Modules 1 & 2 Closing Statements - Tuesday 14th September 2021 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:00:42 Welcome back. We are now going to hear a statement closing statement on behalf of Celotex and made by Mr. Craig or Queens Council. Mr. or I can see you there. Can you see us? All right.

00:00:54 you see us? All right. Uh I I can Mr. chairman and you it sounds to me as though you can you can hear us and we can hear you. So I think uh we're all ready to go. So when you're ready, we look forward to

00:01:05 when you're ready, we look forward to hearing from you. Thank you. Uh good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Miss Istafan, and Mr. Akbar. May I start by reiterating on behalf of

00:01:17 May I start by reiterating on behalf of Celletex its deepest sympathy to the bereaveved families, survivors, and everyone affected by the tragic fire at Grenful Tower.

00:01:29 Grenful Tower. Celotex recognizes and has from the outset recognized the crucial importance of this inquiry in ensuring that no such tragedy occurs again.

00:01:40 tragedy occurs again. It has approached the inquiry with cander and transparency. It has self-reported to the inquiry matters learned by its current management in the course of

00:01:51 management in the course of investigations carried out after the Granful Tower fire. It has acknowledged shortcomings identified by those investigations in the historic testing and certification

00:02:03 the historic testing and certification of certain of its products and has taken full and concerted steps to remedy those shortcomings. It has not sought and does not seek in its submissions to the inquiry to deny

00:02:16 its submissions to the inquiry to deny its shortcomings. However, they must be put in the context of the role played by Celletex in the refurbishment of Grenful Tower. That is

00:02:28 refurbishment of Grenful Tower. That is what I will seek to do in this closing statement. Celotex's position in relation to modules one and two is set out in detail in the written submission that it has provided to the inquiry.

00:02:42 that it has provided to the inquiry. My comments today will be structured as follows.

00:02:45 follows. First, I provide an overview of Celotex's position. Second, I address Celotex's investigations following the fire. Third, I highlight a number of key

00:02:56 Third, I highlight a number of key failings by the designers, contractors, and building control body responsible for the design, construction, and inspection of the cladding facade at Grenful Tower. Fourth, I addressed the

00:03:08 Grenful Tower. Fourth, I addressed the position of Arconic, which manufactured and supplied the Rainabond aluminium composite material used in the cladding system at Grenful Tower. I will refer to

00:03:19 system at Grenful Tower. I will refer to that material as Rainabond PE that of course drove the external fire spread at the tower.

00:03:30 Starting then with an overview of Celletex's position. Celotex is a manufacturer of polyisoccyanurate insulation known as PIR.

00:03:41 insulation known as PIR. Two of its products were used in the refurbishment at Grenell Tower. RS5000 was supplied through distributors and used as insulation in the cladding system. Uh and TB4000 was Celotex now

00:03:55 system. Uh and TB4000 was Celotex now understands purchased from a builder's merchant and used to fill gaps in the window surrounds at Grenell Tower. PIR is and has been widely used in the construction industry. It is an organic

00:04:08 construction industry. It is an organic compound which in com which in common with all organic compounds will combust under certain conditions. Its combustibility was clearly highlighted by Celletex in its health and safety

00:04:21 by Celletex in its health and safety data sheet which was available on Celletex's website and cited in Celletex's product literature including the RS5000 data sheet on which a number

00:04:32 the RS5000 data sheet on which a number of designers and contractors involved in the Grenell Tower refurbishment claimed to have relied. The building regulations in force at the time of the refurbishment permitted

00:04:44 time of the refurbishment permitted combustible insulation to be used in high-rise residential buildings. There were additional requirements that had to be met when using combustible insulation in a building over 18 m. But

00:04:55 insulation in a building over 18 m. But provided those requirements were met, PIR could be used in such buildings. Now the design and compliance of the cladding system at Grenful Tower was the

00:05:08 cladding system at Grenful Tower was the responsibility of specialist designers, contractors and consultants engaged on the refurbishment. Those included studio E the architects,

00:05:19 Those included studio E the architects, Harley the specialist cladding contractor, Ryden the design and build contractor, Exivera the fire engineer, and Max Forom the M and advisers.

00:05:30 and Max Forom the M and advisers. Each of those construction professionals held themselves out as having the necessary experience and expertise to carry out their respective roles. They each had specific responsibilities in

00:05:43 each had specific responsibilities in relation to the design and construction of the cladding facade under the terms of their respective contracts. They were responsible for ensuring that the cladding facade complied with

00:05:54 the cladding facade complied with building regulations. Celotex was not part of the design or construction team on the Grenell Tower refurbishment. Celotex did not design or construct the

00:06:06 Celotex did not design or construct the cladding system at Grenful Tower. Its sole role was as the manufacturer of insulation which was supplied through distributors for the refurbishment.

00:06:17 distributors for the refurbishment. Design of the cladding system requires consideration of the system uh as a whole and each component of it. As the manufacturer of a single component of

00:06:28 manufacturer of a single component of the cladding system, Celotex could not reasonably have been expected to input into the design of that system or ensure compliance of the system with building regulations.

00:06:39 regulations. While Celatex was provided with some information about the proposed cladding system at Grenful Tower, it was not privy to full details of the design process and had no access to the

00:06:51 process and had no access to the contractual documents governing the refurbishment or the NBS specification which governed the selection of products.

00:07:01 products. Celotex had no dealings with the architect or fire engineer whose input would have been relevant to assessing the cladding systems compliance with building regulations. Celotex was never asked to provide

00:07:13 Celotex was never asked to provide assurance that the cladding system was compliant or to verify compliance of the system and it did not do so. Now the building regulation guidance at

00:07:24 Now the building regulation guidance at the time of the refurbishment was contained in volume two of approved document B known as ADB2. This permitted the use of combustible insulation such as PIR in high-rise

00:07:37 insulation such as PIR in high-rise buildings. It provided four potential routes to compliance for a cladding system in a building over 18 m. First, the linear route which required

00:07:48 First, the linear route which required individual components of the cladding system to meet specified standards of fire performance. Second, testing the complete cladding system in accordance with British standard BS8414

00:08:01 standard BS8414 to demonstrate that the system as a whole met specific performance criteria known as the BR135 criteria. Third, obtaining a desktop study from a

00:08:12 Third, obtaining a desktop study from a suit suitably qualified fire specialist to confirm that the cladding system would if tested meet the BR135 criteria. And finally, and fourth, uh, obtaining a

00:08:25 And finally, and fourth, uh, obtaining a holistic fire engineering assessment to confirm that the system met the requirements of the building regulations taking account of the adequacy of the fire prevention measures in the building

00:08:36 fire prevention measures in the building as a whole. Under the linear route, insulation in the cladding system had to be of limited combustibility and the cladding panels

00:08:47 combustibility and the cladding panels had to be classified as class not under British standards or class B or better under European standards. The term limited combustibility which applied to the insulation was specifically defined

00:09:00 the insulation was specifically defined in ADB2. That definition required in summary that the insulation be non-combustible or classified as class A2 or better under the European testing regime.

00:09:12 regime. Since PIR has never fallen within the definition of limited combustibility, the linear route to compliance was unavailable if PIR was being used.

00:09:24 unavailable if PIR was being used. PI could only be used in a cladding system on a high-rise building if the system was shown to meet the BR135 criteria, whether by way of testing or desktop study or a holistic fire

00:09:36 desktop study or a holistic fire engineering assessment was undertaken. Industry guidance available at the time of the refurbishment emphasized that PIR

00:09:47 of the refurbishment emphasized that PIR was not a material of limited combustibility and therefore could not be used under the linear route to compliance. For example, technical guidance note 18 issued by the building

00:10:00 guidance note 18 issued by the building control alliance stated that thermos setting insulence which include PIR did not meet the definition of limited combustibility and should not therefore be accepted as satisfying the

00:10:12 be accepted as satisfying the requirements of the linear route. The limitations on using PIR were therefore well known and should have been familiar to any designer, contractor or

00:10:23 to any designer, contractor or consultant involved in the design in the design and construction of a cladding system.

00:10:30 system. However, the evidence heard in modules one and two shows that the construction professionals involved in the Grenful Tower refurbishment were unaware of,

00:10:41 Tower refurbishment were unaware of, disregarded, or otherwise failed to follow the requirements of ADB2 when designing and constructing the cladding system. In particular, the construction

00:10:53 In particular, the construction professionals gave no proper consideration to which, if any, potential route to compliance they were following. They had no regard to the fact that the insulation and cladding panels were combustible.

00:11:06 panels were combustible. They did not consider what impact that combustibility would have on compliance of the cladding system with building regulations. They failed to appreciate that the linear route to compliance was

00:11:18 linear route to compliance was unavailable because of the Celotex insulation they had selected. They failed to recognize that the Rainabond PE cladding panels they had chosen were so highly combustible that

00:11:31 chosen were so highly combustible that they could not meet the requirements of the building regulations concerning the spread of fire over the external walls. And finally, they undertook no assessment at all of the fire

00:11:43 assessment at all of the fire performance of the cladding system as a whole, whether by way of a BS8414 test or a desktop study or otherwise.

00:11:54 or a desktop study or otherwise. These matters we submit were not sellers's responsibility. They represent fundamental failings on the part of the construction professionals who were responsible for

00:12:06 professionals who were responsible for the design and construction of the cladding facade. Yet the construction professionals refused to acknowledge this. They all seek to exculpate themselves by blaming

00:12:18 seek to exculpate themselves by blaming others.

00:12:19 others. Studio Eley and Ryden make two particular points. They say first that ADB2 was unclear and they seek to blame their compliance

00:12:31 they seek to blame their compliance failures on its poor drafting. Secondly, they suggest that they were misled by Celotex's product literature into believing that use of RS5000 at

00:12:42 into believing that use of RS5000 at Grenful Tower was compliant with ADB2. These arguments should be rejected. They have been devised after the event by the

00:12:53 have been devised after the event by the construction professionals to excuse their failure to have any proper regard to the compliance of the system they designed and constructed. I take each

00:13:04 designed and constructed. I take each argument in turn. First, ADB2. While some criticism can fairly be made of certain aspects of ADB2,

00:13:15 of certain aspects of ADB2, the provisions of ADB2 regarding the use of insulation and cladding panels in a cladding system over 18 m were sufficiently clear to achieve their

00:13:26 sufficiently clear to achieve their objective. The inquiry's experts confirmed that no competent architect, designer or cladding contractor should have been confused about those provisions.

00:13:42 Now, as regards Celotex's product literature, Celotex's position is that there is no reliable evidence that anyone from

00:13:54 reliable evidence that anyone from Studioe, Harley, or Ryden actually read its product literature, let alone relied upon the product literature or was misled by it.

00:14:06 misled by it. Nor is there any reliable evidence that anyone else involved in the refurbishment was misled by seller Texas product literature. The construction professionals cannot

00:14:18 The construction professionals cannot credibly argue that their design and construction of a non-compliant cladding facade is explained by reliance on Cellot Texas product literature.

00:14:30 Cellot Texas product literature. RS5000 was first launched for use in raincreen cladding systems in August 2014

00:14:38 2014 after a cladding system incorporating the product had been successfully tested by the building research establishment to BS8414 in May 2014.

00:14:50 to BS8414 in May 2014. Prior to August 2014, Celletex marketed no products at all for use in buildings above 18 mters. RS5000 was marketed on the basis that a

00:15:03 RS5000 was marketed on the basis that a cladding system incorporated incorporating the product had been demonstrated to meet the BR135 criteria by way of a BS8414 part two test. The

00:15:15 by way of a BS8414 part two test. The product literature stated that the fire performance and classification report issued by the BRE for RS5000 only related to the components of the

00:15:26 only related to the components of the system described in the literature and that any changes to those components would need to be considered by the building designer. This reflected the requirement in ADB2 for any cladding system containing

00:15:37 for any cladding system containing combustible insulation to be shown by test or assessment to meet the BR135 criteria.

00:15:46 criteria. Celotex also produced a rainscreen cladding compliance guide which drew specific attention to to first of all the requirements imposed by ADB2 on the

00:15:57 the requirements imposed by ADB2 on the use of insulation in high-rise buildings and secondly the importance of building designers ensuring that any cladding system incorporating RS5000

00:16:08 system incorporating RS5000 met the BR135 criteria. This guide was a key part of the RS5000 product literature. It was distributed

00:16:19 product literature. It was distributed along with other product literature to Cellex's customers including Harley. Mr. Hyatt, the inquiry's architectural expert, confirmed that warnings given in the guide about the limitations of the

00:16:32 the guide about the limitations of the fire performance classification obtained by Celletex and the importance of designers checking that the classification covered any enduse application. were absolutely clear.

00:16:45 application. were absolutely clear. No competent construction professional who actually read Seller Texas product literature could have thought that that RS5000

00:16:55 RS5000 met the requirements of the linear route to compliance or could be used in a different cladding system over 18 m without verifying that the system as a

00:17:06 without verifying that the system as a whole met the BR135 criteria. Some of the RS5000 product literature referred to RS5000 being suitable or acceptable for use in

00:17:19 being suitable or acceptable for use in buildings above 18 m in height. Those words obviously needed to be read in the context of each product document as a whole. When so read, two things

00:17:31 as a whole. When so read, two things were or should have been clear to any construction professional. first that the basis for RS5000 suitability for use in buildings over 18 m was the fact that it had been

00:17:44 m was the fact that it had been incorporated in a system that had been tested to BS8414 and shown to meet the BR135 criteria. It followed that the product's suitability for use in any particular

00:17:57 suitability for use in any particular rainscreen cladding system would need to be verified and assessed against the system in which RS5000 had been tested. Indeed, when witnesses from Ryden Holly

00:18:09 Indeed, when witnesses from Ryden Holly and Studioe were taken to the product literature in evidence, they accepted as much. We give the references to that evidence in our written submission. Any

00:18:21 evidence in our written submission. Any competent construction professional intending to rely on the RS5000 product literature would indeed have read it carefully and in full and not relied on single words in isolation and out of

00:18:34 single words in isolation and out of context.

00:18:35 context. Mr. Hyatt agreed with this. However, it is clear from the evidence of Ryden Harley and Studioe witnesses that they either did not read the

00:18:46 that they either did not read the literature or they did not read it with any care.

00:18:50 any care. They cannot therefore credibly claim to have relied on the literature so as to justify their disregard of their own compliance obligations.

00:19:01 compliance obligations. Ryden, for example, suggests in its closing submissions that Mr. Lawrence, who was Ryden's contracts manager, attempted to satisfy himself that RS5000

00:19:14 attempted to satisfy himself that RS5000 was suitable by reading the RS5000 data sheet. That is a distortion of the evidence. Mr. Lawrence admitted that he

00:19:25 evidence. Mr. Lawrence admitted that he in fact gave the data sheet nothing more than a cursory look, which he acknowledged sounded inappropriate knowing what's happened.

00:19:37 knowing what's happened. Mr. Lawrence also said that he probably did not get beyond the headline banner and the first paragraph on the first page of the data sheet. Ryden argues that Mr. Lawrence's failure to read the

00:19:49 that Mr. Lawrence's failure to read the rest of the document is excusable because he was not able as a contracts manager to interpret technical information. That in our submission is untenable.

00:20:01 That in our submission is untenable. The RS5000 data sheet was only three and a half pages long. It was and should have been readily understandable to a construction professional in Mr. Lawrence's position.

00:20:12 Lawrence's position. As the design and build contractor, Ryden was itself responsible for the design and construction of the cladding facade and should have ensured that it was capable of discharging that

00:20:23 was capable of discharging that obligation by equipping its senior personnel with the necessary technical expertise. However, Mr. Lawrence and other Ryden personnel assigned to the refurbishment

00:20:35 personnel assigned to the refurbishment had no meaningful knowledge or understanding of the building regulations or ADB2. Mr. Lawrence was not even aware that ADB2 provided alternative routes to compliance for a cladding system.

00:20:47 compliance for a cladding system. Indeed, he admitted that no one at Ryden ever checked compliance of the cladding system because it lacked the expertise to do so. The suggestion that Mr.

00:20:58 to do so. The suggestion that Mr. Lawrence or anyone else at Ryden was misled by Celotex's product literature is Celletex submits unsustainable.

00:21:08 Celotex's product literature also referred to the class N classification of RS5000.

00:21:16 Now class N is a relevant performance criterion for insulation. For example, it is relevant to the provision of cavity barriers in ceilings and other cavities.

00:21:27 and other cavities. However, as any competent construction professional should have known, class Nort was not the relevant criterion for use of insulation in a cladding system

00:21:38 use of insulation in a cladding system on a high-rise building if following the linear route to compliance. The required insulation in such a system uh following the linear

00:21:49 in such a system uh following the linear route needed to be of limited combustibility and not class N. The inquiry's experts agreed that compet competent construction professionals would have

00:22:01 construction professionals would have understood the distinction between class N and limited combustibility and would have known that insulation was required to be of limited combustibility as opposed to class N when following the

00:22:13 opposed to class N when following the linear route. Nevertheless, Mr. Ray Bailey of Harley and Mr. Crawford of Studioe suggested in their evidence that they relied on the

00:22:24 their evidence that they relied on the reference in the RS5000 data sheet to the product having class N classification as validating its compliance with the linear route. That evidence is analyzed in Celotex's

00:22:37 That evidence is analyzed in Celotex's written submission. It was contradicted by the evidence of other studio and Harley witnesses and is not reliable. It is clear from the evidence of Mr. Bailey and Mr. Crawford that neither of them

00:22:50 and Mr. Crawford that neither of them understood what limited combustibility actually meant in the context of ADB2. When shown the relevant provisions of ADB2, Mr. Bailey accepted that they made the position clear. He and Mr. Crawford

00:23:03 the position clear. He and Mr. Crawford should have known that a class N classification for insulation did not mean that it satisfied the linear route to compliance. Some Celotex product literature referred

00:23:16 Some Celotex product literature referred to RS5000 having class N performance throughout the entire product. This was in order to make clear that the whole product had been tested and not

00:23:27 whole product had been tested and not just the aluminium facer or the foam. This was intended to distinguish RS5000 from Kingspan's K range, which was believed only to achieve class N when

00:23:39 believed only to achieve class N when the foil facer or the foam was tested separately and not when tested as a composite product. Celotex accepts in hindsight that the phrase throughout the product was

00:23:51 phrase throughout the product was potentially confusing. However, its meaning was reasonably clear. As Mr. Hire said an architect would at the time have understood the phrase as simple assurance that the

00:24:02 phrase as simple assurance that the product meets class n in its entirety. Mr. Ray Bailey and Mr. Crawford, however, suggested that they took this phrase to mean that RS5000 was a product

00:24:13 phrase to mean that RS5000 was a product of limited combustibility. That we submit is unrealistic and contrived. Even if they read the phrase at the time, the suggestion that they were misled by that wording into

00:24:25 were misled by that wording into believing that RS5000 satisfied the limit linear route to compliance is not credible.

00:24:33 credible. The final point to address in relation to Cellertex's product literature is the description in the literature of the cladding system tested to BS8414 in May

00:24:45 cladding system tested to BS8414 in May 2014.

00:24:48 2014. In the immediate aftermath of the Grenell Tower fire and in view of the focus on the role played by the cladding system in the fire, Celotex suspended the sale of RS5000

00:25:00 Celotex suspended the sale of RS5000 pending further clarity and set about ascertaining the relevant facts surrounding the supply of the Celletex products that were used at Grenful Tower. This work was directed by

00:25:12 Tower. This work was directed by Celletex's managing director, Mr. O. Sullivan.

00:25:15 Sullivan. He had joined Celletex in May 2016 after the Celletex products used in the refurbishment were supplied. In the course of this work, Celotex's

00:25:28 In the course of this work, Celotex's current management learned of certain issues concerning the testing, certification, and marketing of Celotex's products. This has been

00:25:39 Celotex's products. This has been addressed in previous submissions by Celotex.

00:25:43 Celotex. One of the issues learned by Celotex's current management was the existence of differences between the system actually tested by the BRE in May 2014

00:25:54 tested by the BRE in May 2014 and the description of that system in the RS5000 product literature. Celotex acknowledges that this description was inaccurate.

00:26:05 inaccurate. The product literature failed to identify that at certain levels of the test rig a thinner cladding panel had been used behind which was installed a 6 millm magnesium oxide board.

00:26:18 millm magnesium oxide board. Those components were not mentioned in the test report prepared by the B following the May 2014 test or in Cellex's product literature. This issue was not previously known to

00:26:31 This issue was not previously known to Celotex's current management. I will explain shortly more about the steps Celtex took in response to this discovery.

00:26:42 discovery. However, it's important to emphasize that the misdescription of the s of the test system had no impact on and is completely irrelevant to the

00:26:54 completely irrelevant to the specification, supply and use of RS5000 at Grenful Tower. That is because it is clear beyond doubt that no construction professional

00:27:05 that no construction professional involved in the refurbishment placed any reliance whatsoever on the description of the test system in Cell Texas's product literature.

00:27:16 product literature. That includes Ryden Harley and Studio E. For example, both Mr. Lawrence of Ryden and Mr. Ankatel Jones of Harley

00:27:27 and Mr. Ankatel Jones of Harley confirmed in evidence that they that they never read the system description and took no steps to compare the system tested by Celotex with the system to be

00:27:40 tested by Celotex with the system to be installed at Grenful Tower. So far as Studio E is concerned, the clear inference to be drawn from Mr. Crawford's evidence is that he also never read the system description and

00:27:51 never read the system description and never considered its relevance to the cladding system at Grenful Tower. Even if the construction professionals had compared the system described in

00:28:03 had compared the system described in Cell Texas's product literature with the system proposed for Grenfell Tower, it should have been obvious to them that the differences between the two systems were so great that RS5000 could not be

00:28:15 were so great that RS5000 could not be used at Grenful Tower without further testing, obtaining a desktop study, or obtaining a holistic fire engineering report. This was confirmed not only by

00:28:26 report. This was confirmed not only by Mr. hired, but also by Mr. Sakula, the inquiry's cladding expert. In other words, the misdescription of the te tested system was irrelevant. It had no

00:28:39 tested system was irrelevant. It had no impact whatsoever on the refurbishment. Nonetheless, Celotex acknowledges that the misdescription should not have occurred

00:28:50 misdescription should not have occurred and has approached this matter with cander and transparency.

00:28:58 Once established, the issue was reported in January 2018 to the inquiry, the Metropolitan Police,

00:29:09 to the inquiry, the Metropolitan Police, Trading Standards, the Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government, and the BRE. At around the same time, the issue was publicly announced on Cellotex's website

00:29:22 publicly announced on Cellotex's website and steps were taken to notify customers, contractors known to have used RS5000 and desktop study providers that had been given copies of the BR's test

00:29:35 been given copies of the BR's test reports.

00:29:37 reports. Celotex also instructed linklers to undertake a review of all relevant documentation and other evidence concerning the testing of RS5000

00:29:48 concerning the testing of RS5000 and to prepare an objective and impartial account of the facts. The result of that review was set out in a BSH414 summary paper which was

00:30:01 a BSH414 summary paper which was provided to the inquiry in September 2018 as an appendix to Mr. O'Sullivan's witness statement. That summary paper and other appendices

00:30:13 That summary paper and other appendices to Mr. Sullivan's witness statement contain a full and detailed account of the BSA 414 tests commissioned by Celletex in 2014

00:30:25 Celletex in 2014 as well as the subsequent launch and promotion of RS5000.

00:30:31 Given the inaccuracies in the description of the test system, Celotex was concerned to establish whether that gave rise to any safety issues. It

00:30:42 gave rise to any safety issues. It therefore commissioned another BS8414 test, replicating as closely as possible the system described in the product literature so as to be able to share with the market information about the

00:30:55 with the market information about the likely practical effect of differences between the system described and the system in fact tested in May 2014. This further test was carried out in

00:31:07 This further test was carried out in April 2018. It showed that the retested system met the BR135 criteria. In other words, it showed that RS5000 could safely be used

00:31:21 showed that RS5000 could safely be used in the system described in the product literature in accordance with the statutory guidance at the time of the refurbishment. The results of this retest were

00:31:32 The results of this retest were announced in May 2018.

00:31:37 The matters which emerged in the course of Celotex's investigations involved inappropriate and unacceptable conduct on the part of a number of its

00:31:48 conduct on the part of a number of its employees. This was of real concern to Cellex's current management. Some of the employees involved including Mr. Roer had already left the company.

00:32:01 Mr. Roer had already left the company. Those who remained were the subject of disciplinary proceedings, including Mr. Hayes, Mr. Burgerer, and Mr. Evans, all of whom gave evidence in

00:32:12 Mr. Evans, all of whom gave evidence in module 2. They and three other employees resigned between December 2017 and March 2018.

00:32:23 2018. Celotex has sought to learn from this experience and has implemented improvements in its management and operational procedures to ensure that no such situation occurs in again. Among

00:32:36 such situation occurs in again. Among other things, Celotex has recruited new technical and operational management, improved training procedures, implemented changes in improvements to

00:32:47 implemented changes in improvements to to its testing processes, and designed new quality assurance systems with the assistance of a new quality assurance manager.

00:32:57 manager. In addition, Celotex has undertaken extensive due diligence to ensure that its products were and are safe. This includes commissioning additional

00:33:08 This includes commissioning additional fire safety tests of its insulation products.

00:33:13 products. These tests include the further BS8414 test of RS5000 which I've already mentioned. They also include BS476 tests to confirm the class N and class one

00:33:26 to confirm the class N and class one classifications of RS5000 and TV 4000 respectively. Cellotex recognizes the importance of ensuring that product literature is

00:33:37 ensuring that product literature is clear, accurate, and unambiguous. These principles underly the code for construction product information recently proposed by the construction

00:33:48 recently proposed by the construction products association. Cellotex endorses those principles. It has reviewed its product literature for its current range of insulation with those principles in mind and it will

00:34:00 those principles in mind and it will review the finalized code once it has been formally launched with the intention of adopting its provisions. Celletex simly endorses the work of the industry safety steering group chaired

00:34:12 industry safety steering group chaired by Dame Judith Hackett which is focused on improving competency and encouraging culture change in all sections of the construction industry.

00:34:25 construction industry. Mr. Chairman, I turn to my next topic, the wider failings of the construction professionals involved in the Grenful Tower refurbishment. The module one and two evidence has

00:34:36 The module one and two evidence has demonstrated the extent of those failings.

00:34:40 failings. Each of Studioe E, Harley and Harley, Ryden, and Exhiba fell far short of fulfilling the obligations they owed to the design they owed in relation to the

00:34:52 the design they owed in relation to the design and construction of the cladding facade.

00:34:55 facade. RBKC building control failed to carry out any adequate assessment of the external facade and other construction professionals involving C the

00:35:06 professionals involving C the fabricators of uh the Rainabon cladding panels and Max Forom the M& consultants uh were um also at fault.

00:35:17 uh were um also at fault. The failings of these various construction professionals were directly causitative of the installation of a non-compliant and unsafe cladding system at Grenful Tower.

00:35:29 at Grenful Tower. However, with the exception of RBKC, none of them has acknowledged their failings or accepted responsibility for their shortcomings despite overwhelming

00:35:41 their shortcomings despite overwhelming evidence of their incompetence. Celotex submits that they are clearly responsible for what happened on the night of the 14th of June 2017.

00:35:53 night of the 14th of June 2017. For the purposes of this oral statement, I highlight only certain key points. I begin with Studioe Harley and Ryden. In addition to selecting inappropriate

00:36:05 In addition to selecting inappropriate cladding panels and non-compliant insulation for the cladding system, these construction professionals failed in a number of other respects.

00:36:16 in a number of other respects. First, they failed to devise any coherent strategy for cavity barriers. Their failure to make any provision for cavity barriers around the window openings is particularly significant.

00:36:28 openings is particularly significant. This meant that there was a disproportionately high probability of an internal fire spreading into the cladding system. This failure was reckless. It was clear from ADB2 and

00:36:42 reckless. It was clear from ADB2 and other industry standards with which the cladding system was required to comply that cavity barriers were needed around the windows. However, none were provided despite

00:36:54 However, none were provided despite Harley having been advised by Mr. mort of side that the absence of cavity barriers at the head of the windows was a weak link for fire.

00:37:05 a weak link for fire. Secondly, Ryden wrongly arranged for SD plastering a dry lining contractor to fill gaps in the window surrounds at Grenful Tower with Celotex TB 4000 and

00:37:18 Grenful Tower with Celotex TB 4000 and Kingspan TP10 insulation. This contravened not only ADB2 but also the ND NBS specification which required rockwool non-combustible insulation to

00:37:31 rockwool non-combustible insulation to be used in those gaps. This had important consequences. The configuration of materials in the window surrounds also contributed to the

00:37:43 window surrounds also contributed to the disproportionately high probability of an internal fire spreading into the cladding system. Ryden is primarily responsible for this

00:37:55 Ryden is primarily responsible for this serious error. Mr. Lawrence personally approved the use of combustible insulation to fill gaps in the windowless surrounds without giving any consideration to the fire performance of

00:38:07 consideration to the fire performance of the products used or the requirements of ADB2.

00:38:11 ADB2. He admitted in evidence that SD plastering was not a design subcontractor and that Ryden was therefore itself responsible for the wrongful selection

00:38:23 responsible for the wrongful selection and use of combustible insulation around the windows. Despite this, Ryden argues that SD Plastering and Studio E are to blame and

00:38:35 Plastering and Studio E are to blame and not Ryden. Celotex agrees that studioe and SD plastering may also be at fault. Studioe for failing to clarify in drawings that

00:38:46 for failing to clarify in drawings that the insulation in the window surrounds was to be rockwool and SD plastering for failing to have any regard for fire safety.

00:38:54 safety. However, that does not exculpate Ryden which remains responsible for this serious error. Thirdly, Harley selected combustible

00:39:05 Thirdly, Harley selected combustible styrofoam and kingspan insulation as the core of the window infill panels. This was contrary to the requirements at ADB2.

00:39:17 ADB2. Harley did this without giving any consideration at all to the compliance of those products. Its disregard of the fire performance of the window infill panels is reflective of its general

00:39:29 panels is reflective of its general approach to fire safety. Fourthly,

00:39:34 Fourthly, Studio E, Harley, and Ryden all failed to have any regard to the fire safety of the crown that was an architectural feature at the top of the building comprised solely of tall fins of

00:39:46 comprised solely of tall fins of Rainabon PE without any insulation behind them. These fins were found by the inquiry in its phase one report to have been the primary driver of the extraordinary

00:39:58 primary driver of the extraordinary horizontal fire spread witnessed at Grenful Tower. That was one of the unique features of the fire and undoubtedly contributed to the extent to

00:40:09 undoubtedly contributed to the extent to the tragedy. None of studio e Harley or Ryden though gave any adequate consideration to the fire risks posed by their design of the crown.

00:40:24 Next I turn to Exivera. Exa was the only fire engineer on the project. It bears heavy responsibility for the fire.

00:40:36 for the fire. It failed to produce any comprehensive fire safety strategy despite having contractually agreed to do so. It misleadingly stated in successive

00:40:48 It misleadingly stated in successive drafts of its out outline fire safety strategy that it considered that the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread.

00:41:01 external fire spread. That advice was given without Mr. Ashton, the author of the outline fire safety strategy, giving any consideration to the proposed overcladding of the building.

00:41:14 overcladding of the building. Whilst that advice was qualified by the further statement that the position would be confirmed by an analysis in a future issue of the report.

00:41:26 future issue of the report. That statement implied by use of the word confirmed that Exiver already held a fairly firm view that overcladding the building would give rise to no problem which would just be confirmed later.

00:41:39 which would just be confirmed later. Moreover, the promised further report was never produced despite that is ex remaining engaged by the TMO for the duration of the

00:41:51 the TMO for the duration of the refurbishment.

00:41:54 These errors were compounded by Mr. Ashton's failure to to exercise any care in answering questions that were put to him by the design team after Ryden's

00:42:07 him by the design team after Ryden's appointment. On two occasions, those questions were of vital importance relating to the insulation in the cladding system and the provision of cavity barriers. The

00:42:18 the provision of cavity barriers. The answers Mr. Ashton gave on each occasion were inadequate, ambiguous or wrong. He admitted in evidence that he did not at the time pay much attention because he

00:42:29 the time pay much attention because he was not going to spend our hours at work on answering ad hoc questions for which he was not paid. Yet he was not transparent about this

00:42:40 Yet he was not transparent about this and proceeded to answer the questions and provide advice that was careless and inadequate. It does not behove Exora now to say that

00:42:51 It does not behove Exora now to say that it is not responsible for that inadequate advice which amounted to an abdication of its responsibility as the fire engineer on the project.

00:43:02 fire engineer on the project. I turn next to building control. RBKC

00:43:08 RBKC has admitted that its building control department failed to carry out any adequate assessment of the cladding system or the crown and consequently issued a completion certificate for the

00:43:20 issued a completion certificate for the refurbishment which should never have been issued. The full extent of RBKC's failings became apparent from the evidence of Mr. Hoben, the building control officer

00:43:32 Hoben, the building control officer assigned to the refurbishment. Celotex recognizes the heartfelt emotion which Mr. Hoben showed when answering

00:43:43 which Mr. Hoben showed when answering questions from the inquiry. However, his evidence showed that he was not capable of performing his role to the required standard.

00:43:54 the required standard. He had no prior experience of the overcladding of high-rise residential buildings. He lacked the necessary technical knowledge. He was confused about the routes to compliance and did

00:44:05 about the routes to compliance and did not understand the meaning of limited combustibility or that PIR could not be used in a cladding system if following the linear route to compliance.

00:44:16 route to compliance. One of Mr. Hoben's central failings was not to obtain a comprehensive cladding package. As a result, he did not have the information needed to assess compliance of the cladding system.

00:44:29 compliance of the cladding system. He claimed in evidence that he relied on Okconics's BBA certificate to verify compliance of the Rainabon PE panels, but that evidence we submit is is unreliable.

00:44:40 unreliable. Mr. Hoben did not mention the BBA certificate in either of his witness statements, and he admitted in evidence that his practice was any way not to read s such certificates in detail

00:44:51 read s such certificates in detail because he lacked the training and knowledge to interpret them. As regards insulation, Mr. Hoben claimed to have looked up Celtex insulation on a website after

00:45:05 Celtex insulation on a website after seeing it on site. However, it is unclear a what insulation Mr. Hoben uh saw on site, b when he saw

00:45:16 Mr. Hoben uh saw on site, b when he saw the insulation, c what website he may have viewed, and d what he saw on the website.

00:45:24 website. Mr. Hoben said that he knew that the insulation was Celotex insulation from the company logo he saw. However, two kinds of of Celotex

00:45:35 However, two kinds of of Celotex insulation were on the Grenful site. RS5000 and TB 4000 which as I've said was used by Ryden to fill gaps in the

00:45:46 was used by Ryden to fill gaps in the window surrounds. There was no Celotex logo on the facer of RS5000. However, if Mr. Hobman looked up TB

00:45:57 However, if Mr. Hobman looked up TB 4000, whatever he saw could not possibly have justified compliance of the insulation used in the cladding system. Mr. Hoben was also unclear about what

00:46:08 Mr. Hoben was also unclear about what website he viewed. He gave conflicting evidence about whether he viewed Celotex's website or the LABC website. In addition, he could not recall what he had seen on the website.

00:46:21 had seen on the website. Celotex submits that his evidence on this issue is wholly unreliable. The tribunal cannot fairly conclude that Mr. Hovind was misled, whether by some

00:46:32 Mr. Hovind was misled, whether by some something seen on Celotex's website or the LABC website, into believing that the insulation used in the cladding system was compliant.

00:46:44 system was compliant. There is a specific issue about whether Mr. Hoben saw the LABC certificate for RS5000

00:46:53 RS5000 when looking for information about Celotex insulation online. If he did view the LABC certificate, he would have seen one of the later versions of the certificate and not the

00:47:05 versions of the certificate and not the original version of the LABC certificate issued in August 2014. This follows from the likely timing of his viewing of any website that is after

00:47:19 his viewing of any website that is after delivery of Celotex insulation to the Grenful site. This matters because the later versions of the LABC certificate gave prominence

00:47:31 of the LABC certificate gave prominence to the limitations on using RS5000 in high-rise buildings. RS5000 was delivered to the Granville site in batches from April 2015 onwards,

00:47:44 site in batches from April 2015 onwards, whereas TB4000 was on site ready for for installation from around July to September 2015.

00:47:55 September 2015. Now, documentary evidence provided by the LABC

00:47:59 the LABC confirms that no RS5000 certificate was available to view on the LABC website from the 6th of November 2014 until the

00:48:10 from the 6th of November 2014 until the 1st of July 2015, on which date the LABC posted on its website the revised version of the RS5000 certificate.

00:48:21 RS5000 certificate. It follows that the only LABC certificate that Mr. Hoben could have viewed online after the delivery of Celletex insulation to the Granful site

00:48:32 Celletex insulation to the Granful site was the revised version. That version set out in extensive detail that the BR135 certification obtained by Celotex for RS5000

00:48:44 Celotex for RS5000 applied only to the specific test system tested and that an appropriate classification report or supplementary report had to be obtained to evidence

00:48:55 report had to be obtained to evidence the suitability of the products use in any proposed makeup. For good measure, the revised certificate also stated that thermos

00:49:06 certificate also stated that thermos setting insulins such as RS5000 did not meet the limited combustibility requirements of ADB2 and should not therefore be accepted as satisfying the

00:49:17 therefore be accepted as satisfying the linear route to compliance. It follows that Mr. Hoben could not have relied on the LABC certificate as permitting the use of RS5000 at Grenful

00:49:28 permitting the use of RS5000 at Grenful Tower. We agree with the LABC's closing submission on this point. Mr. Hoben admitted in evidence that his failure properly to investigate the

00:49:39 failure properly to investigate the suitability of RS5000 was a serious failing on his part. It is clear that he failed also to assess compliance of other aspects of the

00:49:50 compliance of other aspects of the facade works including the absence of cavity barriers, the non-compliant wind uh window infill panels and the crown. There can be no doubt that if RBKC

00:50:01 There can be no doubt that if RBKC building control had done its job properly, the refurbishment works would not have been approved and construction of an unsafe cladding facade would have been prevented.

00:50:13 been prevented. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I turn to Aronic. The position of Aronic is dealt with in Celotex's written closing submission in detail. It is also covered by other core

00:50:24 detail. It is also covered by other core participants to substantially the same effect.

00:50:28 effect. I can therefore deal with this matter shortly. I wish to emphasize two points. First, unlike PIR which could safely be used in compliance with the building

00:50:40 used in compliance with the building regulations in a cladding system with an appropriate combination of other components. Rainabond PE panels could not be used safely in a cladding system at all.

00:50:54 safely in a cladding system at all. This was demonstrated by the BS8414 tests carried out by the department for communities and local government following the Grenful Tower fire.

00:51:05 following the Grenful Tower fire. Those tests showed that cladding systems incorporating PE cord ACM panels failed to meet the BR135 criteria irrespective

00:51:16 to meet the BR135 criteria irrespective of the kind of insulation with which the panels were combined. The tests failed even when non-combustible insulation was used in a

00:51:27 non-combustible insulation was used in a cladding system with PEC cord ACM panels.

00:51:32 panels. By contrast, a cladding system incorporating Celotex RS5000 with an ACM panel with a class A2 filler met the test criteria.

00:51:45 met the test criteria. And as I have mentioned, the system tested by Celotex in April 2018, which replicated as closely as possible the system described in Celotex's product literature, also met the BR135 criteria.

00:52:00 literature, also met the BR135 criteria. Aronic nevertheless suggests that Rainabond PE was capable of being used in a compliant manner in high-rise buildings. Celotex invites the inquiry to reject

00:52:14 Celotex invites the inquiry to reject this contention. Contrary to our conics argument, Rainabon PE was incapable of being used on a building in such a way as to adequately resist the spread of fire

00:52:27 adequately resist the spread of fire over the external walls. Aronic knew that was the case. Its technical manager, Mr. Ver repeatedly warned the company that ACMP was

00:52:40 warned the company that ACMP was dangerous and unsuitable for use on cladding facads. These warnings were unequivocal and not couched with qualifications and

00:52:51 couched with qualifications and reservations. They demonstrate that Arconics's own technical manager regarded the product at the time as necessarily inappropriate

00:53:04 at the time as necessarily inappropriate and unusable. However, these warnings were overridden by the company which was unwilling to stop selling Rainabon PE despite knowing

00:53:16 stop selling Rainabon PE despite knowing how dangerous it was. The second point I wish to emphasize is that Arconics's own documents and the evidence given by its managing director, Mr. Schmidt, make absolutely clear that

00:53:30 Mr. Schmidt, make absolutely clear that Arconic deliberately misled the market about the true fire performance of Rainabond PE over an extended period of time.

00:53:41 time. Rainabond PE was marketed in the UK and supplied for use at Grenful Tower on the basis of a certificate from the BBA certifying that the product may be

00:53:53 certifying that the product may be regarded as having a class N surface. Aronic knew that this certification was invalid and false.

00:54:04 invalid and false. Rainabond PE had never been tested under BS476 part six and 7 which are the tests necessary to achieve class N classification.

00:54:15 classification. The product was only tested under the Euroclass regime but those tests did not justify the class N classification claimed by Aronic.

00:54:28 claimed by Aronic. So far as the cassette variant of Rainabond PE is concerned, Aronic knew that this variant only ever achieved the class E classification when

00:54:40 achieved the class E classification when tested from 2004 onwards. That is one of the lowest classifications possible under the European testing regime. It meant that the product in cassette

00:54:53 It meant that the product in cassette form could not be used on building facads. Those test results were never disclosed to the BBA or the market. The cassette variant

00:55:04 BBA or the market. The cassette variant of course is the version of the product that was used at Grenle Tower. So far as the rivet variant of Brainabon P is concerned that initially achieved

00:55:15 P is concerned that initially achieved the class B classification but Arconic later acknowledged that those results were attained by manipulating the test systems.

00:55:26 systems. From 2013 onwards the rivet variant only ever achieved euro class C under ADB2. A cladding panel classified as class C

00:55:39 cladding panel classified as class C could not be treated as having a class N classification under British standards. That required at least class B or better.

00:55:51 better. In 2014,

00:55:54 In 2014, Aronic cancelled the class B certifications that it had previously obtained for Rainabond PE. There was therefore no class B

00:56:06 There was therefore no class B classification in existence at the time that RB was sold for use at Granful Tower. The submission to the contrary made by

00:56:17 The submission to the contrary made by Aronic this morning is in our submission wrong.

00:56:23 wrong. Aronic did not disclose to the BBA that the Rivet variant only achieved a class C classification after 2013 or that Aronic had cancelled the class B

00:56:36 or that Aronic had cancelled the class B classification previously obtained for the Rivet variant. That was despite the class B classification of the rivet variant having formed the basis of the BBA's certification of Rainabondon PE as

00:56:50 BBA's certification of Rainabondon PE as class N.

00:56:52 class N. Had our conic disclosed the cassette test results or the post two 2013 rivet results to the BBA, the BBA certificate would not have been issued in the terms it was or would have been withdrawn.

00:57:06 it was or would have been withdrawn. In either event, the BBA certificate could not have been relied upon by Arconic or other parties to support the use of Rainabond PE at Grenell Tower.

00:57:17 use of Rainabond PE at Grenell Tower. Aronic's documents also show that long before Rainabon PE was supplied to use of Grenell Tower, Mr. VA had repeatedly advised the company in strong terms that it should stop marketing Rainabon PE for

00:57:31 it should stop marketing Rainabon PE for use in architectural facads because the product was so dangerous. His advice, however, was overridden by iconics management on the grounds that he was

00:57:42 management on the grounds that he was technical and unccommercial. As a result, Rainobon PE continued to be promoted and marketed for use in cladding systems in the UK when there

00:57:53 cladding systems in the UK when there was no legitimate basis for doing so. The product should not have been sold or supplied for use at Grenfold Tower. Aonic should have stopped marketing it

00:58:04 Aonic should have stopped marketing it for use on building facads long before then. Aronic's suggestion that it should be exempted from criticism is we submit untenable. It is obvious that Arconic

00:58:18 untenable. It is obvious that Arconic bears heavy responsibility for the specification and use of cladding panels at Grenful Tower that it knew to be dangerous.

00:58:29 dangerous. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I reiterate Celotex's commitment to assisting this inquiry.

00:58:37 inquiry. As I said at the outset, Celotex has acknowledged with regret that there were shortcomings in the historic testing and certification of certain of its products. It has been transparent and

00:58:50 products. It has been transparent and candid about those shortcomings. It has learned lessons and made improvements to its business as a result.

00:58:59 result. Celotex's role, however, needs to be seen in the context of the Grenful Tower refurbishment. Celletex submits that it is clear on the evidence that responsibility for the

00:59:12 evidence that responsibility for the non-compliant planning facade at Grenful Tower lies as I have outlined in this statement with the construction professionals responsible for the design and construction of the facade or

00:59:25 and construction of the facade or advising on it and the TMO RBKC and Oconic.

00:59:31 Oconic. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. Thank you for the opportunity to make the statement on behalf of Celotex.

00:59:41 Celotex. Well, thank you very much, Mr. O. That's very helpful and given us a lot to consider. Uh, at this point, we'll take the afternoon break and we'll resume at

00:59:52 the afternoon break and we'll resume at half past 3 when Mr. Webb, Queens Council, will make a statement on behalf of Kingspan. So, half past 3, please.

01:17:39 Well, welcome back everyone. We're now going to hear a closing statement on behalf of Kingspan from Mr. Grant Webb, Queens Council. Good afternoon, Mr. Webb. I can see you. Can you see me?

01:17:52 Webb. I can see you. Can you see me? Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Yes. Good. And we can obviously we can obviously hear each other as well. That's good. Well, we're ready to hear your statement. Um, off you go

01:18:03 hear your statement. Um, off you go then. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Grandport Tower fire was a tragedy that should never have happened. And as I said in the opening statement, Kings Insulation

01:18:16 the opening statement, Kings Insulation welcomes and supports the vitally important work of this inquiry in its efforts to determine what went wrong and why.

01:18:25 why. In module one of phase two, the inquiry has been considering amongst other things the numerous failings which resulted in the refurbishment of Grenful Tower being non-compliant with the building regulations.

01:18:37 building regulations. Kingspan Insulation had no direct involvement in the refurbishment of Grenful Tower. It played no role in the design or installation of the cladding system. It provided no advice or

01:18:48 system. It provided no advice or technical guidance to those responsible for the design of the refurbishment or the installation. It had no contractual relationship with the council or the TMO or any of the

01:18:59 the council or the TMO or any of the designers or any of the contractors engaged on the refurbishment. It did not provide any products directly to those involved in the refurbishment. It was not informed that its K15

01:19:11 It was not informed that its K15 phenolic insulation product was being used on the tower and it was not aware that K15 had been used on the tower until after the fire. Those responsible

01:19:23 until after the fire. Those responsible for the design of the refurbishment had specified that Celotex's PIR insulation would be installed behind the cladding and almost all of the rainscreen insulation purchased for the tower,

01:19:34 insulation purchased for the tower, approximately 95% of it was Celotex's PI. However, since the fire, it's become clear that a limited amount of K15 phenolic insulation was used as a

01:19:45 phenolic insulation was used as a substitute when supplies of the Celotex PIR could not be obtained for a short period.

01:19:51 period. In total, only about 5% of the Rainspan installation purchased for use on Grenful Tower was K15. Given that Kingspan Installation had no involvement in any aspect to the design

01:20:02 involvement in any aspect to the design or refurbishment of Grenful Tower, and no witnesses connected to the company were called to give evidence in module one, my submissions on module one will be brief.

01:20:12 be brief. Much of the evidence heard in module one and two has focused on aspects of the raincreen cladding and the facade insulation used on Grenville Tower. And so my submissions will also focus on

01:20:23 so my submissions will also focus on these issues. However, it's important to keep in mind at all times that the tragedy was a result of multiple failings on the part of many different entities and individuals who went far

01:20:35 entities and individuals who went far beyond the issues relating to the cladding system. Such failings included, for example, failings in respect of the window systems, fire doors and their automatic closures, the gas supply cutff

01:20:47 automatic closures, the gas supply cutff and the smoke extraction system, as well as in relation to the response to the fire on the night. The reasons for the tragedy cannot be properly understood unless the importance of those numerous

01:20:58 unless the importance of those numerous wider issues are fully recognized. Focusing on the cladding system itself, the starting point is the building regulations. At the time of the refurbishment of the tower, the

01:21:10 refurbishment of the tower, the collective guidance and approved document B and technical guidance note 18 required any cladding system for the tower to be assessed under one of four available routes to compliance.

01:21:21 available routes to compliance. As Kingspan Installation noted in its closing submissions in phase one, none of these routes was satisfied in respect to the Grenful Tower refurbishment. Kingspan Installation therefore agrees

01:21:32 Kingspan Installation therefore agrees with the conclusion reached at paragraph 26.4 of the phase 1 report, namely that the design of the refurbishment was not compliant with the building regulations.

01:21:43 compliant with the building regulations. The system therefore should not have been specified or installed. Further, it should not have been approved by building control. When it comes to considering how and why

01:21:54 When it comes to considering how and why a non-compliant cladding system was specified and installed, we would invite you to have regard to the following four points in particular. First and foremost, we invite you to

01:22:05 First and foremost, we invite you to consider the dominance of the role played by the PE called ACM cladding in the Grenful Tower fire. As set out at paragraph 2.13 of the phase 1 report, the evidence has established that the

01:22:17 the evidence has established that the principal reason why the flames spread so rapidly up, down, and around the building was the presence of the PE cord cladding, which acted as a source of fuel. Put simply, the use of iconics

01:22:29 fuel. Put simply, the use of iconics reaed

01:22:33 the tower unsafe following the refurbishment works. It's now clear that prior to the Grenville tower refurbishment, Arconic knew that the cassette version of its PE cord ACM cladding only achieved

01:22:45 cord ACM cladding only achieved euroclass E when tested. It therefore knew or should have known that its claim of a eurolass B classification was incorrect, certainly in respect to the cassette version that was subsequently

01:22:57 cassette version that was subsequently used on Grenell Tower. It knew or should have known that the product was unsafe and not suitable for use on tall residential buildings. As far as we are aware, no system

01:23:10 As far as we are aware, no system incorporating PE cord ACM cladding of the type used on the tower has ever successfully passed a full-scale BS8414 fire test in combination with any form

01:23:21 fire test in combination with any form of insulation. After the Grand Tower fire, the Department for Communities and Local Government commissioned two BS8414 tests on PEC called ACM cladding systems.

01:23:33 on PEC called ACM cladding systems. One system incorporated PI insulation. The other incorporated synthetic mineral fiber insulation classified as non-combustible. Both systems failed the test in under

01:23:44 Both systems failed the test in under eight minutes and therefore failed to meet the criteria set by BR135. The independent expert panel concluded that ACM with unmodified poly polyethylene filler presents a

01:23:57 polyethylene filler presents a significant fire hazard on residential buildings at any height with any form of insulation. This is a vitally important issue. It is clear from all of the available evidence

01:24:08 clear from all of the available evidence that whilst the building regulations did not permit PIR or phenolic facade insulation to be used with the iconic PE cord ATM cladding, the iconic cladding

01:24:19 cord ATM cladding, the iconic cladding would have been unsafe whether it had it had been combined with combustible or non-combustible insulation as demonstrated by that DCLG testing. Furthermore, the extensive independent

01:24:30 Furthermore, the extensive independent and peer-reviewed testing and modeling carried out and published by Effectis has shown that there would have been no material difference in the nature and speed of the spread of the fire at

01:24:41 speed of the spread of the fire at Grenfield Tower had the PE cord ACM cladding been combined with non-combustible synthetic mineral fiber installation instead of PI. Full details of that testing and

01:24:52 Full details of that testing and modeling are provided in footnote 11 of our written closing submissions. In addition, the validity of the expert panel's conclusion that PE cord ACM cladding presents a significant fire hazard with any form of insulation is

01:25:05 hazard with any form of insulation is also clear from the evidence relating to other serious fires involving this type of cladding. Such fires have occurred in buildings behind buildings using synthetic mineral fiber insulation directly behind PE cord ACM such as the

01:25:18 directly behind PE cord ACM such as the Tory Amber fire in Madrid in August 2020 and the fire at the torch in Dubai in 2015 or even when there was no facade installation at all such as at the

01:25:29 installation at all such as at the address building in Dubai in 2015. The common factor again and again has been the PE called ACM cladding. Full details of the fire in Milan just two

01:25:40 details of the fire in Milan just two weeks ago are not yet available, but the indications are that this was yet another fire involving PE cord ACN. The second major failing was in respect of design. Those at studio lacked

01:25:52 of design. Those at studio lacked experience of high-rise cladding system. This was coupled with widespread ignorance of the risks inherent in PE cord ACM cladding amongst those involved in the project. Overall, there was a

01:26:03 in the project. Overall, there was a lack of understanding and appreciation uh in relation to the question of safety when it came to the design of the refurbishment as demonstrated for example in respect to the positioning of

01:26:14 example in respect to the positioning of cavity barriers and detailing around the window reveals. In this context, it's important to note that even if the iconic cassette system had genuinely been euroclass B, it would

01:26:25 had genuinely been euroclass B, it would still have been impermissible to combine such cladding with PIR or phenolic insulation under the linear route to compliance. Thus, the design of the cladding system on any view was not

01:26:36 cladding system on any view was not compliant with the regulations. The third major failing was in respect of building control. Building control should have acted as an external and independent safeguard on the refurbishment project to ensure that the

01:26:48 refurbishment project to ensure that the specified cladding system was compliant with the building regulations. It failed in this critical role. The inquiry's appointing building control expert Ms. Menses confirmed in her report that

01:27:00 Menses confirmed in her report that she'd not seen any evidence of communications between any party and building control, but refers to the compliance or non-compliance of the cladding system, nor any evidence that

01:27:11 cladding system, nor any evidence that building control requested details of the cladding systems ability to resist fire spread. She described this as a fundamental failing. Ultimately, those responsible for the

01:27:22 Ultimately, those responsible for the design, construction, and approval of Grenville Tower refurbishment bear responsibility for the fact that the refurbishment failed to comply with the building regulations and was unsafe.

01:27:33 building regulations and was unsafe. Fourfully, however, Kingspanulation is firmly of the view that the building regulations themselves were flawed and remain flawed to this day because the linear route compliance permits systems to be built based on smallcale testing

01:27:46 to be built based on smallcale testing of individual components without requiring the safety of the system as a whole to be proved in full-scale fire test. Had a full-scale fire test been required in respect to the Grenle Tower cladding system, then it's clear from

01:27:58 cladding system, then it's clear from the DCLG tests that it would have failed whatever insulation was used. Mr. Chairman, I now turn to module 2. My suitions on module 2 fall into three

01:28:09 suitions on module 2 fall into three parts. First, a few introductory points in respect of certain issues relevant to module 2 evidence relating to Kingpan insulation. Second, I shall consider the evidence concerning testing,

01:28:20 evidence concerning testing, certification, and classification of K15. And thirdly, I shall respond to some of the other allegations that have been advanced against Kingspan insulation which do not directly relate to K15 itself.

01:28:34 to K15 itself. The first point I wish to address at the outset concerns the safety of K15 insulation. On numerous occasions during this inquiry, it has been asserted that K15 phenolic insulation is somehow unsafe for use in rainscreen cladding.

01:28:47 unsafe for use in rainscreen cladding. It's also been asserted that the company knew that it was unsafe. These allegations are demonstrably untrue. They're contrary to the evidence. In total, 14 different cladding systems

01:28:59 total, 14 different cladding systems incorporating current K15, the type of insulation used on the tower, have successfully passed full-scale BS8414 fire tests. Each of those tests is

01:29:10 fire tests. Each of those tests is listed at footnote five of our written and closing submissions. Those tests have involved a range of different cladding systems, including ACM systems with an A2 rating. There have also been

01:29:21 with an A2 rating. There have also been other successful tests of systems incorporating K15 conducted by third parties with which Kingspan Insulation has had no involvement. Kingspan Insulation is not aware of any

01:29:32 Kingspan Insulation is not aware of any other type of raincreen insulation that has passed so many different cladding systems. Sorry, which I repeat that. Kingspan insulation is not aware of any other type of rainscreen insulation that

01:29:44 other type of rainscreen insulation that has been used in so many different cladding systems which have passed full-scale BS8414 fire tests. The only realistic way to test the cladding

01:29:55 realistic way to test the cladding system is via full-scaled fire test of the whole system. This was the conclusion referred to by Dr. Lane in her presentation to the inquiry on day 68 in November last year, referencing

01:30:06 68 in November last year, referencing Dr. Raymond Conny's conclusions in his 1994 report and it remains the position today. At the time of the refurbishment of Grenle Tower, approved document B

01:30:17 of Grenle Tower, approved document B expressly permitted cladding systems that had successfully passed BS8414 test to be used on high-rise residential buildings. Thus, such systems were recognized to be safe systems. The MHCLG

01:30:30 recognized to be safe systems. The MHCLG guidance for building owners of multi-story multi-occupied residential buildings dated January 2020 also explicitly allows the retention of correctly installed and maintained raincreen cladding systems which have

01:30:43 raincreen cladding systems which have passed a BS8414 test. Kingspan installation relies on each of its 14 successful 8414 tests to demonstrate why it is confident and right to be confident that K15 can safely be used

01:30:55 confident that K15 can safely be used and retained in appropriate cladding systems.

01:30:59 systems. The second point concerns concerns the role played by insulation in a rainscreen cladding system. No one doubts that residential buildings should be insulated. No one doubts that

01:31:10 should be insulated. No one doubts that rainscreen cladding systems should contain insulation. Indeed, one of the primary objectives of the Grenell Tower refurbishment project was to improve the insulation and thermal performance of

01:31:21 insulation and thermal performance of the building. But any rainscreen insulation, including non-combustible insulation, will play some role in a cladding fire, not least because its insulating properties act to

01:31:32 because its insulating properties act to retain heat from combustion of the cladding system. Therefore, the relevant question in so far as insulation is concerned is not what would have happened if there had been no raincreen insulation at Grenford tower, but

01:31:44 insulation at Grenford tower, but whether the nature or speed of the spread of the fire would have been materially different had an alternative type of insulation been used. On this issue, the scientific evidence is clear and unequivocal. The nature and

01:31:57 is clear and unequivocal. The nature and speed of the spread of the fire would have been no different had non-combustible insulation being used instead of P oric insulation behind the PE cord ACM cladding. Testing commissioned by the DCLG following the

01:32:09 commissioned by the DCLG following the Grenford tower demonstrated that the systems incorporating Pcord ACM failed BS8414 tests whether combined with non-combustible synthetic mineral fiber

01:32:20 non-combustible synthetic mineral fiber or with PI insulation. Both systems as I've said failed very quickly in under eight minutes. In fact, the system incorporating non-combustible insulation failed marginally quicker than the system incorporating PIR.

01:32:32 system incorporating PIR. Independent testing and modeling by effect as I've said demonstrates that the PC cord ACM was so dominant in the fire spread that there would have been no material difference in the rate of the fire spread on Grenville tower if

01:32:43 the fire spread on Grenville tower if non-combustible synthetic mineral fiber had been used instead of the P insulation. It's understood that the inquiry will be producing its own expert evidence on these fundamental issues in module 7.

01:32:55 module 7. The third point to emphasize is this. Whilst Kings Pan Solution has fully acknowledged and apologized for historical shortcomings in its processes and procedures as set out in its written statements, many other allegations and

01:33:07 statements, many other allegations and assertions have been made against the company and its employees which are quite simply untrue. As I've said, allegations attacking K15 safety have been made which totally ignore the

01:33:18 been made which totally ignore the relevant evidence. maybe that K15 has been used in more cladding systems which have passed full-scale fire tests than any other type of installation as far as we're aware and I shall deal with other similar allegations shortly.

01:33:30 similar allegations shortly. It is part of the role of council to the inquiry to put allegations to witnesses in order to elicit an answer in evidence. There is though an inherent risk that those observing the questioning process may mistakenly

01:33:42 questioning process may mistakenly believe that an assertion put to a witness must be true, but it may not be. That risk is all the greater when the incorrect assertion is repeated time and time again either by council or the

01:33:53 time again either by council or the media as if it were an established fact. Core participants are therefore dependent on you, Mr. Chairman, and you members of the panel, to be extremely careful when considering the totality of the evidence, both written and oral, to

01:34:06 the evidence, both written and oral, to ensure that the process followed does not result in an incorrect understanding of the true factual position or incorrect conclusions being drawn. Kingspan Installation has been

01:34:17 Kingspan Installation has been criticized for certain shortcomings between 2005 and 2014. It has learned from its mistakes and has taken steps to ensure that its processes and procedures are improved. But such matters should

01:34:28 are improved. But such matters should not distract from the important goal of establishing the actual cause of the fire, the true reasons for its tragic consequences, and the need to ensure that necessary measures are tech are taken to protect life safety in future.

01:34:42 taken to protect life safety in future. The reality is that none of the shortcomings on the part of King's Spang Station are relevant to the unsafe design of the Granville Tower refurbishment. Nor were they caused of the fire and nor were they caused to the nature or speed of the spread of the

01:34:54 nature or speed of the spread of the fire.

01:34:56 fire. In respect to the testing of K15 to which I now turn, various allegations been made to the effect that Kingsman insulation somehow manipulated BS8414 tests. Such allegations are not true.

01:35:09 tests. Such allegations are not true. None of the BS8414 tests of K15 have been manipulated. More generally, the criticisms made of Kingspan installation in respect of testing can be categorized into six main themes, and I shall deal with each of them in turn. Now, the

01:35:22 with each of them in turn. Now, the first category of allegations concerns the design of the 2005 BS8414 test. That criticism is misplaced. The BS8414 test was introduced in 2002.

01:35:35 was introduced in 2002. was a new type of test being a test of a system rather than a particular product. The 2005 test was one of the very first VS8414 tests undertaken.

01:35:46 VS8414 tests undertaken. At that time, it was reasonably believed by those involved that testing a single specific type of cladding would not be particularly helpful for fire engineering professionals. The thinking was that it would be better to test a

01:35:57 was that it would be better to test a buildup that could be taken to simulate the performance of a generic non-combustible outer cladding. Contrary to the assertions advanced by others, there was nothing dishonest or inappropriate about Kingpanulation's

01:36:09 inappropriate about Kingpanulation's approach to the 2005 test. It was a bonafide test of a system which had been suggested by the BR. Both the B and King Spanulation were trying to understand how a new testing regime was intended by

01:36:21 how a new testing regime was intended by to be used by professionals within the industry.

01:36:25 industry. Furthermore, the rationale behind the approach adopted was entirely reasonable. Indeed, in 2014, the regulatory guidance was amended so as to allow evidence from a test on one system to be used by a fire engineering experts

01:36:36 to be used by a fire engineering experts to advise on safety of a different system via desktop studies. Thus, the concept of extrapolation came to be accepted as a legitimate route to compliance.

01:36:47 compliance. There have also been allegations made that the 2005 test was rigged in some way. Again, these allegations are simply untrue. It was a valid test conducted transparently and honestly. Criticisms

01:36:59 transparently and honestly. Criticisms criticisms have been made of the way in which the timings of the test were recorded, but those timings were recorded by BRE employees and Kingpan Insulation was not involved in taking or recording those timings. In any event,

01:37:12 recording those timings. In any event, the system met the BR135 criteria regardless of any issues concerning the way in which the timings were recorded. This was made clear by the BRE in their evidence. There has also been an attempt

01:37:24 evidence. There has also been an attempt to allege the 2005 test used unrepresentative fire barriers. The basis of this allegation has never been understood and has not been supported by any expert evidence. Inspolation understands that fire barriers used were

01:37:36 understands that fire barriers used were offthe-shelf purchases that were on the market at the time and typical of such products.

01:37:42 products. The allegations that the 2005 test was somehow rigged by King's Manulation is one of numerous examples of very serious allegations which been made against the company which have no basis. In fact, the 2005 test was conducted honestly and

01:37:55 the 2005 test was conducted honestly and transparently by Kingspan Insulation and the B and that is what the evidence shows. The fact that repeating allegations made to the been made to the contrary does not change that reality.

01:38:07 contrary does not change that reality. Erraneous allegations have also been made about the requirement for a BR135 classification report. It was repeatedly put to witnesses in the context of the 2005 test that a classification report

01:38:18 2005 test that a classification report was somehow necessary in order to enable the company to state that the test had met the criteria set by BR135. The true position is that at the time of the 2005 test, there was no regulatory

01:38:30 the 2005 test, there was no regulatory requirement to obtain a classification report. There's always an option available, but the relevant data was set out in the test report provided by the test house and competent professionals could satisfy themselves as to whether

01:38:41 could satisfy themselves as to whether the data met BR135 criteria. 10 years after the test, however, there was a change in the guidance. In June 2015, BCA technical guidance note 18 for

01:38:53 2015, BCA technical guidance note 18 for the first time suggested a classification report should be obtained. Within three months of this new guidance being published, Kingspanislation sought a classification report for the 2005 test. All the

01:39:05 report for the 2005 test. All the relevant information relating to the 2005 test was set out in the original test report. And so there's no difficulty in B issuing a classification report in 2015 for the 2005 test. This

01:39:17 report in 2015 for the 2005 test. This has also been confirmed by the B in their submissions and evidence. Furthermore, those competent to do so can look at the 2005 test and as for themselves that the test met the BR135 criteria.

01:39:29 criteria. Finally, in relation to the 2005 test, it was alleged during oral submissions yesterday that the only successful BS8414 test on K15 at the time of supply to Grenul was the 2005 test. This is

01:39:41 to Grenul was the 2005 test. This is incorrect. In fact, when K15 was first purchased for Grenful Tower in May 2015, a further successful BS8414 test of K15 had taken place. And when K15 was

01:39:52 had taken place. And when K15 was supplied for the second time in September 2015, a further two successful BS8414 tests of K15 had taken place. All three of these tests were in respect to the current K15, the type used on the

01:40:03 the current K15, the type used on the tower.

01:40:05 tower. The second category of criticism concerns the fact that King's Manulation continued to rely upon the 2005 test after certain changes were made in respect to the way in which K15 was manufactured.

01:40:16 manufactured. The company has fully accepted that the change in technology means that it should have reconducted the 2005 test with K15 manufactured using the new technology. However, its failure to do

01:40:27 technology. However, its failure to do so was based on its honest belief that the change in technology would not make any material difference to the fire performance of the product in a BS8414 test. Dr. Malcolm Rashford, the

01:40:38 test. Dr. Malcolm Rashford, the technical director at the relevant time, explained based on his extensive experience of phenolics at ICI and at Kingspan insulation that both new technology and old technology K15 use

01:40:49 technology and old technology K15 use fundamentally the same type of phenolic foam. that there was no reason on a chemical level to expect any significant differences in terms of the fire performance between the two technologies, explaining that if

01:41:00 technologies, explaining that if anything, the new technology benefit benefited from a less flammable blowing agent.

01:41:06 agent. On the 6th of June 2019, Kingspan Insulation undertook ABS 8414 test of a system which was as close as possible to the system used in the 201 in the 2005

01:41:17 the system used in the 201 in the 2005 test but which incorporated current K15 instead of old technology K15. The system passed the test. This 2019 replacement test demonstrates that the

01:41:29 replacement test demonstrates that the failure to undertake a replacement for the 2005 test earlier in time has not given rise to any fire safety risks. Any fire engineer or other expert who relied upon that original 2005 test now has the

01:41:42 upon that original 2005 test now has the replacement test to rely upon inspect the current K15. The company has now put in place a rigorous audit and change management system to ensure continuing product

01:41:53 system to ensure continuing product compliance. The third category of allegations relating to testing concerns fire performance. It has wrongly been asserted on numerous occasions that new technology K15 has a worse fire

01:42:05 technology K15 has a worse fire performance than old technology K15. There's absolutely no scientific or expert evidence to support such an assertion. The allegation has been based in particular on a report by Iva Meredith

01:42:16 particular on a report by Iva Meredith of a December 2007 BS8414 test of a cladding system incorporating aluminium cassettes. That system failed. It was asserted by cross by council in

01:42:27 asserted by cross by council in cross-examination that the new technology K15 failed spectacularly in this December 200 2007 test and the test proved the new technology K15 had a

01:42:38 proved the new technology K15 had a worse performance than old technology K15. Such assertions are patently incorrect. K15 did not fail the test in 2007, let alone fail it spectacularly as

01:42:49 2007, let alone fail it spectacularly as asserted. The failure of the system tested in December 2007 demonstrates that that cladding system as a whole was not capable of passing the demanding requirements of the BS8414 test. The

01:43:02 requirements of the BS8414 test. The failure of the test says nothing about new technology K15 as against old technology K15. This reality is demonstrated by the fact that the December 2000 test was repeated in

01:43:13 December 2000 test was repeated in January 2008 using non-combustible synthetic mineral fiber insulation instead of K15 and it failed again. Yet no one considers that the failure of the

01:43:25 no one considers that the failure of the 2008 test means that the synthetic mineral fiber insulation is unsafe or is somehow less safe than old technology K15.

01:43:35 K15. It would be perverse and wholly wrong for the inquiry to conclude that the difference between the 2005 8414 test result and the 2007 test result could somehow be attributed to the slight

01:43:47 somehow be attributed to the slight technological changes in respect of K15 as opposed to the gross differences in the designs of the cladding systems being tested. Yet that was the assertion repeatedly put to witnesses as if it were true and

01:43:59 put to witnesses as if it were true and then reported as if it were established fact in the media. It's also notable that Mr. Meredith, whose report described the failure of that December 2000 test, was not present

01:44:10 that December 2000 test, was not present when the test took place. Yet, his description of the test as a raging inferno, was referenced on numerous occasions during this inquiry, as if it was a firstirhand witness account. It

01:44:21 was a firstirhand witness account. It was not. He did not witness the test, nor is there any evidence that he saw even a video recording the test before writing his report. In contrast, Mr. Baker, a BR certification scheme manager

01:44:33 Baker, a BR certification scheme manager who did attend the test and witnessed it, described the language used in Mr. Meredith's report as quite flowery, and he himself declined to call the failure spectacular when invited to do so by

01:44:44 spectacular when invited to do so by council to the inquiry. Nor is it clear why almost no mention has been made during cross-examination of the fact that the same raincreen cladding system failed when tested in January 2008 using non-combustible

01:44:57 January 2008 using non-combustible insulation despite evidence relating to this test having been drawn to the inquiry's attention. The fire performance of new technology K15 cannot be assessed on basis of a comment made by one person respected one

01:45:09 comment made by one person respected one test of a whole cladding system which he did not witness and when he had limited experience of such tests. Conversely, ability of current K15 to be used successfully in different cladding

01:45:20 successfully in different cladding systems systems is demonstrated by the fact at least 14 cladding systems using current K15 have passed PS8414 tests. As I've said, the repeated assertions that

01:45:33 I've said, the repeated assertions that new technology K15 has an inferior fire performance to old technology K15 are entirely unsupported by any scientific ev evidence. The panel was enjoined to consider the basis of each and every

01:45:44 consider the basis of each and every allegation leveled against Kingpang installation. Time and time again, there is no scientific basis to support the allegations advanced.

01:45:55 allegations advanced. The fourth area of criticism concerns two BS8414 tests conducted in 2014. The first was a tresper cladding system. The second was of a terra cotta tile cladding system. Both tests were

01:46:07 cladding system. Both tests were undertaken using non-standard K15 which differed from current K15 and it used a thicker unperforated full facer. It was made using a different blowing agent. The first tresper system failed the

01:46:19 The first tresper system failed the BS8414 test and the second terra cotta system passed. Whilst these R&D changes intended to improve thermal performance were considered by employees at the time to

01:46:30 considered by employees at the time to be irrelevant to the issue of fire performance in a full-scale BS8414 test. Kingspan installation has accepted that it should have made clear those 2014 tests used non-standard K15.

01:46:43 tests used non-standard K15. The important point however is that new tests were carried out very shortly afterwards using current K15. BS8414 tests of systems featuring a terra cotta tile raincreen were

01:46:55 terra cotta tile raincreen were undertaken in April 2015 and again in January 2016 using current K15. Those systems also passed. Accordingly, if any fire engineer relied upon the successful

01:47:08 fire engineer relied upon the successful 2014 terra cotta test which used the R&D version of K15, then they would similarly be able to have relied upon the 2015 and 2016 tests as relevant alternative tests using current K15.

01:47:22 alternative tests using current K15. Out of an abundance of caution, Kingspan Installation also carried out a replacement test of the unsuccessful 2014 Tresper test using current K15 in 2019.

01:47:34 2019. The test again achieved the same result. I.e. just as it failed in 2014, so it failed again in 2019. Thus again, if any fire engineer did have any regard to the

01:47:45 fire engineer did have any regard to the failed 2014 test, they can now refer to the replacement test. In summary, therefore, whilst these two 2014 test results should have been marked as R&D results, there was no intention to

01:47:57 results, there was no intention to mislead anyone. And the further testing demonstrates that if any fire engineer did place reliance upon either of those tests, then any such reliance would not have given rise to any fire safety issues. Any such engineer can now rely

01:48:10 issues. Any such engineer can now rely on the further testing as alternatives. Kingspan has put in place improved procedures so as to ensure that the R&D testing is not relied upon for current marketing products.

01:48:22 marketing products. The fifth area of criticism concerns the withdrawal of the test reports I've been discussing. Kingspan installation removed the test and classification reports for the 2005 test and the successful 2014 terra cotta test from

01:48:35 successful 2014 terra cotta test from its website and all marketing literature in March 2019 so as to ensure that they were not relied upon in any new projects. The company also then wrote to fire engineers, including the BRE, on

01:48:47 fire engineers, including the BRE, on the 23rd of October, 2020, confirming that the test reports for the 2005 test and those two 2014 tests were being withdrawn, but explaining that the replacement tests could be relied upon

01:48:59 replacement tests could be relied upon instead of the withdrawn reports. The company's withdrawal of these three tests was an appropriate and prudent step. It acted reasonably and responsibly, ensuring that it had conducted appropriate testing to enable

01:49:11 conducted appropriate testing to enable all those within the industry to understand precisely why the company was confident that the withdrawal of the three tests gave no risks gave rise to no risks to health or safety. The test

01:49:22 no risks to health or safety. The test reports the replacement tests are available to anyone who wishes to rely upon them in place of any of the three original tests. Finally, in relation to testing, it has been suggested to various witnesses that

01:49:34 been suggested to various witnesses that Kingspan installation should not have claimed class N in respect of K15. This criticism is not accepted. Whilst there was that there may be room

01:49:45 Whilst there was that there may be room for me for more than one interpretation of the relevant regulations and guidance respect to the requirements for claiming class N. Kingspan installation considers that its interpretation is reasonable, valid, and legitimate

01:49:57 valid, and legitimate having regard to the relevant statutory guidance set out in approved document B. K15's original class N classification was derived from the testing for NOIC products produced by its Dutch sister

01:50:08 products produced by its Dutch sister company in Kestran. The BBA accepted these test reports as appropriate evidence of K15's class N classification as explained in its evidence of the BBA. In May 2007, Kingspan station tested the

01:50:21 In May 2007, Kingspan station tested the foil facer used on K15 to BS476 parts 6 and 7. It passed the test. Approved document B requires either the product or surface material of a composite

01:50:32 or surface material of a composite product to meet the relevant criteria set out in BS476. K15 is a composite product for which the facer is the surface material. And following this valid testing, Kingspan

01:50:43 following this valid testing, Kingspan Insulation rightly claimed that K15 was class N. It has been suggested to witnesses by council to the inquiry that the company should not have relied upon the wording of proved document B in respect of class N. This line of

01:50:55 respect of class N. This line of questioning was not supported by any expert evidence. Indeed, it appears to be directly contrary to the explanation provided by Dr. Lane who explained that in 1985 the definition of class N was

01:51:06 in 1985 the definition of class N was significantly changed in part because the requirement to consider the substrate with the surface was removed from the text in the statutory guidance document. This remained the definition to the time of the Grrenful Tower fire.

01:51:18 to the time of the Grrenful Tower fire. Thus, King's Punisation's interpretations of the requirement of BS476 parts 6 and SE7 is consistent with Dr. Lane's evidence that deliberate change the statutory guidance to permit

01:51:30 change the statutory guidance to permit the testing of the surface material of a composite product as opposed to the testing of the entirety of the product. Guidance expressly permitted the testing of the fal facer of K15 and that is what

01:51:41 of the fal facer of K15 and that is what was tested. Furthermore, this understanding of the guidance is also to be considered in the context of Mr. Par's evidence that when you test a composite product like K15, the phaser

01:51:52 composite product like K15, the phaser can delaminate from the product and then touch the burner element which affects the test. Kingspan installation cannot be criticized for testing K15 in accordance with the plain reading of the

01:52:03 accordance with the plain reading of the text of the statutory guidance following an express amendment to permit testing in this manner. The repeated assertions to the contrary are not only unfounded but appear to ignore the expert evidence

01:52:15 but appear to ignore the expert evidence which the inquiry itself has aduced on this point certification. I now turn to issues which have been raised concerning BBA and LABC certification of K15.

01:52:27 and LABC certification of K15. The BBA is responsible for the contents of its own certificates. The BBA is qualified to make judgments about the content of the certificates and or seek expert assistance if needed and it can

01:52:38 expert assistance if needed and it can and does amend the wording of its certificates. The BBA also regularly audits Kingpan station's manufacturing processes. The first BBA certificate relating to K15 was issued in October 2008.

01:52:52 K15 was issued in October 2008. Five further versions were published between this date and November 2020. As regards the content of K15's BBA certificates, John Alpin of the BBA confirmed in his evidence that the

01:53:04 confirmed in his evidence that the certificate content has evolved over time, which is the case with most BBA certificates to reflect external changes and updates the standard BBA wording for a particular product type. I believe that the wording has been clarified

01:53:16 that the wording has been clarified since the issue of the certificate, but I have no concerns as to the content of previous issues if it is to be read by a suitable suitably experienced and competent individual behaving ethically.

01:53:27 competent individual behaving ethically. Four of Kingsman Installations witnesses were asked questions about a reference to paragraph 12.7 of approved document B in the K15 BBA certificate dated April 2010. In the course of that questioning,

01:53:38 2010. In the course of that questioning, it was repeatedly suggested that the certificate was incorrect to reference paragraph 12.7. In each case, the witness's attention was drawn only to the first part of paragraph 12.7, which requires any

01:53:50 paragraph 12.7, which requires any insulation used in the external wall construction of a building over 18 m to be of limited combustibility. However, during questioning, none of those four witnesses was taken to the

01:54:01 those four witnesses was taken to the second part of paragraph 12.7, which makes it clear that the restriction does not apply to certain masonry cavity wall constructions. The effect of this exemption was to

01:54:12 The effect of this exemption was to permit the use of K15 in such masonry cavity wall constructions. The second sentence explains why paragraph 12.7 of approved document B was referred to in the BBA certificate. Further, Mr. Alburn

01:54:25 the BBA certificate. Further, Mr. Alburn of the BBA explained precisely this point in his witness statement and explained that certificate wording was technically correct and that a suitably competent reader would have no difficulty in understanding the meaning.

01:54:36 difficulty in understanding the meaning. It's therefore not understood why King's Spaniel witnesses were not taken to the second part of paragraph 12.7 when being asked to justify why that paragraph was referred to in the BBA certificate,

01:54:47 referred to in the BBA certificate, particularly given that the certificate was drafted by the BBA and the BBA had explained why it was drafted that way. Kingsulation cannot be criticized for BBA's decision to refer to that

01:54:58 BBA's decision to refer to that paragraph in its certificate. The LABC also produced some certificates in respect of K15. The LABC was responsible for drafting those certificates with the assistance of

01:55:10 certificates with the assistance of Heraffordshire Building Control. Wording was only included on the lab certificate which had been authorized by the LABC.

01:55:18 the LABC. As the inquiries heard, the 2009 lab certificate stated that K15 can be considered as material limited combustibility. In its written opening submissions,

01:55:30 In its written opening submissions, Kingspan Insulation accepted and acknowledged that taken in isolation, this sentence could be misleading. The LABC has tried to suggest in its submissions that Kingspan Insulation is somehow to blame for the use of this

01:55:42 somehow to blame for the use of this language. Even though it is wording that came from Mr. Jones of Heraffordshire Building Control was not suggested or provided by Kingspan Insulation. Kingspan Insulation is not to blame for

01:55:53 Kingspan Insulation is not to blame for LABC's choice of wording. LABC has to take responsibility for its own choice of language in its own certificates. Whatever the reason for LABC's choice of

01:56:04 Whatever the reason for LABC's choice of wording in 2009, the relevant language was not included in the subsequent certificates. Accordingly, at the time of supply of K15 for use on Grenville Tower, the applicable LABC certificate

01:56:15 Tower, the applicable LABC certificate of the 30th of March 2015 did not contain the wording which has been criticized and nor had the prior certificate of 2013. The relevant point, therefore, is this.

01:56:27 The relevant point, therefore, is this. Whatever criticisms might be made about the LABC's choice of language in its 2009 certificate, there's absolutely no evidence that anyone involved in the design of the Grenful Tower refersment

01:56:38 design of the Grenful Tower refersment read that outdated 2009 certificate, far less that they relied upon it or were misled by it in any way. In addition, there has been some criticism about some of the product

01:56:50 criticism about some of the product literature relating to K15. Kingspan Insulation accepted before the start of module 2 that certain statements made in early versions of K15 product literature

01:57:01 early versions of K15 product literature and other information issued prior to 2014 could and should have made it clearer that the 2005 BS8414 test related to a particular system and advised caution against applying a 2005

01:57:14 advised caution against applying a 2005 test too broadly. However, this has to be seen in the context of the newness of the BS8414 test and general uncertainty within the industry at the time as to the extent to

01:57:25 industry at the time as to the extent to which it was appropriate to extrapolate the performance of one cladding system in a BS8414 test to other systems. Ultimately, the position was clarified in June 2014 technical guidance note 18,

01:57:38 in June 2014 technical guidance note 18, which made it clear that a BS8414 test in respect of one system could be relied upon by appropriate professionals when assessing the likely performance of other systems.

01:57:49 other systems. In any event, at the time of the Grenville Tower refurbishment, Kingspan Installation standard advice to clients correctly referred to approved document B and to technical guidance note 18 and appropriately summarized relevant routes

01:58:01 appropriately summarized relevant routes to compliance. Again, whatever criticisms be made of the historical product information, there is therefore absolutely no evidence that anyone involved in the design of the Grenell Tower refurbishment was misled in any

01:58:13 Tower refurbishment was misled in any material way by any of the outdated product information relating to K15. I now turn to allegations about Kingsman insulation itself. One of the most

01:58:24 insulation itself. One of the most perplexing allegations that has been advanced is the assertion that the company's actions were somehow causitive of the tragedy that occurred because K15, and I quote, set the precedent that combustible insulation could genuinely

01:58:36 combustible insulation could genuinely pass a BS8414 test and so be used over 18 m. But such an allegation makes no sense whatsoever. As I've explained, current K15, the type

01:58:47 As I've explained, current K15, the type used on the tower, has been used in 14 different systems which have each genuinely passed full-scale BS8414 tests. Those have all been proper tests

01:58:58 tests. Those have all been proper tests in respect to which no wrongdoing has taken place. The fact that numerous systems incorporating K15 have validly passed BS8414 tests cannot render Kingspan installation responsible for

01:59:10 Kingspan installation responsible for any wrongdoing on the part of any other manufacturer. The allegation is a nonsense in fact and in law.

01:59:19 in law. The second point on this topic is that Kingspanislation's corporate culture has also come under attack. The reality is that Kingspan Slation's priority has always been about the safety of its

01:59:30 always been about the safety of its products. It has never pursued commercial interests at the risk of life or fire safety. Kingspan Insulation has provided a very considerable volume of documents to the inquiry spanning a period of over two

01:59:43 inquiry spanning a period of over two decades. Of those disclosed, over 23,500 have been provided by the inquiry to call participants. That is three times greater than the volume of documents 7,73 provided from

01:59:56 volume of documents 7,73 provided from Celotex. Notwithstanding the K15 amounted to only 5% of the raincreen insulation purchased for the tower whilst the Texas P amounted to 95%.

02:00:07 whilst the Texas P amounted to 95%. It's n it's 63 times greater than the 378 documents provided in respect of our conics disclosure notwithstanding that our conics PE cord ACM material covered

02:00:18 our conics PE cord ACM material covered the whole tower and was the principal cause for the spread of the fire. In short, virtually every aspect of Kingspan Installation's business over the last two decades has been examined in detail for disclosure purposes. That

02:00:30 in detail for disclosure purposes. That process has unearthed a handful of emails and chats, mainly involving three individual former employers, which have revealed conduct that was totally inappropriate and unacceptable and which

02:00:41 inappropriate and unacceptable and which has been acknowledged as such and for which Kingspan Insulation has apologized unreservedly. Such improper place improper behavior has no place in Kingspan Installation or

02:00:52 has no place in Kingspan Installation or the wider Kingspan group and is in no way reflective of its core values. None of those three employees remain in employment of the company. Those isolated communications are the

02:01:03 Those isolated communications are the exception and they should not condemn the behavior of the many hundreds of employees that work at Kingspan Insulation, let alone the 18,000 employees who work for Kingspan Group worldwide.

02:01:15 worldwide. The company has responded by taking robust measures ensuring that its culture is embedded throughout the organization and details the numerous steps taken by the company has set out in its opening submissions.

02:01:27 in its opening submissions. I now turn to the final point in relation to allegations that Kingsman Insulation misled the housing communities and local government parliamentary select committee in 2018.

02:01:39 parliamentary select committee in 2018. At that time, the linear route compliance under the building regulations permitted raincreen cladding systems to be installed on buildings above 18 m provided all the material used had achieved certain

02:01:50 used had achieved certain classifications in small-cale fire tests. Kings considers that this approach is flawed and not based on scientific or empirical evidence. In particular, this approach takes no account of how individual products will

02:02:03 account of how individual products will perform when combined in a cladding system. As part of his evidence, Mr. Burnley, the then managing director of Kingspan Installation, drew those concerns to the attention of the select committee and referred to some examples

02:02:15 committee and referred to some examples of BS8414 tests of whole systems which had failed despite the fact that the individual components had achieved the necessary classifications. At the committee's request, the company

02:02:26 At the committee's request, the company provided details of three tests of the systems comprising Euroclass A1 and A2 cladding and insulation that had failed full-scale fire tests. One of those three tests was of a cladding system

02:02:37 three tests was of a cladding system that Kingspan Insulation had arranged to be tested. The other two had been independently commissioned by third parties and had nothing to do with the company. When Mr. Parcher came to give evidence on the 9th of December 2020, he

02:02:51 evidence on the 9th of December 2020, he was subjected without any notice to extensive cross-examination to the effect that King's Manulation had deliberately misled the select committee. Leaving aside for now whether such cross-examination is permissible

02:03:02 such cross-examination is permissible and article nine of the bill of rights which is a matter for you Mr. chairman and to which we have in draw drawn the inquiry's attention. The allegation that Kingspan ten Kingspan misled parliament

02:03:13 Kingspan ten Kingspan misled parliament is wholly wrong. The company was initially criticized for not informing the select committee that one of the test reports it had provided related to a cladding system which had contained deliberate design flaws. But that

02:03:25 deliberate design flaws. But that allegation was based on misunderstanding of the true factual position. The report provided to the committee was of a system which was robustly built and contained no deliberate design flaws

02:03:36 contained no deliberate design flaws whatsoever. When that mistaken understanding was corrected, the company was then criticized for not providing the select committee with details of another system which had passed a BS8414 test. That

02:03:48 which had passed a BS8414 test. That criticism is also entirely misplaced. The point being made to the select committee was that some systems which comply with the linear route will nevertheless being incapable of passing a BS8414 test and are therefore unsafe.

02:04:02 a BS8414 test and are therefore unsafe. It was never being suggested that all systems passing the linear route would fail a fire test. The company provided details of the test which illustrated the relevant point of public safety which was being made. The other system

02:04:14 which was being made. The other system which passed the test was irrelevant to the issue of public safety under consideration and so was not provided. Kingspan station was acting in good faith by attending the select committee

02:04:25 faith by attending the select committee as requested and properly drawing attention to the three valid fire safety tests which demonstrate that the linear route to compliance is not 100% effective in screening out unsafe cladding systems.

02:04:37 cladding systems. The company drew the parliamentary select committee's attention to a genuine and important issue of public safety. It should not have been criticized for doing so during the course of this inquiry. The criticism is particularly difficult

02:04:49 The criticism is particularly difficult to understand in circumstances in which the inquiry's own expert Dr. Lane has presented evidence as to the importance of full-scale testing and the problems associated with smallcale testing. As

02:05:00 associated with smallcale testing. As I've mentioned, the issue of public safety raised by Kingspan insulation is real. The system based upon the classification of individual products in small-cale fire tests is not failafe. For example, if

02:05:12 tests is not failafe. For example, if studio E had switched the specification for the Grenful Tower refurbishment to non-combustible synthetic mineral fiber installation instead of PIR, the proposed system would have been superficially compliant with the linear

02:05:24 superficially compliant with the linear route because of Varconics PE cord ACM wrong full classification of Euro class B. However, the evidence clearly indicates that the tragic outcome of the

02:05:35 indicates that the tragic outcome of the Granville Tower fire would have been the same even if non-combustible mineral fiber insulation had been used with the PE ACM instead of PIR. Conversely, full-scale fire testing of the Grenville

02:05:47 full-scale fire testing of the Grenville Tower cladding system would have revealed the lack of safety of the proposed system. King's manulation strongly believes that it should be a requirement of the building regulations that every cladding system proposed for use on a residential building with a

02:05:59 use on a residential building with a floor above 18 meters should have to pass BS8414 test regardless of the classification of the individual components. This is the best and most robust way to ensure that all cladding

02:06:10 robust way to ensure that all cladding systems are safe. Kingsman station will continue to state its position on this important issue of public safety even if others try to criticize it for doing so. Finally, Mr. chairman and by way of

02:06:21 Finally, Mr. chairman and by way of conclusion, Kingspan Installation emphasizes the following points. First, extensive testing shows that at least 14 different systems incorporating K15 have

02:06:33 different systems incorporating K15 have passed full-scale fire tests under BS8414.

02:06:36 BS8414. Those systems are safe systems. Second, Kingspan Insulation recognizes that there were certain shortcomings in respect of some aspects of the testing of K15, but those shortcomings have not

02:06:48 of K15, but those shortcomings have not resulted in anyone being misled in any material way. Replacement tests carried out means that any professional who relied upon any relevant historical testing can now rely on replacement tests in any event.

02:07:01 tests in any event. Third, whilst criticisms have been made of the wording in early versions of K15 certificates issued by the LABC, the relevant issues had been corrected long before the refurbishment. The certificates current at the time of the

02:07:13 certificates current at the time of the refurbishment were appropriately worded. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any person involved in the refurbishment relied on, let alone was misled by the wording of any LABC certificates for

02:07:24 wording of any LABC certificates for K15.

02:07:26 K15. Finally, it's imperative that the inquiry move on from the unfounded accusations that have been made and apply a clear, calm, and measured approach to the evidence. That evidence

02:07:38 approach to the evidence. That evidence is unequivocal. The type of iconic PE cord ACM cladding used on Renful Tower had only achieved a Euroclass E classification in testing was unsafe for

02:07:49 classification in testing was unsafe for use with any type of insulation. Furthermore, the nature and speed of the spread of the fire would not have been materially different if non-combustible mineral fiber insulation had been used behind the ACM cladding instead of the

02:08:02 behind the ACM cladding instead of the type of insulation that was in fact used. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Webb. Um, we're due to hear next from uh, Miss Lee

02:08:14 due to hear next from uh, Miss Lee Queen's Council on behalf of the building research establishment, but I think we ought to have a short break before we do. And um, I'll apologize to Miss Leak when I eventually see her. So,

02:08:26 Miss Leak when I eventually see her. So, we'll rise. Well, we'll come back to Host 4 and that'll be enough. Thank you very much. 4:30, please.

02:15:57 Well, welcome back everyone. We're now going to hear a closing statement on behalf of the building research establishment from Miss Leak Greens Council. Good afternoon, Miss Leak. Can

02:16:09 Council. Good afternoon, Miss Leak. Can you see me and hear me? All right. Good afternoon, sir. I can. Thank you. Right. Well, the first thing I must do is to apologize for keeping you hanging around for 15 minutes. Uh the reason is that the previous speaker, I'm afraid,

02:16:21 that the previous speaker, I'm afraid, overran and then we had to have a short break for inquiry purposes. So, I'm sorry about that. And you should not feel that you're under pressure to take any less than the time you've been

02:16:33 any less than the time you've been allotted,

02:16:35 allotted, which I think is sir which I think is half an hour if you need the whole half hour. Of course, sir, I don't think I will take up the whole half hour. In any event, all right. Well, off you go when you're ready.

02:16:47 ready. So, thank you. First of all, BR would like to recognize publicly the courage and determination of all of the berieved survivors and residents, knowing that for many, the inquiry process will have

02:16:59 for many, the inquiry process will have been a painful and distressing experience. On behalf of BRE, I would like to offer our heartfelt condolences to all those who have been affected by the fire and

02:17:10 who have been affected by the fire and its aftermath. Over the last year, BR and its legal team have attended many days of the inquiry's hearings remotely and observed council to the inquiry's examination of the conduct of a number

02:17:22 examination of the conduct of a number of organizations and individuals dating back several years. This is the first time that there has been such comprehensive and intense scrutiny of the conduct and oversight of

02:17:33 scrutiny of the conduct and oversight of the building industry in this country. The evidence has shown that it is much needed. As an organization which has worked to improve the built environment and ensure the health and safety of

02:17:44 and ensure the health and safety of those who use it, BR welcomes this scrutiny and throughout has cooperated fully with the inquiry. In looking at the events, the inquiry has shone a light on practices, policies

02:17:56 has shone a light on practices, policies and procedures and regulation that have fallen short of what is to be expected in this country irrespective of whether they caused or contributed to the fire. I would like to reiterate on BR's behalf

02:18:09 I would like to reiterate on BR's behalf its intention to remain open and not defensive, to acknowledge and learn from historic shortcomings identified, and to take on board any recommendations that the panel makes.

02:18:21 the panel makes. The RE submitted in writing that nothing that it did or failed to do caused or contributed to the tragic fire at Grenell Tower. Whilst B stands by that,

02:18:32 Grenell Tower. Whilst B stands by that, we do not propose to set out the causitive factors here. Rather, B wishes to use its allotted time for the following. First, to assist the inquiry

02:18:43 following. First, to assist the inquiry in establishing facts in so far as they concern B. Second, to identify where there were shortcomings in BR's own practices, processes, and procedures irrespective

02:18:55 processes, and procedures irrespective of causation. Third, to reflect upon those. and fourth to consider what questions might be asked in module six to inform recommendations for the future of the

02:19:06 recommendations for the future of the regulatory regime. Turning now to those topics. First of all, establishing the facts. It was established in module one that Kingspan's K15 and Celotex's RS5000

02:19:19 Kingspan's K15 and Celotex's RS5000 flammable insulation boards came to be used with Aronics Rainabond panels in cladding systems that were installed onto Granful Tower. The fitting of those composite systems proved to be fatal.

02:19:32 composite systems proved to be fatal. The inquiry has heard much from core participants about events that preceded that installation on a broad range of topics with some being more central to others to the inquiry's mandate.

02:19:44 others to the inquiry's mandate. The RE emphasizes again the RE did not test or classify the composite systems that were installed onto Granful Tower. No manufacturer engaged a testing house

02:19:57 No manufacturer engaged a testing house to do that task. However, during the course of the evidence, the following matters that did involve BR was scrutinized by the inquiry.

02:20:09 inquiry. BR tested to BS8414 part one, a system that incorporated K15 on 31st of May 2005. BRE produced a BR135 classification

02:20:22 BRE produced a BR135 classification report for that specific system in 2015. The RE tested to BS8414 part 2, a system that incorporated RS5000

02:20:34 that incorporated RS5000 on the 2nd of May 2014 and it produced a BR135 classification report that inaccurately listed the components in that system.

02:20:46 that system. So these tests at BR were of different systems from those fitted on the tower and the relevant B test reports and classification reports do not relate to

02:20:58 classification reports do not relate to or classify any systems other than the systems tested on those dates. Nor do they relate to or classify any individual component parts. Anyone

02:21:09 individual component parts. Anyone saying or believing otherwise was wrong. With regard to King's Span's test of May 2005,

02:21:18 2005, the ARI explained in its oral opening statement for module 2 that it was not inappropriate for a classification report to be produced 10 years later in 2015.

02:21:30 2015. The RE's Tony Baker explained why in his evidence. A test report is a statement of fact relating to the system tested at that time from which a classification

02:21:42 that time from which a classification report may be produced if the system tested met the criteria of BR135. Both the test report and classification

02:21:53 Both the test report and classification report relate only to the system tested. It is now known that the formula of K15 was changed without BR's knowledge after

02:22:04 was changed without BR's knowledge after the May 2005 test. Kingspan changing the formula of K15 in the intervening period rendered the classification report of no use to Kingpan, the market or building control.

02:22:18 Kingpan, the market or building control. There is no obligation on a test laboratory to interrogate the test sponsor as to whether the composition of any components has changed between the test and the issuing of a classification

02:22:31 test and the issuing of a classification report. And there was no error at B in issuing that classification report which stated that it was valid only for the system as installed and as detailed in

02:22:44 system as installed and as detailed in the corresponding test report. With regard to Celotex's test of May 2014,

02:22:52 2014, it is also a fact that the cladding system described in Celletex's classification report would, if it had been subject to the test, have been capable of achieving BL135

02:23:03 capable of achieving BL135 classification. This was established when the system as described in that classification report was tested to BS8414 part two following the fire at Grrenful

02:23:16 part two following the fire at Grrenful Tower in 2018. Whether, how, and to what effect Kingpan and Celotex misused their test and classification reports is an a question

02:23:29 classification reports is an a question for the inquiry to answer. BRI is deeply troubled by the evidence about how those reports were used by Kingspan and Celitex.

02:23:39 Celitex. Irrespective of causation, BR understands why Celletex's May 2014 test at BR was subject to particular scrutiny.

02:23:50 scrutiny. Former employees of Celletex have told this inquiry that they intentionally committed a fraud on the market by misdescribing a cladding system for which Celotex was the test sponsor.

02:24:03 which Celotex was the test sponsor. Siteex failed to describe to declare that the system tested by BR on the 2nd of May 2014 included a 6 millm magnesium oxide board and that two different

02:24:14 oxide board and that two different thicknesses of Marley aternit board were used 8 mm as well as 12 mm in relation to allegations that were made by Celex's former employees

02:24:25 made by Celex's former employees Jonathan Roer and Jamie Hayes about BR's former employee Phil Clark would like to refer you to the relevant paragraphs of its written closing submissions for module 2 at paragraphs

02:24:38 submissions for module 2 at paragraphs 44 and 45. So in addition to what is set out in those paragraphs, we submit that it is inherently improbable that Mr. Clark or indeed

02:24:51 improbable that Mr. Clark or indeed anyone at BR, an independent testing house committed to making a positive difference in the built environment, would assist a company to deceive the market. There simply was no incentive or

02:25:04 market. There simply was no incentive or motive for Mr. Clark to join in that deception. This is supported evidentially by the fact that Mr. Clark declined Jonathan Roer's request to remove a photograph

02:25:16 Roer's request to remove a photograph from the test report that showed the magnesium oxide board. If he had been a party to the deception, surely he would have removed the photograph.

02:25:28 photograph. However, whether the conduct of Mr. PL and other B staff lacked rigor and attention to detail during Celotex's test is another matter and B has taken

02:25:39 test is another matter and B has taken steps to improve its processes and procedures since that time. In that regard, I move on to the second and third topics's own practices and reflecting on

02:25:51 own practices and reflecting on shortcomings identified. The AR accepts and readily so that the inquiry scrutiny of the Kingpan and Celitex tests while they did not relate

02:26:02 Celitex tests while they did not relate to the cladding systems that were installed onto Grenell Tower has identified that there was room for improvement in BR's own processes and procedures. BR recognizes that its processes in 2014

02:26:17 BR recognizes that its processes in 2014 were insufficiently robust to identify Celotex's dishonesty. It is accepted that there were genuine shortcomings in BR's testing of

02:26:28 shortcomings in BR's testing of Celotex's system on the 2nd of May 2014. The way in which that test was conducted did not meet the high standards that BR expected of itself. Amongst other

02:26:41 expected of itself. Amongst other things, the magnesium oxide board should have been spotted and should have been recorded in the test report. BR wishes the berieved survivors and residents to know that it has reflected

02:26:53 residents to know that it has reflected carefully on the issues highlighted by this inquiry and has made changes to its own internal processes, practices and structures. Foremost among the changes that have

02:27:05 Foremost among the changes that have been made to date are the following. B has been under new management since 2019.

02:27:11 2019. The new management has been working to ensure that the quality of BR's processes, procedures, and systems matches BR's scientific capabilities.

02:27:22 matches BR's scientific capabilities. There have been extensive changes to BR's executive team, including a new executive responsible for oversight of the UKASS accredited services.

02:27:33 the UKASS accredited services. Additional roles have been created to strengthen internal audit and the oversight of testing, classification, and certification. The RE will take on board the inquiry's

02:27:45 The RE will take on board the inquiry's recommendations, but emphasizes that it is not waiting until the inquiry's report is published to make major changes and improvements. It is addressing the issues identified

02:27:57 It is addressing the issues identified by this inquiry. Now, BR's new leadership has implemented a major program of improvement. This includes strengthening the role of BR's

02:28:09 strengthening the role of BR's independent impartiality committee which provides scrutiny of BR's activities to ensure that it is acting impartially across all business areas.

02:28:20 across all business areas. implementation of an updated operational risk management framework and creation of a new system of audit. These address risks which go wider than

02:28:31 These address risks which go wider than those around quality and compliance and are supported by more extensive risk registers and more robust internal audit plans and systems for managing resulting actions.

02:28:43 actions. There have also been improvements to testing, including enhanced checking of test rigs, greater focus on photographic records throughout the test rig build process,

02:28:55 process, increased checking of the documentation and materials for any products coming into the business, and improvements to test result data sheets. BR has also implemented improvements to

02:29:07 BR has also implemented improvements to procedures in the updated BS8414 2020 and a new system for the calibration of equipment. These changes have been applied within

02:29:18 These changes have been applied within the current regulatory regime. The final issue I want to address concerns the future for the building industry.

02:29:27 industry. Unsafe cladding systems never should have been installed on Grenell Tower. The berieved survivors and residents and the wider public in addition to learning

02:29:38 the wider public in addition to learning in module two how those unsafe systems came to be installed must be assured after module six that the governance of the building industry will be reformed

02:29:49 the building industry will be reformed to avoid a repetition of the of the tragedy at Grenell Tower. The ARI looks forward to contributing to module six. The is committed to assisting in the

02:30:00 The is committed to assisting in the formulation of changes to the regime in the light of the flaws that have been identified to date. In the meantime, BRE suggests that the following questions should be explored as part of the

02:30:12 should be explored as part of the inquiry's consideration of issues in module six. Whether the current regulatory regime underpinned by manufacturer's self declaration

02:30:23 manufacturer's self declaration remains fit for purpose given what has been discovered during this inquiry about manufacturer's practices. Whether there should be a specific mechanism for reporting suspected

02:30:35 mechanism for reporting suspected dishonesty or misleading information in the market for use by testing houses like BR and other stakeholders in the building industry.

02:30:46 building industry. BI has made clear contrary to the suggestion of other C core participants that it is not a regulator. There is a question of how regulatory

02:30:57 There is a question of how regulatory oversight can be improved and how testing houses like BR can play a part in the regulatory environment. So in conclusion, the Rhopes that the

02:31:08 So in conclusion, the Rhopes that the process of examining the facts, practices, policies and regulation in this forensic environment will contribute to the public understanding of what has happened in

02:31:19 understanding of what has happened in the past in the building industry and will contribute to the bereaveved survivors and residents understanding of what happened to them and their loved ones and why. As an organization, the RE is committed

02:31:31 As an organization, the RE is committed to learning whatever lessons for the future can be drawn from that history. The RE will welcome the inquiry's report and recommendations in this investigation. They will be analyzed carefully and the

02:31:43 They will be analyzed carefully and the lessons learned will be shared within the organization and beyond to ensure continued organizational development and improvement in this critically important area of building practice.

02:31:55 area of building practice. Thank you, sir. Well, thank you very much. You've been very economical with your time. I'm sorry we again that we kept you waiting quite so long in order to make your statement but it's been

02:32:06 statement but it's been not at all. It's been very helpful and you've raised some important questions for us to consider. Thank you very much. Thank you sir. And at that point we will conclude for the day. Uh tomorrow we shall hear some

02:32:19 the day. Uh tomorrow we shall hear some more closing statements from other core participants and we'll do that at 10:00 tomorrow morning. Thank you very much. 10:00 tomorrow.