Opening statements for Phase 2 from bereaved, survivors and residents' representatives addressing the causes of the fire, failures in building regulations, corporate responsibility, and the need for systemic change. Powerful testimony on regulatory failures and culture of non-compliance.
00:00:06 good morning the inquiry is about to resume therefore please can you take your seats and remain silent just to run through some housekeeping there is no
00:00:18 through some housekeeping there is no planned fire alarm test today if the alarm sounds trained fire wardens on this floor will direct you to evacuate you will be directed through
00:00:30 evacuate you will be directed through one of the three Far exits within this room which are to be used in case of evacuation at the end of the session please remain seated until the chairmen
00:00:41 please remain seated until the chairmen panel member and the witness have left the room no photographs are allowed to be taken in the hearing room and your phone should be switched to silent the
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00:01:16 also may we remind you that no eating is allowed in the hearing room thank you
00:02:37 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing today we're going to hear opening statements on behalf of the Reid survivors and other residents of the
00:02:49 survivors and other residents of the language to west estate so without more ado I should invite mr. Barr wise to make an opening statement thank you the Buried survivors and residents come to
00:03:03 Buried survivors and residents come to you in the confident expectation based on the chairs exhaustive and exotic exacting phase one report that you and your team will leave no stone unturned in seeking to establish where
00:03:16 in seeking to establish where responsibility lies for the disaster the VSR know that the factors which led to the fire are complex into woven and deep-seated responsibility lies in more
00:03:29 deep-seated responsibility lies in more than one place any adequate explanation of a disaster on this scale is not susceptible to simplistic or one-dimensional narratives and the BSR
00:03:42 one-dimensional narratives and the BSR are confident the inquiry will be wary of any attempts to advance them your starting point is module one which will be concerned of the detail of how the 2012 to 2016 refurbishment was carried
00:03:56 2012 to 2016 refurbishment was carried out but as this is the opening of phase 2 and given the need to identify where responsibility for the disaster may lie I inevitably mentioned as indeed have
00:04:08 I inevitably mentioned as indeed have others in opening matters which arise in other modules in these submissions as in our written submissions I propose to address the design of the refurbishment and the roles and responsibilities held
00:04:21 and the roles and responsibilities held by the various Corps participants I intend to do so by examining what those core participants now say in order to obfuscate deflect responsibility and
00:04:32 obfuscate deflect responsibility and blame others for the disaster that ensue I will end by addressing the urgency of the need to prevent recurrence of such a disaster before examining the
00:04:45 disaster before examining the refurbishment it's necessary to look back to the seeds of the fire which was sown before a single drawing was produced the decision to refurbish Grenfell was a product of me jerk
00:04:57 Grenfell was a product of me jerk reactions rather than carefully thought-out plans and decisions the relevant history is that the Lancaster West Estate within which Grenfell sits
00:05:08 West Estate within which Grenfell sits had been left to deteriorate it had received no real investments it's it's since its inception in 1970 among the many problems faced by residents the
00:05:21 many problems faced by residents the towers heating and hot water system was beyond economic repair and its windows provided neither the sound nor insulation required by modern standards by 2009 our bkc had engaged consultants
00:05:35 by 2009 our bkc had engaged consultants to consider what to do with Grenfell the resulting report the Notting Barnes South draft final master plan recommended demolition of the tower and one of the three-finger blocks in the
00:05:48 one of the three-finger blocks in the event neither that plan nor any other cohesive strategy for investment in the area was adopted instead our bkc reacted
00:05:59 area was adopted instead our bkc reacted at the last possible moment to pressing needs within the area by deciding to construct a school for which it could obtain grant funding under the government's building schools for the
00:06:10 government's building schools for the Future programme that project was the Kensington Academy and leisure center known as calc by this point Grenville's pressing needs had reached such a degree of criticality that they
00:06:23 such a degree of criticality that they could no longer be ignored moreover the adverse effect that the construction of calc would have on Grenville's residents meant that refurbishment was seen as a necessary step to assuage the residents who were
00:06:36 step to assuage the residents who were by now complaining about calc an obsession with aesthetics which was to dog the project began at this early stage our bkc in the tea
00:06:48 stage our bkc in the tea fear'd Grenfell would appear a poor cousin to this brand-new facility next door
00:06:55 door grenfell was also regarded as an as an eyesore by Studio E the architects RB Casey had engaged the cow who later became the architect of Grenfell studio
00:07:08 became the architect of Grenfell studio he expressed the view that Grenfell created a poor-quality frontage for calc thereby endangering the success of the Cal project which remained RB Casey's
00:07:19 Cal project which remained RB Casey's priority throughout over cladding Grenfell was seen as a solution to RB Casey and others athletic concerns the decision to climb the Academy part of
00:07:32 decision to climb the Academy part of the 40 million pound calc development in a powder coated highly combustible core insulating panel set into motion the fate of Bren Fell's cladding the
00:07:44 fate of Bren Fell's cladding the contractors at grenfell would later seize upon the cladding used on the Academy as having set a precedent saying next door are using powder coated
00:07:55 next door are using powder coated aluminium so not an inferior product precedent already said it was an unfortunate precedent the powder coated aluminium cladding panel used on the
00:08:07 aluminium cladding panel used on the Academy has an unacceptably poor reaction to fire namely Euro Class E and is also an insulating core panel which poses particular risks in the event of
00:08:19 poses particular risks in the event of fire as indicated by the specific warnings in appendix F of approved document b besides aesthetics another
00:08:30 document b besides aesthetics another important design priority for grenfell was our BK c s and t mos desire to offset part of the cost of the refurbishment by obtaining funding for environmental sustainability this desire
00:08:44 environmental sustainability this desire was reflected in the design teams imperative to win a Brienne award an environmental award curated by the VRE the Building Research Establishment both
00:08:55 the Building Research Establishment both that and the requirement to obtain eco funding were later incorporated into ridings freakin struction agreement and the ultimately agreed design and build contract given
00:09:07 agreed design and build contract given the current environmental imperative the drive to reduce carbon emissions was laudable but it is perhaps an opportune moment to reflect on the fact that at
00:09:18 moment to reflect on the fact that at Grenfell at least that drive very directly red LED with much encouragement from the insulation management manufacturer Celotex to the use of
00:09:29 manufacturer Celotex to the use of combustible insulation behind the rains flooding which fueled the inferno which ensued the use of combustible insulation results in fires much higher
00:09:41 results in fires much higher temperatures than they otherwise would be and so it was at Grenfell the designers at groennfell were keen in order to win the Breanna award not only
00:09:54 order to win the Breanna award not only to meet but to exceed the requirements of approved document L which imposes thermal efficiency requirements expressed as target new values that aim whilst admirable in itself did not
00:10:07 whilst admirable in itself did not excuse the need to ensure that the form of insulation used was capable of complying with the fire safety requirements of the building regulations yet the importance of fire safety
00:10:19 yet the importance of fire safety appears to have been overlooked but over focus on sustainability at the expense of fire safety is reflected nationally in the guidance underlying the building
00:10:30 in the guidance underlying the building regulations in that there is an inherent potential conflict between approved documents L & B which has not expressly been addressed as it must be returning
00:10:42 been addressed as it must be returning to TMO in the execution of these hastily defined project objectives PMO's behavior was far from the flawless image it now seeks to project from the outset
00:10:55 it now seeks to project from the outset it disregarded its procurement obligations in a way that likely affected the quality of the refurbishment PMO's circumvented public
00:11:06 refurbishment PMO's circumvented public procurement legislation by requiring the consultants involved in calc whom TMO decided to use on grenfell to cap their fees below the thresholds
00:11:17 to cap their fees below the thresholds at which they then enforced public contract regulations would have required a competitive procurement process under what is known as a zoo namely the Official Journal of the European Union
00:11:30 Official Journal of the European Union the balance of the consultants fees would later become payable by the contractor once the professionals contracts had been novated to it such
00:11:41 contracts had been novated to it such procurement process would have in spot ensured transparent competition and should have resulted in the most suitable and qualified professionals being appointed instead TMO conducted no
00:11:54 being appointed instead TMO conducted no competitive process and apparently on the grounds of speed and convenience alone retained Studio E as the architect for Grenfell even though Studio II had
00:12:06 for Grenfell even though Studio II had no experience of high-rise building or heating renewal nor of cladding and as one of their architects said in an email upon winning the project they were a
00:12:18 upon winning the project they were a little green on process and technicality so I proposed some rapid CPD a further breach of the procurement process procedures occurred in the process used
00:12:29 procedures occurred in the process used to select the contractor for this an OSHA procurement process known as the restricted procedure was used but TMO entered discussions with Rhydon alone
00:12:40 entered discussions with Rhydon alone prior to the award of preferred bidder status seeking a reduction in costs of 800,000 pounds namely the amount by which ridings tender exceeded PMO's
00:12:52 which ridings tender exceeded PMO's available budget that private negotiation included amongst other reductions a two hundred and forty three thousand pound reduction in the cladding costs involving a change from the zinc
00:13:05 costs involving a change from the zinc cladding specified to one of the alternative options included within the specification namely aluminium composite panels this requested reduction was dressed up as value engineering but to
00:13:19 dressed up as value engineering but to be properly so described it would have needed to preserve or improve functionality at a lesser cost that is not what happened and indeed the
00:13:30 that is not what happened and indeed the TMO seems to have given no thought and asked no questions as to whether performance including safety was in any way compromised by this cost reduction
00:13:42 way compromised by this cost reduction TMO was advised that giving one contractor an opportunity to engage in the so-called value engineering process to the exclusion of others would invalidate the procurement process and
00:13:54 invalidate the procurement process and as a result it was careful not to formally agree this variation until after the award of the contract this manipulation of the procurement process
00:14:06 manipulation of the procurement process was not transparent and may arguably have adversely affected the selection process there are of course other early contributing factors to the scale of the
00:14:18 contributing factors to the scale of the fire beyond those that I have mentioned and beyond the refurbishment project itself many of these factors have rooted in the mismanagement of the tower and
00:14:30 in the mismanagement of the tower and necessary repairs by TMO over many years doors are an obvious example why did TMO simply remove door closers on discovering as dr. Lane explains in
00:14:43 on discovering as dr. Lane explains in her phase 1 report that there was a systemic problem with the door closes an important question for module 3 will be why this systemic fault was not
00:14:54 why this systemic fault was not addressed and why the door closes were not better maintained so that they did not permit the entry of significant amounts of smoke early in the fire if
00:15:05 amounts of smoke early in the fire if further evidence of TMO is complacent attitude to fire is needed one need look no further than the fact that prior to the refurbishment no one had troubled to
00:15:17 the refurbishment no one had troubled to reduce the fire strategy for the tower to writing that is very telling the purpose of the fire strategy is to ensure the building is compliant with
00:15:29 ensure the building is compliant with legislation and to ensure the safety of those within it publicly available specification 911 dated 2007 advises
00:15:40 specification 911 dated 2007 advises that as
00:15:40 that as strategies should be prepared as a necessary precursor to deciding upon the fire prevention and management practices which are required by the regulatory reform fire safety order 2005 TMO and RB
00:15:57 reform fire safety order 2005 TMO and RB kc both or responsibility for ensuring the necessary fire prevention and management practices under the fire safety order teemo's fire risk Assessor Kyle Stokes
00:16:10 teemo's fire risk Assessor Kyle Stokes also played his part by careless statements regarding not only the nature of the cladding but also stating the lifts were firefighter lifts when they were not overriding the Fire Brigades
00:16:23 were not overriding the Fire Brigades advice that a premises information box was required and more fundamentally his failure to adopt the correct approach to fire risk assessments in failing to
00:16:34 fire risk assessments in failing to consider the nature of the population of Grenfell at all leading to a flawed assessment of the consequences of fire none of Stokes's failures excused he mo
00:16:47 none of Stokes's failures excused he mo it had been clearly warned by the fire brigade during bimonthly meeting in early January 2016 that Stokes was prone to making unjustified statements faced
00:17:01 to making unjustified statements faced with that warning TMO cannot now say it was entitled to rely on stokes without question a very further very significant
00:17:12 question a very further very significant example of TM owes contribution to loss of life is its failure to produce personal evacuation emergency plans referred to as peeps for the many
00:17:23 referred to as peeps for the many residents who suffered from mobility or cognitive disorders this failure was despite being well aware that such plans were required since TMO proposed
00:17:34 were required since TMO proposed reduction of peeps for TMO staff but not residents furthermore the fire risk assessments produced by Kyle Stokes all recorded that peeps would be put in
00:17:46 recorded that peeps would be put in place on the night of the fire there were none
00:17:52 were none there is therefore much within the confines of shed of module one and beyond with which TMO if it were being entirely candid with this inquiry could
00:18:03 entirely candid with this inquiry could reproach itself instead PMO's opening statement expresses regret as to the events leading to the fire but essentially says that it's all its
00:18:15 essentially says that it's all its actions were based on advice of the professionals this is to overlook some very serious failings for which no one but TMO is to blame and which
00:18:26 but TMO is to blame and which contributed to the loss of life whilst we recognize the participants submissions are generally addressing module 1 issues the participants are
00:18:37 module 1 issues the participants are equally well aware that this is the opening of phase 2 and what they say now is critically important it is misleading for a party to express as TMO does its
00:18:49 for a party to express as TMO does its sympathy remorse and sorrow for the horrifying and tragic events which took place on the night of the fire and then to conclude as TMO does that it is
00:19:01 to conclude as TMO does that it is undeniable that the design and construction of the refurbishment compromised the safety of the building and led to a tragic loss of lives without acknowledging any aspect of
00:19:12 without acknowledging any aspect of teemo's own performance which contributed to that compromised state and that loss of life that's denial of
00:19:23 and that loss of life that's denial of responsibility by TMO is reflective of an approach being adopted by all too many of the core participants each of whom as counsels think wiry has observed
00:19:34 whom as counsels think wiry has observed indulges in a blame game what should be happening is that each body should consider its conduct reflect honestly upon the adequacy of it and seeing how
00:19:45 upon the adequacy of it and seeing how its own behavior together with that of others played out make constructive suggestions as to how to avoid the recurrence of this terrible disaster or anything like it
00:19:56 anything like it on the contrary each core participants eyes are to firmly fixed on ways to avoid legal liability the expense of examining what in fact
00:20:07 the expense of examining what in fact happened they have all been at pains to tell you in opening how cooperative with the inquiry they have been and are being
00:20:18 the inquiry they have been and are being but TMO Harlee various former and current ridin employees Osborne Barry Kevin lamb and studio II gave the lie to that by intimating to the inquiry late
00:20:31 that by intimating to the inquiry late on Tuesday evening their intention to invoke privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions unless the Attorney General gives an undertaking preventing their
00:20:42 gives an undertaking preventing their oral evidence from being used against them in criminal proceedings whilst in other circumstances no criticism of those under threat of criminal proceedings would arise for seeking such
00:20:54 proceedings would arise for seeking such an undertaking the timing of this application which clearly could and if it was going to be made should have been made many months ago gives the
00:21:05 made many months ago gives the appearance of sabotaging this inquiry these core participants know that seeking these undertakings will inevitably cause delay and the timing of this application is much to their
00:21:18 this application is much to their discredit the behaviors of arrogance and complacency which caused the disaster at Grenfell still rage unchecked
00:21:29 Grenfell still rage unchecked Ament among many of the core participants the only party which admits it could have done something better and was at fault without seeking to say it's fault had no effect is RB Casey
00:21:41 fault had no effect is RB Casey commenting on its own Building Control Department it does so now only in the face of clear expert evidence in numerating those failings it is no
00:21:53 numerating those failings it is no coincidence that such admission is prefaced by a denial of any legal liability for failures in reliance on the principle that a local authority planning department owes no duty of care
00:22:05 planning department owes no duty of care in tort under the judgment of the House of Lords as it then was in Murphy and Brentwood backs omission in any event over
00:22:14 over the fact that the House of Lords in that case expressly left the door open for the possibility of a duty of care arising in the event of physical harm arguably a case such as Grenfell is
00:22:27 arguably a case such as Grenfell is precisely why that door was left open our be KC's approach is therefore consistent with TM o--'s and the corporate mystic or participants general
00:22:38 corporate mystic or participants general stance which appears to be the denial of liability at the expense of addressing responsibility it was suggested by RB KC's counsel yesterday that there might
00:22:51 KC's counsel yesterday that there might be confusion as to the separation of functions between r b kc and t mo there is none RB KC's role and function were separate from TM O's but in some areas
00:23:04 separate from TM O's but in some areas they bore joint responsibility so for example as building owner RB KC's CEO was a responsible person under their regulatory reform fire
00:23:17 under their regulatory reform fire safety order 2005 but TM o was also a likely responsible person under the order our be case he also fails to mention that it had a scrutiny way over
00:23:30 mention that it had a scrutiny way over t mo the effectiveness of that scrutiny will need to be examined by this inquiry to the extent that our BK c now seeks to minimize its role by pointing to t mo
00:23:42 minimize its role by pointing to t mo who is effectively its subcontractor it is behaving in the same way as the corporate participants one hallmark of the grenfell disaster is the epidemic
00:23:56 the grenfell disaster is the epidemic level of incompetence from fire safety perspective across substantially all the disciplines involved both in the refurbishment and in the management of the building these disciplines include t
00:24:08 the building these disciplines include t mo and its fire risk Assessor and many of the professionals and contractors involved in the refurbishment principally the fire engineer X / Studio e ridin Harley and other subcontractors
00:24:21 e ridin Harley and other subcontractors as well as RB KC Building Control before addressing the extent to which the relevant
00:24:28 relevant all participants were incompetent it's necessary to consider the question of compliance with the building regulations and other guidance the building regulations impose a set of functional
00:24:39 regulations impose a set of functional requirements or outcomes which must be achieved the requirements governing fire safety are B 1 to B 5 + B 4 is the requirement that the external wall salutes adequately resist spread of
00:24:51 salutes adequately resist spread of flame it is argued by many of the core participants that lack of clarity in approved document b which is the guidance underlying the building regulations led to confusion as to that
00:25:05 regulations led to confusion as to that whilst it is true that approved document b known as ad b is based on a post-war 1946 document and is not fit for purpose in some fundamental respects
00:25:16 in some fundamental respects nevertheless it was sufficiently clear as to the requirements for a facade on a building over 18 metres tall as groennfell was there are four possible
00:25:28 groennfell was there are four possible routes to compliance which three of which derived from ad b first either the precise cladding proposed is tested by a large scale test carried out in
00:25:39 large scale test carried out in accordance with BS 8 for 1/4 second the so-called linear route which requires that the cladding should use only limited combustible compatibility insulation and the external surface of
00:25:50 insulation and the external surface of the lorentz should comply with diagram 40 namely B national class zero or euro Class B 3 s so B s 3 D 2 or better third
00:26:01 Class B 3 s so B s 3 D 2 or better third a holistic fire engineered study fourth is a route postulated by the Building Control Alliance technical guidance note 18 namely a desktop study there is no
00:26:13 18 namely a desktop study there is no evidence that at grenfell any consideration was given to following any of the four routes to compliance no large-scale test was considered nor
00:26:24 large-scale test was considered nor holistic fire engineered study nor desktop as a result by default the designers and contractors must have been following the linear route insofar as the designers and contractors appear to
00:26:37 the designers and contractors appear to have been concerned about any aspect of compliance they seemed to have take Comfort or at least claim they may have done so from the fact that the BBA certificate for the cladding panel was
00:26:48 certificate for the cladding panel was class zero and the fact that the insulation literature said the product was class zero
00:26:57 a DB was absolutely clear in requiring limited combust ability insulation in the external walls if the linear route to compliance was being followed that is
00:27:09 to compliance was being followed that is clear from industry guidance notes current at the time of Granville the Building Control Alliance technical guidance note 18 first issued in June 2014 recommended that if the linear
00:27:21 2014 recommended that if the linear route to compliance was followed all key components of the cladding should be limited combust ability additionally this was clear from guidance produced by the Center for wetting windows and
00:27:32 the Center for wetting windows and cladding technology the standard system for the clock the standard for systemized building envelopes which was expressly incorporated by reference into the employer's requirements in ridings
00:27:43 the employer's requirements in ridings contract
00:27:44 contract it appears the designers and crack contractors fell broadly into two camps at groennfell they either did not think about compliance at all or many of those who did address it seemed to have
00:27:56 who did address it seemed to have understood what was required and ignored it this is one of the more troubling emerging themes that many of the professionals and contractors willfully
00:28:08 professionals and contractors willfully failed to comply with the regulations all statutory guidance despite being fully aware of and understanding the guidance the most egregious example of
00:28:19 guidance the most egregious example of this is x over the fire engineer described by dr. lane as top tier was retained by TMO at the outset of the grenfell refurbishment pursuant to two
00:28:30 grenfell refurbishment pursuant to two separate instructions first to prepare a fire strategy for the existing building and second for the proposed refurbishment pursuant to these instructions it's over produced a fire
00:28:42 instructions it's over produced a fire strategy for the existing building an initial design note and three iterations of the outlined fire strategy for the refurbishment dr. Lane finds that each
00:28:54 refurbishment dr. Lane finds that each of these five documents was fundamentally flawed starting with the fire strategy of the existing building which represented a missed opportunity to provide assessment of fire risks that
00:29:06 to provide assessment of fire risks that resulted from any difference between the original and current guidance each successive x over fire strategy should have informed the next but failed
00:29:17 should have informed the next but failed to do so
00:29:18 to do so in a positive way due to the flaws in each the fundamental flaw in all three versions of the outline fire strategy was that it failed to adequately address
00:29:29 was that it failed to adequately address functional requirement before external fire spread and in fact made a negligent misrepresentation in that it read it is considered that the proposed changes
00:29:40 considered that the proposed changes will have no effect on the building in relation to external fire spread but this will be confirmed by an analysis in a future issue of this report this
00:29:52 a future issue of this report this statement was seriously misleading because by the time it was made in November 2013 the design team knew that xover had been copied in on the stage see report issued in October 2012 which
00:30:06 see report issued in October 2012 which made clear that both new insulation and zinc composite rainscreen cladding rainscreen cladding were proposed given that the strategy contained no caveat or
00:30:18 that the strategy contained no caveat or exclusion relating to the cladding system the natural reading of that statement was that it's OVA had taken the cladding into account and insulation
00:30:29 the cladding into account and insulation into account given that the existing concrete was non combustible and that any form of metal composite cladding was almost inevitably going to be combustible xover must have known the
00:30:42 combustible xover must have known the cladding represented a worsening of the condition of the existing building that was therefore a material alteration within the meaning of the building regulations and as such ought to have
00:30:55 regulations and as such ought to have been flagged up it seems however that a culture within xover certainly amongst those who worked on the grenfell strategies was to play down potential
00:31:06 strategies was to play down potential non-compliance in order to get around the building control officer in a contemporaneous email in the context of the ventilation system one of ex OVAs
00:31:17 the ventilation system one of ex OVAs employees acknowledged that the proposals amounted to making any visting crap condition worse and an instruction to the effect that no sprinklers wanted was simply accepted
00:31:30 sprinklers wanted was simply accepted instead of being questioned ex oversaw its role and means of adding value as one of advising on the building control officers likely attitude and to massage
00:31:44 officers likely attitude and to massage the presentation of certain aspects of the design in order to avoid a proposal being rejected as non-compliant xover was clearly at fault and yet accepts
00:31:57 was clearly at fault and yet accepts absolutely no responsibility for any shortcomings in its performance despite the eviscerating report of dr. lane in which she considers x overs failure to
00:32:09 which she considers x overs failure to fully address functional requirements B 1 B 2 B 3 and B 5 and the total emission of B 4 evidences serious incompetence furthermore dr. Lane considers that its
00:32:22 furthermore dr. Lane considers that its overs failure to issue a revised outlined fire strategy to address before even once X over became aware of the details of the cladding system was as she says very serious evidence of
00:32:35 she says very serious evidence of professional negligence x overs submissions are an exercise in semantics its defense to dr. lanes criticism is that her approach is flawed in that she
00:32:48 that her approach is flawed in that she has construed its obligations by reference to the fire Industry Association Guide 2015 which was not in force at the time and also that dr. Lane uses the guide to full text over of
00:33:00 uses the guide to full text over of providing advice which the guide required but which in fact xover was not asked to do by the client but he is a bad point firstly because dr. Lane
00:33:12 bad point firstly because dr. Lane identifies the guide as epitomizing her experience of good practice from both before and after 2012 secondly x over completely overlooks that the advice
00:33:24 completely overlooks that the advice which did in fact provide was negligent according to dr. lane who considers X over made serious mistakes in each of its fired strategy documents
00:33:35 its fired strategy documents thirdly xover overlooks the fact that the three iterations of the fire strategy amounted to a negligent misrepresentation in relation to B for external fire spread which instilled a
00:33:47 external fire spread which instilled a false sense of security in the design team by the use of the words it is considered that the proposed changes will have no effect and by suggesting this would be confirmed that was not the
00:33:59 this would be confirmed that was not the conclusion which should have been reached what should have been said was that the cladding would likely have an adverse effect but the extent of the worsening of condition could not be
00:34:10 worsening of condition could not be known until the precise cladding system had been defined fourthly xover volunteered advice on cavity barriers in the cladding in 2015 on being asked by
00:34:23 the cladding in 2015 on being asked by studio e who forwarded a query from Harley about the degree of fire resistance required of the cavity barriers given X / did not have the cladding specification such advice
00:34:35 cladding specification such advice should not have been given at all and X / was negligent in failing to warn that the outlined fire strategy section on external fire spread required to be the
00:34:47 external fire spread required to be the subject of a proper analysis now the cladding system including insulation and composite metal cladding was proposed instead of preferring advice X / should
00:34:59 instead of preferring advice X / should have refused to give any advice until the full specification had been shown to them at the very least X / should have warned of the dangers of thereof
00:35:10 warned of the dangers of thereof reliance on their advice given they're ignorant of the design of the rest of the system and in the anab absence of the B for analysis X / overlooks the
00:35:22 the B for analysis X / overlooks the culture of knowing and willful non-compliance which permeated the firm and all those knowingly involved in as X / said making an existing crap situation
00:35:34 / said making an existing crap situation worse that language terrible as it is has a deeper significance than may at first blush appear X / was well aware that in order to be acceptable under the
00:35:46 that in order to be acceptable under the Building Regulations the proposed works and system must not make the existing conditions worse this therefore is proof that X OVA was willfully advocating a non-compliant
00:35:59 willfully advocating a non-compliant system insofar as ventilation part of its b1 means of escape strategy was concerned as already explained that culture is seeking to get around the
00:36:11 culture is seeking to get around the building control officer extended to all aspects of X overs behavior on the Grenfell project and probably explains the wording which should not have appeared in the context of external fire
00:36:23 appeared in the context of external fire spread namely that the proposed changes would have no effect x over makes a general plea that it would be wrong for a party who was sidelined at the time to
00:36:35 a party who was sidelined at the time to end up now being front and center this appears to be x over zarg y iment that after november 2013 if it's cut out of the loop x over asserts it is strongly
00:36:47 the loop x over asserts it is strongly arguable that it was exonerated from any continuing obligation by Ryden being appointed designer build contractor in 2014 this is a most peculiar and flawed
00:36:59 2014 this is a most peculiar and flawed submission it is flawed for two reasons first x over was not sidelined on the contrary it produced the seminal
00:37:10 contrary it produced the seminal documents on which the fire safety of Grenfell tower depended namely the existing and outlined fire strategy the fact that these documents were according
00:37:21 fact that these documents were according to dr. lane negligently prepared and contained a negligent misstatement that the proposed works would have no effect on external fire spread is likely to be causative second x overs own procedures
00:37:35 causative second x overs own procedures required it to ensure that its services were no longer required and had been completed but yet there is no evidence that X overdid so recent relativity
00:37:46 that X overdid so recent relativity disclosure includes x overs internal operating procedure dated the first of april 2010 which provides at paragraph 4 for the closure of the project this
00:37:58 for the closure of the project this requires the x over project manager to either
00:38:01 either all elements of the project of the proposal have been carried out or alternatively he should contact the client to ensure they are satisfied with the scope of exodus' services and that
00:38:13 the scope of exodus' services and that they matched the clients expectations it's over does not mention this procedure or suggests that it was carried out xover concludes by suggesting each party must assist this
00:38:25 suggesting each party must assist this inquiry in coming to accurate and reliable conclusions and by sincerely hoping that phase 2 will bring some measure of closure for the victims that
00:38:36 measure of closure for the victims that is unlikely to happen if each participant adopts a similarly misleading approach as x over turning to our colleague now self anonymized as aap
00:38:49 our colleague now self anonymized as aap SAS but who shall remain our conic to the BSR our conic begins phase 2 as it ended phase 1 by pointing out that it
00:39:01 ended phase 1 by pointing out that it would have been obvious to anyone professionally involved in constructing a building that its product by reason of its polyethylene core was not of limited combustibility in its oral opening our conic claimed
00:39:15 in its oral opening our conic claimed credit for the fact that it is not seeking to blame others however it is blaming others by its submission that the flammability of our onyx product was or should have been obvious to others
00:39:28 or should have been obvious to others furthermore our chronic argues that the fabrication of its panels into the riveted or cassette product is the cause of the problem which is not merely blaming others it is also a thoroughly
00:39:41 blaming others it is also a thoroughly bad point it overlooks the inherent flammability of the product and completely ignores the fact that as widens counsel explained on Monday our chronic new by 2011 that its products
00:39:54 chronic new by 2011 that its products behaved very poorly in fire and increasingly could not be used in European markets this was due to the fact that countries such as Spain were switching to the Euro class system and
00:40:05 switching to the Euro class system and had a Euro Class B requirement whereas Reina Bond PE 55 was at best Class E and on 29th June 2011 had been test at his class path or biet in subsequent
00:40:18 at his class path or biet in subsequent testing it subsequently obtained and e-government documents in october 2000 explaining the correlation between uro classes and national classes tell us
00:40:29 classes and national classes tell us that class II means the product will flashover meaning auto-ignite within two minutes in fire in those circumstances it is disingenuous for our conic now to
00:40:40 it is disingenuous for our conic now to make the submission that when the standard a gray-green product was tested for reaction to fire it was capable of achieving a be our conic also fails to
00:40:51 achieving a be our conic also fails to mention but armed with the knowledge that its product was at best class ii and increasingly could not be sold in other markets our conics set out to
00:41:02 other markets our conics set out to increase sales in the UK and win the grenfell tower project please may we go to M ET three zeros five three one six
00:41:13 to M ET three zeros five three one six one underscore zero zero 24 and scroll to the email starting at the bottom of page 23 at the bottom of page 23 you see
00:41:29 page 23 at the bottom of page 23 you see an email from Peter flourish of our conic to Deborah French in which early cast French weather are conic is on track to meet the target for their UK forecast sales of PE Reina bond in the
00:41:43 forecast sales of PE Reina bond in the table can we scroll down at the table we see the years 2012 to 2014 for the year 2014
00:41:51 2014 we see an almost doubling of the planned sales from the previous year in 2014 the letters in red are the plan ah conic plans to sell 65,000 square meters
00:42:05 plans to sell 65,000 square meters bringing a revenue of one point eight eight five million and a profit margin of just over half a million pounds if we scroll up to the top of page 23 can we
00:42:19 scroll up to the top of page 23 can we scroll up
00:42:20 scroll up we see the email Debora French in reply to mr. Furley confirming that yes they are on target and she lists 7 UK projects beginning
00:42:31 and she lists 7 UK projects beginning with Whelan's house and then further down under the list of projects she says projects I am still working on but confident we will get them are grown
00:42:42 confident we will get them are grown felt ours
00:42:44 felt ours this gives the lie to our conics previous narrative that all it does is sell the product and that it is not involved in the process of persuasion to get its product onto buildings it does
00:42:57 get its product onto buildings it does so through its distributors targeting potential contractors on a project in this case CP and so it was at Grenfell by the 29th of March 2012 CEP through
00:43:10 by the 29th of March 2012 CEP through its mr. Jeff blades had made contact with studio e to discuss cladding options furthermore as our chronic well knew the BBA certificate for the cladding panels on which the grenfell
00:43:23 cladding panels on which the grenfell contractors and designers would be relying was misleading because it didn't not in fact apply to the Cosette as opposed to the riveted version of the panel the suggestion by our conic on
00:43:35 panel the suggestion by our conic on Tuesday that the BBA panel the BBA certificate relates to nothing other than the surface of a none fabricated panel and that such product could achieve a B would only be a valid point
00:43:47 achieve a B would only be a valid point if the certificate did not appear on its face to relate to both the riveted and cassette panel the certificate contained diagrams of both the riveted and
00:43:58 diagrams of both the riveted and cassette systems and only in the smallest of footnotes in the middle of a page where it would undoubtedly be missed
00:44:05 missed did it state that the significant did not the certificate did not apply to the cassette at all our conic had tested the cassette version of the product and knew
00:44:16 cassette version of the product and knew it was at best class II our conic was clearly at fault in failing to give BBA the debt test data for the cassette panel as well as the riveted panel yet
00:44:28 panel as well as the riveted panel yet further lest there be any doubt our conic became aware at latest by April 20 sixteen whilst the works that Grenfell was still ongoing by being sent booths
00:44:39 was still ongoing by being sent booths Murie guidance that UK building regulations required all significant elements of each and every layer of the wall to be non combustible or of limited combust ability even earlier in 2015 our
00:44:53 combust ability even earlier in 2015 our conic had become aware that in order to comply with diagram 40 of ADB the external surface of the wall must be classed zero and that in order to achieve that class the F are not PE was
00:45:06 achieve that class the F are not PE was required yet our conic failed to advise any of the contractors or designers with whom it had been dealing on grenfell that the polyethylene cored Rana bond was unsuitable and non-compliant or that
00:45:20 was unsuitable and non-compliant or that the BBA certificate which suggested the product was for class Sarah was for the riveted but not the Cosette panel our conic relies on our phase 1 submissions
00:45:31 conic relies on our phase 1 submissions in which we suggested that the insulation also had an important role to play in order to seek to exonerate its product that is a visible submission the
00:45:42 product that is a visible submission the call panels the panels contained polyethylene a substances professor told us professor Bisbee told us in his phase 1 presentation with a heat of combustion akin to diesel and close to light of
00:45:54 akin to diesel and close to light of fluid as the phase 1 report records it can flow whilst burning and generate burning droplets it has a high calorific value compared with other
00:46:05 calorific value compared with other common construction materials and will provide a fuel source for a growing spreading fire our conics knowledge that the cassette panel was at best an e Brenda's absurd its conclusion that it
00:46:18 Brenda's absurd its conclusion that it says the tragedy at grenfell tower shows the awful consequences which can arise when combustible materials are used in a particular combination and configured in
00:46:29 particular combination and configured in a particular manner that is not what the fire at groennfell shows it shows that the use of a thermoplastic with a heat of combustion similar to lighter fuel within any construction is likely to
00:46:42 within any construction is likely to result in an uncontrollable inferno due to the fact that as the phase 1 report clear the dripping burning droplets will set fire to anything in its path the DC LG testing carried out in 2012
00:46:56 the DC LG testing carried out in 2012 2017 tells us that the polyethylene cord panels will not be compliant with the building regulations in combination with either combustible or non combustible inspiration and
00:47:07 or non combustible inspiration and present a significant fire hazard the reader of Arc Onix opening submissions however would be left blissfully unaware that the chair had found Reina bond PE
00:47:18 that the chair had found Reina bond PE 55 to be Kanaan compliant with building regulations on the grounds that not only did it adequately resist flame spread but on the contrary promoted it our
00:47:29 but on the contrary promoted it our conics unerring ability to overlook the innate flammability and non-compliance of its product despite its own marketing materials in December 2016 advising the
00:47:41 materials in December 2016 advising the product was unsuitable for youths over 10 metres and despite its withdrawal of the product as a result of the fire is systematic of its symptomatic of its disingenuous approach to this inquiry
00:47:55 disingenuous approach to this inquiry turning to solar Tech's unlike the other core participants Celotex does admit wrongdoing or viet it denies that these actions had any causative effect the two aspects of
00:48:07 causative effect the two aspects of wrongdoing Celotex admits to our first discrepancies in the BS 8 for 1 for tests carried out by bre on rs.5000 insulation in May 2014 and the way that
00:48:20 insulation in May 2014 and the way that test was described in Celotex marketing literature it was that test which led Celotex to be able to market its RS 5000 product as suitable for use above 18
00:48:32 product as suitable for use above 18 meters the second aspect of admitted wrongdoing is the understatement of lambda values by the selective use and emission of data lambda values represent
00:48:43 emission of data lambda values represent the heat conductivity of a material such as insulation and are therefore part of the thermal calculations done to ascertain the ability of every layer of the external walls to resist heat loss
00:48:55 the external walls to resist heat loss those calculations are known as u values the lower the lambda values and overall new values the better both these aspects of Celotex is wrongdoing the
00:49:07 of Celotex is wrongdoing the misstatement of the test and the understatement of the lambda values feature in the reasons why the designers and contractors at Grenfell were influenced to use solo times both these
00:49:19 influenced to use solo times both these behaviors influence evidence of culture within Celotex at the time which will require careful examination in this inquiry it is not the case that the test
00:49:30 inquiry it is not the case that the test on rs.5000 and the misdescription of that test and the understatement of the lambda values had no causative effect as sterlet X was well aware there was a
00:49:42 sterlet X was well aware there was a lack of knowledge in some building inspectors about the use of combustible insulation Celotex exploited this lack of knowledge but in a way which
00:49:53 of knowledge but in a way which carefully avoided expressing of U on the requirements of ad being a good example of this was that in April 2015 a distributor of RS 5000 sig told Celotex
00:50:07 distributor of RS 5000 sig told Celotex that the nhbc was refusing to approve RS 5000 unless there was no difference between the proposed cladding system on site and that described in sulla Texas
00:50:19 site and that described in sulla Texas RS 5000 may 2014 test if we may turn to see el4 zeros 1 4 0 6 at the bottom of
00:50:32 see el4 zeros 1 4 0 6 at the bottom of page one we see seller Texas ahead of technicals reply to sink he says the official view Celotex view Celotex are
00:50:44 official view Celotex view Celotex are open about the tests we have performed and we always include the rain screen cutting guide the key line being any changes to the components will need to be considered by the building designer
00:50:55 be considered by the building designer at the foot of page 1 he says here is my view and if we scroll down
00:51:05 he says ultimately the specification of this product will depend on the requirements of ADB Celotex do not try to second-guess what may or may not be
00:51:17 to second-guess what may or may not be deemed suitable and if rs.5000 is rejected as an option we take it on the chin
00:51:22 chin we have had conversations with the nhbc and are generally aware that we will struggle to be able to get Rs 5000 accepted at this time he went on we have
00:51:36 accepted at this time he went on we have heard of only one job where the inspector said it was okay to use any insulation up to 80 meters and only above 18 meters did it have to be non combustible or in line with the
00:51:48 combustible or in line with the requirements of BR 135 clearly wrong the fire hasn't got a tape measure and if it starts at the ground floor it will love to race up the first 18 meters just
00:52:00 to race up the first 18 meters just shows you the smoke of confusion out there if we can scroll back up to the top of page one can we scroll back up so
00:52:13 top of page one can we scroll back up so the Texas distributors reply to this was thanks for that never has the expression smoke and mirrors been more appropriate I think I'll adopt an approach of caveat
00:52:24 I think I'll adopt an approach of caveat emptor and if specifically challenged use the rockwool options if I'm not challenged it will be Rs 5,000 this as
00:52:35 challenged it will be Rs 5,000 this as Celotex well knows is how in its marketing strategy worked contractors and designers would use the fact that the sales literature indicated the
00:52:46 the sales literature indicated the products was fit for over use over 18 meters to get it onto buildings if they could get it past the building control inspector Celotex also emits Jim mentioned just how aggressive its
00:52:59 mentioned just how aggressive its marketing strategy was its used the subcontractors and specifiers effectively as pushers to ensure that its products were specified and used on
00:53:10 its products were specified and used on buildings this was part of Salas ex's so-called
00:53:14 so-called push-pull marketing strategy using potential contractors on a project to push the product on to architects who would then pull it specify it there by
00:53:26 would then pull it specify it there by pulling it on to the building nowhere was that more apparent than in an internal Celotex document in early June 2017 in which solar tech acknowledged
00:53:37 2017 in which solar tech acknowledged that architects and main contractors push rs.5000 particularly vehemently but noted that to sell RS 5000 Celotex needed to engage with the key
00:53:49 needed to engage with the key decision-makers namely the building owner client warranty provider and fire engineer the document records that one of the main reasons why RS 5000 was continuing to achieve success was
00:54:02 continuing to achieve success was because of Celotex is growing relationships with these warranty providers and fire engineer's in these circumstances it does not lie in sulla
00:54:14 circumstances it does not lie in sulla Texas mouth to assert that the misleading description of the May 2014 test for RS 5000 had no causative effect and that the designers at Grenfell
00:54:26 and that the designers at Grenfell cannot have relied upon it a Celotex accepts it was dealing directly with Harley in relation to the use of RS 5000 at groennfell and indeed it is clear
00:54:38 at groennfell and indeed it is clear that Celotex went out of its way to win the grenfell project the so-called must-win projects list sent by sulla tex to its parent company Sanger Bank on the
00:54:51 to its parent company Sanger Bank on the 7th of November 2014 included at item 2 Grenfell tower Celotex or grenfell as being a flagship for the RS 5000 product
00:55:02 being a flagship for the RS 5000 product hence in July 2015 it drafted a Celotex case study regarding the use of Celotex at grenfell boasting super low lambda
00:55:13 at grenfell boasting super low lambda values delivering better you values and thinner solutions precisely the qualities it knew the designers of grenfell wanted whilst it was heartening
00:55:24 grenfell wanted whilst it was heartening that seller Texas counsel corrected Hartley's incorrect submission that there was no evidence that Harley knew that
00:55:31 that was dangerous it is nevertheless disappointing that Celotex itself also fails to recognize the evidence which demonstrates the fallacy of its position turning to studio II its position is
00:55:45 turning to studio II its position is untenable and based on four fundamental misconceptions first studio II considers the regulatory system was not fit for purpose and had permitted unsafe cladding for many years second studio he
00:55:58 cladding for many years second studio he didn't have knowledge of the products and could not be expected to know they were unsafe third all its staff acted with reasonable skill and care and fourth mr. Hyatt the Inquirer exactly work has not adopted the correct
00:56:10 work has not adopted the correct standard of skill and care and has overlooked that Harley would always do the design each of these four arguments are flawed after the first the fact that the ADB guidance is in part
00:56:23 the ADB guidance is in part unsatisfactory and not fit for purpose does not mean that it in fact confused studio a studio you were not confused rather they do not appear to have
00:56:35 rather they do not appear to have addressed what was necessary to comply with the requirements of ADB they openly say they delegated that to others as to the second the fact that studio II did not have knowledge of the products is
00:56:47 not have knowledge of the products is not a defense taking the obvious case of the insulation everyone agrees that should have been limited combust ability if the linear route was being adopted it was
00:56:58 linear route was being adopted it was obvious that both Celotex F are originally specified and rs.5000 eventually used and which were the same product were not of limited combust
00:57:09 product were not of limited combust ability neither the RS 5000 nor the fr 5000 were marketed as limited combust ability if studio II had troubled to establish what compliance required it
00:57:21 establish what compliance required it would have established that the insulation must be of limited combust ability and the F R 5000 which it specified an RS 5000 which had approved were not third studio he did not act
00:57:35 were not third studio he did not act with reasonable skill and care in the ways described by mr. Hyatt in that they failed to identify what compliance looked like at the outset failed to specify in its NBS specification appropriate products such
00:57:48 specification appropriate products such as the insulation that NBS specification was the document against which all the contractors tendered it was a flawed starting point for the whole project
00:58:00 starting point for the whole project what appears to have happened is that Studio II was so intent on achieving what it considered to be the right aesthetic outcome agonizing as between
00:58:11 aesthetic outcome agonizing as between the brushed aluminium and the battleship gray that instead of focusing on or even considering the performance criteria which functional requirement be for dictated it instead defined the products
00:58:23 dictated it instead defined the products in the specification and subsequently purely by reference to aesthetic criteria finally whilst Harley the cladding subcontractor was legally
00:58:34 cladding subcontractor was legally liable for the cladding design and was under implied duties to revisit the design and warned of obvious shortcomings as was ridin that does not exonerate Studio II from negligence in
00:58:46 exonerate Studio II from negligence in preparing the original design given studio ease role after Novation of approving Harley's drawings it is clear Studio II had ongoing responsibility to
00:58:58 Studio II had ongoing responsibility to approve the development of the design studio e makes the bizarre suggestion that a perfectly legitimate approach to the question of compliance might be to
00:59:09 the question of compliance might be to leave it to what it calls an advanced stage once the building control officer or approved inspector has been consulted that will almost invariably be too late and is painfully close to what happened
00:59:21 and is painfully close to what happened at grenfell the relevant contractors and designers were by then determined to simply get things passed the bco without him noticing that risk is the more
00:59:32 him noticing that risk is the more likely once the contract has been put out to tender and priced and the budget agreed at that stage there's an increasing reluctance to make changes
00:59:43 increasing reluctance to make changes turning to ridin its stance in its opening is misleading in four key respects first a contractor does not diminish its responsibilities to its client by subcontracting its obligations
00:59:57 client by subcontracting its obligations Ryden recites at length both studio he's obligations to ridin under its novated retainer and Harley's obligations to ridin under its dome to design and build some contract ridin amidst to mention
01:00:10 some contract ridin amidst to mention that it for full responsibility to TMO for the design of the works under the amended clause 2.17 of it's JCT design and build contract that clause imposed
01:00:22 and build contract that clause imposed on ridin an obligation to exercise all the reasonable skill and care to be expected of a professionally qualified and competent design and build contractor experienced in the carrying
01:00:33 contractor experienced in the carrying out of such works for a project of similar size scope value and character and complexity to the works there may be an argument about precisely what that
01:00:44 an argument about precisely what that means but the extent of the obligation assumes experience in the design of high-rise cladding projects of this nature for a designer experienced in
01:00:55 nature for a designer experienced in such products projects are familiarity with the relevant requirements of a DB would have been essential given ridin was being paid for design Tiamo was
01:01:06 was being paid for design Tiamo was entitled to assume that even where subcontractors were used at least some basic level of scrutiny of the subcontractors design was being exercised including a check that a DB
01:01:19 exercised including a check that a DB have been considered ridin points out that one of Harley's witnesses accepts it is normal practice for a facade contractor to consider compliance just
01:01:30 contractor to consider compliance just because a contractor bears that obligation to ridin does not mean ridin does not also oh that obligation to TMO for this reason ride ins position that it essentially has a facilitative and
01:01:42 it essentially has a facilitative and management function whether or not a description of what ridin actually did is not at all reflective of its true obligations to TMO and is a misleading
01:01:53 obligations to TMO and is a misleading description of its proper role second ridin fails to accept that it should have appointed x over to advise on the compliance of its design with building
01:02:04 compliance of its design with building regulations even if ride ins role had been confined to that a facilitator managed and coordinator as riding wrongly contends that role included identifying
01:02:16 contends that role included identifying the need for specialist design and ensuring that specialist design input was in fact obtained that was particularly so if ridin felt unable to
01:02:28 particularly so if ridin felt unable to provide the advice itself as part of the tender documents ridin had been provided with X overs outline fire strategy which in Section B four referred to the
01:02:39 in Section B four referred to the prospect of future analysis ridin ought therefore to have insisted on that analysis being done indeed given that changes had been made to the
01:02:50 changes had been made to the specification of the cladding the need for that analysis was all the more pressing ridin was perfectly well aware that it needed to a point X over it
01:03:01 that it needed to a point X over it undertook to do so in a contractor induction meeting on the first of April twenty-fourth it was recorded that riding would contact X over with a view to using them
01:03:12 contact X over with a view to using them going forward yet ridin deliberately failed to do so in mid-september 2014 ridin became aware that studio he was seeking advice from X OVA instead of
01:03:24 seeking advice from X OVA instead of recognizing that advice was necessary ridin told studio II I know we haven't employed X over so if you're getting some free advice then great otherwise we
01:03:35 some free advice then great otherwise we will need to look at this it's clear that ridin had no interest in appointing a fire engineer and it made that clear to everyone given this it's entirely disingenuous for riding to suggest as it
01:03:48 disingenuous for riding to suggest as it does that ridin only failed to a point a fire engineer because studio II did not suggest one was required or that as rider now asserts Bryden cannot be expected to have done more ridin
01:04:02 expected to have done more ridin understood full well that a fire engineer was required but did not want to appoint one for reasons of cost ride and clearly bears a significant share of responsibility for the failure to obtain
01:04:13 responsibility for the failure to obtain advice from X over on external fire spread thirdly ridin asserts it had no knowledge that the combination of cladding panels and insulation poster
01:04:24 cladding panels and insulation poster to health and safety it is clear that ridin took the view that the most important thing was to satisfy and appease the building control officer rather than risk him rejecting the
01:04:35 rather than risk him rejecting the building at the end this issue arose when Harley was seeking clarification of the fire resistance of the cavity barriers leading to ride ins mr. Laurence email to Harley on the 30th of
01:04:47 Laurence email to Harley on the 30th of March 2015 to say that Harley should not upset the building control officer over a 10 K issue which he said could affect me later
01:04:58 me later when trying to get sign-off for the whole building and that's an 8.5 million issue for me it's clear that bryden's priority was getting sign off of the building rather than investigating what
01:05:10 building rather than investigating what the building regulations and guidance required it is therefore not appropriate for Ryden to claim it was never aware of any non-compliance Ryden shows simply not to engage with
01:05:22 Ryden shows simply not to engage with potential non compliance problems even when copied on correspondence alluding to them such as the cavity barriers versus fire stopping issue finally ridin makes the bad point that it's entitled
01:05:34 makes the bad point that it's entitled to assume that if the employers requirements specified particular products those products were fit for purpose that is patently incorrect when a design and build main contractor or
01:05:46 a design and build main contractor or subcontractor assumes responsibility for the design to date as both ridin and Harley did they come under an implied obligation to satisfy themselves that the design is viable and that includes
01:05:59 the design is viable and that includes compliance with the relevant statutory guidance in the event that the design does not comply and/or poses any risk to health and safety the main unsub design and build
01:06:11 the main unsub design and build contractor both come under an implied obligation to warn Harley should have warned riding but whether or not it did ride and should have warned TMO turning
01:06:24 ride and should have warned TMO turning briefly to Harley they responded on Monday to counsel to the inquiries admonishment of the corporates for playing the blame game by rather belatedly
01:06:34 belatedly admitting fault in relation to the emission of two barriers around windows harly spoilers good deed immediately however by pointing out that the lack of cavity barriers was not Harley's responsibility
01:06:46 barriers was not Harley's responsibility because studio he should have specified them and by observing that they anyway were not causative of harm because cavity barriers could never have been effective so while seeking to portray
01:06:57 effective so while seeking to portray itself as having laudable candor Harley is in fact conforming to the behavior of the other corporate core participants my concluding remarks are aimed at
01:07:08 my concluding remarks are aimed at reminding although we are well aware this inquiry needs no reminder of the dangers posed by the current regulatory system and the way in which certain manufacturers and contractors exploited
01:07:21 manufacturers and contractors exploited as I've explained this inevitably evolves involves trespass into module six for which I hope you'll forgive me in module six you'll be considering how we may prevent
01:07:32 you'll be considering how we may prevent recurrence of this disaster or anything like it clearly the culture of some corporates needs to change but if the backpacking passing responses of the
01:07:43 backpacking passing responses of the corporates in this enquiry are anything to go by it is naive to think that any of but the rarest of offending companies will change of their own volition in
01:07:54 will change of their own volition in this current regulatory environment there is therefore an urgent need for recommendations we cannot help but marvel at how it is that the grenfell
01:08:05 marvel at how it is that the grenfell fire occurred at all given how much knowledge both central and local government have had about the lack of clarity in the regulations and in particular the risk of confusion about
01:08:17 particular the risk of confusion about class zero to say nothing of their knowledge of previous fires central government has known since 2000 that ADB should have been overhauled to remove
01:08:28 should have been overhauled to remove reference to national standards including plus zero it has known this because of the radar research program which it and some industry sectors commissioned and because of the House of
01:08:40 commissioned and because of the House of Commons Select Committee report entitled potential risk of fire spread in Ville of in buildings for external cladding systems in 2000 that overhaul of ADB should have
01:08:53 that overhaul of ADB should have happened because the European tests which have result in Euro classifications a one down two F measure reaction to fire and therefore our wholly superior to the UK standards BS
01:09:06 wholly superior to the UK standards BS 476 part six and seven from which class zero is derived those standards measure only surface spread of flame the Euro classes however are based on the product
01:09:18 classes however are based on the product the tendency of the products of flashover meaning auto-ignite when a certain temperature is reached according to government documents on the correlation between the Euro classes and
01:09:29 correlation between the Euro classes and UK national standards in 2000 a 1 a 2 and B were considered not to flashover whereas C and D would do so in 10 minutes
01:09:39 minutes and II within 2 minutes it is not possible to equate the Euro classes to class 0 but the radar to project Part two results in May 2000 produced a
01:09:53 two results in May 2000 produced a transposition table showing that class o might be as low as Class E it is staggering that despite this knowledge
01:10:04 staggering that despite this knowledge and the report of the Select Committee explaining how class 0 could be misunderstood as being a meaningful measure of a product's behavior in fire we are still 20 years later subject to a
01:10:18 we are still 20 years later subject to a meaningless class 0 criterion
01:10:23 furthermore government was given further cause to overhaul ADB in 2015 when it commissioned by bre a suite of seven reports into the adequacy of various
01:10:36 reports into the adequacy of various aspects of ADB the project was entitled compartment sized resistance to fire and fire safety research the results were shocking in that the reports made clear
01:10:48 shocking in that the reports made clear that ADB provides no means of calculating the increased fire load caused by modern insulation standards to be imposed on the facade in the event of
01:10:59 be imposed on the facade in the event of a fire escaping from a window these reports also revealed that fire resistance requirements for external walls are no now no longer accurate given their based on an
01:11:12 accurate given their based on an immediately post-war document which does not take account of the increased insulation requirements and therefore results in much hotter fires the reports
01:11:23 results in much hotter fires the reports also revealed that sprinklers should be installed on buildings much lower than 30 meters and that the provisions of ADB concerning the evacuation of those with disabilities are far from adequate all
01:11:37 disabilities are far from adequate all that knowledge acquired between 2000 and 2015 and yet nothing was or has been done to cure these fundamental problems
01:11:49 done to cure these fundamental problems the amendments made to ADB in 2019 are footling given this battle the way in which successive governments have ignored this knowledge and for example
01:12:01 ignored this knowledge and for example the 2015 suite of reports on ADB were not released until halfway through a consultation on ADB in 2018 this brings
01:12:12 consultation on ADB in 2018 this brings into sharp focus the need for the reintroduction of the public authority accountability bill grenfell is the archetypal example of why candor from
01:12:23 archetypal example of why candor from state and private bodies is a prerequisite to everybody's safety both central and local government have also been made aware over the years of the
01:12:35 been made aware over the years of the propensity of cladding not to comply with ADB and the risks of poor maintenance of social housing one of the recommendations of the Select Committee report into in 2000 was that cladding on
01:12:47 report into in 2000 was that cladding on all social housing buildings should be assessed it seems this was not done given that in the wake of grenfell it had to be done even though local authorities had some piecemeal but
01:13:00 authorities had some piecemeal but important knowledge it was not brought to bear in a cohesive way by way of example contemporaneously during the grenfell project our BK sees head of
01:13:11 grenfell project our BK sees head of refurbishment sorry head of Building Control John Allen emailed his colleague Hansen
01:13:17 Hansen in March 2014 saying there could be another Lacan L house elsewhere he went on to describe Lacan all as having been state of the art but acknowledged the cause was overall worsening of condition
01:13:30 cause was overall worsening of condition through years of neglect furthermore GMOs Janice ray wrote a note in 2013 on McConnell David Gibson was also aware of some guidance on lack not Claire
01:13:41 some guidance on lack not Claire Williams even questioned the nature of the cladding in 2014 during what she called her lack nor moment as did Janice Ray in 2016 following the Shepherd's caught fire why this collective
01:13:54 caught fire why this collective knowledge did not operate on our bkc building controls or ta Mo's mind and caused them to reconsider the Grenfell project under their noses we shall hopefully discover in this
01:14:06 we shall hopefully discover in this inquiry but one cannot help but think that greater candor including immediate publication and dissemination by central and local government of fire research reports and reports of fires may have
01:14:19 reports and reports of fires may have resulted in greater and more widespread understanding and less complacency had the radar 2000 reports and the 2015 reports been released to the public at
01:14:31 reports been released to the public at the time given to government they could have been considered by the whole of Industry and experts and the benefits of that data could have been fed meaningfully in two subsequent consultations on ADB as it is government
01:14:46 consultations on ADB as it is government was holding as from 2000 what may properly be regarded as a ticking time bomb which it chose not to share with industry and experts thereby rendering
01:14:58 industry and experts thereby rendering all consultations on ADB thereafter a meaningless sham the long period in which government has known about the flaws in ADB has known sprinklers were
01:15:10 flaws in ADB has known sprinklers were needed in buildings lower than 30 meters has had the hackett review and the subsequent 2018 select committee report on hackett and yet the resultant trivial amendments to ADB 2019 are deeply
01:15:24 amendments to ADB 2019 are deeply troubling at least however ADB does now include the ban on anything below - in buildings over 18 meters the fundamental flaws I have described are
01:15:37 fundamental flaws I have described are however not addressed by the 2019 amendments as will be apparent these matters strongly suggest a likely breach by government of article 2 of the Human Rights Act in failing to ensure safe
01:15:50 Rights Act in failing to ensure safe systems to protect the public as a result of these long and inexplicable periods of inaction despite fundamentally important but privately held knowledge of danger to
01:16:03 privately held knowledge of danger to the public promises 10 days ago to introduce sprinklers into new builds above 11 meters and the establishment of a building safety regulator and plans for
01:16:14 building safety regulator and plans for improved or improvement of performance standards may be thought to be too little too late well thank you very much
01:16:26 little too late well thank you very much indeed well that's probably a convenient moment to which to have a short break so we'll rise now and resume at half-past eleven please
01:33:27 hello the inquiries about to resume therefore please can you take your seats and remain silence just to remind you that no photographs are allowed to be
01:33:39 that no photographs are allowed to be taken in the hearing room and your phones should be switched to silent thank you
01:34:42 [Music]
01:34:46 some of the bereaved survivors and residents are represented by Imran Khan Queen's Counsel who was intending to
01:34:57 Queen's Counsel who was intending to make an opening statement on their behalf but I understand that he's not able to be here and therefore well bender Gill is going to read out a
01:35:08 bender Gill is going to read out a statement in his place yes yes so when you're ready thank you thank you sir madam the commencement of phase two of the Grenfell tower inquiry raises many
01:35:19 the Grenfell tower inquiry raises many questions which need to be addressed in respect of policies made and decisions taken before the fire whilst many of our clients feel that the phase one proceedings left questions unanswered
01:35:32 proceedings left questions unanswered they hoped that it is the goal of the inquiry to ensure that in Phase two all key issues will be addressed and no stone left unturned our submissions for
01:35:44 stone left unturned our submissions for modules one to seven reflect our client's views and perspectives on the divan that on those decisions taken which led to the catastrophic tragedy what's what that was the Grenfell tower
01:35:55 what's what that was the Grenfell tower fire in June 2017 this is a summary of our written submissions and full references can be found in the written document if we remind ourselves that the
01:36:12 document if we remind ourselves that the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea allocated a budget of nine point seven million for the regeneration works in July 2013 of that eight point five
01:36:23 July 2013 of that eight point five million was allocated for the construction works initially ledbetter were in were considered as the main contractor but their costs came in
01:36:34 contractor but their costs came in around 12 min 12 million pounds far in excess of the proposed budget and in March 2014 we know that Ryden were
01:36:45 March 2014 we know that Ryden were informed by TMO that their tender was in the lead subject to value engineering and finally Ryden were awarded the contract for the
01:36:56 were awarded the contract for the refurbishment of Grenfell tower for the position of design and build contractor
01:37:10 I'm sorry from our analysis of the material a number of key themes emerge which run throughout the decision-making process and these are first cost-cutting
01:37:24 process and these are first cost-cutting the decisions taken by our bkc tenant management organization were led by their budget with Cusco ting being the most important consideration at the time
01:37:36 most important consideration at the time of decision making value engineering was a constant focus of discussion between the relevant parties the term has two meanings which are intrinsically linked
01:37:48 meanings which are intrinsically linked value adding and cost-cutting we heard from mr. OTT yesterday that the TMO reject this suggestion we therefore invite the inquiry to consider which of
01:38:00 invite the inquiry to consider which of these was applied in the case of Grenfell tower was value added as a result of this exercise or was it as we suggest an exclusively cost-cutting
01:38:11 suggest an exclusively cost-cutting exercise secondly lack of coordination we suggest that it is beyond doubt that there was a lack of coordination between the parties all the way through from the
01:38:23 the parties all the way through from the design to the construction stage and this is clear from the reams of Correspondence which has been disclosed third lack of care and skill there was a
01:38:36 third lack of care and skill there was a demonstrable lack of care and skill by the contractors resulting in the subpar quality of work which has been identified by the experts post-fire we
01:38:47 identified by the experts post-fire we invite the inquiry to seek explanations as to how these constructors were appointed and whether they were competent enough to carry out their tasks on the project and finally but
01:38:58 tasks on the project and finally but passing the disclosure shows that there is a constant attempt by individuals and organisations post-fire to blame each other parties and individuals have
01:39:09 each other parties and individuals have continuously passed the buck for responsibilities that should fall squarely in their remit in our written submissions Madden we wrote perhaps with some optimism that we invite the inquiry
01:39:22 some optimism that we invite the inquiry to ensure that such buck-passing does not continue in these proceedings and that parties are held accountable for their actions these words could not have been more prescient as we all saw
01:39:35 been more prescient as we all saw earlier this week within minutes of this phase of the inquiry commencing the Blaine gang started from almost every single corporate core participant we and
01:39:47 single corporate core participant we and our clients have been genuinely shocked at hearing the corporate seek ECP's seeking to defend the indefensible and trying to justify the unjustifiable
01:40:00 trying to justify the unjustifiable every one of the corporate CPS has read what we have read has seen what we have seen and yet despite this they have each with the limited exception of our BK c
01:40:12 with the limited exception of our BK c and c lo text to an even lesser extent denied any fault and sought to blame others sir/madam according to our clients each of these corporate CPS has
01:40:26 clients each of these corporate CPS has blood on its hands and it cannot be washed off by the block by the blood on another's it is our submission that these four overriding themes played an
01:40:38 these four overriding themes played an integral role in the decision-making process such that they led to at least 15 key missed opportunities when
01:40:49 15 key missed opportunities when components of the cladding system could have and should have been identified as dangerous and unsuitable which would have avoided the tragedy that took place on the 14th of June 2017 at each of
01:41:04 on the 14th of June 2017 at each of these key opportunities a party or parties had the chance to identify these issues and do something about it they did not
01:41:15 did not first we look at the decision to undergo the refurbishment the initial decision to undergo a refurbishment was taken by our be KCT among the reasons for their
01:41:27 our be KCT among the reasons for their decision include as Claire Williams who was the project manager of DMO stated to improve energy efficiency and allow residents to control their own heating
01:41:39 residents to control their own heating systems and energy and also to make the building more thermally efficient the TMO will decline for the project and they were involved in correspondence with the design team from the outset
01:41:53 with the design team from the outset module one witness's reiterate throughout their statements but cost-cutting was the key motivator and we submit that their consistent focus on
01:42:04 we submit that their consistent focus on cost-cutting led to poor quality of work and further to the use of unacceptable materials at paragraph 41 of his witness
01:42:15 materials at paragraph 41 of his witness statement mark anderson of TMO says at the time I left the TMO in January 2013 the focus was very much on costings and viability rather than appointing any
01:42:27 viability rather than appointing any specialist contractors Simon Kesh RT Lea state's value for money is regarded as the key driver for the project in email
01:42:39 the key driver for the project in email correspondence dated September 2013 between Bruce unas of studio e Claire Williams of TMO Philip Booth of RT Lea and others Bruce soon as highlights budgets forced
01:42:53 Bruce soon as highlights budgets forced clients to adopt the cheapest cladding option Mark Harris of Harley at paragraph 23 of his witness statement says there was a real focused among
01:43:04 says there was a real focused among various stakeholders on value engineering and further Simon cash refers to an email train in October 2015 where it is said that Peter Madison
01:43:17 where it is said that Peter Madison reiterated that the key for him is still budget
01:43:22 budget then quality and finally time Zack Maynard writen paragraph 13 of his witness statement notes that the TMO made the decision on cladding primarily
01:43:35 made the decision on cladding primarily based on cost these are snapshots from correspondence and information gathered in the period between mid 2013 to late
01:43:46 in the period between mid 2013 to late 2015
01:43:47 2015 which demonstrate that cost was the priority for our bkc tml over and above quality of work in short as far as they were concerned our clients lives were
01:44:00 were concerned our clients lives were not worth it their lives were cheap and our clients say this was less of a missed opportunity than a death sentence for seventy two innocent people
01:44:13 seventy two innocent people next testing and certification as you know approved document b is a building regulations document which covers fire
01:44:24 regulations document which covers fire safety matters within and around buildings and contained within within this document of provisions which set out the required level of fire resistance of materials to be used on
01:44:36 resistance of materials to be used on the external walls of buildings over 18 meters in height the requirement is that of limited combust ability which refers
01:44:47 of limited combust ability which refers to the susceptibility of the external walls to ignite from an external source and the flame spread which is measured using a system of classification for
01:44:58 using a system of classification for materials whilst the class zero classification exists and is often relied upon as the benchmark for fire safety materials both for fire safety in
01:45:10 safety materials both for fire safety in materials within the industry it is insufficient inter alia because the class 0 classification fails to consider a materials reaction to fire meaning its
01:45:22 a materials reaction to fire meaning its combust ability in this way as previously stated the class 0 classification is entirely misleading the BBB
01:45:32 the BBB is an independent and accredited certification scheme which testifies to the compliance with Building Regulations the BBA tested and issued a state a certificate for the accreditation of
01:45:45 certificate for the accreditation of Reina bond architectural wall panels and these are the cladding panels that were installed in Grenfell tower dr. barbara lane stated that these panels did not
01:45:57 lane stated that these panels did not meet the requirements of approved document b it is clear that had these panels been tested correctly they would have been found to be non-compliant with building regulations and would not have
01:46:10 building regulations and would not have been installed on Granville Tire a red font are a missed opportunity next manufacture and marketing CeeLo Tech's were the manufacturers of the PIR
01:46:23 Tech's were the manufacturers of the PIR insulation boards and of particular importance RS 5000 which was incorporated within the cladding system on Grenfell Tower CeeLo Tex
01:46:35 on Grenfell Tower CeeLo Tex Rs 5000 was tested at a BRE test center in February 2014 the test was terminated prematurely as the fire spread was too
01:46:47 prematurely as the fire spread was too fast that the tests could not go on as it would pose a risk to employees and surroundings this first test failed a second test was carried out in May 2014
01:46:59 second test was carried out in May 2014 with thicker cladding panels used as part of the setup this test passed however after the test was conducted some major concerns were raised by the
01:47:11 some major concerns were raised by the National House Building Council regarding the materials used with the insulation boards this is because they were not a true representation of a typical range green cladding system that
01:47:25 typical range green cladding system that would be installed on a building aluminium panels are typically used in conjunction with installation boards as part of cladding systems however these
01:47:37 part of cladding systems however these panels were not used as part of this test
01:47:41 test a different type of cladding panel was used the process that CeeLo Tex understood undertook is described by the National House Building Council as
01:47:53 National House Building Council as deliberate over engineering a/c low tax made every effort to ensure that the rs.5000 project passed the test no
01:48:04 rs.5000 project passed the test no matter what once the rs.5000 product product passed the test when it should not have it was marketed to suppliers and consumers as
01:48:15 marketed to suppliers and consumers as being suitable for buildings above 18 meters in height it is clear this assertion was not true because as a matter of fact rs.5000 was not suitable
01:48:30 matter of fact rs.5000 was not suitable for buildings over 18 meters in height when it was actually tested in September 2017 it failed to achieve the required performance to demonstrate that the
01:48:42 performance to demonstrate that the material was a class zero material in any case has already stated class zero is considered to be insufficient to meet the requirements of approved document b
01:48:55 the requirements of approved document b this material should never have been used on Granville Tower CLO Tech's rs.5000 has since been removed from the market this was a
01:49:08 removed from the market this was a missed opportunity our conic produced ray no bond aluminium cladding panels which was supplied to contractors for Grenfell tower we have noted that dr.
01:49:21 Grenfell tower we have noted that dr. Barbara Lane confirms that this material was not one of limited combustibility and therefore does not comply with the building regulations it is clear that
01:49:32 building regulations it is clear that our conic should have recognized that the product they were selling was not suitable for his proposed purpose they should have known and now we know that they did in fact know that they were
01:49:45 they did in fact know that they were supplying a material which was to be sold in the UK that failed to comply with UK Building Galatians to suggest that this was a missed opportunity is an understatement
01:49:58 missed opportunity is an understatement of the utmost gravity next material selection right and design and build contractor so essentially they were
01:50:10 contractor so essentially they were responsible for all aspects of design and construction in relation to the refurbishment Ryden subcontracted out the work to specialist contractors such as Harley
01:50:21 specialist contractors such as Harley facades for the external works Jay is right and Coe for the mechanical and electrical words and so on Simon Lawrence of Ryden states paragraph 40 of his witness statement write-ins
01:50:34 40 of his witness statement write-ins role was to then manage and coordinate the work of those third parties it is clear that right and relied so heavily on the word of Building Control but they themselves did not but should have
01:50:47 themselves did not but should have considered the suitability and compliance of materials as the design and built contractor Ryden was responsible for the delivery of the project and according to Claire Williams
01:50:58 project and according to Claire Williams of TMO as part of this arrangement Ryden were contractually responsible for assuring compliance with all legislation regulation standards guidance and for
01:51:10 regulation standards guidance and for receiving all necessary building control approvals we submit they fail to do so this was a missed opportunity Studio II
01:51:21 this was a missed opportunity Studio II the architects in the main design team were involved in the project from inception studio we prepared the National Building specification in January 2014 which included not less
01:51:35 January 2014 which included not less than 150 millimeters for spandrel panels and 18 millimeters for columns of C low tax installation it was Bruce unas who
01:51:46 tax installation it was Bruce unas who suggested the cladding material change from zinc to aluminium which was the material actually used on the tower when the TMO requested a value engineering
01:51:59 the TMO requested a value engineering exercise to take place what this essentially meant was cost-cutting so that materials which should have been identified by Studio E as being unsafe
01:52:11 identified by Studio E as being unsafe and unsuitable to be used on the tower or not Studio E were criticized by mr. Hayat the expert architect for their failure to produce the proper amount of
01:52:22 failure to produce the proper amount of design that fell into their responsibility the fact of the matter is that the materials were being discussed prior to the appointment of a main contractor and tenderers were asked to
01:52:33 contractor and tenderers were asked to make their tenders on the basis of a range of materials provided to them the responsibility therefore fell on Studio E to ensure that the materials they
01:52:45 E to ensure that the materials they themselves suggested were compliant not only that but as building control expert Beryl Menzies states the full plans application that was submitted by Studio
01:52:56 application that was submitted by Studio E had in sufficient detail so that compliance could be ensured another missed opportunity there is a necessity to consider the competence of these
01:53:07 to consider the competence of these contractors further Thomas rec states in his witness statement that he has no recollection of a discussion about compliance of materials with Building
01:53:18 compliance of materials with Building Regulations it is this attitude that allowed things to slip through the cracks as key issues failed to be identified until it was too late mr.
01:53:29 identified until it was too late mr. Hyatt is highly critical of Neill Crawford who was the day-to-day manager of this project because at around 60% of the way through the construction phase
01:53:40 the way through the construction phase in mr. Hyatt words Neil Crawford asked a question of the most fundamental kind about an issue compliance of the cladding that should have been firmly
01:53:53 cladding that should have been firmly established prior to the release of studio EES stayed de report this is almost 2 years prior back in 2013 we
01:54:04 almost 2 years prior back in 2013 we submit that this was far too late and the issue of compliance was ignored we invite the inquiry to ask why these life or death questions were not asked and answered and
01:54:15 answered and answered at the start of the construction phase we also invite the inquiry to consider the culture of blame amongst the majority of the parties involved in the refurbishment especially
01:54:27 involved in the refurbishment especially on the issue of compliance to give just one example Neil Crawford states that ensuring compliance is the responsibility of the clerk's of works and Building Control
01:54:38 clerk's of works and Building Control who were checking the works inquiries is invited to ask whether this is right given but the problem lay with the initial design and the material selection which was driven by Studio II
01:54:50 selection which was driven by Studio II from the outset next fire strategy ik Solva were engaged on behalf of the TMO to provide fire consultancy services
01:55:01 to provide fire consultancy services they were tasked with creating an existing fire strategy report and a refurbishment fire strategy report Kate Cooney was responsible for the existing
01:55:13 Cooney was responsible for the existing fire strategy report to ensure compliance with building regulations Terrance Ashton was tasked with the refurbishment fire strategy and he
01:55:25 refurbishment fire strategy and he carried out three fire strategy reports for the proposed refurbishment none of which surprisingly accounted for the over cladding that was proposed as part
01:55:39 over cladding that was proposed as part of the reverbs his explanation for this was that whilst he knew some over cladding was proposed he was not provided with any information as to the
01:55:51 provided with any information as to the cladding materials in order to take this into account so he simply omitted this from his assessments we submit that xover failed to obtain the important
01:56:04 xover failed to obtain the important information to ensure that their reports were complete and studio eve failed to effectively communicate vital information which was needed for the reports to be accurate in October 2012
01:56:17 reports to be accurate in October 2012 which was the date of the first fire strategy report or at least by 2015 mr. Ashton should have been able to identify
01:56:28 Ashton should have been able to identify the proposed materials were unsuitable and would not comply with dealt with building regulations for fire safety this was yet another missed opportunity
01:56:39 this was yet another missed opportunity because the issues could and should have been caught at the design stage but simply if Xavier had undertaken their job competently they would have realized
01:56:51 job competently they would have realized that the materials used as part of the cladding system were unsuitable for their intended purpose it is perhaps worth noting in passing that they were
01:57:03 worth noting in passing that they were serious that there was serious confusion around fire breaks versus cavity barriers and while mr. Ashton notes this confusion in his witness statement
01:57:14 confusion in his witness statement there's no record of him seeking to clarify the same this confusion is likely what led to the inaccurate advice from X OVA who were consulted on fire
01:57:25 from X OVA who were consulted on fire safety matters Carl Stokes was the independent fire risk Assessor who tended for the job in summer of 2010 and was responsible for conducting the fire
01:57:36 was responsible for conducting the fire risk assessments he undertook for FRS over the course of four years from 2012 to 2016 he was working under the premise
01:57:47 to 2016 he was working under the premise that the principle of code of compartment ation was the underlying principle which governed the stay-put policy it is our submission that Carl
01:57:58 policy it is our submission that Carl Stokes should have considered whether compartment ation was actually affected in the tower during his fire risk assessments he acknowledges the changes
01:58:09 assessments he acknowledges the changes to the facade could affect the integrity of the compartments in the building however he states that it was not in his remit or expertise to consider whether materials that were being used were
01:58:22 materials that were being used were compliant with Building Regulations in relation to fire safety and further he wrongly assumed that they were compliant another missed opportunity for the
01:58:34 another missed opportunity for the issues to be identified and rectified mr. Stokes should have inquired further about the specific changes that were being made and how these would affect the integrity of compartment ation if he
01:58:46 the integrity of compartment ation if he had done so it is likely that many lives may not have been lost moving to the next topic the supply of materials including the Rayner bond ACM panels and
01:58:59 including the Rayner bond ACM panels and PIR insulation si G's supply supplied the insulation boards manufactured by sealer Tex to Harley facades to install
01:59:11 sealer Tex to Harley facades to install as part of the cladding system acting as the suppliers they bought the product and sold it on without satisfying themselves of its compliance or alerting
01:59:23 themselves of its compliance or alerting Harley to the need to check whether the product was compliant a missed opportunity CEP supplied the rana bond aluminium cladding panels and aluminium window
01:59:36 cladding panels and aluminium window frames from our colleague to Harley for the refurbishment when CEP purchased the cladding panels from our conic they should have checked that they complied
01:59:47 should have checked that they complied with UK building regulations they did not
01:59:51 not it was another missed opportunity next fabrication and preparation CEP also fabricated the ACM panels and window
02:00:02 fabricated the ACM panels and window frames fabrication refers to the preparation of materials so that they are ready for installation they claimed that the selection and review materials
02:00:13 that the selection and review materials can only be done in the context of the full cladding system information which they did not have they state that Harley and studio e had this wider information
02:00:25 and studio e had this wider information therefore they were responsible for ensuring that the whole cladding system was compliant with building regulations at this point if more questions had been
02:00:36 at this point if more questions had been asked or greater care had been taken CEP should have identified that there was a potential issue with this use of material especially paired with the PIR
02:00:48 material especially paired with the PIR insulation boards and should have alerted the stallers Harley to these concerns this was a missed opportunity next installation Harley woody Harley were
02:01:09 installation Harley woody Harley were the envelope package contractor so they were responsible for the installation of the cladding they purchased the PIR installation boards from sige plc given
02:01:21 installation boards from sige plc given that Harley are referred to as cladding specialists throughout the disclosed materials it is expected that compliance with Building Regulations should have been seriously considered when installing materials having looked at
02:01:34 installing materials having looked at the evidence it is clear that Harley relied on evident information given to them the manufacturers of the materials and also from the design team without making their own judgments there was an
02:01:46 making their own judgments there was an opportunity before these materials were installed for contractors to confirm that the materials they were installing was safe and compliant missed
02:01:57 was safe and compliant missed opportunity next installation the function of our bkc building control was to ensure that all building work carried out in their borough should meet current
02:02:08 out in their borough should meet current building codes and regulation requirements john hoeven senior building control servile surveyor had over things sick had over 30 years of experience he
02:02:20 sick had over 30 years of experience he is rightly criticized by barrel barrel Menzies the Building Control expert also dr. Barbara Lane notes in Section 11 of her first report but on her site
02:02:31 her first report but on her site inspection she noticed that the cavity barriers were poorly prepared with jagged edges which led to an imperfect fit creating gaps around the columns John Hoeven claims that he was not
02:02:44 John Hoeven claims that he was not trained to check cavity barriers nor was he trained to check the installation of the cladding miss Menzies comments that this is incredibly surprising given his many years of experience had he checked
02:02:57 many years of experience had he checked he as he should have he would have identified his problems and the fire may not have spread as quickly as it did building control are also heavily criticized by these - lenses for their
02:03:10 criticized by these - lenses for their failure to recognize that the materials which form the cladding system were unsuitable for the of the tower it is our submission that these problems could
02:03:21 our submission that these problems could have and should have been picked up by Building Control we do note however that our bkc have addressed this issue in both their written and oral submissions and do accept that it was a failure on
02:03:32 and do accept that it was a failure on their part is seal a completion certificate when they did whilst it is encouraging that they have accepted some responsibility this was in the face of overwhelming evidence and they really
02:03:44 overwhelming evidence and they really and they really had no choice but to do so John Rowan and partners were contracted to undertake Clarke of Works responsibilities for the general building works their role is to
02:03:55 building works their role is to represent the client on the construction site in ensuring the quality of both materials and workmanship are in accordance with the design specification this title is highly contested by
02:04:07 this title is highly contested by Jonathan white who claims that his role is more likened to that of the site supervisor because he did not attend the site regularly enough or for the duration of the project we invite the
02:04:18 duration of the project we invite the inquiry to explore this further mr. white states that he attended the site to undertake weekly inspections from October 14 some seven months after construction began he states he was not
02:04:32 construction began he states he was not asked to consider the compliance of materials at the design stage as John Rowan and partners were only instructed to undertake these inspection after the construction had already started
02:04:45 construction had already started dr. Barbara lanes notes that the cavity barriers were poorly prepared leading to an imperfect fit it's our submission that the clerk of works should have picked up on these quality issues and
02:04:56 picked up on these quality issues and taken appropriate steps to ensure they were rectified if mr. white had learned had done so there is every possibility the overall quality of workmanship would not have contributed to the events of
02:05:09 not have contributed to the events of the 14th of June 2017 and missed opportunity finally on this topic general manager during their own submissions yesterday our Talia maintained that they were not
02:05:21 our Talia maintained that they were not project managers though the disclose material states otherwise we asked the inquiry to determine what role they actually played in the management process they provided contract
02:05:33 process they provided contract administration services and their role was to ensure that the project ran according to time and budget there were several layers of management and this continued from the design of
02:05:44 and this continued from the design of the project to completion we invite the inquiry to consider whether the poor coordination between the parties resulted in unanswered questions misguided answers in respect of the
02:05:58 misguided answers in respect of the compliance of materials this feeds directly into the issues identified by employees of RT Lea in particular whereby they claim that individuals of the tmro and Claire Williams
02:06:09 the tmro and Claire Williams specifically would miss direct design related issues to them Simon Cashman and Neil Reed both identify correspondence which suggests
02:06:20 identify correspondence which suggests that individuals of the TMO were wrongly directing these issues towards them it is our submission that this confusion around parties roles and responsibilities in Stern and the
02:06:33 responsibilities in Stern and the overall lack of effective coordination is what resulted in this cladding being installed on the tower these are some of the questions that need to be addressed by the inquiry and turning back to the
02:06:45 by the inquiry and turning back to the four themes that we identify above the cut the issue of cost-cutting the lack of coordination the competence of contractors and the culture of bug
02:06:56 contractors and the culture of bug passing we invite the inquiry to ensure that this does not continue during the proceedings finally sir madam whilst we have
02:07:07 finally sir madam whilst we have identified at least 15 key missed opportunities from the part of those involved in the refurbishment of gran felt our we note that there has actually been a missed opportunity for this
02:07:19 been a missed opportunity for this inquiry and that is to recognize the issues of race and social class which we on behalf of our clients you should be an integral part of this
02:07:31 you should be an integral part of this inquiry whilst it may be argued that race and class do not readily fall to be considered within this module we asked
02:07:42 considered within this module we asked the question would the issues of cost-cutting budget restraints lack of compliance of building regulations arise
02:07:55 compliance of building regulations arise if the makeup of the residents of Grenfell tower had been different namely if they had been wealthy and white thank
02:08:07 if they had been wealthy and white thank you mister steena we're going to hear from you next day the people of the
02:08:30 from you next day the people of the Granville Tower and the walk where are raised by an application which has all of the appearance of looking like an attempt to pull a fast one made by some
02:08:41 attempt to pull a fast one made by some of the firms who want to have whatever they might say from this witness box not be used against them in any future prosecution they want the protection of
02:08:53 prosecution they want the protection of an undertaking from the Attorney General worded in the following way No all evidence a person may give before the inquiry will be used in evidence against that person in any criminal proceedings
02:09:06 that person in any criminal proceedings or for the purpose of deciding whether to bring such proceedings yet those self same companies have provided what they wanted to say in their statements no
02:09:18 wanted to say in their statements no such undertaking was asked to cover those statements but they are clearly scared of what they know they have to face in this witness box why make this
02:09:30 face in this witness box why make this application now why wait until we are in the middle of the opening part of phase 2 of this inquiry well over a year after the close of phase 1 in December 2008
02:09:41 the close of phase 1 in December 2008 team our response to this application will be dealt with on Monday so let me simply say that the people we represent are furious like you chair I could use
02:09:53 are furious like you chair I could use other words they're furious that this application has been made at this time do the companies who have made this application still not understand - they still have no respect no regard and no
02:10:06 still have no respect no regard and no feeling for those who have lost so much over the last few days we have listened to the litany of excuses and the revolving door of the blame game but we
02:10:19 revolving door of the blame game but we have yet to hear anyone other than our bkc who have made some admissions or Celotex who in their statement serve blamed a few bad apples so that they have done wrong well why is that surely
02:10:33 have done wrong well why is that surely they and their lawyers can read and understand the evidence which has been disclosed in documents and statements and emails within this inquiry surely
02:10:45 and emails within this inquiry surely they can understand what went wrong so why have no admissions being made to their own failures well perhaps there is no real mystery imagine the financial
02:10:56 no real mystery imagine the financial consequences of making admissions to their own businesses think about the drop in trade the loss of profit the insurance implications think about the seconds and resignations and think about
02:11:09 seconds and resignations and think about what admissions could do to accelerate civil claims in comparison to that spending part of their profits all the insurance companies avoiding large
02:11:21 insurance companies avoiding large payouts now and fighting all the way is much more attractive but make no mistake these commercial considerations don't seem so attractive to the people of the
02:11:33 seem so attractive to the people of the ground fault our our right to the truth there were 72 people and many people injured at the ground fault our fire we
02:11:46 injured at the ground fault our fire we will be considering their fate and what happened to them during the following modules of this inquiries the companies responsible killed those seven to people as sure if they're taking
02:11:58 to people as sure if they're taking careful aim with a gun and pulled the trigger
02:12:01 trigger let us remember the youngest they killed Logan the unborn son of Marcio an Andrea who's delivered stillborn whilst his mom lay in a coma and who died in the womb
02:12:13 lay in a coma and who died in the womb as a result of smoke and cyanide poisoning let us remember the many other families I only mentioned just just a name that comes to mind the Shu cares
02:12:25 name that comes to mind the Shu cares entire family practically wiped out those companies responsible killed when they criminally failed to consider the safety of others they killed when they
02:12:37 safety of others they killed when they promoted their unsuitable dangerous products in the pursuit of money and a place within the market and they killed when they entirely ignored that ultimate clients the people of the Granville
02:12:49 clients the people of the Granville Tower when hearing the evidence about these companies and when watching them wriggle on the hook during these hearings there does not forget who they killed and the bereaved who have been
02:13:01 killed and the bereaved who have been left behind since the time of the Granville Tower fire we have had at least five major fires barking Crewe Clapton Bolton in blocks of flats we
02:13:14 Clapton Bolton in blocks of flats we have had the Hackett review and other reports which have condemned the behaviors of companies such as Ryden and their like we have had reports which vilify the training and management of
02:13:25 vilify the training and management of the London Fire Brigade despite this dismaying array of information many residents of social housing living conditions which are soon to be brexit
02:13:36 conditions which are soon to be brexit heed European partners would have condemned for animals as coolly unsafe
02:13:43 since the Granville Tower far there have been promises about reform promises about fire safety and promises of change but no actual change no actual reform
02:13:54 but no actual change no actual reform and no actual safety the dignified measured calls from the BS ours for identifiable change appear to be falling upon deaf ears this cannot go on it is a
02:14:08 upon deaf ears this cannot go on it is a shame we say and a stain on this society that people are still living in tower blocks with highly flammable cladding on their buildings it is staggering that central government and local government have
02:14:19 government and local government have left people living alone people with mobility problems carers and families in conditions which mean that hanging over their heads is a terrifying death and a poison of fire in a poisonous fire what
02:14:34 poison of fire in a poisonous fire what would you do if you are in such a building practice regular fire safety drills with your family or friends prepare homemade smoke hoods have torches ready to tie everyone together
02:14:46 torches ready to tie everyone together to move down the stairs will sit in a wheelchair wondering how on earth you'll get out so people are still living in blocks of flats where as debt where there is dangerous cladding and who the
02:14:57 there is dangerous cladding and who the in the event of a fire will depend for their lives on the undoubtedly brave but in adequately prepared firefighters to save them so unsurprisingly the report
02:15:09 save them so unsurprisingly the report by the charity inquest last year found that residents mental health has been affected family life undermined and life is lived under constant stress we
02:15:21 is lived under constant stress we suggest that the failure to ensure that people living in tower blocks can live without fear within their own homes is a clear demonstration that the lives of people living in multi occupancy buildings are considered worth less than
02:15:34 buildings are considered worth less than those for example earning a good living within the companies who killed the 72 people at the Granville Tower so what about justice well as to that the people
02:15:46 about justice well as to that the people of the ground fault are on the walk have been told by the police investigation that they will have to wait many more years for any possible prosecution and there for many years to hold those responsible to account this year yet
02:15:59 responsible to account this year yet again we have had the blandishments of government in the form of Secretary of State for housing communities and local government robert Generic MP who on the 20th of January 2020 became the most
02:16:11 20th of January 2020 became the most recent politician to say that he in his department will ensure that everyone is safe and feel safe going on to say as ever we will be publishing shortly publishing our response to the phase
02:16:23 publishing our response to the phase on report and moving on he said and in and in anticipation of a wider program of building safety reforms the Grenville inquiries phase one report published in
02:16:36 inquiries phase one report published in october found that the Grenville towers cladding did not comply with building regulations and was the principal reason for the rapid fire spread on the 15th of
02:16:49 for the rapid fire spread on the 15th of January 2020 Sir Thomas Windsor chief inspector at Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services said it was alarming that more than two years after the ground fell far
02:17:00 than two years after the ground fell far more than three hundred buildings still had the same cladding as the tower in his report Sir Thomas said the firefighters responded to the tower fire in June 17 with determination dedication
02:17:13 in June 17 with determination dedication courage and commitment but he then went on to say in agreement with us and in agreement with the this report the phase 1 report and many other commentators of the London Fire Brigade that the people
02:17:26 the London Fire Brigade that the people of the ground full tower were also let down by failures failures in planning and preparation incident command communication and working with other emergency services so let's add this up
02:17:39 emergency services so let's add this up people are still living in tinderbox buildings with no one able to say that the deep failings of the London Fire Brigade have been rectified government
02:17:50 Brigade have been rectified government data released this month has revealed that more than 21,000 households are still living in flats wrapped in the aluminium composite panel cladding that allowed the flames to spread so rapidly
02:18:02 allowed the flames to spread so rapidly in the early hours of the 14th of June 2017 the figures published show that of 450 high-rise residential buildings in
02:18:13 450 high-rise residential buildings in England that have been found to have the combustible cladding 315 as yet have ad works undertaken to remove it with 76 of
02:18:24 works undertaken to remove it with 76 of these buildings not have any plans in place to do so responding to those figures United said over two and a half years later it's obvious that the
02:18:36 years later it's obvious that the government have no intention of making people safe and are continuously dragging their feet on the matter Rental United went on to say it's only a matter of time before
02:18:47 say it's only a matter of time before another tragedy happens and the blame will lie solely at the government's door it took far too long for Commissioner cotton to be ousted by the mayor despite our call for her immediate resignation
02:18:58 our call for her immediate resignation at the close of the phase 1 hearings in 2018
02:19:02 2018 now the appointment of Commissioner Andy row on the 10th of December by the Mayor of London Sadiq Khan was a late that at least welcomes death as it should be
02:19:13 least welcomes death as it should be recalled he was amongst the senior firefighters at the Grenville tower fire ground and he recognized quickly after he attended that the stay-put policy must be abandoned on his employment
02:19:24 must be abandoned on his employment sorry on his appointment commissioner Roe stated we have some real challenges ahead but I'll be working tirelessly with the brigade the mayor and local communities to ensure we deliver on the
02:19:35 communities to ensure we deliver on the recommendations of the ground fault our inquiry report the mayor also commented on the appointment of the new new commissioner saying that he looks
02:19:46 commissioner saying that he looks forward to working with Andy Road to deliver on the inquiries recommendations and to ensure the transformation of the brigade is carried out as effectively and swiftly as possible but the people
02:19:57 and swiftly as possible but the people of the Granville Tower and I'm sure that those people who live in dangerous tower blocks are tired of this type of empty promise they are tired of platitudes they are tired of inactivity they want
02:20:09 they are tired of inactivity they want and deserve action from the minister of Housing and local authorities to the Commissioner of the land of fire brigade the people of the gram fault are have had enough of talk about change but no
02:20:21 had enough of talk about change but no actual change it is true that all of this has highlighted the urgent need to establish an implementation body to put into effect the recommendations of statutory inquiries as was discussed
02:20:34 statutory inquiries as was discussed recently in Parliament instead what would represent at least some change will be some signs of real progress and a timetable against which to measure activity so in lieu of others
02:20:47 to measure activity so in lieu of others doing so we have decided to make our own commitment to all change and a commitment to providing nd an indicative timetable to push towards safer communities within the timescale
02:20:58 safer communities within the timescale of this inquiry if the people we represent are not satisfied that sufficient change is being made or that plans to implement change are not being drawn up with sufficient commitment
02:21:09 drawn up with sufficient commitment energy and speed we will have no choice other than to consider making an application to this inquiry to the panel as we now have it to ask for a full and frank explanation from those responsible
02:21:22 frank explanation from those responsible for change namely the minister of housing that is Robert generic MP Sadiq Khan the mayor of London and Commissioner wrote of the London Fire Brigade further if there is no
02:21:35 Brigade further if there is no explanation or no adequate explanation as to the failure to make progress towards change we will request that you sir the chair exercise the inquiries powers of compulsion and a section 21 of
02:21:47 powers of compulsion and a section 21 of the inquiries Act 2005 to order the attendance of the Minister the commissioner and the mayor so they can be questioned by councillor to the inquiry and answer the forthright
02:21:58 inquiry and answer the forthright questions of the people of the ground 'full tower who we who we have the privilege to represent the power of an inquiry under section 21 for the inquiries act enlarged upon in the
02:22:09 inquiries act enlarged upon in the explanatory notes of paragraph 51 explains that the powers are exercisable by the chairman but in a multi-member inquiry in other words the chair with a panel member he will be exercising them
02:22:22 panel member he will be exercising them on behalf of the panel those who those planetary notes are a useful reminder we now have a panel albeit of one for the moment there that therefore the decision
02:22:33 moment there that therefore the decision to require an explanation and the potential calling of evidence is a decision of the panel as a whole with panel members having an equal say with the chair as regards the making of an
02:22:46 the chair as regards the making of an application for an out for an explanation or the attendance of the minister the mayor and the Commissioner we commit to making this only after receiving the clearest of instructions from our client group to do so and we
02:22:58 from our client group to do so and we also commit to making such an application in writing in a document which will be publicly released with due consideration to the inquiry timetable it on the other hand the
02:23:10 timetable it on the other hand the Housing Minister at the mayor and the Commissioner commit to inform include and involve the people of the tower in the pathway to change and reformation of the system then there will be no need to
02:23:22 the system then there will be no need to make the application to call them to call them to account before this inquiry the reason why we have decided to make a commitment to promote change is a failure so far for change to take place
02:23:34 failure so far for change to take place despite the endless statements and emphysema mice's made by so many after all as miss Barr white queen counsel has pointed out with clarity this morning
02:23:46 pointed out with clarity this morning after all cladding fires are not new they have happened around the world well before the Grenville tower fire and they have been a cause for concern for many years all of the companies who have
02:24:00 years all of the companies who have spent the last few days for two days engaging in a pitifully predictable war against each other at the start of this module worked against the clearest background of warnings and evidence of
02:24:12 background of warnings and evidence of the potential dangers posed by cladding in December 1999 the Select Committee on Environment Transport and regional affairs stated following a cladding fire
02:24:24 affairs stated following a cladding fire in urban air sure on the 11th of June where William Linton died and four others were taken to hospital they said as regards the evidence provided to them
02:24:36 as regards the evidence provided to them before their committee the responsible attitude taken by the major cladding manufacturers towards minimizing the risks of excessive fast bread has been impressed upon us throughout this
02:24:47 impressed upon us throughout this inquiry the Select Committee went on and they said notwithstanding this we do not believe that it should take a serious fire in which many people are killed
02:24:59 fire in which many people are killed before all reasonable steps are taken towards minimizing the risks the Building Research Establishment the BRE is an organization which provides
02:25:10 is an organization which provides testing facilities and guidance as to building materials it is true that the BRE itself as questions to answer about their procedures and their supervision of
02:25:21 procedures and their supervision of tests that they conduct we will deal with those within module 2 of this inquiry but the beer BRE reacted to the warnings sat out in
02:25:32 BRE reacted to the warnings sat out in the 1999 select committee report and reviewed their original 1988 guidance on the fire performance of external thermal insulation for walls on multi-story buildings that guidance had then been
02:25:46 buildings that guidance had then been further reviewed in 2003 and then 2013 and emphasized the dangers to residents of this type of cladding fire it's worthy of note
02:25:57 worthy of note Judas quote BRE 135 where they say this the BRE once flames begin to impinge upon the upon the external fabric of the
02:26:08 upon the upon the external fabric of the building from either an internal or external source there is the potential for the external cladding system to become involved and to contribute to the external fire spread out the building
02:26:21 external fire spread out the building they go on to say window openings or other unprotected areas within the flame envelope provide a potential route for fire spread back into the building
02:26:32 fire spread back into the building leading to the potential to bypass compartment flaws and to affect multiple story simultaneously this or thus making firefighting more difficult as we've
02:26:46 firefighting more difficult as we've learned have delays last few days in in all of the submissions these companies were working against this background of real known risk and real known danger to
02:26:57 real known risk and real known danger to other people that evidence has been brought out already in those submissions and it tells us that these companies knew that they were literally playing with fire but it it seems these warnings
02:27:12 with fire but it it seems these warnings this background this history of other fires were ignored by all of the companies before this inquiry who insist on trying to shift responsibility one to another each of these companies owed a
02:27:25 another each of these companies owed a duty to get it right against what was well known of those real dangers presented by cladding materials and insulation what we will suggest you will learn is that those responsible for the
02:27:36 that those responsible for the refurbishment failed to shoulder their own responsibility to ensure that the outcome of the refurbishment was a safe building
02:27:45 building after the Lacan or House high-rise social housing block fire where six people died and 20 were injured in South London in 2009 the all-party
02:27:57 London in 2009 the all-party parliamentary fire safety and rescue sari rescue group called for a major government review of building regulations the all-party group said that thousands of tower blocks were at
02:28:09 that thousands of tower blocks were at risk because they had combustible exterior cladding it later protested the government's ongoing failure to review the building regulations as agreed following the lacan all house fire and
02:28:21 following the lacan all house fire and pointed to the risk of another tragedy to be told by the government that the review following the 2009 lacan all fire would take place in due course now all
02:28:33 would take place in due course now all of this means not only that the industry knew of the dangers presented by cladding and insulation material but also that the need for change and safer regulation had been identified well
02:28:45 regulation had been identified well before the ground floor tower fire the last housing and communities Minister James Brock in Shire promised that the proposed new building regularly scheme will ensure that residents are at the heart of the new regulatory framework
02:28:57 heart of the new regulatory framework but so far that proposed scheme largely ignores residency involvement in regulation as far as we can see the new regulatory proposals are about reactive
02:29:09 regulatory proposals are about reactive or complaints based systems and not about true participation in the day-to-day our bigness in the day-to-day business of regulation from residents of social housing for example the new
02:29:22 social housing for example the new consultation launched in January 2020 is described as a call for evidence regarding risk prioritization in existing buildings and asks for innovative ideas and supporting evidence
02:29:34 innovative ideas and supporting evidence of approaches to assessing risk in existing bit in existing buildings what we have an innovative an idea which will which we will include in our response to that Kahn
02:29:44 that Kahn rotation and that is to ask the people who live in those existing buildings their opinion but this is not good enough the people of the ground felt our
02:29:55 enough the people of the ground felt our need to know that if they are to suffer the risk the people living in social housing need to know that if they are to suffer the risk they must have a say in setting the risk our reply to the
02:30:08 setting the risk our reply to the building regulations consultation last year put it this way by putting residents at the heart of the new system at every level including system design there is a much better chance of
02:30:19 there is a much better chance of achieving widespread stakeholder engagement breviary united made the same point as have others David Parr the director of social policy and technical services at the British
02:30:30 and technical services at the British Safety Council stated surely as a fundamental principle of sound risk management the people who are at the sharp end of a risk must have an input into determining how significant a risk
02:30:42 into determining how significant a risk actually is and how much effort should go into its prevention and control but unfortunately the only reference to who will be making decisions about the risk from building materials appears to be
02:30:54 from building materials appears to be the suggestion by the Housing Minister that the construction product Standards Committee
02:30:59 Committee the CPSC will make recommendations on construction products and system standards and advise on how the testing regime can be improved unfortunately
02:31:11 regime can be improved unfortunately unfortunately that committees membership is obscure and as far as anything can be said about this committee it does not include social housing residents the
02:31:22 include social housing residents the people of the Granville Tower and those still living under daily threat and high-rise blocks we suggest that resident safety should come first and residents must be allowed to play a full
02:31:33 residents must be allowed to play a full part in risk assessment and regulation in the future Dame Judith Hackett has been asked to chair a board to oversee the transition to the proposed new
02:31:44 the transition to the proposed new regulator we asked Dame Judith to consider the appointment to this new board of lay membership from those with experience of living in social housing in line with modern regulatory practice
02:31:57 in line with modern regulatory practice which
02:31:58 which is to include lay membership the people of the Granville tower don't want to hear any more words they don't want to hear about the problems they want solutions and they want change so in
02:32:09 solutions and they want change so in summary if towards the end of module 3 in September this year there are no sure signs of change we will request that this inquiry panel asked for reasons as to the failures to make changes and if
02:32:21 to the failures to make changes and if any explanation is lacking or inadequate we'll make an application to the panel of the ground of this inquiry to compel the attendance of the Housing Minister the mayor of London and the Commissioner
02:32:32 the mayor of London and the Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade finally we should note that today we are still nowhere further with any information from the Cabinet Office as to when the
02:32:43 from the Cabinet Office as to when the second panel member will be replaced the ex Prime Minister Theresa May MP recognized the need for the chair to sit with two panel members not just one and committed to that in her recommendation
02:32:57 committed to that in her recommendation we are also mindful of the provisions of section 8 of the inquiries act 2005 and in particular the need to ensure that the inquiry panel taken as a whole as a
02:33:08 the inquiry panel taken as a whole as a necessary skill and expertise to undertake the inquiry given the diversity of the Grenville tower community it is essential we say that the second panel members expertise
02:33:19 the second panel members expertise professional and life experiences encompass the issues of race class social housing and access to justice perhaps that's a right or reminder that
02:33:32 perhaps that's a right or reminder that overall we must never lose sight of the Grenville community there at the heart of this inquiry the matters being investigated are about their lives and the deaths of those within their
02:33:45 the deaths of those within their families that they loved this panels finding will affect their reception overall of justice and accountability we know that you will work hard to achieve that outcome and for that you have our
02:33:58 that outcome and for that you have our thanks so those are our specials thank you very much go now mr. Williamson I understand that you're going to address us as well make
02:34:11 you're going to address us as well make a further a big statement well I think that would be convenient can I just check the shorthand writers happy to carry on what would you or do you want Gregg sorry you are first-rate could you
02:34:25 Gregg sorry you are first-rate could you thank you very much well then if you would leave Williams I'm not sure how long you expect to require but if you are still running round about one o'clock
02:34:35 o'clock perhaps you'd find a convenient point at which to break no no I wasn't testing shows but you find the convenient sir and madam the team - bereaved survivors
02:34:49 and madam the team - bereaved survivors and residents for whom I appear wish to begin this part of their submissions by thanking the chairman and his team for the Phase one report which is clear that a huge amount of hard work has gone into
02:35:00 a huge amount of hard work has gone into that report our clients seek three main things from phase 2 of the inquiry first of all there must be accountability the
02:35:12 of all there must be accountability the many corporate organizations whose failings have led to this tragedy must be held to account this requires a point to which I will return a relentless
02:35:23 to which I will return a relentless effort by the inquiry to peel away the layers of obfuscation put up on behalf of the corporates by their well resourced and sophisticated teams of
02:35:35 resourced and sophisticated teams of experts and lawyers secondly this inquiry must recommend sweeping change and ensure that this is implemented our clients cannot contemplate the prospect
02:35:47 clients cannot contemplate the prospect that yet another report on tower block fires is simply left to gather dust as was the case with local house thirdly the BS RS must be at the centre of this
02:36:00 the BS RS must be at the centre of this process not at its periphery this is important both in relation to the inquiry process itself and more generally in respect of the management and social housing
02:36:12 and social housing in the future dealing first with accountability there was nothing unavoidable about this tragedy
02:36:23 unavoidable about this tragedy it was the products of human and institutional errors of omission and Commission at the heart of all this is
02:36:35 Commission at the heart of all this is our bkc
02:36:37 our bkc as building owner planning authority and building control authority from the very start this project was bedeviled by a culture which prioritized cost at the
02:36:51 culture which prioritized cost at the expense of all other considerations in July 2013 Laura Johnson the director of housing at our bkc reported to the housing and property
02:37:04 reported to the housing and property scrutiny committee that and the document is our beak k400 365 page underscore to
02:37:16 is our beak k400 365 page underscore to the Savile's report identifies she said Grenville tower as being one of the poorer performing assets in the housing stock with a negative net present value
02:37:29 stock with a negative net present value over 30 years of miners three hundred and forty thousand pounds any industrial investment will effectively increase the negative NPV on
02:37:41 effectively increase the negative NPV on a pound per pound basis increasing the negative NPV to miners one point six four million pounds it followed that
02:37:55 four million pounds it followed that from the point of view of our bkc every pound spent on this project was really money down the drain so that the pressure from above was always for cost
02:38:07 pressure from above was always for cost savings this had two important general consequences the first was their in their discussions about the scope of the works the TMO and
02:38:18 about the scope of the works the TMO and their advisors were obsessed with cost and paid little heed to safety safety simply does not seem to have been a priority for anyone concerned with
02:38:31 a priority for anyone concerned with this project Ledbetter the contractures who were originally in the frame to carry out this project were sidelined as too expensive at about the same time as
02:38:44 too expensive at about the same time as Laura Johnson was reporting to the Housing Committee it was decided on her instructions that a different approach to procurement was to be taken in May
02:38:55 to procurement was to be taken in May 2013 the cost consultants Artie Lea reported internally if we could go to a RT for zeroes six to three to at page
02:39:07 RT for zeroes six to three to at page zero zero zero five they reported that Peter Madison of the TMO has been
02:39:20 Peter Madison of the TMO has been overruled by Laura Johnson also mr. Madison is not keen on progressing with led bitter our report kicking this all off was based upon the objective of
02:39:32 off was based upon the objective of preserving program this now not so important and then these words value for money is to be regarded as the key driver of the project accordingly we are
02:39:46 driver of the project accordingly we are likely to procure reaper cure the steam VAR o j EU LED bitter to be stood down lb k see were clearly at the heart of
02:39:57 lb k see were clearly at the heart of these decisions and cost was by far the most important factor in the decision making process the second important consequence of the concern with cost was that when it came
02:40:10 concern with cost was that when it came to the choice of materials cheapness was not just the key driver of the project it was really all that matters so when studio he began to look at
02:40:21 so when studio he began to look at savings that the hessed of the TNA it was decided to crates change zinc cladding material to something cheaper in March 2013
02:40:33 something cheaper in March 2013 Studio E quotes had CP come in today to discuss
02:40:39 discuss the cheaper ACM cladding option and they will be forwarding samples for possible presentation to planning what is striking in all these discussions is
02:40:50 striking in all these discussions is that the question of fire safety did not seem to feature at all the concern was all about saving money in September 2013
02:41:01 all about saving money in September 2013 Studio II told RT Lea and the TMO that they had quotes met with Harley this morning to discuss the project they are very keen and have been tracking the
02:41:13 very keen and have been tracking the project for some time their recurring experience is the budgets force clients to adopt the cheapest cladding option aluminium composite material brackets
02:41:25 aluminium composite material brackets ACM face fix this advice from which no one seems to have dissented encapsulated a number of things which went wrong with
02:41:36 a number of things which went wrong with this project reliance upon the supposed specialists at Harley without any real due diligence the choice of a cm and
02:41:47 due diligence the choice of a cm and above all the obsession with cheapness this meeting also gives the lie to the suggestion that the final choice was ultimately for the TNA as Harley
02:41:59 ultimately for the TNA as Harley asserted in their all evening on Monday the proposal for the ACM came from Harley
02:42:07 Harley however cheapness was not the only concern and it was not the only obsession which contributed to this tragedy there was also considerable anxiety about aesthetics in particular
02:42:20 anxiety about aesthetics in particular as to how the tower would look post refurbishment to the well-heeled residents of the borough two features of this preoccupation with appearance were
02:42:33 this preoccupation with appearance were to have important results in November 2012 the architects appraisal panel part of the RB KC planning apparatus
02:42:44 of the RB KC planning apparatus recommended that the top of the tower be revised to provide visual interests by way of
02:42:53 way of as we now know the crown was to play a very significant role in the farm yet when it came to be considered Stu Joey and others were mainly worried about
02:43:04 and others were mainly worried about quotes the visual impact visual impact was it seems what really mattered and this concern came from the very top at our bkc in the early part of 2013 Studio
02:43:19 our bkc in the early part of 2013 Studio II had recorded the very strong steer they had regarding Jonathan Bohr's choice of colors and materials for another key our bkc figure relevant to
02:43:31 another key our bkc figure relevant to the module one issues was at that time the Executive Director of Planning and borough development the other important feature was that when the specification
02:43:43 feature was that when the specification of the ACM came to be considered in more detail it was appearance not safety which dominated discussions during the summer of 2014 so in June 2014 we find
02:43:55 summer of 2014 so in June 2014 we find Sarah Scannell of our be Casey's Planning Department expressing concern that quotes panels of this nature will not provide the high quality appearance
02:44:07 not provide the high quality appearance for such a visible building in this borough however it is not of course only our bkc
02:44:15 our bkc who should be held to account for the selection of dangerous materials for this refurbishment unfortunately max Fordham and studio II managed between
02:44:27 Fordham and studio II managed between them to specify Celotex insulation Celotex actively promoted its rs.5000 insulation as quotes acceptable for use
02:44:39 insulation as quotes acceptable for use in buildings above 80 meters height however as the inquiries expert Paul Hyatt explains this claim was both erroneous in and misleading in fact PIR
02:44:54 erroneous in and misleading in fact PIR insulation does not meet any of the definitions for materials of limited combustibility set out in table a 7 of a db2 it is
02:45:05 set out in table a 7 of a db2 it is combustible however Celotex is deceit provides no shelter for studio II or max Fordham all Ryden or xover they should all have
02:45:17 Ryden or xover they should all have known that this product did not comply with the building regulations as regards the ACM we have already seen that the conversation about this material related
02:45:29 conversation about this material related to its appearance and cost not to its safety and suitability we have also heard that as early as 2011 our comic
02:45:40 heard that as early as 2011 our comic knew that the Rana bond ACP eventually ACN eventually applied to ground for tower walls in fact highly combustible and in cassette form should only be used
02:45:53 and in cassette form should only be used on small buildings it was identified by Professor Bisbee in phase one as by a considerable margin the most important factor contributing to upward vertical
02:46:05 factor contributing to upward vertical far spread and indeed to external far spread generally a large number of parties are to blame for this Mis specification including firstly the
02:46:17 specification including firstly the British Board of a grant who failed to make clear in their certificate that the failure to specify a polyethylene core with a far Adal retardant additive or a
02:46:28 with a far Adal retardant additive or a failure to use any of the designated colors would render any panels non-compliant with class zero and approved document b secondly harley who
02:46:40 approved document b secondly harley who knew in early 2015 that ACM was dangerous but continued to recommend its use in its cladding system thirdly our comic who continued to
02:46:51 thirdly our comic who continued to supply polyethylene called ACM products without warning purchases of the products characteristics in fire and the inappropriateness for the use of such
02:47:02 inappropriateness for the use of such products in buildings over 18 meters high it is no for defense for our comic as they suggested the other day having supplied dangerous products to say that
02:47:13 supplied dangerous products to say that others should have made a careful and holistic assessment fourthly Studio II who if they had read the appropriate sections of the BBA
02:47:25 the appropriate sections of the BBA certificate should have reverted to the manufacturer in pursuit of an assurance that the panel comer selected four dreadful would meet attest quiet requirements necessary and in the
02:47:37 requirements necessary and in the absence of any satisfactory insurance should have insisted on a dedicated test being carried out on the preferred panel color and refused to specify it without
02:47:48 color and refused to specify it without satisfactory certification fifthly xover who were aware of the dangers associated with ACM even discussing the possibility of flames entering the cavity via the windows x
02:48:01 entering the cavity via the windows x over should have ensured that the product was fully and properly tested certified and applied in a strict accordance with its certification and with all the requirements of a DB and
02:48:14 with all the requirements of a DB and finally Ryden who should have managed both their cladding subcontractor and their architects with greater care indeed Mr Tavener on behalf of Ryden
02:48:25 indeed Mr Tavener on behalf of Ryden accepted on monday that it took on express and implicit contractual obligations regarding to the quality and standards of the design and construction
02:48:36 standards of the design and construction of the refurbishment work just picking up one of those passes for the moment we now know that Harley the specialist cladding contractor took the view
02:48:47 cladding contractor took the view internally we could go to har four zeros six five eight five at page one a
02:48:59 document I think was referred to the other day there is Harley saying internally there is no point in quotes far stopping as we all know the ACM will
02:49:10 far stopping as we all know the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a far exclamation mark and yet Harley never shared that to you outside their own organization and positively promoted the use of ACM on this project
02:49:24 use of ACM on this project moreover calamitous though the selection of materials were on this project was not the only thing that went wrong and not the only contributory factor to
02:49:35 and not the only contributory factor to this tragedy the procurement of the works by RB Casey and the TNA and really wanted in many ways regard these two bodies as one or singularly ill-managed
02:49:47 bodies as one or singularly ill-managed they selected in studio e an architectural practice which lacked the requisite experience of over cladding tower blocks it seems that the core of
02:49:59 tower blocks it seems that the core of the practices work revolved around education sports leisure recreational and commercial work as events unfolded it became painfully apparent that they
02:50:12 it became painfully apparent that they lacked a basic understanding of the requirements of the building relation regulations as they relate to over planting a tower block with catastrophic consequences they also selected in right
02:50:24 consequences they also selected in right and they contractor which was by far the cheapest but cheapness was to come at a very high price in October 2013 a
02:50:35 very high price in October 2013 a pre-qualification process had taken place
02:50:37 place Rison scored worst of the contractors as measured both by RT Lea and by the TNA despite this ridin were allowed to tender and submitted by far the lowest
02:50:50 tender and submitted by far the lowest tender at just over 9 million pounds compared with other tenders in excess of 10 million pounds RB Casey the TN o and RT Lea decided to proceed with this
02:51:02 RT Lea decided to proceed with this contractor which had scored so poorly on the pre-qualification exercise and whose tender was so far below that of their rivals
02:51:11 rivals however the worst failure in terms of procurement related to the failure to appoint a fire consultant with an obligation to provide a comprehensive
02:51:22 obligation to provide a comprehensive far strategy for the refurbishment and to ensure that they provided such a strategy xover had made a fee proposal to the TNA which included determining
02:51:35 to the TNA which included determining any external fast road issues that there may be
02:51:40 may be the impact those may have on architectural design and yet this never happened no one seems to have clarified with its over what they were supposed to be doing and did they did not make that
02:51:52 be doing and did they did not make that clear themselves their formal relevant contribution never progressed beyond the first edition of an outline far strategy safety strategy in October 2012 which
02:52:04 safety strategy in October 2012 which means bar wise crazy this morning x over issued further editions of the strategy but so far as the relevant part is concerned the wording remained the same
02:52:16 concerned the wording remained the same no one whether at the TMO art elia studio your ridin seems to have thought it troubling that the strategy was outline only or said nothing about regulation before nor did x over
02:52:30 regulation before nor did x over complain about their lack of information or instruction crucially the strategy simply did not engage with the cladding issues at all what did X over think they
02:52:42 issues at all what did X over think they were doing about fire safety for the refurbishment works which they had been engaged to consider their submissions essentially suggests that they were mere spectators and so when ridin came in to
02:52:55 spectators and so when ridin came in to this project in 2014 there was no fire strategy and no clarity as to X overs future role when ridin attended a contracture introduction meeting in
02:53:07 contracture introduction meeting in April 2014 it was recorded that simon lawrence of ridin would contact x over with a view to using them going forward in fact ridin seemed to have taken a
02:53:19 in fact ridin seemed to have taken a conscious decision that they would not contact x over in their.all opening yesterday the TMS thought to rely upon that minute but three of their staff are at that meeting and although right and
02:53:32 at that meeting and although right and never did contact x over as agreed the TMO never followed that up later that year at progress meetings in september and october 2014
02:53:43 and october 2014 Ryden undertook to quites appoint other consultants to include fire but as the CRO Gress meetings rolled on matter simply fell away from the minutes
02:53:55 matter simply fell away from the minutes no contact or appointment was ever made Artie Lia and the TMO were at those meetings why didn't they ask about this didn't it appear strange and troubling
02:54:08 didn't it appear strange and troubling that X / and studio Aoife that matter were not at those meetings by the second half of 2014 therefore all the ingredients were
02:54:19 therefore all the ingredients were present that the disaster which was to ensue between them the parties but in particular studio II forums and Harley had managed to select dangerous
02:54:31 had managed to select dangerous materials for both cladding and insulation Ryden the design and build contractors had in principle complete responsibility for the design and yet they never
02:54:42 for the design and yet they never critically examined the design choices which had been made and they seemed to have decided to keep both studio e and x over very much at arm's length and the
02:54:54 over very much at arm's length and the TMO on our Celia do not seem to have been concerned to check who was doing what these points will no doubt they're not developed in the evidence but by way
02:55:05 not developed in the evidence but by way of example only consider design team meeting number one which was held on site on the 13th of August 2014 the attendance included Simon Lawrence Bruce
02:55:16 attendance included Simon Lawrence Bruce UN's
02:55:17 UN's and Neil Crawford of Studio E Daniel and Cody Jones and Kevin lamb of Harley this was an ideal opportunity to review where the project was on fire strategy the
02:55:30 the project was on fire strategy the design choice has already made for the cladding that necessary future choices lines of responsibility - and how to deal with Building Control those matters
02:55:42 deal with Building Control those matters were particularly important given that Crawford and lamb were new to this project none of this was done indeed Crawford noted in his notebook that the
02:55:54 Crawford noted in his notebook that the far strategy was quotes not approved crates crates this is remarkable more than two years after xover had first been involved yet no one seems to have been concerned
02:56:06 yet no one seems to have been concerned there was even at this stage one final line of defense which might have avoided this tragedy and that was our be Casey's Building Control Department after all
02:56:18 Building Control Department after all what is the purpose of such a department if it is not to insist that applicants submit adequate applications for approval and that these applications are
02:56:29 approval and that these applications are examined in accordance with the building regulations we know that building controlled objective ailed in discharging these responsibilities because in a case where a candid
02:56:42 because in a case where a candid admissions are few and far between our bkc have admitted as much in their written opening submissions at paragraphs 101 to 106 those admissions
02:56:55 paragraphs 101 to 106 those admissions are well warranted in addition to the material selections issues which I have already outlined Building Control and ridin and Harley and Studio II wholly
02:57:08 ridin and Harley and Studio II wholly failed as building controls admissions as they're building control emissions make clear in relation to the very important issue of cavity barriers there was no overall strategy for the
02:57:19 was no overall strategy for the provision of cavity barriers at Grenville tower this led to a catalogue of failures including a lack of vertical cavity barriers to the window jams and a
02:57:30 cavity barriers to the window jams and a lack of horizontal cavity barriers to the window HID head and sill and at the top of the cavities within the rain screen system according to mr. Hyatt and
02:57:41 screen system according to mr. Hyatt and we agree the kraits fundamental errors in design of the cavity barriers meant that the Karli construction documentation which studio he endorsed
02:57:53 documentation which studio he endorsed was deeply flawed in concept with the result that the construction documentation was released in a form that provided absolutely no protection
02:58:04 that provided absolutely no protection against the passage of fire anywhere around the window opening directly into the cavity zone behind the rain screen despite all these failures and
02:58:16 despite all these failures and remarkably building control not only approved the plans but also engaged at the time in email exchanges which gave express comfort to Ryden and studio e telling
02:58:29 comfort to Ryden and studio e telling them on 1st April 2015 that they had quotes no adverse comments to make on the cladding proposals shown annual drawings so if that's the convenient
02:58:40 drawings so if that's the convenient names about halfway through say that
02:58:47 right now for some lunch and resume atop empties