Opening statements from the Mayor of London and Fire Brigades Union on central government's deregulatory agenda, failures to implement coroner's recommendations after Lakanal House, and the culture of complacency that contributed to Grenfell.
00:00:27 [Music] welcome back everybody we are now going to hear
00:00:33 to hear an opening statement on behalf of the mayor of london by miss and stud queen's council who's appearing by video this time good afternoon miss stud good afternoon
00:00:44 good afternoon miss stud good afternoon sir and you can hear me i hope and see me
00:00:48 me yes i can indeed all three of us i can see all three of you right well um you're going to make a statement now and uh if you're ready off you go thank you thank you very much
00:01:00 thank you very much so in this part of the module the inquiry will for the first time examine what the government knew or ought to have known about the weaknesses and failings in the building regulations
00:01:12 and failings in the building regulations and the associated documents as a result of the learning from other earlier fires and what was or ought to have been done in response to that information the built environment is kept safe for
00:01:24 the built environment is kept safe for those who live and work in it in large measure by instilling compliance with the building regulations together with the guidance in the approved documents which sit alongside them
00:01:35 which sit alongside them the statutory framework also informs the specific decisions of those who attend in response to an emergency there is clear evidence that central government were aware of the
00:01:46 government were aware of the shortcomings of approved document b as far back as 2012 when a decision was made to commission wide-ranging research to inform a
00:01:57 wide-ranging research to inform a wholesale review of it on the night of the fire critical and crucial decisions were made on the assumption that the building regulations and approved document b
00:02:08 and approved document b had been complied with and were fit for purpose they clearly were not and central government ought to have known that they were not
00:02:19 known that they were not the inquiry is going to hear from current and former ministers officials and civil servants with first-hand knowledge of what was known prior to 2017
00:02:30 2017 about the effectiveness and efficiency of the building regulations and approved documents the concerns being raised in relation to the fire risk in high-rise buildings
00:02:40 buildings and what action was being taken by government there is a divergence of evidence about what was done and indeed what ought to have been done which will be a matter
00:02:51 have been done which will be a matter for the inquiry to assess but there are a number of features of the evidence that the mayor would urge the inquiry to give particular consideration to in an effort to prevent future tragedies
00:03:03 in an effort to prevent future tragedies occurring where known risks have been identified rule 43 of the coroner's rules 1984 is amended and rule 28 of the coroner's
00:03:14 amended and rule 28 of the coroner's investigations regulations 2013 the statutory obligation of the coroner in relation to the prevention of future deaths
00:03:23 deaths this obligation is intended to ensure that the coroner's learning from hearing the evidence in a particular inquest or inquests
00:03:31 inquests is transferred to those with the power to change the system it reflects the needs for those with that responsibility to be made aware of the problems faults or failures
00:03:44 the problems faults or failures so that the system can be reformed adapted and amended in order to prevent future deaths occurring as a result of the same or similar failures it is that part of the coroner's
00:03:56 it is that part of the coroner's statutory function that is intended to give those families who have suffered bereavement some degree of closure and comfort knowing that lessons have been learned from the deaths of their loved ones
00:04:10 on the 28th of march 2013 in the aftermath of the inquests into the deaths of six individuals who lost their lives in the tragic lachenal house fire
00:04:21 fire arana francis kirkham sent a letter pursuant to rule 43 of the coroner's rules
00:04:27 rules pick secretary of state for communities and local government she made wide-ranging recommendations to the dclg which have significant residence and familiarity to the issues
00:04:39 residence and familiarity to the issues that you've been asked to consider in your inquiry into the fire at grenville tower
00:04:45 tower the mayor summarizes the more relevant and important issues some of which you've already considered in the earlier part of this module first the need for sufficiently clear
00:04:57 first the need for sufficiently clear fire safety advice to be given to residents of high-rise residential buildings in the case of fire within the building
00:05:05 building secondly the need for national guidance to be disseminated to residents in relation to the stay put principle and exact interaction with the get out and stay out policy
00:05:17 and stay out policy thirdly the benefit of retrofitting of sprinklers and the need to encourage providers of housing in high-rise residential buildings containing multiple domestic premises
00:05:28 multiple domestic premises to consider the retrofitting of sprinkler systems fourthly the need for a review of approved document b to ensure that it provides clear
00:05:39 to ensure that it provides clear guidance in words and format that are intelligible to the wide range of people required to use it and in relation to regulation b4 of the building regulations with particular
00:05:50 building regulations with particular regard to the spread of fire over the external envelope of the building and the circumstances in which attention should be paid to whether proposed works might reduce existing fire protection
00:06:04 existing fire protection those issues are all relevant and important considerations for this inquiry as a result of the dreadful tragedy at grenville tower and the inquiry will want to know from those in power
00:06:16 those in power why it was that four years after those matters had been raised by the assistant coroner in relation to lachenal house another tragic fire happened involving many of the same issues with devastating
00:06:29 many of the same issues with devastating consequences
00:06:32 the mayor does not suggest that the machinery of government can resolve complex disabilities such as these in a matter of weeks or months but neither should matters which were
00:06:43 but neither should matters which were considered sufficiently serious and urgent to have resulted in a prevention of future death report be liable to extensive delay on the political whim of a department or a minister
00:06:56 a department or a minister what is clear here is that in the days following the fire the dclg were running for cover
00:07:03 for cover and acknowledging that and i quote the lack of urgency or reason for delay is striking
00:07:09 striking and
00:07:10 and the fact that our focus is on red tape is very clear the evidence disclosed to the inquiry and to be examined over the coming weeks it seems that there were two fundamental
00:07:22 it seems that there were two fundamental problems which this inquiry should examine
00:07:26 examine the first was the rapid change in personnel in dclg and latterly the home office which had primacy over the issues with which this inquiry is concerned
00:07:37 with which this inquiry is concerned and the second was the ability of that department to delay or avoid dealing with issues which had been highlighted by the assistant coroner and about which the dclg had given assurances in 2013.
00:07:53 the secretary of state sir eric pickles responded to the assistant coroner's rule 43 letter on the 20th of may 2013.
00:08:03 2013. on the timing of the review of approved document b he said
00:08:07 he said we have commissioned research which will feed into a future review of this part of the building regulations we expect this work to form a basis of a formal review leading to the publication
00:08:19 formal review leading to the publication of a new edition of approved documents in 2016-17
00:08:26 the research referred to amounted to seven work streams commissioned for bre in 2012.
00:08:34 in 2012. they reported in february 2015 they needed to be published to enable external stakeholders to feed into the review
00:08:44 review those work streams covered periods of fire resistance maximum compartment sizes construction details roof voids cavity
00:08:55 construction details roof voids cavity barriers and fire and smoke dampeners fire protection of basements and basement car parks sprinkler provisions space separation
00:09:07 space separation and means of escape for disabled people this demonstrates that after the lachnal house fire there was already an awareness in government that there were
00:09:18 awareness in government that there were areas of concern which required a proper review
00:09:23 review even before they were the subject of recommendations from the coroner work was already underway by the time the coroner made her recommendations which makes the subsequent delays even
00:09:35 which makes the subsequent delays even more striking the general election called for the 7th of may 2015 prevented publication in early 2015 and following the new appointments of
00:09:46 and following the new appointments of the relevant ministers it was not provided until to them until december 2015.
00:09:54 the workstream research papers referred to the minister in december 2015 for publication and in october 2016 an update was
00:10:05 and in october 2016 an update was provided as publication had still not taken place it is clear that a number of attempts had been made to get authority for publication without
00:10:16 publication without success the inquiry will hear from those who were responsible for and failed to drive these reforms forward but the evidence from the civil service
00:10:27 but the evidence from the civil service suggests that while they were well aware of the issues and reiterated the commitment made to the assistant coroner in 2013
00:10:35 in 2013 issues were not addressed with any urgency
00:10:38 urgency there was a failure to sign off publication of the research to enable this to be carried forward within a reasonable time or at the very least to enable the department to fulfill its commitment
00:10:51 department to fulfill its commitment in spite of the assurance given to the assistant coroner confusion and inaction seem to have been prevalent in november 2015 ryan martin was
00:11:02 in november 2015 ryan martin was emailing saying and i quote we have not announced a formal review of approved document b so there's no timetable for that and no guarantee we will do one
00:11:15 and no guarantee we will do one the regular reminders that sent to progress matters were not acted upon and the delays were compounded by the brexit referendum and the subsequent general election
00:11:25 election there is no requirement by an incoming minister to continue with the commitment of his or her predecessor and this had the effect that these issues of public safety started from the
00:11:39 issues of public safety started from the beginning each time the relevant minister changed
00:11:44 furthermore in the aftermath of the 2015 election the focus of the department was perceived to have changed as richard harrell records in his
00:11:55 as richard harrell records in his statement
00:11:56 statement the position in september 2015 was set out in a briefing to ministers paragraph 10 of the briefing began as follows
00:12:07 follows the current fire safety provisions in part b of the building regulations for england were published in 2006 a further review had been planned for 2013
00:12:17 2013 but this was postponed whilst the department focused its attention on other priorities including the red tape challenge
00:12:25 challenge and the housing standards review paragraph 11 in 2013 the inquiry into the six deaths at the fire of lachenal house recommended that
00:12:36 fire of lachenal house recommended that the guidance in approved document b should be simplified eric pickles response to the coroner set out his intention to review part b during this parliament
00:12:48 during this parliament and that this should would include simplification where this was possible and paragraph 12 a detailed work plan for building regulations is yet to be agreed with ministers but we are looking to review
00:13:01 ministers but we are looking to review how this guidance documents can be improved
00:13:06 improved a substantive review in 2013 may have resulted in a better outcome for grenville tower richard harrell recognized too that post-election in 2015
00:13:18 that post-election in 2015 any increase in the financial burden from regulatory change would be unwelcome
00:13:24 unwelcome in spite of much chewing and throwing no discernible progress was made from the receipt of the research in december 2015 to the time of the grenville fire
00:13:36 2015 to the time of the grenville fire in june 2017.
00:13:40 overlaid upon the changes of personnel was the policy of deregulation the red tape challenged and the perceived need for one in two out
00:13:51 perceived need for one in two out any additional regulation could only be effective in the event that two sets of regulations could be repealed as a result it would appear that during 2016
00:14:02 it would appear that during 2016 there was a move away from the insurance of the full review of approved document b given to the assistant coroner in 2013 to a position where and i quote the
00:14:13 to a position where and i quote the proposal for reviewing adb was a limited scope review focusing on simplification and specific technical issues
00:14:23 issues the submission noted this would help to manage expectations and strong lobbying for the expansion of regulation this would lead to an update of adb
00:14:34 this would lead to an update of adb which would also fulfill the last government's commitment to clarify guidance in this part of the regulations which was a recommendation from the lachenal house coroner in 2013.
00:14:47 from the outside it looks like lip service being paid to an assurance previously given for the sake of these bereaved survivors and residents and others who may come after them
00:14:58 after them the inquiry will need to consider what can be done to ensure that assurances provided to coroners as part of their statutory function to prevent future deaths
00:15:09 deaths are followed through and completed it in full regardless of a change of personnel general election or even government policy the implementation of safety critical
00:15:21 the implementation of safety critical recommendations must not be sidelined for political convenience if this can be allowed to happen then one wonders about the fate of important recommendations made by this inquiry
00:15:34 recommendations made by this inquiry the mayor has a correspondence with the government supported inquest call for a national oversight mechanism to ensure that recommendations from inquiries and inquests are systematically followed up
00:15:49 inquests are systematically followed up as of the date of brian martin's statement in 2018 the reports he had commissioned in 2012 had still not been published the third party stakeholders had not
00:16:01 the third party stakeholders had not been able to provide their comments and assistance and the review completion of which had been promised to the coroner in 2016-17 had not taken place
00:16:13 there were people actively seeking to facilitate the recommendations that had been made
00:16:19 been made on the 5th of august 2014 17 months after the assistant coroner's rule 43 letter the all party parliamentary group on fire and rescue
00:16:30 fire and rescue under the chairmanship of the late david ms
00:16:33 ms wrote to the minister stephen williams it invited three simple changes to be made to approve document b immediately two are relevant to this inquiry
00:16:45 two are relevant to this inquiry first that the report on the effectiveness of residential sprinklers be updated to reflect later more favorable 2012 research
00:16:55 research secondly to reinstate the requirement of one hour fire resistance to the window panels reflecting the concerns raised at lachnall house that the window sets and panels had burned through
00:17:07 panels had burned through in four and a half minutes leading to the spread of the fire to other flats those amendments would at the very least have reinforced to third parties the
00:17:18 have reinforced to third parties the need for the latino house issues to be addressed forthwith in spite of those recommendations from a group that might be thought to have significant expertise in this area the
00:17:30 significant expertise in this area the department through stephen williams considered that such a recommendation would amount to a significant policy change and would not be consistent with the policy on sprinklers and regulation
00:17:41 the policy on sprinklers and regulation more generally
00:17:44 in 2014 at a meeting between the appg and the parliamentary under secretary penny mordent the appg expressed its concern that the
00:17:55 the appg expressed its concern that the department was not giving urgent attention to the coroner's recommendations to amend the building regulations in advance of the current planned review which was expected to be completed
00:18:06 which was expected to be completed during 2016-17
00:18:10 penny morden responded that stephen williams had explained in a letter dated the 19th of september that he had neither seen nor heard anything that would suggest that these specific changes were urgent
00:18:23 specific changes were urgent and that he was not willing to disrupt the work of the department by asking that these matters be brought forward the response from the appg is chilling when viewed in the light of subsequent
00:18:35 when viewed in the light of subsequent events
00:18:37 events as you rightly point out this is a matter for your ministerial colleague stephen williams mp however the group has since written to the minister saying that they were at a
00:18:48 the minister saying that they were at a loss to understand how he had concluded that credible and independent evidence which had life safety implications was not considered to be urgent when amendments of much lesser
00:19:00 when amendments of much lesser importance to the approved document have been made between reviews as a consequence the group pointed out to the minister that should a major fire tragedy with
00:19:11 that should a major fire tragedy with loss of life occur between now and 2017 in for example a residential care facility or a purpose-built block of flats
00:19:23 flats where the matters that have which have been raised here were found to be a contributory to the outcome then the group would be bound to bring this to others attention 12 months later with no progress having
00:19:36 12 months later with no progress having been made
00:19:37 been made the appg sought a meeting and clarity from the new minister james wharton mp the briefing for that meeting contains the following the current fire safety provisions in
00:19:48 the current fire safety provisions in part b of the building regulations for england were published in 2006 a further review had been planned for 2013
00:19:57 2013 but there was this was postponed whilst the department focused its attention on other priorities including the red tape challenge and the housing standards review
00:20:08 review the app record of the meeting which took place with james wharton was noted as being largely more positive than had been the case with his predecessor stephen williams the appg went on to note
00:20:21 the appg went on to note should the review of the approved document in fact proceed as intended then while some clarification and simplification in the guidance is necessary it is felt that any changes
00:20:32 necessary it is felt that any changes need to consider best practice and new technology in construction and to reflect today's built environment where fire safety is wider than the fire and safety rescue services alone
00:20:44 and safety rescue services alone because emergency fire fighting is a measure implemented when safety features and protection have failed and we need to remove this eventuality as much as
00:20:55 to remove this eventuality as much as possible
00:20:56 possible these are the views of both the fire and construction sector which were of one mind that such problems are challenging both its members and may be compromising both life and
00:21:08 and may be compromising both life and socioeconomic safety it went on prophetically today's buildings have a much higher content of readily available combustible material
00:21:19 material examples are timber and polystyrene mixes in structures cladding and insulation with entire internal fire protection usually afforded by layers of
00:21:30 usually afforded by layers of plasterboard and use of fire stopping padding
00:21:34 padding a plasterboard compartment is often incomplete among above full ceilings and becomes imperfect over time through diy and wear and tear
00:21:45 diy and wear and tear this fire hazard results in many fires because adequate recommendations to developers simply do not exist there is no there is little or no requirement to mitigate external fire
00:21:58 requirement to mitigate external fire spread
00:22:00 in the autumn of 2016 there was a gain pressure to publish a discussion document on the amendments to the building regulation and to highlight the need to publish the
00:22:11 and to highlight the need to publish the original reports which had been available for 18 months but have not been published to other stakeholders the regular requests for updates by the appg
00:22:21 appg and concerns raised by the civil service that the assurances given to the assistant coroner had not been met did not meet with action in march 2017 the discussion document
00:22:33 in march 2017 the discussion document was finally provided to the then minister gavin barwell it set out the current thinking in relation to the review it made reference to the savings that
00:22:44 it made reference to the savings that were to be made by way of deregulation but not a single reference to the need to prevent loss of life as a result of the fire at lachnal house nor that it was a culmination of the
00:22:55 nor that it was a culmination of the assurance provided to the assistant coroner in may 2013. the general election was called on the 18th of april 2017 and took place on the 8th of june 2017
00:23:08 and took place on the 8th of june 2017 with the grenville tower fire occurring less than a week later the issues raised by the latino house inquest had not been addressed by central government and neither the
00:23:19 central government and neither the government fulfilled its assurance given to the coroner that approved document b would be reviewed the bereaved survivors and residents need to know why this was
00:23:32 need to know why this was they need to know whether a focus on public safety and the prevention of loss of life
00:23:38 of life rather than deregulation and the red tape challenge would have made a difference on the night of the fire or to the safety in other buildings and they need to know that the
00:23:49 and they need to know that the recommendations that this inquiry makes will be implemented in full and promptly to avoid a situation where assurances are given
00:23:59 are given and are not then fulfilled
00:24:03 thank you sir well thank you very much miss stud
00:24:09 finally this afternoon we're going to hear
00:24:12 hear an opening statement on behalf of the fire brigades union by mr martin seaword
00:24:22 thank you sir thank you mr seawoman well when you're ready thank you
00:24:28 good afternoon sir members of the panel and assessors who are listening the fire brigades union and its members including the firefighters control staff and fire safety officers we represent remain
00:24:39 safety officers we represent remain humbled by the grenfell tower fire and committed to a full and open inquiry you already have our detailed uh written statement
00:24:49 statement and today we focus on the following issues
00:24:52 issues asking the panel to reconsider calling matt rank to give evidence to this inquiry
00:24:56 inquiry central government's deregulatory agenda which created a culture of complacency and was accompanied by a war on health and safety
00:25:07 so the workforce need a voice in this inquiry
00:25:11 inquiry the fbu has filed witness statements with the gti and has profited its general secretary matt wreck to testify that offer remains open the gti team have so far declined to
00:25:23 the gti team have so far declined to call him
00:25:24 call him firstly
00:25:25 firstly the fba refutes the criticisms leveled against the union by some witnesses in modules five and six for one example ron dobson has repeatedly tried to attribute part of the blame for the
00:25:36 attribute part of the blame for the lfb's own shortcomings on poor industrial relations and industrial action by the fbu the fbu refutes that evidence secondly the inquiry is considering
00:25:47 secondly the inquiry is considering issues of profound importance to the lfb's workforce without hearing from its trade union representatives we consider this is both unfair and dangerous
00:25:58 dangerous among the lessons to be learned from this inquiry is the need for decision makers to listen carefully to those who are directly affected by those decisions thirdly matrak can assist the inquiry
00:26:09 thirdly matrak can assist the inquiry with his knowledge and experience acquired over a long fire service career nearly 20 years as general secretary of the fbu
00:26:16 the fbu the fbi has always considered its role as being wider than addressing matters of pay terms and conditions and has for many decades been a key voice on fire policy and fire safety
00:26:27 policy and fire safety but the fbu was not in charge of and didn't manage the lfb the fbi has tried to deliver institutional memory within the foreign rescue service something sadly lacking for from so many
00:26:40 something sadly lacking for from so many in leading positions we asked the panel to recall but do not hear repeat the description of the fbu's role representing its members and campaigning for improved health and safety
00:26:51 for improved health and safety given in our opening oral submissions for module day module 5 on day 176 of page 116 line 23 and following
00:27:02 line 23 and following so far in phase 2 the inquiry is heard only from senior lfb managers yet the firefighters control staff and fire safety officers working in london are directly affected by the issues
00:27:13 are directly affected by the issues being considered and their union i the organization representing them as professional practitioners should be heard yes we can make submissions but submissions are not evidence
00:27:25 submissions are not evidence we urge that matt wreck be called and given the opportunity to answer the criticisms leveled against the fbu and to put the union's different perspective on the issues being considered in modules five and six
00:27:36 modules five and six turning to to our submissions for this part of module six and starting with the central government's deregulatory agenda which created a culture of complacency
00:27:47 created a culture of complacency the grenfell tower disaster was not simply the result of failings by individual professionals or private companies or due to underfunded public services struggling to cope although these all played their part
00:27:59 although these all played their part the fundamental underlying causes of the terrible loss of life at grenfell tower line political decisions made by central government in the service of a social and economic system driven by profit and
00:28:11 and economic system driven by profit and greed
00:28:12 greed these have both encouraged and facilitated a culture of complacency towards building safety fire safety and health and safety in general for more than four decades policies
00:28:24 for more than four decades policies relating to housing local government building building control the fire and rescue service fire safety including testing and certification of construction products fire risk assessment and other related areas have
00:28:36 assessment and other related areas have been driven by an agenda of deregulated deregulation privatization and marketization this agenda has been driven by the profit needs of private businesses with
00:28:47 profit needs of private businesses with corporate interests being prioritized over and above the needs of citizens and with the specific neglect of those living in social housing it's been characterized by an unseemly tolerance of cronyism and corruption
00:29:00 tolerance of cronyism and corruption it has been accompanied by inadequate oversight and enforcement of the building and fire safety regimes by austerity cuts and the war on health and safety
00:29:10 safety this in our submission has predictably diminished respect for health and safety portrayed rules and regulations as bureaucratic and unnecessary red tape
00:29:21 bureaucratic and unnecessary red tape whereas they are vital for building and fire safety degraded public services including building control and fire and rescue services and thereby weakened
00:29:32 services and thereby weakened enforcement of these regimes and has led to the abolition of national bodies
00:29:38 bodies ambiguity and confusion in the guidance which has been left unclarified a culture of complacency created towards fire safety both during and after building works and private companies being enabled to
00:29:50 and private companies being enabled to put profit over people together these factors have created the culture of complacency with the increasingly prevailing attitude the safety didn't matter and so
00:30:01 the safety didn't matter and so contributed to the systemic failure of the building and fire safety regimes thereby enabling the installation of cheap
00:30:08 cheap and dangerous rain screen cladding systems all over the uk including at grenfell tower this is a national disgrace the impact of this culture can be seen
00:30:19 the impact of this culture can be seen in the approach of pretty much all of the private sector companies involved in the refurbishment of grenfell tower safety considerations simply didn't cross their minds as we have set out in paragraph 84 of our written opening
00:30:31 paragraph 84 of our written opening statement
00:30:33 statement i wonder if you'd be kind enough to screen the the first document that's um fbu i think it's 50108
00:30:44 at page 40. it's paragraph 121 thank you very much
00:30:52 excellent
00:30:55 the deregulatory agenda started with margaret thatcher in 1979 and gathered pace thereafter it found its apotheosis at grenfell yet is still being pursued
00:31:06 being pursued so under the conservative administrations of margaret thatcher and john major publicly owned industry and council housing was sold off public services were contracted out repeated policy statements were made in
00:31:17 repeated policy statements were made in favor of cutting red tape or more accurately removing restraints from business
00:31:21 business key examples include lord young's lifting the burden white paper francis moord's deregulation unit of 1986 michael hesseltown's deregulation task force of 1994.
00:31:33 force of 1994. the new labour regime of tony blair and gordon brown from 1997 to 2010 did not reverse deregulation but simply renamed it better regulation their measures included the regulatory
00:31:45 their measures included the regulatory reform act 2001 philip hampton's reducing administrative burdens report 2005 and the less is more report of 2005 proposing the one in and one out rule
00:31:57 proposing the one in and one out rule david cameron and theresa may's administrations from 2010 to 2017 then accelerated the deregulation drive coupled with austerity examples proliferate the coalition
00:32:09 examples proliferate the coalition agreement between the conservatives and the liberal democrats backed deregulation and under undertook cut red tape
00:32:16 tape one in one out was actually introduced in 2011.
00:32:20 in 2011. mr cameron's red tape challenge was in 2011 francis moore's open public services white paper was in 2012. vincent cable and and mr felon
00:32:32 vincent cable and and mr felon introduced a one in two out policy in 2012.
00:32:36 2012. oliver letwood introduced the deregulation act of 2015 and sergey javids one in three out policy was in 2016.
00:32:45 2016. even after grenfell the drive to deregulate continues under prime minister johnson whose adherence to rules is at best sporadic and as recently as february 2021
00:32:56 and as recently as february 2021 convened the task force on innovation growth and regulatory reform tiga and in october launched the reforming the framework for better regulation consultation deregulation and its push for so-called
00:33:09 deregulation and its push for so-called flexibility is deadly dangerous without a strong health and safety culture and adequate enforcement of the rules instead of providing strong leadership to reinforce the importance of health
00:33:20 to reinforce the importance of health and safety at a time of regulatory reform
00:33:23 reform david cameron declared war on the health and safety culture which he described as pointless time wasting and so contributed to the culture of complacency towards health and safety which we've seen repeatedly manifested
00:33:36 which we've seen repeatedly manifested in modules one and two this enabled the manufacturing construction construction industries to put profits before people and for those involved in grenfell to gain the system
00:33:47 gain the system um the citation on screen that you can see now
00:33:50 see now is of then prime minister david cameron's speech declaring war on the health and safety culture he said the government is waging war against the excessive health and safety culture that has become an
00:34:01 culture that has become an albatross around the neck of british businesses this coalition has in a clear new year's resolution to kill off the health and safety culture for good i want 2012 to go down in history not
00:34:13 i want 2012 to go down in history not just as olympics here or diamond jubilee yeah
00:34:17 yeah but the year we we get a lot of this pointless time wasting out of the british economy british life once and for all that was in january of 2012.
00:34:30 thank you i wonder if you could screen the next document which um is from professor bisbee's report lbyp 2601
00:34:41 2601 um at page 113 and it's paragraph 589 thank you
00:34:50 so we're now looking at um the way deregulation affected building regulations and obviously there was a a a stream of consultation but it ended
00:35:01 a stream of consultation but it ended with the building act of 1984 which created the role of of private approved inspector to act in competition with local authority building control services and thereby started the process of
00:35:13 and thereby started the process of marketizing uh building control it introduced the building regulations 1985 which replaced the previously detailed technical and prescriptive regulations covering at least 300 pages with
00:35:24 covering at least 300 pages with functional requirements covering just 25 pages
00:35:27 pages supplemented by guidance in adb and the privatization of the building research establishment uh in in 1997 created the potential for serious conflicts of interest which we
00:35:39 serious conflicts of interest which we have seen laid bare in this inquiry by then his workforce had already been halved and have been made to follow commercial imperatives be more responsive to industry in 1990 it was made an executive agency
00:35:52 it was made an executive agency no longer the government's in-house testing body it was required to compete in the market so the introduction of functional requirements and guidance was a major change it brought significant flexibility for building designers
00:36:04 flexibility for building designers manufacturers and builders notwithstanding industries must be expected to seek to exploit regulatory systems for their own benefit this increased flexibility was not
00:36:16 this increased flexibility was not accompanied by measures to ensure adequate oversight and effective enforcement inevitably therefore and predictably the increased flexibility introduced ambiguity that could be and was
00:36:27 ambiguity that could be and was exploited by some in the construction industry
00:36:30 industry it's thus produced a regulatory regime for building and fire safety which is not fit for purpose as now accepted by the department for leveling up housing and communities uh commonly known as dulux
00:36:43 uh commonly known as dulux as professor bisbee states and that's on in the citation paragraph five eight five eight nine yes there it is that thus in the period from 1986 until 1996
00:36:55 thus in the period from 1986 until 1996 the vision that that hesseltine had initially set out in 1979 was largely realized
00:37:00 realized the construction industry had been granted the flexibility they've been seeking
00:37:05 seeking essentially since the 1930s and the creation of private building control meant that designers and contractors were no longer necessarily limited by constraints applied by local authority building control
00:37:16 building control the race to the bottom had begun thank you if you could replace that with um or just go to paragraph 261 on sorry page 261 paragraph 1598.
00:37:29 page 261 paragraph 1598. thank you very much
00:37:32 and and he concludes this is professor bisbee while the guidance in approved document b could have been clearer and or more restrictive it was the structure and overarching philosophy of the wider
00:37:43 and overarching philosophy of the wider regulatory framework mr c but i'm not sure we've got the page on the screen that you want have we i'm so sorry uh no we haven't yet but i think it's there now it's uh one paragraph one five nine
00:37:54 now it's uh one paragraph one five nine eight
00:37:54 eight right thank you we have it now thank you thank you sir finally and and uh
00:38:02 you said it well that's one five nine eight that is one five nine no that's um oh yes so does that say uh yes there it is so if it starts finally
00:38:15 yes there it is so if it starts finally and fundamentally this analysis shows that while the guidance in approved document b could have been clearer and or more restrictive it was the structure and overarching philosophy of the wider regulatory framework that created and
00:38:28 regulatory framework that created and perpetuated and indeed encouraged the conditions in which the ambiguous guidance could be misinterpreted misapplied and or exploited in the service of generating profit whilst avoiding thus far liability for
00:38:40 avoiding thus far liability for inadequate design decision making the evidence in phase two of this inquiry on the installation of the rain screen trading system on grenfell tower shows that the problems of this unfit for purpose regime were even worse than
00:38:53 for purpose regime were even worse than dame judith hackett had imagined ignorance whereas she reported that regulations and guidance were not always read and understood by the necessary people turns out they were not read by
00:39:04 people turns out they were not read by any of them in the grenfell refurbishment indifference whereas she reported that due to a motivation to do things as quickly and cheaply as possible safety was not always treated as a priority and
00:39:16 was not always treated as a priority and some made attempts to gain the system it turns out
00:39:20 turns out that safety was never treated as a priority with no one thinking fire and all the manufacturers and most of the key players involved in the refurbishment gaming the system likewise all the private companies were
00:39:32 likewise all the private companies were trying to get the job done as quickly and cheaply as possible without regard to safety
00:39:38 to safety whereas she reported a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities exacerbated by a level of fragmentation within the industry it turns out that everyone involved in the refurbishment mistakenly thought
00:39:49 the refurbishment mistakenly thought that compliance was the responsibility of building control this led to reduced ownership and accountability which has been played out in phase two with the the merry-go-round of buck passing continuing to turn
00:40:02 passing continuing to turn even now only a few core participants notably all public bodies including the royal bar of kensington and chelsea the national house building council ucas and now also dulux have admitted
00:40:14 and now also dulux have admitted failures
00:40:16 failures see paragraph 137 of their written opening statement for this module i won't read it out i'm sure you've got it this this belated admission we say is not enough
00:40:28 not enough the disaster was not simply caused by lack of oversight with the government and public authorities being taken advantage of by a few unscrupulous companies grenfell tower was a systemic failure of a regime actively and
00:40:41 failure of a regime actively and regrettably deliberately created by central government which encouraged companies to behave recklessly towards building safety
00:40:52 uh please now turn to the next document which is um from professor bisbee's report at page two paragraph six
00:41:06 we we set out the evolution of adb with its ever greater complexity and flexibility bringing competent ambiguity and scope for manipulation in more detail in our written submissions
00:41:18 written submissions and others of doubt has done a much better job of it but in short there were several elements of confusion particularly over the permitted use of class zero materials the meaning of limited combustibility
00:41:29 the meaning of limited combustibility the meaning of filler materials the need for large-scale testing and the use that could be made of test data the need for large-scale testing of every configuration of a range screen
00:41:41 every configuration of a range screen cladding system was well known to government at least since the select committee reported on the 5th of january 2000
00:41:47 2000 recommending large-scale tests of cladding systems and
00:41:52 and staying at paragraph 20 this is the 2000 select committee report we believe that all external cladding systems should be required either to be entirely non-combustible or to be proven through
00:42:04 non-combustible or to be proven through full-scale testing not to pose an acceptable level of risk in terms of fast spread yet this requirement was dropped in 2006 with the introduction of desktop studies the evidence shows that those involved
00:42:16 the evidence shows that those involved in the construction industry the professionals advising them including architects including also the bre and the experts assisting her majesty's coroner at the lucknow house inquest were confused by the guidance in adb for
00:42:27 were confused by the guidance in adb for at least 25 years before the fire
00:42:32 it also shows the government was aware of the confusion yet failed to clarify it missing countless opportunities to do so since 1992 this confusion was plainly evident in
00:42:43 this confusion was plainly evident in those involved in the grenfell tower refurbishment and was ruthlessly exploited by manufacturing companies for their own commercial self-interest we've set that out in our paragraph 41
00:42:56 we've set that out in our paragraph 41 mirroring the tragedy caused by the same central failing at the edge in 2005 and at lakewood house in 2009 the grenfell tower disaster was due primarily to the selection and installation of a highly
00:43:07 selection and installation of a highly combustible rain screen cladding system which could have been avoided if there had been clear simple provisions in adb withdrawing the use of class zero classification and preventing the use of
00:43:18 classification and preventing the use of combustible materials in rain screen cladding systems on an existing high-rise residential building it is shameful that it took the deaths of 72 people to bring this about
00:43:29 of 72 people to bring this about professor bisbee reports and this should be on screen it is that by the time of uh the grenfell tower fire this is his paragraph six there had been numerous opportunities
00:43:40 there had been numerous opportunities where the statutory guidance and regulatory compliance testing regime could have been made simpler or less permissive however in each case there appears to have been powerful commercial and ideological incentives to increase
00:43:52 ideological incentives to increase complexity while also increasing flexibility for industry i show that's professor bisbee that the resulting complexity coupled with widespread incompetence and poor regulatory oversight of built
00:44:03 regulatory oversight of built environment professions and professionals significantly contributed to the disastrous fire safety outcomes at grenfell town we agree and further say that in pursuit
00:44:14 we agree and further say that in pursuit of deregulation and austerity cuts and in slavish ore of the construction of petrochemical industries the government abdicated its duty to british citizens to protect them from foreseeable harm
00:44:30 this had a material contribution to the grenfell tower disaster this inquiry uh we submit this inquiry will have to determine whether the confusion and ambiguity in adb materially contributed to the disaster
00:44:42 materially contributed to the disaster we submit while not absolving design or construction professionals of their responsibility for failings as regards the installation of unacceptably dangerous external cladding confusion and ambiguity caused by
00:44:54 confusion and ambiguity caused by ongoing deregulation coupled with the effect on building control bodies of austerity cuts and marketization made these people's work more difficult and was likely to have been a contributory factor causing the disaster
00:45:07 contributory factor causing the disaster at grinnell tower this is supported for example by mr hoban's comments at the conclusion of his evidence this was on day 46 at page
00:45:16 at page 217 mr hoban said the other thing i'd like to say is if we had a regulatory body like we had with the greater london council and the regulations and building acts and constructional bylaws that we
00:45:27 acts and constructional bylaws that we had at that particular time and a support network of the experts that administered the regulations at that time
00:45:34 that time i don't think we'd be in a position where we are now
00:45:39 sir turning from building safety to the deregulation of the fire and rescue services and of the fire safety regime the fire and rescue services act 2004
00:45:50 the fire and rescue services act 2004 deregulated and fragmented fragmented i localized important aspects of fire and rescue services we've submitted about this earlier so i'll take it briefly
00:46:01 i'll take it briefly the the act of 2004 removed national standards of fire cover leaving local fire and rescue services to determine their own standards in light of their individual integrated risk management plans with inevitable slippage in the speed
00:46:13 with inevitable slippage in the speed and weight of predetermined attendance to emergencies and and in other departments this was a retrograde step which effectively devolved research and development in firefighting equipment procedures and
00:46:25 firefighting equipment procedures and practices to local fire and rescue services moreover the irmp process was hopelessly fettered by its link to budgeting so the provision of fire and rescue services across the country was driven not by a true assessment of risk
00:46:37 driven not by a true assessment of risk as it should have been but by finances which have been cut in austerity the abolition of national standards created a race to the bottom within the fire and rescue service
00:46:49 fire and rescue service the act abolished the central fire brigades advisory council since 1947 this has been an important national body whose remit covered reviewing lessons from major fires decisions about national standards and guidance
00:47:00 national standards and guidance inspection enforcement of fire safety the planning for operational instance and training that arises from such planning
00:47:07 planning crucially it had worker representation by firefighters there was no such representation at a national level in 2017. its abolition unsuccessfully challenged in the courts by the fbu was a
00:47:19 in the courts by the fbu was a profoundly retrograde step initially the cfbac was replaced by the practitioners forum however this was abolished by lord pickles and the coalition coalition government after the
00:47:30 coalition coalition government after the 2010 election lord pickles doesn't comment in this statement on this further deregulatory step which led to the dearth of national guidance and a significant weakening of national oversight horizon scanning or
00:47:42 national oversight horizon scanning or lesson learning the act 2004 removed the requirement for cuts to firefighter numbers to be approved by a minister the new arrangement allowed fire authorities or chief fire officers to reduce
00:47:53 chief fire officers to reduce firefighter numbers without constraints it abolished her majesty's inspectorate for the fire and rescue service in england
00:48:02 england chief fire officers were now allowed to peer review it introduced an additional duty on fire and rescue services to carry out community fire safety education which whilst welcome in principle placed a further significant
00:48:14 principle placed a further significant duty on the fire and rescue service without a corresponding increase in resource
00:48:18 resource this policy was justified in part by the fact that the number of fires and casualties had been declining which lord pickles refers to in paragraphs 26 and 28 of his statement but though falling numerically these
00:48:30 but though falling numerically these fires were increasing in complexity and severity as buildings were becoming more complex
00:48:35 complex e.g with the installation of rain screen cladding systems to existing high-rise residential buildings as we've seen at grenfell and across the country
00:48:44 country the complexity of modern day fires and increased flexibility afforded to local fire and rescue services means that the national body is more important than ever to consider the lessons from fires and provide considered national guidance tailored to
00:48:56 considered national guidance tailored to the modern world of firefighting the cfb
00:49:00 the cfb c would have been the ideal forum to consider the recommendation of the corridor from the lateral firing quest in relation to stay put get out and stay out
00:49:08 out evacuation of a high-rise residential building in the event of a fire would be a difficult and complex operation as mr mcgurk advises is paragraph 26 of his report
00:49:19 report there is still no practical strategy or operational procedure in the uk or internationally for the evacuation of a high-rise residential building in a fire as a direct result of deregulation such
00:49:30 as a direct result of deregulation such discussions did not happen
00:49:34 it wasn't just the fire and rescue services it was the regu it was the fire safety regime that was deregulated the regulatory reform fire safety order 2005 fire safety order
00:49:49 fire safety order 2005 fire safety order became law in october 2006. i wonder if we could see the next document now it's um fbu
00:49:57 fbu five zeros 108 at page 18 paragraphs 45-46
00:50:05 let me know if you didn't get that
00:50:09 so the fire safety would repeal the certification and enforcement regime of the fire precautions act 1971 under which certain high-risk buildings albeit not generally high-rise
00:50:20 albeit not generally high-rise residential buildings were required to hold a valid fast safety certificate issued annually after inspection by the fire and rescue service instead the fire safety order introduced
00:50:31 instead the fire safety order introduced a self-compliance regime with fire risk assessments becoming the responsibility of a responsible person for the building the government knew of the risk of the increasingly widespread use of unsafe
00:50:43 increasingly widespread use of unsafe planning materials from the fbu submission to the select committee in june of 1998. that submission provided that the primary risk there forever cladding
00:50:54 primary risk there forever cladding system is that of providing a vehicle for assisting uncontrolled fire spread up the outer face of the building with the strong possibility the fire re-entering the building at higher levels via windows or other unprotected areas in the face of the building this
00:51:06 areas in the face of the building this in turn poses a threat to the life safety of the residents above the far floor
00:51:12 the government knew what all to be done about it after receiving the report of the select committee on the 5th of january 2000 at paragraph 22 the select committee recommended that
00:51:24 22 the select committee recommended that the department and the housing corporation instruct local authorities and registered social landlords to undertake a review of their existing building stock with a view to ascertaining how many multi-story
00:51:35 ascertaining how many multi-story buildings are currently using external cladding systems and how many cutting systems are in use which whilst complying with the regulations in force at the time when they were installed do not comply with current regulations
00:51:47 not comply with current regulations but no such instruction was given instead it was left to responsible persons to carry out what they considered to be a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment without any guidance for existing high-rise residential buildings with rain screen
00:51:59 residential buildings with rain screen cladding
00:52:01 cladding please now see the the next document that's
00:52:05 that's met met
00:52:07 met met triple zero one two nine eight one at page nineteen paragraph five point three the deregulated self-compliance fire safety regime was loose and far less
00:52:18 safety regime was loose and far less effective than the certification procedure which could have been but wasn't extended to high-rise residential buildings
00:52:24 buildings in 2018 it was reported that 500 out of 800 of the uk fire risk assessors were not registered with accredited bodies colin todd told the police one consequence of deregulation
00:52:37 consequence of deregulation and this is the citation on screen paragraph 5.3 although there have been calls by many bodies for mandatory certification or registration of fire risk assessors or
00:52:49 registration of fire risk assessors or fire risk assessment companies government has always strongly resisted any proposal that this should be a legal requirement and the panel will doubtless remember he
00:53:01 and the panel will doubtless remember he he reinforced that in his oral oral testimony
00:53:05 testimony this resistance flew in the face of the senior coroner's recommendation in his regulation 28 report following the inquest into the death of the firefighter and fbu member stephen hunt in manchester
00:53:16 in manchester as well as the recommendation made after lachenal
00:53:19 lachenal the deregulatory policy of the fire safety order particularly the government's failure to regulate competency thus led to the appointment of mr carl stokes who was insufficiently qualified and incompetent to risk assess the fire
00:53:31 and incompetent to risk assess the fire safety of such a complex building he didn't properly assess the rain screen cladding system and described as tolerable the severe risk it presented neither the far safety order
00:53:43 presented neither the far safety order nor the guidance provided under article 50 helped him because they didn't clarify with the fire risk assessment duty applied to the envelope of the building
00:53:51 building the duty applied to the common parts of a high-rise residential building but this term wasn't defined the government's mistaken view was that it did not apply to the external envelope as the lfb were told
00:54:04 envelope as the lfb were told see the written opening statement for module 3 of the lfb of the 30th of march 2021 and the reference for that is lfb double zero one two
00:54:15 double zero one two zero nine four five page two paragraph eight
00:54:19 eight like the unfit for purpose building safety regime the lacks regulatory and safety regime of the fire safety order was a further source of encouragement of a complacent attitude to fire safety
00:54:31 a complacent attitude to fire safety see for example what tony pearson of x over says
00:54:35 over says this is on day 19 at page 84. he said the fact that they the lfb appear to be happy for the building to continue to be operated would suggest
00:54:46 to continue to be operated would suggest that there's a general consensus that although it's not code compliant the risks in the context of the regulatory reform order are tolerable lord pickles stated that he excluded the
00:54:57 lord pickles stated that he excluded the fire safety award from the coalition government's policy of removing unnecessary and bureaucratic rules and the red tape challenge i.e their policy of deregulation but that statement is disingenuous
00:55:10 is disingenuous he well knows the fast safety order itself was the product of earlier deregulation to which he also refers in a statement secondly the order's regime was itself the product of a very substantial and
00:55:21 the product of a very substantial and prolonged deregulation exercise under the previous government leading to many legislative provisions being repealed and a streamlined content being contained in the order and that's in his
00:55:32 contained in the order and that's in his witness statement of paragraphs 29-30 business was more than happy with the greatly reduced provisions in the fire safety order the coalition government fire minister mr bob neal mp told an
00:55:44 fire minister mr bob neal mp told an all-party parliamentary fire safety and rescue group seminar on the 9th of may 2011 that the fire safety order was effective
00:55:52 effective well received by many in the business community and proportioned
00:55:58 we submit the central government policy of deregulation of both the fire and rescue service and of the fire safety regime was a further underlying contributory cause of the disaster
00:56:09 lord pickles and the failure to take any or any significant action following the fire at liquor house the coroner's rule 43 letter in 2013 contained several
00:56:20 43 letter in 2013 contained several recommendations in relation to central government we're confident the inquiry will investigate them all closely and having heard and studied qc for the mayor earlier this afternoon i now just look at one of the coroner's
00:56:32 i now just look at one of the coroner's recommendations it was the one about stay put it was recommended that the government publish consolidated national guidance in relation to the staple principle and its interaction with get out and
00:56:44 and its interaction with get out and stay out policy including how such guidance is disseminated to residents lord pickles effectively did nothing beyond erroneously asserting that the lga the local government association guide of 2011 already gave
00:56:57 association guide of 2011 already gave such guidance and had been reviewed in 2012 with stakeholders expressing a high degree of satisfaction the chairman of the lga from 2011 to 2014 was simeric cockle
00:57:10 2014 was simeric cockle a champion of deregulation and leader of the royal borough of kensington council from 2000 to 2013. the coroner's recommendation a year later in 2013 and arising from the
00:57:23 later in 2013 and arising from the deaths of six people at lacanal should have informed lord pickles that that was not the case a timely review might have resulted in national guidance including on the
00:57:34 national guidance including on the revocation of staples and evacuation of high-rise residential buildings in the event compartmentation fails during a major fire however nothing was done even now four years after the fire there's still no such guidance
00:57:49 skip all of those because they've been covered so well by others none of the um none of uh of her recommendations were implemented either effectively or at all either by lord
00:58:01 effectively or at all either by lord pickles his successors or anyone else in government this was the consequence of the government's deregulatory agenda further this failure had significant consequences both for the occupants of grenfell tower and the firefighters who
00:58:13 grenfell tower and the firefighters who attended the disaster we submit there is an urgent need for a national oversight body to consider rule 43 and regulation 28 reports and other recommendations from reliable sources to
00:58:24 recommendations from reliable sources to ensure they are properly reviewed and implemented turning if i may to privatization and the culture that private is best since 197 how am i doing for time i'm a
00:58:36 since 197 how am i doing for time i'm a little over i'm afraid you're running a bit long yes how much more have you got uh if i have a look at the black line i think realistically i've obviously taken far too long i think realistically i've
00:58:47 far too long i think realistically i've got about 10 minutes but i i can take it a bit shorter well and we're not going to stop you in your tracks but uh instead of ours you can slim it down perhaps you would thank
00:58:58 can slim it down perhaps you would thank you sir we appreciate it i'll do that
00:59:04 well the essential point of of this section of our oral submissions is that the the private sector has demonstrated um that it didn't think far and it
00:59:16 um that it didn't think far and it treated compliance as getting it past building control so far from um benefiting uh the building sector and and the the regulatory sector the
00:59:29 and and the the regulatory sector the introduction of private companies had the opposite effect so we've demonstrated that at paragraphs 91 of our written opening statement in
00:59:40 91 of our written opening statement in respect of all the companies involved in grenfell
00:59:44 and uh we've we've looked at the effect on building control in our written opening statement and
00:59:54 and far from providing good quality work the evidence shows that the workmanship of the private sector companies at times was quite shocking as we've set out in paragraph 93 of our statement
01:00:05 paragraph 93 of our statement and
01:00:05 and [Music]
01:00:07 [Music] also
01:00:08 also the the culture of deceit cronyism and corruption that we've set out in paragraph 99 of our written opening statement
01:00:17 statement should be avoided if possible the
01:00:21 the um specifically looking at the marketization of the london fire brigade there have been failed attempts to marketize the fire and rescue service in london
01:00:30 london and these show the unacceptable safety and financial risks incurred in privatisation in october 2011 the fbu the gmb and unison commissioned research
01:00:41 the gmb and unison commissioned research into privatization in london's fire service training and control centers and concluded that it would compromise safety and bring high financial risks the report highlighted the poor
01:00:53 the report highlighted the poor performance of previous public partnerships finding that one in five was 20 of these strategic partnership contracts had either been terminated reduced in scope or suffered significant
01:01:04 reduced in scope or suffered significant operational or financial problems just to mention and not go into too much detail
01:01:10 detail of
01:01:12 of failed attempts in the lfb asico which was sold to private equity for just two pounds in september uh 2012 to look after the brigade's fleet
01:01:24 fleet and was brought back into the public sector just a few months later the fire control project in in control and the taxpayer is still paying 50 000
01:01:35 and the taxpayer is still paying 50 000 pounds a day in rent for 80 empty buildings
01:01:39 buildings and the national audit office report of 2011 found that the implementation of fire control was heavily reliant on consultants and interim staff and the public the project was rightly
01:01:51 and the public the project was rightly dubbed by the public accounts committee as one of the worst cases of project failure
01:01:56 failure and we've seen what happened with the distracting introduction of the new vision system by capita in the control room
01:02:03 room and we've heard evidence of the difficulties working under the contractual arrangement with babcocks uh for initiating new training
01:02:13 so far from benefiting um
01:02:16 um industry the introduction of privatization
01:02:21 the inquiry may conclude it was a disaster testing and certification i know that's been covered very effectively by others so i won't go into it
01:02:34 so i won't go into it uh not much has been said about central about social housing um but
01:02:40 um but grenfell tower along with much of social housing had suffered decades of neglect and repair and lack of investment we detail the impact of this and how it contributed to the disaster in
01:02:51 contributed to the disaster in paragraphs one two one to one three four of our written submissions the use of cheap trading that caused the fire was due at least in part to the need to save money and keep the refurbishment within budget
01:03:02 budget this in turn was a consequence of central government policy restricting the funds that could be used for capital works in council housing the decay and neglect of social housing by central government did not just mean that the
01:03:14 government did not just mean that the occupants of grenfell tower had poor quality homes we say it materially contributed to costing 72 of them their lives
01:03:23 we've said enough about austerity cuts i'm sure you've got our points on that may i just give you our conclusions here now
01:03:31 now the central state has a fundamental responsibility for the safety of its citizens in a modern democracy we submit the central government has failed woefully in this task they fail to regulate high-rise residential buildings and specifically
01:03:43 residential buildings and specifically the foreseeably hazardous orbit desirable process of insulating them against the cold and rain by installing rain screen cladding systems they've cut back regulations and allowed businesses to ignore fire safety rules as part of a
01:03:55 to ignore fire safety rules as part of a war on health and safety culture and to prioritize profit over safety they've abdicated the duty to research and develop emerging fire risks and protection measures whereas for half a
01:04:06 protection measures whereas for half a century central government had an authoritative statutory fire and rescue advisory body that strategically assessed the risks and provided ministers with reliable expertise that was abolished as part of deregulation at
01:04:17 was abolished as part of deregulation at a time when the built environment was increasing in complexity the abolition of the cfbac has been a disastrous the failure the philosophy of deregulation has blighted efforts to improve and has
01:04:29 blighted efforts to improve and has actually worsened the living conditions of millions of people and
01:04:35 and we call for certain recommendations um
01:04:39 um thank you sir for uh giving the fb the opportunity to make submissions for listening to them and here's hoping you can find some time to celebrate this special day congratulations well thank you very much mr seaworth
01:04:52 you very much mr seaworth thank you well um that doesn't quite finish the opening statements because we have three more
01:05:01 more uh in the program but each of those has been
01:05:06 programmed for tomorrow and i don't think any of those who are going to make uh their closing statements would thank me for suggesting they do it here and now so we're going to break at that
01:05:17 now so we're going to break at that point
01:05:18 point and we shall resume tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock when we shall hear the final three closing statements
01:05:30 closing statements so that's it for this afternoon we break now we resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow please thank you very much
01:05:58 you