Opening of Module 2 investigation into manufacturers' testing, certification and marketing of cladding materials used at Grenfell Tower
00:00:14 so
00:00:24 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing
00:00:28 hearing today we begin module two of this phase of the inquiry in which we're going to investigate the way in which products intended for use in the construction industry are
00:00:39 in the construction industry are manufactured tested and sold and in particular the way in which the materials that were used on the cladding of grenfell tower were presented to the market
00:00:53 were presented to the market we shall begin by listening to core participants opening statements but before we do that i should like formally to welcome mr ali akbar to the panel
00:01:03 panel mr akbar who was recently appointed to the panel by the prime minister is embarking on his role today on behalf of mrs istafan and myself i
00:01:15 on behalf of mrs istafan and myself i should like to welcome mr akbar as a fellow member of the panel we look forward to working with him and benefiting from his experience and we hope that he will find his new
00:01:26 and we hope that he will find his new role interesting and stimulating as we both have unfortunately mr akbar is unable to be here in person this morning because he and his family have recently
00:01:38 because he and his family have recently been isolating due to coronavirus but he's participating in the proceedings remotely and we are in constant communication with him
00:01:49 with him so with that introduction i'm going to invite mr millet to make a brief opening statement uh on behalf of the inquiry
00:01:56 inquiry yes mr miller thank you mr chairman mr chairman
00:01:59 chairman members of the panel we now open module two
00:02:03 two of this phase of the inquiry and i would like to begin by adding my own warm welcome and that of my council team
00:02:11 team to mr ali akbar who joins the panel from today
00:02:16 today module 2 is all about the principal materials
00:02:19 materials used in the cladding system installed at grenfell tower as part of the refurbishment in the years 2012 to 2016. those materials are first
00:02:32 those materials are first the reynabond pe55 cladding or rain screen
00:02:36 screen panels manufactured and sold by arconic second the rs 5000 insulation boards manufactured and sold by celetex
00:02:47 manufactured and sold by celetex third the kingspan cooltherm k15 insulation boards manufactured and sold by kingspan fourth the window infill panels made by alu glaze
00:02:59 alu glaze and fifth the lambotherm cavity barriers manufactured and sold by siderise the specific issues that we will be investigating are those contained in issue 4a of the
00:03:10 are those contained in issue 4a of the inquiry's updated list of issues which can be found on the website but they are as follows and that their title is testing certification and classification
00:03:21 certification and classification exterior wall materials a what testing and or certification and or classification had occurred in respect of the exterior wall materials
00:03:32 wall materials at grenfell tower including the cladding and insulation b was any such testing and or certification and or classification adequate and appropriate
00:03:43 appropriate c is the testing certification and classification regime for external wall materials
00:03:49 materials fit for purpose we will also be examining
00:03:53 examining at issues 4d to h in the updated list of issues so far as concerns the particular component
00:04:00 component elements of the cladding system installed at granville tower the following d was the exterior of the building
00:04:07 building including the cladding insulation fixings and windows compliant with relevant building regulations fire regulations other legislation british standards including testing requirements
00:04:18 including testing requirements guidance and industry practice e to the extent that it was compliant with such regulations legislation british standards guidance etc were any of those
00:04:29 of those inadequate and if so in what respect so far as relevant to the nature and immediate causes of the fire and its spread f if not compliant in any respect what elements
00:04:40 elements or aspects of the exterior of the building at the time of the fire failed to comply with what elements or aspects of what regulations legislation british standards guidance industry practice and in each case to
00:04:52 industry practice and in each case to what extent g who was responsible for such failures and h
00:04:57 and h what advice or information was available and what assessments were made about the components that comprise the exterior of the building their fire safety fire resistance and compliance with safety standards
00:05:08 compliance with safety standards including information or advice from manufacturers of relevant components turning to the topics for module 2 in general terms in the first part of module 2 we will be
00:05:20 in the first part of module 2 we will be hearing from witnesses for or from each of the manufacturers of the principal materials we will be investigating what they did in order to subject
00:05:31 in order to subject those products to fire safety tests how those tests were set up and pursuant to what requirements or guidance how the results of those tests were
00:05:42 how the results of those tests were recorded and archived and who had access to them what information was provided by manufacturers to certifying bodies and how certificates came
00:05:52 came to be astute in the form that they were how the marketing and technical literature published to the uk construction market by each manufacturer for each such product came to be composed
00:06:03 product came to be composed and whether that literature presented its fire classification and fire performance in a fair and transparent manner and what each manufacturer knew about
00:06:14 and what each manufacturer knew about the specific application of its product for use in the cladding system proposed for installation at grenfell tower and their role in selling and providing such products to studio e
00:06:25 such products to studio e ryden and harley for use in that system we propose to take the evidence starting with witnesses from celetex and then kingspan and then allu glaze
00:06:37 and then kingspan and then allu glaze and then ciderise and then finally arconic
00:06:39 arconic we're likely to take the evidence of mr stern of sig sig in either december 2020 or january 2021 later in module 2 we will hear witnesses
00:06:51 later in module 2 we will hear witnesses from the testing house the bre in respect of the testing to british standard 8414 of the systems incorporating the celetex and kingspan insulation products and the
00:07:02 and kingspan insulation products and the classification of those systems we will also be hearing from the main certification bodies namely the british board of agreement or bba
00:07:12 bba in respect of arconic's rhino bond pe55 panels
00:07:16 panels the one certificate that predated the fire issued on the 14th of january 2008 and kingspan's cool thumb k-15 insulation products namely five certificates running between
00:07:27 namely five certificates running between october 2008 and november 2015. we will also hear from herefordshire building control who under the auspices of the local
00:07:38 who under the auspices of the local authority building control nabc provided system approval and registered details certificates for kingspan's k-15 from may 2009 onwards we will also be
00:07:50 from may 2009 onwards we will also be hearing evidence from labc module 6 when there will be further and broader examination of the testing and certification regime in general and construction products
00:08:01 construction products more generally in turn in module two we will be examining with them the role they played and the tests how they interpolated the test results the extent of their audit
00:08:12 the extent of their audit or monitoring of the manufacturers and how each of the key certificates involved in this inquiry came to be composed and worded as they were
00:08:22 were turning then to the outline program by way of an outline program for module 2 we will have the oral opening statements from certain of the core participants today and again on monday the 9th of
00:08:33 today and again on monday the 9th of november
00:08:34 november next tuesday the 10th of november we will have the benefit of a presentation to be given by dr barbara lane on the subject of fire testing and classification in that presentation she will explain
00:08:45 in that presentation she will explain the relevant fire classifications and the applicable testing regimes and methodologies including those relating to national class naught and limited combustibility on wednesday the
00:08:57 limited combustibility on wednesday the 11th of november we will have the first of our factual witnesses in module 2 namely jonathan room of celetex the factual evidence for module 2 will then run until the 1st of february
00:09:09 will then run until the 1st of february 2021
00:09:11 2021 hearings will then cease for the festive period from the evening of thursday the 17th of december and will resume again on monday the 11th of january 2021 and will then run till
00:09:22 of january 2021 and will then run till the 1st of february 2021 as i've said there will be no expert evidence at the end of module 2. i want to say something about arconic if i may
00:09:34 i may as core participants know from the inquiries letter of the 29th of september 2020 on the 25th of november 2019 the inquiry indicated that it would be
00:09:46 the inquiry indicated that it would be calling oral evidence from six current or former employees of arconic in module two three of whom are resident in france
00:09:55 in france namely claude vela claude schmidt and gwaniel derendinger and one of whom is resident in germany namely peter frelich and two residents who are resident in
00:10:07 and two residents who are resident in the united kingdom deborah french and vince meakins in january 2018 dla piper arconic solicitors wrote to the inquiry
00:10:18 arconic solicitors wrote to the inquiry to raise the issue of article 1 bis of french law number 68678
00:10:24 68678 of the 26th of july 1968 as modified in 1980
00:10:29 1980 it's more commonly referred to as the french blocking statute or the fbs this is a french law it provides as follows subject to
00:10:40 it provides as follows subject to international treaties or agreements and applicable laws and regulations any individual is prohibited from requesting seeking or disclosing in writing
00:10:50 writing orally or in any other form documents or information of an economic commercial industrial financial or technical nature with a view to establishing evidence in foreign judicial or administrative
00:11:02 foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in relation there too article 3 of the french blocking statute imposes criminal sanctions for breach being a maximum of six months
00:11:13 being a maximum of six months imprisonment and or a monetary fine it extends both to natural
00:11:17 natural and to legal persons in january 2018 dla piper asserted that the french blocking statute precluded arconic from disclosing a
00:11:28 precluded arconic from disclosing a large number of relevant documents to the inquiry they suggested that the inquiry seek to enter into an ad hoc agreement with the french government to provide an exception to the
00:11:39 to provide an exception to the prohibitions imposed by the french blocking statute while the inquiry reserved its position on the scope and the effect of the french blocking statute and indeed continues to do so in april 2018 we were able to confirm
00:11:52 in april 2018 we were able to confirm that dla piper could have a discussion with the competent french authorities with a view to facilitating a discussion between the inquiry and representatives of the french ministry of justice
00:12:03 ministry of justice dla piper also encouraged the inquiry to work
00:12:06 work with the metropolitan police service to see if a mechanism could be found to obtain documentation via the concurrent criminal investigation and in a way which permitted it to be shared with the inquiry
00:12:17 shared with the inquiry in the light of that the inquiry worked closely with the metropolitan police to gather witness statements and a significant volume of relevant documents and it did say
00:12:28 documents and it did say in march 2020 so this year dla piper said that it would revisit the issue of the applicability of the french blocking statute to the oral evidence of its witnesses in
00:12:39 to the oral evidence of its witnesses in light of the decision by the attorney general to extend the scope of her undertaking which was originally provided in february 2020. in early june 2020 dla piper asserted
00:12:52 in early june 2020 dla piper asserted that the oral evidence of the archonic witnesses
00:12:56 witnesses who will be called to give evidence in module 2 would engage the french blocking statute dla piper suggested that the inquiry should seek the assistance of her majesty's government in reaching an agreement with the french
00:13:08 in reaching an agreement with the french government in order to overcome the constraints of the french blocking statute as a consequence the inquiry has sought assistance from the foreign commonwealth and development office to
00:13:19 commonwealth and development office to explore the possibility for an agreement to be reached between her majesty's government and the french government that would permit archonic witnesses to attend to give oral evidence to the inquiry
00:13:30 to give oral evidence to the inquiry without risk of prosecution under the french blocking statute the inquiry has been in regular contact with the foreign commonwealth and development office since june this year
00:13:41 since june this year discussions continue if the present position changes then of course core participants will be informed at the earliest
00:13:48 earliest opportunity notices under section 21 of the inquiries act 2005 have been served on ms french and mr meekins
00:13:58 meekins within the united kingdom because they are within the united kingdom they have instructed their own solicitors wilmer hale who have told us that they have accepted service of the section 21 notices
00:14:09 service of the section 21 notices on behalf of miss french and mr meekins and that those witnesses will attend to give evidence but they've also told us that ms french and mr meekins have considered carefully the risk of prosecution under the french
00:14:21 the risk of prosecution under the french blocking statute having done so are content to give evidence pursuant to the section 21 notices without objection they have reserved the right to revisit the application of the french blocking
00:14:33 the application of the french blocking statute
00:14:34 statute if and where circumstances weren't it but as they've told us for the avoidance of doubt such circumstances are not at this stage foreseen the same cannot be said for the archonic
00:14:47 the same cannot be said for the archonic witnesses who are in france and germany namely mr vela mr schmidt mr rendinger in france and mr frolich in germany as to those individuals
00:14:58 in germany as to those individuals we have taken independent leading and junior council's advice as matters stand we consider that there is no legal mechanism for affecting valid service of a section
00:15:09 for affecting valid service of a section 21 notice
00:15:11 21 notice on a witness or potential witness for the inquiry outside the united kingdom and therefore in consequence there is no basis on which an english court could or would enforce such a notice
00:15:23 would enforce such a notice that is principally because the proceedings of the inquiry are not court proceedings to which international conventions on service of court documents apply unlike the two
00:15:34 apply unlike the two uk-based archonic witnesses those four non-uk iconic witnesses are at the moment relying on their risk of prosecution under the french blocking statute as the
00:15:45 under the french blocking statute as the reason for declining to come to the inquiry to give oral evidence
00:15:50 evidence neither arconic nor any of those witnesses has provided any evidence that there is a real risk of prosecution under the french blocking statute if they did attempt to give oral evidence to the inquiry
00:16:03 evidence to the inquiry on the contrary there are very sound reasons for thinking that the risk of their prosecution by the french prosecutor is very low indeed not only has there been to our knowledge only one successful prosecution
00:16:15 only one successful prosecution under the french blocking statute in the 51 years since that statute was enacted but it is hard to think
00:16:22 to think that the french prosecutor would wish to punish those individuals for giving evidence before a public inquiry in an erstwhile eu member state looking into a notorious fire
00:16:33 into a notorious fire in which so many were killed and that is all the more say where those witnesses have extremely pertinent evidence to give
00:16:40 give about the product principally implicated in the rapid and fatal spread of the fire in the end if arconic and its witnesses seek to stand on their strict legal
00:16:51 seek to stand on their strict legal rights
00:16:52 rights and refuse to come to give evidence that is a matter for them they may find that the bsrs other court participants and indeed the public generally take a
00:17:03 and indeed the public generally take a dim view
00:17:04 dim view of their conduct regardless of the legalities doubtless archonic will have considered the impact of its witnesses refusal to give evidence on how they are viewed in the world beyond this inquiry
00:17:15 in the world beyond this inquiry and in particular by the markets both for their own products and the financial markets standing here as i do
00:17:23 as i do i can only urge arconic and its witnesses to do the right thing and come and insist to assist the inquiry
00:17:30 inquiry if they do not then you are not completely powerless the panel has at its disposal detailed documents
00:17:40 documents from arconic and witness statements from these witnesses we will be showing the uh the iconic witnesses
00:17:48 witnesses uh statements and their documents to the public
00:17:51 public to tell the story of arconic's role in selling their acm pe panels to the uk construction industry
00:17:58 industry and particularly those involved in the grenfell tower refurbishment as we have already heard from much of the evidence at module one those witnesses by not attending to explain their words and deeds at the
00:18:10 explain their words and deeds at the time
00:18:11 time run the risk of adverse inference and criticism
00:18:15 criticism and although due account must of course be taken
00:18:18 be taken of their reasons for not attending the countervailing absence of evidence of a real risk of prosecution under the french blocking statute may also weigh in the balance
00:18:29 may also weigh in the balance we've provided a six day slot in the module two timetable for these four non-uk witnesses at present that proposed slot runs from the 14th of january 2021
00:18:40 january 2021 following the evidence of miss french and mr meekins if the four non-uk witnesses do not attend
00:18:47 attend then we will use some of those days to present the relevant evidence and the questions we would have asked them in what we intend to be a coherent way
00:18:57 way so that the public can understand what questions those witnesses would have had to answer
00:19:02 to answer we may then be able to bring forward the remaining module two witnesses but that timetabling will of course be kept under close review i should add that it is possible that we
00:19:13 i should add that it is possible that we will need to recall during the course of module 6 later in this inquiry some witnesses who would have attended or will have attended to give evidence in module 2. i should also say something
00:19:26 in module 2. i should also say something about kingspan cool firm k15 as recently as the 29th of october kingspan solicitors wrote to the inquiry attaching a letter directly from
00:19:37 attaching a letter directly from kingspan to the bre saying that they were now withdrawing a number of their bs 8414 test reports and associated br 135 reports
00:19:50 and associated br 135 reports kingspan's letter to the bre said in terms
00:19:54 terms that the very first test carried out on cool firm k-15 in 2005 was not representative of the k-15 product
00:20:03 product which had been sold by them from 2006 onwards
00:20:08 onwards that is to say the k-15 tested in 2015 in 2005 was essentially a different product
00:20:16 product to what was being sold after 2006. was also confirmed that the k-15 product used in two further bs-8414 tests in 2014 was not representative of the k-15
00:20:29 was not representative of the k-15 product then on the market the letter says that this was prompted by discoveries of irregularities relating to the testing systems of the systems tested which had in turn been prompted by
00:20:41 which had in turn been prompted by requests from this inquiry now this raises very serious questions about why king spann did not withdraw these reports at the earliest opportunity when it
00:20:52 at the earliest opportunity when it became aware of these issues and at the first sign of any material irregularity the inquiry has been and had been actively pursuing this line of investigation with kingspan
00:21:04 investigation with kingspan for some two years therefore questions as to why these reports continue to be relied upon why they were not withdrawn earlier as a precautionary measure and the timing of this letter our
00:21:16 and the timing of this letter our matters we will have to explore in the evidence clearly however this is a matter of significant public importance and will need to be investigated in this module and possibly at module 6
00:21:28 module and possibly at module 6 as well members of the panel that was all i was proposing to say by way of opening module the module two to you
00:21:35 to you we will now turn to hear opening statements from the core participants starting with team one of the bsrs represented by ms stephanie barwise queen's council yes thank you very much mr millet now
00:21:46 yes thank you very much mr millet now before i invite miss barwise to address us can i just remind everyone that although we had been hoping to enable some of the uh those representing core participants
00:21:57 uh those representing core participants to address us in person for reasons that i explained earlier in the week the imposition of the lockdown makes it important for us to ensure that as few people as possible come through
00:22:09 as few people as possible come through the building at any one time and so we have uh asked all those concerned to make their
00:22:17 their opening statements to us remotely so at this point i'm going to invite miss barwise to address us before i do that can i just make sure i've got contact with miss
00:22:28 i've got contact with miss barwise good morning miss barwise good morning mr chairman and you can see me and i can see you indeed
00:22:36 indeed yes we can hear each other good good right well then uh over to you please um make your opening statement if you would thank you thank you very much sir and
00:22:47 thank you thank you very much sir and good morning mr fan and mr mr akbar you have our written submissions our submissions today will fall into four parts first an interview an overview of the crisis in industry so far as product
00:23:00 crisis in industry so far as product testing and marketing is concerned and the manifestation of that problem at grenfell
00:23:06 grenfell second a brief review of the regulatory and testing regime third analysis of the behavior of the principal manufacturers in their testing of the grenfell products and finally
00:23:18 of the grenfell products and finally concluding remarks starting with the overview it is all too clear that the manufacturers whose products were used at grenfell were untroubled by the safety of their
00:23:30 were untroubled by the safety of their products
00:23:31 products and some of them remained so despite the disastrous fire i will address their written submissions in due course but it is of great concern that even now
00:23:42 but it is of great concern that even now kingsfan seeks to trivialize its wrongdoing and despite compelling evidence to the contrary
00:23:49 contrary arconic does not even accept that it did anything wrong instead arconic continues to perversely assert that its product could have complied
00:23:59 complied even though that assertion is undermined by the test evidence relating to the reynabond pe55 planning panel
00:24:07 panel which the chairman has in any event found non-compliant in phase one siderise acknowledges that its cavity barriers are incapable of being tested in a construction representative of rain
00:24:19 construction representative of rain screen cladding except in specific tests yet it fails to advertise that fact clearly in its marketing materials the failure by these manufacturers to
00:24:31 failure by these manufacturers to acknowledge the seriousness of their behaviors
00:24:33 behaviors still less the consequences renders any other assertions they make utterly hollow the serious implications raised by the manufacturer's testing and
00:24:45 raised by the manufacturer's testing and promotion of the products used at grenfell
00:24:48 grenfell which includes the independence of testing
00:24:51 testing and certification bodies require a radical rethink of the current regulatory framework and testing regimes the supposedly independent test and
00:25:02 the supposedly independent test and certification bodies acted in breach of the duties of impartiality and accuracy imposed on them by international standards implemented in the uk by british
00:25:14 implemented in the uk by british standards
00:25:15 standards the failings and susceptibility to abuse of the large-scale fire testing regime are of the utmost importance since this regime underlies the
00:25:26 since this regime underlies the government's building safety program which prescribes the extent
00:25:30 extent to which the combinations of products used on facades are safe or not critically that program currently allows on high-rise
00:25:41 high-rise residential buildings so-called flame retardant fr polyethylene cord cladding
00:25:48 cladding albeit only in conjunction with mineral wool insulation and also allows foam insulation albeit only in conjunction with a2 cord composite flat cladding
00:26:00 composite flat cladding these may in fact be dangerous combinations given the inherent flaws in large-scale testing
00:26:07 testing and the wage in which it's been abused to our knowledge from the very outset in 2005 namely just before the introduction of large-scale testing
00:26:19 large-scale testing as an alternative route to compliance for both
00:26:22 for both cladding and insulation as a system these combinations certainly would not be permissible in new builds or overcladding now since the amendment of the building
00:26:33 the amendment of the building regulations in 2018 to prohibit the use of any material below a2
00:26:39 a2 in the facade a feature which dominates the events leading to the use of products at grenfell and therefore cannot be ignored is the role of culture and competence
00:26:51 is the role of culture and competence within
00:26:52 within both manufacturers and independent test or certification bodies this issue is yet more important than the often asked question whether regulations should be changed
00:27:04 whether regulations should be changed from permitting performance-based design to requiring only prescriptive design both prescriptive and performance-based design
00:27:14 design require great competence in the designer it should be remembered that insofar as the grenfell designers considered routes to compliance at all they all considered that the
00:27:26 at all they all considered that the prescriptive route was being followed and yet that still did not result in compliance the most sinister aspect of the events
00:27:37 the most sinister aspect of the events leading to the product selection at grenfell
00:27:39 grenfell is the manner in which the manufacturers well understood the statutory regulation and guidance and sought to circumvent it by clever marketing so for example the
00:27:51 by clever marketing so for example the manufacturers kingsfan celetex and arconic understood the importance of and misconceptions about class zero classification in the uk and went out of their way to advertise
00:28:04 and went out of their way to advertise their products as having class zero even though in fact neither the kingsman k15 or celetex rs 5000 and tb 4000 insulation
00:28:16 5000 and tb 4000 insulation nor the pe 55 cladding panel used at grenfell
00:28:20 grenfell in fact had class 0 classification what is more class 0 was of no relevance whatsoever to insulation since the classification is only
00:28:31 since the classification is only required under the linear route for the surface of the cladding panel which was required to be class zero whereas the insulation was required to be of limited combustibility
00:28:43 to be of limited combustibility throughout the manufacturers regarded so-called independent certifications such as british board of agroman certificates known as bba certificates
00:28:54 certificates known as bba certificates or local authority building control labc certificates as mere marketing tools and as a result those manufacturers were anything but candid
00:29:05 candid in their dealings with these bodies archonic kingsman and celetex well understood that the building control officer was the only obstacle
00:29:16 control officer was the only obstacle to getting their products onto high-rise buildings
00:29:19 buildings despite the use of such products over 18 meters
00:29:23 meters being a breach of the building regulations and adb if the linear route was being followed the means to circumvent building control officers was by satisfying them with a
00:29:34 officers was by satisfying them with a bba
00:29:35 bba or labc certificate yet worse these manufacturers and their trade associations appear to have lobbied institutions such as the national house building council
00:29:47 as the national house building council and the building control alliance which give guidance to industry and in particular the building control sector this enabled the manufacturers to in effect
00:29:57 effect rewrite the guidance provided by approved document b since they persuaded those institutions to produce guidance notably bca's technical guidance note 18
00:30:09 notably bca's technical guidance note 18 first issued june 2014 and nhbc's july 2016 guidance on the acceptability of combustible materials in common wall constructions
00:30:21 materials in common wall constructions including acm on high-rise buildings both these pieces of guidance in some respects
00:30:27 respects contravened both the building regulations and the guidance contained in adb
00:30:34 in adb by way of brief scene setting of the products used in the facade of grenfell first the various forms of insulation cladding panel and cavity barriers were uniformly unsuitable for use
00:30:46 were uniformly unsuitable for use on a high-rise building this despite the fact
00:30:49 fact that the certificates and marketing materials suggested they were fit for such
00:30:54 such use second neither the insulation nor cladding panel were of limited combustibility as the insulation undoubtedly should have been and we submit the panel should
00:31:05 have been and we submit the panel should also have been given the route to compliance with building regulations being followed with the so-called linear route under adb
00:31:14 adb third there were no valid tests in place justifying the use of any of the insulation products nor the cladding panel over 18 meters and the other tests on which vba labc
00:31:28 and the other tests on which vba labc certificates were based were either not genuinely carried out or not at all starting with the insulation both the insulation managers
00:31:39 insulation managers manufacturers kingsfan and celatex had carried out large-scale testing known as bsa414 testing in a manner both faye
00:31:48 faye and those carrying out the tests should have known to be improper by either concealing components designed to facilitate a pass and or using materials which were not as
00:32:00 and or using materials which were not as described in the test reports the events which led to foam insulations being used on grenfell began in may 2005
00:32:11 began in may 2005 when kingsfan carried out a bs bs-8414 test
00:32:15 test shortly before the adb consultation in july by the july consultation government proposed to introduce the bs-8414 test
00:32:26 bs-8414 test as an alternative means to compliance not only for the cladding panel which is already allowed as an alternative to the compliance uh to adb compliance but also for
00:32:37 uh to adb compliance but also for insulation which had since 1992 been unequivocally required to be of limited combustibility king's fan in 2005
00:32:48 combustibility king's fan in 2005 set the precedent that its combustible polyurethane insulation k15 could pass a vs 8414 test for overcladding and masonry construction this test was
00:33:00 and masonry construction this test was not genuine as i will explain this was the only bs 8414 test
00:33:06 8414 test suggesting foam insulation could be used over 18 meters for some seven years until 2012 when another insulation manufacturer extratherm
00:33:17 extratherm passed the test a test result which was also withdrawn following the fire at grenfell king's fans bs-84141 2005 test
00:33:29 king's fans bs-84141 2005 test is the only test which had any relevance to the grenfell tower as at the date of first supply of kingspan to grenfell in may 2015. king's fans later
00:33:41 in may 2015. king's fans later apparently successful test of k-15 in july 2014
00:33:45 july 2014 was of no relevance to grenfell as it was under the bs-84142 test for cladding on a steel frame it is not a defense for king's fan to
00:33:56 it is not a defense for king's fan to say as it does by its written submissions that it was not aware of the use of k-15 on grenfell until after the fire king's fan has gone out of its way
00:34:07 of its way since 2005 to ensure that the 2005 bs-84141 test had the broadest possible application even though it's clear that bs-8414
00:34:21 even though it's clear that bs-8414 is a system-specific test and by definition not of general application kingspan even saw to extend the application of its bbs
00:34:31 its bbs 84141 test for masonry buildings to steal framed buildings despite the fact
00:34:38 fact of the different bs 84142 test for that the fact that kingspan did not specifically target grenfell as a project is irrelevant
00:34:49 irrelevant all kings fans actions over a prolonged period
00:34:53 period were designed to give the impression that the 2005 test proved k-15 could be safely used over 18 meters regardless of whether the
00:35:04 meters regardless of whether the construction was the same or even close to that tested as to the relatively small amount of k-15 on grenfell we await the expert's opinion on the
00:35:15 we await the expert's opinion on the extent to which k-15 would have assisted rapid flame spread given much was on the columns it may be highly significant given the way columns acted as chimneys
00:35:26 acted as chimneys fueled as dr lane reported in phase one by the insulation within them furthermore in a general sense king's fans actions were seminally causative
00:35:38 fans actions were seminally causative in that it was at this time regarded as the industry leader and it set the precedent that combustible insulation could genuinely pass
00:35:46 pass a bs-8414 test and so be used over 18 meters
00:35:51 meters the inquiry should ignore kings fans claims that it has successfully replicated the 2005 test in 2019 thereby demonstrating that
00:36:02 test in 2019 thereby demonstrating that k-15 could have passed even without the significant distortion of the 2005 test which occurred mr pargeter of kingsman observes that
00:36:13 mr pargeter of kingsman observes that the test conducted in june 2019 was not a perfect replica of the 2005 test
00:36:20 2005 test and indeed how could it be since kingspan employees struggled some years after the test to identify precisely what components have been used in the 2005 test
00:36:33 in the 2005 test furthermore as the schedule of major changes mr pardita exhibits to his third statement shows the k-15 product has undergone so many changes
00:36:44 changes that it isn't the same formula at all as that which is used in 2005. king's fans willingness to suggest that a test many years later on what is in effect a completely
00:36:56 on what is in effect a completely different product demonstrates the 2005 test could have been successful undermines their credibility more bizarrely still and as we heard
00:37:08 more bizarrely still and as we heard from mr millet this morning we learned yesterday that kingsfan has only formally written to fire engineers on the 23rd of october 2020 some four days
00:37:19 days after receipt of the written opening submissions to withdraw the 2005 test we had suggested in our submissions that kingspan had in fact withdrawn the test
00:37:31 kingspan had in fact withdrawn the test in 2019
00:37:32 in 2019 because mr parjita's second statement of paragraph 22.4 suggested as much but it now transpires that the test had not formally been withdrawn the 2005 test should as kingspan
00:37:46 the 2005 test should as kingspan accepts have been withdrawn in 2006 and frankly not relied upon in the first place given the circumstances of its execution
00:37:56 execution this very belated withdrawal is not to kingspan's credit following the 2005 test
00:38:05 test celetex in may 2014 picked up the baton from kingspan using an essentially copycat method of passing the test on its rs 5000 pir insulation
00:38:18 on its rs 5000 pir insulation only this time using a bs-84142 test for clouding on a steel frame not masonry
00:38:25 masonry although this test was irrelevant to grenfell
00:38:28 grenfell by november 2014 celetex had identified grenfell as a must-win bid and made contact with harley to secure the use of
00:38:39 the use of rs 5000 on the project as for the cladding panel arconic had carried out also in 2005 testing under the harmonized
00:38:51 harmonized standard en 135011 at a french government test house including what is known as en138 or the single
00:39:02 en138 or the single burning item test which although smaller scale than the bs8414 test nevertheless involves the construction of a mock-up rig based on arconic's own assessment of the
00:39:14 based on arconic's own assessment of the position
00:39:15 position it appears an artificial construction of the rig was used to obtain a b classification for the rivet version of raynabon pe55
00:39:26 raynabon pe55 the cassette version tested at the same time was given an e classification as the test had to be stopped although the cassette version of pe55 was the one used at grenfell
00:39:39 of pe55 was the one used at grenfell nevertheless arconic's artificial test of the riveted panic panel played a critical role in the story which led to grenfell as it was this test alone which arconic
00:39:51 as it was this test alone which arconic chose to share with the bba for the purpose
00:39:54 purpose of obtaining its bba certificate which gave a b
00:39:57 gave a b classification to rain upon pe55 the certificate on its face appeared to apply to both riveted and cassette versions and the first page
00:40:09 and cassette versions and the first page featured a photo of a high-rise building supplied to vba by arconic each of these manufacturers fully appreciated the inherent flammability
00:40:20 flammability of their products and its unsuitability for use
00:40:24 for use over 18 meters as illustrated by events the only reason to manipulate a test by secret modifications to the rig and or by using materials or products
00:40:35 and or by using materials or products which are unrepresentative of ordinary construction products is that you know the product will not pass unless you do celetex had acknowledged
00:40:47 celetex had acknowledged internally on november 2013 even before embarking on its bs-8414 test that on one view its product realistically shouldn't be used behind
00:41:00 realistically shouldn't be used behind most cladding panels because in the event of a fire it would burn
00:41:08 turning briefly to the relevant regulatory regime the issues within module 2 require us to consider two relevant regimes first the regime governing the supply of
00:41:19 first the regime governing the supply of products to the market by manufacturers and distributors second the regime governing specifiers and contractors in selecting products the regime governing manufacturers and
00:41:30 the regime governing manufacturers and distributors is contained in the construction products regulation 2013 which implements the european council directive known as the construction products regulation 2011.
00:41:43 regulation 2011. that regulation requires that where there is a european harmonised standard in existence for a product then it must be c marked and a declaration of performance must be drawn up for it
00:41:54 up for it it is an offence not to draw up a declaration of performance or to fail to bring a product into conformity with that declaration if manufacturers have reason to believe their product is
00:42:06 have reason to believe their product is not in conformity if however there is no european standard for the product but instead there is a set of guidelines published by the european organization for technical approvals
00:42:17 approvals then the manufacturer may apply for european technical appraisal under those guidelines but is not compelled to do so ce marking is beneficial to manufacturers as it's
00:42:29 is beneficial to manufacturers as it's like a passport which makes the products easily marketable within europe and it's beneficial to end users because the mark guarantees the product meets european safety standards and complies with eu legislation
00:42:43 and complies with eu legislation the second regime governance the designers and contractors all construction work is potentially subject to the building act 1984 which provides for the publication of
00:42:54 which provides for the publication of building regulations those regulations provide that relevant building work must comply with the five functional requirements in schedule one of the regulations those include at b4 the requirement that
00:43:07 those include at b4 the requirement that the external wall shall adequately resist the spread of flame
00:43:11 flame practical guidance as to how the functional requirements are to be achieved is contained in the approved documents with adb relating to file the building act makes clear that
00:43:22 the building act makes clear that compliance with the approved documents is not a complete defense to liability for non-compliance an adb makes clear that it's possible to justify compliance by means other than those contained in it if adb
00:43:36 other than those contained in it if adb is followed however then it provides for three routes to compliance first the linear route in section 12.5 to 12.9
00:43:45 to 12.9 which at the time of grenfell expressly required insulation to be limited combustibility and by virtue of the health warning in 12.5
00:43:54 12.5 we submit that it also required that limited combustibility cord cladding be used
00:44:00 used with a class zero external surface there was a debate about whether the core of the cladding panel should be limited combustibility although industry guidance in the form
00:44:11 although industry guidance in the form of bca's guidance note 18 issued in june 2014 made clear that the linear route required the panel to be of limited combustibility
00:44:22 limited combustibility the second route was that the criteria within a document called br 135 must be satisfied which set parameters for the large-scale bs-8414 tests
00:44:34 bs-8414 tests principally in terms of maximum permissible temperature to be reached within a designated time third a fire safety engineering approach this was expressed to be targeted at a
00:44:46 this was expressed to be targeted at a specific element of the design which is either problematic or a complex structure
00:44:52 structure such as an airport terminal our regulations at the time of grenfell therefore utilized a predominantly performance-based approach telling designers what functionality was
00:45:03 telling designers what functionality was required
00:45:04 required rather than telling them how to achieve it but also proffering a linear or prescriptive route that performance versus prescriptive balance has shifted slightly with the
00:45:16 balance has shifted slightly with the 2018 amendment to the building regulations prohibiting products which are less than a2
00:45:23 a2 it's important to note that adb did not provide for compliance by means of a desktop study this was introduced by the bca guidance note 18
00:45:33 note 18 and was defined as the opinion of a suitably qualified fire specialist that the cladding system proposed
00:45:40 proposed would meet the criteria of br135 importantly regulation 7 of the building regulations requires that products and materials are
00:45:51 that products and materials are appropriate for the circumstances in which they are used this is elaborated by appendix a of adb which requires that the product must either be in accordance with a
00:46:02 must either be in accordance with a design
00:46:03 design shown by test to be capable of meeting the performance required by british or european standard or have been assessed from test evidence by ucas accredited laboratory
00:46:14 by ucas accredited laboratory using appropriate standards or design guidance
00:46:18 guidance that guidance was the extended application or exact rules implemented in the uk by british standards
00:46:25 standards the fire test study group also produced guidance
00:46:28 guidance on assessments of products in lieu of tests in june 2000 both the xap and file test study group guidance
00:46:37 guidance are clearly targeted at providing for the extrapolation of tests from one product to others within a family as opposed to extending the results of an
00:46:48 opposed to extending the results of an entire system test to another system a means of extrapolating the large-scale test now exists in the form of bs 9414 but this did not exist at the time of
00:47:01 but this did not exist at the time of grenfell
00:47:02 grenfell this calls into question all desktop studies carried out the sinister rewriting of the adb guidance which began with bca's guidance note 18
00:47:13 note 18 introducing the concept of desktop studies was inappropriate in that there was at the time no means of extrapolating the results of the s8414 system test
00:47:25 the results of the s8414 system test furthermore the july 2016 guidance went yet further and contravened both the requirements of the building regulations and of adb by introducing the ability to
00:47:36 and of adb by introducing the ability to use combinations of highly flammable material
00:47:40 material over 18 meters acm and foam insulations in a defined wall build up from inside to outside but without the need even for a desktop
00:47:53 but without the need even for a desktop it is now clear that kingspan was actively involved in the drafting of both pieces of guidance
00:47:59 guidance as internal email exchanges show king's fan was in its own words slowly educating the nhbc and working with them to produce bca
00:48:12 and working with them to produce bca technical guidance note 18 that promotes bs
00:48:16 bs 8414 and desktops to the bs 8414 testing regime which underlay the alternative route in the adb guidance and which underlies the government's
00:48:28 and which underlies the government's building safety program it's instructive to consider its history as at 2005 the consultation on adb proposed the bs 8414 test as an
00:48:39 proposed the bs 8414 test as an alternative route to compliance for the insulation this suggests we had forgotten what we knew
00:48:46 knew namely that combustible insulation poses a threat to life and needs to be of limited combustibility on taller buildings large-scale testing was initially
00:48:57 large-scale testing was initially suggested in 1988 by the first edition of br135 only for insulation because at that point in time combustible insulation was permitted by
00:49:09 combustible insulation was permitted by the then enforce adb 1985 provided it was encased in brick or block the first edition of vr135 recognized that
00:49:20 vr135 recognized that even encased in brick or block insulation provided a risk of progressive fire spread within the facade by the time the first large-scale test
00:49:31 large-scale test fire note 9 predecessor to bs8414 was introduced it was an alternative means of compliance for the cladding panel
00:49:40 panel alone that was because by that time the then enforce adb 1992 required insulation must without exception
00:49:51 exception be limited combustibility over 18 meters adb 2006 however introduced large-scale testing
00:50:00 testing as an alternative means of compliance to the linear route for both cladding panel and insulation as we know the manufacturers were alive to this change
00:50:11 to this change and sought to exploit it it's ironic that the large-scale test first proposed in order to protect life by recognizing the inherent risk in
00:50:22 life by recognizing the inherent risk in using combustible insulation at a time when its use was not prohibited has become a vehicle for abusing the system and allowing combustible material back onto walls at height
00:50:35 onto walls at height as dr lane will give a presentation next week on testing i shall say only that which is necessary to explain kingspan celetex's abuse of the bs-8414 test
00:50:46 the bs-8414 test the large-scale test consists of a rig six meters high with a main wall and a side or wing wall both are mocked up with cladding panels cavity barriers and insulation
00:50:57 cavity barriers and insulation with a crib containing the heat source in the main wall the test lasts 60 minutes for ignition with the heat source being extinguished after 30 minutes the performance of the
00:51:09 after 30 minutes the performance of the cladding system is judged by reference to the criteria in br 135 governing maximum permissible temperatures allowable within prescribed times these
00:51:20 allowable within prescribed times these are measured at two sets of the thermocouples running horizontally across the rig if these temperatures are exceeded or importantly the flames over top the rig then the
00:51:31 the flames over top the rig then the test is a fail however as the bs-8414 test themselves contain no pass or fail criteria whilst the system tested
00:51:41 tested and the time temperature data is recorded in a test report the test can only be meaningfully interpreted by a classification report from the test house
00:51:51 house which confirms whether or not the criteria
00:51:54 criteria in br135 have been met a further problem with the bs-8414 tests and indeed the smaller scale tests under
00:52:05 and indeed the smaller scale tests under bsen135011 is that products may be assisted to pass using
00:52:10 using fire retardants which have the effect of delaying the time to ignition and reducing flame spread in a test but that is not indicative of how the
00:52:21 but that is not indicative of how the products will behave in a real fire this practice of adding fire retardants is clear from papers sango bam has including its northborough research
00:52:33 including its northborough research paper which makes clear that this practice of including retardants is not only hazardous to health and the environment but furthermore it is done solely and i
00:52:44 but furthermore it is done solely and i quote
00:52:45 quote in order to pass unrealistic fire safety tests
00:52:49 tests this stark fact alone calls into question
00:52:53 question the viability of large-scale testing as a measure of fire safety the use of retardants to pass smaller scale tests also needs to be addressed both kings
00:53:05 also needs to be addressed both kings fan and celetex have used fire retardants as paul o'brad explained to selatex's management committee by his email of the 13th of august 2012 fire retardant is used in all celotex
00:53:18 fire retardant is used in all celotex products
00:53:19 products he expressed concerns that if lev levels of retardance were lowered he would have concerns about fitness of purpose of the product kingspan have used fire retardant
00:53:31 kingspan have used fire retardant lacquer specifically to ensure k-15 passed bs 476 parts six and seven so the class zero tests as mr pagita admits by his third statement
00:53:44 admits by his third statement the deficiencies in the bs-841 form methodology have been well ventilated not least but it's not reflective of what dr lane calls real life conditions in a facade namely
00:53:58 real life conditions in a facade namely test windows vents and doors that's paragraph 01.120 of her phase 1 report arab is also on record as saying that it is practically
00:54:09 record as saying that it is practically impossible to replicate the text construction on site
00:54:15 site turning to the principal manufacturer's testing of the grenfell products i start with kingspan's 2005 bs bs-84141 test of k-15
00:54:26 test of k-15 which as i've said was the only relevant test prior to supply to grenfell in may 2015.
00:54:32 2015. this test was wholly invalid the inquiry will need to establish precisely what materials were used in the 2005 test because the bre report is as one of the
00:54:43 because the bre report is as one of the kingspan employees said quite ambiguous in some of its descriptions it is however finally clear from kingspan's 23rd of october 2020
00:54:54 kingspan's 23rd of october 2020 letter to bre that a non-combustible cement fiberboard was used as a cladding panel and we know that the cavity barriers were of a steel and graphite construction
00:55:06 and graphite construction not freely commercially available these materials were unrepresentative of ordinary cladding construction and particularly the cavity barriers were a phenomenal efficacy
00:55:18 phenomenal efficacy preventing the flames from over topping the rig as it appears they otherwise would have done one of the bre engineers who assisted at this test recorded a seemingly falsified delayed
00:55:31 recorded a seemingly falsified delayed set of timings in his notes as explained in our submissions these made the test seem credible when otherwise it would have been apparent that the flames had reached four meters
00:55:42 that the flames had reached four meters up a six metre rig after only five minutes of a sixty minute test thereby demonstrating that the test would have failed but for the cavity barriers
00:55:53 barriers the 2005 test was rendered irrelevant a year after it was carried out since there was a huge tech change in k-15 technology in 2016. sorry in 2006
00:56:06 in 2016. sorry in 2006 the 2005 test was carried out using old technology whereas subsequent tests were carried out using new technology k-15 after the technology change in 2006
00:56:19 k-15 after the technology change in 2006 was a completely different product with poor performance in fire as both kings fan observers and bre who carried out a test on new technology k-15 in 2007
00:56:31 technology k-15 in 2007 acknowledged kingspan's observer referred to the rig as a raging inferno and bre made so-called unofficial comments
00:56:42 made so-called unofficial comments making clear the problem was not a system failure but that in fact the k-15 product was fully
00:56:49 fully involved in the fire and continued to burn
00:56:52 burn after the heat source was extinguished it is therefore disappointing that kingspan's submissions that paragraph 46 characterized the 2007 test on new tech
00:57:05 characterized the 2007 test on new tech k15 as a system failure contrary to what bre told them at the time as is recorded in kingspan's own internal 2008 report of that test
00:57:18 own internal 2008 report of that test kingsfan and its written opening submissions relies on a successful test in 2014 to make the case that new tech k-15 could have passed the
00:57:29 that new tech k-15 could have passed the 2005 test
00:57:31 2005 test we now know that that test has been withdrawn but this test was demonstrably irrelevant anyway principally due to the fact that it was under bs
00:57:41 under bs 84142 for steel frames not for overcladding masonry as the 2005 test was
00:57:48 test was it also used a different cladding panel namely terracotta and as kingspan accept at paragraph 51 of their submissions the 2014 test was in any event
00:57:59 the 2014 test was in any event not reflective of the k-15 product because it utilized a research and development version of k-15 as i said kingspan finally withdrew the 2014 test
00:58:11 2014 test formally by its letter 23rd october 2020 but nevertheless kingspan relies on the fact of re-testing of k-15 with the terracotta panel in april 2015
00:58:23 with the terracotta panel in april 2015 to suggest that the july 2014 terracotta test
00:58:27 test would have passed even if it hadn't been a research and development version of k-15
00:58:33 k-15 a comparison of the test reports however for the terracotta tests in july 2014 and april 2015 at paragraph 48b and 53 of kings band submissions shows
00:58:45 and 53 of kings band submissions shows the tests were not like for like in that the cladding panel used and the cavity barriers were different and the cavity barriers fixed in a different method king's band's reliance on the 2015 test
00:58:57 king's band's reliance on the 2015 test to which
00:58:58 to which to justify the withdrawn 2014 tests therefore does not avail it the position remains that there was no valid bs 84141 test
00:59:10 valid bs 84141 test at the of k-15 at the time of first supply to grenfell
00:59:16 that king's fan and possibly bre had concerns as to the circumstances of the k-15 2005 test after it was carried out is evidenced by the fact that despite
00:59:27 the fact that despite recognizing they needed to obtain a classification report for the 2005 test kingspan failed to do this until 10 years after the test
00:59:37 the test by which time it was as a matter of industry practice obsolete since as resolved by the fire test study group tests expire after five years
00:59:48 tests expire after five years kingspan recognized internally that advertising k15 to have been certified for use above 18 meters was in its own words dodgy given the
00:59:59 was in its own words dodgy given the lack of classification report the other test results relied on by king's fan were class zero results whilst these are wholly irrelevant to
01:00:10 whilst these are wholly irrelevant to insulation kingsfan recognized the importance of these in the uk market and wanted them recorded in the all-important bba certificates kings fans mr pargeter accepted in his
01:00:22 kings fans mr pargeter accepted in his second witness statement that he knew from 2016 onwards k-15 could not achieve class zero but it now seems from his third statement to paragraph 34b
01:00:33 paragraph 34b that the 2012 class zero tests had been assisted to pass using fire retardant as explained in our submissions the 2012 tests were regarded
01:00:44 submissions the 2012 tests were regarded by kingspan as their best ever and not repeatable that is little wonder if fire retardant had been used kingspan appears to have no relevant
01:00:55 kingspan appears to have no relevant class zero results for k-15 at the time and it sought and obtained its first
01:01:01 its first bba certificate for k-15 in october 2008 given the product had changed in 2006 and that as kingspan accepts by paragraph 40 of its submissions
01:01:13 paragraph 40 of its submissions the tests on the foil facer only as opposed to the whole product were undertaken in 2007. despite this practice of testing the
01:01:24 despite this practice of testing the foil facer only being described subsequently by its own employees variously as a bit of a cheat and complete spin kingspan
01:01:36 and complete spin kingspan simply says it should have informed bba of this
01:01:39 of this but nevertheless continues to rely on these and the 2016 tests as justifying k-15s class zero certification that's paragraph 40-42 of their opening
01:01:53 that's paragraph 40-42 of their opening in fact there were no relevant class zero tests which could justify the bba certificates tests in december 2008 were carried out on
01:02:03 on research and development versions of k-15 tests in 2009 were invalidated by the subsequent major product changes mr parjita refers to given kingsfan had
01:02:15 mr parjita refers to given kingsfan had used fire retardant to pass the 2012 tests the december 2013 bba certificate in force at the first supply to grenfell was also obtained
01:02:26 obtained on a false premise as king's fan acknowledges its change control procedures were lacking this made it practically impossible to be sure of the precise characteristics
01:02:38 be sure of the precise characteristics of the product at any one time kingspan had to draw up a declaration of performance due to there being a harmonized european standard
01:02:46 standard in respect of its product that prior to grenfell
01:02:50 grenfell july 2013 attributed a euro class c1 cs1 d0
01:02:57 c1 cs1 d0 one wonders how kingspan could be certain of the accuracy of such a declaration given the major changes in formulation of the product and its faces recorded in mr parjita's schedule
01:03:11 recorded in mr parjita's schedule king's fans dealings with the bba as certifying body reflect a complete lack of candor on king's fans part as we've explained in our submissions with king's fan at pains to obtain a bba
01:03:23 with king's fan at pains to obtain a bba certificate which in its own words would be as open and delimiting as possible by not confining the use of k-15 to the construction used in the bs-8414
01:03:36 to the construction used in the bs-8414 test
01:03:37 test as bre would themselves acknowledge by internal email from mr baker to one of his colleagues and i quote the market is starting to get very confused through clever marketing by
01:03:49 confused through clever marketing by kingspan
01:03:51 kingspan meanwhile within kingspan the tone was triumphal
01:03:56 triumphal when certifiers such as bba and labc produced inaccurate statements about k-15
01:04:02 k-15 such as labcs stating that k-15 was of limited combustibility even by its opening however fan insists that the wording used by labc to that
01:04:14 that the wording used by labc to that effect was not entirely clear it wasn't unclear it was simply wrong and indefensible king's fans would-be competitors
01:04:26 king's fans would-be competitors sangoban
01:04:27 sangoban noted king's fans quote great focus on delivery of results irrespective of the obstacles and setbacks one of those obstacles was statutory
01:04:38 one of those obstacles was statutory compliance which was swept away by a large amount of internal testing
01:04:43 testing and external testing which was as one of king's fans employees would later say necessary to justify our lie kingspan's
01:04:55 lie kingspan's opening is devoid of any mention of the highly irregular circumstances of the 2005 test
01:05:01 2005 test the absence for a decade of a classification report in respect of that test
01:05:06 test nor the use of fire retardance in his class zero testing albeit these matters are attested to to a degree by witnesses and there is ample documentary evidence
01:05:17 and there is ample documentary evidence king's fan instead characterizes its actions
01:05:21 actions and failings as mere historical shortcomings turning to celetex it at least recognizes that the behaviors of its employees were unacceptable
01:05:32 unacceptable in so far as they procured the carrying out of the bs-84142 test in may 2014 in a wholly improper manner by using
01:05:42 by using magnesium oxide board which is used in furnaces
01:05:45 furnaces to fortify the cavity barriers at the levels of the rig which were critical to satisfying the bre br135 criteria celestex also went on to procure a
01:05:58 celestex also went on to procure a misleading report from dre which apart from one photo namely figure 18
01:06:04 18 which celetex had sought to remove concealed the way in which the test had been distorted the photo celetex had sought to remove clearly shows the effect of the
01:06:16 clearly shows the effect of the reinforced cavity barrier at the top of the rig it stopped the flames dead in their tracks celetex also accepts that the understatement of it
01:06:27 that the understatement of it by it of lambda values was wrong celetex's position however is that albeit these actions were wrong they were of no causative effect on the specification
01:06:39 causative effect on the specification supply and use of rs 5000 at grenfell whilst of course celetex's bs 84142 test of a malia turnip cement
01:06:50 bs 84142 test of a malia turnip cement particle board and over a steel frame was of no relevance to the construction at grenfell
01:06:56 grenfell and rs 5000 should not have been specified
01:07:01 specified that doesn't detract from the fact that celetex set out very much as king's band did to obtain a report
01:07:08 report with the broadest possible number of applications mr roper's research email in november 2013
01:07:16 2013 at the outset before celetech's testing began
01:07:20 began makes this clear he said celetex wanted to test the worst case scenario and then extend it by an assessment report which would broaden the scope of potential systems to which k-15 was
01:07:32 of potential systems to which k-15 was applicable roper also noted that kings fan had achieved this by an labc report stating k-15 can quotes be used in a variety of systems
01:07:44 variety of systems celetex followed suit by also obtaining an labc certificate using that exact wording wording which celetex itself had suggested to
01:07:55 which celetex itself had suggested to labc
01:07:57 labc furthermore celetex obtained a desktop from x over dated the 26th of may 2015 which purported to extend the test to brickwork terracotta a1 laminates
01:08:11 brickwork terracotta a1 laminates and aluminium sheeting cladding albeit the report does not in fact conclude that pir can safely be used with aluminum aluminium sheeting on top of all this
01:08:23 aluminium sheeting on top of all this celetex specifically pursued grenfell celetex's email exchange in november 2014
01:08:31 2014 makes clear that grenfell would sell a texas number one must-win bid it is therefore wrong for celetex to suggest that its wrongful actions had no impact
01:08:43 that its wrongful actions had no impact on the selection and use of rs 5000 at grenfell
01:08:48 grenfell we agree that celetex did not give the assurances in writing relating to the use of rs 5000 at grenfell which ray bailey initially claims they did
01:08:58 did there is however no evidence that celetex advised the proposed construction at grenfell was wholly different to that used on the contrary mr room asked mr axel
01:09:11 on the contrary mr room asked mr axel jones to send him drawings of grenfell by his email of the 27th of august 2014 and it was mr angel jones's evidence that he recalls mr roon saying rs 5000 could be used over 18 meters
01:09:25 rs 5000 could be used over 18 meters without qualification furthermore we know from the email thread between celetex's head of technical rob warren and mr stern dated the 2nd of april 2015
01:09:37 april 2015 which i read out in our module 1 opening that when the distributors sig asked what celetex advised when discrepancies between the proposed construction
01:09:48 construction and the construction in which rs 5000 had been tested arose mr warren gave in his words both celetex's official view and his own view
01:10:00 celetex's official view and his own view the official view was that the classification report only related to the system tested his own view
01:10:07 own view was and i quote selatex do not try to second guess what may or may not be deemed suitable and if rs 5000 is rejected we take it on the chin we have had
01:10:19 we take it on the chin we have had conversations with nhbc and are aware we will generally struggle to be accepted at this time he ends by noting the degree of confusion
01:10:29 confusion amongst building control surveyors in other words celetex's approach was to offer its product see if it was accepted and not discourage its use even
01:10:41 and not discourage its use even in wholly different constructions to that in which rs 5000 have been tested given this and celetex's intention expressed from the outset of the rs 5000
01:10:52 expressed from the outset of the rs 5000 project
01:10:53 project that it should be used in the widest range of constructions possible and their desire to ensure their product was used on grenfell it is not open to celetex now to assert
01:11:04 it is not open to celetex now to assert that their actions had no causative impact on the selection and use of rs 5000 at grenfell not least their own marketing data
01:11:15 marketing data whilst making reference to the specific system tested nevertheless also sought to give the product its broadest possible application for example the data sheet
01:11:26 application for example the data sheet which states rs 5000 is the first pr insulation board to successfully test to bs84142 meets the criteria set out in br135
01:11:38 meets the criteria set out in br135 and is therefore acceptable for use in buildings about 18 meters in height celetex cannot hide from the fact that its intention
01:11:49 its intention was to mislead and to trade on specifiers known lack of understanding this data sheet
01:11:55 sheet along with other material was sent by roon to angel jones on the 27th of august
01:12:00 august 2014. angel jones forwarded it by his email 18
01:12:05 email 18 september 2014 to neil crawford during the exchange concerning cavity barriers it cannot seriously be suggested that given stellar texas strategy explained
01:12:17 given stellar texas strategy explained by warren which i've just read out that celetex's actions had no effect on the selection of rs 5000 furthermore celetex is subsequent
01:12:28 furthermore celetex is subsequent carrying out in april 2018 of a similar bs-84142 test to that carried out in may does not prove that rs 5000 could legitimately
01:12:39 prove that rs 5000 could legitimately have passed the test in 2014 even without the interventions since in addition to the differences between the two tests emitted by seletex there is also the
01:12:50 emitted by seletex there is also the fact of the changes in formulation of the product principally the polyol change in product in one of its production lines in 2012. like kingspan and arconic celetex
01:13:03 like kingspan and arconic celetex understood the importance of being able to market rs 5000 as class 0 and it did so despite the fact that after 2012 it had only achieved class 0 on one of
01:13:16 it had only achieved class 0 on one of its two production lines celetex and quite possibly sangomak gaubang
01:13:22 gaubang have serious questions to answer about how the culture which is clearly prevalent within celetex was allowed to take hold and persist anyone within celetex or
01:13:35 and persist anyone within celetex or sangobao
01:13:36 sangobao who knew rs 5000 was identical to the fr 5000 product which was not advertised as fit for use above 18 meters
01:13:46 meters knew or should have known that rs 5000 was inherently not fit for use above 18 meters
01:13:54 meters and ought to have questioned why a product not fit for use at height was now simply being rebranded to suggest it was but without intending to improve the
01:14:05 but without intending to improve the product from a fire safety perspective in any event it's clear that some within celetex
01:14:13 celetex became aware of the deceptive manner in which the may 2014 test had been carried out
01:14:18 out as early as october 2014. debbie berger's
01:14:22 berger's annotations on a version of the test report at this time make that clear jonathan room also sought to stop celetex promoting rs 5000 on nhbc projects in june
01:14:36 rs 5000 on nhbc projects in june 2015 and yet the product was not withdrawn
01:14:39 withdrawn until a few days after the grenfell fire this suggests a widespread culture within celetex of ignoring compliance and as we point out in our submissions
01:14:51 and as we point out in our submissions that had at the outset of the celetex testing program been a conscious decision by celetex's management committee mag to in effect adopt the kingsfan route
01:15:03 to in effect adopt the kingsfan route celetex's behavior towards certifying bodies and test houses was as poor as kingspan's the overwhelming likelihood is that phil clark of bre author of the 2014 report and also
01:15:16 author of the 2014 report and also involved in the 2005 test assisted celetex in understanding how to pass the test but by november 2014 bre was explaining to celetex's burger and room
01:15:29 to celetex's burger and room that attitudes were changing towards combustible insulation pointing out that people had quotes been burnt
01:15:36 burnt by k-15 approvals in the past and the focus of insulation companies on sales rather than life safety this however did not prevent celetex
01:15:47 this however did not prevent celetex from continuing to press nhbc to accept rs 5000 in the face of initially strong opposition from nhbc who were aware of at least some of the flaws in the 2014 test
01:16:01 flaws in the 2014 test last but not least areconic it appears to have realized in 2005 that its pe
01:16:08 its pe product had poor performance in fire this was the only explanation for arconic's manipulation of the single burning item test of the riveted pe panel to achieve a
01:16:19 of the riveted pe panel to achieve a class b
01:16:20 class b arconic began formulating its strategy for the uk in 2006 at a meeting in luton when arconic suggested the need for a bba certificate was pressing
01:16:32 bba certificate was pressing in order to capture the public sector of the market which accounted for 50 percent of the available market it seems the fate of the uk was finally sealed
01:16:43 sealed at the freiburg meeting in july 2011 between messes verla and freilich of arconic
01:16:49 arconic and rita of 3a composites who make a leuco bond they all noted the new regulations required a class b as the minimum in europe and that this
01:17:00 b as the minimum in europe and that this would force fee out of the market in their view within the coming month by 2013 arconic had a clearly formulated marketing strategy
01:17:11 marketing strategy of targeting architects and investors together with main contractors and installers pushing the aesthetics of the product onto architects through cpd
01:17:22 onto architects through cpd this was to be achieved with the assistance of six approved fabricators the strategy appears to have succeeded since by
01:17:29 since by june 2014 grenfell was on arconic's list of projects in the pipeline which debbie french was confident of winning to achieve
01:17:40 confident of winning to achieve arconic's
01:17:40 arconic's recently increased uk sales forecasts as already explained arconic had obtained its bba certificate on a false premise namely
01:17:51 certificate on a false premise namely that rb55pe could be considered class zero that certificate was shown to harley in relation to grenfell by ms french in april 2014.
01:18:03 by ms french in april 2014. harconic had procured its bba certificate by only providing to bba its bs 476 test reports for rayna bond fr not for the pe product that was
01:18:15 fr not for the pe product that was because
01:18:17 because rb55pe had no zero test class zero test results as at march 2007. despite that being of great concern to its then uk sales manager who
01:18:29 concern to its then uk sales manager who considered the lack of class zero represents a misrepresentation to the market furthermore as already explained arconic had
01:18:39 had also obtained its bba certificate suggesting pe was class b by not showing to bda its class e certificate for cassette panels
01:18:49 panels and yet on its face the certificate applied to both cassette and riveted product archonic will have been well aware that if it was forced to declare a class e for the cassette
01:19:01 declare a class e for the cassette version
01:19:02 version of rb55 when the riveted version scored class b this would call into question its b classification for the rivet so it
01:19:13 its b classification for the rivet so it was
01:19:14 was our conic went out of its way not to share its class e rating with customers in march 2010 verla said in an internal email thread that the fact that the cassette panel
01:19:26 that the fact that the cassette panel doesn't achieve a b was quotes very confidential guy scheideker observed that quotes it shouldn't even have been mentioned when mr vela was
01:19:37 have been mentioned when mr vela was pressed on this within archonic by miss moises in july 2010 he said and i quote it's hard to make a note about this because we are not clean once the market did become
01:19:51 not clean once the market did become aware of this disparity between riveted and cassette pe archonic was challenged on how this could be the case the disparity suggested as we know was the case
01:20:02 the case that the rivet test could not be quite genuine
01:20:07 genuine our conic was from at latest 2009 monitoring cladding fires around the world bucharest in 2009 memos and tamweel tower in 2012
01:20:19 memos and tamweel tower in 2012 lacrosse melbourne in 2014 torchtower in the address in dubai in 2015
01:20:25 2015 king fahed center in riyadh in 2015. arconic breathed an internal sigh of relief
01:20:33 relief every time the fire did not involve pe55 but yet it knew that all composites react the same way mr vela had been warning archonic of the
01:20:44 mr vela had been warning archonic of the dangers of pe for some time and given their tracking of international fires archonic can hardly claim ignorance furthermore this knowledge appears to have reached the highest levels within arconic
01:20:57 the highest levels within arconic in april 2015 mr vela made clear to diana pereira american president of arconic building and construction that pe was euro class c to e
01:21:08 that pe was euro class c to e and in his words flammable and as such could not be used above 8 to 10 meters depending upon the country this gives the lie to paragraph b1 of our conic
01:21:19 the lie to paragraph b1 of our conic submissions that iconic could not be reasonably expected to be familiar with the regime in other jurisdictions demonstrably archonic was so aware
01:21:31 demonstrably archonic was so aware eventually archonic gave the instruction to no
01:21:34 to no longer use pe on projects in france in may 2016 by mr flackon's emailed instruction but this came too late considering at the very latest the american parents
01:21:46 the very latest the american parents april 2015 knowledge of the product's unsuitability at height and mr bella's june 2015 email to mr mariches
01:21:55 mariches stating all projects must be urgently switched
01:21:59 switched to fr no warning was however given to grenfell
01:22:04 grenfell or indeed to other customers on the contrary
01:22:08 contrary archonics letter to customers of december 2015 stated that both pr pe and fr were class zero which was untrue albeit noting that the reactions to fire
01:22:21 albeit noting that the reactions to fire of the two products were different this was hardly the warning that the information known to arconic would have justified in view of all this it is not opened or
01:22:33 in view of all this it is not opened or iconic to say as it does in its written opening that its role was merely a purveyor of product
01:22:39 product and it was for others to judge the suitability of it arconic actively pursued grenfell tower and was only successful given that it was a public sector project
01:22:51 was a public sector project due to our conics having a bba certificate which it had in turn only obtained in the terms which it did by failing to make proper disclosure of tests to bda
01:23:04 to hear from mr millet this morning that our conics witnesses domiciled outside the uk are threatening not to attend the inquiry it's something which the bereaved and survivors will
01:23:17 which the bereaved and survivors will struggle to comprehend given their need to understand archonic's role in the disaster it will reflect poorly not only on those iconic employees as individuals but also
01:23:30 iconic employees as individuals but also on our conic as a global company if those involved do not come to the inquiry to tell what they know
01:23:38 they know by way of concluding remarks we express our concern that the manufacturers are in general not humbled by the grenfell fire and their behaviors
01:23:49 by the grenfell fire and their behaviors are not altered by it celetex at least admit
01:23:54 admit some past wrongdoing but they all seem to blame
01:23:58 to blame others it is deeply troubling that kingsfan having instigated a new business
01:24:04 business in 2018 king's fan facades by which kingspan will provide a prescriptive list
01:24:10 list of components for its own bs8414 testing systems
01:24:15 systems working it says with a limited number of recommended suppliers no one who has read the correspondence and test reports can be anything but horrified
01:24:25 horrified at the thought of kingspan expanding its ability to attest products which intention is made clear by paragraph 93 of kings band's opening what is needed is firm and independent
01:24:38 what is needed is firm and independent scrutiny
01:24:39 scrutiny of kingspan and other manufacturers yet kingspan is now trumpeting itself as a paragon
01:24:45 a paragon of hackit motivated virtue while simultaneously giving the impression that it will continue to exploit the bs-8414 testing route
01:24:56 bs-8414 testing route as mr parjita's k-15 update report only three months after the grenfell fire
01:25:02 fire indicates testing kingspan showing no remorse was using its participation in the government's testing programme to
01:25:13 in the government's testing programme to enhance
01:25:13 enhance its own position parjita said test is anonymous so a fire safety engineer won't be able to put it down as kingspan
01:25:22 kingspan we will be looking at challenging the norms that are associated with non-combustible we'll be changing the gap to four millimeters and if we get a pass it's a credible alternative danger that if we win the test and
01:25:34 danger that if we win the test and celetex par will then put in the test as they perform similar we are looking for the next development to keep up ahead of the game strategy support bs8414ts support the
01:25:48 strategy support bs8414ts support the use of desktop studies kings fans unrepentant arrogance is truly
01:25:53 truly chilling bearing all this in mind and in particular the degree to which independent certification and testing has also
01:26:02 has also suffered from a lack of impartiality accuracy
01:26:05 accuracy and competence we invite the panel to give careful and contin continuing consideration to whether urgent recommendations must be made
01:26:15 made before the end of phase two including a recommendation that the government should urgently review the premise of its building safety programme whilst we recognize the risks and
01:26:26 whilst we recognize the risks and difficulties in making individual recommendations in circumstances where fundamental overhaul of the regulatory system an underlying testing regime is required
01:26:37 an underlying testing regime is required and the module 6 evidence is yet to be heard
01:26:40 heard we nevertheless invite the panel to be required to make such immediate recommendations as are necessary to secure public safety unless i may assist further
01:26:51 unless i may assist further those are my submissions well thank you very much indeed mr wise that's uh very helpful and very thought-provoking um we'll take a short break now
01:27:02 um we'll take a short break now and we'll keep it down to 10 minutes and resume
01:27:05 resume at 20 to 12. thank you very much
01:39:37 well i'm now going to invite mr hochman to make an opening statement on behalf of our comic
01:39:45 here he comes
01:39:50 ah good morning good morning mr talkman can you see me can you hear me good morning sir i can see you and hear you i hope uh you can see and hear me we can thank
01:40:02 uh you can see and hear me we can thank you
01:40:03 you and uh so it only remains really for me to invite you to address us on behalf of our colleague thank you sir and good morning to your colleagues as well um
01:40:15 to your colleagues as well um before i begin my prepared remarks um i'd like to deal with two things by way of preliminary if i may
01:40:26 may and the first concerns the observations that mr millett made during his opening address as to the attendance by certain individuals
01:40:38 attendance by certain individuals to give evidence to the inquiry um i'm sad to say that i had no notice that he was going to make those remarks although i suspect that one or two others may have had such
01:40:50 one or two others may have had such notice and this is obviously not the moment to respond fully to what he said
01:40:56 said but i do want to make a few observations in relation to that subject right at the outset
01:41:05 outset there are three individuals as we understand it not four three individuals only one of whom is still employed by the company we represent who having taken their own separate
01:41:18 who having taken their own separate legal advice have to date at least declined to attend to give oral evidence so far as the company is concerned
01:41:30 so far as the company is concerned which we represent mr millet unfortunately misstated its position by suggesting that it has failed to cooperate
01:41:39 cooperate with the inquiry something which i hope we would never do as mr millet himself made clear um the inquiry has been in contact and
01:41:52 um the inquiry has been in contact and we understand remains in contact with the french government via the uk foreign office in the hope of providing sufficient legal assurances to enable
01:42:05 sufficient legal assurances to enable the company's current and former employees
01:42:08 employees to give oral evidence to the inquiry without the risk of criminal prosecution and whilst the company obviously can't control whether any witnesses testify the
01:42:21 whether any witnesses testify the company remains willing to do what it can
01:42:24 can to assist the inquiry in working with the french government so those are the remarks that i wanted to make about that subject before i start
01:42:34 start the second thing if i may which i would like to mention is the question of timing um obviously and i make absolutely no complaint about this far from it but i'm starting my remarks um
01:42:48 but i'm starting my remarks um i think uh roughly half an hour later than um
01:42:51 than um was originally intended um on a dry run last night um my prepared remarks took me just under 45 minutes to deliver and so sir if it's acceptable to you
01:43:04 and so sir if it's acceptable to you i will aim to finish i think it's about quarter to 12 now i will aim to finish by about half past 12 or 25 to 1. um i'll do my best anyway but as i say
01:43:17 um i'll do my best anyway but as i say um
01:43:17 um i i i won't be able to uh to finish precisely within the time originally allotted to me and i hope that you and your colleagues will understand that
01:43:30 so at the outset of these oral submissions on behalf of the company um i do wish to reiterate once again if i may our profound sense of regret in relation
01:43:43 our profound sense of regret in relation to the grenfell tower fire and its terrible consequences we renew our sympathies to all those affected
01:43:52 affected and we recognize the importance of this inquiry in providing a comprehensive account
01:43:57 account of the causes and consequences of the fire
01:44:00 fire and a fair and objective evaluation of the responsibilities of those concerned we continue to hope that those watching and hearing these oral submissions
01:44:11 and hearing these oral submissions will understand that if the inquiry is to fulfill its remit it must receive representations from all participants such as the company we represent and
01:44:22 such as the company we represent and must give those representations careful consideration if it's to arrive at a true and just conclusion now in these submissions i'm going to cover seven headings
01:44:36 i'm going to cover seven headings the supply of acm the use of acm at grenfell tower the uk regulatory regime testing the bba certificate and some wider
01:44:47 the bba certificate and some wider factors
01:44:49 factors so firstly the supply of acn and i want to begin by discussing the company's approach
01:44:55 approach to the supply of acm pe and to try to meet head on some of the serious criticisms which have been leveled against us it's clear from the evidence to date
01:45:08 it's clear from the evidence to date that the arrangements for the supply of the acm panels were made on the company's behalf by its uk representative deborah french the objective features of these arrangements will we anticipate
01:45:21 arrangements will we anticipate hardly be in dispute including the fact that ms french made available a copy of the bba certificate there can be no doubt that the decision
01:45:32 there can be no doubt that the decision as to the choice of product and method of fabrication was a matter for others and not for her in the event we know that the information provided by the company
01:45:43 information provided by the company as to methods of fabrication was unfortunately not consulted by those involved in the grenfell tower refurbishment project as a result there were numerous
01:45:55 as a result there were numerous departures from the company's information has outlined a long time ago by dr barbara lane in her phase one report at section eight
01:46:07 one report at section eight on the tower itself only two thirds of the external surface comprised acnpe and of that at least 50 percent was comprised of panels
01:46:18 comprised of panels fabricated in a fashion which can only be described as unorthodox indeed as pointed out by mr hyatt
01:46:25 hyatt the acm pe used on the columns and crown of the tower were fabricated in a way which was entirely peculiar to grenfell tower and which could not
01:46:36 to grenfell tower and which could not possibly have been anticipated by the company
01:46:38 company in a construction project of any kind in relation to the more orthodox 50 even that was utilized within what i might call an irregular building construction
01:46:51 an irregular building construction there were numerous departures from regulatory guidance including matters such as the absence of cavity barriers around window openings and so on
01:47:01 and so on these deficiencies were not something which the company could have been expected to anticipate in their written opening statements to the inquiry
01:47:13 the inquiry and indeed in the oral comments that you heard earlier this morning core participants have suggested that the company's employees were or must have been aware that acmp
01:47:25 were or must have been aware that acmp panels would contribute to the spread of fire
01:47:29 fire we submit however that the correct question
01:47:32 question is whether there was an awareness that the panels could so contribute if the products were used
01:47:41 used within a cladding system that was not compliant with regulations or otherwise fit for purpose and if so whether such awareness ought to be treated as a basis
01:47:52 awareness ought to be treated as a basis for criticism
01:47:55 and without foreshadowing the evidence which will be heard in module two the following four broad propositions are we submit beyond dispute
01:48:07 are we submit beyond dispute first cladding systems came under increasing scrutiny because a number of fires had developed across the world involving such systems even though the precise details of those systems
01:48:20 precise details of those systems were not known however it was also the case
01:48:23 case that the product was capable of being used safely even for high-rise residential applications if the appropriate cladding system was designed
01:48:33 designed and adequate safety precautions were incorporated into the building works for example as professor torreira pointed out in his phase one report at page 88
01:48:45 page 88 in those cases he mentions where buildings had experienced large external fires there were no significant injuries let alone fatalities given the wider
01:48:56 let alone fatalities given the wider construction features and fire protection systems involved in those buildings and so it is important to recognize
01:49:07 and so it is important to recognize and this as i say is my first point that a product is not inherently dangerous nor unfit for sale merely because that product may be inappropriate for certain applications
01:49:18 inappropriate for certain applications or maybe unsafe if it is misused secondly even if there was the potential for misuse of the product that did not impose any duty on the
01:49:30 that did not impose any duty on the supplier of the product it was reasonable for a company to conclude
01:49:35 conclude that it could rely on building regulations in the markets into which it sold as well as the judgment of the professionals to whom it sold the products to ensure that the product was being
01:49:47 to ensure that the product was being used appropriately for particular applications the same conclusion was drawn by other suppliers who continued to supply
01:49:56 supply acmpe who would indeed have supplied it for use at grenfell if the company had not done so the point has been made previously that
01:50:07 the point has been made previously that the company had a small uk market share with only one authorized sale
01:50:12 sale agent it must be the case if one thinks about
01:50:16 about it that a supplier of a product is reasonably entitled to proceed on the basis that those responsible for the use of the product will do so in a way that complies with
01:50:28 will do so in a way that complies with any relevant regulatory regime this must particularly be the case where as in the supply of the product for grenfell tower those responsible for the use of the product are persons such as
01:50:40 product are persons such as architects and construction professionals whose work is subject to regulatory oversight by building
01:50:48 building controlled officials a supply of a product must also be reasonably entitled to proceed on the basis
01:50:56 basis that an application of the regulatory regulatory regime in a particular jurisdiction will achieve a suitable outcome the standards set by the relevant regulatory regimes
01:51:07 regulatory regimes are a matter for the law makers in each jurisdiction in so far as it may be suggested as it has been
01:51:15 has been that there were deficiencies within the uk regime
01:51:19 uk regime or with the way it was implemented by those involved in the refurbishment of grenfell tower it cannot be reasonable we say to suggest that the company should have identified those
01:51:30 should have identified those deficiencies and should already have withdrawn acmpe from the uk market insofar as the company is concerned
01:51:42 company is concerned the uk regime was an overseas regime and it regulated not the supply of the product
01:51:49 product but the building and refurbishment work the company was entitled to proceed on the basis
01:51:56 the basis that the uk regulatory regime would ensure
01:51:59 ensure that a suitable outcome would be achieved by those responsible for the building works and moreover as i shall emphasize that regime would itself
01:52:10 shall emphasize that regime would itself have prevented the grantful tragedy if only it had been properly complied with by those on whom the relevant duties lay so that was my second broad observation
01:52:23 so that was my second broad observation the third
01:52:24 the third which is briefer is this that the company did make clear we say via the bba certificate that the far performance of a product cannot be judged in isolation
01:52:36 a product cannot be judged in isolation but must ultimately be assessed as one component
01:52:40 component of an overall wall assembly and therefore
01:52:43 therefore it was both permissible and appropriate and i shall have a lot more to say about this
01:52:49 this for the company to rely in promoting its product
01:52:52 product on the class zero classification or certification fourthly and with the benefit of hindsight
01:53:01 hindsight we now know of course that the product was misused at grenfell tower as one component of a unique refurbishment that tragically
01:53:13 unique refurbishment that tragically failed
01:53:14 failed in so many ways to comply with applicable regulations but that is a fact
01:53:21 fact that neither the company nor perhaps other manufacturers of single component parts of the cladding system could have been expected to know at the time
01:53:31 time and it's worth noting that at the time the product was sold for use as one component of grenfell tower there was no awareness of any fires
01:53:42 there was no awareness of any fires involving rainy bomb pe that had resulted in any loss of life or significant injuries so we say at the conclusion of this section of my
01:53:53 this section of my submissions that it would not be correct despite
01:53:56 despite the allegations made by others to criticize
01:54:00 criticize employees within the company on the basis
01:54:03 basis that they were as it has been suggested seeking to exploit the uk marketplace now my next heading the use of acm at grenfell tower the first and quite
01:54:17 at grenfell tower the first and quite general point to make is that just as acmpe panels were widely used both in this country and abroad so was their physical nature widely known and understood
01:54:29 known and understood we are next to our written submissions a paper
01:54:32 paper summarizing the evidence currently available that's to say at the time as to industry knowledge of the characteristics of acmpe prior to the grenfell tower fire it's a
01:54:44 prior to the grenfell tower fire it's a remarkable feature of the evidence within
01:54:47 within phase two that hardly any of the witnesses called today to date were prepared to acknowledge an awareness
01:54:54 awareness of the combustible nature of the core of the panel
01:54:58 the panel though some admitted to an awareness that the core was plastic and some but fewer admitted that it was therefore combustible the inquiry may take the view that those
01:55:10 the inquiry may take the view that those who profess ignorance of these matters do so with their own
01:55:14 their own interest to protect we know from the evidence of professor professor bisbee that the challenging nature of the call would have been widely known among those
01:55:25 would have been widely known among those concerned with fire safety and in professor bisbee's phase one report at paragraph 431 he acknowledges that pe
01:55:36 at paragraph 431 he acknowledges that pe materials are known to be highly combustible something which in his oral evidence on the 21st of november 2018 he confirmed so a responsible specifier would have
01:55:48 so a responsible specifier would have taken into account the combustible nature of acnp when selecting the combination of materials to use on the external facade moreover the
01:55:59 on the external facade moreover the inquiry
01:55:59 inquiry may take the view that irrespective of the precise state of knowledge of individual witnesses and of their subjective evidence on that
01:56:10 and of their subjective evidence on that point
01:56:11 point there is a more fundamental consideration since no one concerned with the choice or use of acmpe could have been unaware of the existence
01:56:22 could have been unaware of the existence of the core it would follow that anyone responsible for the choice or the use of it had the option to check the combustibility of the core
01:56:33 combustibility of the core whether by asking the manufacturer directly
01:56:37 directly which the evidence shows to have occurred on other projects or by some other means such as looking at test results available on the websites of testing and regulatory
01:56:48 websites of testing and regulatory bodies
01:56:50 bodies etc and none of those responsible for the refurbishment can escape their share of responsibility by claiming ignorance or lack of information
01:57:01 information in the case of ryden the main contractor whose written opening is particularly critical
01:57:07 critical of the company whom we represent their attention was expressly drawn to the issue by the email relating to the lachenal moment and even this did not suffice to induce
01:57:20 and even this did not suffice to induce them to ensure that the regulatory regime was complied with
01:57:25 with it's also indisputable that alternative options were available including not only non-combustible insulation but significantly less combustible cladding panels
01:57:37 cladding panels including those which were fire retardant
01:57:40 retardant an option of which any reader of the bba certificate would have been aware for example the company at that time offered
01:57:48 offered acn fr as well as i think acm a2 products both of which were more fire retardant in respect of such options
01:57:59 retardant in respect of such options it's worth noting at the moment that at the material time the company was reducing the price difference between its acm pe and acmr for fr
01:58:10 between its acm pe and acmr for fr panels
01:58:11 panels the evidence has also shown that a zinc composite material with a fire retardant core
01:58:17 core had originally been specified for use at grenfell tower the white alu glaze infill panels were we understand also available in fire retardant four
01:58:29 also available in fire retardant four above all of course the market was wholly familiar with the concept of non-combustible insulation the only kind previously used in
01:58:40 the only kind previously used in high-rise applications those who ultimately selected astm pe for use at grenfell tower not credibly claimed to have been ignorant of the availability
01:58:52 availability of more fire retardant alternatives particularly having originally specified one such alternative only to change the specification later in order at least in part to save money
01:59:06 in order at least in part to save money the inquiry may have been struck in the course of module one we respectfully submit by the growing body of evidence to the effect that quite simply no or no adequate
01:59:18 that quite simply no or no adequate thought was given in the design fabrication and installation of the cladding system to compliance issues in relation to fire indeed it seems that few if any of those
01:59:30 indeed it seems that few if any of those involved
01:59:31 involved even managed to read the bba certificate or if they did manage to read beyond the first page there was a reference by mr ashton of x over to
01:59:42 over to further analysis of the cladding issue to be carried out at a later stage but as everyone concerned
01:59:51 concerned was or should have been aware that further analysis never took place nor was there any other evaluation least of all in the local authority building control function
02:00:02 building control function of the fire safety implications of the chosen combination configuration of the materials used this we would submit must be the
02:00:14 this we would submit must be the central and perhaps shocking conclusion for the inquiry to draw as it enters into its consideration of phase two
02:00:22 phase two module two i think i'm still on track in timing terms and i turn to my next section which is entitled
02:00:31 entitled the uk regulatory regime
02:00:39 that regime as we all know applies to the construction and refurbishment of a building and accordingly will be relevant to those who are responsible for the building
02:00:50 who are responsible for the building work
02:00:51 work it does not apply to those who manufacture and supply materials chosen by those who are involved in the building work the suitability of a particular building
02:01:02 the suitability of a particular building product necessarily depends on the context in which it's used and it is those who design and carry out the construction and refurbishment work who will have knowledge of that context
02:01:14 who will have knowledge of that context and who could reasonably be expected to have a detailed knowledge of the regime itself which it would not be reasonable to expect of a manufacturer
02:01:26 manufacturer in any jurisdiction particularly in a foreign jurisdiction the role of the company that we represent was essentially to supply a product
02:01:36 product which required fabrication before use in a particular construction context the company made recommendations it is true
02:01:47 company made recommendations it is true as to how to fabricate the product if the rivet or cassette version were to be adopted but it was for
02:01:55 for others to decide which method to adopt for the fabrication of the product how to fit the fabricated product to the external surface of the tower
02:02:06 external surface of the tower what other components to combine with it and in every respect how to carry out the refurbishment and it was really the responsibility of others to take appropriate steps to achieve compliance with part b4 of
02:02:19 to achieve compliance with part b4 of the regulations there appears to be a suggestion that the company intended that its products would achieve compliance within the uk by reference to what has been called the
02:02:31 by reference to what has been called the linear route this suggestion we say is clearly untenable for a number of reasons in the first place the company was in no position to formulate objectives
02:02:43 position to formulate objectives in relation to the uk regulatory regime in which it had no expertise secondly however it is self-evident that compliance with the linear route would not only require conformity with
02:02:56 would not only require conformity with paragraph 12.6 of approved document b relating to the external surfaces of walls but also compliance with paragraph 12.7
02:03:07 but also compliance with paragraph 12.7 relating to the requirement that any insulation product etc should be of limited combustibility which of course the insulation used at
02:03:18 which of course the insulation used at grenfell was not the failure to follow the linear route by those whose duty it was to do so was we submit the root cause of the
02:03:30 was we submit the root cause of the spread
02:03:31 spread of the fire and it is clear therefore that those who were responsible for the design and construction of rental tower failed adequately to analyze the
02:03:42 failed adequately to analyze the regulatory regime and to determine how they were to comply with it
02:03:48 it was not within the company's knowledge that any particular uk entity or individual working on the grenfell project was making compromised decisions in respect of the refurbishment
02:03:59 respect of the refurbishment or failing to comply with regulatory requirements consequently the company was not in a position to determine if the state of the uk regime was such
02:04:10 if the state of the uk regime was such that
02:04:10 that the continued sale of acnpe was problematic and it was entitled to rely on the fact and belief that its project product would be used
02:04:21 that its project product would be used in a safe manner in accordance with statutory building controls
02:04:27 controls although the refurbishment works incorporating the installation of the cladding system at grenfell failed to achieve compliance it cannot be inferred from this but any
02:04:38 it cannot be inferred from this but any and all construction projects with cladding systems including acmp would have failed in this respect
02:04:47 respect as mr hyatt said on tuesday this week day 34 at page 179 it is possible for cladding systems as a
02:04:58 it is possible for cladding systems as a whole
02:04:58 whole to be compliant even when including combustible products and it is therefore possible that a building incorporating acmp
02:05:08 acmp but designed to be in compliance with the regulatory regime and including all appropriate features such as cavity barriers and non-combustible installation
02:05:19 non-combustible installation insulation would have been in compliance and there are two examples before us showing that it is possible for a building designed in compliance with the
02:05:30 building designed in compliance with the regime
02:05:32 regime to to to to be constructed the first is at tableau on the chalcott estate where the cladding system comprised rayna bond acm
02:05:45 comprised rayna bond acm pe cladding in rivet fabrication and with rockwool insulation the fire did not spread across the outside of the building because of the overall cladding system
02:05:57 because of the overall cladding system used the precise features in the cladding system and the construction of the building most notably the fire breaks limited the fire to a small area
02:06:08 limited the fire to a small area another relevant example is the fire in 2010
02:06:12 2010 at sudbury house was i think a 24-storey cloud
02:06:17 cloud tower clad in acmpe this time fabricated as cassette with mineral wool insulation which cep
02:06:28 with mineral wool insulation which cep who were involved in that construction i think have confirmed was contained uh just like the fire at taplow
02:06:37 taplow house before leaving the topic of the regulatory regime let me add one further comment
02:06:48 regime let me add one further comment concerning the construction products regulations because we have noted that the original suggestion in written openings that the company was in breach
02:07:00 in breach of the construction product regulations has now as you will have seen been abandoned it being accepted
02:07:11 been abandoned it being accepted that there was no relevant harmonized standard
02:07:14 standard for the product in other words and this is a comment of perhaps wider significance an allegation of wrongdoing which had been made an allegation of
02:07:27 which had been made an allegation of wrongdoing turns out to be a case of a business making legitimate commercial choices now i want to say something
02:07:38 choices now i want to say something about
02:07:39 about product testing and i'm afraid this is going to be a little bit technical but that's
02:07:44 that's unavoidable
02:07:48 let me first distinguish between testing with regard to the national class and testing
02:07:55 testing under the system of en classification testing under bs 476 parts six and seven which can lead to
02:08:07 parts six and seven which can lead to an outcome of national class zero testing under 476 is testing in relation to the unfabricated sample of a product that is the product that
02:08:20 of a product that is the product that the company that we represent manufactures and supplies it does not involve
02:08:26 involve a test of the fire performance of a fabricated product in other words rivet or cassette or otherwise a fabricated product incorporated into a particular wall assembly
02:08:40 into a particular wall assembly and therefore nc 0 which can be the outcome
02:08:44 outcome of a 476 test nc 0 is a classification in relation to an unfabricated product and a classification moreover in relation
02:08:57 classification moreover in relation as mr hyatt carefully explained into the surface of the unfabricated product
02:09:05 product and therefore it can as shown by other bba certificates evidenced by the inquiry and again this was confirmed by mr hyatt an nc0
02:09:17 this was confirmed by mr hyatt an nc0 classification can be achieved alongside various different
02:09:23 different en classifications now the en classification the european system is a test of the panels in particular en13823
02:09:37 of the panels in particular en13823 is a test of the panels in a particular mocked up system the system in which the panels are assembled may vary from one test to another not
02:09:48 may vary from one test to another not just in terms of the method of fixing whether rivet or cassette but also in terms of the substrate used the size of the cavity the arrangement of the panels and other things so if for example
02:10:01 and other things so if for example an enb classification is achieved it shows that the product is capable capable of achieving enb in a particular
02:10:12 capable of achieving enb in a particular system
02:10:13 system when fabricated in a particular way but given the nature of en testing a classification such as enb does not mean and it cannot be treated
02:10:26 does not mean and it cannot be treated as
02:10:27 as achievable in all circumstances indeed because the en13823 test relates to the testing of a product fabricated in a particular way in a
02:10:38 fabricated in a particular way in a mocked up system which may vary from one test to another two or more en classification reports can coexist in relation to the same product at the
02:10:49 in relation to the same product at the same time
02:10:52 same time and it follows from all of the above that the time to test the potential use of the product in a particular context must be at the point of system assembly
02:11:03 point of system assembly and by applying one of the routes to compliance now in this case we know that in 2005 and again in 2011
02:11:17 2005 and again in 2011 panels of the acm product panels of the acm pe product configured in a particular mock-up system achieved
02:11:28 system achieved enb that shows that the product was capable of achieving an enb and although subsequent en testing involving the product
02:11:40 testing involving the product in which the particular mocked up systems will have vary and indeed the particular method of fabrication although on that en testing
02:11:53 although on that en testing enb was not achieved this is not inconsistent with the fact that in 2005 and 2011
02:12:00 and 2011 enb was achieved and therefore that the product was capable of achieving that result
02:12:06 result the variable was not the product it was the system into which it was incorporated and this point is in fact illustrated by the written openings of certain core
02:12:18 by the written openings of certain core participants which have referred to variations in the width of the cavity between the cladding panels
02:12:25 panels and any substrate whilst there's no scientific evidence as to what the effect of that difference would be it's right to note that variations of this kind are inherent in a process
02:12:37 this kind are inherent in a process whereby the tested system will vary from test to test indeed the width of the cavity may be only one of the differences between the tested the systems
02:12:48 between the tested the systems in which the panels are assembled may also vary in terms of matters such as the method of fixing and fabrication the substrate used the arrangement of
02:12:59 the substrate used the arrangement of the panels etc and the fact that these features may vary from one test to another is a feature of the en testing process of the en testing process
02:13:10 of the en testing process what's important is that the cstb the recognized testing body in france nonetheless confirmed and published on its website the relevant test results including
02:13:23 the relevant test results including those
02:13:23 those showing that in a given system an enb result could be achieved as well as others less favorable and the inquiry has documentary evidence
02:13:34 and the inquiry has documentary evidence showing
02:13:35 showing that a range of en classifications was shared by the company both internally and externally against that background let me turn my
02:13:47 against that background let me turn my um
02:13:48 um uh fifth topic i think it is uh to the um
02:13:55 um the bb-8 and um let me deal with that in as much detail as i
02:14:06 deal with that in as much detail as i as i need to um in safari's behavior in relation to fire is concerned let me stress at the outset that the bba
02:14:17 let me stress at the outset that the bba certificate went no further than to certify as to the surface of an unfabricated product panel and contained
02:14:26 contained a range of caveats as to the fire performance of a fabricated panel in a particular cladding system the first page of the certificate as you
02:14:37 the first page of the certificate as you know
02:14:38 know describes the panels as aluminium polyethylene composite no no um two ways about that everybody reading certificate even the front page would
02:14:51 certificate even the front page would know
02:14:51 know that the core was polyethylene and states that a panel may be regarded as having a class zero surface and it refers
02:15:02 zero surface and it refers the reader to section six and in section six at section 6.1 we see that when a sample of a standard pe product was subjected
02:15:16 of a standard pe product was subjected to an en test it received a b classification and was therefore capable of achieving that classification that did not mean as i've tried to explain
02:15:27 explain that an enb classification would be achievable in all circumstances and irrespective of the method of fabrication and other features of the cladding system section 6.2 of the certificate then
02:15:40 section 6.2 of the certificate then deals separately with the testing of a fire retardant sample section 6.3 then states that both products
02:15:47 products that is both fr and pe may be regarded as having a class zero surface in relation to approved document b and then crucially section 6.5
02:16:00 and then crucially section 6.5 states that for resistance to fire the performance of a wall incorporating the product is not covered by the certificate and that the performance of the wall
02:16:13 that the performance of the wall incorporating the product can only be determined by further tests and then the certificate of section 6.6 states that cavity barriers should be
02:16:25 states that cavity barriers should be incorporated behind the cladding as required by national building regulations and that particular attention should be paid
02:16:34 paid to preventing the spread of fire within a building breaching the cladding system through windows and door openings it follows that the bba certificate is
02:16:46 it follows that the bba certificate is cautiously worded the reference to class zero is expressly related
02:16:51 related to the surface of the product and the certificate as a whole limits itself to specific examples of product moreover clear advice is given that the fire resistance
02:17:03 advice is given that the fire resistance of the cladding system incorporating the product is not covered by the certificate but must be subject to further testing and as you know and i'll mention this quite briefly
02:17:15 and i'll mention this quite briefly these
02:17:16 these limitations are consistent with guidance contained in approved document b paragraph 16 which itself restates the importance of checking
02:17:30 restates the importance of checking any reference to the surface spread of flame
02:17:35 flame to make sure that it's suitable to the construction to be used and emphasizes that small differences in detail
02:17:42 detail such as differences in the fixings may significantly affect the rating that's in approved document b itself now the assertion in
02:17:54 itself now the assertion in section 6.3 of the certificate that the product may be regarded as having a class 0 surface in relation to approved document b is obviously a reference to paragraph
02:18:06 is obviously a reference to paragraph 12.6 of the guidance and diagram 40 and so the certificate was simply setting out that since the product was capable of achieving the requisite european class
02:18:17 achieving the requisite european class it could be treated for the purpose of compliance with the guidance as achieving the requisite national class
02:18:26 class we do acknowledge as other core participants have stressed that under european testing some fabricated versions of the product failed to achieve a b classification
02:18:39 failed to achieve a b classification but for the reasons i've tried to set out that was not inconsistent with the nc 0 certification being a certification relating to the
02:18:50 being a certification relating to the surface of the product which in a particular system and when fabricated in a particular way had been shown to be capable of achieving the b classification and as i've mentioned already we know
02:19:03 and as i've mentioned already we know that the bba were willing to certify nc0 for products with an en classification much lower than enb
02:19:15 let me add that the bba certificate was issued
02:19:18 issued following a lengthy period of wide ranging discussions between the company and the bda and in the course of those discussions
02:19:29 and in the course of those discussions it was agreed that the certificate would relate
02:19:31 relate to the surface of the relevant acn products both p e and f r rather than to a sample cladding system containing a number of different components
02:19:43 different components of which the acn would have been but one we know that from the evidence of mr album of the bba and it was made clear to the bba in the course of these
02:19:56 clear to the bba in the course of these discussions that for the purpose of fixing the acm panels
02:20:01 panels two possible methods could be employed rivet and cassette which were alternative methods of fabrication and fixing and did not affect the nature of the
02:20:12 and did not affect the nature of the product
02:20:12 product itself since the certificate was to confirm
02:20:16 confirm that the external surface of the product could be treated as national class 0 for the purpose of diagram 40 this conclusion would have remained unchanged even if
02:20:28 would have remained unchanged even if the bba had been provided for example with information on the fire performance of the core material standing alone or even with information as to the fire
02:20:39 or even with information as to the fire performance of the product when fabricated or fixed in a particular way
02:20:44 way whether rivet or consent or cassette because to repeat the certificate was simply to confirm that the external surface of the product could be classified as national class
02:20:56 could be classified as national class zero
02:21:00 and please remember that the company also had available to it at the time class zero results in respect of another product
02:21:11 respect of another product called rb33 which had thinner aluminium skins but a thicker pe core than rb55 that you can see from dr lane's table of results
02:21:25 from dr lane's table of results her appendix e at page e3 and it was surely a legitimate inference that rb 55 pe would achieve class 0 if rb
02:21:38 would achieve class 0 if rb 33 with a thicker core but thinner aluminium skins had done so on the basis of all this the bba itself determined
02:21:49 determined that it was appropriate to issue the certificate in the terms in which it was issued and in particular the product could be regarded as having a class zero surface
02:22:00 a class zero surface and i might add that we know that the bba consulted various external bodies including the cstb in order to check and confirm that it was justified in issuing the certificate
02:22:12 was justified in issuing the certificate and the in these terms in the light of the express warning in section 6.5 of the certificate no one could reasonably or justifiably assume that the performance of a wall
02:22:24 that the performance of a wall incorporate incorporating the product whether fabricated and fixed by rivet or cassette
02:22:30 cassette would necessarily correspond with the test results provided so for all these reasons i'm afraid we do not accept that the categorization of the product
02:22:41 that the categorization of the product as nc 0
02:22:43 as nc 0 or the bba certificate itself misled the uk market and indeed we say that uh since the certificate related to
02:22:54 that uh since the certificate related to the reaction to fire of the surface and the potential spread of fire across that surface the nc 0 classification in the certificate would not have
02:23:06 in the certificate would not have changed in the light of further fire performance information following the issue of certificate unless the fire performance of the surface were to have changed
02:23:18 of the surface were to have changed which it did not an en test result remain relating to the far performance of the product in a particular cladding system would demonstrate and demonstrate
02:23:29 demonstrate and demonstrate only that the product was as part of that system capable of achieving a particular en result
02:23:37 result and therefore further en results would not have impacted upon the classification contained in the bba stifled unless any such result
02:23:46 result demonstrated that the product itself was incapable of achieving that classification so we say with great respect that the en
02:23:57 so we say with great respect that the en e result emphasized elsewhere in a system involving cassette fabrication as for example at sudbury
02:24:09 as for example at sudbury did not detract from the fact that the product was capable of achieving enb in an appropriate system and therefore
02:24:17 therefore the nc 0 classification remained appropriate now i'm on my final and relatively brief heading and
02:24:29 and relatively brief heading and all i want to do at this stage is to remind the inquiry if i may please of a series of events which although crucial in terms of the eventual
02:24:40 crucial in terms of the eventual and terrible outcome were nonetheless events
02:24:43 events in which on any view the company which we represent had no involvement at all the first of these events was the start of the fire in flat 16. the inquiry has
02:24:56 of the fire in flat 16. the inquiry has dealt with this in its phase one report obviously no responsibility can attach to the company for the start of the fire the second point concerns the extent if
02:25:07 the second point concerns the extent if any of the fire safety precautions available within flat stick 16 and the remainder of the tower on which you have heard and will continue to hear evidence concerning deficiencies in such
02:25:20 evidence concerning deficiencies in such precautions among other obvious points are the absence of a sprinkler system or other means of extinguishing fire within the individual flats including flat 16. the next point
02:25:34 including flat 16. the next point is the escape of fire into the cladding system
02:25:37 system and this is important there can be no doubt that if the escape of the fire had been prevented or even delayed
02:25:48 had been prevented or even delayed sufficiently to enable firefighters to extinguish it within the flat then the grenfell tragedy would simply not have occurred it should never be forgotten that on the
02:26:00 it should never be forgotten that on the evidence
02:26:01 evidence a delay of an additional few minutes in the escape of the fire would have enabled the fire service to extinguish it
02:26:09 it while still in the flat without any of the terrible consequences which followed and indeed the stay put policy was based on the assumption that this would occur
02:26:20 on the assumption that this would occur the inquiry in its phase one report found
02:26:23 found that the firefighters entered the kitchen of flat 16 only five minutes after the fire broke out
02:26:31 out and in your phase one report you found that it was the use of combustible materials surrounding the windows
02:26:40 windows and the absence of cavity barriers manifestly required by the regulatory regime
02:26:47 regime which prevented the containment of the fire within flat 16 for those vital few additional minutes and next
02:27:01 minutes and next i would like to make brief reference in this review of wider factors to the expert evidence that it was the combustible insulation which could well have been the first
02:27:13 could well have been the first major component of the cladding system to ignite
02:27:17 to ignite and which therefore played a key role in precipitating the ignition of the acm panels the importance of the presence of the combustible insulation clearly from
02:27:30 the combustible insulation clearly from the comparison that we have drawn with taplow and with sudbury where acm panels
02:27:36 panels were utilized in conjunction with non-combustible insulation and so i would respectfully remind the inquiry that
02:27:47 respectfully remind the inquiry that it's already clear that the kind of tragedy which occurred at grenfell could only have occurred as a result of a uni unique combination of factors including the
02:27:58 combination of factors including the combination and configuration of the materials used in the refurbishment the failure of compartmentation and of other internal systems and the undue reliance one has to say
02:28:11 and the undue reliance one has to say on the state policy among other factors
02:28:16 and just to remind you that we attempted to assist the inquiry as to the involvement and interaction of many of these factors in the schedule
02:28:28 of many of these factors in the schedule which we submitted as part of our written closing at the conclusion of phase one and so in my very brief conclusion uh
02:28:41 very brief conclusion uh we would invite the inquiry in due course to conclude that the principal cause of the grenfell tragedy
02:28:49 tragedy was the failure by those responsible for the refurbishment of the tower holistically to consider fire performance as mentioned above and we will be urging the inquiry against
02:29:01 the inquiry against that background not to criticize a single product manufacturer for continuing to sell a product which had been in widespread use for many years
02:29:13 years and which could properly have been used at height
02:29:17 at height in the context of building works which achieved
02:29:20 achieved the necessary regulatory compliance thank you very much thank you very much mr hochman
02:29:32 at this stage i'm going to invite uh mr orr uh to address us on behalf of celetex so can we see if mr orr can be
02:29:45 can we see if mr orr can be brought onto the screen please
02:29:55 good afternoon mr chairman good afternoon
02:29:59 afternoon i can see you can i see ninja and can you can you see and hear me i i can see and hear you sir good thank you now before you begin i'm very conscious of the fact that we're running
02:30:10 that we're running behind time uh as indicated in the timetable which i think you were sent um so the question for you i want to ask you is this it's just after half past 12
02:30:22 you is this it's just after half past 12 now you are you've been allotted an hour and i certainly don't want to cut you down at all would you prefer to well if you start now i think i'm going
02:30:34 well if you start now i think i'm going to have to ask you to find a convenient moment around 1 o'clock give or take to break your statement another possibility although i'm not
02:30:46 another possibility although i'm not pressing you on this by any means is that we take an early lunch
02:30:51 lunch now and give you an uninterrupted hour starting at let's say half past one i know you weren't expecting to be asked that question but um
02:31:02 that question but um do you have a preference
02:31:05 um mr chairman i um i'm really in in your hands if if the panel would prefer um
02:31:13 prefer um me to deliver my my statement in one go i'd i'd be content with that but i i do think i could start now and find a convenient moment around one o'clock
02:31:24 a convenient moment around one o'clock all right well it is a bit early isn't it to have lunch so should we do that if you'd like to start no and i'll leave it to you to find a convenient moment round about one o'clock at which you would be happy to break uh
02:31:37 at which you would be happy to break uh your statement when you get there ah i'm grateful sir right thank you
02:31:48 so mr chairman panel members can i can i start by thanking the inquiry for this opportunity to make an opening statement at the commencement of module two
02:32:00 commencement of module two and i wish at the outset uh on behalf of celetex
02:32:05 celetex to reiterate its deepest sympathy to the bereaved families survivors and everyone affected by the tragic fire at grenfell tower
02:32:16 tragic fire at grenfell tower celetex has from the very start of this inquiry
02:32:20 inquiry endorsed the need to ascertain what caused the fire and ensure that no such tragedy occurs again
02:32:29 again celetex is and and has throughout been committed to providing its full cooperation and assistance to the inquiry it recognizes
02:32:40 recognizes the urgent need to ensure that public confidence in the safety of high-rise residential buildings and in the construction industry as a whole is fully restored
02:32:51 whole is fully restored the work of this inquiry is fundamental to achieving that objective celetex has provided the inquiry with a written opening submission for module
02:33:02 written opening submission for module two
02:33:03 two that sets out its position on the module two issues in full it provides references to relevant documents and to the evidence of witnesses who gave evidence in module one
02:33:14 one i understand that it is now available on the inquiries website for those who may be interested in reading it in this oral opening statement i propose to highlight
02:33:25 to highlight the following points first celetex's role in the refurbishment of grenfell tower second celetexa's investigations following the fire
02:33:37 following the fire third the building regulations at the time of the refurbishment fourth the marketing and supply of the sellatex
02:33:46 sellatex products that were used in the refurbishment and finally and fifthly the testing and marketing
02:33:53 marketing of our conics reynabond pe cladding panels
02:33:59 turning then first to identify the nature of celitex's role celetex is a manufacturer of polyisocyanurate insulation known as pir two of selatex's products
02:34:13 known as pir two of selatex's products were used in the refurbishment at grenfell tower first a product known as rs 5000
02:34:20 rs 5000 this was used as insulation in the rain screen cladding system second a product known as tb 4000 was celetex
02:34:29 celetex understands used to fill gaps in the window surrounds at grenfell tower pir is widely used in the construction industry
02:34:40 industry its high insulation value helps building designers and contractors to meet modern energy conservation requirements pir is an organic product which in
02:34:52 pir is an organic product which in common with all organic products will combust under certain conditions the combustible nature of pir was or should have been known to
02:35:03 was or should have been known to construction professionals considering the use of celetex insulation the combustible nature of the product was clearly highlighted in celetex's health and safety data
02:35:14 in celetex's health and safety data sheet
02:35:14 sheet to which readers of celetex's website and of its product literature were directed
02:35:21 directed the building regulations in force at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment permitted combustible insulation to be used in high-rise residential buildings there were additional requirements that
02:35:33 there were additional requirements that had to be met when using combustible insulation in a building over 18 meters but provided those requirements were met pir was acceptable for use in such buildings
02:35:46 buildings the construction or refurbishment of a building over 18 meters involves a number of construction industry professionals from a variety of disciplines they
02:35:57 from a variety of disciplines they are responsible for ensuring that the building works comply with building regulations that responsibility does not and cannot realistically fall on the manufacturer of an
02:36:08 fall on the manufacturer of an individual product such as celetex that was in that indeed was the position in respect of grenfell tower celetex was not part of the design or
02:36:19 celetex was not part of the design or construction team on the grenfell tower refurbishment celetex did not design or construct the rain screen cladding system at grenfell tower
02:36:27 tower its sole role was as the manufacturer of insulation which was supplied through third-party distributors for the refurbishment the distinction between a
02:36:39 refurbishment the distinction between a building designer and contractor on the one hand
02:36:42 one hand and a product manufacturer on the other is fundamental and and we respectfully suggest needs to be born in mind can i turn then to celetex's
02:36:54 can i turn then to celetex's investigations following the fire none of the key celetex personnel involved in the testing certification and marketing
02:37:05 and marketing of the celetex products used at grenfell tower remain employed by celetex mr o'sullivan celetex's current managing director
02:37:15 director joined celetex on the 1st of may 2016 after the celetex products used in the refurbishment were supplied in the immediate aftermath of the
02:37:27 in the immediate aftermath of the grenfell tower of fire and in view of the focus on the role played by the rain screen cladding system
02:37:33 system on the tower celetex suspended the sale of rs 5000 pending further clarity and set about ascertaining the relevant facts concerning the sp the
02:37:44 the relevant facts concerning the sp the supply of that product for the refurbishment this work was directed by mr o'sullivan with the assistance of celetexas lawyers
02:37:55 celetexas lawyers linklaters in the course of this work certain matters came to light concerning the testing certification and marketing of cellular texas products which were previously unknown to
02:38:08 which were previously unknown to celetex's current management this included issues concerning the testing of rs 5000 prior to its launch in august 2014
02:38:19 prior to its launch in august 2014 and the declaration of lambda values which are a measure of insulating capacity
02:38:25 capacity for certain cellatex products once established these matters were promptly announced by notices on celetex's website and reported
02:38:37 on celetex's website and reported to the relevant authorities including testing and certification bodies the ministry of housing communities and local government trading standards and the metropolitan
02:38:49 trading standards and the metropolitan police
02:38:50 police and in addition celetex made a full report of these matters to the inquiry
02:38:58 celetex also instructed linklaters to undertake a comprehensive review of all relevant documentation and other available evidence to ascertain as fully as possible the
02:39:10 to ascertain as fully as possible the circumstances in which rs 5000 was tested
02:39:13 tested launched and marketed the results of that review were set out in a summary paper which celatex provided to the inquiry in september 2018 together with a
02:39:26 in september 2018 together with a witness statement from mr o'sullivan in his witness statement mr o'sullivan gives
02:39:34 gives first-hand evidence of relevant events after he joined celetex and an account of other relevant matters discerned from celetex's documents
02:39:45 now following the emergence of the matters i have mentioned celetex was concerned to establish whether they gave rise to any safety issues it conducted
02:39:56 to any safety issues it conducted extensive due diligence in relation to the testing of its products and it commissioned additional fire safety testing of both its 4 000 and 5000 ranges of
02:40:07 of both its 4 000 and 5000 ranges of insulation that testing confirmed that those products
02:40:13 products achieved the classifications that they were stated to have at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment
02:40:22 celetex recognizes that the matters which emerged during its investigations involved inappropriate and unacceptable conduct on the part of a number of employees
02:40:35 this was of real concern to seller texas current
02:40:39 current management some of the employees involved
02:40:43 involved had already left the company those who remained were the subject of disciplinary proceedings six employees resigned between december
02:40:55 six employees resigned between december 2017
02:40:57 2017 and march 2018 so panel members celetex has sought to learn from this experience
02:41:09 has sought to learn from this experience it has taken concerted steps to ensure that no such situation occurs again those steps include recruiting new technical and operational management
02:41:22 new technical and operational management designing and implementing changes in improvements to lambda and other testing processes designing new quality assurance systems with the assistance of a new quality assurance manager
02:41:33 assurance manager and reviewing and improving training procedures celetex recognizes that this is an ongoing process it is committed
02:41:45 ongoing process it is committed to continuous improvement
02:41:50 celetex has given careful consideration to whether the matters which emerged following the grenfell tower fire concerning the testing certification and marketing of its products
02:42:02 marketing of its products had any impact on the specification and use
02:42:06 use of those products at grenfell tower on the evidence there is we we submit no basis for believing that those matters
02:42:18 those matters did have any impact on the specification and use of the products at grenfell tower this point is addressed in celetex's written opening submission i will also deal with it in this oral
02:42:30 i will also deal with it in this oral opening statement i need though first to outline the relevant building regulations that were in force at the time of the grenfell tower
02:42:41 at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment
02:42:45 at the time of that refurbishment the building regulations permitted the use of combustible insulation in buildings over 18 meters in height
02:42:56 in buildings over 18 meters in height the statutory guidance set out in volume 2
02:43:00 2 of approved document b known as adb2 provided four routes to compliance for a rain screen clouding system first the linear route
02:43:11 clouding system first the linear route which involved compliance with the requirements of sections 12.6 to 12.9 of adb2 second testing the complete cladding
02:43:24 second testing the complete cladding system
02:43:24 system in accordance with british standard 8414 in order to demonstrate that the system met the performance criteria given in the report produced by the
02:43:35 given in the report produced by the building research establishment on the fire performance of cladding systems known as br135
02:43:45 third obtaining a desktop study from a suitably qualified fire specialist confirming that the complete clouding system would meet the performance criteria given in br 135
02:43:58 given in br 135 if it was tested to bs 8414 and fourth carrying out a holistic fire engineering study taking into account the adequacy of fire prevention
02:44:09 account the adequacy of fire prevention measures in the building and other factors affecting fire spread to demonstrate that the cladding system would adequately resist the spread of fire
02:44:18 fire over the walls
02:44:21 now the linear route to compliance was only available if each of the individual components in the cladding system met specified standards of fire
02:44:32 met specified standards of fire performance in particular under the linear route the insulation needed to be of limited combustibility if combustible insulation like pir
02:44:44 if combustible insulation like pir was being used the linear route was not available one of the other three routes to compliance would then need to be followed
02:44:56 that is clear from adb2 and it would be helpful if we could have on the screen at this stage the particular page from adb2
02:45:07 the particular page from adb2 the reference for that is clg five zeros two two 224 at page 96.
02:45:27 at page 96. now sorry just a moment it's coming up i think
02:45:36 now what this um so so the relevant provision here is section 12.7 of adb-2
02:45:47 of adb-2 and what this provision makes clear is uh that any insulation product we haven't got it yet would you like to wait until we get it up
02:45:58 wait until we get it up oh it's just come up
02:46:01 apologies mr chairman it it was up on my screen
02:46:04 screen oh well it's up on ours as well now
02:46:09 yes on you go so so um so 12.7 section 12.7 is what we should be looking at and what that makes clear is that any insulation product
02:46:20 insulation product used in the external wall construction of a building over 18 meters had to be of limited combustibility if one was following the linear route to
02:46:32 one was following the linear route to compliance
02:46:36 now pir was clearly not of limited combustibility that was apparent from the definition of limited combustibility in appendix a of adb2 to which section
02:46:48 in appendix a of adb2 to which section 12.7 refers in general terms a product was only of limited combustibility if it was non-combustible for example
02:47:00 if it was non-combustible for example if it was a totally inorganic material such as concrete or was classified as class a1 or class a2
02:47:08 a2 under european standards that did not include pir industry guidance available at the time of the refurbishment emphasized that pir did not meet the
02:47:20 emphasized that pir did not meet the requirements of section 12.7 of adb-2 for example technical guidance note 18 issued by the building control alliance stated that thermosetting insulins which
02:47:33 stated that thermosetting insulins which include pir do not meet the limited combustibility requirements of adb2 and so should not be accepted as meeting adb2 paragraph 12.7
02:47:44 adb2 paragraph 12.7 that's specifically referred to in celitex's written opening submission at paragraph 35 subparagraph 4. it therefore was or should have been
02:47:55 it therefore was or should have been clear
02:47:55 clear to any designer or contractor that if they were following the linear route pir could not be used indeed mr hyatt the inquiry's architectural expert
02:48:07 the inquiry's architectural expert confirmed in his evidence earlier this week
02:48:10 week that any reasonably competent architect would have known that pir products were not compliant with the linear route if therefore pir was to be used at
02:48:21 if therefore pir was to be used at grenfell tower any designer or contractor should have known that one of the other routes to compliance had to be followed each of those routes to compliance required the fire performance of the
02:48:33 required the fire performance of the cladding system as a whole to be considered that brings me to the second of the four routes i mentioned this involved testing the complete
02:48:44 this involved testing the complete cladding system to bs 8414 now that is a substantial undertaking requiring construction of the system on a full-scale test rig
02:48:55 a full-scale test rig which is then subjected to a fire load simulating a fire escaping from a window there are only a small number of testing houses in the uk with the capability to conduct such
02:49:06 with the capability to conduct such tests
02:49:08 tests at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment it was standard practice to widen the scope of application of a bs8414 test by by way of a field of application
02:49:19 by by way of a field of application report
02:49:20 report or a desktop study these studies enable building designers and contractors to extrapolate the results of a bs-8414
02:49:31 to extrapolate the results of a bs-8414 test of a particular cladding system to determine whether a system containing different
02:49:37 different components would if tested meet the performance criteria under br 135
02:49:45 now bsr team 1 appears to suggest in its opening submission that desktop studies
02:49:52 studies were not a permitted route to compliance that we submit is wrong all four of the routes to compliance i have identified were well established by the time that
02:50:03 were well established by the time that insulation and cladding products were purchased for the grenfell tower refurbishment they were i identified in industry guidance available at the time
02:50:15 available at the time including the technical guidance note issued by the building control alliance to which i have referred furthermore mr hyde has confirmed in both his
02:50:25 both his expert report and his oral evidence this week
02:50:29 week that all four routes to compliance including desktop studies were available at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment
02:50:40 now during module 1 there was much discussion about class naught this is a national fire performance classification for individual construction products at the time of the
02:50:54 construction products at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment class naught was relevant to the specification and use of cladding products on the external surface
02:51:04 surface of an of an exterior wall under the linear route compliance that appears from section 12.6 of adb2 which required the external surfaces of
02:51:16 which required the external surfaces of walls
02:51:17 walls to be classified as class naught which as i've said is a national classification or alternatively class b or better under european standards
02:51:29 b or better under european standards it is clear from section 12.6 that these classifications that is class naught
02:51:36 naught or alternatively class b or better applied only to the external surface of the wall they did not apply to the insulation that was installed within a cladding
02:51:47 that was installed within a cladding system
02:51:48 system behind the exterior cladding panels under the linear route to compliance insulation in the cladding system was required to be of limited
02:51:59 was required to be of limited combustibility as i've explained adb2 made clear that class naught and limited combustibility were different concepts and were not
02:52:12 were different concepts and were not interchangeable each of these terms was separately identified in adb-2 class naught was determined by specific fire tests under british standard 476 part 6 and 7
02:52:25 under british standard 476 part 6 and 7 whereas limited combustibility was defined
02:52:28 defined as i've said in appendix a of adb-2
02:52:36 the various routes to compliance i've mentioned
02:52:39 mentioned should have been known to the construction professionals involved in the refurbishment of grenfell tower the relevant provisions of the building regulations and adb-2
02:52:50 regulations and adb-2 were well established having been in force since 2006. they were well publicized in industry guidance available at the time including the technical guidance note i
02:53:01 including the technical guidance note i have mentioned however the evidence given in module 1 now shows that the construction professionals involved in the grenfell tower for
02:53:11 tower for refurbishment were unaware of disregarded or otherwise failed to follow
02:53:18 follow the requirements of adb2 when designing and constructing the cladding system at grenfell
02:53:23 grenfell tower they gave no proper consideration to which of any potential route to compliance they were following importantly they had no regard to the
02:53:34 importantly they had no regard to the fact that the insulation and other components of the clouding system were combustible and they did not consider what impact that had on compliance of the cladding system
02:53:45 system with building regulations nor did they undertake
02:53:49 undertake any assessment of the fire performance of the cladding system they were proposing to install whether by way of of a desktop study or otherwise
02:53:59 otherwise despite the linear route to compliance not being available these failings on the part of the designers contractors and fire safety consultants were fundamental and they should have
02:54:11 were fundamental and they should have been identified by rbkc building control however that did not happen none of these matters was celetexa's responsibility
02:54:25 was celetexa's responsibility so i'm now moving uh to a new topic the supply of the celetex products used in the refurbishment so so that may be a convenient moment yes well if that's convenient to you i
02:54:36 well if that's convenient to you i suggest we stop there and uh we'll resume at two o'clock if that's all right thank you and we'll look forward to seeing you then
02:54:47 seeing you then good thank you very much at two o'clock then please
02:55:51 you