Module 6 (Testing, Government, FRA) Closing Submissions - Wednesday 22nd June 2022 (2/2)

22 June 2022 · Dominic Adamson QC - LABC, Matthew Bedford QC - NHBC, Counsel to the Inquiry · 1:51:30
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Closing submissions from LABC and NHBC. LABC accepts certification errors for K15 and RS5000 but denies corruption allegations, arguing they were 'played' by manufacturers exploiting industry confusion. NHBC accepts it should have acted more swiftly but contends its certification was not relevant to Grenfell.

Key moments

Full transcript

00:00:27 well we're now going to hear a closing statement on behalf of the local Authority building control by Mr Dominic Adamson Queen Council so Mr Adamson take your place at the uh Leon and uh begin when you're

00:00:41 the uh Leon and uh begin when you're ready thank

00:00:46 you good afternoon Mr chairman mran and Mr

00:00:50 Mr rall at ABC wishes to begin this statement by once again expressing its sincere condolences and apologies to the families of those who perished in the G fell our fire to the survivors of this

00:01:02 fell our fire to the survivors of this tragedy and to others affected by it labc intends to address you today and it has six points that it wishes to make first the the evidence in module six has

00:01:15 first the the evidence in module six has conclusively demonstrated that there was long-standing confusion over the meaning of class zero and the concept of limited combustibility labc was in no way responsible for that confusion which

00:01:27 responsible for that confusion which existed long before it was formed the confusion was manipulated by unscrupulous players within the construction industry such as kingspan and celotex second the evidence in module 6 has conclusively demonstrated

00:01:40 module 6 has conclusively demonstrated that successive governments implemented and thereafter maintained a competitive building control regime within a non-prescriptive framework of legislation without sufficient control or oversight this led to what many refer

00:01:52 or oversight this led to what many refer to as a race to the bottom third atabc acknowledges once again that there were shortcomings in its type approval and registered detail certification for K15

00:02:03 registered detail certification for K15 and its registered detail for rs5000 the evidence conclusively demonstrates uh that those shortcoming shortcomings were symptomatic of Industry confusion rather than its cause

00:02:14 Industry confusion rather than its cause fourth labc rejects the baseless criticisms that it was corrupt and or dishonest in the manner in which it operated its type of roval and registered detail schemes it

00:02:25 registered detail schemes it emphatically denies the suggestion that decisions it took were financially motivating and or driven by a desire to preserve a commercial relationship with kingspan and or celotex uh it is Del deny that

00:02:38 and or celotex uh it is Del deny that these baseless allegations also demonstrate regulatory capture of labc fifth although labc issued deficient certificates in relation to

00:02:49 deficient certificates in relation to both K15 and rs5000 those errors had been corrected by the time those products were considered for the grenfell tower refurbishment there is absolutely no evidence that labc

00:03:00 absolutely no evidence that labc certification deficient or otherwise influen the decision to use those products and sixth labc rejects attempts which have been made by other core participants to use labc as a shield for

00:03:12 participants to use labc as a shield for their own

00:03:13 their own shortcomings as the inquiry knows atabc has made radical changes to its company structure and strategic Direction it has already introduced extensive measures to

00:03:24 already introduced extensive measures to drive up standards in the building control profession however it does not regard its work as being done it has been invited by the panel to participate in the process of identifying potential

00:03:35 in the process of identifying potential recommendations arising from the evidence heard in Phase 2 labc welcomes that um uh recommendation and will actively participate in the

00:03:46 actively participate in the process uh point one industry confusion according to Professor Bisby uh uh the widespread confounding of class zero with non-combustible appears to have

00:03:58 with non-combustible appears to have been a serious problem since at least 1991 and openly discussed with the government since at least 1999 there cannot be and labc does not

00:04:09 1999 there cannot be and labc does not believe there is any dispute with that proposition nor does there appear to be any dispute that successive governments singularly failed to address the confusion despite multiple opportunities

00:04:21 confusion despite multiple opportunities to do so following devastating Fires at Noley Heights in 1991 garana Court in 1999 and at laal house in 2009 9 in particular labc notes what is now the

00:04:33 particular labc notes what is now the department for leveling up housing and communities and which I'll refer to as the department accepts that it failed to keep ADB up to dat or to address known ambiguities including around class zero

00:04:46 ambiguities including around class zero it acknowledges that approved document B was poorly drafted and that it had the potential to cause confusion amongst industry and building control it accepts

00:04:57 industry and building control it accepts it missed numerous opportunities over a period per of years labc would suggest decades to identify and understand issues with enforcement and compliance with building

00:05:08 with building regulations against such a background of admitted failure by successive governments it can be no surprise that the confusion which Professor Bisby highlights persisted or that it manifest

00:05:20 highlights persisted or that it manifest itself in labc certification labc takes little comfort from the fact that its deficient certification was a symptom of the wide spread confusion and misunderstanding within the industry

00:05:32 misunderstanding within the industry over the meaning of class Sera and the distinction between it and materials of limited combustibility but LBC insists it was not the cause of this confusion uh and

00:05:43 uh and misunderstanding uh the industry confusion coupled with the catalog of government failures led to a regulatory regime which was exploitable and exploited by the

00:05:54 exploited by the unscrupulous LBC realizes that it was manipulated by manufacturers who prayed on industrywide confusion to obtain LA's CER certification it naively believed

00:06:05 CER certification it naively believed that applicants acted in good faith but there must at least be a measure of understanding of the point made by Mr Ying of labc when he said to this inquiry open quotes I'm still struggling

00:06:18 inquiry open quotes I'm still struggling to come to terms with why anybody would actually try and sell a product that wasn't fit for purpose particularly in relation to fire safety I am sure he

00:06:29 relation to fire safety I am sure he speaks for many the answer to the question which Mr euwing posed namely why would anyone do that is toold first successive governments allow them to do so and

00:06:41 governments allow them to do so and second the manufacturers greed the government had known for many years that manufacturers were selling products which were likely to be unsafe for example the moment it became cognizant

00:06:53 example the moment it became cognizant of the radar 2 research at which identified that only four of the 11 aluminium rain screen products tested similar to those used on Grenville Tower satisfied class zero requirements it

00:07:06 satisfied class zero requirements it should have appreciated that there was something profoundly wrong this was hard data which proved that the majority of the products tested did not even achieve class zero rather than impose stringent

00:07:18 class zero rather than impose stringent performance criteria on cladding materials the government preferred not to distort the market place or to be a barrier to trade the D Department accepts this was open quotes another

00:07:29 accepts this was open quotes another missed opportunity for the Department to have reviewed the adequacy of class zero and also to have potentially uncovered the manner in which the manufacturers were gaming the testing system close

00:07:41 were gaming the testing system close quotes it states that it was difficult to it is difficult to understand why the government didn't take action labc agrees and it is grateful to the department for its mostly accurate

00:07:52 department for its mostly accurate appraisal of its shortcomings point two competitive building control labc has read with interest the submissions made in particular by the

00:08:03 submissions made in particular by the bsrs and the Royal B of Kensington Chelsea relating to the introduction of competition into the building control Arena Mr Maxwell Scott Queen's Council on behalf of rbkc identifies a tension

00:08:16 on behalf of rbkc identifies a tension between on the one hand the introduction of competition to the building control system by the introduction of approved inspectors and on the other the requirement that local Authority build

00:08:27 requirement that local Authority build and control at least from 2010 onwards be cost neutral this was and is the only regulatory regime which was subject to competition such a unique Arrangement

00:08:39 competition such a unique Arrangement required central government to keep a close eye upon how the system was operating in practice he contends that a close eye was not kept labc agrees moreover the demand that building

00:08:51 moreover the demand that building control bodies be cost neutral plac under resourced local Authority building control teams at a disadvantage to improved to approved inspectors the expectation that building control

00:09:02 the expectation that building control bodies would work collaboratively with applicants could compromise their ability to perform their primary function there was a risk of blurring of lines caused by the

00:09:13 of blurring of lines caused by the expectation that building control bodies would work with an applicant rather than performing a regulatory function um the bsr2 team led by Mr Mansfield observes that the story of

00:09:24 Mansfield observes that the story of nhbc clearly demonstrates that in practice allowing regulatory services to be carried out by private bodies leads to inevitable conflicts of interest this chimes with the observation made in a

00:09:35 chimes with the observation made in a department paper in July 2015 which noted that there was uh no incentive for Approved inspectors to inform local authorities where enforcement action may be

00:09:46 be needed uh to do so um would be to bite the hand that feeds them bsr2 assert with some justification that regulatory functions do not belong in private hands

00:09:58 functions do not belong in private hands LBC

00:10:00 LBC agrees point three shortcomings in labc certification uh briefly and by way of recap labc accepts first with respect to K15 the type approval summary issued in

00:10:13 K15 the type approval summary issued in 2009 should not have stated that K15 could be considered a material of limited combustibility and suitable for use above 18 M Mr Jones of heriage County council's judgment uh that K15

00:10:27 County council's judgment uh that K15 could be considered uh of limited combustibility was incorrect errors he made could and should have been identified during lbc's member peer review process second with respect to

00:10:39 review process second with respect to K15 registered detail issued in August 2013 it wrongly stated that the product can be used on buildings with stories greater than 80 M from ground level provided it is used in combination with

00:10:51 provided it is used in combination with suitably non-combustible substrates uh and ancillary components it was wrong because it could only be used in a system which was Iden IAL that which had been the subject of the actual BS 8414

00:11:03 been the subject of the actual BS 8414 test third with respect to rs5000 lbc's First registered system document in 2014 should not have stated that rs5000 was acceptable for use in

00:11:14 that rs5000 was acceptable for use in buildings with stories above 18 m in height subject to the board being fixed to a non-combustible substrate without explicit reference to the required caveats specifically It could only be

00:11:25 caveats specifically It could only be only be used in the system which was identical to that which had been the subject of the B s 8414 test having regard to the prevailing industry confusion labc contends that

00:11:36 industry confusion labc contends that its principal failings occurred during two distinct periods first in 2009 when the type approval certificate was issued by uh uh harage Council and subsequently

00:11:47 by uh uh harage Council and subsequently through Mr Turner's failure to respond appropriately or effectively with the rock wool complaint that complaint should have been dealt with more effectively labc notes that this was a

00:11:58 effectively labc notes that this was a failing which Mr Turner shared with the Department who were copied to that complaint and who acknowledged that they too missed an opportunity second from July 2014 to November 2014 when labc was

00:12:10 July 2014 to November 2014 when labc was too slow and insufficiently decisive in the manner in which it dealt with the shortcomings in the Rd for K15 during which time there was a growing appreciation within labc of the industry

00:12:23 appreciation within labc of the industry confusion it should now be clear um that the original errors made by labc were a direct result of Industry confusion that had permeated uh the industry for at least 20 years prior to the issue of the

00:12:34 least 20 years prior to the issue of the first system approval for K K15 this confusion of which government was well aware eventually resulted in George Lee of the BBA issuing the Mis misleading agral certificate for K15 which labc

00:12:46 agral certificate for K15 which labc relied upon when issuing its 2009 system approval and 2013 registered detail when he gave evidence to this inquiry Mr Lee remained under the assumption that class zero is equivalent to Limited

00:12:58 zero is equivalent to Limited combustibility point four the baseless criticism of labc although labc does not wish to detain this inquiry with these submissions it is necessary to address

00:13:10 submissions it is necessary to address certain points which appear in the closing statements produced by other core participants first the baseless allegation that BS made by bsr1 team that labc was dishonest in the manner in

00:13:22 that labc was dishonest in the manner in which it issued the certification second the baseless allegation made by the fbu that the content of the C ification was driven by lbc's Financial dependency on kingspan

00:13:34 lbc's Financial dependency on kingspan dealing first with dishonesty uh bsr1 alleg um that open quotes dishonest and unrepresentative testing carried out and certification by BB and labc was client

00:13:47 certification by BB and labc was client focused and executed by insufficiently competent

00:13:52 competent staff it is unclear whether that is an allegation of dis dishonesty leveled at both BBA and L ABC or just BBA any allegation of dishonesty made against labc is absolutely refuted labc does not

00:14:06 labc is absolutely refuted labc does not accept that there is a scrap of evidence that it deliberately intended readers of its certificates to be misled by them BS l1's detailed critique of Lac is to be found at section nine of its

00:14:17 to be found at section nine of its written statement and three points are made first there was a catalog of errors in the certification from 2009 onwards for K15 and rs5000 second it suggests

00:14:29 for K15 and rs5000 second it suggests that there was a flawed certification process and third it suggests labc was open crat played all the way but ready to indulge kingspan and celotex none of these points uh to lbc's

00:14:41 celotex none of these points uh to lbc's dishonesty the specific allegation of indulgence is denied labc notes that it was never suggested to Mr Turner or Mr Jun that they were dishonest and it does not accept either was however LC is not

00:14:54 not accept either was however LC is not and has never been blind to the unsatisfactory nature of parts of their evidence by way of example labc has readily accepted that Mr Turner's response to the complaint made by Mr

00:15:06 response to the complaint made by Mr Cody of Rockwell in 2009 about the literature produced by kingspan for K15 which indicated that it was a material limited combustibility was wholly inadequate but such a failing Falls well short of dishonesty labc also accept

00:15:20 short of dishonesty labc also accept that Mr Ying's decision to agree to an extension of the Rd certificate for K 15 to November 2014 was also wrong he described it as fool Harding which it was given that he knew that a BBA

00:15:32 was given that he knew that a BBA certificate existed and he was aware of concerns which had been raised about the use of K15 by Mr Martin of the department and M with Mr Evans of nhbc uh BSR state that the admission was

00:15:46 nhbc uh BSR state that the admission was warranted it is clear that the content of the K15 uh certificate was at that time under active consideration Mr Ying was wrong to allow an extension but that decision was

00:15:57 an extension but that decision was corrected um this clearly demonstrate that he was not dishonest Financial dependency the fbu suggests that Mr Turner and Mr Ying's shortcomings in

00:16:09 Turner and Mr Ying's shortcomings in their handling of the kingspan uh matter can only be credibly explained by lbc's Financial dependency upon kingspan this is a risible suggestion the income labc

00:16:21 is a risible suggestion the income labc derived from kingspan was minuscule and could in no way give rise to a dependency the flimsy basis upon which this allegation has has been explored in evidence cannot be overstated for example obviously flippant emails and

00:16:34 example obviously flippant emails and jokes relating to bonuses and saving failing companies between colleagues have been treated as if they were fact LBC was not beholden to the cladding industry generally or any particular

00:16:45 industry generally or any particular manufacturer or supplier there was limited Financial benefit behind each registration neither labc nor lab staff were driven by profit and the need to certify applications for financial gain

00:16:57 certify applications for financial gain or to maintain a relationship with any other ENT entity labc derived no income from the original 2009 type approval which included the erroneous statement

00:17:09 which included the erroneous statement despite this the allegations of financial dependency persist far more credible explanations for the conduct of Mr Turner and or Mr y have been ignored for example Mr Turner accepted that

00:17:21 for example Mr Turner accepted that between 2008 and 2011 he had frequently engaged and had positive dialogue with kingspan on matters such as thermal performance which had become open more

00:17:32 performance which had become open more important to building control close gr it was kingspan who had become accessible through government convened groups in which he was partaking he accepted with hindsight that this may

00:17:44 accepted with hindsight that this may have affected how he dealt with concerns about fire performance he also explained that he had no budgetary responsibility and no responsibility to generate income

00:17:55 and no responsibility to generate income surely a much more credible explanation for Mr Turner's conduct is that he naively trusted kingspan and thought wrongly they were a responsible organization as for Mr Ying he was not

00:18:07 organization as for Mr Ying he was not afraid to make concessions about his and lac's shortcomings he accepted the possibility that Kings ban may have been attempting to sweeten labc with the

00:18:18 attempting to sweeten labc with the promise of further registered detail work at a time when there were active concerns about the Rd for K15 in 2014 but a proper analysis of the evidence demon rate that Mr y was not corrupted

00:18:30 demon rate that Mr y was not corrupted by the possibility of losing further work in December 2014 kingspan made a verbal threat to labc that it would not proceed with £31,000 worth of registered detail work in relation to other

00:18:43 detail work in relation to other products if the Rd uh for K15 was not extended and or issued reissued if labc was financially dependent in the way that has been alleged then one would have expected Mr Ying to do what

00:18:55 have expected Mr Ying to do what kingspan wanted them to do to extend or reissue the ific in order to preserve the relationship and secure the work labc did nothing of the sort as Mr Ying explained we didn't do anything and

00:19:08 explained we didn't do anything and didn't jump to the tune I think this just demonstrates that we weren't that finance-driven the questions you were asking me earlier you know this had to be right and we knew at this point that any registered detail had to be correct

00:19:20 any registered detail had to be correct when it went out the next time which wasn't until I think March of 2015 thus the evidence clearly demonstrates that the allegation of financial influenced by labc of labc by

00:19:31 financial influenced by labc of labc by kingspan is completely unfounded even if kingspan was attempting to sweeten up labc they failed Mr Ying accepted that labc was played all the way by kingspan

00:19:42 labc was played all the way by kingspan and celotex but neither he nor labc indulged either kingspan or celotex the fbu goes even further and suggests the content of labc CICS are a

00:19:53 suggests the content of labc CICS are a clear example of regulatory capture the submission is confused in so far as it suggest that certificates reflect lbc's Financial dependence on kingspan and the like tailoring the content of

00:20:05 like tailoring the content of certificates to preserve commercial relationships is corruption not regulatory capture this is emphatically denied and without Foundation labc was played but it was not

00:20:16 played but it was not corrupt point five uh the impact of deficient labc certificates labc has two submissions first there is no evidence before the

00:20:27 first there is no evidence before the inquiry of any undue significant weight being attached to labc certification to demonstrate proof of compliance in accordance with ADB the inquiry received evidence of an occasion in July 2014 when Mr Ying was

00:20:40 occasion in July 2014 when Mr Ying was approached by Mr Everett of Europa far facad who indicated that a specialist contractor had sought to rely on the Rd for K15 as proof of compliance with ADB and

00:20:51 and b135 the specialist contractor singular he was referring to was kingspan this was the only example of such conduct which was ever brought to lbc's attention it is clear that Mr

00:21:03 lbc's attention it is clear that Mr Everett did not accept King's plan's claim at face value and he gave careful thought of to the issue of whether the use of K15 was permissible on that development in its written submissions labc has provided numerous examples from

00:21:16 labc has provided numerous examples from the evidence before you which suggests that labc itself and lbc's certification were not widely known of or relied upon in the construction industry thus there is limited evidence for the suggestion

00:21:27 is limited evidence for the suggestion that the constru construction industry professionals were relying on labc K15 certification to justify its use the evidence before the qu inquiry of Reliance of lab certification in relation to rs5000 is we would submit

00:21:41 relation to rs5000 is we would submit non-existent secondly and most importantly there is no evidence that lbc's historically deficient certificates played any role in the decision to use K15 or rs5000 as part of

00:21:52 decision to use K15 or rs5000 as part of the grenfell tower refurbishment LBC addressed these points in detail in its closing submissions to module 2 nothing in module 6 has undermined the force of the points made fundamentally this was

00:22:04 the points made fundamentally this was because by the time the decisions were taken about insulation on gford Tower the labc certificates for K15 and rs5000 were correct the historic errors could not and did not make any difference The

00:22:16 not and did not make any difference The only positive evidence of actual Reliance was the very late and false claim from Mr hobin of rbkc that he had considered an lab cerificate labc invites the inquiry to reject his

00:22:27 invites the inquiry to reject his evidence for example examples of the lack of Reliance on labc cerification labc invites the inquiry to consider Annex B to its closing statement of module

00:22:36 module 6 point six uh labc should not be used as a shield it is regrettable that some cor participants have sought to use labc as a shield to justify defend or

00:22:48 as a shield to justify defend or mitigate their own failings I believe two examples here suffice First Kings ban sought to justify its continued marketing of K15 on the basis of an lab certificate despite the fact that it

00:22:59 certificate despite the fact that it knew it was wrong and had been obtained on false premises labc need not say anything more about that risible proposition second nhbc has sought to suggest that it was powerless to take

00:23:10 suggest that it was powerless to take action against the use of K15 and it has attempted to blame local Authority building control bodies and labc it argues that if it had declined to issue final certificates on a development with

00:23:22 final certificates on a development with K15 it would not have made a difference because the matter would have been referred back to the local Authority who it is asserts would not have taken enforcement action Mr John Lewis of nhb

00:23:33 enforcement action Mr John Lewis of nhb C said this I think one points which we at nhbc did have in mind at the time was that legally if nhbc was not prepared to accept the building with K15 on it then

00:23:44 accept the building with K15 on it then that meant we would not be able to issue a final certificate and the regulatory process meant that then those schemes would have to revert back to local Authority building control for them to take enforcement action we had in the

00:23:55 take enforcement action we had in the back of our minds that labc had a certificate accepting it was a material of limited combustibility and we're generally accepting buildings with this material on it and so we were kind of thinking well is there a great deal of point in rejecting them and sending them

00:24:07 point in rejecting them and sending them back to the local Authority if they're likely still to still get only get approved under the local Authority's ways of doing things labc does not accept this is true labc is unaware of a

00:24:19 accept this is true labc is unaware of a single example of this happening in practice this is nhbc's way of abating its responsibility for building control if nhbc theing single largest private sector building control body in the

00:24:30 sector building control body in the country had declined to issue the certificate because it was not satisfied that K15 was safe and it had made clear that this was the basis for its refusal it is not accepted that lbc's members

00:24:41 it is not accepted that lbc's members would disregard that conclusion in the manner nhbc suggest concluding remarks in opening module six uh Council to the inquiry indicated that certain Court participants were attempting to obate or

00:24:54 participants were attempting to obate or smuggle something past Council to the inquiry whilst it's not clear which party CTI was referring to it is most definitely not labc labc has engaged fully with the

00:25:05 labc labc has engaged fully with the inquiry since 2018 in an open and honest Manner and has provided full and prompt disclosure labc also proactively highlighted where and why mistakes were made with this in mind labc must again

00:25:17 made with this in mind labc must again categorically refute any allegation that decisions or errors were made based on financial motivation or undue influence such allegations we say are entirely without Merit and not

00:25:29 without Merit and not evidence-based labc accepts historic M mistakes were made and it was manipulated by manufacturers who prayed on industrywide confusion to obtain labc certification it naively believed the

00:25:40 certification it naively believed the applicants acted in good faith labc has monitored the inquir proceedings and listened to the evidence presented extremely closely labc has acknowledged historic errors and has learned from

00:25:51 historic errors and has learned from these errors and addressed competency issues the steps it has taken included but are not limited to the creation uh of of independent accredited and audited standards framework for local Authority

00:26:02 standards framework for local Authority building control teams this quality management system ensures that surveyor competence is matched to project complexity it has developed offall accredited qualifications for building control professionals and it's developed

00:26:13 control professionals and it's developed a ucast audited competency validation assessment to measure competence of building control professionals it has also wound down its registered detail scheme however it does not regard its work as being done it wants to continue

00:26:25 work as being done it wants to continue to work to regain the Public's trust in that respect it will actively participate in the process of formulating phase 2 recommendations as it has been invited to do so by the panel that concludes my oral statement

00:26:37 panel that concludes my oral statement on behalf of labc and I'd like to thank you for affording me the time to address you well thank you very much Mr

00:26:45 Adamson the uh the next statement is going to be made by Mr Matthew but Queen's Council on behalf of the national house building Council so Mr BFD like to come up

00:27:04 thank you when you're ready then sir very much um nhbc repeats its commitment to assisting this inquiry to ensure that what occurred at gemfield Tower never

00:27:15 what occurred at gemfield Tower never happens again it is crucial that the house building industry learns from the events that took so many lives on the 14th of June 2017 nhbc again expresses its deepest

00:27:27 2017 nhbc again expresses its deepest condolences to those who lost loved ones in the grenfall tower fire to the survivors of that fire and to all those affected by this tragedy we invite the inquiry to analyze

00:27:40 tragedy we invite the inquiry to analyze the position of nhbc with the following six points in mind first of all as a building control body nhbc operates within a system that at its heart relies

00:27:51 within a system that at its heart relies upon subjective assessments regarding whether systems such as external wall Arrangements will meet the functional requirements of the building regulations that system is imposed by and can only

00:28:04 that system is imposed by and can only be strengthened by government secondly nhbc is only one of the large number of organizations offering building control services and it should not be held to a

00:28:16 services and it should not be held to a higher standard than others simply because of its market share where nhbc has been criticized for allowing combustible cladding systems to be used above 18 mters and in particular

00:28:29 be used above 18 mters and in particular K15 in Reliance upon BBA certificates nhbc did So based upon third-party assessment of products and materials as outlined in government Guidance the

00:28:41 outlined in government Guidance the evidence shows that a same or a less stringent approach was taken by other BCBS what this points to is a wider problem within the industry as opposed

00:28:52 problem within the industry as opposed to a failing by nhbc thirdly to the extent that nhbc C and others have been criticized for working with the building industry that

00:29:03 working with the building industry that was what government policy required of BCBS both at the relevant time and today there have been some suggestions that nhbc's actions in addressing the

00:29:15 that nhbc's actions in addressing the use of K15 were driven by a desire to hide past errors Andor were commercially motivated and that some evidence from nhbc Witnesses has been an exp poost

00:29:27 nhbc Witnesses has been an exp poost facto rational Iz ation given to the inquiry these are serious allegations which require cogent evidence before any such conclusion can be drawn the

00:29:38 such conclusion can be drawn the evidence is that between 2013 and 2014 it was primarily nhbc staff challenging kingspan requesting test

00:29:49 challenging kingspan requesting test evidence and ultimately driving the industry away from Reliance upon certificates which it is now known were issued in error and based upon deception

00:30:00 issued in error and based upon deception by

00:30:01 by manufacturers whilst nhbc accepts it should have done more and acted more quickly the panel will of course examine what other industry groups and BCBS were doing at the relevant time before

00:30:13 doing at the relevant time before drawing adverse conclusions against nhbc fifthly nhbc has always recognized that the use of testing or desktop

00:30:24 that the use of testing or desktop reports was only evidence that could assist in showing whether the minimum standards have been met as required wherever nhbc considered such reports as

00:30:35 wherever nhbc considered such reports as a means of showing compliance nhbc's own fire engineers and their line managers would critically evaluate the reports against the background of their own Professional Knowledge and experience

00:30:47 Professional Knowledge and experience further information would be required from the Builder Andor its fire engineer as necessary before nhbc would reach a conclusion as to whether all of the evidence showed that minimum standards

00:30:59 evidence showed that minimum standards have been met and sixthly whilst the actions of nhbc and its staff have been carefully scrutinized is important not to lose sight of the fact that nhbc was

00:31:11 to lose sight of the fact that nhbc was not involved at any stage in the refurb to gr grenal Tower the evidence is one way neither the guidance issued by nhbc nor that of the Industry Group the

00:31:22 nor that of the Industry Group the building control Alliance was applied referred to or contemplated by RB KC all the relevant Architects nhbc has undergone a period

00:31:33 Architects nhbc has undergone a period of self-reflection since the fire including in the wake of evidence heard at this inquiry to consider what it could have done differently during the relevant period and nhbc accepts the

00:31:45 relevant period and nhbc accepts the following first of all it should not have placed the level of Reliance it did upon the kingspan K15 BBA certificates given the potential for an error within

00:31:56 given the potential for an error within such certificates the evidence shows there was overreliance throughout the industry upon these the panel might think that a particularly unsatisfactory element of the current regime is that

00:32:08 element of the current regime is that independent certification is capable of showing evidence of compliance with the regulations but the test evidence Behind These certificates is confidential to the manufacturer and not available to

00:32:20 the manufacturer and not available to builders or BCBS who seek to rely upon that CER certificate instead the BC the BBA refers Builders and BCBS to the manufacturer for any additional or

00:32:33 manufacturer for any additional or supporting evidence they require nhbc submits this has created the opportunity for unscrupulous manufacturers to exploit certificates issued in error to an alarming degree

00:32:45 issued in error to an alarming degree had the BBA and others known that had there been a system whereby nhbc had been able to obtain the test evidence upon which some BBA certificates were based this would have

00:32:56 certificates were based this would have exposed Kings fans Mis conduct far earlier secondly nhbc accepts it should have acted more swiftly to change its own policy once the problems with kingspan became apparent the level of

00:33:09 kingspan became apparent the level of King span's deceit and manipulation that has been exposed in this inquiry is utterly shocking nhbc was not aware until receiving disclosure in this inquiry as to how far this manufacturer

00:33:21 inquiry as to how far this manufacturer was prepared to go to market its products it is accepted that one way of tackling the problem could have been for nhbc to refuse to issue building control

00:33:32 nhbc to refuse to issue building control final certificates where K15 was specified over 18 M it is hard to say in 2022 what effect this would have had had

00:33:43 2022 what effect this would have had had nhbc taken this stance alone at the time other BCBS would have issued building control final certificates and the possibility effective enforcement action would have been limited nevertheless

00:33:56 would have been limited nevertheless it's accepted that un natural action at that time would have raised awareness of the issue and could have forced swifter and more decisive action thirdly it's accepted that nhbc's 2016 guidance note

00:34:10 accepted that nhbc's 2016 guidance note was insufficiently clear this is in view of first of all the drafting of that document secondly the fact that unbeknownst to nhbc staff there was a

00:34:21 unbeknownst to nhbc staff there was a Class B 100% PE core ACM panel on the market in 2016 and thirdly what nhbc now knows about the quality of some option 3 reports

00:34:33 the quality of some option 3 reports which have been prepared in the industry the evidence however demonstrates that this guidance which could only apply to nhbc customers was not in fact used by the builders as a route to demonstrating

00:34:46 the builders as a route to demonstrating that any ACM PE cladding facades were compliant as the inquiry is aware nhbc is a private Company Limited by guarantee it has no share holders and is

00:34:58 guarantee it has no share holders and is nonprofit Distributing any Revenue above operating costs is reinvested in the organization to fund its purpose and ensure sufficient capital is in place to back its Insurance business nhbc

00:35:11 back its Insurance business nhbc provides building control services through its subsidiary nhbc BCS as an improved inspector nhbc is not the house building industry's regulator whilst

00:35:23 building industry's regulator whilst nhbc BCS must apply and interpret building regulat s and make judgments as to whether these have been complied with which nhbc staff confirm they do

00:35:34 which nhbc staff confirm they do fearlessly independently and without regard to commercial considerations this does not make nhbc a regulator in a technical or legal

00:35:45 technical or legal sense nhb's reputation built over more than 80 years is grounded in public industry and customer confidence in the safety of the buildings that it's

00:35:56 safety of the buildings that it's involved with for both both warranty and building control services upholding standards is a key part of ensuring that reputation is maintained each nhbc witness was

00:36:08 maintained each nhbc witness was questioned about their expertise and qualifications and it submitted that those in key positions at nhbc were suitably qualified and experienced to perform the roles required of them at

00:36:21 perform the roles required of them at the time of the fire in 2017 between Mr Evans Mr Lewis and Miss Marshall there was a combined total of nearly 100 years working in the building control industry Mr Evans has a degree

00:36:34 control industry Mr Evans has a degree in building surveying and since he began working as a building surveyor in 1991 he had been involved in buildings ranging from small houses to airport terminals and football stadiums Miss

00:36:47 terminals and football stadiums Miss Marshall holds a first class degree in building engineering and is a past president of the chartered Association of building Engineers Mr Lewis holds a BSC in construction management and an

00:36:58 BSC in construction management and an MSC in Fire and explosion engineering he has been a building surveyor since 1994 and from 2013 was a specialist fire engineer other external and internal

00:37:11 engineer other external and internal fire Engineers were employed where necessary this meant that for the key period in question from 2013 onwards nhbc had either internal Andor external

00:37:23 nhbc had either internal Andor external fire engineering advice available and its approach was always to take specialist external advice were required to the extent that it's been suggested to nhbc witnesses that they or

00:37:37 suggested to nhbc witnesses that they or nhbc's actions in dealing with kingspan were moed motivated either by a desire to cover up past mistakes or to increase market share for commercial Advantage

00:37:48 market share for commercial Advantage this is strongly refuted and is inconsistent with a fair reading of the evidence nhbc would ask the panel to consider the following matters in this regard first of all raising standards in

00:38:01 regard first of all raising standards in the industry and improving the quality of housing is why nhbc exists any profits that are made are reinvested for that purpose Brian Martin said that nhbc

00:38:13 that purpose Brian Martin said that nhbc was more than just a commercial Enterprise and had taken positive steps in dealing with combustible cladding problems the suggestion that standards were lowed for profit was strongly

00:38:24 were lowed for profit was strongly refuted by all nhbc Witnesses as Mr Evans said in evidence when it was put to him that it would have been bad for business had nhbc stopped accepting

00:38:35 for business had nhbc stopped accepting the use of K15 over 18 M it was not done to protect market share it was not done for any other reason than to allow industry to give us the information so

00:38:47 industry to give us the information so we could make an informed decision which we did in

00:38:50 we did in 2015 I'm a building control professional I've been in the industry 32 years at no time was any approach made to me to find a solution to protect nhbc's Integrity

00:39:02 a solution to protect nhbc's Integrity or historic buildings if anyone had I would not be working for that employer and this typified the reaction of all nhbc staff when such suggestions were

00:39:13 nhbc staff when such suggestions were put to them there is no evidence that could reasonably and safely lead to a conclusion that nhbc's actions were in some way designed to cover up past mistakes nhbc has disclosed all relevant

00:39:26 mistakes nhbc has disclosed all relevant communication and documents from Key Personnel over an extensive period no document has been identified which supports any posited theory that evidence now given is a

00:39:37 theory that evidence now given is a recent invention far less that nhbc was acting out of desire to secure a commercial Advantage the evidence shows clear and candid concern on the part of

00:39:48 clear and candid concern on the part of nhbc about in particular the actions of kingspan and a determination to get to the bottom of whether K15 was safe for use above M and if so in what

00:40:00 use above M and if so in what circumstances as to being driven by profits it was the evidence of Steve Evans that the letter sent to nhbc's customers in March 2015 informing them of the change in

00:40:12 2015 informing them of the change in nhbc procedure to require compliance with the BCA guidance note caused difficulties with nhbc customers and led to projects being rejected and negative

00:40:23 to projects being rejected and negative commercial consequences for nhbc one example of this this is the Apex project a warranty proposal where a desktop report was provided by the Builder supporting the use of ACM PE

00:40:36 Builder supporting the use of ACM PE cladding nhbc refused to provide a warranty for this building as its own internal procedures suggested that the cladding makeup was not compliant this refusal was made notwithstanding the

00:40:48 refusal was made notwithstanding the very full evidence provided from Dr Roman Connelly Who provided further updated reports insisting that the cladding was compliant with the regulations and presented an acceptable

00:40:59 regulations and presented an acceptable risk nhbc was also aware that this project had received a final certificate from the relevant local Authority Who provided building control for the project following this refusal a

00:41:11 project following this refusal a different warranty provider was content to offer a warranty and took a fee for doing so notwithstanding the presence of 100% PE ACM cladding in the facade John

00:41:23 100% PE ACM cladding in the facade John Lewis also gave evidence that nhbc's customers were complaining that nhbc was requiring more than their interpretation of ADB required which is supported by

00:41:34 of ADB required which is supported by contemporaneous correspondence CTI has also established from each of nhbc's witnesses that nhbc interpreted ADB as requiring compliance

00:41:45 interpreted ADB as requiring compliance with both paragraphs 12.7 and diagram 40 of ADB thus requiring that all elements of the cladding makeup including filler materials were materials of limited

00:41:57 materials were materials of limited compability as the inquiry has established this was far from the universal approach adopted across the industry with some designers manufacturers and Builders considering

00:42:08 manufacturers and Builders considering only the combustibility of the outer face and not its core had nhbc been attempting to lower standards for commercial Advantage then it could have chosen to interpret ADB as requiring

00:42:20 chosen to interpret ADB as requiring compliance with either paragraph 12.7 or diagram 40 which would have enabled combustible materials to be used in a wider variety of makeups without desktop reports it is untenable to suggest that

00:42:33 reports it is untenable to suggest that these were the actions of an organization seeking to lower standards for commercial Advantage this inquiry has confirmed that the building regulation regime

00:42:44 that the building regulation regime before the gfel fire was complex and non-prescriptive with a deficit of clear Guidance the extensive reform of fire safety and Building Safety regulation

00:42:56 safety and Building Safety regulation and guidance following the fire at greenfeld Tower amply demonstrates the pressing need for reform which existed in

00:43:04 in 2017 one of Dame Judith hackett's key findings was that the package of regulations and guidance in the form of approved documents can be ambiguous and inconsistent nhbc and the industry as a

00:43:17 inconsistent nhbc and the industry as a whole had to work within that imperfect framework it is the Builder's sole responsibility under the regulations to ensure Works complete comply with those

00:43:28 ensure Works complete comply with those regulations a BCB cannot provide a guarantee of compliance with the regulations and the process does not remove the obligation of the person carrying out the work to achieve

00:43:39 carrying out the work to achieve compliance an a AI also cannot insist on a higher standard than that set out in the building regulations there has long been confusion over the application of ADB so

00:43:51 confusion over the application of ADB so much so that the coroner in the lack andol inquest her honor judge Francis kirkin CBE made recommendations in 2013 to government in which she concluded

00:44:02 to government in which she concluded that ADB is the most difficult document to use her recommendations included the clear guidance in relation to regulation B4 with particular regard to the spread

00:44:13 B4 with particular regard to the spread of fire over the external envelope of the building was provided and expressed in words intelligible to the wide range of people engaged in construction maintenance and refurbishment of

00:44:24 maintenance and refurbishment of buildings the Secretary of State responded as set out at paragraph 43 of our written submissions assuring the coroner that the department was committed to a process of simplification

00:44:35 committed to a process of simplification and that research was commissioned which would feed into a review of ADD and a new addition in 201617 to ensure the guidance was capable of being more easily understood

00:44:47 capable of being more easily understood the reality however was that the recommendations within the lacanau house report were not acted upon before 2017 and instead government relied upon

00:44:58 2017 and instead government relied upon the industry to issue guidance in the interim industry guidance obviously does not have the same status as statutory or government guidance nevertheless mhg's

00:45:10 government guidance nevertheless mhg's approach was to rely on industry guidance to fill at least a temporary Gap where interpretation was required because it did not have according to Brian Martin a mechanism for changing

00:45:22 Brian Martin a mechanism for changing the approved documents very quickly so we tried to get industry guidance to resolve problems that might have Arisen in between reviews the evidence was that had industry not sought to adopt a

00:45:34 industry not sought to adopt a consistent application of the building regulations through guidance there would have been what Brian Martin described as a really big problem bigger than the one we're dealing with now nhb submits nhbc

00:45:47 we're dealing with now nhb submits nhbc submits that the house building industry should not have been placed in this position and the panel should be slow to criticize those who use their best efforts to ensure consistency and drive improved standards in the industry

00:45:59 improved standards in the industry whilst working within an imperfect system the use of combustible materials in construction is not new mhclg was aware of the issues concerning external

00:46:11 aware of the issues concerning external external cladding systems throughout the review of ADB which led to the 2006 Edition being published it was suggested to nhbc witnesses that Reliance upon the

00:46:23 to nhbc witnesses that Reliance upon the BBA certificate was an expost facto justification for nhbc accepting K15 this is strongly refuted Reliance on an independent certificate as evidence of

00:46:34 independent certificate as evidence of compliance is and was wholly permissible as confirmed by several authorities set out in paragraph 46 of our written submission the use of BBA certificates

00:46:46 submission the use of BBA certificates has long been a part of industrywide building control processes in the UK and remains so today nhbc of course accepts that in its role as an AI

00:46:57 that in its role as an AI it's concerned with whether there is compliance with a specific or functional requirement of the building regulations and is required to take reasonable steps to satisfy itself within the limits of

00:47:08 to satisfy itself within the limits of skill and Care in doing so BBA certificates may be relied upon by a BCB nhbc knew the BBA to be an accredited and trusted organization and had no

00:47:20 and trusted organization and had no reason to doubt his competence the actions of nhbc and respected the various ba certificates relating to in particular K15 do not however show that it blindly relied upon

00:47:33 however show that it blindly relied upon those certificates if that had been the case nhbc would not have needed to have undertaken its own extensive investigations into K15 the BBA certificate for K15 had been

00:47:46 K15 the BBA certificate for K15 had been in use and accepted by other BCBS since 2008 prior to 2013 no concerns have been raised in the industry or by government about it Mr

00:47:58 industry or by government about it Mr Evans told Mr Martin in July 2014 that on the basis of the BBA certificate of 2008 nhbc and other BCBS

00:48:09 certificate of 2008 nhbc and other BCBS had accepted the use of K15 this did not cause Mr Martin to contact Mr Evans and raise concerns over this it is beyond dispute that other BCBS accepted the BBA

00:48:20 dispute that other BCBS accepted the BBA certificate at face value and that this was standard practice within the industry it was Mr Evans evidence that other BCBS interpreted paragraph 7.3 of

00:48:31 other BCBS interpreted paragraph 7.3 of the certificate in the same way as nhbc that it allowed for K15 to be used over 18 M either based on the certificate alone or by reference to the

00:48:42 alone or by reference to the manufacturer this was confirmed in the Philip pettinger email of the 3rd of April

00:48:48 April 2014 in which he stated that on warranty only jobs nhbc are accepting K15 if the building control body is happy and deem it to comply they always are and always

00:49:00 it to comply they always are and always do Mr Turner of labc who had previously worked for a local Authority providing building control said that whenever in my role within a local Authority When

00:49:11 my role within a local Authority When anybody came to me with a product that I'd never heard of or not seen before my question was do it does it have a BBA certificate does it meet the requirements laid down indeed as the

00:49:23 requirements laid down indeed as the panel is aware and has just heard labc went further and issued its own registered detail certificate for K15 this was issued on the basis that K15 had the appropriate BBA certificate

00:49:35 K15 had the appropriate BBA certificate lbc's position remained supportive of K1 15's use even when concerns were raised with labc by another manufacturer there were also real

00:49:46 manufacturer there were also real problems with a BCB suddenly taking a unilateral stance to refused to accept the certificate as Mr Evans explained at the inquiry had nhbc refused to accept

00:49:57 the inquiry had nhbc refused to accept K15 its only real power as an AI would have been to refuse to issue a final certificate so that development would revert back to the local Authority for enforcement action Mr Lewis said that

00:50:10 enforcement action Mr Lewis said that nhbc knew that given a local Authority BCB would regard the use of K15 as compliant given the existence of the BBA certificate Andor the labc registered

00:50:22 certificate Andor the labc registered detail they were consequently unlikely to take enforcement action it is unclear how a local Authority could both accept K15 in its role as a

00:50:33 could both accept K15 in its role as a BCB but then also take enforcement action against a builder when they had used it regardless of the position of the AI who had acted for building

00:50:44 the AI who had acted for building control nhbc's refusal would not have stopped the use of K15 and was likely to have created more confusion in the industry Mr Evans was asked to explain

00:50:56 industry Mr Evans was asked to explain why he allowed nhbc surveyors to permit the use of K15 having seen the amended BBA certificate dated the 6th of April 2010 but published in

00:51:07 2010 but published in 2013 with retrospective effect which suggested K15 could be used in accordance with paragraph 12.7 first as Mr Evans explained nhbc

00:51:18 12.7 first as Mr Evans explained nhbc had questions at the time that it wished to explore when faced with this certificate produced by a reputable accredited body as Mr Evans said in our

00:51:29 accredited body as Mr Evans said in our mind there had to be a reason why BBA were making that statement King spam must have provided them with information at that time in order to make that statement what we wanted to understand

00:51:40 statement what we wanted to understand was what information had they provided what information had they got which we hadn't which allowed them to make that statement whilst it's of course accepted the king spam would not be able to show

00:51:51 the king spam would not be able to show that K15 was a Mulk it was not unreasonable to think that having apparently passed one test kingspan would be able to provide as repeatedly promised further tests which would

00:52:03 promised further tests which would demonstrate K15 reliability in a variety of wool

00:52:08 of wool makeups after the reissue of the certificate on the 17th of December 2013 nhbc knew the complex buildings being designed would not have concluded their construction stage for quite some

00:52:20 their construction stage for quite some time so there was time for nhbc to complete its investigation when King spam was repeatedly assuring it that it could provide further information to demonstrate compliance with the building

00:52:32 demonstrate compliance with the building regulations as the BBA would not provide the information used in its assessment nhbc took the only available route it had and raised its concerns and requests

00:52:43 had and raised its concerns and requests for evidence directly with kingspan Brian Martin's evidence was that in this difficult situation I thought nhbc waiting for more tests to come back was

00:52:54 waiting for more tests to come back was the best available answer we had nhbc was not permitting kingspan to Mark its own homework what it was doing was investigating the evidence to support

00:53:05 investigating the evidence to support King span's claims the fact that kingspan prevaricated and lied to nhbc significantly contributed to the length of the

00:53:14 of the process there was a suggestion in questioning of nhbc's witnesses that it could have sought information from the BBA the reality is the BBA would not have provided such information to nhbc

00:53:26 have provided such information to nhbc on the basis of its confidentiality agreement with kingspan and would have referred nhbc to kingspan with whom it was already in dialogue nhbc refutes any suggestion

00:53:38 dialogue nhbc refutes any suggestion that it took a LAX approach to fire safety the evidence is that nhbc was regarded as difficult by the building industry particularly in relation to building control and that this harmed

00:53:49 building control and that this harmed its commercial relationships contrary to any suggestion that nhbc was in League with kingspan Brian Martin said in evidence that nhbc was taking leadership over dealing with

00:54:01 was taking leadership over dealing with kingspan and that he saw nhbc doing this both as a positive thing and reflecting the way the government encouraged industry to behave nhbc's efforts to confront

00:54:13 behave nhbc's efforts to confront kingspan are evidenced by the volume of Correspondence seen by this inquiry which shows nhbc staff challenging kingspan and pressing it the test data absent which Builder customers would

00:54:26 absent which Builder customers would have been informed that the product would not be accepted for example on the 16th of June 2014 Mr Evans wrote to kingspan explaining that unless it provided additional test evidence nhbc

00:54:39 provided additional test evidence nhbc would need to consider whether it would accept K15 in buildings over 18 M as fit fit for purpose further on the 10th of October 2014 at a meeting with kingspan

00:54:50 October 2014 at a meeting with kingspan nhbc explained that unless it received a letter of comfort from BR and arap it would start to inform Builder customers the K15 was no longer acceptable in buildings over 18 M this was followed up

00:55:03 buildings over 18 M this was followed up by email where nhbc emphasized the need for kingspan to move quickly and the letter to kingspan dated the 5th of February

00:55:10 February 2015 in which nhbc set out the action it was taking and additional requirements that K15 would now be subject to these were then communicated to all nhbc

00:55:22 were then communicated to all nhbc Builder customers King spam was sufficiently concerned by nhbc's actions that they went as far as to instruct lawyers to threaten nhbc with an injunction which did not change nhbc's

00:55:35 injunction which did not change nhbc's decision to change its policy when considering the degree to which it's fair to be critical of nhbc for its approach the panel might ask what evidence there is of other BCBS

00:55:46 what evidence there is of other BCBS including local authorities taking similar steps during the relevant period whilst nhbc did more than others in the industry it accepts that it was not

00:55:57 industry it accepts that it was not enough in terms of BCA guidance Mr Evans explained that one of the reasons for the formation of the BCA was because as a profession BCBS didn't want to compete

00:56:09 a profession BCBS didn't want to compete on technical standards and as Builders shouldn't be shopping around for lower standards the panel must of course be careful to differentiate between nhbc

00:56:20 careful to differentiate between nhbc and the BCA the two organizations are separate and perform different functions from one another the BCA members are represented on his committees by professionals working

00:56:31 committees by professionals working within the building control industry with the expertise to contribute and review proposed guidance independently in putting their names to the guidance under the BCA umbrella each

00:56:43 the guidance under the BCA umbrella each member including labc had an obligation to its own organization to ensure that it reviewed and agreed with the terms of that guidance draft guidance was also

00:56:54 that guidance draft guidance was also provided to mhclg as a papers only member of the BCA aside from receiving relevant documents mhclg could and would occasionally attend meetings in relation

00:57:06 occasionally attend meetings in relation to the BCA guidance note Mr Martin said this was a short-term solution to the problem we've addressed both options three and four in our written closing

00:57:17 three and four in our written closing giving time constraints I will confine these oral submissions briefly to option three it is unsustainable to suggest that desktop assessment were a creation either by nhbc or the BCA or that they

00:57:31 either by nhbc or the BCA or that they were created to legitimize alleged past practice they were an established convention nhbc had seen desktop reports for other elements of construction such as fire doors and cavity barers Steve

00:57:45 as fire doors and cavity barers Steve Evans confirmed that these reports were part of our daily work the use of desktop reports for external Wall Systems was first raised not by nhbc or

00:57:56 Systems was first raised not by nhbc or by the BCA but at a meeting with and by wintech in November 2013 as documented in nhbc's noted the meeting and the evidence of steuart

00:58:07 meeting and the evidence of steuart Taylor of wintech such a report having been provided to wintech by the BR further at no time did mhclg raise any concerns or suggest that option three

00:58:19 concerns or suggest that option three was not compliant with ADB in an email to Mr Evans on the 21st of June 2016 Mr Mr Martin said I'm comfortable with the principle set out in the BCA guidance note the four options are a

00:58:32 guidance note the four options are a matter of fact Mr Martin's evidence was clear that the BCA guidance note was a good thing and that he said it was more restricted than at least some interpretations of ADB he also said it

00:58:45 interpretations of ADB he also said it made ADB safer where option three desktop assessments were provided to nhbc these would be scrutinized challenged and further Evidence required

00:58:56 challenged and further Evidence required where necessary before nhbc would issue a final certificate for building control purposes the process was that a fire engineer would review each option three assessment and it would then be

00:59:07 assessment and it would then be escalated to Steve Evans for a further review who would send it for formal internal signoff by a senior manager usually Diane Marshall or Ian Davis whilst not qualified fire Engineers Miss

00:59:19 whilst not qualified fire Engineers Miss Marshall and Mr Evans are long-standing professionals who are familiar with the requirements of the regulations had there been any desire to lower standards nhbc would not have put in place a

00:59:31 nhbc would not have put in place a multi-layered approvals process it is correct that Mr Martin discussed with nhbc concerns about some desktop reports

00:59:42 nhbc concerns about some desktop reports but he clarified these were not for nhbc projects Mr Martin said he was happy with how Mr Evans speaking on behalf of the BCA addressed the issue during his

00:59:53 the BCA addressed the issue during his presentation at the facad toour building conference in July 2016 and said he hoped this would improve the industry's understanding and provide Clarity until the issue could be

01:00:05 provide Clarity until the issue could be addressed by way of a review of ADB nhbc Witnesses have been closely questioned on the motive behind publication of technical guidance note

01:00:16 publication of technical guidance note 18 and if this was an attempt to make compliance easier it's important to repeat that it was the BCA and not nhbc that published the BCA guidance note the

01:00:27 that published the BCA guidance note the panel will also appreciate the point that if it was truly nhbc's motive to increase its own profits by winning more work for itself by allowing option three reports it would have issued the

01:00:39 reports it would have issued the guidance in its own name and not work with other bodies around the BCA table to produce review and issue the BCA Guidance the 2014 note was amended in

01:00:51 Guidance the 2014 note was amended in June

01:00:52 June 2015 to allow option three desktop assessments to be undertaken by any suitably qualified fire specialist as with all previous BCA guidance this was

01:01:03 with all previous BCA guidance this was agreed by all BCA members in the technical committee neither mhclg nor any members of the technical group raised the possibility that the term fire specialist might be misunderstood

01:01:16 fire specialist might be misunderstood and or lead to less qualified people undertaking the assessment as far as nhbc was concerned any review by it of a desktop assessment would have picked up any deficiencies including the expertise

01:01:29 any deficiencies including the expertise of the author there is no evidence the change in language in fact led to a dilution in standards as the inquiry is aware fire engineer is not a protected title the only way for that problem to

01:01:42 title the only way for that problem to be remedied is for regulation of this field of work which is something nhbc would welcome it was suggested to John Lewis that BR trust b135 guidance if

01:01:54 Lewis that BR trust b135 guidance if read side by side with ADB would suggest that option three was not a valid form of compliance and there as there was no means of extrapolating test data from BS 8414

01:02:07 extrapolating test data from BS 8414 tests the evidence is that this could not preclude option three from being a possible route to compliance not least of all as ADB sets out possible as opposed to exhaustive or prescriptive

01:02:19 opposed to exhaustive or prescriptive Roots paragraph 0.21 expressly states there may be alternative ways achieving compliance with the building regulations than provided in the guidance if it were the

01:02:31 provided in the guidance if it were the intention of government to exclude an otherwise standard route to compliance then this would be explicit to the contrary the effect of appendix a is to allow desktop assessments this was Brian

01:02:43 allow desktop assessments this was Brian Martin's understanding of the wording of b135 as explained to the inquiry as to the refurbishment of gremal tower rbkc did not refer to the BCA guidance during

01:02:54 did not refer to the BCA guidance during its work on grenal Tower Tower it had no impact on the project in terms of nhbc guidance the purpose of nhbc's external guidance was

01:03:06 purpose of nhbc's external guidance was to set out in a transparent manner that if the nhbc Builder customer could show it had followed that guidance nhbc building control services was likely to

01:03:18 building control services was likely to accept that project in question for building control purposes that was not however a foregone conclusion because nhbc would always check each project on

01:03:29 nhbc would always check each project on a caseby casee basis as explained in evidence the 2016 nhbc guidance note was based upon nhbc's experience of reviewing option three and option four

01:03:42 reviewing option three and option four reports there is simply no evidence that it resulted from lobbying by kingspan or any other

01:03:49 any other manufacturer the guidance note was launched at the July 2016 conference where Brian Martin was present and whose view was that this was in principle a permissible approach and did not widen

01:04:01 permissible approach and did not widen the roots to compliance within ADB nhbc has accepted there were shortcomings with the document and when asked by CTI Mr Evans said he did not

01:04:12 asked by CTI Mr Evans said he did not stand by the 2016 nhbc guidance note based upon the postfire mhclg testing importantly this guidance note was not in the event used to accept any

01:04:25 was not in the event used to accept any building with ACM cladding Steve Evans said that nhbc checked all builds which had used the 2016 note and no buildings with ACM cladding had used the guidance

01:04:36 with ACM cladding had used the guidance as a means of showing compliance after the fire nhbc reviewed all its relevant guidance to reflect the withdrawal of the 2016 guidance note

01:04:47 withdrawal of the 2016 guidance note this resulted in nhbc issuing new internal guidance in August 2017 then updated in December 2018 the 2016 guidance note could not have

01:04:59 the 2016 guidance note could not have been used when considering whether the cladding on greml Tower was compliant other BCBS should not have used nhbc guidance to complete their own work and the evidence is that rbkc did not do so

01:05:12 the evidence is that rbkc did not do so in fact the publication date um was after John hobin issued a final certificate for the refurbishment work John Lewis said in evidence that if grel Tower had been an nhbc project it would

01:05:25 Tower had been an nhbc project it would have been referred to him and he would not have accepted it finally reviews as has been well established nhbc conducted various reviews into projects where it provided

01:05:38 reviews into projects where it provided either building control services or warranty insurance that are relevant to combustible cladding the 2015 combustible cladding review looked at schemes that were registered from the

01:05:49 schemes that were registered from the first of January 2014 and projects still in build registered prior to that date this review required that for all projects which had commenced pre

01:06:00 projects which had commenced pre 20104 there was confirmation from kingspan the K15 was suitable for use over 18 M on that project for all projects where the notice was issued in

01:06:11 projects where the notice was issued in 2014 or 2015 nhbc ensured that one of the routes in the BCA guidance note had been followed which included checking the internal escalation procedure which

01:06:22 the internal escalation procedure which I've already explained none of the buildings in the 2015 review had specified the use of ACM cladding with a PE core the 2017 post Fire review looked initially

01:06:35 2017 post Fire review looked initially at projects that have been accepted under the 2016 nhbc guidance note as the basis for compliance a small number of buildings were identified which specified ACM cladding however none of

01:06:48 specified ACM cladding however none of these had used the 2016 guidance note as a route to show compliance and none had a PE core

01:06:56 a PE core the building specifying ACM were then investigated under the terms of nhbc's internal guidance b66 b600 which took account of new mhclg

01:07:08 b66 b600 which took account of new mhclg test evidence once this process had been completed it was extended to a review of all projects under construction to ensure that wherever option three or four have been used as a route to

01:07:19 four have been used as a route to compliance they met the required standard these two were checked under the revised procedure under b600 CTI has pressed nhbc witnesses as

01:07:30 b600 CTI has pressed nhbc witnesses as to why the reviews did not cover historical projects where nhbc had provided building control services as the high market share enjoyed by K15

01:07:41 the high market share enjoyed by K15 would suggest a large number of projects would have been completed with this product there are three matters we ask the panel to consider in this regard the first is an AI has no power to impose

01:07:54 first is an AI has no power to impose conditions or describe modifications to completed works the powers of an AI are unlimited and cease completely after a final certificate has been issued secondly in relation to buildings

01:08:07 secondly in relation to buildings constructed between 2008 and 2014 where K15 had been specified nhbc would have issued a final certificate assuming all other matters were compliant if K15 had been used in

01:08:20 compliant if K15 had been used in accordance with the BBA certificate including reference hav been made by the Builder to kingspan as the manufacturer once that had been issued nhbc would have no power to contact the

01:08:31 nhbc would have no power to contact the Builder and require or request the cladding Ed be checked thirdly this must take into account what has happened since

01:08:39 since 2017 there has of course been extensive publicity about K15 and combustible cladding Gally since the tragic fire at Granville this has led to inquiries with

01:08:50 Granville this has led to inquiries with Builders and warranty providers in order to establish whether the cladding that is has been used was compliant as a result Central and local government conducted his own review into properties

01:09:02 conducted his own review into properties which might have combustible cladding as the panel is aware after the grill fire a letter was sent to all local authorities asking them to assess all buildings over 18 MERS within their

01:09:14 buildings over 18 MERS within their region in order to assess risk from ACM cladding and nhb of course is cooperated with that process so in conclusion nhbc reiterates it commitment to assisting

01:09:26 reiterates it commitment to assisting the inquiry to ensure that what occurred at Grenville Tower never happens again we wish to reiterate that at all times nhbc acted with his core purpose to improve standards in house building

01:09:38 improve standards in house building often going further than other BCBS or industry bodies and that this came before any commercial considerations and finally nhbc is Keen to learn any lesson

01:09:49 finally nhbc is Keen to learn any lesson it can and to play its full part in ensuring an improved fire system in the UK house board industry for the future so those are my submissions well thank you very much Mr

01:10:00 you very much Mr but we are running a little bit ahead of time but I think that's a good point at which to take our afternoon break and when we come back we'll hear a final

01:10:11 when we come back we'll hear a final statement from D UHC which is going to be delivered by Mr Beer Queen's Council uh we'll rise now we'll come back at 25 3 and then we'll

01:10:23 we'll come back at 25 3 and then we'll hear Mr be thank you very much much 25 stream

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01:26:22 and now finally this afternoon we're get to hear a closing statement from uh on behalf of the department for leveling up uh housing and communities made by Mr

01:26:33 uh housing and communities made by Mr Jason beer Queen's Council thank you very much thank you very much sir um I'll again refer to um the department as the department yes and as it has done throughout the inquiry the department

01:26:45 throughout the inquiry the department has um assisted and supported uh module six by providing by way of disclosure thousands of documents to the inquiry by providing 26 witness statements to the

01:26:56 providing 26 witness statements to the inquiry from 19 Witnesses ranging from the then Secretary of State to former ministers to the then permanent secretary other senior civil servants

01:27:08 secretary other senior civil servants and very Junior civil servants from which number the inquiry heard oral evidence from 10 departmental Witnesses and finally by setting out in

01:27:19 Witnesses and finally by setting out in its 45-page written opening statement its position in Rel to the issues uh that arise in part two of module six of the inquiry namely the adequacy or

01:27:30 the inquiry namely the adequacy or otherwise of the building regulations and approved documents as well as the amendments to them the adequacy or otherwise of other standards and guidance including in relation to fire

01:27:42 guidance including in relation to fire safety measures the fitness for purpose of the testing certification and classification regime for exterior War materials and the adequacy or otherwise of the Department's response to

01:27:53 of the Department's response to recommendations from various sources in the Years leading up to the fire on the 14th of June

01:27:59 June 2017 as the department set out in its written opening it accepts responsibility for the failures of the past and in particular its failure to

01:28:10 past and in particular its failure to understand how and whether the regulatory system was working in practice or how it was being enforced in this regard the department failed to exercise sufficient oversight

01:28:22 failed to exercise sufficient oversight of a system that it owed as the sponsoring government Department furthermore the department accepts that it should have put in place a system that enabled officials within the

01:28:33 that enabled officials within the department to take on board to work on and then to progress the lessons learned and recommendations given following other fires including those tragic events at Lenell house in July

01:28:46 events at Lenell house in July 2009 whilst the Department's recognition of these failures cannot change the terrible events of the 14th of July 2017 nor atone for the immeasurable loss and

01:28:57 nor atone for the immeasurable loss and grief suffered by the bed survivors and residents the department hopes that its sincere commitment to learning the lessons of this tragedy will give a measure of Solace to those

01:29:09 measure of Solace to those affected the issues that arose for the inquiry in module 6 Phase 2 can be summarized in the following way up until June 2017 what was the system in place

01:29:22 June 2017 what was the system in place for the testing uh certification and classification of exterior W products up until June 2017 what was the legislative system in place in England and Wales in respect of uh building

01:29:34 and Wales in respect of uh building regulations and what role did the department play in it how did the regulatory system develop and was it adequate what recommendations were made and from what sources as relevant to the

01:29:45 and from what sources as relevant to the risk of fire at Grenville on the 14th of June 2017 bearing in mind its composition and occupancy and and what steps did the department take to address

01:29:56 steps did the department take to address such recommendations were those uh steps appropriate as related to the risk of fire in high-rise residential buildings the extent to which any inadequacies in the building regulations

01:30:08 inadequacies in the building regulations approved documents standards or other guidance or to what extent any failure to act upon warnings or recommendations as to the risk of fire spread in high-rise residential buildings caused

01:30:20 high-rise residential buildings caused or contributed to the manner and speed of the spread of farm at Grenville Tower the extent of the damage and the number of casualties is ultimately a matter for the

01:30:31 the inquiry turning briefly then to the testing certification and classification of exterior War products this is an area in which the department has historically

01:30:42 in which the department has historically had less

01:30:43 had less involvement and I will therefore leave it to other better place core participants to outline the relevant structure for the inquiry however not withstanding the extent of the department

01:30:54 extent of the department historical involvement it has listened carefully to the evidence throughout the inquiry and notes that this evidence has established that the system of testing and certification was being gained by

01:31:06 and certification was being gained by certain

01:31:08 certain manufacturers the department has already introduced the building safety act uh 2022 Paving the way for a new National regulator for Construction

01:31:21 regulator for Construction Products covering all Construction Products marketed in the UK with powers to withdraw products from the market if they present a safety risk in addition this will no doubt be

01:31:34 risk in addition this will no doubt be one of the issues considered by the independent review of the effectiveness of the system that the department has already established in line with the findings of Dame Judith hackit to the extent that the inquiry is

01:31:46 hackit to the extent that the inquiry is considering within module 7 the adequacy or otherwise of small scale tests as a means of classifying exterior W products and the issue of desktop assessments as a means for certifying such systems the

01:31:59 a means for certifying such systems the department looks forward to any recommendations from that evidence however the Department's preliminary view is that both retain some benefit as methods of classifying products and

01:32:10 methods of classifying products and demonstrating compliance and in this regard I would highlight the point made in the written closing submissions of this module by others namely that tests and particularly small scale tests

01:32:22 and particularly small scale tests should not be reli on in a vacuum a competent designer should also consider how those components are to be used within a whole system and that issue of

01:32:33 within a whole system and that issue of the competent designer is one to which I will return later so the system of building regulations and the Department's role in it the department set out in some detail in its written

01:32:45 set out in some detail in its written opening for module 6 the Genesis and development of the regulatory system of the building regulations and I will therefore not repeat that here however the essential features of it

01:32:56 however the essential features of it noting that some of them have now changed through the building safety act and which are relevant to the issues that I'm going to address are as follows first the system enshrined at

01:33:08 follows first the system enshrined at the time in legislation by the building act 1984 and the various building regulations made there under was and continues to be an outcomes-based regulatory model which provided

01:33:20 regulatory model which provided flexibility in an era of complex infinitely varied and evolving systems of

01:33:26 of construction the secretary of state has responsibility for uh the overall system and the department is the sponsoring Department approved documents are

01:33:37 Department approved documents are produced under the provisions of the 1984 act and are approved by the Secretary of State to provide guidance for those involved in the construction industry for common building situations

01:33:49 industry for common building situations there was and still is no legal requirement to follow the guidance provided in an approved document whilst the approved documents cover a range of topics approved document be obviously concerned fire

01:34:01 document be obviously concerned fire safety the fire protection of buildings including their design is a complex subject and therefore whilst approved document B is int intended to provide guidance for common situations such

01:34:14 guidance for common situations such guidance is necessarily for the benefit of competent professionals that is something which is recognized by others in their written closing submissions where it is suggested that it is quote

01:34:26 where it is suggested that it is quote obvious from a perusal of paragraphs 12.5 to 12.9 of approved document B that compliance with the linear route is an issue that should have required expert

01:34:37 issue that should have required expert advice and input on behalf of the department I would respectfully agree the system was a decentralized one and once the secretary of state had set the standards in the form of the

01:34:49 the standards in the form of the building regulations and if or he or she chose to do so given guidance by way of the approved documents it was then for local authorities to Monitor and enforce

01:35:00 local authorities to Monitor and enforce compliance the department did not at that time have any superintending role within the building regulations to ensure that local authorities were carrying out their role

01:35:11 carrying out their role properly both local Authority building control bodies and approved inspectors can provide certification that works have been carried out in accordance with the building regulations the department

01:35:22 the building regulations the department played no role in that ultimately it is for the person carrying out the building Works whether themselves or through their contractors to comply with the provisions of the building regulations I would invite the

01:35:35 building regulations I would invite the inquiry to keep those propositions as to the system in place at the time in mind when considering the evidence given by the department and other Witnesses during the course of the module 6

01:35:47 during the course of the module 6 hearings so the development of the building regulations in approved document B this inquiry has heard heard a great deal of evidence detailing the changes to the building regulations and

01:35:58 changes to the building regulations and the approved documents spanning a period of 32 years from the building regulations 1985 to the date of the fire in respect of the building regulations themselves whilst there was

01:36:09 regulations themselves whilst there was a period in which functional requirement B4 was arguably stronger at least semantically because the word adequately was omitted I would note the conclusion

01:36:21 was omitted I would note the conclusion respectfully that the inquiry during its phase one report namely quote although in another context there might be room for argument about the precise scope of the word adequately it inevitably

01:36:34 the word adequately it inevitably contemplates that the exterior must resist the spread of fire to some significant degree appropriate to the height use and position of the building the department respectfully

01:36:45 building the department respectfully submits that that is exactly the conclusion that should be drawn when the inquiry is considering functional requirement B4 and that it must follow that the inclusion or exclusion of the

01:36:57 that the inclusion or exclusion of the word adequately does not materially affect the suitability of this drafting a competent professional would or should have understood that functional requirement B4 INE inevitably

01:37:09 requirement B4 INE inevitably contemplated that the exterior wall of a high-rise building must resist the spread of fire to some significant degree turning to the approved document

01:37:21 degree turning to the approved document the department accepts that the inquiry has identified aspects of the drafting in various versions of ADB that were potentially confusing to Industry and to building

01:37:33 confusing to Industry and to building control much of the inquiry's evidence on the issues identified within approved document B focused on the 2006 Edition and the amendment of the title to

01:37:45 and the amendment of the title to paragraph 12.7 to quote insulation materials stroke products and the introduction of the word filler whilst the department accepts as uh did

01:37:56 whilst the department accepts as uh did Mr Martin during his evidence that both of these amendments were capable of causing confusion the department would reiterate that a competent professional face with the decision as to whether to

01:38:07 face with the decision as to whether to use for example an acmp panel should have in the face of any ambiguity in approved document B been referring themselves back to the functional requirement and considering whether

01:38:20 requirement and considering whether specifying a product such a product would me meet the overall objective of ensuring that the exterior wall in question resisted the spread of fire to some significant

01:38:31 some significant degree the department would suggest that it is plain that the professionals engaged in the refurbishment of gemville Tower and those professionals engaged in the construction and refurbishment of

01:38:42 the construction and refurbishment of other high-rise residential blocks in the country cannot claim to have seriously turn their minds to the question of compliance with functional requirement B4 in any meaningful way

01:38:54 requirement B4 in any meaningful way furthermore the preponderance of high-rise buildings clad with acmp panels and combustible insulation demonstrates that local Authority building control and approv inspectors were not applying their minds or not

01:39:06 were not applying their minds or not competently applying their minds to the basic functional requirement but this position is supported by the br's written closing submissions for this module and indeed

01:39:17 submissions for this module and indeed by Professor bisby's report phase two regulatory testing and the path to Grenville the paragraphs 929 and 930 to the extent that it has been suggested by some core participants that

01:39:29 suggested by some core participants that the Department's interpretation of filler as including the core of an acmp PE panel is an ex postf facto rationalization or that it R represents

01:39:41 rationalization or that it R represents a political lie this must be viewed against the unequivocal evidence of the br's witnesses that approved document B in 2006 prohibited the use of acmp PE

01:39:53 in 2006 prohibited the use of acmp PE panels there has been no collusion between the department and other parties in asserting that the term filler was intended to cover the core of such panels the simple truth is that CES were

01:40:06 panels the simple truth is that CES were one of the things to use Mr Martin's term that the word filler was intended to

01:40:12 to cover it was the Department's belief throughout the period in question that if a competent professional applied the provisions of paragraph 12.7 of approved document B correctly

01:40:23 document B correctly it prohibited the use of acmp panels because of the presence of Highly comb of the highly combustible core to the extent that it has been argued by arconic that the wide use of acmp panels

01:40:37 arconic that the wide use of acmp panels demonstrates that they were treated as acceptable by government I would invite the inquiry to consider that the Department's role was a decentralized one and it did not hold any sort of

01:40:49 one and it did not hold any sort of database about what products were being specified and where this is supported Again by the written closings of the BR which reinforced the Department's position that generally

01:41:01 Department's position that generally compliance with the building regulations and guidance was thought to be being achieved and that until relatively recently before the 14th of July 2017 the department was not aware that acmpe

01:41:14 the department was not aware that acmpe panels and insulation were being widely used in

01:41:18 used in practice certain core participants have suggested that the department adopted a head in the sand approach rather than facing up to the predictable Legacy of buildings clad with acmp panels for the

01:41:32 buildings clad with acmp panels for the reasons that I've just explained this is not the case properly considered and applied by a competent professional functional requirement B4 would not permit the use of such materials and ADB

01:41:43 permit the use of such materials and ADB 2006 was always intended to effectively prohibit the specification of composite materials with combustible CES the department in its decentralized role

01:41:54 department in its decentralized role with a lack of any super superintending function did not appreciate such materials were being widely specified in practice until much later turning to relevant

01:42:06 later turning to relevant recommendations and the Department's response the department has set out in its closing submissions for module six a chronological list of its responses to

01:42:18 chronological list of its responses to historical recommendations and it accepts that it failed to take heed of the various warnings given over a number of years that might have enabled it to identify

01:42:30 that might have enabled it to identify the widespread compliance with the building regulations that the inquiry has

01:42:35 has uncovered because the inquiry has our written closing I do not propose to rehearse each occasion on which the department accepts that it missed an opportunity to reflect on whether the

01:42:47 opportunity to reflect on whether the building regulation system was operating as intended but I would wish to take this opportunity to respond to one discreet Point made by some of uh the

01:42:58 discreet Point made by some of uh the bereaved survivors and residents in their written closing submissions for this module and to reinforce the reasons why the department considers that those recommendations and warning warnings

01:43:09 recommendations and warning warnings were not heeded in the way that the bed survivors and residents might have expected them to have been dealing first with a point made in BR BSR team 1's uh closing submissions

01:43:23 BR BSR team 1's uh closing submissions it's asserted that the inquiry should draw conclusions from a document suggesting that the Nole Heights Fire be quote

01:43:32 quote downplayed or played down the simple point I would wish to make in response to this is that the inquiry hasn't heard any evidence any oral evidence from any

01:43:43 any evidence any oral evidence from any witness who can speak to what the intention of that suggestion was what lay behind it but what it meant and therefore the inquiry should now submission be slow to draw any

01:43:55 submission be slow to draw any conclusions in respect of it as to the reasons why the department missed the opportunities presented to inquire into the effective operation of the

01:44:05 the system the department would suggest respectfully that there fourfold firstly the lack of a formal oversight role for the Department in the regulatory

01:44:16 regulatory framework secondly and connected to that a Reliance on industry thirdly Financial constraints in the

01:44:27 thirdly Financial constraints in the department and fourthly the deregulatory policy the department would suggest that these elements combined led to a situation where officials felt unable to

01:44:39 situation where officials felt unable to escalate concerns when they arose it's apparent from the submissions made by other core participants that it is appreciated that Financial

01:44:50 is appreciated that Financial constraints are accepted to have had an impact on the Department's operations it's a particular note that others recognize that whilst Mr Martin himself asserted that he was a single

01:45:03 himself asserted that he was a single point failure in reality responsibility was not one that could possibly fall on one person's shoulders in respect of deregulation

01:45:14 shoulders in respect of deregulation whilst the department would not accept that the delays to the publication of the seven work streams was due to it being quote enslaved to the deregulatory

01:45:26 being quote enslaved to the deregulatory agenda despite safety warnings as has been suggested by others the delays I would suggest are primarily demonstrative of an underappreciate of the risks by the

01:45:38 underappreciate of the risks by the department in not updating approved document B sooner based upon a false understanding that the system was generally operating as it should be but

01:45:50 generally operating as it should be but the department would accept that deregulation played a part in underpinning a culture in the department where officials felt unable properly to escalate warnings

01:46:03 unable properly to escalate warnings when they were raised or to progress work in response to recommendations and in particular those made by the coroner following the laal house fire the department would accept that an

01:46:15 fire the department would accept that an exemption from the building regul for the building regulations or at least those aspects of them which concerned life safety should have been sought from the deregulatory

01:46:27 the deregulatory agenda although to the extent that it's suggested by the fbu that Dame Melanie herself should have known about the lack of such an exemption apparently drawing

01:46:38 of such an exemption apparently drawing the fbu do a direct line between her time as permanent secretary and Lord Pickle's time as permanent secretary I would um respectfully remind the inquiry that Dame Melanie was only in post as

01:46:50 that Dame Melanie was only in post as permanent secretary during Lord Pickle's tenure for 10 and 1 half weeks the department regrets that such a culture was allowed to form and has

01:47:01 culture was allowed to form and has overhauled its risk management procedures in the Years following the fire to ensure that in future risks are properly flagged and are escalated the department remains

01:47:12 escalated the department remains committed to learning from the tragedy and to taking steps to ensure that such a fire canot happen again in England and Wales the fire safety act

01:47:24 Wales the fire safety act 2021 and the building safety act 2022 will bring about improvements in building safety the biggest improvements in building safety for a

01:47:37 in building safety for a generation the latter act paves the way for the establishment of the building safety regulator Under the Umbrella of the health and safety executive and a new National regulator for Construction

01:47:48 new National regulator for Construction Products as part of the office for product safety and standards in addition the department has committed to invest 5.1 billion to address the

01:48:00 to invest 5.1 billion to address the fire safety risks caused by unsafe cladding of which 1.7 billion pound has already been allocated an additional £60 million has been provided to replace waking watch

01:48:12 been provided to replace waking watch measures with fire alarms in all buildings regardless of height all the nature of the building all the reason for needing the watch the building safety act puts

01:48:23 watch the building safety act puts residents at the heart of the building safety regime and it gives them a strong voice in the management of their Building Safety it ensures all residents are informed about building safety are

01:48:36 are informed about building safety are engaged in how their building is kept safed and are empowered to be able to challenge those responsible for their safety in addition the department has removed much of the burden for meeting

01:48:49 removed much of the burden for meeting the cost of remediation from lease holders as well as improving lease holders ability to seek redress extending liabilities to include Associated companies and extending

01:49:00 Associated companies and extending limitation periods are part of this this and other work in the department will help ensure that those who created building safety issues pay for them to be fixed and that the work is done

01:49:12 be fixed and that the work is done promptly the department continues to seek pledges from developers those companies who have profited from the broken building regulation system to to remediate life critical fire safety

01:49:25 remediate life critical fire safety defects in buildings over 11 m in height without recourse to the government's 5.1 billion pound F fund to date 45 residential development

01:49:36 fund to date 45 residential development companies have signed such pled pledges and the department actively seeks pledges from others whilst the department maintains that the tragedy at gemville could have

01:49:48 that the tragedy at gemville could have been avoided had those professionals engaged in its refurbishment actually stopped and properly considered the use of acmp panels and combustible

01:49:59 of acmp panels and combustible insulation as against the simple functional requirements set down in paragraph B4 of schedule one to the building regulations a position supported by the closing submissions

01:50:10 supported by the closing submissions made in this module on behalf of many bed survivors and residents the department recognizes that it too Bears the responsibility for failing to take notice of warnings that the regulatory

01:50:22 notice of warnings that the regulatory system

01:50:23 system was inadequate and operating sufficiently poorly such that it would permit such a state of affairs to arise the department will continue to reflect on the evidence that has been heard

01:50:34 on the evidence that has been heard throughout module 6 as it works to reform the building safety system and we'll look forward to receiving the inquiry recommendations in due course that's the Department's closing

01:50:45 that's the Department's closing submission well thank you very much Mr

01:50:49 V well that brings us to the end of the all statements uh closing module 6 so we shall rise in just a moment it only

01:51:00 shall rise in just a moment it only remains me to say that there will be no hearing of the inquiry tomorrow we shall resume on Monday of next week at 10:00 when we shall hear closing statements

01:51:12 when we shall hear closing statements relating to module

01:51:18 4 so uh that's the end for today we'll resume 10:00 on Monday next week thank you very much

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