Modules 1 & 2 Closing Statements - Monday 13th September 2021 (1/2)

Full transcript

00:00:38 so

00:00:47 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing

00:00:50 hearing this week we're going to hear closing statements in relation to modules one and two from a number of core participants and our suggestion the

00:01:01 and our suggestion the lawyers who are going to make these statements on behalf of their clients have all agreed to do so remotely so we're going to be going to various remote locations and uh i shall need on each occasion to

00:01:14 and uh i shall need on each occasion to ensure that we have the contact that we need to have in order for this to work well uh the first person we're going to hear from is miss barwise queen's council on behalf of

00:01:26 barwise queen's council on behalf of those of the core participants represented by what we now call team one i can see miss barwise on my screen as far wise can you see me

00:01:38 on my screen as far wise can you see me i can indeed say yes good thank you well i can hear you and i i gather you can also hear me i can so uh you're going to make the first of the closing statements on behalf of your clients and if you're

00:01:51 behalf of your clients and if you're ready to go we'll look forward to hearing from you yes indeed sir good morning mr stefan and mr akbar as well

00:02:00 well you have our written submissions what i say now is by way of overall summary i shall begin with module one and then address module two first an overview of module one

00:02:12 first an overview of module one despite being a legacy and very high profile project for rbkc and the only building it had ever overclad the refurbishment of grenfell was hastily

00:02:23 refurbishment of grenfell was hastily conceived by an inept design team with a hapless lead consultant studio e inexperienced in high rise and cladding projects

00:02:33 projects studio e failed to familiarize itself with the relevant parts of building regulations relating to external fire spread and cavity barriers as it should have done to ensure a compliant design

00:02:45 have done to ensure a compliant design procurement rules both in relation to the retention of the design team and the ultimate contractor ryden were flouted by tmo

00:02:54 by tmo tmo capped the fees of each design team member beneath the threshold at which the pressure the procurement rules would apply to avoid the need for public procurement

00:03:06 procurement although an oju procurement process took place for the contractor tmo breached the rules by illicit and unilateral dealing with ryden prior to its conclusion

00:03:17 conclusion gmo's breaches of procurement rules may have resulted in the selection of both an architect and contractor ill-equipped to carry out the project studio e accepts it would have been

00:03:29 studio e accepts it would have been unlikely to win a competitive tender process

00:03:32 process madison admitted tmo's unilateral communications with ryden posed a potential risk of challenge due to a breach of the public procurement rules

00:03:43 breach of the public procurement rules the project was wrong footed from the start by studio use specification failing to specify performance requirements and instead prioritizing aesthetics

00:03:54 aesthetics from the outset studio e failed to address the requirements of a compliant cladding system studio e's cladding design as finalized by ryden and harley the cladding

00:04:05 by ryden and harley the cladding subcontractor was patently non-compliant with building regulations and adb had harley adhered to its subcontract the cladding panels would as a minimum

00:04:17 the cladding panels would as a minimum have been class zero and should according to the inquiry's cladding expert mr secular have been fr as opposed to pe and the insulation would have had to be limited combustibility

00:04:30 have had to be limited combustibility pushing the windows out from their original concrete frames into the cladding meant they were not bounded by effective cavity barriers since cavity barriers are ineffective within metal

00:04:42 barriers are ineffective within metal rain screen cladding the compliance of the facade with the functional requirement b4 external fire spread of the building regulations was never established xova bears a

00:04:54 never established xova bears a significant responsibility for the disaster as the ultimate specialist given its failure to point out despite continued involvement in the project that the entirety of its reports were

00:05:06 that the entirety of its reports were unreliable absent the analysis of the cladding's impact on external fire spread

00:05:12 spread the fundamental non-compliance of the design was exacerbated by workmanship but even perfect workmanship could not have rescued this flawed design

00:05:23 have rescued this flawed design despite its patent non-compliance the project was signed off by rbkc's building control department whose mr hoban demonstrated a woefully flimsy grass for building regulations

00:05:36 grass for building regulations the refurbishment project is characterized by the lack of competence of most of the construction professionals their seeming ignorance of their obligations and refusal to take

00:05:47 their obligations and refusal to take respon professional responsibility for their actions before turning to the responsibility of the main protagonists i addressed two points generally way raised by way of

00:05:58 points generally way raised by way of defense

00:06:00 defense first that non-compliance is due to a lack of clarity in the regulations this is a flawed argument whilst it's clear adb was in many respects unclear and is not fit for

00:06:13 respects unclear and is not fit for purpose

00:06:14 purpose building regulations were clear as to the outcomes required namely the functional requirements it was clear external walls must not promote flame spread and that adb must

00:06:27 promote flame spread and that adb must be interpreted in that light whilst the inquiries experts are critical of the regulatory regime both professor torreira and mr hyatt consider that building regulations and

00:06:39 consider that building regulations and adb albeit flawed were sufficiently clear to produce a satisfactory outcome adb section 12 expressly alluded to the

00:06:50 adb section 12 expressly alluded to the safety risk posed by combustible cladding and extensive cavities it also referred to br 135 that document contained warnings

00:07:01 that document contained warnings regarding previous cladding fires and contained a graphic diagram showing the mechanism by which fire could break out and repeatedly break back in to a high-rise building

00:07:13 high-rise building the diagram was replicated in celetex's compliance guide it was absolutely clear if following the linear or prescriptive route then

00:07:24 linear or prescriptive route then combustive limited combustibility insulation must be used none of the designers or contractors can say with any credibility they were not warned

00:07:34 warned a quick squint at the test route option and br 135 would have warned them of the dangers of combustible material on high rises

00:07:45 rises studio e ryden and harley knew the cladding had a plastic core wreck handled the sample and knew it was some sort of plastic soons did by implication as he

00:07:56 soons did by implication as he specifically referred to his long-standing knowledge of the luco bond which he equated to acm the 2009

00:08:05 the 2009 a luca bond brochure which soon introduced in cross-examination entitled from a pioneer to the synonym showed diagrammatically that a leukobond had a plastic core and stated a leukobond

00:08:18 plastic core and stated a leukobond composite could be considered a plastic soons was aware from the sun valley fire that pur insulation was a fire hazard but unconvincingly claimed he thought

00:08:30 but unconvincingly claimed he thought pair was different crawford was aware metal cladding burns and falls off blake of ryden was aware acm panels often contained a pe core

00:08:41 acm panels often contained a pe core which he understood was plastic and combustible daniel angel jones's email at the time said as we all know acm will be gone very quickly in the event of a fire but

00:08:53 very quickly in the event of a fire but in cross-examination he denied unconvincingly that anyone was aware the materials were combustible most school children know that plastic melts when heated

00:09:05 melts when heated no credence should be given to contractors and designers who claim ignorance

00:09:11 ignorance adb's flaws were not the cause of the non-compliant cladding which included insulation which was not of limited combustibility it would be completely wrong to

00:09:22 it would be completely wrong to exonerate the professionals and contractors on the ground that the guidance which most of them did not even trouble to read was at fault something more significant is at play

00:09:35 something more significant is at play but confusion in the guidance building regulations are primarily concerned with life safety and the failure of grenfell's designers and contractors to familiarize themselves

00:09:48 contractors to familiarize themselves adequately or at all with regulations and adb

00:09:52 and adb coupled with their deliberate in curiosity as to the products is tantamount to a total neglect of safety

00:10:01 safety grenfell demonstrates the existence of a culture of non-compliance within certain sectors of the construction industry put bluntly there is a kind of

00:10:12 put bluntly there is a kind of recklessness as to whether or not compliance is achieved no one addressed the requirements for facade compliance no one considered it

00:10:23 facade compliance no one considered it their responsibility to fully read the bba certificate for our rain upon cladding panels to discover that the panels were available in fr and that the claimed class zero did not apply to

00:10:35 claimed class zero did not apply to smoke silver panels or indeed to any pe panel only mr lam harley's subcontractor understood that the lack of cavity

00:10:46 understood that the lack of cavity barriers around windows rendered the facade non-compliant but he relied on harley's apparent satisfaction and failed to raise this with studio e

00:10:57 failed to raise this with studio e ryden and harley's failure to escalate the lack of cavity barriers to studio e is a striking example of willful non-compliance ryden and harley understood the

00:11:09 ryden and harley understood the importance of cavity barriers from the taplow house fire yet did not use this knowledge at grenfell despite side rise advising of a weekly link for fire at

00:11:20 advising of a weekly link for fire at the windows no credible explanation was offered by any witness for failure to heed this clear warning the non-compliance of grenfell's facade

00:11:31 the non-compliance of grenfell's facade was not caused by a lack of clarity in the guidance since the designers and contractors were generally not conversant with it the second common line of defense is

00:11:43 the second common line of defense is that the party in question is exonerated by the fault of others doubtless the inquiry will have no difficulty with the concept that the degree to which each party bears responsibility is not automatically

00:11:56 responsibility is not automatically reduced by someone else being at fault assuming causation can be proved whilst the manufacturers knowingly misled the market this cannot exonerate those who fail to understand adb

00:12:09 those who fail to understand adb equally the fact that had the designers understood adb properly they would have rejected rs 5000 and k15 does not exonerate the manufacturers given their

00:12:21 exonerate the manufacturers given their intention to exploit the confusion taking each of those primarily responsible within module one not necessarily an order of responsibility i

00:12:33 necessarily an order of responsibility i start with studio e prior to innovation studio e as lead consultant was responsible to tmo for investigating the effect of statutory compliance at stages c to e and soon

00:12:46 compliance at stages c to e and soon admitted this included compliance with building regulations including fire safety

00:12:52 safety studio e misunderstood its contractual obligations post novation soon's considered under the design and build route all design responsibility lay on the contractor

00:13:05 lay on the contractor wrongly concluded that studio e could therefore rely on ryden and harley's design expertise without checking harley's designs hyatt is clear that neither the spectrum

00:13:16 hyatt is clear that neither the spectrum of design possibilities under the design and build umbrella nor the version of it selected at grenfell altered the riba design stages or studio ease obligations

00:13:28 or studio ease obligations its initial failure to produce a code compliant design coupled with an inexperience and naivety in trusting ryden and harley were competent led directly to the design being

00:13:39 led directly to the design being non-compliant studio e's closing submissions reject mr hyatt as an expert on the grounds he does not have the requisite experience in cladding

00:13:50 in cladding hyatt does not fault studio e for their inexperience in cladding rather he opines how a competent architect would have approached the question of compliance studio e also criticizes hyatt and the

00:14:03 studio e also criticizes hyatt and the inquiry for failing to consider the widespread non-compliance of some 2000 other high-rise clad buildings in england and wales if mr sacula's evidence is accepted this

00:14:15 if mr sacula's evidence is accepted this was however not a universal problem furthermore it is clear from contemporaneous guidance such as the standard for systemized building envelopes produced by the center for

00:14:28 envelopes produced by the center for windows and cladding technology and referred to in the grenfell mbs specification that facades should not be composed of materials which readily support combustion or add significantly to the

00:14:41 combustion or add significantly to the fire load that aluminium cladding does not offer significant resistance to fire and the composites might delaminate posing a hazard to firefighters and occupants

00:14:52 occupants importantly it also discounted class zero as an adequate metric of reaction to fire

00:14:58 to fire [Music]

00:14:59 [Music] building control alliance tgn 18 advised that if following the linear route both cladding and insulation should be of limited combustibility and it was clear

00:15:11 limited combustibility and it was clear from nhbc's july 2015 text technical extra guide that pir or pur insulations were not limited combustibility if studio e suggests that the standard

00:15:24 if studio e suggests that the standard of care is to be set by the incompetent and willfully non-compliant sector of industry that is clearly a bad point studio e's seeming confusion about its

00:15:35 studio e's seeming confusion about its contractual obligations is barely credible and its failure to negotiate terms under which it could operate namely a cap on liability meant that taking on the project with full and

00:15:46 taking on the project with full and unlimited liability was as soon as noted at the time irresponsible and may have meant it was uninsured it is to studio ease discredit that it

00:15:57 it is to studio ease discredit that it claimed it was effectively press ganged into signing the contract with ryden in 2016 on terms with which it claimed not to agree when those terms had been on the table since april 2014

00:16:10 the table since april 2014 instead of confessing its administrative incompetence and weakness studio e's thought instead to argue its appointment was limited in two respects first that lawrence had suggested to both crew

00:16:22 lawrence had suggested to both crew soons and crawford that pseudoe's role would be merely responsive to ryden's requests

00:16:28 requests something may have been said by lawrence but it was insufficiently clear to bury the terms of the written agreement and was never reduced to writing second crawford sought to artificially

00:16:40 second crawford sought to artificially confine the term design intent such that studio e was not liable for statutory compliance by stamping drawings conforms to design intent instead crawford claimed harley alone

00:16:52 instead crawford claimed harley alone was responsible for statutory compliance hyatt rightly disagrees studio e was the author of its own misfortune its failure to even consider

00:17:03 misfortune its failure to even consider the statutory requirements for the cladding at the outset left it at the mercy of unscrupulous manufacturers and their agents and led it to prepare an essentially proprietary specification

00:17:16 essentially proprietary specification instead of identifying performance criteria

00:17:20 criteria studio e created the specification by cutting and pasting from the nbs facilitative online platform this gives unrivaled exposure of products to decision makers but

00:17:32 products to decision makers but encourages a lack of adherence to adb by presenting model clauses with drop-down links to a dizzying array of product options without indicating conformity with adb over 18 meters higher doesn't

00:17:46 with adb over 18 meters higher doesn't fold studio e's failure to specify required performance criteria saying instead

00:17:53 instead many of us would have blindly stumbled into that same problem that said hyatt considers that a competent architect would have considered the approved documents cwct

00:18:05 considered the approved documents cwct guidance and product literature before preparing the nbs specification the inquiry might therefore properly conclude that a competent architect should have stipulated fire performance

00:18:17 should have stipulated fire performance criteria as opposed to cutting and pasting from the nbs given that studio e chose a proprietary specification it had to ensure

00:18:28 specification it had to ensure compliance of both the main product specified and alternatives the specification of celetex fr 5000 later rs 5000 put studio e in breach of

00:18:40 later rs 5000 put studio e in breach of its obligation to ensure compliance and the fact that max fordham initially volunteered fr 5000 is nothing to the point

00:18:50 point critically hyatt finds false studio e for failing to require x over to revisit the statement made in each version of its fire strategy that the proposed changes

00:19:01 fire strategy that the proposed changes would have no adverse effect in terms of external fire spread but we would be confirmed by analysis neither exover nor any fire engineer

00:19:12 neither exover nor any fire engineer provided the analysis crawford claims he did not pursue this because xover's ashton assured him of the compliance of acm and celetex by phone call this is not credible given it is not

00:19:24 this is not credible given it is not mentioned in crawford's statements and contemporaneous email exchanges in hyatt's opinion studio e should have reverted to x over once the rain screen

00:19:35 reverted to x over once the rain screen cladding was selected ryden equates responsibility with blame it suggests those to whom it delegated are to blame

00:19:46 are to blame ryden was responsible to tmo for the design both that originally prepared by studio e and as finalized by ryden ryden's mr lawrence admitted ryden

00:19:57 ryden's mr lawrence admitted ryden should spot obvious non-compliance with building regulations on any view there were obvious non-compliances which ryden should have observed and corrected

00:20:08 should have observed and corrected first failure to have selected any route to compliance thereby defaulting to the prescriptive route but using rs 5000 and k15 neither of which were limited

00:20:19 k15 neither of which were limited combustibility insulations second failure to ensure there were cavity barriers around windows ryden bore primary responsibility also in some respects by selecting products

00:20:31 in some respects by selecting products together with sd plastering such as the upvc window surrounds and the insulation behind them through which fire readily escaped into the cladding

00:20:42 escaped into the cladding ryden also blames arconic for dishonestly producing a dangerous product and others for selecting it this overlooks ryden's role in advocating acm without questioning it

00:20:54 advocating acm without questioning it safely because it increased ryden's profit margins as it is cheap ryden was intimately involved in the selection of acm and urged the planners

00:21:05 selection of acm and urged the planners to accept it ryden's willful blindness in failing to consider acm's fire performance should not exonerate it blake was aware it was plastic and

00:21:16 blake was aware it was plastic and combustible ryden knew just how cheap acm was because it would make a 200 000 pound windfall profit by using face fixed and 127 000 profit on cassette

00:21:27 fixed and 127 000 profit on cassette fixed albeit such savings were shared 50 50 with harley ryden protests that the offline meeting held in march 2014 in breached

00:21:38 held in march 2014 in breached procurement rules was not causative because acm was priced within the tender that is a bad point the saving offered by ryden in the meeting held in breach

00:21:49 by ryden in the meeting held in breach of oshu procurement rules was a significantly larger discount than that originally offered in ryden's tender the illicit post-tender negotiations

00:22:00 the illicit post-tender negotiations therefore guaranteed acm selection albeit the saving to tmo increased in the illicit negotiations ryden's profit margin on the saving had

00:22:12 ryden's profit margin on the saving had yet to be agreed with harley this despite ryden having declared a 12.5 profit margin by its tender ryden asserts it was not prohibited from

00:22:23 ryden asserts it was not prohibited from making a secret profit it was

00:22:26 it was this was a publicly tendered contract in which ryden had declared a profit margin by secretly pocketing additional savings ryden increased its profit margin over that declared had tmo known ryden should

00:22:40 that declared had tmo known ryden should not have been awarded the contract on those terms as to harley its drawings showed non-compliance with adb diagram 33 as horizontal cavity barriers did not align

00:22:52 horizontal cavity barriers did not align with compartment floors and the window head

00:22:55 head harley also failed to alert studio e to the lack of cavity barriers around windows despite lam noticing their absence

00:23:04 absence harley selected highly combustible tp10 and styrofoam as the insulating cause the window infill panels and failed to carry out any checks of their fire performance or compliance

00:23:16 performance or compliance lam proposed tp10 because it was class zero without determining compliance despite being aware of restrictions on insulation above 18 meters

00:23:27 insulation above 18 meters harley's mark stackly selected styrofoam which lamb unquestioningly accepted ryden did not address compliance hughes confirmed he assumed harley's

00:23:39 hughes confirmed he assumed harley's specification notes for compliant xover as the fire engineer bears significant responsibility it contracted with tmo to prepare an initial appraisal

00:23:51 with tmo to prepare an initial appraisal and then a fire strategy for grenfell is refurbished that would comprise a preliminary fire strategy in stage c to be detailed in stages d to e with adjustments in stage

00:24:03 stages d to e with adjustments in stage f meaning input from x over after ryden's appointment xover's initial stance was that it was excluded after november 2013 but this was not borne out by the

00:24:15 but this was not borne out by the evidence

00:24:16 evidence xover's retainer was not terminated and xover did not implement its closure procedures the inquiry's fire engineer experts agree that the fire strategy is the key document governing life safety and

00:24:29 document governing life safety and therefore it's over played a critical role exover was acutely aware it had not provided the b4 analysis supporting its statement that the changes would not adversely affect external fire spread

00:24:42 adversely affect external fire spread ashton was asked for ad hoc advice in september 2014 at which point it should have been clear that grenfell's facade was non-compliant in at least two respects there were no cavity barriers

00:24:54 respects there were no cavity barriers around windows and rs 5000 insulation was not limited combustibility dr lane concludes that at latest that was the moment to cogently indicate the

00:25:05 was the moment to cogently indicate the need to complete the fire strategy instead ashton gave poor advice suggesting cavity barriers were only needed if insulation was combustible ignoring that they were needed in any

00:25:17 ignoring that they were needed in any event

00:25:19 event lane's evidence was that ashton should have said he could not properly advise because he did not know what system was proposed

00:25:26 proposed x over

00:25:41 he available he would have appreciated the cladding with zinc and the insulation was celatex fr the fact that the zinc cladding was subsequently changed to acm does not

00:25:52 subsequently changed to acm does not reduce x-over's negligence in asserting changes including metal padding would have no adverse effect or be if this was stated to be confirmed by analysis in a future report

00:26:04 future report the statement that the cladding would have no adverse effect was always incorrect misleading and should never have been made even when zinc cladding was proposed while studio ian ryden knew the cladding

00:26:17 while studio ian ryden knew the cladding had evolved from the stage c report and that the cladding strategy had not been considered their negligence in failing to ensure the strategy was considered does not break the chain of causation

00:26:29 does not break the chain of causation given xover had been paid for the analysis and should when asked to give ad hoc advice have advised it remained outstanding x-over also bears some responsibility

00:26:41 x-over also bears some responsibility for the lack of adequate means of escape for those with disabilities exover wrongly considered the law did not require it to consider means of escape for the disabled and that on

00:26:52 escape for the disabled and that on assumption underlay their fire strategies xover failed to question the ex the occupancy of grenfell despite being aware of evacuation lifts

00:27:04 aware of evacuation lifts ashton claimed he would only question occupancy in the case of an elderly person's home exogenous failure to question occupancy is significant given lane's opinion that

00:27:15 is significant given lane's opinion that a building's risk profile is a function of its occupancy and fire growth rate as to the manufacturers they insist their responsibility is subsidiary to

00:27:26 their responsibility is subsidiary to those who specified their products arconic insists that if its acmpe had not been chosen another acm pe would have been that may be so but both

00:27:37 have been that may be so but both arconic and celetex went to great lengths to ensure their products were used at grenfell it therefore does not line their mouths to seek to reduce their responsibility

00:27:48 to seek to reduce their responsibility for the disaster or to suggest their dishonesty was not causative first archonic miss french explained archonic set yearly targets for reynabond to increase its uk market

00:28:01 reynabond to increase its uk market share our connect achieved this by a deliberate marketing strategy of cultivating relationships with fabricators to ensure rayner bond was put forward to specifiers

00:28:12 put forward to specifiers the relevant fabricator cep had a long-standing commercial relationship with arconic as blades admitted cep would keep tabs on projects and then

00:28:23 would keep tabs on projects and then propose archonic so it was at grenfell cep introduced studio e to arconic in october twenty twelve

00:28:32 twelve blades quoted for arena bond acm despite this then specification not requesting acm

00:28:39 acm he was unable to explain this but admitted his intention was to ensure rayna bond acm was used at grenfell in december 2013 cep contacted harley

00:28:50 in december 2013 cep contacted harley and harley asked cep to quote only for a reina bond acm system french admitted harley and cep were instrumental in ensuring the selection

00:29:01 instrumental in ensuring the selection of rayna bond as to zeloteks whilst it has shown greater candor than kingsfan in admitting fault celetex's canda is marred by the artificiality of its insistence that its

00:29:14 artificiality of its insistence that its actions were not causative and it overlooks an important piece of evidence celetex regarded grenfell specifically harley as a target grenfell was at the top of celetex's

00:29:27 grenfell was at the top of celetex's must-win projects list emailed by roon to a sangha ban company in november 2014.

00:29:34 2014. this reflected celetex's desire to use grenfell as its flagship case study to push our rs 5000 onto more high rises harley correctly saw celetex as being

00:29:46 harley correctly saw celetex as being very keen

00:29:48 very keen the day after rs 5000 launched celetex alerted harley sent the rs 5000 literature and offered to attend harley's offices to present the new

00:29:59 harley's offices to present the new product

00:30:00 product celetex was so desperate to ensure rs that 5000 was used at grenfell that it used its relationship with its supplier zig to give harley an abnormally high discount of 47.5 percent

00:30:14 discount of 47.5 percent celetex intended designers and contractors to rely on its misleading marketing

00:30:20 marketing seller texas internal presentation above 80 meters in may 2014 stated nobody understands the test requirements architects ask if it can be used above

00:30:31 architects ask if it can be used above 18 meters the answer is yes crawford and lawrence demonstrated this by taking comfort from assurances in celetex's product data sheet that rs

00:30:43 celetex's product data sheet that rs 5000 was the first par to successfully test to bs 8414 and therefore was acceptable for use over 18 meters in conclusion to our module 1

00:30:55 in conclusion to our module 1 submissions we suggest the major underlying problem is that of competence currently only the term architect is a legally protected title the generic term engineer as opposed to defined grades

00:31:08 engineer as opposed to defined grades including chartered engineer is not a nor is fire engineer being a chartered fire engineer is not a prerequisite to describing oneself as a

00:31:19 prerequisite to describing oneself as a fire safety engineer from the public's perspective it is not clear which persons are qualified fire engineers

00:31:27 engineers if titles were defined and protected by legislation others would then not be able to use that generic term core curricular and cpd requirements could be defined by the registering body

00:31:38 could be defined by the registering body under such legislation as does arb under the architects act the inquiry will doubtless wish to consider also inviting arb to revise the guidance it gives as to the parts one to

00:31:51 guidance it gives as to the parts one to three criteria for architects and whether this should as hyatt suggests have a more technical foundation and be more specifically focused on statutory compliance not just in relation to fire

00:32:04 compliance not just in relation to fire but all aspects

00:32:07 turning to module two the evidence tells a story which reaches much further than the confines of grenfell the products used at grenfell weren't either not tested in a legitimate way or

00:32:19 either not tested in a legitimate way or not successfully tested to the standards their bba certificates claimed these facts either were or should have been appreciated by the independent certifiers and test houses and senior

00:32:30 certifiers and test houses and senior figures within them the whole certification process may properly be regarded as positively dangerous since it creates a veneer of respectability which in some cases

00:32:43 respectability which in some cases serves to conceal test results obtained by dishonest testing whilst independent certifiers and test houses are not regulators they are bound to retain integrity and independence

00:32:56 to retain integrity and independence and test in accordance with the recognized test procedures the frauds practiced on the market by king's fans celetex and arconic were compounded by the certifiers and test

00:33:07 compounded by the certifiers and test houses whose complicity cannot be explained by mere incompetence the manufacturers and certifiers or test houses contemporaneous behaviors are now exacerbated by their lack of candor and

00:33:20 exacerbated by their lack of candor and ability to reflect fully on their behavior demonstrated by almost every witness for the manufacturers and most of those for the independent certifiers and test houses

00:33:31 and test houses whilst the certifiers vba and labc recognized shortcomings in their procedures both were contemporaneous contemporaneously hopelessly weak and did not properly action the warnings

00:33:43 did not properly action the warnings they received from a senior civil servant brian martin in july 2014 martin warned vba that its first amendment certificate for k-15 erroneously described k-15 its limited

00:33:56 erroneously described k-15 its limited combustibility bba dismissed this as simply down to human error but without examining the true cause of the error martin also alerted nhbc to his concerns

00:34:08 martin also alerted nhbc to his concerns that foam insulations were being mistaken for limited combustibility and that email was forwarded to labc these warnings some three years before the grenfell fire were not recognized by

00:34:21 the grenfell fire were not recognized by the certifying bodies as an indication they were being duped alternatively the certifiers were aware they were to some extent being duped even now bba notes there is a balance to

00:34:33 even now bba notes there is a balance to be had between fairness and robustness but bba allowed that balance to tip far too far in the manufacturer's favor amongst the manufacturers king's fans

00:34:46 amongst the manufacturers king's fans brains and denials have only become louder during module two and arconic still inhabits a parallel universe in which it is legitimate to assert that technically its product might be

00:34:57 technically its product might be regarded as class b despite vela and schmidt submissions that the relevant test was engineered to pass arconic still insists its pe product

00:35:08 arconic still insists its pe product could still be regarded as class 0 even though it unlike the fr version was never tested to bs bs-476 only celetex admits faults and has taken

00:35:20 only celetex admits faults and has taken corrective action the only truthful voices were jonathan roper and jamie hayes of celetex hayes acknowledged his failure at the time to challenge fraudulent behaviour

00:35:31 time to challenge fraudulent behaviour was a failure of courage and a failure of character and a failure of moral fiber

00:35:38 fiber the otherwise widespread lack of candor is an affront to the dead the bereaved and the former residents of grenfell

00:35:49 the other issue which emerges strongly from the evidence is the degree to which certain manufacturers notably kings fan lobbied industry bodies which issue guidance such as nhbc and bca

00:36:02 guidance such as nhbc and bca kingspan's campaign to influence government policy in the aftermath of grenfell is particularly shocking as the fire should have prompted a sea change in culture and attitude safety

00:36:15 in culture and attitude safety king's found seoul's large-scale bs-8414 test on k-15 at the time of supply to grenfell had been carried out in 2005 and was 14 years old at the date

00:36:27 in 2005 and was 14 years old at the date of its withdrawal shortly before module 2 began

00:36:32 2 began kingspan's witnesses admitted it was a wholly unrealistic test not representative of any ordinary building system baker at vre described it as an indicative test when asked to issue a

00:36:45 indicative test when asked to issue a classification report confirming the test result met the r135 a decade later furthermore the 2005 test was only relevant for a few months as k15's

00:36:57 relevant for a few months as k15's formulation materially changed in 2006 with the production of new tech which meant the 2005 test was no longer applicable to the product being sold

00:37:09 applicable to the product being sold by the time kingspan gained its first bba certificate for k-15 in 2008 which relied solely on the 2005 test the certificate was irrelevant to the

00:37:21 certificate was irrelevant to the version of k-15 being sold newtek's fire performance was much worse than old tech as was demonstrated in the metsexotec test of december 2007.

00:37:32 metsexotec test of december 2007. despite meredith's 2008 report of the test quoting bre's opinion that the k-15 product had materially contributed to the failure nevertheless king's fans

00:37:43 the failure nevertheless king's fans closing submissions denying u-tech was worse than old tech these denials are absurd given further testing of new tech served only to establish its poor performance a

00:37:55 only to establish its poor performance a second attempt met set so tech test in 2008 failed and meredith's april 2008 report recorded that tests on new k-15 showed a quicker time to ignition and

00:38:08 showed a quicker time to ignition and double the heat output compared to old technique to old tech which he said confirmed initial suspicions in respect of reaction to fire

00:38:19 of reaction to fire by email thread in june 2008 titled k-15 problems king's van off-site a kingspan subsidiary was described as experiencing a very dramatic test failure with k-15

00:38:33 a very dramatic test failure with k-15 despite that kings fan resolved not to reveal to off-site that the dramatic failure was due to k-15's formulation having changed instead of being concerned about new

00:38:45 instead of being concerned about new k-15 safety rochefort decided instead to ensure offside only used off old tech for testing

00:38:54 testing roshfort's claim that he had meant king's fan should revert to selling only old tech was palpable nonsense both at odds with the words used and with kings fans actions which were to continue

00:39:06 fans actions which were to continue selling new fifty new fifth new k-15 kings fan obtained k-15's certificate in 2008 and used that certificate to

00:39:17 2008 and used that certificate to procure an labc registered detail which wrongly described k-15 as limited combustibility king's fans meredith and philip heath were well aware at the time that the

00:39:28 were well aware at the time that the labc certificate wrongly described k-15 as limited combustibility but testing was put on hold given this happy outcome for kingsfan only once knowledgeable entities such as

00:39:41 only once knowledgeable entities such as nhbc and wintec began challenging kingspan did it reluctantly resume research and development and testing efforts milichapp describing the s8414

00:39:52 efforts milichapp describing the s8414 testing as a constant pain in the ass for as long as he could remember as the 2005 test was carried out under bsa4141

00:40:02 bsa4141 named against masonry kingsfan also had to overcome the problem that despite its suggestions to the country k-15 had not been tested under bs-84142

00:40:13 been tested under bs-84142 for steel-framed buildings following initial failures in early 2014 it eventually passed in july 2014 but in doing so king's fan was perpetrating a

00:40:25 doing so king's fan was perpetrating a further fraud as the version of new k15 used to pass the test was an r d version which had a significant positive impact on fire performance

00:40:36 on fire performance milly chap's evidence was that kingsfan intended to transition into production of this new r d version of k15 but that it was never sold because it could not be commercially produced

00:40:47 be commercially produced even if kingsfan had begun to produce this new version of k15 it's clear they intended to do so covertly rather than announce a new product

00:40:57 product this follows from king's fans immediately using the test to sell k-15 miller chap suggested kingspan had not deliberately intended to sell k-15 using

00:41:08 deliberately intended to sell k-15 using this test but they could not have done so by accident kingspan continued to sell standard k-15 on the back of this test until its withdrawal in october 2020

00:41:21 withdrawal in october 2020 on the shaky foundations of the 2005 test king's fan built itself a house of cards by using the bba certificate to obtain the labc certificate

00:41:32 obtain the labc certificate that house has collapsed but not before considerable collateral damage was done kingspan's reliance on a single 2005 test which did not reflect the product

00:41:44 test which did not reflect the product being sold and its subsequent inability to pass tests drove it to push for desktop assessments to be recognized as a route to compliance under adb

00:41:55 a route to compliance under adb adb provided external walls should either comply with the linear route or meet the performance criteria in br135 using full-scale data from bs8414 tess

00:42:07 using full-scale data from bs8414 tess this did not permit desktop assessments since appendix a of adb provided assessments could only be made by laboratories using appropriate standards

00:42:18 laboratories using appropriate standards or guidance there was at the time no set of extended application or exact rules which could be applied to bs-8414 tests which are system tests and do not lend themselves

00:42:29 system tests and do not lend themselves to extrapolation for discrete products within the system kingspan's marketing exercise was an exercise in disingenuity it claimed the

00:42:41 exercise in disingenuity it claimed the product as opposed to a system had passed the bs-8414 test and therefore was acceptable over 18 meters this despite almost every kings van witness professing to have understood

00:42:53 witness professing to have understood that the bs-8414 test was a system test similarly any descriptions of the system provided were deliberately generic pargeter accepted that customers were

00:43:04 pargeter accepted that customers were told the 2005 test used non-combustible cladding

00:43:08 cladding it was a deliberate strategy enabling king's fan to argue any non-combustible cladding could be used with k-15 king's fan also provided assurances that

00:43:19 king's fan also provided assurances that k-15 was fit for purpose and suitable for individual developments on hundreds if not thousands of projects for which it had no applicable test report

00:43:30 it had no applicable test report as meredith noted in a contemporaneous email

00:43:33 email fortunately nine times out of ten they accept our word when king's found was challenged meredith confirmed it was always a requirement to defend k-15 and he

00:43:45 requirement to defend k-15 and he accepted that in doing so he knowingly misled a number of professionals about k-15's fire performance king's fans closing submissions overlook inconvenient documents and evidence

00:43:57 inconvenient documents and evidence it is almost as if they were absent for key parts of the inquiry their suggestion that kingspan placed great weight on safety but there have merely been a few unacceptable outbursts

00:44:09 merely been a few unacceptable outbursts is risible philip he can me for someone who gives a damn i'm trying to think of a way out of this one imagine a fire running up this tower was typical of king's fans

00:44:20 tower was typical of king's fans reaction when challenged the tenor of king's fans internal correspondence is gleeful when its product is misrepresented as limited combustibility when they knew it was not

00:44:31 when they knew it was not following the labc certificate erroneously characterizing k-15 as limited combustibility heralded by philip heath's email as great news rochefort asked out of curiosity which

00:44:44 rochefort asked out of curiosity which fire test result did we use to get this heath replied we can be very convincing when we need to be we threw every bit of fire test data we could at him we probably blocked his server in the end i

00:44:55 probably blocked his server in the end i think the labc convinced themselves cool firm is the best thing since sliced bread we didn't even have to get any real ail down him their entire purpose was to mislead for commercial advantage

00:45:08 was to mislead for commercial advantage kingspan is also adamant in its closing that its interpretation of adb is correct insofar as testing the phaser only was legitimate this was rejected by its own staff

00:45:19 this was rejected by its own staff contemporaneously who considered claiming class 0 for a phaser test when it's meant to be for a product as placed on the market was a bit of a cheat and

00:45:30 on the market was a bit of a cheat and complete spin and joke that alls we do is lying here because k-15 doesn't actually get class zero when we test the whole product lol

00:45:42 zero when we test the whole product lol under cross-examination however rochefort and parjita defended their interpretation parjita asserted that technically it was irrelevant what the foil facer was attached to but accepted

00:45:54 foil facer was attached to but accepted king's fund was prepared to interpret adb to make sales and accepted its interpretation was potentially less safe this is gross understatement it was positively dangerous

00:46:06 positively dangerous taking it to its logical conclusion as council to the inquiry illustrated one could staple the foil phaser to a dynamite call it class zero and put it on a building

00:46:18 on a building one of the most perturbing aspects of kingspan's behavior is its post-grenfell campaign to persuade government that all products should be subject to bs 8414 testing and the linear route should be

00:46:30 testing and the linear route should be abolished

00:46:31 abolished king's fans plan was to engineer the tests of non-combustible materials such that they were likely to fail albeit kingspan refused to characterize its plan as testing to fail

00:46:43 plan as testing to fail pargeter insisted it was merely designed to perform poorly and trying to create a worst-case scenario this plan was incubated in september 2017 when nhbc began taking a very hard

00:46:57 2017 when nhbc began taking a very hard line over desktop studies kingspan's audacity after the fire knows no bounds

00:47:04 no bounds both fargeta's second statement and kingspan's opening submissions referred to three failed tests involving mineral wool without mentioning any material wool test had passed

00:47:16 wool test had passed following parjita's first cross-examination kingspan wrote to the chairman of the select committee suggesting parjita had been misled into making a mistake in answering as he did

00:47:28 making a mistake in answering as he did that both may and july tests had been designed to perform poorly pargeter even produced a fifth statement to justify his position by that statement he admitted that the may test had in fact gone ahead and

00:47:41 may test had in fact gone ahead and passed

00:47:42 passed he claimed in his second cross-examination that when first cross-examined he'd simply been unable to recall that the may test passed despite admitting there was a little bit of surprise and a bit of disappointment

00:47:55 of surprise and a bit of disappointment that it passed by its closing kingspan objects to our characterization of it as seminally causative of the grenfell disaster and it claims it did not intend that anyone

00:48:07 it claims it did not intend that anyone should copy its behavior regardless of king's fans intentions celetex did go down the king's fan route given the inquiry is concerned with

00:48:18 given the inquiry is concerned with responsibility in the wider sense it will appreciate that kingspan's fingerprints are all over this disaster as a perceived market leader sitting on

00:48:29 as a perceived market leader sitting on several industry committees king's fan has influenced events leading to grenfell's non-compliance by causing bca to issue tgn 18 introducing desktops

00:48:40 to issue tgn 18 introducing desktops which in turn legitimize the widespread use of products such as rs 5000 and k15 and causing nhvc to issue its acceptability of common wall

00:48:51 acceptability of common wall constructions which permitted the use of acm combined with k-15 without even a requirement for a desktop the widespread use of such products

00:49:02 the widespread use of such products wrongly gave comfort to grenfell's designers

00:49:06 designers we therefore repeat king's fans behavior was seminally causative of the grenfell disaster celetex celetex's dishonesty began with

00:49:17 celetex celetex's dishonesty began with its rebranding of our fr-5000 a product it knew to be unfit for use over 18 meters as a new product rs 5000.

00:49:28 meters as a new product rs 5000. celatex initially intended not to copy kingspan but in 10 instead test a representative cladding system but its bs 8414 test for rs 5000 was deliberately engineered to pass and not

00:49:41 deliberately engineered to pass and not representative of a normal cladding system

00:49:44 system as roper explained doing the right thing namely advertising a system and being transparent about its limitations rather than exploiting market ignorance would have required a

00:49:55 market ignorance would have required a complete re-education of the market and probably a lawsuit brought by kingspan against celetex having failed its first vs 8414 test

00:50:06 having failed its first vs 8414 test celetex chose to increase its chances of satisfying br135 by using magnesium oxide board to fortify the cavity barriers at level 2 and at the top of the rick with the intention of mrkit

00:50:20 the rick with the intention of mrkit ropa was instructed by his manager to create a new slideshow for general business use omitting reference to the failed test and the subsequent use of magnesium oxide

00:50:31 magnesium oxide roper admitted he knew at the time this amounted to a fraud on the market but despite feeling incredibly uncomfortable felt unable to challenge since the decision had been made at the highest

00:50:42 decision had been made at the highest level

00:50:44 level as the marketing literature did not describe the test accurately it was impossible for those following the br 135 route to compliance to do so the literature used the r of the phrase rs

00:50:57 literature used the r of the phrase rs 5000 is suitable for use in buildings above 18 meters in height without caveat the wording also suggested the product as opposed to a system met br 135

00:51:09 as opposed to a system met br 135 criteria

00:51:10 criteria roper took this wording directly from king's fans march 2011 literature arconic the bba certificate for rb55

00:51:21 arconic the bba certificate for rb55 which appeared to relate to both rivet and cassette fix versions of the product was based solely on the test for the riveted version of the product said to be class b but engineered to pass

00:51:34 be class b but engineered to pass the test on the cassette product carried out at the same time never shown to bba had failed nominally given a class e according to mr alban if bba had been

00:51:45 according to mr alban if bba had been shown that test it is unlikely to have issued the certificate in the terms it was

00:51:51 was the use of rb55 cassette at grenfell therefore depended on a certificate obtained by a test engineered to pass in 2010 vela admitted rayna bond pe in

00:52:04 in 2010 vela admitted rayna bond pe in cassette form doesn't obtain level b having said that this shortfall in relevance to this standard is something that we have to keep as very

00:52:15 that we have to keep as very confidential schmidt acknowledged this showed archonic new pe cassette was not class b and that veiler wanted to keep that secret

00:52:25 secret he admitted arconic deliberately and dishonestly misled customers about pe cassettes fire certification schmidt accepted arconic senior management was implicated in this

00:52:37 management was implicated in this cover-up

00:52:38 cover-up in summary pe 55 was contrary to the bea certificate neither a class b nor a class zero arconic argues perversely that the

00:52:49 arconic argues perversely that the engineered test is nevertheless valid and that adb diagram 40 permitted bba to equate class b to class 0. it did not class 0 can only be obtained

00:53:01 it did not class 0 can only be obtained by testing under bs 476 adb's table a7 footnote 1 states national fire classes do not equate to euro classes the fact

00:53:12 do not equate to euro classes the fact that diagram 40 permits either class 0 or class b surfaced cladding panels did not entitle bba to assume the two equated

00:53:24 in may 2012 vela asked schmidt to decide what euroclass to attribute to pe vela claims schmidt agreed class b would be removed from marketing literature as it was no longer a wholly accurate

00:53:37 it was no longer a wholly accurate reflection of the position schmidt claimed not to recall but arconic's 2012 literature removed reference to pe schmidt accepted it was risky leaving

00:53:49 schmidt accepted it was risky leaving customers to realize that the cassette variant was class e this is a gross understatement and iconic merits the strongest condemnation for its failure to inform customers of

00:54:01 for its failure to inform customers of this safety critical fact arconic suggests from 2014 onwards it advised that pe achieved class e but this did not happen at grenfell despite

00:54:12 this did not happen at grenfell despite arconic deciding in january 14 to reclassify pe weather rivet or cassette as class e this begs the question why the bva certificate was not immediately revised

00:54:23 certificate was not immediately revised to reflect that even following the fire when the bba certificate was revised in august 2017 whilst it made plain neither p nor fr should be used over 18 meters the

00:54:36 should be used over 18 meters the certificate never let nevertheless recorded both as class b ba's reviews of rb55 included a catalogue of errors

00:54:47 catalogue of errors the critical second triennial review of the certificate in 2014 to 2015 if conducted properly may have revealed pe cassette's true performance

00:54:58 performance was conducted by amoroso under the supervision of nakomo prior to joining bba amarozzo had no knowledge of building regulations or adb nokomo had no training on cladding did

00:55:10 nokomo had no training on cladding did not understand the difference between testing to bs 476 and en 13501 as he said i wouldn't say i'm good in fire myself

00:55:21 in fire myself amoroso thought the function of the test was confined to checking consistency between publicly available uk technical literature and the text of the bba certificate

00:55:32 certificate no one had told her certificate holders must

00:55:35 must provide new test data straight away bba is to be severely criticized for its decision to close the second review in 2015 despite arconic's repeated refusal

00:55:48 2015 despite arconic's repeated refusal to provide updated information requested or to cooperate with the review described by alban as an exceptional extreme case the effect of closure of the review was

00:56:00 the effect of closure of the review was to preserve rb 55's certificate even though by then p riveted was class c and p cassette was class e and arconic had internally decided to reclassify rivet

00:56:12 internally decided to reclassify rivet and cassette as e bba elicited none of this information bba had no policy governing suspension of certificates and no record of

00:56:23 of certificates and no record of arconic's failure to provide information as moore belatedly concluded bba ought to have obtained the relevant information to keep the public safe

00:56:34 information to keep the public safe the evidence shows bba instead to be a hopelessly weak institution too willing to please commercial clients at the expense for sure ensuring appropriate safety standards

00:56:47 appropriate safety standards as for bre at its most extreme the behavior of some individuals at bre and arguably the institution itself as senior individuals were aware amounted to complicity in the

00:56:59 amounted to complicity in the manufacturer's frauds bre's phil clark was heard on video giving advice to celetex roper and hayes are clear that clark knew of the hidden

00:57:10 are clear that clark knew of the hidden magnesium oxide in the rig and indeed clark even took delivery of it and the ruby cladding panels the zebra striped panelling rig would have stood for days before the test it

00:57:21 have stood for days before the test it is inconceivable that bre was unaware of the irregularities it is clear bre as an institution knew that the bs-8414 testing regime was

00:57:32 that the bs-8414 testing regime was being abused as it understood the k-15 2005 test was indicative that was how baker put it and in evidence he said he thought kingspan had been trying to pass off the test as a

00:57:45 been trying to pass off the test as a full marketable system whilst howard didn't agree it was indicative he admitted it was not a complete system and was the only test k15 had to justify its use for a decade

00:57:58 k15 had to justify its use for a decade bre nevertheless issued a classification report over a decade later despite being aware that misrepresentations have been made about k-15

00:58:09 made about k-15 the effect of all this was to allow the manipulation of the bs-8414 testing regime to promote the sale of flammable products unfit for use over 18 meters

00:58:20 products unfit for use over 18 meters bre's support of k-15 for 15 years is indefensible given dr sarah colwell and dr deborah smith had been the main driver from bre's side of the joint venture between

00:58:33 bre's side of the joint venture between it and government to get bs 8414 tests to bl-135

00:58:37 to bl-135 accepted into adb it seems bre did not want to undermine their own prodigy by highlighting abuse of the system bre was also receiving requests for

00:58:48 bre was also receiving requests for desktops on the back of its work for kingspan and yet must have known having struggled over a prolonged period to come up with a set of credible exap rules for kingsfan based on the testing

00:59:00 rules for kingsfan based on the testing it was doing that there was no meaningful way of extrapolating from bs 8414 tests bre should have been suspicious of desktops once it understood from

00:59:11 desktops once it understood from meredith's july 2015 email to clark howard and dr smith that king's fan was responsible for producing bca's tgn 18 which introduced the concept of desktops

00:59:24 which introduced the concept of desktops bre's clerk allowed kings fans test to proceed when they should have been terminated he tolerated flames over topping the rig in kingsman's trespass

00:59:35 topping the rig in kingsman's trespass in march 2014 commenting unless a man might have put that out a better man would have put it out although bre stood up to kingspan and failed the test as king as bre knew

00:59:49 failed the test as king as bre knew kingspan might use even a failed test as the basis for a desktop yet clark was instructed by howard to prepare a test report clark claims to be unaware

01:00:00 clark claims to be unaware this failed test spawned 29 desktops of which three were carried out by bre and none of which indicated the test had failed to meet bre

01:00:11 failed to meet bre br135 which even clark found very strange and to be honest slightly shocking

01:00:18 shocking howard however was not shocked by the 29 desktops on the failed test he said it's a set of data that you can then use if it's going into fire safety engineers to

01:00:29 it's going into fire safety engineers to justify a clouding system

01:00:33 xover it also carried out desktops based on that failed transfer test one for kingsfan concludes in draft that larson fr acm coupled with k-15 would

01:00:45 larson fr acm coupled with k-15 would comply with vr 135 despite the draft containing numerous queries as to the components of the system proposed not available

01:01:01 [Music]

01:01:11 174 and 173 rely on the failed trespa test which shows early termination of the test xover's module 2 submissions

01:01:22 xover's module 2 submissions disingenuously portray it as an innocent bystander duped by the manufacturers when in fact x over was a part of the problem

01:01:31 problem its desktop dated 26th of may 2015 advised celetex rs 5000 could meet the br135 performance criteria in three constructions namely brickwork

01:01:43 constructions namely brickwork terracotta and a1 cladding but although it also considered aluminium cladding it did not expressly say that rs 5000 combined with aluminium would not comply

01:01:56 combined with aluminium would not comply instead the concluding paragraph confusingly suggested the constructions described in the body of this report meet the requirements this desktop may have given comfort to

01:02:08 this desktop may have given comfort to nhbc in its acceptability of common wall constructions of july 2016 which approved rs 5000 and k15 for use with both brickwork and aluminium cladding

01:02:21 both brickwork and aluminium cladding without the need for a further desktop in conclusion king's fans reach into the government's post-grenfell building safety testing program to such extent that rig design

01:02:33 program to such extent that rig design was by a kingspan subsidiary cast doubt on the validity of that programme in any event the program's conclusions are only valid if the underlying products are honestly tested

01:02:46 products are honestly tested given this and the potential for abuse of the bs-8414 and other tests and the intrinsic flaws in the bs-8414 test which mean it is not realistic yet is

01:02:57 which mean it is not realistic yet is treated as if it proves a system safe in fire we invite the panel to give immediate consideration to making urgent recommendations it may be that the only safe short term

01:03:10 it may be that the only safe short term solution is to resort to prescriptive approach whereby predominantly only non-combustible materials can be used this is not a viable long-term solution

01:03:21 this is not a viable long-term solution but given the current lack of competence across certain sectors of industry established in module 1 there may be no other choice those are my submissions sir

01:03:32 those are my submissions sir well thank you very much indeed mr wise that's very helpful um

01:03:37 um well at that point we'll take our break for the morning and we'll resume at 20 past 11 we're running slightly behind time but we've got time in hand so that

01:03:48 time but we've got time in hand so that doesn't matter and thank you again and at that point we'll break as i say

01:19:16 welcome back everyone the next statement is going to be made by mr james maxwell scott queen's council on behalf of the royal borough of kensington and chelsea so

01:19:27 so i'm going to check mr maxwell scott are you there

01:19:32 yes i am good now i can't see you at the moment i don't know whether you can see us can you

01:19:38 you i can see you but i'm getting a message saying the host is not allowing me to turn my video on oh

01:19:48 oh well i think we ought to be able to see you as well as hear you somebody somebody's going to

01:20:00 yes now i can see you now and you can still see us exactly good thank you well now you're going to make your the closing statement on behalf of uh rbkc

01:20:12 so when you're ready off you go thank you mr chairman panel members the council has carefully reflected on the evidence heard by the inquiry in

01:20:23 the evidence heard by the inquiry in modules one and two it has at all times sought to do so in accordance with the formal public commitments to candor that it has made

01:20:34 made as you know the council has submitted a detailed 48-page statement setting out its position on issues relevant to it in these modules i anticipate that in accordance with the

01:20:46 i anticipate that in accordance with the inquiry's normal practice that statement will be available on the inquiry's website later today my aim this morning is to spend no more than 45 minutes outlining the main

01:20:58 than 45 minutes outlining the main points made in the written closing statement

01:21:01 statement i hope that this will be of assistance not only to the panel but also to the bereaved survivors and residents and the many other people who are following the work of the inquiry

01:21:13 work of the inquiry this oral statement will be an outline a summary

01:21:17 a summary it will not involve detailed citation of the evidence that supports the points that i make those who wish to analyze those points further will find the supporting evidence set out in detail in the

01:21:29 evidence set out in detail in the written closing statement and the footnotes to it

01:21:34 before saying anything further i wish to remind you the admissions made by the council in its module 1 opening statement

01:21:41 statement those admissions related to the council's building control service having considered all the evidence heard in module 1 the council considers that it was right to make those submissions

01:21:53 to make those submissions and it stands by them the council apologizes unreservedly for its failings council is truly sorry what happened to grenfell town on the

01:22:05 what happened to grenfell town on the 14th of june 2017.

01:22:10 the council would have preferred to make its modules one two and three closing submissions in a single statement that was inquiry's original plan although we fully understand why that plan has changed

01:22:21 plan has changed the council had an overarching role in the management and refurbishment of grenfell town a role which straddles modules one and three in order fully to understand the council's position it will be necessary

01:22:34 council's position it will be necessary to read its closing statements in modules one two and three together

01:22:40 the two main topics which i will be focusing on this morning will be the refurbishment project and building control

01:22:48 control i need to make it clear but i will not be addressing in detail council's monitoring of a tmo's performance during the refurbishment project

01:22:57 project this important topic will be addressed in the council's module 3 closing statement

01:23:03 statement because all of the relevant witnesses from the council were called in module three not module one what this means in practice is that the council's position on

01:23:14 is that the council's position on failings in its systems for monitoring the tmo

01:23:17 the tmo will be addressed in the module 3 closing statement rather than in this one nevertheless it may assist if i make it clear today but in its module 3 closing statement

01:23:30 but in its module 3 closing statement the council will be making further admissions i'm not going to outline all of them today but they will include the following

01:23:38 following the number of council officers devoted to monitoring the tma was insufficient given the number of residents whose properties were managed by the tmo and the scale and importance of the tiles

01:23:49 the scale and importance of the tiles delegated to the tmo

01:23:53 there was no council document setting out what its residual responsibilities were under the fire safety order in respect of properties managed by the tmo there should have been

01:24:05 there should have been the officers in housing commissioning who monitored the tmo received no training on the council's residual responsibilities under the fire safety order

01:24:16 order they should have done

01:24:19 the level of resident consultation envisaged by the 2006 modular management agreement was not achieved

01:24:28 before moving to my two main topics now i first make a few general points about overclouding projects the council was heavily involved in the decision at grenfell tower rather than

01:24:40 decision at grenfell tower rather than another building managed by the tmo be selected for refurbishment it was also heavily involved in the decision but over cladding the tower would form part of the project

01:24:52 would form part of the project the council has no wish to minimize its involvement in those decisions it is clear from the reports written at the time but a number of arguments were put forward in support of a proposal to

01:25:04 put forward in support of a proposal to refurbish and overcloud the tower the most significant with a desire to improve the heating system and the thermal performance of a tower the inquiry's expert architect paul

01:25:16 the inquiry's expert architect paul hyatt describes the desire to improve thermal performance as a laudable a in his opinion applying firmware insulation to the outside of the

01:25:27 insulation to the outside of the existing external concrete walls was a good option for improving the building's thermal performance if thermal insulation were applied to the outside of the tower

01:25:38 the outside of the tower it would need to be over clad to protect it from rain this would in turn provide an opportunity to improve the external appearance of the tower this was regarded a time as another

01:25:49 this was regarded a time as another argument in support of the proposal to refurbish the tower but it was certainly not the most important argument used

01:25:58 grenfell tower was far from being the first high-rise building to be retrofitted with ranged screen clad by 2012 overclouding buildings was a growing industry

01:26:10 i invite the panel to think about the position in 2012 of the hypothetical building owner or building manager wishing to overcloud a high-rise building

01:26:21 building and to ask itself the following questions

01:26:24 questions would it be unreasonable for such an organization to expect that it would be entering a well-regulated market a market sufficiently well regulated to

01:26:35 a market sufficiently well regulated to ensure that there was minimal risk of unsafe products being proposed for use on its building would it be unreasonable for such an organization to expect that it could

01:26:46 organization to expect that it could eliminate the fat residual risk by engaging one an award-winning architect two

01:26:52 two a reputable design and build contractor and three a top-tier fire safety engineering fan the hard truth which was starkly illustrated by the evidence heard in

01:27:04 illustrated by the evidence heard in modules one and two is that the overclouding market was dysfunctional and poorly regulated the building owner entering it was entering a world full of potential

01:27:15 entering a world full of potential snares and pitfalls some of these were present through the deliberate actions of leading industry players

01:27:22 players others existed because the relationship between manufacturers and those involved and testing and certifying their products

01:27:30 products lacked the open collaborative character but could and should have been present we know all of this now thanks to the work of this inquiry but that does not mean that in 2012

01:27:43 but that does not mean that in 2012 building owners and building managers should have known this or should have foreseen it those involved in the project on behalf of the council assumed wrongly but all

01:27:55 of the council assumed wrongly but all the products suggested by the design team for use on the project was safe unfortunately the members of a design team all seem to have made the same wrong assumption

01:28:06 wrong assumption and

01:28:07 and most tellingly each member of a design team seems to have assumed that other members of the design team were thinking about such matters

01:28:16 matters that they therefore did not need to do so

01:28:21 i turned out my first main topic the refurbishment project during the refurbishment project the council's main role was providing the tmo the money to pay for the project

01:28:34 tmo the money to pay for the project the council did not itself enter into contracts with the design team or the contractors that was done by the tmo it was well understood within the council that the tmo had authority to

01:28:45 council that the tmo had authority to choose and appoint contractors and to manage capital works projects an issue which has attracted a considerable amount of attention both within and outside the inquiry is where

01:28:58 within and outside the inquiry is where the cost cutting on the part of the council was to blame for the grenfell tower fire in the circumstances we have taken a view but it would assist the inquiry for our submissions to focus in particular

01:29:11 our submissions to focus in particular on cost-related issues and that is the approach that we've adopted in our written closing statement in it we have undertaken a detailed analysis of 15 issues relating to the

01:29:23 analysis of 15 issues relating to the refurbishment project we have sought to identify the decisions that were made who made them and the extent to which they were influenced by cost considerations

01:29:34 considerations we've analyzed not only the choice of materials used but also choices made in respective contractors and professional advisors and aspects of the design itself

01:29:45 itself in this oral statement i'm not going to cover all 15 issues covered in our written statement but i will briefly summarize the council's position on eight issues and then state some specific findings

01:29:57 and then state some specific findings which we invite the panel to make in its final report before i turn to those issues and findings i need to refer to two important concepts

01:30:08 important concepts first public money public sector organizations are funded by the public money that they have is public money and should be managed and spent in the awareness that it is the public's money

01:30:21 awareness that it is the public's money it should be managed and spent prudently should also be seen to be managed and spent prudently secondly value for money where a public sector organization

01:30:33 where a public sector organization purchases goods or services it is as a general principle expected to seek to achieve value for money

01:30:41 money value for money requires consideration not only of cost but also quality the cheapest goods or services will also represent the best value for money

01:30:52 represent the best value for money but not always value for money is not the same thing as cheapest

01:30:57 cheapest in practice a competitive procurement exercise is likely to be the best way of achieving value for money and is certainly the best way of demonstrating value for money

01:31:10 much has been made within and outside the inquiry of the fact that kensington and chelsea is one of the wealthiest boroughs in the uk it is a matter of record but the

01:31:21 it is a matter of record but the neighborhoods of kensington and chelsea are home to many affluent residents and the property values in kensington and chelsea are much higher than the national average in these respects it is legitimate to

01:31:33 in these respects it is legitimate to describe the royal borough of kensington and chelsea as one of the wealthiest boroughs in the uk but that does not mean that the concepts of public money and value for money do

01:31:44 of public money and value for money do not apply to its council a tmo was not strictly speaking a public sector organization but it was a not-for-profit organization which derived all of its funding from

01:31:56 which derived all of its funding from the council principles of public money and value for money therefore applied equally to it

01:32:06 i now turn to summarize the council's position on eight specific issues relating to the refurbishment issue one

01:32:14 issue one the decision to use reyna bond pe cutting material in our written closing statement we analyze this as two separate decisions

01:32:25 analyze this as two separate decisions the first was the decision in principle to use acm cladding material the second was the decision to select rayna bond pe rather than rayna bond fr

01:32:37 rather than rayna bond fr in our submission it is important to analyze these two decisions separately in particular because the people involved in them were not the same early on in the project a cladding

01:32:49 early on in the project a cladding system with zinc panels was proposed although at that stage it was just that a proposal not a decision when conditional planning permission was granted by the council's planning

01:33:01 granted by the council's planning department in january 2014 the materials to be used on the external facade of a cladding system were not prescribed by way of the conditions of the planning approval

01:33:12 approval decision on the materials was left open for future consideration by may 2014 the position had changed a design team had decided in principle

01:33:24 a design team had decided in principle to use acm cladding

01:33:27 the decision to use acm cladding was taken by the tmo which had responsibility for major works under the modular management agreement but studio e

01:33:38 but studio e cep

01:33:39 cep harley and ryden all had some involvement in encouraging the tmo to choose acm cladding

01:33:49 it is right to acknowledge that the choice of acm cladding material rather than another cladding material such as zinc was intended to save money studio e artelia and ryden all

01:34:03 studio e artelia and ryden all identified the use of acm clouding material as a potential cost savings for tmo

01:34:09 at no stage did any of the tmo's professional advisors or contractors suggest that the use of acm carried any fire safety risk

01:34:21 fire safety risk at no stage did any of them suggest that it might not comply with the building regulations or approve document b

01:34:31 but which type of acm cladding did the tmo choose the truth is but they were never given a proper choice arconic was not the only manufacturer of

01:34:42 arconic was not the only manufacturer of acm cladding but in order to serve their own interests

01:34:47 interests others involved in the project arranged matters so that after ryden's appointment the tmo were only offered acm manufactured by our colleague

01:34:59 rayna bond pe was not the only acm cladding manufactured by our colleague but

01:35:05 but and this is the key point the tmo was never informed that rayna bond was available in a fire resistant core as well as a pe core for reasons known only to it

01:35:18 for reasons known only to it iconic took no steps actively to market the fire resistant core in the uk or to draw the uk market's attention to the obvious potential benefit that it offered

01:35:29 offered a call with better fire performance as a result all the evidence suggests that rayner bond p was a default option supplied by our comic to customers in the uk market

01:35:42 the uk market the difference in cost between the pe core and the fire resistant core appears to have been modest but is absolutely clear that the tmo did not choose the pe core to save money

01:35:56 not choose the pe core to save money it did not in truth choose the pe core at all

01:36:00 at all the tmo was never given the opportunity to make an informed choice between the two cores

01:36:06 two cores it was never even told that there was a choice to be made

01:36:12 issue two a decision to select cassette fixing robbed and riveted fixing the decision to select cassette fixing was made after planning had stated that

01:36:23 was made after planning had stated that it would not accept rivet fixing cassette fixing cost approximately eighty thousand pounds more than rivet fixing

01:36:31 fixing the decision was therefore clearly not cost related

01:36:37 issue three a choice of insulation material

01:36:42 almost all of the insulation material used on grenfell tower was sellatex rs-5000

01:36:48 rs-5000 it was not a non-combustible material it should never have been used the history of how celetex rs-5000 came to be on the building can be summarized

01:36:59 to be on the building can be summarized shortly

01:37:01 shortly seletech's fr5000 was first suggested by an employee of max fordham in august 2012.

01:37:09 2012. his focus at the time was on finding a material with a suitable u-value cost played no part in his suggestion that celetex fr5000 would be suitable

01:37:21 that celetex fr5000 would be suitable studio e in due course adopted max fordham's suggestion and specified celetex fr5000 studio e never properly considered the five performance of celetech's fr5000

01:37:35 five performance of celetech's fr5000 or whether its use over 18 meters will be compliant with the building regulations or approved document b celetex fr5000 should never have been specified

01:37:47 specified later harley substituted rs 5000 for fr5000

01:37:52 fr5000 the chemical composition of rs-5000 was identical to that of fr-5000 neither the tmo council were ever informed that

01:38:04 council were ever informed that celetech's rs 5000 have been substituted for celetex fr 5000 there was no discussion of the insulation material during the value engineering exercise

01:38:16 engineering exercise in summary cost considerations played no part in the choice of insulation material

01:38:25 issue 4 for decision to reprocure the decision to re-procure rather than proceed with ledbitter was taken by the tmo the consistent evidence of the relevant

01:38:37 the consistent evidence of the relevant witnesses from the tmo and the council was that the council did not instruct the tmo to make the decision the council acknowledges but it was aware of the tma's intended decision in

01:38:49 aware of the tma's intended decision in advance of it being made and that it supported it by the time the decision was made in july 2013 it had been under consideration for approximately six

01:39:00 consideration for approximately six months

01:39:02 months it was not taken hastily or lightly there were a number of factors behind the decision these included concerns about ledbetter's lack of experience of projects of his nature

01:39:15 projects of his nature concerns about ledbetter's lack of experience of working on sites with residents and occupation concerns about whether ledbitter was engaged and committed to the project

01:39:26 engaged and committed to the project concerns that ledbitter was being uncooperative in negotiations with the tmo and artedia and concerns that ledbit was overcharging in summary

01:39:37 in summary cost related issues were clearly a factor in the tmo's decision to re-procure but they were not the only factor

01:39:44 factor there was nothing inappropriate in principle

01:39:47 principle in seeking to achieve value for money

01:39:52 issue five the choice of ryden as principal contractor the decision to appoint ryden as preferred principal contractor was taken by the tmo board at a meeting on the

01:40:03 by the tmo board at a meeting on the 27th of march 2014. tmo did not need formal approval from the council to appoint ryden nor did it seek such approval the tmo did keep the council informed

01:40:15 the tmo did keep the council informed about the tender process and the decision to appoint ryden the cabinet was informed in a report that ryden submitted the most economically advantageous tender scoring

01:40:26 economically advantageous tender scoring highest on both price and quality this was an accurate statement of the outcome of the procurement process that procurement process had been run by the tmo with assistance to make

01:40:38 the tmo with assistance to make procurement specialist and artedia the procurement exercise was set up so that quality factors counted for 60 and cost factors counted for 40

01:40:51 and cost factors counted for 40 inquiry heard at such a ratio is not unusual

01:40:55 unusual it ensures that quality considerations are given priority over cost considerations we suggest that such a ratio does a good job of capturing the concept of value

01:41:06 job of capturing the concept of value for money

01:41:08 for money and that an organization which uses it gives appropriate rather than inappropriate weight to cost considerations

01:41:17 issue six the setting of the budget and the choices made in relation to the scope of the works the estimated budget in the tmo's initial proposal to the council's

01:41:28 initial proposal to the council's cabinet was six million pounds two points should be noted about this initial proposal in 2012. first the figure of 6 million was very much a rough estimate and was regarded

01:41:41 much a rough estimate and was regarded by the council as a rough estimate secondly the scope of the project had not been finalized at the time for example the number of additional homes on the lower floors of grenfell town was subsequently increased

01:41:55 between 2012 and 2014 there were discussions about the scope of the project

01:42:01 project in those discussions the tmo was informed by laura johnson that the council had very specific requirements about the refurbishment of the nursery and the boxing club

01:42:12 and the boxing club these were places which were important to the local community in this respect she exercised influence over what was and what was not included in the project

01:42:23 in the project but she did not overrule peter madison on this or any other issue because the initial estimate was only a rough estimate the council was not particularly surprised or concerned when

01:42:35 particularly surprised or concerned when the tmo subsequently requested but it be increased

01:42:39 increased the fact that the initial estimate had been six million became ancient history it did not dictate how the council responded to requests for increased funding

01:42:50 funding in july 2013 the cabinet agreed to increase the budget to 9.7 million in march 2014 the cabinet agreed to increase the budget again this time to 10.3 million

01:43:04 at this time the cabinet was informed but if the budget was not increased a possible solution would be to reduce the number of additional homes at no time was it ever suggested to the

01:43:17 at no time was it ever suggested to the council that a possible solution would be to choose products with lower safety standards at no time divitimo or any of its contractors subcontractors or

01:43:29 its contractors subcontractors or professional advisors ever suggest of a council that for safety reasons it was necessary to spend more money on the refurbishment

01:43:40 issue 7 the choice of studio e as architect

01:43:45 architect the decision to appoint studio e as architect for the refurbishment project was taken by the tmo board at a meeting on the 29th march 2012. the council acknowledges that officers

01:43:57 the council acknowledges that officers from the council spoke to officers from the tmo about the opportunity to use the calc team on the grenfell project amateurmo's decision was clearly

01:44:08 amateurmo's decision was clearly influenced by the fact that studio e had previously been selected by the council to work on the calc project an economies of scale benefit was one of

01:44:20 an economies of scale benefit was one of the perceived advantages of choosing studio e where it was not the only one it is therefore right for the council to acknowledge that cost-related considerations indirectly played a part

01:44:33 considerations indirectly played a part in the decision to appoint studio e i say indirectly because no other architects were considered by the tmo therefore the question of whether studio e were in fact more or less expensive

01:44:46 e were in fact more or less expensive than other architects did not arise

01:44:50 studio e had experience of designing and clouding schools but did not have experience of overclouding high-rise residential buildings neither the tmo nor the council asked

01:45:02 neither the tmo nor the council asked whether studioe had experience of overclouding high-rise residential buildings

01:45:08 buildings this was a missed opportunity

01:45:12 issue eight the extent to which x-over services were used tmo engaged exodus to provide it with fire engineering services the council was not involved in

01:45:23 the council was not involved in ex-over's appointment in the event the service provided by ex-over to the tmo was limited the most notable example of this is that exxova never issued a final version of

01:45:36 exxova never issued a final version of its outlined fire safety strategy in the circumstances it is right to consider whether xover's failure to provide to tmo with the final report was caused by cost-related matters

01:45:49 caused by cost-related matters in our submission it was not exo wrote the proposal setting out the scope of services which it would provide xover also wrote the proposed fee

01:46:00 xover also wrote the proposed fee structure

01:46:01 structure the tmo accepted both of these proposals these proposals are relevant for two reasons

01:46:08 reasons first

01:46:09 first exover was entitled to move from one stage of the project to another unless it was formally stood down from the project

01:46:16 project which it never was secondly

01:46:19 secondly even at the end of the project the total fee charged by exober was lower than that stated in its original fee proposal in short there was no contractual or

01:46:31 in short there was no contractual or financial obstacle to x over completing the work which it in fact failed to complete

01:46:38 complete xover should have completed debris which it had agreed with the tier mode and should have been used more on the project

01:46:45 project there are a range of reasons why it was knocked

01:46:48 knocked but the evidence does not indicate that a desired by the tmo or the council to save money was one of them

01:46:57 findings sought by the council as set out in our written closing statement we invite the panel to make the following six specific findings

01:47:08 the following six specific findings one

01:47:10 one as a general principle public money should be and should be seen to be managed and spent prudently two

01:47:18 two concept of value for money requires consideration not only of cost but also of quality it is not a synonym for cheapest three

01:47:29 three ensuring that the grenfell tower refurbishment project represented value for money and monitoring the budget were legitimate activities

01:47:39 four the council acted appropriately in the instances in which it sought directly or indirectly to control or influence the budget for the grenfell tower refurbishment project

01:47:52 five the cabinet unanimously decided to increase the budget as requested on the two occasions on which it was asked to do so

01:48:01 do so 18th of july 2013 when the budget was increased to 9.7 million and 19th of june 2014 when the budget was further increased to 10.3 million pounds

01:48:13 pounds 6.

01:48:15 6. neither the tmo nor any of its contractors subcontractors or professional advisors ever suggested to the council that for safety reasons it was necessary to spend

01:48:26 safety reasons it was necessary to spend more money on the refurbishment

01:48:35 before moving to my second main topic let me very briefly say three things about planning first as a matter of law planning is not concerned with fire safety issues

01:48:47 concerned with fire safety issues the council's planning department when considering the application for planning permission did not therefore consider whether the cladding posed any fire safety risk the fact that it did not do so is to be

01:48:58 the fact that it did not do so is to be expected and is entirely normal secondly

01:49:03 secondly it is clear from the evidence that the design team had decided in principle but it wished to use acm cladding before the meeting with officers from the council's planning to park which took place on the

01:49:16 planning to park which took place on the 8th of may 2014. bsr team 1 submit the decision was taken many weeks before that they stated that from march 2014 onwards the only material put forward to the

01:49:28 the only material put forward to the planners was acm thirdly although in the council planning and building control fell within the same directorate they were completely separate functions

01:49:39 separate functions as the enquiries experts explained this was normal at the time paul hyatt said that in his experience planning and building regulation departments were effectively separate entities within a local authority

01:49:52 entities within a local authority departments do not have any direct dialogue with each other around an application beryl menzies said that she would not have expected to see any interaction between planning and building control

01:50:04 between planning and building control when asked whether she could give any good examples of the interaction occurring between a planning department and a building control department her answer was to be quite honest no

01:50:18 i now turn to my second and final main topic

01:50:21 topic building

01:50:22 building control the function of a building control body is now much more clearly understood than it was at the start of module one the function can be provided by either a

01:50:33 the function can be provided by either a public sector body or the private sector in the case of the public sector it is provided by a local authority builder control department all local authorities are required by

01:50:45 all local authorities are required by law to provide a builder control service in the case of the private sector it is provided by approved inspectors

01:50:54 in 2010 central government passed legislation to protect private sector approved inspectors from being undercut by local authorities the legislation required local

01:51:06 the legislation required local authorities to run a cost neutral builder control service to be clear this was a national legal requirement imposed by central government on local

01:51:18 imposed by central government on local government it was plain from the evidence of a council's building control manager john allen but he was very conscious of this requirement he told the inquiry that the restructuring of the council's builder

01:51:30 restructuring of the council's builder control department in 2013 was linked to it

01:51:35 it whether the service is provided by the public sector or the private sector the role is the same it is not a design role inquiry's building control expert bill

01:51:46 inquiry's building control expert bill menzies was very clear on this important point

01:51:50 point she said that building control were not part of a design team and were told not to be involved in design they were there to check the design team's work inquiries expert architect paul hyatt

01:52:03 inquiries expert architect paul hyatt even had reservations about describing building control as checking he said i don't like checking because it suggests transferring of responsibility in heights view the role of a designer

01:52:16 in heights view the role of a designer is to produce a compliant design independent of and regardless of builder control's views because building control is not involved in design it is not part of a design

01:52:28 in design it is not part of a design team inquiries experts were also very clear on this point both paul hyatt and jonathan sakula said that the design team should solve problems and come up with a compliance

01:52:40 problems and come up with a compliance design before approaching building control

01:52:45 control hyatt said i would wish to have my ducks in a row then go to seed builder control and say this is what we're proposing this is the basis

01:52:54 basis it is clear from the evidence of the factual witnesses that in practice the council's build and control officers were not treated by members of the design team as fellow members of our

01:53:05 design team as fellow members of our team

01:53:06 team this point is well illustrated by an internal email between two employees of over which included the sentence let's hope that paul hansen doesn't pick up on it

01:53:18 up on it hansen was one of the council's builder control officers if xover's employees had considered hansen to be a fellow team member they would surely not have been hoping

01:53:29 they would surely not have been hoping that he would fail to pick up on non-compliance with guidance builder control services have a difficult job to do and it is made more difficult when contractors and construction

01:53:40 contractors and construction professionals fail to engage with them in an open and collaborative manner

01:53:49 i now turn to the checking function provided by the council's building control department mr chairman you will be recall but in our module one opening we admitted a

01:54:01 our module one opening we admitted a number of failings on the part of building control the council's position is that those admissions were rightly made and it stands by them i read out the full list of admissions

01:54:13 i read out the full list of admissions in my module 1 opening statement i'm not going to do so again they are repeated in full in the council's modules one and two closing statement but i will mention what are probably the

01:54:25 but i will mention what are probably the three most important ones

01:54:28 builder control failed to ask for comprehensive details of the cladding system including the crown builder control failed to identify but the insulation materials and products

01:54:40 the insulation materials and products used in the cladding system would not have limited combustibility and therefore did not satisfy the requirements paragraph 12.7 of approved document b

01:54:52 building control issued a completion certificate on the 7th of july 2016. it should not have done so

01:55:02 mr chairman that brings me to the end of the point that i wish to make today as i explained at the outset the council had an overarching role in the management and refurbishment of grenfell tower

01:55:13 tower therefore

01:55:14 therefore in order fully to understand the council's position it will be necessary to read its closing statements in modules one two and three together once the module three closing statements are available

01:55:27 are available the granford tower fire caused terrible loss of life had a devastating impact on many people the council apologizes unreservedly

01:55:38 the council apologizes unreservedly for the failings admitted in this closing statement and those that it will admit in its module 3 closing statement it remains wholly committed to supporting the work of the inquiry

01:55:51 well thank you very much indeed mr maxwell scott and we shall certainly bear in mind the need to read all

01:55:59 read all three closing statements modules one two and three or one and three in particular together

01:56:05 together in due course when we come to consider our decisions thank you very much indeed

01:56:11 now the next statement is going to be made by mr seaword on behalf of the fire brigades union he's scheduled to speak to us at 12 noon but i can see mr seaworth there he's ready

01:56:23 i can see mr seaworth there he's ready to

01:56:24 to i think ready to address us mr seaword can you see us

01:56:31 perhaps we haven't quite got contact yet no

01:56:36 no you you have but you were looking at a a still image not not the real thing well

01:56:42 well it's just

01:56:44 it's just a real virtual scene yes thank you very much so yeah we've got contact you can see us we can see you and we can see you and vice versa so if you are ready to make your closing

01:56:55 you are ready to make your closing statement for the fbu then please go ahead thank you sir the fbu and those it represents remain humbled by the suffering caused

01:57:08 remain humbled by the suffering caused by the grenfell tower disaster and committed to a full and open inquiry modules one and two lay at the heart of this inquiry they have exposed

01:57:20 what caused grenfell tower to become a combustible death trap in blatant disregard of the safety of the residents and the firefighters who attended the fire in such tragic circumstances

01:57:33 fire in such tragic circumstances dame judith hackett foreshadowed modules one and two in her interim report of december 17 dame youth described how the regulatory system covering high-rise and complex buildings was not fit for

01:57:45 complex buildings was not fit for purpose

01:57:46 purpose leaving room for those who want to to take shortcuts among her key recommendations was a need for stronger and more effective enforcement with the system but this requires the

01:57:58 with the system but this requires the necessary resources she said to be available and demonstrably independent those charged with enforcing must have appropriate enforcement powers

01:58:09 appropriate enforcement powers in her final report of may 2018 dame judith found subsequent events have reinforced the findings of the interim report and strengthened my conviction that there is a need for a radical rethink of the

01:58:21 a need for a radical rethink of the whole system and how it works this is most definitely not just a question of the specification of cladding systems but of an industry that has not reflected and learned for itself

01:58:34 has not reflected and learned for itself she listed the key issues underpinning the system failure as she saw it all of which we have now seen played a part in creating the combustible death trap

01:58:46 combustible death trap ignorance regulations and guidance are not always read by those who need to read them and when they do read them the guidance is often misunderstood and misinterpreted indifference

01:58:58 indifference the primary motivation is to do things as quickly and cheaply as possible rather than to deliver quality homes which are safe for people to live in when concerns are raised by others

01:59:09 when concerns are raised by others involved in building work or by residence they're often ignored some of those undertaking building work failed to prioritize safety using the ambiguity of regulations and guidance to game the system

01:59:24 lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities module one reveals professionals such as studio e and x over assuming only a limited role and seemingly no one taking ownership of the design of the cladding system including

01:59:36 design of the cladding system including the windows the choice of materials of the fire safety strategy so all the fire safety strategy everyone said it was someone else's job to ensure the rain screen cladding system was compliant

01:59:48 system was compliant with the building regulations and safe for the occupants

01:59:53 inadequate regulatory oversight and enforcement tools the enforcement measures were inadequate as has been rightly admitted by the royal bar of kensington chelsea in

02:00:05 royal bar of kensington chelsea in respect of building control mistakes were made as has been rightly admitted by the labc the construction industry cannot be trusted to regulate itself because

02:00:16 trusted to regulate itself because ultimately the profit motive prevails over safety and quality neither building control bodies including

02:00:24 including labc nhbc and bac nor the bre or the bba could stand up to the petrochemical companies that gained them by failing to disclose material test

02:00:35 by failing to disclose material test results

02:00:36 results or correct glaring errors by dishonestly fabricating test rigs or by otherwise manipulating the testing and certification system to further their marketing ends

02:00:47 their marketing ends by obtaining test results and certificates which were wrong and misleading they kept to themselves their knowledge of failed tests knowledge which would have greatly assisted mr suns and mr lam

02:00:58 have greatly assisted mr suns and mr lam as was immediately apparent to mr simmons from the transcript of his angry telephone conversation with debbie french in the aftermath of the fire and which would have led to the revocation of the bba bba and bre

02:01:12 revocation of the bba bba and bre certificates relied upon to market their products

02:01:16 products the testing of certification bodies chose not to impose such an obligation on the companies and didn't liaise even with each other to share such information as they had

02:01:27 information as they had there was no learning from from now familiar high-rise facade fires there was no other testing energy of alternative test rigs with different combinations of products beyond those

02:01:38 combinations of products beyond those sponsored by industry there was no attempt to remedy the known flaws with bs 8418 testing bre by the behavior of mr clark and mr howard was guilty of indifference at

02:01:49 howard was guilty of indifference at best

02:01:50 best or of complicity with a company's malpractice at worst the independence of these bodies was compromised by their board membership coming from the construction of manufacturing industries and by their

02:02:02 manufacturing industries and by their dependence on fee income from these sponsors

02:02:06 sponsors the panel have our written closing submissions for module two on their lack of independence and rigor and we trust you will take those points into consideration dame judith came in for widespread

02:02:18 dame judith came in for widespread criticism

02:02:19 criticism from many in the construction and petrochemical industries in the wake of her reports but the evidence induced in modules one and two about the grenfell tower refurbishment project project not only bears her out

02:02:31 project not only bears her out but has managed to shock almost all those listening the evidence has shown how wide and deep the malaise has been profiteering and deregulation

02:02:43 profiteering and deregulation iconic certex and kingspan intent on accessing the lucrative uk high-rise market

02:02:50 market with us able to exploit a flawed and supine testing and certification regime to achieve a seal of approval for their lethal products the evidence revealed during module two of the grenfell tower

02:03:02 during module two of the grenfell tower inquiry has been a damning illustration of the deadly havoc of the uk's watered-down safety system privatization and corporate power

02:03:14 privatization and corporate power the fbu agrees the labc's view set out in paragraph 105 of its closing written statement

02:03:21 statement nabc

02:03:23 nabc 2019740

02:03:26 2019740 at page 36. um they say in labc's view it's plain that in the decade preceding the grenfell fire there was a significant degree of confusion in the construction

02:03:37 degree of confusion in the construction industry as to the far safety related requirements of the building regulations in respect of rain screen cladding on high-rise buildings although kingspan and celetex have sought to characterize organizations

02:03:49 sought to characterize organizations such as nabc and bba's experts to whom manufacturers of thermo-setting instruments look for guidance and to whose opinions they deferred it is plain that it is manufacturers who

02:04:00 it is plain that it is manufacturers who had and have far greater knowledge and resources they know how badly their products perform they know how to exploit the sometimes clumsy language in the building regulations the official guidance they

02:04:12 regulations the official guidance they know how to fake fire tests to get better results they know how to cheat they know how to lie indeed kingspan prides itself on its ability to lie

02:04:24 ability to lie in his statement to the house of commons on the 19th of january 2021 um

02:04:30 um and that reference is clg three zeroes three one one three three straight ninety uh the secretary of state for the um mhcog robert generic called on the

02:04:42 um mhcog robert generic called on the companies who manufacture cellular distribution construction products to do the right thing and address the rotten culture and poor practice that has come tonight he was presumably there

02:04:53 has come tonight he was presumably there referring particularly to the male practices of iconic king spanish celtics which have come tonight in module two and which are well detailed in in other core participants submissions and not

02:05:05 core participants submissions and not repeated here but the fbu notes both kingspan's post-grantful fire lobbying of mps and the conservative party's receipt of large donations from the property and

02:05:16 large donations from the property and construction industries and fears that calling on the companies to remedy this situation is worthless unless the government accepts that companies cannot be trusted to regulate themselves

02:05:27 themselves distances them from the testing and certification bodies and encourages respect for health and safety regulation if allowed too great an influence over regulatory testing and certifying bodies

02:05:38 regulatory testing and certifying bodies these companies will always put profit ahead of safety the lessons of grenfell must be learned not lost returning to ignorance and indifference

02:05:49 returning to ignorance and indifference two of the issues underpinning the failed regulatory system most of the players in module one had often not even read part b of the building regulations or approved document b at all or had only given it

02:06:01 document b at all or had only given it cursory attention and lacked an understanding of its most basic con concept

02:06:07 concept the products used in the cladding system were chosen seemingly without any certainly without any proper consideration of the route to compliance with the building regulations nor of their far performance those involved in the refurbishment were

02:06:18 those involved in the refurbishment were content to assume these building materials could be used on grenfell tower because their use was widespread one is left asking did any of the design team read adb 2013

02:06:30 did any of the design team read adb 2013 and br 135 and apply them to the proposed refurbishment before construction began none of the architects fire engineers or cladding specialists did

02:06:42 cladding specialists did mr ashton of exover is an exemplar of the culture of complacency and arrogance that enabled the disaster he had no specific training on the risks posed by combustible materials and external wall

02:06:53 combustible materials and external wall systems

02:06:54 systems he did not undertake any cpd on combustible materials in wall systems he was aware of a number of serious fires worldwide due to inappropriate use of materials including leckanov he was

02:07:05 of materials including leckanov he was aware of the potential for external fast break

02:07:08 break and of br135 and the guidance contained therein about the dangers of fire spreading within cladding but

02:07:16 but mr ashton thought he knew adb and so did not need to reacquaint himself with it turning to the architects in studio e the scale of their ignorance of the

02:07:27 the scale of their ignorance of the material guidance regulations and testing requirements is staggering and the fbu contends it could not have escaped noticing any proper selection process

02:07:38 process in summary none of them reacquainted themselves with the building regulations or the guidance i won't detail all the evidence in support of that proposition it's all set

02:07:49 support of that proposition it's all set out in our written submission the professionals ignorance was mirrored by all the other people and bodies engaged in the refurbishment the building regulations were clear

02:08:01 building regulations were clear and but the guidance was not the guidance is approved document b the bre test reports the bba certificates and the labc approvals were unclear and inconsistent in places

02:08:12 were unclear and inconsistent in places causing uncertainty and confusion about their meaning the inquiries experts have advised that architects mr hyatt that fire engineers dr lame

02:08:23 mr hyatt that fire engineers dr lame cladding specialists mr sakula and building control officers dr menzies should have read them all carefully and got to grips with the requirements for installing a rain screen cladding system

02:08:36 installing a rain screen cladding system it's for the inquiry however to decide who else

02:08:40 who else should have mastered the guidance and applied it to their part of the project the panel may find of assistance the preamble in her owner francis curcum's letter of the 28th of march 2013

02:08:52 letter of the 28th of march 2013 recommending the dclg should review and clarify adb to make it intelligible to the wide range of people and bodies engaged in construction maintenance and refurbishment of buildings and not just

02:09:03 refurbishment of buildings and not just to professionals she wrote in her preamble the introduction to adb states that it is intended to provide guidance for some of the more common building situations

02:09:14 of the more common building situations however adb is a most difficult document to use further it's necessary to refer to additional documents in order to find an answer to relatively straightforward questions concerning the fire protection

02:09:26 questions concerning the fire protection properties of materials to be incorporated into the fabric of a building

02:09:30 building the fbu contends these were not easy documents to read and understand in the context of the refurbishment and the diligent reader would find in them no guidance directed specifically

02:09:41 them no guidance directed specifically to the challenging questions one how to overcrowd an existing high-rise residential building two how to improve the thermal insulation of such a building without compromising fire

02:09:52 building without compromising fire safety

02:09:53 safety three how to check the applicability of bba certificates and bre test results they should have been clarified as her honor francis kirkham had recommended

02:10:06 grenfell was not an isolated case it was a disaster waiting to happen the large and widespread number of high-res high-rise residential buildings all over the country now found to be blighted with grenfell type claddy multiple

02:10:18 with grenfell type claddy multiple breaches of compartmentation inadequate fire safety measure measures and with residents living in fear and accruing unmanageable debt demonstrate the regulatory regime for the fire safety

02:10:30 regulatory regime for the fire safety in high-rise residential buildings was broken by national systemic failures which allowed and in some respects encourage the individual's concern to ignore farsight and to create buildings capable of total failure in the event of

02:10:41 capable of total failure in the event of fire those national systemic failures created the environment in which a high-rise block of much-needed flats in london was turned into a highly combustible death trap

02:10:52 combustible death trap systemic regulatory failure is acknowledged in the widespread reforms introduced in the last 12 months but much more needs to be done with over 1 000 unsafe high-rise buildings waking watch in london alone

02:11:05 buildings waking watch in london alone and still now over four years from the grenfell tower fire there can be no doubt as the london fire commissioner and current mayor have recently stated property owners and governments need to join up and fix this it's a national

02:11:17 join up and fix this it's a national disgrace and embarrassment this ignorance and indifference cannot be explained by the negligence of those involved in the grenfell refurbishment each high-rise residential building with

02:11:28 each high-rise residential building with grenfell-type cladding discovered since the fire was refurbished or built in breach of building regulations this shows the ignorance and indifference cannot be explained solely by the negligence professionals involved

02:11:39 by the negligence professionals involved in the refurbishment inexcusable though that is

02:11:42 that is these problems the result of an unhealthy culture of non-compliance complacency and prioritizing profit over safety which has been allowed to develop over the last 15 to 20 years and which

02:11:53 over the last 15 to 20 years and which has enabled companies to cut corners and game the system in the grenfell refurbishment companies waited to be told what to do by regulators rather than taking responsibility for building to correct standards

02:12:04 standards aiming at minimal compliance instead of ensuring safety and careless of achieving non-compliance this culture affected all who worked on the project they failed to think far and

02:12:16 the project they failed to think far and instead slipped into a culture of always assuming without checking that someone else was responsible they all failed some more than others the professionals behaved unprofessionally the companies gained the system they were all careless

02:12:29 gained the system they were all careless of the resident's safety in the event of fire

02:12:33 turning to the deregulatory agenda the the fire brigades union submits that this is the natural result of central government's deregulatory agenda which is publicly and we say recklessly

02:12:44 is publicly and we say recklessly demeaned health and safety on the principle that business interests should not be fitted the deregulatory agenda was pursued while simultaneously weaking enforcement weakening enforcement by obliging and

02:12:55 weakening enforcement by obliging and forcing authorities to encourage compliance before taking action

02:13:00 action failing to update and clarify guidance and imposing austerity cuts on local authorities which led to understaffed and overworked building control bodies up and down the country

02:13:11 up and down the country we have set out the details in our written opening statement for module 1 and won't repeat them here requiring testing and certification bodies to fund their operation out of fees or to be

02:13:22 their operation out of fees or to be cost neutral put them at the mercy of their clients from the petrochemical industry profit was put squarely ahead of safety

02:13:31 of safety we hope that these underlying cultural issues will be fully explored in later modules as dame judith says paragraph 3.23 of our interim report having a performance-based system which

02:13:43 having a performance-based system which relies on sophisticated judgments places increased reliance on the competence of those undertaking the design and construction of buildings and the skill and rigor of the regulators verifying the quality of work that's

02:13:55 verifying the quality of work that's done

02:13:56 done so the current regulatory regime allows greater flexibility in design and construction but as the statistics and the evidence shows the enforcing authorities are denied a commensurate increase in resources to provide and

02:14:08 increase in resources to provide and train enough building control officers to do the extra and more complex work involved

02:14:15 involved rbkc and the tmo made value for money the main driver of the project ahead of quality and programming the tmo totally failed to oversee the project to ensure compliance with

02:14:27 project to ensure compliance with building regulations the companies prioritized profit ahead of safety

02:14:32 of safety most tellingly ryden was not prepared to pay for additional architectural or fire engineering advice after assuming assuming its design and build role and the tmo did not require them to do so or

02:14:43 the tmo did not require them to do so or otherwise to fill the gap their respective perceived needs to keep costs down and to make a profit pervaded nearly all the really important decisions made including the initial

02:14:55 decisions made including the initial choices of architect fire consultant and building contractor using acm pe cladding panels and preference to sync metal ones and the amount of work done by studio e and x over particularly after ryden

02:15:07 and x over particularly after ryden became the design and build contractor other core participants have detailed the evidence relating to the multiple phases of those involved in the project project and on the conduct of iconic

02:15:18 project and on the conduct of iconic kingspan celtics in their dealings with the bba and bre we support and pay tribute particularly to the bsr teams for their detailed and powerful written closing submissions and do not attempt to duplicate them here

02:15:30 to duplicate them here we also support and endorse the oral submissions made today by stephanie barwise qc to avoid unnecessary duplication where possible

02:15:38 possible the fbu now focuses on the tmos engagement of studio e which knocks the project off the rails of x over which kept it off the rails and of riding which ensured the lack of

02:15:50 and of riding which ensured the lack of any further useful professional input from architects or fire safety engineers taken together these florida point set the project on a course of non or minimal compliance

02:16:02 on a course of non or minimal compliance corner cutting and complacency towards fire safety engaging studio e the panel may consider the project went off the rails right from the start when the tmo decided to point studio his

02:16:15 the tmo decided to point studio his architectural project without any tender exercise or adequate competency and experience checks which would have constrained the tml either to seek assurances that studio would acquire the necessary training competence and

02:16:26 necessary training competence and experience also ensure the appointment of accrediting specialists had a competitive procurement process been run for the for the grenfell tower project studio e would probably not have qualified given it had no experience of

02:16:38 qualified given it had no experience of overcrowding an existing high-rise residential building

02:16:44 mr kutcher was engaged as a high level director he admitted they did not advise the tmo of studio his lack of experience but he claimed that they were all they already knew he was obliquely there referring to its

02:16:56 he was obliquely there referring to its appointment to the calc project the tmo should have known in any event because both studio e's tender for the calc project revealed no such experience

02:17:08 revealed no such experience of of overcrowding high-rise and because competency checks should have been undertaken mark anderson of the tmo could not explain this ambition he was aware of the lack of

02:17:19 ambition he was aware of the lack of fire involving cladding and breach of compartmentation and of cladding fires in dubai and elsewhere abroad when cladding was identified as a feature for the project from december

02:17:30 from december 2011

02:17:32 2011 he realized it needed to be compliant with the building regulations and that fire safety needed to be thought through by the pre-construction professional team

02:17:40 team mark anderson was also aware of the odu thresholds and the general principles of procure procurement law such as transparency and equality and was responsible for ensuring that procurement rules and procedures were

02:17:51 procurement rules and procedures were followed on the gt project the tmo did not interview anyone else nor was there any design competition he said speed of appointment was a significant influence

02:18:02 significant influence this however did not begin to justify breaching the procurement rules he agreed that the oju limit may have resulted in there being a cap on studio e's fees

02:18:12 e's fees minutes of tmo meetings do not show discussion of oj limits despite mr anderson saying they were discussed this indicates the panel may feel that the tmo knew it was behaving

02:18:25 that the tmo knew it was behaving improperly artelia's minutes mentioned deferring feast postage d due to exceeding the the oju limit mr sums was non-committal as to whether

02:18:36 mr sums was non-committal as to whether this shows studio he did manipulate fees to fall below the oju limit that was on day seven but when confronted by his email to the tmo

02:18:48 to the tmo which appears at um art 50981

02:18:53 art 50981 that mentions 50 deferment of stage d fees to keep below the agent mr sims accepted that this suggests the fees were amended for that purpose

02:19:04 fees were amended for that purpose the tmo's appointment of studio he breached the procurement rules under the public contracts regulations allegedly to minimize several months of delay and at the request of of rbkc

02:19:16 delay and at the request of of rbkc the parties agreed that the tma would only agreed that cmo would only pay fees up to the og threshold of 174 000 pounds this meant that any further use of

02:19:27 this meant that any further use of studio by ryden would have to be paid out of ryden's already narrowed margin for profit they failed to instruct studio e properly

02:19:38 properly and

02:19:39 and sorry the failure to instruct studio e properly thus had a profound effect on limiting the work studio he actually did on the project though inexcusable studio e's complicity

02:19:50 though inexcusable studio e's complicity in breaching procurement rules is readily understandable they wanted the contract

02:19:54 contract harder to fathom is why the tmo didn't follow proper process we may never know the public interest was ill-served by the appointment of architects who lacked the competency to design the rain screen

02:20:06 the competency to design the rain screen clouding system whatever the motivation the appointment of studio e was in breach of the rules was penny pinching and it kick-started the refurbishment project on a course of non-compliance

02:20:17 non-compliance cutting corners it was not a legitimate appointment and cannot relieve the tno responsibility for important elements design material selection and construction as as claimed by the tmo

02:20:30 as as claimed by the tmo a proper procurement would probably have resulted in the selection of an architectural practice familiar with the overclouding of high-rise buildings or prepared to appoint a creating specialist as mr secular thing should

02:20:41 specialist as mr secular thing should have happened or more familiar with adb and br 135 or who would have insured the fire safety engineering consultants advice fully on the project and with more understanding of and a

02:20:53 and with more understanding of and a more rigorous approach towards fire safety

02:20:57 safety studio did not thereafter require relevant experience of overcrowding uh an existing high-rise residential building by taking on a suitable architect or cladding specialist and the tmo did not require them to do so

02:21:09 tmo did not require them to do so philip booth described the golden triangle of project drivers price quality and time and said the tmo changed the driver from programming ie timing to to value for money at the

02:21:20 ie timing to to value for money at the meeting on the 21st of may 2013. peter madison has been overruled by laura johnson he said the inquiry may want to consider whether it was reasonable to elevate value for

02:21:31 it was reasonable to elevate value for money above quality and programming without clarifying that far safety was not to be compromised nearby studios failings in the event were legion and causative of the disaster the

02:21:44 legion and causative of the disaster the main failings are set out in the fbu's written closing statement for module one and not repeated here save in one respect which touches on on what mr maxwell scott qc said about

02:21:57 on what mr maxwell scott qc said about building control xover provided an outline fire safety report direct building control the meeting on the 6th of november 2012 but it made no mention of cladding and studio e did not correct this

02:22:09 studio e did not correct this misinformation cladding was not discussed building control would not have known about celetex fr

02:22:16 fr 5000 either the fb asks the panel to consider whether this was concealment from building control and to take into consideration that among the other among the architectural services studio he agreed to provide was

02:22:29 services studio he agreed to provide was seven responsibility for coordinating building regulation approval and eight seek to ensure that all designs can comply with relevant statutory requirements

02:22:40 requirements and you can see see that in in the annexate the schedule of architectural services

02:22:46 services and of the later agreement if this was concealment then studio you were gaming the system and disabling building control from fulfilling their enforcement role under building

02:22:57 enforcement role under building regulations

02:23:00 returning to the appointment of ex-overs by

02:23:02 by consultants and the grenfell tower project stayed off the rails when the tml appointed x-over as far consultants failed to involve them properly at key stages of the project or

02:23:14 properly at key stages of the project or otherwise ensure they discharge their duties

02:23:17 duties knowing x over on the project team gave false confidence to others involved that fire safety issues were being properly addressed

02:23:25 addressed ex-over were directly appointed aspire consultants to the gt project by the tmo's acceptance of their fee proposal of 9th of may 2012 for consultancy services without any bidding process

02:23:39 services without any bidding process the proposed scope of work included wide-ranging albedo specified duties up to river stage 5 for such wide ranging consultancy duties x over agreed fixed fees of 3 300 pounds

02:23:51 x over agreed fixed fees of 3 300 pounds up to regis river stage c and at 5 300 pounds for riba stages dne with provision for additional fees

02:24:02 additional fees this was a wholly inadequate fixed fee for fire consultancy work on such a large project of over planning works to an existing high-rise residential building

02:24:12 building xover had full unlimited professional freedom to set out their own scope of the 2012 to 16 prime refurbishment works and the existing building fire strategy another question for the inquiry is why

02:24:24 another question for the inquiry is why do they propose such low fees and why did they fail to carry out sufficient work they were also tasked to prepare an existing building fire strategy for

02:24:35 existing building fire strategy for which again x over proposed a wholly inadequate fee which again was accepted by the tno this time on the 31st of july 2012. neither

02:24:44 neither kctno nor artelia had any objections to the two x over fee proposals although they were plainly inadequate to enable the works proposed to standard required

02:24:55 the works proposed to standard required and we're very wide-ranging and loose in nature with a clear lack of detail likewise there's no evidence of kctmo or artelia attempting to determine whether

02:25:06 artelia attempting to determine whether the items proposed by x-over were sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the building regulations and the fire safety order the fbu invites the panel to conclude

02:25:17 the fbu invites the panel to conclude that the appointment of x over like that of studio e was driven by cost savings and the failure to undertake a proper bidding process had adverse consequences the absence of tender documentation led

02:25:29 the absence of tender documentation led to ignorance or confusion over the nature of the project in particular that it involved a rain screen cladding system which necessitated a thorough check on compartmentation certainly the reports produced by x over

02:25:40 certainly the reports produced by x over omitted any mention of the rain screen cladding system and thus failed to take into account the major fire risk proposed by the project the low fees encouraged a culture of aspiring to minimum compliance instead

02:25:52 aspiring to minimum compliance instead of trying to ensure the residents were safe in the event of fire and avoidable doubts existed about the scope of exhibit retainer from stage f

02:26:04 stage f despite representing the biggest risk of a breach compartmentation between the cladding and the remainder of the building or apartments is not mentioned in x server's outline fire safety strategy

02:26:16 strategy claire barker's email to kate cooney did not mention cladding but claire barker had attended the meeting on thursday the 26th of july 2012 with the whole team albeit she seems not to inform kate

02:26:28 albeit she seems not to inform kate cooney the proposal was declared the tower nor did she raise the need for specific fire safety advice on cladding it seems likely that at this existing building safety strategy report

02:26:41 existing building safety strategy report stage xover was aware that kate cooney was not that the project involved credit excerpts failings were also legion and overall dr lane finds serious incompetence on the part of x over very

02:26:53 incompetence on the part of x over very serious professional agents in summary the main people on the project who should have thought fire x over failed to consider the effect on fire safety of the rain screen creating

02:27:04 fire safety of the rain screen creating system

02:27:05 system and despite this being the main component of the works they also repeatedly behaved unprofessionally prepared an inadequate and unreliable existing

02:27:14 existing building fire strategy fire safety strategy draft report of august 2012 by kate cooney failed to inspect fire compartmentation during their site visit despite the state book strategy in grenfell tower

02:27:26 state book strategy in grenfell tower relying on a high degree of compartmentation and prepared an inadequate fire safety strategy for the refurbishment failing to address the spread of fire over

02:27:37 over the materials of walls and roof and spread it far from one building to another

02:27:42 moving on to the appointment of brighton as design and build contractor this appointment was also in breach of the procurement rules and likewise demonstrates the adverse consequences of having value for money as the main

02:27:53 having value for money as the main driver as opposed to preserving the golden triangle ryden's tender documents which i i won't detail but they are set out in our written submissions may make no

02:28:05 written submissions may make no provision for instructing x over nor any extra budget for architectural fees

02:28:13 secret meetings took place during the tender exercise mr madison on behalf of the tmo preferred the lowest tender ryden

02:28:20 ryden mr blake and mr henton of bryden had personal and private access to the top decision makers in the tmo in march 14 mr madison privately informed mr blake that ryden were in

02:28:31 informed mr blake that ryden were in pole position to win the contract subject to reducing the total cost by 800 000 pounds through value engineering on day 28 he denied this meeting but on

02:28:42 on day 28 he denied this meeting but on day 29 when confronted by emails referencing offline discussions he was constrained to admit the meeting took place

02:28:51 place mr madison's diaries revealed several confidential telephone discussions with mr blake over the 12th and 13th of march 2014.

02:28:59 2014. his notebook entries evidence of telecon on the 19th of march 2014 that says agreement with ryden to keep negotiations and contract price confidential

02:29:10 confidential which seems to refer to the offline discussions they were having with ryden on the bid neither the diary entries nor the notebooks nor the secret discussions with mr blake were mentioned by mr blake in his earlier witness statements

02:29:22 in his earlier witness statements serious doubts thus arise about the credibility of both mr madison and mr blake

02:29:29 blake due to an internal error brighton had anyway tendered 212 000 pounds below true cost and now i had to find savings of over a million pounds by value engineering

02:29:40 pounds by value engineering um mr blake accepted it was in ryden's own interest to push the selection of face fixed acm panels as this was the most obvious way to recoup its 212 000 pounds costing error

02:29:53 pounds costing error ryan the lowest tenderer subsequently entered a building contract with tmo on the 30th of october 14 at a sum reduced by an astonishing 10 percent already the lowest tender

02:30:05 percent already the lowest tender little wonder they didn't pay for consultancy fees the fba contends little weight can be placed on high scores for quality in the tender process when ryden's tender guaranteed minimum

02:30:17 when ryden's tender guaranteed minimum professional involvement in the design and build of the rain screen cladding system

02:30:23 system ryden also recouped its two hundred and twelve thousand pounds costings error by the switch to cassette fixed acm clamping and lowers ink planning but mr blake did not advise the tmo of this

02:30:34 blake did not advise the tmo of this further saving this is a clear example of a company putting profit before safety

02:30:42 as to planning permission neither ryden nor the team owned or anyone else involved in the project applied for planning permission to use the cheaper acn cladding this may be another example of them gaining the system as to building

02:30:54 gaining the system as to building control mr blake claimed he told studio 8 it was their responsibility to submit information to building control and that he didn't know the drawings provided to building control showed zinc cladding

02:31:05 building control showed zinc cladding the inquiry may find this was another example of ryden gaming the system asked if he ever considered fire safety at any point during the project mr blake said he he considered the adequacy of

02:31:17 said he he considered the adequacy of the project as a whole from day one not any specific aspect inquiry may conclude that both mr blake and mr madison were unlawfully interfering in the tender process

02:31:28 interfering in the tender process but their evidence is unreliable about the tender process say where it's corroborated by other reliable evidence that mr blake's answer about fire safety was tantamount to an admission that he did not think fire

02:31:40 did not think fire in conclusion and summary sir the fbu submits there was an institutional deep-seated complacency about fire safety a shameful and inexplicable failure to oversee work

02:31:52 and inexplicable failure to oversee work of contractors or to seek assurance from properly instructed professionals and encroaching the running and funding of the testing and certification bodies by the manufacturing companies thereby

02:32:03 by the manufacturing companies thereby compromising their independence a failure by most corporate participants to willingly and readily engage with this inquiry with full and frank and early disclosure

02:32:14 early disclosure and we point out this contrast starkly with the cooperation and openness given by firefighters and control room staff as

02:32:23 as and facilitated by both the nfb and the fbu and without any legal advice or assistance or attorney general's undertaking those conclude my submissions and thank

02:32:34 those conclude my submissions and thank you sir on the panel for your patience well thank you very much mr seaword there's a lot for us to think about there

02:32:42 there um

02:32:43 um the next statement will be made by mr james agarose queen's council on behalf of the tmo but he's not able to start this morning and he's scheduled therefore to

02:32:56 and he's scheduled therefore to address us at two o'clock so at that point we will rise we'll have a slightly extended break at this point and we'll sit again for the next statement at two o'clock thank you very

02:33:08 statement at two o'clock thank you very much

02:33:20 you