Opening statements from Celotex, Kingspan, BBA (British Board of Agrément), Fire Brigades Union, and Mayor of London representatives addressing testing, certification, and marketing of cladding products used at Grenfell Tower.
00:00:08 thank you yes now i hope that we're going to
00:00:20 yes now i hope that we're going to have mr all back on the screen any moment
00:00:28 mr chairman i i i hope i am on the screen
00:00:32 screen oh thank you mr you are just about yes you're now full size on the screen right are you ready to carry on uh yes i am thank you thank you then off
00:00:43 uh yes i am thank you thank you then off you go
00:00:43 you go thank you very much
00:00:47 thank you so i i'm now turning to my fourth topic which is the supply of the celetex products
00:00:54 products used in the refurbishment and i start with rs 5000 now prior to august 2014 celetex
00:01:05 now prior to august 2014 celetex marketed no products for use in buildings over 18 meters in may 2014 a cladding system incorporating rs 5000
00:01:16 incorporating rs 5000 was successfully tested to bs8414 by the building research establishment following that test celetech's marketed rs 5000
00:01:27 rs 5000 for use in multi-component rain screen clouding systems from august 2014 onwards the product literature produced by
00:01:38 the product literature produced by celetex for rs 5000 it included a product data sheet a rain screen application data sheet a specification guide and a cladding
00:01:49 a specification guide and a cladding compliance guide this literature made the following six points clear first that adb2 provided an alternative
00:02:00 first that adb2 provided an alternative route to compliance for cloning systems through meeting the performance criteria in br135 by testing to bsa414 second that a bs8414 test was a system
00:02:13 second that a bs8414 test was a system test
00:02:14 test to achieve classification under br135 the cladding system must have been tested to the full test duration requirements of bs 8414 third
00:02:26 8414 third that a classification under br135 applies only to the system as tested and detailed in the classification report and that when specifying or checking a
00:02:38 and that when specifying or checking a system
00:02:39 system it is important to check that the classification documents cover the end use application fourth that rs 5000 had been incorporated
00:02:50 incorporated in a rain screen cladding system which had been successfully tested to bs8414 and met the performance criteria in br135
00:02:58 br135 as a result rs 5000 was suitable for use in buildings over 18 meters fifth however that this fire performance and classification
00:03:09 and classification only related to the rain screen cladding to system
00:03:13 to system tested to bs 8414 and finally sixth that any changes to the components of the cladding system listed in the product literature would need to be considered by the
00:03:24 would need to be considered by the building designer now those points clearly identified for building designers and contractors the matters they would need to bear in mind if using rs 5000 in a cladding
00:03:37 mind if using rs 5000 in a cladding system on a building over 18 meters indeed the rain screen cladding compliance guide explained that it provided a step-by-step guide to an alternative route to
00:03:50 guide to an alternative route to compliance for adb-2 and could i ask to have that put on the screen
00:03:56 screen it is zero cel-000 zero that's four zeros one two three nine
00:04:13 and if we could start by going to page two of the document
00:04:19 and if we could um zoom in on the upper part of the document it's the paragraph exactly there now uh what what that paragraph says is is
00:04:31 uh what what that paragraph says is is what i've just said that this this guide provides a step-by-step guide
00:04:36 guide to an alternative route to compliance for adb2
00:04:41 for adb2 and then if we could move to page three
00:04:48 and if we could zoom in on the top uh right hand part of the document the third column of text says the performance of the system
00:04:59 performance of the system under investigation is evaluated against three criteria external fire spread internal fire spread mechanical performance and and then it goes on to say the
00:05:10 and and then it goes on to say the classification applies only to the system as tested and detailed in the classification report the classification report can only cover the details of the system as tested it cannot state what is not
00:05:21 tested it cannot state what is not covered when specifying or checking the system
00:05:23 system it's important to check that the classification documents cover the end use
00:05:27 use application and then if we can go to the the fourth and final page of this document
00:05:37 it is a relatively short document and not difficult to read or comprehend um again on the the top of the the document the third in the second
00:05:48 the document the third in the second column
00:05:49 column uh there's a heading celetex rs 5000 that then sets out a description um which it says the uh comprises the
00:06:00 um which it says the uh comprises the system
00:06:00 system tested and then in the final column of text again it repeats uh the warning that any changes to the components listed and construction methods set out in
00:06:11 and construction methods set out in figure 4 will need to be considered by the building designer and then finally to note that on the bottom of this page the the compliance guide
00:06:22 page the the compliance guide if we could move down to the bottom part of the page the compliance guide contains a bibliography which lists the adb2 bs8414
00:06:33 which lists the adb2 bs8414 and br135 guidance thank you so um moving on then from from the literature itself
00:06:44 literature itself what what is important to note is that it was celetex's policy and practice always to send out the rain screen cladding compliance guide which i've which i've just explained
00:06:57 which i've which i've just explained when responding to queries about the use of its insulation in buildings over 18 meters this information was therefore widely disseminated among customers and potential customers
00:07:09 among customers and potential customers and indeed it was shared with harley as i will come on to describe the consequence is that any construction professional who read the celetex product literature
00:07:20 who read the celetex product literature would have known that the br 135 classification achieved by rs 5000 applied only to the the the cladding system tested by celetex and any changes to the components of the
00:07:31 and any changes to the components of the system described in the product literature would need to be carefully assessed in order to ensure that the product was suitable
00:07:38 suitable for use in a system with different components the product literature also referred to other performance characteristics of rs 5000
00:07:47 5000 including its brain rating and its class class nord classification that should not have been a cause for confusion as any competent construction professional should have known
00:07:59 professional should have known class naught is not relevant to determining compliance of insulation used in the rain screen cladding system on a building over 18 meters albeit that it can be a relevant
00:08:10 albeit that it can be a relevant indicator
00:08:11 indicator of a product's reaction to fire for other purposes
00:08:17 at this stage i need to refer back to the investigations carried out by celetex after the grenfell tower fire in the course of those investigations
00:08:28 in the course of those investigations celetexa's current management learned that there were certain differences between the rain screen clouding system incorporating rs 5000 which had been tested
00:08:39 tested by the bre in may 2014 and the description of that system in the bre's
00:08:46 the bre's test and classification reports issued following the test and described in the in the rs 5000 product literature this is fully
00:08:58 product literature this is fully addressed
00:08:59 addressed in the summary paper which celetex provided
00:09:03 provided to the inquiry as an appendix to mr o'sullivan's witness statement once this issue had come to the attention of celetex's current management it was announced on celetex's website
00:09:16 it was announced on celetex's website and reported to the relevant authorities and the inquiries of as i've said it involves
00:09:22 involves unacceptable conduct on the part of a number of former employees the tested system should clearly have been described accurately in both the bre reports and in cell texas product literature
00:09:36 texas product literature in order to determine whether the misdescription of the test system gave rise to any safety issues celetex commissioned another bs8414 test
00:09:47 commissioned another bs8414 test replicating as closely as possible the system described bre reports and the rs 5000 product literature this further test was carried out in
00:09:58 this further test was carried out in april 2018 it showed that the retested system met the performance criteria in br135 the results of this test were announced
00:10:11 the results of this test were announced to the market and others on the second of may 2018. celetex accepts as i've said that the system tested in may 2014 should have been accurately described in
00:10:23 should have been accurately described in in the product literature in the bre reports
00:10:26 reports and i've explained the steps that celetex took when this issue was discovered by its current management however there is no reason to believe that the misdescription of the tested
00:10:37 that the misdescription of the tested system
00:10:38 system had any impact at all on the specification and use of rs-5000 in the grenfell tower refurbishment the rain screen cladding system
00:10:49 the rain screen cladding system described in cell texas product literature and in the bre reports as well as the system actually tested in may 2014
00:10:58 may 2014 was so substantially different from the rain screen clouding system installed on grenfell tower that the bre certification of rs 5000 was simply not relevant
00:11:09 was simply not relevant to the external wall construction at grenfell tower as a result no construction professional could have relied on the bre reports or seller texas product
00:11:21 seller texas product literature as demonstrating compliance of the rain screen cladding facade at grenfell tower this was confirmed by dr lane in her phase one expert report
00:11:33 phase one expert report it has also been confirmed by mr hyde in his expert evidence this week it is moreover clear from the evidence of the start studio e harley and ryden
00:11:45 the start studio e harley and ryden witnesses
00:11:46 witnesses in module 1 that no reliance was in fact placed by any designer or contractor on the description of the tested system in
00:11:56 in cell texas product literature or the bre classification report that evidence is addressed in paragraphs 52-72
00:12:06 52-72 celetex's written opening submission together with the evidence of celestex's role in the specification and supply of rs 5000 for use at grenfell tower
00:12:17 use at grenfell tower that is the issue to which i now turn there are four key points i would like to mention here first celetex fr 5000 was specified for use
00:12:31 fr 5000 was specified for use in the grenfell tower project in 2012. that was before the launch of rs 5000 fr 5000 was not marketed
00:12:42 fr 5000 was not marketed for use in buildings over 18 meters it was specified for grenfell tower without cello texas knowledge and without any communication with celetex it appears to have been identified for
00:12:53 it appears to have been identified for the project by max fordham and incorporated into the nbs specification by studio e without any regard to fire safety or compliance with adb2
00:13:06 compliance with adb2 second celotex was first contacted by harley about the use of insulation for grenfell tower in june and july 2014 at that stage celetex informed harley
00:13:18 at that stage celetex informed harley that he did not yet have a product suitable for consideration on a building over 18 meters
00:13:25 third after the marketing launch of rs 5000
00:13:30 5000 mr room who was then celetex celetex's major
00:13:34 major projects and specification manager sent harley a full set of the rs 5000 product literature including the rain screen cladding compliance guide as a result harley had more than
00:13:46 as a result harley had more than sufficient information about rs-5000 to understand what factors it would need to consider when assessing compliance of the rain screen cladding system that it was designing and installing at
00:13:59 that it was designing and installing at grenfell tower fourth in february 2015 there were a number of further email exchanges
00:14:09 exchanges between celetex and harley these concern the calculation of u values which are relevant to determining the thickness of insulation required for a rain screen cladding
00:14:21 required for a rain screen cladding system
00:14:22 system they were not concerned with determining compliance of the cladding system with building regulations that as i've said was not something on which a product manufacturer could
00:14:33 which a product manufacturer could advise
00:14:34 advise and was not celetex's responsibility
00:14:39 now the evidence given in module one shows that despite celetex having made its product literature available to the designers and contractors involved in the grenfell tower refurbishment
00:14:51 refurbishment none of them read that information with any care
00:14:55 any care if they read it at all with two exceptions the harley and studio e witnesses all confirmed
00:15:03 confirmed that they did not read the literature at all
00:15:06 all or if they did read it they they acknowledged that they did not do so carefully
00:15:11 carefully they consequently paid no heed to the warnings given by celetex about the need to ensure that any changes from the tested system described in celetex's product
00:15:22 described in celetex's product literature were considered by the building designer the two exceptions that i need to mention are mr ray bailey who was the sole director of harley and mr crawford
00:15:33 mr crawford of studio e mr ray bailey suggested that he had relied on a celetex sales brochure but it is apparent we say from his evidence that insofar as he read any of
00:15:46 evidence that insofar as he read any of the celetex product literature he didn't do so carefully he claimed to have relied on a reference in the product literature to rs-5000 having class naught fire performance throughout
00:15:58 performance throughout but that was irrelevant to assessing compliance of the insulation for a cladding system in a building over 18 meters
00:16:05 18 meters as i've explained mr ray bailey also claimed in evidence that celetex had signed off on the use of rs 5000 at grenfell tower after carrying out a desktop study and
00:16:17 after carrying out a desktop study and he claimed that um that desktop study had been given to mr ancatel jones who was harley's design manager however no such desktop study has been
00:16:28 however no such desktop study has been disclosed by anyone to this inquiry and mr bailey admitted in further questioning that he had never seen such uh such a study
00:16:38 study his evidence about celetex signing off on the use of rs 5000 and providing a desktop study to harley was denied in terms by other harley witnesses including mr
00:16:50 by other harley witnesses including mr ben bailey and mr ankitel jones mr ben bailey said that he was given no assurances by celetex as to the use of rs5000 in combination with the cladding panels used at
00:17:02 with the cladding panels used at grenfell tower mr mr ankletel jones who indeed was the person within harley with primary responsibility for ensuring compliance of the rain screen cladding
00:17:14 compliance of the rain screen cladding system
00:17:15 system confirmed in his evidence that he had no discussions with celetex about the suitability of rs 5000 for grenfell tower
00:17:23 tower and that he was unaware of any desktop assessment having been carried out for the grenfell tower project
00:17:31 so far as mr crawford is concerned he claimed in evidence that he had been misled by the rs 5000 data sheet however we submit that his evidence cannot be reconciled with his witness
00:17:43 cannot be reconciled with his witness statement
00:17:44 statement where he said that he had no specific recollection of reviewing the data sheet mr crawford also could not explain how he had failed to appreciate the need to assess differences
00:17:55 differences between the system proposed to be installed at grenfell tower and the system tested by celetex if he had in fact read celetex's product literature the inquiry may consider that the
00:18:06 the inquiry may consider that the evidence given by mr ray bailey and mr crawford on these points was unsatisfactory and self-serving celetex submits that it was not credible
00:18:17 celetex submits that it was not credible and is not reliable
00:18:20 ryden however tries to rely on the evidence of mr ray bailey and mr crawford
00:18:27 crawford to argue in its written opening submission that selatex is responsible for the specification and use of rs-5000 at grenfell tower rather than the designers and contractors
00:18:39 contractors this in our submission is a misplaced attempt by ryden to avoid responsibility for its own failings
00:18:46 failings and the failings of the designers and contractors for which ryden is liable as the main contractor on the project
00:18:54 in considering ryden's argument it is necessary to bear in mind the nature and extent
00:19:00 extent of ryden's own responsibility for the non-compliance of the cladding facade grenfell tower as the main contractor ryden was contractually obliged to design and carry out the
00:19:12 to design and carry out the refurbishment works in accordance with the building regulations although ryden engaged studio in harley's subcontractors it remained responsible as the main contractor
00:19:23 contractor for the design and construction of the rain screen cladding system and for ensuring that that system complied with building regulations despite this ryden had no experience or
00:19:35 despite this ryden had no experience or capability to ensure that the cladding system was compliant
00:19:39 compliant no one at ryden working on the refurbishment or it would appear in ryden more generally
00:19:45 generally had any knowledge or expertise in relation to fire safety fire a facade design and construction or regulatory compliance
00:19:56 or regulatory compliance ryden's witnesses all also admitted that despite ryden relying completely on subcontractors to ensure compliance with building regulations
00:20:08 with building regulations ryden had no processes to satisfy itself as to the competence of the subcontractors that it used as a result neither studio e nor harley
00:20:21 as a result neither studio e nor harley were subjected to any or any adequate due diligence process before they were engaged by ryden to compound matters ryden decided not to engage exever
00:20:33 engage exever or any other fire safety consultant on the grenfell tower project despite mr lawrence who was ryden's contracts manager acknowledging in his evidence that a fire safety consultant was essential
00:20:45 fire safety consultant was essential on projects of any complexity it appears that this decision by ryden was driven by its desire to cut costs
00:20:54 costs which was a major consideration for ryden on this project given its miscalculation when tendering which meant that its bid was understated by more than two hundred thousand pounds
00:21:06 thousand pounds ryden's attempt to shift responsibility onto celetex for its own failings is celetex submits misconceived the evidence of mr ray bailey and mr crawford is unreliable
00:21:17 crawford is unreliable for the reasons i have given that evidence cannot be taken at face value or to demonstrate reliance by harley or studio e
00:21:24 studio e on anything said by celetex in its product literature ryden also relies on the evidence of mr hogan
00:21:34 hogan who was the rbkc building control officer responsible for checking compliance of the grenfell tower refurbishment works
00:21:42 works however mr hoban's evidence does not support ryden's argument it does not we submit demonstrate any meaningful reliance
00:21:53 meaningful reliance on anything said by celetex in its product literature rather it demonstrates mr hoban's complete
00:22:00 complete failure to carry out his function as a building control officer with any degree of competence mr hoban was assigned to the grenfell tower refurbishment
00:22:12 tower refurbishment despite having a full workload and being very ill-equipped for the role he had no previous experience of high-rise residential overcladding projects
00:22:23 residential overcladding projects he had received no training on fire performance in external wool construction or the fire safety classification of cladding materials he did not know what a bs-8414 test was
00:22:36 he did not know what a bs-8414 test was and he had never read br-135 he told his line manager mr john allen that he was overstretched and he asked for help
00:22:47 for help however he was given no help although mr hoban said he had checked the suitability of the insulation used in the rain screen cladding system his evidence on this was very confused
00:23:00 his evidence on this was very confused he said that he had looked at either the celetex or lao or local authority building control websites
00:23:07 websites but he was unsure which website he had viewed
00:23:11 viewed and he could not explain what information he had looked at on either website insofar as he saw anything
00:23:20 anything it is clear from his evidence that he gave it no careful consideration in fact he admitted that he never investigated precisely why rs 5000
00:23:31 investigated precisely why rs 5000 was suitable for use in a building over 18 meters
00:23:34 18 meters and he accepted that that was a serious failing
00:23:38 failing on his part when giving evidence last week ms menzies was particularly critical
00:23:47 critical of mr hogan's failure to check compliance of the products used in the cladding system she said that interrogating product literature was a core function of the building control officer
00:23:58 building control officer and that mr hogan should have understood that bs 8414 was a system test and that he therefore needed carefully to check the precise combination of materials used in the cladding system
00:24:11 used in the cladding system mr hoban however did not do that in short ryden's attempt to shift responsibility onto celetex is without merit and should celetex
00:24:22 is without merit and should celetex submits
00:24:23 submits be rejected
00:24:26 this brings me to tb 4000. i can deal with this shortly tb 4000 is a general purpose insulation board
00:24:35 board it is invariably bought in large quantities and different thicknesses by distributors and builders merchants as a stock item in december 2017 the inquiry informed
00:24:47 in december 2017 the inquiry informed celetex that tb4000 had been found in windows surrounds at grenfell tower the product had apparently been glued to the underside of upvc windows
00:24:59 of upvc windows it appears that the tb-4000 used at grenfell tower had been purchased by st plastering one of ryden's subcontractors from a travis perkins outlet celetex did
00:25:11 from a travis perkins outlet celetex did not know
00:25:12 not know and had no means of knowing that tb4000 was purchased and used at grenfell tower in this way the decision to use tb4000 seems to be
00:25:23 seems to be taken by ryden in consultation with sd plastering the decision appears to have been based on the product's perceived ability to prevent bowing of window surrounds but without any
00:25:35 of window surrounds but without any regard
00:25:36 regard to fire safety neither ryden nor sd plastering considered whether use of tb-4000 in the window surrounds was compliant with the building regulations or the guidance in adb-2
00:25:50 regulations or the guidance in adb-2 mr lawrence who advice who as i've said is
00:25:53 is was ryden's contracts manager he admitted in evidence that ryden was itself responsible for ensuring that use of tb 4000 in the
00:26:04 for ensuring that use of tb 4000 in the window surrounds complied with building regulations because
00:26:08 because he accepted there was no other designer involved in that aspect of the refurbishment on whom ryden could rely this was therefore all down to ryden
00:26:21 this was therefore all down to ryden however neither mr lawrence nor anyone else at ryden investigated whether tb4000 was in fact suitable
00:26:30 suitable for use in the window surrounds as a result
00:26:34 result mr lawrence did not know that tb4000 was not a material of limited combustibility and he did not know that it could not be used in the exterior wall construction
00:26:45 used in the exterior wall construction unless the construction was shown to meet the performance criteria in br135 or a holistic fire engineering analysis was undertaken in short we submit that responsibility
00:26:58 in short we submit that responsibility for the non-compliant use of tb-4000 lies squarely with ryden and not with celtics
00:27:07 celtics finally mr chairman i would like to say a few words about iconic
00:27:14 archonic manufactured marketed and supplied the raynabond pe panels used as the cladding facade at grenfell tower
00:27:26 grenfell tower the inquiry is already found in its phase one report that these panels were the principal reason for the devastating spread of fire up down and around the tower
00:27:37 of fire up down and around the tower on the 14th of june 2017. these panels were made of aluminium composite material and they had a core of unmodified
00:27:48 and they had a core of unmodified polyethylene polyethylene is highly flammable unlike pir which could safely be used in compliance with the building
00:27:59 in compliance with the building regulations in a cladding system with an appropriate combination of other components raynabon pe could not safely be used in any cladding system on a high-rise
00:28:10 any cladding system on a high-rise residential building that was demonstrated by the bs 8414 tests
00:28:17 tests carried out by the department for communities and local government following the grenfell tower fire those tests
00:28:25 tests showed that the cladding system incorporating those tests show that cladding systems incorporating acm panels with the pe core failed to meet the br
00:28:37 with the pe core failed to meet the br 135
00:28:38 135 criteria irrespective of the kind of insulation with which the panels were combined the tests failed even when
00:28:50 the tests failed even when non-combustible mineral wool insulation was used in a cladding system with acm pe panels by contrast
00:29:01 pe panels by contrast the tests carried out by the department for communities and local government showed that a cladding system combining celetex rs 5000 with an acm panel with a class a2 filler
00:29:14 with an acm panel with a class a2 filler did in fact meet the br135 criteria the experts appointed by the department for communities and local government accordingly concluded that pir
00:29:25 accordingly concluded that pir insulation could safely be used in a cladding system with class a2 panels on residential buildings at any height now although rayna bond
00:29:38 at any height now although rayna bond panels with an a2 core were available at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment archonic did not actively promote them the evidence suggests that arconic did
00:29:50 the evidence suggests that arconic did not do so
00:29:52 not do so because it was concerned to ensure that its products remained competitive in the uk and its reynabond pe panels were cheaper than panels with an a2 or fire retardant
00:30:04 than panels with an a2 or fire retardant core
00:30:07 arconic's documentary and other evidence is summarized in celetex's written opening submission at paragraphs 85 through to 112.
00:30:18 at paragraphs 85 through to 112. the iconic evidence is summarized to the same effect in the written opening submissions of the two bsr legal teams that evidence shows
00:30:30 legal teams that evidence shows that over an extended period arconic misled both the bba and the market about the true fire performance of rayna bond
00:30:39 bond pe panels
00:30:42 the story begins with arconic's concealment of the results of a test it had carried out a brain upon pe in cassette form when it applied for a certificate from
00:30:53 when it applied for a certificate from the bba
00:30:55 the bba in respect of rayna bond tests carried out by arconic in 2005 under european standards had revealed a significant disparity
00:31:06 significant disparity between the fire performance of raynabon pe in rivet form which achieved class b and raynabon pe in cassette form which failed the test completely and could only be classified as class e
00:31:19 and could only be classified as class e it was reynabond pe in cassette form that was used at grenfell tower although arconic was required by its contract with the bba
00:31:30 contract with the bba to disclose full particulars of all test data available on raynabond it provided the bba only with copies of the test report for the rivet variant it represented to
00:31:43 for the rivet variant it represented to the bba
00:31:44 the bba that that test result was a representative of the fire performance of raynabon pe however the product was fabricated as a result when the bba issued its
00:31:57 as a result when the bba issued its certificate in 2008 it's certified that raynabon pe could be regarded as having a class naught surface based on the class
00:32:07 class b classification achieved by the rivet variant
00:32:12 variant the bba has confirmed in witness statements provided to this inquiry that if if it had known that the fire performance of the cassette variant was different to that of the rivet variant it would
00:32:24 to that of the rivet variant it would have based its certification of rain upon pe
00:32:27 upon pe on the euro class test results for each variant of the product in that event the cassette variant would have been restricted to buildings of less than 18
00:32:38 restricted to buildings of less than 18 meters in height the cassette panels could could therefore not have been used at grenfell tower and the tragedy of the 14th of june 2017
00:32:49 14th of june 2017 would not have occurred
00:32:53 now further euro-class testing carried out by arconic after the issue of the bba certificate confirmed that the cassette variant only ever achieved class e
00:33:05 ever achieved class e those tests also demonstrated from 2014 onwards that the rivet variant only achieved
00:33:13 achieved class c as a result from 2014 onwards the product could not be said to have a class naught surface
00:33:24 surface whatever its form of fabrication
00:33:28 despite this arconic continued marketing raynabon pe in the united kingdom as having a class naught surface on the strength of the bba certificate
00:33:40 on the strength of the bba certificate throughout this period arconic ignored increasingly strident warnings from mr verla
00:33:47 verla the head of iconic sales technical support team about the dangerous nature of reynabond pe
00:33:53 pe and the unsuitability of the product for use on any building facade of whatever height mr verla urged the company's management to move
00:34:04 urged the company's management to move all of its acm business to fire retardant panels but his advice was rejected apparently on the ground that it was regarded by our conics
00:34:15 that it was regarded by our conics management as technical and anti-commercial and i quote there from an internal archonic email of the 29th of june 2015.
00:34:29 arconic steadfastly refuses to acknowledge any deficiency in its approach to the testing
00:34:36 testing marketing and supply of rain upon pe celatex submits that the position arconic has adopted in its opening for module 2
00:34:45 module 2 is untenable i make the following particular points first arconic appears now to acknowledge that a cladding system incorporating rain upon pe
00:34:56 rain upon pe would not pass a ps8414 test however arconic continues to argue that the specification and use of reign-upon pe at grenfell tower
00:35:08 reign-upon pe at grenfell tower could theoretically be justified by a holistic fire engineering report that is completely unrealistic given the fire propagation characteristics
00:35:20 fire propagation characteristics of raynabon pe second arconic argues that it was neither necessary nor relevant for it to provide the 2004 cassette
00:35:31 for it to provide the 2004 cassette test result to the bpa when applying for a certificate from the bba that is simply untenable arconic's contract with the bpa
00:35:42 arconic's contract with the bpa expressly required disclosure of all test data then available as i've said third arconic argues that once the bba certificate was issued
00:35:53 certificate was issued there was no need for additional fire performance information regarding the surface of rain upon pe to be disclosed to the vpa unless the fire performance of the surface of the product
00:36:04 product had changed which it did not that also is untenable archonic was expressly obliged by its ongoing contracts with the bba immediately to notify the bba of any new
00:36:17 immediately to notify the bba of any new or additional information concerning reynabond pe
00:36:23 fourth argue uh arconic argues that he was not in a position to determine if the state of the uk regulatory regime was such that continued sale
00:36:34 continued sale of reynabond pe was problematic and that it was entitled to rely on what it describes as its belief that its product would be used in a safe
00:36:45 that its product would be used in a safe manner
00:36:48 that also is untenable in the light of the extensive documentary evidence showing that arconic knew that rayna bond pe
00:36:56 bond pe was unsafe and should not be used on building facades arconic's documents show that it deliberately sought to leverage the difference between uk and european
00:37:09 the difference between uk and european fire safety standards so as to continue selling rain upon pe in the united kingdom after it had been forced to stop stop selling that product
00:37:20 selling that product in countries that applied european standards
00:37:25 archonic claims in its written opening that it has from the outset endeavoured to cooperate with this inquiry both as regards the provision of information
00:37:36 information and as regards all evidence however konic appears to be hiding behind the french blocking statute to prevent its witnesses from attending to give evidence before this inquiry
00:37:47 to give evidence before this inquiry this makes our comics claim of cooperation a hollow one arconic's stance is odd given that it specifically sought and obtained an extension of the attorney general's undertaken
00:37:58 undertaken undertaking in march 2020 on the ground that our conics witnesses would be giving evidence on behalf of the company and that the company
00:38:07 company therefore also needed the benefit of an undertaking from the attorney general arconic's reliance on the french blocking statute is we suggest plainly inappropriate
00:38:18 is we suggest plainly inappropriate given the public importance of the issues being examined by this inquiry and the major role that arconics cladding panels played in the spread of fire
00:38:27 fire on the 14th of june 2017. it is a matter of deep concern to celetex
00:38:35 celetex that arconic should be seeking to hide behind
00:38:38 behind the french blocking statute in these circumstances celetex urges the inquiry to continue its efforts to achieve a resolution of this matter with the french authorities
00:38:50 with the french authorities it also invites archonic to abandon its reliance on the french blocking statute so as to demonstrate that archonic truly is intent
00:39:00 is intent on cooperating with this inquiry so that uh only leaves it to thank uh you for this opportunity uh to make this opening statement well thank you very much mr all it's been
00:39:12 thank you very much mr all it's been very
00:39:12 very helpful and interesting to hear what you have to say thank you very much indeed
00:39:18 right the next statement is going to be made by mr webb on behalf of kingspan so perhaps he could come up on the screen
00:39:33 good afternoon mr webb good afternoon um you can hear me and see me all right can you
00:39:39 can you yes i can sir good thank you we can see you and hear you very well so please make your statement on behalf of kingspan thank you mr chairman members of the panel this is the first
00:39:52 members of the panel this is the first time that
00:39:53 time that kingspan installation limited has made an oral statement to the inquiry this module will also be the first time that any of the employees of the company have given evidence to the inquiry
00:40:06 evidence to the inquiry the first thing i wish to say is that everyone at kingspan insulation has been deeply shocked by the devastating and appalling tragedy of the 14th of june 2017.
00:40:17 of the 14th of june 2017. it is a tragedy which resulted in the death of 72 individuals and the terrible suffering of so many other people i speak on behalf of all those employed
00:40:28 i speak on behalf of all those employed by the company and its representatives when i say that we all wish to express our profound sorrow that this disaster occurred
00:40:36 occurred and to offer our deepest sympathies to the bereaved families the survivors the residents and to everyone affected by the tragedy it was a tragedy that should never have
00:40:47 it was a tragedy that should never have happened
00:40:49 happened king's ban installation welcomes and supports the vitally important work of this enquiry in its efforts to determine what went wrong and why the company has worked hard to respond
00:41:00 the company has worked hard to respond fully to all the questions asked of it and it will continue to do so king's fanning station has set out its position concerning the content of module 2
00:41:10 module 2 in its detailed written opening statement that opening statement draws upon the evidence provided in 15 witness statements and over 21 000 documents provided by the company to the inquiry
00:41:24 the company to the inquiry although kingston installation had no knowledge until after the tragedy that any of its insulation had been used in the refurbishment of the facade of grenfell tower it's now clear that a limited amount of k-15
00:41:36 clear that a limited amount of k-15 phenolic insulation product was used during the refurbishment when there were gaps in the availability of the specified installation celatex rs-5000 pir
00:41:47 celatex rs-5000 pir it's also no now clear that another of its installation products tp10 was used in some window reveals the company has looked in detail at its
00:41:58 the company has looked in detail at its processes and procedures and has identified some important process shortcomings particularly in relation to the way that three bs-8414 tests one undertaken in 2005 and two in 2014
00:42:11 one undertaken in 2005 and two in 2014 were conducted and relied upon for the marketing of k-15 however further testing undertaken in 2015
00:42:21 2015 2016 and since the fire has supported and validated the performance claims made historically in respect to those three earlier tests
00:42:33 in respect to those three earlier tests the company is confident therefore that at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment these shortcomings did not affect the safety of any cladding system incorporating k-15 which relied upon
00:42:44 incorporating k-15 which relied upon those three bs-8414 tests nevertheless the shortcomings should not have happened and kingspan installation offers a full and sincere apology for
00:42:55 offers a full and sincere apology for them
00:42:57 them these issues been set out in the witness statements of the company's employees and in its written opening statement kingston installation also wishes to make two important submissions at the
00:43:08 make two important submissions at the outset
00:43:09 outset which are dealt with more fully in section f of its written statement first testing and peer-reviewed research carried out since the tragedy indicates
00:43:20 carried out since the tragedy indicates that the pe chord acm cladding used on grenfell tower was unsafe and should not have been used on tall buildings second the testing and research carried
00:43:31 second the testing and research carried out indicates that the devastating spread of the fire was caused by the presence of that pe called acm cladding and that the outcome of the fire would not have been different in any material way
00:43:42 way if non-combustible mineral fiber insulation had been used behind that cladding instead of pir the company welcomes the detailed consideration of these important issues including by the experts instructed by
00:43:54 including by the experts instructed by the inquiry in the coming modules we recognize that the inquiry is a dynamic process where evidence is heard and examined and the core participants will have an
00:44:05 the core participants will have an opportunity to comment upon that evidence in closing submissions however tempting it might be to respond today to certain points raised in the opening statements of others
00:44:15 others we will wait until the actual evidence has been heard in full and will respond to that evidence by way of closing submissions in due course my oral statement today will therefore be short
00:44:26 will therefore be short and we'll focus on the following six points first who is king spanish slation and what is k15
00:44:34 k15 second how did k-15 come to be used in the refurbishment third how did pe cord acm cladding come to be used on grenfell tower fourth what issues arise from the fact
00:44:46 fourth what issues arise from the fact that such cladding and such insulation were used
00:44:50 were used fifth the testing certification and promotion of k-15 and sixth what kingspine installation has done since this tragedy so turning to the first point who is kingspan insulation and what is
00:45:03 kingspan insulation and what is kingsman installation is a company within the kingspan group responsible for the sale of cool thumb k15 insulation in great britain k15 is a type of rigid board insulation made from phenolic foam
00:45:16 board insulation made from phenolic foam insulation is a vital part of any construction both for environmental reasons and for the health and comfort of its residents and it's widely accepted in the industry that installation should be added
00:45:27 that installation should be added to buildings during cladding refurbishment relevant requirements respect for the conservation of energy is set out in part l of the building regulations the building regulations at the time of the
00:45:38 regulations at the time of the refurbishment of grenfell tower permitted the use of k-15 on tall buildings
00:45:42 buildings provided that it was used as part of a cladding system which could be shown to be compliant with approved document b or with the bca technical guidance note 18.
00:45:53 18. as the inquiry has heard at the relevant time approved document b provided for three routes to compliance for any cladding system the so-called linear routes compliance could be used if the installation was classified as
00:46:05 if the installation was classified as limited combustibility or as non-combustible k-15 was not classified as either and so could not have been used under the linear route there were two
00:46:16 under the linear route there were two other routes to compliance and approved document b the second route required that the particular cladding system meets the criteria given in br135 when tested to bs 8414
00:46:28 when tested to bs 8414 the third route required assessment of the building as a whole by a fire engineer
00:46:33 engineer the bca technical guidance note 18 also allowed compliance via desktop study
00:46:40 study it is clear that none of these four routes were followed by those responsible for the design of the refurbishment of grenfell tower furthermore as was concluded in the
00:46:51 furthermore as was concluded in the phase 1 report the functional requirement set by b4 1 of schedule 1 of the building regulations which requires that the external walls be adequately resist the spread of fire
00:47:03 be adequately resist the spread of fire was not met as was noted in the report this was a submission that had been made by kingspan installation in its phase one closing submissions it's important to note that kingsman
00:47:14 it's important to note that kingsman station was not asked to provide and did not provide any advice to those responsible for the refurbishment about the suitability of k-15 for use on grenfell tower with pe called acm
00:47:25 grenfell tower with pe called acm cladding
00:47:27 cladding indeed the company did not know that any of its k-15 product had been used on grenfell tower until after the fire had occurred that brings me to the second issue how did k15 come to be used in the
00:47:39 did k15 come to be used in the refurbishment the first point to note is the insulation specified by those responsible for the refurbishment of the grenfell tower with celatex rs 5000 pir
00:47:50 5000 pir and not k15 phenolic insulation since the fire kingsman installation has learned and the inquiry has heard that there appear to have been supply problems in respect to the celitex
00:48:01 problems in respect to the celitex product during the refurbishment and that in total 145 sheets of k15 were delivered by third party suppliers sif and ccf to grenfell tower because of short gaps
00:48:13 to grenfell tower because of short gaps in the availability the celatex rs 5000 some of those k15 sheets were supplied in may and the rest in september 2015. on the information currently available
00:48:25 on the information currently available it appears that k-15 constituted 5.2 percent by area of the great rain screen
00:48:31 screen insulation boards ordered for use in the refurbishment as i've said at no stage did anyone involved in the refurbishment asking spanish station for advice as to whether k-15 should be used on the
00:48:43 as to whether k-15 should be used on the tower with p called acm and the company had no knowledge that k-15 had been used until after the fire the only contact that seems to be made with king's peninsulation in respect to the refurbishment was a
00:48:55 in respect to the refurbishment was a request for a single u-value calculation in july 2012 that is a calculation of the thickness of insulation needed to meet a specified thermal performance requirement
00:49:07 requirement that request made no reference to the type of cladding being proposed king's fan installation heard nothing more and had no other contact with those responsible for the design of the refurbishment
00:49:18 refurbishment as we know a decision was subsequently made to use the celatex pir product as i said k-15 was not classified as either non-combustible nor limited combustibility and so could
00:49:30 nor limited combustibility and so could not be used in the refurbishment via the linear routes to compliance there was nothing in any of the k-15 product literature or third-party certification current at the time of the refurbishment
00:49:41 current at the time of the refurbishment which stated that k-15 could be used under the linear route in short no steps appear to have been taken by those responsible for the refurbishment
00:49:52 refurbishment to consider whether pir or k15 could be used in conjunction with pe called acm in a manner which was compliant with approved document b or technical guidance note 18. had that
00:50:04 or technical guidance note 18. had that vital question being considered the conclusion would have been the pe chord acm could not be used with the celetex product or k-15 unless verified by a full-scale testing
00:50:15 verified by a full-scale testing a desktop study or a whole building fire engineering assessment none of those routes were followed by those responsible for the refurbishment
00:50:26 for the refurbishment the third issue which arises is this how did p coordination cladding come to be used on grenfell tower kingspanning solutions understanding of the evidence so far is that the bba certificate for the pe
00:50:38 is that the bba certificate for the pe called acn cladding used in the refurbishment stated that it achieved euro class b the effect of this is that in principle the linear route compliance permitted the use of pe called acm claddy on tour
00:50:51 the use of pe called acm claddy on tour buildings
00:50:51 buildings without any further testing or fire engineering assessment provided that it was used in conjunction with non-combustible or limited combustibility installation but the fundamental issue here is that
00:51:03 but the fundamental issue here is that following the grenfell tower fire the testing commissioned by the department for the communities and local government demonstrated that the pe called acm cladding
00:51:13 cladding failed the large-scale bs-8414 fire tests
00:51:17 tests both when combined with pir insulation and when combined with non-combustible synthetic
00:51:22 synthetic mineral fiber insulation and these were not
00:51:25 not marginal fails they were out and out failures of the test both systems failed in under eight minutes because of flame height in other words despite its apparent
00:51:36 in other words despite its apparent euroclass b classification the pe cord acm cladding system used for grenfell tower was incapable of meeting the safety standards set by br135 regardless of whether non-combustible
00:51:48 regardless of whether non-combustible mineral fibre insulation or pir insulation was installed behind it this strongly indicates that the pe cord acm cladding was not safe for use regardless of the type of insulation
00:52:00 regardless of the type of insulation with which it was combined
00:52:03 the fourth issue is this what issues arise from the fact that pe called acm cladding and pir and phenolic insulation were used in the refurbishment the first question which arises here and
00:52:14 the first question which arises here and which this module we'll be exploring is how and why the pe called acm cladding
00:52:19 cladding could ever have been certified as euro class b when in fact it failed and failed so badly to pass any of the large-scale bs-8414 fire tests regardless the type of insulation used
00:52:31 regardless the type of insulation used behind it
00:52:33 behind it the second question therefore is whether the linear route compliance is fit for purpose or whether instead it's better to carry out large-scale fire tests to ensure that the cladding system
00:52:43 system as a whole can meet the relevant requirements of the building regulations it's appreciated that opinions may be divided on this issue but kingspan installation believes that one of the lessons to be learned from
00:52:55 one of the lessons to be learned from this tragedy is that it is inherently safer to test any particular cladding system as a whole rather than to assume that it'll be safe because each component has passed or has apparently passed some
00:53:08 has passed or has apparently passed some smaller scale test we understand the value of large scale testing will be considered in module six we welcome that the third question which follows from the failure of the p called acm
00:53:20 from the failure of the p called acm cladding systems to pass bs-8414 tests when used with non-combustible mineral fiber insulation is this
00:53:27 is this with the nature or speed or spread of the grenfell tower fire have been any different
00:53:32 different had synthetic mineral fiber being used behind the pe called acm cladding instead of peir or phenolic insulation this third question is of course an issue of very real importance
00:53:44 issue of very real importance not least in terms of understanding the impact of different installation types in the cladding fires the dc lg tests showed that a system using p
00:53:54 using p called acm plus synthetic mineral fiber insulation failed just as quickly as the system using pir
00:54:00 using pir insulation furthermore extensive computer modeling undertaken by independent fire experts effectus
00:54:09 effectus and published in a series of peer-reviewed academic papers shows that the influence of the pe called acm cladding was so dominant in the grenfell tile fire that replacing the pir insulation with synthetic
00:54:21 the pir insulation with synthetic mineral fiber insulation would not have made any material difference to the nature or extent of the fire that research was partly funded by kingspan installation but it was entirely independent of the company
00:54:35 was entirely independent of the company that research also shows that if a2 rated acm
00:54:38 rated acm ie limited combustibility cladding had been used with pir insulation then the fire would not have spread over the building facade it therefore appears to king spain installation from the evidence currently
00:54:50 installation from the evidence currently available
00:54:51 available that the decision to use pe called acm cladding
00:54:54 cladding had the greatest possible consequences regardless of the what decision was then taken in respect to the type of insulation to be installed behind it ultimately it will be mattered for the experts
00:55:06 will be mattered for the experts instructed by the inquiry to provide their independent opinion evidence on these issues we look forward to the inquiry examining these important issues in depth in due course fifth
00:55:18 in due course fifth i come to the testing certification and promotion of k-15 as at may 2015 when the first k-15 sheets were delivered for use on grenfell tower four systems
00:55:29 on grenfell tower four systems incorporating k-15 have been tested to bs8414
00:55:33 bs8414 and have successfully met the br135 criteria
00:55:37 criteria by the time the second supply of k15 for use in the refurbishment in september 2015
00:55:42 2015 two more cladding systems incorporating k-15 so
00:55:46 k-15 so six in total had been successfully tested to bs8414 a further 11 successful bs-8414 tests have been undertaken since september 2015
00:55:56 2015 involving cladding systems using k-15 however the tragedy of the grenfell tower fire has caused ban insulation to review in detail the product development
00:56:07 product development testing certification and promotion of k-15
00:56:11 k-15 as i've said this review has identified some important process shortcomings particularly in relation to the way certain tests of cladding systems undertaken in 2005 and 2014
00:56:22 undertaken in 2005 and 2014 were conducted and relied upon for the marketing of k-15 those issues being set out in the witness statements provided by the company's employees and have been summarized in its written opening statement
00:56:34 opening statement in particular as to the testing it's recognized that there were production process
00:56:39 process changes after the original 2005 bs8414 test and that a new test should have been carried out following those changes however that 2005 test has now been
00:56:52 however that 2005 test has now been replicated as closely as is possible using current standard k-15 and it passed it's also recognized that another of the six successful tests
00:57:03 another of the six successful tests undertaken by september 2015 namely a 2014 test using a terracotta cladding system had used research and development variant of k-15 and so that test should not have been
00:57:15 and so that test should not have been relied upon however two further bs-8414 tests of similar terracotta systems using current standard k-15 were undertaken in
00:57:26 undertaken in 2015 and 2016 and both also passed and met the criteria in br135
00:57:34 br135 the four other bs 8414 tests which had been carried out by september 2015 were all successful tests of cladding systems using current standard k-15
00:57:45 standard k-15 some shortcomings in respect of k-15 marketing and product literature have also been identified which again have been set out in the witness statement and in the opening statement
00:57:55 statement as at today's date a total of 15 bs 8414 tests of cladding systems incorporating current standard k-15 have successfully met the criteria used by
00:58:07 successfully met the criteria used by br135
00:58:09 br135 that includes three tests using a2 acm panels
00:58:12 panels as well kingspan installation is confident
00:58:15 confident that adb compliant cladding systems that incorporate k15 are safe furthermore many regulatory regimes around the world allow the use of suitably tested systems
00:58:27 allow the use of suitably tested systems incorporating k-15 on tall buildings it is important to emphasize
00:58:33 emphasize that a large-scale fire test such as bs8414
00:58:36 bs8414 is a test of the entire cladding system a failed ps8414 test therefore means that the cladding system as a whole has failed
00:58:46 failed but it does not necessarily follow that there is a problem with the insulation an example of this is the failed bs-8414 test carried out in 2007 on a sotex system using k-15
00:58:59 on a sotex system using k-15 certain individuals at king's peninsula were naturally very concerned about this failure
00:59:03 failure and expressed their concerns in emails some of which have been quoted in the written submissions of other core participants what has received less attention however is the fact that a very similar
00:59:14 is the fact that a very similar if not identical so tech cladding system was tested shortly afterwards using non-combustible synthetic mineral fiber insulation instead of k-15 and that also failed the
00:59:26 instead of k-15 and that also failed the test
00:59:27 test that set out in paragraph 46 of our written statement the reality is that such failed tests demonstrate that the bs-8414 system was working robustly in identifying that
00:59:38 was working robustly in identifying that some cladding systems were not capable of passing the test regardless of the type of installation used behind them the sixth issue i'd like to mention is the initiatives taken by the company
00:59:49 the initiatives taken by the company since the tragedy kingspan installation has implemented wide-ranging improvements of its processes
00:59:55 processes and procedures addressing the specific shortcomings that it has identified historically but also improving its procedures generally these changes have been set out in the
01:00:06 these changes have been set out in the witness evidence and summarized in the written opening statement provided by the company they include briefly first improvements to product traceability second the introduction of a new
01:00:17 second the introduction of a new protocol and guidance on fire testing third a review of the marketing literature and performance claims relating to its installation products fourth the publication on its website of
01:00:28 fourth the publication on its website of all bs8414 test reports of systems incorporating standard k-15 whatever the outcomes of those tests fifth new marketing protocols six
01:00:40 fifth new marketing protocols six the new code of conduct seventh improved technical sport provided under the kingspan assured technical support program eighth a new accreditation protocol
01:00:51 eighth a new accreditation protocol governing new or amended certification procedures and ninth improved change management procedures finally i conclude by saying that kingspan installation
01:01:02 kingspan installation is committed to assisting this inquiry to get to the truth as to both how and why this tragedy occurred and what can and should be done to ensure that no future tragedies of this nature can
01:01:14 future tragedies of this nature can occur
01:01:16 occur the company will continue to support the work of the inquiry at every step of the way so mr chairman thank you and thank you for the opportunity to make these submissions well thank you very much mr
01:01:27 submissions well thank you very much mr webb
01:01:28 webb um it's certainly been very interesting and helpful to hear from you so thank you again um now the next person to address us is mr sortel who's going
01:01:39 to address us is mr sortel who's going to
01:01:40 to make an opening statement on behalf of the
01:01:43 the british board of aggramar so good afternoon mr sortel you're there good afternoon sir yes indeed you can see me i can see you yes yes indeed and we can hear each
01:01:55 yes yes indeed and we can hear each other so that's good well would you like to go ahead then and and make your statement i'm sorry we are running a bit late but i think we'll you shouldn't feel at all under any pressure from me at least of
01:02:06 under any pressure from me at least of time and we'll um take a break after we've completed your opening statement so when you're ready thank you and mr chairman
01:02:17 chairman madam sir i represent the british board of agroman and i'm here to provide you with my all opening submissions the bba expresses its deepest sympathy to the bereaved
01:02:29 to the bereaved victims and survivors of a grenfell tower fire as an organization it is committed to helping improve construction safety to prevent such a tragedy from occurring
01:02:41 to prevent such a tragedy from occurring in the future part of the purpose of the inquiry is to examine the decisions relating to a design construction and refurbishment of grenfell tower it is also to examine
01:02:53 of grenfell tower it is also to examine the guidance and industry practice relating to construction works on such high-rise residential buildings an essential aspect of commitment to prevent this tragedy recurring
01:03:05 prevent this tragedy recurring is to look critically at these issues and to determine what can be improved the founding purpose of the bba was to provide an independent authoritative source of data
01:03:17 independent authoritative source of data on the performance of construction materials
01:03:20 materials and their suitability for use in clearly defined applications it is in that spirit the bba has engaged with
01:03:28 with and contributed to the efforts to prevent such a tragedy happening again the bba led evidence for hackett inquiry and to the parliamentary committee set up to consider its findings
01:03:40 up to consider its findings the bba is agitated for before adoption of a hackage reports findings which it enthusiastically endorses the bba has also provided evidence to the metropolitan police
01:03:52 the metropolitan police as part of their investigation the bbas disclosed a number of documents and provided several witness statements to this
01:04:00 to this end it has been and it continues to be ready to provide what assistance it can to consider what the bba does the aggramar
01:04:11 aggramar board itself was established by the government in 1966 following building failures attributed to the inappropriate use of construction materials
01:04:22 materials the agrimoon board became the bba in 1982
01:04:26 1982 at the same time as became a self-funding non-profit distributing company
01:04:30 company with no formal government association part of a function of the bba is to issue agrimore certificates in respect of building materials a
01:04:41 in respect of building materials a certificate states the bba's opinion as to a product's compliance or contribution to compliance with the particular building regulations noted in the certificate
01:04:52 noted in the certificate fire safety is one part of the contents of a certificate in the witness statement evidence provided by the bba and in particular the first witness
01:05:03 and in particular the first witness statement of john alvin it describes what the relationship is between a bba certificate and the relevant building regulations and product safety standards each certificate maps the applicable
01:05:15 each certificate maps the applicable building regulations considered in the bba's assessment the building regulations themselves are supported by approved documents which provide guidance on measures to
01:05:26 which provide guidance on measures to allow construction to satisfy the relevant regulatory requirements in terms of fire safety products are certified by reference to approved document b approved document b
01:05:38 approved document b approved document b sets out systems for classifying the reaction to file properties of a product using either a national or european classification system
01:05:49 classification system then sets out a minimum class deemed to satisfy particular types of application diagram 40 of approved document b defines permissible
01:06:00 defines permissible areas of use on a building for products based on their reaction to fire characteristics materials achieving class o or zero can be used in the same locations
01:06:12 be used in the same locations as those achieving euro class b the test method set out and bs 476 are the ones used to achieve class 0 and the tests defined in bsen13501
01:06:25 the tests defined in bsen13501 are used to achieve euro class b bs 476 and bs bsen13501 test different things but both result in
01:06:36 test different things but both result in a reaction to fire classification both tests are acceptable when making a decision about reaction to fire when considering diagram 40 and in terms
01:06:47 when considering diagram 40 and in terms of its application in the approved document the two classifications are functionally equivalent even if they are different tests a certificate does not extend to
01:06:58 a certificate does not extend to individual applications it is a summary allowing a designer of a structure
01:07:04 structure to make an informed decision on the performances of a product a bba certificate therefore draws for designers
01:07:12 designers or specifiers attention to the relevant standards
01:07:15 standards applicable to that product and this includes but is not limited to fire safety it provides an independent opinion
01:07:24 opinion as to performance of that product assessed against those standards the bba's processes that lead to this opinion
01:07:32 opinion are themselves independently reviewed by ucas
01:07:37 ucas a bba certificate therefore affords confidence to a specifier or designer as to the assertions made by product manufacturer about their products properties
01:07:49 about their products properties a bba certificate provides summary of the information necessary to make a decision an individual application but a bba certificate must be read in
01:08:00 but a bba certificate must be read in its entirety they are intended to be technically robust but also concise it is self-evidently not possible to fit all of the relevant
01:08:11 not possible to fit all of the relevant information required by a designer or specifier on the first page in a short section in the first page it will refer to the contents of a
01:08:22 it will refer to the contents of a certificate itself the bba's relationship with certificate holders is contractual the certificate is based on the documentary material
01:08:33 on the documentary material that is provided by the supplier the applicant certificate holder pays a fee for bba
01:08:39 for bba for initial assessment and if appropriate certification and subsequent inspections pursuant to his contract the supplier has obligations
01:08:50 has obligations to make disclosure of any testing that has been carried out any changes to the composition of the material also have been reported under the contract by the manufacturer
01:09:03 under the contract by the manufacturer the effectiveness of a certification process is therefore based on certificate holders observing the terms of their certification contract in good faith
01:09:13 faith both during the initial assessment process and during ongoing surveillance as well as rigorousness of a bba's own assessment certification and inspection processes
01:09:25 certification and inspection processes it is particularly important for manufacturers disclosed for bba all test results and other information that may be relevant to the assessment of the product
01:09:36 of the product the standard certification process of the bba
01:09:39 the bba has been set out in a number of witness statements and is summarized in its opening statement and i would defer to the inquiry to that if i turn to the products the certified
01:09:51 if i turn to the products the certified products
01:09:51 products are being considered by the inquiry but bba had issued certificates in respect of two of the materials used in refurbishment of grenfell tower
01:10:02 used in refurbishment of grenfell tower which are an issue for its inquiry but firstly at kingspan call firm k-15 secondly rhino bond architectural wall cladding panels covering both the standard and fire
01:10:14 covering both the standard and fire retardant grades of the product and the bba understands that this was marketed as rhino bond 55 pe bba has detailed in its evidence to
01:10:25 pe bba has detailed in its evidence to the inquiry the process in which those product manufacturers applied for certification the documentation that was provided with their applications and the subsequent surveillance reviews
01:10:37 and the subsequent surveillance reviews and updates of the certificates the two products were first certified in 2008
01:10:44 2008 kingspan first applied for certification in 2003
01:10:49 in 2003 and alcoa as iconic was then known applied in 2006. the evidence therefore also shows the evolution of a bba as an organization in the time frame
01:11:01 as an organization in the time frame since those applications were made with greater levels of supervision training
01:11:06 training and continuing development evolving over time
01:11:09 time but within a more formal structure and this is a process that has continued since june 2017 as well turning first to kingspan k15
01:11:22 turning first to kingspan k15 the k-15 certificate went through a number of reissues from 2008 to 2013 before a new certificate was issued in 2015.
01:11:34 2015. the wording on the certificate was changed on each occasion so the history of the certification of kingspan k15 illustrates the different measures of the bba put in place
01:11:45 the bba put in place to ensure the certificate wording is not capable of misinterpretation on the 30th of october 2020 after the bba submitted its written
01:11:57 after the bba submitted its written opening statement and before the bba had seen kingspan's opening statement kingspan voted for bba advising them that faye will be withdrawing
01:12:08 that faye will be withdrawing three bs 8414 test reports from circulation the bba has been in direct contact with kingspan
01:12:16 kingspan and kingspan's opening statement has subsequently been amended as well the bba certificate for kingspan k15 was already
01:12:26 already in the process of being reissued at the instigation of kingspan pending further information from kingspan the current kingspan k15 certificate has as a result been suspended in
01:12:39 has as a result been suspended in accordance with the bba's procedures and the bba's website is in the process of being updated to reflect this suspension of the certificate
01:12:50 certificate i'll now turn to iconic vaynerband there was
01:12:53 was one certificate for rona bond architectural wall cleaning panels the history of the information provided to the bba by alca remember comic compared to the
01:13:04 by alca remember comic compared to the information actually in the bba's possession has been of great concern to the bba a witness statement of brian moore the former executive director of the bba
01:13:16 the former executive director of the bba and the first witness statement of john owen
01:13:19 owen head of approvals for construction products details the information that was not provided to the bba about the reaction to fire properties of raynor bond
01:13:30 raynor bond at the time that alcoa applied for certification it had in his possession a report that stated that the cassette version of the product had a significantly worse
01:13:41 significantly worse fiverr classification rating to a riveted version alker was aware at the time of the original assessment that the cassette version should have been classified as
01:13:52 been classified as e at the time of the initial bba assessment when alcor was presented with draft certificates by the bba it did not correct them to show that
01:14:04 it did not correct them to show that there was a very significant difference between the riveted and cassette versions
01:14:09 versions alcoa never provided this information to the bba prior to the grenfell tower fire the bba was not advised in advance
01:14:20 fire the bba was not advised in advance of any significant changes to a specification of a product during the lifetime of a certificate it was in fact a bbc journalist who alerted the bba
01:14:32 alerted the bba to the fact the core to a rhino bond pe product
01:14:35 product had been changed in 2015 and mr brian moore describes in his witness statement the subsequent enquiries
01:14:43 enquiries for the bba carried out in november 2018 the bba was provided with advanced disclosure of appendix 0 of dr barbara lane's
01:14:55 of appendix 0 of dr barbara lane's report
01:14:56 report which was approximately a month before publication the bba was concerned about the discrepancy between the information that dr lane was provided with by iconic
01:15:07 provided with by iconic the information that he had been provided with by alka or our colleague during the certification process dr lane referred to a number of documents relevant to
01:15:18 a number of documents relevant to certification though bba had not seen at the same time the bba had further documents that dr lane had apparently not seen
01:15:29 that dr lane had apparently not seen in short the bba were not provided with relevant fire test results by iconic either when vayner bond was originally certified or when the certificate was subsequently
01:15:41 or when the certificate was subsequently reviewed
01:15:43 reviewed once the bba became aware of the existence of additional technical information that had been withheld it entered into a series of correspondence seeking classification clarification
01:15:55 seeking classification clarification as our colleague were unable to explain the failure to provide this information to the bba satisfaction the certificates were suspended on the 16th of november 2018 and subsequently
01:16:07 16th of november 2018 and subsequently withdrawn on 28th of february 2019 if the information available to dr lane was made available to the bba either during the application process or
01:16:19 either during the application process or afterwards the bba would have either reissued or amended for certificate to reflect the distinction between the fr and pe
01:16:28 fr and pe core and the riveted and cassette forms of the product however reports that dr lane referred to being made available for bba it would have written or updated for
01:16:39 it would have written or updated for certificate to provide for correct classifications and to place these in the context of approved document b if a bba had known the cassette version of the product was class e and achieved a different reaction to
01:16:52 e and achieved a different reaction to file classification to a riveted version which was class c the certificate would have shown both the differences between the two versions and reflected those fire classifications
01:17:04 classifications the bba understands the rhino bond cladding
01:17:08 cladding used on the refurbishment grenfell tower had a smoke silver pure white duragloss surface coating as noted in section 6.1 of the certificate
01:17:19 certificate the file test provided for bba was in respect of a gray green duragloss 5000 coating
01:17:25 coating the certificate confirmed that these performances may not be achieved by other colors of the product the radar bond cladding therefore used in the reference to grenfell tower
01:17:36 in the reference to grenfell tower was not covered by a bba certificate as that certificate did not cover the colors of a product used on the building in its opening statement the bba has
01:17:48 in its opening statement the bba has commented on proposals for change the bba has made changes to its processes certificate wording and training before and after the fired grenfell tower
01:17:59 and after the fired grenfell tower it has also commented on dr barbara lane's proposals some of the points that dr lane has made such as the references to class zero hinge on the way in which approved document b is worded
01:18:11 document b is worded and this is not for the bba as an independent certifier to comment on similarly the bba does not provide a value judgment as for merits or worth of different fire
01:18:22 as for merits or worth of different fire testing methods the bba has now moved to a position of carrying out its own surveillance across all products the way in which the bba changes staff
01:18:33 bba changes staff has evolved and a significant amount of technical staff's time is devoted to building technical knowledge
01:18:40 knowledge the effectiveness of a bba's training and competence for staff involved is examined by ucas its accreditation body
01:18:48 body the bba does not agree that fire test data and classification reports for product
01:18:53 product be provided as part of the certificate but this is to prevent a certificate from becoming overly long or difficult to use but bba does now reference file test
01:19:04 but bba does now reference file test reports
01:19:05 reports on which specific content is based to enable a specifier to make their own assessment of results for bba would again emphasize that certificates
01:19:16 would again emphasize that certificates are concise documents and that they must be read in their entirety
01:19:22 entirety as for failed fire test results the bba suggested testing on developmental versions of a product has no relevance to classification if a particular product
01:19:33 particular product has failed to meet a but for designers amended
01:19:37 amended so the product then meets the standard following a further test the original failed test may not be relevant
01:19:44 relevant if however a final version of a product has been tested a number of times with different results the bba would expect to be provided with these tests and this is relevant to a product
01:19:56 and this is relevant to a product certificate again the bba is clear in this position that if it had been provided with all of the information in our colleagues possession both at the time of the certificate for vinyl bond architectural wall planning
01:20:08 vinyl bond architectural wall planning panels were issued and afterwards it would have made a material difference for content of that certificate so as to reduce the likelihood of information being omitted from
01:20:19 information being omitted from disclosure or presented in a misleading way the bba's contracts are being reviewed the bba itself has made proposals to support the process of certification
01:20:31 support the process of certification and to ensure the information provided to a certification body is as accurate as possible these are details
01:20:39 details in the bba's written opening statement and they are twofold firstly to reinforce the contractual obligation of canda when providing information to a certification body with a duty of fair
01:20:52 certification body with a duty of fair presentation buttressed by the criminal law if false or misleading information is provided this would be an ongoing obligation to cover changes to the certified product
01:21:05 cover changes to the certified product and secondly to clarify and improve whistleblower protection for an employee of a product manufacturer
01:21:15 to conclude the bba's opening position it is important for specifiers and designers to have independent verification of the properties of a product and its
01:21:26 properties of a product and its performance in relation to prevailing circuit safety standards
01:21:30 standards this is not only in relation to its reaction to fire but its other material properties there are three parts to this however the first
01:21:39 the first is at relevant fire safety standards against which a product is being assessed
01:21:43 assessed should be clear and relevant without this
01:21:47 this the yardstick from the certifying body is comparing a product against is not as unambiguous or likely to promote better fire safety outcomes as it ought to be
01:21:58 it ought to be secondly the information that the certifying body is provided with must be accurate and free from material emissions
01:22:08 emissions thirdly the systems and processes that a certifying body has in place must be robust as training and expertise must be of a high standard and the certificates that it provides
01:22:20 and the certificates that it provides must be independent the bba will provide its best assistance to the inquiry it will do what it can to prevent the recurrence of this tragedy
01:22:32 recurrence of this tragedy the bba has closely considered the phase one report it will carefully consider the evidence presented in this module and will comment as appropriate at that conclusion
01:22:44 conclusion and in due course the bba will implement any recommendations that the inquiry will propose
01:22:53 thank you very much indeed um i think at this point in the afternoon we'll take a short break and uh when we come back at 25 to 4
01:23:07 and uh when we come back at 25 to 4 we'll hear from council for the fire brigades union so 25 to 4 please
01:36:29 good well now the next person to address this is going to be mr seaword on behalf of the fire brigades union so could we have mr c wood up please
01:36:41 good afternoon good afternoon mr chairman
01:36:45 chairman and uh you can see me clearly and you can hear me well enough yes i can see you and hear you very good well now you're going to make an opening statement on behalf of the fbu is that
01:36:56 statement on behalf of the fbu is that right
01:36:57 right yes so when you're ready let's start thank you mr chairman mr van and mr akbar of the panel and your assessors professor nethercott and mr montgomery
01:37:09 and mr montgomery the fire brigades union the fbu remains humbled by the grenfell tower disaster and committed to a full and open inquiry with the bsrs at its heart
01:37:20 with the bsrs at its heart the documentary evidence disclosed for module 1
01:37:23 module 1 and confirmed by the oral evidence given so far
01:37:27 so far shows widespread ignorance neglect and or complacent assumption amongst those engaged in the construction of the rain screen cladding system for the facades and crown of grenfell
01:37:39 for the facades and crown of grenfell tower
01:37:41 tower both of the increased fire hazards associated with the rain screen trading system and of the relevant building regulations and guidance
01:37:50 guidance in approved document b and of the associated testing certification and classification regime it seems no one involved in the construction project thought fire it was always assumed to be
01:38:03 thought fire it was always assumed to be someone else's job with the result of the increased fire risk of the rain screen cladding system was almost completely overlooked how did this situation arise how can it be avoided in future in
01:38:16 how can it be avoided in future in module 2
01:38:17 module 2 the fbu understands the inquiry intends to undertake an investigation into the testing certification and classification of specific external wall materials used on grenfell tower
01:38:29 on grenfell tower including as the cti has confirmed this morning
01:38:33 morning whether the testing certification and classification regime was fit for purpose we note the inevitable overlap with module 6 and are grateful for that
01:38:44 with module 6 and are grateful for that clarification dr lane has already reported her opinion in section 11 of her main report that the entire building envelope system was non-compliant with the functional
01:38:56 was non-compliant with the functional requirements of b4 and b3 of building regulations that some of the cavity barriers used in the refurbishment of gt were not classified for the required fire performance by adb 2013
01:39:09 fire performance by adb 2013 and she listed the products the use of which were fundamentally non-compliant and thereby provides a focus for module two
01:39:18 two these products included the rayna bond acp
01:39:21 acp polyethylene pe cassette panels and the thermal insulation boards attached to the original concrete wall certex rs 5000 and kingspan k15
01:39:34 certex rs 5000 and kingspan k15 also fundamentally non-compliant with several other important products used in the rain screen coatings cladding system the alu glaze styrofoam core insulating panels installed between the windows
01:39:46 panels installed between the windows and by the kitchen extract vents the kingspan tp10 insulation specified for insulation around the kitchen extract fans the celetex and kingspan polymeric insulation boards
01:39:57 insulation boards aj celatex tv 4000 and kingspan tp10 used to insulate the window reveals enclosed the new cavity formed between the old and new infield panels between the windows
01:40:08 the windows and the siderise lemontherm rh 25g cavity barriers these all played a part allowing the spread of fire out of flat 16
01:40:19 16 back into the other flats as it spread over grenfell tower and these will not be overlooked turning to the expert evidence for module two dr lane has confronted the complexities
01:40:31 dr lane has confronted the complexities and described the requirements of the building regulations the guidance in adb and the fire tests relating to a red screen cladding system in appendix f of her phase one report
01:40:42 in appendix f of her phase one report she did so to provide a detailed i quote a detailed understanding of the requirement at the time of the grenfell tower fire and also to provide a basis for formulating future changes saying
01:40:53 formulating future changes saying importantly what is important now is to remove
01:40:57 remove any means for loose interpretation of the fire safety requirements regarding external wall construction but the explanatory note issued by the
01:41:08 but the explanatory note issued by the government soon after the grenfell tower of fire did just that this was the dclg's note 4 which provided
01:41:15 provided another means for loose interpretation by conflating the polyethylene core of the acp panels with insulation materials by labeling it filler material and thereby applying the
01:41:26 filler material and thereby applying the requirements in section 12 12.7 of adb for insulation materials instead of those in section 12.6 external wall surfaces
01:41:37 external wall surfaces dr lane has explained the error of this approach
01:41:41 approach this note this sorry this note 4 exemplifies the inadequacy of a piecemeal approach to revising the guidance in adb for a long time before the grenfell
01:41:52 for a long time before the grenfell tower disaster adb needed wholesale review and revision not piecemeal amendment to provide the construction industry with useful guidance on how to meet the
01:42:05 with useful guidance on how to meet the functional requirements of regulations b3 and b4
01:42:08 b3 and b4 one and two when re-cladding existing high-rise residential buildings rain screen cladding systems can be beneficial by increasing thermal efficiency and
01:42:19 by increasing thermal efficiency and keeping buildings dry but as now seems obvious they can increase the risk of fire unless carefully designed and installed the authors of note 4 did not conquer
01:42:31 the authors of note 4 did not conquer the complexities of adb neither did those involved in the refurbishment of grenfell tower then must the fbu submits be a reason why the designers of the rain screen
01:42:43 why the designers of the rain screen credit system at grenfell tower including architects cladding specialists did not understand the relevant sections of the adb the fbi submits there are three major
01:42:54 the fbi submits there are three major factors
01:42:55 factors one the breathtaking failure of the design team to read and understand the guidance two the complexity of that guidance and three the inadequacies of
01:43:06 and three the inadequacies of inadequacies of the testing certification and classification regime these issues like the modules for this inquiry are all interlinked they all reflect the culture
01:43:17 interlinked they all reflect the culture of complacency referred to in our opening submissions for module one as to the first the breathtaking failure of the design team to read and understand the guidance
01:43:29 understand the guidance and without re repeating the transcript references set out in the fbi's written opening submissions for module two andre kurchel
01:43:37 kurchel did not reacquaint himself with regulations b3 and b4 and so could not supervise bruce soames mr sones had not heard of the phrase limited combustibility
01:43:49 limited combustibility and could not recall if he was aware that buildings over 18 meters had different guidance he did not recall reading section 9 of appendix b to adb during the gt product
01:44:00 product project and he did not know the potential routes to compliance under adb at the time of the gt project it could not confirm which route was actually followed
01:44:09 followed neil crawford assumed it was the linear route meaning sections 12.6 to 12.9 of adb
01:44:16 adb although he never discussed this with anyone
01:44:20 anyone thomas wreck was not aware of the general principle that insulation in walls of buildings with a story more than 18 meters above ground level should be of limited combustibility and couldn't define a
01:44:31 combustibility and couldn't define a material of limited combustibility kevin lam did not know what route to compliance was taken at grenfell tower he knew that insulation products needed to be class zero but he didn't know
01:44:42 to be class zero but he didn't know there had to be of limited combustibility reading the guidance would have helped and better training for these members of the design team would have helped as to the second factor identified above
01:44:56 as to the second factor identified above the complexity of that guidance the inquiry may find the complexity of the guidance in adb contributed to the grenfell tower disaster itself the complexity is demonstrated both by
01:45:07 the complexity is demonstrated both by the misfired note 4 published by the government post grenfell and the widespread ignorance of the design team on the grenfell tower project
01:45:16 project the existence of so many high-rise residential buildings with what is now recognized to be dangerous crowding up and down the country may support such a conclusion dr lane and her team have now undertaken
01:45:28 and her team have now undertaken wholesale review of the guidance in adb and she has recommended a spate of necessary revisions
01:45:35 revisions the fbu submits the government should have conducted a wholesale review of the guidance in adb long before the grenfell tower disaster prompted by the inquests into the fatal fires and shirley towers
01:45:47 fires and shirley towers in lacanal house
01:45:50 as to the third the inadequacies of the testing
01:45:53 testing certification and classification regime and commensurate with the complexity of the guidance in adb the testing and certification regime was mind-boggling dr lane
01:46:06 regime was mind-boggling dr lane describes a range of different testing methods that could be adopted to enable a material or product to be certified as passing either national class standards by british standard testing or european standards and she summarizes
01:46:19 or european standards and she summarizes them in several tables in her appendix f the inquiry may find that this added layer of complexity deterred both the practitioners in the design team on the grenfell tower project
01:46:31 team on the grenfell tower project and those responsible for enforcing the regulations from engaging with the documents
01:46:35 documents such as bre 135 and led them instead to rely on the contradictory guidance in diagram 40. no need to read the book just look at the pictures the chairman
01:46:47 just look at the pictures the chairman cited with approval at paragraph 23.62 of his phase one report
01:46:52 report the opinions of professor bisbee and professor torreira who were pains to emphasize the complexity of the rain screen cladding system in terms of the interactions between its various components
01:47:04 various components when exposed to fire the chairman expressed his intention to investigate the extent to which those complexities were recognized and understood by those in the design of the refurbishment and the extent to which the current
01:47:16 and the extent to which the current evaluation and testing regime is capable of ensuring that they are properly consistently with professors torreira and bisbee dr lane testified last week that with a
01:47:27 lane testified last week that with a rain screen cladding system affixed to the facades and crown grenfell tower was a complex building this should have been recognized at the time by those involved in this refurbishment dr lane should know that many of the
01:47:40 dr lane should know that many of the victims of the grenfell tower disaster and i include injured firefighters among them have read and welcomed her reports and respect her painstaking determination to unravel these complexities
01:47:54 i turn to the public interest in testing these building materials the chairman of the panel has already confirmed his public interest in his phase one report central government has long recognized
01:48:05 central government has long recognized the public interest in understanding how building products react when exposed to fire testing products with its own research arms such as the building research establishment bre
01:48:16 establishment bre and regulating the use of building materials
01:48:19 materials as far back as the great fire of london in 1666 the city was rebuilt in accordance with new building regulations requiring the use of stone and brick instead of wood
01:48:30 instead of wood the government has long known of the risks associated with cladding systems and the need for proper testing of building materials mps took a close interest through the 1999 inquiry on cladding after fires at
01:48:41 1999 inquiry on cladding after fires at nosley heights in 1991 and garnet court in 1999. the select committee reported on the 5th of january 2000 on the potential risks which could be posed by fast bread
01:48:53 which could be posed by fast bread involving external cladding systems including
01:48:55 including a shorter period available for escape from the building thus potentially endangering life disproportionate difficulties in firefighting disproportion disproportionate damage to the building
01:49:07 disproportionate damage to the building if only those words had been properly heeded
01:49:10 heeded the select committee in 2000 noted and i quote
01:49:15 quote the responsible attitude taken by the major cladding manufacturers towards minimizing the risks of excessive fast spread
01:49:23 spread which had been impressed upon us throughout this inquiry that's paragraph 18 of the committee's first report and concluded that all external cladding systems should be required either
01:49:34 systems should be required either to be entirely non-combustible or to be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk in terms of fast spread that's paragraph 20.
01:49:44 20. but the rain screen cladding system constructed for grenfell tower met neither of those standards being neither non-combustible nor proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk in terms of fast spread
01:49:56 risk in terms of fast spread where was the responsible attitude impressed upon the 1999 inquiry how did the cladding industry and all those involved in the gt refurbishment come to assume without proof that highly
01:50:07 come to assume without proof that highly combustible building materials could be used
01:50:10 used on high-rise residential buildings the paradigm
01:50:13 paradigm of a high-risk building this brings me to the independence of the certification bodies testing certification and classification bodies should
01:50:23 should be independent of the construction industry including the manufacturers of cladding materials this has long been recognized for example in its annual report for the year ending 31st of march 1999 the day it ceased to
01:50:37 31st of march 1999 the day it ceased to be a non-departmental public body uh an ndpb as their name sponsored by a government department and was then afforded greater autonomy
01:50:48 afforded greater autonomy the british board of agreement declared under the heading background i don't cite it all but just extracting the relevant bits the bba was established to provide construction industry decision makers
01:51:00 construction industry decision makers with independent information on product performance through its aggramar certificates stimulating safe innovation by manufacturers instead and perhaps
01:51:11 by manufacturers instead and perhaps relying on the responsible attitude noted by the select committee in paragraph 18 of the first report cited above these bodies appear to have lost their independence from the crowding and
01:51:22 independence from the crowding and construction industry why did this happen the inquiry may consider it relevant that a when these bodies lost their public funding they became reliant upon
01:51:33 public funding they became reliant upon their commercial sponsors for their running costs this caused an inevitable loss of apparent if not actual independence and may account for some loss of rigor
01:51:44 some loss of rigor b further evidence of a loss of independence is the involvement of construction construction product manufacturers on the board of the bba for example mr ankers chief executive of
01:51:57 for example mr ankers chief executive of the construction products association cpa served on the board of governors of the bba from the 25th of november 1999
01:52:05 1999 until after the grenfell tower disaster who is the cpa it claims on its website to be the leading organization that represents and champions
01:52:16 that represents and champions construction product manufacturers and suppliers equally mr harper a former group chief executive of certex group
01:52:27 group chief executive of certex group limited so served from 15th of november 7
01:52:31 7 until the 13th 31st of march 2016 chairing the bba's board from 2008. celetex in this context needs no introduction
01:52:42 introduction the fbu asked how if at all where these conflicts of interest resolved within the bba
01:52:48 the bba the bba produced certificates which beggar belief was the noble public interest purpose for which the bba was established displaced
01:52:57 displaced to further the interests of its sponsors from the construction industry likewise the inquiry may consider it relevant to investigate why the bre allowed itself to be constrained by
01:53:08 allowed itself to be constrained by confidentiality agreements in the usa could make of test fails did they safeguard the test sponsor's proprietary information at the expense of the public interest in learning from the test results
01:53:20 learning from the test results the fba would ask the inquiry to find that the learning from tests both successful and failed should have been made readily available to those in the fire safety community
01:53:31 the fire safety community including all the different testing certification and classification bodies as well as designers of rain screen cladding systems fire safety consultants and those working in building control and in fire safety departments the fbu
01:53:44 and in fire safety departments the fbu hopes the inquiry will investigate the underlying causes for the ignorance neglect and or complacent assumption of most of those involved at all stages of the grenfell tower refurbishment
01:53:55 of the grenfell tower refurbishment those underlying causes lie at the heart of the inquiry and may include introducing private approved inspectors in 1984 and extending their use in 1997
01:54:07 in 1984 and extending their use in 1997 amending the building regulations and the adb guidance from 1985 but failing to clarify the guidance following the shirley towers and uh black and old house fires to explain the fire safety
01:54:18 fires to explain the fire safety requirements of the increasingly prevalent rain stream cladding systems seeking thermal efficiency but ignoring the correlative increased fire risk cuts to the enforcement agencies both
01:54:30 cuts to the enforcement agencies both building control fire authorities and housing authorities reducing their ability to enforce standards and respond effectively to the new challenges of rain screen cladding systems near constant attacks upon the public sector
01:54:42 constant attacks upon the public sector including fire and local housing authorities privatization of and the encroaching influence of the construction industry upon
01:54:50 upon the testing and certification bodies the bre in 97
01:54:54 bre in 97 and the bba in 99 the lack of publicly funded
01:54:58 funded non-industry research into changing risks posed by new construction methods and systems the introduction of the fire safety order which ignored the structure and exterior
01:55:09 ignored the structure and exterior buildings
01:55:10 buildings failed to address the particular fire safety requirements of residential buildings
01:55:15 buildings the introduction of the housing health and safety rating system in 2004 with no commensurate increase in housing authorities budgets to enable them to provide enough environmental health practitioners
01:55:26 environmental health practitioners to consider the fire hazards associated with rain screen trading systems the concurrent deregulation agenda making it easy for the construction industry to minimize
01:55:37 industry to minimize yet hard for the enforcing agencies to ensure
01:55:40 ensure compliance the abolition of the central fire against advisory council in 2004 and the failure of successor bodies
01:55:49 bodies to advise on the increasing fire risks associated with thermal insulation and the rain screen crowding systems finally the failure of national and local government and of the testing and
01:56:00 local government and of the testing and certification bodies to monitor the development of risks as highlighted by cladding farmers in the uk
01:56:08 uk and abroad although postponing to module six it's imperative that the fbu submit that these underlying causes are then addressed with the same vigor and attention to
01:56:19 with the same vigor and attention to detail as the inquiry has applied in phase one
01:56:22 phase one and in module one of phase two and so in conclusion the multiple phase of the testing certification and classification regime in operation before the grenfell tower
01:56:33 in operation before the grenfell tower disaster were due to a combination of the failure of government to undertake a wholesale review
01:56:38 review of the guidance in adb the failure of the testing certification and classification bodies to retain independence from their commercial sponsors the failure of the design team to
01:56:49 the failure of the design team to confront and understand either the guidance
01:56:52 guidance or the testing certification and classification regime the failure of government to regulate the installation of rain screen cladding systems as presaged was laid by lady
01:57:03 presaged was laid by lady judith hackett as seen with the design and construction companies reviewed in module one the fbu suggests it will become clear in module two in the context of construction product
01:57:15 in the context of construction product manufacturers and suppliers that companies cannot be trusted to regulate themselves thank you miss jim well thank you very much mr seaword that was
01:57:26 much mr seaword that was very interesting and helpful thank you now
01:57:29 now our final
01:57:33 our final speaker this afternoon is miss stud queens council who's going to address us on behalf of the mayor of london yes hello miss stud good afternoon
01:57:44 yes hello miss stud good afternoon good afternoon you can you can i take it you can see me and hear me is that right good welcome good yes and we can see and hear you so when you're ready we shall look forward to hearing what you have to say
01:57:56 to hearing what you have to say thank you mr chairman in a letter to the mayor
01:58:00 mayor dated the 3rd of august 2020 you wrote the inquiry's terms of reference are limited to matters direct directly relating to the fire and do not
01:58:11 directly relating to the fire and do not include the influence of social background and race on the allocation of social housing you went on i've always made it clear however
01:58:21 however that if in the course of the investigations the panel finds that factors of that kind played a part in any of the decisions under consideration it will make that clear in its report
01:58:34 it will make that clear in its report since the last time the core participants made submissions before you through the impact of the covid19 pandemic
01:58:42 pandemic the brutal killing of george floyd and the welcome interest in profile of the black lives matter movement
01:58:50 movement we are reminded of the racial and social economic inequalities present in our society which must not be ignored by this inquiry as a potential factor in influencing
01:59:02 as a potential factor in influencing attitudes and behaviors during the grenville tower refurbishment project
01:59:08 project the mayor raises these issues here and now
01:59:12 now although appreciating that these matters will probably continue to apply in relation to the letter later modules in this inquiry however it must be at
01:59:23 in this inquiry however it must be at the forefront of any examination of decision making throughout the inquiries investigations in relation to its terms of reference
01:59:34 of the many public concerns that fall to be examined and considered by this inquiry
01:59:41 inquiry it is perhaps the visual imagery of the grenville tower cladding on fire on the 14th of june 2017
01:59:50 2017 which remains imprinted in the public memory
01:59:53 memory and causes continuing anxiety to many the post-fire testing of the cladding and the results of those tests taken together with the images
02:00:05 tests taken together with the images that we all saw both at the time and in the aftermath of the fire
02:00:10 the fire has had significant and long-lasting impact
02:00:14 impact on the ability of residents living in buildings with unsafe cladding systems whatever their height and throughout the united kingdom to feel safe in their homes
02:00:27 to feel safe in their homes current inquiries reveal that there are 179 buildings in london above 18 meters in height where aluminium composite cladding
02:00:38 aluminium composite cladding still requires removal additionally 2784 buildings have been registered with the government building safety fund
02:00:50 government building safety fund for the removal of dangerous non-acm cladding
02:00:54 cladding you can see mr chairman that the full scale of the problem is vast
02:01:00 but returning to london there are a significant number of tall buildings in london those who work or reside in them
02:01:10 them need to know that safety is first priority
02:01:14 priority for those responsible for construction and refurbishment the financial cost must not be permitted to take priority over safety
02:01:28 during this module the inquiry will be examining the procurement use and marketing of the cladding products
02:01:35 products used at the grenville tower as dame judith hackett commented in her introduction to her final report the debate continues to run about
02:01:47 the debate continues to run about whether or not aluminium cladding is used for thermal insulation weatherproofing or as an integral part of the fabric fire safety and integrity of the building this
02:02:00 and integrity of the building this illustrates the siloed thinking that is part of the problem we must address
02:02:06 address it is clear that in this type of debate the basic intent of fire safety has been lost
02:02:15 mr chairman it became apparent from the evidence that you heard in phase 2 module 1
02:02:20 module 1 that the corporate core participants concerned in the refurbishment of the grenville tower may have had different priorities than the safety of the residents and their visitors when
02:02:33 of the residents and their visitors when they were considering the appropriate materials
02:02:36 materials to use in the refurbishment those different priorities resulted in the catastrophic results with which we are now so tragically familiar
02:02:49 mr chairman you reached a conclusion in the phase one report that there was compelling evidence that the external walls of the building failed to comply with requirement b41
02:03:02 failed to comply with requirement b41 of schedule 1 to the building regulations 2010 in that they did not adequately resist the spread of fire having regard to the height use and
02:03:13 having regard to the height use and position of the building in fact your conclusion stated on the contrary
02:03:19 contrary that they actively promoted it it will be necessary for this module to look back
02:03:26 look back and understand why it was that combustible cladding came to be installed on the grenville tower
02:03:34 tower this module focusing as it does on testing
02:03:38 testing certification product marketing and promotion
02:03:42 promotion is fundamental to assessing accountability the inquiry will have to consider the evidence provided by a number of core participants as to their responsibility for
02:03:54 as to their responsibility for undertaking evaluating and making public in their literature the detailed results of fire performance testing
02:04:03 testing and their explanations as to whether and if so to what extent fire performance testing and safety was regarded as being secondary to commercial competitiveness and profit
02:04:18 if as the mayor anticipates this was the case
02:04:21 case then the inquiry will need to consider what measures it can recommend that will prevent organizations from adopting such warped and dangerous priorities in the future
02:04:33 future this should necessarily encompass both specific recommendations related to building safety and general recommendations applicable to this and other safety
02:04:44 applicable to this and other safety critical sectors it is an unfortunate fact that demonstrable shortcomings the that the demonstrable shortcomings the inquiries i'm covering
02:04:55 the inquiries i'm covering are not limited to the building cladding section
02:04:58 section sector in recent years for example we have seen airplane and car manufacturers putting profit ahead of safety the effective
02:05:10 ahead of safety the effective recommendations made in this inquiry must impact more widely to compel a safety first approach across all industries within both the public and private
02:05:22 within both the public and private sectors
02:05:25 sectors the mayor has already shared his concerns with the government about the appropriateness of using assessments in lieu of tests or desktop studies as they they are more readily known
02:05:37 readily known the inquiry is very familiar with the criticisms made of these assessments by dame judith hackett both in her interim and in her final report and the mayor invites the inquiry to
02:05:49 and the mayor invites the inquiry to robustly examine this issue and establish how it was that this method with its lack of transparency and use of inaccurate or inadequate data
02:06:00 and use of inaccurate or inadequate data came to be used to test suitability of insulation and cladding systems
02:06:07 looking forward the mayor would ask the inquiry to make recommendations to support those made by dame judith hackett so as to ensure the development of a clearer
02:06:18 ensure the development of a clearer more transparent and more effective specification and testing regime for construction products to that he would add the need for the
02:06:29 to that he would add the need for the results of testing to be readily readily accessible to the public and open to scrutiny to promote transparency
02:06:40 to promote transparency the mayor invites the inquiry to make interim recommendations to ensure that vital changes can be implemented with some urgency on grounds of safety
02:06:51 on grounds of safety he also supports the government's ban on combustible materials on external walls but would urge you also to consider a recommendation to ban its use on all
02:07:02 recommendation to ban its use on all buildings
02:07:03 buildings regardless of height and use
02:07:09 the map seeks to lead by example since september 2019 in new housing developments on greater london authority land delivered through the london development
02:07:21 delivered through the london development plan there is a requirement for the provision of sprinklers in new flats control over the use of combustible materials in buildings of any height and compulsory registration of white
02:07:33 and compulsory registration of white goods to enable effect to be given to a product recall by way of example the mayor will be working with a development partner to build in excess of 800 homes at the same
02:07:45 build in excess of 800 homes at the same times hospital site in haringey which will be developed under this
02:07:52 criteria the mayor wishes just to return briefly to what i've said earlier towards the beginning of this opening about the scenes indelibly imprinted in the minds of many
02:08:04 the minds of many but most particularly the bereaved survivors and relatives in this very emotive part of the inquiry the bereaved survivors and relatives
02:08:15 the bereaved survivors and relatives need and deserve candor transparency and honesty from all the relevant core participants they of course remain at the heart of
02:08:26 they of course remain at the heart of this inquiry and they need to have their questions answered
02:08:32 answered mr chairman that's all i have to say by way of opening well thank you very much indeed and we'll certainly be considering all those suggestions very carefully thank you um
02:08:44 carefully thank you um that i think brings us to a close for this afternoon we shall be sitting tomorrow because we don't sit on fridays but we will take up the
02:08:56 but we will take up the mantle again on monday morning when we'll hear further from other core participants making their opening statements so
02:09:08 that's all for today 10 o'clock on monday please thank you
02:09:48 you