response don't they they do so they're also uh referenced within the london emergency services liaison panel uh major incident procedures the early slp
00:20:54 slp right
00:20:55 right and that would that be regarded then customarily as a central um
00:21:02 central arrangement imprinted on people's minds so that they would know naturally how this would work the yeah the leslip arrangements are the the fundamental major incident response arrangements uh
00:21:14 major incident response arrangements uh for on-scene operations and tactical operations and then that feeds up into or or kind of uh correlates to the strategic coordination arrangements underneath the strategic coordination protocol which is
00:21:25 strategic coordination protocol which is bringing together uh the kind of if there is a need to change the strategy of the response
00:21:34 uh let's then go to um the uh the next framework which is at lfb triple zero six one one seven four
00:21:45 this is the identification of the vulnerable it's a guidance note for local implementation uh january 2015 published by the lrp and uh
00:21:55 and uh is it right that a local authority would also be the lead for this document yes that's correct yes and if you go please to um
00:22:01 to um page
00:22:03 page five paragraph 1.5 defining vulnerability um
00:22:08 um it's it says uh according to the cabinet office guidance
00:22:14 guidance that vulnerabilities is a complex of individual group needs for support it is important to acknowledge that and it goes on while all people caught up in an emergency could be and sometimes in some
00:22:25 emergency could be and sometimes in some and in some circumstances will be defined as vulnerable due to their proximity to the event planning and response arrangements should focus on those who are assessed as not being self-reliant and may need external assistance to become safe
00:22:39 so that is that was that a guiding principle yes um if we then go please to uh page
00:22:47 uh page four in this document paragraph one point two even scope this guidance aims to inform complement and align the capability planning of the borough resilience for a brf to encourage a proactive and
00:22:59 brf to encourage a proactive and coherent approach towards the identification of vulnerable persons this is aimed towards borough-based emergencies in london and building on that look um if we then go back to 2.1 at page
00:23:13 if we then go back to 2.1 at page eight
00:23:18 we'll go on rather to it it shows you the steps for building capabilities via the brf uh and at 2.1 uh it identifies the collective responsibility and and it's set out
00:23:30 responsibility and and it's set out under six heads as you can see there is it the case that a borough resilience forum would accept responsibility for the identification of vulnerable persons and undertake the six steps set out there
00:23:42 steps set out there uh
00:23:43 uh so the borough resilience forum doesn't have a
00:23:47 have a a responding function per se it is a planning and collaboration function but it would be those members of the borough resilience forum because the
00:23:58 borough resilience forum because the the information on those vulnerable is held at the most local level it's held by the individual agencies so it will be held by the uh clinical commissioning group within a borough or within uh social services within a borough so so
00:24:10 social services within a borough so so those lists aren't held at a at a pan-london level which is why we direct this guidance right down to the borough level so that it hits at the most local level right right well just looking at the second
00:24:22 right well just looking at the second part of the paragraph whilst the local authority is the lead authority the brf as the local hubs for multi-agency interaction and emergency planning must accept collective responsibility for the
00:24:33 accept collective responsibility for the identification of vulnerable persons and undertake these six course steps and then they're set out uh and item two in particular you'll see it says ascertain who holds what information
00:24:45 information and and five understand information sharing principles so just to be clear when it comes to vulnerable persons the brf comprises is this right a number of category one
00:24:57 is this right a number of category one well the category one responders in or responsible for the borough in that locality yes in that locality yes and the reason we describe this being a responsibility of the brf is because
00:25:09 responsibility of the brf is because this is both preparatory function and then the implementation thereof so ascertaining who holds what information we would have expected to have been done prior to the emergency so that people know what the lists of lists are we
00:25:22 know what the lists of lists are we wouldn't have necessarily expected a comprehensive list of vulnerable people prior to an emergency because it is always changing by its very nature now what happens okay a number of things
00:25:33 what happens okay a number of things flow from that um the borough resilience forum is borough by borough first of all within the borough would you have expected
00:25:44 you have expected uh
00:25:45 uh the council the the the local authority to hold all uh the information about who was vulnerable no who would
00:25:56 who would nobody would hold all of the information about who was vulnerable that's why it's a collection an ascertation of who holds what information and the ability to triangulate it and documentation options for dynamic identification dependent on
00:26:09 for dynamic identification dependent on the type of emergency so different people will be vulnerable under different circumstances some for their health purposes some for their uh social status
00:26:17 status and support that they receive through adult social care through housing needs etc etc so it's a case of identifying what information uh would classify someone as vulnerable in those
00:26:28 classify someone as vulnerable in those circumstances and then finding out or or knowing who holds that and a quick mechanism to pull that together was it a mechanism that the architecture contemplated would identify gaps
00:26:40 contemplated would identify gaps material gaps in the in the data
00:26:46 what what well what would let me put it differently what were the expectations about the completeness of the data which would be ex which
00:26:56 which this architecture would expect to be held in other words you as lrg would expect to be held by the local authority so we would expect information to those who are known to the borough for receipt
00:27:07 who are known to the borough for receipt of a particular service or a particular known vulnerability but some people will be registered for example with a utility company on their priority lists that they're not
00:27:18 their priority lists that they're not registered anywhere else or they may have recently been discharged from a hospital and therefore have an ailment which makes them more vulnerable than otherwise but wouldn't be known on a local authority list
00:27:30 a local authority list which is why it's a collaboration of of all known
00:27:35 all known lists to be pulled together in in relatively quick time and how frequently would those uh all known lists be pulled together
00:27:46 uh all known lists be pulled together by
00:27:47 by pursuant to this collaboration exercise at the time of need so so so we right i know we would have the incident hoped and expected as as you can see at step six that they they
00:27:59 you can see at step six that they they undertook an exercise to practice it and and ensure that they could do it so that's the exercise and assure um and then it would be a a an operation at the time of an incident
00:28:10 an operation at the time of an incident once the
00:28:11 once the kind of
00:28:12 kind of vulnerability indicators are known and you know what you're looking for can go to those lists and get the most up-to-date information and where the best data let it be assumed was
00:28:23 the best data let it be assumed was contained in the adult social care lists but that the adult social care was under a triborough arrangement as was i think sometimes the case in london how would the fact that that data was
00:28:35 how would the fact that that data was shed between three boroughs uh
00:28:38 uh be catered for by the single brf uh
00:28:44 uh that then is why they would need to ascertain who holds what information and under what arrangements they could bring it back that's the the whole purpose of this sitting with a brf is is that
00:28:55 this sitting with a brf is is that localized knowledge to understand who holds what under what circumstances they can get it and where they can get it from
00:29:02 from so i see so the purpose of the exercise is to know that some of the information about some of your residents is held by the borough next door and in the event of an incident this is how to go about getting it yes i mean i
00:29:13 how to go about getting it yes i mean i put it very colloquially but is that the system yes right um one point uh if we go to page 15 uh
00:29:26 two we have some examples of good practice and we can see london borough of brent gis mapping um it's just one example is that how identification of the vulnerable ought to have been dealt with by a brf or
00:29:38 to have been dealt with by a brf or local authority through through a gsi and so so it's it it's one example of how it could happen the the difficulty you have is every borough has different assets available to it different
00:29:50 assets available to it different structures within it which it works so we aim to provide a number of examples of good practice that hopefully something could resonate with some of the boroughs uh so that it would
00:30:01 some of the boroughs uh so that it would help them on their way it's a difficult task to pull this together at the time of an incident we that the guidance is there to help and guide people through as best as we could
00:30:12 people through as best as we could um to give them real life examples and demonstrate that it could be done or ways in which people could be elaborative in doing it right and you expect training to be delivered on this would you to the contingency planning
00:30:23 would you to the contingency planning teams
00:30:25 teams or the adult social care teams within each borough uh i i would expect there to be a mechanism
00:30:31 mechanism for it to happen uh whether or not he needed exact training um that would be a training needs an analysis that they would need to undertake but i would expect them to have a systematic process by which they
00:30:43 have a systematic process by which they could do it i i'm probably more over to to have exercised it rather than necessarily trained in it so so they should have assured themselves that they were able to do it right through some form of exercise or dry run through yes
00:30:55 form of exercise or dry run through yes i see um can i take you please to the evidence of david kerry at day 268 and i want to show you page 177 of his evidence [Music]
00:31:15 if we go to page 177 to pay a line uh
00:31:21 we need to go to page 177 yes that's it now uh
00:31:32 he says at line 12 it was just one of those where it was like do you know what we've got our list of lists we're never going to achieve more than that so it's kind of don't sweat it on the detail of this document uh and now the the context of that was
00:31:50 the
00:31:53 um
00:31:57 the context of that was responding to the minimum standards for london submission in 2016. and there was there was a problem with that but
00:32:05 that but clearly
00:32:06 clearly he said what he said my question is was that kind of approach we've got our list of lists we're never going to achieve more than that don't sweat it on the detail one envisaged by the lrp guidance
00:32:17 detail one envisaged by the lrp guidance uh no which is why we gave good examples from other boroughs as to how it could have been done so you would have expected people in david kerry's position to do better would you and actually to do the work yes
00:32:32 now david kerry also said that page 175 two pages back i don't think we need to go to it that the cabinet office guidance on the identification of the vulnerable was unachievable
00:32:43 vulnerable was unachievable do you consider that to have been a fair assessment no why is that uh because there's examples in the borough resilience uh guidance that we've just given that boroughs did achieve it i i accept that
00:32:55 boroughs did achieve it i i accept that it was difficult uh but not unachievable right so it was your view at the time that it was achievable for a local authority to have identified the vulnerable within their borough and follow the steps set out in the uh lrp
00:33:07 follow the steps set out in the uh lrp identification of the vulnerable plan as far as is reasonably practical yes i'd accept that there's probably some gaps in there because these lists are dynamic then they're never fully up to date they'll go out of date as soon as
00:33:19 date they'll go out of date as soon as the ink is dry on them
00:33:22 but it was certainly achievable because we've set out examples from other boroughs where they had achieved uh
00:33:29 uh a good
00:33:31 a good a good system to identify vulnerable people
00:33:34 people now can we go back to the plan please the framework identifying the vulnerable again and go to page six and look at paragraph um page six paragraph 1.7.1
00:33:47 um page six paragraph 1.7.1 operational roles
00:33:49 roles london local authorities as stated in identifying people who are vulnerable in a crisis most day-to-day service provisions to vulnerable persons are coordinated by local authorities through adult and children social care cabinet
00:34:01 adult and children social care cabinet office 2008 page 8. therefore local authority emergency planning teams are best placed to lead on emergency preparedness in this context as the minimum standards for london 2013 state
00:34:13 minimum standards for london 2013 state local authorities must have then it goes on documented procedures in place for 24 7 access to information to identify the vulnerable persons known to local authorities and to process the
00:34:24 local authorities and to process the data into a usable format for multi-agency responders now we've seen evidence with earlier witnesses mr heatherington that in uh in november 2016 in the results of evaluating boroughs in meeting the
00:34:37 evaluating boroughs in meeting the minimum standards for london rbkc was uh shown as overall amber which i think meant operational but requires development in other words not quite meeting the requisite standard when it came to identify identification
00:34:49 when it came to identify identification of vulnerable persons and for training provided by borough and borough level exercising now we don't need to go to that
00:34:57 that my question is are you able to assist with who it is that judges whether a line item in the msl assessment is colored amber or red or green so it
00:35:08 is colored amber or red or green so it was a self-assessment i understand that year
00:35:11 year other years we alternated between peer assessment and self-assessment but that would have been i think on on that occasion was a self-assessment so it would have been rbkc's own assessment right capability and when it was filed with um our lrg
00:35:24 and when it was filed with um our lrg uh what was the procedure to address an amber score or a red score so as as set out at the beginning of the the document so i think it's uh the 2016.1 was the minimum standards that
00:35:37 2016.1 was the minimum standards that sets out it it clearly states that part of the process is for to inform borough's own uh
00:35:46 uh work plans to identify areas where they are deficient and improve upon their own services what we did as the london resilience group in compiling or lfp probably we were in the transition
00:35:59 probably we were in the transition probably then right uh we we we amassed the results uh so that that lap could see the scores across the board and then we we pulled out the the trends so where there was a consistent trend that local authorities
00:36:11 consistent trend that local authorities weren't meeting i think we took a trend as nine or more boroughs so it was a quarter or more of the boroughs having either an amber or red we would flag that uh to
00:36:22 amber or red we would flag that uh to lap um and make a recommendation whether or not that was something that as a local authorities panel they wanted to pursue further work on as a collective of uh local
00:36:33 work on as a collective of uh local government organizations and that would then go to la poi g to potentially look at how they could improve right so that's the status of those areas um you said it was a self-assessment in this year as such was
00:36:44 self-assessment in this year as such was there any oversight about whether or not the local authorities were self-assessing themselves according to agreed objective standards so we were we were building in slowly but surely and i
00:36:55 were building in slowly but surely and i would like on the msl so it was developed in 20 2007 and then it was an incremental approach so we're not auditors that wasn't our role this was uh something is better than nothing in
00:37:07 uh something is better than nothing in terms of assurance so this was devised by the boroughs for the boroughs with us as that kind of supporting administrative uh agency to kind of put the pen to paper
00:37:18 agency to kind of put the pen to paper what we had started we we had a working group that was looking through it and we took advice of auditors so we had broken it down into the step-by-step process so there was a four-stage process of
00:37:29 there was a four-stage process of stakeholder engagement how the plan was eventually kind of agreed and circulated amongst the um council uh
00:37:40 council uh and so there were about 13 or so criteria
00:37:43 criteria and we took a sample of evidence on each of those so that they couldn't uh over time we would have a an assessment as to whether or not there was evidence
00:37:55 as to whether or not there was evidence behind their self-assessment um that was a
00:37:58 a quality
00:37:59 quality a quantitative as opposed to qualitative assessment so all we would check is that there was evidence there to to kind of corroborate what they were saying in their assessment um let's go
00:38:10 saying in their assessment um let's go to lfb double zero double one nine two two two
00:38:18 this is the self-assessment results for 2017. so the most recent before the fire if we go please to page five we can see rbkc
00:38:27 rbkc uh and now it's not that easy to see on the screen uh so it needs to be expanded yes thank you that's better um you've got all the boroughs across the top and
00:38:37 and the uh frameworks across the left hand side in the vertical column and you can see the red screens and amber's there yes yes and
00:38:47 and it you can see uh if you go
00:38:53 [Music] up to item 2.6 about a third about halfway down two thirds of the way down identification of vulnerable persons and you cast your eye along to rbkc it's
00:39:06 and you cast your eye along to rbkc it's still shown as amber isn't it for that yes now the london resilience groups report on that um if you go to page 10
00:39:17 says in the bottom box identification of vulnerable persons 9 amber one red so that's 10 out of 33 not green uh and then comments
00:39:29 uh and then comments most boroughs reporting this capability as amber or red indicated that they are still experiencing problems in establishing this capability namely adequate procedures to obtain data and
00:39:40 procedures to obtain data and cooperation with partner agencies now given that the numbers of boroughs having difficulty with this this um
00:39:48 this um function
00:39:49 function uh as late as 2017 can you tell us what was done
00:39:52 was done by
00:39:53 by the lap or by the lrg um or perhaps the lrpb
00:39:59 lrpb to facilitate support in in meeting that standard uh so so the identification of the vulnerable guidance was was part of that so it was identifying ways in which it
00:40:10 so it was identifying ways in which it could be done we also then undertook a data sharing agreement and trying to improve the ways in which data sharing could take place inter-agency
00:40:23 across the partnership and was that done uh i believe it's still in place now still being worked through now that the data sharing agreement is written it is working through everybody signing up to
00:40:35 working through everybody signing up to it and agreeing it right so even now the problem
00:40:39 problem [Music]
00:40:40 [Music] identified in this document has not been cured
00:40:43 cured no no
00:40:45 no no um but
00:40:47 um but i think
00:40:48 i think this is one of the things of an emergency will exacerbate those problems that exist in normal processes and this is where
00:40:56 is where what we shouldn't be creating is emergency processes to share information we should be expanding upon the existing processes between agencies to share information so those barriers exist in day-to-day life an emergency
00:41:08 exist in day-to-day life an emergency will just expand them or expose them beyond that so so there are this is where the result the collective resources of the lrf having over 170 organizations is
00:41:19 lrf having over 170 organizations is part of its greatest strength it's also our greatest or achilles heel in having so many organizations by which to agree some of these protocols
00:41:33 uh now i want to ask you next about the local london local authority gold response arrangements which i think we've touched on uh uh
00:41:41 uh uh is it um and we'll come back to the llacc
00:41:45 llacc when we come to look at the response but is it right that the
00:41:50 london local authority coordination center operating procedure was another document which set out how that entity ought to be activated yes and the scenarios for when it is
00:42:02 and the scenarios for when it is activated yes um it's finally on the topic of plans uh if i can just show you lfb3061187 this is your exhibit 27.
00:42:17 uh this is the london resilience group duty officers handbook of march 2017 [Music]
00:42:25 [Music] and it's got a a colorful um section in it covering duty roles strategic advisor duty manager supervisor and liaison officer
00:42:37 manager supervisor and liaison officer yes uh and is it right if you get well let's go to page four and you could we could just pick this up together page 4 paragraph 2.2
00:42:47 it uh
00:42:51 it says this document refers to on-call responsibilities i'm sorry 1 2.12 aim in maybe view one this document provides a single source of guidance for all of the london resilience group on-call roles in both
00:43:03 resilience group on-call roles in both routine and response operations this document is for internal lfb london resilience group use only and should not be shared with any external parties yes now
00:43:12 now is it right that that handbook includes checklists and action cards with the roles and responsibilities of london resilience officers once saying a major incident or emergency has been notified
00:43:23 incident or emergency has been notified yes and with a notification of a major incident be the declaration of a major incident by one of the blue light services for example yes right so you would expec is
00:43:35 example yes right so you would expec is this right you would expect london this this handbook to come into operation at that moment yes yes and if you go pleased to
00:43:45 to your second statement page 10
00:43:50 paragraph 28 and 29 um
00:43:55 and 29 um you you
00:43:56 you you uh you explain the ability to carry out the roles described in the duty handbook uh and you say that they're contingent on other factors when you list those um
00:44:06 um but if you if you if you look at um uh paragraph 29 four lines down you say however due to the fast-moving nature of the incident and the limited number of nrg staff and volunteers those
00:44:18 nrg staff and volunteers those individuals were sometimes fulfilling more than one rule at a given time there's also particularly important in view of these factors to prioritize urgent tasks during an emergency which can mean that some of the formal steps
00:44:29 can mean that some of the formal steps set out within the duty handbook may not be completed was the duty handbook fit for purpose in a major emergency or was it revealed not to be by the grenfell tower fire
00:44:40 to be by the grenfell tower fire i think it was fit for purpose for its intent to support us as a responding staff um the demanding natures of any incident sometimes mean that you can't follow all
00:44:52 sometimes mean that you can't follow all of the procedures going forwards but also we apply a degree of flexibility as as can be shown in the way in which we responded to roles that are outside of our remit but
00:45:03 but potentially weren't being filled so we stepped in to fill them which would draw us
00:45:07 us out of our core role let's then turn to training and exercises now i think it's right that before the grenfell tower fire the london fire and emergency planning authority or el fipa was responsible for
00:45:18 authority or el fipa was responsible for carrying out certain emergency planning activities yes yes uh and i think that included providing training for london boroughs about pan london arrangements yes for the panama agency yes you said that the paragraph 25 of your first
00:45:29 that the paragraph 25 of your first statement of page nine i think did that also include exercising exercising and training on pan london arrangements yes now turning to training then um if we go please to lfb 3061184
00:45:44 this is a service level agreement to cover the period first of april 2017 to 31st of march 18 between the london local authorities panel that's lap and elfipa yes yes
00:45:56 and elfipa yes yes and if you gave these to page two it says
00:46:04 um the agreement the lap is the commissioner of the services under this sla it is the expectation under this agreement that all services delivered will meet statutory requirements best practice and quality assurance and then
00:46:16 practice and quality assurance and then if you look at the foot of the page provisions by elfipa it says elfipa will support pan london local authority arrangements as follows as laid out in chapter 9 of the guidance to the cca and then the last bullet point on the page
00:46:28 then the last bullet point on the page says provision of training to support pan london arrangements certain elements of plans maintained under civil contingencies legislation will be consistent across all boroughs in turn creating a consistency of training need
00:46:42 creating a consistency of training need this this need will be met by a training program provided on request by elfipa yes
00:46:48 yes uh what was the training program referred to so that's that's the the training on the suite of the lag operational procedures so that's that's our interpretation and how we've worked for many years in
00:47:01 and how we've worked for many years in terms of those planned london arrangements being those pertinent to the lag arrangements and the lag operational procedures is contained in another document yes yes i'm not sure we've looked at it or maybe we have
00:47:12 we've looked at it or maybe we have you remind me have you seen it today i don't think we have no i didn't think we had but i wasn't sure um but if you go to your first statement please page 14.
00:47:24 paragraph 42 you set out the training in respect of the three categories of pan london arrangements we've we've discussed
00:47:31 discussed um by whom was the training delivered normally or should it have been delivered
00:47:36 delivered uh
00:47:37 uh so it depended what the training was so uh for
00:47:42 uh for uh
00:47:43 uh so we delivered layla training um that was a coalition between ourselves and uh experienced emergency planning officers who would collectively design and deliver that training uh
00:47:55 design and deliver that training uh bringing in subject matter experts from the various emergency services so that they could uh apprise layla's of their expectations uh logist training was another uh training
00:48:06 another uh training that we provided that we brought in a uh experienced barrister to provide the the legal background to the logging and then we provided the training ourselves uh from
00:48:16 from our staff who had undergone an accreditation training qualification right and uh looking at the top of page 15 of your statement
00:48:28 15 of your statement you uh identify the lrp london local authority gold arrangements and london resilience groups lrg emergency response arrangements
00:48:37 those are the three categories of planned london arrangements weren't they yes i think um now let's go to the first of those which is lfb 3061201
00:48:50 3061201 this is your exhibit 40. and this is the london resilience well let's go to page one of that first of all please uh yes that is done resilience partnership training and exercising
00:49:01 partnership training and exercising program 2017 to 2020 and it
00:49:07 and it details the training and exercise programs supporting certain objectives of the lrp strategy for the period 2017 to 2020.
00:49:18 strategy for the period 2017 to 2020. um is it right that the program was designed by the lrp training and exercising group that's correct and you were a co-chair i think of that group together with toby gould at the time of the fire that's correct yes where did
00:49:29 the fire that's correct yes where did you become co-chair of that group uh
00:49:34 uh in
00:49:36 2016 i would imagine we would have formed that group on the um once the london resilience group was created in april 2016.
00:49:52 and if we look
00:49:57 down to please at 1.3 it says the training and exercising strategy and program relate primarily to multi-agency preparedness activity individual partner organizations are invited to make best
00:50:09 organizations are invited to make best use of the activities delivered through the program but retain full responsibility for their organization's own preparedness including training of personnel and validation of response and recovery capabilities
00:50:20 recovery capabilities what is meant there by individual partner organizations so that that is the category one or two responders within the london resilience partnership so so each borough is responsible for its own training for
00:50:33 responsible for its own training for of its own plans and its own procedures we would provide the kind of the collective piece on top so in relation to local authorities we didn't train people how to be a gold commander we
00:50:44 people how to be a gold commander we gave them uh insight information briefing and awareness on the role of lag which is a london local authority gold which is just a kind of addition on top of that
00:50:55 a kind of addition on top of that existing gold commander train that we would have expected to be carried out in a borough was attendance at any of the training provided by the lrp um compulsory
00:51:06 how was how is it enforced was it just voluntary uh having regard to the duties it is voluntary with regard to the duty right and now given that individual partner organizations respect retain full
00:51:18 organizations respect retain full responsibility for uh their organization's own preparedness which would include training i think you've explained was there any mechanism whereby the lrg
00:51:30 could or the lap perhaps could assess the quality of the training being given by an individual partner organization such as local authority or the level of preparedness
00:51:42 preparedness no no
00:51:45 so there's no peer review or marking of the training is that right you just turn up and get trained
00:51:52 trained uh
00:51:53 uh depending on which what the course is but yes right but were there any courses where you got marked or peer reviewed
00:52:03 so so individual agencies may well have had systems within theirs but but not that i'm aware of right then let's look next at lfb 3061215
00:52:20 uh this is training events delivered by london resilience group in respect of london local authority gold this is the second
00:52:26 second category of arrangements uh
00:52:29 uh this uh is an overview of the local authority training delivered by nrg 2016-17
00:52:37 2016-17 and
00:52:39 and it says at the top it details the local authority training and exercise programs for the period and then um if you um go
00:52:49 uh well let me ask you this way um does this relate to training delivered by lrg but not not detailing a single organization set of training exercises delivered by the individual boroughs
00:53:02 delivered by the individual boroughs yeah so this this outlines the the kind of exercising program that we had uh
00:53:08 uh in relation to the gold arrangements so we went through a two notification tests per year to test the administrative background exercise connects tested a kind of procedural do all the communications
00:53:20 procedural do all the communications mechanisms work uh exercise prepare was designed as a workshop to inform and improve and the safer city was designed as a culminating exercise on an annual basis for all local authorities to test
00:53:31 authorities to test end-to-end the lag arrangements right while we're on this could you go to page three please so you can see london local authority gold arrangements lag support team training and now
00:53:42 and now this document covers a particular period but you can see dates delivered 12th january 2016 islington second february wolf and forest 15th march camden
00:53:53 15th march camden um where they delivered these these training
00:53:59 exercises delivered monthly to different boroughs uh yes so that relates to uh there was a facility uh emperor state building which is a metropolitan police
00:54:11 building which is a metropolitan police owned building where the strategic coordination center was established in 2008.
00:54:16 2008. it was an expensive facility that kept an entire floor available for use in an emergency
00:54:23 emergency and in 2016 the decision was taken that it would no longer be used it had never been used other than exercising or for the olympics and so on the last friday of every month
00:54:35 and so on the last friday of every month that facility was made available to partners to go and familiarize themselves with it so for the two oncoming
00:54:41 oncoming uh local authority gold teams we would run on a friday morning a familiarization and training session for those local authority gold teams that that ceased in in 2016
00:54:53 that that ceased in in 2016 uh thereafter we offered a series of visits for the chief executives themselves to go to the uh metropolitan police special operations room uh which is where an scg would was then decided
00:55:04 is where an scg would was then decided to be run from
00:55:16 did the lrg have any mechanism whereby they could assess the quality of training being given by individual local authorities in relation to la llag arrangements as i think you've described uh
00:55:27 uh not other than their own assessment uh within the msl just the msl turning into the question of exercises is it right that in in order to test pan london arrangements the london or lfepa
00:55:40 london arrangements the london or lfepa was was to design and deliver annual programs of exercises yes that's correct right
00:55:45 right uh and that was in enshrined i think in ep the statutory guidance that's correct apparently 9.6 uh if we go then to lfb double zero
00:55:56 uh if we go then to lfb double zero double one nine two one nine
00:56:00 one nine page fourteen this says
00:56:05 this says these are the minimum drafts the minimum standards for london draft 2016. if you go to the bottom box on page 15 um
00:56:19 it says over 1.16 oversight by lap implementation of the msl will be overseen by the local authority panel msl as part of their work plans lap will
00:56:30 msl as part of their work plans lap will periodically sign up a progress report for msl
00:56:34 for msl assessment on the msl will be annually alternating between a self-assessment in audios and a peer review and even years this assessment will be enhanced by sample audits and for a selection of msl corresponding with the lap business plan
00:56:47 corresponding with the lap business plan that the evidence of the peer review can then be utilized to substantiate the results of the national capabilities survey
00:56:55 survey as specific assessments can take place if required to validate local authority capability for a specific purpose
00:57:03 now
00:57:07 just on that it looks as if there was going to be a biennial peer review going back to the question i asked you earlier about the peer review of the results of the msls
00:57:19 peer review of the results of the msls did that not happen yeah it was it was in place beforehand so that there was a peer review between local authorities uh and we we tried it a number of different ways uh so that
00:57:31 a number of different ways uh so that the msls have been in place uh since
00:57:34 uh since 2009 and so we were cultivating an improvement to the the assessment period going forwards the peer review on the the alternate years was taken within an srf area where the
00:57:45 srf area where the the boroughs would come together for a day
00:57:48 day and share their expertise and kind of validate uh how their plans work to each other
00:57:54 other to have a uh mutually agreed assessment of their capability so so the the the results that you're looking at were a self-assessment that the results the year before would have been a peer review
00:58:06 review so that would have been members of the sub-regional resilience forum so the six boroughs that we mentioned earlier um coming together for a day to uh quality assure each other
00:58:17 quality assure each other because they they knew the intricacies of how their plans would work as a local authority to agree scoring for each other
00:58:35 now is it right that the annual exercise program
00:58:39 program uh in relation forgive me
00:58:47 sorry if we go back to the bottom of page 14 now before i leave this point um it has a number 1.15 a
00:58:56 a pan excess london exercising london resilience will publish an annual exercise program to support the london local authority gold arrangements following sign off by lapig
00:59:07 following sign off by lapig you see that yes
00:59:11 london resilience will develop and deliver the following annual exercises to support the llag arrangements supported by borough emergency planning staff nominated by lapig and then there are
00:59:22 lapig and then there are there's six times exercise preparer srrf based exercises and then one exercise safer city pan london exercise with all 33 boroughs the llac and the
00:59:33 with all 33 boroughs the llac and the lla gp participating then it goes on over the page two notification exercises additional workshops is requested by an apig and local london local authority
00:59:44 local london local authority contribution to pan london multi-agency command and control exercises and additional llg arrangements um now that that program was that that was that was delivered was it in every in every year yes that's the
00:59:56 it in every in every year yes that's the program you just looked at so in outer files notifications connects preparer and safe city and exercise safe for city is referred to
01:00:06 to in if we go back to the very bottom of page 14 as a panel of an exercise with all 33 boroughs the acc and the lag participating
01:00:18 now i think the exercise safer city 2017 uh
01:00:24 uh was the first one since 2013. why is that so in 2016 we were undertaking uh exercise unified response which was a huge four-day
01:00:35 huge four-day uh multi-agency exercise and we utilized that experience setting up humanitarian assistance centres delivering a beck as that opportunity it takes quite a lot
01:00:46 as that opportunity it takes quite a lot of resource to get a a good exercise delivered
01:00:49 delivered on behalf of them
01:00:53 2014 and 15 i would have thought there would have been a exercise safer city i'm surprised that there
01:00:59 there isn't
01:01:00 isn't it may well have been that we used the opportunity of a wider multi-agency exercise and bolted on the local authority element onto it but i'd be surprised if that was the case right
01:01:12 now you refer to exercise unified response in that last answer and you covered it in paragraph 46 of your first statement at page 15. i think that that was the simulation of a major building collapse at waterloo
01:01:24 a major building collapse at waterloo station wasn't it that's right with 70 fatalities and it took two years to plan also and dominated much of the resilience partnerships training and exercise activity during that period yes that's correct
01:01:35 that's correct yes
01:01:35 yes let's just pick out some there's quite a lot in it that we can we can pick out um but but uh let's just have it up so that people can see it and then they can look at it if they want read it at their
01:01:47 look at it if they want read it at their leisure
01:01:48 leisure so to speak um if we go to um lfb triple zero six one two one four
01:01:56 uh and go
01:01:58 and go there well there it is it's an evaluation report and it runs to some 184 pages
01:02:03 184 pages um and there were a number of lessons coming out of this and just let me give you one or two by way almost a random example
01:02:10 example um can we go please to page 144
01:02:21 in in the text at the top in the early stages of a large incident there will often be a propulsity of confirmed information eur exercise unified response highlighted how shared situational awareness and decision
01:02:32 situational awareness and decision making could be improved if there was a single source of updates from the incident scene to the strategic command level
01:02:38 level and that's a lesson isn't it and just just scrolling through it let's go to page 151
01:02:46 151 paragraph 3.6.25
01:02:50 under communication on the left-hand side there's another lesson inconsistent information related to casualty numbers vital information at risk of being missed or even lost uh page 153
01:03:04 uh page 153 paragraph 3.6.34 tracking of casualty numbers and location being challenging you see that second bullet point down tracking of casualty numbers and location was
01:03:15 casualty numbers and location was challenging noting that this partly reflected artificialities of the exercise
01:03:21 exercise 155
01:03:26 3.6.37 to not 39 a long long set of lessons here about set up an activation process and joint working uh the delay in the activation of the
01:03:38 uh the delay in the activation of the survivor reception center due to failures in the exercise communications structure
01:03:43 structure compounded by a lack of understanding regarding roles and responsibilities within and between agencies and then
01:03:51 and then 157
01:03:59 dealing with the vulnerable
01:04:03 uh
01:04:07 lesson there the faith and disability issues were not consistently managed with sufficient resources to correctly prioritize the support of children and young people
01:04:21 it says essentially survivors and members of the public expectations that a real incident would be higher and require more resources and effort and it goes on in that day there are many many lessons in it my question uh is this what was done
01:04:33 uh is this what was done uh following this document to learn the lessons of these criticisms and embed them at brf level borough resilience forum level uh so the document was uh published and
01:04:46 uh so the document was uh published and shared quite widely across the partnership we have a mechanism through the learning and implementation group to record
01:04:52 record all lessons that then are um allocated to specific capability groups so that through their review of their their frameworks and plans they can incorporate the learning that has been
01:05:04 incorporate the learning that has been identified through these lessons here um into future iterations of the framework so for example uh a deal of the the humanitarian assistance framework will have uh
01:05:15 framework will have uh incorporated or tried to incorporate it in in the kind of direction that it gives the the guidance that it gives through that framework um the implementation of these lessons
01:05:26 implementation of these lessons so it's a continual process of of lessons identified or managed through a database agreed upon a partnership level allocated to the specific working groups for their information and it is for them
01:05:38 for their information and it is for them to act upon and embed into the capability documents going forwards and then they report back uh to either the learning implementation group or we now have a process that has
01:05:51 group or we now have a process that has a cover sheet when a framework it comes to the lrf for approval to say how it has
01:05:56 has incorporated the lessons or to confirm that the lessons have been at least acknowledged if not solved and what work remains outstanding do you do you accept that exercising
01:06:07 do you do you accept that exercising arrangements for communications with the public specifically as one of the matters in this were not conducted regularly before grenfell yes and do you have any observations to make about the frequency and nature of
01:06:18 about the frequency and nature of exercises in general were there enough of them or were there too many
01:06:27 there's quite a degree of exercise that the difficulty comes in getting the right people to the exercises so there tends to be the same faces coming to the exercises a number of times as opposed to it reaching that wider
01:06:39 as opposed to it reaching that wider application and it goes back to a comment i made earlier about it is the responsibility of the entirety of the organization not just a small contingency planning unit to put all of these in place as you can see there is a
01:06:51 these in place as you can see there is a a huge amount of guidance lessons learning um direction
01:06:57 direction to to implement here that is just too much for a small team it needs to be encompassed and embodied which is why we have a kind of mantra that resilience is everybody's business that it needs to be
01:07:08 everybody's business that it needs to be owned collectively across organizations and embedded into every detail and most importantly put into normal everyday processes as far as possible because what we don't want to
01:07:19 possible because what we don't want to be doing is creating a new set of arrangements when pressure is on and you're faced with
01:07:25 with unforeseen circumstances or emergency-like situations looking at it from the other way around looking at it from the david kerry position
01:07:35 position the person charged with responsibility for contingency management in our bkc what ought he or what all rbk see through him to have done
01:07:47 to have done in learning these lessons and ensuring that they were not repeated at an incident such as grenfell tower uh
01:07:56 uh trying to think about the right word but uh acknowledgement of the lessons amongst the various service areas so that they are at least aware of of the kind of
01:08:06 kind of areas identified for improvement and the kind of the learning that we had so that they can build it into their structures going forwards it's not necessarily just for david kerry to do but it should be uh doing his utmost to make
01:08:17 uh doing his utmost to make all those
01:08:18 all those either responsible for a service area or kind of who could be um part in discharging these type of responses in the future aware and
01:08:29 responses in the future aware and understanding of those lessons to try and reduce them happening again in the future
01:08:41 yes thank you mr chairman is that a convenient moment for the break yes if that's you i think it is um right well we'll have our afternoon break now and mrs hetherington will come back to half
01:08:52 mrs hetherington will come back to half past three please and as before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room thank you thank you very much [Music]
01:09:06 [Music] thank you this will help us really please
01:25:57 would you ask mr heatherington to come back in please
01:26:09 right mr hetherington i'm ready to carry on i hope absolutely thank you very much yes mr billy yes thank you
01:26:15 thank you now i want to turn to the response on the night if i may uh and what you did and those of your colleagues in the london resilience group now i think it just to start it's right
01:26:26 now i think it just to start it's right isn't it that matthew hogan was the london resilience duty manager on duty that night that's correct uh and that meant did that he was the first point of contact for notification of the fire yes uh and there was a supervisor on duty as
01:26:38 uh and there was a supervisor on duty as well manuela roddler is that right yes have i pronounced her name correctly roedler and she was engaged i think from the early hours yes yes and tabi gould who acted as the strategic advisor until
01:26:50 who acted as the strategic advisor until you took over at 8 30 a.m that's correct and i summarized it but that's correct is it right now um in in his statement to the inquiry let's go to hit it's matthew hogan at lfb
01:27:02 go to hit it's matthew hogan at lfb double zero one one nine three three four
01:27:23 lfb double zero double zero one one nine three three four
01:27:37 now can we go please to um page six paragraph 22 and he says i work at 2 30 hours and saw a notification on my personal phone from bbc news concerning
01:27:49 bbc news concerning what i later came to know was a fire the fire at grenfell tower
01:27:54 i checked my work phone for calls and emails and my pager by this stage i'd received no messages from lfb all under resilience colleagues about the incident now at that stage he hadn't received any
01:28:06 now at that stage he hadn't received any notification from anyone official about the fire notwithstanding a major incident having been declared by the police at 0-126 did you know that yes
01:28:17 yes yes and in fact his first notification of the fire was at 3 12 when he received an email from the tfl and you can see that at paragraph 27 on page seven just have a look at that very quickly
01:28:29 just have a look at that very quickly uh does that surprise you uh yeah it's certainly not how we would expect to be notified no we would expect to be notified at the outset of a major incident to conduct a tripartite
01:28:40 incident to conduct a tripartite conversation with the the agency that's uh declaring the major incident uh the the other kind of closely affected agencies and metropolitan police to
01:28:51 agencies and metropolitan police to determine what the future strategic coordination arrangements would be yes now the strategic coordination protocol and we can have it up if you like but take it from me it doesn't say how long after a major incident has been declared
01:29:02 after a major incident has been declared the london resilience group ought to be notified no it doesn't no why doesn't it you know uh
01:29:10 uh i i think
01:29:14 we would expect it to be um as soon as reasonably practical uh we wouldn't want to set an arbitrage target that would be met but but we didn't think that we needed to set a target that people then
01:29:25 needed to set a target that people then had an expansive time frame that they had that space it should be as soon as reasonably practical that they notify us if they want our support to invoke their strategic coordination arrangements yes and he says uh at paragraph 22 on the uh
01:29:39 and he says uh at paragraph 22 on the uh on the previous page and then at the bot at the top of this page that um he had tried to receive more information about the fire online uh from the television and from social media news sources was it was it
01:29:50 media news sources was it was it appropriate for the duty manager of london resilience to be seeking out information relating to the fire in that way uh that would be fairly standard practice we would try and gather as much information as we could
01:30:02 information as we could prior to being informed or trying to get in touch with others as and when if we get back to um page eight of his statement paragraph 27 uh he says that he didn't consider email being the to be
01:30:14 he didn't consider email being the to be the best means of notification outside office hours no because there's no expectation that that's how you would see it as well would you absolutely which is why we we publish the alerting mechanisms for us to go through lfb
01:30:26 mechanisms for us to go through lfb control who can then page us yeah yes now um
01:30:30 now um has the london resilience group since the fire suggested any modifications to its partners on prompt notification to the london resilience duty manager in the event of a future disruptive or
01:30:42 the event of a future disruptive or major event in london uh
01:30:44 uh yes so we've reinforced that and throughout the the suite of events uh the emergency services have subsequently put in uh enhanced arrangements through the the tri-service calls uh the collaboration between control rooms and
01:30:56 collaboration between control rooms and the notification to ourselves right and now i'm just running through the very brief chronology and we could take this from matthew hogan's statement he appears first to have made or attempted
01:31:07 appears first to have made or attempted contact with the duty lnag at 438
01:31:12 at 438 uh
01:31:14 uh uh and that due to llag was in fact the oncoming duty lag from nine o'clock um so he got the wrong person and then spoke to the right per right due to lag
01:31:25 spoke to the right per right due to lag at 455.
01:31:27 at 455. my question is on the basis of that chronology taken from his statement do any of the protocols give direction on how long after a resilience a london resilience duty manager is informed of a
01:31:38 resilience duty manager is informed of a major incident he must notify the duty llag no we don't have a specified time right but presumably it's asap asap yeah right part of our mantra is why would we hold that risk of not
01:31:50 why would we hold that risk of not sharing that information no and d do you consider that the duty l l a g should have been notified or should have notified um the
01:32:00 um the uh should have been notified sooner uh
01:32:04 uh yes sorry what were the times again well um we probably take this from uh matthew hogan but
01:32:11 hogan but he attempts to contact the duty llag at 438
01:32:15 438 um got the wrong person and spoke to the right duty llag at 455. uh yeah so and i'd assume partly that's him
01:32:25 him assessing information and also working out what the coordination arrangements are going to be so that he informs them um
01:32:33 um of where they're expected to be or if there's a call that they're expected to dial into yes now moving back then to the morning of the 14th of june i want to ask you first about the first strategic coordination group meeting
01:32:44 strategic coordination group meeting which happened at 5 00 am that day in in fact and by way of background for you the lfb we're asking for a strategic coordination group
01:32:55 a strategic coordination group or s c g to be convened at 4 30 but tabby gould and matthew hogan thought there was insufficient time between the request and uh which i came at 0-409
01:33:07 uh which i came at 0-409 and 4 30 so it was delayed for half an hour to five o'clock um does that accord with your recollection or or what you were not you were not involved at this point i wasn't involved at that point but yes that's
01:33:18 involved at that point but yes that's how i understand it it's right i think that these the purpose of the scg is for those responding agencies to formulate a joint
01:33:24 joint strategy and to agree on joint actions to share situational awareness and to provide a common understanding of the incident yes that's right and then to provide direction a framework for direction yes
01:33:37 direction yes and is it right that an scg is established in response to a major incident or emergency and consists of category one and two responders uh yes that's correct yes uh and if you
01:33:48 uh yes that's correct yes uh and if you go to lfb double zero one two three seven six nine page seven
01:33:59 if we go in that to page seven here is a a diagram scg composition uh and around the rim you've got uh lots of responders um are they all category
01:34:12 of responders um are they all category one and two responders uh no the voluntary sector business [Music]
01:34:24 [Music] am i right in thinking therefore that it essentially mirrors those organizations in the lrf yes right is it necessary for all those responders whom we can see here to attend an scg uh no that's its entirety
01:34:38 attend an scg uh no that's its entirety composition there is then uh flexibility within the arrangements uh to to bring together certainly in the first stages those agencies are more closely involved
01:34:49 closely involved of the responders who would attend an scg would it be gold would it be a gold group level yes right and would that include the chief executive of an affected borough
01:35:00 executive of an affected borough yes or their gold commander whichever level they determine that to be within their organization right and it looks it looks as if only once an llag is involved that any local authority
01:35:11 involved that any local authority representation would attend is that right
01:35:15 right uh no no we would seek local authority representation um whether that comes if it was a wide-ranging incident involving many boroughs then it would be london local
01:35:26 boroughs then it would be london local authority gold to act in that representation capacity if it's a single borough then we would look for the the individual borough because they're closest to the incident to represent directly so looking at the
01:35:38 to represent directly so looking at the the um
01:35:47 either going to be the chief executive of the relevant borough or london gold yes on the scg or both possibly possibly those we have had occasions where there has been both
01:35:58 had occasions where there has been both uh and that has also led to kind of confusion at times as well
01:36:04 as well right
01:36:05 right would you always expect the chief executive to attend um or in other words the la gold in the absence at least of an llag
01:36:14 an llag uh
01:36:15 uh so so privacy we would give to the the the kind of local authority gold affected that doesn't necessarily have to be a chief executive that's up to the determination of of that borough how where they put that level it's the
01:36:27 where they put that level it's the strategic person who has the authority to make decisions on behalf of that organization as the representative is the kind of gold term uh we would always seek a local authority
01:36:38 local authority gold if it can't be that borough then we would go to to lag by default right but if the local authority gold was a was around and available would you expect him or her to attend yes so nice
01:36:51 expect him or her to attend yes so nice now we know that nicholas holgate the chief executive of rbkc did not attend the first scg but david kerry and stuart priestly
01:37:00 priestly from its um contingency management team did
01:37:03 did would that have been unusual uh
01:37:10 not desirable but not necessarily unusual uh we would have accepted that they're representing on behalf of their authority
01:37:17 authority and then as we've just covered a major incident had been declared by uh the um police just before 1 30 on the 14th of june and by the lfb controlled separately at 0
01:37:29 by the lfb controlled separately at 0 206
01:37:31 206 a.m on that morning and therefore the first scg took place just under three hours later
01:37:38 later in your
01:37:40 in your understanding and experience should one have been convened earlier uh
01:37:45 uh so it's very difficult to put time stamps on it it's right for it to take place at the appropriate time what we don't want to do and we have considered this uh subsequently in the revision to the
01:37:57 uh subsequently in the revision to the student coordination protocol is put arbitrary times that then force us to uh hold meetings within that time frame when the
01:38:06 when the a full amount of information may not be available to us um so it's a considered approach by the commanders at the time as to when it's best uh taking place out of hours uh the the the 21 minutes
01:38:17 out of hours uh the the the 21 minutes notice you're you're calling around a number of agencies and gathering the right people to either be present in the special operations room or dial in via teleconference um so it takes a bit
01:38:29 via teleconference um so it takes a bit of time to administer and bring those parties together
01:38:36 i'm sorry i i i can't provide an opinion i wasn't awake at that time or available of that information no but um in circumstances where a major incident
01:38:49 in circumstances where a major incident is declared by the lfb would you expect a strategic coordination group meeting only first to be convened three hours or just under three hours
01:39:00 three hours or just under three hours later or would you expect it to have been convened earlier
01:39:06 uh it could have been convened earlier if it was called for earlier yes yes but but should it have been called for earlier would you expect a three-hour delay between the declaration
01:39:18 three-hour delay between the declaration of a major incident and the first scg i wouldn't expect it to be done on a time scale necessarily it is at the time when it is right for the incident to have information available for partners
01:39:30 have information available for partners to come together to consider the strategic approach that they need to adopt
01:39:35 adopt and when there is relevant information for them to take a direction on going forward right now coming to your own notification let's pick this up in your first statement at page 18.
01:39:48 if you look at paragraph 54 in page 18 you say i was called at 531 by toby gould who informed me of a major incident involving a tower block fire in kensington and chelsea and the need for more of our staff to support our
01:39:59 more of our staff to support our response due to the size of the fire i called tebby back at 0.541 once i'd seen pictures of the fire on the news to discuss whether it was necessary to activate the london local authority gold arrangements but toby informed me that
01:40:12 arrangements but toby informed me that rbkc were dealing with the incident and they did not require activation of lna g now
01:40:21 all um
01:40:23 just to be clear to recap the lnag arrangements are for a pan-london response
01:40:29 response as we saw earlier where local authorities pool their decision-making to a single chief executive who speaks for the local authorities in such a response that that's what you said paragraph 12 of your statement
01:40:40 said paragraph 12 of your statement we've covered that already my question is does it also trigger coordination of mutual aid or is mutual aid not contingent on the activation of the london local authority
01:40:51 activation of the london local authority gold arrangements it's not contingent mutually can be asked for by any borough any time right then uh now do you remember what toby gould told you in your conversation at
01:41:02 gould told you in your conversation at 0.541 about the activation of lng uh
01:41:08 uh not word by word but i think i think uh that rbkc were content that they were dealing with the incident um and at the time that's right it's a localized incident they are the best place to understand
01:41:19 understand uh
01:41:20 uh the
01:41:21 the topography the social economic makeup of the borough the the resources that they had and are the lead responding local authority in place to respond
01:41:35 did he tell you that he'd spoken to anybody
01:41:38 anybody already about lnag
01:41:41 lnag speak to him
01:41:45 i can't i can't recall whether he he he explicitly said that he had spoken to someone but but from the statement that he informed me that rbkc were dealing with it and from their subsequent emails that i've seen that um he's had confirmation that they're content to be
01:41:57 confirmation that they're content to be uh leading then i can assume that he did speak to someone right now uh
01:42:02 now uh if we go please to uh matthew hogan's witness statement his first witness statement please lfb double zero double one nine double three four
01:42:14 four page 14
01:42:16 page 14 paragraph 58
01:42:23 he says at approximately 4 55 i spoke to andrew blake herbert duty lnag he confirmed with me that he was content at that stage with rbkc taking the lead for the time being i did not make a
01:42:35 for the time being i did not make a contemporaneous note of that call but i summarized the call in an email sent to lfb and nrg colleagues at 5 58 i exhibit this email as mh27 um were you aware of that conversation
01:42:47 um were you aware of that conversation you know
01:42:48 you know when you spoke to uh toby gould uh probably hadn't seen the email by then i think i was woken up uh half of its head and then
01:42:59 uh half of its head and then right and then uh phone toby back as soon as i've seen that the first call was a very short uh we've got a major incident it's a tower block fire tower block fires
01:43:10 tower block fires weren't that uncommon uh so i didn't grasp the size of it when toby first said so he just said turn on the news and then you'll see uh then once i saw then i rang toby back
01:43:21 uh then once i saw then i rang toby back right
01:43:22 right you say tower block fires weren't that uncommon but your reaction wasn't um
01:43:27 um this is a tower block fire for which there is no uh risk in the in the risk capabilities document
01:43:35 document no because block fires weren't that uncommon in terms of having a quite a small impact in terms of compartmentalized and dealt with by uh local crews and a
01:43:46 and dealt with by uh local crews and a layla responding so it was
01:43:49 it was not uncommon for us to be called that a layla wasn't responding from our borough and we had to chivey along from [Music]
01:43:57 [Music] lfb control getting in touch with us to try and leverage local authority liaison officers coming out in support of local smaller incidents i see
01:44:17 can we then go to double zero double one nine three five nine
01:44:29 this is the email you've exhibited uh which you've just referred to at mh27
01:44:35 at mh27 uh and it's matt hogan to
01:44:38 to uh lfb lrg hi all confirming i've spoken to ladies happy knc leader in the present time manny will send an update to all boroughs to make them aware
01:44:49 boroughs to make them aware um
01:44:49 um now andrew blake herbert was the chief executive of the london borough of havering i think wasn't he that's correct did do you know whether he'd ever acted as a duty lnag before
01:45:00 ever acted as a duty lnag before uh
01:45:01 uh no i don't know no you don't know what does it mean or involved to be a duty lnag
01:45:08 well that is the uh duty local authority chief executive who is on a rotor for that two-week period who we would call as the first person we would expect to take over as the lag role right that
01:45:20 take over as the lag role right that that is as you explained it earlier but what would have been the point of speaking to llag in circumstances where our bkc it had not had not indicated a need to invite them to
01:45:32 invite them to um participate yes uh so earlier i said that we hadn't activated lleg very often but it would be quite commonplace for us to inform them of events that are going on so that
01:45:43 them of events that are going on so that they are apprised of situations and events going on across london right actually so this is for information yes and would it be normal to inform the duty lleg
01:45:54 to inform the duty lleg of any declaration of any major incident yes
01:45:57 yes i see
01:45:58 i see and what information would the the lrg normally provide to a duty llag for them to make an assessment about whether in their view the llag arrangements need activating
01:46:10 arrangements need activating we we'd pass them what information that we had um and we would look to to tell them whether or not the borough itself was dealing with it or not right is there any guidance that an lnag would
01:46:21 there any guidance that an lnag would have
01:46:22 have to enable him or her to make an assessment about whether the nnag arrangements needed activating even though in fact the invitation would have to come from the relevant category one responder the la uh not specified
01:46:33 responder the la uh not specified guidance
01:46:34 guidance by the the nature of their their role as the chief executive we're using that experience and awareness political awareness and the running their experience of being a chief executive and running a local
01:46:45 chief executive and running a local authority themselves as to whether or not there is a need for them to step in or provide support so it provides support and do i take it that you don't know what information was provided to andrew blake herbert by matt hogan
01:46:56 andrew blake herbert by matt hogan before this call or in this call not explicitly no and you don't know therefore the basis on which he was content for uh k and c as he put it to lead at the present time
01:47:07 as he put it to lead at the present time the decision to allow kbc kbc rbkc to lead surprise you at that stage no no it didn't um then let's turn to um lfb doubles lfb triple zero six one
01:47:19 um lfb doubles lfb triple zero six one two eight
01:47:20 two eight nine this is an email at 7 44 am into which you were copied from toby ghoul to nicholas holgate
01:47:31 ghoul to nicholas holgate second email down [Music]
01:47:34 [Music] he says
01:47:35 he says in the second line i try to i understand you spoke to matthew hogan from our team earlier this morning and confirmed you were content for kensington and chelsea to participate in the seg meeting straight telephone teleconferences
01:47:48 straight telephone teleconferences please let me know if that position changes and you feel there would be benefit in london local authority gold participation to lead on any pan london issues i'm not aware of any at present given the scene is contained within
01:48:00 given the scene is contained within kensington and chelsea was it your understanding that if a major incident was contained to one borough of london then the llag arrangements wouldn't be activated
01:48:17 you yeah wouldn't be activated in terms of uh local authority taking the lead only if there was uh overspill so so there were there are incidents such as a terror incident that might be confined to a single borough but the ramifications and public and media
01:48:29 ramifications and public and media interest uh widened out in terms of monitoring of hate crime or prevent crime uh in which case we would bring london local authority gold in to kind of oversee those parts
01:48:40 of oversee those parts so it's not quite straightforward but a single site incident like this we would expect the borough to lead on and have their own command structure for
01:48:51 i see
01:48:55 what what if the disaster even though intra at least for the time being was of such a scale and complexity that no one local authority would
01:49:06 that no one local authority would reasonably be expected to cope with it would you would you expect lleg to be involved then
01:49:15 once once asked for by the borough but the borough still knows its residents its resources whether or not it is beyond its own capability
01:49:27 capability far better than anybody else and would still be
01:49:30 still be uh wanting that kind of vested interest in leading the response to its residents
01:49:38 i i don't see what bringing in another chief executive would bring to it in that early stages because they wouldn't understand the resources
01:49:48 resources all local authorities are different in their makeup and how they would respond and that's why it's so important to understand what the services that they had on hand were how they would respond what the context of the rbkc emergency management
01:50:01 context of the rbkc emergency management plan or contingency management plan was so that they they knew what resources to put in place to respond to this now we've seen some other evidence that um
01:50:13 that um just after this in fact it's about the same you know in fact sorry in this very email apologies it goes on to say we're standing up people to staff the london local authority coordination center to assist in coordinating local authority
01:50:25 assist in coordinating local authority support should that be required um
01:50:30 um can you explain why it would be that llacc staff were being stood up if the lna g arrangements either hadn't yet been activated or it was contemplated that they wouldn't be uh we were just anticipating uh and
01:50:43 uh we were just anticipating uh and getting ourselves onto the front foot um so that we were prepared if there was an activation or if there was something that we could support with i see
01:50:53 i see let's then turn to nfb triple zero 61289
01:51:00 look at the first email in the document at the top of the page from nicholas holgate to toby gould uh and andrew blake herbert and chris naylor who i think was the incoming
01:51:11 naylor who i think was the incoming that's lag copy to david kerry and to you and matt hogan toby thanks he says aside from housing needs that may well spill over borough boundaries i do not brackets yet brackets think llag needs
01:51:23 brackets yet brackets think llag needs to gear up did you understand when you saw that from nicholas holgate's response that he too was under the impression that only if
01:51:32 if the response spilled over into neighboring boroughs or other boroughs would activation of lag then be required uh yes yes then if we go then to lfb triple zero six one two one seven
01:51:49 uh this is an email from you to john barredale and john o'brien at 8 10.
01:51:57 10. uh and
01:51:59 uh and uh it's uh subject heading uh is a major incident in north kensington local authority gold as was the email string below it which
01:52:10 as was the email string below it which we've just seen you know sending it on to them good morning john just for information we've been in touch with both nicholas holgate chris nayna as oncoming nnag and andrew blake herbert
01:52:21 oncoming nnag and andrew blake herbert as off going lnag all are content at the moment that our bkc retain the lead at this point you see that yes uh and then you go on to say the lnac is opening to support k and
01:52:33 say the lnac is opening to support k and c should they need mutual aid and we're in contact with phe and fiona wilcox regarding support to stack and mass facts coordination all boroughs have been made aware but no requests for
01:52:44 been made aware but no requests for mutual aid yet or other issues raised by other boroughs
01:52:50 now chris naylor there's a reference to him there being the oncoming llag this i think was his first ever time as duty llag that's correct yes and he was chief executive of barking and dagging
01:53:02 chief executive of barking and dagging it wasn't he that's correct do you know when he became chief executive of bachmann dagenham uh no
01:53:10 uh no um
01:53:11 um there there is some suggestion uh
01:53:13 uh in publicly available material that it was in 2015. would you quarrel with that uh yes
01:53:21 uh yes i wouldn't disagree with it no um if that's correct can you explain why this was his first duty uh as duty llag more than two years later uh yeah so uh
01:53:32 than two years later uh yeah so uh we
01:53:33 we didn't put a new chief executive to london on the rotor within a year of them arriving so there was time for them to bed in understand the personalities across and then when we would have constructed the rotor following he may
01:53:45 constructed the rotor following he may just not have been put on until later on due to his availability right i see is the i i think we covered this earlier but just confirm again for me is the nnag duty role always fulfilled by a chief executive i had a paid service yes
01:53:58 chief executive i had a paid service yes a chief executive
01:54:01 you say a head of paid service yeah so that that's a technical term used in the in the uh lag resolution in effect a chief executive right so so likewise we wouldn't take uh
01:54:12 so so likewise we wouldn't take uh interim chief executives either onto the uh
01:54:14 uh lag rotor which is why it ran at slightly less than 33. and what training does the chief executive receive before being added to the llag duty rotor so they would have received a uh briefing
01:54:25 they would have received a uh briefing from one of our teams so either the the head of lfbep at the time um or uh
01:54:32 uh after that it was normally uh mark sawyer who delivered a kind of hour-long briefing session to them we offered them a visit round sor where we would uh familiarize themselves
01:54:43 where we would uh familiarize themselves with the
01:54:44 with the areas that they would be working on um but i stress also this is this is incremental this is the lag elements not uh their training as a um a gold within a borough so it's not
01:54:57 um a gold within a borough so it's not their entirety of their emergency response training this should be an addition on top to the kind of complexities or the specifics should i say of being a uh lag and sor is what uh
01:55:11 say of being a uh lag and sor is what uh special operations rumor uh met police lambeth right and
01:55:17 and if we go then to your statement please uh
01:55:24 uh at page 16 your first statement
01:55:29 paragraph 47 you say the details of local authority training events delivered by london resilience group are provided in a document you exhibit and let's look briefly at the exhibit
01:55:41 and let's look briefly at the exhibit this is jh43 that's nfb triple zero six one two one five
01:55:50 uh if you go please to page f we saw this earlier now if we go to page five in this document um ln ag training for chief executives is referred to as the in the second half
01:56:01 is referred to as the in the second half of the page and at the very bot sorry the bottom of the page under sitrep training um there's a heading local london london local authority gold llag training for
01:56:12 local authority gold llag training for local authority chief executives and it says a round of london local authority gold llag training was due to take place in 2017 however due to other priorities including incidents that occurred in 2017 this training was
01:56:24 occurred in 2017 this training was deferred until after the time of the grenfell tower fire and delivered on 20th of november 2017 and 23rd january 2018.
01:56:32 2018. does it follow the the the training on the 20th of november 2017 was the first llag training for chief executives since march 2016.
01:56:43 march 2016. uh so so there would have been uh specific briefings uh but we recognized uh that there was an improvement to be made in the the training uh for chief executives uh and that can be
01:56:55 executives uh and that can be seen in the uh ep 2020 report of 2016 where we wanted to increase the awareness and improve the training available to them and we were going through the process to bring in external facilitators
01:57:08 bring in external facilitators interaction with dclg um information from the coroner information from uh anares as a humanitarian assistant lead so they put the people first in a response um that was due to take place i
01:57:20 response um that was due to take place i think around the 24th of june uh which we obviously had to then postpone i see and then going back to page three which we looked at earlier we've got the lag so llag support team delivered to islington waltham forest in camden
01:57:33 islington waltham forest in camden um that we can't see a reference to rbkc there what do we make of that did it did it not get delivered at all to our bkc or was it just not in in this period covered by this dollar so not in this
01:57:44 covered by this dollar so not in this period covered by this this document uh previously however so this is specific support team training to london local authority gold and we had slightly changed the arrangements because of the
01:57:55 changed the arrangements because of the change in facility so that the the uh facilities at lambeth are far reduced than they were at the strategic coordination center over empress state
01:58:06 coordination center over empress state so you couldn't take a large team with you if you were operating as a gold so we we refined that team down to an advisor a deputy and a logist this previous training had been at a time when that team was much larger and
01:58:18 time when that team was much larger and we were familiarizing them with the kitten equipment that we supplied whereas that was that was a changing model um due to the changes in technology the ability for
01:58:29 changes in technology the ability for lag to dial into to teleconferences and and avail themselves of their technology and also a wealth of advisors in their own directors within their borough um
01:58:41 um rbkc that the predecessor to nicholas holgate had not been on the lag rotor for his own personal reasons so rbkc had not been through that lag support team training right
01:58:52 training right um let's then go to lfb uh triple zero six one two one seven and this is uh uh the email
01:59:03 uh the email uh that we saw earlier the email string
01:59:08 and after the reference into stack and mass facts coordination in the second paragraph in the third paragraph it says next scg at 8 30 08 30. that's correct um now you
01:59:20 at 8 30 08 30. that's correct um now you see it right that you attended that meeting or that call that's correct and you did i did so i think to support the chair of the scg in a london resilience group capacity yes that's correct as strategic advisor
01:59:31 yes that's correct as strategic advisor to the chair that's correct yes now you weren't supposed to be on duty were you uh no but tabi gould i think was committed uh to the ongoing response to the london bridge attack so you offered to attack yes yes did you attend uh it
01:59:44 to attack yes yes did you attend uh it was a telephone conference was it by telephone no i i uh
01:59:50 uh i don't know i think i think it's in my statement i was in a taxi at the time that i wrote that so i i had uh when i was awoken from by toby i traveled straight into the office we had a face-to-face uh and a discussion there
02:00:01 face-to-face uh and a discussion there that's where i ran chris naylor i then jumped in a taxi outside of uh lfb headquarters which is union street uh and it's only a five minute journey down to
02:00:10 to the special operations room so i got there
02:00:13 there uh
02:00:14 uh probably just as that email was was sent uh i'm
02:00:17 uh i'm made my way down so i was physically present in the room now do you remember that nicholas holgate attended that meeting yes did he make any contribution to it do you remember
02:00:28 you remember uh i i can't recollect uh anything that he he made specifically
02:00:35 let's go to mol 6014
02:00:46 these are the minutes of the 8 30 scg meeting on the 14th of june 2017 and it says place telepho teleconference as you can see
02:00:59 if we go to page three
02:01:02 it says
02:01:05 under local authorities provided an update two rest centers were set up in the early hours and this is now reduced to one address which will be available all day portobello rugby trust 221 walmar road british red cross are in
02:01:18 221 walmar road british red cross are in attendance 100 persons are in attendance at harrow road club and 150 at the rugby trust a combination of evacuees and those affected by the fire
02:01:29 affected by the fire was there clarity at that stage to the best of your recollections you saw it on where those affected persons should go no
02:01:39 go no no
02:01:40 no was there any discussion at that stage at that meeting about the humanitarian assistance that was being provided or prepared for those affected by the fire such as a emergency accommodation food drink money
02:01:53 accommodation food drink money uh
02:01:54 uh probably not at that meeting i think fairly soon after the the arrangements or the kind of uh
02:02:03 the humanitarian assistance framework was beginning to be uh instigated uh and i think there was subsequent discussion between the metropolitan police and local authority to to tie down the details of where those various centers
02:02:16 details of where those various centers were right now can you recall yeah even roughly how long this scg went on for
02:02:22 on for uh probably in the in the region of about 45 minutes right rebecca blackburn's recollection is that the meeting was one and a half hours and finished at about 10. would that chime with your
02:02:34 10. would that chime with your recollection uh
02:02:37 uh no i think in my statement i i said most of those meetings were 44 minutes to a 45 minutes to an hour long and this one wasn't longer you don't think not that i can recall
02:02:49 think not that i can recall uh
02:02:50 uh now um we know that there was a cross whitehall meeting at 600 hours on the 14th of june um there's some run-up to that um
02:03:01 um there's some run-up to that um first of all i think you've got a log book
02:03:04 book which which records that that's at
02:03:08 that's at lfb triple zero six one two one nine
02:03:15 if we go to that
02:03:18 page there's your log book we go to page six please
02:03:23 entry number 12 times at 12 15. you say notification of cobra meeting for 1600 scg chair informed lfb informed
02:03:34 for 1600 scg chair informed lfb informed that's correct and then if we go to lfb triple zero six one two two three we can see that there's an email from you to chris naylor and john baradel to update them about the incident
02:03:46 update them about the incident you've sent that as you can see 1421 and in the second line it says or second paragraph it says there have been three scg's and the fourth is in progress now
02:03:57 scg's and the fourth is in progress now and then for three paragraphs down it says there is a cross whitehall meeting at 1600 which nicholas will be on the will be on the call to represent local government the focus at present for our bkc is sorting the practical and
02:04:09 bkc is sorting the practical and accommodation needs for those affected by the incident
02:04:15 and you go on to say
02:04:19 in the penultimate paragraph one of the key issues to this incident is likely to be the duration and demand on rehousing and supports to the affected population so so you were already under the
02:04:31 so so you were already under the impression that this was going to be a mass displacement incident is that is that fair yes even at this early stage yes yes yes
02:04:45 uh and we've seen already in this that that other neighbouring boroughs have already offered assistance as well as being assistance from um
02:04:56 um westminster council for their mortuary my question is what supported uh lbhf london borough of hamilton fulham offered in respect of rest centres so my understanding now having seen
02:05:08 so my understanding now having seen various different uh pieces of evidences that they supported uh with rest center managers as part of the tri-boro arrangements can you recall which other boroughs had offered support
02:05:20 offered support of
02:05:21 of of any nature uh so so the the offers weren't necessarily all coming in to us i think i think there were um offers being made into the the lack on our generic accounts which is why in a later email i
02:05:34 accounts which is why in a later email i said that we were trying to consolidate some of these for nicholas to to kind of uh give him a comprehensive list but mostly these were coming direct to uh rbkc uh either to nicholas himself or
02:05:45 uh rbkc uh either to nicholas himself or into their beck or to uh david kerry himself now in the paragraph immediately above the one that refers to the meeting at white hall and before we get to that you say in the last sentence in this email that present they that's rbc are
02:05:59 email that present they that's rbc are managing within demands and assessing the exact need for support on what basis have you come to the view that rbkc were managing within demands uh so
02:06:10 uh so this was written at 1421 and the scg was taking place at that time i think i was writing this as i was listening to the scg and would have taken a a digest of what was reported by
02:06:23 taken a a digest of what was reported by rbkc during the scg i see so this is essentially nothing more than a record of being told by our bkc that they were managing rather than your own assessment oh yes yes i follow
02:06:37 now at this point 1421 on the 14th of june what were considered to be the practical and accommodation needs of those affected by the fire
02:06:50 um i don't know as i just said i think that would have been uh my digestive of what they were saying on the call to the uh scg right were you surprised at the time that the llag
02:07:02 surprised at the time that the llag arrangements hadn't yet been activated uh no i still wasn't surprised at this stage
02:07:08 stage it was still the
02:07:10 the the borough with their resources uh managing the response for their residents
02:07:16 residents right now uh there was then the cross white hall meeting
02:07:23 meeting at four at four o'clock yes did you go to that uh i didn't know you didn't do you know anything about why it was that nicholas holgate doesn't appear to have attended uh so there was a string of emails if if
02:07:35 uh so there was a string of emails if if you go back to the the logbook i think there was an entry at 1318 where faye taggett white from dclg
02:07:42 dclg got in contact to ask for nicholas to attend uh i think the the process for cross whitehall or cobra meetings is that they dial in representatives to keep the integrity of the uh phone line so that they're not giving out a
02:07:53 so that they're not giving out a telephone number uh so i provided uh nicholas's details and alerted him to the call
02:07:59 the call and for some reason they never called him into the uh actual meeting yes then let's um then move on then during during that period at 1600 nicholas did get in touch with me to say nobody's called me yet right to which i
02:08:11 nobody's called me yet right to which i flagged her to faye target white she said that she would uh i think that's all captured within the email chains that you should have so so far as you knew at the time he was needed on the call but there was a breakdown in communication which meant that he didn't join it yes
02:08:23 that he didn't join it yes now let's then turn to the conference call at 17 30 on the 14th of june yes
02:08:31 um can we go please to your second statement
02:08:38 at paragraph 95
02:08:44 now you refer there
02:08:48 a paragraph 94 first to a call at 17 30 on the 14th of j of june attended by mark sawyer chief executive liaison officer resilience chris naylor duty lag nicholas holgate
02:09:01 duty lag nicholas holgate and john baradel and john o'brien and you say this the call was requested by mark sawyer while i was on an earlier call with him i've not recorded that call within my logbook but my recollection is that john baradel had
02:09:12 recollection is that john baradel had had requested that mark sawyer establish the call and for lrg to provide administrative support we also would have discussed the purpose of the call which i subsequently set out in my email to the attendees at 1610
02:09:25 in my email to the attendees at 1610 and some separately in mark sawyer's email at 1611 indicating that we must have spoken in order to align ourselves as to the purpose of the call the activation of lag was not discussed during this call
02:09:37 lag was not discussed during this call which focused on what immediate support was required by rbkc from other boroughs now this call isn't recorded in your logbook nor mentioned in your first witness statement
02:09:48 witness statement but your
02:09:49 but your recollection in this statement is that it was john baradel that requested the call
02:09:53 call yes
02:09:56 yes yes so not directly to me but mark saw it in his capacity worked from the city of london so my uh assumption was that that he would have been in contact with john baradel throughout the day and that's john's capacity as the chair of
02:10:08 that's john's capacity as the chair of the local authorities panel which is why we kept him and london councils updated throughout the day and on the back of uh recent incidents uh most notably london bridge we had instigated a new process
02:10:21 bridge we had instigated a new process of having what we would we would term a lag family call where we were able to provide that peer support to the the boroughs uh affected um and just apprise uh those uh in the kind of senior lag
02:10:34 uh those uh in the kind of senior lag family so john john baradel as the chair of lap john o'brien from london councils the duty lag and any of the affected boroughs right now um do you know why it was that john
02:10:46 do you know why it was that john bernadel requested the call
02:10:51 no i i presume as a check-in to make sure what the immediate support was required from rbkc i think we outline it in the in the email that i focused what the intention was no you
02:11:03 focused what the intention was no you say
02:11:04 say in the middle of the paragraph that
02:11:08 that um the purpose was in the separate email to to align ourselves as to the purpose of the call what did you mean by that
02:11:21 so that would have been mark and i saying it was
02:11:27 it was it's not a a formal part of our process so we didn't have a default agenda for it so to give people fair warning of what the likely topics were i think i sent out an email at 14 uh 1610 saying
02:11:39 sent out an email at 14 uh 1610 saying these are the likely topics that people could prepare that the discussion that mark and i had would be to agree the kind of the wording terminology of those i think as i sent it out he then sent me
02:11:50 i think as i sent it out he then sent me an email pretty much replicating uh what i had said which led me to believe we'd had a conversation about it i typed up and i think i just slightly beat him to the buzzer in in
02:12:02 slightly beat him to the buzzer in in terms of him emailing me and me getting out to those attendees uh right let's um just see if we can pin this down uh if you go please to lfb double zero
02:12:15 you go please to lfb double zero six one two two four just flowing following the email flow through
02:12:26 if you go to the email at the foot of page one
02:12:30 page one here is an email of 1610 from you to nicholas holgate chris naylor john baradel
02:12:35 baradel john o'brien and mark sawyer yes yes is that the email you're referring to yes say i see and that refers to the purpose of the call of 1730 and you say in the second line the purpose of the
02:12:47 in the second line the purpose of the call is to understand the likely support rbksc will require and how this can be best supported across local government and in particular strategic support to nicholas secondly to consider the wider implications for our bkc and london and
02:12:58 implications for our bkc and london and what initial actions are required now was that the top the subject of the call with you and john and mark sawyer before the email went
02:13:09 and mark sawyer before the email went no that was us agreeing what that wording was to outline to the others what the purpose of the call was sorry
02:13:16 sorry yes that was giving the the attendees nicholas chris john barodel john o'brien uh uh
02:13:21 uh uh mark and myself the understanding of what the purpose of the call at 5 30 will be yes i see and uh
02:13:30 uh you say that the activation of the london local authority goal was not discussed in that call not exactly in paragraph 95 even though it focused on what support could be given to rbkc why wasn't the
02:13:42 could be given to rbkc why wasn't the invocation of london local authority gold discussed or to be discussed because it wasn't requested by nicholas simple as that yes did you have a view or did you and uh
02:13:53 did you have a view or did you and uh mark soil you and john beradill have a view about whether or not it was wise for mr holgate to continue not having invoked london local
02:14:04 not having invoked london local authority gold
02:14:09 i didn't have a view that it was it was the wrong decision because he still has the
02:14:13 the assets and support available from the other 33 boroughs he was being quite uh
02:14:20 uh cognitive about what support it was he needed
02:14:24 needed it it wasn't a uh send me everything you've got and then they would have an issue of of sorting out uh a huge number of people coming in he he was trying to find the dedicated resources that he
02:14:35 find the dedicated resources that he needed to deal with the response as it was unfolding now underneath the
02:14:41 the was my understanding right underneath the text we've just been looking at there's an agenda which we find at the top of page two underneath the list of attendees agenda items significant changes to the
02:14:53 items significant changes to the situation overview and pan london coordination structures in place john heatherington nicholas holgate what did that mean what were the pan london coordination
02:15:04 what were the pan london coordination structures in place to which you were referring there swat have been outlining the
02:15:08 the scg
02:15:09 scg uh
02:15:10 uh how that is in place the the battle rhythm that that's taking what other subgroups are setting up underneath it so the mass fatalities group uh the humanitarian assistance group i think was starting to uh
02:15:21 uh be at least mooted uh if not kind of in place by that time time so we were we were giving uh the other members on the call an understanding of of the breadth of the structures being set up
02:15:33 of the structures being set up and and why was that necessary if um so far as you could see it nicholas holgate was happy for llag to remain uninvoked uh to provide them
02:15:44 uh to provide them an understanding of the wider network of response and casey wanted it yes
02:15:51 yes it was it was so that that the the attendees on that call had a a grasp of the the magnitude so you have the strategic coordination group and underneath it sit a number of subgroups
02:16:02 underneath it sit a number of subgroups such as the mass fatalities coordination group led by the coroner or the humanitarian assistance group or the london resilience communications group and all
02:16:13 resilience communications group and all of those were invoked and responding and we were providing an outline of the the structure that was in place at the time now let's go to nfb triple zero six one two two seven
02:16:24 two two seven this is an email after the 5 30 call at 6 33
02:16:28 6 33 from you to cam hamid cameron uh matt hogan toby gould and steve hamm you see that yes looks like we're pushing the scg to 11 to accommodate an internal la meeting
02:16:39 internal la meeting i think by friday we'll be handed over to recovery so that call should go ahead i think it needs to go with the tripping the color and other events over the weekend just speaking with mark following the local government call
02:16:51 following the local government call and then you go on rbkc wants support but they don't know what they want and are sensible in that they don't just want bodies they need the right people the key now is for rbkc to set the right
02:17:02 the key now is for rbkc to set the right structure for recovery and aha mark is going to go there at eight to to meet them along with deborah collins from southwark to provide that advice and push them to setting their own structures particularly as this is going
02:17:13 structures particularly as this is going to be a long recovery process now um
02:17:18 now um did you what did you consider well
02:17:23 um you you say there and are sensible in that they don't just want bodies what what can you just help us what was it about rbkc's approach that you
02:17:34 it about rbkc's approach that you consider was sensible so
02:17:38 so at that stage it it seemed extremely logical they had their command structure in place
02:17:44 in place they were
02:17:45 they were talking of having all the right structures in place they were starting to understand and assess the needs that they had
02:17:52 they had and i think it was nicholas holgate who was
02:17:56 was saying that he didn't just want lots of bodies he wanted the right person to carry out the task that he needed them to um in order to discharge those functions
02:18:05 functions it seemed logical and sensible that they were going through the right steps at that time
02:18:10 that time um
02:18:11 um the evidence has shown that perhaps that the response wasn't there behind it at the moment and when you say rbkc wants support they don't know what they want what gave you
02:18:22 want what gave you what gave you that impression uh so they hadn't done an assessment of exactly who they wanted so rather than just going out to to local authorities and putting out a blind request uh you can see that the people such as deborah collins from
02:18:34 the people such as deborah collins from southwark who'd recently responded to the uh
02:18:39 the uh the uh london bridge attack uh and i think uh colleagues from southern also had uh experience from the lack of fire we're going in to advise them and apprise them of the the right structures
02:18:51 apprise them of the the right structures what kind of levels of support they would need and how to put that in place
02:18:58 and as i've shown you you say
02:19:03 you say that the key now is for our bkc to set the right structure and for recovery and h.a
02:19:08 h.a was there an issue or problem with the recovery and humanitarian assistance which you were aware of at the time uh
02:19:17 uh no so this is still the the first day uh our understanding was that was still very much the the operational response phase uh over that overnight that night i have a recollection but i cannot find where it was written in in
02:19:29 cannot find where it was written in in any of my evidence that the the thinking was that
02:19:32 was that rbkc would start to set out their recovery strategy on what structure they would be looking for to put in place for the recovery so that the operation could could hand over to that
02:19:45 and also build up the humanitarian response a humanitarian assistance response as well did you remember having a discussion with mark sawyer or
02:19:56 or any of anybody at london resilience group about elena kelly or john baradel providing peer support to our bkc at that moment uh so i think that was covered on the
02:20:08 uh so i think that was covered on the 1730 call that there was an offer from from john to send over some of his communications colleagues and i think he he intimated or there was uh
02:20:20 he intimated or there was uh or eleanor had previously intimated and it was raised by by nicholas on the call that two officers were going across uh to support him with experience from southwark
02:20:32 if you go then to lfb triple zero 61225
02:20:37 very shortly after sending this email you send another one this is a summary of the call that you had had at 5 30 i think and this is a yeah this you call it a short pracy you sent it to nicholas
02:20:49 short pracy you sent it to nicholas holgate chris naylor john baradel and john o'brien mark and mark sawyer a short tracy of the earlier telephone uh the earlier teleconference um
02:21:03 it refers as you can see in the
02:21:09 paragraph at the end of the section headed immediate support and longer term about three-quarters of the way down your screen it says london resilience will work with rbkc to ensure the right
02:21:21 will work with rbkc to ensure the right support to humanitarian assistance and recovery going forward after call note mark sawyer will liaise with rbkc tomorrow morning to detail out the support and provide initial support regarding structures needs and
02:21:32 regarding structures needs and experience of previous events
02:21:37 was there a difficulty with nicolas holgate activating the lneg arrangements at this stage
02:21:45 uh no i mean was it something that you that the meeting other than perhaps that nicholas holgate had considered was was by now necessary no no
02:21:56 no no this was still a wednesday yes yes
02:22:09 and if if we go finally for today's purposes i think to lfb 3061229
02:22:20 this is now 2304 in the evening of the 14th of june it's a handover email to hamish cameron and others uh and in relation to support for rbkc you write
02:22:31 you write uh
02:22:32 uh rbkc support mark is meeting with rbkc to discuss their arrangements for h and recovery i've made the point this is going to be a very long process talk of weeks simply to shore the building to
02:22:43 weeks simply to shore the building to gain access for body recovery i've made the point to mark that they should look to consume this in everyday business as far as possible so that we don't get drawn into a long-term support mark agreed with this i think we will need to
02:22:54 agreed with this i think we will need to do something but i think if possible some advice early days to bring the right people together and let them get on with it and what did you mean by not getting drawn into longer term support so so we have a team of 20
02:23:07 have a team of 20 we already were entwined in the response to london bridge which had been kind of 11 days earlier and we always have to be cognizant that there will be another
02:23:18 cognizant that there will be another incident at another time because we are that that support to the scg and i think it was played out on the sunday night with the finsbury park attack at the subsequent weekend with the child cox estate that we could at any time be
02:23:29 estate that we could at any time be drawn off
02:23:31 drawn off to support another incident at any time so we didn't want to be drawn in or providing the integrated support for a responsibility that is actually that of the boroughs and we
02:23:43 the boroughs and we we've been drawn in for london bridge to support southwark uh because they didn't have the the
02:23:49 the the the necessary expertise at the time so we stepped in to secretary at that humanitarian assistance steering group and had
02:23:57 and had found it hard to extract ourselves and get ourselves back onto a footing where we could respond to any other incident and in the next paragraph but one down which starts battle rhythm for tomorrow yeah four lines down in it you say gold
02:24:09 yeah four lines down in it you say gold is very good this evening really engaging with conversation and open to suggestions regarding timings etc so it felt like the role was supposed to be doing of advising them yeah
02:24:20 yeah who is gold is that nicholas holgate no that's police gold that's met police gold yeah so if you i talk about the change of the meeting time because of rpkc but the second
02:24:31 rpkc but the second uh sentence where it says the met that i refer to the metropolitan police are keen to hand this over so that's me referring over to the metro awesome police and then seo 22 is the emergency
02:24:42 police and then seo 22 is the emergency preparedness unit uh within the metropolitan police so that's what i mean all be albeit working through them in terms of our access to gold as and when we need to to kind of make suggestions thank you
02:24:53 to to kind of make suggestions thank you very much um now mr holger we've come to the end of the afternoon it's 4 30 and i've got a little a little way to go with you yet i'm afraid so i'm going to have to ask you to come back on monday morning i'll ask the chairman to ask you
02:25:04 morning i'll ask the chairman to ask you to come back on monday morning um if that's all right absolutely yes well i'm sorry about that miss tolgate because i i'm sorry mr hetherington because i'm sure you were hoping possibly expecting to get away today but sometimes these
02:25:16 to get away today but sometimes these things don't work according to plan yeah whatever you need i'm happy tonight well that's very good of you so i'm afraid we are going to have to ask you to come back
02:25:23 back on monday morning at ten o'clock please be my pleasure and um as before
02:25:28 as before with weekend coming up in particular please resist any any opportunity to talk to anyone about your evidence thank you very much all right thank you very much would you go over the usher then please and we'll see you on monday
02:25:48 thank you very much mr millet well we'll break off there and resume on monday morning at 10 o'clock yes thank you mr chairman thank you