Closing submissions for Module 6 covering testing bodies, government departments, and fire risk assessors. Counsel highlights systemic failures in building safety oversight, government inaction on known ACM dangers, and industry awareness of combustible cladding risks.
00:00:24 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing today we're going to hear more closing statements in relation to module 6 from various core participants
00:00:35 various core participants the first statement we're going to hear is going to be made on behalf of the mayor of london by ms stud who i'm pleased to say is able to be with us in person so instead would you like to come
00:00:46 person so instead would you like to come up to the lecture and make your statement thank you
00:00:53 [Music]
00:00:58 demonstrates in plain sight the catastrophic consequences of the failure to have in place a robust system for the monitoring and amendment of building regulation and guidance in relation to fire safety
00:01:11 guidance in relation to fire safety it has also revealed a shockingly lackluster attitude to coroner's recommendations in so far as they required action by government departments the evidence heard by the inquiry about
00:01:23 the evidence heard by the inquiry about the system of testing accreditation of testing organizations building control regulations and guidance and the workings of the central government departments
00:01:34 government departments has illustrated a succession of missed opportunities each one of which could have avoided the terrible tragedy at grenville tower the unfortunate comment in the email
00:01:46 the unfortunate comment in the email from brian martin that and i quote we only have a duty to respond to the coroner not kiss her backside
00:01:54 backside illustrates what must be a widespread public concern that lessons are not being learned from coronal inquests in relation to the prevention of future deaths
00:02:05 prevention of future deaths it is also imperative that the recommendations made by this inquiry are prioritized monitored and implemented to provide the bereaved survivors and
00:02:17 to provide the bereaved survivors and residents as well as the public at large with the confidence that the safety issues that are highlighted by such inquiries will be acted upon and be enforceable
00:02:29 enforceable in his opening to this second part of module 6
00:02:33 module 6 the mayor acknowledged that in the most exceptional circumstances circumstances the machinery of government works less quickly than we all would like
00:02:44 quickly than we all would like he appreciates that very often there is of course a bigger picture to consider however what the evidence has revealed in this module is a process that fell significantly short of an acceptable
00:02:57 significantly short of an acceptable standard
00:03:00 in its closing submission the mayor wants to focus on four issues first the lack of rigor from testing and ineffective certification bodies second the drive for deregulation
00:03:13 second the drive for deregulation third the low priority given to building safety
00:03:18 safety and fourth the failures to address the recommendations made by the coroner as a result of the lack of house fire
00:03:27 i turned first to deal with the rigor of testing and the ineffective certification bodies
00:03:34 what became clear from the evidence heard by the inquiry if it was not already obvious is that safety testing and certification is of no benefit unless it is conducted in an open
00:03:45 unless it is conducted in an open independent and transparent way as we've seen in this inquiry failure conduct and conduct it in this way permits a full sense of security to
00:03:56 way permits a full sense of security to permeate
00:03:57 permeate with very dangerous consequences the evidence heard in the course of this module from the building research establishment the united kingdom accreditation service and the national
00:04:09 accreditation service and the national house building council points to an industry that was aware of the dangers of aluminium composite material panels with a polyethylene core in buildings over 18 meters
00:04:21 in buildings over 18 meters from at least 2001 rears pulsed by the fire at the edge in 2005.
00:04:29 2005. in spite of that knowledge raising as it did the obvious risk of mass casualty mass casualties in the event of a fire and the significant risk to public safety
00:04:39 safety it was never spelled out in terms to government even though brian martin had been previously employed by the bre although not directly responsible for
00:04:50 although not directly responsible for the cladding at grenville tower the nhbc relied upon the bba certificate which certified kingspan 15 as suitable for buildings over 80 meters
00:05:03 as suitable for buildings over 80 meters notwithstanding the obvious conflict with paragraph 12.7 of approved document b
00:05:09 b it continued acting within the comfort and boundaries of the certificate because the certificate came from an accredited body that was well recognized
00:05:20 accredited body that was well recognized in answer to questions diane marshall operations director at the nhbc defended the position of the nhbc saying that it was within the view within the industry that a bba
00:05:33 the view within the industry that a bba certificate could be held in that regard where as long as you follow the conditions of the certificate you satisfied the requirements of the building regulations
00:05:45 building regulations as you so aptly put it mr chairman this was a slavish following of a piece of paper this misguided approach relied upon an untested assumption that the
00:05:57 upon an untested assumption that the manufacturer was driven by safety and not by profit as you pointed out to nhb as you pointed out the nhbc approach was based upon a philosophy that it was safe if kingspan
00:06:11 philosophy that it was safe if kingspan told you it was safe how can the position have arisen where john lewis from the nhbc a fire engineer by profession can tell the inquiry
00:06:22 by profession can tell the inquiry i did have a lot of concerns about it yes
00:06:25 yes but you're asking a fire engineer whether you know they would prefer not to use combustible materials you know it's like asking turkeys to vote for christmas
00:06:36 vote for christmas what a perverse position had been reached where the very people who should have been giving that transparent and independent advice on fire safety felt that their opinions might be
00:06:47 felt that their opinions might be considered so partisan that they did not consider it appropriate to express them
00:06:55 the bre responsible for and contracted to government for the investigation of real fires was privatized in 1997 and found itself in a post-privatisation
00:07:07 and found itself in a post-privatisation position where the government funding had cut them to the bone before this inquiry debbie smith referred to by another as the god of fire in the uk
00:07:19 fire in the uk defended the bre approach and observed that the bre had always done work for the public good but she told you you still have to earn money otherwise you're not there you
00:07:31 money otherwise you're not there you cease to exist its purpose up until it changed in 2012 was to advise government if the building regulations or guidance needed to change
00:07:43 regulations or guidance needed to change post 2012 there was an express requirement for the bre not to make any policy recommendations this serves to illustrate the low
00:07:54 this serves to illustrate the low priority being given to fire safety by government the evidence from the bre and government officials in relation to the 2001
00:08:05 officials in relation to the 2001 testing of the acm panels with pe corps whether flames rapidly exceeded the height of the testing rig was shocking to all who heard and saw it
00:08:16 to all who heard and saw it it's hard to imagine just how difficult that evidence must have been for the bereaved survivors and residents
00:08:25 residents it was clear to the bre that the acm with pe corps failed spectacularly and yet the product still satisfied the class zero classification
00:08:36 classification because of the flawed approach taken to the significance of the internal core the bre had first-hand knowledge that acm with pe filler burnt
00:08:48 acm with pe filler burnt catastrophically and yet failed to advise the government that as a matter of priority the adb needed to be amended to highlight the danger revealed by the testing
00:08:59 testing it was their role to provide such advice at the time brian martin was employed by the bre and had worked on the testing program
00:09:10 program he was also seconded to government two or three days a week to advise on the review of the building regulations guidance and on safety contained within the adb
00:09:22 contained within the adb in its 2002 report following on from the tests in 2001 the bre failed to highlight the important life safety implications of the tests that they had conducted
00:09:34 the tests that they had conducted it was the role of the bre to present the data and make recommendations and for government to act on them and yet they failed to do more than to alert government to the fact and i quote
00:09:46 alert government to the fact and i quote these issues may require further consideration such an approach fell well below the standard that the public should have accepted expected and compromised the safety of the built environment putting
00:09:59 safety of the built environment putting lives at risk that those test results remained out of the public domain until this inquiry obtained them as part of its investigation shows a worrying lack of
00:10:10 investigation shows a worrying lack of independence and transparency which put lives at risk and has to change the bereaved survivors and residents may have some justification to ask themselves the same question asked by
00:10:23 themselves the same question asked by council to the inquiry of brian martin which was given that the test resulted in catastrophic full-scale failure the recommendation doesn't spell out in
00:10:35 the recommendation doesn't spell out in clear terms to government that if they don't review class zero people might die and what we all want to know is why they may also question whether a
00:10:46 they may also question whether a different recommendation could have saved the grenville tower from being clad in the same material and ultimately have saved the lives of those who perished in june 2017.
00:11:02 the drive for deregulation whatever the political expedience of deregulation it clearly impeded the amendment of adb to make it fit for purpose and to drive up safety standards
00:11:16 purpose and to drive up safety standards the evidence that the inquiry has heard shows a preoccupation with one in one out and then in 2013 one in two out and finally in 2016
00:11:29 one in two out and finally in 2016 one in three out which had the effect of civil servants becoming non-reactive anthony byrd and richard harrell both told you graphically about the effect
00:11:40 told you graphically about the effect that the deregulation agenda and declining resources had on them personally but also on the ability of their department responsible as it was for building policy to function effectively
00:11:54 building policy to function effectively fewer members of staff more focus on how they should deregulate as anthony bird told you meant we couldn't necessarily with the resources that we had focus on the job in hand
00:12:07 that we had focus on the job in hand and richard harrell told you that the policy was intended to make it difficult to introduce new regulation the system that resulted was that any proposal to regulate required additional
00:12:20 proposal to regulate required additional work
00:12:21 work and any impetus to prioritize life safety regulation was lost the lack of prioritization of safety issues is illustrated by the fact that
00:12:32 issues is illustrated by the fact that following his 2016 appointment and subsequent briefing gavin barwell the new minister of state for housing and planning remained unaware of the fire at la canal house or
00:12:45 unaware of the fire at la canal house or the coroner's 2013 recommendations he accepted that the housing supply agenda took priority during his time in the post
00:12:55 the post any suggestion that the deregulation agenda did not apply to the building regulations or adb as put forward by lord pickles was certainly not as it was understood
00:13:06 was certainly not as it was understood by those dealing with the issues within the dclg
00:13:11 the dclg his evidence to the inquiry was unsatisfactory in many respects and in so far as it differs from that as of his officials it should be rejected
00:13:22 of his officials it should be rejected the lowering of priority in favor of the housing supply agenda also left fire safety matters in the hands of a single civil servant brian martin
00:13:33 martin with all the responsibility falling on his shoulders with disastrous results any system which places responsibility for such crucial matters with a single
00:13:44 for such crucial matters with a single person is clearly broken this should have been obvious to the dclg leadership and the results for building safety were catastrophic
00:13:55 catastrophic the effects of deregulation were compounded by the austerity cuts to government departments and the civil servants service over the same period these concerns were substantiated by
00:14:07 these concerns were substantiated by melanie dawes in the immediate aftermath of the fire when she commented in her email to the cabinet secretary on the 15th of june 2017 at some point we may need to reflect on
00:14:20 at some point we may need to reflect on the impact of cuts to the civil service dclg will be less than 50 percent of its 2010 size by 2020 on some of our deep
00:14:31 2010 size by 2020 on some of our deep expert polity policy functions the expertise is still there and it's excellent but it's sparse and overloaded
00:14:42 failure to act on warnings about fire safety
00:14:45 safety certainly through the early years of the 2000s the concerns being raised about acm and pe corps were there for all to see
00:14:54 see they came from the bre testing other fires in the united kingdom and abroad where external cladding had contributed concerns raised by the industry for example the centre of windows and
00:15:06 example the centre of windows and cladding technology nick jenkins of euroclad and the all party parliamentary group chaired by the late sir david amos mp
00:15:16 mp the dclg which could and should have taken the lead in remedying the misleading confused and poorly written adb
00:15:24 adb which brian martin acknowledged was in need of a revision seemed too paralyzed to do anything effective
00:15:32 effective the amendment of the adb which did occur in 2006
00:15:35 in 2006 incorporated the reference to filler but in fact led to a significant widespread confusion rather than clarification brian martin as a single point of
00:15:47 brian martin as a single point of contact rejected the concerns being raised with him about the misunderstandings in the industry in relation to the term filler and about deaths and near deaths in cladding fires
00:15:58 cladding fires the emails from others in the industry highlighted in the course of council to the inquiry's examination of mr martin were dismissed as hyperbole even when brian martin himself was aware of the
00:16:10 brian martin himself was aware of the shortcomings of the adb and had evidence of widespread non-compliance his failure to act illustrates systemic failures in the dclg
00:16:21 failures in the dclg the lack of political priority being placed on building safety and a corresponding absence of oversight of this vital safety issue for more senior civil servants
00:16:33 civil servants by reason of some or all of the features that have been prevalent in this module a lack of resources ministerial disinterest a lack of prioritization on building
00:16:44 a lack of prioritization on building safety and an erroneous concentration of all building safety and fire matters in the hands of a single individual there is a thread of jaded cynicism that runs through the evidence
00:16:55 runs through the evidence rather than trying to implement change and improvement the dclg was constricted by a lack of fresh thinking and an unhealthy malaise where the deep expertise of brian martin
00:17:07 where the deep expertise of brian martin which should have been helpful in relation to such a complex area became conversely a hindrance to any progress
00:17:18 failures to learn lessons from the lack of house fire is fundamental to the work of this inquiry core participants and the inquiry itself can urge reform
00:17:30 can urge reform make recommendations but unless compliance is enforced and enforceable then nothing changes eleven days after the lachenal house fire brian martin emailed the bre his
00:17:43 fire brian martin emailed the bre his view that the fire did not warrant any changes to adb the bre investigation was closed down so as not to duplicate resources
00:17:54 as not to duplicate resources and the responsibility passed over to the metropolitan police service in the london fire brigade in fact
00:18:00 in fact as it transpired that initial conclusion was incorrect having heard the details evidence in the course of the lachenal house inquest including from brian martin the coroner
00:18:12 including from brian martin the coroner expressed the view that there was clear confusion around the interpretation of adb
00:18:18 adb and that it needed review in spite of the secretary of state eric pickles confirming that such a review would be undertaken dclg was apparently unable to take the recommendations
00:18:29 unable to take the recommendations forward
00:18:31 forward we have heard that they were hampered by frequent elections the brexit referendum and deregulation but perhaps just as significant was the complacency stemming from the initial
00:18:43 complacency stemming from the initial conclusion that lachnal house did not require amendment of a db the evidence that overall deaths occurring in fires were falling and the fact that there was no
00:18:54 and the fact that there was no historical evidence that such a tragedy like grenville tower would occur in the uk
00:19:01 uk that placed unwarranted reliance upon the effective working of the building regulations and was for that reason alone
00:19:09 alone unsustainable however of even more concern to the inquiry
00:19:14 inquiry will be the inability or unwillingness of the dclg to hear or act upon the concerns of the very many organizations which did see the problem
00:19:25 which did see the problem and were aware of the significance of the lack of house recommendations from the coroner the all-party parliamentary group repeatedly urged the government to proceed with a review of adb and warned
00:19:38 proceed with a review of adb and warned government of the problems in the built environment which were compromising safety
00:19:43 safety individual experts such as sam webb who provided evidence in the lachlan house inquest reminded brian martin of the need to simplify adb so that it was easily understood
00:19:56 so that it was easily understood ron dobson the commissioner of the london fire brigade recommended writing to building owners to alert them to the contribution to fire risk made by cladding panels and david metcalf
00:20:08 and david metcalf from the cwct raised concerns about the misleading adb wording for each of those concerns varied and wide-ranging as they were
00:20:19 wide-ranging as they were there was an explanation as to why the rewording of the adb should not take priority
00:20:25 priority brian martin accepted it was not getting the requisite attention for ministers that he thought it required he confirmed in the course of his evidence that the government position was that committing more resources to
00:20:37 was that committing more resources to fire protection or any other regulation was the opposite of where the government wanted to go louise upton who led the fire safety team at dclg at the time of the lacanal
00:20:49 team at dclg at the time of the lacanal house fire thought that a review of the legislation would be unwelcome and to employ a competent person to carry out a risk assessment would question the whole rationale
00:21:00 question the whole rationale of the self-compliance regime it appears that concentration on the deregulation policy obscured focus on what should have been the true priority
00:21:12 what should have been the true priority which was public safety consequently the coroner's recommendations were allowed to remain unconsidered until after the grenville tower fire in 2017.
00:21:24 tower fire in 2017. the commissioned research although held by dclg in 2015 was not published until 2019 having failed to act preemptively the
00:21:35 having failed to act preemptively the government then sought to cover its back when on the 16th of june 2017 two days after the fire brian martin emailed debbie marshall about an article which
00:21:46 debbie marshall about an article which had run in the times suggesting that building regulation guidance permitted the use of cladding used on the grenville tower brian martin had been asked to rebut this
00:21:57 this and he wanted miss marshall to help he attached a script which explained the government's line on why the existing and unamended adb guidance in fact banned the use of the
00:22:09 guidance in fact banned the use of the material
00:22:11 material as noted at the beginning of this submission it is essential that recommendations made by coroners are prioritized reviewed and we're valid implemented
00:22:22 implemented the mayor repeats his support for a national oversight mechanism to ensure that recommendations from inquests and inquiries are systematically and independently followed up
00:22:34 independently followed up as proposed by the charity inquest in his opening statement for this part of module 6 the mayor raised concerns about the fate of important recommendations to be made
00:22:45 of important recommendations to be made by this inquiry given the government's track record in responding to the coroner's recommendations after the lachenal house inquest regrettably the government's tardiness
00:22:57 regrettably the government's tardiness in responding to the inquiry's phase one recommendations indicates that the mayor's concerns are justified
00:23:05 justified the inquiries phase one report was published in october 2019 in may 2022 the government published its fourth progress report on the implementation of
00:23:17 progress report on the implementation of the 15 recommendations given to government and building owners and managers
00:23:23 managers the previous progress report was published in september 2021 at the date of this submission the government has not completed any of its phase one recommendations
00:23:34 phase one recommendations the government states that nine of these recommendations are scheduled to be implemented with the laying of the fire safety england regulations on the 18th of may 2022
00:23:46 on the 18th of may 2022 however these regulations will not become law until the 8th of july 2022 and the new duties will not commence until the 23rd of january 2023
00:23:58 until the 23rd of january 2023 in contrast the lfb have completed 26 of its 29 recommendations and the mayor as part of his oversight responsible for the lfb publishes regular progress reports on
00:24:09 publishes regular progress reports on their implementation with the 26th progress report published on the 31st of may 2022 over three years will have elapsed from the date of the inquiries phase one
00:24:20 the date of the inquiries phase one report before any recommendation for government building owners and managers are fully implemented the mayor is also dismayed at the
00:24:31 the mayor is also dismayed at the government's response to the remain a remainder of the six recommendations directed to the government building owners and managers some of which have been rejected outright
00:24:41 outright in particular the inquiry recommended that the owner and managers of every high-rise residential building be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans for all
00:24:53 emergency evacuation plans for all residents whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised further to a consultation which ran in june and july of last year the government's response published on
00:25:04 the government's response published on the 18th of may almost a year later confirmed that this recommendation would not be implemented the government has said that despite widespread support for the evacuation
00:25:16 widespread support for the evacuation plans and the proposals outlined there remains significant issues with the implementation of them with regard to proportionality practicality and safety
00:25:27 proportionality practicality and safety further time will now be wasted as the government embarks on another consultation on an alternative package of initiatives the government's flat rejection of the
00:25:39 the government's flat rejection of the inquiry's recommendation on peeps is astounding at grenville tower 41 of the disabled residents died the urgency of the inquiry's
00:25:50 the urgency of the inquiry's recommendation on peeps is obvious and the mayor is deeply concerned that the government's attitude to implementation of the phase one recommendations means that any phase two recommendations made by the inquiry to government are
00:26:02 made by the inquiry to government are unlikely to receive their priority and respect which they clearly deserve
00:26:09 half a decade on from the devastating loss of 72 people the way homes are built and managed should by now be totally transformed we should today be living in a country
00:26:21 we should today be living in a country where fire safety is prioritized and embedded
00:26:24 embedded rules and regulations are ambitious and rigorous
00:26:29 rigorous guidance is clear and comprehensive and the industry is responsible and highly skilled while important steps have been taken most notably with the building safety
00:26:40 most notably with the building safety act we are still a long way from achieving this vision and while we wait for long lasting changes to be implemented we have no assurance that the practices that led to grenville are not continuing to this day
00:26:54 grenville are not continuing to this day there is very little evidence of a culture change within the construction industry there is real concern that the corner cutting buck passing and rule dodging
00:27:05 dodging it is notable that as recently as january of this year the secretary of state for the dluhc had to set out in terms the action he
00:27:16 had to set out in terms the action he would take against developers in the event that they failed to take steps to make their building safe this is indicative of an industry that is still being dragged to
00:27:29 industry that is still being dragged to consider safety first in too many cases profit still appears to be the overriding priority
00:27:38 this module has demonstrated a litany of missed opportunities to raise awareness and standards and to prevent the catastrophe that is the grenville tower fire
00:27:49 fire the missed opportunities were many and varied
00:27:53 varied what is clear is that matters of public safety must always be prioritized and the system of testing in this field must be independent and transparent this will benefit the industry as well
00:28:05 this will benefit the industry as well as the public but perhaps most of all the inquiry is going to have to achieve what lachenal house coroner was unable to achieve a mechanism whereby its recommendations
00:28:17 a mechanism whereby its recommendations are not belittled and filed away to be resurrected on an occasion in the future where another tragedy of whatever kind has resulted in loss of life and livelihood on a scale similar to that of
00:28:30 livelihood on a scale similar to that of the greenville terror fire thank you
00:28:35 thank you well thank you very much mr stud
00:28:39 the next
00:28:41 next closing statement is going to be made on behalf of arconic by
00:28:46 by mr stephen hochman queen's council and mr hochman not being able to be here this morning is going to make his statement remotely so i'm just going to see if mr hochman is
00:29:00 i'm just going to see if mr hochman is there
00:29:12 no he's not at the moment but i think if we wait a moment he'll appear very soon
00:29:20 i don't know if you can hear me sir but i am here good morning mr hoffman well we can
00:29:25 we can see you and we can certainly hear you i hope you can see and hear us yes thank you good well if you're ready to make your statement we are we should be pleased to hear it so when you're ready off you go
00:29:37 when you're ready off you go thank you very much in this module the inquiry has examined issues under four main headings namely firefighting testing and certification
00:29:48 testing and certification fire risk assessment and the role of central government these oral submissions like our written submissions already provided will focus primarily on testing and certification
00:30:00 primarily on testing and certification and on the role of central government in general terms it can be said that these two topics both relate to the regulatory regime applicable at material
00:30:11 regulatory regime applicable at material times
00:30:12 times this regime will clearly be relevant to the assessment by the inquiry of the acts and emissions of the various core participants which had or may have had some bearing on the grenfell tower fire
00:30:25 some bearing on the grenfell tower fire we do have a wish to stress at the outset that for two separate reasons the position of the company which we represent ought to be distinguished from the position of other core participants
00:30:37 the position of other core participants the first reason is that the regulatory regime applied in general terms to those carrying out the refurbishment work at the time and not to the supply of a
00:30:48 the time and not to the supply of a particular product regardless of the extent to which that supplier had any detailed knowledge of the features of the work involved the second reason is that as an overseas
00:30:59 the second reason is that as an overseas supplier the company could not have had a fully detailed knowledge of the regime in any particular country in which its product might be used
00:31:10 product might be used those involved domestically in carrying out the work would moreover be aware of these two matters and of the resulting distinct position of the company in relation to
00:31:21 position of the company in relation to the refurbishment project the inquiry will not therefore expect us to provide a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory regime or of its
00:31:32 the regulatory regime or of its implications for the work which was carried out at grenfell the inquiry will doubtless seek more assistance on these matters from other core participants
00:31:43 matters from other core participants what we seek to do is to assist the inquiry at this stage by identifying as we did in our written posting three key headings namely
00:31:54 posting three key headings namely the sale and use of acm pe generally which will take me uh just about half of the time available to me secondly the supply of acm pe
00:32:06 secondly the supply of acm pe by aap by arconic the company that we represent
00:32:10 represent and thirdly the supply and use of acmpe and other product project products at grenfell tower of course we appreciate that since the
00:32:21 of course we appreciate that since the preparation of our written closing the inquiry has heard evidence in module 7 which may be considered to have some bearing on the case for
00:32:32 for this company it's extremely tempting to embark at this stage upon an analysis of that evidence but we are confident that to do so now would confuse rather than
00:32:43 to do so now would confuse rather than insisting rather than assist the inquiry and that our analysis of that evidence ought to await the opportunity which we will have to address you specifically in connection with module 7. the only
00:32:56 connection with module 7. the only observation i will make at this point is that there is a distinction to be drawn
00:33:01 drawn between factors leading to the start of the cladding fire and those leading to the spread of the fire and the conclusions which one draws may not be identical in respect to those two
00:33:14 identical in respect to those two aspects
00:33:15 aspects so let me move please to my first main heading the sale and use of acm pe generally
00:33:23 generally with regard to this it seems to us that the key issue must be the extent to which over the years prior to the grenfell fire it was acceptable or at least not unusual
00:33:35 or at least not unusual for such products to be specified this may involve thinking about whether it was regarded as acceptable for combustible products generally to be
00:33:46 for combustible products generally to be specified
00:33:47 specified more particularly it may involve thinking about whether it was regarded as acceptable for acmpe to be specified in turn this may depend partly on
00:33:59 in turn this may depend partly on whether the product was capable of being used in a manner which was compliant with regulatory regimes or at least was perceived as being capable of being used in that way
00:34:13 capable of being used in that way it would be recollected that we have from the outset emphasized to the inquiry the importance of evaluating the conduct of tor participants by reference to their knowledge and by
00:34:24 by reference to their knowledge and by reference to accepted practice at the relevant time even if where appropriate the inquiry deems it necessary also to evaluate such
00:34:35 deems it necessary also to evaluate such practices from today's standpoint the argument which we will be advancing is that acmpe was in widespread use
00:34:46 is that acmpe was in widespread use and was treated as being an acceptable form of rain screen planning moreover it was potentially compliant or at the very least perceived as being compliant with the relevant domestic
00:34:59 compliant with the relevant domestic regulatory regime we suggest that the inquiry can take judicial notice of the fact that the use of combustible materials for the purposes of external wall construction
00:35:12 purposes of external wall construction has been commonplace for many centuries indeed for substantial periods of history timber was probably the only material which could in practical terms be used for this purpose
00:35:25 be used for this purpose moreover the practice of using timber undoubtedly continues to this day and in the course of his evidence in module five professor torreira discussed a four-story building which
00:35:38 discussed a four-story building which might be designed using timber as the structural material he pointed out that the complexity of a timber building is much higher than the complexity of a steel building when it
00:35:50 complexity of a steel building when it comes to fire but he but that he could design both buildings to an equal level of safety as to probability and consequence albeit the designer of a timber building
00:36:03 the designer of a timber building would have to be a top-notch engineer it follows that we should not react with astonishment to the proposition the buildings can be designed using timber or other combustible materials
00:36:16 timber or other combustible materials and that it was not until after the grenfell tower fun that there was any general limitation whereby materials were restricted to those which are either non-combustible
00:36:27 those which are either non-combustible or limited combustibility the inquiry has here been considering in particular an external wall construction involving essentially two layers of combustible
00:36:40 essentially two layers of combustible material
00:36:41 material the inner layer comprising insulation and the outer layer comprising some of some form of rain stream which as the name implies is intended to screen the
00:36:52 name implies is intended to screen the insulation against the effects of incumbent weather it follows that the key component of such a wall construction was the insulation the purpose of which was to maximize energy efficiency the
00:37:05 maximize energy efficiency the importance of which in the current energy crisis is all the more obvious than it has ever been before but for the use of the insulation there would have been no call for any form of
00:37:17 would have been no call for any form of rain screen as to the type of insulation this was discussed by mr evans of the nhbc who explained that at the material time
00:37:28 who explained that at the material time there was a focus on thermal insulation it was he said a big drive of the government as part of the carbon agenda and they wanted ever more thermally efficient
00:37:40 wanted ever more thermally efficient wall makeups builders were finding that the only way that they could achieve this was with insulation which was not material of limited combustibility
00:37:52 limited combustibility similarly in response to a query from sweden
00:37:56 sweden brian martin stated that requirements for thermal insulation put greater pressure on designers to use polymer insulation materials which tended to be lighter and to provide
00:38:09 tended to be lighter and to provide greater insulation value than non-combustible alternative as regards the external rain screen cladding
00:38:17 cladding there is ample evidence that this too was in regular use for many years before the fire
00:38:24 the fire i'll consider later in this section of our submissions the extent to the to which this was facilitated by the then applicable regulatory regime at this point i merely observed
00:38:36 point i merely observed that if acmp was in widespread use it must follow that those charged with the building control function believe that its use was permissible
00:38:48 that its use was permissible it's simply inconceivable that building control officers up and down the country were as weak and as lacking incompetence as with all respect we saw in the case
00:38:59 as with all respect we saw in the case of the rbkc building control function at grenfell tower moreover
00:39:06 moreover as we pointed out in our phase one written closing professor bisbee himself in his phase one report acknowledged that pe materials were known to be
00:39:18 that pe materials were known to be highly combustible something which in his oral evidence in phase one
00:39:23 phase one he also confirmed the use of acmpe was moreover confirmed by mr evans of the nhvc which had a significant involvement in building
00:39:34 significant involvement in building control
00:39:36 control although mr evans claimed to believe that the use of acmp was not permitted by the regulatory regime something that i would address a little later
00:39:45 later he did acknowledge that there was a high number of buildings out there with pe corp something that was in effect confirmed by mr evans colleague john lewis who in
00:39:58 by mr evans colleague john lewis who in his witness statement stated that at the end of 13 he knew anecdotally of projects where nhbc provided warranty or building
00:40:09 where nhbc provided warranty or building control where the external wall arrangement specified a combustible material in buildings which were over 18 meters
00:40:19 meters it is in any event likely that this was the case given the publication by the nhbc in july 2016 of their guidance which improved the use of acm panels on
00:40:31 which improved the use of acm panels on facades providing that such panels were at minimum class b and which provided a class zero spread of flame
00:40:41 of flame it's worth adding incidentally that this guidance also stipulated for reliable cavity barriers around window and door openings to reduce the likelihood of fire entering
00:40:53 reduce the likelihood of fire entering the cavities of these points and likewise such reliable cavity barriers at compartment lines to restrict the unseen spread within the wall buildup
00:41:04 unseen spread within the wall buildup it follows that the aap the archonic bda certificate contains stipulations very similar to those contained in the nhbc guidance
00:41:17 those contained in the nhbc guidance similar evidence emerges from the powerful comments by mr jenkins of booth murray at the siderise bre facade conference in january 2016
00:41:29 conference in january 2016 who stated that in many instances his company was asked to supply standard polyethylene core acm material he added that there were many tall
00:41:40 he added that there were many tall residential buildings recently constructed in the uk where such panels had been installed in combination with various foil-faced rigid foam insulation boards which were
00:41:53 rigid foam insulation boards which were not of limited combustibility the inquiry will be aware that we have submitted from an early stage that the market share of the company which we represent aap
00:42:06 of the company which we represent aap sas
00:42:07 sas was in the uk comparatively small and there's certainly no evidence to the country for present purposes however the point is not that the supply of acmp by
00:42:19 point is not that the supply of acmp by that company was rare but that the supply of acmpe was not
00:42:27 a number of questions were posed by the inquiry to witnesses as to the reasons why combustible materials were in such widespread use
00:42:38 widespread use unsurprisingly perhaps the answer to this question took broadly speaking one of two forms some witnesses questioned the degree of use
00:42:48 use and claimed that they were unaware that the use was so widespread but in the light of the evidence which i've already mentioned this response lacks plausibility
00:42:59 this response lacks plausibility other witnesses claimed that they did not believe that the use of combustible material was in conformity with the contemporary regulatory regime
00:43:10 contemporary regulatory regime again for reasons which i will come to this response lacks plausibility it is of course easy to understand why following the grenfell fire
00:43:22 following the grenfell fire witnesses should wish to distance themselves from matters in this way either to deny that combustible materials were in widespread use or to claim that their use auto being
00:43:34 or to claim that their use auto being concluded could be precluded by the contemporary regime however it seems from a strategic view of the evidence that the grenfell tower fire was not the only reason
00:43:46 was not the only reason why witnesses were incentivized to close their eyes to what was in front of them the true reason is because as awareness of the situation developed
00:43:57 as awareness of the situation developed even before the grandfather no one was willing to face up to the legacy issue namely the problem that all parties were to face in dealing with the
00:44:09 parties were to face in dealing with the legacy of buildings clad with combustible materials if and when it should be decided that that was no longer a safe method of construction to employ
00:44:20 employ and you may recall that um mr metcalfe of the cwct was asked whether it was true that nobody had acknowledged since 2006
00:44:32 acknowledged since 2006 that there had been what uh council called a 10-year legacy of misunderstanding by the uk construction industry with unknown fire with unknown life safety
00:44:45 unknown fire with unknown life safety implications he gave no satisfactory response
00:44:53 now the same kind of analysis can be applied not only to the question of the use of acmp but as to whether it could
00:45:05 use of acmp but as to whether it could have been used in a way which was potentially compliant with the regulatory regime or at least could have been used in a way which was believed by reasonable people in the marketplace to
00:45:17 reasonable people in the marketplace to be usable in that way but this would seem to be the inevitable conclusion from the inec from the examination of witnesses in module six
00:45:28 witnesses in module six the point was often put on the basis of a lack of clarity but it seems to us very clear that there was in fact simply no requirement in relation to the rain
00:45:41 requirement in relation to the rain screen
00:45:41 screen to be of limited combustibility and indeed the approach of your own council has been that the regime permitted the choice of
00:45:52 that the regime permitted the choice of a material by reference to its surface alone rather than its core if this was an approach which could have been taken in good faith by a uk
00:46:03 been taken in good faith by a uk supplier then that must have been all the more true in the case of a non-uk supplier
00:46:10 supplier for the purpose of developing this line of reasoning it seems to us necessary to begin
00:46:16 begin by observing that the evidence has identified a number of different concepts relevant to the assessment of fire performance some but not all of these concepts
00:46:27 some but not all of these concepts are actually listed in the inquiry's own factory for module six as we know and as was emphasized by mr bird
00:46:37 bird the regulatory regime did not involve banning products as such but rather made provisional for the control of use to make sure the products could be used safely to meet the
00:46:50 could be used safely to meet the functional requirements it should of course also be stressed that the ultimate functional requirement was to achieve adequate resistance to
00:47:01 was to achieve adequate resistance to fire
00:47:01 fire and specific requirements such as the linear route to which i'll be making reference were intended to represent methods of potential compliance with the ultimate requirement
00:47:13 ultimate requirement so dealing in turn with two or three relevant concepts and referring first to class zero this is
00:47:22 this is as it happens identified as follows in the inquiries fact sheet it's described as a notional product performance classification for lining
00:47:33 performance classification for lining materials
00:47:35 materials defined in approved document b which can be achieved either by a product being comprised throughout of material of limited combustibility or by meeting certain requirements when tested
00:47:47 meeting certain requirements when tested in accordance with bs 476 and bs false bs476
00:47:54 bs476 part 6 and bs 476 part 7. in our submission some at least of the criticism directed to the use of class 0 as a test
00:48:06 to the use of class 0 as a test has been unfounded being based upon the assumption that the test was intended to apply or could have been applied in a much broader way than was ever realistic
00:48:19 broader way than was ever realistic thus being a test which was at any rate primarily to ascertain the way in which a flame would spread across the surface of a product the test manifestly could not be relied
00:48:30 the test manifestly could not be relied upon
00:48:31 upon in order to reveal wider aspects of fire performance such wider aspects being discussed further below moreover being a test of a product and
00:48:42 moreover being a test of a product and not a system the test by definition could not have enabled a designer to specify a particular product without also considering the system in
00:48:54 without also considering the system in which it was to be deployed we certainly submit that there can be no possible criticism a product manufacturer in seeking to obtain by appropriate
00:49:05 in seeking to obtain by appropriate means a class 0 certification by virtue of the reference to class 0 in paragraph 12.6 of approved document b
00:49:16 in paragraph 12.6 of approved document b national class 0 was one component and only one component of the linear route to compliance a product manufacturer supplying a product with a class 0
00:49:28 product with a class 0 certification would not be confirming and could not be taken to be confirming that the linear route had been satisfied whether the linear route had been satisfied would be a matter for wider
00:49:41 satisfied would be a matter for wider consideration in the context of paragraphs 12.9 12.5 to 12.9 of approved document b taken as a whole
00:49:52 taken as a whole we suggest that in most if not all cases the extent to which a particular facade design would have achieved compliance with the linear route
00:50:03 linear route was necessarily a matter for expert advice and input and the requirement for such advice was obvious simply from a perusal of
00:50:14 was obvious simply from a perusal of those paragraphs no one involved in refurbishment works to which the linear route might apply could properly or legitimately claim to believe that a class zero certification
00:50:27 believe that a class zero certification enabled a product to be used in any particular cladding system irrespective of the other components in the system or the configuration in which they were to be deployed
00:50:38 they were to be deployed the point has repeatedly been made in the course of submissions and evidence that class zero was in itself an inadequate test for the purposes of fully assessing fire performance
00:50:50 fully assessing fire performance a proposition which could perhaps be described as a glimpse of the blindingly obvious
00:50:56 obvious if by reason of the language in approved document b or for any other reason contractors or others involved in building work were relying on class 0 for purposes beyond those to which it
00:51:08 for purposes beyond those to which it was properly intended then that is an approach the fallacy of which simply cannot be laid at the door of an individual product manufacturer let alone one
00:51:19 product manufacturer let alone one operating from overseas plainly the issue is a matter for those involved in the design and implementation of a refurbishment project
00:51:29 project and also for government and other official bodies and individuals involved in the regulatory process the point
00:51:37 the point can be made and has been made in each of these categories individuals manifest the ought to have been aware of the limitations of class 0 as a method of assessment
00:51:49 as a method of assessment and of the extent to which class zero was being relied upon in an inappropriate manner the next concept that i'd like to mention is the notion of a test of
00:52:00 mention is the notion of a test of reaction to fire the inquiry fact sheet lists a number of european reaction to fire tests including the single burning item test
00:52:12 including the single burning item test en13823
00:52:14 en13823 and the single flame source test en1192 it's important to understand that the
00:52:22 that the en13823 test does involve the testing of a product in a particular system
00:52:29 system the fact sheet states that a reaction to fire test
00:52:33 fire test is used to determine the extent to which products and materials contribute to the early stages of a fire before it reaches flashover
00:52:45 flashover it's to be noted that dr smith accepted and testified that the bre and government went forward with the with the retention of class 0 and or class b
00:52:58 the retention of class 0 and or class b knowing
00:52:59 knowing that some class zero products might achieve a european class significantly inferior to class b but would nevertheless be allowed
00:53:11 but would nevertheless be allowed on a uk building above 18 meters it does seem clear that the european reaction to fire tests provide a somewhat sounder basis than
00:53:22 provide a somewhat sounder basis than class 0 for the assessment of the fire performance of cladding materials though necessarily with some limitations in particular it needs to be stressed once again
00:53:33 once again that an individual product manufacturer cannot carry responsibility for the significance attached by the approved document to the outcome of a reaction to fire test
00:53:46 of a reaction to fire test if and to the extent that reliance upon european class b was insufficient as a method of assessment or as a component in the linear route
00:53:57 linear route then the responsibility for this must lie at the door of government or at the door of those involved in any particular project who failed to take sufficient expert advice
00:54:09 expert advice the third concept which deserves consideration in this present context is that of resistance to fire which relates to a later point in time
00:54:21 which relates to a later point in time than the early stages of fire and concerns the extent to which a particular element in the system or indeed the system as a whole will resist the penetration or spread of
00:54:33 will resist the penetration or spread of fun
00:54:34 fun this is of course a highly relevant concept in the context of the functional requirement of the building regulations themselves namely adequate resistance to
00:54:45 themselves namely adequate resistance to fire
00:54:46 fire it seems clear that the preferred method of testing in relation to this issue was full-scale testing pursuant to bs 8414
00:54:57 full-scale testing pursuant to bs 8414 the inquiry will i'm sure well recall that in the company's bba certificate and in many others those using its products were expressly
00:55:09 those using its products were expressly informed
00:55:10 informed that the certificate gave no assurance as regards resistance to fire and that this would have to be the subject of separate tests
00:55:22 the inquiry may take the view that it may have seemed perfectly reasonable for different approaches to be applied to the insulation on one hand and the rain screen cladding whose
00:55:35 hand and the rain screen cladding whose solitary function was to protect externally the insulation on the other there was an explicit requirement for the insulation itself to be of limited
00:55:46 the insulation itself to be of limited combustibility if that requirement was complied with then it would perhaps be understandable if the view were taken that the rain screen cladding need achieved no higher standard than
00:55:58 achieved no higher standard than national class zero it certainly cannot have been an accident
00:56:04 accident but the two approaches as to insulation in paragraph 12.7 and as to the rain screen in paragraphs 12.6 were different mr martin acknowledged that the
00:56:16 mr martin acknowledged that the suggestion that paragraph 12.7 was intended to include all materials in the external wall would leave diagram 40 and paragraph 12.6 as
00:56:30 leave diagram 40 and paragraph 12.6 as empty of content
00:56:34 many of the witnesses of course sought inappropriately to take advantage of
00:56:40 of what they claimed was their understanding of the requirement in paragraph 12.7 of approved document b requiring the insulation to be of limited combustibility
00:56:53 limited combustibility it's submitted nonetheless that all attempts to suggest that paragraph 12.7 applied in any form or in any way to the rainstream cladding were and are doomed
00:57:05 rainstream cladding were and are doomed to failure there was a clear consensus at the cwct meetings in 2014 and 2016 that the reference to filler in
00:57:16 that the reference to filler in paragraph 12.7 could not certainly not without further exegesis be taken to include a reference to the combustible core of a composite product
00:57:29 of a composite product mr martin conceded that his department did not confirm in writing until after the grenfell fire that the words filler material were intended to have that
00:57:40 material were intended to have that application once again the point is reinforced that this awareness of the significance of the word filler could not possibly have been achieved at
00:57:52 could not possibly have been achieved at any material time by an overseas product manufacturer it's worth noting that the question whether the external walls of a building
00:58:03 whether the external walls of a building needed to be fire resisting specifically arose for decision at the latino house inquest as a result of an expert witness called david walker having suggested that this was the case
00:58:16 having suggested that this was the case brian martin you may recall was accordingly called to give definitive evidence
00:58:22 evidence of the official position on this issue which was accepted by the coroner in this connection the transcript of the evidence of mr martin at the landfill house inquest is worthy of close
00:58:34 house inquest is worthy of close attention
00:58:35 attention and we have the the full transcript
00:58:40 see in particular the passage it's on page 35 where mr martin confirms that generally the main surface of a building could be expected
00:58:51 surface of a building could be expected to
00:58:51 to be class zero he goes on to state that class zero is the most restrictive of all the classes the most stringent short of
00:59:02 classes the most stringent short of non-combustible he accepts that class zero was designed to prevent fire on the exterior of a building fire traveling from floor to floor in a way
00:59:14 traveling from floor to floor in a way that makes it difficult to deal with from a fire authority's point of view finally he states that class zero material will burn
00:59:25 that class zero material will burn just not very much none of this seemed controversial at the time certainly not to the various parties
00:59:36 certainly not to the various parties at the inquest some of whom are represented here
00:59:42 here before you to death by contrast the use of combustible insulation was plainly directly contrary to the requirement of adb paragraph 12.7
00:59:55 requirement of adb paragraph 12.7 this meant that anyone proposing combustible insulation but wishing actually to comply with the regulatory regime at the time
01:00:06 regime at the time would have needed to recruit a facade expert
01:00:10 expert or to carry out a full stale full-scale test of the proposed facade under bs-8414
01:00:17 bs-8414 and if this step had been taken and it's a point we've made before if this step had been taken the facade would clearly have been designed and presumably the design implemented in a completely
01:00:30 design implemented in a completely different way from a causative point of view the fact that no one involved in the project insisted on taking expert advice in the face of this manifest breach of
01:00:42 in the face of this manifest breach of the regulatory regime is probably the most significant of all the failures with which the inquiry will be concerned the truth is that for many years
01:00:54 the truth is that for many years policymakers and regulators did not see the use of combustible rain screen panel in general and of acmp in particular as particularly problematic or risky
01:01:06 particularly problematic or risky this is a realization which understandably which was understandably and dramatically enhanced by the grenfell tower fire itself until then the concern in terms of fire
01:01:20 until then the concern in terms of fire performance focused principally on the insulation and the need for that component to be of limited combustibility and white one might mention in this context the fact
01:01:32 context the fact that professor bisby no less in his report dated the 10th of november 2021
01:01:39 2021 at paragraphs 1360 and 1443 expressly acknowledges his own failure to highlight prior to the grenfell fire
01:01:50 to highlight prior to the grenfell fire any potential problem with the way in which the regulatory regime handled the supply of the acm product to the extent that policymakers and
01:02:01 to the extent that policymakers and regulators did consider other and wider factors apart from the insulation the better view was deemed to be that alongside the nature of the insulation it was necessary to take a
01:02:14 insulation it was necessary to take a holistic view of the combination of materials and of the way in which they were configured in the cladding system as a whole dr raymond connolly
01:02:25 dr raymond connolly in his 1994 report investigation of the behavior of external cutting systems in fire report 10
01:02:34 report 10 after defining the term fire hazard stated as follows in assessing the fire hazard it was found that the design detailing and
01:02:45 found that the design detailing and construction of the complete cladding system
01:02:48 system is more important than the reaction to fire properties of the individual materials involved consequently it is suggested that the fire hazard be determined by
01:03:00 that the fire hazard be determined by testing the complete cladding system as in practice given dr connolly's reputation and standing it's also worth emphasizing
01:03:11 standing it's also worth emphasizing that in 2015 he felt able to provide advice for building control purposes approving the use of acm pe in connection with the apex building in
01:03:23 in connection with the apex building in england
01:03:24 england although the proposal was not approved by the nhbc it was ultimately approved for building control purposes by the london borough of eu according to the nhb witness dr john
01:03:36 according to the nhb witness dr john according to the nhb witness john lewis dr connolly provided a long and detailed report concluding that the cladding did not pose a risk
01:03:47 not pose a risk moreover in his statement to the inquiry dr connolly confirmed his agreement with the house of commons committee that a full-scale fire test should be required
01:03:59 full-scale fire test should be required as the sole measure for demonstrating compliance with part b form but importantly he also stated and this is a says in his statement to
01:04:10 and this is a says in his statement to the inquiry as recently as last december that the wholesale prohibition of combustible planning was not required now i move if i may
01:04:22 now i move if i may to make some brief comments under my second heading before moving to my third and final heading my second heading you'll recall concerned
01:04:32 concerned um the supply of acm pe by
01:04:37 pe by um
01:04:38 um archonic aap sas the company which we represent
01:04:43 represent it is of course for the purpose of this aspect of the closing all the more important to stress to the inquiry
01:04:52 inquiry that this company should be judged not with hindsight but on the basis of what they knew or ought to have been ought to have known at the time thus for example a topic to which
01:05:03 a topic to which we refer briefly in this closing concerns previous fires particularly overseas whether in france or in other jurisdictions such as the
01:05:14 or in other jurisdictions such as the middle east or australia the present position is that the inquiry has seen relatively little fully detailed analysis of the facade build-up or of the actual causes
01:05:26 or of the actual causes of
01:05:27 of overseas fires and the point is now reinforced by the evidence in module 6 that there was a widespread failure possibly in some instances
01:05:39 possibly in some instances deliberate or so it's been alleged on the part of those in the know including those in government and indeed those having professional expertise to make known to the public at large
01:05:51 to make known to the public at large including the construction industry generally the full facts which their experimentation and expertise were undoubtedly bringing to light one might add that not only
01:06:03 one might add that not only did this company lack much of the information now disclosed to the inquiry but it's also the case that unlike some of the other suppliers they made no attempt to bring about pressure
01:06:16 attempt to bring about pressure on
01:06:17 on uk regulators or others to encourage an interpretation of the regulatory regime which was favorable to them we do recognize that it's been suggested
01:06:30 we do recognize that it's been suggested by though
01:06:31 by though that it's been suggested that those in the industry should have been put on notice by recent overseas fires of the issues which arose at grenfell
01:06:42 issues which arose at grenfell however it is perhaps easy to be misled as to the potential relevance or impact of these overseas farmers
01:06:50 farmers in the first place so far as the evidence goes their wider impact was to some degree limited in that the market may have been persuaded that if a severe
01:07:01 may have been persuaded that if a severe fire took place at height this could have been due to a variety of causes and that one could not simply assume that inapt materials were utilized
01:07:13 inapt materials were utilized secondly and in any event it seems at least as likely that the history of overseas fires was on balance reassured
01:07:22 reassured in that the very limited loss of life was perceived as confirming the adequacy of regulatory regime a product
01:07:32 a product manufacturer especially in another jurisdiction cannot be taken to have known of the domestic stay put policy with its attendant implications for life safety
01:07:46 attendant implications for life safety of course we acknowledged that views such as those i've been discussing have now been severely criticized as manifesting undue complacency but the
01:07:57 manifesting undue complacency but the evidence is nonetheless clear that these were views widely held at the time
01:08:04 now i want to go on to my third and final heading the supply and use of acmpe and other products at grenfell tower
01:08:16 this is not the place obviously to rehearse fully the submissions we made in our module 2 closes written
01:08:25 but since module 6 is concerned with testing and certification there are
01:08:31 there are some points in relation to testing and certification of the products used at grenfell tower to which we wish to refer we acknowledge that the inquiry has scrutinized closely
01:08:44 that the inquiry has scrutinized closely the tests carried out on behalf of this company aap and we emphasize that these tests were undertaken by an authoritative testing body in france
01:08:57 authoritative testing body in france namely the cstb we remind you that the bba certificate was a product certificate relating to an acm panel
01:09:09 acm panel and in common with other bva certificates did not distinguish between the performance which might be achieved once the panel had been fabricated whether
01:09:20 the panel had been fabricated whether for fixing by rivets or as a cassette in my oral submissions to you on the 14th of september 2021
01:09:31 to you on the 14th of september 2021 i made the point that two or more en
01:09:36 en european classification reports can coexist
01:09:40 coexist in relation to the same product at the same time
01:09:43 same time each report shows the classification which the tested product was capable of achieving
01:09:51 achieving in the tested system one such report in 2011 showed a b classification for the product when fabricated as rude
01:10:02 product when fabricated as rude and uh it expressly that that report expressly shows that it remains that it remained valid until 2016. later on the same day in the course of
01:10:15 later on the same day in the course of his oral closing on behalf of celetex their council claimed that arconic had cancelled the class b certifications that it had previously obtained for reynabon pe and that there
01:10:28 obtained for reynabon pe and that there was therefore no plant speed classification in existence at the time that rayna bond was sold for use at grenfell tower in our module six written closing as i'm
01:10:40 in our module six written closing as i'm sure you've seen we have responded in detail to this allegation and shown that there was in fact
01:10:47 fact a valid class b certificate for the riveted version granted in 2011 and therefore still valid in 2016. the further criticism has been
01:11:00 the further criticism has been the failure of the company to report to the bba the outcome of the cassette testing in 2005 without reiterating the full content of
01:11:11 without reiterating the full content of our previous submissions on this topic we would remind the inquiry of the central point that the bba certificate could not and did not claim that the product in
01:11:22 did not claim that the product in question
01:11:23 question namely the acmpe panel would achieve an enb result in any and every system and in any and every configuration
01:11:34 every configuration we have repeatedly pointed out that approved document b itself makes this very point in appendix a in the following terms in something called note 2
01:11:46 in something called note 2 any test evidence used to substantiate the fire resistance rating of a construction should be carefully checked to ensure
01:11:56 to ensure that it demonstrates compliance that it's adequate and applicable to the intended use small differences in detail such as the fixing method
01:12:08 such as the fixing method joints dimensions and the introduction of insulation material etc may significantly affect the rating that is an explicit requirement
01:12:21 that is an explicit requirement of the
01:12:22 of the whole scheme with which we are dealing
01:12:28 and i just like to add um on a separate matter reference to the steps taken by the company from early 2014 onwards to make clear to the market
01:12:40 2014 onwards to make clear to the market the wider testing picture particularly with regard to cassette uh we deal with that in our module two written closing particularly at paragraphs 144-152
01:12:55 um now i'm moving um towards the conclusion of these submissions but i have
01:13:01 have a few further points to make there is a further argument arising
01:13:08 arising dealt with in greater detail in our written closing arising from the testing carried out or perhaps rather not carried out in the
01:13:20 perhaps rather not carried out in the course of the preparations for the refurbishment of grenfell tower we repeat that a failure to undertake a holistic fire assessment was of
01:13:31 a holistic fire assessment was of crucial
01:13:32 crucial causative significance there is however a narrower but also powerful point relating to the whole to the role of harley
01:13:44 of harley who purchased the acmpe from the fabricators cep and who were responsible for the way in which it was installed from their submissions to the inquiry it
01:13:55 from their submissions to the inquiry it would seem that hardly regard perusal of the class zero certification on the front page of the bba certificate as representing
01:14:08 of the bba certificate as representing a fulfillment of their responsibilities
01:14:13 nothing could be further of course from the truth not least because of their manifest obligation to consider the bba certificate in its entirety in addition disclosure by the inquiry
01:14:26 in addition disclosure by the inquiry mainly i think after the end of module two has revealed that harley knew or ought to have known a great deal about the performance in practice of acnpe and about the
01:14:37 practice of acnpe and about the conditions under which it would perform they among others or clearly to have taken into account this information in deciding on the suitability of acmpe
01:14:48 in deciding on the suitability of acmpe as opposed to a fire retardant alternative in the context of grenfell tower or the need at any rate to seek holistic fire engineering advice
01:15:01 fire engineering advice and i mentioned in that context the evidence of mister sakhila on the 5th of may 2021 who made clear that there was a duty on those involved in
01:15:13 there was a duty on those involved in construction work to consider the nature of the materials specified irrespective of any warnings which might or might not be given by suppliers and indeed where appropriate to make specific inquiries
01:15:26 appropriate to make specific inquiries of the suppliers if there was any doubt about the suitability of particular materials
01:15:34 materials now
01:15:35 now i want to deal with an argument strongly advanced on behalf of kingspan insulation who
01:15:43 who in this module but based on the module 7 evidence assert that the use of combustible insulation had no causative significance at
01:15:55 had no causative significance at grenfell tower for this striking proposition they rely upon the experiments by professor bisbee and professor torreira this argument is one to which it may of
01:16:07 this argument is one to which it may of course be necessary to return in the context of submissions about module 7
01:16:13 module 7 but it is appropriate in this presentation to make the point that the argument is wholly flawed for a separate and independent reason
01:16:24 independent reason i've already stressed the fundamental point
01:16:27 point that the use of combustible insulation at grenfell tower being inconsistent with the linear route to compliance and with the clear regulatory stipulation in adb paragraph 12.7
01:16:40 stipulation in adb paragraph 12.7 ought to have led those concerned with the refurbishment project to carry out some form of holistic fire engineering assessment or to commission such an
01:16:52 assessment or to commission such an assessment from those with suitable expertise
01:16:55 expertise if that had been done it's clear that the combination of materials used at grenfell tower would never have been approved and the tragedy would never have occurred
01:17:07 have occurred however the argument advanced on behalf of kingspan overlooks the fact that the conduct of kingspan and of celetex as the suppliers of the
01:17:19 celetex as the suppliers of the insulation was a critical element in the failure of all those concerned to carry out that necessary holistic assessment
01:17:30 assessment as was bar wise pointed out in section 6 of her module 2 written closing kingspan and celechex both made representation
01:17:41 representation to the effect that their product was suitable for use above 18 meters and thereby expressly or by implication gave reassurance that paragraph 12.7 was satisfied
01:17:55 that paragraph 12.7 was satisfied seeking successfully as it transpired to give a green light to others as to the appropriate use of such products
01:18:04 products via the linear route without holistic testing testing or assessment now i want to make just a few further brief comments
01:18:16 just a few further brief comments um
01:18:17 um arising um primarily from steps taken in relation to testing after the fire and related matters
01:18:28 after the fire and related matters regrettably as we respectfully submit following the fire the focus throughout has been on the acmpe panels supplied by this company
01:18:39 acmpe panels supplied by this company though the majority of those panels as we have previously sought to stress albeit
01:18:48 albeit supplied by a aap were fabricated and utilized in ways that could not possibly have been foreseen by them for example on the
01:18:59 foreseen by them for example on the crown and on the columns testing was then carried out by the bre which itself was of unproven around iran ability and in configurations which more
01:19:10 ability and in configurations which more little resemblance to the tower we also consent contend with great respect that perhaps too little emphasis in phase two has been placed so far
01:19:22 in phase two has been placed so far on the fact that at least as regards the start of the fire in the cladding system there were many other causes equally or more potent than the acmpe
01:19:34 equally or more potent than the acmpe panel
01:19:35 panel of these among the most significant as we submit were the failure to introduce suitable non-combustible barriers around the windows and indeed
01:19:46 barriers around the windows and indeed in the cavity itself which at the very least would potentially have delayed the onset
01:19:53 the onset and spread of the fire with consequent and spread of the tadding fire with consequential advantages in terms of success of the intervention
01:20:04 success of the intervention by the london fire brigade equally significant at a later stage were the failures of compartmentation both internal and external
01:20:15 both internal and external which led to the fire re-entering and spreading internally to a far greater extent than in any of the overseas or indeed domestic examples of previous fires
01:20:27 previous fires what happened at grenfell was truly a perfect storm in which the acm pe panels were but one component
01:20:36 component of the maelstrom
01:20:39 we urge the inquiry to continue to take an objective view of all these matters and not to allow itself as unfortunately mr martin
01:20:50 as unfortunately mr martin at one point did to limit its focus to the role of the acn suggesting as he did that if one were to immediate
01:21:00 immediate remediate building defects more widely the population of the united kingdom would be living in tents something that he said in an email that you've seen
01:21:12 you've seen nor we are confident will the inquiry follow the advice of whichever nameless nameless official it was and again quoted in an email that you've
01:21:24 and again quoted in an email that you've seen who commented that the loss of a particular company involved in the grenfell tower refurbishment would not be severe
01:21:35 be severe so that concludes my oral presentation and i'm grateful to you and your colleagues for your patients well thank you very much mr hochman uh for delivering those remarks and for
01:21:46 for delivering those remarks and for delivering them so clearly and i'm sorry you weren't able to be here in person but
01:21:51 but you haven't uh lost out in any way as a result so thank you very much now we are due to take our morning break uh at half fast eleven you finish
01:22:02 uh at half fast eleven you finish slightly ahead of time for which we're grateful
01:22:04 grateful uh what we'll do therefore is to break now we'll resume at 20 to 12 if the next speaker who is going to be mr green queen's council on behalf of
01:22:16 mr green queen's council on behalf of kingspan
01:22:17 kingspan is available five minutes earlier than scheduled if he's not available until 1145 then we'll resume then thank you very much
01:39:57 the next statement we're going to hear will be made by mr tim green queen's council
01:40:02 council on behalf of kingspan mr green is going to make it remotely and i'm very pleased to say that i can see you mr green can you see me or us i can see you sir um
01:40:13 you see me or us i can see you sir um are you able to hear me sir yes we are thank you very much indeed so um thank you for making yourself available a little earlier than scheduled that's very helpful and we're ready to hear your statement if you'd like to carry on
01:40:25 your statement if you'd like to carry on thank you very much sir mr chairman mr sesta found mr agbor these submissions focus on two aspects of the inquiry's stated objectives for module six
01:40:37 objectives for module six namely examining the functional requirements of the building regulations and considering the government's handling of issues raised in relation to fire safety kingspan insulation sincerely hopes that
01:40:49 kingspan insulation sincerely hopes that this enquires examination of these important issues will help to bring about real improvements in the regulatory regime going forward the grenfell tower fire was a tragedy
01:41:01 the grenfell tower fire was a tragedy that should never have happened and it is vital that the necessary reforms are now made to the regulatory regime so that there is no possibility of such unsafe cladding systems being
01:41:12 of such unsafe cladding systems being constructed in the future these submissions divide then into six parts firstly some important initial points of context secondly i'll highlight just one of the many failures on the part of the
01:41:23 many failures on the part of the government namely the failure to act on the information it held about the risks posed by pe cord acm thirdly the danger is still posed today by the regulatory regime in relation to
01:41:34 by the regulatory regime in relation to the linear route to compliance fourth the position of kingspan insulation for relation to certain assertions advanced during module six fifthly the importance of reviewing the
01:41:45 fifthly the importance of reviewing the module six evidence in the light of the expert evidence now provided
01:41:50 provided and lastly a few words by way of conclusion some initial points of context then please
01:41:56 please given that witnesses were questioned in module six about kingspan insulation kingspan insulation k15 product it is right that i start by reiterating certain points
01:42:09 certain points kingspan insulation had no direct involvement in the refurbishment of grenfell tower it played no role in the design or installation of the cladding system it provided no advice or technical
01:42:20 it provided no advice or technical guides to those responsible for the design of the refurbishment or its insulation it had no contractual relationship with the council or the tmi or any of the designers were any of the contractors
01:42:32 designers were any of the contractors engaged in refurbishment it did not provide any products directly to those involved in the refurbishment it was not informed that its k-15 phenolic insulation product was being
01:42:44 phenolic insulation product was being used on the tower at the time of the refurbishment and it was not aware that k-15 had been used on the tower until after the fire in total only about five percent of the
01:42:55 in total only about five percent of the rain screen insulation purchased for use on grateful tower was k-15
01:43:01 the second introductory point that i would ask the inquiry to keep in mind is that it is now clear beyond any doubt that the nature and speed of the spread
01:43:13 that the nature and speed of the spread of the grenfell tower fire was caused by the presence of a conic's rhinobond pe called acm cladding last week the inquiry heard the evidence
01:43:25 last week the inquiry heard the evidence of the experts professor bisbee and torreira
01:43:28 torreira their evidence was absolutely clear on this issue professor bisbee explained that one of the reasons why pe called acm cladding was in his words so dangerous
01:43:41 was in his words so dangerous is because of its very volatile behavior his conclusion was simple don't use it don't use pe chord acm
01:43:52 don't use pe chord acm whether in cassette form or riveted or otherwise
01:43:56 otherwise why not
01:43:57 why not again the answer is very simple in his words it has a core of polyethylene unmodified polyethylene that will burn a lot
01:44:08 a lot it has the potential to cause in his words a very big fire one year ago in king's spanish relations closing submissions for module two on the 28th of june
01:44:19 the 28th of june we said this any ranged insulation including non-combustible insulation will play some part in the clouding fire not least because its insulating properties act to
01:44:30 because its insulating properties act to retain heat from combustion of the cladding system on the basis of the extensive modeling carried out by effectus we also said this at paragraph 12 of those submissions
01:44:42 those submissions the nature and speed of the spread of the fire across the exterior of the tower was a result of the pe called acm cladding
01:44:50 cladding and would not have been materially different if non-combustible insulation had been used last week professor bisbee reported on his experiments those experiments confirmed the points
01:45:01 those experiments confirmed the points we made a year ago it is the capacity of insulation to retain heat which is relevant in cladding fires involving pa called
01:45:12 in cladding fires involving pa called acn
01:45:13 acn and not whether that insulation is combustible or non-combustible and professor bismu's experience also showed that the speed and spread of the fire
01:45:24 fire over the pe called acm cladding was materially the same whether that cladding was combined with combustible insulation or non-combustible insulation
01:45:35 professor bismu's conclusions are entirely consistent with the peer-reviewed published papers by effectus
01:45:42 effectus any rain screen cladding product sold for use in the uk must take into account the reality that it will be used in conjunction with insulation given the need underpinned by regulatory requirements
01:45:54 regulatory requirements for effective insulation on buildings this means that the cladding must be designed to be capable of withstanding the heat that is inevitably retained in the system by insulation in the event of
01:46:05 the system by insulation in the event of a fire
01:46:07 a fire it is clear that our conics pe called acm cladding was not safe for use in the rain clean in a rain screen cladding system
01:46:14 system with either combustible or non-combustible insulation from a regulatory perspective there are significant questions as to a how and why the regulatory regime failed to
01:46:25 why the regulatory regime failed to prevent pa call be called acm from being marketed as suitable for use given that it was so dangerous and how and why the regulatory regime failed to prevent pe called acm from
01:46:37 failed to prevent pe called acm from being used on grenfell tower those to now submission are key questions
01:46:43 questions which need to be answered as part of this module 6 analysis
01:46:48 secondly the failure of the government to act on the information it held about the risks posed by pe cord acn the starting the starting point for this analysis is the remarkable fact that
01:46:59 analysis is the remarkable fact that large-scale testing undertaken by the bre for the government in 2001 had shown that p called acm was unsafe when used in combination with non-combustible
01:47:10 in combination with non-combustible insulation dr cowell's evidence was that she was shocked by the 2001 pe acm test which failed in her words extremely rapidly she was she said shocked at the
01:47:22 rapidly she was she said shocked at the speed it took off
01:47:26 the test had to be manually terminated very early at 5 minutes and 45 seconds because it was such a significant fire this was notwithstanding the fact that pe acm tested had achieved class zero
01:47:39 pe acm tested had achieved class zero certification in light of that test dr cowell concluded that pe cord acm was not an appropriate product for use for external cladding of high-rise buildings
01:47:51 cladding of high-rise buildings those government tests demonstrated precisely the failure mechanism which later resulted in the grenfell tower fire namely the failure of the aluminium skin
01:48:02 namely the failure of the aluminium skin exposing the polyethylene core which then burned professor bisby said that he was left speechless when he learned these government tests carried out in 2001 a
01:48:13 government tests carried out in 2001 a report in 2002 prior to the grenfell tower fire there was very little if any information available in the public domain about any large-scale testing involving
01:48:24 about any large-scale testing involving pe called acm but it is now clear that the government was in possession of such information and for whatever reason it was not published and not acted upon
01:48:37 published and not acted upon in 2017 following the grenfell tower fire the government carried out large-scale testing two systems comprising pe called acm with combustor pir insulation and non-combustible mineral fiber insulation
01:48:50 mineral fiber insulation the conclusion of the independent expert panel following those tests was this acm cladding with unmodified polyethylene filler prevents a
01:49:01 polyethylene filler prevents a significant fire hazard on residential buildings at any height with any form of insulation what is so shocking is that precisely the same conclusion could and should
01:49:12 the same conclusion could and should have been drawn by the government 15 years earlier when it received the 2002 bre report in respect to the 2001 pe cord acm test the regulatory regime could and should
01:49:25 the regulatory regime could and should have been amended at that stage to prevent the use of such pe called acm cladding on tool buildings the 2001 test of a system using pe cord
01:49:36 the 2001 test of a system using pe cord acm was never published by the government a paragraph 47 of its written closings the department for leveling up housing communities accepts that research commission and funded by public monies
01:49:47 commission and funded by public monies should be published it expresses regret that the report of the 2001 test was not published describes this as an oversight
01:49:58 describes this as an oversight in the event no action whatsoever seems to be taken in light of the 2001 test commissioned by the government it is one of a number of issues of key importance that appears to have been missed by officials acting for the department
01:50:11 officials acting for the department leaving aside the failings of individuals for a moment what does this tell us about the regulatory regime how and why were steps not taken at any stage between 2002
01:50:22 stage between 2002 and 2015 to ensure that the regulatory regime precluded the use pe called acm cladding in light of the knowledge acquired by the government from its own tests
01:50:34 the government from its own tests the obvious answer is that the system in place failed to even recognize the importance of the test data held by the government or the importance of the multiple other reports
01:50:44 reports of concerns about pe called acm part of the reason for this failure is that no emphasis was placed by the regulatory regime or by the relevant government department
01:50:56 government department on the need for test states to be collated and shared transparently even in respect of the data held by the government another part of the reason for the failure may have been over reliance by the government on individual product
01:51:08 the government on individual product testing
01:51:09 testing rather than a proper appreciation of the value of large-scale system testing nor was there any real appreciation of the need to amend adb
01:51:21 the need to amend adb to deal with the risks so clearly imposed
01:51:24 imposed by pe called acm the written closing submissions of the department of leveling up housing and communities accept as they must a series of crucial failings on their
01:51:35 a series of crucial failings on their behalf
01:51:36 behalf including the failure to recognize the extent of the risk posed by pe called acm despite multiple warnings over a period of years the department also states that it
01:51:47 the department also states that it deeply regrets that the gravity of the risk posed by pe called acm cladding was not appreciated even when this was expressly raised in the cwct meeting on the 2nd of july
01:52:01 the cwct meeting on the 2nd of july see paragraph 97 of the department submissions
01:52:06 in addition the department also accepts that it failed to keep adb up to date or address known ambiguities including the term filler in paragraph twelve seven
01:52:17 term filler in paragraph twelve seven there are multiple lessons to be learned here as the government recognizes apart from anything else there needs to be a reliable system with a collation and sharing of large-scale test data on which the
01:52:29 large-scale test data on which the government the regulatory authorities and appropriately qualified professionals can rely
01:52:36 can rely thirdly the danger is still posed today by the regulatory regime in malaysia in relation to the linear routes to compliance the government's failings in respect to
01:52:47 the government's failings in respect to the regulatory regime do not end with past mistakes in respect to pe call acm the linear route to compliance provided by approved document b was flawed back in 2015
01:52:58 in 2015 and we submit remains flawed today in 2015 the linear route was based on small-scale testing of individual products
01:53:07 products it did not expressly require any consideration to be given as to how products will perform when used together in a system that same fundamental weakness in respect to the linear route to
01:53:19 respect to the linear route to compliance remains today it is still possible for a cladding system to be deemed to comply with the linear route based on small scale testing of individual components when in
01:53:30 testing of individual components when in fact the system would fail a large scale bs 8414 test this is a point which has now been made by professor bisbee at paragraph 326 of his report on desktops and on desktop
01:53:42 his report on desktops and on desktop studies
01:53:44 studies he says this that it is conceivable that an external wall arrangement that abides by the recommendation of adb's linear route might even fail to
01:53:55 of adb's linear route might even fail to meet the requirements of br135 if tested to bs8414 professor torreira made a related point very simply when he said
01:54:06 very simply when he said so you can have a perfectly non-combustible material that is an extreme hazard because it deforms and breaks apart very rapidly as the inquiry knows there are
01:54:18 as the inquiry knows there are documented examples of a one and a2 systems failing when tested to bs 8414 kingspan insulation has provided the inquiry with five systems which have
01:54:30 inquiry with five systems which have failed to meet br135 criteria when tested to bs 8414 even though they would have been permitted under the linear route because they comprise only a1 non-combustible and a2 insulation and
01:54:43 a1 non-combustible and a2 insulation and cladding products those examples are set out to paragraph 145 of our written closing submissions in phase two to module two it's not clear to us whether professors
01:54:54 it's not clear to us whether professors blissful and terrible have been provided with copies of those five system tests but they do illustrate very clearly the point that they are now making and the point that king spanish elation has been making
01:55:05 making for many years king's financial nation witnesses were heavily criticized during the course of module two for the fact that kingspan insulation had drawn the parliamentary select committee's attention to this point
01:55:17 committee's attention to this point in 2018
01:55:20 in 2018 the validity of the point kingsman insulation was making is now clearly accepted by professors bisbee and torreira
01:55:27 torreira and it's hoped its importance will now be accepted by the inquiry it remains unclear to king's spanish elation whether the inquiry has sought disclosure from the bre or other test houses as to whether they hold test data
01:55:40 houses as to whether they hold test data related to other large-scale tests of systems comprising a1 or a2 insulation and cladding which would be deemed to comply with the linear route but which have failed when tested to bs 8414
01:55:51 have failed when tested to bs 8414 we do however invite the inquiry to try to collate information relating to any such tests from test houses and make any such data publicly available
01:56:01 available the failure of the government to publish the bre's 2001 pe called acm test was a very significant mistake and it hoped the inquiry will now play an important role in ensuring that test
01:56:12 an important role in ensuring that test data relevant to systems comprising a1 and a2 insulation and cladding and the linear routes compliance are now made publicly available such data are likely to assist informed
01:56:24 such data are likely to assist informed decision-making in respect to the risks inherent in the linear routes to compliance the inquiry has now seen that brian martin accepted in emails back in 2013
01:56:36 martin accepted in emails back in 2013 that he never expected the linear route to result in a system that would always pass the
01:56:42 pass the br135 criteria professor bisbee explains the paragraph 333 of his desktop assessment report that he believes that it is self-evident
01:56:54 that he believes that it is self-evident that a system which complies with the linear route could still fail to meet the requirements of br135 classification when tested to bs 8414
01:57:05 when tested to bs 8414 he observes that the liney route has the potential to mislead incompetent designers into thinking that they have met requirement b4 of the building regulations in contrast dr cowell of the bre
01:57:18 in contrast dr cowell of the bre considered it in her words an extraordinary proposition to suggest that a system which complied with the linear route might not be expected to pass the r135 criteria
01:57:30 expected to pass the r135 criteria a regulatory system is clearly not fit for purpose if its unstated assumptions are not cleared even highly specialist and competent professionals such as dr cowwell with years of
01:57:42 such as dr cowwell with years of relevant experience just as the government knew that pe called atm systems were dangerous back in 2002 and did nothing about that fact so it is clear that the government now knows that the linear routes compliance
01:57:54 knows that the linear routes compliance is not fit for purpose the government's reaction to the grenfell tower fire was to ban the use of combustible products over 18 meters that decision was taken without the
01:58:06 that decision was taken without the benefit of the expert evidence now obtained by this inquiry and without a full understanding of the unintended consequences
01:58:16 these issues are not simple the evidence of professors bisbee and terrero demonstrates the complexities of cladding systems as both professor bisbee and torreira have made clear
01:58:27 have made clear batting systems must not be looked at as merely a collection of independent products with assumptions being made as to how they will perform together simple intuitive assumptions like
01:58:39 simple intuitive assumptions like combustible products must be unsafe and non-combustible must be safe do not
01:58:46 do not work professor bisbee explained at paragraph 17 of his phase 2 experiments work package 2 that in his words the experiments presented in this report have
01:58:57 presented in this report have highlighted the immense complexity of the heat transfer environment within a ventilated range screen cladding cavity this suggests that an intuitive understanding of the factors that govern
01:59:08 understanding of the factors that govern fire initiation growth and spread in such situations can very easily lead to false or incorrect assertions
01:59:19 assertions the fact that these issues are not intuitive make intuitive matters reinforces the need for a truly scientific approach to be taken to the safety of planning systems
01:59:30 taken to the safety of planning systems as professor torreira has correctly stated banning combustible materials will not solve the problem that merely provides a false sense of security
01:59:40 security professor torreira described in an ideal system where material properties were measured and used by competent professionals to model facile performance in the context of a chosen fire safety strategy
01:59:52 fire safety strategy it espoused the use of large-scale system testing for example testing to bs8414
01:59:58 bs8414 to provide additional data and model validation as part of this process kingspan insulation agrees with this approach
02:00:09 approach it is clear from the evidence heard by this inquiry the bs8414 testing has not been perfect in the past but the fact that the bs 8414 test is not perfect does not mean that
02:00:20 not perfect does not mean that large-scale system testing should be abandoned
02:00:23 abandoned rather the focus should be on improving the testing to ensure that it captures more data which can then be used to greater effect it is submitted that proper use of
02:00:34 it is submitted that proper use of computational fluid dynamics or cfd for short should be used part should be part of the modeling approach professor terrero recognizes the advantages of cfd modelling
02:00:46 advantages of cfd modelling albeit that it must be undertaken by very competent professionals improvements such as scrutiny of the testing process by regulators will also help to prevent abuse the system
02:01:00 fourthly the position of kingspan insulation in relation to certain assertions advanced in module six king spain insulation has accepted that there have been short comings in the
02:01:11 there have been short comings in the past
02:01:12 past in respect to the testing and certification of its k-15 insulation it has identified those shortcomings and apologized for them in its module 2 opening and closing
02:01:24 in its module 2 opening and closing statements issues concerning the testing and certification of k15 were explored again in module 6 for the purpose of considering the failings on the part of others who were involved in the relevant
02:01:36 others who were involved in the relevant testing and certification processes including the bre labc
02:01:42 labc the nhvc and the bba some of the questions put to witnesses from those organizations have sought to suggest that kingspan insulation may somehow have placed improper pressure on
02:01:55 somehow have placed improper pressure on or had some form of improper dealings with
02:01:58 with those independent bodies such allegations were denied on multiple occasions by various witnesses from those organizations kingspan insulation position on these
02:02:10 kingspan insulation position on these allegations is very clear at no time did it have any improper dealings with any of these bodies within respect of testing certification
02:02:21 certification guidance notes or otherwise
02:02:26 it's worth saying a word about a carconics current position it's clear from their written and their oral submissions today that even now they do not accept they were at fault for selling a cladding
02:02:37 were at fault for selling a cladding product which was so very dangerous we note that a paragraph 76 of their written submissions is suggested yet again that k-15 manufactured after 2005
02:02:49 again that k-15 manufactured after 2005 was somehow more flammable than the k-15 that was tested in 2005. as we have repeatedly said that assertion is not based on any scientific evidence and it is not true
02:03:03 scientific evidence and it is not true the allegation appears to rely largely on the december 2007 test of a sotex system which failed with k-15 but that same system failed in january 2008 with non-combustible mineral fiber
02:03:17 2008 with non-combustible mineral fiber these two tests must be seen together the phase were due to the thermo-mechanical properties of the a1 aluminium cassette cladding system rather than the type of insulation
02:03:30 rather than the type of insulation the 2008 test is one of the five examples that kingspan insulation has provided of a system which would comply with the linear route but nevertheless fails when subjected to
02:03:42 but nevertheless fails when subjected to a large scale test
02:03:46 in their oral closing submissions on monday the bsr team one suggested again that kingspan insulation was somehow responsible for the use of any and all
02:03:57 responsible for the use of any and all combustible materials at height this apparently stems from k-15 being the first combustible insulation to be part of a system that passed a bs-8414
02:04:08 part of a system that passed a bs-8414 test
02:04:10 test this assertion is without merit kingspan insulation has never promoted the use of combustible materials generally
02:04:20 generally it promoted its own k15 insulation following a bs 8414 test in 2005 of a cladding system which incorporated k15
02:04:31 incorporated k15 and there have been 14 other cladding systems incorporating the type of k15 used on grenfell tower which have passed the
02:04:41 the s-8414 test since kingspan insulation is not responsible for the different products produced by other manufacturers
02:04:52 other manufacturers it was also suggested on monday that king's van insulation had lobbied for the widening of tgn 18 by the bca there was no evidence cited for this assertion
02:05:03 assertion it is an assertion which is incorrect and wholly unsupported by any evidence in addition there was an allegation on monday that mr nick jenkins had somehow assisted kingsman insulation to
02:05:14 assisted kingsman insulation to manipulate the outcome of a building safety program test this is completely incorrect there was no manipulation of this program by either kingsman insulation or
02:05:27 program by either kingsman insulation or mr jenkins
02:05:30 firstly the importance of reviewing the module 6 evidence in light of the expert evidence now provided kingspan insulation has set out in its written submissions the issues which it considers ought to have been subject to
02:05:41 considers ought to have been subject to greater scrutiny in module 6. these include the extent of the problems which still remain in respect to the regulatory regime and the potential dangers still posed by the linear route to compliance
02:05:53 to compliance however it is submitted that the service of the latest expert evidence of professors torreira and bisbee has been a watershed moment in this inquiry
02:06:04 those reports drill down into many of the critical issues concerning both the true causes of the speed and spread of the grenfell tower fire as well as the weaknesses past and
02:06:17 as well as the weaknesses past and present of the regulatory regime we would invite the panel to revisit the phase two evidence particularly the module six evidence in the light of the crucially important
02:06:28 in the light of the crucially important evidence now given by these two experts back including remarks
02:06:36 ultimately our conic must be their responsibility for the fact that its roanoke bond pe called acm product was unsafe
02:06:44 unsafe and unfit for use as range screen cladding in combination with either combustible or non-combustible insulation however the government must also bear
02:06:55 however the government must also bear its share responsibility the government knew about the dangers posed by pe called acm cladding since at least 2002 and did nothing to prevent its use
02:07:05 its use the objective of the regulatory regime is to achieve safe buildings the regulatory system should have prevented the use of unsafe pe called acm
02:07:18 pe called acm not permitting it under the linear route without any large-scale testing it is apparent that the regulatory regime was unfit for purpose at the time of the grenfell tower refurbishment in
02:07:30 of the grenfell tower refurbishment in 2015
02:07:32 2015 kingspan insulation's position is that it still remains unfit for purpose today the linear route to compliance is not the way forward nor are inappropriate blanket bans
02:07:44 nor are inappropriate blanket bans rather the regulatory regime must be founded on a properly scientific approach
02:07:49 approach so so as to ensure that only safe cladding systems are built in the future only those proper competence should be responsible for assessing the safety of individual designs
02:08:02 individual designs the evidence of professors torreira and bisbee and bisbee over the last two weeks has been enormously helpful in clarifying many of the problems and potential solutions
02:08:14 and potential solutions their evidence is warmly welcomed kingspan insulation will make further submissions in respect to the recommendations for improvements the regulatory regime in due course
02:08:25 in due course and in accordance with the timetable set by the inquiry thank you for your patience sir well thank you very much mr green that's very helpful
02:08:35 uh finally this morning we're going to hear a closing statement by sam lee queen's council on behalf of the building research establishment
02:08:46 establishment and miss leek is going to address this remotely as well so good morning this league i can see you can you see us i can thank you can you hear me we can
02:08:57 i can thank you can you hear me we can hear you thank you and i hope you can hear us as well um thank you thank you for making yourself available a little bit sooner than we had suggested in the timetable but that's uh owned to the good um we're ready to
02:09:09 uh owned to the good um we're ready to hear you if you'd like to make your statement thank you thank you sir so first of all bre again would like publicly to recognize the courage and determination
02:09:20 determination of all of the bereaved survivors and residents who have been involved in the hearing process knowing that for many this will have been a painful and distressing experience on behalf of bre i would like to offer
02:09:32 on behalf of bre i would like to offer heartfelt condolences to all who've been affected by the fire and its aftermath throughout this module of phase two of the inquiry biari and its legal team have attended many days of hearings in
02:09:44 have attended many days of hearings in person and remotely and have observed council to the inquiries probing forensic examination of more than 30 years of work carried out by public authorities and private organizations
02:09:56 authorities and private organizations which touches the regulation of cladding systems in the uk this is the first time that there has been such comprehensive and intense scrutiny on that subject as an organization which has worked to
02:10:08 as an organization which has worked to improve the built environment and to ensure the health and safety of those who use it bre welcomes this scrutiny bre has cooperated fully with the inquiry to provide evidence on matters
02:10:19 inquiry to provide evidence on matters within its knowledge and which concern its own work for government and private entities as the evidence was heard it became apparent that bre's role in the regulatory system
02:10:31 regulatory system has been misunderstood by others including stakeholders working in the building industry and the inquiries expert professor luke bisbee
02:10:40 bisbee the same misunderstanding was apparent from questions posed by council to the inquiry bre is not the department and its role is not akin to that of the department
02:10:53 is not akin to that of the department certadare will address the following topics all of which are dealt with in more detail in our written closings first the correct analysis of bre's role
02:11:04 first the correct analysis of bre's role second the regulatory system applicable to the external walls of buildings including cladding systems and bre's role in it or lack thereof
02:11:15 role in it or lack thereof third bre's specific research projects for government as raised by council to the inquiry in questions to bre witnesses
02:11:24 witnesses fourth an accurate summary of bre's knowledge and steps taken about three particular issues addressed in evidence by council to the inquiry industry confusion about the meaning of
02:11:35 industry confusion about the meaning of adb
02:11:37 adb use of acm pe on high-rise buildings in the uk
02:11:41 the uk and kingspan's misleading claims about its k-15 product fifth the department's knowledge from other sources and sixth ucas's assessment of bre last
02:11:53 and sixth ucas's assessment of bre last year
02:11:55 year first of all bre's role it is correct that bre used to be an executive agency within the department of the environment that linked with government ceased 25
02:12:07 that linked with government ceased 25 years ago in 1997 when bre was privatized bre then became a group of companies owned by an independent charitable trust
02:12:18 owned by an independent charitable trust when it was privatized bre ceased to be funded by government it became an independent self-funding body
02:12:25 body generating income and receipts from its activities through contractual arrangements for the supply of services clients include government departments other public bodies and private sector
02:12:37 other public bodies and private sector customers
02:12:39 customers the parameters of bre's work and obligations whether for public or private sector clients are defined by contract and regulatory requirements
02:12:50 regulatory requirements bre companies are obliged to fulfill their contractual and regulate regulatory obligations and to maintain client confidential confidentiality
02:13:02 confidentiality profits are used to serve wider society for the public benefit or are invested internally to make improvements at bre in the last 20 years bre trust has
02:13:13 in the last 20 years bre trust has funded over 20 million pounds of research
02:13:16 research or the public benefit produced or updated over 300 publications and supported more than 300 postgraduate students through its university partnerships
02:13:27 partnerships bre's structure and its history under government under government control afford it no regulatory function nor any special status
02:13:38 nor any special status those who believe that biari has a function or a status that changes its duties from those of a private entity to those of a public authority are misguided
02:13:49 are misguided bre is not a part of government it is not a public authority it is not publicly funded it is not a regulator as acknowledged by mr seaword and miss
02:14:00 as acknowledged by mr seaword and miss barwise queen's council on monday bre does not have any other status to oversee what is placed into the built environment the ari does not draft building regulations nor approved documents
02:14:14 regulations nor approved documents some core participants still appear to misunderstand bre's role by way of example it is not correct that bre's dr sarah colwell and i quote wrote the book
02:14:27 colwell and i quote wrote the book together with the brit department's brian martin as was suggested by bsr team 2 in their opening and closing submissions for this module it is not correct that bre were involved
02:14:40 it is not correct that bre were involved in drafting approved document b and were therefore very familiar with its content as was wrongly stated by an employee of wintec in a witness statement
02:14:51 wintec in a witness statement it is not correct that bre was advising government of necessary changes to the provisions in clauses 12.5 to 12.9 of approved document b 2006
02:15:03 approved document b 2006 as professor bisbee wrongly stated in his phase 2 report it is not correct that it felt a bre to provide clarification on adb
02:15:14 provide clarification on adb as the industry body cwct wrongly stated in a witness statement and it is not correct that bre's role was to advise government on adb as the mayor of london wrongly stated in
02:15:27 as the mayor of london wrongly stated in his written closing each of those misapprehensions suggests that biari has a role in the regulatory system akin to the department or a government appointed regulator it does
02:15:38 government appointed regulator it does not
02:15:39 not biary now understands that questions put to its witnesses under rule nine and orally perhaps labored under the same misapprehensions about bre's role the work of bre companies primarily
02:15:52 the work of bre companies primarily covers two core areas testing
02:15:55 testing and research this work carried out under commercial contract with public and private bodies is quite different from the work of the department or a regulator commercial work of these types is
02:16:06 commercial work of these types is carried out by other companies in the building industry who like bre are engaged under contract in its testing function bre carries out ucas accredited testing
02:16:18 bre carries out ucas accredited testing classification and certification of constructing construction products for manufacturers to the standards set by government and regulatory bodies bre companies have no unique regulatory
02:16:31 bre companies have no unique regulatory status from being a testing house those wanting testing services are free to use other commercial testing houses such as warrington fire ucas accredited testing houses are
02:16:43 ucas accredited testing houses are specifically required not to disclose test sponsors confidential information this regulatory requirement of confidentiality is in turn
02:16:55 confidentiality is in turn contained in contracts between bre and test sponsors in its research function bre undertakes independent research on behalf of its customers whether the commissioning
02:17:06 customers whether the commissioning client be a government department or a profit making company
02:17:11 company again
02:17:12 again bre has no special regulatory status as a result of undertaking that research government contracts are let through a competitive tender process bre is under no obligation to bid for
02:17:25 bre is under no obligation to bid for or to accept a government contract and government is under no obligation to engage bre the objectives assumptions scope and
02:17:37 the objectives assumptions scope and budget of a research project are set by the contract which are the parameters within which bre must operate when delivering the contract
02:17:48 when delivering the contract the product of the contract is owned by the commissioning client who may use it or not to fill their fulfill their objectives as with other commercial arrangements it
02:17:59 as with other commercial arrangements it is not open to bre to disseminate information in breach of confidentiality
02:18:07 second the regulatory system and bre's role in it or the lack thereof so in order for the regulatory system to be scrutinized and bre's role within it
02:18:18 be scrutinized and bre's role within it to be properly understood it is crucial that the inquiry and participants in it accurately understand that system and the role of different entities within it
02:18:29 entities within it at a very basic level there are six layers of documents in the regulatory system for external walls and high-rise residential buildings first the building act 1984 being statue
02:18:42 first the building act 1984 being statue passed by parliament bre has no part in drafting statute second
02:18:49 second building regulations which the secretary of state of the department has power to make pursuant to the building act the secretary of state is advised by the building regulations advisory committee
02:19:01 building regulations advisory committee or brac
02:19:02 or brac on the exercise of the power to make building regulations
02:19:10 the building regulations contain functional requirements as you know for cladding systems the relevant functional requirement is functional requirement b4 which applies to external walls
02:19:22 walls bre has no statutory role in drafting building regulations further
02:19:28 further no bre employee sat on brack when the 2010 building regulations were drafted third
02:19:35 third approved document b which the secretary of state has power to issue pursuant to the building act brac is the statutory advisory body to be consulted on amendments to approve
02:19:47 be consulted on amendments to approve documents
02:19:48 documents approved document b records among other things
02:19:52 things the secretary of state's view on how functional requirement b4 can be complied with bre has no statutory role in drafting
02:20:03 bre has no statutory role in drafting approved document b and again no bre employees sat on brac when approved document b 2006 was drafted
02:20:14 fourth bre br135 was a document produced by bre in 1988 when it was part of government and which has since been updated it became part of the regulatory system
02:20:26 it became part of the regulatory system having been incorporated into approved document b by the secretary of state the secretary of state and brac remained responsible for determining whether and how to use br135 in the
02:20:40 whether and how to use br135 in the regulatory system for external walls br135 being a part of the regulatory system
02:20:48 system does not somehow make bre a regulator nor responsible for that regulatory system
02:20:56 system fifth
02:20:57 fifth bs-8414 parts one and two are bsi documents based on bre's fire note 9 of 1999.
02:21:06 1999. the s8414 parts one and two were incorporated into adb by the secretary of state
02:21:12 of state the secretary of state and bragg remained responsible for determining whether and how to use fire note 9 and then the 8414 documents in the regulatory system for external walls
02:21:25 regulatory system for external walls again this does not somehow make the rea regulator all responsible for that regulatory system and six
02:21:34 and six building control completion certificates local authority building control have the statutory power and duty to give such a certificate when building work is deemed to comply with the applicable
02:21:45 deemed to comply with the applicable functional requirements bre does not issue completion certificates bre has no status to provide an interpretation of building regulations or approved documents that might inform
02:21:57 or approved documents that might inform whether a local authority gives a completion certificate whereas other entities such as the building control alliance or the national house building council may
02:22:08 national house building council may assume guidance on the meaning of building regulations or approved documents to assist local authority building control the re does not do so bre's work may inform a building control
02:22:21 bre's work may inform a building control officer's decision in a narrow and distinct way biaria is a testing house can be contracted to carry out a test on a clouding system to one of the bs-8414
02:22:33 clouding system to one of the bs-8414 methods
02:22:34 methods if test data meet the criteria in br135 bre may issue a test report and a classification report to evidence that the specific cladding system
02:22:46 the specific cladding system is classified to bl-135 that classification report may then be relied upon by a local authority when exercising its power to give a completion certificate
02:22:58 completion certificate for the avoidance of doubt bre was not engaged to and therefore did not test the cladding systems installed onto grenfell tower prior to their
02:23:09 onto grenfell tower prior to their installation nor did bre issue a bl-135 classification for the cladding systems issued onto the tower installed onto the tower
02:23:19 tower no testing house did
02:23:23 it has become apparent in this in this inquiry that regulatory failure occurred prior to the fire at grenfell tower the cladding systems fitted onto grenfell tower
02:23:34 grenfell tower should have been subjected to a bs 8414 test
02:23:37 test before even being considered for the refurbishment project those cladding systems never would have passed a bs 841 test and therefore never would have been
02:23:49 and therefore never would have been classified to bs to br 135 had those clouding systems been directed down the appropriate route to compliance with building regulations being 135
02:24:01 with building regulations being 135 classification they would not have been fitted onto grenfell tower and would not have been signed off by building control by way of a completion certificate as the inquiries expert professor bisbee
02:24:12 as the inquiries expert professor bisbee said last week in his oral evidence if you test acm pe on an 8414 test i defy you to pass that test
02:24:24 test bre had no role in setting or interpreting the regulations which should have clearly directed specifiers of those cladding systems to bl 135
02:24:37 cladding systems to bl 135 nor in applying or enforcing the regulatory regime by giving a completion certificate or other right otherwise it has become apparent in this enquiry
02:24:48 it has become apparent in this enquiry that adb 2006 was unclear that specifiers lacked competence to interpret adb in a way that met functional requirement
02:24:59 in a way that met functional requirement b4
02:25:01 b4 and that building control 2 lacked competence to interpret adb in a way that met functional requirement b4
02:25:10 b4 participants in the inquiry who believed that it was bre's role instead of or in parallel with the department to uncover or address those regulatory failures do
02:25:22 or address those regulatory failures do not understand the role of bre third
02:25:28 third bre's specific research projects for government as discussed in evidence with council to the inquiry evidence in this module and as summarized in bre's written
02:25:39 and as summarized in bre's written closing submissions covers bre's contracts with government over nearly three decades we refer you to those written submissions for fuller detail
02:25:51 biari's research for the department time and time again provided the department with the knowledge
02:25:59 knowledge that first of all class naught alone is an inadequate predictor of tolerant tolerable fire spread across cladding systems and second that full-scale testing was the only
02:26:13 that full-scale testing was the only method which could satisfactorily assess the performance of cladding systems that knowledge ought to have resulted in the department formulating a regulatory system which was intelligible to
02:26:25 system which was intelligible to stakeholders that prohibited the use of acmpe on the external walls of high-rise residential buildings
02:26:35 buildings it was not bre's role to formulate that regulatory system it was for the department to do so it was for the department to act on objective data and technical conclusions
02:26:46 objective data and technical conclusions provided by bre and on information provided by others if it so chose in line with its policy objectives
02:26:57 i will now address briefly four specific projects undertaken for the department that were discussed with council to the inquiry first pre-privatisation in the mid-90s
02:27:09 first pre-privatisation in the mid-90s when clouding systems were first emerging in the uk building industry bre's dr raymond connolly conducted a series of tests for the department from the test results dr connolly
02:27:21 from the test results dr connolly concluded that cladding material achieving class naught rating may suffer extensive burning and
02:27:29 and there is a clear need for full-scale testing of performance in fire that research project unequivocally informed the department more than 20
02:27:40 informed the department more than 20 years prior to the tragic fire at grenfell tower that class naught alone is an inadequate predictor of tolerable fire spread across cladding systems and that full-scale testing should be
02:27:51 and that full-scale testing should be used to assess the safety of cladding systems
02:27:55 systems second
02:27:56 second as a consequence of dr connolly's findings
02:27:59 findings in 1998 the recently privatized bre produced for the department fire note 3. fire note 3 reflected the full-scale test method recommended by dr connolly
02:28:12 test method recommended by dr connolly fire note 3 was succeeded by fire note 9 which as i have already stated was succeeded by the bs-8414 test methods as a result of bre's research the
02:28:25 as a result of bre's research the department had been provided with a solution to the concerns raised by bre's dr connolly about the emerging use of clouding systems it was for the department to decide whether to cite fire note 9 in approved
02:28:38 whether to cite fire note 9 in approved document b and if so how including whether to excise a linear route to compliance in favor of mandatory full-scale testing
02:28:50 in favor of mandatory full-scale testing third
02:28:51 third contract 1924 dating between 1999 and 2002
02:28:56 and 2002 also known as cc1924 has been much discussed in this module it is important to understand the true and contractual purpose of cc 1924
02:29:08 and contractual purpose of cc 1924 and the significance of the work product cc 1924 was to produce data to input into the drafting of a new version of bl-135
02:29:21 bl-135 the data were to be used and were used to set the criteria in bl-135 so as to exclude cladding systems whose combination of materials displayed
02:29:33 combination of materials displayed intolerable fire spread the contract achieved that objective as scientists do bre presented objective data and
02:29:44 bre presented objective data and technical conclusions to the department not emotive language bre's technical conclusions included the following
02:29:54 following and i quote the aluminium sheet product satisfied class naught requirements but in the full scale intermediate scale and single burning item test
02:30:05 and single burning item test proved to be one of the worst performing products
02:30:08 products and
02:30:09 and the full-scale test was the only method which satisfactorily assessed the system performance including detailing such as fire barriers
02:30:19 barriers again
02:30:20 again bre's test data and technical conclusions inform the department that first class naught alone is an inadequate predictor of tolerable fire spread
02:30:31 predictor of tolerable fire spread across a cladding system and second that full-scale testing was the only method that satisfactorily assessed tolerable fire spread as a consequence of cc 1924
02:30:44 as a consequence of cc 1924 bl-135 was updated the process of updating was by the formation of an industry advisory group which consulted with bsi technical
02:30:55 which consulted with bsi technical committees fsh 21 and 22. prior to publication br 135 2003 was agreed by the department
02:31:07 br 135 2003 was agreed by the department bre's witness's evidence was that bre-135
02:31:11 bre-135 precludes the use of acm pe in a cladding system as a system that incorporates acmpe will not meet the bl 135 criteria
02:31:23 will not meet the bl 135 criteria it was for the department equipped with bre's data and conclusions to ensure that those types of cladding systems were directed down the bl 135 route to compliance which could prevent them from being put
02:31:36 which could prevent them from being put into the built environment if the department's policy choice favored a different outcome or if its policy was to achieve that outcome but it was poorly executed in adb the
02:31:48 it was poorly executed in adb the responsibility for that does not lie with bre
02:31:51 with bre bre's witnesses were asked why they did not warn industry about the dangers of acm acm pe as a result of cc 1924 br135 was the published warning to
02:32:04 br135 was the published warning to industry not to use acmpe as a cladding system containing it would fail to meet the bl-135 criteria bre had provided the department with the
02:32:16 bre had provided the department with the knowledge and means effectively to ban acmpe
02:32:20 acmpe that was precisely the point of cc 1924 fourth
02:32:26 fourth the investigation of real fires program was also much discussed between bre's witnesses and council to the inquiry and its work product has been criticized by the inquiry's expert professor bisbee
02:32:39 by the inquiry's expert professor bisbee these criticisms are misplaced the investigation of real fires programme must not be equated with bre having powers to investigate fires as a regulator
02:32:51 regulator bre had and has no such remit or powers the program was a contractual research project
02:32:59 project with the product belonging to the department for use or not as it saw fit it operated on a limited budget with the department setting criteria for
02:33:10 with the department setting criteria for the types of fire that were to be investigated
02:33:16 the department was aware of the constraints placed on the irf program by its budget bre's written closing submissions for this module detail
02:33:26 detail how bre raised the issue of those constraints with the department see in particular paragraph 70 and footnote 53 more significant fires were escalated by
02:33:38 more significant fires were escalated by bre's production of fires of special interest reports i now turn to a few notable example reports produced under the irf programme first of all garnet court
02:33:51 first of all garnet court cti asked bre's witnesses about bre's report for the department on the fire at garnet court in 99 bre entirely rejects the suggestion that text was malignly deleted from this
02:34:03 text was malignly deleted from this report
02:34:05 report when compared to br's bre's reports for irvine council that suggestion is groundless and was rejected by bre's witnesses and the departments alike
02:34:17 departments alike the first paragraph of the report expressly states that it is a simplified version of a report prepared for irvine council further the report for the department
02:34:29 further the report for the department expressly referred the department to the select committee's earlier report on that fire
02:34:36 that fire the select committee had reported concerns about the adequacy of class nought as a predictor of tolerable fire spread spread across cutting systems citing bre's dr connolly's work and
02:34:47 citing bre's dr connolly's work and recording that there is a clear need for full-scale testing the department was again presented with bre's technical conclusions about class naught and
02:34:59 conclusions about class naught and large-scale testing about which bre reminded the department in its report on garnet court it was for the department to act bre notes that professor bisbee having
02:35:12 bre notes that professor bisbee having suggested in his phase two report that information was removed from the garnet court report retracted that suggestion in his oral evidence preferring the explanation
02:35:24 evidence preferring the explanation that mention of class nord was not necessary anymore transcript day 90 sorry day 290 section 195 lines one to five
02:35:36 195 lines one to five the edge building cti also asked bre's witnesses about their reports for the department on the fire at the edge building in 2005. in a fires of special interest report
02:35:48 in a fires of special interest report bre expressly raised with the department the potential for a db to be read rightly or wrongly as allowing combustible material in a cladding framework without a br 135
02:36:00 cladding framework without a br 135 classification as acknowledged by ms barwise queen queen's council on monday this report amounted to and i quote
02:36:11 to and i quote a clear warning from martin colwell and greenwood
02:36:16 greenwood all then at bre that the provisions of section 12 of adb governing external fire spread were insufficiently clear it was for the department to remedy that
02:36:27 it was for the department to remedy that concern or not as it saw fit blacknell house bre's witnesses were asked about reports for the department on the fire at lakeland house in 2009.
02:36:40 lakeland house in 2009. bre produced a first draft fires a special interest report for the department 13 days after the fire it was then instructed by the department to cease investigating this fire
02:36:52 to cease investigating this fire bre had no obligation or authority to continue investigating separately the re was contracted by the metropolitan police service and the
02:37:03 metropolitan police service and the london fire brigade to investigate this fire for a different purpose
02:37:08 purpose the contract expressly excluded investigations that pertained to building regulations criticisms about the content of bre's reports for the department the police
02:37:20 reports for the department the police and the fire brigade failed to understand the contractual nature of bre's work and the parameters set
02:37:29 set bre had no authority remittal funding to investigate matters outside of how it was contracted bre's investigation of real fire reports from 2001
02:37:41 from 2001 until 2015 contained as you have heard a generic statement as follows the findings from this period have reaffirmed the overall and i underline overall effectiveness of
02:37:54 and i underline overall effectiveness of the building regulations and adb it was put to bre's witnesses that this generic statement was false bre says as follows
02:38:05 bre says as follows first this statement must be read against the common understanding between bre and the department that approved document b required most components of an external wall to be of
02:38:17 components of an external wall to be of limited combustibility unless the cladding system had been classified to bl-135
02:38:26 second this statement must be read with the underlying assumption that professionals can be expected to act with competence and integrity it is wholly unrealistic to suggest that
02:38:39 it is wholly unrealistic to suggest that bre ought to have predicted that people in the building industry from architects to manufacturers and industry bodies to building control would adopt an interpretation of adb
02:38:52 would adopt an interpretation of adb that failed to meet functional requirement b4 third where a specific fire gave rise to a concern about how building regulations and adb had been applied in the built
02:39:04 and adb had been applied in the built environment bre drew that concern to the department's attention the edge fire is an example as already discussed
02:39:13 discussed finally as detailed in bre's written closing submissions for this module the statement was accurate as dr crowder put it in his oral evidence
02:39:23 evidence the statement communicated that bre at that time
02:39:27 that time did not see a need for a total rewrite of building regulations at adb as he said it doesn't indicate a fundamental problem and a fundamental need to go
02:39:39 problem and a fundamental need to go back to the drawing board but this was followed up with then specific recommendations so the inquiry is invited to consider that the real problem in hindsight at
02:39:52 that the real problem in hindsight at that time was with compliance as professor bisbee said acmpe panels would never have passed eight four one four
02:40:04 fourth bre's knowledge and steps taken by bre
02:40:09 by bre this part of bre's oral closing will cover bre's employees knowledge in relation to three specific issues raised by cti
02:40:19 by cti in industry confusion about the meaning of adb
02:40:23 of adb the use of acmpe on high-rise buildings in the uk
02:40:27 in the uk and kingspan's misleading claims about its k-15 combustible insulation board bre must be judged against its actual
02:40:38 bre must be judged against its actual not perceived or assumed role within the building industry and against factually accurate findings not assumptions about what bre's employees knew
02:40:52 about what bre's employees knew bre's position is that the department was in possession of the relevant information concerning confusion about the meaning of adb
02:41:02 of adb and of the risks of acmpe to a greater degree and
02:41:08 and or earlier than bre bre's position is that it the ore acted appropriately when information about industry practice was provided to it
02:41:22 industry practice was provided to it sorry expand briefly as follows first
02:41:26 first with regard to industry confusion about the meaning of adb as detailed in bre's written closing submissions bre's employees became aware of this confusion in all around october 2013
02:41:39 confusion in all around october 2013 when bre was contact con contacted by trespa
02:41:44 by trespa biari's tony baker then raised the matter with the department the following month
02:41:49 month this was the appropriate thing to do as a pro as approved document b is the government's is the department's document the department not bre had the authority
02:42:02 the department not bre had the authority to act
02:42:03 to act second
02:42:05 second with regard to the use of acmpe on high-rise buildings in the uk as detailed in bre's written closing submissions it was in january or february 2016
02:42:16 it was in january or february 2016 when bre first became aware when nick jenkins of booth murie raised the matter in february 2016 dr sarah colwell referred mr jenkins to
02:42:29 dr sarah colwell referred mr jenkins to the department again
02:42:31 again this was the appropriate thing to do as the department regulates the industry again it was for the department not bre which had the authority and the
02:42:43 which had the authority and the responsibility to act third with regard to kingspan's misleading claims about its k-15 insulation board certain misrepresentations were made
02:42:54 certain misrepresentations were made about a bs 8414 test report that bre had produced for kingspan bre acted to stop misrepresentations about this bre document
02:43:06 about this bre document first when when in 2006 kingspan issued a misleading flyer entitled what's lurking behind your facade bre complained to kingspan after which
02:43:18 bre complained to kingspan after which the flyer was removed second biari informed bba that its certificate in respect of k-15 wrongly represented that k-15 itself
02:43:30 wrongly represented that k-15 itself satisfied abadb in both those instances bre acted appropriately suggestions were put to bre's witnesses that bre should have done more
02:43:43 that bre should have done more first actively to uncover regulatory failure and second to address regulatory failure when bre employees learnt about issues
02:43:54 when bre employees learnt about issues in the industry these suggestions mistake bre's role for that of the department it was simply not open to let alone advisable for bre to start
02:44:07 let alone advisable for bre to start acting
02:44:08 acting as if it had regulatory powers suggestions were made that after cc 1924 biari ought to have warned the industry
02:44:19 biari ought to have warned the industry about the dangers of acmpe these suggestions misstate both bre employees knowledge about the use of acmpe
02:44:30 acmpe and misunderstand the scope purpose and the significance of the outputs of the contract for competent professionals
02:44:41 professionals suggestions were made that the investigation of real fires program ought to have surveyed existing building stock for acmpe again these suggestions mistake both bre
02:44:53 again these suggestions mistake both bre employees knowledge about the use of acmpe and more fundamentally misunderstand the scope and purpose of the contract
02:45:05 and purpose of the contract suggestions were made that the investigation of real fires program ought to have investigated the fires at taplow house and sudbury house and downward fire spread at la canal house
02:45:17 downward fire spread at la canal house these suggestions again misunderstand the scope and purpose of the contract as i have said bre is not a regulator and it has no investigatory powers
02:45:31 faq frequent frequently asked questions misunderstandings in the industry about bre's role have been further evidenced by dr sarah
02:45:43 have been further evidenced by dr sarah colwell
02:45:44 colwell being asked to draft an faq to address confusion about the meaning of adb as you will recall she was asked to do so in july 2014 at a cwct meeting
02:45:59 so in july 2014 at a cwct meeting earlier i addressed cwct's misunderstanding about bre's role as stated in a witness statement before this inquiry bre's dr sarah colwell accepted that she
02:46:12 bre's dr sarah colwell accepted that she did not raise the matter of an faq with brian martin after the cwct meeting although the evidence is that she had already suggested an faq to mr martin
02:46:23 already suggested an faq to mr martin prior to that meeting in reality dr colwell's error was to engage with any suggestion that an faq would originate from bre
02:46:35 originate from bre dr debbie smith's evidence was that she was puzzled by dr colwell's agreeing to help with an faq as and i quote it's not bre's role to write the
02:46:46 it's not bre's role to write the guidance directly nor to interpret the guidance debbie dr debbie smith's statement about brs bree's role is correct
02:46:59 fifth the department's knowledge from other sources
02:47:04 sources it is clear from the evidence heard in this module that the department was aware of the following first
02:47:11 first paragraphs 12.5 to 12.7 of adb 2006 were being interpreted differently from bre's interpretation and what bre understands to have been
02:47:23 and what bre understands to have been the department's interpretation second
02:47:27 second industry was interpreting those paragraphs in a way that failed to protect against the risks of intolerable fire spread identified by bre's dr connolly's report
02:47:38 identified by bre's dr connolly's report in 1994
02:47:39 in 1994 and by bre's experimental program under cc 1924 in 2002 third acm pe was in fact being used on
02:47:50 third acm pe was in fact being used on high-rise residential buildings in the uk
02:47:53 uk and fourth combustible insulation boards were also in fact being used on high-rise residential buildings in the uk without any technical basis for doing so
02:48:05 so it is evident that the department was aware of these matters at least as early as bre was and to a greater degree yet was unwilling or unable to act
02:48:17 yet was unwilling or unable to act brian martin's oral evidence to the inquiry was plain that in the period after the cwct meeting of july 2014 he was not going to act on the
02:48:28 he was not going to act on the information available to him his view
02:48:31 his view was that guidance from industry bodies was the appropriate way to disseminate a stricter interpretation of paragraphs 12.5 to 12.7 of adb 2006
02:48:43 of paragraphs 12.5 to 12.7 of adb 2006 version
02:48:45 version mr martin stated that the department relied on the recently published bca technical guidance note 18 issue north of june 2014
02:48:56 issue north of june 2014 at the nhbc communication entitled the use of combustible materials within the external wool construction of buildings over 18 meters in height which attached bca note 18
02:49:09 which attached bca note 18 as he said as a way of flagging the bca guidance note to nhbc members which is nearly every house builder in the country
02:49:20 country his evidence was that this would be a more effective means of ensuring widespread readership than an faq on the department's website
02:49:31 than an faq on the department's website there was nothing material that bre could tell the department that the department did not already know as already stated bre time and time
02:49:42 as already stated bre time and time again informed the department that class naught is an inadequate predictor of tolerable fire spread across cladding systems and that full-scale testing was the only method which could
02:49:53 the only method which could satisfactorily assess cladding systems performance upon learning that specifiers of cladding systems and building control were interpreting adb differently
02:50:05 were interpreting adb differently perhaps so as to rely on class naught alone
02:50:08 alone in lieu of br135 classification it was for the department to act
02:50:15 sixth ucas assessment of bre in may 2021
02:50:22 bre is mindful of the evidence in phase 2 module 2 of this inquiry ucas's consequent assessment of bre in may 2021
02:50:31 may 2021 and ucas is evidence in that regard in this module it is acknowledged that ucas identified certain improvements required in bre's quality management systems for the
02:50:42 quality management systems for the purpose of iso accreditation but
02:50:45 but a bre emphasizes that there is no evidence that any such issues impacted on bre's test results the ucas reporting process included
02:50:56 the ucas reporting process included discussions with testing personnel who were expressly recognized by ucas as being competent well-trained and who correctly carried out test procedures
02:51:07 out test procedures bre reiterates that ucas raised no concern
02:51:11 concern about bre's conduct of bs-8414 tests indeed ucas concluded that there was no obvious indication of any testing having
02:51:22 obvious indication of any testing having been performed incorrectly bre also wishes to reiterate that the concerns raised by ucas are in no way connected with the fire at grenfell tower
02:51:34 tower like many organizations bre constantly seeks to improve the quality of its work and internal processes bre continues to seek improvements based on learning from this inquiry
02:51:46 on learning from this inquiry and from ucas assessments
02:51:50 so in conclusion the inquiry determined in phase one that the cladding systems put onto grenfell tower should never have been signed off by building control at the rural borough
02:52:01 by building control at the rural borough of kensington and chelsea and could never have met functional requirement b4 of building regulations 2010.
02:52:09 2010. the evidence seen and heard in this module has disclosed that prior to the tragic fire at grenfell tower paragraphs 12.5 to 12.9 of adb 2006
02:52:20 2006 were interpreted by industry stakeholders in a manner that failed to accord with functional requirement b4 bre has addressed in these closing submissions other misunderstandings on
02:52:32 submissions other misunderstandings on the part of industry stakeholders concerning bre's role in the industry and detailed its true role bre did not draft adb bre does not have any other status to
02:52:43 bre does not have any other status to oversee what is placed in the built environment and where bre heard concerns it passed them on to the appropriate authority bre's research data and technical
02:52:55 bre's research data and technical conclusions demonstrated time and again to the department that class naught alone was an inadequate predictor of tolerable fire spread and that full-scale testing was the only method
02:53:06 full-scale testing was the only method which could satisfactorily assess cladding performance cladding systems performance professor bisbee's evidence on 9th of june 22
02:53:15 june 22 likewise leads to the conclusion that cladding materials must be tested as part of a system in a large-scale test this has been known since bre's dr
02:53:26 this has been known since bre's dr connolly's work in the 1990s the evidence before the inquiry in this module has revealed regulatory failure in the years leading up to the fire at grenfell tower
02:53:37 grenfell tower participants in the inquiry and those in industry who believed that it was bre's role instead of or in parallel with the department to address that regulatory failure
02:53:47 failure do not understand the role of bre finally bre hopes that the examination of practices policies and regulations will contribute to the public understanding
02:53:59 understanding as to how unsafe cladding systems came to be signed off on grenfell tower and other buildings bre proposes to provide written submissions setting out changes to its own practices
02:54:10 own practices and its proposals for recommendations as was stated at the conclusion of module two bre is committed to learning whatever lessons for the future can be learned from this inquiry
02:54:21 from this inquiry and to play its part in the strengthened building safety regime the inquiries report and recommendations will be analyzed carefully and the lessons learned will be shared within the organization and beyond to ensure
02:54:34 the organization and beyond to ensure continued organizing organizational development and improvement in this critically important area of building practice thank you sir
02:54:45 thank you sir well thank you very much miss league that
02:54:49 that brings us to a close for this morning and we shall now rise and sit again at two o'clock when we shall hear a closing statement on behalf of the
02:55:01 a closing statement on behalf of the local authority building control from mr adamson queen's council but that will be at two o'clock thank you very much
02:55:32 you