Module 6 Openings - Monday 6th December 2021 (1/2)

Full transcript

00:00:22 hmm

00:00:31 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing

00:00:34 hearing today we're going to hear opening statements in relation to the remaining topics in module 6 from those of the core participants who wish to make an oral statement but first we're going to

00:00:46 oral statement but first we're going to hear from councils of the inquiry mr richard millett queen's council yes mr mr chairman good morning to you good morning members of the panel today marks the start of the next section of module 6 of this inquiry

00:00:59 section of module 6 of this inquiry in this phase we are going to be looking in detail at the actions of successive governments in addressing fire safety in the built environment in light of the evidence you have

00:01:10 in light of the evidence you have already heard in modules one two three and five of the inquiries work important questions arise about the regulation of fire safety in the years

00:01:21 regulation of fire safety in the years before the grenfell tower fire anybody who has followed the work of this inquiry to date will appreciate that much has already been said both by factual and by expert witnesses about

00:01:33 factual and by expert witnesses about the adequacy and the clarity of the regulatory regime which applied to grenfell tower during the time of its refurbishment and its management that is to say

00:01:44 its management that is to say principally the building regulations and the rro

00:01:48 the rro this will be an opportunity for those who had responsibility for the regulation of fire safety to explain their acts and their omissions at the time and to explain why they did

00:02:00 at the time and to explain why they did and said what the record shows the evidence that you are about to hear over the coming months will enable you the panel to understand first the wider context in which those responsible for

00:02:13 context in which those responsible for making the decisions about the refurbishment at grenfell tower came to make the decisions that they did second the context in which the various manufacturers made and sold pe cord acm

00:02:26 manufacturers made and sold pe cord acm panels

00:02:27 panels and combustible insulation and in which the bre carried out tests and research and the bba and other bodies came to certify those products

00:02:39 bodies came to certify those products the wider context in which the tmo managed the building and purported to discharge its statutory obligations in relation to fire safety and fire risk assessments

00:02:50 assessments the further background and context for the lfb's own actions their own emissions and their understandings in the years between latino house in 2009 and grenfell tower in june 2017.

00:03:04 and grenfell tower in june 2017. much of that evidence you will will already have heard what you will hear will also put you in the best possible position to make appropriate recommendations for future

00:03:15 appropriate recommendations for future change

00:03:17 change government when examining the work of successive governments before the grenfell tower fire we will be asking four essential questions

00:03:27 questions first were the risks from fire in high-rise buildings properly understood by government before the grenfell tower fire

00:03:36 fire second

00:03:38 second had lessons been learned from previous relevant incidents both in the united kingdom and overseas third

00:03:45 third what steps had and had not been taken by government to address the risks from fire in high-rise buildings and fourth what motivated government in

00:03:56 and fourth what motivated government in the approach which it did take to fire safety prior to the grenfell tower fire when undertaking this investigation we will be looking at very closely at the

00:04:07 will be looking at very closely at the functional requirements of the building regulations and the relevant guidance in relation to fire safety including the practical guidance issued pursuant to statute such as approved

00:04:18 pursuant to statute such as approved document b on fire safety that will include detailed consideration of a number of things including first the development and interpretation of the relevant building regulations and associated

00:04:30 building regulations and associated guidance over the relevant years and second reviews of and amendments to the building regulations and associated guidance including relevant consultations

00:04:41 consultations inevitably given the findings of this inquiry in the phase one report and the role of the external wall at grenfell in promoting rapid flame spread

00:04:52 grenfell in promoting rapid flame spread we will be focusing particularly closely on the regulation of external wall materials

00:04:59 materials and some central questions we'll be examining include the following first what changes if any were made to relevant guidance including approved document b to address the risks posed by

00:05:10 to address the risks posed by combustible external wall materials on tall buildings as they were perceived from time to time second why national class naught remained a relevant performance

00:05:22 remained a relevant performance requirement in paragraph 6 12.6 of approved document b dealing with external surfaces third how and why clause 12.7 of

00:05:34 third how and why clause 12.7 of approved document b came to be worded in the way that it did and what it covered in setting a quotes limited combustibility unquote's requirement for certain materials

00:05:46 requirement for certain materials fourth how and why the alternative route of large-scale testing was introduced into approved document b and finally the emergence of desktop studies in 2014

00:05:59 studies in 2014 as a further route to compliance with approved document b we will be looking closely at government policy on relevant aspects of fire safety and the evidential or other basis

00:06:10 safety and the evidential or other basis for such policies we will seek to understand what motivated government at different stages in its approach to fire safety and building regulation and what it knew about the building

00:06:21 and what it knew about the building industry including its approach to compliance and its culture this will include an examination of fire safety research commissioned by the ministry for housing communities and

00:06:33 ministry for housing communities and local government now known as the department for leveling up housing and communities and other relevant organizations the conclusions drawn by those organizations and any action taken by government in relation to such

00:06:46 by government in relation to such research

00:06:47 research we'll be looking in detail also at relevant matters raised in relation to fire safety by external individuals and organizations including coroners and other relevant bodies

00:06:58 other relevant bodies of particular pertinence to the grenfell tower fire is the inquest into the six deaths in lachnal house in july 2009 not least because of the recommendations

00:07:09 not least because of the recommendations that the coroner directed at central government that came to be of great relevance to the fire at grenfell tower that inquest ran as i as i think you know from the evidence we've heard

00:07:20 know from the evidence we've heard already from january to march 2013 it's already been the subject of considerable attention in module 5 and the first part of module 6. we'll be exploring what investigations

00:07:31 we'll be exploring what investigations were carried out following that fire what evidence was given to the inquest on behalf of the government and its officials

00:07:39 officials and its advisors together with the nature the extent and the adequacy of the response of central government to the coroner's detailed recommendations in late march 2013

00:07:51 in late march 2013 we intend to scrutinize the steps taken by government in response to recommendations made by inquiries by inquests parliamentary committees experts and industry associations

00:08:04 experts and industry associations and to examine the conclusions reached following investigations into previous fires

00:08:09 fires that will involve consideration about how

00:08:13 about how thoroughly previous fires were actually investigated whether appropriate lessons were learned from those fires whether those lessons were learnt were made public and communicated to relevant

00:08:24 public and communicated to relevant stakeholders and what if any changes were brought about to the relevant regulatory regime as a result of those earlier fires that examination will include

00:08:35 that examination will include a particular consideration of the noseley heights fire in liverpool in 1991 the garnet caught fire in irving in scotland in 1999 and the edge fire in

00:08:46 scotland in 1999 and the edge fire in salford in 2005. we will also want to understand what lessons were learnt from other similar fires including those which occurred abroad

00:08:57 including those which occurred abroad such as the spate of cladding fires in tall buildings in the uae between 2012 and 2016 and the la crosse fire in melbourne in australia in 2014

00:09:08 melbourne in australia in 2014 we will be asking what the government knew

00:09:11 knew about these fires and whether any appropriate steps were taken to address the risks which were identified in those fires

00:09:19 fires we will also be examining central government's actions in response to the latino house coroner's recommendations and the lfb's request for assistance about the meaning about the scope of the

00:09:31 about the meaning about the scope of the rro and about the setting of competency standards for fire risk assessors we will be hearing further evidence about the production of the 2011 local authority local government authority

00:09:43 authority local government authority lga guidance fire safety and purpose-built blocks and in particular its treatment of vulnerable persons and of the fire risks posed by external cladding systems

00:09:55 cladding systems we will also investigate the role of central government in the drafting and production of the addition of gra 3.2 firefighting in high-rise buildings published in february 2014

00:10:06 published in february 2014 and in particular its treatment of the risks posed by cladding and other modern methods of construction and also its treatment of the stay put policy and evacuation strategy and its

00:10:18 policy and evacuation strategy and its consistency or otherwise with the lga's guidance

00:10:22 guidance treatment on the same subject the inquiry plans to hear oral evidence from a number of previous ministers and officials within the ministry for housing communities and local government

00:10:33 housing communities and local government and from officials within the fire safety unit of the home office together with other key advisors to government including personnel at the bre the british the building research

00:10:44 bre the british the building research establishment testing and certification in this part of module 6 we will also be undertaking a more holistic examination of the testing and

00:10:55 holistic examination of the testing and certification regime picking up from where the inquiry left off in module 2 and asking broader questions about the way in which the testing and certification regime led to a situation

00:11:07 certification regime led to a situation whereby many buildings like grenfell tower were clad in combustible materials in the years prior to 2017. we will be focusing in particular on the

00:11:18 we will be focusing in particular on the following first the development of the various standards and criteria relevant to fire safety for external wall arrangements including testing to bs 8414 and the br1

00:11:31 including testing to bs 8414 and the br1 35 criteria also the development of the practice of carrying out desktop assessments the standards procedures and operational practices of accredited fire test

00:11:42 practices of accredited fire test organizations such as the bre the standards procedures and operational practices of certification bodies such as labc the local authority building control

00:11:53 control the system of accreditation for testing and classification bodies the development of guidance in relation to fire safety of external wall systems produced by manufacturers industry

00:12:04 produced by manufacturers industry associations and standards setting organizations the role of organizations such as the national house building council and hbc and the labc

00:12:15 and the labc the interaction between manufacturers testing and classification organizations certification and accreditation bodies industry associations and standard setting organizations

00:12:27 setting organizations and the oversight and regulation of the regime for testing classification and certification as a whole in relation to fire safety and performance in fire and finally

00:12:38 and finally to add to that long list the role of central government in all oversite or any oversight including in relation to the guidance produced by manufacturers industry associations or other similar

00:12:50 industry associations or other similar organizations we therefore intend to hear oral evidence from witnesses from the following organizations involved in the testing and certification regime first the labc

00:13:02 first the labc then nhbc

00:13:04 then nhbc ucas uk as united kingdom accreditation service

00:13:08 service the center for windows and cladding technology cwct about which you've already heard something and the bre in relation to the structure of this part of module six we will begin with

00:13:20 part of module six we will begin with opening statements today from some eight of the core participants our sets of core participants then from wednesday this week 8th december we will begin to hear evidence from the labc as

00:13:32 begin to hear evidence from the labc as part of the testing and certification evidence which we will be taking first before moving on to the central government witnesses in the last part of module 6.

00:13:42 module 6. we currently anticipate that this remaining part of module 6 will last some 12 weeks and will conclude in early april 2022 allowing for a short break during january 2022

00:13:55 during january 2022 by way of postscript by the time this week is over many will have read the opening written submissions of the public or quasi-public bodies from whose witnesses

00:14:07 quasi-public bodies from whose witnesses we are going to hear and will have heard what they tell you we have seen a number of concessions made by these bodies particularly by dluhc and the home office

00:14:19 dluhc and the home office you may come to wonder whether they go nearly far enough and whether there are any further concessions to come before their witnesses come to assist us i would say

00:14:30 witnesses come to assist us i would say this

00:14:31 this this inquiry is not a game of cat and mouse

00:14:35 mouse where core participants might hope that their witnesses will smuggle something past council to the inquiry or council to the inquiry might miss a trick these core participants and their

00:14:46 these core participants and their witnesses know or ought to know what is in the documents it is in the interests of the inquiry's work and so in the public interest that these bodies fully embrace their

00:14:57 that these bodies fully embrace their obligations of candor and openness and face up to the stark realities that they reveal

00:15:03 reveal their written submissions tend to suggest that they have been drafted with fingers crossed we would urge the witnesses to come in this module to approach their evidence in the full spirit of cooperation and

00:15:14 in the full spirit of cooperation and make concessions unhesitatingly where justified on the material mr chairman members of the panel that is all i propose to say at this stage thank you very much thank you very much indeed

00:15:25 you very much thank you very much indeed mr millet

00:15:27 mr millet well the

00:15:29 well the first of the statements to be made by on behalf of uh core participants is going to be made by ms barbara's queen's council who represents

00:15:40 who represents a number of the bereaved survivors and residents

00:15:44 residents good morning miss barwise good morning mr chairman you're ready to uh make your opening statement i am yes thank you very much well then off you go you have our written submissions i propose to begin with some opening remarks second

00:15:57 begin with some opening remarks second an overview third government's response to lachenal house fourth government's failures in relation to the regulatory reform order and other specific failures and end with some

00:16:08 specific failures and end with some closing remarks the grenfell disaster is a predictable yet unintended consequence of the combination of the laudable desire to reduce carbon emissions coupled with an

00:16:21 reduce carbon emissions coupled with an unbridled passion for deregulation in particular a desire to deregulate and boost the housing construction industry government's dependency on that industry

00:16:32 government's dependency on that industry resulted in june in government becoming the junior partner in the relationship thereby permitting industries exploitation of the regulations government's response on realising the

00:16:44 government's response on realising the extent of the problem was to react by concealment instead of candor the result is a prolonged period of concealment by government

00:16:55 government which should properly be regarded as one of the major scandals of our time the failure to identify and address the problem of fire safety in facades

00:17:06 the problem of fire safety in facades has in one sense transcended party politics

00:17:10 politics stretching as it does across conservative labour conservative liberal democrats coalition and finally again conservative governments that said certain political ideals

00:17:22 that said certain political ideals principally deregulatory policies entwined with a radical housing policy bear primary responsibility for the astonishing period of willful blindness

00:17:33 astonishing period of willful blindness reflected in a failure to revise adb properly from 1992 and a failure to review it at all from 2006 to the time of the grenfell fire and

00:17:44 of the grenfell fire and beyond the events which occurred at grenfell are not merely the product of the absence of enforcement or oversight as government now suggests

00:17:55 as government now suggests but are an unintended consequence of a political ideology which broke free from common sense and safety constraints that is ultimately a

00:18:06 that is ultimately a failure of systems government now accepts the regulatory system was not fit for purpose and that it failed to clarify and simplify adb

00:18:17 it failed to clarify and simplify adb but does not yet accept that the building regulations and adb were fundamentally flawed albeit intelligible to a competent person as professor torreira has

00:18:28 person as professor torreira has explained

00:18:30 explained the original architect of what became the coalition government's green economy michael hesseltine had intended that there be fetters on industry he said

00:18:41 there be fetters on industry he said markets know no morality it is our responsibility to bring a balance to the books of life in the event however the overriding deregulatory imperative meant there were

00:18:53 deregulatory imperative meant there were no fetters and safety considerations were not balanced against either the environmental apparel imperative or industry freedoms on the contrary the particular brand of

00:19:05 on the contrary the particular brand of deregulation and dependence on big society involvement instead of adequate regulation enabled industry to write its own rules

00:19:15 own rules none of this however exonerates those in the construction industry who willfully exploited the regulations and ignored even those parts of the regulations and

00:19:26 even those parts of the regulations and adb which were clear by way of overview from 1957 onwards responsibility for building regulations and housing lay with different departments which laterally became the

00:19:38 departments which laterally became the minister for housing communities local government now known as the department for levelling up responsibility for fire had lain with the home office prior to 2001 but from

00:19:49 the home office prior to 2001 but from then until 2016 also lay with the same departments as building regulations and housing

00:19:56 housing i shall therefore refer to the relevant government department simply as the department let us begin with the origin of the problem which led to grenfell it can be traced back to the 1952 model bylaws for

00:20:10 traced back to the 1952 model bylaws for use by local authorities which made a distinction between the structural external wall which had to be non-combustible and cladding allowing the latter to be class zero the definition of class zero between

00:20:22 the definition of class zero between 1953 and 76 was confined to the surface spread of flame test contained in bs 476 part 7.

00:20:31 part 7. the 1965 building regulations the first to apply nationally permitted class zero cladding unless the building was less than three feet from another at this time class zero could be a

00:20:44 at this time class zero could be a combustible material with a minimally non-combustible surface both the requirements for the structural external wall and the definition of class 0 became increasingly less robust

00:20:57 class 0 became increasingly less robust during the further deregulatory processes which began in earnest with the building act 1984 and adb 1985. these provided for functional

00:21:08 these provided for functional requirements but without the prescription previously contained in the 1965 regulations and instead provided merely the non-mandatory guidance in adb

00:21:20 merely the non-mandatory guidance in adb problems began with the use of modern cladding material although there had as yet been no testing of acm even in the 1960s there was awareness of the dangers of

00:21:31 was awareness of the dangers of aluminium cladding and some civil servants brian martin included were later aware of this research as bre acknowledged in a report prepared for itself in july 2016 the impact on

00:21:45 for itself in july 2016 the impact on fire safety of external cladding systems had been a real concern since their appearance 30 years ago the fact of the floor in the regulations

00:21:56 the fact of the floor in the regulations in adb is one thing but the culpable failure is not to have corrected it governments knowing neglect of safety can be traced back to the failure to take evasive action following the noslee

00:22:09 take evasive action following the noslee heights fire in 1991. civil servants were aware of the significance of this fire although ministers may initially at least have been unaware of the full extent of the

00:22:20 been unaware of the full extent of the implications for the government estates action programme by which the department funded local authorities to reclad 1960s blocks using combustible cladding

00:22:31 blocks using combustible cladding the pilot for this program noslee heights suffered a terrible fire shortly after re-cladding the government's own investigation of real fires contract led to bre required

00:22:43 real fires contract led to bre required the research to provide timely feedback on the effectiveness or otherwise of adb in achieving fire safety accordingly complete candor in reporting

00:22:55 accordingly complete candor in reporting was required instead a memo which appears to have been written by someone within government states we have received via hmea a request from markham street press

00:23:06 hmea a request from markham street press office to play down the issue of the fire

00:23:10 fire the likely reason was the need to avoid the bad press then circulating in a national newspaper headed danger flats that could explode like a tinderbox and to avoid the cladding scandal then

00:23:23 to avoid the cladding scandal then estimated at a likely cost of 500 million but which has reached biblical proportions today the report of the nosley fire was stated to be limited circulation and yet

00:23:36 to be limited circulation and yet contain two vitally important pieces of information first that cladding could pose a risk to life if the cavity was large enough to permit vertical flame spread and second

00:23:47 permit vertical flame spread and second that cellulosic materials such as upvc should not be used in close proximity with polymeric materials such as glass reinforced plastic grp

00:23:59 reinforced plastic grp the cladding was grp and the window reveals were upvc had this report been published perhaps the combination of upvc window reveals and polymeric cladding would not have

00:24:11 and polymeric cladding would not have been used at grenfell as to the propensity for vertical flame spread it was only a later bre report in 1994 by connolly which characterized the

00:24:23 1994 by connolly which characterized the cladding cavity as a chimney flue up the full height of the building once again that is the situation at grenfell the connolly report contained a prohibition on referring to it in any

00:24:36 prohibition on referring to it in any published work so the chimney finding too remained secret the consistent pattern of inadequate investigation and suppression of reports

00:24:47 investigation and suppression of reports from noseley to garnok through the edge and lachanel goes beyond mere accident and involves government collusion government's tendency was to regard

00:24:58 government's tendency was to regard fires as something to be covered up or trivialized such that the public might be reassured and avoid criticism of underlying regulations thereby allowing

00:25:09 underlying regulations thereby allowing continuing to allow industry the latitude it wanted even following the privatization of bre in 1997

00:25:17 in 1997 close links between it and the department remained and brian martin who would become a senior civil servant was seconded to the department in 1999

00:25:28 department in 1999 before joining it in 2008. his relationship with bre remained strong with informal lines of communication there are clear indications that bre

00:25:40 there are clear indications that bre regarded clients as its handler to some degree

00:25:44 degree during the investigation of garnok for north ayrshire council bre asked itself can we say that we think they were sold a pup

00:25:52 a pup this is obviously an inappropriate question for scientists to ask themselves north asia had been sold a pup as the grp cladding was unlikely ever even to have been class zero it is not clear

00:26:05 have been class zero it is not clear whether bre felt constrained by central or local government to suppress the fact that the cladding was non-compliant with regulations and adb perhaps it felt constrained by both

00:26:17 perhaps it felt constrained by both given government had paid for the ayrshire report the report sent to the department was entirely neutered and failed to mention class zero

00:26:28 class zero it is profoundly odd that bre would have prepared such a report especially given the more fulsome version given to north asia but equally odd that the department

00:26:39 asia but equally odd that the department did not question the properties of the grp cladding given the impact of the smoke plume on the grp was said to have generated a self-propagating fire

00:26:51 self-propagating fire both noseley and garnok had many similarities primarily they were part of the government's housing management department estates action project which was clearly of the utmost importance to

00:27:02 was clearly of the utmost importance to it

00:27:03 it both fires included the use of grp panels which was not even class zero at garnok and may not have been at nosley both involved upvc window reveals which

00:27:15 both involved upvc window reveals which softened and created a firepath at another estate's action project lavenden there was subsequently in 1997 a fatal fire involving a upvc fascia and

00:27:27 a fatal fire involving a upvc fascia and soffit at the eaves the report stated that if the soffit and fascia were thermoplastics such as updc then significant risk to life can occur

00:27:38 then significant risk to life can occur why therefore was the nosley report not more widely circulated at latest at the time of the lavenden report the continued failure to prohibit upvc

00:27:50 the continued failure to prohibit upvc is the more shocking given the select committee's criticism of the department for failing to prohibit it one of the salient features of the edgefire in 2005 was that it involved

00:28:02 edgefire in 2005 was that it involved downward spread of flame in cladding this made it particularly important to understand whether or not the cladding panels achieved class zero and yet

00:28:13 panels achieved class zero and yet professor bisbee is unable to find in any report any reference to class zero although greater manchester fire and rescue requested and obtained a copy of the report on the edge it was not widely

00:28:26 the report on the edge it was not widely circulated again this was a fire which merited widespread understanding especially so given one of the joint investigators of the fire with later remark to brian martin that it signaled

00:28:39 remark to brian martin that it signaled the end of rain screen cladding it did not but should have ended the use of highly combustible cladding whether government admitted it or not

00:28:50 whether government admitted it or not these fires would have informed brian martin given his background at bre of widespread dangerous non-compliance with adb

00:29:00 adb inadequate investigation became a pattern in subsequent fires which the inquiry will obviously need to explore the first missed opportunity to abandon

00:29:11 the first missed opportunity to abandon class zero came after the nosley fire in 1991. the 1992 edition of adb removed the requirement that external walls big limited combustibility and instead

00:29:24 limited combustibility and instead confined the requirement only to the insulation within the external wall this was a lost opportunity to remove the class zero classification and require that cladding panels in addition

00:29:36 require that cladding panels in addition to the insulation be limited combustibility instead government exacerbated the problem by diluting functional requirement b4 of the building

00:29:47 requirement b4 of the building regulations by the second 1992 amendment this replaced the absolute requirement to resist fire spread with a requirement that the external wall need only

00:29:58 that the external wall need only adequately resist fire spread that lesser and confusing requirement remains to this day this is consistent with government

00:30:09 this is consistent with government legitimizing the flammability of the cladding rather than solving the problem it posed

00:30:15 it posed whether or not ministers were aware of the noseley cover-up they were certainly aware of the findings of the select committee in 2000 following the ghana court file as i've explained the investigation of

00:30:27 as i've explained the investigation of that fire was also the subject of a cover-up

00:30:31 cover-up this tends to suggest the government did not want to know the extent to which cladding contributed to fire that is the more extraordinary given the fire occurred in june 1999 and evidence

00:30:44 fire occurred in june 1999 and evidence to the select committee a month later ventilated the class zero conundrum it is a term repeatedly confused with limited combustibility due to its definition which provides it might

00:30:56 definition which provides it might either be a limited combustibility material or a class one material it is frequently forgotten that class zero materials are not invariably

00:31:07 zero materials are not invariably limited combustibility the term is predominantly but not exclusively a measure of the surface spread of flame as it is a test for lining materials in which the cut edge

00:31:18 lining materials in which the cut edge of the specimen is not tested is not heated i should say the definition means class zero applies both to the surface of the material and also

00:31:29 to the surface of the material and also to the entire product including composite products containing plastic or foam cores if following the linear route to compliance class 0 is on one view the

00:31:41 compliance class 0 is on one view the only requirement cladding panels over 18 meters must satisfy as clause 12.6 of adb directs the reader to diagram 40 which in turn only requires that the

00:31:52 which in turn only requires that the surface be class zero we do not hold that view given the opinion of the inquiry's cladding expert mr sacula

00:32:00 mr sacula this problem however led to the debate as to whether clause 12.7 which requires insulation to be limited combustibility might also extend to the core of a cladding panel

00:32:13 extend to the core of a cladding panel by virtue of the word filler government witnesses suggest that filler was introduced into clause 12.7 in response to the edge fire in 2005

00:32:25 response to the edge fire in 2005 given however that the heading of 12.7 insulation products was also introduced in that edition it should not have been wasted on the draftsman that whatever

00:32:36 wasted on the draftsman that whatever filler meant it was confined to insulation if the amendment was made in response to the edge then the material they were concerned with was the filler was a form of insulation

00:32:47 the filler was a form of insulation namely the core of a sandwich panel even though it was used to stiffen not insulate

00:32:54 insulate both we and mr sacular do not rely on the word filler as imposing a duty to supply better than class zero panels rather we rely on the functional requirement to ensure the walls

00:33:05 requirement to ensure the walls adequately resist flame spread class 0 does not provide any significant fire safety as the phone call may ignite as was explained in evidence to the

00:33:16 as was explained in evidence to the select committee despite the select committee's recommendation that fire test 9 should be substituted for class 0 the classification was cynically retained

00:33:28 classification was cynically retained the explanation for government's refusal to withdraw class 0 may be the radar research which identified that adoption of the more realistic european tests such as single burning item

00:33:41 such as single burning item would quote discriminate against foil-faced insulation products the problem with jointly procured industry and government research such as radar is the risk of conflict of

00:33:52 radar is the risk of conflict of interest

00:33:54 interest it appears the research was commissioned to give voice to building industry manufacturers concern to ensure that no significant change to the regulatory status quo will occur

00:34:05 the regulatory status quo will occur due to the introduction of the new reaction to fire test methods kingspan was not shy in broadcasting government's industries hold over government proclaiming that government

00:34:17 government proclaiming that government has stated it will not implement the new euro class system until the industry is ready to adopt it the second missed opportunity to abandon class 0 came following the 2000 select

00:34:29 class 0 came following the 2000 select committee report when the department retained bre to assist in revising br 135 by large scale and other testing and to develop further

00:34:40 and other testing and to develop further guidance for adb i will call this the br135 revision contract

00:34:46 contract the results of these testing programs carried out as early as 2001 and reported on in 2002 reveal the precise dangers of pe acm even used in

00:34:58 dangers of pe acm even used in conjunction with mineral wool and the usb unsuitability of class 0 as a metric of flame spread it is clear from these reports that a

00:35:09 it is clear from these reports that a cladding system described as aluminium polyethylene core sheets using a glass wall insulation failed the large scale test within just under six minutes

00:35:21 scale test within just under six minutes a full version of the report summarizing the full-scale testing reveals that the crib fire for this test had to be extinguished at a mere 5 minutes and 45 seconds

00:35:32 seconds when we remind ourselves that the crib is meant to remain ignited for 30 minutes

00:35:37 minutes it's easy to understand why professor bisbee expresses disbelief that class 0 was not withdrawn after september 22 reports of these 2001 tests

00:35:48 reports of these 2001 tests we venture further and consider it beggars belief that aluminium composite panels containing polyethylene were not expressly prohibited given it was patently a material inconsistent with

00:35:59 patently a material inconsistent with the adequate or indeed any inhibition of flame spread this testing program taken together with other government data other data government was receiving at the time

00:36:11 government was receiving at the time make it incredible that the national classes were not withdrawn one of the bre reports available to the department at the time made clear that certain combustible claddings can

00:36:23 certain combustible claddings can support unlimited vertical flame spread but noted that less combustible ones do not

00:36:29 not it was therefore clear beyond per adventure that combustible cladding posed the risk of unlimited vertical flame spread which the department knew or should have known

00:36:40 or should have known high-rise buildings had no capacity to tolerate as professor tarero explains the likely reason for government's failure to act is industry interference

00:36:52 failure to act is industry interference as the centre for windows and cladding technology cwct explained to bre at the time industry was concerned that the use of the large-scale test proposed in the br

00:37:04 the large-scale test proposed in the br 135 revision contract would result in rain screen cladding ceasing to be a permissible method of construction that because all the rainscreen

00:37:15 that because all the rainscreen claddings tested had failed in that program

00:37:20 program this cd sub cd cwct claimed could lead to quotes economic consequences for the building industry and the uk as a whole this may explain government's failure to

00:37:32 this may explain government's failure to abolish class zero contrary to the select committee's recommendation if the class zero criterion in diagram 40 prevailed and the bs-8414 test was

00:37:44 40 prevailed and the bs-8414 test was simply an alternative then industry could avoid the test and continue using unsuitable class zero panels a lie to this was government's failure to extend the requirement for limited

00:37:56 to extend the requirement for limited combustibility to cladding panels as well as insulation after the 2000 select committee there were countless opportunities to withdraw class zero not least amongst them

00:38:08 class zero not least amongst them lachnal house fire in 2009 and the of further opportunity presented by the deputy coroner's recommendations in 2013.

00:38:19 2013. as to the government's relevant knowledge of the inadequacy of adb it appreciated both the class zero conundrum and its knock-on effect of causing confusion as to the insulation

00:38:32 causing confusion as to the insulation requirements government's nonchalance in the fair face of clear warnings is telling as to its intentions industry warned brian martin in 2013 and

00:38:44 industry warned brian martin in 2013 and 2014 that combustible insulation was being used and that adb 12.7 did not clearly require limited combustibility cord cladding panels

00:38:56 cord cladding panels the filler issue was raised by tony baker of bre directly with martin by email in 2013 and martin responded by admitting the problem with diagram 40

00:39:07 admitting the problem with diagram 40 and class 0 was in his words you can have a thin surface that gives you the performance and back it with something less desirable the problem

00:39:19 the problem together with this problem together with the fact that there had been major fires worldwide involving acm were all made clear to martin as a cwct fire group meeting in july 2014

00:39:32 meeting in july 2014 one is forced to conclude that the ambiguity in adb was deliberate and that the department intended class 0 should remain permissible

00:39:43 remain permissible even though bre agreed to develop an faq document with the department this never materialized the department telling bre that the issue would be considered in

00:39:54 that the issue would be considered in the next version of adb the filler debate continued and proved a controversial topic at a conference bre hosted in january 2016.

00:40:06 hosted in january 2016. martin's responses to a post-conference query on the meaning of filler made clear he had not taken bre's advice seriously and did not intend to clarify the regulations since as he said he was

00:40:19 the regulations since as he said he was not sure the text is all that ambiguous it was also made clear to martin at the july cwct meeting that despite adb 12.7

00:40:30 july cwct meeting that despite adb 12.7 clearly requiring insulation must be limited combustibility the confusion that class 0 equated to limited combustibility led some designers to use foam insulations to comply with the thermal

00:40:43 insulations to comply with the thermal requirements imposed by part l the department clearly took this on board as brian martin shared what he called a friendly warning with the nhbc

00:40:54 called a friendly warning with the nhbc on that same day as the july meeting as he told nhbc i've been talking to a few folk who had indicated to him that kingspan's k-15 insulation was being

00:41:05 kingspan's k-15 insulation was being missed sold by virtue of a erroneous vba certificate martin then escalated this to his to senior officials within the department

00:41:16 senior officials within the department saying combustible insulation had been used on possibly a lot of buildings as from 2014 at latest therefore the department was fully on notice both of

00:41:28 department was fully on notice both of the use of widespread uh combustible the widespread use of combustible insulation and the dangers and use of acm the government was also aware of the

00:41:40 the government was also aware of the fact of and risks posed by desktops desktop assessments of large-scale tests were never a route to compliance under adb despite considerable argument to the

00:41:51 adb despite considerable argument to the contrary particularly from nhbc which was largely responsible for the increase in desktops by its drafting of tgn 18 together with bca

00:42:03 bca martin discussed his concerns that desktops were not being done adequately with nhbc in june 2016 but he did not intervene to prevent their use

00:42:15 intervene to prevent their use government has also been aware since 1994 that cavity barriers were ineffective in rain screen cladding the requirement for cavity barriers within the external cavity was

00:42:26 within the external cavity was introduced into adb 1992 as a result of the nosely fire the government and bre however understood as from bre's connolly report in 1994 that cavity barriers were

00:42:39 in 1994 that cavity barriers were ineffective in rain screen cladding the report recorded the failure of metals and that inc cavity barriers would only work if fixed directly to masonry

00:42:52 turning briefly to the policies which impacted fire safety first the government's commitment to the housing construction sector began in october 2010 with the spending review in which it

00:43:04 with the spending review in which it planned over the next four to five years to reduce the regulatory burden on the house building sector whilst also incentivizing local authorities and communities to support housing growth

00:43:16 communities to support housing growth increased housing was no doubt necessary but our criticism is the unwavering commitment to the housing construction sector even when it became clear it

00:43:27 sector even when it became clear it posed a threat to safety the housing agenda was compounded by the one in one out rule which began in autumn 2010 requiring a deregulatory measure to be found of equivalent net

00:43:39 measure to be found of equivalent net cost for any new regulation introduced between 2010 and 2016 one out one in one out became one in two out and ultimately one in three out

00:43:51 one in three out hard on the heels of the one in one out came the budget moratorium in march 2011 which meant a waiver had to be obtained in order to make any changes to building

00:44:03 in order to make any changes to building regulations and these had to be compensated for by cuts in the house building industry the housing standards review in 2012 was as led some deputy director of building

00:44:15 as led some deputy director of building regulations says an example of regulation to deregulate ostensibly an exercise to remove contradictory standards it was described by david cameron as a bonfire of the

00:44:27 by david cameron as a bonfire of the building regulations this was a return to the red tape challenge begun in 2011 in which pickles the secretary of state proposed a bonfire of red tape including section 20

00:44:41 bonfire of red tape including section 20 of the london building act which required sprinklers on industrial buildings over 30 meters the 2015 productivity review entitled fixing the foundations creating a more

00:44:53 fixing the foundations creating a more prosperous nation was an impetus to compensate for the fallout of the financial crisis and boost boost productivity including boosting the northern powerhouse by committing 13

00:45:05 the northern powerhouse by committing 13 billion to transport networks in the north relaxing planning laws and building more affordable homes together with support for first-time buyers this became known in the autumn 2016

00:45:17 this became known in the autumn 2016 statement as accelerated construction with government committing 2 billion pounds to speed up house building on surplus public sector land and a commitment to encourage new developers

00:45:30 commitment to encourage new developers and different models of construction in house building it seems when considering the impact of the budget moratorium the department gave consideration to the interplay

00:45:41 gave consideration to the interplay between deregulation and the article two of the european convention on human rights right to life which imposed on government an obligation to have in place appropriate

00:45:52 obligation to have in place appropriate systems to safeguard life government's recognition that it self-inflicted regulatory paralysis risked breaching the right to life and

00:46:03 risked breaching the right to life and yet continued in action in relation to regulations and adb is truly chilling as randall the director of social housing would comment on the day of the

00:46:14 housing would comment on the day of the grenfell fire some of the stuff about disproportionate burdens feels uncomfortable today as to the impact of these policies on the review of building regulations

00:46:27 the review of building regulations consultations in 2008 2010 and 2012 were simply identifying opportunities to deregulate the review in 2010 to 2013 comprised

00:46:39 the review in 2010 to 2013 comprised purely deregulatory and style stylistic changes

00:46:43 changes government's continued failure to revise adb to correct the class zero conundrum and ambiguity as to the core of composite cladding products from 1992

00:46:54 composite cladding products from 1992 when it had sufficient knowledge to do so can only be justified by a desert desire to preserve the ambiguous status quo

00:47:03 quo in order to give the construction industry the desired latitude in order to preserve this status quo and given its self-induced regulatory paralysis government was drawn into ever

00:47:15 paralysis government was drawn into ever more ridiculous exercises martin was asked in april 2015 to produce a worry list after the bre seven work streams which had been commissioned in the wake of the

00:47:27 had been commissioned in the wake of the lachenal inquest became available those reports indicated fundamental flaws in various aspects of adb and yet were not made public until

00:47:39 and yet were not made public until february 2019 during a consultation on adb

00:47:44 adb martin's worry list was absurd in that albeit it noted the government's position on sprinklers was becoming increasingly hard to defend it omitted cladding as a concern

00:47:57 it omitted cladding as a concern there then followed the saga of the adb discussion document originally proposed in spring 2015 pending the election as originally proposed it would have

00:48:08 as originally proposed it would have given adb priority in the review queue but instead following government's 2015 productivity review involving yet further indulgence to the house building

00:48:19 further indulgence to the house building industry all that was possible was a productivity review of all the approved documents which took the form of yet further harvesting of the regulatory winds

00:48:31 winds the discussion document totally lacking in substance as it was was not published until 2017 a usability survey of users also finally

00:48:42 a usability survey of users also finally published in 2017 was equally pointless being confined to canvassing views on style and usability despite the substance being so flawed

00:48:53 substance being so flawed government was well aware of the flaws by then not least because of the seven work stream reports this period of willful blindness requiring a complete suspension of

00:49:04 requiring a complete suspension of disbelief by civil service and ministers alike was undoubtedly facilitated by the government's preoccupation with its radical housing agenda this was compounded by the department

00:49:16 this was compounded by the department priding itself on being a deregulatory department and the fact that a single senior civil servant brian martin had responsibility for adb for a prolonged

00:49:28 responsibility for adb for a prolonged period of nearly 20 years by the time of the grenfell fire he had been initially involved with adb from 1999 when seconded to the department from bre

00:49:40 department from bre he came to refer to adb as almost like my third child not only was he too close to adb to have any objectivity about its shortcomings

00:49:51 any objectivity about its shortcomings but clearly from a certain point he seemed to lack desire to do so referring to himself as getting a bit stale even had he wanted to change

00:50:02 even had he wanted to change government's regulatory imperatives would have made it practically impossible perhaps a further demotivating factor for him

00:50:12 for him his perceived superior knowledge of adb and fire safety rendered him untouchable and his behavior and that of his department with him became puerile and callous particularly in his dealings

00:50:25 callous particularly in his dealings with the all-party political group for fire safety that group was understandably agitating for review of the building regulations and adb

00:50:36 and adb civil servants knew they were endlessly procrastinating producing discussion documents about the revision of the regulations and adb and the building control system rather

00:50:47 and the building control system rather than actually revising adb the department dressed up deregulatory measures as safety improvements and sat on the critical seven work stream reports

00:50:57 reports ministers may have been unwitting pawns but if so were foolish or naive the coalition's government's self-avowed radical housing policy required rapid

00:51:09 radical housing policy required rapid building of vastly increased number of homes and that coupled with the deregulatory policies meant government could not impose burdens on industry that in turn led government to allow

00:51:21 that in turn led government to allow industry to write its own rules under the guise of empowering the citizen that big society imperative however however well intended at the outset and possibly triggered by the powerless

00:51:33 possibly triggered by the powerless financial state of the country following the 2008 financial crash did not lead to citizen empowerment but instead led to industry getting its own way

00:51:45 industry getting its own way nhbc and bca appear to have been lent on by kingspan to write rules circumventing adb

00:51:52 adb notably tgn 18 which legitimized desktops and lately nhbc's acceptability of common wall constructions

00:52:03 of common wall constructions this was in itself a desktop which legitimized the use of acm together with combustible insulation the very combination which proved lethal at grenfell

00:52:15 grenfell this occurred with government's tacit approval because it depended on industry to build both the houses as quickly and easily as possible and also to write the rules

00:52:26 rules government now having prevented itself from imposing burdens by regulating as to the system of building control it could only be as good as the flawed guidance on which it was based as adb

00:52:39 guidance on which it was based as adb was the benchmark used by building control bodies the situation was undoubtedly worsened by the creation of private building control officers namely approved

00:52:50 control officers namely approved inspectors which led to competition between local authority building control and approved inspectors that competition resulted in contractors becoming valued clients to be cherished

00:53:02 becoming valued clients to be cherished rather than policed resulting in a race to the bottom as government was made aware it was an open secret that workmanship was terrible and that building control

00:53:13 was terrible and that building control had become as one building control body would later tell the labc in many cases morally corrupt and a mere commodity to be bought and cast aside as

00:53:24 commodity to be bought and cast aside as industry chooses nhbc in its capacity as improved inspector recognized in 2016 the need not to allow commercial pressures to

00:53:35 not to allow commercial pressures to override life safety issues noting our reputation would be shredded if we knowingly let something go we knew was life-threatening and there was an accident

00:53:46 accident nevertheless it did precisely that it approved kingspan k15 for some eight years from 2005 despite the obvious fact that the bba certificate applied only to

00:53:59 that the bba certificate applied only to one specific system tested under bs-8414 nhbc continued to approve k-15 even once alerted to the dangers in late 2013 by

00:54:10 alerted to the dangers in late 2013 by an independent facade engineer nhbc's continued approval was on the spurious grounds of compliance with bca tgn 18 which was merely a circumvention

00:54:22 tgn 18 which was merely a circumvention of adb which nhbc and bca had devised this circumvention was necessary in order to protect nhbc which as an approved inspector had approved so many

00:54:34 approved inspector had approved so many developments using k-15 even now nhbc is disingenuous in its defense pretending to have been alerted to the fact that k-15 was not limited

00:54:46 to the fact that k-15 was not limited combustibility only by a change in the bba certificate in fact nhbc was already aware k15 was not limited combustibility from november

00:54:57 not limited combustibility from november 2013 prior to the revision of the bba certificate labc reveals itself as a spineless members association motivated primarily by a need to foster

00:55:10 motivated primarily by a need to foster local authority building control bodies despite providing system approvals for products such as k-15 and celotex's rs-5000 on which it knew bcos and others

00:55:22 rs-5000 on which it knew bcos and others would rely labc did not investigate the accuracy of these approvals even when alerted back in 2011 to sharp practice by both kingspan and celetex

00:55:36 by both kingspan and celetex as to the test houses and certifiers they were complicit in supporting the testing regime and therefore are a part of the problem bre is a wholly flawed organization

00:55:48 bre is a wholly flawed organization which has effectively sponsored kingspan's activities for over a decade without raising the alarm and has presided over a series of inadequate and dangerously misleading fire

00:55:59 dangerously misleading fire investigations beginning with noseley and garner continuing through the edge and nakano when jenkins then of booth murray raised the filler debate with colwell of bre

00:56:11 the filler debate with colwell of bre she simply referred him on to brian martin prompting jenkins to describe bre as a buck-passing load of incompetence to conclude the review government was aware of critical fire

00:56:24 government was aware of critical fire safety issues many years before grenfell and could have foreseen the disaster in addition to its knowledge of the class zero conundrum and the confusion caused

00:56:35 caused thereby which led to the use of acm and combustible insulation government was also aware of three other critical issues first poor workmanship and

00:56:46 issues first poor workmanship and willful non-compliance flowing from the fundamental ambiguity in adb described after the fire by the department's director of housing mcnamara as one of the open secrets in the building

00:56:57 the open secrets in the building industry

00:56:58 industry as to willful non-compliance ministers too became aware at latest from december 2015 onwards that cavity barriers were not being installed when new homes were

00:57:09 not being installed when new homes were built

00:57:10 built the dramatic fire spread resulting from this lack of cavity barriers at kennett drive in june 2014 completely destroyed four homes on an estate and as a result

00:57:21 four homes on an estate and as a result timber-framed houses were the subject of a parliamentary debate that fire and the old tannery fire in july 2015 in which 45 properties were

00:57:32 july 2015 in which 45 properties were damaged or destroyed should have acted as indicators that the radical new homes policy and coupled with the lack of compliance with adb

00:57:43 with adb posed a very dangerous combination second government was also aware of the tension between its green agenda and fire safety brandon lewis as housing minister was

00:57:55 brandon lewis as housing minister was warned as early as 2012 that the green agenda was driving increased use of combustible insulation with the inevitable impact on fire safety

00:58:06 inevitable impact on fire safety third the government's chief fire and rescue advisor between 2013 and 2017 peter holland told both upton and martin in february 2015 that bre knew products

00:58:18 in february 2015 that bre knew products were made simply to pass the test and that there was no redundancy built into the products i now turn to government's failure to respond appropriately to the lachenal house fire

00:58:30 house fire government did not prioritize the response to lachenal and in fact responding to it conflicted with the coalition government's true priority namely its radical housing agenda

00:58:42 namely its radical housing agenda government's investigation into the fire was a complete whitewash the public report in july 2009 of the chief fire and rescue officer then advisor then sir

00:58:53 and rescue officer then advisor then sir ken knight focused on a lack of compartmentation and firefighting issues but failed to focus on the cladding despite noting unusual fire spread

00:59:04 despite noting unusual fire spread knight subsequently discovered that the cladding was class three and not class zero and yet despite alvipa's desire to make the findings public for safety reasons the department refused

00:59:16 reasons the department refused the department's concern instead was to reassure noting the need to avoid giving the impression that we believe all buildings of this construction are inherently unsafe

00:59:28 construction are inherently unsafe what next transpired is an extraordinary suppression of information the department shut down the inquiry prematurely without explanation leaving it to alfipa and the police to carry out

00:59:40 it to alfipa and the police to carry out further investigations a grotesque abdication of responsibility it also raises the specter of a deliberate cover-up given knight never sought to correct his

00:59:51 knight never sought to correct his misleading report this was compounded by bre's report for police of which knight had been kept appraised bre's report failed to

01:00:02 appraised bre's report failed to investigate downward spread or establish what the cladding panel actually was

01:00:10 government's response to the inquest was equally misleading brian martin's evidence to the deputy coroner was an exercise in disingenuity because it suggested that class 0 was

01:00:22 because it suggested that class 0 was unlikely to spread fire at no point did he suggest that class zero was an inadequate metric and ought to be abandoned the department now claims by its opening

01:00:34 the department now claims by its opening that its response to the deputy coroner's rule 43 recommendations letter fulfilled its statutory obligations we disagree nothing meaningful whatsoever was done

01:00:47 nothing meaningful whatsoever was done by way of response the department concedes that it missed the opportunity to ensure the system was fit for purpose and with that we agree but we reject the implicit submission

01:00:59 but we reject the implicit submission that the missed opportunity was accidental the department's suppression of the critical information as to the nature of the cladding removes the possibility of

01:01:10 the cladding removes the possibility of accident

01:01:11 accident the rule 43 letter recommended first that the dependent department provide clear guidance on the definition of common parts under the rro and the scope of the inspection required for a fire

01:01:22 of the inspection required for a fire risk assessment or fra second that the dependent the department encouraged providers in high-rise buildings to consider retrofitting sprinklers and third that the department

01:01:35 sprinklers and third that the department review adb to ensure it gave clear guidance on b4 starting with the definition of common parts and scope of the fra following the fire the department

01:01:46 following the fire the department commissioned the lga guide to give guidance as to landlord to landlords and risk assessors they did not give adequate guidance this guide did not give adequate guidance on

01:01:57 guide did not give adequate guidance on the fra scope namely the need to inspect flat entrance doors and consider the external walls pickles response to the deputy coroner relied on the lg guy lga guide as

01:02:09 relied on the lg guy lga guide as guidance under article 50 of the rro yet despite offering to do so the department failed to review the lga guide it also failed to consider what the

01:02:20 it also failed to consider what the scope of the rro should be against what it actually said instead abdicating its responsibility the department considered the question would be for the courts to decide and

01:02:32 would be for the courts to decide and refused to address the underlying policy question other than to repeat the original policy intent this contradicted the department's stance in the immediate wake of the lack

01:02:44 stance in the immediate wake of the lack of fire when the department's housing section had indicated the risk assessor should consider the structure between flats and common parts in the department's post-grenfell

01:02:55 in the department's post-grenfell internal communications the only steps recorded against the definition of common parts or scope of fra was pickles response to the coroner

01:03:06 response to the coroner nothing was done as to the second recommendation sprinklers the department's reply to the coroner simply attached the letter sent to local authorities and private

01:03:17 to local authorities and private registered housing providers following shirley towers this limp-wristed letter had itself been sent to create the impression of pro-activity given considerable press and media interests and the department's

01:03:30 and media interests and the department's desire as it said to be able to say that dclg is taking action

01:03:36 action it was however clear that the department had no intention of promoting sprinklers internally acknowledging that it would need a defensive line against them as to the third recommendation namely

01:03:49 as to the third recommendation namely the review of building regulations and adb

01:03:52 adb this had not been done by the time of the grenfell fire the critical review of adb was instead wrapped up in a wholesale review of the approved documents which was nothing more than a deregulatory cull of

01:04:05 more than a deregulatory cull of provisions the department now admits the urgent review of adb should not have been folded into the wider review again any implicit suggestion of mere

01:04:17 again any implicit suggestion of mere oversight is rejected this was a conscious decision taken over many years the opportunity to review adb kept being presented and as late as september 2015

01:04:30 presented and as late as september 2015 harrell head of technical policy in the building regulations division was aware as he said that the documents themselves are in urgent need of comprehensive review to address problems created by

01:04:43 review to address problems created by many decades of iterative change pickles in his response to the coroner volunteered a review of the competent person scheme for window installers even though this had not been requested and

01:04:55 though this had not been requested and was not causative at lachnal it was a purely deregulatory measure giving scheme providers the ability to write their own rules which the department had already intended to

01:05:07 department had already intended to implement

01:05:09 implement in any event as martin admits he did not in fact follow through with the review i now turn to government's wider failures

01:05:18 failures these include first failure to ensure that the fire safety regime the rro was adequately supported by guidance whilst in dr lane's opinion the guidance

01:05:29 whilst in dr lane's opinion the guidance was intelligible as a competent person would have read it in its entirety it was unclear in relation to both the ambit of the rro and whether the scope of an fra extended to leaseholder doors

01:05:42 of an fra extended to leaseholder doors and external walls and whether peeps were required in general housing general needs housing blocks the government should not have deferred to industry for sector-led guidance

01:05:53 to industry for sector-led guidance which principally derived from todd but should instead have ensured clear cohesive guidance was provided the department was aware of the peeps issue shortly after the lga guide was

01:06:05 issue shortly after the lga guide was drafted as it was copied on an email received from a consultancy pointing out that the lga guide's position on peeps was contrary to law with the department's approval todd's

01:06:17 with the department's approval todd's office granted drafted a tendentious and incorrect response to the letter suggesting that a vulnerable or disabled person should simply remain in their flat and await rescue by the fire and

01:06:29 flat and await rescue by the fire and rescue services the final response sent by lgg disingenuously relied on stay put rather than explaining the true rationale for

01:06:40 than explaining the true rationale for lga's position on peeps namely to avoid disprove

01:06:45 disprove imposing disproportionate burdens on landlords which was a department's position at the time a further failure is government's abdication of responsibility for

01:06:56 abdication of responsibility for producing competence criteria for fire risk assessors leaving it instead to the fire safety sector government chose not to legislate to require that only a person defined as a

01:07:08 require that only a person defined as a risk assessor may carry out fras and did not expressly require such a person to be competent but lachenal provided a trigger for improving the competency of risk

01:07:19 improving the competency of risk assessors

01:07:20 assessors during the process of government shuffling off responsibility for drafting competency criteria onto the fire sector federation government was made aware that a nationally accredited

01:07:31 made aware that a nationally accredited register of ucas accredited risk assessors was necessary to avoid competency standards defaulting to their lowest level yet in the end government left it to the

01:07:43 yet in the end government left it to the fsf to resolve fsf discussed setting up a self-financing scheme but it didn't come to fruition industry cannot be allowed to produce guidance

01:07:54 guidance because it does not speak with one voice like most sectors it contains good actors and bad actors unfortunately the bad actors are often the most vocal

01:08:06 the most vocal having more to protect themselves against

01:08:09 against kingspan demonstrates this point perfectly its opening submissions are an ode to the bs 8414 test having completely abused and exploited the bs-8414 system

01:08:22 the bs-8414 system for over a decade making light of it as they did so they now seek to use this inquiry as a vehicle to advocate large-scale testing because their ability to market their

01:08:33 because their ability to market their products depends upon it

01:08:37 two other government failures are of broad relevance to the grenfell disaster first government failed those with disabilities over a prolonged period the department was aware from july 2004 that

01:08:51 department was aware from july 2004 that the adb guidance on means of escape for those with disabilities was clearly inadequate the department was reminded in 2012 that it had received a run of letters

01:09:03 it had received a run of letters complaining that adb doesn't provide adequate means of escape for disabled people

01:09:09 people yet again martin defaulted to his standard position that it was for industry professional bodies not the department to draft the guidance and explain adb to its members

01:09:21 explain adb to its members the finally produced bre workstream 7 report in july in february 2015 also makes clear that the majority of users were vehemently critical of the guidance

01:09:33 were vehemently critical of the guidance for means of escape for those with disabilities it read much more needs to be done to educate designers about the wide range of needs that arise the world needs much more practical

01:09:45 the world needs much more practical guidance on managing evacuation of disabled people this clear criticism sits ill with the report's conclusion that adb is considered to be sufficient to provide

01:09:57 considered to be sufficient to provide minimum guidance despite martin noting these concerns in his april 2015 war book a brief for new ministers

01:10:07 ministers no further guidance or amendment to adb was made by the time of the grenfell fire

01:10:13 fire second government was aware of underfunding of social housing and problems with tenant management organizations but failed to act in the conservative 2010 emergency

01:10:24 in the conservative 2010 emergency budget council spending was to be cut at a rate of 7.1 over a period of four years and thereafter remained constrained following the grenfell tower does fire

01:10:36 following the grenfell tower does fire mcnamara the director general of housing admitted the department knew that housing benefit did not pay for housing costs in large parts of the country she questioned the extent to which

01:10:48 she questioned the extent to which government had incentivized rbkc's choice of contractor which had under quoted by orders of magnitude compared to other bidders mcnamara also asked did the regulator

01:10:59 mcnamara also asked did the regulator know the tmo was failing the answer is that it did barwell was made aware by virtue of an appeal to him as secretary of state of the problems which existed with mmas and tmos

01:11:11 which existed with mmas and tmos impacting on for example safety of gas supply and the problems caused by inadequate funding finally a few thoughts by way of closing

01:11:22 finally a few thoughts by way of closing remarks

01:11:23 remarks grenfell is a lens to see how we are governed the failures are system failures if the civil service is known for its poor institutional memories ministers have

01:11:36 institutional memories ministers have little hope they are often if not invariably not in any way expert in the sector into which they are parachuted often there only briefly and there does not appear to be any handover between

01:11:49 not appear to be any handover between ministers to alert incomers of problematic issues the civil service now lacks technical expertise

01:11:57 expertise so government is entirely dependent on industry

01:12:00 industry ministers with laudable exceptions appeared insufficiently aware that their role encompassed protection of the nation's safety as for the as the potential for danger

01:12:11 as for the as the potential for danger arises in all fields of human endeavor it is vital that we be governed in such a way that safety considerations are somehow ring ring-fenced and not

01:12:22 somehow ring ring-fenced and not abandoned to political whims of the day ministers did receive warnings of the problems caused by the use of combustible materials and so the responsibility for failure to react does

01:12:34 responsibility for failure to react does not lie with officials alone in particular the political subterfuge in 2015 or 2016 whereby very high level civil servants persuaded ministers to

01:12:45 civil servants persuaded ministers to write to each other in a desperate attempt to progress the review of adb should have warned ministers that urgent action was needed that was well before leadsom received

01:12:57 that was well before leadsom received his warning from harold in may 2017 that we or ministers are increasingly vulnerable to some or all of these risks becoming material and government being

01:13:09 becoming material and government being held to account for being inactive there is a need for greater accountability select committees are only the only respected internal scrutiny method but even then their

01:13:21 scrutiny method but even then their recommendation to abandon class zero was not heeded all party political groups are too numerous and there is the perennial risk that they are reduced to mere lobbying

01:13:32 that they are reduced to mere lobbying groups which may explain the ease with which martin and others were able to brush off the fire safety groups concerns

01:13:40 concerns on an individual level martin appears to have escaped unscathed indeed being promoted to head of technical policy despite presiding over one of the major scandals of our time

01:13:54 one of the major scandals of our time as for government and industry post grenfell we shouldn't discuss these issues as if they're historical there's every reason to believe that little has changed despite grenfell

01:14:06 little has changed despite grenfell adb guidance remains fundamentally flawed

01:14:09 flawed desktops banned following the fire have been legitimized by bs 9414 todd's position that peach should not be required in general needs housing was legitimized in a new version of path 79

01:14:22 legitimized in a new version of path 79 despite the inquiry's phase 1 recommendations to the contrary that was only withdrawn following a pro proposed application for judicial review of the decision to publish three and a half years after the fire

01:14:35 three and a half years after the fire although the rro has been amended to clarify that its scope extends to flat entrance doors and external walls it has not been amended to expressly require that the person carrying out the fire

01:14:46 that the person carrying out the fire risk assessment be both competent and a risk assessor there is still no national register of accredited risk assessors despite the post lacking drive to create one

01:14:58 post lacking drive to create one these are both government and industry failures as the former shrugs off responsibility onto industry and industry defaults to what suits it best one would have thought the horror of

01:15:10 one would have thought the horror of grenfell in which a disproportionately high number of those who died were disabled or vulnerable would have dissuaded those who sought to publish the revised version of past 79 not least

01:15:22 the revised version of past 79 not least in the middle of a government consultation on the subject the need for the inquiry to make urgent and wide-ranging recommendations is clear

01:15:32 clear thank you sir well thank you very much mr wise there's a lot there for us to consider thank you well at that point i think we'll take the break for the morning we'll resume at half past 11 when we

01:15:45 we'll resume at half past 11 when we shall hear the next opening statement thank you very much how fast please

01:32:10 now the next statement is going to be made by mr mansfield on behalf of the other group of bereaved survivors and residents good morning mr mansfield good morning sir and you're ready to make your opening statement most certainly i

01:32:22 your opening statement most certainly i am yes good thank you thank you yes and also

01:32:26 also your colleagues sitting alongside estefan and mr akbar good morning

01:32:34 i'm taking stock because may i pay tribute

01:32:37 tribute to the previous statement and submissions because not only do we adopt a large measure of them i'm certainly not intending to repeat

01:32:49 intending to repeat those matters which we had intended to reinforce so they've been made very succinctly so i don't go over that ground

01:32:56 ground however i do wish if i may first of all just to indicate that

01:33:00 that subject to your own agreement the timing of this section is split rather differently in other words i'm going to take rather rather longer than 45 minutes uh i've agreed

01:33:11 longer than 45 minutes uh i've agreed with mr williamson unless he's changed his mind in his incubation period uh where he's elsewhere um 55 minutes i might take i might take a little less as

01:33:22 might take i might take a little less as long as that's acceptable to you and it doesn't disturb and i take it mr williamson uh has tailored his yes remarks accordingly yes he has so in other words the overall time slot will be exactly as it was

01:33:34 time slot will be exactly as it was before right thank you uh i better take my watch off so i can watch the time more guy i can't see the clock over there

01:33:46 so it's uh

01:33:49 a matter that will have occurred to you already but it needs to step one needs to step back and

01:33:58 and we are reaching we would submit on behalf of team two the kernel of this inquiry

01:34:07 because the aspect of governance is perhaps i mean every section is important it's not a supervening importance to to the ones you've heard before

01:34:19 to to the ones you've heard before it not only underpins but overlays everything that has happened in the grenfell case described on a previous occasion as a disaster of human rights

01:34:32 as a disaster of human rights and a shocking disaster one in which there has been a serious disregard democratic disregard

01:34:43 democratic disregard of

01:34:45 of sways of our society who unfortunately some of whom were burnt to death on that day so

01:34:57 so bearing how serious it is one has to ask the inevitable question

01:35:04 why did this happen in this way how had it got so bad

01:35:12 we say there is something beyond i think a word that's been used this morning

01:35:20 morning the whim

01:35:22 the whim of those in power this wasn't a whim we don't say we say and we do adopt other words that have been used that there was a deliberate policy

01:35:33 policy by government to not only mislead the public but also to afford and facilitate a hostile environment

01:35:46 this time not so much to do with those coming from abroad but for those who are living here the hostile environment namely

01:35:57 the hostile environment namely that health and safety so it's more than a radical housing agenda it's it's a step beyond that what lies and overlays and underpins

01:36:10 what lies and overlays and underpins everything you're listening to in terms of evidence and we'll continue to listen to in this section everything that is in a sense underpinning it is the back cloth

01:36:22 underpinning it is the back cloth is

01:36:23 is this hostile environment in which health and safety is diminished health and safety is disregarded health and safety is seen as an

01:36:35 health and safety is seen as an obstruction to

01:36:38 to business enterprise and so on now once you go that extra step it's not just a radical housing program it is in fact

01:36:48 fact a form of social engineering that has been happening here and deliberate social engineering not as an oversight nothing that you've heard so far

01:37:00 heard so far nor that you will hear in this part of module six was an accident was an oversight was somehow something they just missed or even a level of

01:37:11 they just missed or even a level of incompetence no far far worse and we say it's looking at a mindset a political mindset which actually is not doesn't remain

01:37:23 doesn't remain at the level at which it's broadcast and i'll come back to it a little later it's not doesn't remain at that level it percolates through to every level because it infuses in each of

01:37:37 because it infuses in each of the citizens of the country as well as those obviously levels at which they're managing property overseeing property constructing property refurbishing property

01:37:49 property refurbishing property if at the back of their minds almost as an unconscious layer within their thinking is that's all right we don't need to

01:38:00 we don't need to bother about fire safety i be specific because

01:38:06 because we have if you like a license from those who govern that actually we've gotta in a sense do away with it because well the burning of the

01:38:18 with it because well the burning of the bonfires however you want to describe it that is

01:38:22 that is that is the license that's the permission that's the collusion creates an entirely different environment the one in which all those are worse than misdemeanors the catalog

01:38:34 are worse than misdemeanors the catalog you've heard this morning are committed because those in government either consciously do it or unconsciously do it because they think that they are going to be as it were

01:38:45 that they are going to be as it were excused

01:38:46 excused by their mentors and their governors and this is an attitude which we say has to be

01:38:54 be banished

01:38:55 banished it's not a political whim that comes and goes this is something that is fundamental to our all our human rights in terms of survival

01:39:06 in terms of survival in the future and of course we'll bear upon no doubt a future stage hopefully possibly next year when you come to sit down together to consider what recommendations you're

01:39:18 consider what recommendations you're going to make because i've certainly made this point before you you can have what regulations you want what statutes you want whatever you want but if at the underneath it all you have

01:39:29 but if at the underneath it all you have people

01:39:31 people who as it were are in these positions who maintain this as it were disregard for health and safety as being an albatross a word used by

01:39:43 albatross a word used by the prime minister of the time until that is dispensed with until there is a recognition that respect has to be shown to safety and to people

01:39:56 has to be shown to safety and to people and it brings me to a second point before just dealing with the framework

01:40:03 in this section we say the we we've called them the reflective questions you may be aware of what they are we as team two have um regularly asked

01:40:15 regularly asked at your council ask at the end of a witness uh reflective questions the obvious ones are is there anything you would have done differently or step back is there

01:40:27 differently or step back is there anything you think should have been done differently even if not by you these are important questions and of course

01:40:34 course another one that the families have been asking is you know do you have anything to say to the families because at the root of it all it's the human rights of the families that have been damaged here

01:40:45 the families that have been damaged here as well as the prop property itself is there anything you want to add now i appreciate for a little while it might have appeared odd to have to ask those questions that

01:40:56 odd to have to ask those questions that it perhaps hasn't got a forensic benefit but

01:40:59 but i think you would have seen even recently that it does have a benefit these questions have been asked and mayor say on behalf of the families they're very grateful that they are being asked they're going to become

01:41:11 being asked they're going to become even more pertinent in this part that is governance because the the people who were participating in the mindset participating in setting

01:41:23 in the mindset participating in setting the agenda that led to that hostile environment are going to be here well almost here there is one

01:41:35 there is one who i'll come back to who at the moment isn't going to be here and we say if we're going to be talking as we have in in in the statements that made before and

01:41:46 statements that made before and particularly mr millet for example who posed the question this morning about motivation twice and we accept that motivation is extremely important to try and explain

01:41:58 extremely important to try and explain what has happened here root and branch what has happened not just a certain level

01:42:03 level but throughout the institution as a whole

01:42:10 and so we ask that those questions continue to be asked or such of them as feel to be appropriate and the answers are sometimes

01:42:20 sometimes very

01:42:21 very educative

01:42:22 educative but that's one thing the other thing is that it does satisfy not entirely but it it pays respect to the families that witnesses are

01:42:33 witnesses are recognizing the repercussions for those who sit here those who are lucky enough to be sitting here and others at home watching so that's the first point

01:42:45 so that's the first point in relation to the reflective questions but of course the

01:42:51 the point about the questions as well does have another forensic benefit it allows you mem uh all three of you to be in a position to assess what hope there is for the future

01:43:03 assess what hope there is for the future and we're here having this inquiry hope it's accepted that you know hope springs eternal that we are

01:43:12 are working together to provide a situation in which i think all the families would say never again should this happen of course in human

01:43:23 in human frailty it might but we have to ensure that the cause of this situation not the person in a sense not the thing

01:43:34 in a sense not the thing in this case a white good in one of the flats catching fire in the middle of the night but

01:43:42 but that the people who are come some of them coming here have the candor the other phrase used by mr millet this morning to acknowledge

01:43:55 to acknowledge because until they acknowledge we're going nowhere because it means they're setting a different agenda for the next generation who are already in place are we going to be treated

01:44:06 are we going to be treated with the same disdain uh as the

01:44:10 uh as the the inhabitants of grenfell tower and others beyond grandfather and we hope not we hope that the lessons that can be learned i'll learn when witnesses are asked the direct question

01:44:22 witnesses are asked the direct question well would you done anything differently how rarely would they have done anything differently and those who've been asked this question very few have really gone that far even fewer

01:44:33 even fewer even fewer despite the undertaking that has been granted

01:44:39 granted have had

01:44:40 have had the courage to acknowledge and admit that mistakes were made worse than mistakes

01:44:49 mistakes because we say it was a deliberate policy

01:44:51 policy we would hope that the politicians who come here will face the truth will admit the truth and will give us

01:45:02 will admit the truth and will give us all hope that those who come after and who read your report in due course will pay attention and realize

01:45:10 realize that never again means something and they're not empty words so otherwise of course

01:45:18 course there will be little to reassure those who sit here that we're going to get anywhere

01:45:25 anywhere so the why question why this happened and the answer to that and the answer coming from politicians will be listened to very carefully to see whether in fact at last there's going to be an acknowledgement

01:45:38 be an acknowledgement and we just pray and aid at this stage the fact that i think only last week uh

01:45:46 uh mr rowe the current commissioner said this and it this is revealing in in itself we we adopt it to some extent it is roughly what i'm saying now

01:45:59 what i'm saying now he was being asked uh by mr millet um on the the it was the afternoon of uh last tuesday the 30th of november it was very near the beginning and he was dealing with an interview

01:46:10 and he was dealing with an interview he'd given to the guardian newspaper and he said i think every single major institution that should have kept those survivors the bereaved the people who lived in the tower safe

01:46:21 tower safe let the families down it was the most appalling example of institutional failure i think in recent british history and we were part of that as well well as

01:46:33 and we were part of that as well well as a

01:46:34 a uh i'm not going into here what concessions he may or may not have made but the general point he's making is the one we're making is that the institution that has failed has been our democratic institution that

01:46:47 has been our democratic institution that has failed by the paralysis by the cover-up by the dismissal by the actual need to burn health and safety is that

01:46:59 safety is that how our democracy is to be measured i hope not

01:47:03 hope not so therefore i just ask as another preface to this uh briefly i'm not uh trying to obviously remind you of things you probably carry around with it but um could i have i've asked for this the

01:47:15 um could i have i've asked for this the list of issues updated list of issues to come on screen i haven't got an actual reference for the oh yes it's on the website anyway i i can deal with um it's number 10 please

01:47:28 it's number 10 please there we are response to recommendations and we say this section of the indication of the ambit of your inquiries of particular use and in fact

01:47:40 inquiries of particular use and in fact knowingly or unknowingly i have to say knowingly mr military was really reflecting these in one in his four questions this morning what was the recommendation i i'm going to reduce them to four

01:47:51 to reduce them to four a b and c d and e so the first one is what recommendations including from inquiries inquest investigations experts and so forth and parliamentary committees were relevant

01:48:02 parliamentary committees were relevant to the risk of fire well you've heard quite a lot about that this morning but that that's the first question second one what appropriate steps taken by central i leave out local for the moment

01:48:13 the moment upon such recommendations this links obviously to sea so in a sense if i can run them together c being a

01:48:23 a specification of lachenal house in particular their recommendations and that one i'm going to answer those two now quickly nothing

01:48:33 nothing you've heard it spelt out this morning shocking nothing had happened to those recommendations particularly lachenal and so c is important so it

01:48:44 lachenal and so c is important so it won't take a lot of time to answer that one d

01:48:46 one d if and to what extent any such recommendations were not implemented what were the reasons we say key question and of course i've touched on it already finally to what extent did any failure to implement any of these

01:48:58 any failure to implement any of these recommendations cause or contribute well we say

01:49:02 we say again there can be a relatively short answer which i i will leave for the moment but we say in short form all the recommendations arising in lack

01:49:13 all the recommendations arising in lack and all alone never mind the ones that went before there were other inquests suggesting sprinklers other reports and so on so there was a matrix of other reports and recommendations

01:49:26 of other reports and recommendations reflecting uh exactly what was coming out of lachenau and therefore we say the recommendations and i concentrate on high-rise

01:49:37 high-rise residential cladding tower is the situation that you you we are faced in this particular enquiry although it spreads beyond those buildings but

01:49:49 buildings but in terms of that we we say there is a clear connection between the failure to act

01:49:56 act on any of the recommendations before the fire

01:50:00 fire grenfell itself indicates because the recommendations are all

01:50:06 are all critical

01:50:07 critical i can remind you if necessary but i'm sure the coroner's letters well in mind so i'm not again i'm not going to take time on something that you know well so

01:50:17 so may i then um just before picking up on bearing those questions in mind just before i embark on the on the first one and which i'm going to add very little

01:50:29 and which i'm going to add very little but um

01:50:32 sometimes there's there's a kind of what i call a a benchmark or a litmus test uh which you can bear in mind as we've already gone through this morning and go

01:50:43 already gone through this morning and go through

01:50:44 through now

01:50:45 now and that is this it's it's um something that lord pickles has put in his statement and um i've asked actually that it can

01:50:56 and um i've asked actually that it can be put up

01:50:57 be put up i don't know whether that can be done done at clg triple zero one nine four seven one

01:51:02 seven one paragraph sixty seven paragraph 67 of lord pickle statement please but if it can't be found too quickly i'll repeat the reference it's clg triple zero there

01:51:15 the reference it's clg triple zero there we are

01:51:17 we are one nine four seven one paragraph 67 there we are

01:51:23 thank you and certainly helps people live because i i just read it because um

01:51:31 when you read this i'm not going to spell out what the obvious

01:51:38 obvious inferences are because they speak for themselves it's rey located without doubt

01:51:44 doubt during my tenure as secretary of state say for the matters raised in respect of lack of a house fire i do not recall that the issue of the guidance in approved document b

01:51:56 approved document b and the potential industry use of combustible materials in external cladding systems was ever raised with me and then you guys know about timber

01:52:07 and then you guys know about timber freight buildings and so on well

01:52:12 well i think

01:52:13 i think i can have what some people call a pregnant pauls at the end of that but bear that in mind that's what he's saying

01:52:21 saying and he is deputed as by the prime minister as the representative of the big society the big man he was described as

01:52:32 the big man he was described as representing the big society and the changes that were being as it were funneled and channeled through him are the ones i've already touched on briefly

01:52:43 briefly so

01:52:44 so bear that in mind as you go through and i'm going to rattle through if i may but not too fast in terms of the first question in other words what are the reports

01:52:55 words what are the reports and

01:52:56 and inquests but i'm going to start with one which hasn't been mentioned today i mention it because the idea that

01:53:07 i mention it because the idea that the risks of cladding on buildings was not something known and appreciated or certainly if you're having any any kind of cognizance of the housing arena uh

01:53:19 of cognizance of the housing arena uh you sh and this is not a this is not a fire abroad it is mentioned in some correspondence but it rarely gets the attention it deserves and that's the summerland fire

01:53:30 and that's the summerland fire 1973 i won't go through the details but if you have a moment at any stage that's when cladding was understood very clearly

01:53:41 clearly it wasn't high rise appreciate that had three different kinds of combustible material one of which was a cladding material galbestos it contained perhaps

01:53:55 material galbestos it contained perhaps obviously asbestos there were breaches of compartmentation there was a modification of a fire door the vents were not fireproof and so the list

01:54:05 list interminable but known identified and there was an inquiry um into that afterwards very soon afterwards in the same year

01:54:16 afterwards in the same year stretching into the following year in which certain recommendations were made interesting the recommendations because they behave upon although the regulations were not identical there was

01:54:28 regulations were not identical there was a request for a regulation regulatory review

01:54:31 review because of the combustible materials there was a recommendation and this this becomes hackneyed and i won't repeat it more than now sprinklers please i've just added up the time so

01:54:42 please i've just added up the time so you know at least nine occasions government was said by even bre that it would be desirable

01:54:53 by even bre that it would be desirable not just to pass a letter to the local authorities and say hey look at this this is what the last inquiry said it was actually indicating essentially certainly as time went by

01:55:04 essentially certainly as time went by coroners in their letters became uh more assertive and said we'd like a mandatory situation which obviously is at the hands of government and of course the rejection of that

01:55:16 rejection of that is part of the political whim oh no we can't have that another regulation too much burden too expensive

01:55:24 expensive and we in our written submissions have made clear that that expense as claimed by lord pickles was uh erroneous in the extreme in other words it it would cost 10

01:55:36 in other words it it would cost 10 percent of what he was putting forward so

01:55:40 so there it was in 1973 it set the pace uh between then and the next major item of course it's there is an explanation for the gap

01:55:54 and the gap is because cladding on residential buildings didn't really become an issue until a later point in time now in fact

01:56:05 until a later point in time now in fact the later point in time is noseley that's been covered this morning i'm not going to go back over it but nosey is important for a lot of reasons but one of them is that

01:56:16 a lot of reasons but one of them is that the government of the day knew or were aware that they were engaging in a pilot if you like exercise the pilot exercise

01:56:28 if you like exercise the pilot exercise being

01:56:30 being the difficulty in blocks or tower blocks of flats

01:56:34 of flats post the second world war difficulty of keeping them warm putting it shortly so ins that's why insulation came up as an issue so the idea was can we cover that

01:56:46 issue so the idea was can we cover that literally

01:56:47 literally uh by over cladding systems as they were termed then but i don't think this morning you you heard this and i add it to the chronology here in 1986

01:56:58 chronology here in 1986 that is in other words before noseley was actually built and fissioned and finished because it was commissioned in 89 the fire was in 91 this is in 1986

01:57:12 fire was in 91 this is in 1986 the government was aware then they were aware then and i i would put to you that it's not sufficient for people to come here and

01:57:24 sufficient for people to come here and say nobody told me or i didn't find out that's the whole point of being a responsible government minister that you take an interest in the area you're dealing with and you ask

01:57:36 the area you're dealing with and you ask for information and of course it's the fault of the civil service if they don't give it or they don't brief ministers properly however

01:57:46 however this is what the circular on the 9th of december 1986 from the department of environment this time about the project that's the pilot

01:57:57 about the project that's the pilot clad overcloud block a risk of increased vertical fire spread has been identified during the laboratory testing of over

01:58:09 during the laboratory testing of over cladding systems incorporating combustible insulins

01:58:15 insulins well there you have it in one sentence it all

01:58:19 it all the roots of this why we're sitting here is spelt out in 1986 so that

01:58:26 so that assuming some form of uh rational uh cohesive policy making and policy makers you would expect them to have been aware from a very early stage well

01:58:38 been aware from a very early stage well nosley heights was commissioned and there was this major fire ubvc and windows and so forth and it was in 1992 has already said the approved document b was then altered

01:58:50 was then altered such that

01:58:51 such that we get this bifurcation 12 6 12 7 in other words between limited combustibility for insulation and uh the requirement of

01:59:03 and uh the requirement of um over cladding to remain as class o may i just stand back and hopefully try one hopes that this isn't a scholastic exercise about how many angels can get

01:59:14 exercise about how many angels can get on the

01:59:15 on the head of a pin is this such a difficult problem because

01:59:20 because the problem's been summed up in a sense in 1986 for somebody somewhere to sit down and say if we are going to keep the citizens warm with over

01:59:33 keep the citizens warm with over cladding we better not making sure and we better make sure that nothing in the overcladding whether you call it insulation whether you call it a panel whether you call it

01:59:44 you call it a panel whether you call it whatever name you want to put filler and filler interestingly um it's been mentioned this morning who put filler in the works

01:59:54 the works brian martin that's what he did in 2005 after the edge fire so it's his wording and if no one else he has responsibility

02:00:05 and if no one else he has responsibility then

02:00:07 then to ensure

02:00:08 to ensure that

02:00:09 that the community and in particular the construction community people who he knew a lot about according to his emails because he heard he's heard talk from reliable sources well if

02:00:20 heard talk from reliable sources well if he said talk from a reliable sources then this was a situation in which at the lack of inquest where he gave illness he could have clarified all of this what he meant by sticking it in there did he mean filler was

02:00:32 there did he mean filler was insulation or did he mean filler was between a couple of panels which is part of over cloning in fact this is playing with words as somebody

02:00:41 somebody has already said playing with words throughout so that the

02:00:46 the noseley experiment and so forth and the alteration in 1992 of the approved document b and then his alteration in 2005. he's the

02:00:57 then his alteration in 2005. he's the king of the of the documentation of the regulations so the ministry had if they had wanted to had the facility and what is really shocking is that they only as

02:01:09 is really shocking is that they only as it were say oh well actually yes it it's not oh it's limited combustibility when does it say that after the fire melanie dawes makes a statement after

02:01:20 melanie dawes makes a statement after the fire and behave well we've always said it's limited no they haven't and so what's been happening here is a misrepresentation misleading uh from the all the way through

02:01:31 uh from the all the way through deliberately because this wasn't an oversight brian martin lived the whole thing from 1991 but before 1999 he was in building control before that he was in the

02:01:43 control before that he was in the construction industry so he really has bridged the gap and there's a big gap in most of the construction as we've seen which has led to some of the fires so he's the one

02:01:55 so he's the one and he and we'll see exactly i hope it's not unfair to call him the eminent screes here he's the one along with zapton along with others who are

02:02:07 zapton along with others who are advising ministers and of course the ministers have already as it were got their framework of thought so they won't be

02:02:14 be challenging mr martin in any way at all now i want the the next this is in the question one i'm not dealing with all the all the inquests you've heard a lot about the

02:02:26 you've heard a lot about the house of common commons report

02:02:29 report which uh

02:02:31 which uh of the select committee and i i was going to ask you to look at it but i i'm not going to look at it now may i ask you to bear in mind that we we have uh put forward the

02:02:42 uh put forward the the evidence of bob moore to that committee

02:02:47 committee the evidence of the fire brigades union to that committee is extremely instructive because they are mapping out should anybody not have ever heard of these issues it was all

02:02:58 ever heard of these issues it was all there in front of the house of commons and of course the the

02:03:03 the only part that i'm going to look at at this moment which is important the first report was in fact headed should anybody have not realized there were risks from 1986. it's headed potential

02:03:17 risks from 1986. it's headed potential risk of fire spread in buildings via external cladding systems couldn't be clearer

02:03:23 clearer and then they go on and say whether there's a risk posed by such cladding the extent of the use of external cloning can anybody say they weren't aware

02:03:32 aware of what was or what the issues were after this major tower fire the adequacy of the regulations and so forth so the terms of reference were extremely clear

02:03:43 terms of reference were extremely clear however

02:03:44 however there's been reference but not actually meant the detail of the conclusions of this of this report which was carried out immediately after the noseley fire

02:03:55 the noseley fire now

02:03:57 now we

02:03:58 we it's paragraph 19 so you know where it is but i don't ask for it to be on screen

02:04:02 screen they say this a joint report we do not believe that it should take a serious fire in which many people are killed

02:04:13 killed before all reasonable reasonable steps are taken towards minimizing the risk and then they go on to say small scale tests are not really sufficient or appropriate

02:04:24 appropriate but then the following one paragraph 20. this is this is really important this is way back therefore um

02:04:33 um when this was and in fact it's the year that brian martin actually joins uh

02:04:39 uh the bre

02:04:41 the bre who also gave evidence and may i pause for a moment the committee if you look up the membership of the committee which again i'm going to show you on the sheet but i can tell you

02:04:52 you on the sheet but i can tell you uh if one was to ask the question you know who do you think was a member of this committee out of all the people in this section lord pickles

02:05:03 lord pickles he was a member of this committee to give him his due he he left in 1998 so just before the report but again somebody in his position wouldn't we say

02:05:16 somebody in his position wouldn't we say have been an unaware that the committee he'd been sitting on had continued with this work and come up with this particular proposition we believe that all external

02:05:28 proposition we believe that all external cladding systems should be required either

02:05:32 either to be entirely non-combustible important

02:05:37 important because of course i just paused there because scotland as you may be aware took a different course and so after grenfell had happened scotland was able to say they hardly had

02:05:48 scotland was able to say they hardly had any buildings that qualified in the way that grenfell did so they were saying either non-combustible so that's you know that was an opportunity we're talking

02:05:59 that was an opportunity we're talking about opportunities missed this was an opportunity after this report for the government of that day which was soon to be

02:06:06 be um

02:06:08 um not so very long after that uh uh

02:06:11 uh uh another government wedded to the changes we've already talked about so this was an opportunity to make changes the alternative to non-combustibility

02:06:22 the alternative to non-combustibility or to be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk we therefore recommend compliance with the standards and so on i don't read the rest of it but it's there that's an

02:06:34 rest of it but it's there that's an important report with a report an important conclusion but that's not the only thing that they were recommending can i just mention the other things that in 1999 were being

02:06:46 in 1999 were being uh recommended and had they been carried out might have been making a difference and that is

02:06:53 that is that the

02:06:55 that the the department

02:06:58 authorizes registered social landlords to undertake a review of their existing building stock to ascertain how many multi-storey buildings are correctly using external

02:07:11 buildings are correctly using external cladding systems and how many cladding systems are in use which whilst complying with the regulations in force at the time when they were installed do not comply with current regulations a

02:07:23 not comply with current regulations a register

02:07:25 register because after grenfell if their register had been established way back then

02:07:30 then it would have been far easier to identify where the problems lay with high rise and additionally they also said they recommended

02:07:41 said they recommended fire safety assessors be reasses reassess themselves for their competency and they should be called in to evaluate what work may be necessary in order to

02:07:54 what work may be necessary in order to minimize the risks that they're talking about again something that came up late these are in other words this is old hallowed ground which we say government knew about

02:08:05 which we say government knew about and ignored all the way through and then they make something which is important they actually note that both classo and limited combustibility are

02:08:16 classo and limited combustibility are different

02:08:17 different from the classification of non-combustible so if there was any confusion this was the opportunity for mr martin or others as he later transferred to the department to get as it were to get on

02:08:29 department to get as it were to get on top of

02:08:30 top of um the distinctions that shouldn't be made when one's dealing with the outside and risk outside of a building and risk to those who live within

02:08:41 within and then obviously one comes that there were inquests in between with recommendations for rule for 43 letters i can't go through those and then one gets to lachenal you're aware of the headings there

02:08:53 headings there particularly the top one stay put and get out you i didn't show it in the last occasion but it's important because uh mr shah who's here today

02:09:05 uh mr shah who's here today ahmed he he i put it in the submissions before i come back to it because it's that's what they're living with he took a photograph of of what was in grenfell tower

02:09:16 of of what was in grenfell tower at the time uh in when i started the period with him in 2010 and the fire in grenfell tower at that time what did the notice say nothing about stay put it said get out

02:09:29 stay put it said get out nothing for the rest of the that's all there was on it and if you need any contact the town hall now i'm not going to look at the but that's all it says so

02:09:39 so the

02:09:39 the review of stay put that was being suggested

02:09:43 suggested had been suggested in the isle of man case suggested again in lacanal and i'm not going to go through all the recommendations because that's been done none of them were actually

02:09:55 none of them were actually adopted and taken up at all stay put being still being one of the most important although as a result of phase one and you will be aware of it from other evidence in other modules that the

02:10:07 other evidence in other modules that the state policy now has been revised and there's a and of course it links to compartmentation and it links to evacuation which in turn links to the

02:10:18 to evacuation which in turn links to the disabled and the vulnerable so there's a kind of knock-on effect that once you start examining something which should have happened after lachen lacking and

02:10:28 and i think those of us who practice have often wondered how frustrating it must be

02:10:34 be for coroners who take time to write it out in detail knowing that possibly what they're saying will be as they put vernacular on the back burner and actually won't be

02:10:45 the back burner and actually won't be activated and that is precisely uh what happened in in the lacanal case now i'm not going to uh do more on this set on the lack of

02:10:57 uh do more on this set on the lack of aspect other than it's been touched on as well the inquest itself by this time lord pickles is in post as it were and brian martin is there as well the inquest took i mean he's giving

02:11:08 well the inquest took i mean he's giving evidence the inquest took best part of 2013 in the beginning months and the letter sent to lord pickles was sent a very um

02:11:20 sent a very um in a very timely manner right at the end of it and it had a lot of publicity so even if you are shielded in your department you don't know what's going on in the department you only have to

02:11:31 on in the department you only have to watch television and you'd have seen the images of lacrinol because it was so at that stage dramatic and so

02:11:40 and so the the fact of the fire the fact of a coroner coming up with very detailed recommendations which would have made a difference we say had any of them being activated but

02:11:52 say had any of them being activated but none of them were so one turns really to a section

02:11:57 a section and i'm i'm skipping over foreign fires lacrosse and all the other ones that come in the list and um

02:12:06 and um the constant recommendations that were coming up

02:12:08 coming up before we get to um the fact of the next question there were no steps taken i don't take time over going through what steps we're not taking because you have it

02:12:19 taking because you have it but we then come to therefore the question

02:12:23 question why were there no steps taken in other words the underpinning of this policy of government which we say is extremely important to understand why this happened

02:12:34 why this happened housing policies part of it but the radical housing policy is part of a much bigger

02:12:40 bigger policy uh determination and we say reading it now it well even then

02:12:48 then these are important uh

02:12:51 uh statements policy statements being made by the head of government and therefore ministers and percolating downs to local authorities must have been aware

02:13:03 authorities must have been aware that what was coming into power in 2009 uh just after i say 2009 for express reasons

02:13:12 reasons the these speeches about the role of health and safety didn't start once they the cameron government were in power they started in 2009

02:13:24 they started in 2009 and what it was being said in 2009 as a bearing again it's very interesting because the critical period for grenfell tower and mr shah ahmed had been as i put on the last submissions 2010 in 2009

02:13:38 put on the last submissions 2010 in 2009 what was being said and broadcast by the potential prime minister as he was then he was bemoaning 12 years of government obsessed by legislation and regulation

02:13:50 obsessed by legislation and regulation and stating this the risk-averse culture has damaged our economy

02:13:57 economy our politics and our society that's a bold statement it's an ideological statement

02:14:04 statement and and i think one can't as it were demur from that is exactly what it is and it's what's on the tin essentially because he's setting it out well before

02:14:15 well before and he promised at the same time as this in at the end of 2009 that his government would bring to health and safety the presumption

02:14:26 to health and safety the presumption that there's no such thing as a risk free

02:14:30 free environment and efforts to eliminate all risk

02:14:34 risk will eliminate enterprise creativity achievement innovation is there anything it doesn't affect we say this couldn't be a clearer

02:14:45 we say this couldn't be a clearer statement it can't be fudged it's not an accident of history this is a deliberate policy set out

02:14:53 set out by mr cameron and adopted by his cabinet and government appreciate it was a coalition in october 2010 so it's the next year

02:15:05 in october 2010 so it's the next year he goes a bit further he wants to scrap health and safety rules that put people off

02:15:10 off then he talks about mr pickles the big man on the side of the people and in the party conference in 2011 so it's year after year the shadow of health and safety is holding people back

02:15:23 health and safety is holding people back this isn't how a great nation was built britannia didn't rule the waves with armbands on well there we are it's it's ridiculing humiliating health

02:15:35 it's it's ridiculing humiliating health and safety and relegating citizens

02:15:40 citizens uh as it were too effectively a bonfire so it's extremely serious when one gets essentially to the the main speech which i i i do think

02:15:51 the the main speech which i i i do think is important to recall uh what he said it was a new year's resolution comes the year later 2012.

02:15:59 2012. and this we we we say he needs to be here to answer what he meant

02:16:04 meant because if it's going to be said through his

02:16:08 his proteges through his ministers or whatever that he didn't mean what he said well let him come and say that but this is what he did say to kill off the health and safety culture for good i

02:16:19 health and safety culture for good i want 2012 to go down in history not as just the olympics here or diamond jubilee but the year we are we banished a lot of pointless time wasting from the

02:16:30 a lot of pointless time wasting from the economy

02:16:31 economy and the british life once and for all it has become an albatross around the neck of businesses costing them billions of pounds a year a feared health and safety

02:16:42 pounds a year a feared health and safety monster to be slain so that businesses feel they can get on they can plan they can invest they can grow without feeling they're going to be strangled by red tape

02:16:54 red tape and health and safety regulation i i've read it at full and obviously with a little bit of emphasis but i think it's important to recall to relive

02:17:06 recall to relive the atmosphere the environment of the time because it could happen again unless

02:17:12 unless it is banished as an approach it doesn't matter who's you know which part is in power which party espouses this kind of ideology uh it is not

02:17:23 this kind of ideology uh it is not uh we say to be adopted again it gets worse

02:17:27 worse with the

02:17:29 with the red tape challenge itself which

02:17:33 which indicated this was oliver letwin a couple of years later in 2014 a call to minimize risk is a call for a cowardly society

02:17:44 is a call for a cowardly society it really is putting people who dare to say

02:17:48 say what about this what about that it's not just about cutting regulations which they were doing as well but it's about not introducing anything that's going to cause more trouble and

02:17:59 that's going to cause more trouble and expense for business and it's very interesting that in none of the speeches that we found is there a single word said about health and safety

02:18:10 health and safety by those who are perpetrating this policy

02:18:14 policy so therefore that's the background which we say cannot be dismissed and needs to be confronted and needs to be accountability for setting that kind of agenda

02:18:27 for setting that kind of agenda but i want to interpose if i may um i'm watching the time i think i'm getting close i can do it fairly rapidly that

02:18:38 that and this is in a sense i hope it's not uh

02:18:41 uh in part a tribute to sir david amos

02:18:46 sir david because it may not be known to the public just exactly

02:18:52 exactly what

02:18:53 what he did

02:18:54 he did and it wasn't just him and it wasn't a pressure group it wasn't part of our democracy the ability of an all-party group which some crave and all party group

02:19:06 some crave and all party group the appg

02:19:08 the appg in relation to fire rescue safety and

02:19:13 and i'm going to start with what he said at the end of his um

02:19:21 tenure in a sense although not at the end of his life after the fire at grenfell tower so it's 2019 he said this it's a compelling insight over the past

02:19:33 it's a compelling insight over the past six years the all party group has met resistance when seeking improvements to fire safety despite compelling evidence that such measures should be introduced in the 13 years since regulations were

02:19:45 in the 13 years since regulations were last reviewed has happened it is perhaps rather easier for a conservative member to make these points than it would be for other members because

02:19:55 because we should never have got to the position of the grenfell tower fire tragedy especially after the warnings and recommendations from the coroner after the lachenal house fire and the

02:20:06 after the lachenal house fire and the 23013 inquest the rule 43 letter to the secretary of state to the fault of every member of parliament that our voice was not heard

02:20:16 not heard and the recommendations were not listened to well

02:20:21 well deference to him perhaps i just add or alter the last word

02:20:27 they were in a sense heard the recommendations they were listened to but worse they weren't heeded they were ignored

02:20:38 they weren't heeded they were ignored why because of the greater policy that was in force at that time and what is of some interest is the disclosure by the bbc in a few

02:20:50 is the disclosure by the bbc in a few days after the fire itself followed up by the journal inside housing which again is quoted from time to time uh they revealed that this committee

02:21:01 uh they revealed that this committee over the period of time that they were after the fire uh so through from 2014 in fact i think it is through to

02:21:12 2014 in fact i think it is through to 2017 the committee wrote 21 times saying the same thing basically when are you going to do something about the recommendations out

02:21:23 something about the recommendations out of lacanal reviewing adb and so forth spring clips all the ones you all the issues to turn about

02:21:32 now without getting i'm going to just ask for one to come up in the last few minutes but that the correspondence demonstrates without a question

02:21:43 without a question that they were fobbed off time and again with the same and i'm sorry to say lies

02:21:50 lies the lies

02:21:53 the lies that's were right we're doing a review it'll be out in 2016-17 really

02:21:58 really well as we now know from a a a note that's been revealed straight after the fire where they were getting a conference

02:22:09 where they were getting a conference together of members of the house of commons a note has been revealed in which

02:22:15 which work had not even begun on the adb review so what they were saying to the all party group what they were saying to the house of commons what they were

02:22:26 the house of commons what they were saying to the british public was complete nonsense intended to be we'll just put them off we'll do it yes but they don't they don't do a thing and of course now we have the hackett review and all the rest of it because panic

02:22:38 and all the rest of it because panic stricken they're thrown into it but could we have on screen please an early repost from brian martin it's at clg triple three

02:22:51 it's at clg triple three triple zero one one two nine five underscore triple zero one

02:23:00 and this is one in which um david amis has written in response to your letter it's a start at the top of the page the group have argued that a review of the proof document b should be

02:23:11 review of the proof document b should be brought forward and invited you to meet with them that's their point all the way through please meet us now and talk about it

02:23:18 about it and the recommendation on brian martin is you decline the info invitation and this is the policy of the civil service throughout advising pickles not to meet harriet

02:23:29 advising pickles not to meet harriet harman the mp not to engage why because if they did engage they'd soon discover that really very little has been done and um

02:23:42 paragraph four is of interest following the lack of house fire the coroner criticized the complexity of the guidance on approved document being called on government to revise it secretary of state rejected this but committed to a review which would

02:23:53 but committed to a review which would deliver a revised document 2016-17 so in fact um it was rejected in fact as we know nothing was being done and then the

02:24:04 nothing was being done and then the sprinklers are dismissed because of the cost and bringing this review forward would require the allocation and reallocations paragraph six of resources it's unlikely that new evidence would

02:24:15 it's unlikely that new evidence would justify any significant change and so it goes on could we have one more document please clg

02:24:24 clg triples one two three four five five zeroes eight nine four underscore triple zero one a letter dated the first of december 2015

02:24:36 december 2015 from uh sir david amos to james wharton thank you very much and you will see there paragraph over the past two years of

02:24:48 paragraph over the past two years of correspondence between your predecessor stephen williams myself the group has felt continuous frustration over dismissive responses to its well-founded

02:25:00 dismissive responses to its well-founded and justifiable concerns whereas yesterday we did feel a more considerate tenor and then he goes on to deal with the discussions and you will see on the next page triple zero two

02:25:13 page triple zero two sir david and the committee have a large number of propositions of how constructive ones of the way forward

02:25:20 forward i can summarize none of these were followed up he was whistling and the committee were whistling in the wind they were to be feeling in the next letter that comes in the sequence i don't ask for it to go on screen he

02:25:33 don't ask for it to go on screen he describes the committee and sorry the cross party groups complete dejection at that unanimous dejection is the word used

02:25:44 used that's to the mp he just written to because once again uh and

02:25:50 uh and he

02:25:51 he the the demands that they're making the observations that they are making and in fact what he's saying to them is is it going to take a fire and he actually predicts is it going to take a fire

02:26:01 fire in 2017

02:26:05 of a high-rise block before you're going to do anything but it didn't matter what he said um

02:26:11 um and once he tried as he did at the end of the sequence he tries to get a date as to when is this going to happen this review

02:26:19 review because at that time it's uh gavin barwell who's giving very different answers about when it's going to come first he's going to make a statement and he's not going to make a statement and of course we know why

02:26:31 and of course we know why and

02:26:32 and may i

02:26:33 may i then because i see the time with uh a cameo

02:26:36 cameo which we we submit actually speaks volumes as to what's going on here the cameo is this picture the morning of the fire

02:26:49 melanie dawes now melanie dawes is an important individual because she she was the head of the civil service

02:27:00 service and she she had a particular responsibility she'd come into post as it were a little later than some 2015 she came into post

02:27:11 she came into post and the cameo is this that she says in her statement i don't answer it be up she says in her statement funny that i didn't the morning of the fire was the first

02:27:22 the morning of the fire was the first time

02:27:24 time i'd heard of lachenal it was the first time i knew there was any query over a proof document b and any

02:27:32 any attempt to redraft it but of course she ought to know because she'd be right in the center of it she's telling the truth she didn't know why

02:27:42 why because lack lachenal didn't matter i'm afraid and lacking all of the recommendations even the deaths had not spurred them into action instead of misrepresentation

02:27:56 into action instead of misrepresentation so what she said is very interesting that she didn't know but even bigger question

02:28:01 question why did she start thinking about lachnal was it something she read in the phrase or was it lord pickles ringing her up or something because within a few days he

02:28:12 something because within a few days he was asking interesting questions little cameo on the 22nd of june when they were putting out what what was meant by approved document b he said

02:28:23 he said and he asked for access to his documents what did he want to know he wanted to know

02:28:29 know what the response of the department had been

02:28:32 been to the recommendations and to the all-party group warnings so there we have a little cameo of what's going on there it may be he just had a lot of memory or maybe

02:28:43 he just had a lot of memory or maybe some of the can i call it the claire williams lachlan moment had suddenly as it were come home

02:28:51 come home to complete the cameo it's on the morning of the fire that the red tape challenge are meeting not to secure health and safety quite the opposite they're actually

02:29:03 quite the opposite they're actually meeting

02:29:04 meeting oliver letwin who thinks it's cowardly to have

02:29:09 to have a risk-averse society their meeting in order to see if they can remove health well fire safety regulations to make it easier for business so i think

02:29:21 make it easier for business so i think i've overstepped them out by a few minutes i apologize to those who come after him

02:29:26 after him thank you thank you very much mr mansfield

02:29:29 mansfield now um we're going to hear a statement next from

02:29:34 next from mr adrian williamson queen's council unfortunately mr williamson i think is not able to be here at any rate he's attending

02:29:42 attending um

02:29:43 um by zoom

02:29:44 by zoom and uh i think i better just check that he can hear and see us and vice versa good morning mr williamson good morning can you hear me we can thank you very much and i hope you can see us and hear us all right

02:29:57 see us and hear us all right good thank you very much well mr man feels slightly overrun but uh he says he'd agree you would agree that he should take whatever time he takes so now it's your turn all right thank you

02:30:09 now it's your turn all right thank you thank you very much thank you very much stop my clock for now uh good morning mr chairman mrs esteban and mr actball in module two we saw that the project manufacturers are colic celetex and

02:30:21 manufacturers are colic celetex and kingspan were indeed as we had called them crooks and killers fraudulent in their marketing recklessly unconcerned with public safety and focused on the bottom line

02:30:33 focused on the bottom line by fair means or foul because of the inherent dangers posed by their combustible building products the process of testing and certification of

02:30:44 process of testing and certification of the same needed to be rigorous impartial expert and above all wholly independent if the testing and certification system had been rigorous and independent the

02:30:57 had been rigorous and independent the manufacturers might not have got away with selling their lethal products in fact the testing and certification system was hopelessly inadequate and those responsible actually knew that

02:31:09 and those responsible actually knew that combustible products were going onto building and they failed to provide tests that could reduce the risks instead they stood back and let it happen

02:31:21 happen when the inquiry comes to consider the evidence in module 6 it will see that these bodies these testing and certification bodies were wholly aware in the years leading up to the grandfall

02:31:32 in the years leading up to the grandfall tragedy of the issues organizations and individuals with whom the inquiry has been concerned to date for example as recorded in an article in

02:31:43 for example as recorded in an article in the rics building control journal under the faithful heading combustible cladding burning issues the nhbc for example held a facade to tall

02:31:55 nhbc for example held a facade to tall building seminar in 2016 which included key speakers from the dclg the bre and x over the article nation that these parties

02:32:06 the article nation that these parties discussed the use of combustible materials in the external walls of high-rise buildings in addition to consequences of poor specification and the like

02:32:16 the like why then was this testing and certification system if such it can be called at all so dysfunctional as the saying goes a fish rots from the

02:32:28 as the saying goes a fish rots from the head down

02:32:30 head down the government should have been alert to see that the testing and certification bodies were performing their roles scrupulously and impartially in fact as we've already heard today

02:32:41 in fact as we've already heard today from mr mansfield and ms barwise successive governments were seeking to stand back and let the market work its magic

02:32:50 magic the key figure within government again as we've heard was brian martin he had long been aware of the risks of employing the type of material used at grenfell

02:33:00 grenfell these dangers were not disputed but nothing was done instead martin took an attitude that was complacent and collusive with a dangerously out of control industry

02:33:12 dangerously out of control industry for example as long ago as 2008 concern was expressed to him by someone called philip reed about fire safety uh surrounding types of composite

02:33:25 uh surrounding types of composite panels

02:33:26 panels mr reed said that there were loopholes in the existing framework that allowed manufacturers to offer products that were misleading in their sales documentation and were a genuine fire

02:33:38 documentation and were a genuine fire risk to the public martian's response could scarcely have been more dismissive he said if you're concerned that a manufacturer is deliberately misleading people with its literature then that's

02:33:50 people with its literature then that's something that should be taken up with the relevant trading standards authority in 2013 martin's colleague mr anthony byrd

02:34:00 byrd raised the alarm regarding downward fast spread at lack of house martin replied again dismissively the falling debris could have been from the bird netting or some other crap falling

02:34:13 bird netting or some other crap falling out of the window i still think they are over-egging the impact of the panels as late as um 2016 only a year before the fire martin

02:34:26 2016 only a year before the fire martin said this about the regulatory framework could we add up please clg three zeros three one

02:34:34 three one zero nine three at page four at the bottom of the page

02:34:54 so there we see mr martian saying it's for the designer and the building control body to conceive consider if requirement b4 has been met he then

02:35:04 he then discusses uh adb and various other matters and he says this however if the designer and building control body choose to do something else then that's

02:35:15 choose to do something else then that's up to them thank you very much that can come down

02:35:19 come down i turn now to the building research establishment the bre the bre was founded in 1921 100 years ago as the building research board a civil service body in an effort to

02:35:32 civil service body in an effort to improve the quality of housing in the uk it so operated until 1997 when it was privatized indeed the bre based as follows on their

02:35:43 indeed the bre based as follows on their website

02:35:44 website following 75 years as a building research agency of government bre was privatized in 1997 by michael heselthein in the last days of the conservative

02:35:55 in the last days of the conservative government reactions from across the construction sector were unequivocal bre won't survive because no one will pay privately for research well here we

02:36:06 pay privately for research well here we are two decades later under the ownership of the bre trust not just surviving but thriving and growing an international base for our business so we can drive our positive impact and how

02:36:19 we can drive our positive impact and how has it quotes growing the international base for their business close crates by putting its customers front and center of its operation and who are its customers they are the

02:36:31 and who are its customers they are the manufacturers who have used and abused the testing and certification system to push dangerous products into an ignorant and complacent marketplace

02:36:42 and complacent marketplace and the bre have colluded in this process

02:36:46 process on that same website which was accessed but a few days ago and four years after the terrible fire at grantham and in full knowledge of the devastating

02:36:57 and in full knowledge of the devastating evidence which has been heard in this inquiry the bre say this our customers use our expertise and services to deliver their social

02:37:08 services to deliver their social environmental and economic goals and how does the bre seek to secure those economic goals for their customers

02:37:19 those economic goals for their customers at the heart of the operation lies obsessive concern over client confidentiality the quotes economic goals close quotes of the customer come first

02:37:32 of the customer come first as the website also states following the tragic fire that occurred at grenfell tower in june 2017 bre were asked by dclg to contact all of

02:37:44 bre were asked by dclg to contact all of our customers who had tested and achieved br 135 classifications for their external planning system and then this where permission to publish details of a

02:37:56 where permission to publish details of a cladding system has been granted by the customer

02:37:59 customer this document summarizes the generic components included we submit this is symptomatic of a corrupt culture in the testing and

02:38:10 corrupt culture in the testing and certification industry client confidentiality should not come first the public interest and public safety must always come first

02:38:21 safety must always come first after all as was rightly said in the 19th century if the broad light of day could be let in upon men's actions it would purify them as the sun disinfects

02:38:33 would purify them as the sun disinfects possibly sexist language apart this remains a most valuable guiding principle in the 21st century it is not however a principle by which

02:38:44 it is not however a principle by which the bre was prepared to live to the contrary for the bre its commercial interests were paramount for example in 2014 the cwct

02:38:56 for example in 2014 the cwct approached the bre to ask whether they wish to be involved in a working group to oversee the development of cwc activity in relation to far performance

02:39:07 activity in relation to far performance for curtin walls and rain streams having regard what was to happen three years later at grenfell it is hard to imagine a more pressing ins

02:39:18 imagine a more pressing ins issue

02:39:20 issue dr sarah caldwell of the bre well knew by then that there were problems with the relevant issues that they were seeing in the industry and which were not clearly defined in adb

02:39:32 which were not clearly defined in adb indeed since 2002 colwell and dr debbie smith the managing director of bre global limited had known that acm pe rainstreen cladding products

02:39:45 that acm pe rainstreen cladding products were being used on facades of the same type as that which were later used at grenfell they also knew that this aluminium sheet product proved to be one

02:39:56 aluminium sheet product proved to be one of the worst performing products when tested

02:40:00 tested despite all this smith commented internally when approached by cwct and please could we have our bre three zeroes four seven three six four slash

02:40:12 zeroes four seven three six four slash one in the middle of the page

02:40:31 and there we see debbie smith saying whoa this looks very dangerous we need to discuss our strategy to ensure that we don't end up handing the fire safety mandal to cwct a

02:40:45 handing the fire safety mandal to cwct a competitor losing the need for br 135 bs 8414 etcetera etcetera thank you for that we take that down now furthermore the bre generally and smith

02:40:58 furthermore the bre generally and smith in particular seem to have taken a remarkably hands-off approach to their role

02:41:04 role their line was not to let in the disinfecting light but to shrug their shoulders and say it's not my job gov smith observes in her witness statement

02:41:15 smith observes in her witness statement given to this inquiry indeed that bre has no subsequent role or responsibility in relation to any performance claims which the test

02:41:26 performance claims which the test sponsor their client may make for the products or systems which they sell into the market in summary the bre is an organization in need of root and branch reform

02:41:39 need of root and branch reform beginning with a return to the public sector and the adoption of an unequivocal ethos of public service it is striking that following the fire ucas prepares an assessment report on

02:41:52 ucas prepares an assessment report on the bre after examining a number of test job files and associated documentation related to bs 8414 testing

02:42:03 related to bs 8414 testing the report makes depressing reading for example ucas observing that those who were carrying out the tests had no ostensible qualifications so to do

02:42:16 i turn now to the cwct the center for windows and cladding technology they are a trade body whose stated purpose is to publish standards and

02:42:27 purpose is to publish standards and guidance in relation to fire resistance facades cladding and glazing their key objectives are to provide guidance and training in all areas of

02:42:38 guidance and training in all areas of facade engineering and to carry out research

02:42:42 research as we have seen the bre regarded them as deadly rivals however

02:42:48 however they are um and unhappily the ca wct also did little to shine light into these murky areas they seem to have had limited

02:42:59 they seem to have had limited understanding of the key issues for example

02:43:04 at a board meeting in july 2013 tech who seemed to be fair to have been more on the ball than most raised concerns about misunderstandings regarding insulation

02:43:16 regarding insulation since class zero products did not meet the fire regulations cwc agreed to look into this but seem to have done nothing about this crucial confusion

02:43:27 confusion a year later but still three years before the fire the cwc far group noted at a meeting that there was quite a degree of ignorance with some people confusing

02:43:38 ignorance with some people confusing class zero with limited combustibility close quotes and that clause 12 7 of adb did not make clear that the necessary prohibition on

02:43:49 clear that the necessary prohibition on the use of polyethylene called acm in buildings

02:43:53 buildings what is so remarkable and so disheartening is that this was a meeting attended by many of the key players in this tragedy who have given or will be

02:44:04 this tragedy who have given or will be giving evidence in this inquiry including colwell of bre martin of dclj and iva meredith of kingspan the issues were plainly performed and

02:44:15 the issues were plainly performed and yet the cwct was unable or unwilling to address them effectively i turn next to the labc local authority building control the organization which

02:44:28 building control the organization which represents all local authority building control teams in england and wales according to their their documentation they are said to be independent impartial and expert

02:44:42 independent impartial and expert however in their dealings with the crooks and killers the lb labc were in fact neither independent expert nor impartial

02:44:54 expert nor impartial the first key labc certificate we are concerned with in this inquiry is the one issued for king's pounds k-15 which supported the false claim that the

02:45:05 supported the false claim that the product was of limited compostability this seems to have been brought about by informal

02:45:12 informal conversations between pack of kinspan and barry turner of the nabc it appears that this certificate was subject to little or no scrutiny in fact

02:45:24 subject to little or no scrutiny in fact the drafting of the document as we heard in module 2 was entrusted to an officer with little or no experience of facade compliance in 18 meter buildings

02:45:36 compliance in 18 meter buildings despite receiving a letter from rockwell in 2009

02:45:40 in 2009 asking how k-15 could possibly be thought to be of limited combustibility the labc entirely failed to address this false claim until the issue of its

02:45:51 false claim until the issue of its registered detail in august 2013. however it's important to note that despite these concerns having been raised this detail still claimed that

02:46:02 raised this detail still claimed that k15 was compliant as a product with br 135 when no such classification existed further as we know br135

02:46:13 further as we know br135 cannot classify a product only a system how did this come about well it is clear that the labc were not independent but were far too close to

02:46:24 independent but were far too close to manufacturers like kingspan and far depend too dependent upon their business thus in july 14 one sees mr ewing of the labc excitedly informing his colleagues

02:46:36 labc excitedly informing his colleagues following a visit to kingspan she had could we go to labc302686

02:46:45 page one

02:46:56 so what one sees at the bottom of the page

02:46:59 page mr ewing reporting that he had got back from hereford which is where kingspan's property is uh 10 minutes ago and had been asked to quote uh for a

02:47:11 and had been asked to quote uh for a number of products and if we could scroll up the page

02:47:17 we see the response from the colleagues fan bloody tastic and we'll save this uh failing company yet and mr ewing then reported that justin

02:47:29 and mr ewing then reported that justin davies of kingston had been really impressed with our approach i think we can take that down now furthermore the labc were internally

02:47:40 furthermore the labc were internally subject to exactly the confusion which the cwct had been discussing for example in a 2013 internal exchange concerning clause 12 7

02:47:51 internal exchange concerning clause 12 7 of adb

02:47:53 of adb it was stated that essentially as the board is described as class 0 it can be termed a material of limited insert and so in terms of the relevant

02:48:04 insert and so in terms of the relevant part of document b it is suitable for use within the wall construction even at heights over 18 meters the manufacturers were only too happy to exploit this ignorance for their own

02:48:17 exploit this ignorance for their own ends

02:48:18 ends in particular celetex doing so in 2014 and onwards indeed

02:48:27 indeed celetex

02:48:29 celetex were bragging by 2014 that they had once again demonstrated uh their applications being suitable for buildings above 80 meters which was

02:48:41 buildings above 80 meters which was supported by nabc approval

02:48:46 and that was all based upon a registered detail which the labc had issued which wrongly proclaimed that celetex rs 5000 had been successfully tested to bs 8414

02:49:00 had been successfully tested to bs 8414 and was suitable for buildings above 18 meters in height indeed

02:49:07 indeed as the inquiry will recall at this point the world of the labc collided with that of the residents of grenfell tower in august 2014 mr room of

02:49:19 grenfell tower in august 2014 mr room of solitex sent an email to mr anchored all jones of harley attaching rs 5000 information sheets and labc documentation

02:49:30 documentation the subject line of the email as we all recall was grenfell tower rs 5000 data i turned them to the nhbc

02:49:42 the national house building council was set up 85 years ago and like other venerable institutions such as the bre it appears to offer

02:49:53 such as the bre it appears to offer confidence that all will be well in the construction world indeed its website claims that their purpose is to build confidence in the construction quality of new homes and to

02:50:06 construction quality of new homes and to use their unrivaled expertise to support customers to improve construction quality however like the bre the nhbc was at

02:50:17 however like the bre the nhbc was at best gullible and at worst collusive when dealing with the manufacturers its interactions with kingspan are illustrative of this once more it is

02:50:29 are illustrative of this once more it is kingspan who are at the heart of this darkness

02:50:33 darkness in october 2013 wintec asked for a meeting with the nhbc to discuss the concerns of the cwct in relation to the use of k-15 with rain

02:50:46 in relation to the use of k-15 with rain screen cladding in buildings over 18 meters

02:50:50 meters the meeting duly took place in november of that year and the nhbc noted

02:50:58 noted internally and if we could go to nhb

02:51:03 nhb four zeros zero five nine seven page one [Music]

02:51:15 so it was reported internally um on the basis of what kingspan uh kit wintek had said that the the k-15 had been tested in one instance on a

02:51:26 had been tested in one instance on a masonry war construction on that basis kingston were claiming that it was suitable for use in buildings over 18 meters high but continued mr lewis of

02:51:37 meters high but continued mr lewis of nhbc when you dig down to the detail it's only acceptable if the wall construction is exactly the same as that tested

02:51:45 tested most of our schemes a steel frame with a metsec or similar external wool bag will build up and say the king's fan test doesn't hold true and if we follow the adb and bl-135 guidance we shouldn't be

02:51:58 adb and bl-135 guidance we shouldn't be accepting it even with a cementitious line the product is still combustible and so it doesn't meet adb recommendations thank you take that down the nhbc then seem to have investigated

02:52:12 the nhbc then seem to have investigated the position with kingspan indeed they went so far as to produce a draft memo to them in february 2014 raising concerns about the new version of the bba certificate and asking for

02:52:24 of the bba certificate and asking for clarification as to the technical basis upon which changes to that certificate had been made however despite this and despite the importance of these issues by june of

02:52:36 importance of these issues by june of that year matters had not really progressed very far the nhbc um therefore uh wrote to

02:52:47 to uh kingspan and they said this unless additional test evidence supporting the use of k-15 in constructions which differ from the bs 84141

02:52:59 bs 84141 test can be provided before 30th june 2014

02:53:04 2014 nhbc building control services will need to reconsider the acceptance of k-15 in buildings over 80 meters at as fit for

02:53:15 buildings over 80 meters at as fit for purpose

02:53:16 purpose they received an evasive response from meredith kingspan were clearly playing for time a little later brian martin as we've heard notified the

02:53:27 brian martin as we've heard notified the nhbc that he had heard quotes from relatively reliable sources close quotes that several buildings had been erected where pir insulation had been used in

02:53:40 where pir insulation had been used in cladding panels well over 18 meters in height and that people were under the impression that pir was a material of limited combustibility which it was not

02:53:52 limited combustibility which it was not despite all this in october 2014 the a nhbc was still merely discussing the results of testing carried out by kingspan and holding a meeting with them

02:54:04 kingspan and holding a meeting with them where test reports were presented and discussed

02:54:07 discussed there was plenty of talk but no apparent desire on the part of the nhbc to wage war on these unsafe products what instead the nhbc did was to hold

02:54:20 what instead the nhbc did was to hold yet further meetings in november 2014 with the bre and arab fire it is poignant to note that again key witnesses in this inquiry were

02:54:31 key witnesses in this inquiry were discussing at this meeting the very issues which this inquiry has act has had to wrestle with for example in this meeting arab i think

02:54:42 for example in this meeting arab i think dr lame

02:54:43 dr lame [Music]

02:54:44 [Music] stated

02:54:45 stated that they were quite deeply concerned about the use of combustible components within external wall constructions of high-rise buildings and also that they felt that the current

02:54:58 and also that they felt that the current guidance was not sufficiently robust what then happened was that the nhbc did finally resolve to take some action but at the most leisurely of paces in february 2015 when

02:55:12 leisurely of paces in february 2015 when this particular saga had been ongoing for 18 months it was administered by the nh nhbc that and could we go to uh nhb

02:55:23 uh nhb four zeros two double six seven at page three

02:55:36 so in relation to k-15 we see that um ig who's a uh an hpc man advised that the proposed letter to kingspan was being finalized with advice from the

02:55:47 being finalized with advice from the head of

02:55:49 head of legal there were also discussions with the bba

02:55:53 the bba um

02:55:54 um and um that the nhvc were keen to find find an acceptable solution in conjunction with the bba

02:56:05 conjunction with the bba thank you take that down on

02:56:10 the action arising from all this was that the nhpc in march 2015 sent out a note to builders on the use of combustible materials in buildings over 80 meters however and stockton

02:56:24 80 meters however and stockton this was couched in general terms and did not even mention k-15

02:56:30 k-15 a clue to this course of action may be inferred from the fact that the nhbc had only felt able to deal with kingspan at all with advice from the head of legal

02:56:41 all with advice from the head of legal no doubt because they were fearful that kingspan would resort to litigation if their position was under threat the nhbc were also aware of the dangers

02:56:52 the nhbc were also aware of the dangers and limitations of the testing of rs 5000 the celetex product and even went so far as to raise these concerns with them

02:57:01 them however the evidence shows again and again that the nhbc took far too relaxed to start when it came to allowing rs 5000 to be specified

02:57:12 5000 to be specified at this point i should say something about the issue of desktop stubby studies

02:57:17 studies which ms barweis has referred to during their exchanges with kingspan the nhbc and labc whilst being perfectly

02:57:28 nhbc and labc whilst being perfectly well aware that there were serious issues with the full-scale testing route started to draft the first edition of what would become the bca technical diamonds note 18

02:57:40 diamonds note 18 we submit that this was a particularly problematic piece of guidance since it legitimized the use of desktop studies in place of further testing initially this only

02:57:51 initially this only permitted ucas accredited testing laboratories with testing data already in their possession to carry out the studies but then

02:58:01 but then the scope of the note was further widened

02:58:05 widened this resulted in a series of extremely questionable studies some of which actually permitted the use of polyethylene called acm alongside combustible insulation much like what

02:58:17 combustible insulation much like what occurred at grenfell

02:58:21 uh not satisfied with the already extremely dubious and newly legitimized desktop study compliance route the nhbc then decided to take this further

02:58:33 then decided to take this further they published their 2016 guidance note permitting an appendix 3 the use of class 0 euro class b acm alongside k15 or rs 5000

02:58:47 alongside k15 or rs 5000 i should now briefly say a few words about

02:58:52 two other bodies ucas and the bba the united kingdom accreditation service is the national accreditation body for the uk

02:59:01 the uk appointed by government to assess organizations that provide certification testing inspection services we have significant concerns about the

02:59:12 we have significant concerns about the role and performance of ucas however it has not been possible to deal with ucas in these submissions into the lack of relevant disclosure so far provided

02:59:23 provided we expect that we'll have more to say about them once that disclosure has been provided

02:59:29 provided the british board of agreements the bba two have lofty aspirations claiming on their website that for 50 years they have been helping the construction and manufacturing industries build

02:59:41 manufacturing industries build confidence in the solutions created throughout the supply chain the bpa is not being called to give evidence in this module that we think is a regrettable decision

02:59:53 that we think is a regrettable decision since the bba occupies a pivotal role in the current testing and certification regime and thereby of the regulation of construction products generally

03:00:05 construction products generally in any event we invite the inquiry to keep at the forefront of its mind the evidence heard in module 2 which details the very significant shortcomings in the bba's procedures and

03:00:18 shortcomings in the bba's procedures and personnel

03:00:19 personnel these are all relevant to the systemic failures with which module 6 is concerned

03:00:26 concerned those systemic failures were numerous persistent and serious what is so alarming and tragic is that the cladding and insulation dangers which would lead

03:00:38 and insulation dangers which would lead to the grenfell fire were not in any way unknown

03:00:42 unknown for example mr lewis of the nhpc who whose document we saw a moment ago recalls in his second witness statement for this inquiry that he was from at least 2014 onwards concerned about the

03:00:54 least 2014 onwards concerned about the issue of combustible materials on buildings over 18 meters in particular the risk of 100 p called acm

03:01:03 acm indeed he often made fire safety presentations and these he highlighted to the audience that if they identified 100

03:01:12 100 pe called acm then as could be seen in a video she showed it could not be said to meet regulation b41 the script for a presentation of this

03:01:24 the script for a presentation of this kind entitled combustible facade is before the inquiry i'm now about to call up an image which shows images of a build burning building that some may

03:01:35 build burning building that some may find distressing and may wish to look away from

03:01:39 away from could we please have up nhb4061

03:01:44 at page nine

03:01:56 and that diagram shows how combustible facades would lead to rapid fire spread and how the cladding consistent contributed to flame spread resulting in multiple

03:02:08 flame spread resulting in multiple simultaneous secondary fires the mechanism shown is very similar to what actually happened at grenfell that can come down thank you very much and yet nothing effective was done by

03:02:20 and yet nothing effective was done by any of these apparently authoritative bodies and the manufacturers were allowed to hide in plain sight it is noticeable in this context that the opening submissions from these core

03:02:32 opening submissions from these core participants provide very thin gruel indeed

03:02:36 indeed pious generalises from the nhbc and the bre

03:02:40 bre and little at all from the other bodies finally dame judith hackett as has been referred to observed in her 2018 report that the current process for testing and

03:02:52 that the current process for testing and certifying products for use in construction is disjointed confusing unhelpful and lacks any sort of transparency just as the process of

03:03:03 transparency just as the process of constructing the building itself must be subject to greater scrutiny the classified classification and testing of the products need to undergo a radical overall she was quite correct the

03:03:15 overall she was quite correct the testing and certification bodies should have been robustly independent guardians of the public interest they were not they did not provide solutions to the safety industries in the cladding

03:03:27 safety industries in the cladding industry they were in fact part of the problem

03:03:30 problem the regime was wholly unreliable the relationship between the testing bodies and the manufacturers was far too close as a result the bodies were wholly

03:03:41 as a result the bodies were wholly ineffective in monitoring and holding to account the manufacturers commercial gain at all times took precedence over safety however in one respect dane

03:03:52 safety however in one respect dane judith was insufficiently critical she reported upon the deep flaws in the current regulatory system but in truth at the time of the fire and now there is no system worthy of the of

03:04:05 now there is no system worthy of the of the name rather there is a series of disparate ostensibly competent bodies dealing with testing and certification the remit and responsibility of these

03:04:16 the remit and responsibility of these bodies and their accountability are all unclear their competence to pronounce upon safety is equally obscure what is required is that a proper system

03:04:27 what is required is that a proper system is brought into existence whereby no material is allowed to be incorporated into a building anywhere in the uk unless such material is certified safe

03:04:38 unless such material is certified safe by a single authority body whose loyalty is to the public interest and to nothing else that concludes the team two oral submissions and so can i thank you for

03:04:49 submissions and so can i thank you for indulgence allowing me to run over by a few minutes thank you mr williamson that's that's quite all right um well thank you for your statement we will break at this point so that

03:05:00 will break at this point so that everyone can have some lunch we'll resume please at five past two when we shall hear uh a an opening statement from uh miss stud queen's council on

03:05:11 from uh miss stud queen's council on behalf of the mayor of london thank you very much five past two please

03:05:27 you