Closing statements for Modules 1 and 2 from core participants including Mayor of London, addressing systemic failures in procurement, regulation and corporate accountability.
00:21:44 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing
00:21:47 hearing today we're going to hear further closing statements in relation to modules one and two from a number of different core participants they're all going to be presented uh
00:21:58 they're all going to be presented uh remotely
00:21:59 remotely uh and the first is going to be made by miss anne stud queen's council on behalf of the mayor of london ms stud uh yeah i have you on my screen so i can see you and i hope you can see
00:22:11 so i can see you and i hope you can see me and
00:22:12 me and i must check whether you can hear me of course can you hear me i hear you and see you good thank you very much and we can see and hear you so uh if you're ready to make your closing statement on behalf of the mayor off you go thank you
00:22:25 behalf of the mayor off you go thank you thank you sir in his opening for modules one and two the mayor emphasized the need for accountability and recommendations to prevent future occurrence
00:22:38 prevent future occurrence these are the two issues that may give the bereaved survivors and residents some confidence that the tragedy of grenville will not be repeated i turn to deal with module one the
00:22:50 i turn to deal with module one the primary refurbishment the mayor
00:22:54 the mayor like many others listening to the evidence over many months has been appalled by the corporate core participants ability and willingness to shun responsibility and place the
00:23:05 shun responsibility and place the responsibility on others for what should have been the central consideration in everything they did safety
00:23:14 safety the evidence has depressingly demonstrated that the safety of the tower
00:23:19 tower and the londoners living in it was not a priority during the procurement or the refurbishment process
00:23:28 the procurement and the award of the tender has revealed much of significant concern
00:23:34 concern the kctmo
00:23:36 the kctmo who were meant to provide a bridge between the tenants and their landlords to be the voice for the tenants and to act in their best interests sold the interests and safety of the
00:23:49 sold the interests and safety of the bereaved survivors and residents to the lowest bidder dame judith hackett's phrase a race to the bottom has significant resonance when you reflect on the evidence that you heard
00:24:01 reflect on the evidence that you heard from ryden and the kc tmo in relation to the procurement
00:24:08 a lack of transparency in the procurement process evidenced by information passing between representatives of ryden and the tmo outside the tender process
00:24:20 outside the tender process gives the appearance that this was a cozy arrangement designed to achieve a mutually beneficial result for the lowest possible cost
00:24:31 for the lowest possible cost by way of example ryden's receipt of information obtained from peter or sasha
00:24:37 or sasha at the kctmo that they were in pole position or that it was theirs to lose and the communication prior to the tender being awarded that subject to a
00:24:49 tender being awarded that subject to a small amount of value engineering peter madison would be able to recommend the riding beard to the board are just examples of the unacceptable conduct that has been uncovered by this
00:25:01 conduct that has been uncovered by this inquiry in relation to the procurement once awarded the contract the willingness of ryden to pocket a 200 000 pound saving by using acm cladding and
00:25:14 pound saving by using acm cladding and not telling the kc tmo the true amount of the saving the cladding that they used to achieve that saving was not and never had been compliant with the building regulations
00:25:26 compliant with the building regulations safety considerations were non-existent and profit paramount
00:25:33 the evidence called before you from the web of contractors involved in the project from studio e downwards demonstrated a lack of knowledge care coordination and competence which
00:25:46 care coordination and competence which was at times astounding there seems to have been a private primary focus on profit from the contractors and value from the client rather than any accountability for risk
00:25:58 rather than any accountability for risk or safety
00:26:00 or safety none of the basic checks for fire performance were carried out by the design team nor picked up by any other organization including the kctmo
00:26:11 including the kctmo it reveals a total absence of risk ownership
00:26:15 ownership by those who should have been expected to have the safety of the residents at the heart of what they were doing the architect relied upon the fire safety engineers
00:26:26 safety engineers and the fire safety engineers relied upon the cladding contractor the cladding contractor relied upon the manufacturer who had a commercial interest in remaining silent and they all relied upon the final
00:26:38 and they all relied upon the final arbiter of building control for compliance without taking any responsibility for it themselves and without providing the information that was necessary for any accurate assessment to be
00:26:50 assessment to be made no one asked intrusive questions and no one offered information that they knew might be relevant to the safety of those living in the tower
00:27:01 those living in the tower as dr lane said to you fire safety engineering is about protecting people when you forget that you get caught up in the game of making things work and
00:27:13 in the game of making things work and getting things through and you forget about your primary responsibility which is protecting people
00:27:21 people in the refurbishment of the tower it is hard to see that any organization focused on protecting people at any stage
00:27:32 stage compliance with the regulatory regime to protect the residents was all of their responsibility and its total absence demonstrates a disregard for human life in the
00:27:43 disregard for human life in the interests of profit there has to be a cultural change in approach putting accountability and safety first
00:27:55 safety first and at the center of this web were the residents
00:27:59 residents who had little power to influence their own destiny and who were entitled to have those making decisions on their behalf to assume proper responsibility for their risk and for their safety
00:28:12 risk and for their safety instead
00:28:13 instead what the evidence demonstrates is a total ambivalence to both they were failed the kctno who should have been looking out for their interests
00:28:24 out for their interests failed to be intrusive in the management of their contract to ensure that the safety of residents was and remained paramount
00:28:31 paramount preoccupied as they were with value appearance and visible floor numbers at the end of the train was the building
00:28:42 at the end of the train was the building control department of rbkc a department that in the period from 2013 to 2017 had lost 10 surveyors who had 230 years
00:28:55 had lost 10 surveyors who had 230 years experience between them replaced by one graduate
00:29:00 graduate mr hoban demonstrated to you the toll that this has had on his ability to do the job he wanted to be able to do the consequences of what appears to be a
00:29:12 the consequences of what appears to be a gross lack of resources were catastrophic the system was broken the building control department in the person of john hoban was clearly unable
00:29:24 person of john hoban was clearly unable to ensure compliance or conduct the intrusive inspections necessary in a project such as the grenville tower if building control is to be the final
00:29:35 if building control is to be the final safety net the system has to be resourced robust interventionist and capable of mandatory compliance with sanction for failures
00:29:47 compliance with sanction for failures building control must be kept separate and independent from the contractors so that accountability and compliance can be properly enforced it must not be possible for a client to
00:29:59 it must not be possible for a client to choose their own regulator or limit the sanctions that can be applied to them in the event of non-compliance regulator must be transparently independent of the project
00:30:11 independent of the project without strict regulatory control a continuation of a system of approved inspectors as an alternative to local authority building control will allow contractors the opportunity
00:30:23 will allow contractors the opportunity to choose their regulator depending on the type of project and the prospect of who might be amenable to lower standards of compliance the mayor has previously highlighted
00:30:34 the mayor has previously highlighted problems with the market-based approach to building control grenville tower is a truly terrible example of all that was wrong with the
00:30:45 example of all that was wrong with the regulatory system amongst other failures the system allowed non-compliant flammable cladding to be used and signed off on very many
00:30:56 to be used and signed off on very many other residential buildings up and down the country it is clear that the building regulations and approved document b were either not understood or not
00:31:07 were either not understood or not regarded as paramount or ignored on the understanding there would be no sanction as dame judith hackett identified in her report contractors and subcontractors
00:31:20 report contractors and subcontractors were able to use the ambigu ambigu ambiguity i apologize of regulations and guidance to play the system and to pass the responsibility over to a different
00:31:31 the responsibility over to a different subcontractor in the chain on the assumption that it was someone else's problem i turned to deal with module two the cladding products
00:31:42 cladding products in the evidence the evidence and the lack of cooperation arconic has provided to the inquiry is to be deplored that iconic celetex and kingspan were in different ways able to market
00:31:55 were in different ways able to market their products as suitable for use on buildings over 18 meters notwithstanding that each of the products had failed in fact to perform to a near satisfactory level in the event of fire is shocking
00:32:08 level in the event of fire is shocking the inquiry will consider with the utmost concern the evidence of institutional indifference to safety an environment where corporate bodies considered that it was appropriate and acceptable to manipulate testing
00:32:22 acceptable to manipulate testing to manipulate marketing material to obscure the known risks and to conceal the truth behind the data all done in order to increase the share of the market and ultimately increase
00:32:34 of the market and ultimately increase sales
00:32:36 sales not only does the evidence show a wholesale and cynical disregard on the part of the corporate corps participants for the safety of residents but it also demonstrates an outdated and
00:32:47 but it also demonstrates an outdated and ineffective testing system where the bba and the bre fundamentally failed to ensure that their safety testing had any of the requisite rigor that the others assumed
00:32:59 requisite rigor that the others assumed existed
00:33:02 existed on the part of the certifying authorities it is not enough for john alvin to say that he did not think the bba procedures were ever designed to cope with a situation where a
00:33:13 cope with a situation where a manufacturer would deliberately withhold fire test data from the bba that may be right but the evidence demonstrates that there was an over-reliance on misplaced trust
00:33:25 was an over-reliance on misplaced trust and a lack of technical knowledge relating to the regulatory system and fire safety in particular these failures were fundamental flaws and allowed companies like arconic
00:33:37 and allowed companies like arconic kingspan and celatex to exploit those witnesses those weaknesses for their own commercial game when they were challenged some used the threat of litigation to
00:33:49 some used the threat of litigation to prevent exposure of the true position commercial confidentiality has its place but not when it puts public safety at risk
00:33:59 risk there is no reason why the data from testing should not be made available to professionals or indeed the public on request
00:34:07 request at the very least the bre and or the bba should not have data with help from them and should be in control of the testing system from start to finish
00:34:18 system from start to finish so they know precisely what materials are being tested and in what configuration and can reflect the certificate accurately the data upon which the certification
00:34:30 the data upon which the certification process relies must be clear and un ambiguous
00:34:37 throughout these two modules we heard from some of the key players involved in the disastrous refurbishment of gravel tower
00:34:45 tower behind them are many more people the owners directors and senior managers of the relevant organizations who are responsible collectively for the culture
00:34:57 responsible collectively for the culture in which they operated this culture led to an unacceptable priorities and ultimately the death of 72 londoners as in so many tragic disasters across
00:35:10 as in so many tragic disasters across varied sectors commercial self-interest trumped public safety this will continue happening until recommendations are made and
00:35:21 until recommendations are made and measures implemented to ensure safety first this is a unique opportunity to make real and substantial change and one upon
00:35:32 real and substantial change and one upon which the mayor believes this inquiry and those who implement its recommendations will be judged across industry as a whole there has to be a culture of safety and accountability in construction the
00:35:45 accountability in construction the safety of the building and its residents and visitors must be paramount and ownership must remain a responsibility of every organization involved with the project
00:35:57 involved with the project these points must be embodied in primary legislation and be statutory enforceable the mayor asks you to reflect upon a recommendation that the government looks
00:36:09 recommendation that the government looks again at extending the ban on combustible materials on the external walls of new buildings to those below 18 meters
00:36:19 meters the fire testing shows that the use of combustible cladding is a fire risk on any building at any height and this factual certainty should be reflected in your report on module 2.
00:36:34 reflected in your report on module 2. the mayor also asks you to consider a recommendation to ensure that in future building control is fully independent and sufficiently resourced and trained
00:36:45 and sufficiently resourced and trained to do its vital job the mayor asked the inquiry to make clear the need to deliver systemic and cultural change to ensure that the safety of buildings
00:36:57 to ensure that the safety of buildings and those who reside or visit them are paramount
00:37:01 paramount and can never be compromised thank you very much sir thank you very much indeed this stud the uh next closing statement will be
00:37:12 the uh next closing statement will be made by mr campbell queen's council on behalf of siderise now he was uh
00:37:19 he was uh uh scheduled to make his statement at half past 10 but we are now running a little bit ahead of ourselves as a result of miss studs economical use of time um
00:37:30 of time um but i see mr campbell on my screen so mr campbell
00:37:34 campbell are you there can you hear me and are you ready to go on now uh sir i can hear you and i hope you can hear me too we can thank you very much and are you ready to make a statement even though it's
00:37:45 make a statement even though it's slightly ahead of time yes certainly very happy to do so sir
00:37:50 sir and indeed siderise is grateful for the opportunity to to make this oral statement
00:37:56 statement very good well let's uh let's go when you're ready thank you the evidence from modules one and two has revealed serious failures by the construction industry
00:38:07 construction industry and the evidence has given rise to a great many important issues for the inquiry and for the construction industry
00:38:14 industry excuse me
00:38:15 excuse me itself to consider siderise understands that wider picture and supports the vital work on which the inquiry and its team are engaged however siderise does not see its rule
00:38:27 however siderise does not see its rule as being to criticize others nor does it wish to engage in any bug passing
00:38:33 passing therefore i hope you'll excuse the fact that this statement will focus on siderise's rule and the criticisms that have been made of it
00:38:42 the criticisms of side rise in the written statements that have been filed filed fall into to two parts first there is some criticism by the two bsr teams
00:38:53 bsr teams the main criticism of side rise by the bsrs is that the testing of the cavity barriers by side rise was limited and specifically that it was carried out between concrete lintels
00:39:05 between concrete lintels and the connected criticism that siderise marketed its cavity barriers as suitable for use in a rain screen cladding system when they had not carried out sufficient testing to
00:39:16 carried out sufficient testing to demonstrate that
00:39:19 secondly in addition to the criticism by the bsrs there is some criticism of side rise by ryden in its written submissions siderise submits that the criticism of
00:39:30 siderise submits that the criticism of it by ryden is misplaced and very unfair and it'll therefore be necessary for me to respond to that criticism by ryden in a little detail
00:39:42 can i turn first to the criticism by the bsrs in particular their criticism that the testing of the cavity barriers was carried out in tests between concrete lintels
00:39:54 lintels in making those criticisms there appears to be some confusion between product or component testing of the cavity barriers themselves and system testing in accordance with a
00:40:05 and system testing in accordance with a bs 8414 test
00:40:09 the fact that siderise was undertaking component tests of the cavity barriers and that it referred to those component tests in its marketing material should not properly be the subject of
00:40:21 should not properly be the subject of any
00:40:22 any criticism the purpose of such a component test is to demonstrate the integrity and insulation of the cavity barrier itself not to test the fire resistance of other
00:40:33 not to test the fire resistance of other materials that may be used in the construction although component tests undertaken pursuant to bs 476 part 20
00:40:44 pursuant to bs 476 part 20 or tgd 19
00:40:46 or tgd 19 are not equivalent to or a substitute for system testing undertaken pursued to bs 8414
00:40:54 bs 8414 they are nevertheless valuable and provide evidence for the elemental performance of the component table 1 of adb refers to the fire resistance of elements being tested
00:41:05 resistance of elements being tested pursuant to the relevant part of bs-476 therefore effectively recommends that manufacturers undertake component tests of their products to the relevant part of bs-476
00:41:19 further the guidance from the center for window and cladding technology cwct in their technical guidance note 73 was that cavity bearers should be tested to the principles of bs 476 part
00:41:33 the principles of bs 476 part and therefore effectively recommended that they should be subject to component tests
00:41:40 as to the product or component tests themselves prior to 2013 siderise's open state cavity barriers were tested to the principles of bs 476 part 20.
00:41:53 principles of bs 476 part 20. the decision to use the bs 476 part 20 test procedure followed the guidance from the cwct the decision to test the open state
00:42:04 the decision to test the open state cavity barris to bs 476 part 20 was also the subject of discussion and agreement between side rise alex over warrington fire
00:42:16 fire so as you may recall from the evidence of mr mort and others the bs 476 part 20 test procedure was not entirely suitable for open state cavity barriers with an
00:42:27 for open state cavity barriers with an intimate strip with an open state cavity barrier that has a necessity to be an air gap along one side of the barrier at the start of the test and the presence of that gap
00:42:38 the test and the presence of that gap results in an automatic failure of the integrity criteria of the bs-476 part 20 test
00:42:46 recognizing that the bs 476 test procedure was not entirely suitable for an open state cavity barrier in 2014 the association for specialist fire protection the asfp
00:42:59 protection the asfp issued a bespoke test for open state cavity barriers known as tgd19 in a test under either bs476 or tgd19 its standard practice for the
00:43:11 or tgd19 its standard practice for the cavity barrier to be tested between concrete mentals and that's clear from the wording of the standards themselves
00:43:20 some criticism has been made of side rise that they did not draw their customers attention to the fact that the testing was carried out between concrete lintels
00:43:28 lintels but i'd suggest that criticism is unfair first it all to come as no surprise to anyone in the industry that a component test of a cavity barrier was and indeed
00:43:40 test of a cavity barrier was and indeed still is carried out between concrete lintels
00:43:43 lintels to be effective and worthwhile the component test of the cavity barrier would have to be undertaken between the fire resistant materials
00:43:55 if the test was undertaken between materials that were not fire resistant it would be unclear whether any failure of integrity or insulation was caused by the cavity barrier or alternatively by
00:44:06 the cavity barrier or alternatively by the materials holding the cavity barrier second anyone familiar with tgd 19 bs 476 part 20 or the equivalent en
00:44:17 bs 476 part 20 or the equivalent en standard would be aware that the tests are undertaken between concrete lintels third the
00:44:25 third the cwct's technical note 73 made clear that cavity barriers are generally tested between walls of fire resisting construction and tn 73 also warned in terms that
00:44:38 and tn 73 also warned in terms that performance with rain screen panels may be different from a test of the cavity barriers carried out between fire resistant materials mr secular's evidence was that he would
00:44:49 mr secular's evidence was that he would expect a reasonably competent cladding contractor to be familiar with the contents of tn 73 and specifically did you expect a reasonably competent coloring cladding contractor to be aware of the guidance
00:45:01 contractor to be aware of the guidance the cavity barriers are generally tested between walls fire resistant construction
00:45:08 therefore the component test excuse me
00:45:15 therefore the component test side rise siderise undertook were those recommended by the adb and industry guidance further the fact that the testing of the cavity barriers had been undertaken
00:45:27 cavity barriers had been undertaken between concrete lintels and the fact that the tests sidewise had undertaken were component tests and not system tests
00:45:35 tests also been cleared to anyone reading siderise's data sheets and was also clear from tgd 19 and cwct's technical note 73
00:45:47 note 73 significantly there's no evidence that mr lam or anyone at harley was in fact misled by siderise's data sheets or marketing
00:45:56 marketing mr lam stated that he'd reviewed siderise's technical literature but he doesn't claim to have been misled by it mr lam also stated this evidence that he consulted cwct's technical note 73 when
00:46:10 consulted cwct's technical note 73 when considering the requirements for cavity barriers
00:46:13 barriers when he read technical set note 73 he would have read that cavity barriers are generally tested between walls fire resistant construction
00:46:25 can i turn then to say something about bs 8414 or system tests the obligation to carry a system test of the particular combination of panel and
00:46:37 the particular combination of panel and insulating products does not and cannot properly
00:46:41 properly rest with side rise as the manufacturer of simply the cavity barriers nevertheless side drive did support the undertaking of bs 8414 tests
00:46:54 up to the date of the supplier product to harley
00:46:57 to harley siderise had participated in five eight four one four assistance tests in respect of rain screen cladding systems those five tests occurred between 2012 and may 2015 and were all
00:47:09 2012 and may 2015 and were all classified as passes the cladding utilized for those tests was either rain screen boards or terracotta tiles the insulation was either pir phenolic
00:47:20 the insulation was either pir phenolic or stonewall insulation siderise participated in three further systems tests between november 2016 and may 2017
00:47:31 november 2016 and may 2017 all three were classified as a past as far as siderise was aware a system test incorporating acm panels had not been undertaken by anyone prior to 2016
00:47:43 been undertaken by anyone prior to 2016 and sliderise fully acknowledges that was a collective failure by the construction industry however sliders did draw attention to the value of system testing pursuant to
00:47:55 the value of system testing pursuant to 8414 at a conference it hosted in 2012 attended by amongst others the bre arab and harley at that conference siderice stated that
00:48:06 at that conference siderice stated that it was keen to test to 8414
00:48:10 8414 and ask for a cladding partner to come forward to participate in such a test unfortunately no such partner came forward since the fire at grenfell there
00:48:21 forward since the fire at grenfell there have been many full-scale 8414 tests which have involved metal rain screen components in conjunction with side rise cavity barriers and which have been classified as a pass
00:48:32 classified as a pass many examples are given by mr swails in his statement an important set of 841 tests using siderise cavity barriers are those undertaken by the bre in july and august
00:48:45 undertaken by the bre in july and august 2017 on the instructions of the ministry of housing communities and local government the panel may well recall those tests were undertaken with a variety of types
00:48:56 were undertaken with a variety of types of insulation and acp some passed and some failed but clearly with the right components it's entirely possible to design a metal brainstream system with side rise cavity
00:49:08 brainstream system with side rise cavity barriers that will perform successfully in a bs 8414 test therefore the cavity barriers were compatible with many metal green screen
00:49:19 compatible with many metal green screen systems
00:49:20 systems side rows were certainly not by their website or other marketing suggesting or representing that their cavity barriers were suitable for any set of components regardless of the fire resistance of
00:49:31 regardless of the fire resistance of those components nor was it representing that by using its cavity barriers that in some way removed the need for system testing or proper consideration of the performance
00:49:42 proper consideration of the performance of the green screen system as a whole
00:49:48 can i turn then sir to address the criticism made of side rise by ryden in its written submissions and in particular the suggestion by ryden that siderise
00:50:00 suggestion by ryden that siderise infiltrated itself into industry bodies in order to develop standards that suited itself sidewise submits that criticism is
00:50:11 sidewise submits that criticism is wholly unfair and is misplaced and i'm afraid it's necessary for me to take you to the detail of it and if possible i would like to put up
00:50:22 and if possible i would like to put up on screen the relevant section of ryden's written submissions which is at ryd zero zero zero nine four five six four
00:50:34 zero zero zero nine four five six four underscore zero zero forty nine
00:50:45 yes there it is i think thank you and it's it's the bottom half of the page which um i'd like to refer to i wonder if that can be expanded it's under the heading
00:50:57 it's under the heading side rise infiltration of industry organizations
00:51:04 at paragraph 8.4 we can see it's stated by ryden that mr mort was a member of the
00:51:10 the asfp technical committee responsible for the
00:51:15 the development of tgd 19. in passing the asfp are a recognized and responsible body and several of their publications are referred to in appendix h of adb
00:51:29 referred to in appendix h of adb the technical group within the asfp that developed tgd 19 was known as task group 3
00:51:37 3 and it had a relatively wide membership including representatives of the bre exover the cwct and several members sorry several manufacturers of cavity barriers
00:51:48 barriers as well as the asfp's own technical officer
00:51:52 officer there's nothing unusual or wrong in manufacturers becoming involved in industry bodies to seek to improve standards
00:52:00 standards that's particularly so here where they are seeking to develop a product standard in circumstances where the british standard was not adequate
00:52:10 uh turning back to to ryden's written submission we see it paragraph 8.5 at the foot of the page that ryden say that the tgd standard
00:52:21 that ryden say that the tgd standard provided for testing between concrete lentils
00:52:25 lentils that is true it's also true of the position under the bs476 test and i've explained the reasons for it
00:52:36 in the second and third sentences of paragraph 8.5 ryden assert tgd 19 also permitted the first five minutes of the test to be disregarded in
00:52:47 minutes of the test to be disregarded in determining the past criteria for closing times this perfectly matches the product performance siderise had observed in earlier tests it had it had conducted
00:53:00 earlier tests it had it had conducted guaranteeing a pass for siderise products
00:53:05 it's correct that tgd 19 effectively permits the first five minutes of the test to be disregarded it's only possible to measure integrity once the intumescent has reacted
00:53:18 once the intumescent has reacted therefore it's necessary to start the integrity test after allowing a period of time for the intumescent to react and the gap to seal however the five minute period did
00:53:29 seal however the five minute period did not as ryden assert perfectly matched the siderise product performance sidewise cavity barriers have been tested and shown to seal in about two minutes
00:53:40 minutes as demonstrated in tests undertaken by x over
00:53:43 over it would actually have suited siderise to have a more onerous test which only disregarded the first two minutes and not the first five minutes
00:53:55 turning back to ryden's submissions we see at paragraph 8.6 it said that mr mort was a member of the cwct in fact it was side rise as a company rather than mr mort as an individual who
00:54:08 rather than mr mort as an individual who was a member of the cwct and so you may recall that mr sakula gave evidence about the cwct noting that it was formed by the university of bath and offers an msc in
00:54:21 university of bath and offers an msc in facade engineering it has a very wide membership and is a reputable organization
00:54:30 then paragraph 8.7 we see ryden say
00:54:35 say in cwct technical note 73 it was stated that side rise cavity barriers were designed to fully close the cavity in under two minutes in fire test conditions
00:54:47 conditions this was of course thoroughly misleading in light of the fact that it is suggested to the industry that side drives barriers would activate and see the gap in two minutes when the tests only measured performance after five
00:55:00 only measured performance after five minutes
00:55:03 that paragraph is unfortunately confused cwct's technical note 73 says no such thing
00:55:14 says no such thing it doesn't in fact say anything at all about side risers cavity barriers the reference that's given by ryden in paragraph 8.7 to a document
00:55:26 paragraph 8.7 to a document 2428
00:55:28 2428 is not in fact the reference for technical note 73 but rather to a presentation that siderise itself made at a facade conference in 2012
00:55:39 conference in 2012 which was well before the publication of tgd19
00:55:44 tgd19 further what was said by siderise in the presentation was not at all misleading far less thoroughly misleading as ryden asserts
00:55:53 asserts the test siderise undertook in conjunction with x over did demonstrate that the intumescent would activate and seal the gap in two minutes
00:56:04 and then at paragraph 8.8 it's said by ryden that through becoming an active member of the asfp in the cwct mr moore managed both to influence the
00:56:16 mr moore managed both to influence the testing regime in order to suit siderise's products and to have siderise's products recommending industry guidance contrary to what is stated there the
00:56:27 contrary to what is stated there the testing regime did not particularly suit side rises barriers a more onerous test had been advocated by siderise which would have suited it better
00:56:37 better and the reference in paragraph 8.8 to mr mort managing to have siderise's products recommended in industry guidance is simply wrong
00:56:48 guidance is simply wrong sideriser's products were not recommended in any industry guidance and this paragraph appears to be a mistaken reference back to the previous paragraph graph and the mistaken assertion that
00:57:00 assertion that cwct's technical note 73 specifically recommends sidewise's products when it doesn't
00:57:09 so the document can now be taken off the screen
00:57:13 screen thank you
00:57:15 thank you so when considering the suggestion by ryden that mr moore tour side rise in some way infiltrated groups industry groups to produce a standard that suited itself
00:57:26 that suited itself it's also significant to note that the development of tgd 19 was discussed at a meeting of the cwct on the 2nd of july 2014
00:57:37 on the 2nd of july 2014 attended by amongst others luke bisbee and barbara lane as well as mr mort after that meeting in december 2014 siderise at their instigation met with
00:57:48 siderise at their instigation met with dr lane and charlotte robin of arab to discuss amongst other things the fact that there was no entirely suitable test for an open state cavity barrier
00:57:59 for an open state cavity barrier it was agreed that tgd 19 whilst not perfect was a good step forward as a suitable test for an open state cavity barrier
00:58:08 barrier contrary to the whole thrust of what's being asserted by ryan it's in fact to sidewise his credit that it recognized the lack of suitability of the bs 476 test procedure for open state cavity
00:58:21 test procedure for open state cavity barriers and it was proactive in seeking to work with the sfp to develop an alternative and it's also to side rise its credit that well before the grenfell fire it
00:58:32 that well before the grenfell fire it sought out industry experts such as dr lane to discuss the new test standard and the testing that is undertaking in respect of its products
00:58:43 in conclusion mr chairman in some of the written submissions that have been made all of the manufactures of products used in the refurbishment have effectively been lumped together
00:58:54 been lumped together however siderise's position is very different from that of most of the other manufacturers in particular the cavity barriers were themselves plainly fire resistant
00:59:06 themselves plainly fire resistant as a manufacturer and supplier of a single component siderise's responsibility was to ensure that its cavity barriers were appropriately tested in accordance with the then available and
00:59:17 available and test standards and they were cavity barriers of the same type that were supplied to harney continue to be supplied to this day and in combination with the correct
00:59:29 and in combination with the correct insulation and panels they can indeed provide vital protection
00:59:36 finally mr chairman i would suggest that mr mort deserves credit for pointing out the weak link for fire that was not appreciated by others even though he mr mort had no responsibility for the
00:59:48 mort had no responsibility for the design of the facade it is very unfortunate that his advice was effectively ignored
00:59:57 mr chairman those are my submissions and i'm grateful to you and to the panel for your patience and listening to them well thank you very much indeed mr campbell they've been very interesting and given us quite a lot to think about
01:00:09 and given us quite a lot to think about thank you
01:00:10 thank you now um
01:00:11 now um the next
01:00:13 the next statement is due to be made by mr adamson queen's council on behalf of the labc but he is not scheduled until 11 15.
01:00:26 until 11 15. what i'm going to suggest oh well uh mr adamson are you there already i i i i am here sir can you hear me we can hear you and we can see you and i
01:00:37 can hear you and we can see you and i was going to suggest that you might rather wait a little longer before you made your statement but if you're ready to make it perhaps you'd like to go ahead now
01:00:47 ahead now my only observation is this uh sir that i'm i'm unconscious that you are scheduled for a break at 11 o'clock and i i do not anticipate being finished by 11 o'clock no well you you are um scheduled to well
01:01:00 no well you you are um scheduled to well we've allowed you shall i say half an hour is that going to be long enough for what you wish to say uh well well uh sir sir i i hoped i do hope so yes
01:01:11 sir sir i i hoped i do hope so yes well i think if it is then we would prefer you to um make your statement no we won't cut you off at 11 o'clock we'll take our break a little bit later than
01:01:22 take our break a little bit later than uh than advised and um we'll still be ahead of ourselves for the morning which will be a good thing so if you are ready to go ahead uh we'd be grateful to hear from you now
01:01:33 be grateful to hear from you now sir thank you thank you very much
01:01:38 sir member of the panel uh local authority building control did not make an opening statement uh for module two and no witnesses from labc
01:01:49 witnesses from labc have so far been called to give evidence to the inquiry as a consequence labc has not had the opportunity in the inquiry to express its sincere condolences and apologies
01:02:01 condolences and apologies to the families of those who perished in the grenfell fire to the survivors of this tragedy tragedy and to others affected by it labc therefore takes this opportunity to
01:02:12 labc therefore takes this opportunity to offer its condolences to all those who have suffered labc is has and will continue to cooperate to the fullest extent of this inquiry
01:02:20 inquiry so the true facts are established those who are responsible for this disaster are held accountable and lessons are learned
01:02:27 learned the structure of my closing statement will focus on five topics one labc's role two at abc's role in this inquiry
01:02:39 role two at abc's role in this inquiry three
01:02:39 three kingspan and k-15 for celetex and rs-5000 and five the impact of labc uh certification errors
01:02:51 impact of labc uh certification errors one
01:02:52 one what is labc labc is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee owned by its members who comprise all local authority building control teams in england and wales
01:03:05 control teams in england and wales labc aims to provide an independent impartial resource to its local authority members to help ensure that new buildings and conversions are delivered to the right standard since its incorporation labc has
01:03:17 since its incorporation labc has operated a registration scheme for products systems and housing types on behalf of all local authority the scheme predates labc's incorporation such approvals were previously issued
01:03:28 such approvals were previously issued directly by local authority building control departments without any central administration by labc at abc sought to offer its registration scheme previously called type approvals
01:03:39 scheme previously called type approvals later restructured as registered details within the land tax agreement the purpose of the agreement was to provide a central register certified of certified products and systems recording the credentials of
01:03:50 systems recording the credentials of such products and systems and their compliance criteria with the building regulations the rcfo product had passed certain british standard tests that would be recorded similarly if a ucas accredited
01:04:01 recorded similarly if a ucas accredited agency had certified certain attributes of a product that would be recorded having all such details in one place would be of obvious value to the local authority or build industry professional having to consider the appropriateness
01:04:13 having to consider the appropriateness of using a particular product in a building or as part of a system incorporating a building however it's vital to understand what labc is not it is not a testing house it
01:04:24 labc is not it is not a testing house it does not test products such as bre or bba this is not its function it is not a building control body which determines whether a product can safely be used on a particular development such
01:04:35 be used on a particular development such as rbkc
01:04:37 as rbkc the labc scheme is designed such that local authority building control teams themselves handle applications for product registration the appraisal of the building control team of the local authority sometimes
01:04:50 team of the local authority sometimes referred to as the research authority which is selected to handle the application is then subject to a second check peer review
01:04:58 review which requires four other building control teams from different local authorities to support the appraisal the second check process is intended to ensure that mistakes on the part of the research authority are picked up
01:05:10 research authority are picked up therefore in summary the labc scheme is not profit orientated labc does not test products and it does not involve itself in the detail of applications for approval registration
01:05:21 applications for approval registration that was the responsibility of the research authority handling it labc scheme does not obviate the need for manufacturers of products registered with the scheme to behave with integrity
01:05:33 with the scheme to behave with integrity during the registration process and in subsequent marketing of the product the scheme is there to assist rather than to be abused labs sees registration does not obviate
01:05:46 labs sees registration does not obviate the need for a building control body to satisfy itself that the system or product being used is compliant and safe for use within the individual product regardless of its labc registration
01:05:58 regardless of its labc registration the scheme relies upon the good faith and honesty and openness of the applicate applicant for registration and the competence or accreditation agencies and testing bodies
01:06:10 agencies and testing bodies so
01:06:11 so there is a a noise going on outside is that interfering with your feed we have been able to hear noises off so to speak and i wasn't sure whether they were somewhere in the
01:06:22 whether they were somewhere in the system or emanating from your end or indeed our end and you can hear them as well can you so it's definitely from my end there is there's
01:06:31 there's there is a workman outside i do apologize um well can i suggest you carry on but if it becomes too uh distracting um either you can raise it or i'll raise
01:06:42 either you can raise it or i'll raise and we'll then decide what to do all right
01:06:49 the scheme relies upon the good faith honesty and openness of the applicant for registration and the competence of accreditation agencies and testing bodies
01:06:59 bodies the evidence the inquiry has heard uh uh shows that kingspan adopted a strategy of applying for approval of a k-15 product on the basis of limited testing to obtain approval of product
01:07:11 testing to obtain approval of product with the intention of abusing that approval and marketing the product for use in circumstances which were not demonstrably safe celetex later adopted the same strategy labc is not responsible for kingspan and
01:07:23 labc is not responsible for kingspan and celatex abuse of the labc scheme nor their abuse of the testing regime labc's role in the inquiry until now labc has played only a limited
01:07:36 until now labc has played only a limited role in this inquiry the service that labc offered has attracted greater prominence than had perhaps been initially anticipated and no person from labc has been called
01:07:48 and no person from labc has been called a raft of rule 9 letters have recently been received in relation to module 6
01:07:54 module 6 which addressed matters and raise questions which are relevant to module two
01:07:58 two therefore labc has had no opportunity to challenge erroneous assertions which have emerged in the evidence it has allowed some to seek to deflect attention from their own actions by misrepresenting labc's role and function
01:08:10 misrepresenting labc's role and function it has allowed others to suggest that labc certificates were relied upon by those responsible for building control approval of grenfell tower when the evidence simply does not support that proposition
01:08:21 proposition labc side of the story has not been heard
01:08:24 heard it suffices to identify two standout examples
01:08:28 examples a david jones of herefordshire council which was the research authority for kingspan's application for approval has alleged that he was pressured by labc in respect of the type approval process for
01:08:39 respect of the type approval process for k-15 this allegation is rejected it will be recalled that it was mr jones who produced the type approval somewhat summary which wrongly stated that k-15
01:08:50 summary which wrongly stated that k-15 was a mere material which could be considered to be of limited combustibility it has been speculated that john hopen our bkc's building control officer considered the erroneous
01:09:01 control officer considered the erroneous labc registration in respect of celitex's rs 5000 product prior to its use on the grenfell tower project labc does not accept that he did indeed labc can demonstrate through the
01:09:12 labc can demonstrate through the chronology that he could not have considered that material unfortunately these allegations were left unchallenged and or were perpetuated by uh questioning of other witnesses you gave evidence the inquiry
01:09:23 witnesses you gave evidence the inquiry team such they've been allowed to gain traction as if they were fact which they are not
01:09:29 are not three kingspan and the erroneous type approval
01:09:32 approval summary kingspan's k15 is an insulation product which was not non-combustible and it was not of limited combustibility as defined by the then current version of adb
01:09:43 of adb subject to alternative routes to compliance k-15 could not be used in accordance with building regulations as part of a range-stream cladding system on buildings with floor above 18 meters
01:09:54 on buildings with floor above 18 meters unless it had been tested as part of a system which had been successfully tested to bs eight four one four one two and achieved criteria provided for by br135
01:10:05 br135 any application of k-15 reliant upon a successful eight four one four test uh uh
01:10:11 uh uh must be identical to its application as part of the system which was tested of course the k15 product being applied must be the same chemical composition as
01:10:22 must be the same chemical composition as the k15 that was tested the distinction between product and system is crucial this is because 8414 is a system test thus a product which is not non-combustible or not of limited
01:10:34 not non-combustible or not of limited combustibility included as part of a system which passes the 8414 test could be used above 80 meters only in a system identical to that which was successfully tested
01:10:45 tested on behalf of labc herefordshire council issued a systems approval certificate in respect of k-15 on the first of may 2009 the system's approval certificate was
01:10:56 the system's approval certificate was provided to conspire together with the type approval summary of heritage council
01:11:02 council the type approval summary contained the erroneous statement that k-15 can be considered a material of limited combustibility and that as a consequence it is suitable for use in all situations
01:11:14 it is suitable for use in all situations shown on diagram 40 of approved document b volume 2 including those parts of a building more than 18 meters above ground
01:11:22 ground kingspan knew that the statement that k-15 was a material of limited combustibility was wrong kingspan knew it could not and should not be relied upon we know this because one kingspan
01:11:35 upon we know this because one kingspan published the statement as to limited combustibility on its own website
01:11:45 overwhelming but i think they've now gone again so could i suggest you go back a couple of sentences and carry on from there i'm sorry to do that to you
01:11:56 there i'm sorry to do that to you no i i do apologize um i don't think it's your fault at all i think we're both victims of some third parties efforts but um i think if you went back a couple of sentences um we could pick up the thread of your
01:12:08 um we could pick up the thread of your statement more easily
01:12:16 a kingspan knew that the statement that k50 oh god
01:12:24 kingspan knew the statement that k-15 was a material of limited combustibility was wrong
01:12:30 was wrong kingsbank knew it could not and should not be relied upon we we know this because one kingspan published the statement as to limited combustibility on its own website in 2009 it was
01:12:42 on its own website in 2009 it was removed in or about february 2010 two the chemical composition of the k-15 product that had been incorporated in the system test to bs-48414 in 2005 was not the same as the
01:12:55 bs-48414 in 2005 was not the same as the k-15 product that was being marketed in 2008 by kingspan but worse still the k-15 product that they were actually marketing and selling performed even worse in far tests than the earlier
01:13:07 worse in far tests than the earlier version
01:13:09 version kingspan's application for system approval was built on deceit in support of its application it supplied the bba certificate dated the 27th of october
01:13:20 certificate dated the 27th of october 2008 and the eighth issue of its k-15 product literature neither of these were reliable and kingspan knew it the bba certificate could not be relied upon for numerous reasons including
01:13:33 upon for numerous reasons including one k-15 had not been successfully tested to eight four one four uh
01:13:38 uh slash one and it did not meet the criteria
01:13:41 criteria of bs br135 as recorded in the bba certificate two the k-15 product which kingspan was marketing had a different chemical composition to the product it had tested
01:13:53 composition to the product it had tested and reacted quite differently to fire a three contrary to the statement in the bba certificate that it could be used on steel frame walls k-15 had not been successfully
01:14:04 walls k-15 had not been successfully tested on a steel frame system for use above 18 meters in fact k-15 was the subject of four steel frame tests in 2000 2008 and all failed
01:14:17 and all failed bba and kingspan were aware by no later than the 24th of december 2008 that the wording of the certificate was misleading and needed to be amended
01:14:28 misleading and needed to be amended kingspan threatened to pass on the costs of reissuing documentation if the wording was amended kingspan preferred to let the file gather dust rather than fix the mistakes which had been
01:14:40 fix the mistakes which had been identified having stopped bba from making amendments kingsbound was free to use a misleading bba certificate as the basis for system approval issued in 2009
01:14:53 for system approval issued in 2009 the k-15 product literature was also misleading because it did not mention that the 8414 test performed on the product was to masonry substrates only
01:15:04 product was to masonry substrates only and it had not been tested on a steel frame
01:15:07 frame it did not mention that the product being sold in 2008 was a different product to that tested in 2005
01:15:14 2005 it did not mention the fact that the 8414 test was in any event not representative of any cladding system in use in the construction industry it did not state that br135
01:15:25 industry it did not state that br135 there was no br 135 classification report
01:15:29 report and instead gave the impression that it had it did not mention that k15 is suitable for use above 80 meters only in one specific configuration contrary to the suggestion implicit in
01:15:41 contrary to the suggestion implicit in cover diagrams it had not been successfully tested for use on a steel thing above 18 meters the statement that fire performance can be equivalent to mineral fire was inaccurate and
01:15:52 mineral fire was inaccurate and misleading as unlike k-15 mineral fiber is a material of limited combustibility it is against this misleading background that mr jones's erroneous type approval
01:16:04 that mr jones's erroneous type approval summary must be considered labc's errors in respect of the 2005 k-15 type approval summary labc accepts that the type approval summary should
01:16:17 that the type approval summary should not have stated that k-15 was of limited combustibility and suitable for use above 18 meters this appears to have arisen as a result of mr jones of herefordshire council having a lack of familiarity with the then current adb
01:16:30 familiarity with the then current adb coupled with its confusing wording and exacerbated by his understanding of his meeting with mr pack and mr heath of kingston
01:16:38 kingston mr jones's judgment that k-15 could be considered of limited combustibility was not a judgment he was permitted to make it was not a question of judgment it either did or did not satisfy the
01:16:50 either did or did not satisfy the definition in the table at a7 of adb and it did not mr jones should not have been tasked to carry out the assessment of k15 by mr jenner the building control manager
01:17:02 jenner the building control manager he lacked sufficient experience for the record labc tasked mr jenner not mr jones and lebc would have assumed that mr jenner would maintain overall control of the exercise in any event the errors
01:17:14 in any event the errors could have been identified during labc's second check process labc does not accept the errors in the documentation were brought about by pressure being applied by labc
01:17:26 pressure being applied by labc mr jones gave an account of an alleged call with an unidentified officer of labc which is not accepted first mr jones suggested he contacted labc to find out more about the lab system
01:17:37 system approval
01:17:39 approval process as a result of a suggestion by mr jenner
01:17:42 mr jenner this is improbable given that mr jenner had himself been tasked by abc to undertake the assessment of k-15 and had already completed at least two system approvals for kingspan previously
01:17:53 system approvals for kingspan previously secondly mr jones claimed labc had asked him to meet kingspan who would explain the process to him it would make no sense for labc to expect kingspan to explain labc's type approval
01:18:05 kingspan to explain labc's type approval process to mr jones and third mr jones claimed that someone at their bc had told them that his assessment should be not particularly in depth that a fee of 500 pounds would be charged
01:18:16 500 pounds would be charged and that he was not to worry about the fact that k-15 was just one element of the rain screen cladding system but there is no reason why labc would inform mr jones
01:18:27 inform mr jones to adopt a less diligent process for this application and also the records unequivocally demonstrate that it was mr jones who fixed the fee at 500 pounds not labc
01:18:38 not labc mr jones claimed that prior to his call with labc he was veering towards returning the assessment of the k-15 application to labc for another authority to undertake but it was that call where he was
01:18:49 but it was that call where he was persuaded that he could do it when asked by you sir uh why he felt it necessary to go to such lengths to satisfy kingspan's requirements in creating the scope of approval
01:19:01 creating the scope of approval he suggested that it was because labc had asked him to do so he went on to say so i suppose from every angle i was being pressured by labc and by kingspan this makes no sense at all there was no
01:19:13 this makes no sense at all there was no pressure from labc lfc had nothing to gain from applying pressure it did not receive a penny of the nominal 500 pound fee set by mr jones this was retained by herefordshire council the research
01:19:24 herefordshire council the research authority what mr jones had to do was to consider the documentary material kingspan provided and assess what compliance with the building regulations and the official guidance that material
01:19:35 official guidance that material demonstrated no more no less he was entitled to rely on such testing as was recorded in the bba certificate and did not need to go behind what stated if mr jones required any further
01:19:46 if mr jones required any further information then it was for him to request it from kingspan mr jones's evidence of the alleged conversation with the unidentified person within labc has changed and
01:19:57 person within labc has changed and expanded over the course of his written and all testimony it is uncorroborated by any documentary or other evidence and it is inconsistent with contemporaneous documents and his
01:20:08 contemporaneous documents and his testimony in that regard is rejected by labc
01:20:11 labc turning to the erroneous assertion in point three of the august 2013 registered details for k-15 kingspan's application for registered detail for k-15 was like its earlier
01:20:23 detail for k-15 was like its earlier application for type approval supported by misleading documentation specifically the obsolete 2008 bba certificate and the ninth issue of the product literature as for the
01:20:35 product literature as for the certificate labc was not informed or provided with a copy of a bba certificate dated in 6th of april 2010 which added on its front page that it had been tested to eight four one four
01:20:48 had been tested to eight four one four slash one for one specific construction on masonry walls thus the limited nature of the test which was explicitly referenced in the latest certificate but not the former was not drawn to labc's attention
01:21:01 drawn to labc's attention as for the ninth edition of the product literature it was like its predecessor littered with falsehoods it was misleading for example because kingston knew that the k-15 product had not been successfully tested on a steel frame
01:21:12 successfully tested on a steel frame system indeed it had failed and it knew that it had been tested only on masonry walls which had and had not been certified for any other use kingspan specifically requested the
01:21:24 kingspan specifically requested the wording which it wished to be included as part of the registered detail labc forwarded this request to mr jones who acceded to it it was consistent with the wording in the bba certificate dated
01:21:36 wording in the bba certificate dated october 2008 which labc had no reason to doubt
01:21:41 doubt factors led to point three of appendix a to the registered detail 28th of august to 2013 stating that the product can be used on buildings with stories greater than 18 meters from grand level provided
01:21:54 than 18 meters from grand level provided it's used in combination with suitably non-combustible substrates and ancillary components note the 8414 testing referenced in section 1 of the bba certificate is
01:22:06 section 1 of the bba certificate is noted as meeting requirements of br135 i alternative route to compliance ref referenced in proof document b or scottish technical handbook so the conclusions with respect to
01:22:17 so the conclusions with respect to kingspan
01:22:18 kingspan kingspan failed to act with integrity which was demanded of them in the application process both in relation to type approval and the registered detail of k-15 both applications were
01:22:29 of k-15 both applications were misleading kingsborough knew all too well what it was doing it is staffing that kingspan accepts no responsibility for the content of the type of approval summary and the registered detail issued and even worse
01:22:41 registered detail issued and even worse contends that it was entitled to rely upon its ill-gotten certification kingspan knew that there was no test data which showed that the k-15 product it was marketing was suitable views in a range screen planning system on
01:22:53 range screen planning system on buildings with dimensions greater than 18 meters kingspan had tried and failed to engineer a successful steel frame test kingspan upon obtaining the iranian certification called a halt to further testing thereby
01:23:04 called a halt to further testing thereby ensuring the product which it knew was unsafe
01:23:07 unsafe would be used in circumstances where in the event of a fire it was liable to cause death or injury labc does not accept that it had too close a relationship with kingspan as has been suggested by the bsr1 team it
01:23:21 has been suggested by the bsr1 team it had limited dealings labc's own review of its interactions with kingspan do not suggest anything excessive or unusual the detail of the application was dealt with by mr james of heritage council and kingpin deceit
01:23:33 of heritage council and kingpin deceit is entirely its responsibility notwithstanding kingspan's uh disgraceful conduct in the procurement of the certification in relation to k-15 labc's erroneous certification did not
01:23:44 labc's erroneous certification did not have any bearing on the grenfell tower project
01:23:47 project um labc would invite the chairman and panel uh to note that the 2009 certificate for k-15 lapsed in april 2012 long before the
01:23:58 2012 long before the refurbishment of grenfell tower the document issued as part of the 28th of august 2013 registered detail did not include the type approval summary
01:24:09 include the type approval summary containing the erroneous statement regarding limited combustibility the 2013 certificate lapsed in november 2014
01:24:20 2014 before k-15 was considered for ken grenfell tower at the time the k-15 uh product was being utilized on great filter the relevant certificate issued in march 2015 specifically stated that it did not
01:24:33 2015 specifically stated that it did not meet the limited combustibility requirements of adb paragraph 12.7 in other words it was by then correct in any event k-15 was never intended to be used on grenfell tower it was only
01:24:45 be used on grenfell tower it was only used because of a shortfall of the supply in relation to rs 5000 the historically deficient documentation was never an issue which had any bearing on its use at grenfell
01:24:56 had any bearing on its use at grenfell tower
01:24:57 tower turning now to celestex in in 2013 celetex began to explore whether it could enter the uh above 18 meter market in an effort to rival
01:25:08 meter market in an effort to rival kingspan's product their plan was to rebrand fr 5000 as rs 5000. celetech set about adopting a similar approach in respect of gaining
01:25:19 approach in respect of gaining registered detail status as kick as kingspan had with its k-15 product namely to test the product in one configuration apply for registered detail status
01:25:31 detail status which they hoped would then enable it to market the product for broader use than could be safely justified by their testing
01:25:38 testing in early 2014 celetex undertook two eight four one four slash two tests the first of which failed leading to a redesign of the test rig the second test incorporated the same
01:25:49 the second test incorporated the same materials
01:25:51 materials but the range screen board thickness was increased and magnesium board was added this specification passed the 8414 test but the inclusion of the magnesium board was not noted by bre
01:26:02 was not noted by bre celatex concealed the presence of magnesium board from bre bre's error was its failure to identify in short celatex rigged to test results and concealed their duplicity and took
01:26:14 and concealed their duplicity and took advantage of bre's failure to identify it
01:26:17 it celetex then set about seeking registration with a wide scope from labc to expo exploit the wider lack of understanding industry over the proper use to which products could be put that would enable it to sell rs 5000 for
01:26:31 that would enable it to sell rs 5000 for projects for which it was not demonstrably safe on the 15th of may 2014 celetex informed labc that it wished to proceed with the registered detail assessment
01:26:43 registered detail assessment mr vapor of celetex emailed the labc appointed research authority in this instance west suffolk council on the 17th of june 2014 outlining the scape of the registration celetex wished to
01:26:55 the registration celetex wished to receive
01:26:56 receive the scape of the registration saw went beyond the scape of the testing which had been performed on the 17th of june 2014
01:27:04 2014 celetech provided the research authority with a letter from vre stating that rs 5000 had passed an 84142 test and a br3 135 classification was being
01:27:17 and a br3 135 classification was being performed
01:27:18 performed on the fifth floor the celetex was informed that it has successfully gained registration for rs 5000 a registered system document dated 21st of august 2014 together with undated
01:27:31 of august 2014 together with undated details drawing and document list was issued to celetex on the 29th of august 2014 and published on the labs website on that day the document stated that celetex rs 5000
01:27:45 the document stated that celetex rs 5000 had been successfully tested to 84142 met the criteria set out in br135 and therefore is acceptable for use with stories uh or in buildings with stories above 80 meters in height subject to the
01:27:57 above 80 meters in height subject to the board being fixed to a non-combustible substrate
01:28:02 substrate and alternative classifiers to adb the wording was consistent with celetex requested scape the reference to using a non-combustible substrate was erroneous the document
01:28:13 substrate was erroneous the document should have stated that the product could be used above 80 meters only if its application was in a system identical that we should pass the 8414 test
01:28:23 test at this time labc was changing the presentation of its registered detail certificates and on the 3rd of november it issued a new registered detail certificate this certificate superseded the earlier
01:28:35 this certificate superseded the earlier document was backdated to the 21st of august 2014. importantly the new certificate corrected the error in the earlier document and now stated that the product
01:28:47 document and now stated that the product had been successfully tested to 84142 met the criteria for br135 and was acceptable for use above uh on buildings with stories above 18 meter
01:28:58 buildings with stories above 18 meter site subject to matching the specification criteria of the bre fire test report carried out
01:29:07 the earlier document was removed from the labs website and was replaced with the new registered details certificate the statement that rs 5000 had been successfully tested to
01:29:19 successfully tested to 84142 and met the br 135 criteria were properly included in the certificate because bre had confirmed this in its br 135 classification report dated the 11th
01:29:31 135 classification report dated the 11th of august 2014. what labsu could not and did not know was that celetex had obtained the bs 84142 passed by rigging the test results
01:29:43 84142 passed by rigging the test results by adding the undisclosed magnesium board
01:29:46 board to the makeup of the test rig and representing masses to bre there was simply no way that the registered details procedure for appraising applications could be expected to discover this the determined forster can
01:29:58 discover this the determined forster can always beat the system upon receipt of the amended certificate in november 2014 cedartech emailed labc requesting some amendments although not notably to the new text emphasizing the
01:30:10 notably to the new text emphasizing the need for any installation to match that used in the 8414 test pending review of the new wording um celetex requested the registration be
01:30:21 celetex requested the registration be withdrawn and labc compliant with this request thus uh from uh the 4th of november 2014 to the 1st of july 2015 there was no extant
01:30:32 the 1st of july 2015 there was no extant labc certification for rs 5000 labc contacted at celetex in may 2015 with a copy of an amended certificate
01:30:44 with a copy of an amended certificate which now also took account of the building control alliance technical guidance note 18. the new revised certificate was technically correct in the absence of a response from
01:30:55 in the absence of a response from celetex the new certificate was issued on the 1st of july 2015 and posted on the labc website where it remained until the 16th of july 2017
01:31:07 the 16th of july 2017 when labc withdrew the registration of rs 5000 two days after the grenfell tower fire
01:31:16 labc's errors in in respect of the rs 5000 product the deficiencies in the rs 5000 certification were not the same as the deficiencies in relation to k-15 and
01:31:27 the deficiencies in relation to k-15 and in any event they existed for a few months only between the 21st of august and the 3rd of november 2014. in the period around july august 2014
01:31:39 in the period around july august 2014 lacbc became aware of various concerns as to the suitability of k15 for use above 18 meters such concerns were obviously relevant to celetex's application for rs 5000 which was a
01:31:52 application for rs 5000 which was a similar product and for which celetex was seeking similar certification there are three aspects to this first the initial draft of the bca technical guidance note 18 have been in circulation since june 2014 and set at
01:32:05 circulation since june 2014 and set at nhbc's position that thermo setting insulins which is what k-15 and rs-5000 rs-5000r
01:32:11 rs-5000r did not meet the limited combustibility requirements of adb table a7 second on the 11th of july 2014 labc were provided with a copy of an email to nhbc which
01:32:23 with a copy of an email to nhbc which expressed concerns about the widespread potentially improper specification of k-15 and its description as a material of limited combustibility this was circulated amongst labc's
01:32:35 this was circulated amongst labc's technical members of staff including labc's technical sales director who was involved in facilitating the ongoing rs 5000 assessment by western council thirdly on the 16th of july 2014 labc
01:32:48 thirdly on the 16th of july 2014 labc was contacted by a company called europa facades who raised queries as to la k15 labc certification and the alleged ability to meet the requirements of 84142
01:33:01 84142 whilst the first certificate issued in respect of rs 5000 on the 21st of august 2014 did not repeat the erroneous statement the k-15 uh in the k-15 certification that the
01:33:12 uh in the k-15 certification that the product can be considered a material of limited combustibility it was still an error because it should have stated the product could be used above 80 meters only of its application was in the system identical that to that which had
01:33:24 system identical that to that which had passed the 8414 test the effect of the november 2014 provision of the rs 5000 certification would be to effectively prevent celatex using labc certification to gain
01:33:37 using labc certification to gain extended applications of rs 5000 the appreciation of labc and of west suffolk council of the intricacies of the 18 plus meter cladding systems
01:33:49 meter cladding systems was markedly developing throughout 2014 the failure to recognize that the essential significance of a successful 8414 test is that it is a system test
01:34:00 8414 test is that it is a system test which provides an alternative route to compliance where the insulation components of a system are not non-combustible or not of limited combustibility was corrected in the
01:34:11 combustibility was corrected in the november 2014 registered detail celetex may have continued to use the original certification issued on the 29th floor was 2014 which had been posted on the labs website and taken
01:34:23 posted on the labs website and taken down at the beginning of november 2014. if it did celetex must have known that they were promoting rs 5000 on a false perspective labc certification of rs 5000 plainly
01:34:36 labc certification of rs 5000 plainly relied upon bre's confirmation that the 84142 test had been successfully completed and the classification to br 135 was in order labc was entitled to rely on the ucas
01:34:49 labc was entitled to rely on the ucas accredited body certification and should not be criticized or faulted for doing so
01:34:54 so topic five did rbkc place any reliance on iranian lab certification when assessing the use of rs-5000 on grenfell tower
01:35:06 of rs-5000 on grenfell tower no it could not and did not when mr hogan rbkc's building control officer was considering the use of rs 5000 on grenfell tower the errors in the
01:35:18 5000 on grenfell tower the errors in the registered detail had been corrected and the erroneous material was not available to be accessed on labc's website despite producing three previous statements it was not until the 30th
01:35:29 statements it was not until the 30th september 2020 during his oral evidence that mr hogan suggested that he looked at labc website which said that rs 5000 was
01:35:38 was suitable for use on buildings of that height it's surprising that it took until this moment for mr hogan to record this detail given that he had numerous prior opportunities to do so
01:35:49 numerous prior opportunities to do so the only website he'd specifically identified up to that point in his written statements was that of the celestex website during his oral evidence on the 1st of october 2020 and an attempt to prompt a
01:36:01 october 2020 and an attempt to prompt a recollection of the document which he saw on the celetex website mr hogan was shown the labc registered system registration certificate dated the 21st of august
01:36:13 certificate dated the 21st of august 2014. he was asked by council to the inquiry whether this was what he saw and mr hoban said i can't say i showed you another document that i had in my possession i don't know whether
01:36:25 in my possession i don't know whether it's been passed to you that mr hogan reiterated he could not say that he'd seen the 2014 certificate when pressed on the point
01:36:36 when pressed on the point thus mr haven and could not say that he considered the erroneous certificate regressively counselling quest did not explore with mr hogan the document which he said he had supplied to the inquiry
01:36:48 he said he had supplied to the inquiry which is presumably a document which mr hogan thought he had considered what then was this other document this is unclear
01:36:55 unclear our bkc produced a document headed chronology of building control which lists
01:37:01 lists a november 2015 celetex rs 5000 datasheet as the only supporting document for the installation board for the avoidance of that the data sheet
01:37:12 for the avoidance of that the data sheet was a celetex document it is true that it mentions the board being supported by labc approval but it is not an labc document labc had no input into its contact content and the use of the term
01:37:24 contact content and the use of the term approval is expressly prohibited under the terms and conditions for registered details
01:37:30 details therefore the evidence does not support the contention that mr hoban considered any erroneous labc documentation prior to the use of rs 5000 on grenfell tower notwithstanding this fact and even more
01:37:41 notwithstanding this fact and even more regrettably the suggestion that mr hoban did consider erroneous documentation produced by labc has been perpetuated in some of the questioning witnesses for example john allen was questioned on day
01:37:53 example john allen was questioned on day 45
01:37:55 45 about the same labc registered system certificate and it was described by council of the inquiry as the document we think that mr hoban may have seen
01:38:05 seen uh despite labc raising explicit concern about that line of questioning the position was put even more emphatically on the 17th of november november 2020 during the evidence of mr vapor of celestex cancer the inquiry described
01:38:18 celestex cancer the inquiry described the 2014 registered system the certificate as a document that john hogan the building control officer of grenfell tower says that he examined to the best of his recollection he did not say anything of the sword labc notified
01:38:31 say anything of the sword labc notified the inquiry team of its concerns as well in response labc was told that the question was inadvertently phrased labc would put it wrong differently the premise of the question was highly inaccurate the email went on to state
01:38:43 inaccurate the email went on to state but it was council inquiry's view that it's still likely to be the labc certificate um
01:38:48 um which was the document that mr hogan looked at online however we were informed that there were no conclusions which had been reached in that regard labc is
01:38:58 labc is at a loss to understand the basis upon which that view had been reached in light of the evidence regrettably this iranian view has been repeated and relied upon in closing statements for example bsr
01:39:11 closing statements for example bsr paragraph
01:39:12 paragraph 1 a paragraph 127 bsr1 submission bsr2 paragraph 11.1.2 and in their module 1 closing statements mhclg's closing statement paragraph 37.
01:39:26 mhclg's closing statement paragraph 37. and it's also been seized upon by ryden in their closing statements for example at paragraph 6 point 16 to 620 in eloise's submission and it's not alone in holding view this view the
01:39:38 alone in holding view this view the suggestion that mr hogan considered the la
01:39:40 la cbc certification is demonstrably incorrect
01:39:44 incorrect uh mr hogan says that the first time he became aware of that celetex was the product to be used
01:39:51 used on grenfell tower was after it was delivered to site the earliest purchase order for rs 5000 for uh grenfell tower is from march 2015 indicating that if mr
01:40:04 is from march 2015 indicating that if mr hogan did check the lab bc website it must have been after this date
01:40:10 date if mr hogan did see an labc certificate for rsf 5000 and for reasons outlined earlier um it can only have been the revised
01:40:21 um it can only have been the revised version posted on the first of july 2015.
01:40:25 2015. if mr hoeven checked the labc website between march 2015 and the end of june 2015 he would have found no registered detail for rs 5000 and if he checked the website after the
01:40:37 and if he checked the website after the first of july 2015 he would have found the final and technically accurate revision of the certificate and it did not mandate the use of the cladding system uh on grenfell tower because this was not the same as that recorded in the
01:40:49 was not the same as that recorded in the bs 84142 test it provides only minimal comfort to labc's personnel and it may seem of limited importance to others but it is apparent that mr hogan
01:41:00 others but it is apparent that mr hogan can have placed no reliance on labc's earlier erroneous certification in any event it should be noted that before he became aware that rs 5000 was
01:41:11 before he became aware that rs 5000 was the insulation to be used on grenfell tower mr hogan was circulated with an labc article which expressly explained that k-15 and rs-5000 do not usually meet the limited combustibility
01:41:22 meet the limited combustibility requirements of adb table a7 and can be only used if they are in exactly the same specification as tested in accordance with a414 and br135
01:41:33 accordance with a414 and br135 classification come what may he knew or ought to have known that rs 5000 could not properly be used
01:41:40 used as proposed by grenfell tower and nothing produced and made available by labc at the material time could have given him any other impression in conclusion and in summary
01:41:52 in conclusion and in summary it is lab it is not labc's function to test products such as k-15 and rs-5000 kingspan obtained type brutal and registered details status on terms which he knew were wrong through deception
01:42:04 he knew were wrong through deception celetex obtained registered detail status for rs 5000 in a similarly underhand fashion labc rejects any suggestion that it was complicit in their deceit
01:42:15 complicit in their deceit kingspan and celetex had opportunities to correct the errors in the certification and chose not to do so nevertheless the historical errors in labc at certification and registered
01:42:27 labc at certification and registered details relating to k-15 and rs-5000 could not and did not have any bearing on their use on the grenfell tower project at the time that those products were
01:42:38 at the time that those products were being used the certification was existed in relation to each product was both accuracy and technically correct it did not mandate the use of the cladding system proposed for grenfell tower
01:42:49 tower after the disaster labc severed ties with kingspan and withdrew and cancelled its certification in relation to all kingspan products lobc withdrew its registration of rs5000
01:43:03 lobc withdrew its registration of rs5000 labc has undergone a reorganization in late 2017 labc implemented a ucas audited iso standards framework for local authority building controls
01:43:15 for local authority building controls teams
01:43:16 teams the framework identifies what good looks like and sets the standards and performance required of local authority building control in the delivery of building control
01:43:27 it has introduced a quality management system to conform to the requirements of iso 9000 2015 part of the quality management system includes an assessment of the competence
01:43:39 includes an assessment of the competence of surveyors closely matched to project complexity independent audits are regularly made to ensure that surveyors are not working outside the scope of this competence
01:43:50 this competence and starting in 2017 at labc has developed a range of off-call accredited learning and qualifications for building control professionals
01:44:01 professionals lebc rightly believes that the reorganization in 2021 is very different from the organization it was in 2000 2000 2009 and 2014.
01:44:12 2000 2009 and 2014. aabc would like to conclude by thanking the chairman and the panel for this opportunity to address you labc reiterates that it welcomes the invitation it has received for witness statements from numerous individuals
01:44:23 statements from numerous individuals with uh
01:44:24 with uh uh within uh module six it is committed to assisting your inquiry thank you good thank you very much mr adamson well at that point
01:44:35 well at that point we shall take the morning break the next statement is going to be made by mr taverno queen's council on behalf of ryden and he
01:44:46 and he is scheduled to make that at 11 45 so i think we will we'll rise now and we'll sit again at 11 45 when we expect to see mr tavern good thank you very much
02:04:50 welcome back we are now going to hear a closing statement uh by mr taverner queen's council on behalf of ryden good morning mr taverner
02:05:01 good morning mr taverner uh good morning and um thank you mr chairman well
02:05:08 thank you well now um it's your turn to make a statement on behalf of your client and if you're ready we'll we'll hear it please thank you thank you very much oh before you before you start can i
02:05:20 oh before you before you start can i just say this um
02:05:22 um we've allowed you two hours you can obviously have the whole of your two hours but i'd ask you not to have any more
02:05:29 more and since you're going to overrun the lunch break can i leave it to you to indicate when it would be convenient to you to make that break and then we'll take uh the break
02:05:40 uh the break from that time yes that's that's very kind uh mr chairman i do anticipate in fact being less than two hours probably nearer the one and a half hour mark well let's see how we get on and and
02:05:53 well let's see how we get on and and when you think it's a good time to have a break because i suspect you'll still go over lunch uh i will
02:05:59 i will then we'll take it then all right thank you very much thank you thank you
02:06:04 thank you um what what we plan to do today sir is to highlight important aspects of our closing submissions and to cover certain specific matters raised by others in their written and
02:06:16 raised by others in their written and oral closing submissions ryden is keen to emphasize however that today's oral submissions should not detract attention away from the detail and analysis set out in our
02:06:27 the detail and analysis set out in our previous submissions written and oral particularly ryden's module one and two written closing the inquiry will be aware that we served our phase two module one and two written
02:06:39 our phase two module one and two written closing submissions on the 28th of may 2021
02:06:43 2021 and for the record they can be found at ryd0094564
02:06:49 underscore 001 our approach today is first to set out some general observations before then and secondly drawing attention to features of the design and
02:07:01 attention to features of the design and build procurement route under which ryden was operating which we consider to be relevant thirdly i'll address the standard of care to be expected of a designer build contractor before then moving on to
02:07:14 contractor before then moving on to addressing certain matters raised by various core participants the purpose of all of this of course is to further assist the tribunal in its investigations and in reaching solid
02:07:25 investigations and in reaching solid conclusions and making firm recommendations um i'm not going to ask for documents to be brought up today they're referenced in our submissions for the convenience of those who may
02:07:37 for the convenience of those who may reread the transcript of these oral submissions i'll sometimes read out where particular references can be found which which we hope will be of some help
02:07:49 which which we hope will be of some help turning first then if i made some general observations the inquiry might well conclude that the last 40 years or so has witnessed progressive and systemic
02:08:01 witnessed progressive and systemic failures within all aspects of the uk construction industry concerning fire safety and that fueled by deregulation
02:08:12 by deregulation references already made to the interim and final reports of dame judith hackett it's an inescapable fact as her interim report dated december 2017 concluded
02:08:24 report dated december 2017 concluded that the current regulatory system for ensuring fire safety in high-rise and complex buildings is not fit for purpose she said and i quote the current regulations and guidance are too complex
02:08:35 regulations and guidance are too complex and unclear this can lead to confusion and misinterpretation in their application to high-rise and complex buildings at paragraph 2.9 of our written closing
02:08:46 at paragraph 2.9 of our written closing submissions we give some and just some examples of the comments by the inquiries experts as the confusion and and differing interpretations the reasons for this state of affairs
02:08:58 the reasons for this state of affairs which left mr hyatt somewhat between disappointed and appalled he said that at day 64 pages 107 and 108 are yet to be considered by the inquiry
02:09:11 are yet to be considered by the inquiry the culpability of all those involved in the grenfell tower project cannot be investigated critically we respectfully suggest without the inquiry first having considered the
02:09:22 inquiry first having considered the unfitness for purpose of the regulations and guidelines and their scope for misinterpretation nor in our submission can the inquiry ignore the exploitation
02:09:33 can the inquiry ignore the exploitation of that state of affairs by the manufactures of products used in planning systems and the assistance given to those manufacturers by the testing houses and the certifying bodies
02:09:45 the certifying bodies a comprehensive and comprehensible statutory backdrop would have been we suggest a very different starting point when assessing the conduct of the professionals engaged on grenfell
02:09:57 professionals engaged on grenfell to one which was not further a cladding industry populated by manufacturers who were honest and open about their projects and their suitability for specific uses as opposed to one's intent on misleading
02:10:09 as opposed to one's intent on misleading the industry for market share and profit would have painted a very different landscape against which to judge decisions made by those involved in the project
02:10:19 ryden's not going to rehearse the inadequacies of the regulated regime or the conduct of iconic celitex and kingspan
02:10:25 kingspan or the behavior of the bre and the bba this is covered in written submissions submitted by ryden and many many of the other core participants ryden considers iconic
02:10:38 ryden considers iconic and its conduct of sections three and four of its closing submissions two points however are worth emphasizing in light of in light of our comics submissions yesterday
02:10:49 yesterday the first is that arconic's involvement with the grenfell tower project started as early as october 2012 when our comics miss french met studio east mr soon
02:11:01 east mr soon and cep's mr blades see in that regard where we set that out at 3.46 of our closing submissions
02:11:12 submissions the second is made at paragraph 3.96 of our closing archonic repeatedly acknowledged in its contemporary in its internal communications the dangers of using pe
02:11:25 the dangers of using pe acm in high-rise residential buildings without any qualifications or reservations that it may be okay to use it
02:11:34 it if used with combinations of other materials
02:11:37 materials and a good example of this is now the the well rehearsed mr werder's email of the 29th of june 2015 where he said pe is dangerous on facades
02:11:48 where he said pe is dangerous on facades and dangerous in in capitals we refer to this email a paragraph three uh
02:11:54 uh 100 of our closing submissions and in the following paragraphs reference the fact that it was only a week or so later that arconic acknowledged a further
02:12:05 that arconic acknowledged a further order for pe for grenfell tower with a smiley face
02:12:10 as to celetex please see sections five and six of our closing submissions at paragraph 5.7 we reference where celetex witnesses agreed in their evidence provided to the inquiry that
02:12:22 evidence provided to the inquiry that the celtics claim stating for use in rain screen applications and suitable for use in buildings above 18 meters in height was thoroughly misleading and dishonest
02:12:34 was thoroughly misleading and dishonest as it implied that the product could be used
02:12:36 used suffice it to say for present purposes that ryden invites the inquiry to find that the main driving cause of the tragedy was inadequately drafted regulations and guidance and the cynical and cavalier approach to
02:12:47 and the cynical and cavalier approach to serious risks posed by their products of the manufacturers of acm and cladding insulation
02:12:56 it's also plain that all of this was compounded by a general lack of understanding of the dangers of these products
02:13:04 products in the uk industry
02:13:08 that these particular factors were the root cause of what happened to grenville is evidenced by the fact that same or similar inappropriate materials have been installed in hundreds of other buildings in the uk and indeed worldwide
02:13:22 buildings in the uk and indeed worldwide the inquiry has more than once been referred to the statistics from the ministry of housing communities and local government and their recent report
02:13:33 there are 469 buildings with acm cladding systems unlikely to meet the building regulations 257 of those are located in london and
02:13:44 257 of those are located in london and there's likely to be up to 1500 to 2000 buildings in total with combustible non-acm padding above 18 meters with varying degrees of problems
02:13:56 varying degrees of problems of course it's a matter of the inquiry but it's respectfully suggested that the contextual background of any assessment of the conduct of those involved in the design and construction of the cladding works of
02:14:07 construction of the cladding works of grenville
02:14:08 grenville includes
02:14:10 includes and in our view in a logical order firstly an inadequately uh or inadequate regulatory regulatory regime two
02:14:19 two dishonest manufacturers knowing of that inadequacy intent on marketing what they knew to be dangerous material for inappropriate use three a slack and complicit testing and
02:14:30 three a slack and complicit testing and certification industry with the result that materials used in the cladding system were the very least headlined as appropriate for use above 18 meters
02:14:39 18 meters when they were not and four
02:14:42 and four poor professional education and dissemination dissemination to the right people
02:14:47 people of reliable information alerting them to the dangers of the use of these products resulting in an alarming widespread ignorance
02:14:56 ignorance the consequence of each of these four factors
02:14:59 factors namely the prolific use in the uk of dangerous materials in wholly inappropriate circumstances is
02:15:07 is therefore to see
02:15:10 in the winder and the wider context of its findings related to those factors above
02:15:16 above that it is respectfully suggested that the inquiry should then turn to those particular firms involved in the grenfell tower project in order to assess which ones nonetheless ought
02:15:28 assess which ones nonetheless ought in the circumstances of their engagements to have known that these materials should not be used as they were a proper assessment we say can only be framed by considering those
02:15:40 can only be framed by considering those firms
02:15:42 firms professional qualifications and standings
02:15:44 standings and the tasks they took on are set out in their respective contracts it's self-evident the different branches of construction industry might be expected to have
02:15:55 industry might be expected to have different degrees of expertise and knowledge
02:15:58 knowledge as i'll seek to develop later on in these submissions design and build contracting companies in general cannot be expected to know what architects engineers or relevant to grenfell
02:16:09 engineers or relevant to grenfell specialist cladding subcontractors know turning fi ma2 to my second topic that is the the design and build model
02:16:21 that is the the design and build model the inquiry will know that design and build is a term describing a procurement route in which the main contractor takes on
02:16:28 on a legal responsibility for the design and construction of works it's more traditional counterpart is where the employer engages from start to finish
02:16:38 finish architect engineer and other specialists to design and the contractor simply takes on legal liability for building to that design if there is then a problem with the building
02:16:49 building and depending on the terms of the agreement
02:16:52 agreement the theory is that if a designer build contract has been used the employer does not have to decide whether it is a design problem and they've said which designers are at fault or on the other hand whether it's a construction problem
02:17:03 hand whether it's a construction problem for which the contractor would be to blame
02:17:06 blame he simply goes to the design and build contractor and takes on a legal responsibility for the lot the model used at grenville is in common use
02:17:16 use so common that there are standard terms and condition prepared by bodies such as the joint contracts tribunal the jct we have already referenced ryden's
02:17:27 we have already referenced ryden's contract with tmo and the incorporation of the jcp standard terms and conditions as amended into writing's contract uh see in that regard our module one opening
02:17:37 opening reference for that is ryd triple zero o
02:17:42 o page nine and page seventeen artillery paragraph fourteen point two of its submissions that's a r t four zeros nine four five eight underscore triple zero six
02:17:55 eight underscore triple zero six referenced the design and build model citing an explanation in construction law and practice 2016
02:18:03 2016 a publication well published through sweden maxwell the inquiry will forgive me for repeating it design and build means the employer will retain a contractor to carry out both
02:18:14 retain a contractor to carry out both the design and the construction works the contractor will in turn retain the specialist designer such as the architect and structural engineer and will also retain subcontractors in the
02:18:26 will also retain subcontractors in the normal way the contractor's obligation in relation to design may be to complete the works of design already begun by the employer's own professional team or maybe to carry out the whole of the design
02:18:38 design often designed professionals are transferred from the employer to the contractor and in that circumstance the contract will normally take responsibility for the work of the design team whether carried out before or after the transfer
02:18:52 carried out before or after the transfer all this comes from section three of the building and civil engineering procurement strategy section paragraph 3.1
02:19:01 3.1 there are many extra er ex many variations on the design and build theme but the sweden maxwell extract describes the operation of many commonly used design and build contracts
02:19:13 design and build contracts the employer engages designers to develop the design to specification stage to allow the employer control of the design to the degree he wants you may invite tenders for proprietary products
02:19:24 products or simply set a performance requirement those designers are often then taken on by contractors to complete design that have already been developed and inspect the work to ensure compliance with that
02:19:35 the work to ensure compliance with that design
02:19:37 design the transfer of the design team by the client to the contractor happens after much of the design has already been carried out by the architect working for the client the contractor so to speak inherits that design and agrees to take on a legal
02:19:49 design and agrees to take on a legal liability for it that being the case it's in his own interest for the contractor to satisfy himself one way or another but the design achieves what the contract requires it to achieve
02:20:02 requires it to achieve if an architect is taken on by the design and build contract then it's invariably the case that it remains the architect's contractual responsibility to take care to ensure the safety and compliance of the design and any
02:20:13 compliance of the design and any subsequent changes to that design this is a continual obligation on the architect it continues from the commencement of his model involvement with the employer to the completion of the design and
02:20:25 to the completion of the design and works uh designing works under his engagement with the contractor self-evidently the moment the architects or indeed any other specialist designers are taken on under a contract by the
02:20:36 are taken on under a contract by the contractor if they consider there might possibly be anything wrong with the design or the specification of products they have a duty and a self-interest to say so
02:20:47 self-interest to say so this is a product of the terms of their engagement with the employer and subsequently the contractor none of this is unusual it all follows common standard industry practice
02:20:59 practice wright retains not just studio e but other professionals structural engineers and mechanical electrical engineers to design and coordinate design including the very
02:21:10 including the very verification of the suitability of materials or all in an entirely unexceptional and normal way ryden also engaged subcontractors is in
02:21:21 ryden also engaged subcontractors is in no way unusual exceptional to engage a specialist cladding subcontractors such as harley and as ryden did making harley responsible for ensuring that the cladding work was safe and complied with the building
02:21:32 and complied with the building regulations but this is a specialist skill is recognized by both uh mr hyatt and mr saluka
02:21:40 saluka experts to the inquiry
02:21:45 i'll just turn to warranties for a moment of interest we submit is that an employer when an employer who is engaged to design and build contractor
02:21:58 design and build contractor he frequently insists on reserving himself the right to take a warranty from the designers and specialists contractors to whom those tasks are subcontracted by the design and bill contract
02:22:09 contract backed by suitable insurance in this case by clause
02:22:15 by clause 3.4.5 of the jc contract between ryden and tmo under the heading conditions of subcontracting it was provided that shall be a condition of any subcontract entered
02:22:26 condition of any subcontract entered into by writing where applicable for the execution and delivery by the subcontractor of such collateral warranties as comply with the contract documents
02:22:39 with the contract documents clause 7e point 1 of the contract
02:22:43 contract provided for the benefit of tmo that the contractor shall procure that each and every design subcontractor shall execute and deliver to the employer within 15 business days of request to do so from on behalf of the
02:22:55 request to do so from on behalf of the employer from time to time a collateral warranty or warranties in favor of the employer such collateral warranty or warranties to be in the appropriate form set out in appendix 3
02:23:06 appropriate form set out in appendix 3 part 2 of the agreement with only such changes that the employer may approve in fact in this case collateral warranties were provided in favor of tmo
02:23:17 warranties were provided in favor of tmo by how harley facades limited as facade subcontractor and by studio e architects limited as architects there were also others from js writers
02:23:28 there were also others from js writers ebony and smoke control subcontractor and curtin's consulting limited they were the structural engineers we refer to all of this because it demonstrates industry expectation
02:23:39 demonstrates industry expectation that design and build contractors such as wright will engage consultants and specialist subcontractors who will design and take responsibility for their design
02:23:49 design it also illustrates that it's far from being rare for that for there to be a continued additional reliance by the employer on the professionals it originally engaged until completion of the relevant work
02:24:03 until completion of the relevant work it's important to note
02:24:06 to note that it's specifically contemplated by employer and design build contractor the designer build contractor rely on others to discharge their duties over to the employer under its main contract
02:24:17 contract because those others will have skills that ride in itself as a company might not be expected to have
02:24:26 this usual and well established route that is of reliance on others reflects the fact that design and build contractors do not often carry in-house the specialist resource necessary to
02:24:38 the specialist resource necessary to carry out the specialist elements of the design and construction of the contract works
02:24:43 works if they did have such resource then there'd be no need to enter into such arrangements with consultants and subcontractors ryden doesn't have statistics to demonstrate how often third-party resources are used by contractors in
02:24:55 resources are used by contractors in design and build contracts of a similar size and nature to grenfell tower it's suggested however it's more common than not for a designer build contractor to engage third party designers
02:25:06 to engage third party designers to carry out the tasks of specialist design
02:25:10 design in the case of inherited design such as grenfell
02:25:13 grenfell it's frequently the case that the designer build contractors will use the same design team engaged by the employer rather than switch horses to use an in-house resource even if available
02:25:27 in-house resource even if available any criticism writing based simply on the fact that it did not utilize in-house architects structural mechanical or electrical engineers or specialist cladding designers but relied on others is we say misconceived
02:25:40 on others is we say misconceived it appears however to underpin at least many of assumptions and observations of course of
02:25:45 course of participants including our comics celetex and x over in their closing submissions we do say it's not butt passing for ryan to emphasize to the inquiry that it was
02:25:56 to emphasize to the inquiry that it was operating within a traditional design and build model and doing nothing out of the ordinary but it passed on tasks to specialists with skills that ryden has never professed to have
02:26:08 never professed to have and i'd never profess to have the the specialist knowledge to understand complex statutory guidance it did not profess to have the specialist knowledge to read all product literature relating to all of the many
02:26:19 literature relating to all of the many products used on the project and the event did not have the skills to see through the misleading product marketing of our comics celetex kingspan or siderise
02:26:31 siderise in any event even if there are designer builders with all of those skills in the case of grenville ryzen reasonably relied on specialists and the contractual obligations agreed with those specialists
02:26:43 those specialists they were the ones who agreed to ensure to ryden that there would be compliance of these products with the building and systems with the building regulations
02:26:54 can i now turn to the what i term the standard care
02:27:01 it's axiomatic that the tasks that ryden took on and the legal liability it has to tmo in respect of those tasks are established by the terms and conditions of its design and build contract
02:27:13 of its design and build contract it is right and acknowledged that as a result of its contract ryden took on a design responsibility which has the potential to give rise to a legal liability's tmo for faults in that design
02:27:26 for faults in that design the inquiry however is not immediately concerned with legal liability
02:27:31 rpek rbkc and its closing submissions and rbk triple zero 64252 underscore double zero seven site lord bingham
02:27:42 site lord bingham in the secretary of state for the home department case their lord bingham's stated of inquiries the purposes of such in an investigation unclear are clear
02:27:53 unclear are clear to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light but culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice but suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing
02:28:04 but suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing if unjustified is allayed but dangerous practices and procedures are rectified and that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save the
02:28:16 learned from his death may save the lives of others
02:28:20 in considering whether ryden's conduct was culpable one of the few core participants who reference the scope of ryden's duty is bsr team one in their module one
02:28:31 is bsr team one in their module one closing submissions at footnote 67 to paragraph 3.3 that's a bsr60 underscore triple zero eight
02:28:42 underscore triple zero eight where it says this and it's referring to the terms and conditions of the tmo contract
02:28:53 tmo contract clause 2.17.2.2
02:28:57 warranting that the works complied with the nbs specification was expressed to be subject to writing's warranty at clause 2.17.2.1 that the design of the works including
02:29:09 that the design of the works including that of any design consultant or sub consultant would be carried out using the reasonable skill and care to be expected of a professionally or professional qualified and competent designer build
02:29:20 qualified and competent designer build contractor experienced in carrying out such works and by clause 2.17.1.1 ryden undertook to be responsible for the design contained in the employees
02:29:31 the design contained in the employees requirements the reference to standard set by the contract is not quite accurate the wording of clause 2.17.2.1 is set out of paragraph 1.30 of our
02:29:43 is set out of paragraph 1.30 of our written closing submissions and it's whereby writing warranted that all the reasonable scale and care to be expected of a professionally qualified and competent design and build
02:29:54 and competent design and build contractor experienced in the carrying out of such works products of a similar size scope value and character and complexity to the works
02:30:05 the works now putting on one side any points of interpretation it's submitted that the scan standard of skill and care against which ryden's conduct should be
02:30:16 against which ryden's conduct should be assessed
02:30:17 assessed is the standard to be expected of a competent design and bill contractor with experience of carrying out a similar project to grenfell that this would be the case it suggested
02:30:29 that this would be the case it suggested even without this provision in its contract with tmo
02:30:35 this is plainly a different standard to that against which an architect mechanical electric engineer fire specialist or indeed any other constructional construction professionals conduct is to be assessed
02:30:47 professionals conduct is to be assessed the inquiry has had the benefit of expert evidence from an independent architect mr hyatt and of course one of his tasks is to inform the inquiries to whether studio e fell below an acceptable professional standard to be
02:30:59 acceptable professional standard to be expected of architects and for the inquiry to assess the cogency of that evidence
02:31:05 evidence he's not sufficiently experienced or qualified to opine on the general conduct of design and build contracts in projects of similar size and character to grenfell mr sakula
02:31:18 also has given evidence to the inquiry and he gave evidence as the standard to be expected from a cladding contractor again it's for the inquiry to assess his evidence as the specific criticisms he
02:31:31 evidence as the specific criticisms he makes of harley the inquiry has also heard uh from dr lane about the standards to be expected from a fire consultant and whether exover or she concludes fell below that standard
02:31:44 below that standard and beryl menses gave expert evidence about what the reasonably competent building control inspector would have understood and been aware now turning to ryden their corporate background is set out as section 2b of
02:31:56 background is set out as section 2b of its company statement dating the 23rd of november 2018 which is at ryd triple zero 94236 there's no doubt that ryden had
02:32:08 there's no doubt that ryden had experience in similar sized projects but ryden is not and never held itself out to anyone as being a qualified architect specialist planning contractor fire consultant or anything of the like
02:32:20 fire consultant or anything of the like and the inquiry is asked to have in mind to have that squarely in mind when considering the validity and veracity of specific criticisms aimed at writing
02:32:33 specific criticisms aimed at writing that is that it has not had an objective view from anyone independent and qualified to advise the inquiry whether at any particular stage in any particular way
02:32:44 particular way ryden
02:32:45 ryden was not entitled to rely on those around it to design and to advise it whether things ought to have been being done differently
02:32:58 can i now uh turn to addressing uh some specific matters raised by other core participants
02:33:06 the first is lack of in-house expertise and knowledge in iconics module one submissions that's ar c
02:33:16 ar c 50769 underscore double zero one and at paragraph seven iconic alleges that one of ryden's central failures was its lack of
02:33:27 central failures was its lack of in-house design expertise and knowledge now with arconic's case in mind it appears to be suggested that ryden ought to have had the in-house specialist expertise and knowledge
02:33:39 specialist expertise and knowledge to have revealed that rb55pe was perfectly suitable for use at grenfell tower and buildings above 18 meters
02:33:47 meters but it should not be used in combination with celetex or other products not
02:33:53 not that rb55pe was unsuitable full stop this itself illustrates the difficulties to this very day it's said by the manufacturer archonic that there's no
02:34:04 manufacturer archonic that there's no reason why its product should not be used above 18 meters others of course say
02:34:09 say that ryden was culpable in not realizing that it was wholly inappropriate now what a state of uh whatever the state of affairs it is said by our colleague or other parties that ryden
02:34:20 colleague or other parties that ryden was blameworthy in not discovering iconic ignores one of the main reasons why parties such as write in the subcontract to pass down tasks to those who are better placed because they have the
02:34:31 better placed because they have the necessary skills to ensure those tasks are carried out successfully the parties who criticize right and make no case that a reasonable design and build contractor would have carried a design resource of sufficient
02:34:43 design resource of sufficient qualification to identify particular failings of the specialists to whom it legitimately subcontracted in the same vein our conic states
02:34:55 in the same vein our conic states nor was there in-house expertise sufficient to form a view of the adequacy or compliance of the outsourced design work
02:35:07 design work now we contend that this is akin to say the design and build contractor must have the same or similar skills in-house as those specialists to whom it subcontracts including a detailed understanding of the products the design
02:35:19 understanding of the products the design and the relevant regulations to ensure that what has been done by those specialists achieves compliance ryden cannot accept any such contention
02:35:30 ryden cannot accept any such contention it should be recalled that the specialist cladding work albeit an important part of the work was just that one part of the works being carried out under the auspices of an array of professionals engaged by
02:35:41 of an array of professionals engaged by ryden
02:35:43 ryden ryan was entitled to engage third party resource to undertake tasks which required skills it did not have and it was not expected
02:35:52 ryden accepts of course that there may be cases where an error in design or specification of products is so obviously non-compliant with the building regulations that a reasonable design and build
02:36:03 that a reasonable design and build contractor may be criticized for not spotting it that however is not this case this is an accepted specialist area and where the problems endemic with the relevant products were sought skillfully
02:36:15 relevant products were sought skillfully to be hidden by the manufacturers the contextual features i referred to earlier are highly material we respectfully suggest in any assessment of whether the non-compliance of the
02:36:27 of whether the non-compliance of the products
02:36:27 products can be characterized uh characterized as obvious
02:36:34 paragraph 10 to 11 of arconic's module one closing submission suggests that ryden had an inexperienced team and was under resourced implicit in iconic suggestion is that an experienced and resourced
02:36:45 is that an experienced and resourced in-house team should and would have appreciated that what its architect and specialist subcontractor were in effect telling it was wrong otherwise it's a suggestion that goes nowhere
02:36:56 nowhere ryden readily accepts it did not know that our conics product was dangerous such as it should not be used in buildings over 80 meters whether alone or in conjunction with celetex
02:37:07 or in conjunction with celetex it's absolutely denied however that a reasonable design and build contract that we've experienced in similar sized projects as grenfell could be called fairly fairly called culpable what's in-house personnel not
02:37:18 culpable what's in-house personnel not having sufficient expertise and experience to know that to be the case
02:37:27 now at paragraph 3.3 of bsr team one's module one submissions that's a bsr 6073 underscore double zero seven
02:37:38 6073 underscore double zero seven it's submitted by then that ryden undertook full responsibility for the design and was obliged to review it and satisfy itself of all aspects of design
02:37:49 satisfy itself of all aspects of design again
02:37:51 again ryden's liability for the design is a consequence of the contract bearing in mind that liability he was entitled to discharge that responsibility by engaging sub-consultants and specialists to do so
02:38:05 sub-consultants and specialists to do so ryden wasn't obliged to anyone to have in-house employees to do so even if they had the requisite in-house skills at paragraph 133 of celotex's closing
02:38:16 at paragraph 133 of celotex's closing submissions this is at cel three zeros one two three four eight underscore double zero five o select refer seletex refers to mr
02:38:27 select refer seletex refers to mr hyatt's evidence and contends that ryden was required and i quote to take great care in his examination of the drawings and specification and the same degree of care in his
02:38:39 and the same degree of care in his examination of the work of other appointed consultants
02:38:44 now mr hyatt's not a design and build contractor and if it's sought to be suggested that a reasonable designer build contractor would have the necessary qualifications and skills to spot errors in the specification made by
02:38:57 spot errors in the specification made by an architect and approved by a specialist contract uh contracting a cladding contractor and which in this case would have revealed that rs 5000 ought not to be used in the very application celetex
02:39:09 used in the very application celetex pushed for it to be used above 18 meters then he has no basis or qualification for saying so and it's similar with regard to rb55pa in cassette or indeed any form
02:39:22 as far as it can be seen as the heights never worked in-house where design and build contract and gives little evidence of his experience in similar sized projects to grenfell
02:39:32 it's notable that a paragraph one three two to one for one of celetex's closing submissions that's at page 50. celetex constantly allied the existence
02:39:43 celetex constantly allied the existence of a legal liability with allegations of blameworthy behavior celestex point to a legal liability relating to the compliance with the building regulations
02:39:54 building regulations and what's said to be admissions by right and personnel as the existence of a legal liability but seemingly to portray this is some sort of admission of blameworthy conduct
02:40:05 sort of admission of blameworthy conduct celestex totally ignores the whole wholly reasonable subcontracting tasks for which a main contractor may have legal responsibility to specialists and there's nothing sinister or untold
02:40:16 and there's nothing sinister or untold in right relying on others as in fact they did
02:40:20 they did the lack of practical reality pervading celetex's contentions are illustrated by its allegation the paragraph 193 of its closing submissions where it says no one at ryden gave any proper consideration to
02:40:32 ryden gave any proper consideration to celetex's product literature this apparently on the basis that ryden personnel should have looked at the product literature in detail presumably not just that produced by selatex but for all the other and hundreds of other
02:40:44 for all the other and hundreds of other products specified installed at grenfell and had they done so that consideration would expose this unsuitability of rs 5000 for use above 18 meters of grenfell
02:40:56 5000 for use above 18 meters of grenfell with rp 55 pe and any advisors and consultants have got it wrong and this of course is the very fact that celetex is subterfuge sought to hide
02:41:07 celetex is subterfuge sought to hide as bsr team two's written closing submissions say it paragraph 93 celetex were used to campaign at smoke and mirrors actively targeting projects over 18 meters
02:41:19 over 18 meters forcefully marketing rs 5000 project decision makers giving every impression that rs 5000 was safe on high rise at paragraph 129 they rightly say that
02:41:31 at paragraph 129 they rightly say that celetex intentionally misled the nhpc and nabc
02:41:37 and nabc we deal with all of this in detail at section 5 of our written closing submissions in particular paragraphs 5.26
02:41:45 5.26 to 5.38
02:41:47 to 5.38 where we refer to the evidence of mr roper debbie berger and mr evans they accept that the celetex literature was designed to lead those in the construction industry to believe that there was a global approval for use of
02:41:59 there was a global approval for use of rs 5000 above 18 meters and they did this in the belief demonstrated by its own internal presentations that it was likely even architects and building control officers
02:42:13 and building control officers lack sufficient knowledge to expose what it represented was untrue it was disappointing to hear celetex's council criticize what mr lawrence did he did in fact look at celetex's data
02:42:25 he did in fact look at celetex's data sheet and read it in exactly the way in which celotex is wanted to read it and indeed better qualified persons than him to read it
02:42:37 can i just add here that a bsr team one in their module one closing submissions paragraph 3.3 that's bsr triple
02:42:47 triple 6073 underscore double zero seven rightly identify that the design and build contract did not oblige or encourage writing to consider the performance requirements
02:42:58 to consider the performance requirements of the cladding instead the proprietary nbs specification directed ryzen ryden to use that specified subject to permitted substitution
02:43:11 that is so and mr hyatt confirmed that a designer build contractor was entitled to proceed on the basis that materials or products specified in the nbs were compliant
02:43:22 compliant ryden was entitled to take additional comfort
02:43:25 comfort from the fact that specification of proprietary mod products in the nbs specification included celetex fr5000 now as to
02:43:35 now as to rb55p
02:43:37 rb55p and its selection it's important to understand the history leading up to its specification the precise chronology is sometimes overlooked we set out that history at section 4 of
02:43:49 we set out that history at section 4 of our written closing submissions in some detail
02:43:52 detail but in short acm was proposed and included in the nbs specification as an alternative and as a result as we understand it of discussions held between artillery
02:44:04 discussions held between artillery studio ian hartley well before ryden had any involvement in the project using acm had been identified as a target for savings by artelia in february 2013
02:44:16 february 2013 well before ryan's involvement harley had expressed its preference to use acm from a selfish point of view in september 2013 well before ryden's involvement
02:44:29 well before ryden's involvement the nbs specification was drawn up in november 2013 and of course ryden was engaged in march of the following year
02:44:39 moreover to reflect the potential for the cost savings by using acm the inquiry knows from the nvs specification alternatives as to the exterior cladding
02:44:50 alternatives as to the exterior cladding was addressed at page 1 of 11 of section h92
02:44:56 h92 that can be found at sea 6016 underscore double zero six four ryden was in effect after price
02:45:07 ryden was in effect after price rana bombed duragloss 5000 iconic standard acm was rv55pe albeit that it came in different colors
02:45:18 albeit that it came in different colors and could be installed in riveted or cassette forms in short acm was already on the mini menu in anticipation of lowering the value of the project it was not something originating from
02:45:30 it was not something originating from writing
02:45:32 writing i'll return to the criticism of ryden's cost savings as a result of the change in due course
02:45:40 turning now if i may to the knowledge of regulations bsr team two in their module one closing submissions of paragraph six page two
02:45:52 page two reference can't solve the inquiries questions to mr lawrence in which he identified ryden's contractual obligation approved document b and mr lawrence acceptance that ryden
02:46:05 and mr lawrence acceptance that ryden did not have and i quote an approved document b board in ryden now if it suggested that that that
02:46:17 that ryden should have had an in-house employed adb specialist within ryden then
02:46:24 then we can't agree ryan was entitled to assume across the board that those that engaged to design and share our aspects of the design complied with the building regulations had the requisite knowledge of the regulations and approved
02:46:36 regulations and approved documents
02:46:38 documents a paragraph aids the bsr team two's module one closing submissions they draw attention to ryden's acknowledgement of a contractual responsibility or a legal liability
02:46:51 or a legal liability then they identify the roles of studio e and harley before characterizing the contracting to them of those roles as and again i quote shifting responsibility in pejorative
02:47:03 shifting responsibility in pejorative terms
02:47:04 terms in reality however ryden in delegating responsibility was operating in an orthodox manner and following standard industry practice
02:47:18 in exoplanets closing submissions uh this is at ex 502124 paragraph 4.3 paragraphs 4.3 to 4.5
02:47:29 paragraphs 4.3 to 4.5 say that even if ryden relied entirely on subcontractors to achieve the fulfillment of its obligations as a minimum that required it to manage the products in such a way
02:47:41 the products in such a way project in such a way as to one
02:47:44 as to one understand the baseline which the employer's requirements represented and two
02:47:49 and two identify and allocate for gaps which remain
02:47:55 remain there's no basis for this it was not as we say at paragraph 62 of our module one opening for design and build contractors proceed on the basis that the professional teams to date
02:48:06 that the professional teams to date including the fire consultants were incompetent we've not done their jobs properly or the professional team and specialist subcontractors engaged were not able to fulfill its contractual functions
02:48:18 functions if there were gaps whatever that means then ryden filled those gaps by engaging professionals to complete the design to the contractually required standards those professionals if unknown to ryden
02:48:31 those professionals if unknown to ryden um if if they were unable in-house to do what they they had contractually promised to do they'd be expected to engage those who would the very least uh who could
02:48:43 uh who could or or even advise white that additional spanish specialist input was needed ryan was entitled to proceed on the basis that any gaps would be filled by the professional team or pointed out
02:48:55 the professional team or pointed out clearly by that professional team
02:49:00 now moving if i may to the selection of studio ian harley
02:49:06 iconic and amongst others say on the assumption that ryden was entitled subcontract specialist tasks and rely on those consultants and subcontractors
02:49:18 subcontractors but it was wrong and blameworthy for ryden
02:49:21 ryden to delegate to architects and specialists studio e and harley arconic says ryden failed to undertake any due diligence as the expertise of
02:49:32 any due diligence as the expertise of studio e and harley and their suitability for the grenfell project they say that in their module one written uh closing submissions of paragraph 16. and celetex make similar allegations
02:49:46 and celetex make similar allegations they say ryden nevertheless had no adequate processes to satisfy itself after the competence of its subcontractors or to supervise their work
02:49:57 or to supervise their work it took no steps to ensure that studio was competent or adequately resourced and it had no process for ensuring that khali
02:50:05 khali one of its most important subcontractors had adequate knowledge of regulatory requirements they say that in their module one submissions their module one and two submissions of paragraph 70.
02:50:18 submissions of paragraph 70. neither anaconic or celitex particularize what they say due diligence or whatever process they have in mind should have been carried out or when and how these processes would have revealed
02:50:28 revealed that ryden's reliance on studio e or harley was misplaced neither referred to any evidence in support of their contentions for example as the standard practice and neither assert that wright was not acting as a
02:50:40 assert that wright was not acting as a reasonable design and build contractor now can i consider harley first
02:50:47 paragraph 26 of its company statement that's ryd triple zero 94236 identifies ryden's system for ensuring the effective selection of competent
02:50:59 the effective selection of competent contractors as part of its due diligence process namely
02:51:05 namely maintaining an approved list of subcontractors requiring completion of a detailed safety health and environmental pre-qualification questionnaire and declaration
02:51:16 declaration conducting pre-contract interviews with subcontractors ryden had regular contact with harley was able to monitor and assess its performance throughout the project for any observable failings
02:51:27 any observable failings it was not in writing or indeed anyone else's interest that partly continued if it was unable to fulfill its subcontract with ryden incidentally harley was told in the
02:51:39 incidentally harley was told in the pre-cut
02:51:40 pre-cut contract
02:51:41 contract interview
02:51:43 interview included at section 4.2 this and i quote note
02:51:51 note all drawings and specifications received by us i.e writing will be commented on and approved in principle only the subcontractor remains fully responsible for the design including
02:52:02 responsible for the design including relevant compliances design and dimensional integration the letter of intent sent to harley that's at har 50120
02:52:14 50120 incorporated the pre-contract interview with uh
02:52:19 with uh with ryden into the contract with harley as appendix d it's alleged by our comic that harley's team was under prepared and experienced for a project such as
02:52:30 experienced for a project such as grenfell tower that's a paragraph 33 of its module 1 submissions and harley's team was also under resourced and stretched across multiple projects that's a paragraph 35.
02:52:44 multiple projects that's a paragraph 35. ryden had no idea that there was a wrist at heart he was not able to comply with his contractual obligations and fulfilling the duties of a competence specialist arconic's comments are based on hindsight
02:52:55 hindsight ryden's understanding went hand in hand with the specialist experience that hardly held itself out as having mr hyatt in his report and this is at p
02:53:06 mr hyatt in his report and this is at p h y r
02:53:08 h y r uh five six heroes 28 and a paragraph 3.7.32 uh to 3.7.33 rightly points to a harley brosher dated
02:53:20 rightly points to a harley brosher dated september 2013 which makes the following endorsement harley offer a complete envelope solution
02:53:27 solution all elements of facade are designed and installed by harley with certain specialist services subcontracted out this provides clients with a one-stop
02:53:38 this provides clients with a one-stop shop solution eliminating clashes on site and takes responsibility for ensuring interfaces details are properly executed unsurprisingly with this in mind mr
02:53:50 unsurprisingly with this in mind mr hyatt having identified what he terms hardy's failure to understand the horizontal cavity barrier requirements says that such a fading is surprising a company that professes specialist
02:54:01 company that professes specialist knowledge and experience in planning work
02:54:04 work none of the inquiry experts appear to have suggested blameworthy conduct on the part of writing in the selection of harley
02:54:15 this the the the evidence in fact uh we suggest is to the contrary the paragraph 4.20 of ryden's closing submissions we highlight that ryzen reasonably
02:54:26 we highlight that ryzen reasonably believed harley to be a competent cladding specialist based on its experience with harley on previous projects simon lawrence's oral evidence was that ryden had no reason to doubt harley's
02:54:37 ryden had no reason to doubt harley's competence that was at day 24
02:54:42 day 24 pages 19 and page 20. so in concluding on harley's selection and in short and repeating paragraph 4.2 one of our closing submissions it was totally reasonable for
02:54:55 it was totally reasonable for a
02:54:56 a a designer build contractors such as ryden to expect a cladding subcontractor such as harley operating under a sub-contract such as ryden had with harley to be knowledgeable about the cladding materials it was being asked to
02:55:07 cladding materials it was being asked to endorse and install and to review compliance and appropriateness of those cladding materials
02:55:15 now i turn to studio e as to studio e iconic's case is that riding at some unspecified unspecified time
02:55:23 time also realized that studio me was incapable of carrying out its obligations uh that this um allegation is made without any supportive analysis or particularization
02:55:34 supportive analysis or particularization celetex makes a similar allegation in its closing submissions where it says that ryden took no steps to ensure studio he was competent or adequately resourced
02:55:45 resourced mhclg2 alleged critically that ryden did not ask studio e if it had if they had been involved in a high-rise residential and over-cladding project before or investigate whether studio e was fully conversed in the
02:55:57 studio e was fully conversed in the statutory requirements and related industry guidance about cladding they do that at their closing submissions paragraph 31.1 again if it suggested that ryden's
02:56:08 again if it suggested that ryden's conducted engaging studio he was culpable then the suggestion is wrong the inquiry knows that studio he was not selected for the project by ryden
02:56:19 selected for the project by ryden by the time that ryan had been
02:56:23 had been came to inherit and engaged uae they've been working for some time on grenfell itself without to ryden's knowledge any apparent problem indeed the criticisms of studio e's
02:56:35 indeed the criticisms of studio e's appointment made by the bsrs are primarily directed not at ryden but at rbkc
02:56:42 rbkc tmo
02:56:43 tmo and artelia
02:56:46 and see in that regard the bsr team one modules one submissions where they say no competitive tender process of any kind was deployed before appointing the design team to the
02:56:57 appointing the design team to the grenville tower project artelia studio e and max fordham were all appointed solely by reason of their involvement in calc that process had been conducted by rbkc
02:57:08 that process had been conducted by rbkc rather than tmo and for a different type of project requiring different knowledge and experience suitability for grenfell tower did not form part of that assessment
02:57:19 form part of that assessment you say that in their module 1 submissions paragraph 2.1 in fact they continue tmo's flawed processes matter proper adherence to procurement could have resulted in the selection of an
02:57:31 resulted in the selection of an architectural practice familiar with the overcladding of high-rise buildings or at least a practice with a more rigorous approach to co-compliance it was less intent on relying on others
02:57:43 it was less intent on relying on others tna made no competence check or inquiry or studio e-relevant skills knowledge or experience and overclouding high-rise buildings it took comfort only from the fact that studio e had
02:57:54 from the fact that studio e had delivered projects value in excess of 50 million
02:57:57 million that it could deliver a 10 million project
02:58:00 project in bsr team 2's module one submissions of paragraph one six three four artillia it is said failed to advise kctmo on the financial standing or
02:58:11 kctmo on the financial standing or competency of studio a to form the role of refurbishment contract even though providing such advice felt within it we met as cdm coordinator
02:58:23 now it's noted that in support of the inexperience of studio he reliance is placed on with what mr soon said in evidence to the tribunal about his competence to handle such a project
02:58:34 competence to handle such a project so for example the rsr team one modules one submissions paragraph 2.1 says mr sooms the project architect had no experience with this type of project and intended to rely upon others such as
02:58:46 and intended to rely upon others such as max fordham and the contractor to carry out his work well there are several points that arise out of this first what mr soon said in evidence
02:58:58 first what mr soon said in evidence about reliance on others goes flat contrary to the contractual tasks an obligation studio e took on with tmo and with ryden
02:59:09 with tmo and with ryden ryden paul is here to remind the inquiry and set out a paragraph 11.4 of its written closing submissions that whilst the ryden studio edit of appointment was executed towards the end
02:59:21 appointment was executed towards the end of the project in february 2016 the retrospective effect of the deed did not fix studio with obligations which it had not always understood it would be responsible for
02:59:34 responsible for in particular on the 17th of april 2014 just a few weeks after ryden had been told that his tender was successful ryden sent mr soon as a draft of the proposed shuttle of services
02:59:45 proposed shuttle of services that's ryd triple zero 64706 other than one item all the services relevant to the inquiries remit and has set out
02:59:56 inquiries remit and has set out paragraph 25 of ryden's phase 2 module 1 written submissions remained as proposed by ryden there was a common understanding from the outset of the scope of studio
03:00:07 the outset of the scope of studio e-services as is clear from the evidence reference to paragraph 11.4 this included for compliance of the design and the selection of materials
03:00:20 within and in compliance with the building regulations secondly a studio had been asked by tmo or artelia at the time there's little doubt the studio e would
03:00:31 there's little doubt the studio e would have professed their competence to carry out all their obligations with reasonable skill and care to be an expected and architect first in such products as gt thirdly the inquiry might think that the
03:00:43 thirdly the inquiry might think that the suggestion in the evidence of studio he did not understand the scope of its duties or was somehow unclear might be a perspective that studio he now gives the true facts in order to
03:00:54 now gives the true facts in order to explain its conduct as opposed to something it really believed at the time in any event tmo and artelia and ex-over defend themselves against the charge that they not they ought not to engage
03:01:06 that they not they ought not to engage uue
03:01:09 uue artelia
03:01:11 artelia in its closing submissions paragraph 38 said that they had no reason to doubt the competence of studio they were a competent designer that proved themselves competent in terms of the calc project and we had no reason to
03:01:23 the calc project and we had no reason to doubt their competence the meetings that we attended the way they presented the options on the cladding showed that they appeared to have quite a knowledge of what they were doing
03:01:32 doing exodus says studio e was sufficiently experienced as a firm of architects that they should either already have been or have ensured that they became capable of designing and specifying the overall
03:01:44 designing and specifying the overall cladding package including the materials and the understanding the provisions of adb on the subject and they should should certainly have been capable of identifying and coordinating any
03:01:55 of identifying and coordinating any specific specialist input necessary for that purpose they say that a paragraph 15.14 of their written closing submissions
03:02:08 of their written closing submissions tmo says
03:02:09 tmo says studio e has shown its competence as architects on the large-scale calc project for where they'd work competently and efficiently witnesses from studio you say they considered despite not having
03:02:20 say they considered despite not having work specifically on an overclocking high-rise building it was not unreasonable for them to take on a project such as grenfell tower refurbishment that's it their module 1 closing
03:02:31 that's it their module 1 closing submissions paragraph 96 importantly however artillery xover and tmo's position appears to have the support of mr
03:02:42 appears to have the support of mr hyatt now mr hyatt set out in his report the phyr5027
03:02:51 paragraph 2.56 to 2.5.14 a summary of studio e's portfolio experience and concludes albeit with the caveat
03:03:03 albeit with the caveat that studio e ought to have recognized the need to carry out further research etcetera
03:03:09 etcetera but they studio he reasonably concluded that they had the skills to take on the grenfell project he says studio architects would appear to have been a very capable architectural practice
03:03:21 architectural practice delivering projects of this of the size and complexion but complexity evidence from the practice portfolio would have required considerable levels of architectural design and technical
03:03:33 of architectural design and technical skill
03:03:35 skill that comes from the same report of paragraph 2.5.12.
03:03:40 mr hyatt said during r11s that despite agreeing that studio e had no previous experience of high-rise residential over-cladding projects or high-rise residential products in general
03:03:53 residential products in general that was a day 63 at page 82. he endorsed his written report where he considered a perfectly reasonable decision on the part of the directors of studio e for
03:04:04 part of the directors of studio e for them to conclude that they had the skill base needed to research such a project and acquire the knowledge necessary for the safe delivery of projects such as rainfall power consequently
03:04:15 consequently this is mr hyde speaking i do not believe that their lack of experience in those areas in these areas provided a reason for them to decline the commission and he goes on
03:04:27 and he goes on studio ee would rightly have considered themselves well able to undertake a project of this type size and complexity of the grenfell tower refurbishment and overcladding albeit i would expect they should have
03:04:39 albeit i would expect they should have recognized that their then current levels of knowledge and skill would need to be expanded
03:04:46 now from his oral evidence it appears that mr hyatt is in no doubt that the standard of service he expected of studio e could be achieved by them carrying out cpd or research alone
03:04:59 carrying out cpd or research alone but the studio he could also have brought on a consultant as additional resource
03:05:04 resource he said that on day 63 pages 82-83 with all this in mind ryden refers also to paragraphs 4.19 of its closing submissions
03:05:17 its closing submissions a page 31
03:05:19 a page 31 and the evidence of mr lawrence where he said that ryan was confident in stewie's competence to ensure the compliance and appropriateness of the acm product
03:05:30 acm product due to the fact that studio e had been working up the design of grenfell tower for two years to studio e's prior involvement on the culp project that he said at daily22
03:05:43 that he said at daily22 page 132.
03:05:46 page 132. now presumably built on views taken of studio e's competence by artelia and tmo it's also notable that ryden's design and build contract obliged ryden to
03:05:58 and build contract obliged ryden to engage studio e and and i refer in this regard to the employers requirements uh contained in the grenfell tower contract
03:06:09 the grenfell tower contract which can be found at tm01
03:06:13 triple zero seven three seven eight uh at the page 84 at page 87 where it says two members of the client's design team the architect and structural engineer
03:06:25 the architect and structural engineer will be novated to the contractor to complete the design post stagey the tenderer is to contract the novated consultants contact details clause 165 and 170 below
03:06:37 and 170 below to ascertain fee information to be included in tender and terms and conditions the reference clause 165 state that the architect is studioe
03:06:51 now turning if i made to another contention and that is that of
03:06:58 that of bsr team 2 at paragraph 4 3.4.1 of their
03:07:06 of their module
03:07:08 2 closing submissions i think where they rightly identify that studio eo duties to ryden to coordinate the design of all consultants
03:07:20 design of all consultants and they reference clause 13 and to develop the design with them and agree with writing the type of construction and quality and selection of materials that's a clause 12.
03:07:34 there's no reason why
03:07:37 why a designer build contractor cannot delegate such coordination functions to a third-party professional rather than use an employee there's no proper basis we suggest for
03:07:48 there's no proper basis we suggest for the for the allegation and contention that any further oversight or coordination of the design at the level which could be fairly expected of a reasonable design and build contractual circumstances
03:08:00 circumstances would have alerted ryden to anything being wrong with the ultimate design and use of both rb55 pe or celotex
03:08:11 i turn now if i may to the apparent reliance by certain parties of particular facts which it says in view writing with
03:08:23 which it says in view writing with specific knowledge which is presumably said means that right ought after all to have known or suspected the design and specification
03:08:34 and specification which on the face of it its professionals all appear to endorse was dangerous and non-compliant
03:08:43 first i i turned to the knowledge of of the pe core
03:08:50 everyone knew or should be expected to know that pe stands for polyethylene iconic knew that to be the case but we're happy for it to be used above 18 meters celetex knew that to be the case
03:09:02 meters celetex knew that to be the case to be the case and was happy for its product to be used in conjunction with rb55p
03:09:08 rb55p the very specialists uh to whom the task of ensuring compliance had been delegated could be expected to know that to be the case cep knew it to be the case
03:09:19 be the case building control would be expected to know that to be the case the fact that rb55 had a pe core did not alert ryden nor ought to it uh not auto it have
03:09:31 nor ought to it uh not auto it have alerted ryden in the circumstances to the fact that the use of the acm containing the pe core was or could be dangerous to occupants or in breach of the building regulations
03:09:43 or in breach of the building regulations or constitute a failure to follow guidance with or without it being used in conjunction with celetex this is evidenced by the prevalent use of pe products above 18 meters around
03:09:55 of pe products above 18 meters around the world
03:09:56 the world in addition ryden ought to be able to trust companies like arconic and celitex not knowingly to peddle dangerous products for use in products such as grenfell tower without explicit warning
03:10:10 grenfell tower without explicit warning iconic specifically advised cep and other fabricators that it would ensure that the right product was used in the right circumstances the inquiry will recall the emails from
03:10:21 the inquiry will recall the emails from debbie french dated the 13th of may 2013 referenced at paragraph 3.66 of ryden's written submissions
03:10:32 of ryden's written submissions where our conic said regarding the supply of rayna bond in the uk
03:10:37 the uk as you know we supply both pe and fr core and control and understand what core is being used in all projects due to the controlled supply route we
03:10:49 due to the controlled supply route we have
03:10:50 have by only supplying rainer bond to a very small group of approved fabricators and working closely with them on all projects we're able to follow what type of project is being designed developed
03:11:03 of project is being designed developed and then offer the right brain upon specification including call
03:11:09 now that email was not sent just as cep but other fabricators and it wasn't sent to ryden but it's the sort of approach one would expect from a reputable company
03:11:21 expect from a reputable company internally iconic knew of the consequences the highly dangerous cause it was adopting in continuing to sell its product for use in the high-rise residential market
03:11:32 residential market it's worth reiterating that arconic itself expressly concluded that it should not be used in high rise residential buildings and that these internal
03:11:43 buildings and that these internal expressed conclusions were not qualified by reference to it being safe to use if designers used it in conjunction with particular other materials or using
03:11:54 particular other materials or using particular build techniques
03:11:58 iconic had a duty not to allow its unsafe product to be used in dangerous situations celetex knew that its product was being used in conjunction with rainer bond acm
03:12:09 used in conjunction with rainer bond acm not
03:12:10 not in its tested system a set out of paragraphs 169 to 176 of ryden's module 2 opening
03:12:20 the end result is that ryden as a reasonable design and build contractor cannot be expected to have been alerted to the dangers of rb55p simply because pe stands for polyethylene and a general knowledge of
03:12:32 polyethylene and a general knowledge of what polyethylene is
03:12:37 arconic alleges a paragraph five of its module one closing submissions that there's clear evidence that cep harley and ryden knew that the core of acmpe was
03:12:49 knew that the core of acmpe was combustible at a point well before the grenfell fire they go on and say this is evidenced in the following reports which relate to the 17th of january 2012 fire at taplow
03:13:01 the 17th of january 2012 fire at taplow heights on the chalcott estate and which was circulated to harley ryden and cep these reports illustrated the key components of the facade with standard reiner bond acm panels and what rockwool
03:13:13 reiner bond acm panels and what rockwool mineral insulation importantly the ryden team members who were part of the chalcott estate project team were also part of the grenfell project team these were stephen blake
03:13:24 project team these were stephen blake simon lawrence and simon o'connor iconic goes on mr hughes's evidence was that in a fire scenario the fixings would fail through heat as they did at chalks
03:13:35 heat as they did at chalks blake's evidence was that while he wasn't aware that people was combustible he conceded that obviously plastic is combustible iconic submissions are misleading
03:13:46 iconic submissions are misleading i'm not going to take the inquiries the reports now but invite the inquirer to consider them carefully the two reports referred to by our comic are
03:13:56 are initial report from fire damage dated the 17th of january 2012 which can be found at har triple zero 10169 and fire damage report from abseil
03:14:09 and fire damage report from abseil survey dated the 23rd of january 2012 and that can be found at cep50323
03:14:19 now there are no direct references in these reports that we can see to the cladding panels being combustible the focus of the report's conclusions of the absolute survey was on the
03:14:31 of the absolute survey was on the failure or the melting of the aluminium windows
03:14:34 windows and no direct reference was made to the clamping panels being combustible and the photos taken shown the fire did not spread the conclusions in the abseil survey
03:14:45 the conclusions in the abseil survey report go to the melting and failure of the aluminium windows and structural integrity of the facade there are several references to aluminium having melted and burned but these refer to the aluminium windows not
03:14:57 these refer to the aluminium windows not the rain screen cladding for example at page 15 of that report it's apparent the temperature is well over 300 degrees and at times over 600 degrees centigrade were reached at the
03:15:09 degrees centigrade were reached at the inside face of facade as aluminium melts at 660 degrees centigrade and there's evidence in the flat that aluminium windows locally have melted abseil survey report also contains
03:15:21 abseil survey report also contains photos of the burned edges of two cladding panels exposing the insulation behind
03:15:26 behind that that's at page nine of the report as well as photos of the corner cladding panel burn through the middle those are pages 13 and 14 of the report
03:15:37 those are pages 13 and 14 of the report now whilst the absolute survey report page 15 refers to the facade as an aluminium thermally broken construction it goes on to state page 16 that areas
03:15:49 it goes on to state page 16 that areas of the facade that were subject to temperatures over 300 degrees centigrade causing potential deformation of aluminium
03:15:58 this statement taken together with the early statement that aluminium only melts at 660. implies that the aluminium cladding panels deformed but did not melt
03:16:08 melt now as the comment about mr blake it's well to consider his evidence on this particular point which can be found at day 28 page 48 whilst he accepts that plastic is
03:16:19 whilst he accepts that plastic is combustible and it was put to him that acn contained pe
03:16:23 pe his evidence was that he did not think of it like that it's suggested by some that mr blake auto realized those iconic in fact knew that rb55p was unsuitable for use in
03:16:34 that rb55p was unsuitable for use in buildings above 18 meeting meters or was led by our conic that it was suitable for use but not in combination with other particular products then this suggestion is simply unwarranted
03:16:45 unwarranted iconically viewing mr blake with the knowledge and experience of our connect that the product was dangerous and not to be used
03:16:54 celitex makes similar comments on the back of the child cops report it says mr o'connor claimed to be unaware of the different types of acm panels and the associated fireworks fire risks despite
03:17:05 associated fireworks fire risks despite having worked on the chalcock's estate project
03:17:08 project similarly mr brake said he had no knowledge that acm pe posed fire risks mr blake was unable to recall distributing a report into the child cox estate fire that had been complied by ryden his evidence making clear that
03:17:19 ryden his evidence making clear that wright had no process in place to ensure the dissemination of such crucial information celetex does not explain how working on the chalcotts or having read the reports
03:17:30 the chalcotts or having read the reports or disseminating the reports which would lead mr connor or mr blake or anyone else at biden to have knowledge of associated fire risks with different acm panels either as a product or used in
03:17:41 panels either as a product or used in combination with celitex
03:17:45 so i note um that it's 12 58 yeah i wonder whether that may be a convenient moment yes i think it would it's convenient to you is it
03:17:56 it it is
03:17:57 it is thank you now the the one thing you could help me with before we rise then for the break is uh how long you think you might need after the
03:18:06 after the adjournment it's just so that if uh if you're not going to take another 45 minutes and that you're free to do so um it would be a good idea to warn mr williamson so that he could follow
03:18:18 williamson so that he could follow without too much today um so i i i'm pretty confident i'll finish within 30 minutes well that's very helpful thank you well
03:18:29 well that's very helpful thank you well uh we'll ask someone to um see if mr williamson can be available from half past two and that will avoid any waste of time
03:18:40 and that will avoid any waste of time good well thank you very much indeed uh we'll break there and we'll resume at two o'clock please thank you very much thank you very much
03:19:40 you