Devastating closing submissions from the Fire Brigades Union and London Fire Commissioner on Module 6, detailing how 40 years of government deregulation, profit over safety, and the war on health and safety directly caused the Grenfell Tower disaster.
00:00:26 now the next set of closing statements is going to be made by mr martin seaword on behalf of the fire brigades union so mr c wood you'd like to come up to the desk you
00:00:37 you'd like to come up to the desk you may begin your remarks
00:00:45 thank you sir members of the panel these oral submissions are evidence-based the references are given in the fbi's written closing statement or most of them anyway for this part and are not
00:00:57 them anyway for this part and are not repeated here start with the true causes of the grenfell tower disaster the evidence received in module 6 shows that the fundamental underlying causes of the terrible loss of life at grenfell tower
00:01:09 terrible loss of life at grenfell tower were political decisions made by central government from 1979 onwards in the service of a social and economic system driven by profit and greed in particular
00:01:20 in particular the disaster was a product of the neo-liberal agenda over the last 40 years of deregulation privatisation and marketization with the introduction of competition into the public sector in
00:01:31 competition into the public sector in areas previously governed through direct public control regulation and oversight by the state of fire safety and fire and rescue services at national and local level was deregulated and replaced by looser
00:01:44 was deregulated and replaced by looser regulation self-regulation and guidance the dominant mantra was that the private sector knows best with the public sector being opened up to ever greater private provision and the public sector being
00:01:55 provision and the public sector being increasingly run down and marginalized especially after the regime of austerity corporate interests were prioritized over and above the needs and rights of
00:02:06 over and above the needs and rights of citizens
00:02:07 citizens particularly those living in social housing
00:02:10 housing including as to life fire safety and equal treatment the deregulatory agenda has been accompanied by a tolerance of cronyism and corruption and a war on health and
00:02:21 and corruption and a war on health and safety regulation we start by looking at the government which led the race to the bottom the election in 1979 of margaret thatcher's government heralded a significant ideological change
00:02:33 significant ideological change whereby the market and the private sector were to be set free as far as possible
00:02:38 possible in 1979 microhestine fired the starting gun for the deliberate policy of deregulation in the construction industry
00:02:46 industry he advocated the part privatization of local authority building control and reducing the building regulations to overarching functional requirements as set out in the consultations including the future of building control
00:02:57 including the future of building control in 1981
00:02:59 in 1981 professor bisbee described in his phase 2 report how the changes first introduced by hesseltine in 1984 provided the construction industry with the flexibility it had been seeking with
00:03:12 the flexibility it had been seeking with the creation of private building control so the designers and contractors were no longer necessarily limited by constraints applied by a local authority building control he said it unleashed a race to the
00:03:24 he said it unleashed a race to the bottom
00:03:25 bottom we agree
00:03:26 we agree the civil servants in dclg agree mr bird head of technical policy in the dclg until 2013 told the inquiry the clear pre-1985 rules which had told
00:03:38 the clear pre-1985 rules which had told builders they couldn't use a crossover panel with a polyethylene core on a high rise were deliberately replaced by a far more innovative functional approach mr harold who replaced mr byrd said the
00:03:50 mr harold who replaced mr byrd said the building act 1984 was intended to deliver a system with the minimal possible government intervention to deliver compliance in the marketplace mr martin gave similar evidence
00:04:03 mr martin gave similar evidence adding that market forces made building control bodies more willing to let third parties tell them something was acceptable and that the government approach was to let the sector resolve its own problems
00:04:15 let the sector resolve its own problems mr bird's view that the new functional approach should have been sufficient was at best naive the commercial marketplace is not some kind of consensus seeking academic forum
00:04:27 consensus seeking academic forum but is driven by the commercial imperative to maximize profits cut costs and undercut competitors ambiguities in the guidance for the building regulation regime
00:04:39 for the building regulation regime caused confusion and provided a means to cut costs in corners and for some to bend and sometimes break the rules what is worse is that the government was aware of all this as is now partially
00:04:50 aware of all this as is now partially admitted by july at
00:04:53 at subparagraphs and h of paragraph six of their closing and paragraphs 124 and 130.
00:05:01 130. it knew that there were ambiguities in adb
00:05:05 adb that the deregulated regime was failing to prevent the use of unsuitable materials on high-rise and that markets know no morality i'm quoting here it is government's
00:05:16 i'm quoting here it is government's responsibility to bring a balance that's what mr hezeltine said at the outset but they failed to bring that balance the tragedy at grenfell tower could well have been avoided if the stricter
00:05:28 have been avoided if the stricter regulatory regime of the pre-1985 building regulations have been preserved preventing the use of combustible materials in rain screen cladding systems on existing high-rise introducing the functional requirement
00:05:39 introducing the functional requirement approach without adequately resourcing and supporting local authority building control
00:05:45 control was a recipe for the grenfell tower disaster
00:05:50 in view of professor torreira's evidence including his oral testimony on the 16th of june 2022 it's clear that the competency gap in all sectors should have been filled
00:06:02 should have been filled before deregulation the free market driven by the desire to maximize profit was never going to be the correct mechanism for ensuring safety in the construction industry
00:06:13 safety in the construction industry as mr harrell told the panel the english marketplace failed in terms of safety the ambiguous guidance in adb and the failure to clarify it made compliance
00:06:24 failure to clarify it made compliance with an enforcement of the functional requirement much more difficult and gave the construction industry the flexibility we saw exploited in modules one to three of phase two
00:06:35 one to three of phase two the fbu asked then why did no one on the gt refurbishment on the gt refurbishment project think fine
00:06:43 fine the answer is provided in this module six two
00:06:45 six two the government policy of deregulation compounded by austerity cuts allowed fire safety to become a costly burden which could be disregarded with impunity pending a disaster like
00:06:57 impunity pending a disaster like grenfell
00:06:58 grenfell we agree the written closing submissions for this part of module 6 with bsr team 1 at 1.1 and 1.3 of bsr team 2 at paragraph 3 and
00:07:09 of bsr team 2 at paragraph 3 and and the paragraphs referred to earlier today by mr mensfield 81 to 85 and paragraph 159 we also agree with the mayor's submission at paragraphs 18 21
00:07:20 mayor's submission at paragraphs 18 21 33
00:07:21 33 and note the concessions made by the current secretary of state for do like in in his written closing statement already cited the government knew from 2002
00:07:32 the government knew from 2002 specifically of the dangers posed by acn cladding with a polyethylene core mr bird admitted that by 2002 following the failed bre test on the 18th of july 2001 he was aware
00:07:45 2001 he was aware a how acm cladding with a polyethylene core could behave in a fire and that it should not have been used over 18 meters b of dr debbie smith's view that classo was at least questionable as a
00:07:57 was at least questionable as a classification for a product to be used as or as part of an external wall over 18 meters
00:08:03 18 meters c although a product such as acm cladding could achieve a class a reaction to fire classification nevertheless it presented a clear external fast spread
00:08:13 spread hazard
00:08:14 hazard and d that a p e cord aluminium rain screen cladding product was likely to perform dangerously with respect to external fast spread habit hazards
00:08:25 external fast spread habit hazards however the government not only failed to act but when adb was modified again in 2006 the routes to apparent compliance were actually extended by keeping the class over classification while reducing the option while
00:08:37 while reducing the option while introducing the option of desktop studies these significantly weakened the already lacks fire safety regime they were brought in despite the knowledge the government possessed about the failures of acm trading systems in the
00:08:48 failures of acm trading systems in the full-scale tests of july 2001 far from tightening up fire safety protection the revised adb maintained and created a regime which could be exploited by the greedy and the
00:08:59 exploited by the greedy and the unprincipled and as you're aware even when the old party parliamentary group on fire safety and rescue repeatedly raised concerns about adb between 2014 2017 including
00:09:12 about adb between 2014 2017 including with ministers their concerns were given short shrift there can be little doubt that deregulation and the failure to clarify adb were significant factors which directly contributed to the graphite
00:09:23 directly contributed to the graphite tower fire
00:09:26 deregulation impeded the work of civil servants in dclg civil servants have consistently testified that deregulation stifled attempts within dclg to address concerns
00:09:37 attempts within dclg to address concerns about the ambiguities in adb and the use of dangerous materials for cladding over 18 meters even after the coroner's recommendations following the latin or fire inquest mr bird told the panel that the deregulatory agenda of
00:09:49 panel that the deregulatory agenda of the government after 2010 had throttled the possibility of new regulation and went on to explain the the savings that had to be made before any
00:10:00 that had to be made before any regulatory provision could be introduced he also said the plan to review adb try in annually was overtaken by the coalition government's policy on deregulation that regulation was seen as a last
00:10:12 that regulation was seen as a last resort
00:10:13 resort that his shrinking team spent an inordinate amount of time looking at how they could deregulate and undertaking other activities supporting deregulation at the expense of other work
00:10:25 at the expense of other work mr ledson told the panel dclg was a deregulating department deregulation was an important government policy and they were addressing the spirit of what the government wanted to achieve as well as the letter the job of officials he said
00:10:38 the letter the job of officials he said was to provide ministers with the widest range of deregulatory options no new regulation could be introduced without a compensating reduction in regulation elsewhere and there was no exemption for the building regulations
00:10:50 exemption for the building regulations there was no process of seeking an exemption other than applying to the secretary of state no application for an exemption was made to the secretary of state because they didn't think they would have got one and it wasn't judged a fight worth having
00:11:03 it wasn't judged a fight worth having deregulation was the reason why the review of adb was wrapped up into a broader review a piecemeal review was ruled out as it would have made it more difficult to offset any changes as required by the one in one out
00:11:16 required by the one in one out one in two out a one in three out rules this approach was agreed by the director general
00:11:24 general the coroner's recommendations following lacking did not result in adb being exempt from the deregulatory regimes of one in one out etcetera mr harrell testified from 2015 there was
00:11:37 mr harrell testified from 2015 there was a far more vigorous and aggressive approach to deregulation explained there was a general sense that regulation was bad and even when there were proposals to do something it was regulatory in terms of
00:11:48 something it was regulatory in terms of introducing something that was attractive to ministers or something they might want to do when they recognized it was regulation they would pull back from that generally because that was not the way they preferred to drive change
00:12:00 preferred to drive change the dclg was frustrated by the depth and challenge of regulatory policy further the policy was intended to make it difficult to introduce new regulation anything that involved amendment or change in approved document triggered a
00:12:12 change in approved document triggered a regulatory impact assessment deregulatory policy applied to matters of life safety this is all what mr t harrell told us the review of adb had to be packaged with a wider review of the building
00:12:24 with a wider review of the building regulations to avoid having to find the necessary savings within part b at the end of 2016
00:12:33 2016 mr harold was told by an official from the better regulation unit not to consider proposing regulation because the department was struggling with its regulatory budgets the better regulation agenda he said
00:12:44 the better regulation agenda he said prevented the government acting on the improper use of materials and had an impact on people's willingness to comply with the regulations likewise ms dawes gave evidence
00:12:55 likewise ms dawes gave evidence that the deregulatory imperative cast a shadow over teams in the department and without rolling up the review of adb into a wider review of the regulations which could be seen as deregulatory it
00:13:06 which could be seen as deregulatory it would have been difficult to progress between 2014 and 2017 the government adopted a far more rigorous approach to deregulation with increased scrutiny of regulatory proposals there needed to be
00:13:17 regulatory proposals there needed to be very good reasons she said for any new regulation or the kind of regulatory oversight put in place from 2017 it would it would not have been very well received in 2015 better regulation would not have
00:13:28 better regulation would not have happened without the grenfell fire she said and and she went on to explain that she found it horrific to think that it took a fire but i honestly i'm not sure she said that it would have
00:13:39 sure she said that it would have happened otherwise the red tape challenge the undervaluing of regulation the localism agenda which removed oversight and the demise of the audit commission all contributed all
00:13:50 audit commission all contributed all contributed to brian martin becoming what's been done the single point of failure mr martin told gti that after the 2015 general election there was an even greater ambition towards
00:14:01 even greater ambition towards deregulation and any document that came out from that from the department required political approval policy change and raising standards was incredibly difficult
00:14:12 incredibly difficult under this regime mr martin told the the panel government policy progressively hardened the prime minister described people like him as an enemy of enterprise the approach of successive governments
00:14:23 the approach of successive governments to regulation affected resources and the mindset of the team and contributed to mr martin becoming a single point of failure
00:14:31 failure all this evidence fully supports our contention that its obsession with a deregulated free market was the cause of the government's failure to do anything about ambiguities and adb and the use of dangerous materials for cladding in high
00:14:43 dangerous materials for cladding in high rise
00:14:44 rise based on this we submit the panel should find the deregulation was a significant cause of the grenfell tower farm turn now sir to the evidence of lord pickles lord pickle stated in his
00:14:55 pickles lord pickle stated in his evidence
00:14:56 evidence that the failure to review adb was the fault of the civil service who misunderstood government policy and not a consequence of the drive for deregulation by him and the rest of the government he claimed that all fire safety
00:15:07 he claimed that all fire safety regulations including the building regulations and adb were exempt from the red tape challenge and deregulation we submit the panel should prefer the evidence of the civil servants which clearly shows the building regulations
00:15:18 clearly shows the building regulations in adb were not exempt from the red tape challenge and deregulation and reject lord pickles evidence on this matter as self-serving and untrue mr bird said that adb and the building regulations were not exempt from
00:15:30 regulations were not exempt from deregulation policy mr ledson said the deregulation policy applied to adb as well as the building rigs even though it was non-mandatory guidance mr harrell said that one in and one out etcetera
00:15:41 one out etcetera all applied to building regulations and guidance
00:15:44 guidance further the better regulation framework manual applied to both the building regulations and the guidance lord pickles did partly but not fully exempt the regulatory reform fire safety order from
00:15:56 regulatory reform fire safety order from the red tape challenge and the drive for regulation but this was not because he wished to ensure regulations relating to life and in particular fire safety were exempt instead as he himself stated towards the
00:16:07 instead as he himself stated towards the start of his evidence the fire safety order was not included as it was itself a product of the deregulatory agenda this evidence was confirmed by mr litzen who added that a lot of the fire safety
00:16:19 who added that a lot of the fire safety legislation was repealed when the fire safety order was introduced and from dr crowder who recalled the far futures review of december 10 which was about decentralizing fire
00:16:30 which was about decentralizing fire safety government having less of a presence in fire safety and encouraging industry to take the lead in this belief that it had that industry would lead the way and do what it needed to do
00:16:42 way and do what it needed to do however the building regulations were not even partly exempted from deregulation and there was nothing in place to ensure the life safety provisions were exempt lord pickles was asked by council to inquiry
00:16:53 inquiry were there any policies in place to ensure that departments such as yours observed their obligations to safeguard life including under article 2 and were properly prioritized his answer
00:17:05 and were properly prioritized his answer i can't think of anything that springs to mind but i would hope that would be the case
00:17:10 the case hope is not good enough for someone who is the secretary of state responsible for both fire safety and the policy of deregulation in his department we submit that he knew full well that there was no such exemption and lord pickles was not being honest in his
00:17:22 pickles was not being honest in his evidence
00:17:24 evidence ms dawes the permanent secretary would surely have known if there were any specific exemptions to this central government policy however her evidence was that she was unaware of any checks and balances to ensure the policy of deregulation didn't
00:17:35 ensure the policy of deregulation didn't go too far in areas impacting life safety nor was he aware of any policies on guidance as policies or guidance in place concerning the dclc dclg's obligations to safeguard life
00:17:47 obligations to safeguard life there were none indeed a letter from lord pickles dated december 2011 expressly included the building rigs and adb as part of a program of i quote barrier busting
00:17:59 program of i quote barrier busting deregulation which was expected to produce
00:18:03 produce 63.6 million pounds by regulatory cuts lord pickles claimed this was a mistake due to naivety on his part but he accepted he had authorized a deregulatory review of the building
00:18:14 deregulatory review of the building regulations which came to be known as the quick wins proposal in 2010. on the second day of his evidence when trying to show he had exempted the building regulations in adb from the
00:18:25 building regulations in adb from the deregulatory agenda lord pickles referred to several documents which he claimed supported him they do no such thing and the panel is asked to reject his evidence about them firstly the letter exchange between mr
00:18:37 firstly the letter exchange between mr stephen aldridge and will cavendish of the cabinet office from november 2011
00:18:44 2011 wasn't even seen by lord pickles at the time but in any event it made no mention of building regulations or the adb his claim that it was deliberately vague is not supported by any other evidence
00:18:55 is not supported by any other evidence and the fact is that neither building regulations nor adb were reviewed despite the recommendation of the lack of house coroner secondly a policy development document for miss upton in january 2012 relied on
00:19:07 for miss upton in january 2012 relied on by lord pickles was also not seen by him at the time but it too made no reference to the building regulations or adb was unambiguously addressing the fire safety order in the king's cross fire
00:19:18 order in the king's cross fire regulations lord pickles reference to it to its constructive is self-serving and unhelpful to the inquiry
00:19:27 inquiry the submission containing the response of the candidate office on the red tape challenge
00:19:31 challenge and annex b to the submission centre lord pickles private secretary made it clear that the building regulations were not exempt i quote maintenance and improvement of the building regulations into the future
00:19:42 the building regulations into the future will continue to be done in accordance with the government's approach to regulation not least the one in one out approach to regulation and the spending review commitment to reduce the burden on house builders by 2015.
00:19:54 on house builders by 2015. lord pickles tried to explain this by saying that there was an exemption for adb
00:20:00 adb his assertion is both unfounded and illogical
00:20:03 illogical adb was guidance on how to comply with part b
00:20:07 part b and therefore could not be subject to a separate standalone exemption other documents demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that the building regulations in adb were very clearly subject to the policy of deregulation
00:20:20 subject to the policy of deregulation ceg the the email dated the 24th of june from jane howden a government press officer described by lord pickles as highly competent which included a section cutting down red tape
00:20:31 included a section cutting down red tape regulation for the construction industry and it went on to state building regulations have placed more burdens on industry than any other dclg policy area
00:20:42 industry than any other dclg policy area we are conducting a 2013 building regulations review to ensure they are fit for purpose and to identify opportunities to deregulate where possible lupus unconvincingly claimed this was
00:20:54 lupus unconvincingly claimed this was not policy but puff to get more coverage in the press when pressed on this email he became prickly saying i respectfully remind you that you did promise that we would be
00:21:05 that you did promise that we would be away this morning and i've changed my schedules to fit this in i do have an extremely busy day meeting people but this is more important than anything but i would urge you to use your time wisely the fact that deregulation was a core
00:21:17 the fact that deregulation was a core policy of the government from 2010 is evident from a letter from prime minister david cameron in april 2011 which uh mr mansfield has already referred to i will just
00:21:28 referred to i will just cite one sentence in that letter which he didn't cite which was
00:21:33 which was david cameron saying dear colleagues et cetera et cetera be in no doubt all those unnecessary rules that place ridiculous burdens on our businesses and
00:21:44 ridiculous burdens on our businesses and on society they must go once and for all just want to emphasize the description of
00:21:50 of all those ridiculous burdens on our businesses that's far safety it's ridiculous lord pickles unconvincingly trying to claim the letter was not directed
00:22:02 claim the letter was not directed specifically at him which of course is true it was addressed to all cabinet members
00:22:09 members he said it wasn't particularly serious as it was addressed to dear colleagues yet it was a not only copy to all ministers but also permanent secretaries who were instructed to prioritize tackling unnecessary regulation
00:22:20 tackling unnecessary regulation he said it had to be seen against the background of private discussions with mr cameron he seemed to be claiming that the prime minister had written a letter saying one thing when his intention was the opposite
00:22:31 opposite the panel is asked to reject lord pickles explanations concerning his letter it clearly reflected a very important policy for the camera and government that deregulation was a key government
00:22:42 that deregulation was a key government policy with no exemption for life including fire safety was supported by evidence from some of the politicians as follows lord wharton told the gti that he considered the work of the building regulations division in the
00:22:53 building regulations division in the dclg to be deregulatory he reportedly told the appg that there was a political policy of not increasing the burden of regulation and the introduction of one measure would need to be offset against
00:23:05 measure would need to be offset against the removal of two others although he couldn't actually recall and said that
00:23:10 said that he couldn't recall any specific policies to provide checks and balances to make sure that life safety issues were not compromised by the deregulatory agenda there were none steve williams agreed
00:23:21 steve williams agreed there was a more rigorous approach to deregulation under the coalition government he also said lord pickles was skeptical about regulation and agreed there was no exemption to deregulation for health and safety
00:23:32 for health and safety gavin barr will give evidence that the cameron government had driven hard on deregulation the red tape challenge and the one in two outro remained manifested commitments in the
00:23:43 manifested commitments in the conservative party manifesto and in 2016 became the one one in three-hour rule however at no stage they take steps to allow say life safety regulation by way of exemption or
00:23:55 regulation by way of exemption or otherwise
00:23:56 otherwise david cameron's now famous speech in january 12 showed the conservative government gave deregulation precedence over safety when he said
00:24:04 he said this coalition has a clear new year's resolution to kill off the health and safety culture for good it's simply not credible for lord pickles to claim that deregulation did
00:24:15 pickles to claim that deregulation did not apply to the building regulations and adb
00:24:18 and adb law pickers also claim that no one ever discussed cladding with him in the five years he was secretary of state we asked the panel not to accept that evidence particularly given the letter from the lack of house coroner it's
00:24:29 from the lack of house coroner it's inconceivable that no one discussed cladding with him or that he did not raise the issue himself given his assurances to the coroner lord pickles told the gti i asked my private office
00:24:41 told the gti i asked my private office and the larger conglomerate of direct generals that i really only had two things i wanted from them i always gave the same speech which was loyalty and tell me when things were going wrong and i promise
00:24:52 i promise that i wouldn't seek to blame them if things were going wrong i would try and sort it out and i think i can say i succeeded in doing that i'd taken over from people who shouted at officers who threw things about i can safely say i never raised my
00:25:03 about i can safely say i never raised my voice to a single officer in the whole of those five years yet now sir in the face of this disaster he is doing precisely what he said he wouldn't do blaming his civil servants
00:25:15 wouldn't do blaming his civil servants for something that went appallingly wrong and which was clearly his responsibility
00:25:22 so moving on to the our fire safety order lord pickles is evidence in relation to the fire safety order was simply not accurate although the fire safety order was not included in the red tape challenge it was not exempt from
00:25:34 tape challenge it was not exempt from the impact of deregulation the deregulation policy prevented any effective review of the fire safety order despite significant concerns over the competence of privately employed
00:25:45 the competence of privately employed fire safety assessors and what was meant by common parts which are both the subjects of the rule 43 letters lord pickles of the letter house coroner these issues were not addressed again because of the policy of deregulation
00:25:57 because of the policy of deregulation when it was introduced the fire safety order brought in a far looser self-compliance regime than the certification procedure it replaced louise upton head of dclg fire safety policy team agreed that the government
00:26:09 policy team agreed that the government were aware that the fire safety order would allow a mixed bag of unqualified fire risk assessors this was a deliberate policy of government designed to spare landlords the expense of having to consult experts
00:26:21 the expense of having to consult experts in fire safety a paradigm example of the deregulatory agenda
00:26:27 agenda misupped and testified that whilst businesses in the fire safety area wanted more regulation we can think of the fire sector federation for example the wider
00:26:38 federation for example the wider business and policy environment was for less regulation they were in a very deregulatory environment the government did not support the sector's efforts over the fire risk assessor competency because
00:26:49 fire risk assessor competency because the policy was hands off ministers didn't want to review the fire safety order because of the deregulatory agenda that's what she said the general thrust of deregulatory policy
00:27:00 policy she further said led to 43 fire and rescue authorities all enforcing the fire safety order in different ways it wasn't just civil servants who took this view
00:27:09 this view dennis davis from the fire sector federation said that mandatory competence requirements for fire risk assessors was opposed by a deregulating government brandon lewis effectively accepted that
00:27:20 brandon lewis effectively accepted that despite evidence that the sector was failing the government failed to address the issue of the fire risk assessor competence both because of the ideological presumption against regulation and because government did
00:27:31 regulation and because government did not consider cumulative evidence he expressly recognized a political predisposition against further regulation in the field of fire safety
00:27:42 regulation in the field of fire safety there's a direct causal link to the grenfell tower disaster here deregulatory policy resulted in the appointment of mr carl stokes who was insufficiently qualified and not competent to risk assess the fire safety
00:27:53 competent to risk assess the fire safety of such a complex complex building mr stokes is by no means unique as was reported by her honoured judge francis kirkham after the lack of house inquest and by senior coroner nigel meadows after the inquest
00:28:05 coroner nigel meadows after the inquest into the death of firefighter stephen hunt in paul's hair world in oldham street manchester
00:28:15 the civil servants were clear that commercial interests took precedence over life safety selecting just a small sample of the evidence ms upton said that the government were more interested in the wheels of the fire safety order running
00:28:27 wheels of the fire safety order running smoothly for business than in legislating for competent accredited fire risk assessors the government had a business led agenda that lost proportion on cutting regulation and
00:28:39 proportion on cutting regulation and lost sight of important matters mr ledson said that any change even to the guidance was seen as disruptive and costly to the construction industry he explained the wrapping up of the review of adb into a broader review was
00:28:51 review of adb into a broader review was due to the cost benefit to business criteria and said there was no principle that balanced life safety against cost mr harrell explained that even just looking at a document was seen as
00:29:02 looking at a document was seen as creating a cost for industry he agreed there was a clear level of commitment in government to deregulation irrespective of life safety and mr martin said lower standards of
00:29:13 and mr martin said lower standards of fire safety were accepted by the government for economic reasons the government didn't want to impose the cost of large-scale file testing on business
00:29:21 business the retention of class o was for market distortion not far safety reasons and was politically motivated he said a review of adb would have had a disruptive effect on the construction industry at a time that the government
00:29:32 industry at a time that the government was very focused on avoiding anything that might impact the economy in a negative way he said that every review had to consider transitional costs and the regulatory policy committee would have
00:29:43 regulatory policy committee would have rejected anything that did not recognize that people would have to familiarize themselves with the new guidance document
00:29:50 document there was a competition between government departments as to which could save industry the most money through deregulation this was dismissed as sibling rivalry by lord pickles but it can be seen clearly in a document
00:30:02 but it can be seen clearly in a document published by the department for business innovation skills in december 2014 a table-headed table 2 departmental regulation and regulation from 2011 to july 2015
00:30:14 july 2015 showed the dclg made a net saving to business over the parliament of 201 million pounds please screen and page two of professor
00:30:26 please screen and page two of professor bisbee's report it's the first document on the list thank you
00:30:31 thank you and if you um
00:30:34 um you could see his paragraph where are we uh
00:30:41 well i can read it from here hopefully you can find it there um by the time or oh it's paragraph six there we are by the time of the grenfell tower fire
00:30:52 by the time of the grenfell tower fire there had been numerous opportunities where the statutory guidance and regulatory compliance testing regime could have been made simpler or less permissive however in each case there appears to
00:31:05 however in each case there appears to have been powerful commercial and ideological incentives to increase complexity while also increasing flexibility for industry in our opening for module six we
00:31:17 in our opening for module six we submitted the drive for deregulation and the war on health and safety created a culture of complacency with an increasingly prevailing attitude safety did not matter
00:31:28 safety did not matter following the oral evidence in module 6 we would now go further and say that the government showed a callous disregard for health and safety it was simply not an issue for them all
00:31:39 it was simply not an issue for them all that mattered with commercial interests it can come as no surprise that given this culture private sector companies involved in the refurbishment of grenfell tower behaved as they did
00:31:50 grenfell tower behaved as they did safety considerations were not an issue for the government so why should they be for anyone else
00:31:57 government ministers and officials ignored and suppressed inconvenient reports and evidence that might have prompted measures that could have prevented the fire at grenfell tower
00:32:08 prevented the fire at grenfell tower an example is the government's failure to publish the report of the failed bre tests on the 18th of july 2001 on acm cladding with a polyethylene core mr bird accepted that even though the government were
00:32:19 government were around that very time consulting on revisions to adb these reports and data had not been put into the public domain that they should have been published and that the bre would not normally
00:32:32 and that the bre would not normally publish reports of this sort by themselves without the consent of government that's mr bird acknowledging that they should have been and were not published mr bird denied there was a cover-up but he had no explanation for the
00:32:44 but he had no explanation for the failure to publish this crucial evidence and we submit it was not simply an oversight
00:32:49 oversight the government chose to put profit ahead of fire safety as reported by professor bisbee rather than eliminating the use of class
00:33:00 rather than eliminating the use of class a class nought for external cladding products or alternatively more tightly restricting its application to products where the testing methods underpinning a class o classification were more technically credible
00:33:11 technically credible the government chose to simply add a new and potentially lucrative to the recently privatized bre alternative route demonstrating compliance with the recommendations of approve
00:33:22 with the recommendations of approve document b ie large scale file testing to bs8414
00:33:27 to bs8414 the dclg did not want to know about fire safety problems and deliberately buried its departmental head in the sand the instruction to play down the issue of the fire in the aftermath of the
00:33:38 of the fire in the aftermath of the noseley heights fire and recorded in a handwritten note in file at 66 389 uncovered by professor bisbee indicates government thinking at the
00:33:49 indicates government thinking at the time don't tell me i don't want to know from october 2012 ministers required the bre not to make any policy recommendations or propose revisions of adb as part of deregulation
00:34:02 that's requiring the bre not to make any policy recommendations or propose any revisions of adb no clear example of burying head in sand
00:34:14 no clear example of burying head in sand this was reinforced by an instruction from debbie smith at the bre to fire safety staff not to raise issues directly with the beer with the dcog likewise the bre's government contract
00:34:25 likewise the bre's government contract to investigate and report on real fires was changed to prohibit on-site investigations save with the specific agreement of the department ministers woefully failed to interrogate
00:34:37 ministers woefully failed to interrogate such reports as they did receive and what are they getting paid for in his comprehensive phase ii report professor bisbee sent out a detailed analysis of the investigations following various major fires since 1991
00:34:50 various major fires since 1991 he notes in each instance the flaws in the investigations and the failure of government to learn any lessons from them
00:34:56 them the following should all have been interrogated by which i mean read intelligently understood and questions asked
00:35:03 asked they were not and the only credible explanation is that the government didn't care so after the investigation into noseley heights in april 1991 which found that the cladding complied with class naught
00:35:15 the cladding complied with class naught no concerns were raised as to whether this provision was adequate nor to what extent the grp rain screen product may have contributed to the fire after garnet court in 1999 where the
00:35:27 after garnet court in 1999 where the fire rapidly spread via the external cladding there was little or no investigation of the contribution of the cladding to the fire the cladding did not satisfy class naught which should have raised concerns
00:35:39 naught which should have raised concerns about non-compliance and enforcement none were raised no questions were asked after the edge fire and salford in 2005 another rapidly spreading cladding fire professor bisbee
00:35:50 spreading cladding fire professor bisbee says the bre investigation failed to achieve any of its of its objectives but no questions were asked after election house in 2009 no questions were asked nor any action taken despite the
00:36:03 asked nor any action taken despite the coroner's rule 43 letter professor bisbee concludes that following lack of house fire at the latest
00:36:10 latest class north should have been withdrawn had this step been taken the disaster might never have happened again to sign professor bismi the consequence of the choice to retain class naught in 2002 would manifest in
00:36:22 class naught in 2002 would manifest in many subsequent fires over the following 15 years
00:36:25 15 years however none of these events were apparently sufficient to motivate the government to withdraw class naught it would take the deaths of 72 people at grenfell tower to motivate government into withdrawing class norm and into
00:36:36 into withdrawing class norm and into disrupting industry status quo only then did government see fit to act on class north and to discontinue its use
00:36:44 use there was a readily available alternative to the testing regime in the european union which the uk was still part of at that time the harmonization of methods of fire testing and reaction to fire and fire
00:36:55 testing and reaction to fire and fire resistance based on eu standards could have had a huge impact on safety however it would also affect the profits and manufacturers and their ability to sell their current products on the uk
00:37:06 sell their current products on the uk market
00:37:07 market the government was aware of this and exploited their ability to delay the transition period and to determine the equivalence between the testing regimes to the full
00:37:18 between the testing regimes to the full consequently even though they were aware of the inadequacies of class naught compared to the eu standards and that by maintaining class north the uk market would be open to creating products of inferior reaction to fire performance
00:37:30 inferior reaction to fire performance i'm citing from mr bird they continue to allow it to be used purely for commercial reasons that's what dr crowder said with devastating consequences of grenfell terror
00:37:41 consequences of grenfell terror as identified by those representing the bsrs the consistent pattern of inadequate investigation and suppression of reports from noseley to garlic through to edge and lacquer goes beyond mere accident
00:37:53 mere accident it involves government collusion and reflects a corrupt culture the government regarded fires as something to be covered up or trivialised such that the public might be reassured and avoid criticism of
00:38:04 be reassured and avoid criticism of underlying regulations thereby continuing to our industry the latitude it wanted
00:38:09 it wanted we pointed out in our opening to module 6 that as well as a lack of competence the involvement of the private sector brought with it a culture of deceit cronyism and corruption we illustrated this with a number of evidential examples
00:38:21 examples kingspan were clearly pleased with government policy including the delay of introducing eu testing standards its technical bulletin in may 2003 stated of of the new european fire classification
00:38:33 of the new european fire classification system
00:38:34 system existing national fire standards are set to be
00:38:38 to be withdrawn for five to ten years hm government has stated it will not implement the new euroclass system until the industry is ready to adopt it in fact the delay went well beyond five
00:38:49 in fact the delay went well beyond five to ten years and by 2017 class north was still in use and eu standards were not in place
00:38:59 the grenfell tower inquiry has not investigated in any depth the extent of collusion including lobbying of ministers and other politicians or officials behind the scenes by companies such as kingspan
00:39:10 such as kingspan whether or not there was more active collusion or corruption we submit the government policy was driven by commercial considerations to the detriment of fire safety and this ultimately led to the disaster at
00:39:21 ultimately led to the disaster at grenfell tower so i'm about halfway through how we doing still on time yes you're doing reasonably well reasonably well
00:39:32 reasonably well reasonably well i'll i'll certainly live with it so moving on to the next big topic which is the building research establishment the bre was first threatened with privatization in 1981
00:39:45 privatization in 1981 it was turned into a more commercial organization during the 1980s and became an executive agency in 1990. by that time it had lost half its staff and was operating under market imperatives
00:39:57 imperatives bre's privatization in 1997 brought commercial pressures and conflicts of interest into the heart of the fire safety regime and limited the work the bre could do in the public interest
00:40:09 the public interest professor bisbee cites the following passage from the bre's deputy director then peter field and his evidence to the parliamentary inquiry in 1999 we are a private sector organization he
00:40:20 we are a private sector organization he told the select committee we are not part of government clearly in days gone by when we were part of government then this work would have been done in the public interest without the need for formal contract
00:40:32 without the need for formal contract one regrets there are now commercial pressures that require clients to place formal contracts with us before we can undertake work since its privatisation in 1997 the bre
00:40:43 since its privatisation in 1997 the bre has failed the wider public interest and been too ready to accept the restrictions imposed upon it by central government and too willing to collaborate with manufacturers a correction is needed to our
00:40:55 a correction is needed to our written closing statement fbu60191
00:41:01 at page 32 paragraph 86 i accept sam lee qc's submission um at paragraph four four of her closing statement
00:41:11 statement um that the bre was not a regulator so we're
00:41:15 so we're not a regulator so where where i wrote that the bra was more collaborator than regulator i correct that to more collaborator than independent contractor
00:41:26 contractor however we consider that the parameters of bre's work and obligations went further than was permitted or required under its individual contracts and the regulatory requirements affecting such
00:41:37 regulatory requirements affecting such work as she submits please screen page four of the bre's written closing statement it's page four it's paragraph 13 if you could
00:41:48 could enlarge paragraph 13 so it's legible
00:41:54 thank you very much
00:42:05 uh miss miss league submits there the bre was a charity with a mission to support research into the built environment for the public benefit those are the important words i want to draw to the panel's attention with a
00:42:17 draw to the panel's attention with a charity with a mission to support research into the built environment for the public benefit if you be
00:42:25 if you be well
00:42:26 well you could probably go to to paragraph 15. it's on the same page just go down to paragraph 15.
00:42:36 thank you
00:42:40 and she submits the trust and charity structures were deliberately put in place to retain the authority and independence that bre had developed while publicly funded and to avoid the
00:42:51 while publicly funded and to avoid the bre being driven in any one direction by commercial pressures we submit this charitable mission should have permeated everything bre did
00:43:02 have permeated everything bre did including negotiating its contracts and discharging its contractual duties
00:43:10 the bre should
00:43:12 should we say have remained in the public sector and it should now be taken back into the public sector but as things were as a charity at the least it should have carried out its charitable mission
00:43:25 please now screen um page three of the bre's code of conduct and ethics policy
00:43:33 so that's uh page three of bre oh thank you very much and uh there's so under the under the higher heading respect for life law and the public good
00:43:45 the public good um
00:43:46 um this says we give due weight to the wider public interest and it goes on we'll minimize and justify any adverse effect on society and
00:43:57 society and hold paramount to the health and safety of others
00:44:02 of others and then under the next heading expertise science and research it says we hold a privileged and trusted position in society and thus expect to demonstrate we are seeking to serve wider society and to be sensitive to
00:44:13 wider society and to be sensitive to public concerns and to demonstrate that we are aware of the issues that science and technology raise for society those are fine words but the evidence from module 6 2 shows
00:44:26 but the evidence from module 6 2 shows that post privatization the bre took the benefit
00:44:30 benefit of being seen to be authority of independence and serving the public interest without bearing the burden of carrying out its contractual work in manner consistent with its charitable objectives its code of conduct
00:44:42 objectives its code of conduct this it failed to do so when investigating files for the government or for other customers it did not conduct research into the built-in environment for the public benefit but for the benefit of its customer
00:44:53 customer the government and when discharging contractual duties for commercial clients it readily agreed to keep fire data confidential to its customer without any exception in the public interest accordingly it did not
00:45:05 public interest accordingly it did not hold paramount the health and safety of others or give due weight to the wider public interest or minimize and justify any adverse effect on society nor did it seek to serve wider society and to be
00:45:18 seek to serve wider society and to be sensitive to public concerns or to demonstrate that it was aware of the issues that fire science and technology raise for society from being a publicly funded safety body
00:45:29 from being a publicly funded safety body the bre became a tool for use by government to limit its research and suppress fire data fire data and for use by manufacturers to market their products whether they were safe or not
00:45:41 were safe or not sadly the bre has now lost the authority and independence that it had developed while it was publicly funded how did this happen it happened because the bre
00:45:52 it happened because the bre could not overcome the challenges to its independence introduced by privatization in the toxic culture created by the government's war on health and safety instead financial dependency on manufacturers and on a government
00:46:04 manufacturers and on a government increasingly disinterested in fire safety
00:46:07 safety led to unresolved conflicts of interest the loss of independence and reduced health and safety research
00:46:16 dealing with conflicts of interest first the bre largely depended on contracts with government but also looked to industry for sponsorship and sold fartists to commercial clients for revenue all of these activities were obviously
00:46:28 all of these activities were obviously loaded with potential conflicts of interest post privatization particularly with the government disinterested in fire safety for example dr crowder gave evidence albeit hearsay of the lobbying pressure from industry
00:46:40 of the lobbying pressure from industry on government to preserve reliance on class o iron class naught despite him wanting to dispense with it and brian martin asserting a desire to discontinue it at some point
00:46:51 discontinue it at some point dr smith the senior director of bre was unaware of any discussions within the bre or with government about whether it was in the public interest that private businesses should sell fire safety tests
00:47:02 businesses should sell fire safety tests for revenue made no effort to find out or consider possible safeguards of the public interest
00:47:08 interest she agreed with council to the inquiry that her emails about the cwct guidance on acm cladding might be read as indicating that her sole concern was to protect the bre's
00:47:21 sole concern was to protect the bre's revenue streams and that she was not interested in matters of public file safety
00:47:27 parliament she said commercial bodies were never willing to fund fundamental research or experiments for the benefit of a better understanding of far safety in the public interest dr colwell also told the panel
00:47:39 dr colwell also told the panel the potential conflict of interest between life safety and commercial gain was never discussed and so it seems um members of the panel that the bre seems never to have challenged
00:47:50 the bre seems never to have challenged their clients demand for confidentiality
00:47:54 not negotiating a public interest exception to confidentiality clauses in its contract there is no evidence that dr smith or colwell or anyone else at the bre attempted to negotiate a variation of
00:48:06 attempted to negotiate a variation of the contractual obligation where it conflicted with the wider public interest
00:48:11 interest or otherwise put the case with publication to alert other parties other interested parties of fire safety risks the bre cites a british standard in the
00:48:24 in the in their closing statement
00:48:26 statement as requiring it to preserve clients confidentiality but paragraph 4.2.1 of that british standard provided and i quote the laboratory shall inform the customer
00:48:38 the laboratory shall inform the customer in advance of the information it intends to place in the public domain so why didn't the bre do this we invite the panel to conclude the commercial and government interests prevented the bre
00:48:50 government interests prevented the bre from notifying its clients that it would put information into the public domain or at least share with other testing houses and regulatory bodies information about failed tests or policy recommendations that arose from its work
00:49:02 recommendations that arose from its work the bre could and should have insisted upon incorporating a public interest exception to the confidentiality clause in its contracts both with commercial clients and the
00:49:13 both with commercial clients and the government the bre could then have published failed test results and made public its concerns about fire safety but it didn't
00:49:24 moving on to policy implication reports even without a public interest exemption it could have issued a policy implications report to the government when appropriate but it didn't our search of relativity
00:49:37 but it didn't our search of relativity found no policy implications reports for dclg
00:49:41 dclg or on amending the guidance in adb or otherwise on the risks associated with the use of acm panels on high-rise buildings before the grenfell tower fire not publishing failed test results dr
00:49:52 not publishing failed test results dr smith agreed when asked by council's inquiries it would have been beneficial for public safety in relation to the bre's work in the service of wider society quoting from the condo
00:50:03 society quoting from the condo to insist that failed tests be put into the public domain but it didn't instead the commercial imperative after privatization disposed the bre to favor the commercial interests of its clients over the wider
00:50:15 interests of its clients over the wider public interest not pursuing concerns about fire safety mr baker of the bre agreed that kingspan's product literature of 2013
00:50:26 kingspan's product literature of 2013 was misleading that was on day 100 it wasn't in this last module but he could not recall the bre taking any action to address these concerns he said the bre was not a regulatory body and didn't have the power to do anything
00:50:39 and didn't have the power to do anything but the bre could and should have insisted upon incorporating a public interest exception to the confidentiality clause and its contracts bre could then have published failed test results and made public its
00:50:50 test results and made public its concerns but it didn't not advising government properly of the risks
00:50:56 risks bre's review of uh where it's better known as contract cc 1924 i'm sure that's how you'll remember it back in 2000 to 2001 produced very clear evidence that the
00:51:07 produced very clear evidence that the aluminium rain screen product used in the rain screen system five tests that's one of the tests conducted was obviously unsuitable for external cloning applications and ought to have raised an alarm
00:51:18 raised an alarm seems likely this was an acm pe range screen cladding product of the same type as that which was later used for the rain stream cladding at grandfather tower
00:51:27 tower dr smith testified that she was not in any doubt after the rain screen system 5 test that acm panels with the polyethylene core should never ever be used above 18 meters
00:51:38 used above 18 meters but she did not include clear advice to this effect in the report to government she said the bre's role was to present the technical evidence and data and signal what they think needs to be considered then it's for government to
00:51:49 considered then it's for government to consider and decide what to do it appears however that she didn't even signal the government this critical public safety issue needed to be considered no policy implications report
00:52:00 considered no policy implications report or other similar document was given to government
00:52:06 also not advising other interested parties or the public dr smith said she couldn't
00:52:11 couldn't uh advise other parties of the dangers of acm panels with the polyethylene core because of the contractual obligation to keep reports confidential since privatization she said it was a matter for the department not for the bre we disagree
00:52:25 department not for the bre we disagree for the reasons i've already outlined not sharing fire data with others in the fire safety regime with the bra's refusal to respond to cwct's concerns
00:52:36 refusal to respond to cwct's concerns about cladding dr smith told the panel tellingly
00:52:39 tellingly cwct are a competitor i mean how much time she said how much time do you devote in terms of our effort and resources in producing documents for others
00:52:50 documents for others where we ask was the wider public interest
00:52:53 interest the wider public interest was subverted to the commercial imperative of suppressing competitive in the marketplace not guarding against cheating dr smith realized it was always possible that
00:53:05 realized it was always possible that manufacturers might attempt to gain any aspects of the testing system including by willfully cheating yet neither she nor anyone else in bre took adequate steps to minimize the risk of it happening
00:53:16 it happening she appears not to have considered steps that could have been taken such as taking a full suite of photographs of the test rig or insisting that bre employees set up the test rig according
00:53:27 employees set up the test rig according to the customer's design specification
00:53:31 sometimes even actively assisting manufacturers to gain the tests it's obviously a matter for the panel to determine on the evidence but mr room of celetex and mr meredith of kingspan both
00:53:42 celetex and mr meredith of kingspan both testified that stephen howard and they said either dr sarah caldwell or phil clark of the bre helped them devise tests that stood a better chance of passing and to better
00:53:53 better chance of passing and to better market their products insufficient funds for health and safety research apart from modest funding available for research from the bre trust for which staff could bid every
00:54:04 trust for which staff could bid every now and again the bre had to fund itself completely after 2002 there was a sort of subsidy until then and generate an income for each work stream carried out
00:54:16 stream carried out so post-privatization the bre did not have the resources to support all the health and safety work that it needed to do like attending standards committees
00:54:27 committees to do the testing it wanted to do so for example in contract cc 1924 testing of the external wall build up with and without far barriers was not undertaken
00:54:39 undertaken doctors doctors coldwell crowder and smith all confirmed that less work in support of fire safety research was carried out across the board post privatization and the bre investigated fewer fires as a result
00:54:51 fewer fires as a result dr smith also said less work in support of adb was carried out post privatization she told the panel say you have to sit down and take decisions about which activities you can afford to support and that's really the
00:55:03 support and that's really the environment which we've had to exist since privatization there's nobody there that's funding those tendencies dr crowder said his information about the sudbury house and tableau house
00:55:14 the sudbury house and tableau house fires two separate fires was gleaned from press reports not from a bra investigation he said the resources were not available to capture data and identify trends resort research had to
00:55:25 identify trends resort research had to stop at the limits imposed by clients and their budgets meaning fundamentals were not understood there was a reduced independence from government control
00:55:36 government control of fire safety research after privatization the bre could only do the research that the government procured if the intended research wasn't aligned with particular government policy objectives then it
00:55:47 government policy objectives then it probably wouldn't get funded after privatization the bre lacked sufficient independence to carry out the necessary research in face of a government increasingly disinterested in
00:55:58 government increasingly disinterested in fire safety and
00:56:01 and on to the inadequate and misleading investigations after him we say largely due to privatization the bre carried out a series of inadequate and dangerously misleading fire investigations
00:56:13 fire investigations and research projects and i've already mentioned nosley heights through to leckel house and right up to grenfell fire
00:56:22 fire the common thread in these investigations is that they failed to report let alone to highlight the contribution to any of these files made by or the combustibility of class naught rain screen products used
00:56:33 rain screen products used this is set out in professor bisbee's report which raises many questions particularly about the conduct of the bre
00:56:40 bre we've highlighted several of these failed investigations in our closing statement and do not repeat them here on each occasion privatised bre was prevented from performing its proper function due we submit to deregulation
00:56:53 function due we submit to deregulation and the commercial considerations which would give precedence over public safety so to summarize after privatization the bre's financial dependence on a government increasingly disinterested in
00:57:04 government increasingly disinterested in fire safety and on commercial clients with their own agenda led the bre to fail the fire safety regime by not negotiating a public interest exception to the confidentiality clause
00:57:15 confidentiality clause not issuing policy implication reports not publishing failed test results not pursuing concerns about fire safety not advising government properly not investigating fires properly not
00:57:26 investigating fires properly not advising other interested parties or the public not publishing fire safety research findings not sharing fire data with others in the fire safety regime not guarding against the known risk of
00:57:38 not guarding against the known risk of cheating the fartists sometimes even possibly actively assisting manufacturers to get to gain the tests
00:57:48 so that concludes our submissions on on the bre
00:57:51 the bre and
00:57:53 and we've already referred at length in our um submissions to the bba
00:57:59 the bba and the nhbc and ucas and don't repeat those here but um if time permits a few words on the
00:58:08 the labc
00:58:11 this the the local authority building control
00:58:14 control is a clear example of regulatory capture privatization and the introduction of competition had a disastrous effect on building control shockingly it ultimately led to the labc falsely certifying products
00:58:26 certifying products as being of limited combustibility because of commercial interests before i go on any further sir i don't want to fall into the same trap how much time have i got left well how
00:58:37 how much time have i got left well how much time do you need well i think i probably need about five minutes maybe ten oh you're you're well in you you'll find up that i'm fine at that okay yes okay thank you that's fine good
00:58:50 okay yes okay thank you that's fine good thank you very much that was very well negotiated so you didn't you didn't actually give me a time well i didn't i didn't wish either to cramp your style or to uh very extend it too far but you're you're
00:59:02 extend it too far but you're you're doing all right i'll indicate if i think you're running out of time yeah okay thank you very much so barry turner was a senior technical advisor at london local authority building control labc
00:59:14 local authority building control labc and that was an influential membership organization which advised supported and promoted local authority building control bodies who had difficulty completing the business with private building
00:59:25 business with private building controllers he said enforcement is difficult to sell developers don't want you looking over their shoulder well abc was not publicly funded and like the
00:59:37 and like the local authority building control bodies that it supported it needed to generate income in a competitive market this provided ample scope for regulatory capture
00:59:48 capture and the labc was well and truly captured by kingspan for price it issued type approval certificate and after 2010 registered details for building products which mr turner understood would be
01:00:00 which mr turner understood would be relied upon to fast-track building control approval on developments specifying those products for example nabc issued a type approval certificate for kingspan's k-15 installation product
01:00:12 for kingspan's k-15 installation product in may 2009 which falsely stated it could be considered a material of limited combustibility mr turner now accepts that this was inaccurate and misleading but he could
01:00:24 inaccurate and misleading but he could not explain how it came to be issued despite concerns raised by members of the technical working group which concerns were overlooked labc also collaborated with kingspan on a number of project projects
01:00:36 a number of project projects and accepted sponsorship by kingspan mr turner accepted that this relationship probably affected the way labc responded to concerns raised about kingspan's fire performance statements
01:00:47 kingspan's fire performance statements for example from september 2009 mr cody of rockwell complained to mr turner about kingsman's claims that k-15 was of limited combustibility mr turner could not explain why he
01:00:58 mr turner could not explain why he neither invoked labc's complaints procedure nor replied substantively to mr cody nor why he did not consult the bre until june 2015 incredibly he turned instead to kingspan's head of
01:01:11 he turned instead to kingspan's head of marketing before responding at which stage again incredibly he defended the certificate he neither reviewed nor withdrew the certificate he said he would have he would have dealt with it differently
01:01:22 would have dealt with it differently if he had appreciated the risk to public safety
01:01:27 safety he was a child building control surveyor and member of the royal institute of charges of airs with over 53 years experience we submit mr turner must have realized the risk to public safety of wrongly
01:01:38 the risk to public safety of wrongly certifying a k-15 product of limited combustibility his false assertion that it was of limited combustibility revealed the truth
01:01:46 truth that the labc was serving the manufacturers not the public's interest once again commercial interests took precedence over public safety david ewing also now accepts it was a
01:01:57 david ewing also now accepts it was a pretty major error to certify that k-15 could be considered a material of limited combustibility there being absolutely no test evidence in support likewise he now acknowledges the claim
01:02:08 likewise he now acknowledges the claim made in the labc registered detail certificate of august 2013 the k-15 was suitable for use above 18 meters but not substantiated by the technical data provided by kingsman david ewing was
01:02:19 provided by kingsman david ewing was labc's technical sales director in charge of the registered detail scheme in july 2014 he was made aware he was made aware of brian martin's concerns about the use of combustible insulation
01:02:30 about the use of combustible insulation above 18 meter meters in his email exchange with steve evans of the nhbc but he did not act in the public interest
01:02:38 interest by for example alerting labc's members to the issue of checking all certificates issued for k-15 the only credible explanation is labc's financial dependency on kingspan mr lewis says that issuing k15
01:02:51 kingspan mr lewis says that issuing k15 registered detail certificate in august 14 based on the 2008 bba certificate and despite brian martin's concerns was an oversight
01:03:00 oversight he denied feeling any pressure e.g from phil hammond the labc managing director to increase the number of registered details registrations or of knowing this contributed to martin taylor's decision to leave labc
01:03:12 to leave labc he further says he trusted kingspan that they would not be providing inaccurate information but any such trust could not have survived the warning from steve evans
01:03:23 survived the warning from steve evans in august 2014 that kingspan were not going to be able to prove that k-15 was acceptable above 18 meters his oral evidence on these points is we submit unbelievable
01:03:35 submit unbelievable he did not act in the public interest and check kingsman's assertion because it was not in labc's commercial interest to do so
01:03:42 to do so mr ewing and the labc were likewise played by celetex in august 14 when they failed to obtain any classification report before issuing a registered detail certificate of celtics in respect of its fr-5000 product stating falsely
01:03:55 of its fr-5000 product stating falsely it was suitable for use above 18 meters the part privatization of building control coupled with the absence of public funds or any proper governmental oversight
01:04:05 oversight led to labc's predictable yet shameful dependency on its fees earned from manufacturers the labc certificates facilitated the successful marketing of combustible insulation for use above 80 meters over
01:04:17 insulation for use above 80 meters over an extended period from august 2009 up and down the country including at grenfell tower the labc's failures were themselves the consequence of a failed regulatory system that was not fit for purpose
01:04:31 moving on to the response to the coroner's letter following lack of house inquest just briefly a few points as the gti is aware uh lord pickles
01:04:42 uh lord pickles that the letter that the rule 43 left to lord lord pickles included a number of recommendations that he review the content of the building regulations and in particular adb to provide clearer and simpler
01:04:55 adb to provide clearer and simpler guidance in relation to matters such as the spread of fire over the exterior of a building by the time of the grenfell tower fire some four years later no such review had been undertaken in fact lord pickles
01:05:06 been undertaken in fact lord pickles failed to take any effective steps to respond to the coroner's rule 43 letter following the oral evidence in in module 6 we submit that the simple explanation for the failure of the dclg in relation
01:05:18 for the failure of the dclg in relation to the coroner's letter is that it did not fit in with the drive to deregulate and to prioritize commercial interests consequently it was ignored we submit there's an urgent need for a
01:05:29 we submit there's an urgent need for a national oversight body to consider rule 43 letters and other recommendations from inquiries to ensure they are properly reviewed and implemented
01:05:42 failings in in government the evidence in module 6 has shown that there were significant failings in the dclg including by brian martin who it's been called the single point of
01:05:54 it's been called the single point of failure however we submit it would be wholly wrong to try and lay the blame for grenfell disaster on a on a middle-ranking civil servant to the extent that senior government ministers have sought to do this we
01:06:05 ministers have sought to do this we submit that represents a shameful application of their responsibility mr martin has admitted his failings and expressed remorse at their consequences this is in stark contrast contrast to
01:06:17 this is in stark contrast contrast to the evidence of the politicians who either couldn't remember or as in the case of lord pickles sought to blame others including mr martin we also know that he wasn't separately represented
01:06:28 represented it's wrong and reprehensible senior politicians who were responsible for the dclg should seek to blame mr martin we do not accept that any single point of failure by a civil servant caused the
01:06:39 of failure by a civil servant caused the grenfell tower disaster fire grenfell tower was the consequence of decades of policies promoting commercial interests at the expense of everything else including fire safety it happened due to the war on regulation
01:06:51 happened due to the war on regulation as an albatross around the neck of business mr martin was a product of this environment not its calls
01:06:58 in our opening in module 6 we contended that side by side with ever more zealous promotion by the central government of deregulation and the commercial interests of the private sector was the degrading and undermining of the public sector
01:07:09 sector further over recent years that process has accelerated as a consequence of austerity and cuts in public expenditure we provide we submit that the oral evidence in module 6 has further
01:07:20 evidence in module 6 has further supported those contentions there were cuts in civil service staff the reduction in staff and civil service including in the dclg was clearly an issue and the falling head count reduced
01:07:31 issue and the falling head count reduced its effectiveness mr bird told the panel that the head count in his section of the dclg had gone down by 40 in the time he was there and this
01:07:41 and this we have to remember is at a time when professor torreira has explained the building environment has become ever more ever more increasingly complex he said declining resources both in terms of research management in terms of
01:07:52 terms of research management in terms of headcount coupled with the undertaking of and being cognizant of the various deregulatory measures meant they had less and less time to focus on the building regulations mr
01:08:03 to focus on the building regulations mr harrell also referred to the reduction in resources including head count in 2006 he said there were 14 construction professionals in a division with with a much smaller scope of work
01:08:15 with with a much smaller scope of work there were three grade sixes supporting the deputy director by 2015 this had reduced to five technical specialists with one grade six mr martin
01:08:27 mr martin and he he went on to describe those resource pressures as tectonic
01:08:33 ms doors also gave similar evidence about the lack of resources and i won't take up time with those but we submit the performance of civil servants in the dclg has to be evaluated
01:08:45 servants in the dclg has to be evaluated against this background of significant cuts in staff these policies are not just about numbers they have real life consequences beyond people losing their jobs
01:08:56 [Applause] mr miss dawes was asked to comment on an email sent to her on 20th of june asking how the dclg might have incentivized
01:09:07 incentivized rbk's choice of the contractor ryden who made the lowest bid she answered she's talking about the cuts to local council funding the budgets for housing were very tight
01:09:18 budgets for housing were very tight indeed grenfell tower along with much of social housing has suffered decades of neglect and lack of investment this too was a consequence of central government policy arbi casey's housing
01:09:29 government policy arbi casey's housing stock was no different from that in the rest of the country although rbkc is a well-off local authority the council were unable to invest any of their general funds in social housing because central government policy had restricted the
01:09:41 government policy had restricted the available monies to those which were generated by rents in the housing revenue account mr dawes
01:09:47 mr dawes missed doors went on to explain how matters deteriorated in 2015 but we were also very concerned just about general funding for any form of social housing investment which had been
01:09:58 housing investment which had been stopped in the first year of the government following 2015 although it was reinstated later when gavin barwell and sergey javid did their housing work but we were worried about that as well because that was just simply to keep
01:10:10 because that was just simply to keep house building going in the social sector
01:10:13 sector this evidence shows how central government policies forced poor choices on local housing authorities including the use of inexperienced and inadequate contractors using poor and dangerous
01:10:24 contractors using poor and dangerous materials
01:10:25 materials shoddy workmanship was common as we highlighted in our opening submissions and this issue too was addressed in miss dawes's evidence were you aware of this open secret being
01:10:36 were you aware of this open secret being the inconsistent standards and tolerance of shoddy work were you aware of that ask council
01:10:43 i said yes i think i was were you aware of inconsistent standards and tolerance of shoddy work by building control authorities before the the grenfell tower fire well i can't remember
01:10:55 the impact of austerity and cuts as a contributing cause of the grenfell tower fire cannot be overlooked and of course there's the ongoing impact of austerity louise upton during her
01:11:06 of austerity louise upton during her evidence said there was little value in peeps without someone being there to implement them and to recommend that those who manage high-rise maintain information on vulnerable or disabled occupants would place a significant
01:11:18 occupants would place a significant burden on them you can take it from me she said that this response didn't tell sorry she was asked the question and the question her counsel
01:11:29 question and the question her counsel put to her now you can take it from me this response didn't tell else with grant that the underlying rationale for the lga's guide position on peeps was an anxiety to avoid imposing disproportionate burdens on landlords do
01:11:41 disproportionate burdens on landlords do you know why that rationale was not explained to us with grant no would you accept that it should have been in the spirit of canada yes the advice of a disability expert wasn't sought by the home office or anyone else
01:11:53 sought by the home office or anyone else miss upton had no knowledge of disability law it's clear that commercial interests of landlords are still the priority even today over lives of disabled people finally the lack of caretakers or
01:12:04 finally the lack of caretakers or concierge
01:12:05 concierge is itself the direct result of cuts and resources for social housing stretching back decades austerity and commercial interests continue to prevent issues in high-rise being effectively addressed today
01:12:18 being effectively addressed today and we've we've just seen the the latest recommendation on the government website
01:12:24 website not to to implement your recommendation regarding peeps as mr mansfield explained earlier as to the foreign rescue service the home office portrays the white paper as
01:12:36 home office portrays the white paper as progressive and positive the proposal set out in the white paper it says seek to strengthen fire as a profession enabling fire and rescue professions to improve their skills and fully serve the community as well as unlocking and nurturing talent
01:12:48 unlocking and nurturing talent the proposal seeks to support positive culture and to improve diversity and inclusion in addition to this the government intends to commission an independent review into the current pay negotiation process and consider whether
01:13:00 negotiation process and consider whether it's fit for a modern emergency service the fbu knows from bitter experience that this heralds an attack on collective bargaining which has nothing to do with the grenfell tower disaster
01:13:12 grenfell tower disaster all the steps which the government should be taking to prevent a recurrence conclusion the central state has a fundamental responsibility for the safety of citizens in a modern society
01:13:23 safety of citizens in a modern society we submit the central government has failed woefully in this task they failed to regulate high-rise in particular by avoiding the foreseeable hazards of insulating them against the cold and rain through installing
01:13:34 cold and rain through installing safe rain screen cladding systems they've cut back regulations and allowed businesses to ignore safety rules as part of a war on health and safety culture and to prioritize profit over safety they've abdicated the duty to
01:13:46 safety they've abdicated the duty to research emerging fire risks and developed protection measures whereas for half a century central government had an authoritative statutory fire and rescue advisory body
01:13:57 statutory fire and rescue advisory body that strategically assessed the risks and provided ministers with reliable expertise
01:14:01 expertise that body was abolished as part of deregulation at a time when the built environment was increasing in complexity the philosophy of deregulation has blighted efforts to improve and has actually worsened the living conditions
01:14:13 actually worsened the living conditions of millions of people grenfell tower was the culmination of more than four decades worth of these policies those who lost their lives are also the victims of big business and economic and social system
01:14:24 economic and social system that values the generation of wealth over the protection of those without the wealth to protect themselves in the scramble for profits those people were collateral damage central government and the economic system which
01:14:36 government and the economic system which they nurture bear ultimate responsibility for the grenfell tower fire
01:14:40 fire thank you for your patience thank you very much mr seaword well it's a little earlier than usual for a break but we did start earlier after lunch so i think probably this is
01:14:51 after lunch so i think probably this is a good time to take the afternoon break uh we'll stop there and we'll resume please at 3 15 when we'll hear a closing statement on behalf of the london fire commissioner thank you very
01:15:03 london fire commissioner thank you very much 315 please
01:30:39 the next statement is going to be made by mr stephen walter on behalf of the london fire commissioner uh yes mr torch when you're ready good afternoon sir mr famous rapport
01:30:51 mr famous rapport um
01:30:52 um so in in this month of june five years on from the tragedy in 2017 may i begin these relatively brief observations on the issues which arose
01:31:03 observations on the issues which arose in module 6b as i will call it by again assuring you that the constant and ongoing work which the brigade is engaged in to meet your
01:31:15 the brigade is engaged in to meet your recommendations in the phase one report remains a priority for the london fire commissioner as you know uh there is much to do
01:31:26 uh there is much to do across a range of the brigade's operations and while a great deal has already been achieved some of the improvements and the changes are complex
01:31:37 are complex and will take time to progress but nevertheless 26 of the 29 recommendations which related to the lfb have been completed
01:31:48 have been completed and a further two were to be completed by the end of the year it just seemed an appropriate time in june to update you all thank you yes and those who are listening so i i know that the panel will have read
01:31:59 read our closing statement for module 6b and uh it's publicly publicly available so as usual i have no intention of repeating it all here although i may
01:32:10 repeating it all here although i may well probably will repeat one or two of the points which have been made by others during the course of the day forgive me for that but those are points which actually do bear repetition
01:32:22 repetition um i do though want to say something about the importance of context the phrase context is everything might be probably is overused
01:32:35 might be probably is overused and sometimes it's misunderstood but it is a particularly felicitous phrase
01:32:41 phrase when applied to the grenfell tower tragedy
01:32:45 tragedy at least in so far as the operational response of the fire service is concerned
01:32:51 concerned whether it is the sheer scale and rapidity of the fire and the impact on operational resources that had and in the control room or the chain of events which led to the
01:33:03 or the chain of events which led to the building being shrouded in highly flammable materials or the impact which the political atmosphere of deregulation had upon the efficacy of the building
01:33:14 had upon the efficacy of the building regulations just to give three examples of so many other matters of context a full understanding of the wider context is essential to a proper
01:33:26 context is essential to a proper and fair
01:33:27 and fair assessment of the emergency response of the fire service on the night of the 14th of june 2017 but but more importantly it's also essential for the purposes of
01:33:38 it's also essential for the purposes of learning from the events of the past uh uh so that really effective and meaningful changes can be made now the reason why that's relevant to the submissions that i make today is that
01:33:49 submissions that i make today is that module by module in phase two the evidence has provided a very substantial body of essential context from multiple witnesses on a wide range
01:34:00 from multiple witnesses on a wide range of issues
01:34:02 of issues which were explored as you know with the lfb almost solely
01:34:08 solely in phase one the evidence in module six b uh has been of vital importance to a proper
01:34:18 proper understanding of the extent to which aluminium composite material panels with a polyethylene core acmpe were generally known
01:34:29 were generally known to be in use on residential high-rise buildings
01:34:32 buildings and the effectiveness of the building regulations in preventing such use and when i refer to the building regulations i include approved document b although of course i recognize that one provides the functional
01:34:44 that one provides the functional requirements that one provides the route the suggested route to compliance we highlight acm pe here rather than dealing with modern materials generally in what was known about them
01:34:56 in what was known about them because obviously the evidence is very clear
01:34:59 clear that it was that that product and the system within which it was designed and installed which was the principal cause of the manner in which the grenfell
01:35:11 of the manner in which the grenfell tower fire behaved and the devastating speed of its extensive spread as professor bisbee reminded us only last week
01:35:21 last week it was the polyethylene core which was responsible not only for the velocity of the horizontal spread but also crucially for its downward and lateral spread
01:35:33 lateral spread which was so unusual by reason of the extensive pooling of the molten product at the top of the building in the architectural crown now the london fire commission's position as you know
01:35:47 commission's position as you know and that of fire and rescue services nationally as far as we're aware is that historically a very high degree of reliance had been placed on the provisions of the building
01:35:58 placed on the provisions of the building regulations as a bulwark against catastrophic all-consuming fires in residential buildings of the kind which occurred at grenfell tower and it was those regulations
01:36:10 and it was those regulations which existed to prohibit the use of dangerous materials such as acmpe from being used now in light of the evidence given in module 6 b it is clear
01:36:23 module 6 b it is clear that in the years leading up to the greenville tower fire with actually very few exceptions the limited extent of the brigade's knowledge of the risks of acmpe
01:36:35 knowledge of the risks of acmpe and materials and its reliance on the effectiveness of the building regulations was it would seem broadly shared across the fire sector and by government itself
01:36:47 itself in our written submissions we have set out some key evidence in module 6b of witnesses from response to the responsible government department dclg at the time
01:36:58 dclg at the time and from
01:36:59 and from the bre formerly the british research establishment most of whom most of those witnesses were highly experienced technical advisors in relation to the built
01:37:10 advisors in relation to the built environment now in setting out that evidence though we do not
01:37:16 we do not seek to criticize individuals or point the finger of blame those are obviously matters entirely for you
01:37:24 for you for the panel when you consider the context
01:37:27 context in which they had to perform their functions in the at least perceived climate of deregulation at key moments
01:37:39 at key moments but for present purposes we just want to highlight if we may two important points which emerge from that evidence in module 6b
01:37:47 module 6b first
01:37:48 first notwithstanding the failed uh test of an acm panel by the bre in 2001
01:37:57 in 2001 which was reported to the government department in 2002 but not published until after the grenfell tower fire
01:38:06 fire none of those particular witnesses those who gave evidence on behalf of the government department or the bre none of them was aware
01:38:16 was aware of the use of acmp panels on high-rise residential buildings in the uk save for dr colwell and mr martin from about 2014.
01:38:30 and to the extent that there was a growing awareness of the risks that was a there was obviously a failure to appreciate the extent of the hazard and
01:38:41 and again crucially communicated more widely to the industry and the fire sector secondly
01:38:51 secondly although there was an awareness of international fires involving acm there was a firm belief that those fires would not occur in the united kingdom
01:39:03 united kingdom partly because acm was not thought to be widely in use on tall buildings but partly and perhaps mainly because the building regulations were said to prohibit such use
01:39:16 were said to prohibit such use and indeed the department government department expressed views to that effect
01:39:21 effect when asked by multiple parties including fire and rescue services in light of fires involving acmpe materials abroad david crowder dr crowder
01:39:34 david crowder dr crowder and it must be remembered he he is a and has been for a number of years a very highly respected expert in the field in the fire sector and someone with a great deal of experience and knowledge
01:39:46 experience and knowledge was of the view you'll recall when he gave evidence that that was an industry-wide belief that that is faith in the building regulations and and
01:39:57 regulations and and an absence of knowledge of the use of acm materials in in high-rise buildings to take one important example it's i mean it this is how i'm now repeating things to the person this morning but it
01:40:08 things to the person this morning but it is worth it following the torch fire in dubai
01:40:12 dubai in february 2015 the government's chief fire and rescue adviser
01:40:19 adviser was informed by the government department later that month that the dangers posed by acm pe materials cladding should not be a problem in the uk
01:40:31 should not be a problem in the uk because quote there are provisions in the building regulations to prevent this kind of problem
01:40:39 problem and the same broad view was expressed by the department for example in response to queries about the address hotel file also in dubai in late january 2016.
01:40:52 2016. and that may be one reason why
01:40:56 why there was no system in government by which requests for information from foreign governments about foreign fires were retained routinely made
01:41:09 were retained routinely made no warnings by government were disseminated more widely of concerns expressed for example and that this this is where there was an acknowledgement of the use of acm but
01:41:21 acknowledgement of the use of acm but but no warnings were given uh or information disseminated about concerns expressed for example at the cwtc meeting in july 2014
01:41:35 at the cwtc meeting in july 2014 that acm
01:41:36 that acm may be in common use or the expressions of concerns from nick jenkins if you remember of booth murray in february 2016 that confusion
01:41:48 confusion over the interpretation of approved document b to the building regulations raised a risk of a fire in the uk like those in dubai it seems
01:41:59 it seems that those concerns were not escalated to senior officials in the department again
01:42:05 again failing to appreciate the extent of the hazard now the london fire commissioner acknowledges and has said you knew this from the evidence that the
01:42:16 you knew this from the evidence that the brigade wrote to central government and to housing providers on a number of occasions from at least 2009
01:42:25 2009 raising general concerns about materials used in the construction and refurbishment of residential buildings
01:42:32 buildings and about levels of compliance with the building regulations now while those concerns did not relate to materials
01:42:43 materials because they were not known to be widely used
01:42:45 used the commissioner accepts that more could on reflection that more could have been done to highlight with government a growing awareness of the possibility that the
01:42:57 awareness of the possibility that the regulations were not always being adhered to or were being interpreted interpreted in a way which impacted on fire safety
01:43:08 it's in that context that part of the reason why the brigade wrote to government seeking greater clarity in the terms of the uh building regulations as did the lack of all courier coroner
01:43:21 as did the lack of all courier coroner in the rule 43 recommendations was that there was an important link to issues in for of enforcement of the regulatory reform fire safety
01:43:32 of the regulatory reform fire safety order
01:43:33 order for which fire and rescue services are responsible there's a direct link between the two now that hasn't been the focus of
01:43:40 focus of a lot of attention during the course of the inquiry but it is important that i make the point because in a great many cases proof of a breach of one or more of the
01:43:51 proof of a breach of one or more of the duties
01:43:52 duties held by responsible persons under the fire safety order or indeed where such persons want to argue that they did all that was reasonably practicable to meet the duty defending
01:44:03 practicable to meet the duty defending their
01:44:04 their position where those arguments occur they are dependent very often on an analysis of the requirements of the building regulations and building and british
01:44:16 regulations and building and british standards and those two are really inextricably linked the evidence of module 6b as we know has highlighted a number of areas within the regulations where interpretations especially in relation
01:44:28 interpretations especially in relation to adb
01:44:30 to adb vary to a significant extent we also heard i know it's module 7 but it's relevant to this that the combined effect just for example of regulations 8
01:44:41 effect just for example of regulations 8 and 11
01:44:42 and 11 of the building regulations is that more or less a complete discretion is given uh to depart from the express requirements this is for
01:44:54 this is for building control departments so long as quote reasonable standards of health and safety for persons in and about buildings are demonstrated now the point of our making that
01:45:05 now the point of our making that submission to you it's not in our written submissions is that as long as there is
01:45:09 there is uncertainty of an interpretation of the regulations and the statutory guidance combined with the wide discretion which is vested in local authority building control
01:45:20 local authority building control departments to depart from those express requirements there will continue to be real challenges in the enforcement of the fire safety order against building owners and
01:45:31 order against building owners and responsible persons for fire service fire and rescue services around the country but what
01:45:39 but what is and always has been certain this is my final point what is and always has been certain about the building regulations as mr martin accepted during his evidence
01:45:52 martin accepted during his evidence is that they did not do not allow for the contingency that stay put as a safety strategy might have to be revoked we just don't
01:46:03 might have to be revoked we just don't provide for it at all and that a full-scale emergency evacuation ensued such an eventuality is
01:46:12 is just not
01:46:13 just not contemplated and i've said it before but it's it's particularly pertinent to 6b and as a consequence these kind of buildings were not designed to facilitate evacuation as you know now
01:46:27 facilitate evacuation as you know now um
01:46:28 um following the fire the the tragedy in june 2017 for buildings in london they've been expected by the lfp and others
01:46:38 others just over a thousand uh out of a total actually of 29 000 odd both high-rise and low-rise residential blocks
01:46:48 blocks just over a thousand have been identified to have potentially dangerous cladding and for those buildings evacuation uh plans
01:46:59 uh plans temporary fire alarms and so on uh waking watches that sort of thing have been put in place by building owners and responsible persons following the national fire chief council's interim guidelines that's the position
01:47:11 interim guidelines that's the position in those buildings and of course the brigade
01:47:14 brigade has new processes to assist in affecting uh
01:47:18 uh those strategies but in general terms if stay put as a principle of building desire principle of building design is to be
01:47:29 principle of building design is to be abandoned
01:47:30 abandoned as professor torreira suggests as you know
01:47:35 know it would obviously be necessary as he says to fundamentally change the regulatory approach can't just change it overnight including adb
01:47:47 including adb and to establish multiple redundancies within the fire within the safety system to enable mandated phased evacuation and that would include sprinklers as we know
01:47:58 that would include sprinklers as we know smart alarm systems and many other fire suppression measures levels of redundancy the lfb
01:48:07 the lfb has campaigned for the provision of sprinklers for many years and currently campaigns for additional protected escape stairways
01:48:18 protected escape stairways so
01:48:18 so if
01:48:19 if and when such changes are implemented by government there needs to be political will of course as we know the lfb will personally purposefully engage in making it work
01:48:31 engage in making it work all reasonable efforts of course need to be made to ensure that residents
01:48:36 residents including those with disabilities have an opportunity to evacuate and all to be supported in doing so in the event of fire and that is about the way in which buildings are
01:48:48 is about the way in which buildings are designed
01:48:50 designed and refurbished and built and that shouldn't be done by seeking convenient interpretations or loopholes in the statutory guidance about which we
01:49:02 in the statutory guidance about which we have heard so much or
01:49:05 or to echo the words of stephanie barwise queen's council this morning deliberate manipulation and deliberate non-compliance that's all i have to say on behalf of
01:49:17 that's all i have to say on behalf of the commissioner well thank you very much indeed mr walsh thank you
01:49:23 thank you well now the last statement due to be made today is going to be made by mr glass and queen's council on behalf of
01:49:31 of ucas
01:49:32 ucas and
01:49:34 and mr glassman is going to make his statement by zoom and where rather earlier than we thought we'd be at this stage due to the expedition of the council but mr glass and i can see you there waiting to
01:49:46 glass and i can see you there waiting to speak to us is that right i hope you can see me and hear me as well thank you very much and i take it you can see us and you don't need to hear us particularly but we certainly
01:49:57 hear us particularly but we certainly need to hear you i'm sorry we've come to you rather early than you probably expected but that might be a good thing in any event um
01:50:06 um i'm sure on a day like this everyone would like to be able to finish early well um we are ready to hear you so if you are ready to address us please um please start whenever you're ready thank
01:50:17 please start whenever you're ready thank you
01:50:18 you good afternoon chairman estefan and mr ackball the united kingdom accreditation service ucas
01:50:28 ucas has as you know filed a written claising statement
01:50:31 statement and in these oral submissions i'm going to expand on some of the points that we've made in writing picking up on occasion on some of the observations made
01:50:42 made in the written statements by the other core participants
01:50:47 at the outset i would like to repeat ucas's expression of sympathy to all the bereaved survivors
01:50:56 survivors and residents of the grenfell tower fire
01:51:02 i also want to emphasize on behalf of ucas two central points first ucas recognizes the strength of feeling expressed in the written
01:51:14 feeling expressed in the written statements from the grieved survivors and residence groups yikas recognizes that the strength of feeling is justifiable as uks acknowledges that some of the
01:51:26 as uks acknowledges that some of the evidence relating to the bre and to the bba demonstrates that improvements are needed on the part of ucas
01:51:37 secondly and relatedly ucas is committed to learning all that it can from the grenfell tower tragedy and ucas is acting now
01:51:48 and ucas is acting now on those lessons it's that second aspect that i would like to focus on this afternoon particularly as it will serve to foreshadow the evidence that ucas
01:52:00 foreshadow the evidence that ucas intends to serve in october in response to the inquiry's request for statements from core participants who have implemented or who are implementing
01:52:12 implementing relevant reforms since the fire ucas sought to respond to the fire swiftly
01:52:20 swiftly for example ucas conducted a number of additional visits to the conformity assessment bodies cabs in
01:52:28 in 2017 uk has contributed to the independent review of building regulation fire safety by dame judith hackett that was published in may 2018
01:52:39 hackett that was published in may 2018 and has contributed to the ongoing independent review of the construction products testing regime conducted by mr paul morel ms annelise day queen's council
01:52:52 annelise day queen's council both reviews post specific questions as part of the consultation and ucas has responded to those with detailed submissions providing information
01:53:04 providing information identification of gaps and shortcomings of the existing regime and suggesting recommendations
01:53:13 as we explain in the written statement eucas has identified a number of key areas to focus on in response to the tragedy
01:53:23 tragedy those areas on addition to the work that ucas has undertaken specifically in relation to the bba and the bre that i'll come to at the end
01:53:34 and the bre that i'll come to at the end the first key area of work relates to product certification activities all existing accredited product certification schemes are being reviewed
01:53:46 certification schemes are being reviewed to ensure that they remain fit for purpose are meeting end user expectations and are adequately described in the scopes of accreditation there are literally hundreds of those
01:53:57 there are literally hundreds of those schemes
01:53:59 schemes but in the past 12 months ucas has commenced a program to review construction product certification schemes
01:54:07 schemes ucas has identified over 70 schemes which are being reviewed that is involving an in-depth evaluation the scheme criteria against the
01:54:18 the scheme criteria against the requirement of accreditation standards generally the reviews are taking place alongside annual assessments to cabs but specific attention is being given to
01:54:30 but specific attention is being given to those schemes that do not utilize national or international standards or criteria set by regulations
01:54:39 for schemes that utilize criteria set by the cab or by another scheme owner this review is likely to be completed by the end of 2022
01:54:50 end of 2022 further information on the review will be provided by ucas in its statement of inquiry later this year the second key area relates to ucas's
01:55:01 the second key area relates to ucas's assessment processes aspects of the assessment practice are being reviewed to see whether there are sufficient checks that ensure that the scope of accreditation is adequately
01:55:12 scope of accreditation is adequately covered having regard to the risks associated with that particular scheme over a four-year assessment cycle that has involved a number of different
01:55:23 that has involved a number of different strands of work developing further processes to evaluate risk in the planning and conduct of assessments to that end ucas established a project
01:55:35 to that end ucas established a project in 2020 aimed at developing an evaluation tool to be used for the assessment of each cab criteria being developed that take into
01:55:46 criteria being developed that take into account the scope and operating model of the cab as well as the sectors in which it operates the tour has been piloted in two sectors
01:55:57 the tour has been piloted in two sectors and plans are being established to fully embed the process within ucas ucas is establishing a new assessment portal in its it system as part of that a new reporting format
01:56:10 as part of that a new reporting format has been piloted that will provide improved data to enable trends in cab performance to be monitored and to ensure that a root cause analysis can be conducted
01:56:24 cause analysis can be conducted there's also increased monitoring of the effectiveness of corrective actions carried out by cabs a step which is being established through additional training and ensuring that sufficient time is
01:56:37 and ensuring that sufficient time is allocated to review corrective actions on assessments
01:56:44 ucas is also developing further guidance on the appointment of assessors to ensure any threats to impartiality are mitigated
01:56:53 mitigated as part of that ucas intends to introduce additional monitoring and audits to review how those threats are being mitigated
01:57:04 the third area relates to technical expertise
01:57:10 expertise a full review of the operation of technical advisory committees is underway
01:57:15 underway the committees will in future be managed by a central secretary which will enable harmonization of best practice and increased oversight and enhanced management
01:57:26 management there's ongoing work to ensure that there is a sufficient pool of technically competent resources and additional mentoring
01:57:35 mentoring which will be made available for new staff
01:57:39 staff and for assessors that additional mentoring will strengthen technical expertise available to ucas
01:57:52 fourth area relates to improving mechanisms for handling any significant non-conforming work
01:57:59 work that occurs in cabs and that will include a more detailed and structured technical review
01:58:08 ucas has emphasized to cabs and to ucas's own staff that there is a duty of candor
01:58:15 candor on the cabs to report concerns regarding performance of cabs that ucas accredits ucas has long had a learning culture and
01:58:26 ucas has long had a learning culture and the importance of learning from adverse incidents will continue to be reiterated in training and all aspects of ucas's operations
01:58:37 the final key area of work that i'd like to draw attention to is in relation to the proposed amendments to the customer agreement in the course of lorraine turner's
01:58:49 in the course of lorraine turner's evidence
01:58:50 evidence you pointed out sir that a number of the difficulties that have arisen in relation to ucas role could be addressed by amending the customer
01:59:00 customer agreement ucas respectfully agrees it's undertaken a review of the customer agreement with cabs and it's instructed external lawyers to advise on revising
01:59:12 external lawyers to advise on revising the customer agreement many of the proposed amendments strengthen and in some cases clarify existing provisions and powers
01:59:24 and powers nonetheless the amended customer agreement will enable ucas to be confident that it will be able to adopt a more robust role with cabs and that the agreement will address some
01:59:36 and that the agreement will address some of the issues that have been raised in this inquiry
01:59:41 the proposed amendments will go to a wide range of issues and we've detailed those in section c of the written note and just highlight a few points that are
01:59:53 and just highlight a few points that are particular relevance the first sir is in relation to the power to make unscheduled visits although this power is already implied in the existing customer agreement the
02:00:06 in the existing customer agreement the amended agreement makes that power explicit
02:00:10 explicit the amended agreements specifies that ucas may
02:00:13 ucas may at its sole discretion carry out additional or unscheduled visits in particular in order to verify that any notified changes to its
02:00:24 that any notified changes to its requirement for accreditation have been implemented
02:00:30 the second is in strengthening the obligations owed by the customer the cab to ucas
02:00:38 to ucas the amended agreement will impose more onerous and exacting obligations on the customer
02:00:44 customer it will provide that the customer must ensure that any information it provides to ucas whether as part of an application for accreditation an assessment or otherwise is true and
02:00:57 assessment or otherwise is true and accurate in all respects the customer must notify you cass as soon as is practicable if the customer becomes aware that information provided to you cass is
02:01:09 information provided to you cass is false or inaccurate the customer must take all appropriate steps to correct any statements used by itself any of its officers
02:01:21 any of its officers employees or representatives any of its clients or any other person with which it is associated which could bring accreditation into disrepute
02:01:31 disrepute or
02:01:32 or could be misleading regardless of whether it's been notified of the statement in question by ucas or from any other source and finally the customer must action
02:01:44 and finally the customer must action each mandatory improvement action raised in a ucas assessment report within the period specified by newcast
02:01:54 the third area is in relation to the definition of significant non-conformity as well as the notification provisions
02:02:05 provisions the draft amended customer agreement will set out an extensive definition of significant non-conformity and will impose an obligation on the customer to notify
02:02:17 notify ucas as soon as is practicable following identification of any such significant non-conformity
02:02:26 what the draft amended agreement will do is to reconcile the confidentiality obligations imposed on ucas with ucas's wish to ensure that acab cannot prevent
02:02:39 wish to ensure that acab cannot prevent disclosure of significant non-conformities to regulators or users or other interested parties
02:02:49 just in terms of the confidentiality of obligations imposed on ucas itself you may recall that in her second witness statement lorraine turner explained that ucas itself is held to
02:03:02 explained that ucas itself is held to iso 17011
02:03:06 iso 17011 which imposes confidentiality obligations clause 8 of the 2017 version which is currently applicable is the confidentiality clause
02:03:18 confidentiality clause it may be helpful just to see that on screen
02:03:22 on screen it's provided at page 14 of ucas zero zero double one forty four seven
02:03:46 see at paragraph 44 of the written note we we set it out and the relevant provision draw attention to is in 8.1.1
02:03:57 draw attention to is in 8.1.1 the accreditation body should inform the conformity assessment body in advance of the information it intends to place in the public domain and then critically except for
02:04:08 and then critically except for information that the conformity assessment body makes publicly available or when agreed between the accreditation body and the conformity assessment body all other information obtained during
02:04:20 all other information obtained during the accreditation process is considered proprietary information and shall be regarded as confidential
02:04:29 i think we can move that from the screen thank you
02:04:36 the draft amended customer agreement will ensure that ucas can comply with that confidentiality obligation but
02:04:46 but at the same time ensure that it can alert stakeholders end users and the public to any safety related information
02:04:55 to that end the draft agreement will provide that the duty of confidentiality will not
02:05:01 will not apply to
02:05:02 apply to quote any disclosure made by ucas and circumstances following its apprehension or notification of any significant non-conformity or customer failure
02:05:15 non-conformity or customer failure close quote and as i've said there's an exhaustive definition of what significant non-conformity means so the changes will make clear beyond
02:05:27 so the changes will make clear beyond doubt that any instance of fraud on the part of the cab would allow ucas to depart from its obligation of confidentiality a point we know which was discussed in oral evidence and which
02:05:39 was discussed in oral evidence and which has been commented upon by some of the core participants
02:05:45 the customer will be under an obligation to notify any significant non-conformity to all
02:05:52 to all interested third parties including its clients product manufacturers regulators or
02:06:02 or impacted members of the general public it will be for the cab to identify any relevant impacted members of the public
02:06:13 relevant impacted members of the public and ucas will ensure that sufficient action is taken who will fall within that definition will depend upon the nature of the accredited activity
02:06:24 accredited activity and in the written note we give the example of a failure by a hospital laboratory which would mean patience of that laboratory
02:06:33 compliance with this obligation will be through assessments of cabs and monitored
02:06:39 monitored by the ucas technical quality and risk team
02:06:46 then in relation to sanctions available to ucas
02:06:51 again you will recall perhaps from the written evidence that lorraine turner explained that a cab's failure to report significant non-conforming work or
02:07:02 significant non-conforming work or indeed non-conforming work to ucas would be sufficient to attract sanctions although there would be consideration of the relevant circumstances such as and i
02:07:13 the relevant circumstances such as and i quote from her statement the reasons why the cab did not inform ucas the associated risk and the actions taken by the cab
02:07:23 the cab to correct the issue and address the root cause of the significant non-conforming work there's a range of sanctions available that are detailed in the draft a
02:07:34 that are detailed in the draft a customer agreement including terminating an application for accreditation or refusing an application withdrawing suspending or partially suspending an accreditation
02:07:46 suspending an accreditation reducing the scope of an accreditation requiring a further assessment of the customer
02:07:53 customer and publishing that fact and the suspension or withdrawal of the accreditation in any media it considers appropriate
02:08:05 now in terms of publication of sanctions at the moment ucas website confirms which organizations are currently under suspension or had their accreditation
02:08:17 suspension or had their accreditation withdrawn
02:08:19 withdrawn the information identifies where the suspension has been imposed as a sanction
02:08:25 sanction this information is kept up to date to reflect the current status of the cab if a member of the public wishes to find out whether a body has been accredited
02:08:37 out whether a body has been accredited or subject to a sanction in the past they're able to request this information from ucas directly ucas is currently reviewing whether the historical record of sanctions could be
02:08:49 historical record of sanctions could be retained in the ucas website and whether this information is of use bear in mind two points first that the current status of accreditation is always available via
02:09:01 accreditation is always available via the website and secondly and critically ucas will not lift a sanction without confirmation that the issues that led to the sanction have been properly addressed
02:09:16 so as well as those major areas of work by newcastle in response to the fire there's some specific areas of work that we mentioned in the written note uh that are worth drawing brief
02:09:28 uh that are worth drawing brief attention to bear in mind the closing statements that have been made by the other core participants first
02:09:37 first the construction industry technical advisory committee ucas is reviewing whether to include fire performance testing of building products in that committee
02:09:49 of building products in that committee or whether to establish a standalone committee
02:09:54 committee that's ongoing work secondly
02:09:58 secondly picking up on some of the observations made by the core participants in their written statements about ucas's relationship with government ucas is working with bayes to conduct a
02:10:11 ucas is working with bayes to conduct a strategic review of accreditation and accredited conformity assessment this work is expected to be completed over the summer and may result in changes to the bay's
02:10:23 and may result in changes to the bay's ucas memorandum of understanding
02:10:29 as i indicated at the outset ucas is also focused on the accreditation of the bba and bre
02:10:38 first in relation to the bba in his statement for the inquiry mr randall from ucas explained at paragraph 15.3
02:10:49 15.3 that quote following the annual surveillance visit to the bba in january 2021 ucas has undertaken a review of the bba scheme
02:11:00 undertaken a review of the bba scheme which has highlighted the need to update the references on the bba schedule to reflect better the scope of the scheme close
02:11:08 close quotes recently ucas has concluded the review of the bba scheme and completed the annual surveillance assessment
02:11:19 surveillance assessment that review indicated that a number of changes to the bba scheme were required to enable ucas to continue to include the bba scheme within the scope of bba's accreditation
02:11:31 within the scope of bba's accreditation for product certification under iso 17065
02:11:38 alternatively if the scheme is to continue in its current format ucas considers that it could be appropriate to transfer the accreditation to iso 17020
02:11:50 accreditation to iso 17020 as an inspection activity ucas is currently in discussion with d-luck
02:11:57 d-luck and with the office for product safety and standards in its role as the new construction product regulator to work with bba to determine next steps
02:12:08 to work with bba to determine next steps and the future direction of the scheme taking into account that the scheme is used in industry to support evidence of compliance with the building regulations
02:12:20 the building regulations we intend to provide further information on the scheme review in the october statement of inquiry
02:12:29 as to the bre in april 2022 ucas staff met with bre staff to discuss ongoing assessment to ensure
02:12:41 to discuss ongoing assessment to ensure that the requirements of iso 17025 were met
02:12:47 ucas emphasized the need for close monitoring of the effectiveness of corrective actions from previous assessments and the need for improved internal audits within the laboratory
02:13:00 audits within the laboratory the next assessment is taking place this month
02:13:03 month where the issues highlighted in the evidence presented to the inquiry will be covered a planning meeting has been held with bre with respect to the coverage of the
02:13:14 bre with respect to the coverage of the fire testing scope it was noted in that meeting that the level and frequency of witnessing the fire testing activities has been increased additional monitoring and review of the
02:13:27 additional monitoring and review of the assessment and post-assessment activities is being implemented
02:13:34 drawing to an answer i said at the outset that ucas accepts that the evidence to the inquiry that the inquiry is heard in
02:13:45 the inquiry that the inquiry is heard in relation to the bba and bre assessments indicates that lessons need to be learned
02:13:53 notwithstanding its acknowledgement that there are lessons to be learned ucas does not accept that it's fair to say that the evidence suggests that as an organization it's not fit for purpose
02:14:07 an organization it's not fit for purpose assessments are necessarily a sampling exercise
02:14:11 exercise they cannot guarantee to find all areas of non-conformity as acknowledged by some of the core participants sampling is a valid way of monitoring
02:14:23 monitoring the cab's own system should require ongoing monitoring of compliance with the requirements
02:14:30 ucas conducts a huge number of assessments each year we calculate that over 30 000 assessment days
02:14:40 days per year are conducted using peer experts
02:14:45 experts what the inquiry has seen is of course a very limited snapshot of those however what the inquiry has seen is that ucas has raised multiple
02:14:56 that ucas has raised multiple non-conformities it's not correct to say that ucas does not wish to find problems
02:15:05 what the inquiry has also seen
02:15:09 seen is that ucas has witnessed tests for example in relation to bre during the period 2012 to 2016 ucas took a fire testing expert each
02:15:22 ucas took a fire testing expert each year
02:15:23 year typically spending four to six days each year looking at the testing including resistance to fire and witnessing a number of tests it's recognized that the full bs
02:15:34 it's recognized that the full bs 8414 test was witnessed only once in that period however
02:15:41 however the report submitted to the inquiry demonstrates that multiple fire testing records were examined and staff equipment and facilities were assessed each year on site
02:15:52 on site in addition to a sample of other fire resistance tests
02:15:59 it is unfair to say that ucas does not raise criticisms because it's funded by the cabs
02:16:06 the cabs ucas has in place robust safeguards to ensure that it can retain its impartiality and perform its accreditation function effectively despite its funding model
02:16:17 effectively despite its funding model which as we say in our written note is one shared with other accreditation bodies internationally we've sought to explain those safeguards at paragraph 17
02:16:29 at paragraph 17 to 21 of our written note
02:16:34 it's also important to bear in mind that ucas itself is not a regulator it has no legal or enforcement powers
02:16:44 eucas itself is subject to a peer evaluation process and like all recognized accreditation bodies submits to a program of peer evaluation to maintain its european and
02:16:55 to maintain its european and international mutual recognition agreement signatory status and its status as the uk's sole national accreditation volume
02:17:06 the peer evaluation last took place in may 2021
02:17:11 may 2021 where a team of 13 accreditation specialists from other european accreditation bodies spent a week with ucas
02:17:19 ucas this evaluation included observation of live assessments and detailed inspection of case records across all sections of the organization to determine the effectiveness of the
02:17:30 to determine the effectiveness of the assessment process and compliance with the international standard in addition the peer evaluation team scrutinized ucas's impartiality
02:17:42 scrutinized ucas's impartiality as well as the effectiveness of the management system and overall technical competence the review identified areas for further improvements but
02:17:52 but concluded that ucas has robust processes and systems in place that provide confidence in the reliability of the accreditation service that ucas delivers
02:18:04 that ucas delivers no systemic risks were identified with the ucas system
02:18:12 all of those points however are not made in any way to detract from ucas's acknowledgement that lessons need to be learned and are being learned
02:18:25 and are being learned that fact i hope has been demonstrated by the detail that's set out in our written statement and which as i've said will be developed in our october statement to the inquiry
02:18:37 statement to the inquiry so those are the submissions on behalf of ucas
02:18:41 of ucas wellness glasses thank you very much indeed
02:18:44 indeed um
02:18:46 um you managed to complete well within the time
02:18:48 time that we estimated for you so thank you very much and that brings us to an end of the proceedings for today but tomorrow we shall have some further closing statements on
02:18:59 some further closing statements on behalf of other core participants i'm not tomorrow no i'm reminded not tomorrow is a terrible day for everyone trying to travel anywhere no we're going to sit on wednesday
02:19:12 no we're going to sit on wednesday so we shall not sit tomorrow at all we shall sit on wednesday at 10 o'clock when we shall hear the further closing statements from other core participants so thank you all
02:19:23 other core participants so thank you all very much wednesday at 10 o'clock please
02:19:40 you