Closing statements from TMO and Studio E on Modules 1 & 2, addressing design responsibilities, product testing failures, and regulatory system deficiencies.
00:00:38 good afternoon everyone the next statement is going to be made by mr james agarose queen's council on behalf of the tmo mr agaros i see you on my
00:00:49 of the tmo mr agaros i see you on my screen
00:00:50 screen i hope you can see us can you and can you hear us i can indeed oh good i can thank you very much and we can hear you that's excellent right well then if you're ready to make your
00:01:02 then if you're ready to make your closing statement please go ahead yes well good afternoon mr chairman and good afternoon members of the panel at the outset of these planes and submissions for modules one and two of
00:01:14 submissions for modules one and two of phase two
00:01:16 phase two the tma wishes to reiterate that its deepest sympathies and condolences remain with the bereaved survivors and residents
00:01:23 residents and it reaffirms its commitment to supporting the inquiry in its its valuable work so between september 2020 and march 2021
00:01:34 so between september 2020 and march 2021 you heard evidence from numerous individuals from a range of entities in relation to phase two modules one and two
00:01:42 two and while the issues in modules one and two are distinct there is a significant overlap not least because the matters investigated module two resonate in many aspects of the matters considered in
00:01:54 aspects of the matters considered in module 1.
00:01:57 module 1. module 1 was concerned with the design development and refurbishment of grenfell tower that took place between 2012 and 2016. it focused on various issues including
00:02:09 it focused on various issues including but not limited to the decision to refurbish grenfell tower the appointment of various pre-contract professionals by the tmo and rbkc planning and building control
00:02:22 and rbkc planning and building control so module two is divided into two parts part one investigated the way in which the primary materials used on the grenfell tower refurbishment were manufactured
00:02:33 manufactured tested and sold and this included consideration of the wording of the relevant certificates whether the fire performance of the materials was presented in a fair and transparent manner in marketing and
00:02:45 transparent manner in marketing and techno technical literature and what the different manufacturers knew about the use of their products on grenfell tower part two then examined the role of the testing and certification bodies and the
00:02:57 testing and certification bodies and the extent to which they audited the manufacturers and how test results were interpreted by the relevant bodies so the tmo witnesses did not participate
00:03:08 so the tmo witnesses did not participate in module two but the evidence before the inquiry has been deeply troubling and it's right the tmo comments on it especially considering your conclusion
00:03:19 especially considering your conclusion in the phase one reports and i quote from that the principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up the building was the presence of the aluminium composite material acm panels with
00:03:30 composite material acm panels with polyethylene cores which acted as a source of fuel for the growing fire and the presence of the pir and phenolic foam insulation boards behind the acm
00:03:41 foam insulation boards behind the acm panels and perhaps the epdm membrane and the aluglaze window infill panels contributed to the rate and extent of vertical freight flame spread
00:03:54 vertical freight flame spread the importance of these findings cannot be overstated when considering that the tmos fire safety strategy as is common for buildings of this nature was based upon compartmentation
00:04:07 upon compartmentation and 27 active and passive fire safety measures to support the stay put policy which as professor torreira said was based around the concept of no external
00:04:18 based around the concept of no external spread of the fire the submitted inquiry should also keep in mind sir the active and passive fire measures at grenfell tower were not designed
00:04:28 designed to perform in the extraordinary circumstances which arose or where non-compliant fire propagating products were installed
00:04:38 in summary the tmo submits the legitimately unnecessarily delegated responsibility for important elements of design material selection and construction to
00:04:50 material selection and construction to qualify professional bodies through properly structured contractual arrangements the tmo submits her that for a non-construction professional to delegate in appropriate circumstances is
00:05:03 delegate in appropriate circumstances is necessary and legitimate and it should not be viewed as dodging or abrogating responsibility or buck passing
00:05:13 so the evidence heard in module one demonstrates several professional teams who contracted with the tmo and between themselves failed to select and use products which were compliant with
00:05:24 products which were compliant with prevailing standards some of the causes of these failures were uncovered in module two which disclosed that the marketing and sale of those products was often not driven by
00:05:35 those products was often not driven by safety
00:05:36 safety considerations and so the tma wishes to make it clear that if it had known about the combustible nature of the products used in the refurbishment and their ability to support the surface
00:05:47 and their ability to support the surface spread of fire it certainly would not have permitted their use as has been said before by the tmo the tmo invites the inquiry to place its
00:05:58 the tmo invites the inquiry to place its actions in context i.e to consider to consider whether the way in which it acted during the procurement design and construction phases was substantially different from any other
00:06:10 substantially different from any other social housing management organization especially in the life of knowledge in the housing sector of cladding danger at the time
00:06:20 the time so we on behalf of the tmo note that while the inquiry has obtained expert evidence that addresses the performance of many corporate bodies and professions it has not heard evidence from any in
00:06:31 it has not heard evidence from any in any individual who can speak with authority
00:06:34 authority about how a body like the tmo may have been expected to act when fulfilling the role of cdm client in major public works
00:06:45 so in making this assessment the tmo points the fact that following the fire at grenfell tower over 2000 buildings or something like up to a million homes have been found to be clad in the same
00:06:57 have been found to be clad in the same or similar materials as were used at grenfell tower for each there would have been a client and in no case apparently was the client able to prevent unsafe cladding being
00:07:09 able to prevent unsafe cladding being being erected
00:07:13 so the tmo submissions on module 2 matters will be taken out of term they'll be addressed at the beginning of these submissions as the evidence before the inquiries disclose numerous disturbing abuses of
00:07:25 disclose numerous disturbing abuses of the classification and certification system
00:07:28 system which has caused and underpinned the national cladding crisis and led to a belief from many of those involved in the project that the great the products used on grenfell tower were safe for use
00:07:42 turning now to the certification and classification materials used so as the inquiry knows the primary materials cons used in grenfell tower
00:07:53 materials cons used in grenfell tower and considered a module to uh rayna bond pe 55 rain screen panels manufactured and sold by arconic rs 5000 insulation boards manufacturing
00:08:04 rs 5000 insulation boards manufacturing sold by celatex kingspan cool firm k15 insulation boards manufactured sold by kingspan window infill panels manufactured by
00:08:15 window infill panels manufactured by allu glaze and lamithan cavity barriers manufactured sold by ciderise part 2 of module 2 examined the role of the bre the bba and the lbc
00:08:29 the bre the bba and the lbc in the wording of certificates and the testing auditing and monitoring of manufacturers and their products dealing first with the rayna bond 55 pe rain screen panel cassette system which
00:08:41 rain screen panel cassette system which was manufactured by alconic this was the most prevalent cladding used on grenfell tower so you heard evidence the system was tested in 2005
00:08:52 tested in 2005 but the test was actually stopped after 850 seconds with the results of the test being recorded as not usable but give an idea of the fire behavior of the product
00:09:03 idea of the fire behavior of the product the system obtained only a class e rating in
00:09:06 rating in 2005 and the same rating when tested again in 2011 2014 and 2015. to be used on buildings over 18 meters
00:09:18 to be used on buildings over 18 meters in accordance with adb products had to obtain either a class a european class b or national class 0 rating with no class b or class 0 rating the
00:09:29 with no class b or class 0 rating the product should never have been considered for use or used at grenfell tower
00:09:36 tower even though it had not achieved a national class zero certification in any test the pa the bba issued a certificate which seemed to represent that it was
00:09:47 which seemed to represent that it was indeed class zero which certificate witnesses have said was misleading and factually incorrect so mr jonathan sakula one of your your
00:09:58 so mr jonathan sakula one of your your experts said that he would expect a contractor to accept a bba certification and it was accepted in evidence by arconic that anyone reading the certificate would have been mislaid
00:10:10 certificate would have been mislaid so this is particularly troubling as arconic was aware that the cassette system was to be used on grenfell tower rs 5000 insulation boards rs 5000
00:10:22 rs 5000 insulation boards rs 5000 insulation boards which you found sir in your phase one report more than likely more likely than not contributed to the rate and extent of vertical flame spread
00:10:33 spread were manufactured and sold by celatex and used on grenfell tower the inquiry heard evidence that the rs 5000 insulation test which was conducted in may 2014 was rigged following an
00:10:46 in may 2014 was rigged following an earlier failed test with two magnesium oxide boards being added to improve its chances of passing the fire test not only were two magnesium boards added
00:10:57 not only were two magnesium boards added but celatex also used cement panels to conceal their presence from onlookers or later in photographs after the test was conducted the magnesium oxide boards were not
00:11:09 magnesium oxide boards were not referenced in either cell texas marketing literature or in the bre report
00:11:14 report and the bre accepted that in failing to note the magnesium oxide on the test rig it made a fundamental admission and that celatex may have made a concerted effort
00:11:25 celatex may have made a concerted effort to hide it so even more concerningly possibly ex-employees of celetex told the inquiry that a bre employee was aware of the
00:11:36 that a bre employee was aware of the presence of magnesium oxide boards unsurprisingly celetex accepted that its marketing and technical literature was thoroughly misleading
00:11:47 thoroughly misleading that the emissions and misdescriptions were entirely deliberate it also accepted that the system which had passed the test would not have been commercially viable if the tests had been done correctly
00:11:59 been done correctly and so of course while ultimately a matter for you and for the inquiry there appears to be a strong cynical and manipulative element to celetex's conduct which had little or nothing to
00:12:10 conduct which had little or nothing to do with the promotion of safety kingspan call fam cool firm k-15 insulation boards
00:12:21 call firm k-15 insulation boards manufacturing sold by kingspan were used on grenfell tower again the inquiry heard evidence of misrepresentation by kingspan and
00:12:32 misrepresentation by kingspan and malpractice potentially within the bba kingspan tested the k-15 insulation in 2005
00:12:40 2005 in a version that passed the fire test but later changed its chemical composition in a way that caused it to perform very differently in a fire situation than before
00:12:52 situation than before in fact in a test in 2007 the new composition burnt ferociously and had to be extinguished before it set fire to the laboratory and unsurprisingly therefore it did not achieve the
00:13:04 therefore it did not achieve the criteria of br135
00:13:08 despite the 2007 failure kingspan continued to market the product based on the 2005 fire test results which had accepted an oral evidence amounted to
00:13:19 accepted an oral evidence amounted to deliberately misleading the customer when in 2008 bowmer and kirkland another contractor specifically highlighted concerns with k-15 to kingspan
00:13:31 concerns with k-15 to kingspan pointing out that the bre test which informed the marketing material did not relate to the product it was supplying and suggesting strongly that kingspan clarify how the material was suitable
00:13:43 clarify how the material was suitable for use instead of addressing the concerns raised kingspan's internal documents demonstrated a cynical disregard for them one manager wrote i think boma and
00:13:55 one manager wrote i think boma and kirkland are getting me confused with someone who gives a damn and also i'm trying to think a way out of this one imagine a fire running up this tower any ideas
00:14:07 ideas it's also alarming that a certificate was issued by the bba in 2008 which classified k-15 as class 0 stating that the product will not contribute to the
00:14:18 the product will not contribute to the development stages of a fire or present a smoke or toxic hazard when it was neither not when it was neither non-combustible nor a material of limited combustibility
00:14:31 limited combustibility unsurprisingly possibly sir the bba accepted this was a very basic failure of due diligence and further in 2010 the certificate was revised to say that k-15 could be used
00:14:44 revised to say that k-15 could be used in accordance with paragraph 12.7 of adb the bba said this was a human error accepting this the resulting certificate was capable of misinterpretation
00:14:55 was capable of misinterpretation so again of course it's a matter for you but the tmo would say in conclusion in relation to these matters that considering the many abuses of the regulatory system
00:15:06 of the regulatory system and how easily this occurred and indeed the nationwide crisis it has played a part in causing the inquiry should consider whether whether the certification system is fit
00:15:18 whether the certification system is fit for purpose that so many dangerous products were certified and marketed marketed as suitable for use in safety critical situations in high-rise social housing
00:15:29 situations in high-rise social housing is deeply troubling
00:15:32 so now turning to module one matters including procurement some cost issues and the question of pre and post contract appointments by the tmo
00:15:44 contract appointments by the tmo and where design responsibility lay the circumstances in which the decision to refurbish grenfell tower including the source of funds and the decision to deploy them at grenfell tower have been
00:15:56 deploy them at grenfell tower have been explored in depth and so we do not intend to revisit them in any detail here
00:16:02 here suffice it to say that the motives were undoubtedly good and largely connected with improving thermal efficiency and domestic and shared amenities
00:16:14 shared amenities and so it
00:16:16 and so it may be observed that it seems highly unlikely that any other local authority other than rbkc would have been able to spend a similar amount of money on the refurbishment and renovation of a single block of social
00:16:28 renovation of a single block of social housing
00:16:29 housing either then or now
00:16:33 so you know that the tmo is a not-for-profit organization funded by public monies and therefore it had an obligation to secure value for money in procurement
00:16:44 procurement and so we submit that this should be kept in mind when the when the inquiry considers the question of tender bids cost savings and value engineering
00:16:55 cost savings and value engineering artelia's pre-tender estimate was just over 10 million ryden's bid came in at 9.249 million durkins at 9.94 million and malali's at
00:17:06 durkins at 9.94 million and malali's at 10.48 million the average therefore was circa 9.8 million thus
00:17:12 thus while ryden's bid overall bid was the lowest indeed some 700 000 lower than the next lowest bid this rightly provoked a question at a tmo board as to why this was
00:17:24 why this was but so it's also worthwhile considering that ryden's bid on the tender for the external facade was 3.8 million whereas other contractors put in estimates of between 3.6 million and 4.1 million thus
00:17:38 between 3.6 million and 4.1 million thus ryden's bid for the external facade was certainly not the cheapest and so as the inquiry knows price was not the sole determining factor rather it was 40 percent of the evaluation
00:17:50 it was 40 percent of the evaluation the overall quality of the bid was 55 percent i.e the majority and the interview was 5 percent and ryden scored highly in these last two categories also
00:18:01 highly in these last two categories also so as the inquiry is aware artelia was deeply involved in the assessment of the tender and would have been expected to comment or demur if there were any areas
00:18:12 comment or demur if there were any areas that were underpriced in ryden's beard and since they did not the assumption was that ryden's bid was realistic
00:18:20 so dealing now with value engineering as a concept and a discrete issue rightly concern has been expressed about the concept and application of value engineering in the context of the
00:18:31 engineering in the context of the refurbishment it's been confirmed by several witnesses that value engineering which may be defined as a process of trying to find more cost-effective ways of achieving
00:18:42 more cost-effective ways of achieving the same outcome or achieving a better outcome for the same cost is common in construction projects as well indeed as in other industries such as the aviation industry where safety standards are very
00:18:55 industry where safety standards are very high
00:18:56 high thus there it should not be assumed that value engineering involves the inevitable sacrifice of safety for costs and the tmo would submit there's no sound basis for saying that this
00:19:07 sound basis for saying that this occurred during the grenfell tower refurbishment paul hyatt your architectural expert was asked about value engineering and he said that many design and build contractors are highly competent and
00:19:20 contractors are highly competent and highly
00:19:21 highly highly responsible and will interrogate a design with great effect and find less expensive but not worse ways of doing something
00:19:31 something so one discreet topic which we appreciate you will deal with is what's been referred to as the offline meeting between peter madison and ryden can i deal with that now albeit briefly
00:19:43 while it's right that the inquiry scrutinized this in many searching questions by mr millet sir
00:19:50 sir we say on behalf of the tmo that you may conclude that although in hindsight the meeting was probably unwise by the time it occurred ryden had already been identified as the preferred
00:20:02 already been identified as the preferred bidder through both price and quality and as a company which had already completed several overcladding projects of this type it was certainly not an inappropriate choice
00:20:14 inappropriate choice while again it's right to say that ryden was asked to carry out some value engineering it's likely that any successful tenderer would have been required to do the same thing and there
00:20:25 required to do the same thing and there was nothing irregular about value engineering the context of a refurbishment funded by public money costing around 10 million pounds
00:20:36 costing around 10 million pounds can i now turn to some cost issues in relation to the selection of materials used at grenfell tower and in particular in relation to the selection of cladding materials
00:20:46 materials so it was clear from an early stage
00:20:50 to ryden the acm was cheaper than zinc cladding and it estimated that using acm in lieu of zinc would lead to a saving of just under 300 000 pounds
00:21:01 of just under 300 000 pounds harley negotiated on cladding prices with ryden and offered them a saving of 400 of approximately 419 000 for acm cassette
00:21:11 cassette and approximately 576 000 for face fix cladding in fact sir and it may be a factor which the inquiry takes into account harley's plot price included a costing error
00:21:23 included a costing error which left them some 212 000 pounds out of pocket and cynically the inquiry may find both harley and ryden agree that the tmo could in some way absorb the
00:21:34 the tmo could in some way absorb the cost of harley's error and only 376 000 of the 576 000 saving was in fact passed on to the tmo
00:21:46 while the cheaper acm cladding was chosen in preference to zinc none of the tmo's professional advisors seem to appreciate that this may affect fire performance or safety and certainly none
00:21:58 performance or safety and certainly none advised the tmo that there was any safety disbenefit in evidence peter madison denied that the tmo was looking for the cheapest cladding he said that in discussions
00:22:10 cladding he said that in discussions with studio e he was looking for something that would secure planning permission and would meet all pertinent safety regulations claire williams in turn said that when
00:22:21 claire williams in turn said that when the cladding was discussed it was always referred to as class zero and no contractor ever suggested that one type was inferior or better quality than another and so also any suggestion that tmo
00:22:33 and so also any suggestion that tmo selected rayna bond pe rather than brain and bond fr ie fire retardant for cost reasons is wrong as the tma was never informed that brainerdbomb was available in a fire
00:22:45 brainerdbomb was available in a fire retardant core as well as a pe core and so it's a point which the inquiry may we wish to take into account but additionally the fact that the more expensive cassette was used in
00:22:56 expensive cassette was used in preference the face fixed product indicates that cost was not the sole or overwhelming driver for the tmo
00:23:05 even if with the benefit of hindsight the tmo had asked further questions about the pros and cons of acm over zinc cladding it may still have been chosen
00:23:17 cladding it may still have been chosen given its common use in so many construction projects at that time and indeed the evidence which the inquiry heard about incorrect certification in module two
00:23:29 in module two in summary the tmo says that the inquiry may rightly conclude that its aim the tmo's aim was to find a cost-effective cladding but not necessarily the cheapest cladding and certainly not a
00:23:40 cheapest cladding and certainly not a cladding where safety was sacrificed for cost had the tmo been told by any of its professional advisors that the cladding was unsuitable or even dangerous it
00:23:51 was unsuitable or even dangerous it would undoubtedly have made a different decision
00:23:56 decision regarding insulation and to take this briefly the inquiry heard evidence that products used on the refurbished from a product were discounted ones and were different from those contained in the
00:24:07 different from those contained in the mbs specification and so even though there was a requirement for any changes to the mbs specification to be approved by the tmo in writing it the tmo was never informed that
00:24:18 it the tmo was never informed that celetex rs 5000 have been substituted for celetex fr 5000 or indeed that kingspan k15 had been had been used
00:24:29 been had been used and so there was certainly no discussion of the insulation material during the value engineering exercise so can i now turn to tmo's role in various aspects of it
00:24:41 various aspects of it mr egros before you do can i just say that from time to time you're in danger of slipping off not off entirely but slipping down at the bottom of our screens i don't know
00:24:52 the bottom of our screens i don't know why i'm so sorry no it's right it hasn't prevented us from understanding what you're saying no i say oh that is a bit better yes is that better i'm sorry i may have adjusted my screen um um
00:25:03 um don't worry ill advisedly i apologize for that you didn't disappear too much but um i think that's better okay i'm glad for that you can still hear me sir oh yes thank you
00:25:14 hear me sir oh yes thank you yes thank you so the the tmo is the client for this design and build project and the role of a client in a cdm project is defined within the
00:25:25 project is defined within the regulations either cdm regulations and related guidance and acop and so these specifically envisage that client may not have construction experience and is entitled to rely on
00:25:38 experience and is entitled to rely on its professional appointees in the pre-contract phase the tmo engaged a professional team which consisted of artelia studio e and others to design the
00:25:50 studio e and others to design the project brief and to plan and manage the pre-construction phase on its behalf artelia was engaged throughout the project and in the pre-contract phase it
00:26:01 project and in the pre-contract phase it advised the tmo about appointing a professional team of designers and contractors to turn the brief into a realizable design as well as administering advising
00:26:12 design as well as administering advising and advising on the procurement and value engineering exercises so it had a duty to advise the tmo if any appointees made by it were lacking
00:26:23 any appointees made by it were lacking or unsuitable the post-contract phase commenced in october 2014 when ryden was appointed as principal contractor under the jct design and
00:26:35 contractor under the jct design and build contract during the post-contract phase artely was the tmo's employer's agent and contract administrator and was responsible for monitoring progress of
00:26:46 responsible for monitoring progress of the contract it remained in this important role in the important role of cdm coordinator referred to as cdmc throughout the project at least until
00:26:57 throughout the project at least until october 15 2015 when cdm 2007 was superseded by cdm 2015 but so it's notable that by the time by this time by the introduction of cdm
00:27:10 this time by the introduction of cdm 2015
00:27:12 2015 most of the important design decisions had already been taken
00:27:18 so it's been suggested and by artelia in particular the tmo has underplayed its role in decision making and underplayed its responsibility for signing off on designs
00:27:30 signing off on designs so the tmo does not accept that it's underplayed its role it acknowledges its role in some design decisions but it's only fair to say that these were narrow and these were in narrow and limited
00:27:41 and these were in narrow and limited circumstances as a non-specialist client it did not have a duty actively to scrutinize designers or their design decisions at every turn
00:27:53 every turn moreover it had a legitimate expectation the companies engage would meet the terms of their contracts regarding their own design and safety responsibilities
00:28:06 so the tmo has been described as an educated or informed client on a number of occasions in fact in part because it seems mark anderson and david gibson were
00:28:18 mark anderson and david gibson were qualified architects it's been suggested that tmo should have questioned studio e and other professional bodies further including about design decisions made
00:28:29 including about design decisions made in fact mr anderson had not worked in practice as an architect for many years and in any event had moved on before the detailed design work and refurbishment began
00:28:40 began although mr gibson was a qualified architect he was not employed as such within the tmo and he had not worked as an architect since 1991 and had never been involved in any
00:28:52 and had never been involved in any overcladding project before neither he nor claire williams had any technical expertise in relation to the refurbishment so overall in this context the tmo would
00:29:04 so overall in this context the tmo would say that it was entitled to rely on the expertise within its project team of consultants and contractors and the contractual and legal framework regarding selection of materials
00:29:15 regarding selection of materials including cladding and insulation and compliance with the prevailing legislation regulations and guidance so one of the discrete issues which was
00:29:26 so one of the discrete issues which was addressed in evidence in module 1 was the question of project manager and the question was whether a scheme project manager was necessary and should have been appointed by tmo
00:29:38 have been appointed by tmo so when assessing this the inquiry should bear in mind that there was undoubtedly an extensive professional team in place which included which already include numerous experienced contractors and cdm
00:29:50 numerous experienced contractors and cdm appointees the inquiry had evidence from artillery that it was not intending to fulfill the role but in fact it did not inform the tmo of this or of the need to appoint a
00:30:01 tmo of this or of the need to appoint a project manager even though part of its responsibility was to identify gaps in the professional team
00:30:08 team moreover in meeting minutes artelia did refer to itself as project manager and philip booth and peter blythe were referred to as project manager and
00:30:19 referred to as project manager and assistant project manager respectively although claire williams was a client project manager this is wholly distinct from a project manager exercising a role in the design process
00:30:31 in the design process so we also invite you to consider whether artelia was through what it did on the project a de facto project manager including because the tier may regularly ask it for advice and to utilize its project
00:30:43 for advice and to utilize its project management skills and it did so moreover artillery was the employer's agent and the roles the roles of employers agent and project manager were very close
00:30:56 so also assessing what if any were the effects of not appointing a project manager submitted the inquiry should keep in mind the confusion around who had design responsibilities i'll come on
00:31:07 had design responsibilities i'll come on to that later including the responsibility to ensure that all design was compliant with standards
00:31:13 standards the tmo submits there is no sound basis for thinking that an appointed project manager would have resolved this confusion in fact what was probably need was a design matrix specify specifying
00:31:25 was a design matrix specify specifying who had design roles and on what specific matters so another issue you considered was that of client design advisor
00:31:36 of client design advisor and this was considered at length by the inquiry
00:31:40 inquiry so significantly neither the cdm regulations nor associated guidance and acop required a client design advisor to be appointed and the tmo submits it was a very rare
00:31:52 and the tmo submits it was a very rare appointment to make at the time of the refurbishment whatever were the reasons for not appointing a separate client design advisor it submitted there is no good
00:32:03 advisor it submitted there is no good evidence to suggest the decision that the decision was purely motivated by financial concerns as the inquiry knows artelia made a proposal to the tmo to perform the
00:32:14 proposal to the tmo to perform the additional role of client design advisor for a fee of approximately 30 000 pounds and the tmo declined its offer the inquiry heard explanations from tmo
00:32:25 the inquiry heard explanations from tmo witnesses as to why this was including that the sum of thirty thousand pounds was relatively small when considering the overall cost of the project claire williams set out her
00:32:37 claire williams set out her understanding of what the role entailed in an email to artelia on the 29th of august 2014 where she said that whatever the role did involve it did not relate to
00:32:49 did involve it did not relate to cladding
00:32:51 cladding she claire williams was asked whether if a client design advisor had been appointed they might have been able to alert the tmo to any mistake made by a contractor or a specialist a
00:33:02 contractor or a specialist a subcontractor on the remaining design and of course so while this is a legitimate question to ask it's ultimately speculative and fails to recognize that no one else noticed such
00:33:13 recognize that no one else noticed such mistakes or indeed alerted the tmo to them when they had responsibility to do this
00:33:21 this so the assertion that tmo had the skill set to take on the role of client design advisor must be open to challenge certainly artela did not explain who would check the drawings technically and
00:33:34 would check the drawings technically and who would determine if the drawings complied with adb claire williams lack of technical knowledge must have been apparent to artelia through her emails to them and ryden about acm
00:33:46 ryden about acm in fact sir it may be that a more personal question is not whether there should have been a client design advice but whether there should have been a specialist facade engineer
00:33:56 engineer but you heard evidence from jonathan sakula the expert in this and he said that the need for such an appointment should have been raised with the tmo by studio e but it was not
00:34:08 studio e but it was not so the last of the three roles that you considered was that a principal designer and as you know design responsibilities under the cdm regulations change during the refurbishment of grenfell tower in
00:34:20 the refurbishment of grenfell tower in 2015
00:34:22 2015 meaning that a principal designer was required to be appointed by the 5th of october 2015. in fact artila did not tell the tmo until very late in the day
00:34:33 until very late in the day that it did not intend to take on the role of principal designer when it certainly ought to have informed it earlier
00:34:40 earlier in the event claire williams took on the role after all others engaged on the project and other third parties approached refused to take it on her disappointment at being left to
00:34:52 her disappointment at being left to manage this was was reflected aptly in an email between simon cash and neil reed of artelia dated the 27th of october 2015 where
00:35:03 dated the 27th of october 2015 where artela acknowledged its lack of professional closure in fact sir artelia offered to assist the tmo when taking on the role of principal designer
00:35:14 principal designer in any event by the time claire williams took on the role she was led to understand by the project team that the design was fundamentally complete and that she would be largely assisted by artelia and ryden in preparing and
00:35:27 artelia and ryden in preparing and collating the health and safety file
00:35:32 so can i now turn to deal with the selection of the professional team and their roles and responsibilities
00:35:43 so the the team engaged by the tmo in the pre-contract phase consists of some 10 companies and in the post-contract phase 12 companies in evidence you heard from 33 witnesses
00:35:56 in evidence you heard from 33 witnesses whom the tma whom the tmo dealt with either directly or indirectly and so to summarize ambitious as it may be the inquiry heard a good deal of a good deal of conflicting
00:36:08 good deal of conflicting and inconsistent evidence from studio e ryden harley and artelia about which of them had responsibility for important aspects of the design
00:36:19 for important aspects of the design ryden says it expected once appointed the designs had already the designs already prepared by studio e max fordham and others were compliant with fire
00:36:30 and others were compliant with fire safety and building regulations harley said that when it was appointed the selection of cladding materials was a fader complete as the materials had already been selected by studio e which
00:36:42 already been selected by studio e which while true leaves open the question whether they or whether they ought to have done more to review them studio e
00:36:49 studio e said it was for the cladding specialist harley to establish a fire safety strategy for its cladding design artelia in turn placed fault at the door of ryden saying that they should have
00:37:01 ryden saying that they should have identified any deficiencies in the fire strategy
00:37:08 turning um to deal with some of the performance of each of the individual contractors starting with max fordham and briefly here max fordham was the building services engineering consultant
00:37:19 building services engineering consultant was saying retained by the tier mode throughout the refurbishment project in august 2012 it proposed the use of celetex fr 5000 for the rain screen
00:37:30 celetex fr 5000 for the rain screen cladding insulation saying it could meet its third its target thermal performance value and was also thin enough to work within studio e's proposed design dimensions
00:37:42 e's proposed design dimensions paul hyatt your architectural expert said that max fordham ought not to propose the fr 5000 as being a pir product it did not comply with adb
00:37:53 product it did not comply with adb he said that a mineral wool insulation may have met the requirements of adb if combined with sufficient cavity barriers
00:38:03 studio e studio e was appointed by the tmo as lead consultant lead designer and architect
00:38:10 architect although it's accepted that the inquiry will consider how the procurement rules were applied in studio e's appointment a significant driver in its appointment was a desire within rbkc to optimize the
00:38:22 was a desire within rbkc to optimize the use of the calc team as it was recognized by all that to procure an architect would take several months
00:38:29 months and there was a widespread and understandable desire to minimize any further delay this notwithstanding studio e had shown its competence architects on the large
00:38:40 its competence architects on the large scale calc project for rbkc where they had worked competently and efficiently witnesses from studio e said that they consid they said they considered that despite not having worked on an
00:38:52 despite not having worked on an overcladding high-rise building project before
00:38:55 before it was not unreasonable for them to take on the grenfell tower refurbishment paul hyatt agreed saying it was reasonable for studio e to be appointed as the architects
00:39:06 as the architects they're having dealt previously and well with many other complex projects despite their lack of familiarity with high-rise cladding projects at the outset of the project studio we
00:39:18 at the outset of the project studio we had envisaged using zinc for the cladding acm was first tabled for use in march
00:39:23 march 2013
00:39:25 2013 when cep met with studio e after alcoa now arconic suggested there might be scope to switch from zinc to the cheaper acm cladding option
00:39:36 acm cladding option studio e had received similar advice when it started to work with harley in 2013.
00:39:43 seriously therefore asked those tendering for the project in early 2014 including ryden to tend to both for the original zinc cladding and to provide alternative prices for aluminium rain
00:39:55 alternative prices for aluminium rain screen claddings and ultimately rayna rayno bond acm was chosen
00:40:01 chosen as studio e specified the precise products to be used they had a responsibility for ensuring that those products complied with the building regulations as well as adb which gave a
00:40:13 regulations as well as adb which gave a clear warning about the use of combustible materials in a cladding system however studio e said it did not read the product brochure and did not consider using a planet a cladding panel with a
00:40:25 using a planet a cladding panel with a fire resistant core
00:40:29 while they could have taken some comfort from the class zero rating they should have looked beyond it also if they'd been unable to appreciate or understand this themselves they ought to
00:40:40 understand this themselves they ought to have consulted the appointed fire engineer x over which was retained on the project studio a didn't look at the cwct guide
00:40:51 studio a didn't look at the cwct guide nor did it look at the br document five performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multi-storey buildings i was also unfamiliar with the tech with the technical guidance notes
00:41:02 tech with the technical guidance notes 18
00:41:03 18 and the bca's guidance documents for the construction industry including in june 2014
00:41:10 2014 use of combustible cladding materials on residential buildings
00:41:17 regarding insulation paul hyatt your expert said that as studio he was adopting the linear route to compliance with adb2 and was specifying materials
00:41:28 with adb2 and was specifying materials they ought to have satisfied themselves that the materials were of limited combustibility which of course they were not
00:41:36 not so dealing with one point in fact studio was never novated to ryden but was appointed by them and its contract with ryden was was not finalized until the third of february 2016.
00:41:49 third of february 2016. at riba stage d it was contracted to understand and investigate the effect of the statutory standards and apply them to the design reba seiji its role was to consult
00:42:00 reba seiji its role was to consult statutory authorities on developing and preparing technical designs and specifications including for statutory standards and construction safety
00:42:13 some quotes are pertinent in relation to studio esa of studio e paul hyatt said very serious problems arose simply because studio e failed to produce the
00:42:24 because studio e failed to produce the proper amount of design work that fell to their responsibility under the pre-novation stage appointment under which they were employed for full and substantial service by kctmo
00:42:39 substantial service by kctmo he said that studio e should have been capable of understanding and applying the guidance in adb and it failed to follow it and any other recognized route to compliance
00:42:50 compliance he said a decision about which route to compliance for the functional requirement in b4 was being adopted should have been made before the tender process
00:43:00 process and that they shouldn't have been relying on the input of a special incl specialist cladding subcontractor to make that decision so he didn't agree that studio ease role was limited paul
00:43:12 that studio ease role was limited paul height didn't agree that studio israel was limited to reviewing harley's drawings from the point of view of architectural intent as had been suggested as this was not among other
00:43:23 suggested as this was not among other things consistent with the ryden studio e deed of appointment turning now briefly to x over x over was appointed by the tmo in mid
00:43:34 x over was appointed by the tmo in mid 2012
00:43:36 2012 to provides fire safety engineering services
00:43:39 services it said it it was said to be a top tier a quotation surf fire safety engineering firm
00:43:45 firm with extensive experience and an international practice it was appointed under two separate instructions the first to prepare a fire strategy for the building as it stood
00:43:57 strategy for the building as it stood the second to prepare a fire strategy in relation to the proposed refurbishment works
00:44:02 works despite producing several reports none of xover's reports mentions overclouding of the building dr lane in particular is highly critical of exoma x over which he considers made
00:44:15 of exoma x over which he considers made some serious errors and omissions and instilled a false sense of security within the design team and it is submitted within the tmo paul hyatt is also critical of exo for
00:44:28 paul hyatt is also critical of exo for not drawing studios attention to through the inherent risks of acms on a high-rise building dealing now with ryden key within the team of professionals was
00:44:40 key within the team of professionals was ryden which occupied the role of principal contractor within this design and build contract so the role of principal contractors defined again in the cdm regulations an associated code of practice
00:44:52 associated code of practice and its duties are extensive and include ensuring that the construction phase is properly planned managed and monitored and that there is competent site management
00:45:04 management the tmo appointed ryden as a design and build contractor in march 2014 after the tender process ryden had said it was a specialist in refurbishing affordable housing
00:45:16 refurbishing affordable housing including high-rise residential towers as the inquiry noted upon appointment it took on an important design responsibility for the project including developing the design and
00:45:27 including developing the design and specification contained in the employer's requirements into something capable of being built it appointed several specialist subcontractors including harley which
00:45:39 subcontractors including harley which was itself particularly experienced in high-rise residential refurbishments including ones that use similar cladding to grenfell tower such as the chalcott's estate and ferrier point
00:45:52 estate and ferrier point in its opening statement ryden accepted that it was at top that it was at the top of the supply chain at grenfell tower and had a contractual liability for the designers and specialists that
00:46:03 for the designers and specialists that engaged as well as those it employed and so clause 2.17.1 of the design and build contract with the tmo made ryden fully
00:46:14 with the tmo made ryden fully responsible in all respects for the design of the works
00:46:19 works in evidence simon lawrence accepted that ryden had a direct design responsibility to ensure the works complied with the relevant specifications codes of practice and regulations
00:46:31 practice and regulations but despite this it seems that no one within ryden was checking that the designs were compliant with the building regulations and there was in fact no in-house design expertise
00:46:43 in-house design expertise no design manager was employed and there was no design matrix which would have clarified design responsibilities paul hyatt is particularly critical of ryden for not having a tracker to
00:46:55 ryden for not having a tracker to monitor progress on this complex project and he said the management of the project overall was chaotic
00:47:04 ryden did not engage a fire consultant such as x over and none was ever integrated into the design and build team
00:47:12 team even though minutes suggested a fire engineer was to be used after the tender stage
00:47:18 stage ryden said that it it typically did not engage fire consultants and had not engaged one even on previous high rise over cladding projects such as the chalcott's estate
00:47:29 the chalcott's estate paul hyatt said he would have expected ryden to retain a fire consultant on a design and build project of this size ryden was familiar in general terms only with adb but unfamiliar with the
00:47:42 only with adb but unfamiliar with the cwct guidance and the standard for systematized building envelopes was also unfamiliar with the technical guidance note 18 was not aware of the guidance in adb
00:47:53 was not aware of the guidance in adb paragraph 12.7 that in a building of 18 meters and above
00:47:58 above any insulation product using the external wall construction had to be or should be
00:48:04 should be of limited combustibility so can i deal with one um aspect of the evidence which relates to ryden and it's been referred to as the lack and all moment and i'll deal with this briefly
00:48:15 moment and i'll deal with this briefly if i may
00:48:17 if i may so we accept that this is a significant matter and we accept that you are likely to make a finding on whether the conversation claire williams and david gibson said they had
00:48:28 williams and david gibson said they had with simon lawrence from ryden occurred and of course said the context is that simon lawrence denied reassuring claire williams about the cladding but in fact said that if he had been
00:48:39 but in fact said that if he had been asked he would have provided reassurance as indeed he did not consider the cladding to be unsafe however so there were there were the very least two instances in which
00:48:51 the very least two instances in which ryden was asked for reassurance on the safety of cl of the cladding and while it's right that no email trail can be found supporting either the tea or tmo
00:49:02 found supporting either the tea or tmo or ryden in reply it seems likely it is submitted that matters would have progressed as they did
00:49:08 did without the question having been answered on either occasion
00:49:14 turning now to artelia
00:49:19 the inquiry will consider carefully the role played by played by artelia which was the employer's agent quantity surveyor and cdmc
00:49:28 cdmc whether it provided the tma with a professional advice that was contractually bound to give they submitted the inquiry should also consider whether the service it offered went beyond its contracted role
00:49:41 went beyond its contracted role artillery was engaged throughout the project
00:49:44 project it was first engaged around about april 2012
00:49:49 2012 was formally contracted from august 2012. its cdmc role ended on the 5th of october 2015 when a new role of principal designer under the cdm 2015
00:50:01 principal designer under the cdm 2015 regulations was created in some paperwork artillery described itself as project manager which is likely to have influenced the way that some companies such as studio e
00:50:12 some companies such as studio e understood its role the main contractual documents governing artelia's responsibility contained an appendix that said artelia had design responsibility
00:50:23 responsibility to make sure products used were not dangerous to health and safety and met applicable standards so these were onerous responsibilities which artelia plainly ought to have discharged
00:50:36 plainly ought to have discharged as cdmc
00:50:38 as cdmc artillery was required to advise the tmo about into alia the competence of designers and contractors including the principal contractor it accepted that as cdmc it was required
00:50:49 it accepted that as cdmc it was required to look at design risks and work with the design team on design risk assessments so at no time did artelia say considered studio e or ryan were not competent to
00:51:00 studio e or ryan were not competent to be able to perform their roles or the tmo should supplement its professional team with other advisors also
00:51:10 also as cdmcrt was expected to consider the reports issued by the fire safety consultant x over but despite this it never set its reports ix overs reports
00:51:21 never set its reports ix overs reports failed to deal with the exterior wall and the cladding so the inquiry will assess what artelia said about its own role but the tmo respectfully suggests that it sought to define its role and responsibilities too
00:51:35 define its role and responsibilities too restrictively and the tmo is entitled to place greater reliance on than on artelia than it accepts
00:51:43 accepts moving now on to harley harley was engaged as the envelope package specialist subcontractor by ryden
00:51:51 ryden they principally through osborne berry installed the cladding system including rhino bomb pe celetex and the fire barriers
00:52:01 barriers just excuse me for one second
00:52:05 so it's rather rather noisy here we're just shutting a window
00:52:10 as a bonafide a cladding specialist tmo placed great reliance on harley to provide a news compliant products in the cladding of grenfell tower and to advise
00:52:21 cladding of grenfell tower and to advise this if they were in any way unsafe so of course it's a matter of the inquiry
00:52:27 inquiry and your colleagues but the two mayor would submit that there's much about the evidence given by harley witnesses which is troubling what is apparent is that no one from harley was willing to assume
00:52:38 harley was willing to assume responsibility for the design of the facade or for the choice of the products used also that despite their professed specialism the quote was this is what we do
00:52:49 the quote was this is what we do all seem to have limited understanding about the use of acm and adb and other guidance
00:52:58 guidance witnesses from the company accepted that harley was taking on full responsibility for its design work and accepted that it had to assess the fire safety and compliance of each component in the system
00:53:10 system harley agreed had an obligation to comply with all statutory requirements including the bill building regulations as well as the bre document fire performance of external thermal
00:53:21 performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multi-story building second edition 2003 which provided that the system shall not be a fire risk at any stage of
00:53:32 be a fire risk at any stage of insulation nor shall it constitute a fire hazard after completion if for any reason the insulin becomes exposed
00:53:42 exposed although
00:53:43 although although it had onerous responsibilities in connection with the fire safety of components within the system it seems that none of harley's staff have been on product product knowledge courses
00:53:54 product product knowledge courses relating to acm panels or on insulation to be used in a rain creek rain screen system and some were unfamiliar with the curtains consulting specification
00:54:05 curtains consulting specification and br 135 moreover harley did not understand the difference between the pe and fr core and never queried with anybody on the
00:54:16 and never queried with anybody on the grenfell tower project whether fr fire retardant should be specified instead of pe
00:54:21 pe instead harley said it relied on cep and the manufacturers particularly rayna bond to warn them if the product wasn't suitable for the project
00:54:33 suitable for the project regarding the rs 5000 insulation harley said that studio he signed it off so it used it without apparently making even a cursory examination of the
00:54:44 making even a cursory examination of the fire performance of the materials had anyone hardly read the certificate and the bre report on which it was based they would have realized that rs 5000 was not a material
00:54:55 was not a material of limited combustibility
00:54:59 so despite accepting this and the tmo would say inconsistent with this harley also sought to limit its duty to responsibility to check that the products were compliant only to the best
00:55:10 products were compliant only to the best of its skill and ability which of course should have been as a specialist saying that studio was the facade concept designer
00:55:21 concept designer a good example of the unsatisfactory way in which harley went about his work is that in august 2014 a freelance draftsman was brought in to act as project designer and to do many
00:55:33 project designer and to do many important drawings on the project despite harley's design responsibilities the freelance had not received any specific trading on fire safety within facade design and had not worked on a
00:55:45 facade design and had not worked on a high-rise residential overcladding project involving acm he had some awareness of important relevant guidance but no formal training on the building regulations or adb
00:55:58 on the building regulations or adb he received no on the job training from harley or any other party he never met studio e or building control and no fire consultant or anyone from harley ever checked his drawings
00:56:11 harley ever checked his drawings so he seemed to be unaware that there was a difference between national class zero and limited combustibility and his understanding of the definition of limited combustibility was wrong
00:56:23 so i'm going to deal lastly or possibly the penultimate topic in relation to cavity barriers which we've identified as a discrete topic
00:56:33 slipping down again afraid oh i'm so sorry sir it's it's when i move my screen
00:56:38 screen i do apologize no don't worry it's just that better that's lovely thank you yes
00:56:46 so the the absence wrong placement and type of
00:56:50 type of cavity barriers around windows and in the external wall was undoubtedly a major cause of the spread of fire the tmo thinks that the inquiry is
00:57:01 the tmo thinks that the inquiry is unlikely to disagree with paul hyatt who refers to multiple and serious errors in respect of the design of the cavity barriers at all stages
00:57:12 barriers at all stages he said a cavity barrier strategy was needed before tender and this should have formed this should have formed the basis of the full plans application to building control
00:57:23 application to building control he said he could find no evidence of a comprehensive design strategy with respect to the provision of cavity barriers and rather than the piecemeal approach which occurred the facade
00:57:35 approach which occurred the facade should have been looked at holistically and suitable drawings produced at the design and procurement stage by studio e
00:57:46 he said there was a troubling lack of knowledge in both ryden and studio e about the need for cavity barriers and a lack of mutual understanding about which party had the responsibility to
00:57:57 which party had the responsibility to specify
00:57:58 specify detail and install them in the event cavity barriers were omitted from the lo from locations where adb required them to be placed in a building of this type
00:58:10 building of this type to compound matters it seems that remarkably building control had said that they were not even required and when in september 2014 a march 2015 studio he did seek some
00:58:24 a march 2015 studio he did seek some advice from x over in respect of cavity barrier placement x over was of little assistance and did not even update their own reports
00:58:35 own reports harley could not explain why there was not a comprehensive strategy relating to cavity barriers during the grenfell tower project it purported to have relied on studio e
00:58:46 it purported to have relied on studio e which it considered had the resources of a fire consultant available to it in which it thought must have considered the cavity barrier design even then there were departures from
00:58:57 even then there were departures from studio e's drawings those done by harley and ordered the mock-up produced by osborne berry correspond with either drawings
00:59:07 drawings harley said it would have known it needed to put fire barriers as it described them in but wouldn't have known necessarily where they needed to go
00:59:16 go this even though it understood that in the cwct guidance for rain stream walls adb requires that cavity barriers are provided around window openings it also said it relied
00:59:29 window openings it also said it relied on building control for the placement of cavity barriers
00:59:35 so that the tmo submits that you should consider harley's assertion that it was not responsible for placing cavity barriers around the window cavities very carefully
00:59:45 carefully also consider carefully why when side arrives identified on a harley drawing that there was an obvious weak link for fire harley did not revert to side
00:59:56 fire harley did not revert to side arrives or seek further advice from studio e or building control so ryden said it relied on harley and studio e to advise on the appropriate
01:00:08 studio e to advise on the appropriate design for the facade including for cavity barriers and on harley to ensure that adequate fire barriers were placed it also said it relied on consultation with building control
01:00:19 with building control astonishingly again the site manager from ryden said he was specifically told that cavity barriers around the windows were not required
01:00:30 were not required and so
01:00:31 and so this this topic was considered in some detail in paul hyatt's report and he was asked about the tmo's role in relation to this important aspect of the project on number of occasions
01:00:42 on number of occasions and while it's right to say that he was highly critical of corporate members of the tmo's professional team he was not critical of the tmo
01:00:52 the tmo although specifically asked about it which he says was entitled to expect that the designs produced by its professional team would be compliant
01:01:03 professional team would be compliant with legislation and so a last short section before i conclude
01:01:08 conclude and this section is in relation to the role of building control and the clerk of work
01:01:14 of work i hope i haven't slipped down again
01:01:18 so the the tmo invites the inquiry to look carefully at the roles played by building control and the clerk of works and the extent to which its sign off of the works i building control sign off of
01:01:30 the works i building control sign off of the works
01:01:31 the works sign up for the works as being compliant serve to reinforce the tmo's belief that its professional team had delivered a compliant project
01:01:43 team had delivered a compliant project and so we accept the tmx that while building control control can never have been expected to be a substitute for proper design or specification of suitable materials
01:01:54 or specification of suitable materials as some parties have suggested it might it certainly nevertheless had an important role in verifying whether those things had occurred
01:02:06 occurred boarding control inspected the site and signed off on the refurbishment on the refurbishment work as compliant with the building regulations rbkc has accepted that building control
01:02:17 rbkc has accepted that building control failed in several respects it failed to ask for comprehensive details of the cladding system including the crown
01:02:25 the crown it failed to request an up-to-date version of the fire strategy for the refurbishment and failed to identify that the insulation materials or products using the cladding system are not of limited were not of limited
01:02:37 not of limited were not of limited combustibility and so not compliant with adb
01:02:42 adb our rbkc accepts that building control should not have issued a completion certificate as it did on the 7th of july 2016.
01:02:53 on the 7th of july 2016. so the inquiry may also consider whether ryden did tell john hoban of building control that the cladding system had been fitted to many buildings of similar
01:03:04 been fitted to many buildings of similar height and construction throughout the uk
01:03:07 uk and that the cladding would comply with the standard to set out and approve document b and that the cladding panels were rated class zero above also where the ryden should have passed
01:03:19 also where the ryden should have passed on details of the fire breaks following the note by john rowan and partners dated the 16th of june 2015 which stated last building control site visit was the
01:03:30 last building control site visit was the same as before friday the 15th of may the only observation was that further details of the cladding fire breaks were required
01:03:38 required ryden to confirm if they have done this
01:03:44 and so lastly in conclusion in in our oral submissions so the tmo very much regrets any missed opportunities in preventing the grenfell tower fire from occurring
01:03:57 the grenfell tower fire from occurring so the tma does not want to abrogate responsibility and accept that the inquiry will scrutinize its conduct and make findings about it
01:04:07 about it so what we say what the tmo says that it it discharged its duty as client under cdm 2007
01:04:15 cdm 2007 and 2015
01:04:17 and 2015 in this design and build contract and although compliance with cdn will not be fully determinative of the issues the inquiry will examine it is submitted that compliance with the
01:04:28 it is submitted that compliance with the primary regulations that govern the refurbishment of grenfell tower will be
01:04:34 will be a reasonable indicator and barometer of the tmo's overall conduct so as we have said before the tmo invites inquiry to benchmark
01:04:46 invites inquiry to benchmark its conduct against other social housing providers
01:04:51 providers also
01:04:52 also to view its conduct in the light of the widespread lack of understanding about the dangers of cladding and insulating high-rise building buildings using certain products which
01:05:04 buildings using certain products which underpins
01:05:05 underpins the national cladding crisis
01:05:10 so a terrible fire with tragic consequences happened at grenfell tower but it could equally have happened at any other building clad in the same or similar materials
01:05:22 similar materials in those circumstances the tma invites the inquiry to consider whether it is right to judge it as harshly as many have
01:05:32 the tmo did rely and was entitled to rely on the extensive professional team that was assessed pre and post-contract all of whom had their own duties under
01:05:43 all of whom had their own duties under the cdm regulations it's clear from the statements and oral evidence given before the inquiry that there was an unacceptable level of confusion among contractors and
01:05:54 confusion among contractors and individuals working on the refurbishment including as to where design responsibility lay and who bore responsibility for ensuring that materials used in the refurbishment were compliant with prevailing legislation
01:06:07 compliant with prevailing legislation standards and guidance leaving aside for the moment the wider question of the extent to which manufacturers of these products sought to deceive the testing certification body the tmo invites the inquiry to
01:06:20 body the tmo invites the inquiry to consider whether it's reasonable or feasible for it to have seen through or ultimately untangled this confusion and deception when the inquiry assesses this
01:06:32 when the inquiry assesses this tmo submits it was entitled to rely on professional contractors and advisors who are regulated by their own professional bodies to understand and implement the detailed
01:06:43 to understand and implement the detailed contractual arrangements that exist between them and the tmo
01:06:49 whatever conclusion the inquiry reaches about the tmo's conduct it should also it is submitted go on to consider whether the conduct identified was causative of the fire this particularly because the intensive
01:07:01 this particularly because the intensive investigation conducted by the inquiry has shown that the causes of the grenfell tower multiple deep rooted and systemic
01:07:10 systemic and so that concludes the submissions on behalf of the tml and i'm sorry about the
01:07:15 the framing of my face i i moved my screen during the speech
01:07:21 speech well mr agarose don't worry about that because we we didn't lose sight of you and we could always hear you very clearly so i don't think our understanding of what you were saying was at all affected and thank you very
01:07:32 was at all affected and thank you very much for your case for that statement which of course we found very helpful now the we're going to take our afternoon break at this point because we are expecting to hear one more statement
01:07:45 are expecting to hear one more statement this afternoon from uh mr pop at qc on behalf of studio e
01:07:53 studio e he was scheduled to appear at quarter to four but
01:07:58 but i think he may have been alerted to the fact that we would like to see him earlier if he could be free and so subject to his convenience so to speak we'll rise now and we'll resume at
01:08:10 speak we'll rise now and we'll resume at 25 past
01:08:12 25 past three and hope to see him then thank you very much 25.3 please
01:26:41 well welcome back everyone the next statement is going to be made by mr pop at queen's council on behalf of studio e and i have listened to pop out on my screen mr pop do you can you see
01:26:54 on my screen mr pop do you can you see us and can you hear me so i can see and hear you all good thank you very much well if you're uh it's good of you to make yourself available a bit earlier than i think you were scheduled to appear
01:27:06 scheduled to appear um but anyway if you're ready to make your statement we'd be pleased to hear it thank you thanks sir mr chairman mr fan mr apple
01:27:18 mr chairman mr fan mr apple it is
01:27:19 it is 595 days since i appeared before the panel to deliver studio e's opening statement for phase two of this public inquiry
01:27:29 inquiry in that opening i began by explaining that the first thing studio e wanted to say
01:27:35 say is how truly devastated it is that this horrific disaster occurred and today by disclosing the people who made up studio e the company asked me to
01:27:46 made up studio e the company asked me to begin again by recording their deep and profound sorrow for the tragedy that befell the occupants of grenfell tower all those involved in the rescue attempts following the fire
01:27:59 attempts following the fire all those
01:28:01 all those involved in other ways and whose lives were so tragically and seriously affected as the circles of terrible consequences rippled outwards from the events of the
01:28:13 rippled outwards from the events of the 14th of june 2017.
01:28:17 over these 595 days the world has of course changed beyond all recognition we've all seen harrowing stories of unimaginable suffering
01:28:29 unimaginable suffering and many of those listening may have been touched in some cases many times by tragedy yet again none of these awful events of the past 19 months however take away from the
01:28:42 19 months however take away from the horrors of that shocking night in june 2017.
01:28:48 another bit comparatively insignificant event that has occurred since i last appeared before you is that studio e has gone into administration
01:28:59 administration i mentioned this not to garner any sympathy
01:29:02 sympathy but to explain to those who might not know
01:29:05 know that this small company's contribution to this
01:29:08 to this inquiry which was initially hampered by the limitations in funding for representation and legal assistance has subsequently been affected by the
01:29:19 has subsequently been affected by the cessation of its business as a result it was not vp represented for the phase one hearings of the inquiry
01:29:27 inquiry and following my brief opening statement it was only represented for limited specific tasks during the phase two hearings
01:29:36 hearings its limited resources have also meant that it has instructed its legal advisors to review just a small minority of the additional documents statements
01:29:47 statements expert reports oral evidence of factual and expert witnesses
01:29:53 witnesses and the oral and written submissions provided by the other core participants
01:30:00 yet as i said on the previous occasion as i say again now the people involved in this company have been concerned at all stages of these investigations to try and assist your
01:30:12 investigations to try and assist your inquiries and to be seen to be doing so it wanted to engage and notwithstanding the various constraints on its ability to do so it did engage
01:30:23 to do so it did engage its people came and spoke to their witness statements and were questioned in many instances vigorously so over a number of days but they sought to answer all the
01:30:34 but they sought to answer all the questions asked of them and whilst its lawyers were not instructed to attend many of those who were at studio e at the time of grenfell listened to and read much of the
01:30:46 listened to and read much of the evidence provided to the inquiry
01:30:50 further they sought to assist inquiry by identifying a number of questions which they properly considered should be asked of the architecture expert instructed by the inquiry
01:31:03 the inquiry those questions were formulated to try and elicit essential evidence that studio e believes the inquiry needed to elicit to fulfill its terms of reference importantly they also sought to assist
01:31:16 importantly they also sought to assist the inquiry by making full written opening submissions with a substantial appendix and they provided substantial written closing submissions
01:31:27 so the reason why studio e did all of this
01:31:31 this why they tried so hard to engage to answer all questions asked of them to ask questions of others to set out their thoughts and arguments in writing
01:31:43 in writing the reason why they did all of this was because they wanted to explain as fully and as clearly as possible the role they played in the project
01:31:54 the role they played in the project and to clear up some apparent misconceptions and misunderstandings in the inquiry's provisional understanding informed as that understanding was by the written evidence of its architectural expert
01:32:08 studio he also did this because it too had questions gaps in its understanding of what led to the events on that fateful night and why they happened and to help the inquiry to discharge its
01:32:20 and to help the inquiry to discharge its function to identify any and all lessons that need to be learned so that when buildings
01:32:27 buildings are constructed or refurbished in the future
01:32:30 future the risk of a disaster like this ever happening again are eliminated insofar as possible
01:32:38 and so sir it is with great sadness that i now have to say that in many important respects studio e does not believe that the inquiry has yet properly explored all of the questions it needed to
01:32:50 all of the questions it needed to explore
01:32:52 explore does not believe that the inquiry has yet elicited all of the evidence needed properly to learn all the lessons to be learned
01:33:00 learned and it does not believe that it's wrong and the actions of the pseudo-e team have been properly fully and fairly examined by the inquiry or its
01:33:11 examined by the inquiry or its instructed expert and so sir what i propose to do over the course of the next 40 minutes or so is begin first by summarizing the
01:33:22 begin first by summarizing the conclusions that studio e suggests can be reached on a fair appraisal of the evidence and an application of the proper test as to its role and performance on this
01:33:33 as to its role and performance on this refurbishment project secondly to outline why studio e believes that the inquiry's architectural expert evidence is deeply flawed and significantly
01:33:44 is deeply flawed and significantly inadequate and finally to identify why it considers that the approach of the inquiry has unfortunately resulted in it not receiving certain evidence which it in
01:33:56 receiving certain evidence which it in studio e's view should have received and the absence of which needs crucial matters relating to the role of an architect
01:34:04 architect unexplored or unanswered so i will not lengthen the opening by a sign of closing by providing references to each of the points and submissions
01:34:15 to each of the points and submissions that i'm about to make each of these points has been included in studio e's written opening and closing submissions and appropriate references have been provided in those
01:34:26 references have been provided in those documents at clean stage
01:34:30 so let me begin with a summary of the salient points which studio e contends are established by the evidence in relation to its role as the architect and the performance of that role on this
01:34:42 and the performance of that role on this project
01:34:44 project and let me say straight away that with its own former directors and senior employees having examined the relevant documents as best they can they having listened to the evidence of
01:34:56 they having listened to the evidence of many others centrally involved in the project and experts instructed by an inquiry and they having been vigorously questioned and having reflected on their own evidence
01:35:09 own evidence studio we firmly believed that its staff were not incompetent nor were they dishonest and it strongly maintains that they discharged their obligations with reasonable care and skill
01:35:21 reasonable care and skill and in accordance with the practice of a responsible body of architects at that time
01:35:29 time and it is crucial when making any assessment of studio e's performance that its performance is not viewed for the benefit of hindsight but rather within the confines of the knowledge and practices of responsible
01:35:42 knowledge and practices of responsible architects at the relevant time when it is so viewed studio e contends that its understanding of its design responsibility and its knowledge base
01:35:53 and its knowledge base is typical of what would have been reasonably understood and known within the industry at the time and which will be found to be underpinning hundreds if not thousands
01:36:04 underpinning hundreds if not thousands of similar completed projects across the uk
01:36:09 uk so in this section i will list 10 points to substantiate the position i've just outlined
01:36:15 outlined these are not the only points i could make but in trying to manage the time we have for the closing these are the 10 points we want to flag up now additional submissions and the detail behind these
01:36:27 submissions and the detail behind these 10 points is set out in the written submissions which i'm confident will be carefully considered by the enquiry team so so with that let me make my point one
01:36:38 so so with that let me make my point one which is that the relevant regulatory system was not fit for purpose this was the conclusion of the interim report
01:36:47 report then judith hackett's review of december 2017
01:36:53 2017 the royal institute of british british architects submission to the review agreed and said i quit
01:37:00 i quit the current building house and fire safety legislation associated guidance and compliance routes are ambiguous and open to widely varying interpretation
01:37:12 open to widely varying interpretation appendix f of dr lane's 2018 report of inquiry so the system contained areas quote of confusion disagreement and loose interpretation
01:37:25 loose interpretation and
01:37:27 and she said had permitted the routine use of what are now considered to be unsafe cladding materials on buildings for many years
01:37:36 the fundamental relevant problem with the system as it pertains to the issues for this inquiry and the fire is that in simple terms it permitted the use of combustible and
01:37:49 it permitted the use of combustible and highly flammable materials studio e contends that adb2 allowed combustible material on the external walls of high-rise buildings so long as
01:38:01 walls of high-rise buildings so long as it achieved a class zero classification the studio e understands that bba certificates for renault bond alec bond and balcon at the relevant
01:38:12 alec bond and balcon at the relevant time verified that acm cladding with a combustible polyethylene achieved a class zero classification did we note that vba revised
01:38:24 did we note that vba revised certificates for some of these materials just seven weeks after the grenfell fire further evidence that acm with a combustible call was regarded as
01:38:36 combustible call was regarded as compliant prior to the fire is the fact that the government have had to amend the building regulations and adb adb-2 guidance in order to ban the use of combustible material
01:38:49 the use of combustible material so we contend that any assessment of studio e's performance and its exercise of reasonable care and skill must be considered in that context
01:39:00 must be considered in that context the context of that regulatory system and that is the basis of my second point these flaws and weaknesses in the system allow the widespread use of unsafe
01:39:12 allow the widespread use of unsafe cladding materials on high-rise buildings
01:39:16 relation to this point we note that currently the mhclg has identified 469 buildings with acm cladding systems
01:39:27 469 buildings with acm cladding systems unlikely to meet the building regulations 257 of which are in london they're also estimated to be a third of 1 700 buildings with combustible non-acm
01:39:41 1 700 buildings with combustible non-acm cladding above 18 meters which required remediating from the building safety fund
01:39:48 fund these circa 2000 buildings represent approximately 16 percent of the estimated 12 and a half thousand high-rise residential multi-occupied
01:39:59 high-rise residential multi-occupied buildings of 18 meters or more or more than six stories in height this is a significant percentage of buildings which have similar
01:40:10 buildings which have similar characteristics to those of grantful town
01:40:14 town significant volume of tall buildings with materially similar cladding systems unfortunately demonstrates by itself but a high-rise tower clad with combustible cladding as a grantal
01:40:26 cladding as a grantal does not by itself evidence of departure from the norm it certainly cannot be described as an outlier or plainly unacceptable to the people and bodies responsible for
01:40:38 people and bodies responsible for constructing or refurbishing such towers or those responsible for designing or those responsible for checking
01:40:51 so point three is that others knew of the problems and exacerbated them in this regard certain product manufacturers are now widely reported to
01:41:03 manufacturers are now widely reported to have produced materials and testing data which had the effect of misleading designers and other parties including building control officers approved inspectors and on occasions
01:41:15 approved inspectors and on occasions fire engineers bre bba and other testing bodies
01:41:19 bodies to consider that their products were safe
01:41:24 safe certificates obtained from industry bodies such as the bpa bre labc and nhbc on which professionals in the industry reasonably relied
01:41:35 reasonably relied are now known to not accurately reflect the risk posed by certain products
01:41:43 these problems and difficulties in the system created an industry in which certain materials were routinely marketed certified specified
01:41:54 routinely marketed certified specified reviewed and signed off as compliant with a regulatory regime as a result the industry gained misplaced confidence from the continued and widespread use of them
01:42:07 so point four is that the knowledge of the inadequacies in the systems was not held by studio e and could not be expected to be held by a reasonable body
01:42:19 expected to be held by a reasonable body of architects at the time the sort of problems were not known by the reasonable architect indeed misleading tests and certificates would have the impact the
01:42:31 certificates would have the impact the further misleading designers to consider that these products were safe moreover the test by which the conformity of a product to the criteria within adv adb2 or br135 of a scientific
01:42:45 within adv adb2 or br135 of a scientific not an architectural nature a reasonably competent architect would not be expected to have an understanding of what these tests entail
01:42:56 of what these tests entail instead the architect would satisfy itself that the product had met the necessary criteria by reference to and reliance upon documents which confirm that compliance
01:43:09 for instance where the nabc stated that k15 may be considered to be a material of limited combustibility and reasonably competent architect could not consider itself competent to
01:43:20 not consider itself competent to challenge such assertion nor would there be any good reason at that time for it to do so
01:43:29 further studio we itself did not have any actual knowledge at the time of the project that the products used on the tower were unsafe and it could not reasonably have been
01:43:40 and it could not reasonably have been expected to know that they were not safe
01:43:44 not safe so in this regard it is noteworthy that harley and ryden had previous experience of using the same or similar cladding materials
01:43:53 materials that studio e was aware that similar products had been used on high-rise residential buildings for many years indeed it was referred to one such building that had been refurbished by
01:44:04 building that had been refurbished by harley and ryden with acm to show how the material could be used
01:44:11 be used studio e also recently understood that a facade specialist would be responsible for satisfying compliance to building regulations
01:44:23 so by way of 0.5 we seek to emphasize studio e's design role and
01:44:31 and content that that role was generally limited
01:44:36 limited it's against the background of the previous points that i've made that it's important to have a proper understanding of studio e's actual role on this project
01:44:47 project it is only then that an assessment of its performance can fairly be conducted for example at the stage of preparation of employees requirements studio e's role was to prepare design information
01:45:00 role was to prepare design information for the purpose of allowing the works to be put out to tender it was known at the time and always envisaged that the actual design of the cladding would be carried out by the
01:45:11 cladding would be carried out by the successful main contractors and their appointed specialist subcontractor
01:45:17 to ensure that the design information in the employer's requirements was of sufficient detail to enable an effective tendering process studio e consulted widely with the
01:45:29 studio e consulted widely with the number of manufacturers fabricators and installers including harley and provided them with sufficient details and information to identify the necessary requirements for the town
01:45:41 the town cwe also consulted with the appointed fire engineer who by its report advised that quotes it is considered that the proposed changes
01:45:52 is considered that the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread but this will be confirmed by an analysis in a future issue of this report
01:46:04 throughout this wide preparatory and consultation process at no point was studio e alerted to any cause for concern regarding the tender design information in the employer's
01:46:16 information in the employer's requirements
01:46:19 post-contract studio e was appointed by ryden to provide architectural services during the construction stage of the project
01:46:28 project ryden was the design and build contractor that held itself out as having a speciality in refurbishing affordable housing including high-rise residential towers
01:46:39 residential towers it is crucially important to understand that upon appointment ryden took on design responsibility for the project
01:46:50 the project ryden was responsible for the development of the design and specification contained in employees requirements and to
01:46:59 and to turn it into something that could be built
01:47:02 built ryden appointed various specialist subcontractors who were responsible for their package of works on the project such as the cladding subcontractors harley
01:47:13 harley harley was particularly experienced in high-rise residential refurbishments and as i've already mentioned had worked with ryden before on other projects which used similar systems to
01:47:24 projects which used similar systems to that used on the grenfell project studio e's role during the post-contract period
01:47:31 period included coordinating the detail design of others including the engineers and specialist subcontractors liaising with planning and building control to achieve statutory approvals
01:47:43 control to achieve statutory approvals and responding to site enquiries in coordinating the detailed design studio we commented on drawings prepared by others including harley
01:47:55 by others including harley this was from the view of maintaining the architectural intent established at the planning and tender stages which covered aspects such as sighting spatial arrangements amenity tolerances
01:48:09 spatial arrangements amenity tolerances appearance proportions colors or finishes of the products when studio e spotted a clear and obvious error when reviewing drawings for consistency with architectural
01:48:20 for consistency with architectural intent it would raise a comment for the designers to address studio e did not review these drawings for any purpose above and beyond their
01:48:32 for any purpose above and beyond their consistency with architectural intent the subcontract package for which harney was responsible was specialist in nature studio e could not identify technical
01:48:43 studio e could not identify technical errors in the designs and or specifications of these specialist disciplines ryden was responsible for approving harvey's designs for the cladding facade
01:48:54 harvey's designs for the cladding facade it was for ryden and its specialist contractors to determine whether the materials proposed for the clouding and its fixtures were suitable and met the requirements
01:49:05 requirements as relevant and is set out in employers requirements
01:49:11 if there had been an obvious issue of non-compliance it could be said that the reasonably competent architect should identify that but the panel and insulation were marketed as suitable for their intended
01:49:23 marketed as suitable for their intended use
01:49:25 use and none of the specialist subcontractor main contractor fire engineer or building control deemed there to be an issue
01:49:32 issue let alone an issue so manifest that the reasonably competent architect should have raised concerns
01:49:43 so point six
01:49:46 is to consider studio e's role in the building control process
01:49:52 studio e was responsible for coordinating the building control approvals process however building control had advised studio e that it wanted to control the
01:50:03 studio e that it wanted to control the provision of information regarding the works such that it would request the specific information it considered it required starting with a basic set of design information and moving on from there
01:50:17 information and moving on from there as a result of the process required by building control documents and drawings were provided in stages and building control would then ask for any additional drawings and information as the refurbishment works
01:50:29 information as the refurbishment works progressed and would satisfy itself of any particular issues during the course of its site visits studio e provided both its own information and information provided by
01:50:41 information and information provided by others to building control for its consideration studio e also understands that there was direct contact between building control and others on the project that did not involve studio
01:50:54 the project that did not involve studio e
01:50:56 e and
01:50:58 and ultimately building control certified the works as compliant
01:51:06 so by where point seven i address studio e's role specifically in relation to fire safety with regard specifically to fire safety
01:51:17 with regard specifically to fire safety remind the panel at the initial meeting with kctmo it was studio e who raised the possibility that specialist fire safety advice may be required
01:51:29 safety advice may be required this recommendation was accepted by the tmo and studio e was instructed by it to approach xover to provide a quote for the provision of specialist fire consultancy services
01:51:42 consultancy services and the tmo thereafter engaged it's over at its fire engineer saved from minor matters xavier did not raise any queries or concerns about the
01:51:53 raise any queries or concerns about the brief to overcloud the tower or the compliance of the cladding and its components with part b for the building regulations had it done so
01:52:04 had it done so studio e would have ensured that they were resolved in due course with building control
01:52:11 as for the celetex fr 5000 product this was first specified by max fordham the specialist m d engineer to meet their performance requirements
01:52:23 their performance requirements studio e sent x over its stage c report which contained details of the celitex product on the 31st of october 2012 xavier was therefore aware that the
01:52:35 xavier was therefore aware that the af5000 product had been specified for the project from an early stage its studio e is not aware that xover gave any advice or warning regarding the
01:52:47 gave any advice or warning regarding the use of celitax fr5000 on an 18 meter plus building with a story above 18 meters at any stage of the
01:52:56 the project
01:52:58 project it is
01:52:59 it is it is submitted therefore clear that when including the celetex product advised by max fordham studio we relied on the advice of max fordham alex over with regard to its suitability including
01:53:11 with regard to its suitability including with regard to fire safety in this regard studio we also relied on trade literature and extensive use of the material on previous completed projects all indicating that a product
01:53:23 projects all indicating that a product was securing approval from building controls across the uk over many years and after the works had been tendered ryden had primary design responsibility
01:53:35 ryden had primary design responsibility for the range screen cladding to side the cladding package was expressly designated as a contractor's design element in the employer's requirements
01:53:46 element in the employer's requirements it was for ryden and its appointed specialist subcontractor to carry out the detailed designs and to ensure that their designs complied with building regulations indeed
01:53:57 indeed in the design warranty it was hardly not studio e that was obliged to sign off the overpad and it is hardly that held itself out as a self-professed expert in padding
01:54:10 a self-professed expert in padding application it was hardy that changed the insulation specification from the five at the afr 5000 to the celotex rs 5000 in september
01:54:23 5000 to the celotex rs 5000 in september 2014
01:54:25 2014 and they did say without reference to studio e
01:54:29 studio e they also changed the panel specification from zinc to acm and harley did not seek studio e's advice regarding these changes in specification and appear to have had no
01:54:41 specification and appear to have had no concerns regarding the use of the rs 5000 or acm ultimately of course i've already mentioned the building controlled approved the rates clearing cladding
01:54:53 approved the rates clearing cladding facade including the use of cell tax is compliant with the regulations
01:55:00 so 0.8 i just want to mention studio each role in relation to casualty variation sorry cavity barriers in terms of window openings compartment walls and compartment floors
01:55:13 compartment walls and compartment floors studio is approach to cavity barriers developed in consultation with others in the employees requirement was set out in its drawing in section p10-435
01:55:24 the drawing shows that the cavity barrier strategy was based on preventing fire from traveling from one compartment to another via the cavity the compartments lined up with a base
01:55:37 the compartments lined up with a base as such this drawing shows cavity barriers along all compartment lines in order to prevent a fire breaching the compartment line this in principle designed for the
01:55:48 this in principle designed for the karate cavity barriers wasn't submitted reasonable any further development of the design was to take place during detailed design development following the appointment of
01:56:00 development following the appointment of ryden and hardy who were then responsible for ensuring compliance with the building regulations in the exercise of its coordination role thereafter studio eeas with the
01:56:12 thereafter studio eeas with the different parties as required to coordinate the approach to cavity barriers
01:56:18 barriers as a result of studio lee's coordination of building control and approval the cavity barrier designs of hardy were agreed by building control studio we also specifically sought the
01:56:30 studio we also specifically sought the input of the specialist fire engineer xobo regarding the cavity barrier strategy
01:56:35 strategy in short therefore in relation to these barriers
01:56:39 barriers the strategy and principle of installing cavity barriers in line with the compartment edge was reasonable and consistent with industry practice over a wide range of construction types
01:56:50 wide range of construction types it was for ryden and its specialist subcontractor to provide the detailed designs of the cavity bearer strategy and to ensure that it complied with building regulations studio evas with harvey xover siderise
01:57:04 studio evas with harvey xover siderise and building control to coordinate building control's approval of harness designs and in any event and unfortunately as stated in section 10 of dr baine's reported
01:57:16 in section 10 of dr baine's reported inquiry
01:57:17 inquiry due to the presence of acm the cavity barriers would have made negligible difference to the spread of fire regardless of where they were located
01:57:30 so point nine studio e properly consulted and took advice from appropriate specialists throughout its role on the project and in order to obtain information where
01:57:41 in order to obtain information where others have greater or more specific expertise which was outside the expertise of a reasonably competent architect
01:57:50 architect studio e consulted with those specialists wherever necessary studio e relied on the advice of those appointed specialists and suppliers that
01:58:01 appointed specialists and suppliers that the products being considered were suitable for the intended purpose the studio he considers it was reasonable and appropriate for it to do so had any specialists had any concerns or
01:58:14 had any specialists had any concerns or raised any queries on any of these issues studio e would have acted on them and it would it is submitted be self-evident to any manufacturer fabricator and or installer that its
01:58:27 fabricator and or installer that its products would need to comply with a relevant regulatory regime none of those entities contacted by studio e raised any queries or concerns
01:58:38 studio e raised any queries or concerns regarding the brief to overcloud the tab or the compliance of the cladding and its components with part b for building regulations
01:58:48 similarly building control did not raise any queries or concerns regarding the brief to overcloud the tower or the compliance of the cladding with part b four of the regulations
01:59:00 part b four of the regulations again had it done so studio e would have worked to resolve those concerns
01:59:07 so all of this leads to my final point in the section point 10 and that is that studio e exercise the reasonable care and skill required and expected of an architect in
01:59:21 required and expected of an architect in its position
01:59:25 make that submission for all the reasons set out in the written opening and closing submissions provided by studiory by its oral opening
01:59:36 by its oral opening and by today's closing and having had regard to much of what has been said by others e respectfully but firmly says
01:59:47 others e respectfully but firmly says that it did discharge the duties he does in its role as an architect on this project
01:59:54 project its performance can only be assessed and judged once proper consideration is given to the standards of the industry at the time the regulatory system governing construction and refurbishment
02:00:06 construction and refurbishment and in particular cladding of high-rise buildings
02:00:11 buildings it's only then that studio's role on this project which also needs to be considered in the context of the terms of its engagement and its involvement and actions of all
02:00:23 and its involvement and actions of all those involved on the project can be properly
02:00:26 properly evaluated
02:00:28 evaluated and so when that is done and its actions are not viewed through the lens of hindsight
02:00:35 hindsight it can be seen that studio e acted in accordance with the standards of a responsible body of architects at the time
02:00:45 time the former studio employees are devastated that in spite of this in spite of the way it carried out its duties such a horrendous tragedy could happen
02:00:57 could happen they are devastated for all those affected directly by events at wherever and also on behalf of all those many others who now find themselves in buildings deemed unsafe
02:01:08 buildings deemed unsafe and also deeply shocked to discover that there are so many other affected buildings
02:01:14 buildings i will not repeat all what i feel that i've already said in my previous points but i will just collate the important observations we invite you to draw
02:01:24 to draw in relation to the issue of cladding this is an important example of studio e's performance as compared to that of others involved in the project and in
02:01:36 of others involved in the project and in this regard we say the cladding was designed by harvey not studio e ali a specialist subcontractor that designed the cladding raised new
02:01:48 designed the cladding raised new concerns about its designs the project appointed fire engineer with full knowledge of the products raised no concerns about harvest designs
02:01:59 concerns about harvest designs projects appointed building control with full knowledge of the product raised no concerns about hai's designs the project appointed main contractor with full knowledge of the products
02:02:11 with full knowledge of the products raised no concerns about harley's designs
02:02:16 designs the panel was marketed as class zero and the insulation was expressly stated to be suitable for use above 18 meters and there was nothing to allow studio e
02:02:28 and there was nothing to allow studio e to a problem with harney's designs there had been a sustained campaign by product manufacturers to convince the construction industry that they were safe for use on buildings like
02:02:40 they were safe for use on buildings like grenfell
02:02:43 these conclusions in relation to the cladding are just an example of one aspect all being for present purposes a crucial aspect of the project similar conclusions about knowledge can
02:02:55 similar conclusions about knowledge can be reached in respect of many other issues that arise and the inquiry is invited to consider in relation to any of these issues for example fire
02:03:06 to any of these issues for example fire safety
02:03:08 safety cavity barriers window openings etc three
02:03:12 three questions who knew of the problem at the relevant time who didn't know but should have known and who didn't know and could not
02:03:23 and who didn't know and could not reasonably have been expected to know in every instance those questions are asked studio e should be assessed as falling on the right side of the dividing line
02:03:38 so with that i move to my section two as part of this closing and that relates to the evidence of mr
02:03:50 and that relates to the evidence of mr hyde the architectural expert instructed by the inquiry
02:03:57 so the [Music]
02:04:00 [Music] evidence provided by mr hyatt is in pseudo-e's submission subject to numerous and significant
02:04:11 subject to numerous and significant flaws
02:04:13 flaws let me start with his lack of relevant expertise and experience the evidence provided by mr hyatt to the inquiry to date including the hyatt
02:04:25 inquiry to date including the hyatt report and mr hyatt's supplemental report
02:04:29 report gave rise to significant concerns that he does not have the requisite experience as an architect to advise the inquiry on the issues relevant to its terms of
02:04:40 the issues relevant to its terms of reference
02:04:41 reference these concerns were set out in detail in sudo e's previous submissions however it would seem those concerns were not accepted because of course mr hyatt continues to be the sole
02:04:53 hyatt continues to be the sole architectural expert instructed by the inquiry
02:04:57 inquiry visual evidence only compounded the concerns already expressed by sudhiri mr hyatt confirmed that he has never been involved in an overcladding
02:05:09 never been involved in an overcladding scheme
02:05:10 scheme never applied section 9 or section 12 of adb2 in practice was not aware prior to his work for the inquiry of what are now known as the different routes to compliance with
02:05:22 different routes to compliance with functional requirement b4 for building regulations but he was not aware prior to his work with the inquiry of the bca technical guidance note 18. either in its first
02:05:35 guidance note 18. either in its first version or revision one published a year later
02:05:39 later but he had never completed a specification using the nbs software used by studio e on the project the last decade and a half of his career
02:05:51 the last decade and a half of his career had not been at the pit face of projects and
02:05:56 and he did not appear to have any significant knowledge or understanding of design and build procurement
02:06:05 mr hyatt has therefore never personally dealt with the very issues on which he was asked to provide expert evidence
02:06:14 evidence it appears that mr hayek's one and only experience of cladding is on a new build stadium in perth australia there all evidence on this project was
02:06:25 there all evidence on this project was short and we contend vade however it was clear that this was a very different type of building to an existing high-rise residential tower as it grantful
02:06:37 it grantful it's situated in a different jurisdiction with different regulations legislation guidance and industry practice to that which applied to grenfell in any event it remains that mr hayek's
02:06:50 in any event it remains that mr hayek's experience of cladding is at most limited to a single project which for reasons already set out bears little relevance to battle mr hyatt cannot therefore be submitted
02:07:03 mr hyatt cannot therefore be submitted express a valid expert opinion on these issues and his evidence should carry no or minimal evidential weight his lack of expertise which may be a
02:07:15 his lack of expertise which may be a consequence of his lack of experience in the matters on which he was asked to apply was also demonstrated by various other aspects of his evidence his flawed understanding of design and
02:07:26 his flawed understanding of design and build contracts his misunderstandings of tender specifications on design and build contracts
02:07:33 contracts the evidence he gave regarding appointments his lack of understanding about the division of responsibilities on the design and build project is lack of understanding about adb2
02:07:47 is lack of understanding about adb2 the route to compliance with the building regulations and the cavity barrier strategy
02:07:54 also and again unfortunately he showed a lack of understanding about the evidence he had apparently reviewed in order to prepare his report and again by way of just a single
02:08:05 and again by way of just a single example
02:08:06 example he referred to a helpful grid as he described it contained in dr blaine's report
02:08:13 report without without realizing that the grid was taken from studio e's drawings
02:08:20 this lack of understanding of the evidence is also shown by the view that studio we were driving the overcloud of the tower when the evidence shows clearly that they were not
02:08:31 clearly that they were not and also the majority of the responsibilities that mr hyatt ascribed to the architect in fact rested with parties other than studio e on the project
02:08:44 and the approach set out by mr hyatt in many places in his britain evidence and his oral evidence was predicated on an assumption that studio e was to prepare all of the detailed design
02:08:56 all of the detailed design and or dictate what the detailed design should be
02:09:00 should be this goes against the inherent philosophy of a design and build procurement which applied to this project
02:09:07 project in which the detailed design is developed by the design and build contractor with experts in the industry
02:09:15 further mr hyatt has not examined the approach of other architects on the other 436 tall buildings identified by mhclg as having acm above 18 meters or
02:09:29 mhclg as having acm above 18 meters or being otherwise non-compliant with building regulations follows that mr hyatt cannot apply on the standards recently to be expected of an architect on
02:09:40 to be expected of an architect on commissions of the type complexity and scale
02:09:43 scale as
02:09:44 as foreign he cannot rely upon his own personal experience of similar projects because he does not have any such experience and he has chosen not to investigate
02:09:55 and he has chosen not to investigate projects of a similar type likewise mr hyatt cannot sensibly comment on the reasonableness of the choice of materials or construction techniques at the tower without an
02:10:07 techniques at the tower without an understanding of whether and if so why a responsible body of architects involved in those other projects exercised reasonable care and skill and yet the same or similar materials came to be
02:10:20 same or similar materials came to be used
02:10:24 separately pseudo-e notes that similar concerns could be raised regarding the inquiry's appointed cladding expert mr sakula
02:10:33 sakula mr sakula confirmed in his oral evidence that he has no experience of overclouding projects on buildings over 18 meters in the preceding 18 years
02:10:44 18 meters in the preceding 18 years no experience of specifying or using acm panels with a pe core and he is
02:10:51 and he is quite not really so much involved in that part of the industry this increases the risk of any findings made by the inquiry and reliance on either mr heinz or mr sakura's evidence being founded
02:11:05 sakura's evidence being founded so i say no more about the topic of expert evidence we have set out a lot of material in the written opening and closing submissions
02:11:16 submissions and we
02:11:18 and we urge a careful examination of the points made there but i turn now if i may to section three the final section of this closing and that relates to issues with the
02:11:29 that relates to issues with the structure of the evidence of the inquiry time does not permit any lengthy examination of these points in the oral closing we've set out a number of detailed
02:11:40 detailed concerns and observations about the approach of the inquiry to the architectural issues and specifically to the questioning of witnesses by councils of inquiry i say i do not repeat those matters here
02:11:52 i say i do not repeat those matters here but i do identify as headline points just a few matters and i make these observations very much in sorrow not in anger
02:12:05 in sorrow not in anger but i do draw attention to the uh impression at least that was received by studio e that unfortunately counseled to the
02:12:16 that unfortunately counseled to the inquiry may have approached questioning of relevant witnesses including studio e witnesses
02:12:23 witnesses with a preconceived idea that studio e had failed properly to discharge its obligations that led to for example persistent questioning on certain topics where the
02:12:35 questioning on certain topics where the witnesses initial answers did not accord with that apparently held preconceived view on the other hand matters which should have been installed with witnesses in light of answers they had given were not
02:12:48 light of answers they had given were not explored if the answer given was consistent with or supported of that apparently preconceived view matters set out in the witness
02:12:59 matters set out in the witness statements of studio e witnesses were not brought to other witnesses to advance studio e's explanation of events or to correct a misunderstanding apparent in the witnesses evidence
02:13:11 apparent in the witnesses evidence and many of the points and questions studio e had invited council to inquiry to put to mr hyatt was simply not advanced
02:13:21 advanced the problems caused by the questioning of witnesses and mr hyatt in particular are exacerbated because it is of course the case that it is not possible for studio e to reduce independent expert
02:13:33 studio e to reduce independent expert evidence of its own as it would of course in other types of proceedings when the experts would have the opportunity to discuss their respective positions produce a
02:13:44 their respective positions produce a joint statement and then for the experts to give all evidence and be cross-examined in the absence of that scrutiny studio you have not had the opportunities to
02:13:55 you have not had the opportunities to address the concerns that they have about mr high acceptance
02:14:01 so more generally in relation to the structure of the inquiry we do note that the government evidence regarding the regulatory regime is not to be given until module six and we do ask in those
02:14:13 until module six and we do ask in those circumstances how particularly mr height can fulfill his instructions without having had that crucially important evidence
02:14:24 evidence the structure of the inquiry risk therefore decisions taken by studio e being viewed as the exception when evidence suggests that they were consistent with industry practice
02:14:38 we have suggested that a potential way forward would be for the other high-rise buildings noted to have similar materials or designs which were referred to by module two witnesses to be
02:14:50 to by module two witnesses to be analyzed so that they can provide an insight into industry practice at the time of the works studio considers that this may be of some comfort for those living in
02:15:01 some comfort for those living in potentially affected towers up and down the country as i've already said there are over two 000 buildings with the same or similar materials to those used on grenfell tower
02:15:13 tower some of those buildings form part of the evidence already presented to the enquiry
02:15:18 enquiry and can therefore be scrutinized as part of the inquiry's proceedings and information on others can be obtained either from public pleadings in the business and property courts or by
02:15:29 the business and property courts or by way of an information request from the mhclg
02:15:35 so alternatively the inquiry could seek to appoint another architectural expert who has the requisite experience to advise on these matters or could invite architectural practices
02:15:46 or could invite architectural practices and professionals to submit their views to a public consultation such a consultation could of course be expanded to the wider construction industry
02:15:57 industry in short studio e does not consider that the inquiry can fulfill its terms of reference or can make findings on studio e's performance of its obligations if it does not broaden its analysis of
02:16:09 if it does not broaden its analysis of the industry at the time of the works through the suggested or other appropriate means studio e of course remains open to discussing this further with the inquiry
02:16:21 discussing this further with the inquiry should it be invited to do so
02:16:26 so that concludes what i want to say on behalf of the studio we saved my final remarks
02:16:34 and these are that having been retrospectively examined and considered studio e does believe that the relevant regulatory system was not fit for purpose and appears to have permitted
02:16:47 purpose and appears to have permitted the routine use of unsafe cladding materials on buildings for many years product manufacturers produced materials and testing data which had the effect of
02:16:58 and testing data which had the effect of misleading designers to consider that their products were safe at the time of the project studio e did not have any knowledge that the products used on the towel were unsafe
02:17:11 used on the towel were unsafe and there was no information available to it or indeed to other architects designers and building control which would have reasonably alerted it to any lack of safety
02:17:24 and whilst it will continue to examine this question and will listen to and where it should it will accept any criticisms leveled against it from its understanding of the industry
02:17:36 from its understanding of the industry and awareness of the volume of tall buildings at the time with materially similar external services studio e considers that it acted as would be expected of a reasonably
02:17:48 would be expected of a reasonably competent architect in its position
02:17:52 it is nonetheless devastating to it that notwithstanding the tragedy of grenfell occurred and that so many other people in so many high-rise buildings are even now living
02:18:04 high-rise buildings are even now living in fear of buildings deemed unsafe
02:18:10 so thank you for giving me the opportunity to make these remarks and i conclude on behalf of studio e once again by expressing the heartfelt condolences
02:18:22 by expressing the heartfelt condolences and sympathies of all those associated with that company so thank you well thank you very much mr popper
02:18:34 that i think concludes the statements that we expect to hear this afternoon we shall hear further closing statements tomorrow
02:18:42 tomorrow and that we shall do at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning thank you very much 10 o'clock tomorrow peace
02:18:54 you