Opening submissions for Module 4 examining the government response to Grenfell, including devastating critiques of RBKC's failures and the UK's lack of a proper disaster management system from legal representatives of bereaved, survivors and residents.
00:00:28 [Music]
00:00:34 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing
00:00:38 hearing today we're going to start another section of the inquiry module 4 which is concerned with the response of local and central government to the fire we have a number of people making
00:00:50 we have a number of people making uh opening statements for module four it's a very full day so i hope you'll forgive me for reminding all of you that it's important to keep to the timetable otherwise we
00:01:01 to keep to the timetable otherwise we shall be here much later than we wish so without further ado i'm going to invite mr millet to open the proceedings yes thank you very much mr chairman good morning to you good morning morning members of the panel
00:01:13 members of the panel as the chairman has just said today we start module four of phase two of this inquiry's investigations the structure of module four is divided into three distinct but closely related
00:01:25 into three distinct but closely related topics
00:01:26 topics which map the inquiries list of issues namely issue 13a 13b
00:01:32 13b and 13c
00:01:34 and 13c in summary the first issue issue 13a requires an exploration of the policies the procedures and the plans in place for london to deal with a major emergency such as the grenfell tower
00:01:46 emergency such as the grenfell tower fire on the part of the tenant management organization local and central government this of course includes the relevant local authority rbkc
00:01:57 rbkc the second issue c13b examines the response to the grenfell tower fire in the form of the provision of emergency relief by those same entities
00:02:07 entities the inquiry will focus on the immediate aftermath this being the first seven days following the fire on the 14th of june 2017 running therefore until the 20th of june 2017.
00:02:20 20th of june 2017. the third issue issue 13c requires an assessment of whether that response was adequate the inquiry will examine those matters during these module four hearings in six
00:02:32 during these module four hearings in six distinct or perhaps overlapping parts before i identify what each part involves it would be helpful to you and the public in general to have an outline
00:02:43 the public in general to have an outline of the legal framework against which the evidence in module 4 falls to be assessed
00:02:48 assessed the order in which the evidence is to be called is generally intended to follow this part-based structure but because of the nature of the subject matter and the issues there are naturally overlaps and therefore rigid
00:03:01 naturally overlaps and therefore rigid adherence to the strict divisions between these six parts is impracticable and undesirable c13a encompasses an understanding of the structure of the legislation the
00:03:12 structure of the legislation the regulation and guidance at central and london level it is far from straightforward and it resists accurate simplification by way of introductory remarks
00:03:24 by way of introductory remarks however i can point out the very basic building blocks of the structure the primary legislation is the civil contingencies act 2004 it's it is enabling legislation which
00:03:36 it's it is enabling legislation which leads to the details to delegated legislation uh which comes in the shape of the civil contingencies act 2004 contingency planning regulations 2005.
00:03:48 contingency planning regulations 2005. part one of the act deals with local arrangements for civil protection and it's relevant for the issues under investigation here particularly at part two
00:03:59 two section two of the act itself uh imposes duties on category one responders those are defined in schedule one part one of the act they include local authorities in this case rbkc
00:04:11 in this case rbkc and the greater london authority the gla section two of the act contains duties including duties to assess the risk of an emergency occurring to maintain plans for the purpose of
00:04:23 to maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring so forest reasonably practicable that if an emergency occurs the person or body is able to continue to perform his or its functions and other like duties the 2005 regulations substantiate the
00:04:36 the 2005 regulations substantiate the scope and nature of the duties under the act
00:04:39 act and add further duties including the duty of category 1 responders to cooperate with each other and with category 2 responders additionally the creation of a local
00:04:50 additionally the creation of a local resilience forum is required the regulations also provide the central government input into emergency planning and the requirement of category one responders to maintain a
00:05:01 category one responders to maintain a community risk register there is also guidance to voluntary organizations and particularly on training and exercises in addition to the 2005 regulations
00:05:13 in addition to the 2005 regulations there is also a piece of statutory guidance called emergency preparedness or ep as it's sometimes referred to in short that deals with the pre-emergency phase
00:05:24 that deals with the pre-emergency phase and and sets out the requirements in the act and the regulations and it is mandatory reading for organizations who have duties there under the document runs to some 600 pages and
00:05:36 the document runs to some 600 pages and is divided into 17 chapters of particular relevance to our investigation in this module are chapter 2 cooperation chapter 3 information sharing chapter 4 risk assessment duty
00:05:50 sharing chapter 4 risk assessment duty chapter 5 emergency planning chapter 7 communicating with the public and chapter 14 the role of the voluntary sector
00:05:57 sector in addition to the statutory guidance there is non-statutory guidance entitled emergency response and recovery or er which can be found at cab404624
00:06:10 that is dated october 2013. it is published or was published by the cabinet office's civil contingencies secretariat it comprises 14 chapters and
00:06:21 secretariat it comprises 14 chapters and runs to 233 pages of particular relevance are chapter 3 agencies and chapter 7 meeting the needs of those affected
00:06:31 affected within central government there are three relevant government departments first the cabinet office that operated not only under the statutory and non-statutory guidance but
00:06:44 statutory and non-statutory guidance but something called the central government arrangements for responding to an emergency concept of operation or conops
00:06:52 or conops that describes how the uk central government response is organized and its relationship to the central regional and local tiers in england secondly mhclg
00:07:05 secondly mhclg that was the department that contained the resilience and emergencies division or red or red red
00:07:13 red had two roles non-response phase planning and advisory and the emergency response phase under the statutory guidance ep
00:07:24 under the statutory guidance ep red is responsible for ensuring good two-way communication between category one and category 2 responders and central government and for ensuring that planning is
00:07:36 and for ensuring that planning is coordinated where necessary and also the category 1 responders have the support they need
00:07:42 they need in turn red has or had five heads of resilience two of which
00:07:49 of which are in london red works with the london resilience forum
00:07:54 forum or r lrf
00:07:56 or r lrf and has duties under the non-statutory guidance
00:07:59 guidance the err
00:08:02 the err third the home office that had no formal role as a lead government department responsible for civil emergencies but it was responsible for fire assets
00:08:13 for fire assets a major fire does not have a lead government department and so the home office took on that role because of its responsibility for fire assets at the time
00:08:24 now within local governments breaking that up there was the london resilience partnership the lrp which was the umbrella organization for some 170 organizations who were category
00:08:38 some 170 organizations who were category 1 and category 2 responders the lrp
00:08:42 the lrp the umbrella organization is supported by something called the london resilience group the lrg the nrg coordinates the activity of the
00:08:53 the nrg coordinates the activity of the lrp it carries out the day-to-day planning of pan-london resilience and the lrg is the secretariat to the london resilience forum which i mentioned a
00:09:05 resilience forum which i mentioned a moment ago the lrf now the lrf coming back to that is split and it's split into sector panels and at this point one has to i think
00:09:18 and at this point one has to i think resort to visual aids can i please have up on the screen lfb
00:09:26 lfb 3061162
00:09:31 nfb lfb 3061162
00:09:35 and if we that's the first page and you can see that it's entitled london resilience forum version 2.2 june 2017
00:09:43 2017 terms of reference and there's a helpful introduction and aim and objectives as you can see on the screen if we can go please to page seven here is appendix nought one c london
00:09:55 here is appendix nought one c london resilience forum lrf structure and there it is
00:09:59 it is and the forum is in the middle and into it feed a number of different panels
00:10:05 panels ranging round in the clockwise direction from government clg military right round to the environment agency and supporting the lrf are first of all the sub-regional
00:10:16 are first of all the sub-regional resilience tears and underneath that the borough resilience fora on the left and on the right the london resilience programme board with with capabilities supporting it in
00:10:28 with with capabilities supporting it in turn
00:10:30 turn now on this chart you'll note that the lap is present um and it is the third up from the bottom left local authorities panel now the local authority's panel is of particular importance because it
00:10:41 of particular importance because it carries out specific resilience work on behalf of the london resilience forum the nrf
00:10:48 the nrf that work includes ownership and oversight of the london local authority gold
00:10:53 gold that in turn is an important pan-london role in a serious emergency and you will have heard in phase one some evidence about gold and silver you'll hear that the gold resolution
00:11:04 you'll hear that the gold resolution which is a an agreement uh was an agreement between 33 london local authorities which permits a nominated chief executive known as the london local authority goal to commit
00:11:15 london local authority goal to commit resources and expenditure on behalf of all local authorities in the event of emergency
00:11:21 emergency as part of this structure the london resilience forum structure each local authority in london maintains a borough resilience forum and you'll see that sometimes referred
00:11:32 and you'll see that sometimes referred to as a brf to coordinate civil protection at local level
00:11:36 level under regulation 4 7 b it must meet every six months that's the 2005 regulations it must meet every six months rbkc's brf borough resilience
00:11:47 months rbkc's brf borough resilience forum was chaired by david kerry a name who will be familiar to to you mr chairman from chapter 30 of the phase one report he was the beck the ub ecc the borough emergency
00:12:00 beck the ub ecc the borough emergency control center on the night of the fire and we will be hearing from him in some detail in evidence during the course of this module now i'm going to turn against that background to
00:12:11 background to uh an outline of the six parts of module four
00:12:15 four first bsrs um in part one we'll hear evidence from those who are directly affected in the immediate aftermath of the fire it is vital that their experiences be heard
00:12:26 vital that their experiences be heard first
00:12:28 first that is because in the end the basic aim of the morass of legislation delegated legislation statutory guidance non-statutory guidance
00:12:37 guidance and the various different bodies and structures set up was for their benefit it was to anticipate and meet the basic human needs of each individual as an individual in the aftermath of an event
00:12:49 individual in the aftermath of an event such as grenfell tower where they have personal needs you can then come after that having seen how that worked or didn't as the case may be
00:13:00 may be um to
00:13:02 um to follow the evidence that that comes later with those personal experiences very firmly in mind the inquiry will also hear um from some some of the bereave the survivors and
00:13:13 some of the bereave the survivors and entire residents as well as those who are residents of nearby properties who were also affected in the immediate aftermath of the fire the inquiry has received
00:13:24 the inquiry has received in the region of 215 written witness statements from those directly affected specifically in relation to module 4. we will be hearing live evidence from a number of those regarding the provision
00:13:35 number of those regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of the fire additionally the inquiry will hear a selection of red extracts from those directly affected
00:13:46 directly affected in the light of that volume of material it would be impracticable to read all of that evidence but i do stress that it remains evidence before the inquiry that the inquiry team has considered and will
00:13:58 the inquiry team has considered and will be considered further by the team and by you the panel it is simply impossible for us regrettably to hear from each and every witness who has provided a statement but
00:14:09 statement but we are extremely grateful to those who have provided those uh statements because they shine an invaluable light and insight into the experiences that
00:14:20 and insight into the experiences that each has undergone the second part is rbkc and we will be considering the plans the policies the procedures and the response of our bkc
00:14:32 of our bkc we will be examining the provision of emergency relief by it and hearing directly from those whose responsibility it was to plan for a major emergency within the borough we will scrutinize the adequacy of those
00:14:44 we will scrutinize the adequacy of those arrangements we will explore for example the initial response of our bkc and the provision of staff and and support at the rest centers the emergency rest centers
00:14:55 centers the emergency rest centers given to those displaced by the fire and the treatment of those within the cordon we will hear from the then chief executive or town clerk nicholas holgate about his management of the borough's
00:15:07 about his management of the borough's response and we will investigate whether his leadership was effective in accordance with required standards a significant issue will be whether rbkc
00:15:18 a significant issue will be whether rbkc should have sought greater external assistance at an earlier stage section three or part three is then the tmo we will be examining the
00:15:29 is then the tmo we will be examining the role of the tmo the tenant management organization in the aftermath of the fire through the evidence of teresa brown and robert black
00:15:36 black specifically we will investigate the role of tmo staff at rest centres the setting up and management of the safe and missing list of residents and their involvement in facilitating the return
00:15:47 involvement in facilitating the return of evacuated residents to their homes part four will examine the voluntary community and faith sectors we will be looking at the response through the eyes of that sector
00:15:59 through the eyes of that sector that includes evidence from the british red cross who were present at the westway center a rest center set up for those displaced on the morning of the 14th of june additionally we will be hearing live
00:16:11 additionally we will be hearing live evidence and red evidence about the spontaneous response of the community and faith centers who offered support and sanctuary to those affected by the fire
00:16:22 fire part five we'll be looking at london resilience in that part we will seek to understand more closely the structure of london resilience as it was on the 14th of june john hetherington of the london
00:16:34 john hetherington of the london resilience group the lrg will explain the many strands and elements of london resilience such as the london resilience partnership the london resilience group and the london resilience forum which is
00:16:47 and the london resilience forum which is a creature of statute the inquiry will probe how those structures operated in practice uh changes to the structure since the grenfell tower fire and whether mutual aid was effectively utilized and
00:16:59 aid was effectively utilized and coordinated by the london local authority control centre we will also hear from the mayor of london's chief of staff on the role of the mayor of london and the greater london authority in responding to the
00:17:11 london authority in responding to the grenfell tower fire against that background we we will hear evidence regarding the circumstances leading up to the activation of the london local authority gold arrangements
00:17:22 london local authority gold arrangements we will note and i would invite the panel to note that by the afternoon of the 16th of june 2017 at the request of rbkc responsibility for leading the humanitarian response
00:17:34 humanitarian response passed from rbkc to john barredale town clerk for the city of london and the london lead on resilience that enabled the greater provision of staff and resources from the other
00:17:46 staff and resources from the other london councils to aid the response part six
00:17:51 part six is central government in part six we will be scrutinizing the plans and procedures which were in place on the part of central government and their response to the fire in turn we will be exploring the civil
00:18:02 we will be exploring the civil contingencies act and the associated regulations and guidance and how central government manages the civil resilience landscape
00:18:10 landscape we will be hearing from the right honourable nicolas hurd the then minister of state for policing and the fire service who chaired the first first two cross whitehall meetings and at one time was minister for the grenfell
00:18:22 time was minister for the grenfell victims
00:18:23 victims additionally we will probe the actions of the department of communities and local government the dclg as it was then known and the role they play in the resilience network in london
00:18:35 play in the resilience network in london module 4 will conclude with the evidence of day melanie dawes on the actions of the department that she led at the time of the fire now there are some housekeeping matters that i should highlight the first is
00:18:47 that i should highlight the first is that the inquiry will not sit the whole week commencing monday 18th of april um because of the easter celebrations and secondly it will also not sit on the monday the 2nd of may which is a bank
00:19:00 monday the 2nd of may which is a bank holiday
00:19:01 holiday the inquiry is mindful of the fact that module 4 is taking place during the month of ramadan which was
00:19:08 which was which was the case at the time of the fire as you will recall the inquiry will make all reasonable adjustments possible for those observing and attending to give evidence to the inquiry
00:19:20 inquiry finally i have to thank the team of junior council led by mr dermot keating and inquiry solicitors holly war who have devoted so much effort and attention to the investigation of the issues in this module and enabled the
00:19:32 issues in this module and enabled the oral evidence to be organized in a caged and coherent manner mr chairman members of the panel that concludes my opening statement for module 4. thank you very much thank you very much mr millet
00:19:45 much thank you very much mr millet now the
00:19:46 now the first
00:19:47 first of the core participants opening statements is going to be made by mr friedman queen's council on behalf of those we now know as team one good morning mr friedman good morning thank
00:19:59 morning mr friedman good morning thank you when you're ready please make your statement the aftermath of the grenfell tower fire was a humanitarian crisis
00:20:10 was a humanitarian crisis but it was also a political one the crisis was humanitarian because basic features of human existence were in general this was a disaster inside a community where those affected mostly could not
00:20:22 where those affected mostly could not leave or did not want to even though their homes possessions and privacy were destroyed
00:20:28 destroyed huge numbers of their friends and family were dead
00:20:31 were dead and the smoke and debris were still around them the crisis was political because a disaster was undeniably human made
00:20:40 made and its victims remained under the governance of those in part who made it at the foot of the burning tower many bsr knew or would soon know that their immediate fate lay in the hands of
00:20:53 their immediate fate lay in the hands of two layers of government most politically implicated in the cause of the disaster rbkc
00:21:00 rbkc and dclg
00:21:02 and dclg lancaster west estate at five o'clock in the morning on the 14th of june was a ground zero for our clients in a human sense they had bare life with
00:21:13 in a human sense they had bare life with all else lost and the realization that their world was never going to be the same again in a political sense the social contract with government which had already frayed was broken
00:21:25 which had already frayed was broken because a state that not only fails to protect its people but positively undermines their safety is not worthy of their consent the inquiry is about to look like no uk
00:21:38 the inquiry is about to look like no uk public inquiry before it about what happened next both central and local government have publicly accepted that the state failed in the aftermath of the fire
00:21:50 in the aftermath of the fire five features of that failure are essential to understanding events one
00:21:56 one the uk does not have a disaster management system but relies on voluntary unsupervised local government arrangements to protect human welfare when that welfare is most
00:22:08 welfare when that welfare is most exposed as it was here two local government in north kensington collapsed in exceptional fashion not just logistically but in terms of moral
00:22:19 just logistically but in terms of moral authority for reasons foreshadowed by its treatment of residents before the fire
00:22:25 fire three
00:22:26 three regional and central government did not and had no efficient mechanism to effectively intervene when they should have
00:22:34 have four
00:22:35 four in the humanitarian and political vacuum a community network on the ground made up of bsr civil society and emerging state allies bridged the gap to
00:22:46 state allies bridged the gap to co-produce recovery however five the burden placed on bsr did them damage it prolonged their suffering and for many of them the aftermath of the fire
00:22:57 many of them the aftermath of the fire continues to this day it remains to be seen whether the experience could have a positive legacy and whether the various factors that caused and prolong the disaster are amenable to change
00:23:09 disaster are amenable to change on that recovery is a work in progress turning first to the state's readiness for disaster grenfell was a crisis located in one
00:23:20 grenfell was a crisis located in one place other catastrophic events are followed by the dispersal of survivors and bereaved back to their disparate homes and communities here the fire and aftermath were combined
00:23:32 aftermath were combined in that respect the way in which the law and guidance divided up the stages of response and recovery is a problem because acute need to assist a recovery arose immediately in grenfell and not at
00:23:44 arose immediately in grenfell and not at some later dust settled stage in the aftermath that is therefore still part of the event what we now call the bsr are not yet bsr
00:23:57 what we now call the bsr are not yet bsr the bereaved are not yet bereaved they are frantic searches for proof of life the survivors are still escapers they have got out of the tower but are absolutely not safe
00:24:09 absolutely not safe forced from their homes residents are displaced awaiting a homecoming that may never come
00:24:16 come a community of victims is coming into being those rushing from the tower to the tower and around the tower and those who cannot get there for reasons beyond their control
00:24:28 their control all of this matters because in the uk there is no statutory or administrative concept of a disaster only an emergency defined in the civil
00:24:39 only an emergency defined in the civil contingency act 2004 as an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare you've asked the civil service witnesses may tell you that there is dispute
00:24:50 may tell you that there is dispute amongst experts about what constitutes a disaster and it is better to have a wider concept of emergency that is inclusive and flexible but what about when the emergency is catastrophic and
00:25:03 when the emergency is catastrophic and especially so when the castro catastrophe is placed specific the current law lacks effective triggers to rapidly scale up the state's response first
00:25:14 first the system only has two models of emergency powers part one of the civil contingency act wages heavily on the effectiveness of the particular local authority
00:25:26 the particular local authority confronting the emergency with a largely voluntary system of neighbouring support which in london you've just heard is called london resilience the other model in part two of the act
00:25:39 the other model in part two of the act is that central government effectively takes over and rules by executive order in between the models there is no duty to scale up and limited powers for ministers to do so none of
00:25:51 powers for ministers to do so none of which were used in response to grenfell second
00:25:55 second central government would not be ready to scale up even if they wanted to the civil contingency act contains duties for so-called category run responders that includes blue light
00:26:07 responders that includes blue light hospitals the local authority and then their layer of london they have a duty to assess plan warn and inform around the risk and thereafter the event of an emergency
00:26:19 the event of an emergency neither central government nor individual secretaries of state responsible for these services are statutory responders they have no duties under the act other than those they self-adopt at their
00:26:30 than those they self-adopt at their discretion and although they have duties under human rights law reference to human rights appears nowhere in the act regulations or guidance third there is no external inspectorate
00:26:43 third there is no external inspectorate function
00:26:44 function so as we saw with the fire and rescue services judgment over appropriate preparation is delegated locally to the responders themselves with some level of peer group feedback which is patently inferior to
00:26:56 which is patently inferior to independent audit and standard setting fourth
00:27:01 fourth the law in times of emergency is hugely deferential to the state it's overwhelming credo is that government should not be readily questioned because it is presumed to
00:27:12 questioned because it is presumed to have the expertise and the democratic accountability that judges are constitutionally reluctant to second guess one of the several problems with that is that the civil contingency
00:27:23 that is that the civil contingency regulations that purport to enforce this act are very general in what they require and the bulk of activity in this field is steered by non-binding national and regional guidance documents
00:27:35 and regional guidance documents most significantly there are no dedicated or binding regulations at all on aftermath response this means that local authorities are largely their own judges of what is reasonable in terms of planning and
00:27:47 reasonable in terms of planning and action on matters of fundamental human welfare
00:27:51 welfare finally
00:27:52 finally the system depends on local authorities assisting one another in times of crisis with a convoluted and complicated regional structure especially in london
00:28:03 regional structure especially in london that has no hierarchy or clarity as to how to scale up a situation when one authority cannot cope but does not admit that to be the case for fear of political
00:28:14 political legal or other criticism stepping back there is no sophisticated system somewhere in central london with plans data and specialists that can grasp
00:28:27 data and specialists that can grasp reality quickly and affect change indeed there is not even an audit of what the state of readiness is in any given locality
00:28:35 locality neither is there a local hierarch london hierarchy primed to take over that is a fantasy but before grenfell tower and then covered 19 the political classes were
00:28:46 covered 19 the political classes were not making that clear now everyone should know the entire system waged on the local authority having the capability and capacity to deal with
00:28:57 capability and capacity to deal with matters on the ground or call for london centralized command and in the case of rbkc that wager fundamentally failed and the system crashed
00:29:09 we look at the reasons why that is so in our statement section dealing with local government which we split into three headings
00:29:17 headings one disconnection two denial and three incompetence but the upshot is that witnesses from every part of society and government from parents looking for missing
00:29:29 from parents looking for missing children to national security advisers in downing street describe a void or absence of government this was a temporary collapse of the state of exceptional character
00:29:41 exceptional character first
00:29:43 first for reasons examined in module 3 to this inquiry
00:29:46 inquiry there was a fundamental pre-existing disconnection between the primary state responder and its disaster victim community and that was due to the way in which
00:29:58 and that was due to the way in which rbkc governed there is no need to repeat the submissions on the treatment of residents before the fire but the evidence of the aftermath will make no sense
00:30:08 sense without bearing in mind what happened before
00:30:11 before the key guidance on emergency response presupposes the local authority collaborating with its community institutions and citizens that form of engagement was entirely
00:30:22 that form of engagement was entirely beyond rbkc a post-fire review by the grenfell tower recovery task force described the council as distant from the community it served old-fashioned in its operational
00:30:33 served old-fashioned in its operational behaviors limited in its understanding and commitment to collaborative interagency work insular despite cross-borrower and management and with a significant deficit in understanding of
00:30:44 significant deficit in understanding of modern public service delivery so much so that the bishop of kensington's report after the fire called for a renewal of democracy
00:30:54 democracy as the council and local government were often experienced as paternalistic and patronising with a lack of genuine listening and understanding and party politics an obstacle rather than help
00:31:07 politics an obstacle rather than help you cannot get a clearer example of rbkc's disconnect and its disconnected culture and practices than the council leader nicholas padgett brown's documented assurances to conservative
00:31:20 documented assurances to conservative councillors on the evening of the 15th of june 2017. he told them that rbkc had long-standing community engagement with the various charities
00:31:31 engagement with the various charities and faith groups helping grenfell victims by virtue of the fact that it had financially supported or otherwise sponsored them as quote agents in normal times
00:31:43 times his concession was that coordinating them has proved challenging in these unique circumstances aside from evidencing the distance and paternalism that paget
00:31:54 the distance and paternalism that paget brown and colleagues would be criticized for
00:31:57 for this view confuses corporate relationships based on grants and actual relationships based on mutual respect and genuine community network and it is a view that paget brown still
00:32:09 and it is a view that paget brown still holds
00:32:10 holds it was fed to andrew o'hare o'hagan who wrote the highly contested essay in the grand on grenfell tower in the london review of books and it is maintained in mr paget brown's evidence to this
00:32:21 mr paget brown's evidence to this inquiry and to the police the various statutory guidance documents and checklists do not deal with this level of social disconnect you cannot govern in crisis without
00:32:33 you cannot govern in crisis without employees and mediators who can rapidly feed back from the ground you have to be able to learn from not just the faith and community centers who will tell the inquiry they were ignored
00:32:45 will tell the inquiry they were ignored but they extended families from the tower and the walkways like the elwahabis or the mendy family you had to seek out the converging network of people from in and around the tower men like muhammad rasool almed al
00:32:59 tower men like muhammad rasool almed al guari karimusuli and shaheen saddafi and women like muna el agbani hanan wahhabi corrin jones and manira mahmud and you needed to connect with those who
00:33:10 and you needed to connect with those who had been critical like edward dafon or shah ahmed rather than defensively rejecting all dissenting views when the inquiry hears or reads into the
00:33:21 when the inquiry hears or reads into the record the accounts of the bsrs it will become an apparent how these networks of insight were squandered the root of that loss was long-standing
00:33:32 the root of that loss was long-standing in the degraded nature of local government and democracy that had come to exist in this part of the city witnesses are about to tell you that grenfell was an event that would challenge all plants
00:33:45 challenge all plants well even with bad cheap or overwhelmed plants a council can do better if it has real community engagement and rbkc did not have that
00:33:56 not have that however
00:33:57 however instead of recognizing the problem the council's leadership descended into denial
00:34:02 denial you will be told that a disaster of this nature was beyond any local authority and the error of the rbkc leadership despite early advice is that it failed to ask for london gold command or llag
00:34:14 to ask for london gold command or llag to take over that is undoubtedly correct but the point leaves unmarked the more complex and indeed troubling aspects of the delay
00:34:24 the delay this was a political crisis because rbkc was both the organization charged with leading the response and simultaneously implicated in its cause that was a fundamental conflict of
00:34:36 that was a fundamental conflict of interest which no one in rbkc london resilience or central government was sufficiently quick to confront at the very best for reasons developed in module 3. rbkc knew it had shut down
00:34:48 in module 3. rbkc knew it had shut down genuine resident consultation on the refurbishment and robustly defeated its critical critics who accused it of compromising fire safety the first rbga rbkc gold meeting at 11
00:35:01 the first rbga rbkc gold meeting at 11 a.m on the 14th of june focused in part on robert black's account that the refurbishment was signed off by building control with all due procedures complied with
00:35:12 due procedures complied with while the fire was still burning and no remaining life still undeclared the tmo board planned to commission a pr firm to put its message out
00:35:24 firm to put its message out when the chief executive nicholas holgate spoke to key figures in the london resilience set up at 5 30 pm on the 14th of june it was indicated that the leader of the council might call on
00:35:36 the leader of the council might call on quote political leaders across london to provide political support to rbkc even though this was recognized at least by the deputy head of london resilience
00:35:47 by the deputy head of london resilience as what he termed a delicate subject by the morning of the 16th of june both rbkc and the tmo reported their their appointment of lawyers and
00:35:58 their appointment of lawyers and expected the police to remove computer servers immediate imminently and still they remained technically in control but before they relinquished control
00:36:10 but before they relinquished control rbkc formally attacked bsrs as somehow would be leaders of revolt during emergencies the key commanders of police fire service local authority and
00:36:22 police fire service local authority and others meet at the strategic coordinating group known as the scg at these meetings there were documented efforts by rbkc only i emphasized not
00:36:35 efforts by rbkc only i emphasized not the police and no other responders to frame grenfell residents as a problem at 11am on the 15th of june rbkc registered great concern over community
00:36:47 registered great concern over community tension
00:36:48 tension with hostile residents very vocal in negative comments towards the incidents dclg officers on watching briefs then fed back to whitehall later that day quote
00:36:59 quote worried about community tension several embittered residents painting the situation in a very poor light inside a mob
00:37:10 inside a mob joe farah at dclg was then told by rbkc chief executive mr holgate in a call at 12 30 pm on the 15th of june that grenfell tower residents have been
00:37:22 grenfell tower residents have been complaining for a long time about the council
00:37:25 council with the suggestion that several people could make this worse than it is and the council is worried that they might need assistance from the police again
00:37:34 again at 11 am on the 16th of june rbc kc claimed hurt and anger was being stoked by a small number of known local instigators who continued to fabricate
00:37:46 instigators who continued to fabricate stories to further their aims i emphasize again this was not the position of the police who were advising that there should be a meeting to provide reassurance and clarity
00:37:57 provide reassurance and clarity when outsiders mounted political protests at the town hall on the 16th of june and gained access to the building the logs reported that this was managed peacefully by police and there were no
00:38:08 peacefully by police and there were no arrests
00:38:09 arrests and by 9 am on the 17th of june the official cabinet current recorded information picture summarized currently no intelligence to indicate any disruption or significant public
00:38:20 disruption or significant public disorder
00:38:21 disorder no further issue did arise not least because bsrs and their allies wanted direct action of that nature to stop
00:38:30 stop rbk's c's efforts to instill fear of the crowd against our clients could not have underscored my why it was inappropriate and unjust for response
00:38:41 inappropriate and unjust for response and recovery to remain under its control the final problem of course was that rbkc was incompetent especially its leadership and that is something that the council admits
00:38:52 something that the council admits pointing to a range of errors including insufficient training experience exercise planning and resources at some point on the first morning either at 6 30 a.m or 10 am
00:39:04 either at 6 30 a.m or 10 am rbkc officer stuart priestley and david kerry logged that their chief executive and now rbkc gold commander nicholas holgate was advised of mutual aid arrangements via london local authority
00:39:16 arrangements via london local authority gold which he declined because in his words
00:39:20 words that looks like we can't cope panel if anything would indicate that a local authority could not cope it would be that kind of let's not confront our
00:39:32 be that kind of let's not confront our weaknesses mentality and whether that looks like we can't cope with said in terms or not multiple bystanders speak to the mentality which they watched for two days without beginning to intervene
00:39:48 when the local system of emergency response crashed as it did central government now accepts that it floundered the damage done by that floundering took place in a country of division
00:40:00 division the general election on the 8th of june 2017 resulted in a hung parliament which remained prerogued until the 21st of june
00:40:08 june with the surviving conservative administration still depends on negotiations with the democratic unionist party the election had been contested over austerity deregulation migrancy and
00:40:19 austerity deregulation migrancy and inequality the first images of the grenfell tower fire told any watcher that these divisions had life and death implications
00:40:31 implications public disquiet was quickly evident with the crime minister attending the scene but failing to meet its survivors rbkc directly implicated as the building owner
00:40:41 owner and successive government policies towards social housing and deregulation but particularly so in dclg since 2010 identified as an underlying
00:40:53 identified as an underlying cause
00:40:54 cause on dclg
00:40:56 on dclg ideas and people can make a difference lord eric pickles has spent his working life in local government with shadow secretary of state from 2007
00:41:07 with shadow secretary of state from 2007 to 2009
00:41:09 to 2009 chaired the conservative party into government on a deregulation platform and was secretary of state between 2010 and 2015.
00:41:19 and 2015. systems aren't made by single individuals but you will need to consider in terms of policy and workplace culture how much the dclg of 2017 was something
00:41:31 how much the dclg of 2017 was something of a house that eric built and in terms of what it was like to work in dclg
00:41:38 in dclg it is right to ask if a minister can exhibit bullying tendencies in this inquiry room before its panel when questioned by your counsel
00:41:48 counsel what was it like for civil servants identifying problems to him and how much had this become a disaffected and badly led department in those years
00:42:01 now delay in relieving rbkc of its power powers initially occurred because central government but especially dclg made assumptions in the council's favor without objective justification to do so
00:42:14 without objective justification to do so joe farah the director general of the local government and public services at dclg was held by the red department at 205 pm on the 14th of june that k and c
00:42:26 205 pm on the 14th of june that k and c are our aren't on our radar at all and therefore we don't hold anything on them
00:42:32 them nevertheless a background briefing from the office of the permanent secretary day melanie dawes declared that nicholas padgett brown's relationship with the department is good he is well respected
00:42:45 department is good he is well respected and open to ideas and a safe pair of hands who runs a tight and steady ship nicholas holgate the brief continued had previously worked in the treasury
00:42:57 previously worked in the treasury apparently with doors and dclg therefore had a very good relationship with him lady dawson stated that this was enough for dclg to conclude of rbkc that there
00:43:08 for dclg to conclude of rbkc that there was a strong track record of service delivery and no risks to flag we say
00:43:16 we say that approach unreasonably equates their value judgments about what is a well-run council with capability in disaster management and wrongly assures itself that holgate would be a competent gold
00:43:27 that holgate would be a competent gold commander because he once worked in the treasury
00:43:31 treasury worse
00:43:32 worse although grenfell was just a bus ride away from whitehall and there was public reporting in detail on how things were going wrong dclg assumptions that rbkc could handle things continue to operate
00:43:44 could handle things continue to operate for two days this is the moment in concrete terms where the system that relies on local response came unstuck there was no framework for dclg to
00:43:56 there was no framework for dclg to assess the adequacy of the response on the ground except for a sentence of government late except for attendance of government liaison officers to scg meetings
00:44:06 meetings these under-trained and relatively junior liaison officers missed crucial signs that rbkc was out of their depth consequently the secretary of state and his permanent secretary provided
00:44:18 his permanent secretary provided assurances to downing street that things were okay and no more staff were needed a turning point was when holgate attended the ministerial meeting on the afternoon of the 15th of june having not
00:44:30 afternoon of the 15th of june having not been there on the 14th of june and those present found it immediately obvious that he was not in control before then the extent to which rbkc leadership was compromised at the very
00:44:41 leadership was compromised at the very least by apparent conflict of interest went without acknowledgement in retrospect the prime minister's private secretary lorna grafton reflected that as a department it responsible for local
00:44:54 as a department it responsible for local authorities dclg was reluctant to be seen to intervene in the matters falling within the council's jurisdiction and was mindful of its established ways of dealing with local authorities
00:45:07 dealing with local authorities the matter could be put more bluntly dclg and rbkc were two compromised state entities mutually accommodating one another when concerns over their actions
00:45:18 another when concerns over their actions before the fire were in the froze of compelling a public inquiry consequently both of them leading on recovery was hugely problematic and on that the blame must lie across
00:45:30 and on that the blame must lie across government the emails show that there was doubt about the capability and capacity of dclg to lead from an early stage
00:45:38 stage both the home office and the cabinet office internally predicted the likelihood that dclg's response would be as one put it one email put it to mess things up
00:45:48 things up citing its lack of resources and alleged poor leadership from the 16th of june there was a move to stop the passive monitoring that had characterized the initial days
00:45:59 characterized the initial days mark sedwill as national security advisor previous permanent secretary of the home office and soon to be cabinet secretary quickly concluded that dclg were wrong not to
00:46:10 concluded that dclg were wrong not to have intervened earlier as rbkc were completely out of their depth and warned that without exceptional measures including senior minister and civil service dedicated deployment then is in
00:46:21 service dedicated deployment then is in his words this will become our new orleans
00:46:28 at the london regional government level this same syndrome of delay repeated itself
00:46:35 itself albeit unlike at central light government level there was no power to intervene
00:46:40 intervene first
00:46:41 first for experienced figures in urban emergency the initial response of the london leadership of london resilience was overly generous to rbkc llag command was offered at 7 44 am on
00:46:54 llag command was offered at 7 44 am on the 14th of june declined by holgate at 7 50 on that basis that aside from housing needs that may well spill over borough boundaries i do not yet think
00:47:05 borough boundaries i do not yet think llag needs to gear up as a result at 8 10 the duty london gold were quote all content at the moment that rbkc retained the lead as of the afternoon of the 14th of june
00:47:18 as of the afternoon of the 14th of june rbkc were commended by john heverington deputy dead ahead of london resilience who remained off-site throughout that day for their approach to survivors in rest centers
00:47:29 rest centers he emailed that they were managing within demands and accessing the exact need for support at the telephone meeting at 5 30 p.m between holgate and llag by which time
00:47:40 between holgate and llag by which time 12 faith fatalities were confirmed with knowledge this will rise and rbkc was seeking political support still no one was asking for or pushing for
00:47:51 was asking for or pushing for l-a-l-l-a-g intervention at 11 04 p.m on the 14th of june heavington by way over hand over notes summarized
00:48:02 over hand over notes summarized reluctance to get drawn into a long-term support commenting that gold is very good this evening i.e holgate and to focus on advising rbkc to let them get on with it
00:48:15 on with it these were not the conflicts of interest we claim against rbkc and dclg but they were overly accommodating relations amongst peers and colleagues with holgate failing to ask for london
00:48:26 with holgate failing to ask for london gold activation out of insecurity and the others unwilling to press for it either for want a proper situational awareness misplaced professional courtesy
00:48:37 courtesy or caution by the following day there was far more disquiet
00:48:42 disquiet press reports were reflecting the inadequacies of the response the mayor of london's office that had most situational awareness through sadiq khan's site visits and real dialogue with people on the ground
00:48:54 with people on the ground objected to rbkc managing the recovery process
00:48:58 process mark sawyer was deployed to interwar bkc hq on a watching brief only to find the system comprehensively failing there was a teleconference held at 5 pm on the 15th of june where it became clear that
00:49:10 15th of june where it became clear that london gold support was needed but this then required authorization from the relevant london chief executives and handover did not occur until 2pm on the 16th of june think of the visual aid mr
00:49:23 16th of june think of the visual aid mr millet just showed you and imagine the calls that i've got to go around all those
00:49:28 those boxes so
00:49:32 boxes so even though the handover did happen on the 16th of june over the weekend the command situation remained chaotic with no structures of control and rbkc councillors and officials
00:49:43 and rbkc councillors and officials remain unaware of the implications of laag's own vocation at 8 40 p.m on the 20th of june hillary patel from dcag is at dclg described
00:49:54 patel from dcag is at dclg described people confused by the different agencies working on the ground and they don't realize that everyone is working to one command the saga of london intervention
00:50:06 the saga of london intervention seriously brings into question the model of local resilience that underpins the uk's emergency response framework its flaw was that llag resolution does not envisage a circumstance where the
00:50:17 not envisage a circumstance where the london gold commander would intervene without request what happened in the tussle of removing rbkc from power is a form of democracy malfunctioning in a time of crisis with
00:50:29 malfunctioning in a time of crisis with those who govern getting the benefit of the doubt and the bsrs without holmes fate still unknown frantic for information paying the price
00:50:41 information paying the price all of which begs the question what was it like for the bsr the commemoration hearings at the beginning of this inquiry
00:50:52 beginning of this inquiry registered the importance of the lives that were lost a crucial part of this module will register the importance of the lives that remained and in these first seven days what it
00:51:04 and in these first seven days what it meant to escape to search to displace and to be dispersed the short answer is that it was unspeakably terrible
00:51:15 is that it was unspeakably terrible and yet the inquiry has 200 plus statements of people who have dragged themselves back into the aftermath to do their best to tell you how it was
00:51:27 to tell you how it was their accounts are not concerned with laws systems and plans they do not share in the state's concern for restoration of order or as countless official emails and documents put it getting a grip
00:51:39 and documents put it getting a grip but they do tell you what it was like to be abandoned by the state in a moment of need of the most basic necessities of life
00:51:48 life when we talk of the bsr that is wrong because there is no single bsr
00:51:54 bsr what you have is a multiple individual experience or what you have is multiple individual experiences of private trauma that went that when read together
00:52:05 that went that when read together show patterns of collective or shared damage
00:52:08 damage understanding can therefore come from seemingly minor events like laundry meal times access to petty cash as well as each individual's personal moments of
00:52:20 as each individual's personal moments of high drama or lois ebb learning that firefighters did not get to the higher floors discovering that tmo lists of who lived in the building were years
00:52:31 of who lived in the building were years out of date being told that your family or friend did not make it out each bsr
00:52:39 each bsr had ground zero moments it might be just looking up at the tower it might be aggressively being aggressively shouted at by the police or frantically looking for family
00:52:50 frantically looking for family as they lived through the inquiry's chosen topics of rest centers initial accommodation finances and response services they accumulated more of those moments
00:53:01 moments of people treating them with bureaucratic distance or requiring them to relive their trauma or trying to take from them or ignoring them or telling them facts they knew to be untrue or contradicted and perhaps their most
00:53:13 contradicted and perhaps their most common experience was that no one engaged with them at all consider just three of the core topics you've identified immediate rest and reception
00:53:22 reception initial accommodation and communication of information the places that victims go in the height of disaster must meet basic human needs
00:53:34 of disaster must meet basic human needs physically they need food water warmth and rest psychologically they need security and safety including elementary information as to who is missing and what will happen next
00:53:46 happen next rest centers and a reception point for converging family and friends in lancaster west was therefore critical but without a pre-planned and structured approached by the local authority bsr
00:53:57 approached by the local authority bsr suffered a torrid pillar to post experience that was physically harsh as much as deeply traumatic examples include hissam shuker rushing to the garden bar and grill on bramley
00:54:10 to the garden bar and grill on bramley road only to find smoke inhalation victims shaking with trauma and shock as he went round to check whether any one of them were his family this was neither rest nor reception but
00:54:22 this was neither rest nor reception but emergency triage that no one should have been sent to he was given a list of venues that he and his family then rushed around others repeatedly speak of moving between too many rest centers
00:54:33 moving between too many rest centers round in circles from latimer christian center to rugby portobello to clement james at these various locations there were vast numbers of distressed people some crying some numb many in states of
00:54:46 some crying some numb many in states of high anxiety and all the time it felt like government in mickey chapietto's words had vanished as these rest centers became overwhelmed
00:54:57 as these rest centers became overwhelmed they also had to turn away non-survivors leaving friends and family of the missing with nowhere to go for those who went early to the west way the atmosphere was overwhelming in terms
00:55:09 the atmosphere was overwhelming in terms of noise and movement chaotic with no leadership or any organization creating fear rather than calm people were turned away for want of identification destroyed in the fire or
00:55:21 identification destroyed in the fire or because they were not listed in tenants in flats that they had lived in for years
00:55:26 years westway until the first weekend was not a safe place and yet people including the jafari family were sleeping there and omar alhajali who after finding out his brother was
00:55:37 who after finding out his brother was dead because pictures of the body were published on facebook was released from hospital and went to the west way homeless without money or papers only to be absolutely overwhelmed
00:55:49 papers only to be absolutely overwhelmed by the atmosphere inside it from these various staging centers without any pre-existing housing emergency plan accommodation was found in hotels
00:56:01 accommodation was found in hotels the consequence of these urgent arrangements which for many people then turn into places they stayed in four months if not years need to be understood these were placements not homes
00:56:13 these were placements not homes staying in them underscored the real homes had been lost that privacy was gone an immediate connection to community severed ordinary things that we might all relate to because we've all stayed in the
00:56:24 to because we've all stayed in the hotels became ghastly like doing laundry when you have several young children or eating hotel or take away food over and over again for each meal aggravated when it is ramadan
00:56:37 meal aggravated when it is ramadan or staying on higher floors or being dependent on lifts when you have just come out of a high-rise fire it was terrible to have large families all in one room
00:56:47 one room but frightening for them to be spread across separate rooms sometimes on several floors others like mohammed rasool and maniro mahmud were dealing with vulnerable family members for instance with
00:56:59 family members for instance with dementia whose removal to unfamiliar hotel surroundings made their conditions worse
00:57:04 worse there were people sent out of the borough or to distant locations leading to physical and emotional isolation there's a moving account to that effect from al michet de messi who was rescued
00:57:16 from al michet de messi who was rescued very late from the tower spent time in hospital and then was sent via several bus rides to recover in a burden breakfast in warnsworth no one
00:57:26 no one no one knew the duration of their stays what their stays would be resulting in anxiety about whether bookings had been renewed and sometimes leading to movement at short notice or having to
00:57:37 movement at short notice or having to check out each day because the next day was guaranteed which is a particular predicament that many in the walkways faced
00:57:47 faced and on the walkways think of the residents who had to return home
00:57:53 home they suffered lack of amenities including no hot water or gas and the trauma of being so close to the tower
00:58:02 tower with children who knew other children who died in the fire literally playing in its dust and debris people
00:58:10 people of course needed information on vital matters who was alive or dead where would they sleep whether it would be safe to breathe in the air around them or for their children to touch that
00:58:21 them or for their children to touch that debris
00:58:22 debris how they would eat how it was going to be paid for the disaster would have rendered anyone insecure but in this case there was good reason to mistrust rbkc and the tmo
00:58:34 reason to mistrust rbkc and the tmo in those circumstances clear reliable and comprehensible information was at an absolute premium the worst example of inadequate information was in relation to missing persons in what the late clary mendy
00:58:47 persons in what the late clary mendy described as a helpless waiting game there were constant rumors but lack of concrete facts even if final identification of deceased was time consuming which would be
00:58:59 was time consuming which would be importantly reviewed in module 8 people did not want to be kept at arm's length
00:59:06 length but enrolled in trustworthy discussion about what was going on more generally rather than reaching out to communicate critical recovery information on
00:59:17 critical recovery information on available support people's experience of rbkc was silence disappearance and leafleting on mundane matters unavailable to non-resident breathe in any event
00:59:28 any event and often it was only with great effort that one could obtain answers and in that respect people who were less able to battle given exhaustion lack of access to technology language difficulty
00:59:41 access to technology language difficulty or other vulnerability lost out
00:59:45 lost out there is a repeated image in many of the statements of survivors and debris bereaved of them making their own lists
00:59:55 own lists on the wall of the basement gymnasium in rugby portobello which eventually turned into a large scale table of the tower that each neighbor would fill in
01:00:08 tower that each neighbor would fill in to establish who was out and who was not they should have never been left to piece together their lost community in this way
01:00:16 this way in this and other experiences of the aftermath what residential what residual connection there was between the state and its citizenship collapsed
01:00:25 collapsed individually and collectively people had their moment of realizing if we are
01:00:31 if we are not for ourselves then who will truly be for us and if we don't take control now it's not going to happen and in the end
01:00:42 and in the end by way of new beginning community response the grenfell tower fire came down to the people and the place they were in
01:00:49 were in some of that is to do with north kensington rbkc may not have been engaged and properly networked into this community but many others were this is an area that has produced the
01:01:01 this is an area that has produced the notting hill carnival the uk's first law centers it has pioneered the british anti-racism movement and created immense socially connected spaces of faith and a range of
01:01:12 connected spaces of faith and a range of art music literature and descent all the time acting as host and home to migrant communities as reflected in the background of many of the bsr families
01:01:25 background of many of the bsr families and from this place grenfell united emerged to aid bsr recovery with its key aims to keep the community together to provide support to one another in
01:01:36 to provide support to one another in rebuilding lives to seek justice and accountability and to honour the memory of those who died
01:01:43 died what eventually turned into grenfell united began from improvisation people made their lists of survivors and missing persons and a what's up group for essential single line communication
01:01:55 for essential single line communication from these lists and updates meetings began organically involving evolving into more formal ways in order for bsr themselves to fill the humanitarian gaps that they were individually and
01:02:06 that they were individually and collectively experiencing if resilience means anything it was evident in this community in crisis intervening to help itself when the state had failed it
01:02:17 the state had failed it theirs is a work in process progress coming together with others to renegotiate what the terms of the social contract might be in a late stage of this inquiry
01:02:30 in a late stage of this inquiry you have reached an important module a module that will explain on a different level to you why the disaster occurred and what might prevent its repetition
01:02:41 what might prevent its repetition while this module stands alone you will hear echoes of the evidence from the other modules which shed light on a cultural issue of governance an excessive focus on localism
01:02:52 an excessive focus on localism accompanied by underfunding and lack of regulation a local government uncaring of the needs and views of its residents and a central government too dysfunctional in its modern state format to see or act on the
01:03:05 modern state format to see or act on the problem until it is too late the bsr accounts you are about to hear ought to serve as a lesson of constitutional proportions that the ultimate end of all government
01:03:16 that the ultimate end of all government all laws and all economics is a human being
01:03:20 being that the decisions that are made or not made in power or for profit have a significant impact on the lives of people
01:03:28 people and until democracy becomes again more socially aware of these connections pain like this will repeat if a disaster shakes people awake then what changes might we make to
01:03:40 then what changes might we make to remain awake without disaster and that is a road to recovery that bsr want this inquiry to now move to
01:03:50 thank you very much mr freedman now um
01:03:55 now um since covid is still with us we have to do just a little bit of cleaning up before we hear our next statement
01:04:19 thank you very much and now we're going to hear an opening statement from imran khan queen's council good morning church good morning mr good morning members can i take the opportunity of wishing ramadan mubarak to our muslim
01:04:32 wishing ramadan mubarak to our muslim sisters and brothers um so
01:04:36 um so our clients lives were dramatically irrevocably and irreparably damaged in the aftermath of the fire they lost friends family members and
01:04:48 they lost friends family members and their homes in the course of one devastating night except they were not lost it's perhaps more appropriate to say that they were taken
01:04:59 that they were taken friends family members homes were taken from our clients taken as a result of the callous conduct those who were duty-bound to assist them
01:05:10 those who were duty-bound to assist them rbkc
01:05:12 rbkc tmo
01:05:15 and let's be clear that those that were taken were not nameless individuals they had names and they had lives
01:05:26 and they had lives which were prematurely cut short following this trauma and loss caused by those responsible our clients want it indeed needed and deserved
01:05:37 deserved a response from their local authority in the state
01:05:40 the state that was level-headed organized and compassionate but it's apparent from the evidence disclosed thus far to the inquiry that certainly rbkc's
01:05:51 to the inquiry that certainly rbkc's response to the fire was wholly inadequate and fell way short of what our clients required
01:05:59 required in our clients eyes this characterization is a gross understatement of what actually happened in the aftermath of the devastation of the fire
01:06:10 the fire our clients were not treated with the dignity and respect they deserved and in our submission we set out in particular what rbkc and others fail to do
01:06:21 do and the impact these failures had on our clients
01:06:26 clients in our written submissions the inquiry was set out in brief the legislative framework for emergency preparedness in england well so we don't intend to repeat this here and i know that mr millett did a fine job in
01:06:38 that mr millett did a fine job in summarizing that we only wish to emphasize that london local authority gold llag cannot become involved in emergency response without an invitation
01:06:49 response without an invitation as mr friedman's council just made plain it's a clear flaw that llag cannot intervene without a request being made and so we invite the inquiry to explore
01:07:00 and so we invite the inquiry to explore the necessary changes that need to be made
01:07:03 made to the llag protocol in the light of this response to the fire we further concur with mr friedman that central government should have been aware that rb case would not have been able to cope in the
01:07:15 would not have been able to cope in the first instance so looking at the immediate aftermath and rbkc's failure to ask for help well in the immediate aftermath the former chief executive rb casey mr
01:07:27 former chief executive rb casey mr nicholas holgate was offered additional assistance in the form of invoking the formal mutual aid agreement between the london local authorities in his witness state with the inquiry mr david kerry the contingency planning
01:07:40 david kerry the contingency planning manager of rbkc raised the possibility of invoking mutual aid at the meeting with mr nicholas holgart on the morning of the 14th of june 2017. he went on to state
01:07:52 he went on to state whether to formally invoke the pan london local authority mutual aid agreement was a strategic decision that could only be made by the chief executive
01:08:01 executive in beggar's belief we say that mr holgate did not invoke the pan-london local authority mutual agreement immediately rather than as we shall see
01:08:11 shall see waiting until days after the fire in his witness state mr carrie did not address the response he received from mr holgate mr stewart priestly the chief community
01:08:22 mr stewart priestly the chief community safety officer at the time of the fire created a log of events on the 14th of june
01:08:27 june in which mr holget's response to the suggestion was recorded in the log mr priestley referred to the fact that mr kerry raised the possibility of invoking formal mutual aid agreements
01:08:38 aid agreements available via llag as early as 6 30 a.m on the 14th of june mr holgate's response to suggestion provides some insight into his attitude
01:08:50 provides some insight into his attitude in the aftermath of the fire his response to suggestion of mutual aid was to say that looks like we can't cope the conversational mutual aid at that point ceased
01:09:02 point ceased mr holgate he would see was too concerned with rb case's appearance to invoke formal mutual aid agreements on the morning of the 14th of june while mr kerry stated his statement to
01:09:14 while mr kerry stated his statement to the inquiry that mr hogan was making calls with london authority gold very early on rbkc didn't did not actually activate formal mutual aid arrangements
01:09:25 activate formal mutual aid arrangements until the 15th it seems that rb casey's reluctance to accept how it was primarily due to the concern that rbkc would have appeared that it can't cope
01:09:36 that it can't cope shamefully mr holgate prioritized rb case's appearance and reputation over the welfare of our clients by way of example we note an email sent
01:09:47 by way of example we note an email sent to 12 25 am on the 16th of june 2017 by mr charlie parker of westminster city council
01:09:55 council he sent it to councillor nikki aiken also of westminster city council mr parker stated in respect of the issue of permanent housing following the fire that i quote i've offered nh nicholas
01:10:08 that i quote i've offered nh nicholas holgate total wcc westminster city council support however i don't believe he quite understands the magnitude of the problem there is apparently a sense anecdotally
01:10:19 there is apparently a sense anecdotally anecdotally from rbkc members that they are reluctant to take housing assistance from labour councils why on earth we say was mr hogan apparently so reluctant and unable to
01:10:31 apparently so reluctant and unable to accept help and why did he fail to appreciate the scale of the disaster it's especially troubling that there was a sense that rb casey were lucky to take housing assistance from labour councils
01:10:44 housing assistance from labour councils was this in fact the case and if so what impact did this have on the response
01:10:50 response if it was indeed the case that rbkc were reluctant to take housing assistance from labour councils it would suggest that petty party politics took priority of the lives of
01:11:02 politics took priority of the lives of our clients at 2 pm on the 16th of june 2017 llag operations were formally activated in his witness empathy inquiry mr baradel stated that he conducted an
01:11:15 baradel stated that he conducted an immediate review and assessment of rb case's response mr baradel formed the grenfell grenfell fire response team gfrt under his leadership which drew on resources from the other
01:11:26 which drew on resources from the other london boroughs and in his statement inquiry mr kerry explained
01:11:32 explained it got to the stage where the council did not have the capacity to deal with the aftermath and a london la wide response was required
01:11:40 required i believe that none of the 33 local authorities could have coped with the scale of the grenfell tower and response on their own and mr kerry was probably right when he says that's unlikely that any one local
01:11:52 says that's unlikely that any one local authority could have coped mr kerry knew it it was obvious that that was the case and so why is it that mr holgate did not why did rbkc not draw on resource to the
01:12:04 why did rbkc not draw on resource to the extent that was required why did rbkc miss a crucial opportunity to activate llag in the immediate aftermath of the fire such conduct and failure undoubtedly
01:12:15 such conduct and failure undoubtedly compounded the distress and trauma that the bsrs were experiencing mr charlie parker of westminster city council summarized the situation following llag gold's takeover
01:12:27 following llag gold's takeover in an email to council nikki aiken on the 16th of june he said this there have been a number of developments this evening regarding the grenfell tower disaster after numerous discussions and attempts to help from
01:12:38 discussions and attempts to help from london government and wcc nicholas has now agreed that london resilience needs to be stood up and start to take a bigger role in matters are bkc unable or equipped to
01:12:49 in matters are bkc unable or equipped to deal manage the situation tomorrow there'll be an opportunity for john barrowdale to go into rbkc's chair of lnap to start to create some rigor into their handling
01:13:01 into their handling we also note a particularly damning email sent by councillor aiken to mr alexander chief executive director for government communication at 8 26 a.m on the 16th of june
01:13:12 on the 16th of june council aiken state and reference rbkc only took them two days to decide they can't cope we told them first thing and when is it they wouldn't be able to cope
01:13:23 they wouldn't be able to cope and so despite mr holgate's apparent concern that rbkc would look like we can't cope it was abundantly clear even at that time but they could not an email sent at 8 28 pm on the 16th of
01:13:36 an email sent at 8 28 pm on the 16th of june by dame dawes to mark mr mark saidwell of the cabinet office gives perhaps an insight into what was then happening quote john baradel took over at lunchtime as gold commander for the
01:13:48 lunchtime as gold commander for the whole recovery he has clearly made very significant progress this afternoon i think we can now be sure that the situation is coming under proper control given the improvement in the response following the activation of lleg
01:14:01 following the activation of lleg how effective would the response to fire have been had llag arrangements being activated by rb case in the first few moments after the fire rather than days after llag had no choice but to pick up the
01:14:13 llag had no choice but to pick up the pieces of rb case's shambolic response and this could have potentially been avoided had a pan london at a lady response being invoked earlier
01:14:24 response being invoked earlier the mayor of london no less has condemned rb case's response dating quote
01:14:29 quote it was obvious to me very early on that rbkc did not have an adequate grip on the response and could not cope on their own
01:14:36 own without a doubt this had a very serious detrimental impact on the humanitarian response in the first days after the fire
01:14:43 fire because rb case's failure to invoke the mutual aid resolution meant that no one else could step in and take charge of the situation either this was extremely frustrating because i could see that pan london support and
01:14:55 could see that pan london support and coordination was urgently needed to this day i still don't really really understand why rb casey were apparently so unwilling to ask for help when they
01:15:08 so unwilling to ask for help when they clearly needed it and it was available to them
01:15:12 to them we know that 48 hours after the fire the mirror of london others wrote to downing street
01:15:17 street asking for the introduction of commissioners to be appointed to ensure that bereaved survivors and residents were poured were properly supported and the emergency response properly governed
01:15:29 governed the mayor's letter was never answered and his request never granted
01:15:34 granted given the clearly chaotic response in the aftermath of the fire we asked why this was the case the mayor's sentiments have been echoed by dame melanie dawes quote rb casey's response and in
01:15:46 quote rb casey's response and in particular their seeming lack of willingness to accept help created problems which affected not just the immediate aftermath but also the gold command recovery efforts for some time to come
01:15:57 efforts for some time to come this is particularly apparent in the observations of the disorganized and chaotic way in which rbkc ran the westway center which was set up as a rest center which mr friedman referred to
01:16:09 mr friedman referred to return to this now so at 9 00 am on the 16th of june dr joe farrow the director general for local government and public services of the ministry of housing and local government
01:16:20 government visited the westway centre which was at that time still being run by rbk scene she recalled this quote the visit itself was not reassuring i had first hand knowledge of what a
01:16:31 i had first hand knowledge of what a well-managed and properly coordinated relief effort should look like to me this job this did not appear to be either
01:16:39 either dr pharaoh criticized criticized rbk's poor organizational center she commented she commented there was quote a notable absence of senior rbkc
01:16:50 quote a notable absence of senior rbkc officers visible to me at the res center in my experience i would have expected them to be there it was also apparent to dr farah that rb case did not have an adequate relief plan in place
01:17:01 plan in place she commented that it was concerning that now bkc council admitted to her that rbkc were very lucky that the manager of the west wave westway center had allowed it to be used as a rest center
01:17:12 center as it suggested rbkc did not have the quote tried and tested relief plan in place
01:17:18 place she also noted quote in addition there was a lack of suitable blow up beds with apparently people sleeping on the floor with no mattresses i would expect any council to have made arrangements in advance for appropriate
01:17:30 arrangements in advance for appropriate equipment to provide it in the event of emergency but that did not appear to have been the case the previous day the mayor of london visited the westway centre and he noted i had frustration from volunteers etc
01:17:42 i had frustration from volunteers etc about things not being properly coordinated despite this rb case he were again desperate to appear in control of the response
01:17:50 response in his wit statement the mayor observed this
01:17:53 this on my way to the site before i had a telephone conversation with the then leader of rbkc counselor nicholas harjit brown
01:18:01 brown he had given me the impression that the response was all under control it was clear from what i saw on the 15th of june this was not the case
01:18:12 of june this was not the case after activation of llag on the 16th of june mrs rapinder hardy of the london bar of healing took control of the westway center and at approximately 7 a.m on the 17th of june she attended the west west
01:18:23 of june she attended the west west centre and her assessment of rb casey's management to the rest center was highly critical her immediate impression was that there was a lack of leadership in command authority from rbkc
01:18:34 authority from rbkc she noted that in particular the handler from rbkc to the london of ealing was minimal in detail with more questions raised than answers given she also condemned the state of the
01:18:45 she also condemned the state of the westway center stating that it was a mess
01:18:47 mess it did not appear to be a safe welcoming or an inviting place it failed to encourage residents to come in it was a chaotic situation confusion and the lack of any joined up working to meet the
01:18:59 of any joined up working to meet the urgent and pressing needs of those who presented at the rec center was rife what our clients needed following the loss of their loved ones were safe secure and stable surroundings
01:19:12 secure and stable surroundings he said what they got was a complete and in the words of mrs hardy an utter mess indeed rb case's evidently chaotic response was not only detrimental those tasks were taken over
01:19:25 tasks were taken over it was severely damaging to our clients in her assessment mrs hardy also noted that rbkc's process for distributing emergency cash to survivors was disorganized
01:19:36 was disorganized and done without checks she said this whilst emergency money was being handed out this was also being documented on paper without a proper process to manage funds and who received
01:19:47 process to manage funds and who received it
01:19:48 it again no checking process mr michael adamson the chief executive of the british red cross at blc says that he offered assistance to mr holgate in respect of the distribution
01:19:59 holgate in respect of the distribution of emergency cash he spoke
01:20:02 he spoke on the 15th of june mr addison spoke to mr holgate a made number of offers of assistance including assistance with cash distribution the form of small amounts of money to be given to those who had been affected to
01:20:14 given to those who had been affected to buy food and personal items but according to mr adamson mr holgate said he did not wish to take up
01:20:21 up most of brc's office of additional assistance he told me our biki's rbkc had the cash distribution process covered mr adams mr adamson was clear that this
01:20:33 mr adams mr adamson was clear that this was not the case in fact mr adamson subsequently became aware that although the council had attempted to dispute cash the mannery which had done so was haphazard
01:20:42 haphazard had been conducted by a number of different officials and different actors and this made it impossible to track who received what by failing to manage the cash distribution process our clients failed
01:20:53 distribution process our clients failed to receive financial assistance when they needed it the most by way of one example only mr abdul wahab abdullah means state that having lost his home and his community he was forced to fight
01:21:05 and his community he was forced to fight for financial assistance he said quote it was very difficult to get financial assistance from the councils i did not know who was responsible for controlling the distribution of funds it was an uphill battle for my brother i
01:21:17 it was an uphill battle for my brother i to obtain funds from rbkc
01:21:23 no survivor of such a tragedy should have gone through what mr abdulhamid did rb casey's chaotic approach extended its handling of information related the residents of the tower
01:21:35 related the residents of the tower their initial method of registering survivors of fight at the westwood center as well as the other rest centers rugby portobello and clement james center was utterly disorganized and moved at a snail's pace
01:21:46 moved at a snail's pace as mrs hardy noted on her arrival i did not even have a potential list of grenfell town residents which would have enabled me and the other and the officers working with me to understand the extent of the situation the names of
01:21:58 the extent of the situation the names of individuals families who were seeking support who was missing and which of the services we could ask for assistance the tmo was asked to assist rb case in running the rest centers and ms claire
01:22:09 running the rest centers and ms claire richards ceo of the clement james center commented on the tmo's shambolic approach to the registration of potential survivors mr richards stated
01:22:20 that tmo staff wrote information on scraps of paper and they didn't appear to have a system they didn't seem to be capturing accurate record of everyone that was arriving inside and who they were looking for
01:22:31 looking for the lack of centralized and accurate information held by rbkc and kct mode and the haphazard approach the collection handling information had a lasting and damaging impact on the response of fire
01:22:43 response of fire mr adamson says that this early failure meant that gfrt did not quote inherit a complete picture of those who had been affected from rbkc upon taking over the response
01:22:54 from rbkc upon taking over the response further says mr adams said that the lack of adequate registration hindered the effectiveness of the distribution of charitable donation survivors of fire in particular mr adamson stated that the
01:23:05 in particular mr adamson stated that the issues with the registration process made it difficult for london emergencies trust to have seen to whom the funds that have been raised from the blc fundraising bill ought to be distributed in a situation where many of those who
01:23:16 in a situation where many of those who had been affected were in dire need of immediate financial assistance in short chair no one knew who the victims were no one knew who was still left in the
01:23:27 no one knew who was still left in the fire
01:23:27 fire and no one knew who needed help and no one knew who needed money we now attend rbk's provision of emergency accommodation it only demonstrated lack of respect and
01:23:39 it only demonstrated lack of respect and dignity for our clients it was simply appalling
01:23:43 appalling the mayor of london stated in the aftermath of fire that he spoke to survivors who expressed grievances to he says this these range from inadequate and unsuitable hotel allocations to lack of communication about whether those in
01:23:54 of communication about whether those in hotels were required to check in or out each day
01:23:57 each day and our clients many of them experience these very same grievances and we deal with just a few ms aziza rihani and her 24 year old daughter
01:24:08 daughter ms henry honey were residents of town for 20 years they've told us that they at their home of the town was their palace that's how they described it on the night of the fight their home
01:24:19 on the night of the fight their home their palace was taken from them ms hinn rahani also lost her dear friend ms mariam elgawari and her family in her witness safety inquiry ms aziz
01:24:30 in her witness safety inquiry ms aziz rihani
01:24:31 rihani said that she and ms hinderihani were provided with one double bedroom to share this accommodation was not suitable this room was very small and the windows did not open
01:24:42 not open which made me feel very anxious there's only one double bed that i was about to share with my daughter the rahanis had a two bedroom flat for the tower and yet they were only
01:24:53 the tower and yet they were only provided one bedroom rbkc were aware that the rihannis had a two bedroom flat tower at 10 a.m on the 14th of june kctmo provided ms amanda gill head of housing
01:25:06 provided ms amanda gill head of housing news rbkc with an excel spreadsheet with a list of residents the spreadsheet stated that the rouhani's flat was in fact a two bedroom flat
01:25:15 flat it may seem minor compared to what happened but as mr friedman rightly points out it is these small things which make all the difference following the trauma of their the loss
01:25:26 following the trauma of their the loss of their home the rohanis were expected in the aftermath show a bed between them ms mariam adam was pregnant time the fire
01:25:36 fire lived with her adult brother yasin yusuf adam her husband used to abdullah and her and her friend ms amna muhammad in flat 14 in town on the night miss adam and her family
01:25:48 on the night miss adam and her family lost their home they lost their community they lost their friends friends were rania ibrahim nuru jamal fatiha ahmedn tuku
01:25:58 tuku in the aftermath fireman's adam and her family were forced to share one room with one double bed between the four of them
01:26:05 them in the rbkc housing allocation spreadsheet is adam was listed as having been allocated one room at the premier inn in elle's court in her witness everything inquiring as adam stated that on the 14th june we were given a room at the premier inn
01:26:18 were given a room at the premier inn hotels court but the council only booked one room for four people and he only had one double bed in mr abdul hamid's was at the hotel my brother-in-law and i took turns sleeping
01:26:29 brother-in-law and i took turns sleeping on the one bed that we had at other times i slipped on the floor my wife could not use the bed due to a disability condition she slept on a makeshift bed on the floor that was not suitable that she was pregnant
01:26:41 suitable that she was pregnant we understand flat 14 of the towel was one bedroom flat but it housed four adults
01:26:45 adults however had rb casey record accurate information about the actual composition of the residence more suitable accommodation could have and should have been provided in his witnesses mr singh of the tmo
01:26:58 in his witnesses mr singh of the tmo stated that they provide assisted rp case including providing information to rbkc of household composition so rbkc could provide suitable accommodation to residents
01:27:08 residents despite four adults requiring a placement the information incorrectly recorded that two adults in child were placed at the premiere of inn mr abdullah means stated the rule of the primary was extremely cramped
01:27:20 primary was extremely cramped uncomfortable but we just did not have any information or interact with anyone about getting a more suitable room or multiple rooms or support it's unforgivable chair that our clients
01:27:32 it's unforgivable chair that our clients having lost so much were forced to endure such dire circumstances
01:27:38 the scarcity of information passed from a rbkc to survivors of fire applied across their response in the aftermath ms richards of the clement james centers stated there was no clarity
01:27:50 stated there was no clarity around whether food and drink was included within people's hotel accommodation some individuals had run up bills for food and drink and were then told it was not included uh our client mrs ganette shawwal was
01:28:01 uh our client mrs ganette shawwal was resident of flat 153 and tragically she lost her five-year-old son isaac palson knight fire she said that during the entire time that she stayed in emergency hotel accommodation she received no
01:28:13 accommodation she received no information about the weekly food allowance stating i didn't know what i was entitled to so often i would just eat one meal a day as no one told me what i was allowed to have
01:28:23 have she was a grieving mother she should have been provided immediately provided with such basic information we turned to a separate issue which is of equal importance to our clients the adequacy of the distribution of
01:28:34 adequacy of the distribution of charitable funds particularly in relation to the rugby portobello trust in his state of the inquiry mr mark sims of the trust explained the rpt issued over 3200
01:28:46 over 3200 individual grants totaling more than 16.8 million pounds these funds donated by the public were collected by multiple organizations and passed on to rpt for distribution to grenfell residents
01:29:00 for distribution to grenfell residents mr sims can see that the rugby portability trust was not set up to dispute significant sums of financial aid and yet he agreed to design administer the grants program we asked white was an
01:29:11 program we asked white was an organization which was not equipped to deal with the task at hand was granted such an important role and just by way of example one of our clients mrs raya rojo was denied access to charitable funds by the
01:29:24 denied access to charitable funds by the rpt
01:29:25 rpt she was an unofficial tenant of the town and resident of both flats 96 and 186 following complications and establishing her residency attempts she was recognized eventually as survivor was
01:29:37 recognized eventually as survivor was provided with emergency accommodation in july 2017. despite this our client informs us that rb
01:29:44 rb rpt refused to add her to the list of recipients of charitable funds and this failure was compounded by the rpt's failure to keep funds aside for
01:29:55 rpt's failure to keep funds aside for those who are unable to access funds in the immediate aftermath of fire for example due to complications in establishing her residency in the tower our client mrs halima diaz wasn't able
01:30:06 our client mrs halima diaz wasn't able to access the fresh start grant provided by the rpt in the first instance once it established that she was eligible for the fresh start grant mr sims informed her
01:30:17 start grant mr sims informed her that the rpt no longer had the funds to provide her with financial assistance we also noticed document produced by the london emergencies trust the responsible distributing funds raised by the brc
01:30:29 distributing funds raised by the brc entitled distributing funds in a disaster
01:30:33 disaster the document noted that in distributing charitable funds namely the fresh start grant of ten thousand pounds to survivor households the issue of defining a household was a contentious one
01:30:44 contentious one an email sent by a survivor of the fire to our because the rbkc council judith blakeman to survive express concern that a single household would only receive 10 000 pounds despite splitting
01:30:55 receive 10 000 pounds despite splitting into two households after the fire we invite the inquiry to investigate this further and to ask what more could have been done to ensure an equitable distribution of charitable funds
01:31:06 distribution of charitable funds and finally we asked inquiry while the scope of the inquiry investigation the article on fire is only limited to the first seven days after the fire as i think is obvious from what ms friedman has just said
01:31:19 friedman has just said our clients do not have the luxury of limiting the impact of the fire to the first seven days we asked why the inquiry thought it appropriate to limit the scope of its investigation
01:31:31 to limit the scope of its investigation our clients are deeply concerned that by limiting the scope of the inquiry so severely
01:31:35 severely questions will go unanswered and justice will continue since the fire our clients have continued to be impacted by the shambolic response particularly in respect of accommodation
01:31:46 particularly in respect of accommodation ms adam we've already referred to was forced to share a hotel room with one bed
01:31:51 one bed had no choice but sleep on sofa the floor of the hotel room she was not only pregnant but also suffered from the slipped disc at the time of the fire in her witness statement inquiry she
01:32:02 in her witness statement inquiry she stated there was a lot of pain and my back condition worsened whilst i was at this hotel she suffers from back pain back problems to this day ms halima di ajimo
01:32:14 ms halima di ajimo who was a resident of flat 203 for over a year ms danjuma had no choice but to reside in a hotel finally in october 2018 she was provided permanent accommodation by rbkc
01:32:26 permanent accommodation by rbkc however
01:32:28 however she's informed us that her bathroom was not fit for purpose she was forced to the shower at a local gym and during kovid 19 lockdown the gyms were closed so ms diaz had no access to a working shower
01:32:40 shower and that problem wasn't resolved until 2021
01:32:44 2021 outlands misses shaquille and mr farhad never lost their beloved husband and father
01:32:50 father mr muhammad amir sabra ned on the night of fire
01:32:54 of fire not only did mrs neda endure the loss of her husband but she was in a coma following fire the letters were finally provided with permanent accommodation by rbkc
01:33:05 permanent accommodation by rbkc however we're sick irony they've been rehoused at hortensia road a building with the same combustible cladding as grenfell tower in her witnesses the inquiry is
01:33:16 in her witnesses the inquiry is shaquilla never stated quote we were horrified upon finding out that the council moved us into a building that has the same flammable cladding that was on grenfell tower further a report was produced which
01:33:28 further a report was produced which concluded there was no adequate procedures for disabled residents to be evacuated
01:33:33 evacuated chair this is more than an inexcusable failure on the part of our bkc it is truly a disgrace that our bkc have once again put our clients lives at risk
01:33:45 clients lives at risk we conclude by saying this the survivors of a tragedy and one of the richest boroughs in the country should not have had to endure the hardship
01:33:53 hardship and the dignity that we have described very briefly they should not have had to fight for support in the way that they were forced suicide
01:34:02 suicide rbk bkc's others responsible initial aftermath of five was chaotic and disorganized to say the least rb case's response exacerbated was what was already a dire situation
01:34:14 was already a dire situation and was severely damaging to the lives of our clients even until today not only that the response did not respect our clients did not treat our clients with the dignity in with the dignity that they deserved
01:34:28 dignity that they deserved and it does feel like it's a broken record but we have repeatedly said had the tragedy not occurred in social housing
01:34:35 housing the response we say would have undoubtedly been very very different indeed thank you
01:34:43 thank you thank you very much mr khan at that point we'll take our break for the morning we'll resume please at
01:34:51 please at 10 to 12
01:34:52 10 to 12 and then we'll hear some more opening statements thank you very much 10 to 12 please
01:52:26 um
01:52:31 now the next opening statement is going to be made by professor thomas on behalf of the
01:52:36 of the uh parties whom he represents so professor thomas when you're ready we should like to hear from you thank you
01:52:48 it's nearly five years since the grenfell tower phi disaster and during this time the uk has had to respond to the most
01:53:00 the uk has had to respond to the most significant emergency
01:53:04 of our lifetime the coded pandemic that inquiry will undoubtedly examine the preparedness and response to an emergency
01:53:16 emergency the very matters which are central to this module
01:53:22 it's human nature to want to move on but for the grenfell community the bereaved residents and survivors moving on
01:53:33 moving on has been virtually impossible and this has been compounded by the failings of local and central government in response to the fire
01:53:45 grenfell tower and the fire was a national disaster being watched on an international stage around the world
01:53:57 around the world few will disagree that this disaster warranted an immediate
01:54:03 immediate and coordinated response from both central and local government and unfortunately that didn't happen [Applause]
01:54:17 bobby ross
01:54:20 he lived in flat 122 in the town with his dad steve power who died in the fire
01:54:30 his sister rebecca who escaped and survived and their three dogs who also died in the fire steve had lived in grenfell tower since
01:54:41 steve had lived in grenfell tower since 1985.
01:54:43 1985. he grew up in the tower and had fond memories of his childhood on the
01:54:49 on the lancaster west estate bobby recalls returning to grenfell tower from a takeaway in shepherd's bush after about 1am being told about the fire
01:55:01 being told about the fire he describes working his way through a chaotic scene outside the tower finding his brother and sister who was being put in an ambulance at that stage dad was unaccounted for
01:55:14 at that stage dad was unaccounted for and he remained with his brother to search for steve but to no avail bobby then spent the next 48 hours searching for his father with his
01:55:26 searching for his father with his brother
01:55:27 brother he didn't sleep had nowhere to go he had lost his home and so waited around the area of the tower waiting for some news
01:55:37 some news the council was nowhere to be seen
01:55:43 didn't provide any information he recalls being told by a friend's mother that people were being provided with emergency accommodation at the west
01:55:54 with emergency accommodation at the west way
01:55:55 way and turning up in a com to a confused scene
01:55:59 scene with the council nowhere in sight and volunteers doing the best they could there was no communication from the council about accommodation or his
01:56:10 council about accommodation or his father
01:56:11 father so he had to rely on volunteers in the community
01:56:16 community neighbors helping neighbours
01:56:21 don't off please thank you
01:56:24 neighbors helping neighbors on his recollection he didn't see anyone from the council at the scene until three days after the fire
01:56:36 until three days after the fire as a result of which he felt abandoned by the
01:56:41 by the during this time he was led to believe that his father might still be alive being told that the authorities were awaiting updates from the hospital and
01:56:53 awaiting updates from the hospital and that his father might be unconscious somewhere
01:56:57 somewhere he described the impact of this period of uncertainty affecting his mental health which was exacerbated when he was finally told of his father's death on the 22nd of june
01:57:09 the 22nd of june this affected his ability to return to work
01:57:13 work and he had no mental health support from the council i didn't know where to get help with my mental health but i desperately needed it
01:57:25 it the inquiry's investigation of the aftermath is limited to the immediate seven days following the fire however
01:57:34 however as
01:57:35 as mr khan of queen's council has said the impact on the lives of those affected by the fire
01:57:44 fire particularly the inadequacies of the housing and mental health support as bobby's case illustrates goes way beyond seven days when bobby wrote
01:57:56 when bobby wrote his inquiry statement in january 2021
01:58:01 2021 he was still living in temporary accommodation he stayed
01:58:06 he stayed in many different hotels which for the most part
01:58:10 most part were unpleasant and unwelcoming he recounts being locked out of his hotel rooms many times because the royal bar of kensington and chelsea
01:58:21 the royal bar of kensington and chelsea had forgotten to renew the bookings on one occasion his belongings were placed in housekeeping and then subsequently lost
01:58:33 housekeeping and then subsequently lost by january 2021 he had been moved to his third temporary flat
01:58:40 flat he had been moved in the first one in november 2017 however
01:58:46 however no thought had been given to bobby's trauma
01:58:50 trauma in his housing allocation the flat was located close to a fire station and a hospital and the constant sounds
01:59:00 sounds of the sirens from the fire engines and the ambulance says were triggers the flat was also in a state of disrepair it leaked the sinks were blocked the cook and the radiators
01:59:11 blocked the cook and the radiators didn't work on one occasion bobby returned to the flat to find security guards sleeping there kensington and chelsea had authorized them to use the flat
01:59:22 them to use the flat as a cafeteria
01:59:26 his privacy was totally violated they had slept in his bed thrown his clothes on the floor wrecked some of his furniture
01:59:35 furniture he moved out of that flat in 2000 january 2018 to be returned to a hotel he had to wait nearly a year until early
01:59:48 he had to wait nearly a year until early 2019 to be reallocated temporary accommodation which was also short-lived as the place was also in a state of disrepair
01:59:59 disrepair he recalls electrician describing it as a doll's house as if it was falling apart
02:00:05 apart there was flooding in the garden and whenever somebody showered it poured onto the patio and seat into his flat there was mold on the wall and damp the
02:00:16 there was mold on the wall and damp the sockets were hanging off the wall and there was a pest infestation bobby recalls that rbkc didn't want to address the issues and were unhelpful
02:00:28 and were unhelpful he moved out of there after two months and returned to a hotel he wasn't allocated his third temporary college accommodation until june 2020 bobby describes his life since the
02:00:42 2020 bobby describes his life since the fire in these words quote since the fire i have moved around a lot and always felt i was in limbo my housing situation was like torture i
02:00:55 my housing situation was like torture i am still in the same situation nearly four years after the fire i've just been moved from place to place i have no stability at all i literally feel like i'm a surfboard
02:01:07 i'm a surfboard i've really struggled mentally after fire and my dad's death and the instability and the issues of my housing have made everything worse i feel as though the council had
02:01:19 i feel as though the council had forgotten about my personal case i just want to move on i
02:01:25 i feel neglected
02:01:29 emma o'connor emma is a young woman who lived in the tower with her partner luke she's also a young person with disabilities
02:01:40 disabilities emma requires the assistance of crutches for support and balance in order to walk emma's housing assessment assess her as quote
02:01:51 quote requiring a ground floor stroke lower floor flat with no more than six steps to access premises or up to the second floor
02:02:05 or up to the second floor luke and emma lived in flat 171 on the 20th floor of grenfell tower
02:02:17 during her time in the tower her disabilities deteriorated emma and luke were fortunately amongst a tranche of residents who managed to self-evacuate the tower in
02:02:29 managed to self-evacuate the tower in the early stages of the fire which bearing in mind their disabilities was truly a life-saving decision in the aftermath
02:02:40 in the aftermath where and to whom could these two young vulnerable disabled people turn to local government social services adult services
02:02:51 adult services disabled local authority services central government no
02:02:56 no none were present instead emma and luke stayed with her mother herself a vulnerable person who lived in sheltered accommodation
02:03:08 lived in sheltered accommodation on the 15th of july at the portobello rugby club emma and luke were provided with a mobile phone which was donated by the public
02:03:21 by the public some clothes were also donated and 550 pounds in financial provisions for both it was not until two days after the fire that they met someone from rbkc
02:03:34 that they met someone from rbkc sat at a table in the same room as the mattress where people were sleeping this person took down their names and details of their medical conditions and issues
02:03:45 issues yet
02:03:46 yet inexplicably that evening emma and luke were offered a room at the crown plaza hotel on the 10th floor
02:04:00 emma distressed and scared try to explain why she would not feel comfortable at the prospect of living so high up
02:04:08 high up nobody contacted them that day so they returned to the westway center a few days later they were offered a run in another hotel the room was small and unsuitable for
02:04:19 the room was small and unsuitable for two people with disabilities the hotel had a dearth of eaton options so the couple were forced to eat in local places which of course were more expensive
02:04:32 of course were more expensive the hotel toilet was broken and they were told by the hotel to use the toilet three to four five floors down
02:04:43 three to four five floors down not only was this difficult because of their mobility issue but but emma's medical condition necessitates that a bathroom is available in the room
02:04:54 bathroom is available in the room the couple were contacted by the council to explain uh sorry the couple contacted the council to explain that their living conditions were just not suitable for people with disabilities a second hotel was found
02:05:07 disabilities a second hotel was found and whilst the single room was bigger it hadn't in a joining door this door was locked although the person on the other side
02:05:19 although the person on the other side did from time to time try to open it so emma and luke people already devastated by a fine which they lost not only all of their personal possessions
02:05:31 only all of their personal possessions but many friends and neighbors now found themselves being moved from pillar to post
02:05:38 to post from one unsuitable hotel to another they felt
02:05:43 they felt abandoned
02:05:45 abandoned uncomfortable and at times distressed and deeply traumatized while some basic provisions were provided such as financial payments
02:05:56 provided such as financial payments emma and luke were effectively supported by their own families there was no professional emotional support or counselling in the immediate aftermath
02:06:07 immediate aftermath and the information about finding support was very limited a few leaflets adult social services and the disability teams were conspicuously
02:06:19 teams were conspicuously by their absence and it was not until emma and luke were allocated a key worker some time after that this person began to explain things and how they could
02:06:30 to explain things and how they could access other financial support and services
02:06:34 services as young people with disabilities in particular emma's needs were not adequately met throughout the immediate aftermath the fact that their only interactions with
02:06:46 fact that their only interactions with rbkc in the first days resulted with emma and luke initially being offered a rom on the 10th floor shows
02:06:55 shows stunning insensitivity and a complete lack of understanding by those tasked with providing care and support for these devastated people
02:07:09 michael john michael john mikey
02:07:15 mikey is african caribbean in his 60s he's wheelchair-bound partially blind and suffers from a heart condition
02:07:26 condition his disabilities were well known to rbkc in june 2017. mikey had moved into the lancaster west estate in late 1974
02:07:39 estate in late 1974 and had lived at baradon walk for over 40 years
02:07:44 40 years at the time of the fire mikey was evacuated from his flat at about 2 30 a.m on the morning of the 14th of june he describes the police banging on his
02:07:56 he describes the police banging on his door shouting get out
02:08:00 get out or they would be thrown out no one inquired whether he needed assistance even though he explained he couldn't walk he managed to evacuate with the assistance of his nephew
02:08:12 assistance of his nephew to an area close to the entrance of his building where he remained in his location
02:08:17 location in his wheelchair for over an hour mikey also describes a chaotic scene there was no organization and he was effectively kettled in by the police
02:08:28 was effectively kettled in by the police corbins in a small area in his wheelchair he was eventually taken to street level with assistance of members of the public he eventually went to his sisters where
02:08:40 he eventually went to his sisters where he stayed for three to four days he received no communication from anyone during this time he recounts that he found the whole experience of the evacuation traumatic
02:08:52 evacuation traumatic and had it not been for his sister's support
02:08:55 support he would have been left out on the streets he was unable to to return to barrett and
02:09:03 and barondon walk and had to remain in the same clothes for four days he was not contacted by anyone from the council or tmo nor did he receive any
02:09:15 council or tmo nor did he receive any information about what to do during this time
02:09:18 time he was eventually contacted by an occupational therapist who had been assisting him prior to the fire and was concerned about him as people were not being allowed back to barron
02:09:29 were not being allowed back to barron and walk
02:09:31 and walk mikey was not told about his entitlement to hotel accommodation or emergency clothing or food he also had difficulty retrieving his medication from the flat as his nephew was
02:09:43 from the flat as his nephew was initially denied entry when he attended on mikey's behalf mikey was forced to return to his flat after about three to four days as he didn't want to inconvenience his
02:09:55 as he didn't want to inconvenience his sister
02:09:56 sister and he had no alternative accommodation his flat was uninhabitable there was no hot water or access to the building from latin
02:10:08 or access to the building from latin road axis because that was closed and would remain safe for a while he was eventually stuck in his flat with no way of getting out he was also concerned about his exposure to levels of
02:10:19 about his exposure to levels of pollution in the area inquiries for temporary accommodation were made on his behalf however the offer from the council was accommodation out of the borough far away from his
02:10:30 out of the borough far away from his family which he could not accept as in his own words i needed help from my family and the community during this traumatic time
02:10:41 with the assistance of his occupational therapist he eventually secured temporary
02:10:47 temporary assisted living accommodation in the w10 area where he remained for a year mikey says of his experience and i quote
02:10:59 mikey says of his experience and i quote it was a very lonely experience unlike other people who lived in the assisted living i was not attended to or checked on by the staff nor was i given any psychological support after my traumatic
02:11:12 psychological support after my traumatic experience different people came in and out of my life at
02:11:16 life at that point offering help i had several key workers different key workers all of whom promised me things that they could not deliver the system was so ineffective and
02:11:28 the system was so ineffective and although the key workers were often nice people
02:11:32 people the process was unprofessional professional and effective the accommodation had no cooking facilities
02:11:42 while he was assessed by the cab
02:11:45 cab and the community coordinator the council on the other hand didn't seem bothered they acted as if they didn't know that i existed it felt as though i didn't exist and
02:11:56 it felt as though i didn't exist and during this time the council didn't really help me at all i was not provided with information about things available or what to do by officials from the council had to rely on hearsay
02:12:07 on hearsay from other survivors and residents
02:12:13 the search for
02:12:16 for abdul
02:12:18 abdul was
02:12:19 was um lazarus and the and his family
02:12:25 the el wahabi family are a large and close-knit family of brothers and sisters wives and husbands
02:12:34 husbands and their respective children
02:12:40 abdul hamid did not live in grenfell tower himself but his sister hanan and her family did as did his brother
02:12:51 as did his brother which meant that abdul hamid was a regular and frequent visitor to the block
02:12:59 block the early morning of the 14th of june is forever seared into abdul hamid's memory the tower was on fire
02:13:10 abdulhamid immediately got up dressed rapidly hastened his way there on arrival at about 1am he was greeted by the full horror of the blaze in the
02:13:21 by the full horror of the blaze in the knowledge that many members of his family were still in the block another relative told him by the time by phone call that hanan and her family had exited
02:13:33 had exited the whole experience was overwhelming but more was to come in the aftermath of the blaze
02:13:40 the blaze first outside the portobello rugby club in the early hours of the morning with other family members abdulhamid waited for news of his missing brother and family
02:13:50 family his daughter made the journey across london attending hospitals king's college charing cross paddington middlesex saint charles desperate for
02:14:02 middlesex saint charles desperate for any news
02:14:04 any news to report back to the family her
02:14:07 her abdulaziz and his family escaped were they injured what state were they in abdul hamid and the rest of the family were all together yet they felt lost confused and strangely alone as if in a
02:14:20 confused and strangely alone as if in a dream
02:14:21 dream but one they knew they could not wake up from
02:14:24 from in the absence of coordination and central leadership chaos reigned which led to the inevitable and in their case cruel
02:14:35 cruel misinformation being given at one point abdul hamid was told by a woman who asked for the family names yes
02:14:46 yes they are safe do not worry
02:14:51 there was no one there from kensington and chelsea or the tmo or central government no one official it was left to the community and local
02:15:03 it was left to the community and local groups to fill that gap abdulhamid remembers the volunteers from the al-manaw mosque with their blue hi-vis jackets offering support and help
02:15:16 hi-vis jackets offering support and help to those in need the search for the family lasted the rest of the day on the 14th with increasing frustration the lack of information his fears and
02:15:28 the lack of information his fears and worries amplified until
02:15:31 until his worst nightmare was confirmed while standing outside the portobello rugby club with his brother abdul hamid heard the screams of his sisters
02:15:43 heard the screams of his sisters someone had told them that abdullah's his wife fousey and three children had not been able to leave their flat and had not survived the fire
02:15:55 that was how the news was broken the screams of his sister drew the attention of the assembled media who ran towards them
02:16:07 media who ran towards them pushing cameras in their faces abduhamed along with his brother and his nephew pushed them away even in this their darkest hour they
02:16:18 even in this their darkest hour they could not grieve properly their sorrow was devoured by the ravenous news media eager for pictures and sound bites of a broken family to be
02:16:31 and sound bites of a broken family to be consumed in that evening's bulletins there was no family liaison officer on the scene and abdu hamid
02:16:42 and abdu hamid first met them at his sister's house quote i was lost nobody contacted me eventually the outreach team contacted
02:16:53 eventually the outreach team contacted me
02:16:54 me once prompted by my sister i felt had no support
02:16:58 support and that myself and my family did not matter
02:17:04 there was no psychological support there were no social workers and counsellors on the scene in the immediate aftermath of the fire there was no coordination or leadership
02:17:16 there was no coordination or leadership by rbkc the tmo central government without the voluntary organizations and the general public there would have been nowhere for abdul
02:17:28 there would have been nowhere for abdul hamid to go and there would have been no support what was needed on the 14th of june and the days that followed
02:17:39 the days that followed were professionals on the ground to help the worried the confused the lost families to help survivors find out about each other
02:17:49 other and to help people just trying to make sense of what they just experienced
02:17:57 in the weeks after the fire we should have been contacted about our health
02:18:03 health and any support available for us i feel that my own and my children's mental health should have been better supported with access to therapy earlier than it
02:18:15 with access to therapy earlier than it was provided rbkc the tmo and central government failed
02:18:22 failed us the experiences of ahmed
02:18:28 ahmed shah ahmed a lease holder and founder and chairman of the leaseholders association he lived with his wife at flat 156 grenfell tower where they lived for 25 years
02:18:42 where they lived for 25 years mr ahmed describes evacuating grenfell tower at about 1am with his wife after the kitchen window shattered letting in a blast of smoke which engulfed their flat
02:18:55 engulfed their flat they
02:18:55 they took refuge with his brother-in-law for a few days before traveling to stay with their son in essex where they remained for some time before being provided with temporary accommodation
02:19:07 temporary accommodation although the carrots and tmo had char's details he received no communications from the council or tmo about rehousing arrangements
02:19:18 arrangements on the 16th of june he sent an email to councillors rockfielding mellon nicholas padgett brown and laura johnson asking for an explanation as to why he had not been contacted and requesting that he be
02:19:30 been contacted and requesting that he be re-housed in the community the response from the tmo was callous and insensitive there was no offer of an apology for his
02:19:41 there was no offer of an apology for his loss
02:19:42 loss or lack of communication by the 20th of june he was still not re-housed
02:19:48 re-housed and he made continued he made a continued plea to the tmo for urgent temporary accommodation in the local community
02:19:57 community detailing that request in an email that morning
02:20:00 morning by the 21st of june shah
02:20:04 shah had not been assigned a family liaison officer and was still not re-housed and
02:20:11 and rbkc's housing department replied to his email
02:20:15 email continued the insensitivity and lack of urgency
02:20:22 urgency quote dear mr ahmed in order to try and provide assistance to those made homeless by the fire at grenfell tower the housing department is trying to establish the whereabouts of
02:20:33 trying to establish the whereabouts of all residents when i last when i was last able to check yesterday afternoon your name was not on the list of those provided with interim accommodation by the council
02:20:49 he is told in the email that it is noted that his insurance company
02:20:56 company may have been involved in providing him with temporary accommodation and he's asked to provide his whereabouts and the contact number
02:21:07 contact number despite his request to remain in the w11 area
02:21:10 area he was offered travel lodge hotel accommodation in fulham which he declined
02:21:17 declined after waiting 10 days he was invited by westminster council to view accommodation on the porchester road which was unfurnished and dirty mr ahmed recounts in an email
02:21:29 mr ahmed recounts in an email correspondence to the council that the carpet was urine stained and the flat was smelly he described the hallway as a death trap with limited lighting
02:21:41 with limited lighting he describes accepting the temporary accommodation in paddington which was unsuitable but there were no better alternatives this property was located on the west way there was noise pollution and when
02:21:53 way there was noise pollution and when the windows were open and the flat was very warm and
02:21:59 and when the windows were shut it was located next to a massive construction site which generated dust and additional noise
02:22:09 noise having survived the horrors at grenfell tower on the 14th of june mr ahmed struggled with the council to be rehoused exacerbated
02:22:21 exacerbated by the lack of communication which have been really traumatizing the family of vincent
02:22:32 the family of vincent chichina
02:22:34 chichina the experiences of vincent's family chronicle a painful search for vinson who lived in flat 144 at grenfell tower
02:22:46 at grenfell tower on the 17th floor where he died in the fire
02:22:49 fire vincent
02:22:50 vincent was born in nigeria and he had lived in the uk from a very young age he was educated
02:22:57 educated in the uk and had attained a bachelor of science in engineering from the university of sheffield his family's experiences between the 14th and 19th of june when they were finally told by the
02:23:09 when they were finally told by the police that vincent had died is painful and harrowing and it chronicles the family's search for vincent and bears out rbkc's failure to response
02:23:22 rbkc's failure to response to a mass fatality which compounds and exacerbates the family's trauma in the immediate aftermath of the family vincent had lived in the tower since
02:23:33 vincent had lived in the tower since 2001 and was a tenant of the council yet vincent's family were never contacted by either the tmo or rbkc to report him
02:23:45 either the tmo or rbkc to report him unaccounted for or miss him instead
02:23:49 instead they were left to conduct their own searches
02:23:54 lugosi his sister describes receiving the call from their sister maria on the morning of the 14th of june telling her that the family about the fire at grenfell
02:24:04 grenfell and that she was unable to reach vincent on the phone they then report him as missing through a helpline number which they saw on the television and were given a reference number by the
02:24:17 reference number by the manchester police as the as a family and with the help of the support of the of a support group at the saint charles's hospital they circulated
02:24:29 charles's hospital they circulated pictures of vincent as a missing person maria visited various local hospitals in search of vincent but was told that they were unable to give out
02:24:40 that they were unable to give out patient details and so no information was forthcoming either way thereby
02:24:46 thereby mountain anxieties of the family maria continued searches at relief centers leaving vincent's description name and address in the hope that someone might
02:24:57 address in the hope that someone might have seen him however no one had on the advice of the red cross relief center maria also attended the
02:25:08 relief center maria also attended the west london police station reporting vincent missing and given the full description she left her mobile number and negozi's but no contact was made by the police to say that these details had
02:25:19 the police to say that these details had been logged were being dealt with the family were left to conduct their own search no help or direction from the authorities
02:25:31 from the authorities not rbkc
02:25:33 not rbkc not the tmo and nothing from the police the next day on the 15th of june maria returned to saint charles's hospital and other local hospitals where
02:25:45 hospital and other local hospitals where she knew survivors had been sent she also returned to the relief centers on the latimer road but nothing there was definite silence an absence of
02:25:56 there was definite silence an absence of contact
02:25:57 contact the authorities not a word from our bkc not a word from the tmo and no update from the police eventually on the 16th of june negozi
02:26:09 eventually on the 16th of june negozi was contacted by the police who reported that vincent had not been located but that he had been reported missing and that they were trying to trace relatives
02:26:21 that they were trying to trace relatives the family were outraged negotia explained to the police that they were the ones who reported him to the police
02:26:32 the police attended to speak to the family that evening still no word or contact from either the tmo or rbkc ngozi describes the
02:26:43 ngozi describes the distress
02:26:46 the experienced by the family that we can waiting for news about vincent in the absence of any contact from rbkc tmo or the police they spent the weekend
02:26:57 tmo or the police they spent the weekend watching news reports negotia describes the impact of the lack of information on the elderly mother who kept rushing to the door any time she heard it knock thinking that vincent
02:27:09 heard it knock thinking that vincent would turn up
02:27:13 their worst fears were realized on the 19th of june when the police finally made contact with
02:27:21 with devastating news the family's distress in particular vincent's elderly mother was amplified by the misleading information from a family liaison officer about
02:27:33 from a family liaison officer about vincent on two separate occasions firstly about where his body had been found in the flat and secondly misinformation about an item that was purportedly found in his
02:27:44 item that was purportedly found in his flat which turned out to have concerned another flat not vincent's negoti also reports that after a while the support from the
02:27:55 the support from the flo
02:27:56 flo dwindled
02:27:58 dwindled they were also told by the fo that they had not reported vincent missing when they clearly had this was extremely distressing for the
02:28:09 this was extremely distressing for the family
02:28:11 family the family's trauma was also exacerbated by the
02:28:17 by the support key worker who was not a specialist in bereavement had a large caseload and was difficult to make contact with the family were left with a sense that
02:28:29 the family were left with a sense that the key work was indifferent to their situation
02:28:32 situation and were initially told that there was no counselling available for them
02:28:37 for them negotia says this we didn't feel supported as a family we don't live nearby and we felt ignored and forgotten about
02:28:49 let's put things in perspective so i i
02:28:54 so i i want to take you back to that week of the aftermath and i want to do so um by looking at reminding ourselves of
02:29:05 um by looking at reminding ourselves of some of the national news headlines during the first six days following the fire
02:29:11 fire from the 15th to the 20th of june okay so i'm going to ask for a slideshow powerpoint presentation to be shown and that's bsr
02:29:24 that's bsr 000189
02:29:26 000189 i wonder if that could start so the first slide slide one and i'm just going to touch upon the headlines if i may families of grenfell tower
02:29:38 families of grenfell tower tour hospitals desperately that's the 15th of june next slide 16th of june suggestions family will be rehoused
02:29:50 suggestions family will be rehoused in three weeks well we know that didn't happen
02:29:55 next slide please slide number three 17th of june silence
02:30:01 silence the scene at kensington and chelsea town hall
02:30:06 town hall slide number four please 17th of june relative site lack of coordination in response
02:30:16 response number five please 17th of june outrageous lack of help for grenfell victims
02:30:26 number six 18th of june volunteers flock from near and far that's one thing we can say about the great british public they do help
02:30:39 great british public they do help but sir one of the things that you're going to be asked to consider should we be relying on ordinary members of the british public when to help in a coordinated disaster
02:30:52 to help in a coordinated disaster response
02:30:56 number seven please 18th of june we think they are hiding locals express fury at council over grenfell response
02:31:08 grenfell response number eight please 18th of june council sidelined in grenfell tower response leader refuses to quit
02:31:20 number nine please 19th of june grenfell tower survivors put in bed and breakfast with no shower says counselor
02:31:31 breakfast with no shower says counselor just pause this so you know i've given you some examples but you can see
02:31:37 what's clear is
02:31:40 is this was
02:31:41 this was all in national media so you know no excuses oh we didn't know that was happening
02:31:51 happening this was being expressed in real time next slide please number 10.
02:32:01 well one thing we do know it's not for a shortage of money at keynes at kensington and chelsea kensington and chelsea council has 270m million pounds in reserves
02:32:13 270m million pounds in reserves much better position one of the richest boroughs in the country one of the richest councils in the land number 11 please
02:32:24 number 11 please why did kensington and chelsea's council emergency plan install well
02:32:30 well that question is asked on the 20th of june and um so i know that that's a question that you're going to tackle in this module next slide please
02:32:42 the red crosses priorities to help every victim of the grenfell tower again that just reflects the fact that you know
02:32:50 you know charities stepped up to the mark where was the council where was local local and central government
02:33:00 number 13 please
02:33:05 20th of june grenfell tower survivors face months of recovery doctors worn and again that touches upon sir some of the psychological trauma
02:33:17 the psychological trauma that um
02:33:18 that um some of the examples i've given you number 14 please council's rush to reassure residents after the fire well
02:33:32 rush is not the word i would use
02:33:36 number 15
02:33:40 22nd of june
02:33:44 accounts the the um church got it right the council failed why
02:33:52 why why should why should the church have got it so right and why should the council have got it so wrong
02:34:00 so wrong next slide please this is a year later it's the 2nd of june 2018 but it's a reflective headline
02:34:11 june 2018 but it's a reflective headline grenfell emails reveal turmoil at the council in the aftermath and again that's something that i hope that you will
02:34:20 you will explore
02:34:22 explore and the final slide please one year on the mosque manager who took in survivors and again that's illustrative of the fact that it was the faith groups
02:34:33 faith groups that were helping thank you that's that's the end of the slides
02:34:42 kendall the royal borough of kensington and chelsea has admitted a number of failings
02:34:50 failings in their opening statement which have been welcomed by our clients but to have to wait almost five years
02:35:01 but to have to wait almost five years for these admissions to failings which were blindingly and patently obvious and well-known as you can see from the headlines that i've just
02:35:12 i've just put before you
02:35:16 the contingency planning was lacking defective
02:35:21 defective and
02:35:22 and not fit for purpose they knew or ought to have known that the contingency management unit was understaffed and not able to cope
02:35:34 understaffed and not able to cope they knew or ought to have known that
02:35:38 that kensington and chelsea's response in the immediate aftermath was chaotic haphazard
02:35:44 haphazard that the housing the re-housing measures fell short of knc's duties and obligations that there was a lack of leadership at
02:35:55 that there was a lack of leadership at the council and there was failed government governance the initial report of the independent inquiry grenfell inquire and recovery task force submitted to the
02:36:07 and recovery task force submitted to the secretary of state on the 31st of october 2017 made
02:36:13 made the following findings that
02:36:16 that knc failed its community on the night of the 14th and in the weeks immediately following
02:36:23 following while many of the staff did its best to help the leadership vacuum aligned with silo service delivery and a distant council that did not know its residents meant
02:36:35 that did not know its residents meant that there was little effective and structured support from
02:36:40 from kensington chelsea that prior to the fire there's evidence to suggest that the raw bar of kensington chelsea was a council that was too distant from the community it served
02:36:52 from the community it served old-fashioned in its operational behaviors limited in its understanding and commitment to collaborative interagency work insula despite cross borough arrangements and
02:37:04 despite cross borough arrangements and with a significant deficit in understanding of public modern public service delivery as a result our bkc is starting from a particularly
02:37:15 our bkc is starting from a particularly low base
02:37:17 low base both in terms of trust from its people it serves and its historic structures and approach to community leadership there is a severe
02:37:29 there is a severe trust deficit between the local community and rbkc to address this effectively will require an entirely different approach to community engagement and service delivery which
02:37:40 engagement and service delivery which will
02:37:41 will require long-term sustained commitment from councillors and officers
02:37:48 sir it was open to rbkc to publicly acknowledge its failings and apologize years ago
02:37:58 years ago yet it did not do so it was open to rbkc to acknowledge its failings to this inquiry in its position statement
02:38:09 in its position statement to this inquiry but it did not it's often said that justice delay delayed is justice denied and in the intervening period of nearly
02:38:20 and in the intervening period of nearly five years the victims of grenfell have had to fight through this inquiry process for these admissions of failings but they still fall short
02:38:31 but they still fall short there has been no ownership of the various failings and breaches under the provisions of the housing act the children act the equality act or obligations and and denial of rights
02:38:42 obligations and and denial of rights under the echr
02:38:46 the feedback
02:38:49 from some of our clients can be encapsulated in in this way the admissions and apologies are welcomed so far as
02:39:01 and apologies are welcomed so far as they go
02:39:02 they go however they do not reflect and cannot now mitigate the scale of the trauma
02:39:09 trauma individually and collectively inflicted upon the bereave the survivors from the tower and those living in the walkways the initial disorganization that has now
02:39:20 the initial disorganization that has now been acknowledged for which an apology has been given did impact upon all of our clients exacerbated their trauma sowed mistrust when better and more
02:39:32 sowed mistrust when better and more appropriate measures began to be put in place
02:39:36 place our clients felt abandoned and ignored before the fire and they felt it again afterwards
02:39:47 there was significant press intrusion in the immediate aftermath which has had a profound effect on the well-being on a number of our clients acceptance of responsibility at this stage would have mitigated the impact of
02:40:00 stage would have mitigated the impact of rumor
02:40:01 rumor speculation uncertainty and in some instances outright lies which were allowed to fester and grow and in turn exacerbate the trauma of the
02:40:12 and in turn exacerbate the trauma of the brief survivors and the local residents
02:40:17 the evidence sir of government ministers to this inquiry during the last week culminating in the evidence of lord pickles last week demonstrates more than
02:40:28 pickles last week demonstrates more than ever
02:40:29 ever the need for public officials and bodies to be bound by statutes of candor in terms of the public accountability bill you see elected officials and civil
02:40:40 you see elected officials and civil servants and those who act on behalf of the state are accountable to the public for their actions and a healthy democracy also requires
02:40:51 also requires public authorities and public officials to make early admissions of failings and liabilities of their wrongs in a clear and transparent way here we are
02:41:03 here we are we have grenfell nearly five years on we've heard about the lachenal recommendations which were never implemented hillsborough 25 years of feet dragging
02:41:16 25 years of feet dragging a national implementation of a duty of candor across public bodies is an essential step in changing this culture which is a cancer at the heart of public
02:41:27 which is a cancer at the heart of public service in this country now we have made extensive submissions on uh the royal bar of kensington and chelsea spailings in relation to its
02:41:38 chelsea spailings in relation to its duties and obligations on the civil contingency act regulations and associated apology uh policies those are in our written submissions but in the light of rbkc's admissions
02:41:51 but in the light of rbkc's admissions i don't propose to deal with those now we do however consider it necessary to highlight
02:41:58 highlight the state's duties under the housing act equality act and echr obligations and i shall do so very quickly the housing act and duties
02:42:09 the housing act and duties so as you know local authorities duties on to homeless people are contained in part seven of the house in that 1996. any person rendered homeless as a result of a fire has a priority need
02:42:22 of a fire has a priority need and plainly cannot be said to have made themselves intentionally homeless it follows that rbkc owed every person made homeless by the fire a full housing
02:42:33 made homeless by the fire a full housing duty under section 193 subsection 2 of the 96 act under that duty rbkc was required to
02:42:44 act under that duty rbkc was required to secure
02:42:45 secure accommodation that became available to each homeless person
02:42:50 person and so as you know that section also goes on to describe that that accommodation must be suitable now
02:42:58 now you know you know and i know that suitable is a relative concept what may be suitable in the short term may not be suitable in the medium or long term we accept that but the duty and so the duty can
02:43:10 but the duty and so the duty can therefore be discharged in stages permitting the use of hotel accommodation to address an immediate housing crisis while more suitable accommodation is located
02:43:21 accommodation is located we accept all of that however at each stage for the individual concerned the accommodation must be suitable for the applicant's
02:43:34 must be suitable for the applicant's household and you're going to have to ask yourself this particularly given some of the stories that i've recounted to you can it be said that those that sample
02:43:47 can it be said that those that sample of clients that i've illustrated were they given suitable accommodation in the aftermath the evidence of the family show that
02:43:58 the evidence of the family show that rbkc failed to comply with their duties to their tenants and leaseholders at every stage the hotel accommodation provided was often inadequate in disrepair or dirty
02:44:11 often inadequate in disrepair or dirty on laura johnson's own evidence offers of unsuitable accommodation were made and many families felt pressurized into accepting unsuitable offers of
02:44:22 into accepting unsuitable offers of temporary accommodation simply to get out of their hotels many experience unacceptable delays in obtaining permanent accommodation and found the system of having to bid for
02:44:33 found the system of having to bid for properties under the allocation scheme stressful
02:44:38 stressful some grenfell tower residents are still waiting for permanent accommodation additionally there was inadequate provision for housing of the walkway residents who were evacuated from their
02:44:49 residents who were evacuated from their homes during the fire a number of whom needed to be permanently re-housed because their homes were rendered inhabitable because of the fire
02:45:03 duties under the equality act 2010
02:45:08 2010 now so
02:45:09 now so thankfully we've set out in our written submissions and so i can just touch upon this very briefly here on behalf of our clients it's well known that the needs of
02:45:20 it's well known that the needs of disabled people are different from the needs of people who are not disabled accordingly the question must be asked did the authorities
02:45:31 did the authorities do what they needed to do what did the authorities do when they were looking at and taking into account these needs public sector equality duty
02:45:45 public sector equality duty is not a duty to achieve results but a duty to have due regard to the need to achieve the goals to eliminate discrimination advance equality and of
02:45:57 discrimination advance equality and of opportunity and foster good relations it is directly sorry it is directed at ensuring that there is a culture of great awareness of the existence and legal consequences
02:46:09 and legal consequences and in this case talking about disability the duty must be exercised in substance with rigor and with an open mind and there must be a proper conscientious
02:46:20 there must be a proper conscientious focus
02:46:21 focus on the statutory criteria typically
02:46:26 typically typically
02:46:27 typically public authorities discharge their due regard
02:46:30 regard obligation under the public sector equality
02:46:34 equality duties by the preparation of an equality impact assessment in relation to the existing and proposed policies
02:46:44 policies and eia will include details of the characteristics of the groups that may be affected by any policies or practice and an assessment of the impact both disadvantageous and advantageous on
02:46:55 disadvantageous and advantageous on those groups it will also weigh the impact on those groups taking into account any mitigating measures as regards as against the aims of the policy and practice
02:47:07 policy and practice this will then inform the public authority's decision on whether to adopt retain
02:47:12 retain the policy or practice in question
02:47:16 where is it where is dia dealing with these issues
02:47:26 special protection afforded to vulnerable and minority groups in circumstances where a risk to life is posed to a vulnerable group the case law makes it clear that the state should
02:47:37 makes it clear that the state should take particularly clear to take measures to correspond to those persons needs accordingly the following questions we say should be asked did central and local government take um protective
02:47:48 local government take um protective measures to adequately respond to the needs of the vulnerable groups was there a failure to take into account the special needs of disabled people elderly people pregnant women and particularly
02:47:59 people pregnant women and particularly the very young in the aftermath was there proper regard to their safety given the fact that they had to urgently evacuate
02:48:08 evacuate you see the presence of an apparently disproportionate number of adults and children in the tower from ethnic and national minority groups and or others who have national or um sorry who have
02:48:21 who have national or um sorry who have protected characteristics raises concerns about the housing allocation policies and practices generally
02:48:29 generally further the failure to have an adequate or appropriate public sector equality duty and
02:48:36 duty and considered a proper eia vetted which vetted the contingency emergency plans policies and procedures would indicate a prima facie breach of the
02:48:48 indicate a prima facie breach of the public sector equality duty and obligation
02:48:58 so i'm going to move on i'm going to deal with a couple more things and i'm going to finish
02:49:04 duties under the echr well sir we say that article 2 systems duty was activated here to provide an effective
02:49:15 to provide an effective emergency response under article 2. this includes both the systems due to an operational duty and under the systems duty this also includes the setting up of an
02:49:26 includes the setting up of an appropriate regulatory framework for rescuing people in distress and ensuring that the effective function of such a framework the operational duty is where the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of real
02:49:38 to have known of the existence of real and immediate risks to individuals and and their life and then there's article 8 rehousing
02:49:47 rehousing you know the right to private and family life
02:49:50 life again has that been compromised in this case and i would ask you to have a look at the submissions that we've made in that regard
02:50:01 can i just deal very briefly with the impact on children
02:50:07 67 of the residents of the grenfell tower were children 17 of which died in the fire children who have been affected by the fire at grenfell include the children
02:50:18 fire at grenfell include the children who also survived the fire who lived in the walkways those who attended schools a community sporting activities children who died in family fire and those who would deplete
02:50:29 fire and those who would deplete displaces resort the fire brief children the question is what has the local authority done in relation to those children's
02:50:40 done in relation to those children's interests
02:50:41 interests the true measure of any society can be found in the way it treats the most vulnerable members children being among society's most vulnerable the equality and human rights commission in its report following
02:50:52 commission in its report following grenfell children's rights found that the authorities failed to put the children's best interests at the heart of their efforts and breached its international obligations the report
02:51:03 international obligations the report highlighted a lack of coordination among services
02:51:06 services both in the immediate aftermath and the year after [Applause]
02:51:17 i'm going to finish with this son [Applause]
02:51:25 we say the failings were many fold
02:51:31 many fold no leadership a failure to identify that rbkc were failing
02:51:38 failing having identified the failure a failure by central government to fill that vacuum
02:51:45 vacuum a lack of communication between residents and a lack of visibility failed promises notably the housing debacle
02:51:53 debacle and an abandonment of children and the vulnerable so my concluding remarks are these in the face of the tragedy and the
02:52:04 in the face of the tragedy and the university faced by the community and this is a community that was united and tried its best to do what it could to support each other and in the absence of direction and leadership from central
02:52:15 of direction and leadership from central local government collectively there were the source of information passing on updates as to what the next steps and what the information was available that was the community that filled and
02:52:27 was the community that filled and stepped in that stepped into that gap in addition there were local churches mosques community organizations including the citizens at vice bureau kensington
02:52:38 kensington law center that provided guidance and assistance which should have been provided by the local authority in some cases the cab and kensington law center were advocates
02:52:50 and kensington law center were advocates for the victims of grenfell against the the local authority particularly with regards to rehousing campaign groups sprung up grenfell united justice for grenfell humanity for
02:53:03 united justice for grenfell humanity for grenfell the grenfell trust have provided direction where governance has failed
02:53:09 failed moniker liko speaks of being provided with updates by grenfell united the silent marches through the community on the 14th day of the month before they were suspended in response
02:53:20 before they were suspended in response to the coveted pandemic where in response to a failed government demand injustice and accountability central and local government failed the people to whom it was accountable to and
02:53:32 people to whom it was accountable to and we say that this module should rigorously examine why this happened so that lessons can be learned and real change will be made thank you sir thank you very much professor thomas
02:53:44 thank you very much professor thomas now
02:53:45 now the next statement is due to be made by mr andrew warnock queen's council on behalf of the metropolitan police service he's going to make that statement from a remote location
02:53:57 statement from a remote location and i have been assured that he thinks he can do it within 10 minutes so if my colleagues agree i would suggest that we take this statement
02:54:07 statement now and hear directly from mr warnock um
02:54:12 um mr warnock uh i can see you i hope you can see us and that you can hear us is that right i can sir thank you and i hope you can see and hear me
02:54:23 see and hear me thank you yes sir i should say i should say although i appear remotely um miss aim car of council is available in the
02:54:33 in the thank you very much well i'm sorry we've kept you waiting but um we are now ready to hear you and if you'd like to make your statement please go ahead
02:54:42 go ahead um sir this opening statement is intended to assist you on the panel by outlining the role of the metropolitan police service in the
02:54:54 metropolitan police service in the immediate aftermath of the tragic events of the 14th of june 2017. but the police service recognizes
02:55:05 but the police service recognizes that the aftermath in its entirety including all elements of the humanitarian effort stretched far beyond the period to be examined by the inquiry
02:55:18 examined by the inquiry however references to the aftermath for the purposes of this module is to the first seven days following the fire as defined in the list of issues
02:55:32 fire as defined in the list of issues as is set out in the inquiries overview note
02:55:37 note the metropolitan police service falls outside the inquiry's list of issues by examination in module four and no metropolitan police service
02:55:48 and no metropolitan police service witnesses are due to be called that notwithstanding the metropolitan police service has relevant documentary evidence to provide
02:56:00 evidence to provide and has done so through the ongoing provision of a large volume of material it has
02:56:07 it has also provided a number of witness statements relevant to the issues for examination in module four the metropolitan police service is a
02:56:18 the metropolitan police service is a category one responder and its main functions within the multi-agency response to a major incident
02:56:26 incident are defined in the leslp manual
02:56:31 manual in summary the core functions of the police service in the aftermath of a major incident as opposed to the immediate emergency response previously examined in phase
02:56:43 response previously examined in phase one
02:56:44 one are to one investigate the incident two secure relevant evidence three collect and distribute casualty
02:56:55 three collect and distribute casualty information and four
02:56:58 and four search for recover and identify those who are sadly deceased both for the purposes of any criminal investigation
02:57:09 investigation and in order to assist her majesty's coroner
02:57:13 coroner aspects of this work are supported by the deployment of family liaison officers
02:57:20 officers the metropolitan police service also has a role in the coordination of the multi-agency response within the strategic coordination group or scg
02:57:32 strategic coordination group or scg the documentary and witness evidence provided by the nps addresses those broad categories described above and we hope it will provide the inquiry
02:57:44 and we hope it will provide the inquiry and core participants with necessary evidence about the practical application of the principles defined in policies such as the leslp manual
02:57:58 such as the leslp manual for example how the casualty bureau operates as a means of gathering information rather than providing it the speed at which the local community
02:58:10 the speed at which the local community responded to the need for rest centers and the nature of the function and purpose of each of those sites once they had been established
02:58:21 had been established the process for the allocation of family liaison officers how that process operated and what the role of family liaison officers was in the immediate aftermath
02:58:35 officers was in the immediate aftermath and the duration of the metropolitan police services tenure as chair of the scg before transition to the london council's
02:58:46 council's lead recovery coordinating group sir if in the course of module 4 hearings
02:58:54 hearings any issues of concern relating to the metropolitan police service arise either from the inquiry team or any other core participant we would encourage contact to be made
02:59:06 we would encourage contact to be made with us directly through our recognized legal representative we are open to constructive discussion about any such issues
02:59:17 about any such issues even those that may not fall within the time frame of the immediate aftermath as defined for the purposes of module four sir those are are
02:59:30 sir those are are that is my opening statement thank you very much and demonstrating well uh that's obviously a convenient point of which to break so that we can all have some lunch we'll stop at that
02:59:41 all have some lunch we'll stop at that point and we'll resume please at two o'clock thank you all very much
03:00:08 you