Module 4 Opening Submissions - Monday 11th April 2022 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:00:26 now the next opening statement is going to be made by mr maxwell scott queen's council on behalf of rbkc so if you're ready mr maxwell scott come up and give us your statement

00:00:40 [Applause]

00:00:44 mr chairman ms istafan mr akbar as you know we have submitted a 50-page written opening we also last week provided the inquiry

00:00:55 we also last week provided the inquiry with a document identifying some key changes made within the council since june 2017 that are relevant to module 4 issues

00:01:05 issues in this oral statement i'm not going to repeat everything we have said in our detailed written opening i will focus on a number of specific topics which i will list at the end of this introduction

00:01:18 list at the end of this introduction by way of introduction i should explain that the council has a key role to play in this module this role

00:01:26 this role has nothing to do with the fact that the council was the owner and landlord of grenfell tower the council's role stems from the fact that as a local authority it was a

00:01:37 that as a local authority it was a category one responder under the civil contingencies act 2004 the tmo was not a category 1 or category 2 responder it owed no duties under that legislation

00:01:50 it owed no duties under that legislation so this isn't like module 3 where the role of a tmo as a council's managing agent was central to the issues under consideration this is much more like module 1

00:02:02 this is much more like module 1 where the council's building control function had nothing to do with the tmo and nothing to do with the fact that the council happened to be the owner and landlord of grenfell tower

00:02:14 landlord of grenfell tower as a category 1 responder the council had a vital role to play if an emergency took place within the borough it would be expected to lead the recovery effort

00:02:26 recovery effort and in particular to lead on the provision of shelter welfare rest centers and other forms of humanitarian assistance the council was also under a duty to

00:02:38 the council was also under a duty to undertake contingency planning so that it would be prepared should an emergency arise in the borough

00:02:48 mr chairman the immediate aftermath was an exceptionally difficult time for the bereaved survivors and residents it was made worse

00:03:00 it was made worse by the fact that the council-led recovery phase was not as organized or as effective as it could and should have been on this point i would like to quote from

00:03:12 on this point i would like to quote from the speech given by elizabeth campbell on the 19th of july 2017. this is a speech she gave immediately after she was formally elected as leader of a council

00:03:23 of a council she said

00:03:25 she said we did not cope well enough in our initial response to the tragedy i am deeply sorry for the grief and trauma that you are suffering i am deeply sorry

00:03:37 i am deeply sorry that we did not do more to help you when you needed it the most

00:03:45 in our written opening statement we have sought to analyze both the council's emergency preparations and its response to the fire and to do so in the light of the council's commitment to canada

00:03:58 council's commitment to canada having done so we have identified and set out a number of specific failings on the part of the council they are set out in our written opening

00:04:09 they are set out in our written opening but i will mention some of the most significant ones now the arrangements which the council had in place before the fire failed to set out how different parts of the council

00:04:21 out how different parts of the council would coordinate their communications the council failed to provide the public with clear consistent communications after the fire

00:04:33 after the fire as a result individual residents missed out on receiving support to which they were entitled the council's provision of rest centers was initially disorganized

00:04:46 was initially disorganized the lack of visible leadership from the council contributed to the problem

00:04:53 the council had not trained enough rest center managers

00:04:59 there was a shortage of senior managers at rest centers on the 14th of june

00:05:08 the council did not run an adequate number of emergency response training events and exercises before the fire

00:05:17 there was insufficient attendance at the training events and exercises that were held

00:05:24 held the council apologizes for its failings

00:05:30 mr chairman the scale and complexity of the problems which had to be addressed in immediate aftermath were unprecedented in london in peacetime a huge number of people provided

00:05:42 a huge number of people provided assistance assistance that made a real difference had they not done so things would have been far worse than they were

00:05:53 they were on behalf of the council i would like to take this opportunity to thank

00:05:58 thank all the people from the local community and fervor field who assisted at a time of great need and to thank all the local community organizations

00:06:10 organizations faith groups and charities who worked with a local community to deliver that assistance the council also wishes to express its

00:06:21 the council also wishes to express its thanks to those councillors and council officers

00:06:25 officers who worked long hours and willingly took on unfamiliar tasks

00:06:32 there are eight topics which i will address you on in this opening they are one leadership two

00:06:39 two communication with the public three local community organizations four

00:06:46 four rest centers hotels and financial assistance five

00:06:51 five the council's contingency planning team and contingency management plan six

00:06:57 six training and exercises seven the needs of specific groups and eight the activation of the london gold arrangements

00:07:08 mr chairman you'll be aware from this list that i am adopting a slightly different structure to my written opening

00:07:15 opening this is deliberate and is done to enable people more clearly to see the connection between some of the failings in pre-fire preparations and what happened in the response

00:07:29 i should make it clear in this opening statement

00:07:31 statement we do not address any events that took place after the 20th of june 2017. this is for the simple reason that the inquiry has stated that in this

00:07:43 that the inquiry has stated that in this module it is focusing on the first seven days

00:07:47 days the council acknowledges that there were shortcomings in its emergency relief response

00:07:53 response in the period after the 20th of june as well as in the seven days before then

00:08:01 i turn first to the council's leadership in immediate aftermath it is important to try and understand the nature of the challenges faced by it

00:08:12 the nature of the challenges faced by it in those early days there was the need to lead a humanitarian response of unprecedented scale and complexity but that was not the only challenge

00:08:24 but that was not the only challenge the leadership was under pressure from the highest levels of central government it also found itself in the middle of the biggest national news story of the day

00:08:35 day with large numbers of media organizations raising questions about the causes of the fire central government's interest was understandable

00:08:46 understandable and the media's questions were legitimate but that did not make the challenge any less

00:08:52 less in addition within a short period of time the council faced hostility over whether the council bore responsibility for the fire itself and over the effectiveness of a

00:09:04 and over the effectiveness of a humanitarian response this was an unusual situation by many the council was not seen as an organization seeking

00:09:16 organization seeking however imperfectly to solve a crisis caused by an event such as a flood which was outside its control

00:09:24 control the council was instead seen by many as the cause of the crisis rather than part of the solution

00:09:34 in the face of these challenges the council accepts that its leadership was unable to cope in the days after the fire

00:09:44 fire the council apologizes for the fact that it was unable to do so

00:09:52 one area which in our submission the council's leadership got right was recognizing the need to spend whatever was required to address the humanitarian crisis

00:10:05 i turn next to the issue of communication with the public i do so at an early stage in this statement

00:10:14 statement because we consider that the councils communication failures were a significant cause of other problems with the council's response for example they weakened the council's

00:10:27 for example they weakened the council's public profile and hampered its ability to provide visible leadership or visible coordination

00:10:36 whenever there is a major emergency the public need accurate information and reliable advice they need that information and advice to be easily accessible and they need it to be regularly

00:10:48 and they need it to be regularly reviewed and refreshed so it remains up-to-date as a category 1 responder the council had a duty to maintain arrangements to provide information and advice to the

00:10:59 provide information and advice to the public in the event of an emergency

00:11:04 the council admits that the arrangements that it had in place were not capable of providing the level of service needed by the public after the fire

00:11:15 needed by the public after the fire they were not as clear or well understood as they should have been they failed to set out how different parts of the council would coordinate their communications

00:11:28 their communications and they were not set up to enable the council to speak with one voice clearly and accurately the council's media communications team was small its main functions were those

00:11:40 was small its main functions were those of a press office responding to media inquiries and issuing press releases there had been a failure before the fire adequately to exercise the emergency communication plan

00:11:53 communication plan these pre-fire problems had a causative impact on the council's response after the fire

00:12:01 the fire the council failed to provide the public with clear consistent communications in immediate aftermath

00:12:09 information was not cascaded effectively either internally within the council or externally as a result there was inconsistency in

00:12:20 as a result there was inconsistency in the information provided by the council to residents

00:12:27 a key theme that emerges from the witness statements is of some residents not receiving support

00:12:35 support which other residents were receiving either because they were not told that they were entitled to it or because they were actively told that they were not entitled to it

00:12:47 they were not entitled to it it is wholly understandable that this inconsistency in delivery frustrated residents

00:12:54 residents and offended their natural sense of fairness

00:12:58 fairness the council apologizes unreservedly for its communications failures it deeply regrets the unfairness that was caused

00:13:09 was caused and the fact that individual residents missed out on receiving support which they are entitled to and which the council wished to provide to them

00:13:22 mr chairman a position has changed since 2017

00:13:26 2017 there is now a crisis communication strategy

00:13:30 strategy a crisis communications plan and a new communications team a team has been trained and has two officers on call 24 7

00:13:42 24 7 365 days a year

00:13:50 my third topic is local community organizations faith groups and charities north kensington was and is an area with tight-knit

00:14:02 and is an area with tight-knit communities and close community ties many local community organizations were embedded in the community and had been providing valuable support

00:14:13 and had been providing valuable support to local residents for decades within minutes of the fire occurring while most of london was asleep local individuals and local community

00:14:25 local individuals and local community organizations sprang into action use their initiative opened their premises and started to help survivors

00:14:36 and started to help survivors they had no obligation to do so but they did and the council is deeply grateful to them for doing so

00:14:47 although they were under no legal obligation to do so the fact that they did could not be described as unforeseeable quite the opposite experience from other national events

00:14:59 experience from other national events clearly shows that it is in fact the norm for local community organizations to be first on the scene that they were at grenfell was both foreseeable and predictable

00:15:12 was both foreseeable and predictable [Applause] given the likelihood that they would be first on the scene the council considers but it should have done more before the fire to liaise with

00:15:23 done more before the fire to liaise with them and to include them within its emergency plans this is particularly so because very few council officers lived within the borough

00:15:33 borough the fact that the council did not do so impeded the effectiveness of the response

00:15:40 response a number of witnesses describe local community organizations experiencing a lack of overall direction from the council a greater level of prefa liaison would

00:15:53 a greater level of prefa liaison would have meant that the council was better placed to coordinate and direct local community organizations when they were most needed in summary the council should have done

00:16:06 in summary the council should have done more before the fire to liaise with local community organizations and include them within its emergency plans it should have done more to harness coordinate and direct the outpouring of

00:16:19 coordinate and direct the outpouring of community support which arose spontaneously in the immediate aftermath of the fire

00:16:27 since 2017 the council has made considerable efforts to improve its approach to community engagement and to support local community organizations

00:16:38 support local community organizations faith groups and charities the council has established a communities department and created a donations plan these community engagement structures

00:16:50 these community engagement structures have been used in recent years in response to events such as the coveted pandemic the arrival of evacuees from afghanistan and the war in ukraine

00:17:04 my fourth topic is rest centers hotels and financial assistance

00:17:10 on the morning of the 14th of june some of the most important priorities were staff arrest centres ensuring that residents had somewhere to sleep that night

00:17:21 sleep that night and consolidating services into a single rest center when it was appropriate to do so

00:17:27 do so [Applause] the evidence suggests that at least five separate premises opened as formal or informal rest centers before 9 00 am that morning

00:17:39 centers before 9 00 am that morning the council did recognize these priorities and did seek to address them however the council acknowledges that it found itself constantly trying to catch

00:17:50 found itself constantly trying to catch up with events to the best of a council's knowledge no council officers were present at any of the five premises before approximately 9 am

00:18:03 approximately 9 am rest centres including the westway which opened later that morning were initially disorganized the lack of visible leadership from the council contributed to the problem

00:18:17 council contributed to the problem the situation was not helped by the fact that many council officers who attended rest centers did not wear anything that visibly indicated the identity of their employer

00:18:30 indicated the identity of their employer this understandably led many to believe that the council was invisible was not providing help and did not care

00:18:41 the services provided at rest centers on the 14th of june focused on residents most immediate needs this should not be regarded as unexpected

00:18:52 unexpected the guidance documents envisage that the services provided within the first 24 hours of an emergency will be more limited for those provided after 48 hours

00:19:04 after 48 hours by the 20th of june a wide range of goods and services were available at the westway

00:19:11 westway these included food and drinks clothes oyster cards and mobile telephones housing advice adult social care children's services healthcare welfare

00:19:24 children's services healthcare welfare and emotional support they also included assistance with replacement documents such as passports visas and driving licenses

00:19:36 moving on to hotels the council's aim was to ensure that every grenfell tower resident

00:19:43 resident who needed emergency hotel accommodation on the first night was offered it over 70 households were accommodated in hotels that night

00:19:54 hotels that night most of them were grenfell tower residents

00:19:58 council acknowledges that there is evidence of a small number of grenfell tower residents not being told about this option in circumstances where they should have

00:20:09 in circumstances where they should have been

00:20:10 been [Applause]

00:20:14 there is a big difference between staying in a hotel out of choice and staying in a hotel out of necessity being forced to stay in a hotel

00:20:26 being forced to stay in a hotel for an indefinite period of time whether you've lost your home and all your possessions is not in any way enjoyable the council understands this

00:20:39 the council understands this it acknowledges that some residents were justifiably dissatisfied with the quality and suitability of the hotel accommodation the council also acknowledges that some

00:20:52 the council also acknowledges that some residents had to move hotel rooms within the first seven days as a result of hotels honoring pre-existing bookings

00:21:01 the reality is that this was very far from an ideal situation booking a large number of hotel rooms at minimal notice in central london in mid-june is far from easy

00:21:14 mid-june is far from easy fighting hotel rooms for over 70 households on the first night took a lot of work

00:21:20 of work and should be regarded as an achievement it was inevitable that some hotels would be of a higher quality or in a better location than others

00:21:33 finally in this topic i will briefly mention financial assistance initially the aim was to provide each household with 500 pounds in cash by the 19th of june the plan was there

00:21:45 by the 19th of june the plan was there for there to be a further payment of 5 000 pounds for households from grenfell tower and grenfell walk council officers work together with the post office and central government to

00:21:57 post office and central government to facilitate this

00:22:00 i end this topic by returning to a theme i've mentioned already the fact that failures in communication resulted in inconsistency in the

00:22:12 resulted in inconsistency in the delivery of services there is clear evidence that some residents were not aware how much money they are entitled to

00:22:23 much money they are entitled to there is also clear evidence that some residents were not aware of the full range of services they were entitled to receive for free while they were staying in hotels

00:22:35 while they were staying in hotels this is a matter of deep regret to the council

00:22:39 council and it apologizes for it

00:22:47 my fifth topic is the council's contingency planning team and contingency management plan the contingency planning team was responsible for the contingency

00:22:58 responsible for the contingency management plan and for training and exercises

00:23:03 exercises the team consisted of the contingency planning manager david kerry and two contingency planning officers there was no formal training program for

00:23:14 there was no formal training program for them

00:23:15 them but all three of them were involved in a wide range of internal and multi-agency training sessions and exercises all three of them were suitably

00:23:26 all three of them were suitably qualified and experienced for their roles

00:23:30 roles kerry in particular had a wealth of relevant experience going back to the 1980s

00:23:37 1980s he had been the council's contingency planning manager since 2005 and had been head of contingency planning at another london local authority before that

00:23:48 kerry chaired the kensington and chelsea borough resilience forum and was active in regional working groups and committees most notably kerry had been the

00:23:59 most notably kerry had been the practitioner advisor to the local authorities panel to the london resilience forum since it was set up

00:24:09 on a day-to-day basis this team of three had little direct input from the officers in the line management chain above kerry

00:24:20 management chain above kerry there were some occasions on which the team provided reports to councillors or more senior officers and there is some evidence of councillors and officers providing

00:24:31 councillors and officers providing oversight of a team's work having considered this evidence the council's position is that there should have been more internal reporting

00:24:42 internal reporting up the management chain and that there should have been greater oversight of both the team itself and the council's emergency response capability

00:24:56 the council had a contingency management plan

00:24:59 plan the plan included a reference to a fire in a block of flats and there were annexes that were intended to address an emergency situation

00:25:10 emergency situation in which residents of the borough could for whatever reason not return to their homes and required humanitarian assistance

00:25:21 the plan contained a large number of useful annexes the council had a mass evacuation and shelter plan an emergency shelter and rest center

00:25:33 an emergency shelter and rest center directory

00:25:35 directory guidance for setting up a community assistance centre and an assistance center manual however it did not have a standalone

00:25:46 however it did not have a standalone humanitarian assistance plan the council admits that it should have done in addition the council admits that both part two of the plan and annex 21

00:25:59 part two of the plan and annex 21 were incomplete draft documents which should have been finalized

00:26:06 in recent years the council has improved both its oversight and contingency planning

00:26:12 planning and its contingency management plan the leader of a council is now the portfolio holder for contingency planning

00:26:20 planning the council has also created a contingency planning assurance group its most recent meeting was chaired by the chief executive the contingency management plan has been

00:26:31 the contingency management plan has been revised

00:26:32 revised and a number of new annexes have been added

00:26:35 added including an emergency centers plan and a donations plan the council now has a byboro humanitarian assistance plan

00:26:53 my sixth topic is training and exercises the regulations and the guidance documents are clear on the importance of exercising the emergency plan

00:27:04 exercising the emergency plan and training staff so that they know what to do in an emergency this is therefore an important topic and we devote eight pages to it in our written opening

00:27:17 training sessions and training exercises are never going to be as realistic as real events but they represent the best preparation that can be provided for the wide range

00:27:29 that can be provided for the wide range of emergency scenarios that could arise because the range is wide it is not realistic

00:27:37 realistic to expect a local authority to put on training sessions and exercises for every possible scenario and there is no requirement to do so the theory

00:27:48 the theory is that sessions and exercises will enable staff to cope when faced with a factual scenario that they have not specifically encountered in training

00:28:00 we concluded our section on this topic in our written opening by identifying five main areas in which the council fell short what i'm going to do today is to explain

00:28:12 what i'm going to do today is to explain what those five areas were having done so i will briefly identify some other relevant points one

00:28:22 one the council did not have formal training programs for council gold council silva or officers who worked in the barrack emergency command center

00:28:34 emergency command center there was no requirement for it to do so but the council accepts that its training programmes should have been more formalized

00:28:43 two the council failed to keep and retain sufficient records of emergency response training this has limited our ability to set out a detailed position

00:28:56 to set out a detailed position on the frequency of training exercises and the level of attendance at them by council staff however

00:29:04 however the council is able to say three that not enough training events were held and four that the level of attendance at the training events that were held was

00:29:16 training events that were held was insufficient

00:29:19 as a result the cohort of trained officers was too small to ensure that there would always be enough officers available to perform the required roles in the

00:29:31 to perform the required roles in the event of an emergency

00:29:34 these are issues that were identified at the time

00:29:37 the time and efforts were made to address them but they had only limited success the council's strategy at the time was to focus on encouraging more officers to

00:29:49 to focus on encouraging more officers to volunteer to be trained up the reality is that this strategy of relying on unpaid volunteers did not work it did not produce enough volunteers

00:30:03 since 2017 the council has adopted a different strategy it now pays officers who agree to do this work a supplement to their annual salary

00:30:14 salary this has had results the number of trained officers now exceeds that recommended by resilient standards for london

00:30:24 the final area number five relates to the exercising of a contingency management plan the plan stated quotes this contingency

00:30:36 the plan stated quotes this contingency management plan shall be exercised at least once annually close quotes the council considers that in order validly to exercise the plan it would have been necessary to exercise

00:30:48 it would have been necessary to exercise it at all levels in other words gold silver and boro emergency command center staff the council admits that it failed to do

00:31:00 the council admits that it failed to do so at least once annually at least some council officers participated in relevant exercises at least once per year

00:31:12 at least once per year but

00:31:13 but the council did not exercise the plan at all levels each year this is another area where things have changed since 2017.

00:31:25 changed since 2017. the contingency management plan is now exercised at all levels twice a year it has also been activated and used to address the covered pandemic

00:31:36 address the covered pandemic and the provision of accommodation for evacuees from afghanistan

00:31:43 finally on training and exercises a few other relevant points as well as participating in internal training events council officers also participated in

00:31:54 council officers also participated in training exercises run at london wide level by the london resilience group in the three years before the fire council officers took part in six

00:32:06 council officers took part in six training exercises organized by london resilience

00:32:12 the two council officers who performed the role of council silva in immediate aftermath were david kerry and stuart priestley

00:32:21 priestley they had both received sufficient training to enable them to do so

00:32:27 the council's chief executive nicholas holgate

00:32:30 holgate was expected to assume the role of council gold in the event of an emergency

00:32:35 emergency and did so on the morning of the 14th of june

00:32:39 june he had undergone training both with the council and with london resilience holgate had received some training from the council but we acknowledge that it was not of

00:32:50 but we acknowledge that it was not of itself sufficient for the role of council gold however

00:32:55 however that does not represent the totality of the training which holgate had received

00:33:02 there was an is a london-wide system under which at any one time two of the chief executives of the 33 london local authorities are on call to

00:33:15 london local authorities are on call to assist as london local authority gold by june 2017 holgate had been a chief executive for several years

00:33:27 several years london resilience had placed him on its on-call rotor and he had served as on-call primary london gold an on-call secondary london gold

00:33:39 an on-call secondary london gold we know that holgate had received some training from london resilience but the details are not clear to us this is a matter which the inquiry may wish to explore in the module 4 hearings

00:33:54 wish to explore in the module 4 hearings doing so

00:33:55 doing so will enable the inquiry to form a view on whether the combination of the training

00:34:02 training that holgate had undertaken with the council

00:34:05 council and the training that he had undertaken with london resilience was sufficient for the roles of london local authority gold

00:34:13 gold and council girl

00:34:19 my seventh topic is the needs of specific groups and i will be addressing both emergency planning issues and the events after the fire

00:34:30 and the events after the fire i should make it clear that i will not be addressing planning for the emergency evacuation of residents with vulnerabilities from a building that is on fire

00:34:42 building that is on fire that issue has been considered extensively in module 3 which in our submission was the appropriate module in which to consider it

00:34:54 the emergency planning guidance documents contain two themes which appear to some extent to be in tension with each other

00:35:05 with each other the first is the need specifically to consider vulnerable persons when engaging in emergency planning the second is the difficulty of maintaining

00:35:18 is the difficulty of maintaining accurate up-to-date lists of vulnerable individuals the way in which the guidance documents attempt to resolve the tension between these two themes is the idea of creating

00:35:32 these two themes is the idea of creating lists of lists what this means is that rather than creating a master list of all vulnerable persons living in a borough a local authority creates a list

00:35:46 borough a local authority creates a list of organizations that should themselves hold lists of vulnerable persons known to them the council considers that its contingency management plan

00:35:59 contingency management plan did achieve that basic requirement i say this because annex one of the plan did list contact details for the tmo

00:36:10 did list contact details for the tmo children's services and adult social care

00:36:15 care and the tmo had agreed in april 2016 that

00:36:22 that in the event of a future incident involving more than a couple of its homes

00:36:27 homes it would provide details of known vulnerabilities turning then to events after the fire on the morning of the 14th of june children's services took steps to

00:36:40 children's services took steps to identify all children previously known to it

00:36:44 to it and attempted to contact them or their families

00:36:48 families social workers were deployed to rest centres and hospitals all relevant local schools were contacted with an offer of critical incident support

00:36:59 incident support and educational psychologists were deployed to schools also that morning a council officer accessed the it system and searched for adults living in

00:37:10 and searched for adults living in grenfell tower known to adult social care

00:37:14 care before 7 15 am she sent an email stating that she had identified seven people to whom adult social care provided services and 25 people over 65 years old

00:37:29 the council admits that it should have done more in the immediate aftermath to make people from diverse backgrounds feel as comfortable

00:37:40 diverse backgrounds feel as comfortable as possible in particular muslim residents who were observing ramadan

00:37:47 ramadan at the time the council acknowledges that many survivors who stayed in hotels were not provided with halal food the council also admits that efforts

00:37:59 the council also admits that efforts should have been made to communicate key messages in languages other than english

00:38:07 my final topic is the council's request for mutual aid and the activation of the london gold arrangements first some points about terminology

00:38:19 first some points about terminology it seems to us that the term mutual aid can give rise to some confusion our reading of the evidence is that it has been used to describe the

00:38:31 is that it has been used to describe the following three different forms of assistance to a local authority one the aid provided to a local authority that has activated the london

00:38:42 authority that has activated the london gold arrangements two aid provided to a local authority that has made a formal request for aid to one or more local authorities but has

00:38:54 to one or more local authorities but has not activated the london gold arrangements three any aid provided by one local authority to another however informally

00:39:07 authority to another however informally our position is that the council activated the london gold arrangements in the late afternoon of the 15th of june and that the formal transfer to london

00:39:19 and that the formal transfer to london gold was completed before 2pm on the 16th of june thereafter john baradel the chief executive of the city of london corporation

00:39:31 london corporation became recovery gold that was how he was described in the minutes of ministerial meetings after the formal transfer

00:39:42 after the formal transfer formal transfer therefore took place over 48 hours after the fire started the council considers that the formal transfer should have taken place

00:39:53 transfer should have taken place earlier than it did the reasons why it did not will be explored in module 4 when all of the key witnesses on this issue are scheduled to give oral

00:40:04 issue are scheduled to give oral evidence

00:40:06 evidence at this stage i'm going to limit myself to identifying two themes which we invite the panel to bear in mind when considering the evidence on

00:40:17 mind when considering the evidence on this issue first

00:40:20 first because of the tribara and agreements the council was able to draw on resources

00:40:28 resources from westminster city council and the london borough of hammersmith and fulham without activating the london gold arrangements

00:40:39 arrangements the panel may wish to consider the extent to which the council requested

00:40:45 requested was offered accepted

00:40:49 accepted and received mutual aid in immediate aftermath

00:40:56 secondly in the period before london gold was activated

00:41:01 activated the london local authority coordination center was preparing for the possibility that london gold would be activated it was not operating from a standing

00:41:12 it was not operating from a standing start at 2 pm on the 16th of june

00:41:21 that concludes my final topic today as you know we cover a wider range of topics in our written opening statement and also analyze the evidence in more detail there

00:41:33 detail there that evidence will be added to by the evidence of witnesses due to record in april and may in our closing statement we will take account of that evidence and set out a council's position

00:41:45 council's position in further detail and in accordance with the council's commitment to canada

00:41:54 well thank you very much mr maxwell scott

00:41:57 scott um

00:41:58 um we're now due to hear or next we're going to hear a statement on behalf of the mayor of london but the timetable suggests that we should have our afternoon break rather

00:42:09 should have our afternoon break rather earlier than usual but at this point because the uh the mayor's statement may take a little while so i think we'll stick to the timetable and we'll stop now we'll come

00:42:20 timetable and we'll stop now we'll come back at three o'clock when we shall hear miss and stud queen's council on behalf of the mayor of london thank you very much three o'clock please

01:01:05 okay [Music]

01:01:11 [Music] we're now going to hear an opening statement on behalf of the mayor of london by mitsan stud queen's council yesterday

01:01:24 mr chairman it's clear from the evidence disclosed by the bereaved survivors and residents in module 4 that they were failed in the immediate aftermath of the fire

01:01:35 aftermath of the fire over those first days the community was badly let down by an ineffective humanitarian response and inadequate leadership all those with a role responding to this

01:01:48 all those with a role responding to this tragedy need to examine what happened and consider what lessons need to be learned

01:01:53 learned so that in future those that require the safety net that the system should have put in place will benefit from it the inquiry will want to consider the system of resilience in london that it

01:02:05 system of resilience in london that it was in place in 2017 and how the jigsaw should have fitted together in practical terms on the ground

01:02:13 ground in this in his written opening the mayor of london has set out in some detail the statutory framework for resilience as it applied in london in 2017

01:02:25 applied in london in 2017 as the panel will see it involved a number of interlinked strands

01:02:29 strands and the mayor does not intend to repeat that part of the written submission in this oral opening he will however outline the mayor of london's specific role in the resilience framework as it's important for the

01:02:42 framework as it's important for the inquiry to appreciate what he was able to do in the aftermath of the grenville tower fire and indeed where he was not able to assist in this oral opening we will cover the

01:02:54 in this oral opening we will cover the mayor of london's role within the statutory resilient framework for london the mayor of london's role between the 14th and the 20th of june 2017 and we will deal with particular

01:03:06 and we will deal with particular elements of resilience decision making in the aftermath of the fire and the key concerns raised by the bsrs in relation to the response of the tmo central and local government

01:03:17 of the tmo central and local government and in that aftermath period and very shortly preliminary observations on recommendations those will obviously be

01:03:28 recommendations those will obviously be developed more fully at the conclusion of the evidence in this module i start with the mayor's role within the statutory resilience framework for london

01:03:38 london the greater london authority differs from other category 1 responders because it's a statutory body and as such is limited to carrying out the functions expressly conferred about upon it

01:03:49 expressly conferred about upon it by the greater london authority act 1999 as a strategic authority the gla's role is quite different from the london local authority roles

01:04:01 from the london local authority roles section two of the gla act states that the gla should consist of the mayor of london and the london assembly the london assembly consists of 25 members

01:04:12 members the executive and decision-making responsibilities of the gla are vested in the mayor whilst through its committee and plenary sessions the london assembly scrutinizes the work

01:04:23 the london assembly scrutinizes the work of the mayor but has very restricted decision-making powers there is a wide general power under section 30 of the gla act which permits

01:04:34 section 30 of the gla act which permits the gla to do anything which furthers one of its principal purposes but that wide power is limited by and must be read in conjunction with section 31 of the act

01:04:46 31 of the act which expressly prevents the gla from providing any health or social services which could be provided by a london borough council or any other public body

01:04:58 borough council or any other public body the gla's powers are limited to incurring expenditure in cooperating with or facilitating or coordinating the activities of other

01:05:09 or coordinating the activities of other bodies providing those services this explains why the gla did not take on a more operational role in response to the grenville tower fire

01:05:20 to the grenville tower fire the cabinet offers guidance notes that as the elected leader of london's regional government the mayor of london plays a full part in supporting the effective implementation

01:05:31 supporting the effective implementation of the act and improving the preparedness of the capital chapter 9 of the guidance which was last revised in 2012 sets out specific requirements of the

01:05:42 sets out specific requirements of the mayor and the gla as follows one engagement in high-level discussions and decisions relating to the management of emergencies in london

01:05:53 of emergencies in london 2. chairing the london resilience forum in 2007 the 17 this function was deputised to fiona twycross the deputy mayor for fire and resilience

01:06:05 mayor for fire and resilience three contributing as necessary to the pre-informing of londoners about the content of emergency plans the correct behavior in an emergency and good practice in terms of preparedness

01:06:17 good practice in terms of preparedness in the home as part of initiatives organized both locally

01:06:21 locally and at the uk level four playing a key role in warning and informing the public during an emergency in london

01:06:30 in london and five taking responsibility for civil protection issues in connection with the management of the two squares parliament square and trafalgar square as part of its general statutory responsibilities

01:06:44 the strategic coordination protocol sets out the strategic coordination arrangements for escalating a multi-agency response to an emergency or

01:06:55 multi-agency response to an emergency or major incident in london the implementation of any plans in a pan-london response to an emergency is through the strategic coordination

01:07:06 is through the strategic coordination group

01:07:07 group in the event of such an emergency or major incident the mayor's office will require initial and regular information about the situation

01:07:18 about the situation the mayor will cut collaborate closely with the strategic coordination group and where appropriately central government including attending cobra meetings if invited

01:07:31 invited however the key role for the mall for the mayor in response to an emergency is acting as the voice of london in order to provide clear and coordination coordinated information and

01:07:43 coordination coordinated information and guidance

01:07:45 guidance publicly the mayor's role is to support the operational response to an emergency in london by providing that unified voice

01:07:54 voice this requires him to provide leadership regional information and reassurance throughout the duration of the response and into the initial stages of the recovery

01:08:06 recovery this role is complementary to and in support of local responders and operational spokespeople in addition to press briefings the mayor's social media channels may be

01:08:17 mayor's social media channels may be used to communicate key information and reassurance messages there are various internal arrangements in place to assist with the mayor's civic leadership as part of his role as

01:08:30 civic leadership as part of his role as voice for london including a mayor's advisory group which for reasons set out in the written opening was not utilized and i say no more about that

01:08:43 but the gold cell procedure was used and had been established to support the mayor's response to a dynamic incident the gold cell comprised an internal

01:08:54 the gold cell comprised an internal group of senior gla officers that convened to share information and ensure that operations that the operation of the mayor's office and the gla would coordinated during the

01:09:06 and the gla would coordinated during the response to an emergency the mayor does not himself attend a gold cell

01:09:12 cell the gold cell enables the mayor to quickly receive relevant and current information about the emergency and the operational response to it to enable him to provide appropriate

01:09:24 to enable him to provide appropriate information to the general public and the relevant stakeholders the gold cell procedure can be activated by the chief of staff or a senior officer acting on his behalf

01:09:35 officer acting on his behalf or the gla duty officer it was activated in the course of the response to the grenville tower fire the gold cell procedure does not impact

01:09:46 the gold cell procedure does not impact on the operational command of the incident

01:09:48 incident as the gla does not have any operational responsibilities rather it is designed to provide the mayor with up-to-date information during

01:09:59 mayor with up-to-date information during a fast-moving incident while the mayor as the executive arm of the gla has a category 1 responder function he has no operational role

01:10:11 function he has no operational role and no operational function in a civil emergency

01:10:15 emergency he has no ability to direct operational responders in particular as john baradel confirms in his statement the arrangements under the resolution for activating london local authority

01:10:28 for activating london local authority gold are initiated by the relevant local authority or authorities this procedure was well known to others concerned with the management of the incident

01:10:38 incident in its early stages

01:10:41 in the event of a major incident the strategic coordination protocol comes into play

01:10:47 into play and in response to the grenville tower fire the london resilience group was notified for a joint assessment and a decision about the level of strategic coordination required

01:10:58 coordination required a strategic coordination group was considered to be the appropriate response to the grenville tower fire and the first meeting was convened at 0 500 hours on the 14th of june 2017

01:11:12 the strategic coordination group brought together the various responders at a strategic level in that context the mayor did not have any active operational role to play in

01:11:24 any active operational role to play in the response to the fire itself although the gla duty officer attended the strategic coordination group meetings both as a category one responder and to support the mayor's

01:11:36 responder and to support the mayor's responsibilities under the strategic coordination protocol the gla officer liaised with the responding agencies as necessary to ensure the gla and the mayor were kept

01:11:47 ensure the gla and the mayor were kept informed of developments in addition in the aftermath of the fire the gla tasked various members of staff to assist with community engagement communications re-housing survivors and

01:12:01 communications re-housing survivors and buildings and building safety under the direction of the london local authority gold i turned to deal with the mayor's role and particular actions between the 14th and the 20th of june 2017.

01:12:15 14th and the 20th of june 2017. john paul graham the gla duty officer was notified of the grenfell tower fire by the london fire commissioner at 0309 hours on the 14th of june 2017.

01:12:29 0309 hours on the 14th of june 2017. mr graham notified the mayor's private office and the gold cell procedure was activated shortly thereafter with the mayor confirming he had knowledge of the fire at around zero

01:12:40 knowledge of the fire at around zero three twenty the gold cell was a means for the senior officials in the gla to share information and discuss what should be released to provide updates to londoners

01:12:52 released to provide updates to londoners including the practical information in relation to road and underground closures

01:12:57 closures one of the key purposes of such messaging is to have an impact on the behaviour of the general public and so it is crucial that the content of that messaging aligns with the operational

01:13:09 messaging aligns with the operational response strategy there was therefore a constant regard to what information was being released or withheld by the operational recovery teams

01:13:21 teams and that might be relevant to londoners in general as outlined in the strategic coordination protocol on notification of the fire at grenville tower the mayor acted as voice of london

01:13:34 acted as voice of london with the aim of providing clear information and guidance to londoners consistent with the information being provided by other operational category one responders however

01:13:44 however given the gla did not have any operational command or control specific communications for those directly affected by the incident

01:13:53 incident remained the responsibility of the of the relevant agencies involved in the operational response the details of the mayor's actions

01:14:04 the details of the mayor's actions during the aftermath are set out in his own statement and the statements of his chief of staff david bellamy the mayor's initial contact was with the operational commanders on the ground the

01:14:15 operational commanders on the ground the london fire commissioner and the commissioner and the deputy commissioner of the metropolitan police service he also attended ministerial meetings and visited the scenes on a number of

01:14:26 and visited the scenes on a number of occasions particularly on the 14th and 15th of june 2017 where he spoke to residents and observed the progress of the response and the recovery

01:14:39 and the recovery by the 15th of june when the mayor visited the grenville site for the second time it was apparent that the humanitarian side of the response was disorganized and inadequate and not meeting the needs

01:14:52 and inadequate and not meeting the needs of the bsrs on that afternoon the mayor had not intended to visit the notting hill methodist church but he was invited to do so

01:15:03 but he was invited to do so what he witnessed was an efficient operation in place with volunteers sorting beddling linen sheets and food parcels and putting clothes into bundles by gender and age group

01:15:15 gender and age group people were hard at work but as at the westway center earlier there did not seem to be any representatives from rbkc or central government present

01:15:27 government present rather the operation was being run by the church at the church the mayor became aware of a large crowd gathering outside and considered strongly that he was his duty

01:15:38 considered strongly that he was his duty as mayor to listen to the concerns firsthand

01:15:42 firsthand so contrary to his security advice he left by the front door and spoke and listened to the concerns of those affected

01:15:50 affected they were understandably angry and frustrated it was clear that the system that should have been in place to assist them was not in place or if it was the response by state

01:16:03 or if it was the response by state agencies was wholly unsatisfactory the response by the local community was overwhelming both in the context of humanitarian aid

01:16:14 both in the context of humanitarian aid the volume of donation and the work of the volunteers in filling the void left by rbkc it was apparent that there was considerable duplication of tasks

01:16:26 considerable duplication of tasks whilst there were a large number of volunteers proper coordination appeared to be lacking the ngos such as islamic islamic relief from the british red cross

01:16:37 from the british red cross used to dealing with disasters overseas were very much leading the way but they were having to improvise in lieu of any direction from our bkc or central government

01:16:49 central government rbkc was invisible if they were present at all

01:16:53 at all there was no obvious method of identifying anyone in authority

01:16:58 the mayor observed that despite the amazing work and the good will of the volunteers the scene was chaotic with members of the public turning up with van loads of clothes nappies and

01:17:10 with van loads of clothes nappies and toys

01:17:11 toys it was impossible to identify who was there and for what purpose the volunteers from organizations such as the british red cross were expressing frustration

01:17:22 frustration about a lack of proper coordination the mayor's chief of staff then attended the ministerial meeting which took place that afternoon at 15 30 just as the mayor was making his way

01:17:34 just as the mayor was making his way back from the scene nicholas holgate attended that meeting by telephone on behalf of rbkc it transpired that others were also concerned about the response effort by

01:17:47 concerned about the response effort by rbkc

01:17:49 rbkc catherine hammond of the cabinet office commented in her evidence that nicholas holgate was unable to articulate a plan beyond the immediate need for re-housing or explain what additional resources

01:18:01 or explain what additional resources were required from outside the council stuart wainwright also from the cabinet office expressed concerns about rbkc's capacity to cope

01:18:15 the mayor's chief of staff was sufficiently concerned at the mounting evidence of problems on the ground that he telephoned john baridale after the ministerial meeting to discuss what action could most hopefully helpfully be

01:18:27 action could most hopefully helpfully be taken

01:18:29 taken john baradel informed the mayor's chief of staff that he was currently on a separate call with nicholas holgate and that he anticipated mutual aid would be invoked mr

01:18:40 mutual aid would be invoked mr baridale's evidence recalls that it became clear to him that during that call further support was needed and a request for such support was made by nicholas holgate later that evening

01:18:52 nicholas holgate later that evening the mayor's chief of staff followed up with an email to john barredale setting out the concerns with rbkc's response that had become apparent to the gla

01:19:03 that had become apparent to the gla of particular note was the concern and i quote it's worth flagging that building a list of people known to live in the tower is something they've apparently so far failed to do

01:19:14 far failed to do this was almost 48 hours after the start of the fire additional concerns were also raised in email and confirmed what had been evident to the mayor during his earlier

01:19:27 evident to the mayor during his earlier visit

01:19:29 visit communication as to what the public should and shouldn't do updates on social media had been sporadic the last update from rbkc had been at 11 34 that day

01:19:40 been at 11 34 that day a lack of responsiveness to the key agencies and to london resilience to assist with coordination communication with the ngos particularly the british red cross who'd struggled to

01:19:52 the british red cross who'd struggled to get direction lack of communication with those offering to help and assist financially with hotels for those affected a lack of communication updates to

01:20:03 a lack of communication updates to others affected eg those evacuated from nearby premises who did not know when they would be allowed back into their homes the mayor's concerns were also set out

01:20:14 the mayor's concerns were also set out in a letter to the prime minister the following day on the 16th of june the same day that his chief of staff attended the grenville recovery task force meeting

01:20:26 the mayor attended a further grenville recovery task force meeting on saturday the 17th of june in that meeting there was a discussion of what financial support should be

01:20:37 of what financial support should be given to families displaced from their homes

01:20:40 homes and whether this should be paid by way of a lump sum or an installment there appeared to be a reluctance by some to give those who needed support this payment as a lump

01:20:52 needed support this payment as a lump sum

01:20:53 sum it appeared to the mayor that there was a difference in governmental approach between the five thousand pounds that have previously been given by way of a lump sum to the victims of flooding

01:21:04 lump sum to the victims of flooding and the 500 pound installment that was being proposed here the mayor would invite your inquiry to examine whether this was a difference in

01:21:15 examine whether this was a difference in approach and if so why the mayor's impression was that it was symptomatic of the prejudice and institutional indifference towards the bsrs

01:21:26 bsrs but it will be for the inquiry to reach its own conclusion on this issue the mayor attended a further meeting of the grenville recovery task force on the 19th of june and his chief of staff

01:21:39 19th of june and his chief of staff attended at official level task force meetings on the 18th of june and the 20th of june 2017. in keeping with his responsibilities as the voice of london the mayor issued a

01:21:51 the voice of london the mayor issued a statement in relation to the main points that had been raised and discussed in the meetings on each occasion and used social media to update members of the public of his attendance and to feedback the discussions at those

01:22:03 and to feedback the discussions at those meetings and reassure people he was seeking action and answers on their behalf

01:22:10 behalf i turned to deal with the particular elements of resilience decision making in the aftermath of fire humanitarian aid and support to those directly

01:22:20 directly affected by such an incident are fundamental elements of any emergency response the aim is to assist people who have been displaced

01:22:31 been displaced and in this case a significant number who had lost everything in the aftermath of the grenville tower fire this support this support should obviously have been a priority

01:22:43 obviously have been a priority for rbkc

01:22:45 for rbkc as it carried the responsibility for activating the formal arrangements for a humanitarian assistance response it is clear from the evidence that there

01:22:56 it is clear from the evidence that there were many both within rbkc and outside who considered early on that given the scale of the incident mutual aid should be invoked and london local authority

01:23:08 be invoked and london local authority gold should take over management of the response and recovery that is apparent from the evidence disclosed by those within rbkc david kerry the contingency planning

01:23:20 david kerry the contingency planning manager recorded in his log on the 14th of june at 10 o'clock in the morning this incident is bigger than any one local authority in london can manage consideration should be given to asking

01:23:32 consideration should be given to asking for mutual aid from becc

01:23:37 as you've already heard from mr khan queen's council this morning david kerry had been alert to the seriousness of the position right from the start as stuart priestly's log recorded at 0 6

01:23:50 as stuart priestly's log recorded at 0 6 30 on the 14th of june david advised nicholas of the mutual aid arrangements available via the lag and our neighboring brothers

01:24:01 via the lag and our neighboring brothers nicholas stated that looks like we can't cope the conversation on mutual aid at that point ended as you have heard already the failure to

01:24:12 as you have heard already the failure to invoke mutual aid at an early stage was even more detrimental in the case of the grenville tower residents given the history of mistrust between rbkc

01:24:23 history of mistrust between rbkc the tmo and the residents which the inquiry has investigated in considerable detail in module three it is clear that this community felt

01:24:35 it is clear that this community felt isolated and abandoned both before and after the fire and this in turn contributed to the difficulties that the authorities then had in trying to regain the trust of the

01:24:46 had in trying to regain the trust of the community community at the later stages of the response in some cases it has understandably been incapable of repair in its exploration of the reasons

01:24:59 repair in its exploration of the reasons for not invoking mutual aid earlier the inquiry will have to consider whether the leadership at rbkc was more concerned with its own reputation

01:25:10 concerned with its own reputation rather than the relief effort coupled with the failure to invoke mutual aid was rbkc's lack of urgency in activating a cohesive humanitarian

01:25:21 activating a cohesive humanitarian response

01:25:23 response this is illustrated most clearly by the fact that the first meeting of the humanitarian assistance group did not take place until 2 pm on the 15th of june 2017.

01:25:37 15th of june 2017. internally there was a perception that rbkc were continuing with business as usual

01:25:44 usual as well as attempting to deal with the response to the fire overall

01:25:49 overall the evidence suggests a reactive response rather than a strategic one with each of the rbkc gold group acting in a vacuum without any overall strategic leadership

01:26:03 without any overall strategic leadership it is particularly telling that the first rbkc gold group did not take place until 11am on the 14th of june 2017.

01:26:15 what was needed and what should have happened

01:26:18 happened immediately was for an individual in our bkc or london local authority gold on request to take charge and lead the strategic response with a

01:26:29 and lead the strategic response with a vision to shape the response according to priority need undoubtedly rbkc should have made a request for mutual aid at the earliest opportunity on the 14th of june 2017.

01:26:43 opportunity on the 14th of june 2017. it's clear from the evidence that the process for invoking mutual aid was known to those in leadership roles in rbkc

01:26:51 rbkc and that this failure had a devastating consequence upon those who had already been so catastrophically affected by the fire

01:27:01 fire even those from within our bkc recognized the pressing need alan's and stuart and rebecca blackburn both recognized that the initial response by rbkc was too slow

01:27:15 response by rbkc was too slow the becc was too slow to open an initial mobilization of staff and general coordination was not great the initial assistance offered by charlie parker the chief executive of

01:27:28 charlie parker the chief executive of westminster council acknowledged as being well placed to provide expertise was rejected by nicholas holgate on the basis that they did not know what help was needed

01:27:39 did not know what help was needed it was obvious to the leader of westminster council nikki aiken on the morning of the 14th of june that rbkc would not be able to cope

01:27:50 would not be able to cope furthermore there was an assumption in central government that rbkc was one of london's best performing performing and competent councils the presumption was that it would be

01:28:03 the presumption was that it would be able to respond in line with those expectations the absence of effective strategic oversight and leadership was felt quickly on the ground

01:28:15 quickly on the ground the bsrs recognized the absence of leadership even if others did not it was noted by individual bsrs in the immediate aftermath of the fire that the

01:28:26 immediate aftermath of the fire that the tmo

01:28:27 tmo rbkc and central government were nowhere to be seen and there was no coordination of leadership from those organizations the bsrs therefore created their own

01:28:38 the bsrs therefore created their own support system the lack of information the absence of leadership and the lack of a coordinated response allowed rumor and false information to

01:28:49 allowed rumor and false information to gain traction and become out of control better communication would have prevented that from happening ultimately the community deserves

01:29:00 ultimately the community deserves strategic leadership from our bkc in the aftermath of this tragedy it was sorely lacking and as has been described within the evidence

01:29:09 evidence led to a huge vacuum into which the community had to respond and do its best to cope with what had taken place

01:29:19 the effect of this uncoordinated and resource limited approach was felt by those who needed the support the most the concerns about rbkc being raised at

01:29:30 the concerns about rbkc being raised at the london level and the central governmental level had a direct correlation with the concerns that were being experienced on the ground it was obvious early on that rbkc did

01:29:42 it was obvious early on that rbkc did not have an adequate grip on the response and could not cope on their own rbkc's failure to invoke mutual aid resolution at the earliest opportunity

01:29:53 resolution at the earliest opportunity meant that when london local authority gold could finally step in and take charge on the afternoon of the 16th of june

01:30:00 june valuable time had been lost to support the community and trust between the bsrs and the agencies tasked with helping them was already in short supply

01:30:11 them was already in short supply this made the task of local of london local authority gold much harder in leading the response after the 16th the bsrs have highlighted a large number

01:30:23 the bsrs have highlighted a large number of issues that stem directly from the uncoordinated and resource limited approach

01:30:29 approach these concern poor communication a failure by rbkc and the tmo to have an up-to-date record of residents in the tower

01:30:38 tower lack of presence of rbkc or tmo officials on the ground and the inadequate provision of temporary accommodation in hotels turning to deal with poor communication

01:30:51 turning to deal with poor communication intertwined in the strategic flaws in the response was a lack of communication in the immediate aftermath this covered both communications at the site in the rest centers and also the

01:31:04 site in the rest centers and also the information available to those affected by the fire via the rbkc channels the effect of this poor communication was felt directly by the bsrs

01:31:16 was felt directly by the bsrs there are examples of individuals only being able to access pre-recorded information on the rbkc housing line survivors describe not being able to

01:31:28 survivors describe not being able to establish what assistance was available financial or otherwise and having to find out everything for themselves the lack of proactive information from the authorities made an already horrific

01:31:40 the authorities made an already horrific situation even worse our bkc had lost the community's trust by its failure to provide clear consistent communication

01:31:51 consistent communication and as stuart priestley's stuart priestley observed once communication was lost on the first day it was very difficult to recover from

01:32:03 it was very difficult to recover from information in relation to the availability of financial assistance was also sporadic inconsistent and sometimes wrong this caused considerable hardship and distress

01:32:15 distress some survivors only found out about the government fund provided for their benefit

01:32:20 benefit via the media and were never told officially a number of survivors did not receive the financial assistance they were entitled to because they were not made aware of it at the appropriate time

01:32:32 aware of it at the appropriate time and one of the bereaved was told in terms and wrongly that he was not entitled to any financial support there were seemingly no specific

01:32:43 there were seemingly no specific department or officials within rbkc or the tmo designated to assist in the immediate aftermath of the fire with providing support and meaningful updates to the bsrs

01:32:56 to the bsrs people needed clear lines of communication and compassionate and practical assistance in their time of need

01:33:04 need there is also evidence from bsrs that relatives and friends of those who perished in the fire struggled to obtain information about their loved ones from the metropolitan

01:33:15 their loved ones from the metropolitan police service and the casualty bureau one person who lost many friends in the fire struggled to find any information that was easily accessible

01:33:28 that was easily accessible and obtained second-hand information in the news

01:33:32 the news a mother

01:33:33 a mother found out that her son had died in the fire

01:33:36 fire on the news one survivor learnt about the death of his friend by seeing pictures of his body being uploaded on facebook a daughter whose father had died in the

01:33:48 a daughter whose father had died in the fire

01:33:49 fire called the helpline but was never called back

01:33:52 back she also called hospitals and the police and felt she was being battered around and not getting any information in relation to her missing father the lack of information in the first

01:34:04 the lack of information in the first week is described as crippling in fact what comes across from the very many statements in this particular issue is that the families and friends of those missing were left to find out their own

01:34:16 were left to find out their own information by trial and error regrettably the bsrs appeared to have been provided with limited assistance by the casualty bureau in terms of

01:34:27 the casualty bureau in terms of communication regarding their missing relatives

01:34:31 relatives it may well have been very difficult to provide such information about those missing

01:34:37 missing but more should have been done to keep the families updated and supported

01:34:45 of equal concern the bsrs were experiencing the effect of lack of leadership on the ground it was apparent that rbkc were either invisible or if they were identifiable

01:34:56 invisible or if they were identifiable as being present were working without any structure or direction emma sprague the london director for independent living and crisis response from the british red cross

01:35:07 from the british red cross noted the reports from her team on the ground on the first day after the fire reflected that it was difficult to identify rbkc personnel so people did not know who was in charge

01:35:18 so people did not know who was in charge or who to ask for help her volunteers had attended early on the morning of the 14th of june and had been unable to obtain information from our bkc as to the identification of the

01:35:30 bkc as to the identification of the allocated main rest center they were directed to attend across a number of centres which had opened spontaneously resulting in those volunteers being spread thinly

01:35:42 spread thinly this resulted in the duplication of tasks which had been noted by the mayor on his visit on the 15th of june and meant that insufficient support was provided to survivors from the start

01:35:55 survivors from the start the lack of a location for an official rest centre made it very difficult for the british red cross to distribute and focus resources when the west way was confirmed on the

01:36:06 when the west way was confirmed on the evening of the 14th of june as being the official center others had to be closed down and people transferred across which inevitably added to the trauma distress

01:36:17 inevitably added to the trauma distress and lack of trust it also meant that vital opportunities to obtain information about survivors and those missing in the very early part of the crisis had been lost

01:36:30 many of the bsrs were unable to identify local authority or central government personnel

01:36:35 personnel from whom they could obtain consistent and reliable information one of the bsrs noted as far as i could see there was no one in central government local government or from the

01:36:47 government local government or from the emergency services at the rpt taking control of the situation we were down in the basement survivors were walking around in shock i think the

01:36:58 were walking around in shock i think the police turned up and started taking names

01:37:01 names we realized that we all needed to organize ourselves and look out for ourselves because no one in authority was doing that

01:37:11 at the rugby portobello trust there were many organizations asking besides for their details but they were unsure who they were or what they were doing there there was no one identifiable from the

01:37:23 there was no one identifiable from the tmo or our bkc to be seen or to take on the task of helping the survivors

01:37:30 survivors one survivor recalled a notable absence of rbkc and the tmo saying it was like they were hiding away from bereaved families even though some people had lost

01:37:41 even though some people had lost everything and needed help they disappeared from us the lack of physical presence from the authorities meant that the bsrs felt abandoned and unsupported

01:37:54 the absence of an up-to-date list of residents for grenville tower was a fundamental hindrance to the smooth running of the relief effort it resulted in survivors having to

01:38:05 it resulted in survivors having to repeat information about themselves and their families multiple times to different people this increased their distress and prevented the organized distribution of money and of other humanitarian aid

01:38:19 of money and of other humanitarian aid the absence of a list of residents also caused distress to those who had survived and were in need of support and help

01:38:26 help it led to one survivor providing his details at the rest center but being informed that someone else's details were recording of having lived in his flat even though he had lived there for 20 years

01:38:37 20 years likewise another individual felt that there was no proper record of tenants at grenville tower and so no one knew who she was

01:38:45 she was as noted earlier in this statement the absence of the list had been highlighted by the mayor's chief of staff in his email to john baradel on the evening of the 15th of june

01:38:56 the 15th of june however the need to have access to such a list had also been highlighted as a result of the adair tower fire in 2015. furthermore in relation to vulnerable

01:39:07 furthermore in relation to vulnerable residents the lfb had requested a meeting with rbkc and the tmo officials as far back as 2012 that a list of vulnerable residents be maintained

01:39:19 maintained these concerns seem to have gone unheeded

01:39:23 unheeded the absence of a list of known residents also had the effect on the ability of others to distribute aid effectively as claire richards acknowledged on the 19th of june

01:39:35 19th of june that their her organization and others had agreed to share and combine lists in the absence of anything more formal the clement james center for which she

01:39:46 the clement james center for which she worked did not in fact receive a list of residents until august of 2017.

01:39:54 the lack of an accurate and up-to-date list of residents undoubtedly caused profound distress to the bsrs but it also raised a significant number of practical issues both for the individuals and for the

01:40:06 both for the individuals and for the authorities seeking to respond to the terrible events it underpins very many of the legitimate concerns raised by the bsrs in their statements particularly concerning rest

01:40:17 statements particularly concerning rest centres hotel accommodation and the availability of financial assistance as we've heard there were considerable issues with the provision of hotel accommodation and food to survivors in

01:40:30 accommodation and food to survivors in the aftermath of the fire there was no structure to enable the matching of accommodation with need for example family groups were not identified as needing more space

01:40:41 identified as needing more space and those with special needs were not identified so as to accommodate their particular requirements there had been no pre-existing agreements with hotels for the

01:40:52 agreements with hotels for the accommodation of those displaced by a major incident as laura johnson accepts in her evidence and this resulted in ad hoc placements where they were available and without

01:41:04 where they were available and without any real consideration of suitability as we've heard earlier today the bsrs have provided the inquiry with stark examples of how this affected them i

01:41:15 examples of how this affected them i picked just a few a man whose wife had died was placed in sheltered accommodation with no one he knew having just been widowed

01:41:26 having just been widowed a mother whose son had learning difficulties was not provided with any support to assist him with being displaced and disoriented after the fire a woman with mobility issues struggled

01:41:38 a woman with mobility issues struggled to use the bath in the bathroom of her allocated hotel room because it was not suitably adapted to take account of her needs

01:41:46 needs a family of five was allocated a suite with one double room dump one double bed and one single bed for five people including a pregnant daughter who slept on the floor

01:41:59 on the floor a disabled mother slept in her wheelchair because her children took the only two single rooms in the hotel room families with children were not identified as having specific

01:42:10 identified as having specific requirements a mother who had no cot for her 18 month old daughter for the period of seven months she was accommodated in a hotel a father unable to sterilize bottles for

01:42:22 a father unable to sterilize bottles for his baby daughter a mother struggling to get any support for her daughter's special needs while she was accommodated in hotel in addition the duration of the

01:42:34 in addition the duration of the accommodation was uncertain one individual says he was often locked out of his accommodation because the booking had not been renewed many others expressed concern because they were not sure how long their

01:42:45 they were not sure how long their booking was for and that they were only extended at the very last moment some hotels gave individuals notice to leave

01:42:54 leave because the booking was at an end and still others were locked out of their rooms because the bill had not been paid

01:43:02 been paid there were also cultural issues that arose as the fire took place during ramadan

01:43:07 ramadan and the haphazard nature of the hotel allocations did not allow for consideration to be given to this some hotels could not provide a meal to enable residents to break fast in the evening

01:43:19 evening in others the food and drink was not suitable

01:43:21 suitable for some there was no halal food and only set times for meals the true support for the bsrs during ramadan came from the community who provided appropriate food for them to

01:43:33 provided appropriate food for them to break the fast in the evening with some volunteers delivering it to them in their hotels and others making it available in the rest centers

01:43:44 in addition to those issues that arose from failures of immediate response there was also a very significant issue that arose from the promised by central government to re-house survivors within a three-week period

01:43:56 a three-week period it was obvious to many people working on rehousing

01:44:00 rehousing survivors that such a deadline was wholly unrealistic furthermore the trauma that had been suffered by the bsrs meant that for some the ability to make such a momentous decision was not conceivable at such an

01:44:13 decision was not conceivable at such an early stage after the fire the effect was to apply significant pressure to those responsible for meeting those targets which was in turn transferred across to

01:44:24 which was in turn transferred across to the vulnerable people who felt pressurized into accepting unsuitable accommodation in the light of all that had gone before the three-week re-housing time frame was

01:44:36 the three-week re-housing time frame was never going to be achieved and added to the distress suffered by an already traumatic traumatized community i turned very briefly to deal with preliminary observations on

01:44:47 preliminary observations on recommendations as he says in his written statement to the inquiry the mayor considers that the community were badly let down by rbkc's failure to acknowledge that they were overwhelmed and in need of help

01:44:59 overwhelmed and in need of help immediately the humanitarian response could have been much more effective in the first days after the fire the mayor also has no doubt that in

01:45:10 the mayor also has no doubt that in terms of the efficacy of the humanitarian and associated resilience arrangements these did not work as well as they should have rbkc's failure to invoke mutual aid immediately in the face of a tragedy of

01:45:22 immediately in the face of a tragedy of this scale was a significant reason for that

01:45:25 that and prevented others from providing the immediate assistance at the appropriate scale that was so desperately needed there was a serious issue with the lack

01:45:36 there was a serious issue with the lack of awareness of what was happening on the ground the strategic coordination group was reliant upon rbkc to provide a comprehensive picture of this but sue redmond was not appointed as the

01:45:48 but sue redmond was not appointed as the humanitarian assistance liaison officer until the 15th of june given that the role her role was to bring together partners including health teams police voluntary and faith sectors

01:46:01 teams police voluntary and faith sectors to oversee the humanitarian assistance effort

01:46:04 effort it was inevitable that the delays in making this appointment rendered updates on the ground from rbkc ineffectual and incomplete

01:46:15 ineffectual and incomplete the mutual aid system is designed around responders requesting help there are clear lessons to be learned here about activating it sooner and understanding the scale and the opportunity of the support from

01:46:27 opportunity of the support from elsewhere

01:46:29 elsewhere clearly many strands of the response that should have helped those directly affected by the fire at grenville tower failed to provide that assistance this module must be used as an opportunity to ensure that improvements

01:46:41 opportunity to ensure that improvements are made and lessons are learned and in that way the bsrs can at least be reassured that the horrific experiences that they testify to will not happen to others in the future

01:46:56 thank you very much now after a very brief interlude for cleaning down you'll hear a statement from mr neil sheldon queen's council on

01:47:07 mr neil sheldon queen's council on behalf of the cabinet office

01:47:22 yes mr sheldon mr chairman members of the panel um as you are aware the cabinet office is the sponsoring department for this inquiry and has been

01:47:33 department for this inquiry and has been involved in that capacity from the outset

01:47:36 outset but this is the first occasion on which the cabinet officers participated in the inquiry as a core participant and it is grateful now to have the opportunity to contribute directly to the important work of the inquiry in its

01:47:48 the important work of the inquiry in its consideration of the aftermath of the fire

01:47:52 fire given that this is the first occasion on which the cabinet office has made submissions to the inquiry in the course of its public hearings it wishes to start by expressing its deepest sympathies to the bereaved

01:48:04 sympathies to the bereaved the survivors and all those affected by the grenfell tower fire the tragic events of the 14th of nov of june 2017 had a profound effect on all

01:48:15 june 2017 had a profound effect on all of those involved in dealing with the aftermath of the fire and it continues to do so

01:48:20 to do so a number of cabinet office office witnesses have provided the inquiry with statements and you will be hearing from one of those witnesses during the course of these hearings but all of those involved in the

01:48:31 but all of those involved in the response to the fire both at the time and subsequently wish me to make clear on their behalf their commitment to continuing to assist your inquiry in whatever way they can in ensuring that a

01:48:43 whatever way they can in ensuring that a tragedy of this nature never happens again

01:48:47 again we understand that in this module the focus will be on the period of seven days after the fire in that context and by reference to the matter set out in issue 13 the cabinet office will be able to assist the

01:48:59 office will be able to assist the inquiry in addressing the following firstly the policies procedures and plans that were in place on the part of central government in dealing with a major emergency such as the grenfell tower fire

01:49:12 as the grenfell tower fire secondly the response of central government by way of the provision of emergency relief in the seven days immediately following the fire and thirdly whether that response was adequate and if not in what respects it

01:49:24 adequate and if not in what respects it was inadequate the role played by the cabinet office in the aftermath of the of the fire was important but relatively narrow in summary the cabinet office has

01:49:35 in summary the cabinet office has responsibility discharged through the civil contingency secretariat or ccs for firstly the formulation of the policy and guidance framework within which

01:49:47 and guidance framework within which multi-agency emergency response arrangements are delivered in england and secondly coordinating the central government response in the event of an inmate of a major emergency where the

01:49:59 inmate of a major emergency where the cross-cutting nature or scale of the effects requires it in both respects the role is primarily a coordinating one directed at ensuring that the planning for and response to

01:50:12 that the planning for and response to major disasters is undertaken efficiently and effectively by those parts of central government with direct responsibility for those areas the witness evidence provided to the

01:50:23 the witness evidence provided to the inquiry on behalf of the cabinet office comprises a total of 17 witness statements including three statements of catherine hammond who was the director of the ccs at the material time and who

01:50:34 of the ccs at the material time and who as you know will be giving oral evidence the inquiry has helpfully provided very detailed lists of questions for the witnesses to address and all of those questions have been answered

01:50:47 questions have been answered it's unnecessary for me to rehearse the detail of that evidence but in the short time available this afternoon it may be helpful if i outlined briefly the key respects of the ccs's involvement in firstly the

01:51:00 of the ccs's involvement in firstly the coordination of the central government response in the immediate aftermath and secondly the formulation of the policies plans and procedures for dealing with an emergency of the scale

01:51:12 dealing with an emergency of the scale and complexity of the grenfell tower fire

01:51:16 fire after i've done so i will say a brief word about the extensive process that has been undertaken by the ccs to learn the lessons of this tragedy and to implement changes in relation to both

01:51:27 implement changes in relation to both planning and emergency response turning first to the central government response the role of the ccs is to act in effect as the coordinating secretariat

01:51:39 secretariat the role is primarily directed to ensuring the smooth coordination of a process which may involve a number of different branches of government often in circumstances of intense pressure of time

01:51:51 pressure of time ccs does not act as a category 1 or category 2 responder in these circumstances and it is not involved in the delivery of emergency response on the ground

01:52:02 the ground instead its core function is to ensure that those parts of central government that are concerned with the emergency response are provided with up-to-date

01:52:13 response are provided with up-to-date accurate information and that the process of cross-governmental coordination is operated efficiently and effectively and that decisions are made well

01:52:24 that decisions are made well what this involves in practice is best illustrated by the chronology of what in fact took place in the immediate aftermath of the fire now a very detailed account as you've seen has been set out in the witness

01:52:36 seen has been set out in the witness evidence but in outline what happened was this

01:52:40 was this the cabinet office first became aware of the fire at 1 30 am on the 14th of june when it was identified by the national security secretariat watch keepers the news was referred to the senior

01:52:52 the news was referred to the senior civil servant duty officer which at the time of the fire was catherine hammond she learned of the fire at 3 am and at 3 49 she updated the head of the ccs readiness and response team that

01:53:04 ccs readiness and response team that would hold responsibility for the ccs response

01:53:08 response a situation report was sent to amongst others number 10 the national security adviser and the duty private secretary in the office of the minister for the cabinet office shortly after 4 30.

01:53:20 cabinet office shortly after 4 30. ccs duty team also contacted and informed dclg red the first meeting of the strategic coordination group of which you've heard the scg

01:53:32 the scg took place at 5 am the critical question from the ccs's perspective in these first few hours was whether there was any indication of a lack of adequate resources to tackle the

01:53:44 lack of adequate resources to tackle the fire and in particular whether the key responders the fire service ambulance services the police were flagging critical issues with resources such that assistance from central government would

01:53:56 assistance from central government would be required no such issues were brought to ccs's attention at that stage following discussions with number 10 and also involving the ccs and the home

01:54:09 and also involving the ccs and the home office

01:54:10 office a decision was taken to convene a cross-government ministerial meeting concerning the fire at this point the home office was the lead government department given its policy responsibility for fire and

01:54:21 policy responsibility for fire and rescue services although there was no information at that stage to indicate that local responders required the intervention of central government the scale of the emergency was becoming clear

01:54:33 emergency was becoming clear and there was desire on the part of central government to take stock verify the position regarding resources and to start assessing what level of support might be required over the coming days

01:54:46 might be required over the coming days ccs took responsibility for making the necessary arrangements for the meeting as described by the witnesses this was done

01:54:54 done as indeed it was done on subsequent occasions over the course of the next several days in accordance with ccs's well-established process for preparing for

01:55:03 for and supporting cross-governmental coordination meetings it's important to make clear that this process applied in essentially the same way regardless of whether or not

01:55:14 way regardless of whether or not meetings were given the specific cobra label

01:55:18 label the notice of the meeting was sent out at 10 37

01:55:21 at 10 37 informing invitees that it would take place at 4pm that day over the course of the next several hours ccs drafted a brief for the chair provided the chair with an oral briefing

01:55:32 provided the chair with an oral briefing drew up an agenda finalized the list of attendees and prepared the first iteration of the commonly recognized information picture or of which you've heard earlier

01:55:44 you've heard earlier the purpose of the is to provide an up-to-date and accurate picture of the current situation including relevant facts and figures information relating to the scene of the

01:55:55 information relating to the scene of the emergency any significant wider impacts the main developments and decisions trends and upcoming decision points the first ministerial meeting took place

01:56:06 the first ministerial meeting took place as scheduled at 4 pm on the 5th on the 14th of june the home office remained the lead government department and the meeting was chaired by the right honourable nick heard mp the minister for police and

01:56:18 heard mp the minister for police and fire services it was attended by a mix of ministers civil servants and first responders and it concluded with a list of eight action points

01:56:29 action points ccs took responsibility for ensuring that those action points were disseminated and that they had come to the attention of the relevant individuals and agencies it was also responsible for following up

01:56:41 it was also responsible for following up the action points by contacting the relevant department or organization to make sure they understood what was required of them and were taking steps to achieve it now this was the first of a series of

01:56:54 now this was the first of a series of cross-government meetings which took place on a daily basis during the seven days immediately following the fire and indeed beyond now the precise format of the meetings

01:57:05 now the precise format of the meetings the list of attendees and so on varied over time the first two meetings were chaired by nick heard mp this was because the home office was responsible for fire and rescue services and the

01:57:17 for fire and rescue services and the police

01:57:18 police which were the two category one responders most heavily engaged in the initial response to the fire thereafter as you will know the prime minister chaired the meetings on the 16th 17th

01:57:30 chaired the meetings on the 16th 17th and 19th of june meetings of officials took place on the 18th and the 20th of june the role of the ccs in each of these meetings was

01:57:41 the ccs in each of these meetings was essentially the same it identified the relevant attendees it prepared a brief for the chair of the meeting it drew up the agenda it ensured the was up to date it disseminated

01:57:53 the was up to date it disseminated and followed up the action points decided at the meeting the detail of precisely what was done and by whom in respect of each meeting in the discharge of the ccs's secretariat functions is set out in the

01:58:06 secretariat functions is set out in the witness evidence of katherine hammond stewart wainwright peter talentire and paul mcglockery the inquiry has received evidence from a number of the attendees at these

01:58:17 number of the attendees at these meetings and there may be a range of views about the decisions that were taken and the contributions made by individual participants however it is respectfully submitted that the evidence demonstrates that the

01:58:28 that the evidence demonstrates that the secretariat function performed by ccs in support of the cross governmental meetings

01:58:34 meetings convened in the seven days following the fire was performed competently efficiently and in accordance with established procedures for coordinating a central government response to a major

01:58:45 a central government response to a major emergency in short the right people were given the right information in order to enable them to make well-informed decisions now it was not the function of the ccs

01:58:56 now it was not the function of the ccs to take operational decisions about the delivery of the central government's response to the grenfell tower fire or to deliver that response on the ground ccs inevitably had a degree of awareness

01:59:08 ccs inevitably had a degree of awareness of the current situation as a result of updating the in particular and in some cases attending the meetings the inquiry has requested and has been provided with the views of the relevant

01:59:20 provided with the views of the relevant witnesses on certain matters that arose in the immediate aftermath of the fire but they were not present on the ground and the decision-making as to how the cross-governmental and multi-agency

01:59:31 cross-governmental and multi-agency response should be delivered was for the relevant local and regional bodies and the relevant government departments and agencies and not the ccs and i must say that any opinions

01:59:42 and i must say that any opinions expressed must be caveated accordingly particularly given that the inquiry will be hearing from those who were directly involved

01:59:51 involved by the 17th of june 2017 ccs had started to look ahead to the recovery phase of the response to the fire and how that process might most effectively be managed and this work was progressed

02:00:04 managed and this work was progressed alongside the continuing support provided to the daily cross-governmental meetings

02:00:09 meetings catherine hammond exchanged some correspondence with mark sedwell the then national security adviser on this issue on the 17th of june and came to the view that the scale of the task was

02:00:20 the view that the scale of the task was such that dclg as the lead department for this phase of the response would benefit from support including the secondment of a deputy director from ccs to assist with the

02:00:32 director from ccs to assist with the coordination of the recovery response ian whitehouse duly transferred to dclg for this purpose on the 19th of june and the inquiry has statements from him

02:00:43 inquiry has statements from him explaining how he came to be involved and the nature of his role the

02:00:49 the transition to the recovery phase at ministerial level was also supported by ccs

02:00:56 ccs on the 20th of june a draft proposal was produced for the composition of a grenfell ministerial recovery group along with an overview of how it should be supported

02:01:07 be supported the subsequent establishment of the recovery group post-dates the seven-day period on which the inquiry is focusing and is not addressed further save to note that the ccs continued to provide

02:01:18 note that the ccs continued to provide secretariat support to the ministerial task force and following the transition to recovery the ministerial recovery group

02:01:29 that is an outline of the chronology relating to ccs's involvement in coordinating the central government response in the seven days following the fire and it is hopefully of some assistance in demonstrating the role of

02:01:41 assistance in demonstrating the role of the ccs in this context and the manner in which that role was discharged in the particular circumstances of this case the second relevant aspect of the ccs's role concerns the policy framework

02:01:54 ccs's role concerns the policy framework within which multi-agency emergency response arrangements in england are delivered

02:02:00 delivered ccs holds responsibility for this framework which consists of an extensive body of legislation policy and guidance the detail of which has been set out in the written evidence provided to the

02:02:12 the written evidence provided to the inquiry with the most relevant identified in our written opening statement

02:02:17 statement one of the key concepts underlying this framework is subsidiarity that is to say local responders are usually best placed to identify the risks in their areas and to put in place

02:02:30 risks in their areas and to put in place appropriate plans and capability to respond to those risks the policies and guidance produced by central government are primarily designed to assist local responders in

02:02:42 designed to assist local responders in discharging those responsibilities ultimately it is for category 1 and 2 responders to assure themselves that their plans are robust and their

02:02:53 their plans are robust and their capabilities adequate to ensure that they are meeting their obligations under the 2004 act and associated regulations that said

02:03:04 that said ccs does have a high level role in assessing that the level of resilience capabilities for dealing with major emergencies across the uk is adequate

02:03:15 emergencies across the uk is adequate primarily through the resilient capability survey which is designed to identify any significant gaps in capability ccs also provides training and support

02:03:27 ccs also provides training and support to local responders through the emergency planning college now the resources in place to assist category 1 and 2 responders in planning for and meeting the challenges posed by

02:03:40 for and meeting the challenges posed by emergencies of various types are extensive

02:03:44 extensive the starting point is the clear allocation of roles and responsibilities set out in part one of the 2004 act all category one responders are responsible for risk assessment

02:03:57 responsible for risk assessment emergency planning communicating with the public information sharing cooperation with other local responders and promoting business continuity

02:04:08 and promoting business continuity management category 2 responders are required to cooperate and share information with other category 1 and category 2 responders

02:04:19 category 2 responders as you've heard from mr millet this morning

02:04:23 morning there is a large body of statutory and non-statutory guidance as to how these responsibilities should be discharged emergency preparedness is the key piece

02:04:34 emergency preparedness is the key piece of statutory guidance which sets out how civil protection duties should be carried out in england and wales it is complemented by a volume of non-statutory guidance entitled

02:04:45 non-statutory guidance entitled emergency response and recovery which is directed to responder agencies and is aimed primarily at developing a shared understanding of the multi-agency

02:04:56 understanding of the multi-agency framework for emergency response and recovery at the local level as well as the roles and responsibilities of individual organizations this guidance is of particular

02:05:08 this guidance is of particular importance when dealing with an emergency such as the grenfell tower fire as it addresses the roles and responsibilities of the category one and two responders in such a situation

02:05:20 two responders in such a situation in brief summary the fire and rescue services will be expected to coordinate the response at the scene of a major fire and local authorities are expected

02:05:31 fire and local authorities are expected amongst other things to work with partners to ensure immediate shelter and welfare for survivors further guidance in this regard is set out in the joint emergency service

02:05:43 out in the joint emergency service interoperability principles jessip and associated guidance

02:05:49 in addition to the legislation and core guidance documents ccs has produced a suite of guidance and policies on discrete topics a full list is included in the spreadsheet exhibited to katherine

02:06:01 spreadsheet exhibited to katherine hammond's first witness statement and we've set out in the written opening the ones that are most likely to be relevant in the current context

02:06:10 another key element of the risk assessment framework is the national risk assessment or nra which in 2009 was combined with the national security risk assessment or

02:06:21 national security risk assessment or nsra

02:06:23 nsra this is updated every two years and consists of a classified assessment of the risks the country faces it forms the basis of the national risk register which is a published document

02:06:36 register which is a published document ccs holds responsibility for producing the nra

02:06:40 the nra in so doing it does not seek to anticipate every possible risk that might eventuate across the uk but rather to group risks of a similar nature together

02:06:51 nature together in order to determine the planning required to respond to risks of that type

02:06:57 type in summary this is done by identifying reasonable worst case scenarios and then using those scenarios to develop national resilience planning assumptions which are then shared with local and

02:07:09 which are then shared with local and national responders to assist them in their planning to deal with major emergencies the inquiry has been provided with the 2016 nra and associated documents

02:07:21 2016 nra and associated documents catherine hammond explains the process for producing the nra in her second witness statement in short for each risk identified there is a government department or agency

02:07:33 is a government department or agency that acts as the designated risk owner the process of producing the next iteration of the nsra requires the designated risk owners to update the

02:07:44 designated risk owners to update the risks they own identify new risks that fall within their remit coordinate the relevant evidence necessary to carry out the assessment of those risks in addition ccs commissions each

02:07:57 in addition ccs commissions each designated risk owner to develop a risk scenario for each risks they own in

02:08:03 in consultation with subject matter experts and key stakeholders and work up reasonable worst case scenarios

02:08:12 the material is extensive and the inquiry has been provided with all of it it may be that some aspects merit more detailed consideration as the evidence unfolds but we hope that that is a helpful overview of the structure of the

02:08:25 helpful overview of the structure of the risk assessment and response planning framework and the role of ccs in its form in its formulation um can i turn finally and very briefly to the work that's been done by the ccs

02:08:36 to the work that's been done by the ccs since the fire to ensure that the appropriate lessons have been learned this was a process began by the ccs at a very early stage catherine hammond sent some preliminary

02:08:47 catherine hammond sent some preliminary views and an email to the deputy national security adviser and the private secretary to the prime minister on the 19th of june and she identified a number of issues

02:08:59 a number of issues at that point as set out of paragraph 79 of her first witness statement this was followed in july 2017 with an internal debrief and lessons

02:09:10 internal debrief and lessons identification exercise and the key points identified during the course of that exercise are summarized in the documents referenced at paragraph 32 of our written opening

02:09:21 written opening a more detailed exercise in capturing lessons learned within ccs was initiated on the first of august and the ccs produced a report summarizing the conclusions of that exercise on the 24th

02:09:33 conclusions of that exercise on the 24th of september 2017 which has been provided to the inquiry

02:09:39 whilst these lessons capture exercises provided a valuable opportunity to reflect on the response of ccs in the immediate aftermath of the fire and to identify areas where it might be

02:09:50 and to identify areas where it might be possible to refine processes and procedures to achieve greater efficiency when dealing with future emergencies of a similar nature the overall picture from the ccs's perspective i emphasize

02:10:02 from the ccs's perspective i emphasize was a satisfactory one the ccs team became aware of the fire very shortly after it broke out as it should have done and immediately started the work of coordinating the central government

02:10:13 coordinating the central government response

02:10:15 response by the time of the first ministerial meeting in the afternoon of the 14th of june a detailed picture of the current situation had been obtained from a number of different sources and distilled into the

02:10:27 distilled into the that meeting and the ones that came after were prepared efficiently and effectively the large number of action points generated by those meetings were promptly communicated to the relevant government departments and agencies and

02:10:39 government departments and agencies and they were followed up in general terms the ccs process for facilitating and coordinating a cross-governmental response at central government level to

02:10:50 response at central government level to a major emergency operated as they should

02:10:55 should following the 2017 general election the national security council commissioned a national security capability review to identify how the united kingdom could develop deliver and deploy its national

02:11:08 develop deliver and deploy its national security capabilities to maximum collective effect that review encompassed the whole gamut of national security and ccs had responsibility for the national resilience element of it

02:11:20 resilience element of it the inquiry has been provided again with all of that relevant material which identifies the recommendations um that relate to national resilience most

02:11:31 relate to national resilience most particularly and we have flagged up in our written opening the chapter that is likely to be of most interest to the inquiry as indeed we have identified the steps that have been taken to identity

02:11:43 that have been taken to identity implement the relevant recommendations

02:11:47 so can i conclude by reiterating the commitment of the cabinet office to providing you with whatever assistance you may require in your investigation of the aftermath of the fire we're aware that whilst a great deal has

02:11:58 we're aware that whilst a great deal has already been done by the inquiry there is much still to do and whilst the role of the cabinet office and the matters you are investigating is a relatively limited and narrow one we're anxious to play a full and constructive part in assisting

02:12:10 full and constructive part in assisting you in discharging your terms of reference thank you thank you very much indeed

02:12:15 indeed now again after a brief interlude for cleaning

02:12:21 cleaning we shall hear an opening statement by mr jason beer queen's council on behalf of the ministry for leveling up housing and communities

02:12:47 good afternoon mr bill now i'm very conscious that you're running slightly late so don't feel inhibited by that you have your 20 minutes and that's no difficulty thank you very much yes thank you as you said this statement is made

02:12:59 you as you said this statement is made on behalf

02:13:00 on behalf the department for leveling up housing and communities which are i shall again refer to as the department you will know that consistently with the approach that it has taken to the

02:13:13 approach that it has taken to the inquiry as a whole in this module the department has assisted

02:13:18 assisted and supported the inquiry firstly by providing by way of disclosure thousands of documents to the inquiry secondly by providing 32 witness

02:13:29 secondly by providing 32 witness statements to the inquiry from 21 witnesses

02:13:33 witnesses ranging from the then secretary of state through the then permanent secretary and other senior civil servants through to junior civil servants from which number

02:13:45 junior civil servants from which number the inquiry has selected three departmental witnesses to hear evidence dame melanie dawes dr joe farrar and jill mcmanus and thirdly by setting out in a

02:13:57 and thirdly by setting out in a page written opening statement its position in relation to the issues that arise in module 4 of the inquiry including addressing directly the qualitative question raised by the

02:14:09 qualitative question raised by the inquiry in paragraph 13c of its list of issues namely was the response adequate and if not in what respects was it inadequate in other words the

02:14:21 it inadequate in other words the department has itself again taken a candid reflective and self-critical approach

02:14:29 approach the powerful evidence submitted to the inquiry by the bereaved survivors and residents and others who lived through the days and weeks following the tragedy makes it clear that serious problems

02:14:41 makes it clear that serious problems during the response undoubtedly compounded their suffering although grenfell tower was unprecedented for a residential fire in the uk

02:14:51 the uk in terms of the number of people who died the impact on those in the surrounding communities and the level of sudden homelessness caused and therefore it posed significant

02:15:03 and therefore it posed significant challenges for all organizations involved in the emergency response the department is clear that the initial response to the disaster was inadequate

02:15:14 response to the disaster was inadequate in particular the response by rbkc was inadequate in particular there were delays in receiving clear and accessible official information

02:15:26 and accessible official information about key support mechanisms such as re-housing and the emergency cash payments particularly where there were language barriers or for example where individuals were

02:15:38 or for example where individuals were vulnerable there was confusion and a lack of coordination between local government and other agencies and at rest centers there were difficulties in

02:15:51 centers there were difficulties in identifying officials from rbkc and other organizations including the department there were challenges of dealing with

02:16:02 there were challenges of dealing with multiple organizations and government bodies

02:16:05 bodies there were issues with official representatives being available at key sites where people sought help there was a lack of coordination of supplies of items including clothing in

02:16:18 supplies of items including clothing in the immediate aftermath whilst there was a huge and positive volunteer effort and many donations from the public this was not coordinated with official support and many felt inappropriately

02:16:30 support and many felt inappropriately reliant on such volunteer support

02:16:33 support and there were difficulties accessing information about those who were missing or deceased the issues that therefore arise are in june 2017 what was the legislative

02:16:47 in june 2017 what was the legislative and policy system in place in england and wales to respond to a disaster such as this

02:16:54 as this did the department perform its role before the 14th of june 2017 appropriately by reference to that system

02:17:03 system and in the seven days after the fire did the department perform its role appropriately by reference to that system

02:17:11 system so the system a large number of core participants have in their written submissions described for the inquiry the architecture of the statutory and policy framework in

02:17:22 statutory and policy framework in preparing for and responding to civil emergencies in england and wales in june 2017. accordingly i'm not going to repeat the detail of that framework now the essential features of it

02:17:34 the essential features of it which are relevant to the issues which i am going to address are as follows but firstly the 2004 act and the 2005 regulations and the statutory and non-statutory

02:17:46 and the statutory and non-statutory guidance documents established a system that's firmly founded on the principle of subsidiarity as mr sheldon has just said responders

02:17:57 as mr sheldon has just said responders are usually best placed to identify the risks in their areas and to put appropriate plans and capability in place to respond to those risks that's the principle of subsidiarity

02:18:10 the principle of subsidiarity second

02:18:11 second category one responders including local authorities emergency services the nhs and the environment agency have a statutory duty to assess the risk

02:18:22 statutory duty to assess the risk of to plan and to prepare for emergencies in addition to their duty to warn and inform the public about such emergencies

02:18:33 inform the public about such emergencies third a lesser state of emergency has been declared by the government the department has no statutory role in responding to a disaster such as that at

02:18:44 responding to a disaster such as that at the grenville tower

02:18:47 fourth the department had an established role

02:18:50 role under the statutory guidance through red the resilience and emergencies division in supporting local responders to prepare for emergencies to act as the point of liaison

02:19:03 to act as the point of liaison between local responders and central government during an emergency and in supporting local responders from response through to recovery it follows that the issues for the

02:19:14 it follows that the issues for the department concerned before the disaster did it act appropriately in supporting local responders to prepare for emergencies and then after the disaster did it appropriately act as the point of

02:19:27 did it appropriately act as the point of liaison between local responders and central government and appropriately support local responders from response through to recovery so i'll address those two issues in turn

02:19:40 those two issues in turn the department's role and conduct before the 14th of june 2017. the department's role before an emergency occurs through engagement with

02:19:51 emergency occurs through engagement with local resilience forums lrfs the geographical areas of which are based on police areas the department considers that its engagement with such responders through

02:20:02 engagement with such responders through lrfs was direct and was consistent with its role as described in the cabinet offices cabinet offices guidance called emergency preparedness in particular

02:20:13 emergency preparedness in particular consistent with paragraphs 13.27 to 28 and 16.2 the way in which red fulfilled those functions in practice is detailed in

02:20:24 functions in practice is detailed in jill mcmanus's witness statement in summary for now read resilience advisors supported lrfs in their emergency planning duties at a strategic level

02:20:36 strategic level including making sure that lrf partners were aware of the latest legislation and government guidance by sharing good practice from lrfs across the country

02:20:47 across the country by providing information about national risks

02:20:50 risks and by supporting them in their own area specific risk planning through the resilience advisors and lrfs red assisted in the formulation of multi-agency emergency plans and

02:21:03 multi-agency emergency plans and pan-london emergency plans these plans were shared with red at least every three years and red participated in key exercises arranged by the lrfs to test these plans

02:21:16 by the lrfs to test these plans the purpose of this involvement was to help lrf partners understand the role of government in response to emergencies and to help them improve and update plans as necessary

02:21:27 necessary now whilst this work was undertaken directly with the lrfs red did not consistently with the statutory and non-statutory guidance have a role in

02:21:38 non-statutory guidance have a role in working directly with individual local responder organizations on a one-to-one basis

02:21:45 basis and did not for example review the emergency plans of the individual london boroughs or the first responder organizations that comprise the lrfs

02:21:56 organizations that comprise the lrfs however the aftermath of grenville received a specific need to address emergency preparedness via other means in addition to the lrf given the scale

02:22:08 in addition to the lrf given the scale and complexity of london and the risks that it faces in comparison to other regional areas for this reason red now works at a sub-regional level to support london

02:22:20 sub-regional level to support london boroughs directly and the city of london with the preparation of their emergency plans

02:22:29 the department's role and conduct in the seven days after the 14th of june 2017 firstly i wish to address judging the adequacy of the conduct of

02:22:40 judging the adequacy of the conduct of the local responders in the aftermath of the fire a number of local responders had individual responsibilities these included most notably at the mps

02:22:52 these included most notably at the mps the lfb and rbkc the mps held the function of gold command in the immediate response phase meaning that it was charged with the overall coordination rule

02:23:04 overall coordination rule however importantly this did not alleviate the responsibilities of the local authority rbkc was statutorily responsible for providing humanitarian

02:23:15 responsible for providing humanitarian relief in the ament of in the event of an emergency such as the tragedy at grenfell as their principal statutory functions and related civil contingencies involved ensuring the

02:23:26 contingencies involved ensuring the well-being of their community and preventing or relieving homelessness the home office was the lead government department given its policy responsibility for fire and

02:23:37 its policy responsibility for fire and rescue services this was because the home office was responsible for the fire and rescue services and the police which were the two category one responders most occupied in the response to the

02:23:50 most occupied in the response to the fire at this time the department's respon responsibility in the multi-agency and recovery phase was twofold namely to deploy a red government liaison officer

02:24:04 deploy a red government liaison officer a glo whose role it was to attend these strategic coordination group meetings and relay information back to the department about the situation on the ground

02:24:15 situation on the ground and secondly to address the issues related to the fire for which it had statutory responsibility the department's initial response was in accordance with this established model

02:24:28 accordance with this established model however it became clear to the department on the 16th of june that there were significant failings in the humanitarian response coordinated by rbkc and led by nicholas paget brown and

02:24:41 rbkc and led by nicholas paget brown and nicholas holgate as the inquiry will have seen multiple efforts of support were refused by rbkc and concerns were not raised with the department through the available

02:24:53 department through the available channels as they should have been by rbkc and others this caused a delay in the full scale of the problem becoming evident and in turn

02:25:04 the problem becoming evident and in turn an unacceptable detrimental effect on the experience of the bereaved survivors and residents it also undermined the efforts

02:25:12 efforts of those who were working on the ground in the immediate aftermath when concerns about rbkc's delivery of its response were raised with the department

02:25:23 department these were escalated promptly including to secretary of state level and the department took swift action alongside others to investigate and deploy support

02:25:34 to investigate and deploy support a director general with experience of disaster management attended the scene on the morning of the 16th of june 2017 and the department supported the permanent transfer of local authority

02:25:46 permanent transfer of local authority gold command to john baradel who was imposed by lunchtime on friday the 16th of june

02:25:54 at the time policy and protocol did not require a senior departmental official to attend the scene of an emergency to perform the task of judging the adequacy of the

02:26:07 task of judging the adequacy of the response of the local responders indeed such an attendance would have been contrary to the statutory resilience model that i've just described

02:26:17 described applying the norms of the day the department felt that the presence of such a senior official had the potential to divert distract and undermine the locally led

02:26:29 distract and undermine the locally led response and add to confusion on the ground

02:26:34 ground our position has however now changed when the scale of an emergency is likely to overwhelm even the most capable and well-equipped local response it is important for central government

02:26:46 it is important for central government to have a visible presence at senior level opening high levels at channels of communication making clear the seriousness with which

02:26:58 clear the seriousness with which government is monitoring the situation and assuring government that the response is being delivered effectively applying this approach it would have been beneficial for a senior official

02:27:11 been beneficial for a senior official to have attended the scene on the morning of thursday the 15th of june at the latest can i address secondly re-housing commitments re-housing was the statutory

02:27:23 re-housing was the statutory responsibility of rbkc pursuant to its duty to relieve or prevent homelessness this included a duty to provide interim accommodation to eligible households who

02:27:36 accommodation to eligible households who were in priority need and unintentionally homeless until they could secure a permanent home the department's responsibility was to

02:27:47 the department's responsibility was to provide general funding for homelessness through the local government finance scheme

02:27:51 scheme and to set the overall policy framework through legislation and guidance it would not usually be involved in the provision of interim or permanent housing

02:28:02 housing however due to the exceptional circumstances of the grenfell tower fire and concerns raised by some bsrs that the local authority would move them to temporary

02:28:14 authority would move them to temporary or permanent accommodation outside of the borough central government did become involved the then minister of state for housing and planning alok sharma offered a commitment that the

02:28:26 sharma offered a commitment that the government and rbkc would work together to make sure that made sure that displaced people would be re-housed locally

02:28:34 locally at the first prime minister chaired grenfell tower recovery task force meeting on friday the 16th of june it was agreed that a commitment would be made to re-house those displaced by the

02:28:45 made to re-house those displaced by the fire within three weeks this commitment from the prime minister was announced on the 16th of june and confirmed in a statement to the house on the 22nd of june 2017.

02:28:56 the 22nd of june 2017. it was later reframed once it became clear that many families were entirely understandably unable to engage with the re-housing process within that time frame it was made clear by ministers

02:29:09 frame it was made clear by ministers alok sharma and nick hurd when attending a meeting with grenfell tower residents on the 19th of june that those affected would not be forced to accept the first three housing offer that they received

02:29:22 three housing offer that they received the department is aware that concerns were raised by rbkc that the three-week deadline was unrealistic and that there were insufficient properties available to re-house those

02:29:33 properties available to re-house those displaced by the fire within that time scale

02:29:37 scale ministers were rightly concerned at the lack of ambition and impetus in our bkc's re-housing program and recognize how deeply inadequate this

02:29:48 and recognize how deeply inadequate this was

02:29:49 was they rightly wished to inject a sense of urgency into this process so that those made homeless by the fire were treated with the respect and priority that they deserved and that they required

02:30:02 they required looking back the department is of the view that although it was right to set difficult targets with the very best intentions the commitments in fact made were too ambitious

02:30:13 ambitious in particular there was an underestimation of the strain that this would place on rbkc instead the department should have sought to drive an intensity of action

02:30:25 sought to drive an intensity of action within our bkc by emphasizing the seriousness of and speed with which it government expected the re-housing effort to be handled without making the three-week

02:30:37 handled without making the three-week commitment the department also recognizes that it should have been clear in the way that the commitment was communicated it should have emphasized that affected people would be provided with temporary

02:30:48 people would be provided with temporary accommodation before

02:30:51 before being offered permanent accommodation and that they weren't obliged to accept the first offer in conclusion the department remains committed to supporting those affected

02:31:03 committed to supporting those affected by the grenfell tower fire in total central government has committed over 160 million pounds to supporting the community since 2017 including over 132 million pounds which

02:31:16 including over 132 million pounds which has already been spent to support re-housing efforts delivering bespoke health and well-being support and the refurbishment of the lancaster west estate

02:31:26 estate the department will continue to reflect on its role in the in these issues uh to be examined in this module and to learn the lessons of the past the inquiry will have seen from the detail in our opening statement

02:31:39 detail in our opening statement that the department has since 2017 developed its systems processes and capacity to make sure that its response to future emergencies as it is as effective as is possible

02:31:51 effective as is possible and will continue to make sure that where change is needed it is implemented thank you sir thank you very much [Music]

02:32:02 [Music] well that concludes the oral opening statements for module four it's also a convenient point of which to close proceedings for today

02:32:13 close proceedings for today and i think mr millet tomorrow we expect to hear

02:32:17 to hear the first uh witnesses of the amongst those who were directly affected by the fire as we do right we do mr chairman yes and our first witness tomorrow morning will be mr curry mussoli

02:32:28 mr curry mussoli thank you very much well we'll look forward to seeing mr mosley at uh 10 o'clock tomorrow and

02:32:35 and that's all for today so we adjourn now until 10 o'clock tomorrow please thank you very much