Opening statements for this module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, outlining the scope and key issues to be examined.
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00:00:00 Good morning, everyone.
00:00:29 Welcome to today's hearing.
00:00:32 Today we're going to hear opening statements from three further core participants, beginning
00:00:38 with Mr Matthew Butt, Queen's Council, on behalf of the National House Building Council.
00:00:46 Good morning, Mr Butt.
00:00:54 Good morning, sir.
00:00:55 And you're ready to make your opening statement.
00:00:58 I am, sir, yes.
00:00:59 Good. Thank you.
00:01:00 Well, that's it.
00:01:01 Get yourself organised.
00:01:02 Take your time.
00:01:03 And then when you're ready.
00:01:06 Thank you, sir.
00:01:12 On behalf of NHBC, I would like to begin by expressing my client's deepest condolences
00:01:17 to all of those who lost loved ones in the Grenfell Tower fire, to the survivors of the
00:01:22 fire, and to all of those affected by this tragedy.
00:01:27 It is crucial that the construction industry learns from the events that took so many
00:01:31 lives.
00:01:32 Whilst NHBC was not involved in the refurbishment of the Grenfell Tower, as part of Module 6,
00:01:38 this inquiry will of course explore its role in the context of the wider house building
00:01:43 industry.
00:01:44 It goes without saying the Grenfell Tower fire should never have happened.
00:01:50 NHBC's view is that more should have been done by the house building industry as a whole,
00:01:55 and by both national and local government to ensure the strictest compliance with building
00:02:00 regulations and to promote fire safety.
00:02:05 In the introduction to our written opening, NHBC acknowledges it should both have acted
00:02:10 more swiftly and been more assertive with manufacturers such as Kingspan.
00:02:16 It's also acknowledged, based upon what is now known, that some Option 3 desktop assessments
00:02:22 in the industry were not as rigorous as they should have been.
00:02:26 And I will address these matters briefly in opening, and also briefly examine NHBC's
00:02:31 internal procedures for ensuring desktop assessments it received were at the required standard.
00:02:38 NHBC was established in 1936 with the purpose of improving construction quality in the house
00:02:46 building industry.
00:02:48 NHBC today employs around 1,200 people and provides services across the UK.
00:02:55 NHBC has no shareholders and is non-profit distributing.
00:03:01 NHBC is independent from both government and companies within the construction industry
00:03:06 and aims to fulfil a range of roles.
00:03:09 These include first of all providing warranty cover, secondly providing building control
00:03:14 services and thirdly providing construction quality and training services.
00:03:21 NHBC has a working relationship with what is now the Department for Levelling Up Housing
00:03:26 and Communities, previously MHCLG, given that is the government body which oversees the
00:03:34 building regulation process.
00:03:36 And NHBC building control services is an approved inspector whose role is to assess individual
00:03:42 buildings for compliance with the building regulations.
00:03:46 Like any building control body, including local authority building control bodies, approved
00:03:51 inspectors are required to take such steps as are reasonable to enable them to be satisfied
00:03:57 within the limits of professional skill and care that the building works in question comply
00:04:02 with the relevant part of the building regulations.
00:04:06 The approved inspector issues a final certificate to the local authority when it is satisfied
00:04:11 those works are complete, however it remains the builder's responsibility to ensure those
00:04:16 works do comply with the building regulations.
00:04:20 A building control body cannot provide a guarantee of compliance with the regulations and the
00:04:26 process does not remove the obligation of the person carrying out the work to achieve
00:04:32 compliance.
00:04:33 Within our written opening at paragraphs 13 to 14 we make some general introductory remarks
00:04:40 in relation to the building regulations and approved documents which all involved in this
00:04:45 inquiry will be well familiar with.
00:04:48 The regulations focus on how a building should perform and set functional requirements.
00:04:53 The approved documents go on to provide information and guidance on some of the ways to demonstrate
00:04:59 compliance with the regulations.
00:05:01 There is no compulsory route or routes to demonstrating compliance so the builder can
00:05:06 consider a range of methods.
00:05:09 NHBC provides guidance to its own builder customers in this regard to help them comply
00:05:14 with building regulations and to meet NHBC warranty standards in respect to their developments.
00:05:22 In terms of the BCA, the BCA was founded in 2008.
00:05:27 It is a cross industry non-profit group which works to address relevant industry issues
00:05:32 within the industry with a single voice.
00:05:36 NHBC is not and never has been a member of the BCA but some of its staff including Steve
00:05:43 Evans currently the head of technical operations and Diane Marshall currently the operations
00:05:49 director have close links with and played roles within the BCA during the relevant period
00:05:56 and you will hear from both of those witnesses during the inquiry.
00:06:00 BCA technical guidance note 18 was published in June 2014 and revised in June 2015.
00:06:09 This guidance sets out approaches to achieving compliance with approved document B for external
00:06:15 wall systems on buildings with a storey over 18 metres.
00:06:20 Options 1 and 2 are the linear approaches to compliance permitted under paragraph 12.5
00:06:27 of ADB and as the panel will be well aware option 1 involved using materials of limited
00:06:33 combustibility.
00:06:35 Option 2 required testing to BS8414 as evidence of the system's classification to BR135.
00:06:45 In the years prior to 2014 it became clear to building control bodies that the linear
00:06:51 routes to compliance were not able to deal with the extensive number of different combinations
00:06:57 of supporting structure, insulation and cladding finishes that were being specified.
00:07:03 A wider range of the science was being used within the industry and it was necessary regularly
00:07:08 to consider whether these were compliant with the building regulations.
00:07:13 Therefore the BCA developed guidance which explained what the range of industry bodies
00:07:19 involved in the BCA considered were acceptable ways in accordance with ADB or providing evidence
00:07:26 that could demonstrate compliance with the building regulations.
00:07:31 In June 2014 the BCA published issue 0 of the BCA guidance note 18.
00:07:39 This set out a third option or approach to demonstrating compliance with the building
00:07:44 regulations known as option 3.
00:07:47 This was a desktop assessment of the cladding system based on test data and was based upon
00:07:52 paragraph 1 of appendix A of ADB which we set out at paragraph 25 of our written opening.
00:08:01 The assessment was to be carried out by a suitable independent UCAS accredited testing
00:08:06 body and based on reasoned arguments or facts and not opinion.
00:08:12 The fire engineer would then issue a report that should demonstrate equivalent performance
00:08:17 to BR135 compliant systems.
00:08:22 Technical guidance note 18 specifically stated that it may not be a benefit if the products
00:08:27 had not already been tested in multiple situations and that the report must specify the actual
00:08:33 tests.
00:08:35 Where option 3 desktop assessments were provided by NHBC's builder customers to NHBC building
00:08:41 control services, the internal procedure was that a fire engineer, generally John Lewis,
00:08:48 would review each option 3 assessment.
00:08:51 He would then escalate it to Steve Evans for a further review who would further escalate
00:08:57 it for formal internal sign off by a senior manager usually Diane Marshall or Ian Davies
00:09:04 in his then role as operations director at NHBC.
00:09:08 This was to ensure that any evidence received by NHBC including but not limited to those
00:09:14 option 3 reports was appropriate and robust in accordance with its legal obligations set
00:09:20 out in the regulations.
00:09:23 The desktop assessments relied upon the underlying tests being conducted properly.
00:09:29 NHBC is now aware based on evidence submitted to this inquiry of how some manufacturers
00:09:36 approached BS8414 tests.
00:09:40 The inquiry has heard for instance how Kingspan's 2005 test used a different version of K15
00:09:47 to that which was available on the market.
00:09:49 NHBC can see with hindsight how option 3 was capable of abuse if unscrupulous manufacturers
00:09:56 went to such lengths.
00:09:58 Used appropriately and with the rigour that a building control body should apply, option
00:10:03 3 was however a valid approach to compliance with the building regulations.
00:10:09 There became a concern about the capacity of UCAS accredited testing houses to deal
00:10:14 with the volume of requests for option 3 reports.
00:10:18 That resulted in the BCA guidance note being amended in June 2015 to reflect the guidance
00:10:26 within ADB that option 3 desktop assessments could be undertaken by any suitably qualified
00:10:33 fire engineer.
00:10:35 That 2015 reissue also added option 4.
00:10:42 This allowed a suitably qualified fire engineer to consider the building as a whole rather
00:10:46 than just the external wall make-ups.
00:10:50 Option 4 reflected paragraphs 0.30 and 0.31 of the introduction to approve document B.
00:10:58 The BCA expected the fire engineered solution to be at least as robust as options 1 to 3.
00:11:06 The production of the BCA guidance note involved input from all of the industry organisations
00:11:12 represented through the BCA.
00:11:15 The draft and final versions were also shared with MHCLG given its role in overseeing the
00:11:22 building regulation process and drafting the building regulations.
00:11:27 The ministry expressed no concerns about either the 2014 or 2015 BCA guidance notes.
00:11:35 In his statement to this inquiry, Brian Martin says the BCA guidance that he found no reason
00:11:41 to disagree with its contents and was satisfied appropriate guidance was being given to the
00:11:46 industry.
00:11:47 Mr Martin's view was that option 4 was not a new method of compliance.
00:11:53 It is correct that Mr Martin discussed with NHBC concerns regarding some desktop assessments
00:11:59 being produced within the industry.
00:12:02 But these concerns did not relate to sites for which NHBC was the building control body.
00:12:08 Having learned of these concerns, Steve Evans addressed them at the Facades at Tall Buildings
00:12:14 conference in July 2014.
00:12:18 Mr Martin said at this presentation that he hoped this would improve the industry's understanding
00:12:24 and provide clarity until the issue could be addressed by way of a review of ADB.
00:12:32 In order to perform a building control function, it is necessary for any building control body
00:12:38 to interpret the building regulations.
00:12:41 The industry, including NHBC, recognise that the approved documents are not prescriptive
00:12:47 and are not updated frequently enough to provide guidance on all new products or methods of
00:12:52 construction.
00:12:54 The approved documents therefore need to be interpreted and applied by building control
00:12:59 bodies to assess the practical methods of construction submitted to them for consideration.
00:13:06 NHBC produced both internal and external guidance for its builder customers in this respect.
00:13:13 NHBC's guidance B500 is an example of internal guidance.
00:13:19 This was issued on 27 March 2015 to inform NHBC personnel as to the process to adopt
00:13:27 the considering residential projects with a floor over 18 metres in height.
00:13:33 Unlike the BCA guidance notes that we have looked at, NHBC's external guidance was
00:13:39 not for use by the industry as a whole, rather it was solely for NHBC's own builder customers.
00:13:47 The purpose of that external guidance was to set out in a transparent manner what NHBC
00:13:54 required before it would agree to provide warranty cover or before it would issue a
00:13:59 building control final certificate when acting as approved inspector.
00:14:04 In terms of the warranty, if a builder met the criteria for NHBC registration and followed
00:14:11 NHBC's standards, then NHBC would be willing to offer cover.
00:14:17 For building control services, if the builder could show that they had followed NHBC's
00:14:22 standards, then NHBC was likely to accept the project, but this was never a foregone
00:14:27 conclusion.
00:14:28 NHBC would always check each project on a case-by-case basis and apply its own internal
00:14:35 escalation process.
00:14:37 NHBC was aware that other organisations at times used or referred to its guidance as
00:14:44 a benchmark, but it never promoted its guidance for use in this way and could have no idea
00:14:51 what internal checks would be in place if others tried to replicate NHBC procedures
00:14:57 or parted them.
00:14:59 NHBC guidance relevant to this inquiry includes first of all the March 2015 letter sent to
00:15:07 NHBC's builder customers, which provided guidance in relation to the use of combustible
00:15:13 material within the external walls of residential buildings over 18 metres in height, which
00:15:19 we address at paragraph 47 of our written opening, and the 2016 NHBC guidance note entitled
00:15:27 Acceptability of Common Wall Constructions Containing Combustible Materials in High-Rise
00:15:32 Buildings, which we address from paragraph 48 onwards of our note.
00:15:38 In terms of King's Ban, NHBC was aware that K15 was widely used within the housebuilding
00:15:46 industry and was indeed the market-leading product.
00:15:50 Difficult issues with combustible insulation arose when the BBA certificate for K15 changed.
00:15:59 Prior to these issues arising, NHBC's position on accepting K15 on buildings over 18 metres
00:16:07 was that there was a current BBA certificate for the product, indicating that it was acceptable
00:16:13 for use on buildings over 18 metres in accordance with ADB, subject to advice being sought from
00:16:21 the certificate holder. Therefore, providing the King's Ban gave the appropriate confirmation,
00:16:27 NHBC would deem that the builder had demonstrated compliance with the regulations and accept
00:16:33 the use of K15 on projects over 18 metres, subject to NHBC being satisfied through its
00:16:41 other site-specific checks.
00:16:44 Regulation 7 of the building regulations permitted reliance on such certificates, which NHBC
00:16:51 accepted, the BBA being a reputable independent accreditation organisation.
00:16:58 NHBC became aware in early 2014 that the requirement to seek the approval of the manufacturer
00:17:06 had been removed from K15's BBA certificate. This caused concern as the BBA certificate
00:17:14 was based on a single BS84141 test for cladding fixed emasonry. In NHBC's view, this limited
00:17:25 the use of K15 on buildings with a floor over 18 metres to those where the wall make-up
00:17:32 was identical to the corresponding test. However, King's Ban, through its marketing and technical
00:17:37 literature, was suggesting that K15 could be used on all buildings. Initially, NHBC
00:17:44 accepted King's Ban at its word and sought to discuss its concerns arising from the change
00:17:50 to the BBA certificate with King's Ban.
00:17:54 Far from there being a lack of concern on the part of NHBC about fire safety, the matter
00:17:59 was being raised with King's Ban in the first place because of such concern. NHBC
00:18:06 was aware that there were many buildings under development where K15 was being used and wanted
00:18:12 to ensure that it was in a position to provide its builder customers with accurate information
00:18:17 and appropriate guidance. NHBC made considerable efforts to push King's Ban to provide substantiating
00:18:25 evidence or undertake further testing and provide information to address its concerns.
00:18:32 These efforts are detailed in the minutes of these meetings which will be explored with
00:18:36 the NHBC witnesses.
00:18:39 What followed shows that King's Ban was not being cooperative and sought either to delay
00:18:45 or frustrate NHBC's enquiries. NHBC began to suspect that King's Ban was being less
00:18:52 than full and frank and later that King's Ban was likely to be concealing test data
00:18:58 from it. Furthermore, no adequate explanation had been provided by King's Ban or by the
00:19:05 BBA as to why the BBA had changed the certificate for K15 and removed the requirement for approval
00:19:12 from the manufacturer. In hindsight, NHBC recognises that it should have been more assertive
00:19:19 with King's Ban.
00:19:21 King's Ban's refusal to comply with these requests led to NHBC's decision in February
00:19:27 2015 to change its approach and insist on compliance with one of the BCA guidance mode
00:19:34 options the project submitted after 1 January 2014. King's Ban's response was to instruct
00:19:43 lawyers to threaten an injunction in relation to NHBC making statements to its builder customers
00:19:50 about K15. This did not deter NHBC from changing its approach and despite King's Ban's threats,
00:19:58 NHBC's change in approach was communicated to its builder customers in the March 2015
00:20:06 letter.
00:20:07 NHBC's procedures in terms of dealing with products such as King's Ban K15 on its own
00:20:13 projects were robust under NHBC's internal escalation procedure and in circumstances
00:20:19 where NHBC was not satisfied, it challenged the builder.
00:20:24 In July 2016, NHBC issued a guidance note. This was never intended to be industry guidance.
00:20:34 It was written on the basis that it would be guidance for NHBC's builder customers
00:20:39 only and therefore issued on the basis that NHBC could control which products it would
00:20:45 cover or issue a final certificate to subject to its own internal checks.
00:20:52 The 2016 guidance note came about because by then there had been a year of option 3
00:20:59 desktop assessments coming in from builders. NHBC had seen its builder customers engaging
00:21:05 fire engineers to provide almost identical reports or near identical wall make-ups. NHBC
00:21:13 concluded that it could provide guidance that would cover certain limited wall types so
00:21:19 that the same work did not need to be repeatedly done, provided NHBC was satisfied that the
00:21:26 same wall type was being proposed and it had seen supporting evidence for this previously.
00:21:32 NHBC acknowledges that manufacturers only had a limited number of BS8414 tests in relation
00:21:40 to their products. The basis for the 2016 guidance note though was NHBC having considered
00:21:48 a large number of option 3 desktop assessments which were both evidence based and from a
00:21:54 range of experienced and qualified fire engineers. If customers submitted option 3 assessments
00:22:02 that did not appear to be based on adequate evidence, NHBC challenged this through its
00:22:07 escalation process. The limited number of BS8414 tests did not change the fact that
00:22:15 NHBC had a large amount of information on which to base the 2016 guidance note. The
00:22:21 body of evidence from a range of experienced and qualified fire engineers showed a very
00:22:27 high level of agreement in the fire engineering community regarding what would be acceptable
00:22:33 in closely defined circumstances. NHBC ensured the requirements in the 2016 note were robust.
00:22:41 If the builder moved away from any of the established wall make-ups, then it would
00:22:46 need to comply with one of the routes set out in the BCA guidance. Prior to the publication
00:22:52 of the 2016 note, Steve Evans had a meeting with Mr Martin of MHCLG on the 30th of June
00:23:00 2016 where this was discussed. In his witness statement, Mr Martin explains his view on
00:23:07 the 2016 guidance that this was a reasonable approach to satisfying the functional requirements
00:23:13 of the regulations. Prior to the Grenfell Tower fire, NHBC did not receive any negative
00:23:20 feedback in relation to the 2016 guidance note. Whilst the note was only for NHBC builder
00:23:27 customers, the BCA technical group was aware of the guidance after it was issued and it
00:23:33 too raised no concerns. After the Grenfell Tower fire, the guidance was withdrawn, pending
00:23:40 NHBC obtaining a fuller understanding of the cause of the fire and assessing whether any
00:23:45 changes to guidance might be appropriate. Concurrently with the issues with Kingspan,
00:23:52 NHBC was also dealing with Cellotex and its product RS5000. NHBC's concern was that Cellotex's
00:24:01 marketing literature suggested that RS5000 was suitable on all wall make-ups over 18
00:24:09 metres. As with Kingspan K15, the manufacturer's statements appeared to go beyond the available
00:24:16 tests and Cellotex did not have a BBA certificate with a condition similar to the original K15
00:24:23 certificate, allowing its use with approval from the manufacturer. NHBC addressed these
00:24:29 concerns by notifying customers of the change in NHBC's approach in the March 2015 letter
00:24:36 as detailed earlier. If therefore a project with a story over 18 metres was to use Cellotex,
00:24:44 then in order to be accepted by NHBC, it would have to comply with one of the approaches
00:24:49 specified in the BCA guidance notes and meet the internal escalation process tests. In
00:24:57 relation to the BS8414 test that Cellotex obtained in May 2014, NHBC is now aware as
00:25:07 a result of evidence presented to this inquiry that there were magnesium oxide boards and
00:25:12 other cladding in the test wall make-up which were not listed in the report. Whilst it might
00:25:18 have been theoretically possible to identify the magnesium oxide board as a white panel
00:25:24 in one of the photographs in the report, this is not a reasonable expectation of fire engineers
00:25:29 at NHBC when a reputable organisation such as BRE had conducted the test. In the course
00:25:37 of this inquiry, individuals from Cellotex have admitted to dishonest conduct regarding
00:25:42 the circumstances of the testing of their product. It has been suggested that the BCA
00:25:50 guidance notes create additional routes and or less robust routes for demonstrating compliance
00:25:56 with the building regulations and NHBC would want to make the following points in response.
00:26:02 First of all, options 3 and 4 were allowed under ADB by virtue of paragraph 1 of appendix
00:26:10 A and paragraphs 0.30 and 0.31 of the general introduction to ADB respectively. Secondly,
00:26:20 the 2014 and 2015 guidance was issued by the BCA and with the agreement of its constituent
00:26:28 bodies, all of whom are highly experienced in the industry. Thirdly, MHCLG was aware
00:26:36 at all times of what was proposed in the BCA guidance notes. At no stage was it suggested
00:26:41 that BCA was improperly interpreting ADB. Fourthly, there was a general recognition
00:26:48 that ADB required amendment and updating by government. Until this happened, the industry
00:26:55 had to use and interpret the existing guidance as best it could using professional skill
00:27:01 and judgement. Fifthly, the requirement for a desktop study was more rigorous than the
00:27:08 procedure under the original BBA certificate for K15, which merely required the manufacturer's
00:27:16 approval. Both options 3 and 4 ensured that an external suitably qualified fire engineer
00:27:23 was analysed in the situation rather than just relying on say-so from the manufacturer.
00:27:29 Sixth, for its part, NHBC did not simply take what a fire engineer stated in a report at
00:27:36 face value. NHBC analysed the report in question carefully and a fire engineer from NHBC would
00:27:44 form his or her own view. NHBC would then take a decision on whether to accept the report
00:27:50 as demonstrating compliance with the functional requirements in ADB. Similarly, there has
00:27:56 been criticism of the 2016 NHBC guidance note. This guidance, which only applied to NHBC
00:28:04 customers, was based on the principle applied to Regulation 7 of the building regulations,
00:28:11 under which past experience can be used to demonstrate that a product can perform the
00:28:15 function for which it was intended. NHBC was not creating a separate route to compliance,
00:28:22 but instead applying the principle of deemed to comply for the purpose of identifying common
00:28:27 wall make-ups, which would be deemed to comply with the option 3 requirements, which was
00:28:31 consistent with approved guidance at the time. Even if a builder was seeking to rely on the
00:28:38 2016 NHBC guidance to show compliance, that would not automatically mean that NHBC would
00:28:45 accept that wall make-up for the purpose of warranty cover or approved inspector services.
00:28:51 NHBC staff would still carefully analyse the information submitted in order to form its
00:28:56 own view and the report would be escalated by the fire engineer to Steve Evans and then
00:29:02 up to the relevant person in senior management. It has also been suggested that Kingspan influenced
00:29:09 NHBC, including by the threat of the injunction to water down the guidance. This is not an
00:29:16 accurate reflection of the situation. NHBC took the view that engaging with Kingspan
00:29:22 at the outset to understand what the situation was with K15 was the correct and professional
00:29:28 response. NHBC did not work with Kingspan on the drafting of its guidance. When NHBC
00:29:35 appreciated fully that Kingspan was not going to cooperate and be transparent, NHBC issued
00:29:41 the March 2015 letter to its customers. This was done despite the threatened injunctive
00:29:47 action by Kingspan. It is now clear that Kingspan abused its standing and position in the industry
00:29:54 to suggest that it was genuinely seeking to demonstrate compliance when this was far from
00:29:59 the case. As I said at the outset, NHBC acknowledges it should have been more assertive with Kingspan
00:30:06 and acted more quickly when dealing with this important and difficult issue. After the fire,
00:30:13 NHBC reviewed all of its relevant guidance following the withdrawal of the 2016 NHBC
00:30:19 guidance note. This resulted in NHBC issuing new internal guidance in August 2017. The
00:30:27 purpose remained the same, which was to aid consistency from NHBC's surveyors and builder
00:30:33 customers in applying the NHBC standards and approved document D where NHBC was providing
00:30:41 warranty or building control services in respect to external walls on buildings with a floor
00:30:46 over 18 metres. In conclusion, NHBC reiterates its commitment to assist in this inquiry to
00:30:54 ensure that what happened at Grenfell Tower never happens again. Improving standards in
00:30:59 the house building industry was and will always be part of NHBC's core purpose. NHBC is keen
00:31:06 to learn any lessons it can and to be part of ensuring an improved fire safety system
00:31:11 in the house building industry for the future. So those are my opening comments.
00:31:15 Well, thank you very much indeed, Mr. Barnes. That's very helpful. Thank you.
00:31:22 The next opening statement is going to be made on behalf of the building research establishment
00:31:28 by Ms. Samantha Leek, Queen's Council, and she's going to make that statement by video
00:31:34 from a remote location. So I better just check that we're in contact with each other. Good
00:31:39 morning, Ms. Leek. Can you see me and hear me?
00:31:42 I can, sir. Good morning.
00:31:43 Good. Thank you. Well, we can see and hear you. So as soon as you're ready, you can make
00:31:48 your statement, please. Thank you.
00:31:53 Thank you, sir. Panel members, in our written opening, we've highlighted two matters which
00:32:00 BRE seek to draw to your attention at the outset of the testing and certification and
00:32:05 government parts of Module 6. Those two items are first of all, an overview of BRE and its
00:32:12 work, and secondly, the assistance that BRE believes it can provide to the inquiry on
00:32:18 these parts of Module 6. Before addressing these two points, as in Module 2, I would
00:32:25 like to repeat BRE's deeply felt sympathy to those who lost loved ones at Grenfell Tower
00:32:30 and to the survivors of the tragedy and those affected. I would also like to say on behalf
00:32:36 of BRE that its intention remains as an organisation to be reflective rather than to be defensive.
00:32:45 When I say not defensive, I mean that BRE will listen carefully to the evidence that
00:32:50 will be heard in this module and will acknowledge where it considers with hindsight that it
00:32:55 could or should have done things differently. Having heard all of the evidence, BRE will
00:33:01 also seek to offer candid reflection as to how governance and practices within the testing,
00:33:08 classification and certification regime should and realistically could change for the better,
00:33:15 including the place of BRE within the whole framework for ensuring the safety of those
00:33:20 who live and work within the built environment. Under new leadership since 2019, BRE is investing
00:33:27 in major improvements to its systems and processes. So the evidence disclosed for the purposes
00:33:34 of Modules 6 and 7 of this inquiry has given BRE further cause to reflect as to its own
00:33:40 practices and what could potentially have been done differently. BRE's witnesses are
00:33:46 still in the processes of considering carefully that evidence and will attempt to assist you
00:33:52 with the issues that have been raised and the criticisms of BRE as an organisation.
00:33:57 May I give you and those listening a very brief overview of BRE and its work? I do so
00:34:04 to set in context the evidence that you will hear in due course about BRE's role and relationship
00:34:09 with government. As you have heard, BRE was formed in 1921 to carry out research into
00:34:16 construction, building materials and suitable methods of construction to build homes. Today,
00:34:22 it is a multidisciplinary building science centre with a mission to improve buildings
00:34:27 and infrastructure. Knowledge generated by BRE through independent research is used by
00:34:34 clients including government to create the products, standards and qualifications that
00:34:40 help to ensure that buildings, homes and communities are safe, efficient, productive, sustainable
00:34:47 and enjoyable places to be. Having started out as a government agency, BRE was privatised
00:34:54 in 1997 upon the formation of what is now called the BRE Trust. BRE has since then been
00:35:03 a profit for purpose organisation. Any profit from BRE's work goes to the BRE Trust which
00:35:10 invests in research and education programmes for the public benefit carried out by BRE,
00:35:16 other research partners and universities across the UK. The BRE Trust is the largest independent
00:35:23 charity in the UK dedicated to improving the built environment for the benefit of those
00:35:28 who use it. Since 2007, BRE Global Limited has been the testing, classification and certification
00:35:35 body within BRE. BRE Global Limited works in a broad range of areas with the largest
00:35:42 being fire and security. In this area, BRE Global Limited carries out UCAS accredited
00:35:49 testing, classification and certification of construction products for manufacturers.
00:35:55 BRE Global Limited also carries out research including for government departments. Profession
00:36:02 for government departments. Profits from BRE's business activities are gift aided
00:36:08 to the BRE Trust which in the last 24 years has funded over £20 million of research for
00:36:15 the public benefit, produced or updated over 300 publications and supported more than 300
00:36:22 postgraduate students through its university partnerships. Its enduring purpose is to contribute
00:36:29 to the improvement of the built environment. Health and safety, referred to with emphasis
00:36:36 yesterday by Mr Mansfield, are in essence at the very core of what BRE does. To some
00:36:43 extent they are its very raison d'etre. Where this module shows that there are matters which
00:36:48 could have been done better, BRE will acknowledge them, accept them and learn from them. Turning
00:36:56 to BRE's assistance to the inquiry in Module 6. First of all testing and certification.
00:37:03 BRE hopes to be able to assist you and the panel to build upon what you have learned
00:37:08 from Module 2 about the regime for the fire safety testing and classification of cladding
00:37:14 systems. As was made clear in Module 2, BRE did not test or classify the cladding systems
00:37:21 that were installed on Grenfell Tower. It was not engaged to do so. In this module however,
00:37:29 BRE hopes to be able to work with the inquiry to deepen its understanding of the development,
00:37:35 operation and oversight of the fire safety testing and classification process for cladding
00:37:40 systems. You will recall that we gave an overview of this in Part B of BRE's written opening
00:37:47 for Module 2. Mr Millett said in opening yesterday that some core participants appeared
00:37:54 to hope that the inquiry would miss things. That is not, nor has it ever been, BRE's
00:38:01 approach to this inquiry. BRE's sincere hope is that light will be shone into all areas
00:38:07 of the building industry and that the evidence heard in Module 6 will form the basis of recommendations
00:38:14 to drive forward necessary changes and improvements to the testing, classification and certification
00:38:21 regime. Echoing the sentiment of a number of core participants yesterday, it is equally,
00:38:27 if not more important, that your recommendations are implemented and implemented quickly. With
00:38:35 regard to the government side of things, BRE and its witnesses believe that they will also
00:38:40 be able to assist with the government part of Module 6. As we set out in our written
00:38:45 opening, BRE's input and expertise are commissioned by way of research projects for use by third
00:38:52 parties, including government departments. For example, BRE's research underpinned
00:38:59 the development of BRE of BRE 135, which was first published in 1988 and originated as
00:39:07 a report of research work by BRE in conjunction with the Loss Prevention Board carried out
00:39:13 for the Department of the Environment. BRE also published in 1999, Fire Note 9, entitled
00:39:21 Assessing the Fire Performance of External Cladding Systems, a Test Method. This resulted
00:39:28 from a Department of the Environment and Industry collaborative research project and was the
00:39:33 first large-scale fire test methodology for external cladding systems. Fire Note 9 set
00:39:41 out the methodology initially used as the basis for the development of BS 8414-1, which
00:39:49 was first published by the British Standards Institution in 2002 following public consultation.
00:39:56 Secondly, BRE has also been commissioned by government to undertake investigations of
00:40:01 fires under the government's Investigation of Real Fires program, which has been running
00:40:06 for several decades. As part of this program, reports are provided to government on fires
00:40:12 in the built environment to inform government of fire safety issues observed from real incidents,
00:40:19 so that government can take account of the issues in the development of the building
00:40:22 regulations, approved Document B, and any other relevant guidance. BRE's expertise
00:40:30 has over time also assisted other public authorities, coroner's courts, and public inquiries to
00:40:37 understand why fires occurred in the built environment and what lessons can be learned.
00:40:43 BRE emphasizes that although it was until 1997 a government agency, and although its
00:40:49 work is commissioned by government, among others, BRE's role has never been to determine
00:40:55 policy or make regulations, nor has BRE ever been a regulator. BRE was established to
00:41:03 undertake building research, including fire research, which may be used, or not, as the
00:41:09 case may be, by third parties to fulfil their functions and objectives.
00:41:16 So finally, improvements to the regulatory regime. BRE understands that Module 6 will
00:41:22 explore how the regulatory regime can be improved and how regulatory oversight can
00:41:28 be strengthened. I repeat the closing remarks from BRE's oral closings for Module 2.
00:41:35 Unsafe cladding systems should never have been installed on Grenfell Tower. Those systems
00:41:42 did not comply with the applicable building regulations, yet were installed by contractors
00:41:48 and signed off by building control. The bereaved survivors and residents, and the wider public,
00:41:55 must be assured that the regulatory regime will be reformed and oversight improved to
00:42:01 avoid a repetition of the tragedy at Grenfell Tower. BRE is committed, both within this
00:42:07 inquiry and outside it, to assisting in the formulation of improvements to the regulatory
00:42:12 regime, and BRE looks forward to contributing to Module 6.
00:42:17 Thank you, sir. Thank you very much, Ms Leigh. Finally this
00:42:22 morning we're going to hear an opening statement on behalf of the Department for Levelling
00:42:27 Up Housing and Communities, made by Mr Jason Beer, Queen's Council. Good morning, Mr Beer.
00:42:33 Good morning, sir. As you've said, this opening statement is made on behalf of the Department
00:42:39 for Levelling Up Housing and Communities, which I shall refer to as the Department.
00:42:46 The Department is deeply sorry for its past failures in relation to the oversight of the
00:42:54 system that regulated safety in the construction and refurbishment of high-rise buildings.
00:43:01 It also deeply regrets past failures in relation to the superintendents of the building control
00:43:08 bodies, which themselves had a key role in ensuring the safe construction and refurbishment
00:43:16 of such buildings. It apologises to the bereaved residents and survivors of the fire for such
00:43:24 failures. This can, of course, neither change what happened nor compensate for the immeasurable
00:43:32 loss and grief suffered. The Department believes that it must examine its own conduct and candidly
00:43:39 accept mistakes, errors and omissions when the inquiry identifies them. You have seen
00:43:47 from the extensive and detailed written opening statement that the Department has sought itself
00:43:53 to identify mistakes made and made efforts to put them right. The Department believes
00:44:00 that critical self-reflection has been necessary throughout, alongside the commissioning of
00:44:06 external and independent reviews of the building regulatory system. The Department also set
00:44:13 up this inquiry in order independently to establish the facts, to identify fault and
00:44:20 to make recommendations. The Department is fully supportive of the work of the inquiry
00:44:26 and its aims and will do everything it can to assist it in its vital work. That is why
00:44:33 the Department has disclosed tens of thousands of pages of documents to the inquiry and provided
00:44:39 dozens of witness statements from junior civil servants to former Secretaries of State, thereby
00:44:46 opening itself fully to the scrutiny of this inquiry and the benefits that that brings.
00:44:52 The public, residents and indeed government trusted those constructing and approving high-rise
00:45:00 blocks and supplying the products used in them were following the law and doing the
00:45:05 right thing. This trust was both misplaced and abused. The Department greatly regrets
00:45:14 that it took the Grenfell Tower tragedy to lay bare this misplaced and abused trust.
00:45:22 Reflecting on its role in the issues to be examined in this part of the inquiry, the
00:45:28 Department has asked itself where its actions contributed to an overarching building safety
00:45:34 system that has subsequently been shown to be unfit for purpose with catastrophic consequences.
00:45:41 Its work over the past few years has found that the Department did not have a good understanding
00:45:48 of how the regulatory system was working on the ground, nor of how well it was being enforced
00:45:54 by local building control bodies. Departmental officials fulfilled their responsibilities
00:46:01 in accordance with the legislative scheme. Their role did not include offering a view
00:46:07 whether individual buildings were compliant. This was the role of local building control
00:46:13 bodies. And the Department did not expect its officials to act as stewards of the system.
00:46:21 The mistaken assumption underlying the Department's approach was that compliance was being monitored
00:46:28 by qualified experts at the local level and that non-compliance with the regulations would
00:46:35 be identified by building control inspectors. The Department did not identify any need for
00:46:42 it to superintend the inspectors. This system of local enforcement failed to
00:46:50 ensure that building safety standards were always met, especially in more complex residential
00:46:57 buildings such as high-rise blocks of flats, which demand greater technical competence
00:47:02 and more intensive oversight corresponding to the level of risk. The Department accepts
00:47:09 that it failed to recognise the risk that those responsible for complying with and enforcing
00:47:15 the building regulations would not diligently fulfil their respective responsibilities and
00:47:21 the potential consequences should that risk eventuate. The Department further accepts
00:47:26 that having failed to recognise that risk, it then failed to add a further layer of assurance
00:47:32 to the system. Had there been a functional enforcement system with efficient assurance
00:47:38 built in, non-compliance to the extent that gave rise to the Grenfell Tower tragedy may
00:47:44 not have been possible. The Department has asked itself whether it should have identified
00:47:50 the failure in the design of the regulatory system, most particularly the enforcement
00:47:56 system and taken steps to remedy it before the tragedy of Grenfell Tower. The Department
00:48:03 accepts that as the government department which sponsors the building safety system,
00:48:09 it should have had a clear process in place to collate and aggregate the information that
00:48:15 it did receive and that obtained individually by local authorities to develop its understanding
00:48:22 of systemic compliance and enforcement risks. Had that risk been identified and properly
00:48:29 quantified it would have been the role of the Department to propose appropriate legislative
00:48:34 change before Parliament, whether for example in the form of increased penalties for non-compliance
00:48:41 or in a system of centralised oversight of the compliance and enforcement system. Building
00:48:47 safety is too important to leave its enforcement to local authorities without that central
00:48:52 oversight, given the risk and consequences of a systemic failure which increased with
00:48:58 the introduction and expansion of competition in the building control market. However, had
00:49:07 the building regulations, British standards and statutory guidance been followed and enforced
00:49:14 with reasonable diligence, a large scale cladding fire could not have happened. In particular
00:49:20 the Department's view is that the meaning of the regulations and of ADB read together
00:49:26 with the regulations was sufficiently clear at the time of the refurbishment of the tower
00:49:31 that no competent professional acting in good faith should have misunderstood or misapplied
00:49:36 the statutory requirements. A competent professional would have taken appropriate advice in case
00:49:43 of uncertainty, not least where the issue involved fire safety. The Department should
00:49:48 have done more to take on board the learnings and recommendations triggered by other fires,
00:49:55 including in particular its response to the Lacanel House fire and the coroner's recommendations
00:50:00 following it. Similarly, correspondence from the APPG should have been addressed in a
00:50:07 timelier manner and with more done to probe the issues raised by it. Individually, these
00:50:15 errors and missed opportunities from the Department and across industry may not have caused the
00:50:20 fire at Grenfell Tower, but cumulatively they created an environment in which such a tragedy
00:50:26 was possible. The Department has accordingly listened carefully to the evidence heard so
00:50:33 far by the inquiry and has accepted the criticisms made and the recommendations of the Hackett
00:50:40 review. The building safety regulatory system was not fit for purpose and within the construction
00:50:47 industry, there was a race to the bottom with profits being prioritized over safety. The
00:50:53 Department did not interrogate the underlying performance of the system nor take active
00:50:58 steps to assure itself whether the regulatory regime was working as intended. This most
00:51:04 definitely is not just a question of the specification of cladding systems, but of an industry that
00:51:11 has not reflected and learned for itself. In the immediate aftermath of the fire, the
00:51:18 Department established the building safety programme directorate, an integrated team
00:51:24 of policy, strategy and technical experts working together to ensure that wider priorities
00:51:31 are correctly identified and escalated. Since that time, the Department has taken a wide
00:51:36 range of measures to make the public safe, the most important of which are as follows.
00:51:44 First it is legislated. The building safety bill was published on the 20th July 2020 and
00:51:51 the Fire Safety Act 2021 will bring about the biggest improvements in building safety
00:51:56 for a generation, including the creation of a new building safety regulator led by the
00:52:03 new Chief Inspector of Buildings as part of the Health and Safety Executive to oversee
00:52:09 the safe design, construction and occupation of higher-rise buildings and a system of oversight
00:52:16 over and regulation of building control bodies and professionals. The role of the new regulator
00:52:23 will be to ensure that residential buildings over 18 metres are safe in terms of both design
00:52:30 and construction and occupancy. The building safety regulator will have powers to set rules
00:52:37 about what operational standards must be met and about practices and procedures to be adopted.
00:52:45 Local authorities and registered building control approvers will have to adhere to these
00:52:49 rules and comply with the requirements in the exercise of their duties and functions.
00:52:55 The building safety regulator will be able to revise these rules to reflect best practice
00:53:00 requirements as the industry changes. The building safety regulator will be responsible
00:53:06 to ministers and ultimately to Parliament for its performance as is typical for national
00:53:11 regulators. The bill provides for an additional safeguard going beyond this usual practice.
00:53:18 As recommended by Dame Judith Hackett, the bill requires a regular independent review
00:53:23 of the whole system and specifically the effectiveness of the building safety regulator.
00:53:30 This will provide another source of public oversight over and transparency in relation
00:53:37 to how the building safety regulator performs its functions.
00:53:41 Second, the introduction of powers that will extend regulations to all construction products,
00:53:49 creating a requirement for products to be safe in line with existing expectations for
00:53:54 consumer products and the creation of a safety critical list of construction products where
00:54:01 their failure could cause death or serious injury. Manufacturers of these products will
00:54:07 be required to declare their performance and put in place measures to ensure that this
00:54:12 performance is consistently met. Third, the establishment of a new national regulator
00:54:19 for construction products within the Office of Product Safety and Standards so that people
00:54:25 can be confident that construction products, including those used to construct homes, are
00:54:31 safe and will perform as they should. The regulator will be given powers to carry out
00:54:37 market surveillance, to share information with other regulators, including the building
00:54:42 safety regulator and local trading standards, to remove any product from the market that
00:54:48 present a significant safety risk and prosecute and fine any company that breaks the rules
00:54:54 and compromises public safety. Fourth, it developed through the British Standards Institute
00:55:01 a suite of national competence standards for individuals working on higher risk buildings
00:55:06 to support the work of the industry-led Competence Steering Group and take forward some of the
00:55:11 recommendations in its final report, Setting the Bar, published in October 2020. At fifth,
00:55:18 it imposed a ban on combustible materials in external walls of new high-rise homes and
00:55:24 funding to remove dangerous cladding from existing high-rise residential buildings.
00:55:29 At sixth, it introduced a new Code of Practice through the BSI for assessors of the BSI
00:55:36 assessors when examining external walls and claddings. The Code of Practice is intended
00:55:43 to help professionals provide consistent risk-based and proportionate advice on whether remediation
00:55:50 of the external walls is necessary and give building owners clarity on the fire risk of
00:55:55 the construction of external walls. The draft was issued for public consultation by BSI
00:56:00 in April and is expected to be published in due course. At seventh, it undertook an independent
00:56:07 review to identify systemic issues with how construction products are tested and certified
00:56:13 and made recommendations about how the system can be strengthened to inspire confidence
00:56:18 that construction products are safe and perform as labelled and marketed. And eighth, it introduced
00:56:25 a programme to encourage the industry to lead and deliver culture change, including
00:56:31 through the Industry Safety Steering Group, chaired by Dame Judith Hackett herself, and
00:56:38 to challenge the industry to make improvements ahead of the new building safety legislation.
00:56:45 This programme is supporting the work of the industry-led Competence Steering Group to
00:56:50 develop recommendations for a new system of competence across the industry and, in addition,
00:56:55 supporting industry initiatives such as the Building a Safer Future Charter and the Code
00:57:01 for Construction Product Information. In conclusion, through these measures, the
00:57:07 Department has sought to remedy the wrongs of the past. It has been committed to preventing
00:57:14 a similar tragedy from happening again. It will continue to ensure that the necessary
00:57:19 changes to the regulatory system are made to protect the safety of those living in tower
00:57:23 blocks and of the public more generally, and will continue to engage with this inquiry
00:57:29 proactively, openly and fully throughout this module and beyond it. So those are the opening
00:57:35 submissions of the Department. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Behan. Well,
00:57:43 we had originally allowed quite a lot more time for opening statements on behalf of core
00:57:49 participants, but as you will know if you've been following the proceedings for the last
00:57:54 day or so, not everyone wishes to make an opening statement, and we have now reached
00:58:01 the end of the statements that people have asked to make orally, although we've received
00:58:08 other opening statements in writing. Tomorrow we shall start hearing evidence from the first
00:58:15 witnesses. It will be a witness from the local authority building control, but the
00:58:23 witness has been asked to attend tomorrow and therefore is not here to give evidence
00:58:27 today. So at that point I'm afraid we shall close the proceedings for today and we shall
00:58:32 resume tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock when, as I say, we look forward to hearing the first
00:58:39 of the witnesses in this part of Module 6. Thank you all very much. 10 o'clock tomorrow
00:58:44 please.