Closing submissions on Module 6 focusing on government deregulation agenda, Approved Document B failures, and systemic concealment of cladding fire risks over 20 years.
00:00:23 [Music]
00:00:28 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing
00:00:31 hearing today we're going to begin hearing closing statements in relation to module six and the first statement is going to be made
00:00:40 made on behalf
00:00:41 on behalf of some of the bereaved survivors residents by miss barwick's queen's council
00:00:47 council say miss barwise if you'd like to come up to the
00:00:50 up to the what's now the council's bench before i invite miss barwise to start her
00:00:55 her statement can i just say this we have a very tight timetable to get through today
00:01:01 today so i'm going to ask all council to make sure that they finish their submissions within the time specified in the timetable i say within because i don't think anyone's going to
00:01:13 because i don't think anyone's going to be grateful to those who overrun or try to overrun and if
00:01:18 and if if necessary i shall intervene to invite you to tutorial statements to a close uh with that ms barwise we should like to hear from you please thank you very much good morning sir good morning mr
00:01:30 much good morning sir good morning mr fan good morning mr akbar our submissions fall into five parts first an overview second the relationship between building regulations and adb the history of fundamental flaws in adb
00:01:43 the history of fundamental flaws in adb and amendments made third delays in reviewing adb following lachnal and knowledge of risk fourth the department's systems failures
00:01:54 fourth the department's systems failures and finally the role of industry starting with the overview the evidence has made plain that the seeds of the grenfell disaster lie in the concealment beginning over 20 years
00:02:06 the concealment beginning over 20 years ago
00:02:07 ago of the fact that class zero cladding was a fire hazard at a time when 1960s blocks were failing and more energy efficient housing was desperately needed
00:02:19 efficient housing was desperately needed the realisation of a burgeoning cladding crisis led to continued lack of candor and the failure to adequately regulate the requirements for the external wall was motivated by a desire to allow the
00:02:31 was motivated by a desire to allow the construction industry sufficient latitude to rapidly build housing all this militated against exposing the dangers of existing overcladding upgrades
00:02:42 upgrades over time this was exacerbated by an overarching unyielding safety blind deregulatory agenda which ministers deny but officials
00:02:53 which ministers deny but officials believed allowed no change to or clarification of building regulations or adb
00:03:00 adb the evidence has revealed an extraordinary conflict which the panel must resolve in that ministers would have the panel believe officials labored of their own
00:03:11 believe officials labored of their own volition under this fatal misapprehension but that is not credible and the evidence suggests otherwise the other allied fantasy is that the
00:03:23 the other allied fantasy is that the which the panel must resolve is the portrayal of the department's mr martin as a lone wolf the single point of failure as dame dawes described him and he after seven
00:03:34 dawes described him and he after seven days of evidence accepted given his physical proximity to colleagues and the way the department operated this is not credible the truth of the matter is that he was
00:03:45 the truth of the matter is that he was put and kept in that position to execute the department's deregulatory strategy and indeed promote it even after grenfell
00:03:55 grenfell colleagues despite their loyalty to him in giving evidence must have been aware of his cavalier attitudes which are evident in the majority of his emails his fundamental desire to protect the
00:04:07 his fundamental desire to protect the financial interests of uk plc as he called it secured his primacy in the building regulations division the department completely ignored all
00:04:19 the department completely ignored all the coroner's recommendations following the fatal lachenal house fire in 2009 the review of adb was deliberately deferred until 2016 2017 when it would
00:04:30 deferred until 2016 2017 when it would have been done anyway and was then rolled up into a wider building regulations review the panelists heard from mr ledson that the roll-up of adb into a wider review
00:04:41 the roll-up of adb into a wider review was so that savings could be made from adb
00:04:44 adb in order to introduce the necessary environmental changes into approved document l and that was clear from the documents put to lord pickles who did not deny the intent but thought the figures merely
00:04:56 intent but thought the figures merely projections the horse trade between parts b and l was as both ministers and officials knew to satisfy deregulatory policies which
00:05:07 to satisfy deregulatory policies which required the introduction of any new regulation to be compensated for by the emission of existing regulation so as to result in a net equivalent cost to business
00:05:18 business these decisions were taken to subjugate building regulation to both the energy efficient and housing and deregulatory agendas at the behest of prime ministers initially
00:05:29 behest of prime ministers initially david cameron and laterally latterly theresa may the series of warnings concerning modern materials received by the department often directly to ministers either by
00:05:41 often directly to ministers either by submissions or appg or the fire sector in advance of ministers making deregulatory decisions on building regulations makes undeniable that government knew both regulations and
00:05:54 government knew both regulations and adb were potentially hazardous and yet forged on with its twin deregulatory and housing housing and deregulatory agendas
00:06:05 housing and deregulatory agendas and an accompanying pattern of concealment emerges from bre's misleading investigations into fires from the department's failure to transparently report on them from
00:06:17 transparently report on them from allowing ambiguity into adb from 1992 onwards and failing to review adb at all from 2006 other than for deregulatory purposes
00:06:29 other than for deregulatory purposes until well after grenfell indeed the department made a conscious decision as dame dorse told us not to clarify clause 12.7 adb even
00:06:41 not to clarify clause 12.7 adb even after grenfell all this despite the 2009 lacanal fire and inquest goes beyond her adventure from at later spring 2015 onwards when
00:06:52 from at later spring 2015 onwards when bre seven workstream reports formally reported the department was aware of adb's antiquity and of it not having kept pace with modern materials
00:07:03 kept pace with modern materials as made clear by those reports they were withheld following input from the then secretary of state sajid javad's advisor the building regulations discussion
00:07:14 the building regulations discussion documents stalled in lord hesseltine's office
00:07:17 office it is clear both the work stream reports and the discussion document were withheld for political reasons the discussion document was withheld until february 2019 despite the
00:07:28 until february 2019 despite the department's appreciation of its significance because it would have committed the department to a review of building regulations albeit the scope of the discussion document was purely deregulatory
00:07:40 deregulatory the work stream reports were withheld because they exposed the extent to which adb was undermined by the use of modern insulation and showed the need for a complete overhaul of building
00:07:51 complete overhaul of building regulations the deliberate decision making is only consistent with a desire to suppress known risks to avoid interfering with the two driving imperatives energy
00:08:03 the two driving imperatives energy efficient housing and deregulation the panel has heard credible evidence from officials that the deregulatory and housing agendas took precedence over
00:08:14 housing agendas took precedence over building regulations and adb review and lord barwell also made clear that the housing agenda was predominant generally however ministers did not admit that the housing and deregulatory
00:08:26 admit that the housing and deregulatory agendas took precedence over adb review despite the life safety risks in the case of each deferral of adb postlacanal the relevant minister was
00:08:37 postlacanal the relevant minister was aware of the dangers posed by delaying adb
00:08:42 adb the evidence has also exposed the tension between functional record building requirements building regulations which imply implicitly require straight state scrutiny and adb
00:08:53 require straight state scrutiny and adb which is prescriptive exploited by industry and policed by an inadequate building control in turn too lightly scrutinized by government
00:09:04 government this was exacerbated by introducing approved inspectors who did not compete on a level playing field with local authorities as they lacked powers of enforcement and would lose fees if work
00:09:16 enforcement and would lose fees if work had to revert to local authorities for enforcement those authorities had to be cost neutral and therefore were desperate for work the department considered approved inspectors a regulator but they are not
00:09:29 inspectors a regulator but they are not a public body have private competing interests and no enforcement powers as such they were merely an inspectorate but this inequality was overlooked
00:09:41 but this inequality was overlooked nhbc's behavior demonstrates its total unsuitability as a putative regulator its acceptance of non-compliant k-15 drove it to interpret the regulations
00:09:53 drove it to interpret the regulations and adb perversely and laterally in 2016 to publish guidance which approved the use of acmpe together with the combustible insulation without test
00:10:05 combustible insulation without test nhbc's closing observes that as insurer of its own book it's it is in its own interest not to lower standards we agree but probably to save face that is
00:10:17 but probably to save face that is nevertheless what it did although an hbc denies this underlying adb was a testing and certification regime propped up by beery bre as test house and bba and labc as
00:10:30 bre as test house and bba and labc as certifiers with ucas presiding above the dishonest and unrepresentative testing and certification was client focused and carried out by insufficiently competent staff
00:10:43 insufficiently competent staff ucas's failure to witness bre testing for some seven years between 2008 and 2016
00:10:50 2016 shows a disregard only consistent with not wishing to find problems ucas emerges as an ineffectual organization too willing to assume
00:11:01 organization too willing to assume competence in the bodies it oversaw and so focused on pleasing them at the expense of public safety that it will not even report fraud the frailty of this house of cards was
00:11:12 the frailty of this house of cards was an ideal prop to facilitate industry capture of an inadequately robust regulatory regime the role of bre as advisor on adb revisions and investigator of fires make
00:11:25 revisions and investigator of fires make it complicit complicit in government's actions
00:11:29 actions bre protests that it is not a regulator we have never said it is but its code of conduct requires it to hold paramount the health and safety of others in this fundamental purpose it failed
00:11:43 fundamental purpose it failed whilst bre was somewhat hamstrung by the department in the way that it was funded and laterally required not to make recommendations it is up to a competent service provider
00:11:54 it is up to a competent service provider especially a safety critical service provider to inform its employer of any constraints affecting its ability to carry out its work if the supplier doesn't advertise the
00:12:05 if the supplier doesn't advertise the difficulty then it is complicit as bre was this is exemplified by bre's misleading and therefore dangerous research
00:12:15 research it does not avail bre to assert as it does that government received warnings from others many of these others might have been and were perceived as having their own agendas whereas bre was supposedly
00:12:28 agendas whereas bre was supposedly independent bre's flaccid recommendations to the department were unscientific and did not communicate the sense of urgency or importance of the recommendation
00:12:40 importance of the recommendation this was particularly true of the cc 1924 test report which recommended only that the fact that a class zero panel was by far the worst performing of those tested may require further consideration
00:12:55 tested may require further consideration whilst bre was independent from 1997 the relationship between it and the department with martin in both camps for nine years was unhealthily close bre did
00:13:07 nine years was unhealthily close bre did the department's bidding an important an important feature of the department's failure to clarify adb is bre's protectionism of its own role as custodian of the fire safety mantle with
00:13:20 custodian of the fire safety mantle with a bs-8414 testing monopoly which blossomed whilst clarification of adb was being mooted by industry whilst of course in module 6 it is right
00:13:31 whilst of course in module 6 it is right to focus on government and related institutions responsibility if industry's role in the events which led to grenfell is ultimately more important as i will explain
00:13:44 important as i will explain what follows must be understood in that light
00:13:48 light i now turn to the relationship between building regulations and adb building regulations are performance-based requiring the engine requiring the designer to achieve the functional requirements and adb is
00:14:01 functional requirements and adb is supposed to postulate routes by which the functional requirements may be achieved
00:14:07 achieved both the building regulations themselves and adb make clear that following adb is not a guarantee of compliance and therefore the designer must use judgement
00:14:17 judgement there are two relevant respects to grenfell in which the department failed to adequately address the functional requirements b4 1 external fire spread and b1 means
00:14:28 b4 1 external fire spread and b1 means of escape
00:14:30 of escape first external fire spread as explained even if using the linear route and particularly if using the test route the designer must exercise judgment
00:14:40 judgment nevertheless a culture of convenient dependency on adb has developed whereby industry has fixated on diagram 40 which in the versions of adb enforce from 1992
00:14:52 in the versions of adb enforce from 1992 onwards provided a colliding cladding panel need only achieve class 0 or from 19 2002 onwards class b or zero regardless of its core
00:15:04 regardless of its core this permits acm panels even though that is clearly in conflict with the functional requirement the evidence shows that neither government nor bre considered
00:15:15 neither government nor bre considered how the functional requirement b41 was to be achieved effectively despite prescribing routes which it now accepts it did not understand and did
00:15:26 accepts it did not understand and did not know whether they would achieve the functional requirement the test route depends on not failing the performance requirements in the performance criteria in br 135 which
00:15:38 performance criteria in br 135 which govern the large-scale bs 8414 tests the panel has heard evidence from doctors colwell and smith that these criteria are completely arbitrary and are only failure criteria so they
00:15:51 and are only failure criteria so they tell the designer only what he should not use
00:15:54 not use do not assist with how to design a safe system
00:15:58 system as to the linear route no one considered whether limited combustibility insulation and class zero would achieve adequate resistance to flame spread in any type of building still less a
00:16:11 any type of building still less a high-rise building these failures are the primary failures insofar as functional requirement b41 is concerned delay in withdrawing class zero and in failure to introduce the
00:16:22 zero and in failure to introduce the euro classifications in a timely manner a subsidiary to this failure albeit significant contributors to the problems experienced professor tarero considers the ambiguity
00:16:34 professor tarero considers the ambiguity resulting from the functional requirements coupled with adb places a considerable burden on the designer but professors torreira and bisbee mr hyatt and mr sacula also consider that a
00:16:47 and mr sacula also consider that a competent designer should have understood what the regulations in adb required
00:16:52 required second functional requirement b 1 means of escape
00:16:56 of escape the department failed to produce adequate guidance in relation to means of escape for those with disabilities adb was premised on inclusive design albeit referencing a repealed statute
00:17:09 albeit referencing a repealed statute and according to dr lane a competent fire engineer should have appreciated additional measures would be required however the department had known since 2004 that means of escape for disabled
00:17:22 2004 that means of escape for disabled people in particular the need to evacuate were inadequate especially given the defend in place strategy underlying adb this was why they commissioned bre
00:17:33 this was why they commissioned bre workstream report seven yet despite that report confirming the guidance was wholly inadequate nothing was done
00:17:42 was done martin admitted he was aware from his involvement in drafting bs triple nine one that a better approach was to cater for the scenario where stay put is withdrawn and evacuation required which
00:17:53 withdrawn and evacuation required which martin thought flowed from lachenal yet there was no formal consideration even after lachnal of ensuring adb or the lga guide which supported the regulatory reform fire safety order was
00:18:06 regulatory reform fire safety order was consistent with bs triple nine one the interface was not addressed because martin and brac considered adb consistent with bs triple nine one which they considered simply added more detail
00:18:19 they considered simply added more detail martin's view and government policy on peeps was that disabled people would self-evacuate or hopefully the fire brigade would get to them in time
00:18:30 brigade would get to them in time and that peeps were impractical and too expensive
00:18:33 expensive martin and upton were not willing to revisit that despite elsmath grant a disability consultant's letter pointing out that the guy breached law no equality analysis was prepared
00:18:45 no equality analysis was prepared because they regarded the lga guide as reflecting current practice even though it did not neither did the department seek advice and no
00:18:54 and no effort was made to consult this inaction was not accidental but was done deliberately to avoid disproportionate burdens on landlords
00:19:05 disproportionate burdens on landlords martin subsequently contradicted himself saying government simply forgot to consult with vulnerable people's groups
00:19:13 groups his take was characteristically offhand pursuing the issue is futile it's a debate that's been going on for years he said he admitted to being fed up with miss
00:19:24 he admitted to being fed up with miss grant's persistence by 2013 martin was aware bre and the stakeholder group on workstream report 7 were relying on the concept of
00:19:35 were relying on the concept of extraordinary effort whereby disabled people would over exert themselves in emergencies martin also knew compliance with the equality act was considered doubtful
00:19:47 equality act was considered doubtful yet he did nothing to correct these disastrous assumptions or ensure that compliance with the equality act was required the failure to define functional requirement v41 in any adequate way and
00:20:01 requirement v41 in any adequate way and to provide adequate guidance for b1 means of escape together with the government's failure to create create reliable processes for timely review of adb and procedures to
00:20:12 timely review of adb and procedures to stay abreast of market developments created an unsafe system of regulation which pertained from 1992 onwards government admits it presided over a
00:20:23 government admits it presided over a system which facilitated disasters such as grenfell the primary fault in relation to b41 was the department's failure to address the meaning of the functional requirement
00:20:35 meaning of the functional requirement and its relationship with the two groups to compliance government admits by its closing that it has not been able to unearth any justification for why class 0 was used
00:20:47 justification for why class 0 was used as a classification for external walls that makes all the more extraordinary the now-admitted catalogue of 13 missed opportunities to observe that class 0
00:20:58 opportunities to observe that class 0 was a flawed metric and failure to withdraw it despite knowledge of the risks
00:21:04 risks the catalogue of missed opportunities begins earlier than the department admits with the noseley fire the panel may draw its own conclusions from the department's failure to address
00:21:15 from the department's failure to address the impact of the noseley and garnic fires or to admit they were also missed opportunities the necessary context is that overcladding was a means to solve the problem of failing 1960s blocks and
00:21:28 problem of failing 1960s blocks and noseley was a pilot project no witness could explain which individuals sent or received the bre memo recording an instruction from someone in government play down the
00:21:40 someone in government play down the nosely fire bre's failure to identify in subsequent reports that a critical factor in noseley was the combustibility of the cladding is an indicator that the
00:21:51 cladding is an indicator that the subject was taboo noslee was followed by the unexplained removal of the word adequately from both building regulations and adb for an eight year period
00:22:02 eight year period thereby making the functional requirement to resist external flame spread absolute bird and martin explained the reintroduction of the word was a word
00:22:13 reintroduction of the word was a word adequately was decided by lawyers purely for consistency but what is the panel to make of that that the lawyers failed to notice this inconsistency for nine years
00:22:24 notice this inconsistency for nine years eight years or is it more likely that removal of adequately was in fact a reaction to the severity of the seminal noseley fire which led to the connolly
00:22:35 noseley fire which led to the connolly system tests which in turn led to the introduction of the large-scale test the word adequately nevertheless reappeared by amendment to the building regulations in december
00:22:47 regulations in december 1999 despite the garnec fire in june 1999
00:22:53 1999 whilst noseley is the fire which eventually led to the development of the large-scale test garnet should not be dismissed as simply non-compliance as martin and some others would have you
00:23:04 martin and some others would have you believe
00:23:05 believe bre reported on garnac in august 1999 to north ayrshire making multiple references to class zero the deliberate excision from bre's subsequent report to
00:23:18 excision from bre's subsequent report to the department of any trace of class zero cannot sensibly be justified by the fact that it was by then known that the cladding was not class zero
00:23:29 cladding was not class zero it was highly relevant that the remedial solution proposed in bre's august 1999 report to was to replace what need only have been class zero cladding with
00:23:40 have been class zero cladding with non-combustible cladding especially given in august 99 the word adequately had not yet been reintroduced so the functional requirement for no
00:23:51 so the functional requirement for no flame spread was then absolute whilst professor bisbee considers garnet did not in a literal sense demonstrate the need for the large-scale testing because the grp was not even class zero
00:24:03 because the grp was not even class zero and hence non-compliant garner and nosely together led to the select committee report garnet should have prompted a reconsideration of the linear route
00:24:15 reconsideration of the linear route given the purpose of the large-scale test is to eliminate the worst systems had it been the sole route to compliance it would have eliminated garner's cladding
00:24:25 cladding despite martin and colwell's continued involvement and their having witnessed the catastrophic failure of a class 0 acm pe in cc 1924 testing in 2001
00:24:38 acm pe in cc 1924 testing in 2001 no one at the department or bre ever reviewed the noseley organic reports in that light on the contrary following lachenal the department martin actively procured bre
00:24:51 department martin actively procured bre crowder to produce bogus research which led to two articles which did not identify the cladding as a significant cause of fire spread at noslee and garner
00:25:02 garner did not mention lachenal and continued the misconception that class zero cladding would limit the rate of fire spread
00:25:12 spread this is disingenuous and misleading crowder accepts the research as flawed and professor bisbee considers it profoundly inaccurate and unhelpful even if one of the original authors of
00:25:23 even if one of the original authors of the garnet report penny morgan confused class zero with limited combustibility those who followed her at bre suggest there was little confusion
00:25:34 there was little confusion colwell claims she never understood a colleague to have been confused about this crowder claims he may have been a little confused in his early career prior to lachenal but not afterwards
00:25:45 prior to lachenal but not afterwards these reports should have been the subject of proper analysis by those subsequent bre commentators who were not confused
00:25:54 confused it is however a convenient confusion to explain dangerously misleading reports professor bisbee expresses amazement that no one realized the cladding or
00:26:05 that no one realized the cladding or continuous cavity at nosley was to blame for fire spread and instead focused on lack of cavity barriers that amazement reflects the perversity of selecting an obviously wrong cause of
00:26:16 of selecting an obviously wrong cause of fire spread but it was however a necessary dissembling if one wished to detract from cladding being the cause this happened again at lacanal
00:26:27 this happened again at lacanal when the government's chief fire and rescue advisor focus on compartmentation at the as the cause at the expense of downward fire spread which he now regrets
00:26:39 which he now regrets the department's admitted 13 opportunities missed opportunities to withdraw class 0 began with connolly's work in 1994 the second is the select committee's recommendations in 1999
00:26:52 committee's recommendations in 1999 the third radar ii and the fourth the catastrophic acmp failure in 2001. the remaining admitted missed opportunities to withdraw class zero
00:27:03 opportunities to withdraw class zero which we do not consider to be a comprehensive list spans the period 2008 to 2016 and includes lacking the department's explanation why these
00:27:16 the department's explanation why these 13 opportunities were missed is wholly unsatisfactory apart from quoting lord barwell who accepted that ministers must bear some responsibility for the failures of the
00:27:27 responsibility for the failures of the department officials are blamed for the failure to understand their oversight function and their perception that they could not challenge deregulatory policies
00:27:37 policies we're therefore back to the position in which we started at module six namely the fallacy of that officials had misinterpreted ministers and prime ministers deregulatory agendas including
00:27:50 ministers deregulatory agendas including david cameron's bonfire of the building regulations effected through the red tape challenge whilst the department admits to having other priorities it does not admit that
00:28:01 other priorities it does not admit that it was adherence to those priorities which meant adb was relegated to the back of the queue and that realistically officials had no power to raise its profile
00:28:11 profile instead it blames mr harrell and the building regulations team for becoming totally internalized in their thinking and therefore lacking the will to ensure their work was prioritized
00:28:23 their work was prioritized that is blaming individuals for failure to resist an overpowering agenda fanatically adopted by ministers it runs counter to the department's tangible frustration that and harold's
00:28:36 tangible frustration that and harold's evidence that his 2017 exchange with martin suggesting gilding lilies meant finding ways to make the discussion document more attractive to the rest of government and ministers
00:28:50 the rest of government and ministers the department claims its failure to abandon class zero after the select committee reports was not politically motivated yet martin's evidence was it was a deliberate decision to retain class zero taken with understanding of
00:29:03 class zero taken with understanding of the risks which had been clear since noseley in 1991. in the circumstances it can only have been a political decision similarly as the department admits the
00:29:15 similarly as the department admits the failure to remove class zero after the radar research despite the clear warnings that program gave as to the lack of equivalence between national and european classes was a conscious
00:29:26 european classes was a conscious decision not to distort the market or be a barrier to trade that decision was one which was patently against the interests of safety and ought to have been recognized as such
00:29:38 ought to have been recognized as such it would not have been a barrier to trade to refuse to allow use of the national classes for a reference scenario which they had not been designed namely externally as opposed to
00:29:50 designed namely externally as opposed to internally within a compartment during the 2005-2006 consultation on adb the department received a clear warning from martin colwell and greenwood all
00:30:03 from martin colwell and greenwood all then at bre but martin seconded to the department that the provisions of section 12 adb governing external fire spread were insufficiently clear the warning flowed from a serious
00:30:15 the warning flowed from a serious cladding fire at the edge in 2005 and led martin to propose a re-draft of section 12 which required all materials in the external wall to be limited combustibility
00:30:27 combustibility martin's evidence was that the department would not make this amendment as it would prohibit timber frame over 18 meters
00:30:35 18 meters the resulting changed version was a hastily contrived fudge by the insertion of the word filler into 12.7 the department deliberately left
00:30:46 12.7 the department deliberately left adb 2006 ambiguous the word filler had been mentioned in bre's report on the edge but latterly mentioned in an nhbc consultation response on insulation
00:30:58 consultation response on insulation provisions the effect of inserting the word filler into a clause dealing with insulation in practice led to the confusion that whatever filler meant it did not mean the core of a cladding
00:31:10 it did not mean the core of a cladding panel
00:31:11 panel both bird and martin initially said their thinking was focused on insulation as they were addressing the edge which involved insulating core panels but their evidence evolved such that
00:31:23 but their evidence evolved such that both later said the word was intended to prompt the designer to think more broadly about the use of a combustible core
00:31:31 core it is now clear that the department had not itself thought through the implications of the word filler nor the products to which it applied the department adopted this approach in
00:31:43 the department adopted this approach in order to allow the use of timber frame and other combustibles in the external wall because without timber frame the demand for factory built ready to assemble housing which many volume house
00:31:54 assemble housing which many volume house builders use could not be satisfied as mr bird said requiring all materials in the external wall to be of limited combustibility was too blunt an instrument and had the massive knock-on
00:32:07 instrument and had the massive knock-on effect of prohibiting timber frame housing which doors described as kit housing and one of government's top 10 to 15 priorities at latest from 2013 onwards martin and
00:32:20 at latest from 2013 onwards martin and likely others in the building regulations team as well as bre were aware of the debate within industry as to the meaning of the external wall guidance
00:32:29 guidance in 2014 an industry body bca produced a guidance note tgn 18 which did what the department had not and suggested 12.7 required all key components to be
00:32:41 required all key components to be limited combustibility tgn 18 was a mixed blessing it tightened the linear route but suggested a specific concept of desktops for bs 8414 tests not
00:32:55 of desktops for bs 8414 tests not contained in adb and not previously common practice as nhbc observes in its closing desktops were common for fire doors but at least
00:33:06 were common for fire doors but at least those in those tests the entire door set is tested not only part of it indeed
00:33:12 indeed bre's tony baker in 2013 said bre would generally not carry out a bs 8414 desktop unless the system was very similar to that tested
00:33:25 similar to that tested whilst professor bisbee accepts desktops were permitted by the building regulations as the designer may adopt any approach bisbee does not consider desktops were expressly specified by adb is a route to
00:33:38 expressly specified by adb is a route to compliance nor were they although adb's introduction mentioned the possibility of a holistic fire engineering assessment this was for complex projects projects such as
00:33:50 complex projects projects such as airport terminals and was not a suggestion of desktops specifically for facades
00:33:55 facades the whole purpose of adb was to provide specific routes to comply with the functional requirements the notion of desktops for bs bs8414
00:34:06 the notion of desktops for bs bs8414 tests seems to have created the confusion that bs 8414 equated to a model test suggesting generic fitness for use
00:34:15 for use on one view desktops contradicted the express terms of br135 which governs the s8414 and stipulated the classification report is confined to the precise system
00:34:27 report is confined to the precise system tested
00:34:28 tested furthermore it's a test designed to eliminate the worst offenders and so offers limited data from which a positive assessment can be made desktops opened the door to products
00:34:40 desktops opened the door to products prohibited by the linear route following tgn 18 desktops became the preferred route to compliance such that bre was overwhelmed with the number of requests
00:34:52 requests tgn 18 was therefore causative of industry behavior the impact of tgn 18 was exacerbated by the june 2015 edition which expanded the
00:35:03 the june 2015 edition which expanded the category of those who might make the assessment to any suitably qualified fire specialist which was an offensively broad definition and in real terms meant anyone claiming to be a fire specialist
00:35:15 anyone claiming to be a fire specialist could carry out desktops even if devoid of relevant qualifications industry continued to issue warnings as to the lack of clarity regarding the external wall from 2013 onwards and in
00:35:28 external wall from 2013 onwards and in 2016 revealed the legacy of acmpe as a ticking time bomb yet these coupled with a spate of international cladding fires did not provoke clarification of adb
00:35:41 did not provoke clarification of adb as the department admits and was clear from martin's evidence from at latest 2014 he appreciated acm posed a threat yet given the rules permitted it
00:35:52 yet given the rules permitted it yet
00:35:53 yet claimed to have underestimated the scale of the hazard the department nevertheless took no position on it nor did it change adb to prohibit acmpe
00:36:06 adb to prohibit acmpe i now turn to delays in reviewing adb post lacking and knowledge of risk being ignored due to the overarching housing and deregulatory agendas the department's closing fails to
00:36:18 the department's closing fails to analyze extensive evidence put to ministers stephen williams and lords wharton and barwell of their own individual knowledge of safety risks involved in deferring adb review
00:36:30 involved in deferring adb review apbg repeatedly warned williams the time frame for adb review was too small sorry too slow and posed a risk a life safety risk but he simply towed
00:36:42 a life safety risk but he simply towed the party line petulant at being slagged off as he said by appg on account of his dismissive responses to their justifiable concerns despite claiming to be aware of such
00:36:54 despite claiming to be aware of such issues he considered himself unable to flick the dial on them and as he said was more focused on zero carbon homes he admitted that during the sophie rossa debate in spring 2015 which addressed
00:37:07 debate in spring 2015 which addressed the fire safety issues such as doors he said the building regulations review was on track not because he believed it beca but because officials told him to
00:37:18 because officials told him to william's motivation may derive from the many conversations he admitted to having with oliver letwin then cabinet minister for government policy whom lord barwell and dame dawes described as the minister
00:37:30 and dame dawes described as the minister pushing the deregulatory agenda and leading on the red tape challenge which doors considered a very important part of the drum beat of the coalition government
00:37:41 government following the department's receipt of bre's seven work streams harold asked martin for a worry list harrell claimed the purpose was just to have a cohesive list of things people had expressed
00:37:53 list of things people had expressed concerns about the language in itself is telling despite this describing the seven work stream reports as overall low risk in a 2016 email
00:38:04 2016 email harrell knew that the seven work stream reports were did give cause for worry hence he's telling the panel that they were desperate to release them as he understood the first report warned
00:38:16 as he understood the first report warned of increased temperatures in fire caused by partel insulation requirements and the seventh was endowed entirely damning as he said of the guidance on means of escape for disabled people
00:38:29 escape for disabled people the worry list was followed by the may 2015 war book produced for wharton to brief him on concerns a forward's look produced at his request in late may 2015
00:38:42 in late may 2015 introduced the concept of the discussion document
00:38:45 document specifically to address the commitments to the lack of coroner
00:38:49 coroner as the panel heard by summer 2015 review of adb was rolled into a wider review of building regulations pausing here an orderly review of either
00:39:01 pausing here an orderly review of either adb or the building regulations would have required the publication of the seven work stream reports and thereafter a discussion document directed by those reports as opposed to directed by the
00:39:13 reports as opposed to directed by the reg deregulatory agenda as was the eventual draft discussion document the report showed the premise of adb was undermined by increased temperatures due
00:39:24 undermined by increased temperatures due to insulation and report 6 expressly highlighted that it didn't include the effect of fire spread on the external wall
00:39:33 wall as from may 2015 lord wharton was on notice by the war book of ongoing concerns about the impact of modern materials particularly combustible foam
00:39:44 materials particularly combustible foam insulation and wood-based products the decision to roll adb into a wider review so that the department could deep maximize deregulation was a conscious
00:39:55 maximize deregulation was a conscious decision taken by the department at the highest level not only at director general and director level as dame dawes claimed but also by lord wharton who was
00:40:06 claimed but also by lord wharton who was aware of the extent of delay caused by the deferral this despite being warned of the risks and urgency of adb review by apbg's letter received the following day
00:40:19 letter received the following day they told wharton the failure to review adb had significant life safety implications yet wharton met with housing director peter schofield and director for building regulations sally randall to
00:40:31 building regulations sally randall to discuss the submission on october 2015 following a further patently deregulatory submission copied to the then secretary of state greg clark which
00:40:42 then secretary of state greg clark which made clear the extent of delay to the discussion document and building regulations review wharton approved it his evidence was he believed earlier review of adb alone sub-optimal that he
00:40:55 review of adb alone sub-optimal that he understood the purpose of roll-up was deregulatory is clear from his telling appg that the review's principal objective was simplification and red tape reduction
00:41:07 tape reduction lord wharton became aware if he was not already of the catastrophic old tannery fire which happened on the 4th of july 2015 and about which he was interviewed a year later the note of interview
00:41:19 a year later the note of interview recorded we had a lucky escape with the tannery last summer and the minister fully understood this the failure at old tannery was extensive failure to install cavity barriers at
00:41:30 failure to install cavity barriers at the outset as was the kennet drive fire in june 2014 which led to the timber frame housing debate in december 2014 and of which both brandon lewis and
00:41:42 and of which both brandon lewis and stephen williams were also aware both fires caused total destruction of many homes but miraculously without loss of life
00:41:51 of life the significance of the timber frame and cavity barrier issue is not that it was causative at grenfell but rather it demonstrates government's continued disregard for fire safety and
00:42:02 continued disregard for fire safety and housing in circumstances where martin said he knew that from 2014 a major fire might occur due to lack of cavity barriers
00:42:11 barriers despite this nothing was done to ensure compliance or to reconsider the use of timber in facades during lord barwell's time as housing
00:42:22 during lord barwell's time as housing minister the limited process of review which was underway ground to a halt his time in office began in july 2016 and lasted until shortly before the grenfell fire
00:42:33 grenfell fire lord barwell unlike his predecessor had responsibility both for housing and building regulations and on his watch both the publication of the seven workstream reports and the discussion
00:42:44 workstream reports and the discussion document stalled the discussion document would always have required right round to all departments and the cabinet office but as barwell told the panel it was
00:42:55 as barwell told the panel it was unnecessarily deferred pending publication of the housing white paper the then office of the sorry the office of the then secretary of state sajid javid proposed
00:43:07 secretary of state sajid javid proposed to lord barwell in september 2016 that javid's dedicated housing policy tim leunig with whom barwell worked closely should review the discussion document as
00:43:18 should review the discussion document as agent for javid and shape the review as led some told the panel loining is the person who could have told javid he could give the green light to the
00:43:29 could give the green light to the discussion document as a result of senior officials subterfuge in november 2016 forcing two ministers to communicate with each other in a desperate attempt to make progress
00:43:40 in a desperate attempt to make progress on adb
00:43:41 on adb lord barwell received a significant warning
00:43:45 warning it put him on notice of the long-standing commitment to review adb and warned him of the need not to become complacent and that the fire sector can was concerned about matters including
00:43:57 was concerned about matters including vulnerable people and changes in construction technology in particular use of increased combustible materials he did not ask officials what those were
00:44:09 he did not ask officials what those were claims to have probably assumed the materials were timber and considered it to be addressed in the review or the discussion document he accepted however that the only review in progress was the purely deregulatory
00:44:21 in progress was the purely deregulatory discussion document in april 2017 lord barwell approved the discussion document and gave his steer to private secretary his private secretary that parts b and m were the
00:44:33 secretary that parts b and m were the two areas where i feel politically there is a significant pressure to move rapidly
00:44:40 rapidly but leadsome told the panel that barwell's email to loinig in april 2017 suggested barwell again wanted loining's buy-in on the discussion document it
00:44:51 buy-in on the discussion document it read gavin was content with the recommendations particularly interested in the work on parts b and m any thoughts tim leunig evidently had some negative
00:45:03 leunig evidently had some negative thoughts on the discussion document because harold never received barwell's approval of it and led some never even saw this email thread prior to giving evidence
00:45:13 evidence barwell was at a loss to explain but explained his office and javid's office had caused five months delay to the discussion document as a result of taking a collective decision to
00:45:24 taking a collective decision to prioritize the white paper the decision to withhold the seven work stream reports was at the highest level contrary to harrell's evidence that they were politically low risk lord
00:45:36 were politically low risk lord hesseltine's private secretary in may 2016 advised lord wharton that there are some potential issues here i will come and speak to you both in context these can only have been
00:45:48 in context these can only have been political issues lord barwell characterized the delay in publishing the reports until february 2019 as absurd and yet lastly the reports got stuck in his office in 2017
00:46:02 reports got stuck in his office in 2017 albeit some of that time was with javid's special advisors or spads spads are not technically minded they advise purely on policy the only conclusion that can therefore
00:46:13 the only conclusion that can therefore sensibly be drawn from this evidence taken together with the government's post grenfell misinformation campaign that adb prohibits a pe core a point it continues to argue is that
00:46:25 a point it continues to argue is that government was deliberately withholding the reports to disclose them would have revealed that government had known adb's flaws since at latest early 2015
00:46:36 since at latest early 2015 and new overhaul of the building regulations and adb was necessary given the warnings which led to grenfell some deliberately ignored such as the select committee and the
00:46:48 such as the select committee and the chorus led by appg delay releasing these critical reports is yet further proof the department was enslaved to its deregulatory agenda in disregard of safety
00:47:00 disregard of safety i now turn to the significance of the department's systems failures the department is keen to present its failures as due to a lack of oversta understanding its oversight role and
00:47:11 understanding its oversight role and inability to gather intelligence the department was supposed to obtain information from industry to ensure policy reflected current technology this was known as the intelligent client
00:47:23 this was known as the intelligent client function future developments were to be anticipated by a process known as horizon scanning both were an abject failure as the panel heard from mr harrell the department was
00:47:34 heard from mr harrell the department was a behind the curve function and inherently unresponsive as a result building regulations did not keep pace with modern materials the department not only failed to
00:47:45 the department not only failed to horizon cap scan but to notice still less diffuse the ticking time bomb on which it stood that said department officials were
00:47:56 that said department officials were aware of combustible insulation potentially being in hundreds of homes and although harold ledson denied being aware contemporaneously of the filler debate martin claims to have discussed
00:48:07 debate martin claims to have discussed this with them in the four years preceding the fire harold ledson also considered warning ministers of flammable tower cladding in 2016 but in fact failed to do so
00:48:19 2016 but in fact failed to do so the process failures significant as they are
00:48:23 are and resulting as they did in an unsafe system of regulation which failed to protect life are really the product of the overarching and unyielding deregulatory agenda coupled with the
00:48:35 deregulatory agenda coupled with the extreme financial constraints following the 2008 crash which as harrell said halted the regular review of building regulations it is therefore fundamentally misleading
00:48:47 it is therefore fundamentally misleading to characterize the parlor state of the building regulations and associated guidance as an unfortunate byproduct of a prolap prolonged lapse in concentration by the department's
00:48:59 concentration by the department's officials tinged with some unspecified ministerial responsibility and a degree of austerity it is more than that the evidence points to willful blindness
00:49:10 the evidence points to willful blindness and complacency towards safety which was subjugated to the more pressing and politically appealing housing and deregulatory agendas
00:49:21 housing and deregulatory agendas that this is so is evidenced by the department's knowledge of risks to life coupled with deliberate concealment dating back to the instruction to play down the nosely fire which concealment continued through
00:49:33 which concealment continued through garnic
00:49:34 garnic through the catastrophic 1924 tests which were never published and not disclosed to the inquiry until leaked to the press
00:49:43 the press laterally the way in which the department approached the lachenal inquest and its failure to implement the coroner's recommendations makes clear its disregard for safety in the face of proven risks
00:49:56 the face of proven risks finally i turned the role played by industry
00:49:59 industry it is ultimately responsible for the events which led to the grenfell disaster
00:50:05 disaster the inquiries experts consider the external fire spread guidance in adb even as it stood
00:50:14 was intelligible to competent designers and therefore if grenfell's designers had been competent they would have understood it those who rely on the ambiguity of filler are not fit to design facades if
00:50:27 filler are not fit to design facades if they fail to realize the core should not equate to diesel or lighter fluid as acm pe does and if they fail to appreciate the risks of using combustible materials
00:50:39 the risks of using combustible materials the inquiry will of course also need to consider the impact of our conics testing
00:50:44 testing of its rivet product to obtain a class b and its use of that test to obtain a bba certificate extending to both the rivet and cassette product
00:50:56 and cassette product that together with arconic's reliance on a class zero classification for the pe fr product despite the pe never having achieved a class zero
00:51:07 achieved a class zero led to a highly misleading bba certificate although arconic's mr schmidt accepted mr vela knew or suspected the class b was not honestly achieved and although
00:51:20 was not honestly achieved and although it was superseded by a later test for rivet resulting in a c which was subsequently downgraded by arconic to an e
00:51:29 e arconic's closing perversely maintains its continued reliance on class b was legitimate although industry could not be expected to appreciate arconic's
00:51:41 to appreciate arconic's misrepresentations to the bba industry's knowledge of the implications of using acmp is clear from its characterization of the situation as a ticking time bomb
00:51:52 ticking time bomb it is therefore not certain that if government had clarified the word filler or even required a2 in external walls over 18 meters as it now has the facade
00:52:03 over 18 meters as it now has the facade at grenfell would not have supported lethal fire spread this is because grenfell's designers did not claim to be confused by the regulations
00:52:14 regulations principally because most were not familiar with them and neither was rbkc building control competent to detect the patent non-compliance in relation to both insulation and cavity barriers despite
00:52:27 insulation and cavity barriers despite the requirement for those two elements being entirely clear similarly in relation to other the other critically relevant consideration for the inquiry namely means of escape for those with
00:52:38 means of escape for those with disabilities dr lane considers adb is premised on inclusive design and did make clear to the reasonably competent engineer that additional measures were required and
00:52:49 additional measures were required and that
00:52:51 that legislation protecting those with disabilities must be complied with competent designers were aware of bs different approach to evacuation and stay put
00:53:03 stay put to conclude that the failure to clarify or amend adb led to the lethal fire spread at grenfell is to overlook the role of the construction sector in deliberate non-compliance even in areas
00:53:16 deliberate non-compliance even in areas where adb left no room for debate such as insulation and cavity barriers the relatively small contribution of any insulation combustible or otherwise to
00:53:27 insulation combustible or otherwise to the grenfell fire which professor bisbee puts between two to ten percent does not detract from the significance of the prevalent culture of non-compliance
00:53:38 non-compliance and lack of competence industries capacity for both good and bad behavior is nowhere more starkly personified than in nick jenkins on the one hand advocating greater clarity in
00:53:51 one hand advocating greater clarity in section 12 7 adb in 2016 and drafting guidance accordingly but following grenfell assisting kingsfan in manipulating the outcome of a building
00:54:02 manipulating the outcome of a building safety programme test the nj juggle as he called it furthermore just after industry recognized the ticking time bomb posed by acmpe
00:54:13 by acmpe nhbc produced its irresponsible july 2016 acceptability of common wall constructions note whilst nhbc accepts by its closing this
00:54:24 whilst nhbc accepts by its closing this note was deficient it was worse than that
00:54:27 that it permitted the use of the very products used at grenfell without the need for test or even a desktop whilst the note itself was not causative at grenfell being published after the
00:54:38 at grenfell being published after the completion of the refurbishment it evidences the degree to which industry sought to manipulate and circumvent the regulation nhbc has notably not in its closing
00:54:51 nhbc has notably not in its closing addressed the how the vault fast which led to it issuing this report of this note occurred it appeared from the module 2 evidence that kingspan may have lobbied nhbc for
00:55:03 that kingspan may have lobbied nhbc for the production of that note they certainly had lobbied for the widening of the desktop provision of bca's tgn 18.
00:55:12 18. king's fans closing suggests we argued kingsbound was seminally causative of fire spread at grenfell we did not but said and still say now that kingspan
00:55:24 said and still say now that kingspan created a false impression from 2005 onwards of the suitability of combustible materials at height it did so by being the first insulation to seemingly pass a bs 8414 test and by
00:55:37 to seemingly pass a bs 8414 test and by misleading marketing coupled with kingspan's expressed desire to educate the market in matters of combustibility and its insignificance in terms of
00:55:48 and its insignificance in terms of individual product performance in that sense it was seminally causative of the uk market's willingness to use combustible materials at height
00:56:00 combustible materials at height the fact that at grenfell neither kingspan nor celestex's insulation was causative of the fire spread beyond the two to ten percent that any insulation would have contributed does not mean
00:56:13 would have contributed does not mean these insulations could not be causative in other constructions professor bisbee has been at pains to stress that such insulation particularly k-15 could be significantly causative if
00:56:26 k-15 could be significantly causative if used a different form of construction to conclude whilst it is beyond doubt that the department never addressed functional requirement b1 or b4
00:56:37 functional requirement b1 or b4 adequately with the result that it has allowed an unsafe framework of regulation to exist for over 30 years those designing facades and fire engineers designing fire safety
00:56:49 engineers designing fire safety strategies must be competent had they been they would have understood the functional requirements and taken responsibility for interpreting them correctly
00:57:00 interpreting them correctly whilst our comics kings vans and celetex products were potentially dangerous the designer should have appreciated their unsuitability for use in a high-rise building with a stay-put policy
00:57:12 building with a stay-put policy whilst of course regulation must be sufficiently clear building regulation alone cannot prevent disasters the sectors themselves must engender competence
00:57:23 competence that alone however is not sufficient given the competence crisis that we have as a minimum the title fire engineer we say should be legally protected
00:57:34 say should be legally protected those are my submissions sir thank you well thank you very much indeed well we're going to take our morning break rather earlier than usual and we'll take it at this point
00:57:45 it at this point after the break we're going to hear closing a closing statement for uh on behalf of other bereaved survivors and residents
00:57:53 residents by mr steen queen's council and mr mansfield queen's council that we'll do at 11 15
00:57:59 at 11 15 and
00:58:00 and at the moment therefore we shall rise for our morning break thank you very much
01:15:12 we're now going to hear a closing statement partly by mr steen queen's council and partly by mr mansfield queen's council on behalf of the other bereaved survivors and residents good morning mr steen morning
01:15:24 residents good morning mr steen morning ready to hear you as soon as you're ready thank you thank you so as you've already outlined i will be addressing first of all madison behalf of team two in so far as they can concern testing
01:15:36 in so far as they can concern testing and certification i'll also be dealing with disability issues and then mr mansfield
01:15:42 mansfield will then
01:15:43 will then come forward and then take on the question of central government
01:15:49 so we say this it is a disgrace that the cladding and insulation manufacturers our conic celetex and kingspan knew that their lethally combustible and
01:16:00 knew that their lethally combustible and toxic materials were being sold onto residential buildings and that they continue thereafter to profit substantially in the aftermath of the grenfell tower fire
01:16:13 the grenfell tower fire but it is also a national disgrace that the testers certifiers and government all knew of the dangers of these materials as well it is a disgrace that despite this
01:16:25 it is a disgrace that despite this knowledge nothing was done to protect the only people who did not know the people living in tower blocks and in particular those living in the grenfell tower
01:16:35 tower up until the night of the 14th of june 2017.
01:16:40 2017. heaped upon this disgrace is the fact that around 650 000 families children of disabled people still live in buildings covered in combustible cladding five years and six days after
01:16:52 cladding five years and six days after the fire at grenfell tower that's five years and six days after 72 innocent men women and children and one on board unborn child lost their lives
01:17:03 on board unborn child lost their lives due to the due to crime compound negligence and neglect loss across this industry
01:17:11 so this is why we have called within our written submissions for accountability what we mean is that at the very least those who knew and had responsibility should be sacked
01:17:23 should be sacked dr colwell should go from her position at the bre and brian martin should be removed from any future work that might have a detrimental effect on people's lives
01:17:34 people's lives we don't make this call lightly or reversely
01:17:37 reversely it is made in the light of the evidence that you have heard during this module both individuals through indolence or professional ineptitude missed clear opportunities to change the system of
01:17:48 opportunities to change the system of regulation which would have prevented the tragedy at the grenfell tower the fact that a ban on that a building industry-wide ban on
01:18:00 that a building industry-wide ban on grenfell style aluminium composite materials with an unmodified polyethylene core is only coming into force this year is yet another disgrace
01:18:11 force this year is yet another disgrace multitudes of flats are still covered in this stuff in november of 2018 the government introduced regulations intended to ban the use of combustible
01:18:22 intended to ban the use of combustible materials and high-rise residential buildings over 18 meters only material achieving the two highest reactions to fire classification class a2 and a1 could be applied
01:18:35 a2 and a1 could be applied but notwithstanding the presence of similar fire safety risks to those in other residential buildings such as hotels hostels and boarding houses they were excluded from the scope of the
01:18:47 they were excluded from the scope of the restrictions introduced under the 2018 regulations
01:18:52 it's taken further public outcry and another consultation the government has finally decided to extend the 2018 regulation restrictions in the 2022 regulations
01:19:06 in the 2022 regulations this means that this year there will be a complete ban on the use of the type of metal composite material used on the grenfell tower those with unmodified polyethylene core
01:19:17 core to ensure it does not become part of an external wall or specified attachment of any new building and buildings undergoing building works irrelevant of height or use
01:19:28 irrelevant of height or use and finally hotels hostels and boarding houses will also and finally be brought within the span scope the 2002 regulations should come into
01:19:39 the 2002 regulations should come into force on the first of december 2022 and apply unless an initial notice building notice or full plans have been deposited beforehand and work has started or starts within six months of
01:19:52 started or starts within six months of that date
01:19:54 that date but why allow this the industry has fair warning in the form of the tragedy at the grenfell tower don't use these materials they are dangerous and they are going to be
01:20:06 dangerous and they are going to be banned
01:20:07 banned does it make sense to let an unscrupulous company buy up the no doubt ever cheapening stocks of this material to shove on hospitals just in time to limbo under the ban
01:20:19 limbo under the ban can we please stop putting corporate profits over safety to life
01:20:28 the real question posed by the module 6 evidence
01:20:31 evidence is how it was that so many buildings including the grenfell tower were made dangerous by the combustible cladding placed on them we suggest that the witnesses called
01:20:42 we suggest that the witnesses called within module 6 have done their best to try to hoodwink you the panel witnesses have presented their evidence to imply that there were some suggestions or problems with combustible
01:20:53 suggestions or problems with combustible cladding and insulation and little more than that
01:20:57 than that the truth is much worse
01:21:00 worse grenfell tower was built not long after the ronin point disaster where an entire corner of a tower block fell away due to poor construction rina point was a 22-storey tower block
01:21:12 rina point was a 22-storey tower block in canning town newham east london that partly collapsed in may 68 only two months after opening at ronan point four people died and 17
01:21:23 at ronan point four people died and 17 were injured because of ronan point grenfell tower was built to last until the corrupt incompetent manufacturers and builders and the erosion of the regime of
01:21:34 and the erosion of the regime of inspection and building regulation fatally undermined its safety we need first of all in the line of documents that we're going to be examining shortly
01:21:45 examining shortly to weigh up uh the understanding of the relevant guides from the bre starting in 1988
01:21:55 1988 [Music]
01:21:56 [Music] the first edition of br135 the 88 guide warned of risk posed by overcladding materials we will see that by 1988 concerns
01:22:09 we will see that by 1988 concerns regarding cladding systems were already well understood concerns of class o were also clear and i take you first of all please to the document bre 135 1988 that is bre
01:22:24 the document bre 135 1988 that is bre four zeros five five five three underscore zero zero zero six
01:22:46 so you should have in front of you thank you very much now on my screen zero underscore zero zero zero six under regulatory aspects you'll see
01:22:58 under regulatory aspects you'll see bottom right hand corner control over the external surface of walls of buildings particularly those of multi-story flats to avoid ignition and
01:23:09 multi-story flats to avoid ignition and flame spread which might enjoy the lives of resident residents above by breaking down effective compartmentation is currently controlled by reference to tests specified in bs 476 part 6 and 7.
01:23:25 tests specified in bs 476 part 6 and 7. however those these tasks only provide information on surface fire behavior the overall fire performance of a ventilated cladding system or insulated assembly incorporating independently
01:23:37 assembly incorporating independently supported weathering finishes and complicated reveal details can only be investigated under actual fire conditions on a full scale building facade
01:23:48 facade to identify the design principles on which constructional recommendations might confidently be based demanded research this would be to determine both the risk of flame spread over then please to the next page
01:24:00 please to the next page thank you over the surface of the building and the risk of progressive spread via viral cavity within the cladding system or through a layer of combustible insulin to areas remote from the
01:24:12 insulin to areas remote from the original fire further down on page seven the document refers to investigation of the problem you'll see there
01:24:25 concern current concern has evolved the likely performance in fire of large areas of external wall insulated in these ways when when a flame plume emitted from a window on one
01:24:38 flame plume emitted from a window on one story impinges on the facade above in high-rise buildings it was felt that a life risk might be caused by the penetration of fire or smoke through
01:24:50 penetration of fire or smoke through walls or upper windows resulting from i read the second of the two bullet points far spread through continuous cavities or combustible insulins contained between the solid wall and the external finish of the system
01:25:04 what does this mean
01:25:07 from 1988 cladding fires which may destroy reliance upon cockmark on compartmentation and meant that stay put as an answer to a fire and at least some tower blocks
01:25:19 a fire and at least some tower blocks could not be sustained this means that from 1988 cladding fires were a known risk a risk that could kill
01:25:30 a risk that could kill a killing risk
01:25:33 the test program is described in the first edition of br135 at page underscore 0007 bottom left hand corner
01:25:46 that is a timber crib that at point a was designed to provide flames typical of a fully developed building fire impinging on the facade
01:26:00 page underscore007 shows the results carried out figure 3
01:26:07 figure 3 shows the rig before the test
01:26:16 it is worthwhile noting that in relation to figure 3 we look at in fact at figure four we can see the same
01:26:26 some consideration was given to windows being included in the test trick
01:26:33 and if we go back to page zero zero zero seven bottom right hand corner
01:26:40 thank you experimental fires typical experimental fires are illustrated involving a system with insulated sound with insulation sandwiched between rendering a wall and b
01:26:51 and b an aluminium-faced cladding system incorporating expanded polystyrene the extent of the ventilated cavity being limited by fire barriers
01:27:02 and then top of our page 0 0 10 please
01:27:09 thank you
01:27:12 these are the test reveal the test results which revealed at the top of the schedule under the performance column that the cladding melted allowing active eps fire in cavity and dripping from
01:27:24 eps fire in cavity and dripping from base of cladding process slowly self-sustaining
01:27:30 thank you
01:27:35 just three years after the 1988 bre guidance was shared with industry a fire tore through a flagship government-funded project at nosley heights
01:27:47 heights the guidance in 1988 had first had foretold the far's behavior the panels there grp glass reinforced polyester were class zero and the cavity acted as
01:27:59 were class zero and the cavity acted as a chimney
01:28:01 a chimney and smaller window frames created gaps filled with combustible materials this may sound familiar as a further at the further premonition of grenfell up tower fire
01:28:12 of grenfell up tower fire flame re-entry occurred throughout the build
01:28:16 build mr martin was asked in his evidence in relation to the nosley house heights fire
01:28:21 fire why small scale fire tests including a class euro classification where an inadequate basis for trying to predict and control afar in the external cladding his answer
01:28:33 cladding his answer well he couldn't recall discussing it and asked rhetorically where does the surface start and finish class o remained in place along a clear threat to life safety to go unchecked
01:28:47 the resulting 1991 building regulations called the cavity barriers in an external padding system which of course proved ineffectual at grenfell and the functional requirement before
01:28:59 and the functional requirement before the external walls of the building shall resist the spread of fires over the walls and jumping ahead in the chronology it was following the next major cladding fire in 1999 at ghana court that b4 was
01:29:11 fire in 1999 at ghana court that b4 was diluted to read the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire suddenly therefore in one stroke fire risk became a subjective exercise
01:29:23 fire risk became a subjective exercise although anthony bird of the dclg claimed his insertion made no difference at all
01:29:29 at all agreeing as he put it was a lawyer's thing
01:29:33 thing now the bre had been privatized in 1997 the bre's ability to advise on policy and carry out crucial research was now severely limited by the new client relationship with government
01:29:45 relationship with government a relationship democrat demonstrative of government's willingness to limit their own knowledge of risk in favor of cost saving
01:29:53 saving beyond this client confidence confidentiality on manufacturers failed tests protected the results from wider
01:30:04 dissemination in the future it is essential and in the public interest for data on failed fire performance tests to be made publicly available
01:30:16 be made publicly available we must ensure decisions made on compliance are able to take account of all known facts not just those that are profited by manufacturers in pursuit of a route to
01:30:27 manufacturers in pursuit of a route to market instead of a route to safety
01:30:32 even though privatized the oversight body that could have stopped the bre from waning wire from running wild was ineffective despite identifying multiple failings at
01:30:43 despite identifying multiple failings at the bre ucas failed to enforce throughout the decades assessment of the bre generally was lacking and the bre were permitted to act in the interest of industry over public safety
01:30:57 industry over public safety they relied on corporate contract terms to protect them from the obvious need to protect life
01:31:05 on the 11th of june 1999 there was the fire at garnet court a 14-story block of flats in irving north ayrshire scotland led to the death of a man who used a wheelchair five others were injured cutting was a
01:31:17 five others were injured cutting was a significant factor in the fire spread the fire spread via the external cutting reaching the 12th floor within 10 minutes of outbreak destroying flats on nine floors
01:31:30 nine floors at westminster the environment transport and regional affairs select committee conducted an investigation i'm going to turn please to the fbu's memorandum which is fbu
01:31:41 memorandum which is fbu 50127
01:31:43 50127 underscore zero zero six
01:31:52 the fbu's memorandum outlined the risks from cladding thank you and concluded starkly it's under the heading whether a risk is posed by such cladding
01:32:05 there are a number of risks that may be posed by the use of combustible or badly installed external cladding systems having said that it should be understood that cladding systems themselves are
01:32:16 that cladding systems themselves are unlikely to be the first item that is ignited
01:32:19 ignited they are far more likely to become involved in fire as a result of a fire in a room that has vented through the room window and which is traveling up the building face this is a common occurrence and is
01:32:31 this is a common occurrence and is predicted by the laws of physics i.e heat rises therefore fire travels upwards
01:32:38 upwards the primary risk therefore of a cladding system is that of providing a vehicle for assisting uncontrolled fire spread up the outer face of the building with the strong possibility of the fire
01:32:49 with the strong possibility of the fire re-entering the building at high levels via windows or other unprotected areas in the face of the building this in turn poses a threat to the life safety of the residents above the far
01:33:00 safety of the residents above the far floor
01:33:02 floor a secondary problem of fire spread through external cladding may be caused by the method of fixing the panels to the exterior facade of the building if lightweight fixing aluminium or metal alloys etc or resin bonded systems are
01:33:14 alloys etc or resin bonded systems are used to attach the panels there is a risk of the panels becoming detached when exposed to fire and falling from the face of the building posing the associated missile risk to firefighters and members of the public
01:33:27 firefighters and members of the public in the vicinity of the building following the ghana court fire and as a result of a request from the subcommittee to review standards bre cc1924 1924 contract was born
01:33:39 cc1924 1924 contract was born this was meant to be a program of work to review the guidance given in bre sorry in br 135 the fire performance of thermal insulation for walls of multi-story buildings
01:33:50 multi-story buildings a major part of this involved large-scale experiments in 2001 one of which included acmpe as cladding dr caldwell recalled this experiment's
01:34:01 dr caldwell recalled this experiment's results as shocking after the rig erupted into 20 meter flames mr martin however could only recall it as an interesting outcome stating of dr colwell
01:34:12 stating of dr colwell she described the mechanism by which it reacted with the fire the i.e the aluminum burned away exposed the polyethylene and then the polyethylene began to burn mr martin put it this way i think she
01:34:23 mr martin put it this way i think she said that it failed the test
01:34:27 yet again this clear risk was not acted on
01:34:30 on the acm pe had been included as a result of an industry survey on materials and cladding systems it is a further total disgrace that this obvious screaming risk to life
01:34:43 that this obvious screaming risk to life was simply left hidden from the public eye until this inquiry's investigation a final part of the cc 1924 work was the production of the second edition of
01:34:55 production of the second edition of br135 dated 2003 written by sarah colwell and brian martin
01:35:04 take it please to the document which is bre
01:35:09 bre four zeros five five five four underscore zero zero zero 0003
01:35:18 both of that time working at the bre it was written from the perspective of the bre's frs the fire reserves research station
01:35:25 station as part of the contract cc1924 placed as you can see by the office of the deputy prime minister i'm now going to turn you to another image but before i do so it'd be best if
01:35:37 image but before i do so it'd be best if i give an image warning the image potentially is upsetting as it may call back memories of the tower fire i'll therefore pause just for one moment people to react if they wish
01:35:57 therefore please turn to bre zero zero zero zero five five five four underscore zero zero zero two
01:36:13 you can see that there could be no doubt that the severity of a cladding fire was understood as we can see a test rig completely under fire on the front page
01:36:36 now turn to page same document page underscore zero zero zero nine showing the schematic that we're all familiar with
01:36:47 the re-135 the second edition shows the mechanism of fire spread a reminder of dates we've had 1988 strong warnings complementation at risk
01:37:00 strong warnings complementation at risk by the time we get to 2003 there is absolutely no doubt at all from this schematic of the nature of the risk and how it can be demonstrated on paper and we can see that this diagram shows graphically
01:37:12 graphically a cladding system contributing to fire spread it can result in a risk of multiple simultaneous secondary fires the left hand side of the block of flat schematic
01:37:24 schematic just
01:37:25 just below the floor from uh second from the top
01:37:29 top left hand side of the block schematic states if the external cladding contributes to the flame spread there is a risk of secondary fire to all levels
01:37:41 page 10 that's underscore zero zero zero sorry underscore zero zero one oh
01:37:49 thank you
01:37:51 under paragraph two fire breakout following the initiation of a fire inside the building if no intervention occurs the fire may develop a flashover and break out from the room of origin through a window opening or doorway
01:38:04 through a window opening or doorway flames breaking out of a whip building from a post flashover fire will typically extend two meters that seems to be the received wisdom going back to 1988 will typically extend two meters above the top of the opening
01:38:16 above the top of the opening irrespective of the material used to construct the outer face of the building envelope
01:38:21 envelope we can see there figure three the severity of the danger is then emphasized under paragraph four just further down the page fire re-entry
01:38:35 window openings or other unpredicted areas within the flame envelope provide a potential route for fire spread back into the building this creates the potential for fire to bypass any compartment floors that may
01:38:46 bypass any compartment floors that may present
01:38:47 present that may be present leading to a secondary fire or floor above if secondary fliers are allowed to develop without innovation without sorry without intervention before flashover occurs then flames may break out again
01:38:59 occurs then flames may break out again thus extending the flame envelope and threatening other openings further up the building irrespective of the materials used on the building envelope and finally at paragraph five there is a
01:39:10 and finally at paragraph five there is a reference uh to the impact on firefighting i'll skip the first sentence however where the external padding system is contributing to the fire propagation rate
01:39:22 propagation rate the potential exists for the fire to affect multiple stories simultaneously thus making firefighting more difficult perhaps a considerable understatement
01:39:34 this means that from 1988 and confirmed in 2003
01:39:39 in 2003 dr colwell brian martin the bre government and the building industry are all aware that cladding and insulation can provide a route for fire and be a fire risk itself
01:39:52 route for fire and be a fire risk itself if padding and insulation are involved in the fire this may leap up a building if cladding and insulation are involved in a far compartmentation may well fail if cutting and installation are involved
01:40:03 if cutting and installation are involved in a fire fire fighting will be made more difficult
01:40:11 despite the clear warnings in the 1988 edition about the risk of re-entry bar window or otherwise in the 2003 second edition any attempt to include windows or aptitude apertures in test rigs had also
01:40:23 aptitude apertures in test rigs had also now gone as we can see at same document second edition which is bre four zeros five five five four
01:40:34 four zeros five five five four at twenty so that's underscore zero zero twenty figure a one
01:40:44 so you will recall recently the questioning by council of inquiry of uh professor bisbee in survivors it touched upon the question of windows apertures not being included in the test rig so 88
01:40:55 not being included in the test rig so 88 there was some attempt to include by the time we get to 2003 no windows no attempt to provide apertures within the test rig
01:41:04 test rig the next revision of br135 is in 2013 the third edition i'll take you briefly to bre four zeros five five five five
01:41:16 four zeros five five five five underscore zero zero two
01:41:25 and then moving on please to underscore zero zero thirteen thank you
01:41:33 thank you
01:41:35 we see our familiar schematic
01:41:39 the third edition of br135 repeats the same embedded warnings of fire spread up a building and increase difficulty with fire service intervention as shown in the second edition
01:41:51 the second edition it's worthwhile pausing just to remember what's going on now at the grenfell tower itself by 2013 the refurbishment plans at the grenfell tower were well underway
01:42:02 grenfell tower were well underway as an example in november of 2012 there was the design team meeting involving the tmo studio e curtains consulting max fordham apple yards the
01:42:13 consulting max fordham apple yards the discussion point there regarding cladding was color and ratio of zinc for the facade and nothing else
01:42:24 take you back please to the br 135 third edition
01:42:30 to underscore zero zero two three so zero zero two three
01:42:51 in addition to previous warnings noting the dangers of combustible cladding and installation with this second edition there is the consideration of combust sorry third edition there is consideration of combustible panels
01:43:02 consideration of combustible panels at uh underscore zero zero two three second paragraph to the bottom right hand side
01:43:08 hand side you'll see there that
01:43:12 a little further down thank you very much combustible panels reference combustible panels are typically based on vinyl or glass reinforced plastic although various new products are being developed in this area some of which
01:43:23 developed in this area some of which contain insulation materials these products generally have good surface spread of flame characteristics to prevent rapid fire spread across the surface of the system but once the panels become involved in
01:43:35 but once the panels become involved in the fire they have the potential to generate folding debris add to the overall fire load and provide a route for fire to propagate up the outside of the building this paragraph dismally confirms that
01:43:46 this paragraph dismally confirms that whilst the outside shell of a product may resist fire spread it can also be dangerously combustible making clear the threat posed by its use when involved in a fire
01:43:57 when involved in a fire this provides no excuse for the unremitting danger to life from these materials being used on buildings
01:44:08 the trend therefore from 88 to 2003 to 2013 has made it clear to all and sundry government the re all of industry what is the nature of this risk what is the
01:44:19 is the nature of this risk what is the extent and seriousness of this danger but of course we have the evidence that relates to other fires it's already been mentioned by this barwise queen's council the fire at the manchester's the
01:44:30 council the fire at the manchester's the edge development that building was clad this is 2005 in sandwich panels that contributed to rapid fire spread up 17 floors in just 10 minutes
01:44:42 10 minutes dr colwill's subsequent report on the far suggested the government revisit the relevant section of approved document b guidance around external wall construction to remove confusion about what materials were compliant
01:44:55 what materials were compliant following that work mr martin rewrote this section as part of a new draft version of approved document b including a new section stating that insulation or any other material used in external wall construction in a
01:45:07 used in external wall construction in a building over 18 meters tall should be of limited combustibility however despite this being included in the draft the final version of approved document b omitted that amendment
01:45:19 document b omitted that amendment instead stating that any insulation product or filler material should be of limited combustibility
01:45:28 that phrasing never went out to consultation and mr martin admitted the thinking was that they could come back and slip in something unconsulted on later
01:45:39 you've also heard the evidence that relates to the group um meeting at the cwct the center for window and cladding technology
01:45:50 cladding technology which effectively tasked the bre sir dr sarah colwell in july of 2014 to draft an faq
01:45:59 an faq according to the meeting minutes the dangers of acm cladding with a polyethylene core were raised with attendees pointing to major fires in the middle east and france pausing again 2014 by that stage you've
01:46:12 pausing again 2014 by that stage you've had the water club tower atlantic city you've had walsh in golden suites fire in south korea mermos tower rube france the safe belhauser building fire in
01:46:24 the safe belhauser building fire in tecum to buy and the tameley tower to buy fire
01:46:28 buy fire these are all fires involving exterior panel facades
01:46:37 so at that meeting dr caldwell was directed to the fact of the other fires in other parts of the world dr cole apparently tried to explain that approved document b was intended to prohibit
01:46:47 prohibit acm use in buildings over 18 meters tall but was told the current wording was insufficient as it only referred to prohibiting combustible insulation products
01:46:58 products with cladding panels apparently subject to the lower far classification class zero as standard many acm products claimed to obtain colwell agreed to take responsibility
01:47:09 colwell agreed to take responsibility for a clarifying faq and raised it with mr martin the civil servant responsible for the guidance mr martin as you will recall had attended the meeting but left before
01:47:20 attended the meeting but left before this discussion dr colwell never completed the faq later claiming she believed the issue would be dealt with in a forthcoming revision of a proof document b she said
01:47:31 she said it was assumed that it would be taken up with that that is why we didn't pursue that conversation with brian which in hindsight is something i should have done therefore approved document b was never revised and remained in place
01:47:43 never revised and remained in place until after the grenfell tower fire dr colwell indicated that by september she decided not to draft an faq but failed to inform the cwtc group she said
01:47:54 failed to inform the cwtc group she said on reflection it is something i should have followed up directly with the group i fully acknowledge it was a lapse on my part not keeping them fully informed with regards to the whole process
01:48:07 regards to the whole process it was also as you recall revealed her evidence that dr colwell failed to reveal those details in her witness statement
01:48:15 statement inquiry has heard that she told an attendee at the march 2015 meeting that she had completed a draft of the faq however when an attendee chased for an update she ignored multiple emails and
01:48:28 update she ignored multiple emails and voicemails until that individual gave up
01:48:34 it should be remembered that the cwct 2004 meeting came at a potentially critical moment when the final decisions to clad grenfell tower in highly combustible
01:48:45 grenfell tower in highly combustible polyethylene core panels were being considered
01:48:50 despite a clear golden thread of knowledge of risk posed by overcladding industry-produced guidance flew in the face of public safety the bca the building control alliance technical guidance note 18 legitimized
01:49:03 technical guidance note 18 legitimized desktop studies which operated in a space of entirely insufficient knowledge or performance of materials and professor busby has recently described the six desktop studies he
01:49:14 described the six desktop studies he reviewed as missing basic information pretty inadequate and not evidence-based mr martin was aware of incompetent studies in use but entirely failed to
01:49:25 studies in use but entirely failed to act to warn his own department even speaking at the launch of the later 2016 note permitting the grenfell cladding and insulation combination
01:49:36 it is against the background that we have set out of known danger life that the evidence of all module six witnesses must be judged
01:49:47 it is not just that in the past these witnesses didn't take the risk seriously but importantly they didn't take account of the seriousness of the risk
01:50:04 in addition we urge the inquiry to give careful consideration to the abject performance of organizations such as the nhpc and labc who have through a post who have through a process of evolution
01:50:15 who have through a process of evolution taken on regulatory functions under the guise of profit-making businesses from 2009 to 2015 the lfbc certified kingspan's k15 and seller taxes rs 5000
01:50:28 kingspan's k15 and seller taxes rs 5000 5000 based upon missing false or misleading data and nhbc ultimately green lit the use of acm rs 5000 and k15 in their 2016 guidance
01:50:41 now we all recall the evidence from professor bisbee describing what he was describing as the limited contribution to the fire of those materials but we need to remember at all times the toxicity of those materials and the
01:50:53 toxicity of those materials and the gases they gave off and therefore the contribution cannot just be limited to how much flame they produced
01:51:01 produced both the labc and nhbc private companies gave false reassurances as to public safety
01:51:08 safety this was against the background of industry having the clearest of warnings surrounding the use of these products from bre one from br 135 editions one to three
01:51:20 three with the certifiers in module 2 there is a clear tension between the public service obligation of ensuring public safety and commercial pressures where private businesses conduct
01:51:31 where private businesses conduct regulatory or quasi regulatory functions it should not need to be said but public safety must be the driving and principal concern in any and all
01:51:43 and principal concern in any and all circumstances the evidence you have heard demonstrates that
01:51:49 that instead of profit making sorry the evidence from uh i'll start that sentence again the evidence you have heard demonstrates that instead profit making has been given an equal
01:52:01 profit making has been given an equal and sometimes overriding emphasis over public safety as of this moment the evidence from inquiry experts professors bisbee and torreira stands to say that much must be
01:52:12 torreira stands to say that much must be done to test cladding systems and materials used within such systems and much must be done to test such systems before we can get a standard for such construction
01:52:23 such construction what does that mean
01:52:26 well it means this that until the science is settled our ability to measure the safety of existing exterior cladding systems is also seriously suspect
01:52:41 our clients say with responsibility comes accountability stated by professor bisbee on day 291 of the inquiry if it's your job to write building regulations then you need to make sure
01:52:53 regulations then you need to make sure that what you are doing is representative of what is happening in the world
01:52:57 the world and if you don't then you're not doing your job
01:53:01 and he's mentioned the fact that this jurisdiction stands on an international stage our systems our systems are not just our own but emulated by other countries
01:53:15 that means that we cannot imagine that our disgrace from a failure to act on the consistent knowledge of risk taking dating back over four decades affects just us
01:53:26 just us this cannot be allowed to continue the system must be reformed so that the discharge of regulatory functions concerning public safety is put back into the hands of entities that are
01:53:37 into the hands of entities that are protected from and not subject to any competing forces such as the desire to make money further attention should be paid to the market dominance of organizations such
01:53:48 market dominance of organizations such as the nhbc which because of their market share hold an inordinate amount of power in shaping safety standards our submission is that a new safety standard must be set within the building
01:54:00 standard must be set within the building industry a grenfell standard this must be not only what is thought to be safe but additionally a wide margin on top to account for industry crime builders and designers ignorance and
01:54:11 builders and designers ignorance and incompetence and expert error the grenfell standard should mean that in practice that a door that is rated potentially to withstand 30 minutes subject to a fire judged to be for
01:54:23 subject to a fire judged to be for sufficient to allow for the arrival of firefighters at 30 minutes to make sure to make safe the
01:54:31 the grenfell standard could become a mark of safety across the building industry and be a very small part of remembering those who died in the fire
01:54:42 and now turn to disability issues
01:54:48 the bare minimum we should accept is that a block is only safe if it is safe for all residents
01:54:57 not just for all residents except disabled people the future litmus test for fire staff for
01:55:06 for the future litmus test for fire safety should be to regard people with disabilities those who need the law's protection most as mentioned by mr thomas queen's council early on and the inquiry
01:55:18 council early on and the inquiry and their abilities of art to survive as the minimum standard by which we should judge
01:55:25 judge risk to life from fire
01:55:29 we have heard shocking evidence about government attitudes toward disabled residents
01:55:33 residents and their safety from fire in the years between lacanal and grenfell but the government has even managed to trump this on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the fire
01:55:43 the fire two and a half years after the prime minister committed to implementing the recommendations the government reneged on the on that commitment by openly rejecting the recommendations most focused on protecting disabled people
01:55:57 what could have led to that mindset we have seen how little the government wished to do to improve things after the latino coroner's recommendations for disabled people it was worse
01:56:08 for disabled people it was worse post lacanal the government chose to actually make them less safe according to the dc lg's louise upton la canal house was totemic and for the housing sector guidance was the thing
01:56:20 housing sector guidance was the thing that was most wanted after the fire
01:56:25 brian martin admitted that before 2011 all statutory guidance on means of escape for disabled people recognized that disabled people had a right to a plan for their evacuation in case of a
01:56:37 plan for their evacuation in case of a fire
01:56:39 fire to the government that was a big problem
01:56:44 within two days of his office being selected to write the lga guidance colin todd recorded that disabled evacuation had been identified as one of the show stoppers to address
01:56:55 stoppers to address as he put it evacuation or not what resulted was the 2011 lga guide by 2013
01:57:05 by 2013 without independent analysis the official factory guidance was born and endorsed by lord pickles in his response to the rachel r 43 letter rule
01:57:16 response to the rachel r 43 letter rule 43 letter
01:57:18 43 letter the lda the lga guidance stated without precedent
01:57:22 precedent that responsible persons need not have any plan for how disabled people would evacuate a building in case of imminent danger
01:57:29 danger in getting there the government dismissed concerns that it was that it was discriminating against disabled people contrary to the equality act we suggest this the government's
01:57:40 we suggest this the government's guidance on landlords evacuation duties to disabled residents was unsafe and unlawful
01:57:46 unlawful ignoring the public sector equality duty we now know that this arose out of a culture of complete disregard for the views of disabled people
01:57:57 disabled people neither mr todd or the government consulted disabled people or the celebrity organized all disability organizations or specialists at all before deciding it was unrealistic to expect landlords to have
01:58:09 unrealistic to expect landlords to have an evacuation plan for disabled residents
01:58:14 why didn't they ask disabled people
01:58:19 there were two strands to government led officials evidence on fire safety and building regulations on the one hand they forgot about disabled people but the more illuminating and deadly
01:58:31 but the more illuminating and deadly strand
01:58:32 strand was that they didn't think disabled people had anything useful to add to their own safety from fire and from fire and landlords views would suffice
01:58:44 as a result the only stakeholders whose views counted were mr todd's office and his clients landlords not residents this is how the government operated so current practice became best practice
01:58:57 so current practice became best practice now the government hardly allowed the ink to dry on the transcripts of this evidence before they revealed their stance
01:59:03 stance on the uh on this inquiries peeps recommendations at the building safety bill's third reading in may of this year building safety minister lord stephen greenough
01:59:14 safety minister lord stephen greenough stated 15 of the 37 disabled residents living in grenfell tower died in the fire
01:59:21 fire that is more than 40 percent of the disabled residents the government are committed to supporting the fire safety of disabled and vulnerable residents in the next breath his tone changed
01:59:35 in the next breath his tone changed the government ran a consultation on the issue of personal emergency evacuation plans peeps in july 2021 the consultation has made clear the substantial difficulties of mandating
01:59:46 substantial difficulties of mandating peeps in high-rise residential buildings around practicality proportionality and safety
01:59:53 safety except it didn't the peeps recommendations were massively backed up by the public consultation including by disabled people and organizations 80 to 90 percent supported keeps
02:00:04 keeps that mantra practicality proportionality and safety was not new we've heard those words before
02:00:11 before so the haunting echo of the government witnesses evidence to this inquiry about about why it attempted to relieve landlords of their vital duties to disabled people
02:00:23 these three obstacles to implementing the 23 recommendations reportedly revealed by the july 2021 consultation were in reality taken from the same
02:00:35 were in reality taken from the same playbook employed a decade ago and defended in mr martin's evidence first lord greynosh said on practicality how can you evacuate a mobility impaired
02:00:46 how can you evacuate a mobility impaired person from a tall building before the professionals from the fire and rescue service arrive disabled people and organizations had told the government how peeps could work with the assistance of staff or others
02:00:58 with the assistance of staff or others the phrase used in the guide itself but the government regurgitated the same stance mr martin used in his dismissal of the contemptuously named benevolent neighbor
02:01:10 neighbor secondly lord grinnell stated on proportionality how much is it reasonable to spend to do this at the same time as we are seeking to protect residents and taxpayers from excessive
02:01:21 residents and taxpayers from excessive costs
02:01:22 costs a decade previously the government dismissed discrimination concerns due to an anxiety to avoid imposing disproportionate burdens on landlords and misupton agreed that this should
02:01:34 and misupton agreed that this should have been disclosed in a spirit of canada
02:01:39 that purported concern for residents and tech taxpayers resulted from closed door meetings with landlords that disabled people should be trapped to die in fire to avoid excessive cost
02:01:52 to die in fire to avoid excessive cost was one of brian martin's dark facts ron martin was asked so people die in their flats because they're bed bound because it's too expensive to have a system to get them out his answer
02:02:05 out his answer i suppose so
02:02:08 what grinos's third point was on safety how can you ensure that an evacuation of mobility impaired people is carried out in a way that does not hinder others in evacuating or the fire service in fighting the fire
02:02:20 fighting the fire nor grenache attempted to justify why disabled people would continue to be left in their flats in a high-rise fire because they might slow down non-disabled people exercising their rights to evacuate
02:02:32 rights to evacuate it was that mindset that led to 40 dying in the gravel tower it was the view went on to say at the time that hopefully the fire brigade will get to them in time but if
02:02:43 brigade will get to them in time but if not that's one of the reasons why there are a large number of people that with disabilities that die in fire it's because they can't get themselves away from an incident
02:02:57 this was the government's decision rejection of your inquiry this inquires recommendations on peeps and sharing information with the frs for nearly all high rise blocks
02:03:08 high rise blocks for the very small fraction of high-rise blocks with simultaneous evacuation policy the very highest risk there is a person-centered fire risk assessment at pc fra
02:03:19 pc fra typical suggested outcomes include fire retardant bedding and fire safe ashtrays well they're fine in themselves i suppose but they're not an evacuation
02:03:30 suppose but they're not an evacuation it was the minister who said forty percent dying died in grenfell this was not because they had a cigarette in bed what this is instead is a sad reminder of the evidence before this inquiry that
02:03:42 of the evidence before this inquiry that apparently disabled people are a risk to themselves and to others
02:03:49 has time already softened the tragedy's impact
02:03:53 impact have the government's failures and their consequences already been forgotten it's the purpose of this inquiry that this should not happen and that this tragedy should never be repeated
02:04:04 tragedy should never be repeated we suggest that the government's rejection of this inquiry's recommendations to safeguard the most vulnerable who are at risk of death strikes at the heart of that purpose
02:04:17 one final point
02:04:20 when i came into this inquiry i had to make myself familiar with the system of regulation that in theory existed and i paid close attention to dangerous hackett's
02:04:32 close attention to dangerous hackett's reports
02:04:34 reports which predicted much of the concerns and considerations that you have considered with this inquiry heaven knows what then judith would now say
02:04:44 say after hearing this evidence she said that the rhetoric structure was not fit for purpose what words would she use now one thing that we all expected was that would be a system of some type a system
02:04:57 would be a system of some type a system of checks and balances risks assessment impact assessments the very stuff of regulation we've seen nothing of that and on all of the issues that i've been speaking about this morning including
02:05:08 speaking about this morning including disability issues if there had been any type of system at all impact assessment risk assessment and the type consideration by committees by meetings by those people that actually are paying attention to these details
02:05:20 attention to these details then this tragedy may have been avoided so we're looking ahead now to a system in the future but it needs to be one that has a system of checks and balances risk assessment and impact assessment
02:05:31 risk assessment and impact assessment that looks carefully at these matters into the future my final point that's never going to be cheap
02:05:38 cheap it has to be paid for when it has to be funded
02:05:41 funded so those are our submissions i now turn and see my place to mr mansfield thank you very much indeed mr
02:05:49 yes on mr mansfield you're going to
02:05:54 add to that statement on behalf of your client so would you like to come up
02:06:46 yes mr benson when you're ready i will be in a moment i'm sorry there's no rush don't worry um
02:06:54 um good morning chair uh veria estefan and ali akbar as well this morning uh
02:07:02 you've had in a sense the public will realize because it's publicly available from the families that's split into team one and two you've had
02:07:13 one and two you've had extensive detailed written submissions on this part of uh well the whole of module six but the part i'm dealing with is
02:07:24 but the part i'm dealing with is included in that now in addition you've had detailed submissions this morning so i i hope that it might be acceptable if i were to
02:07:36 i were to and would be of assistance to you if i were to
02:07:39 were to well in my case i'm sitting back but stand back a little
02:07:45 a little and try and sort of distill some principles for the future out of this module um because
02:07:56 um because as you listen perhaps the most startling
02:08:01 fact
02:08:04 is that the simple solution
02:08:08 solution that might have obviated the need for any of us to be here
02:08:14 was present for many years was neglected by successive governments but obviously particularly one i shall come to in a moment
02:08:26 one i shall come to in a moment between 2010 and 15 namely david cameron's
02:08:30 cameron's there was one staring them in the face
02:08:35 this can't be explained by the fact that they didn't know because
02:08:41 because they didn't know it can't be explained by oversight forgetting falling between the gaps
02:08:49 the gaps it's much more serious than that and one has to say as the select committee did the fire surface did before that
02:09:01 the fire surface did before that just
02:09:02 just how many deaths do there have to be before changes are made a refrain that you will have come across many times it's not limited
02:09:15 many times it's not limited interestingly to building regulations or other forms of social interplay
02:09:25 interplay it's a kind of lethargy
02:09:29 lethargy which says well and in fact martin said this at one point
02:09:34 point it is is that i think he he wasn't so keen to adopt the strength of the words but
02:09:40 but it's the let the bodies build up how where are the bodies
02:09:45 attitude before pedestrian crossing whatever it happens to be
02:09:51 to be safety issue is put in place so it's no accident that this has happened and of course the measure
02:10:00 measure that can be focused on very simply
02:10:04 and was spelt out in the select committee as you've seen in 1999.
02:10:12 in 1999. not entirely it was encompassed but it was there the seeds were there and have remained there namely a ban on combustibles
02:10:23 and it's what uh the
02:10:26 the families whom i represent and everybody else who's heard represent these are the questions why did it take so long
02:10:37 so long for this to happen in fact
02:10:41 in fact it's only really happened about a week ago
02:10:44 ago interesting just before this part of this module that finally we get the complete picture it isn't even complete yet
02:10:55 picture it isn't even complete yet why has it taken a decade essentially a decade to get to this position
02:11:02 position now the that question because you will recall that council
02:11:09 council to the inquiry very helpfully we put them in our submissions set out four questions uh for this module
02:11:20 uh what were the risks from fire and were they in high-rise properties understood by government before the blaze first question
02:11:32 first question i'll come back to that had lessons been learned from previous incidents in the united kingdom and overseas third question what steps had or had not been taken by government to
02:11:44 or had not been taken by government to address these risks from fire final question perhaps of all the most important
02:11:50 important because it links to what i'm saying at the moment about why namely what motivated government in its approach to fires before the 2017 disaster
02:12:03 before the 2017 disaster that we say is the key to answering why it took so long
02:12:10 it is in fact of course a motivation that is discernible and i'll come to exactly and you've heard it before but it's worth just going over it a little
02:12:21 little to indicate the strength of that motivation because the length of time waiting is excessive and extraordinary and can't be explained by anything other than a determined
02:12:34 than a determined policy
02:12:36 policy not to do it in other words not to have the ban
02:12:44 the second allied question to that you may think that is necessary for this inquiry to think about because of the length the duration
02:12:55 because of the length the duration of dilatory behavior by government not just the one in 2010
02:13:04 and what has to be remedied for the future appreciating the inquiry itself may not be able to encompass all of this but it is essential to think
02:13:17 is essential to think how did such a motivating force over such a long period survive and to
02:13:25 to a terrible extent succeed because it killed
02:13:29 killed 72 there was no ban i appreciate there are other factors but the ban is pretty central
02:13:37 and part of the answer to that part of the why question is of course the nature of
02:13:43 of the governance under which we all live
02:13:48 and i want if i may just to address that because it is a situation in which when a centralized government is motivated in the way successive
02:14:00 motivated in the way successive governments obviously right up to the last were motivated
02:14:04 motivated we do not appear to have the means any longer it is like grenfell tower itself the fault lines
02:14:14 lines in government are severe
02:14:20 and it's when you begin to address those two questions related to the uh i'm calling it the why but the motivation questionnaire set by counsel
02:14:32 questionnaire set by counsel that one begins to say is why why did that happen
02:14:38 and could i just bring it up to date just that's just with things that have happened
02:14:43 happened we say
02:14:44 we say the legacy is still there the legacy of the why it happened over 10 years
02:14:52 10 years to even get to the stage we're at
02:14:58 well so you may remember because i you were there when i first opened the case in phase one for the families
02:15:09 and i used a quite astonishing occurrence and i want to just refer to it again because
02:15:20 because there's a risk that it's all going to be repeated
02:15:24 repeated and i appreciate that none of you as the panel want to look back and feel that the work that everybody's done and put into this inquiry resources into
02:15:35 put into this inquiry resources into this inquiry are going to be at the behest and whim of whoever happens to be in power at that point
02:15:44 but the example i gave at the beginning was and now might be perhaps even more potent because of the evidence you've heard
02:15:53 heard that on the 14th of june the day of the fire itself there was a meeting set up the meeting was
02:16:05 the meeting was convened in the name of the red
02:16:09 the red tape
02:16:10 tape challenge
02:16:11 challenge rtc
02:16:13 rtc which is has this it's like an imminent squeeze in this case it hangs behind set up in april 2011 essentially by david cameron
02:16:28 but uh chaired by oliver letwen now the
02:16:33 now the the terrible irony of this
02:16:37 of this as it were motivational factor the why question
02:16:42 question is that on that day what will they do to discuss
02:16:47 discuss they were due to it certainly wasn't off the agenda as uh lord pickles uh seemed to think and i have to come back to him obviously
02:16:59 they were considering whether it would be possible to liberate a little more cladding onto the market in the absence of european standards
02:17:11 in the absence of european standards to enable
02:17:12 to enable industry to as it were exercise their rights in the marketplace of course
02:17:21 of course as it is understood the meeting didn't happen
02:17:25 however a telling example of what is possible here i raise it because not only does it illustrate what was going on in that
02:17:36 illustrate what was going on in that period
02:17:37 period particularly but there is a risk that a similar situation could occur again it may not have come to everybody's notice but
02:17:48 come to everybody's notice but on the 14th of june this year recently gone with the memorial week that there's been there was a meeting in parliament
02:18:01 of and it's the first one that has happened apparently the national institution association held its first parliamentary meeting
02:18:12 there were members of government there and a member of the house of lords who was a minister as well all there in principle of course that's part of the process of our
02:18:25 the process of our government but what is interesting is not just that this was publicized on the 14th the actual meeting was just before
02:18:36 actual meeting was just before a week or so before it was publicized on the 14th
02:18:40 the 14th and what was extraordinary was and it shows that there is a legacy unless we're careful there was no mention of grenfell
02:18:53 one doesn't obviously want to fall overboard but one is somewhat surprised in the publicity that they gave to this on the 14th meeting having a few days before
02:19:04 before not a single mention of grenfell a lot of mention of the role of the insulation industry in relation to green energy that's a
02:19:15 in relation to green energy that's a perfectly valid point but however one might have thought that the lessons of grenfell had percolated industry to such an
02:19:27 had percolated industry to such an extent that on that week before the memorials they might at least
02:19:33 least have remembered they might at least because you've heard this morning from the previous speakers about the role
02:19:40 role and you've heard in evidence as well the role of insulation in this particular case what it tends to demonstrate i don't overwrite it what tends to demonstrate here is
02:19:53 what tends to demonstrate here is that the relationship between
02:19:58 those in government the ministers in particular industry
02:20:05 industry and safety is still at risk if it's not respected if it's not given the place that it's due
02:20:15 due in
02:20:16 in our society
02:20:20 the second point has been touched on by mr steen only minutes ago so i don't go back through it but what is
02:20:28 is is interesting is in the debate over building safety fire safety guidance which is being put out at this moment
02:20:40 moment it is in fact
02:20:43 the terms he's been through the terms on which it's for the moment been rejected so far as the
02:20:52 the recommendations for the those who are less able those who are vulnerable
02:21:00 in in a way that is as the word's been used the litmus test and the phrase has been coined on many occasions that the measure
02:21:10 measure of a society lies within how it treats those who are most vulnerable
02:21:20 attributed originally to mahatma gandhi but it may have been others it's had different phraseology at different times but the point is a very simple
02:21:31 simple and extremely good one namely you do at the end of the day whatever else you do or don't do that's the one
02:21:40 the one to suggest that it's going to cost too much it's going to cost too much if you don't
02:21:47 don't as we now see it's the wrong economic analysis which should not be applied but that's the worst aspect of what was said in the house of lords over these measures
02:22:01 house of lords over these measures sent back for consultation for another as it were kick into the long grass is that
02:22:10 is that in the same way that fire safety became an impediment to government policy in 2010 11 and 12.
02:22:24 we now find that the disabled there's less able
02:22:29 less able they have become the impediment because they might get in the way of the able-bodied making a quick exit
02:22:42 and one only has to put that in its as it were true light to recognize the risks that still pertain in terms of
02:22:54 in terms of making
02:22:55 making progress
02:22:57 progress on all of these matters [Music]
02:23:00 [Music] so before i just distill a couple of principles i would if you would forgive me want to just read i'm not sure obviously i'm not the extent to which
02:23:11 extent to which you may have already read the written submissions but they're just a few initial paragraphs in the one we submitted
02:23:18 submitted on behalf of team two for government because it does summarize our position but it also
02:23:29 it leads into the principles i just want to develop in the time we have today the paragraphs so that you have them in case
02:23:39 case you need to refer to them again come under the heading of central government and they're the preamble it's a few paragraphs 81 82 83 84 85. that's
02:23:50 a few paragraphs 81 82 83 84 85. that's that's it but this is how it's phrased and i just would like to read this part of it the nature and substance of the evidence in the inquiry in this part of the module beggar's belief
02:24:03 beggar's belief belief in a system that failed to protect the right to life there is one overarching conclusion that the edifice of government
02:24:14 of government was
02:24:15 was and remains as much at risk as grenfell tower itself was
02:24:21 was in 2017.
02:24:25 in 2017. the inquiries expose the fundamental fault lines in both the former significantly contributing to the latter an unresponsive system of parliamentary democracy wherein the concentration of
02:24:37 democracy wherein the concentration of power
02:24:38 power is vested
02:24:40 is vested in a cabal of short-term ministers bereft of any technical expertise to enable challenge inquiry robust oversight and transparency
02:24:52 oversight and transparency this was
02:24:53 this was and is
02:24:55 and is a recipe for disaster the core accelerant fanning the flames was a deep-rooted remorseless aggressive political dogma disguised as freedom freedom to facilitate the interests of
02:25:08 freedom to facilitate the interests of industry and private enterprise the combination of force this combination of forces nurtured a hostile environment where health and fire safety
02:25:19 and fire safety human rights and equality within social housing were systematically systematically portrayed as impediments to the free market this provided license and momentum for
02:25:32 this provided license and momentum for behaviors ranging from incompetent to grossly negligent and corrupt the testimony in the government part of this module which is singularly marked
02:25:43 this module which is singularly marked those in positions of authority and responsibility is characterized by arrogance ignorance indifference and in some instances deceit
02:25:54 some instances deceit witnesses have regularly shown a remarkable lack of awareness effectively the higher you go the less you know as if this is a quality to be proud of it has often been born from not wanting
02:26:06 it has often been born from not wanting to know as it didn't fit the political purpose of government it has become increasingly clear that few if any of the nolan's seven principles of public life
02:26:17 nolan's seven principles of public life have been upheld by the majority of senior politicians and civil servants and we list those
02:26:25 those principles i do it uh quickly without the
02:26:28 the the description that follows these were published in 1995 and it's easy to overlook and brush them aside but these principles are selflessness
02:26:39 selflessness integrity
02:26:41 integrity objectivity accountability openness
02:26:46 openness honesty and leadership i pause on that before finishing the last paragraph because
02:26:57 because again a reflective moment is it possible to look back on this module
02:27:04 module and say that really any of those have been satisfied by the witnesses particularly the ones in prime
02:27:14 in prime position particularly brian martin particularly lord pickles i'm going to add david cameron for reasons i'll come to at the end
02:27:26 and the answer i think would be no
02:27:31 no they have not been upheld and in fact worse seriously undermined and these weren't contrived these principles just for academic discussion they were contrived
02:27:43 academic discussion they were contrived because it was necessary to imbue public life with a sense of morality if nothing else
02:27:51 else and in a sense that's what the families are looking for here
02:27:57 the last paragraph of this preamble reads as follows the apotheosis of this race to the bottom came in the modules final stages with
02:28:08 came in the modules final stages with lord pickles his demeanor his excuses illa for ill-informed attempt at empathy right at the end do not bear
02:28:20 do not bear repetition even his apology is couched in terms of an involuntary act of misspeak for which he is not really responsible
02:28:33 for which he is not really responsible well we say here you have another fine example of why these principles are extremely important because one has to re-examine as part of the the inquiry's
02:28:45 the the inquiry's uh
02:28:46 uh robust approach to the evidence is the why question again why it went on for so long because actually at the end of the day those concepts that are contained in
02:28:57 those concepts that are contained in those principles combined with the concept of ministerial responsibility where is it
02:29:08 where is it now mr millet put very carefully to mr lord pickles which he accepted in the end responsibility but it was like if you will remember a brush off yes yes
02:29:20 if you will remember a brush off yes yes yes yes of course i'm responsible doesn't mean anything because within minutes of course were the errors that he was making
02:29:31 were the errors that he was making so ministerial responsibility in our system at the moment which is important in terms of not only those principles but the question of accountability
02:29:42 but the question of accountability now it's not just me or mr steen or stephanie barwise asking these questions the families as you attended
02:29:54 the memorials last week
02:29:57 more than one but particularly the one at the tower what is it that the families and those who speak on their behalf are wanting
02:30:08 who speak on their behalf are wanting it's easy it's trips of the time justice
02:30:13 justice it can be a meaningless concept but not in this one this time it's very meaningful because justice for those who are truly responsible and
02:30:25 for those who are truly responsible and of course i'm already putting fingers very carefully on those who are responsible
02:30:33 they are expecting that those who have and should have if ministerial responsibilities going to mean anything then there has to
02:30:44 going to mean anything then there has to be
02:30:45 be a follow-up there has to be justice
02:30:51 justice for the family in terms of the accountability there's two forms of accountability there's the one you have here in which
02:31:01 in which witnesses come and are asked questions perfectly properly but the families are not and it isn't and obviously not wishing to
02:31:12 and obviously not wishing to obviously indicate what the inquiry's function is as you know well it's not expected that you will deliver accountability you will identify where responsibility lies in this
02:31:25 where responsibility lies in this particular and that has been done through the evidence
02:31:31 evidence and it is hoped that those who are watching those who are listening those who are receiving this evidence will understand that this is only half the exercise
02:31:42 that this is only half the exercise long though it's taken to do but necessarily do in
02:31:48 careful detail so that process has not yet finished so accountability part of the nolan principles is absolutely vital if this inquiry at the
02:31:59 absolutely vital if this inquiry at the end of the day besides making changes in government thinking and one hopes that the government will rethink
02:32:08 rethink their rejection of that less able or vulnerable so accountability we say is key key point here but actually at the end of
02:32:19 point here but actually at the end of the day
02:32:20 the day it's combined with
02:32:24 another proposition and that is the one that is likely still to be pushed to the back and that is a respect not just for those
02:32:35 and that is a respect not just for those who are less mobile but a respect generally
02:32:41 for public health and safety and we say that hasn't been present it's one of the reasons for the gap the length of time
02:32:53 length of time is because the deregulatory agenda which existed long before many years before the advent
02:33:04 the advent of the coalition government in 2010. so it had existed for many many years before that deregulatory approach safety
02:33:14 safety was not
02:33:16 was not taken
02:33:17 taken seriously it wasn't on everybody's lips it wasn't something that was a pressing need
02:33:25 need but of course that's stage one it's not given the respect it's due once it isn't given the respect and it's something that is a and also round
02:33:36 something that is a and also round something that can be traded off so that industry can get on with its business
02:33:42 business and so it becomes obviously later one in two out three out and so the the honed
02:33:50 the honed regulatory agenda which is the key one here
02:33:55 here so it's not been not regarded with respect but it gets worse than that again that's the key factor here because obviously deregulation
02:34:07 because obviously deregulation goes back through a number of governments and as i should be saying at the end there is some a character in this whole scenario that you haven't heard from but he is we say responsible
02:34:20 he is we say responsible for the deregulation agenda the regulatory agenda being honed specifically not just to disregard fire safety
02:34:33 not just to disregard fire safety or unsafety but actually to ditch it actually to target it actually to kill it off
02:34:43 and then one wonders why it's taken 10 years or more because the critical years in the lead up to refurbishment at grenfell tower and all the rest
02:34:55 grenfell tower and all the rest we have
02:34:57 we have the
02:34:58 the as it were the tentacle reaching out and
02:35:02 and essentially corrupting the system and the problem was there wasn't a way of dealing with this
02:35:13 there wasn't a way of dealing with this for those who felt as many and i would submit
02:35:17 submit the majority of the population would
02:35:21 would want there to be
02:35:25 not a risk-averse society as was held not a cowardly society as it was described by those in the red tape challenge
02:35:37 but a courageous society that puts the priorities even though they may cost in the initial stages money but save in the longer run and in this context
02:35:49 and in this context therefore with these principles in mind there are just one or two documents that it's
02:35:55 it's it's um
02:35:58 it's um just worth reminding oneself of uh would you i wonder we have given notice if
02:36:05 notice if i make sure i get the right reference hom
02:36:10 hom triple 0018307
02:36:16 and it's the second page yes here we are now
02:36:21 now that's it thank you
02:36:25 i've called up this document because it's had some exposure you you will recall this is the letter that lord pickles
02:36:36 this is the letter that lord pickles says is a
02:36:37 says is a a fancy letter oh
02:36:40 oh it's a sort of letter you know ceos send out from time to time to get there i'm sorry
02:36:47 i'm sorry this is exactly the mentality of those who obviously
02:36:54 obviously don't regard safety as a top priority but this letter which it was dated as the first page shows was dated in april
02:37:06 shows was dated in april uh 2011 on the eighth i'm not going to read it at all can we get back to the second page sorry we've got the date april 2011. um
02:37:17 um this is the this marks the demarcation between the deregulatory policies before the coalition
02:37:28 the coalition and then
02:37:29 and then how the coalition as it were lifted all of that as it were work that had gone before and then honed it and focused it
02:37:40 focused it on
02:37:41 on safety which they did i'm not going to repeat the maidenhead speech which in fact came a year later on the 2012 because the theme of
02:37:52 on the 2012 because the theme of targeting fire safety and safety generally as an albatross had been going on all around so this is what um ministers are getting the last page of that i don't answer it to come
02:38:03 page of that i don't answer it to come up indicate that this is a letter that went to all government ministers went to the cabinet office and to the permanent secretaries of the civil service throughout
02:38:15 of the civil service throughout and the there's no melee mount about this there's no ambiguity about this about new regulations the top paragraph i want us to be the first government in
02:38:26 i want us to be the first government in modern history to leave office having reduced the overall burden of regulation rather than increasing it next paragraph bold ambition if we try a new approach
02:38:37 if we try a new approach and then he's talking about scrapping this that and so forth i don't read all of it in the past when governments tried to deregulate ministers were asked to make the case for abolition in other words the assumption was that
02:38:48 words the assumption was that regulations should stay unless there was a good case for getting rid of them we're changing that presumption we are changing the default setting our starting point is that a regulation
02:39:00 starting point is that a regulation should go
02:39:02 should go or its aim achieved in a different non-government way and less industry unless there is a clear good justification with government being involved and even when there is a good case for this we must sweep away our
02:39:13 case for this we must sweep away our necessary bureaucracy complexity and gold plating of eu directives and challenge overzealous administration and enforcement this marks a change from the old ways of doing this you see quite
02:39:24 old ways of doing this you see quite clearly
02:39:25 clearly i don't trouble you with the terms of the rest of it it's all in the same vein this isn't a fancy letter just to get the troops a bit worked up this is
02:39:34 this is the prime minister making very clear that his government is going to do things quite differently even to the pre-regulatory regime that went before
02:39:45 pre-regulatory regime that went before that is why this letter is extremely important and it's this letter combined with what the prime minister was saying in the maidenhead speech and elsewhere
02:39:56 in the maidenhead speech and elsewhere about fire safety that meant you had a combination an aggressive approach to this policy safety is no longer given respect it's
02:40:07 safety is no longer given respect it's kicked down the road because it's seen as the albatross or the hindrance and this explains clearly because this is
02:40:18 is 2011 the speech in maidenhead 2012 the coroner's letter 2013.
02:40:27 2013. so the coroner's letter is coming into central government lord pickles in particular but others at a time when actually
02:40:38 at a time when actually nobody's taking it seriously any more than the letter carefully crafted was taken seriously you will remember astonishing
02:40:50 astonishing the head of civil service within the department dame melanie
02:40:58 i'm i'm calling if i may her lack and all moment how could she be in this department head of the civil service she did not know about lacanol she did not know about the
02:41:11 about lacanol she did not know about the rule 43 letter until the morning of the fire when the red tape challenge were meeting just down the road
02:41:19 the road she didn't know anything about it but she wasn't alone she hadn't been briefed why because it wasn't of consent you saw some of the or you
02:41:30 some of the or you saw the results of the slideshows that some
02:41:33 some ministers were given the briefings weren't usually very brief very informal and not adequate at all which is why lachena was on the back burner
02:41:44 on the back burner but the slideshows themselves didn't deal with external fire spread didn't deal with adb because they don't weren't tight despite the building regulations 70 are really concerned with safety and
02:41:56 70 are really concerned with safety and yet it was relegated it was relegated because of this kind of agenda and it's serious because uh if you as another document i'd i'd
02:42:08 uh if you as another document i'd i'd like to
02:42:11 to also refer you to
02:42:15 and that is the
02:42:19 the sorry just one moment get the reference to it
02:42:26 i don't seem to have it readily available but you will remember it's the amos
02:42:31 amos statement that he made to the house of commons i read it out in opening this module and you will recall how how serious that was for him
02:42:42 how how serious that was for him and we put it in our main submissions but it it is something that needs to be reflected on because
02:42:54 he now the late to david and in a way he summarizes the attitude of anybody who tried to challenge that's why the system is at stake here and this
02:43:06 why the system is at stake here and this is what uh sir david was trying to say that this was a speech in 2019 the world was horrified when we saw a
02:43:18 the world was horrified when we saw a tar block ablaze in the fourth or fifth wealthiest country in the world and it should never never have happened over the past six years the all-party
02:43:31 over the past six years the all-party group
02:43:32 group has met resistance when seeking improvements to fire safety despite compelling evidence that such measures should be introduced in the thirteen years since the
02:43:43 in the thirteen years since the regulations were last reviewed nothing has happened it is perhaps rather easier for a conservative member to make those points than for other members because
02:43:54 members because we should never have got to the position of the grenfell tower fire tragedy especially after the warnings and the recommendations from the coroner
02:44:05 recommendations from the coroner after the lachenal house fire and the 230 2013 inquest the rule 43 letter to the secretary of state the large number of letters exchanged between me and
02:44:16 of letters exchanged between me and numerous ministers 21 i think all together and meetings with successive ministers
02:44:23 ministers it brings no comfort to the victims of grenfell it is the fault of the conservative government the labor government of every member of parliament
02:44:34 government of every member of parliament that our voice was not heard and the recommendations were not listened to
02:44:41 now
02:44:44 in a sense that is a tribute to a man who fought hard
02:44:53 who was really rebuffed who was seen as an irritant not they didn't encourage anybody to go and meet him what's the problem with this
02:45:03 this problem is twofold the system is not allowing this to penetrate the cabal led cabinet not allowing
02:45:12 allowing a position in which and this was a the the
02:45:18 the the apbg
02:45:20 apbg 10 or 11 members as it was then with
02:45:25 with ronnie king you will recall ronnie king of great experience lending his services to the committee this is how ronnie ken king was
02:45:36 this is how ronnie ken king was dismissed by brian martin which led to the cross-examination by mr millet
02:45:43 millet basically
02:45:44 basically he he brian martin wasn't going to allow anybody who knew what they were talking about to get anywhere near adb to be allowed to make a constructive contribution
02:45:56 to make a constructive contribution why not
02:45:59 oh because and this this goes back to what's being said in the house of laws recently
02:46:04 recently because
02:46:06 because oh we'll go bankrupt will starve to death it's this approach that it's
02:46:15 that it's where you have safety in mind it's getting in the way of what profit getting in the way of these these it's such obvious equations that are being used that are uh remiss
02:46:28 that are being used that are uh remiss and i want to pause if i may just on this because we haven't i i hope you'll forgive me just for reminding you that you were going to break for lunch about now ah
02:46:39 now ah i misread i thought i was going to go to i'm quite happy to do that you sure yes yes yes yes um well how am i doing i mean you've run out of your time
02:46:52 your time uh well i think i started at five parts but i can
02:46:55 but i can i can i can um
02:46:58 if you can give me an extra five minutes i can do it now what should we say ten to one would that be all right yes yes yes sorry i thought it uh thank you the
02:47:08 the the point it there are a number of other points within this in terms of recommendations could i just pause to make the recommendation here besides the system of government
02:47:20 besides the system of government perhaps it's time to suggest that appg's are given a statutory basis there are a number of them because they're within their basis and to be given powers
02:47:32 their basis and to be given powers because at the moment they're informal they don't have statutory powers and on the whole if government wants to ignore them that is precisely what they do so i would ask for that to be considered
02:47:43 would ask for that to be considered as a possible recommendation uh for the future
02:47:48 future the
02:47:50 the two other points i want to make one is that
02:47:53 that an example of how the rule 43 letter was ignored
02:47:57 ignored and an example of why things are still the same
02:48:00 the same may i just it it's not a regulation it's a different point but it is within the ambit of what's been talked about today you will recall hanan muhabi gave evidence in module 4 right here
02:48:13 evidence in module 4 right here and she describes what it's been like walking away from the fire her family were divided in the sense that half her family survived because
02:48:23 because her half they got out the other half didn't because they were on a higher floor and they stay put stay put question being asked by the families this week bbc asked the question
02:48:36 this week bbc asked the question right this week if i live in a high-rise blog
02:48:39 blog what am i supposed to do do we know no we don't
02:48:44 we don't looking at the government website on this issue we're nowhere near getting answers london fire brigade yes government no
02:48:55 london fire brigade yes government no government has four stages it's barely finished stage one which is only look at looking at the past evidence another three stages to go are we going to wait for people to die again it's the same
02:49:08 for people to die again it's the same lethargy there needs to be an urgency about these issues that we've been over
02:49:15 been over and we would impress you to uh as it were
02:49:20 were persist in the way that you have to date now the final point in the last two minutes
02:49:25 minutes is is this we put it in the opening and on behalf of team two i request consideration by the panel again
02:49:35 again the key figure in the 2010 coalition the key figure the architect of the policy that targeted safety
02:49:47 safety with david cameron and and and this is hamlet without the prince why is he not being called we have requested it has been said twice in reply
02:49:59 in reply that it would be disproportionate it would be unnecessary or may i say we're not asking for every prime minister who's been as it were overseeing deregulation just the one
02:50:12 overseeing deregulation just the one that turned as it were the focus towards fire safety there are obviously necessary questions that the public and the families deserve an answer to
02:50:23 answer to and that is when he did say these things that he did both in the letter and the maidenhead speech and elsewhere
02:50:30 elsewhere did he recognize what he was doing creating the hostile environment in which these errors these gaps these mistakes
02:50:38 mistakes worse
02:50:40 worse occurred because he'd created the conditions of causation and we say once again it needs answers from him rather than assumptions
02:50:52 rather than assumptions and although we appreciate the pressure of time we would be obliged for further consideration of that matter and i'm sorry i misjudged the time that's all right and that's quite right all right
02:51:03 right and that's quite right all right well we'll thank you very much for your uh statement your remarks we'll break there we'll resume please at quarter two uh and we shall be back on track then so
02:51:14 uh and we shall be back on track then so thank you very much quarter two please
02:51:25 you