Modules 1 & 2 Closing Statements - Wednesday 15th September 2021 (2/2)

Full transcript

00:15:52 welcome back everyone we're ready to resume hearing from mr taverner when we're back in contact yes hello mr thank you all back in contact

00:16:03 all back in contact thank you very much indeed if you can hear me sir yes we can thank you very much uh

00:16:07 much uh right well then uh carry on when you're ready please thank you thank you mr chairman i was dealing before the adjournment with particular incidents relied on by some court participants

00:16:19 relied on by some court participants imbuing ryden with knowledge of the risks of the components i dealt with the knowledge of ryden personnel that rb55pe had

00:16:30 had a polyethylene core and the chalcott's tableau house fire reports i turn now if i made to the the the lachnal moment

00:16:41 the lachnal moment uh iconic paragraph 170 of its module 2 closing submissions contends that ryden's attention was expressly drawn to the issue uh by the email relating to

00:16:54 to the issue uh by the email relating to the latino moment and they say even this did not suffice to induce them that's ryden to ensure that the regulatory regime was complied with

00:17:03 with again these criticisms are misplaced the email referred to is that from claire williams dated the 12th november 2014 which can be found at ryd triple zero two three four six eight

00:17:16 zero two three four six eight where she said she just had a latino moment

00:17:20 moment uh we turned to this particular topic at paragraph 4.37 and 4.38 of our closing submissions mr lawrence explained that he did not have the expertise to answer any

00:17:31 have the expertise to answer any technical questions raised by claire williams and he probably would have parted on to harley he said that at day 64

00:17:39 64 page one six four and following he believes he would have understood the question to relate to the lower four floors

00:17:46 floors it was there that uh grc glass reinforced concrete panels were being installed and being discussed at the same time

00:17:54 same time but there's absolutely no reason why uh uh mr lawrence would not pass on fire retardancy issues to the specialists and there's no reason to believe that he

00:18:06 and there's no reason to believe that he would not have relied on them to talk to tmo direct or done anything other than pass on their responses and their views we know that harley's view was that it was safe to use rb55pe

00:18:19 was that it was safe to use rb55pe mr bailey told the tribe you know he considered he was entitled to rely on the bba certificate stating that rb55pe was class zero class naught and that he assumed that it was uh that

00:18:31 and that he assumed that it was uh that that was sufficient to satisfy the uh approved document b uh we refer there to his evidence a day 32 page 30 page 25

00:18:43 page 25 and day 33 page 37 and 38. accounts given by uh claire williams and mr gibson as the conversations they had with mr lawrence

00:18:54 conversations they had with mr lawrence are difficult frankly to believe i'll say no more than to refer to the analysis and conclusions reached by bsr team one in their module one closing submissions

00:19:05 submissions as to the veracity of their accounts that they set these out at paragraph 3.71

00:19:11 3.71 page 15 of those submissions that they too consider them unbelievable

00:19:19 can i turn now if i may to a different topic and that's whether or not ryan should have engaged a facade engineer or a fire consultant i turned first to a facade engineer

00:19:31 i turned first to a facade engineer mr sakula gave written evidence uh in his report jos six zeros seven zeros one

00:19:40 zeros one and a paragraph six point five one where he said and i quote by 2012 in my experience it would have been normal for a facade engineer to be

00:19:51 normal for a facade engineer to be appointed for any large complex project the overcladding of a high-rise residential tower is a large project but it may not be complex the situation which a facade engineer

00:20:03 the situation which a facade engineer would not be appointed for this kind of project would be where the architects had enough technical knowledge and relevant experience not to require the additional expertise

00:20:14 additional expertise or where the building owner did not wish to pay for an additional consultant in oral evidence mr sakula said appointment of a facade engineer was not necessary on any large or

00:20:25 was not necessary on any large or complex project he said some architects are comfortable with their technical knowledge and feel that they don't need the services of fasaj facade engineer others welcome it and would rather have

00:20:37 others welcome it and would rather have a facade engineer on board gt was not a complex project from a facade point of view although it was large

00:20:44 large we refer there to his evidence on day one two five at paragraphs one two seven two one two eight going back to his report he said in the case of grenfell tower refurbishment

00:20:56 case of grenfell tower refurbishment uh i would expect such an appointment to be considered by the tenant management organization in dialogue with studio e during the pre-novations phase

00:21:07 phase the dialogue would have to need to address whether studio he had the required experience and or technical expertise in overclouding its all residential building

00:21:17 mr sakula said in oral evidence that the party that should have initiated the discussion about whether a facade engineer should be appointed was studio e not tmo

00:21:27 e not tmo he said if studio e had doubts about their capability to design the facade they needed to consult or consider appointing a facade engineer again that's a day 125 pages one two

00:21:38 again that's a day 125 pages one two nine to one three two mr sakula agreed that it was his view that in the absence of the appointment of a facade engineer the reasonably competent cladding

00:21:49 the reasonably competent cladding contractor could be relied on to have such design and technical expertise in-house

00:21:55 in-house that's the same transcript a125 pages 140-141 the sum of all of this is that it was not necessary to appoint a facade engineer on this project

00:22:07 engineer on this project neither studio or harley expressed the need for a facade engineer or in any way indicated that their knowledge and skills required the appointment of such uh professional and certainly there's no suggestion in

00:22:18 and certainly there's no suggestion in the circumstances of this case nor was it put to any of the ryden witnesses that it was in any way blameworthy for them not to have considered engaging the services of a facade

00:22:29 engaging the services of a facade engineer

00:22:32 turning out to fire consultancy we uh turned to the appointment of x over by tmo and the charge against writing that it also engaged the fire consultant or ensured that xover had

00:22:44 consultant or ensured that xover had completed the tasks promised to complete under its engagement by tmo in some detail in section 14 of our written closing submissions

00:22:55 written closing submissions it's a page 72 of those written closing submissions on day 65 pages 148-151 mr hyatt the architectural expert

00:23:06 mr hyatt the architectural expert was asked by council for the inquiry whether an architect invaded the design bill con contractor should insist on the appointment of a specialist fire safety

00:23:17 appointment of a specialist fire safety consultant on a project such as this mr hyatt said in response that some architects would be very much more comfortable doing a building like this because they had done many of them

00:23:29 because they had done many of them if they felt comfortable no but you asked me early on should an architect assess their own abilities i think this architect should have considered its own experience and

00:23:40 considered its own experience and abilities

00:23:43 in the end of the passage of questions asked by council he said that studio he should have given the strongest recommendation the appointment of a fire consultant

00:23:54 appointment of a fire consultant similarly if harley considered themselves not sufficiently skilled to ensure that their specialist planning work was safe and complied with the building regulations then again it was for them to say so and recommend consultation with a fire

00:24:06 recommend consultation with a fire consultant

00:24:10 as stated by uh bsr team 2 at paragraph 7.35

00:24:16 7.35 of their submissions and their citing mr hyatt

00:24:20 hyatt studio e should have made it very clear to ryden that there was a need for a specialist consultant to be appointed in the absence of x over

00:24:29 it was said yesterday by council for x over and the reference is day one seven four pages seven to eight that there were six attempts to persuade ryden to use a fire consultant

00:24:42 ryden to use a fire consultant he went on to say at page 56 of the transcript that ryden were advised on several occasions by others in the design team to instruct a fire consultant no source reference was given by council

00:24:54 no source reference was given by council rex over

00:24:55 rex over and it's simply wrong

00:24:59 mr blake said that uh ryden did not appoint a fire safety engineer because that is not the that is the remit of an architect and he said this is transcript 29 page

00:25:11 and he said this is transcript 29 page 64.

00:25:13 64. studio e did not advise ryden that his fire safety engineer was required mr crawford said he's studio e that he knew we had recommended repeatedly that fire

00:25:26 we had recommended repeatedly that fire consultants be used at the start of the project

00:25:29 project and believe bruce recommended they were used in the post-novation stage he also said he had no reason to believe they weren't appointed by tmo or another

00:25:40 they weren't appointed by tmo or another entity

00:25:41 entity since xover responded to queries he said it wouldn't have dawned on him to explore with tmo or xover what the terms of theirs xover's appointment were

00:25:52 terms of theirs xover's appointment were he said he knew studio e had not appointed x over but his understanding was that they were available to studio e as a resource they could use on an as and when basis

00:26:05 could use on an as and when basis and that's uh day 10 page 31-33 mr crawford said he does not recall impressing on mr lawrence that ex-over hadn't provided the promised analysis

00:26:17 hadn't provided the promised analysis that's a day 10 page 36. later on in his evidence mr crawford said that he saw the consultation with x over as ongoing as the details of the cladding became more apparent he sent them to xo1

00:26:29 more apparent he sent them to xo1 it would only have been a problem for mr crawford and studio e if xover had said that they couldn't respond as they weren't appointed but that wasn't the case

00:26:39 case he said that if he asked for advice and it was given and he had every reason to believe that he was getting all the advice that was required but wouldn't question the scope of the advice that's at day 10

00:26:51 that's at day 10 pages 38-40 seems that mr crawford considered that because x-over provided advice he didn't question the arrangements essentially saying he never needed to recommend pointing them

00:27:03 pointing them now mr soon said that studio he had conversations with tmo and recommended further fire advice was required he said that that detail would have included the cladding it would have been

00:27:14 included the cladding it would have been the detail of everything that's day 12 page 159

00:27:21 page 159 soon understood that ryden wasn't going to be instructed x over but it wasn't going to be instructing x over or another fire consultant and that was what they normally did that's a trans uh day 12 page 167

00:27:35 that's a trans uh day 12 page 167 soon says he remembers discussing mr lawrence his approach with him he doesn't remember having concerns at the time

00:27:43 time he thinks he queried this once but doesn't remember pressing him on it adding that he would have pressed him had he believed at the time x over or another fire consultant should be appointed

00:27:55 appointed report importantly he said he did not think it was important to take tell mr lawrence that a fire safety consultant needed to be retained to deliver that analysis

00:28:04 analysis because it was for the specialist to follow through with that analysis so transcript 12 page one six eight one six nine

00:28:11 six nine he says he remembers queering about fire advice but doesn't think he put it to anyone in writing and couldn't say why he didn't repeat the advice to ryden and the tmo post novation

00:28:22 the tmo post novation that further advice was needed so pages 172 173 on day 12. turning to harley mr ray bailey said that the

00:28:33 said that the product was specified by studio e x over with their fire consultant so by the time the design was passed down to us the prescriptive design um but

00:28:46 design um but were named celetex and then he said we were doing our own backup to check to check the stuff that he'd already been signed off by them that's at

00:28:56 that's at day 33 page 28 and 29. mr daniel ancatel jones said he would have assumed that establishing a fire strategy for the cladding design would

00:29:07 strategy for the cladding design would have been done at raba riba stage 4 by the architect he does not agree with bruce soon's evidence uh that it was harley's responsibility to do so

00:29:17 to do so transcript 36 pages 206 and 207 kevin lam said he did not give a vast amount of thought to which route to compliance was being followed but he knew that the architect was backed up

00:29:29 knew that the architect was backed up with a fire engineer we followed the architect's advice that's a transcript 38 page 48-49 mr lawrence's evidence that he considered engaging a fire consultant

00:29:41 considered engaging a fire consultant for certain aspects of the project the lower four floors

00:29:46 in the light of the professional team he had around him he did not it was not put to him that he was advised instructed or sought to be persuaded by anyone to engage it's over the fact is that no stage has any such

00:29:58 the fact is that no stage has any such recommendation by writing by either studio e or harley the appointment of a cladding consultant or a fire consultant either in strong or indeed any terms ryden was not privy to any discussions

00:30:09 ryden was not privy to any discussions the studio may have had may have had with tmo or artillia pre-writing's involvement

00:30:16 perhaps the real point is this if as mr hyatt and mr sakula suggest as they do that studio e and harley as architect and specialist

00:30:28 and specialist ought to have had the skills to ensure compliance writing cannot be blamed for assuming the same

00:30:34 the same and they were not alerted by either to the fact that they did not of course overlying all of this is the fact that xover did not point out that its reports were incomplete and therefore unreliable

00:30:46 therefore unreliable that notwithstanding its contract was continuing

00:30:53 now again now i turn if i if i make an entirely different topic and that's procurement

00:31:02 many parties point to the procurement process and potential failings in that process

00:31:09 process ryden set out its position in some detail at section 17 of its closing submissions page 90.

00:31:16 page 90. but we'd like to add this the inquiry is aware that the governing procurement regulations are the public contract regulations 2006.

00:31:27 contract regulations 2006. they apply to procurements commence before the 26th of february 2015. the regulations are addressed to the contracting authority

00:31:38 contracting authority that is tmo rather than placing or extending such obligations onto bidders such as ryden regulation 47 states that the duties are owed by the contracting

00:31:49 duties are owed by the contracting authority

00:31:51 authority to economic operators i.e bidders and the breaches of such duties are actionable by economic operators

00:32:00 operators trowan hammond's advice to tmo in early march 2014 which was quoted in full by council to the inquiry jury mr david gibson's oral evidence that's a transcript 55 pages 43-44

00:32:14 transcript 55 pages 43-44 stated that the restricted procedure does not permit a contracting authority to undertake negotiations with the tenderers prior to contract award and does not provide for

00:32:25 contract award and does not provide for the contracting authority to revise the tender documents or for tenders to submit revised best and final offers to do so would be a breach of the eu regulations

00:32:36 regulations even if you allowed all the tenderers to renegotiate their prices this advice was then quoted by tmo's jenny jackson in her second of march 2014 email to artillia and others at tmo

00:32:51 2014 email to artillia and others at tmo it was seemingly sidelined with the proposal that and i quote there will need to be some informal discussion with the preferred contractor prior to ward

00:33:02 the preferred contractor prior to ward so there is an understanding of the approach

00:33:05 approach that's at art406433

00:33:10 ryden understands that for mr madison's evidence this is t-59 page 18

00:33:17 but tmo sought further advice from hamline's around the 18th of march 2014 regarding the risks involved in having discussions with ryden but not with the

00:33:28 discussions with ryden but not with the other bidders traus and hamlins advised that there was a risk albeit small that tmo would be challenged ryan was not privy to advice given by

00:33:39 ryan was not privy to advice given by travis and amblin nor internal discussions with tmo and between tmo and artillia about that advice and its interpretation the onus was on tmo to comply with the

00:33:50 the onus was on tmo to comply with the rules it was tmo who are vulnerable to a procurement challenge in the case of breach of the regulations ryden doesn't go into whether or not there was a breach of the regulations but if as has been suggested by other

00:34:02 but if as has been suggested by other court participants there was a breach then this is surely a matter for tmo and not something which could be used to criticize writing this particularly so in circumstances

00:34:14 this particularly so in circumstances where widen was not privy to any advice which was given another topic um which has

00:34:22 which has been raised is by

00:34:25 by the written submissions and also in oral submissions relates to the prices paid by ryden for cladding materials now we set out our position at section 18 page 93 of our closing submissions

00:34:40 18 page 93 of our closing submissions uh and all of the references uh are set out there

00:34:44 out there as indicated above ryden was invited in 2014 march 2014 to identify the amount by which it would reduce its price if different identified

00:34:56 reduce its price if different identified products were used these products included rb55pe cassette an rb 55p riveted or face fixed the savings offered by wyden if p

00:35:09 the savings offered by wyden if p cassette was selected was 293 000

00:35:13 000 and the saving for using face fix was more than 376 thousand tier mode chose pe cassette and a saving of 293 000. now this is a commercial transaction

00:35:25 now this is a commercial transaction between two contracting parties there is massive criticism that the price reduction right and profit was less than its cost saving and ryden maintains there was nothing

00:35:37 and ryden maintains there was nothing wrong with this there was no duty to pass on any saving it agreed with its subcontractor either on a pound-for-pound basis or at all on monday morning last they won the

00:35:49 on monday morning last they won the seven three pages fifteen and sixteen ryden heard a suggestion not presaged in any written closing submissions that ryden was under a duty owed to tmo

00:36:00 that ryden was under a duty owed to tmo not to make a secret profit reference was made to a 12.5 percent profit figure which council for brst 1 suggested and i

00:36:11 which council for brst 1 suggested and i quote

00:36:12 quote ryden had declared a profit margin it was said again and i quote by secretly pocketing additional savings ryden increased its profit margin over

00:36:23 ryden increased its profit margin over that declared had tmo known ryden would not have been awarded the contract on those terms it had declared in the tender frankly we're not sure we understand

00:36:35 frankly we're not sure we understand this or on what basis is being said doing the best we can since monday the only document we have found which refers to a 12.5 percent figure

00:36:46 refers to a 12.5 percent figure is riding it's in ryden's tender at b12 of the contract some analysis at part five of the contract package which refers to contractors ohp

00:36:57 which refers to contractors ohp 12.5 included so and that can be found at tm010041791

00:37:06 underscore 0263 and i quote again contractors ohp 12.5 percent included quotation mark end

00:37:17 quotation mark end included meaning means included in the overall contract tender ohp stands for oversight overhead and profit not just profit

00:37:27 profit ryan refutes that it was obliged to disclose or discourage to tmo any profit it anticipated making or did in fact make over 12.5

00:37:38 make over 12.5 whether net or gross of an anticipated or actual contribution to an overhead figure

00:37:44 figure and this is so whether 12.5 ohp is said to relate only to just a particular external cladding product rb 55 the cladding system as a whole or the contract as a whole

00:37:56 contract as a whole and when the tally as to whether the overhead and profit was was exceeded or not is to be taken at the beginning of the contract or at the end

00:38:05 the end in this regard the inquiries also refer to the fact that at november 2016 ryden anticipated its margin to be 5.15

00:38:16 and again see in that regard ryd triple zero 92301 which formed part of ryden's management accounts

00:38:24 accounts that 5.15

00:38:26 that 5.15 included the adjustable adjusted value of the cladding now that that the sums actually received remedy to a certain extent a pricing error which had made

00:38:37 error which had made is used as an additional criticism horizon and it should not be because of the commercial relationship between it and tmo ryan was able to maintain a contribution to overhead and profit that otherwise would have lost

00:38:50 profit that otherwise would have lost it was not therefore even profiteering when the transaction is looked at as a whole

00:38:55 whole it should also be born in mind that even if ryden had simply charged cost tmo could not reasonably suggest it would not have selected rb55p cassette it's notable that tmo chose cassette a

00:39:07 it's notable that tmo chose cassette a more expensive option in the facefix finally

00:39:12 finally and perhaps the most important point of all on this topic any suspected was unsafe product or an unsafer product than other products being considered to make up a loss has

00:39:23 being considered to make up a loss has no foundation in the evidence and would be wholly wrong

00:39:28 building control

00:39:32 just um a few things about building control ryden accepts that building control was not part of the design team the design team headed up by studio he was made up of those engaged by ryden to

00:39:44 was made up of those engaged by ryden to design

00:39:46 design building control however did accept the cladding systems being compliant and it would be wrong if submitted to ignore the effect that building control's certification of conformity would have had on a designer build

00:39:58 would have had on a designer build contractor such as ryden any reasonable design and build contractor would at the very least have taken this as reinforcing its views that what it had done was compliant and

00:40:09 that what it had done was compliant and safe

00:40:10 safe plainly certification by building control would not have given any calls for ryden to question the competence of its professional team

00:40:21 finally i'll deal very briefly uh with some points raised by cider eyes this morning ryden had taken great care and ensuring that submissions are completely accurate

00:40:34 that submissions are completely accurate sidewise have not notified us or indeed anyone as far as we're aware that they consider them to be factually inaccurate before this morning and we've not had an opportunity to review it

00:40:45 not had an opportunity to review it notably however siderise did not deal this morning fully and head-on with the inadequacy of mr mort's advice given to harley in march 2015. mr moore knew that grenfell was to use

00:40:57 mr moore knew that grenfell was to use acm and he knew his product would be of little effect when used with the acm used at grantful tower in this regard we refer to our

00:41:08 in this regard we refer to our submissions at paragraphs 8.15 to 8.17 of its closing submissions we should just add that there may also be relevant and associated issues for module 6 which we will address further

00:41:22 module 6 which we will address further so can i can i can now come to my uh overall conclusions

00:41:28 the charge against ryden must be that it did not act as a reasonably desired a reasonable design a bill contractor and was therefore in breach of its obligation and relying on others but it operated within the design and

00:41:39 but it operated within the design and build model it engaged professionals previously engaged by the client a well-worn industry standard path it subcontracted specialist works to harm as normal

00:41:50 harm as normal there's nothing unusual in relying on what ryden took to be competent professionals to discharge their duties under their respective contracts and for them to advise writing in the event that they consider themselves not able to do

00:42:02 they consider themselves not able to do this

00:42:03 this this is standard practice any attack on the competence of any particular ride employee for for example not having specialist knowledge of particular products or researching the details of particular projects pays no

00:42:15 details of particular projects pays no fair due regard to what the industry would expect of the skills possessed by individuals within such an organization there can be no proper suggestion that ryden should have employed in-house a

00:42:26 ryden should have employed in-house a particular individual with particular skills who would have realized that it was being ill-advised by studio e or harley ryden as is the norm entered into contracts with others by which their

00:42:38 contracts with others by which their obligations were passed down to those whom it not only believed or was entitled to expect were better placed to discharge those obligations than itself and there's nothing discreditable or disreputable in seeking to do that

00:42:51 disreputable in seeking to do that ryden as a company and their personnel might

00:42:53 might the benefit of hindsight we should have done things differently that's not the same however as saying that then in real time it operated outside the compass of a reasonable

00:43:05 outside the compass of a reasonable design build contractor ryden's conduct can only be fairly considered with due regard

00:43:13 can only be considered with due regard having

00:43:16 having been had to the context the inadequacy of the regulating regime the exploitation of that fact by manufacturers the inadequacy of the testing and certification regimes and the standard practice of design and

00:43:27 the standard practice of design and build contracts the engaging specialist discharges duties over to its client

00:43:33 finally ryden and its employees express their genuine regrets and their sympathies to all those countless people who've been and continue to be affected by this strategy

00:43:44 by this strategy it's understandable that ryden's condolences and those of us who represent them may be disregarded as being hollow even formulaic by those who have suffered at the hands of work overseen by ryden

00:43:55 of work overseen by ryden but they are nonetheless genuine and heartfent heartfelt many thankfully inquiries patience well thank you very much mr taverner um

00:44:06 um we're grateful to you for your statement which um contains a lot for us to take into consideration of course together with your written uh statement

00:44:17 written uh statement uh the next statement is going to be made by mr williamson queen's council on behalf of

00:44:23 behalf of team two

00:44:25 team two of the bereaved survivors and residents and i see you there on the screen mr williamson good afternoon good afternoon sir and i'd take it from that that you can see us and

00:44:36 that that you can see us and hear me

00:44:39 hear me clearly

00:44:41 clearly indeed good thank you well um we invited you to come on a little earlier because we mr taverner indicated that he probably wouldn't want to run on until quarter to three i hope it's convenient for you to come on at this point

00:44:53 for you to come on at this point indeed

00:44:54 indeed in that case we uh invite you to make your closing statement thank you very much sir and thank you for this opportunity uh mr chairman mrs stefan and mr ackball uh in these submissions i'm going to be dealing with

00:45:05 submissions i'm going to be dealing with the module one issues on behalf of team two for about 45 to 50 minutes and mr stein qc will then be covering the module two topics for a similar length

00:45:16 module two topics for a similar length of time

00:45:17 of time on the first day of phase two of this inquiry council to the inquiry observed that the corporate participants had elected quotes to indulge in a merry-go-round of bug passing place

00:45:29 merry-go-round of bug passing place quotes

00:45:30 quotes this process continues the risen and oral closings of the core participants responsible for this tragedy have contributed little to understanding what went wrong

00:45:42 understanding what went wrong we share share the mayor's disgust expressed this morning at the corporate core participants attempts to evade responsibility those are an insult to our clients

00:45:54 those are an insult to our clients adding further injury to the immeasurable pain that has already been caused to them indeed the last three days of oral closings have been an unedifying

00:46:05 closings have been an unedifying spectacle and we are glad to be given the opportunity of the last word on behalf of the victims of these corporate parties those parties have made no real attempt to answer the question which mr

00:46:17 attempt to answer the question which mr mansfield qc posed almost four years ago how on earth he said in the 21st century in one of the richest boroughs in the united kingdom

00:46:28 united kingdom can a block like this just go up in flames with so many casualties involved the inquiry has now heard many weeks of detailed evidence in seeking to answer that question

00:46:39 that question in these brief oral closing submissions i can't do justice to the scope breadth and horror of that evidence i will seek simply to highlight the most egregious

00:46:50 simply to highlight the most egregious failures of the parties most starkly responsible i begin with studio e as a designer and lead consultant for the tmo

00:47:01 the tmo studioe were required to prepare a design that complied with the building regulations they were obliged to investigate and ensure compliance with statutory standards

00:47:12 statutory standards they should have produced tender documents which specified only compliant products

00:47:17 products after they had been invaded to ryden studio remained responsible for all the design work undertaken for the suitability of the specified products for ensuring that all their designs

00:47:29 for ensuring that all their designs complied with the statutory requirements for coordinating and reviewing the designs of subcontractors including harley and for managing building control on ryden's behalf

00:47:41 on ryden's behalf they were also to advise on the need for and scope of services by consultants and specialists including x over and to incorporate their input into the design

00:47:52 incorporate their input into the design they failed manifestly to comply with those obligations their willful ignorance of the scope of their contractual responsibility of the relevant building regulations and of the improved guidance

00:48:06 regulations and of the improved guidance led to the production of a non-compliant and dangerous cladding design they failed to carry out any early evaluation of the regulations or the approved documents and that meant that

00:48:17 approved documents and that meant that they did not appreciate the risks posed by the acm panels and the celertex insulation despite the obvious dangers they failed to take the necessary steps to ensure

00:48:29 to take the necessary steps to ensure that xsaver were properly engaged most significantly they relied upon the supposed expertise of others especially harley for example in september 2013 studio e told artelia

00:48:43 in september 2013 studio e told artelia and the tmo that they had quotes met with harley this morning to discuss the project their recurring experience is that budgets force clients to adopt the cheapest cladding option acm face fix

00:48:58 cheapest cladding option acm face fix now studio e carried out no due diligence on harley but relied upon them to propose safe materials for the cladding system that reliance was completely misplaced

00:49:09 completely misplaced but what is so striking and so chilling is that studio e never asked themselves the question are these materials safe likewise studioe never devised a fire

00:49:21 likewise studioe never devised a fire strategy for the cladding and never ensured that x over developed a suitable fire strategy from first to last the documents which xover produced simply stated as to

00:49:32 xover produced simply stated as to regulation b4 that it was considered that the proposed changes would have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external far spread but that this would be confirmed

00:49:44 spread but that this would be confirmed by a future analysis in fact there never was such an analysis and studio he never pursued this on the contrary studio e took a casual

00:49:56 on the contrary studio e took a casual evasive attitude to fire safety for example in april 2014 claire williams told sims that they had had a meeting with the fire brigade and she wanted to

00:50:07 with the fire brigade and she wanted to get the tma's fire strategy onto their radar

00:50:11 radar soon's replied attached is the fire strategy and rbkc's markup of our far strategy plan i wouldn't show this to the lfb they're likely to support the

00:50:22 the lfb they're likely to support the severe interpretation of the regulations which xavier believe are unnecessary because this is an existing building in fact a quite severe interpretation close

00:50:33 fact a quite severe interpretation close quotes of the regulations or even any interpretation at all was exactly what was required but such an interpretation was singularly lacking from studio e

00:50:45 singularly lacking from studio e what they in fact did in the middle of 2014 was to pass conduct of this project to neil crawford who was not even a qualified architect he thought wrongly that his role was

00:50:58 he thought wrongly that his role was limited to reviewing the designs to ensure compliance with architectural intent only but of course studio's obligations were far more wide-ranging than that

00:51:10 than that crawford took no effective steps to ensure that xavier were properly engaged with the project this was even though as i have said no analysis have been carried out of

00:51:21 analysis have been carried out of compliance with regulation b4 later in 2014 there were discussions about cavity barriers crawford who clearly did not understand the

00:51:32 clearly did not understand the requirements of the building regulations simply acted as a post box between harley and x over for example when crawford sent xover's fast strategy 3 to building control in

00:51:44 fast strategy 3 to building control in september 2014 he did not highlight the fact that xover had not updated its analysis of external far spread he wrongly concluded that it quotes was

00:51:56 he wrongly concluded that it quotes was not a risk in this closing submission studio e don't seek to explain these or their many other failings but instead they make three main points

00:52:07 make three main points the first is to make an ad hominem attack upon mr hyatt the inquiry's architectural expert this is completely unjustified mr

00:52:18 this is completely unjustified mr hyatt's evidence was clear and compelling he established beyond doubt that studios repeatedly fell below the standard of the reasonably competent architect its

00:52:29 the reasonably competent architect its failures are not excused as he explained by complexities in the regulatory system or their inability to understand their own contractual obligations

00:52:40 own contractual obligations secondly studio e accused council of the inquiry of unfairness in his questioning of studio e witnesses there is no warrant for this criticism

00:52:51 there is no warrant for this criticism if studio e had wished to make such points the time to do so was while the evidence was being heard not in closing submissions finally studio e in effect say that they

00:53:04 finally studio e in effect say that they were no worse than many other architects practicing at the time in that acm was widely specified and used on high-rise buildings this suggestion lies in the mouth of studio e

00:53:17 suggestion lies in the mouth of studio e given that crawford told x-over in march 2015 that quotes metal cladding always burns and falls off hence fire stopping is usually just to the back of the

00:53:28 is usually just to the back of the cladding line studio e therefore have offered no real defense for their actions and omissions those actions and omissions contributed substantially to

00:53:40 omissions contributed substantially to this tragedy turning now to ryden the circumstances of ryden's appointment were highly unsatisfactory even fraudulent illegitimate post-tender negotiations

00:53:53 illegitimate post-tender negotiations took place between ryzen and the tma ryden exploited that exploited their private access to the top decision makers at the tmo in order to secure the

00:54:04 makers at the tmo in order to secure the contract

00:54:05 contract they were told they would be appointed subject to value engineering with a target of about 800 000 pounds including cladding savings already priced

00:54:16 cladding savings already priced their lowest bid was then accepted without question leading to the purchase of the cheapest but most dangerous of materials

00:54:25 materials ryden were in fact under their contract fully responsible for the design of the whole of the refurbishment and required to satisfy themselves that the designs

00:54:36 to satisfy themselves that the designs prepared by studio e and harley were compliant

00:54:40 compliant they were also required to carry out in the design and construction works in accordance with good building practice and in compliance with the contract documents and other statutory

00:54:51 documents and other statutory requirements they warranted that they would not quite specify authorized cause or allowed to be used in the refurbishment any deleterious or non-compliant materials

00:55:03 deleterious or non-compliant materials however listening to ryden's evidence and submissions just now one might be forgiven for thinking that this was a company with no responsibility for anything let alone

00:55:16 responsibility for anything let alone for the safe design and construction of the refurbishment works indeed write an assert in their closing submissions that quotes ryden's role was

00:55:27 submissions that quotes ryden's role was only to provide construction management ryden delegated to studio e the responsibility to manage compliance with the employers requirements the relevant regulations and coordinate design works

00:55:41 regulations and coordinate design works that position which you've just heard reiterated by mr taverner is clearly unsustainable legally morally and factually ryden's contractual undertaking to the

00:55:53 ryden's contractual undertaking to the tmo to be responsible for the design and construction of the works required them both to review the designs prepared by studio e and harley and to ensure that

00:56:04 studio e and harley and to ensure that the works and the design were free from defects

00:56:08 defects in managing the project ryden's failings were manifest indeed standing back the position of ryden is obviously and overwhelmingly untenable

00:56:20 untenable 72 people died in a terrible fire shortly after these works were were completed

00:56:26 completed how could ryden who accepted full responsibility for all aspects of the design and all aspects of the construction ever evade responsibility

00:56:37 construction ever evade responsibility for that

00:56:38 for that ryden ought to have set up an appropriate structure to ensure that all aspects of the design and construction works were adequately addressed however no such matrix of responsibilities was

00:56:51 no such matrix of responsibilities was ever established and so they failed to ensure that those involved in the refurbishment understood and undertook their responsibilities ryden ought also to have taken steps to

00:57:04 ryden ought also to have taken steps to satisfy themselves that studio e were competently resourced to carry out design work on the project instead they simply assumed this without undertaking

00:57:16 simply assumed this without undertaking any due diligence ryden were also not competent to check the works of studio e or harley or osborne berry as their employees lacked

00:57:27 osborne berry as their employees lacked even a basic understanding of the building regulations this was truly a case of donkeys led by donkeys

00:57:37 donkeys however ryden's sins were not ones merely of omission they played a central role in the selection of non-compliant materials for the tower

00:57:47 the tower including in particular arconic's reynabond acm panels ryden also failed to notify that the specified rockpool for the voids around

00:57:58 specified rockpool for the voids around the window frames had been substituted by sd plastering with the highly combustible cellar text tb4000 and kingspan thermite pitch tp10

00:58:10 and kingspan thermite pitch tp10 insulation ryden claimed in their opening submissions that as discussions about the choice of panel cladding panels progressed their stance remained quotes

00:58:21 progressed their stance remained quotes neutral

00:58:22 neutral the evidence shows to the contrary in may 2014 ryden put forward their quotes case that acm is not an inferior product to zinc class quotes and simon lawrence

00:58:35 to zinc class quotes and simon lawrence accepted in evidence that ryden saw themselves as an quake's advocate for acm against a reluctant planning body close quotes despite ryden's proactive role in the

00:58:47 despite ryden's proactive role in the change to acm they did nothing to check that the panels were suitable for use in buildings above 18 meters they didn't ask studio e about the far performance of the panels and it did not occur to

00:59:00 of the panels and it did not occur to them to ask x over to confirm their suitability by reference to regulation b4

00:59:07 b4 when asked why ryzen did not scrutinize xover's work or instruct another fire engineer lawrence's evidence simply was i can't explain another glaring example

00:59:19 i can't explain another glaring example of ryden's failings is that in september 2014 they were copied into email correspondence between harley and others concerning cavity barriers this should

00:59:30 concerning cavity barriers this should have alerted those of them to the fact that these supposed specialists harley studio e and xover did not understand the requirements of the building regulations

00:59:41 requirements of the building regulations ryden simply left such matters to be resolved by studio e in building control indeed

00:59:47 indeed ryden wrongly regarded and treated building control as if it were part of the subcontractor team as if it were an adequate substitute for a fire safety engineer

00:59:59 engineer it was not in that same month september 2014 another opportunity arose for ryden to ensure that xavier properly addressed fire

01:00:10 that xavier properly addressed fire safety

01:00:11 safety instead lawrence simply emailed crawford to say quotes i'm just catching up on me emails particularly around design and i have noticed x over in the chain

01:00:22 have noticed x over in the chain i know that they provided information in the tender for the tmo but i don't know if they're still working for them i know that we haven't deployed them so if you're getting some free advice then

01:00:34 you're getting some free advice then great otherwise we will need to look at this

01:00:38 this lawrence did not consider it important to understand the basis on which xava might have been willing to provide free advice or to integrate x over into the

01:00:49 advice or to integrate x over into the design team even though studio e and the tmo were led to believe that ryden would be appointing a fire safety engineer lawrence recognized in evidence that

01:01:01 lawrence recognized in evidence that such an appointment was quotes essential in exodus

01:01:05 in exodus absence the truth was that no one was advising on the fire safety implications of changes to the design post tender in november 2014 as we have heard from a

01:01:17 in november 2014 as we have heard from a number of parties williams of the tmo eventually had her so-called lachnal moment and sought clarification

01:01:28 lachnal moment and sought clarification from lawrence on the fire retardance of the new cladding ryden didn't respond and cannot explain this failure april 2015 ryden had harley's designs

01:01:41 april 2015 ryden had harley's designs and knew that the celestex rs 5000 insulation was to be incorporated into the cladding system however no one at ryden thought to check if harley or studio e had considered

01:01:55 if harley or studio e had considered whether the components of the cladding system were comparable to the tested system identified in the rs 5000 data sheet

01:02:04 sheet nor did ryden contact celetex to discuss the suitability of rs 5000 for the tower indeed ryden's pious assertion in their written closing submissions that quotes

01:02:17 written closing submissions that quotes it cannot however be blamed for the dishonest behaviour of artonic iconic celetex and kingspan the use of their unsafe and dangerous products at grenfell was not only the foreseeable

01:02:30 grenfell was not only the foreseeable but the intended consequence of their commercial objectives close quotes would carry rather more weight if they had taken any steps at all to investigate

01:02:41 taken any steps at all to investigate the safety of the products which they were using i turn now to harley harley and the individuals from the company who gave evidence sought to pass on responsibility to

01:02:53 sought to pass on responsibility to others and and assumed that matters would be all right without checking these were characteristics of this project and characteristic failings of

01:03:04 project and characteristic failings of this project it was harley who promoted the use of the acm panels it was harley who received the bba certificate for the raynerborn panels

01:03:17 certificate for the raynerborn panels from alconic and say that they took comfort in the class zero classification however they failed to appreciate that the panels which contained a pe core

01:03:29 the panels which contained a pe core could not be compliant with approved document b simply because the surface was said to be class zero in fact harley were aware at the time

01:03:40 in fact harley were aware at the time that the acm was highly flammable in march 2015 there was a discussion about fire stopping between harley ryden and studio e anchor tool jones have

01:03:51 and studio e anchor tool jones have hardly observed quotes it's ridiculous there's no point in fire stopping as we all know the acm will be gone rather quickly in afar harley were responsible for ensuring

01:04:03 harley were responsible for ensuring that the design of this facade complied with the relevant statutory requirements and for checking whether the materials specified by studio e were compliant

01:04:14 specified by studio e were compliant yet each harley witness asserts that someone else was to perform this responsibility this failure to check extended to the rs 5000 insulation which

01:04:25 extended to the rs 5000 insulation which hardly included in their designs without discussing its suitability for the tower with celetex lacking in-house expertise and resource

01:04:36 lacking in-house expertise and resource harley sub subcontracted the design work for the cladding system to kevin lam he had no specific training in fire safety within facile design had never worked on a high-rise residential

01:04:48 worked on a high-rise residential over-cladding project involving acm and had little experience of cavity barriers in cladding systems harley took no steps to ensure lamb was competent to produce

01:05:00 to ensure lamb was competent to produce compliant designs lamb then prepared details designs based on the studio e nbs specification his evidence is that he did not consider

01:05:11 his evidence is that he did not consider and was not told that his role extended to ensuring his designs complied with the building regulations he wrongly assumed this would be carried out by anchorage or jones and ray bailey

01:05:24 out by anchorage or jones and ray bailey of harley and by studio e ankertall jones in contrast claims he thought lamb and bender you would do so while ben bailey considered the role

01:05:35 while ben bailey considered the role would be performed by ankitar jones the cavity barrier issue came up again in the early part of 2015 when there were discussions as to the requirements

01:05:46 were discussions as to the requirements between harley studio e ryden and building control ray bailey admits he was surprised that there appeared to be a significant level of confusion between the design team but

01:05:58 of confusion between the design team but that he did nothing to satisfy himself as to the requirements of adb he also now accepts that harley's drawings which omitted uh cavity barriers from around the windows

01:06:10 cavity barriers from around the windows were erroneous those designs also emitted cavity barriers from the top of the columns a failure which ultimately led to the the fire to spread to the crown

01:06:21 fire to spread to the crown the need for cavity barriers at the top of the columns was never even considered by ancient jones and lamb thought them unnecessary it is striking and regrettable that

01:06:32 it is striking and regrettable that harley have put no closing submissions before the inquiry their position is indefensible and they have not sought to defend it

01:06:41 defend it mr lam has served closing submissions but these largely adopt the refrain that quotes it was not for kevin lam as a subcontractor to harley to ensure a

01:06:52 subcontractor to harley to ensure a compliance review process for the whole refurbishment in fact those responsibilities fell upon everyone involved no one could properly

01:07:03 everyone involved no one could properly seek to pass responsibility onto others on the basis of unjustified assumptions the responsibilities fell on everyone and were performed by no one

01:07:14 and were performed by no one i turn next to x over the fire safety consultants engaged in relation to this project

01:07:21 project dr lane's opinion of xaver's work is extremely damning in their closing submissions xover seek to criticize dr lane in particular

01:07:32 to criticize dr lane in particular arguing that she does not consider the factual context in which xover's work was carried out this criticism like that of studio mr hyatt is entirely

01:07:44 like that of studio mr hyatt is entirely unwarranted x over simply never delivered the service they contracted to provide firstly xover were to produce an existing building

01:07:56 existing building fire safety strategy this document should have established a clear baseline for the fire safety of the tower intended to quotes inform the fire risk assessment and fire risk

01:08:08 fire risk assessment and fire risk management plan for the building instead in dr lane's words it was quotes highly inadequate for any relevant purpose to which it was supposed to be

01:08:19 purpose to which it was supposed to be put

01:08:20 put at close quotes and could not be relied upon by the cma equates when considering defect mitigation as part of preparing the refurbishment

01:08:31 the refurbishment fire safety requirements ms cooney who prepared the report did not even visit the tower her report is full of assumptions and unknowns which

01:08:44 full of assumptions and unknowns which were never addressed because lack of coordination within x over meant this in a final version of the existing building fire safety strategy was never produced

01:08:56 fire safety strategy was never produced mr ashton then became involved because in august 2012 studio e urgently needed a fire safety report for the refurbishment works

01:09:07 refurbishment works he prepared an initial design note also without the benefit of a site visit which did not address the functional requirements of regulation b4

01:09:18 requirements of regulation b4 in october 2012 ashton produced outline fire safety strategy one for the refurbishment works again dr lane is highly and rightly critical

01:09:30 highly and rightly critical x-over did not produce or provide a set of fire safety strategy drawings

01:09:37 drawings in her view this fell below the standards of a reasonably competent fire safety engineer crucially fire safety strategy one included the statement repeated in the

01:09:49 included the statement repeated in the later versions of the strategy that quotes

01:09:52 quotes it is considered that the proposed changes will have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external far spread but this will be confirmed by an

01:10:03 spread but this will be confirmed by an analysis in a future of issue of this report

01:10:08 report this statement did flag up the need for the issue to be revisited but the use of the words will be confirmed suggests that the view expressed as to the effect of the

01:10:21 expressed as to the effect of the proposed over cladding was a firm one in dr lane's opinion stating that the overcladding would have now adverse effect was quotes very

01:10:33 now adverse effect was quotes very serious evidence of professional negligence and we agree nearly a year later ashton produced fire safety strategy 2 and two weeks after that strategy three

01:10:46 and two weeks after that strategy three neither of these reports was materially different from strategy one dr lane considers that xavier's failure to fully address functional requirements

01:10:57 to fully address functional requirements b1 b2 b3 and b5 and to entirely omit b4 of the building regulations is evidence of serious incompetence again we agree

01:11:09 of serious incompetence again we agree ashton's failure to obtain up-to-date information on the stage of the then stages of the design fell short of what could be expected of a reasonably

01:11:20 could be expected of a reasonably competent fire safety engineer following ryden's appointment xover was not novated however ashton continued to provide ad

01:11:31 however ashton continued to provide ad hoc advice in response to queries from the design team

01:11:37 team in for example in september 2014 there were emails ex exchanges in which ashton's advice was sought as to the carrier cavity barriers

01:11:49 carrier cavity barriers he failed to look at the drawings in any detail and therefore not did not consider where there should whether there should have been specified cavity barriers around the windows

01:12:01 barriers around the windows but although he was sent the data sheet for csx rs 5000 as an attachment he failed to open it this was a crucial missed opportunity

01:12:13 this was a crucial missed opportunity in evidence he accepted that having chosen to respond to the query his professional duty was engaged and unchanged and that he could have easily alerted the design team

01:12:25 alerted the design team to the need for the insulation either to be of limited combustibility or justified by test data i should finally make this point about

01:12:36 i should finally make this point about both studio e and x over both of whom whacks indignant in their closing submissions about the alleged unfairness of the

01:12:47 about the alleged unfairness of the expert evidence of mr hyatt and dr lane the short answer to these complaints is that had they wished to raise such matters they should have applied to the

01:13:00 matters they should have applied to the chairman

01:13:01 chairman for permission to ask questions of a witness giving oral evidence relating to them

01:13:08 them pursuant to rule 10 of the inquiry rules they did not make such an application and they cannot now we say

01:13:18 we say complain having failed to do so i pass now to the royal borough of kensington chelsea rbkc

01:13:30 rbkc despite all the failings which i have identified on the past of those carrying out the works it is the case that had rbkc performed its building control functions

01:13:43 performed its building control functions competently this tragedy would not have occurred rbkc has admitted wide-ranging failings in carrying out

01:13:54 wide-ranging failings in carrying out building control for the refurbishment although its acceptance of responsibility contrasts starkly and favorably with the

01:14:06 contrasts starkly and favorably with the stance of other core participants it cannot in truth take any credit for this faced with the inquiry's findings in phase one that the cladding system

01:14:18 in phase one that the cladding system failed to comply with regulation b4 and faced with the overwhelming condemnation of building control in ms menzies report rbkc had no choice but to shoulder some

01:14:31 rbkc had no choice but to shoulder some blame

01:14:34 in its submissions rbkc have sought to rely on the fact that many other building control departments also failed in their obligations given the

01:14:45 in their obligations given the widespread use of acm in the uk and indeed elsewhere of itself

01:14:52 of itself this cannot exonerate rbkc nor is it a sustainable position considering the sheer scale of rbkc's incompetence

01:15:03 incompetence they failed at every stage of the building control process from the full plans application which ought to have been rejected outright through to the completion certificate

01:15:15 through to the completion certificate which should never have been issued crucially ms menzies has identified what she describes as fundament fundamental failings on building control's part

01:15:27 control's part in neglecting to ask for detailed information on the cladding system and failing to notice the omission of cavity barriers around the windows

01:15:38 barriers around the windows indeed it was not until the works have started that mr hoban the principal officer assigned to the project discovered that acm was being used although he looked at the art at the bba

01:15:51 although he looked at the art at the bba certificate for the reynabond acm panels he completely failed to appreciate what he said

01:15:57 he said when he discovered that acm was being used he was not concerned as he trusted studio e and thought that x saver was still involved

01:16:08 still involved similarly he relied on harley's assurances that the same cladding system had been used before likewise

01:16:18 likewise even though he knew celetex rs 5000 was not of limited combustibility he never obtained justification from studio e or ryden's for its use

01:16:30 studio e or ryden's for its use because he quotes had a good working relationship with them mr hoban did not investigate what materials were being used for the wind

01:16:41 materials were being used for the wind window in the fill panels at all they were in fact allu gaze alley with a styrofoam core rated euro-class class e i.e providing a major

01:16:53 class e i.e providing a major contribution to fire oben's approach to the cavity barriers was equally cavalier

01:17:01 cavalier extraordinarily he says he thought there would be a steel framework supporting the windows which would act as the cavity barrier around them in fact the framework was an aluminium

01:17:13 in fact the framework was an aluminium and as he accepted an evidence there should have been cavity barriers of the head jam and sill of the windows he wrongly thought that cavity barriers would not be required at the junction

01:17:26 would not be required at the junction between the crown and top of the cladding because it was not a concealed space

01:17:33 hoben's site visits were also entirely ineffective because he failed to appreciate the need to see each element of the installation of the cladding system

01:17:43 system issues were therefore missed for example as the windows had already been installed he was unable to check whether cavity barriers were installed around them

01:17:57 barriers were installed around them building control's failings cannot however simply be attributed to the negligence of one officer notwithstanding the many unjustified

01:18:09 the many unjustified assumptions and failure to check which i have mentioned in relation to mr hoban the management of abk rbkc's building

01:18:20 the management of abk rbkc's building control department was wholly inadequate there was no formal procedure for checking the progress of approval applications there was no oversight of surveyors

01:18:31 there was no oversight of surveyors continuing professional development there was no written plan for the scope or and frequency of site visits there was no adequate system

01:18:43 there was no adequate system for record keeping and um

01:18:48 and um this uh

01:18:50 this uh ties in with the point which um some other core participants such as the fbu have made which is that the underperformance or failures of the form of rb say rbkc's

01:19:04 or failures of the form of rb say rbkc's building control park development needs to be set in the wider context of austerity

01:19:11 austerity swinging cuts to the budget of building control had meant a huge reduction in staff

01:19:17 staff mr hoban's complaints about his workload to his manager mr allen were ignored these complaints give the lie we would say to our bkc's

01:19:29 give the lie we would say to our bkc's claims in their closing submissions that they were concerned only with quotes value for money close quotes uh when uh dealing with the public purse

01:19:42 when uh dealing with the public purse i turn them um to the tmo it stance is that it relied upon and was entitled to rely upon the professionals

01:19:53 entitled to rely upon the professionals it had engaged however

01:19:56 however this fails to recognize its own responsibility for those appointments and for its mismanagement of the project the tmo

01:20:08 the tmo as we have heard appointed studio e not for their own abilities but to maintain continuity with the calc project there was no competitive tender

01:20:20 was no competitive tender indeed to save time and cost the tmo avoided the effect of the public procurement regulations by agreeing that they would only pay

01:20:31 they would only pay fees up to the ojeu threshold with further fees to be paid later had the project been tendered studio e would not have qualified

01:20:42 would not have qualified studio e were never asked by the tmo about their experience in overcladding residential high-rise buildings that experience was non-existence

01:20:53 experience was non-existence but likewise artelia had advised that ledbetter should be retained as the main contractor however this failed for financial

01:21:04 however this failed for financial reasons the tmo budget for the works was unrealistically low some four million pounds below ledbetter's suggested contract figure

01:21:16 suggested contract figure this led to the decision to re-procure and the subsequent appointment of ryden whose bid was by far the lowest this did not even this did not ring alarm bells of the tma who needed to

01:21:29 alarm bells of the tma who needed to make yet further savings of about eight hundred thousand pounds they then in breach of the public contract regulations negotiated with ryden to secure an even lower price

01:21:40 secure an even lower price planning was the key component of the necessary savings leading inevitably to the use of acm the tmo's determination to keep costs to

01:21:51 the tmo's determination to keep costs to a minimum meant that they failed to make full use of the professional services available

01:21:57 available for example they chose not to engage artelia as a project manager instead employing claire williams as the so-called designated project manager in truth there was no one designated

01:22:08 truth there was no one designated project manager with oversight of the approp entire project williams was only project managing the design element

01:22:19 despite studio e's lack of experience in overcladding high-rise buildings the tmo decided not to appoint a client design advisor even though the fee would only

01:22:30 advisor even though the fee would only have been about 30 000 pounds this role was also purportedly performed by the tmo in-house the tma's management team had no appreciation of the

01:22:41 team had no appreciation of the significance of the existing building fire safety strategy and the outline fire safety strategies for the refurbishment prepared by xavier which i've referred to and of course x

01:22:52 which i've referred to and of course x over were not then novated progress meetings attended by gibson and williams of the tmo repeatedly noted that lawrence was to appoint a fire

01:23:03 that lawrence was to appoint a fire safety consultant but the tmo never checked that this had been done then following a change to the cdm regulations artelia were no longer

01:23:14 regulations artelia were no longer required to compile the health and safety file williams then despite having no previous experience of preparing such a file rejected artelia's officer offer to act

01:23:25 rejected artelia's officer offer to act as cdm advisor and took responsibility for it herself significant deficiencies in the information provided by ryzen were missed and no one at the tma considered

01:23:37 missed and no one at the tma considered that as ryden's information only related to the refurbishment works the health and safety file also needed to cover other aspects of the tower

01:23:48 the tower finally i should say this but we are seriously concerned about the credibility of the tma witnesses given the failure of both mr madison and ms williams to disclose personal diaries

01:24:01 williams to disclose personal diaries and notebooks and the tmo's lack of candor in failing to address the unlawful conduct contact with ryden during the procurement

01:24:12 with ryden during the procurement process

01:24:14 process these matters as to credibility are of particular significance when assessing the evidence which williams and gibson of the tma have given about the assurances they say they were

01:24:26 about the assurances they say they were given by lawrence that the cladding materials were not flammable now i have sought in these brief oral submissions to highlight the parties

01:24:38 submissions to highlight the parties mainly responsible for the fire

01:24:42 fire many other parties who have been referenced in module 1 to whom i do not have time to refer also bear their share of responsibility

01:24:53 of responsibility the truth is that many individuals and many organizations have blundered and as a result the residents of the tower were led unwittingly into the valley of death

01:25:07 led unwittingly into the valley of death however

01:25:09 however these parties did not set out with malice a forethought to kill 72 people what is even more shocking than their incompetence is that the refurbishment was in many respects not

01:25:22 refurbishment was in many respects not unusual in the way that it was procured designed managed and constructed the obsession with cost the fragmentation of responsibility and the lack of clarity

01:25:33 responsibility and the lack of clarity over key design decisions are typical of many projects in the uk construction industry for example lawrence of ryden asserted in his evidence that there were

01:25:44 asserted in his evidence that there were numerous quotes layers of quality control and checking close quotes but in fact there was no quality no control and no responsibility

01:25:55 no responsibility this speaks to a deep-seated cultural problem in the construction industry the inquiry needs to engage on these issues constructively and openly with the bereaved survivors and residents and

01:26:07 the bereaved survivors and residents and the wider public indeed this morning mr taverner asserted that quotes ryden in delegating responsibility was operating in an orthodox manner and following standard

01:26:18 orthodox manner and following standard industry practice close quotes if that is right

01:26:22 is right this shows very clearly how that orthodoxy and practice need to change if future disasters are to be avoided i turn now and finally to the

01:26:33 i turn now and finally to the recommendations which we urge the inquiry to adopt in so doing we would ask also the inquiry to consider carefully how its recommendations will relate to the

01:26:44 recommendations will relate to the changes set out in the current building safety bill firstly it is apparent that no single personal body was in fact taking responsibility for fire safety on this

01:26:56 responsibility for fire safety on this project there were times when the tmo and exhaler turned their attention to fire safety but no one ever is to you no one ever focused on the issue properly

01:27:07 one ever focused on the issue properly in future we say there should be a single suitably qualified individual who is required at every stage of the project to consider and be accountable for all fire safety issues

01:27:20 for all fire safety issues secondly there needs to be a change from the current practice whereby everybody and nobody is responsible for design decisions

01:27:30 decisions in this case ryden harley studioe and others all had design responsibility but as the evidence makes clear their concern was simply to pass that responsibility on to someone else

01:27:43 responsibility on to someone else one way of addressing this would be to appoint an independent certifier for projects like this wholly separate from the design team who would impartially

01:27:54 the design team who would impartially provide specialist advice monitor compliance with design specification and standard statutory standards and ensure all project requirements were met thirdly at the key stakeholders in

01:28:07 thirdly at the key stakeholders in public sector projects the tenants and the lessees should be placed at the center of the process at each stage after all these are their homes and their lives

01:28:19 their lives indeed on the very day the fire occurred the leaseholders association pointed out that quotes the material of the cladding used by ryden did not meet health and

01:28:30 used by ryden did not meet health and safety requirements in the true sense eye is a fire risk as it is combustible close quests if they had been consulted earlier and more fully this tragedy might have been

01:28:41 more fully this tragedy might have been avoided

01:28:42 avoided fourthly the whole process of building control should be de-privatized and made once more the monopoly of the state

01:28:50 state competition and commercial advantage should play no part in this process the sole concern of properly funded local authority building control bodies

01:29:01 local authority building control bodies should be the safety though of those who live within their areas this inquiry therefore needs to be prompt imaginative and proactive in

01:29:12 prompt imaginative and proactive in proposing massive cultural change four years have now passed since the fire

01:29:18 fire there has been no real change in the construction industry given the scale of this disaster and the widespread shortcomings which it has revealed government and the construction industry

01:29:30 government and the construction industry will surely feel compelled to accept whatever recommendations the inquiry sees fit to make this is an opportunity which must not be lost

01:29:44 so that that concludes team two's closing remarks on the module one issue so i would now propose to hand over to sam stein

01:29:53 sam stein qc perhaps after the short break to deal with the module two issues yes well thank you very much mr williamson uh that's certainly very helpful i think we will take the afternoon break at this

01:30:05 will take the afternoon break at this point

01:30:06 point mr steen was scheduled to speak at quarter to four but i suspect that he may be able to address us a bit sooner than that so we'll resume at half past three and hope

01:30:19 we'll resume at half past three and hope to hear him then or shortly thereafter thank you very much thank you please

01:47:01 welcome back everyone we are now going to hear a closing statement from mr

01:47:08 from mr sam steen queen's council on behalf of team two

01:47:13 team two uh core participants uh if that is mr steen is there and ready to speak to us oh good afternoon mr steen uh good afternoon sir good afternoon ms estefan and good afternoon

01:47:25 afternoon ms estefan and good afternoon and i imagine you can see and hear us well as we can see and hear you i kind of did so yes good thank you well now thank you for being ready to make your statement a bit earlier than you were originally asked to but

01:47:37 were originally asked to but since you are there and ready we should be pleased to hear from you thank you sir

01:47:44 ten months ago in our opening submissions for module two on behalf of the team to bereaved survivors and residents

01:47:52 residents we described the manufacturers are conic kingspan and celatex as crooks and killers

01:47:59 killers the evidence now having been heard tells us we were right the manufacturers operated without any regard whatsoever for the lives of those

01:48:10 regard whatsoever for the lives of those living within walls covered in their combustible materials

01:48:16 let me start with our conic it was with considerable dismay that those we represent listened to the oral submissions made on behalf of archonic by mr hoffman queen's

01:48:28 behalf of archonic by mr hoffman queen's council yesterday frankly arconic's refusal to accept any responsibility for its conduct confirms why the industry cannot be trusted with

01:48:39 why the industry cannot be trusted with involvement in regulating matters relating to safety in 2004 arconic failed euro-class testing with the results that were not

01:48:50 testing with the results that were not usable

01:48:51 usable this was because the test had to be stopped after after 850 seconds mr schmidt the president of arconic accepted in evidence that the 2004 test

01:49:02 accepted in evidence that the 2004 test which had to be stopped contained crucial fire safety information however

01:49:10 however he stated that by this he meant the safety and protection of property not the safety of people this illogical argument can only be interpreted as an attempt by our comic

01:49:21 interpreted as an attempt by our comic to distance fire safety from being a life and death issue further

01:49:28 further he admitted that it was irrational and irresponsible not to have carried out further tests this was the same product cassette reynabon 55 pe

01:49:39 reynabon 55 pe which fueled and spread the fatal fire at grenfell tower 13 years later

01:49:47 among the many excuses put forward by mr hochman queen's council was the claim that the archonic panels were cut in an unorthodox way

01:49:58 unorthodox way this is frankly nonsense the panels were cassette cut arconic tested cassette cut panels they knew the product was being

01:50:09 they knew the product was being fabricated and that it was going to cep to be practically fabricated into cassettes

01:50:16 cassettes furthermore one

01:50:18 one the product is unusable in unfabricated form

01:50:23 form so it is always sold with the intention of it being fabricated two

01:50:29 two arconic provided guidelines on how to fabricate the panels including the cassette form three

01:50:37 three the certificates relied upon in the context of grenfell tower are based upon euro-class tests carried out on fabricated versions of the panel four

01:50:49 four deborah french provided examples of how the cassette panels looked in sales correspondence for grenfell tower

01:50:58 mr hochman in his submissions relied in part upon the historical widespread use of acm pe cladding and the fact that it had received regulatory approval in the past

01:51:09 past in order to try and defend the actions of our comic but these points made by mr hoffman ignore our connect's own internal emailing which recognized the inherent

01:51:21 emailing which recognized the inherent danger posed by acm pe cladding and its contribution to numerous high-rise fires around the world it also ignores the fact that acm pe

01:51:32 it also ignores the fact that acm pe cladding is considered to be so dangerous that buildings with it installed are now virtually uninsurable and why billions must be spent in funding the removal and replacement of

01:51:43 funding the removal and replacement of these panels

01:51:47 perhaps the most audacious submission made yesterday by arconic was a claim that acmpe was capable of being used safely even in high-rise residential applications

01:52:00 applications archonic simply ignores the dclg tests carried out post grenfell which demonstrated the inherent flammability of acm pe and the fact that our college product

01:52:11 and the fact that our college product was being sold in a country here with a stay put policy

01:52:18 alcoholic has also made further comments that it is a remarkable feature of the evidence they say that hardly any of the witnesses were prepared to acknowledge awareness of the combustible nature of the panel core

01:52:30 combustible nature of the panel core however

01:52:31 however ignorance of the reality or a willingness to fake ignorance of the risks posed by acmpe is precisely what arconic relied on to carry on selling a

01:52:42 arconic relied on to carry on selling a product that they knew well to be dangerous

01:52:45 dangerous alconic pretended not to know the dangers of acmpe all the while acknowledging internally it posed dangers and refused

01:52:56 and refused nevertheless to take any action because it was anti-commercial two further claims made by leading council for archonic were that from early 2014 it took steps to advise customers

01:53:09 2014 it took steps to advise customers of issues with rainer bond pe and those involved in the designer construction of grenfell tower are to blame for using the product in an unsafe manner

01:53:20 archonic has made these claims whilst failing to acknowledge that deborah french admitted in all evidence that she automatically priced all projects with pe

01:53:29 pe and that and in the context of grenfell did not provide harley or cep a choice between the pe and fr call or even tell them that the product had a pe core

01:53:42 iconic has also complained at some length in its oral closing submissions about the questioning by council to the inquiry of mr schmidt however

01:53:53 however iconic raised no objection until now long after the questioning is over when neither council to the inquiry nor the other cps particularly the bsrs have had any opportunity to analyze such

01:54:05 any opportunity to analyze such objections it is difficult to face it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the reason for not publicly raising these complaints earlier is because they would not survive even the most cursory

01:54:17 would not survive even the most cursory analysis or scrutiny

01:54:21 arconic had genuine complaints about how mr shrit mr schmidt was treated under examination then the proper course of action would have been to raise those issues whilst the evidence was being heard not in closing

01:54:33 evidence was being heard not in closing submissions of course our connect could have applied to you sir for permission to ask questions of witness giving oral evidence pursuant to rule 10 of the inquiry rules

01:54:44 of the inquiry rules they made no such application

01:54:48 finally as regards our conic solely it is remarkable that arconic in its closing oral submissions seeks to blame the failure of compartmentalization and the firefighting ability of the

01:55:00 and the firefighting ability of the london fire brigade this is analogous to an ah this is analogous to an art to an arsonist blaming the fire brigade for not putting out the fire he started earlier

01:55:15 let me move on to kingspan kingspan took an early lead in their corner of the marketplace in the race to put combustible but thermally efficient insulation onto buildings

01:55:27 insulation onto buildings to win this dreadful race you needed to get your and no one else's combustible products onto high-rise buildings

01:55:36 at the end of 2007 kingsman tested its new product k-15 with disastrous results mr meredith reported the k-15 test had developed into a raging inferno and that

01:55:49 developed into a raging inferno and that the phenolic was burning on its own steam and the bre had to extinguish the test early because it was endangering setting fire to the laboratory

01:56:02 kingsman have gone to some pains to deny that the new technology k-15 performed differently to the old technology k-15 we reject the basis of those arguments those arguments do not link

01:56:15 arguments those arguments do not link with the evidence that has been disclosed

01:56:19 disclosed after the

01:56:20 after the 2007-2008 testing reports kingspan decided not to test their actual product instead they opted to test prototype products that would never make it to their customers as the formula was not

01:56:32 their customers as the formula was not commercially suitable despite king's fans despite kingspan's claim to the country their attempted manipulation of government even after the fire

01:56:43 government even after the fire shows an enduring pattern of opportunism and utter lack of remorse

01:56:50 on the eve of the first anniversary of the fire a series of emails shows kingsman wanted to persuade the government not to ban the use of all combustible materials on buildings over

01:57:01 combustible materials on buildings over 18 meters

01:57:03 18 meters bad press

01:57:04 bad press and profits were their only concern there was not a genuine desire to prevent a further tragedy kingspan's pr machine advised the

01:57:15 kingspan's pr machine advised the document we're referring to is kin triple 0023990 kingsman's pr machine advised that pushing too hard towards the topic on money could be

01:57:26 towards the topic on money could be taken badly nevertheless on the 13th of june 2018 kingspan's group chief executive responded

01:57:35 responded surely the penny has dropped now for all of us as to where this is headed he meant the complete ban without a serious intervention and hanging back at this stage is to condone

01:57:46 hanging back at this stage is to condone the direction of travel

01:57:52 we suggest the fire at grenfell clearly had limited impact on kins on kingspan's corporate conscience after the fire kingsman pushed ahead from every angle to try to keep

01:58:03 from every angle to try to keep combustible insulation on exterior walls the july 2018 g2 bitter core and rockwool test appears to be designed to present the results to bodies such as the

01:58:14 results to bodies such as the parliamentary select committee this was in an attempt to undermine euroclass testing as well as their competitor rockwall

01:58:26 in trying to discredit mr meredith's 2007-2008

01:58:30 2007-2008 test report mr web queen's council on behalf of kingspan claimed that iva meredith had limited experience of bs 8414 testing and work

01:58:40 and work this is wrong mr meredith was their most experienced team member at the time and have been working on preliminary eight four one four style tests prior to

01:58:51 eight four one four style tests prior to the o5 test further their failure to acknowledge the relevance of the calorim caloric emitter forgiving

01:59:03 carried out by mr meredith as part of the basis for the claim of reduced performance from old to new tech k-15 shows their lack of willingness to engage with this issue

01:59:16 mr webb also was at pains to claim a high degree of engagement with the inquiry

01:59:23 inquiry they state that they have disclosed 23 500 documents but they failed to mention their repeated late disclosures notably they failed to disclose mr rochefort's diary prior to the witness's

01:59:35 rochefort's diary prior to the witness's evidence and disclosed further documentation during the hearings in march

01:59:42 even in their rebuttal of points made about the lateness of withdrawal of test letter in october 2020 kingspan have still failed to clarify why when the tests in question were

01:59:54 why when the tests in question were removed from their website in 2019 it took them until a month before the opening of module 2 to send the withdrawal letter to the bre

02:00:06 i now move to celetex they were attempting to catch up in 2014.

02:00:13 2014. project manager jonathan jonathan ropa explained that he and his company were aware of the dangers of their combustible insulation when he said do we take the view that our product

02:00:24 do we take the view that our product realistically shouldn't be used behind most cladding panels because in the event of a fire it would burn celetex's attitude in their own written closings is that of a student expressing

02:00:37 closings is that of a student expressing fury towards a teacher for not catching them cheating during the exam

02:00:42 whilst the bre duper to bear a portion of the blame for not catching the fraudulent and pivotal may 2014 bs 8.14 test

02:00:53 may 2014 bs 8.14 test it was in that test that celetex used a non-combustible unlisted layer and celatex's management action board the mag was aware of this

02:01:05 the mag was aware of this it must not be forgotten why celetex did this

02:01:09 this they sought to hide from the nhbc the unlisted non-combustible layer since nhbc approval was critical to the success of that product

02:01:20 in order to successfully bring the product to market celetex also had to get rs 5000 certified they admitted using kingspan's exact wording for their labc certificate

02:01:32 wording for their labc certificate mr roper's admissions in evidence revealed the story of how rs 5000 reached grenfell tower let's ask this question day 72

02:01:43 let's ask this question day 72 by failing to ensure referring to the labc certificate that reflected that r135 approval is only for the system tested celatex ran

02:01:54 only for the system tested celatex ran the risk of misleading customers yes mr robert said and misleading building control officers yes

02:02:02 yes and that was intentional deliberate and dishonest i believe so yes said mr open

02:02:10 mr orr queen's council attempted to blame attempted to shift the blame from celetex onto the construction professionals celetex were aware of ignorance and

02:02:22 celetex were aware of ignorance and confusion in industry and set about cynically employed exploiting it by waging a campaign of smoke and mirrors the data sheet sent to harley described rs 5000 as developed specifically as a

02:02:35 rs 5000 as developed specifically as a premium performance pir solution for use in rain rain screen cladding systems this was not true and not new it was simply the rebranded fr5000 pir product

02:02:48 simply the rebranded fr5000 pir product three times through the document the wording deliberately set out an impression of wider applicability and suitability for the above 18 meter market

02:02:58 market until you reach the penultimate sentences on page three

02:03:04 mr orr referred to class o fire performance throughout the product both terms are meaningless and utterly irrelevant to insulation use in rain screen cladding and we

02:03:15 use in rain screen cladding and we invite the panel to conclude that the only logical reason to insert such references was to give an impression of wider applicability

02:03:25 now it is clear the credibility of the bs 8414 tests have been seriously put in doubt

02:03:31 doubt but it is clear that selatex had cell attacks not cheated their test rs 5000 may never have reached the market and the grenfell tower and despite mr orr's presentation to the

02:03:44 and despite mr orr's presentation to the country celetex conducted a campaign to persuade industry that their material was suitable for buildings over 18 meters plus when they knew it was not

02:03:56 when they knew it was not there is no cause for celebration that the building industry's complacency meant that they swallowed whole the headlines broadcast by celetex

02:04:08 we suggest that the evidence within module 2 has demonstrated that there is ample documentary material which the police investigation should be analyzing for use within the possible

02:04:20 analyzing for use within the possible prosecution of a number of individuals and companies for a range of serious criminal offences

02:04:29 overall these companies were committing wholly dangerous frauds mr meredith explanation before the inquiry of what going what was going on within kingspan is exactly what was

02:04:40 within kingspan is exactly what was happening within celetex and arconic on day 76

02:04:44 on day 76 he was asked this question this was a deliberate and calculated deceit by kingspan in which you had become embroiled yes

02:04:52 yes that's correct

02:04:55 kingspan celetex and arconic saw high-rise buildings as high-rise additional cash just waiting to happen what these companies were doing and being allowed to do was to wrap

02:05:07 being allowed to do was to wrap buildings housing families in the high-rise and high-tech equivalent of kingling soaked in petrol it was a lethal combination a few flaming drops of polyethylene from

02:05:18 a few flaming drops of polyethylene from the acm were enough to ignite the foam insulation but the insulation manufacturers also knew the risk that toxic smoke such as hydrogen cyanides

02:05:30 hydrogen cyanides such as hydrogen cyanide was released when pay ir burns celatex knew and understood or could quantify this risk but the fact remains

02:05:41 but the fact remains toxicity was and still is totally unregulated the inquiry needs to grasp this issue to let today below 18 meters anything goes

02:05:55 throughout the entirety of module 2 we are yet to hear any satisfactory answers as to why with all this full knowledge these products were not removed from the market due to the clear danger they posed to life safety

02:06:07 posed to life safety preservation of profits is not a sufficient reason to risk large scale fatalities the evidence has demonstrated that time and time again

02:06:18 and time again archonic celetex and kingspan harbored a disregard boarding on contempt for the rules they lied manipulated data hid results and threatened and threatened litigation

02:06:29 litigation all to get their products to market

02:06:33 the evidence from all three companies showed no regard was given to the danger their products posed to the public nothing was allowed to stand in the way of market share if there was a bad test it was ignored and the next one rigged

02:06:45 it was ignored and the next one rigged until the desired result was achieved if they found data inconvenient they simply hid it if inconvenient questions were asked they ignored them

02:07:01 and now turn to the testers and certifiers

02:07:07 the moral bankruptcy of the manufacturers doesn't stand alone they had help

02:07:13 had help iconic kingspan and celetex use the bre bba and labc to perpetrate their large-scale conspiracies to defraud these organizations with varying degrees

02:07:25 these organizations with varying degrees of consciousness allowed themselves to be used

02:07:29 be used at best they demonstrated such laziness and lack of rigor in their procedures that they were practically inviting the abuse perpetrated by the manufacturers

02:07:40 perhaps we might not be surprised that corporations put profit before safety

02:07:46 safety but we suggest the true shock of module two was the behavior exhibited by those safeguarding the built environment the prioritization of the interests of

02:07:57 the prioritization of the interests of the corporate clients by the testers and certifiers did nothing other than prevent the execution of what should have been their mission to protect life

02:08:09 the bre predicted a fire such as grenville in the 2003 version of br 135 standard but critically failed to utilize this knowledge to protect the public

02:08:22 knowledge to protect the public perversely the bre's actual testing of dangerous combustible materials showed at least a passive indifference to the known existing danger and at worst demonstrated a willingness to connive in the use of these materials

02:08:34 to connive in the use of these materials on buildings despite the obvious importance we would all expect of ensuring bre staff are adequately trained and educated it became clear in the oral and documentary

02:08:46 became clear in the oral and documentary evidence that this was not the case in fact stephen howard the joint business group manager for passive fire testing had no formal higher education or formal training in fire safety at all

02:09:01 the bre claim that they were just a victim of kingspan and celetex's deception

02:09:07 deception but it was their own lacks attitude to the testing process which opened the door to the manufacturers to bring in and use what they wanted as we heard in the evidence it was possible to skip the proper

02:09:18 it was possible to skip the proper cataloging of materials used in tests by sending materials directly to the burn hall instead of by the goods in system for a supposedly scientific body the

02:09:30 for a supposedly scientific body the bre's lack of scrutiny and absence of systems certainly gives the impression that they are anything but scientific and systematic

02:09:40 the bre attitude was demonstrated by mr clark who stated on day 95 the reliance very much was on the honesty of the client

02:09:50 client we're not there to police necessarily every 10th degree of what they're doing there

02:09:55 there there's a large element of trust in everything we do the trust the bre placed in these clients was naive at best and complicit at worst

02:10:06 at worst even when defending the bre mr howard was unable to separate the bre from its client base he said

02:10:15 he said bre is a commercial test laboratory we have a lot of clients who spend a lot of money with bre we don't wish to upset any of them this is not an appropriate attitude for

02:10:27 this is not an appropriate attitude for a body carrying out bre's functions we repeat profit is not and never can be a reason to risk safety mr clark allowed his independence to be

02:10:38 mr clark allowed his independence to be compromised by advising clients about how to pass the s8414 even if we discount the evidence that suggests that mr clark knew about the additional non-combustible layer added

02:10:51 additional non-combustible layer added to the rig to ensure that celatex's insulation passed the test there was nothing about the testing process that demonstrated an understanding of the word independent or

02:11:02 understanding of the word independent or beyond reproach as the bre state on their website

02:11:08 the bre say that they weren't involved in testing systems used on grenfell tower

02:11:13 tower whilst this may be technically true the bre were aware of the abuse by companies to give the impression their products could be used in a wider application the single example cited by the bre of

02:11:26 the single example cited by the bre of challenging such behavior was kingspan's 2006 flyer what is lurking behind your facade bre claiming their submissions that kingspan removed the flyer in fact

02:11:38 kingspan removed the flyer in fact kingspan simply reworded their mantra which now became kingspan's call them k15 has been successfully tested to bs 84141

02:11:49 successfully tested to bs 84141 and when it and when assessed in accordance with br135 it is acceptable for use above 18 meters this gave the impression that the product could be used in multiple systems this simply wasn't true

02:12:02 systems this simply wasn't true the bre failed to challenge the new wording this mantle this mantra was repeated over and over and over again in product literature for kingspan and then

02:12:13 product literature for kingspan and then later adopted by celetex

02:12:17 the bre has promised reform and promised change

02:12:21 change however

02:12:22 however even after all of the evidence heard within module 2 those in the those in control of the bre still do not get the point they claim in their written submissions that the test sponsor must still be

02:12:34 that the test sponsor must still be responsible for accuracy of the built system

02:12:38 system in their written submissions bre uh triple zero forty one two o two page eight they go to they go on to say this

02:12:47 this there are good reasons for the test sponsor being responsible for the accuracy of what is tested by the test laboratory going on to say if the test laboratory were to assemble the system would it

02:12:59 were to assemble the system would it would be open to claims that it had assembled it incorrectly

02:13:05 we suggest that the bre must radically alter its starts and be prepared to put the strictest of controls on goods into the testing laboratory and use trained expert individuals to

02:13:17 and use trained expert individuals to certify the rig for any test that it conducts

02:13:21 conducts frankly this should be a minimum standard

02:13:24 standard the fact is that the bre's privatized status means that they are afraid of criticism from clients which is why we suggest that the government needs to act and bring it back within state ownership

02:13:40 the bba suffered from an even worse lack of expertise than the bre and also suffered from the same lack of independence

02:13:52 independence despite the obvious need for a fire exit for a fire expert within the bba no such expert was present quite simply arconic and kingspan ran rings around the bba

02:14:07 the bba's mr gregorian accepted darconic were driving the basis on which the bba certificate was issued there was little pushback from mr gregorian as he was prepared to acquiesce to our comics demands

02:14:20 acquiesce to our comics demands in part because it was cheaper for our connect not to do further testing and also this was simpler for the bba he also stated it was just bb a policy to certify the panel not what he

02:14:33 to certify the panel not what he considered to be the system failing entirely to even consider asking the question whether the change in format the product affected its file performance

02:14:43 even when the vba requested additional test data arconic simply ignored the request with the bpa doing nothing in response

02:14:54 so words matter particularly when you're certifying products drafters at the bpa including mr mr gregorian seem to have failed to realize this

02:15:04 this blanket wording on the archonic certificate led rental contractors to accept that archonic pe cladding was safe to use and blanket wording on the kingspan certification led the industry at large

02:15:17 certification led the industry at large to believe that k15 could be used in any 80 meters class build it might be expected that companies will push to get wider wording to benefit

02:15:28 push to get wider wording to benefit their market share it is not expected that the certifier blindly allows this without question the bba state in their written closings that it has no extra contractual power

02:15:40 that it has no extra contractual power to demand data for products assessed mr alban gave evidence that we were naive and changed the process as it stands at the moment we submit no evidence no claim

02:15:53 we submit no evidence no claim all claims by manufacturers should be supported by clear evidence

02:16:02 labc hbc unfortunately the labc system of certification was also incredibly problematic kingsman misdirected the lebc's agent mr

02:16:13 kingsman misdirected the lebc's agent mr jones of herefordshire building control into bleep into believing k15 was a product of limited combustibility

02:16:22 instead of considering which specific tests might apply in this case bs476-4 and 11 or indeed looking up a definition

02:16:33 and 11 or indeed looking up a definition mr jones instead applied his own functional interpretation explaining that limited combustibility's purpose was to make sure that the insulation product can't contribute to the development of a fire

02:16:46 the development of a fire in a sense he made up his own rules and applied them the fact that mr jones still stood by his functional interpretation in his oral evidence makes a worrying statement as to the state of training and monitoring of

02:16:58 state of training and monitoring of building control by central government

02:17:04 what has been shown in the evidence is that the claim that rs 5000 was acceptable for use in buildings with stories above uh 80 meters in height had been copy pasted by mr ropa directly

02:17:16 been copy pasted by mr ropa directly from kingspan's march 2011 data sheet to the labc and they simply lifted the text into the certificate without any checks to its veracity

02:17:26 what also became apparent in the evidence

02:17:29 evidence is that despite mr jones making clear to the labc that he did not have the relevant expertise to be able to create the k-15 certificate the labc cajoled him into the role with promises of

02:17:41 him into the role with promises of support that failed to materialize

02:17:45 what conclusions can we draw regarding the certifiers and testers in essence the failings of the bba bre and labc were in part systemic and in

02:17:56 and labc were in part systemic and in part the result of individual negligence and ineptitude

02:18:02 the watchdogs in place which should have secured the safety of building materials have been privatized many years ago and instead their mission had become warped into acting as the lap

02:18:13 had become warped into acting as the lap dogs of the manufacturers

02:18:17 the evidence tells us at this time there was no independent no competent certification or testing agency in place whatsoever the failure by these guardians of public

02:18:29 the failure by these guardians of public safety stems from the message the individual employees of the bba bre and labc appear to have taken from them from their employers that they worked for a service company

02:18:41 that they worked for a service company their aim was to ensure their clients went away happy rather than having any thought of ensuring tests have been conducted in a reasonable or competent manner

02:18:54 there is of course a considerable crossover sir between module 2 and module 6.

02:19:00 module 6. the dangers of combustible cutting were known around the world and within the uk but by the time the lethal materials were placed on the grenfell tower there had been numerous examples of

02:19:11 there had been numerous examples of cladding fires demonstrating the real world dangers to life such as garnet court and lacrimal and lackland amongst many albums moving forward we will need to consider the context and culture which allowed

02:19:23 the context and culture which allowed these companies to play the system with their parentings however they could not have succeeded in their endeavors unless they were allowed to through the abject failure of regulation and control

02:19:35 regulation and control the sad and unpleasant truth which the government has yet to embrace is that although there is the fault of industry this does not stand alone as there was also a gross failure of

02:19:46 as there was also a gross failure of government to put in place rigorous regulatory requirements in relation to a known and identified risk the dangers of these materials was well known within government

02:19:58 known within government individuals such as brian martin lately of the bre and then an adviser to the ministry of housing communities and local government have been aware of the risk since at the very least the garnet

02:20:09 risk since at the very least the garnet caught fire in 1999. the

02:20:14 the 2003 second edition of br135 was prompted by recommendations following the ghana court fire this iteration contained a now familiar diagram showing the behavior of cladding

02:20:26 diagram showing the behavior of cladding under fire and the authors were sarah colwell and brian martin i'm hoping to be able to show the one document i want would like to have on the screen which is bre

02:20:37 have on the screen which is bre zero zero zero zero five five five four at page nine

02:20:48 thank you

02:20:52 this graphic from 2003 displays the likely behavior of flame in a cladding fire with the fire climbing a building entering flats and destroying

02:21:03 entering flats and destroying compartmentation are foretelling of the fire at grenfell tower 14 years later to the left-hand side of the schematic it states in writing that i can read

02:21:14 it states in writing that i can read thank you very much if the external cladding contributes to the flame spread there is a risk of secondary fire spread to all levels i'll repeat that if the external cladding contributes to

02:21:26 if the external cladding contributes to the flame spread there is a risk of secondary fire spread to all levels it needs repeating that this was in 2003.

02:21:37 we can take the graphic now please off the screen it'll be great

02:21:41 thank you

02:21:46 mr martin had been responsible with miss colwell for the drawing off of br135 in 2003 was seconded from the bre to government taking this knowledge with him

02:21:57 taking this knowledge with him in fact he was principally responsible for driving changes in relation to external fire safety as part of approved document b allowing the use of bs 8414 in the revision

02:22:09 revision this of course gave kingspan the opportunity and foothold within this new market to test their combustible insulation for use in external padding in high-rise buildings

02:22:20 in high-rise buildings we should pause to note that it was in march of 2014 that her honor francis kirkham cbe coroner of the inquest for the 2009 latino fire recommended the following

02:22:35 is recommended that your department review adb to ensure that it provides clear guidance in relation to regulation 84 of the building regulations with particular regard to the spread of fire over the external envelope of the

02:22:47 fire over the external envelope of the building

02:22:48 building and the circumstances and the circumstances in which attention should be paid to whether proposed work might reduce existing fire protection

02:22:59 these matters were all going on within the time of the conservative government under the then prime minister david cameron

02:23:06 cameron this was the period known as the bonfire of the regulations also known as the red tape challenge this had been promised as part of the conservative 2010 manifesto

02:23:18 conservative 2010 manifesto in 2012

02:23:20 in 2012 the one in two out wolf regulation was introduced this was meant to ensure that the cost of business of new regulation was covered was covered by double the amount saved on the removal of others

02:23:32 saved on the removal of others later this extended to an extreme one in three out

02:23:36 three out unsurprisingly this was suspended after the grandfather fire

02:23:41 the extent to which the anti-regulatory stance resulted in the failure to grasp the nettle and enforce even the poor levels of regulation existing at the time will be considered in more detail by this inquiry within

02:23:53 in more detail by this inquiry within module six however

02:23:56 however we can be clear about this the corporations in module 2 acted dishonestly using a broken regulatory system in pursuit of profit over public safety

02:24:09 what does this all mean it means that there was clear knowledge of the dangers posed by combustible materials being used on high-rise buildings within the manufacturers the

02:24:20 buildings within the manufacturers the testing and certification bodies and the government however

02:24:25 however there is not the slightest suggestion that residents in high-rise blocks whether they be tenants or leaseholders knew about the dangers posed by combustible material being placed on their high-rise homes

02:24:36 their high-rise homes we should also recall the brave voices of the grenfell residents who did express their fears about what they could see of the standards being used within the refurbishment and who were dismissed as paranoid and ostracized by

02:24:48 dismissed as paranoid and ostracized by the authorities that should have protected them yet despite the lack of knowledge of the residents and leaseholders many are trapped living in buildings covered in these materials

02:24:59 these materials despite their lack of knowledge leaseholders are still being asked to pay for the remediation costs incurred in the removal of non-compliant cladding

02:25:10 we note the mhclg have withdrawn from providing oral submissions but their written closing submissions made to the inquiry make clear they understand and deprecate the role of the

02:25:21 understand and deprecate the role of the manufacturers and the testing certification bodies in the disaster however

02:25:28 however nowhere

02:25:30 nowhere in the mhclg submissions is an apology or the slightest recognition that these regulatory failures and these serious issues occurred on the government's watch

02:25:43 a complacent civil service and the revolving door of ignorant ministers failed to appreciate the risks to life posed by dangerous cladding and failed to introduce any rigor to the regulatory

02:25:55 to introduce any rigor to the regulatory process

02:25:58 we agree the new regulatory structures will be better and more effective but even now the regulatory changes ignore the fact that residents in social housing and high-rise blocks have views which should be taken into account by

02:26:10 which should be taken into account by the new regulators yet industry is still planned to have to is still planned to play a part in the new regulatory regime by contrast social housing and high-rise housing

02:26:22 social housing and high-rise housing residents will have a limited voice

02:26:26 even after all of the deaths and all of the misery the people who suffer the risk are still being excluded from setting the risk

02:26:36 there are of course many issues still to be considered however we can all see the evidence which shows there are crooks who operated within the manufacturers and that at best in being generous the

02:26:47 and that at best in being generous the certifiers and testers were negligent but module two was also shown that a big part in this tragedy was played by the government who failed to operate any level of oversight of a poor regulatory

02:26:58 level of oversight of a poor regulatory regime and actively avoided regulation instead they chose to trust industry well look how that went it had the effect of turning the crooks

02:27:09 it had the effect of turning the crooks into killers responsible for the deaths of 72 men women and children the people of the grenfell tower were not to blame for the horrendously dangerous materials on their building

02:27:21 dangerous materials on their building they are not to blame for their own deaths and nor other residents in tower blocks living under this corrosive threat

02:27:27 threat nor do the leaseholders living in their value-less flats have any reason to be blamed

02:27:32 blamed yet they're being asked to pay the price to remove the cladding and make good their buildings this is wrong this is plainly wrong and as morally unacceptable as the criminal actions of the manufacturers

02:27:44 criminal actions of the manufacturers as wrong as the inaugurat as wrong as the inadequacies and negligence of the testing and certification bodies and should stop we see that the changes desperately

02:27:55 we see that the changes desperately needed are glacially slow in implementation we know that there is a very sensible proposal being made to amend the building safety bill to make the polluters pay adapting schemes already

02:28:06 polluters pay adapting schemes already in place regarding contaminated land we suggest that the government must accept that tenants and leaseholders are not to blame they should not be made to play and they should embrace this proposal

02:28:17 and they should embrace this proposal and pass it into law sadly to date we have seen as a government held bent on ignoring responsibility for its own failures delaying and dragging out remediation and ruining lives in the process by make

02:28:30 and ruining lives in the process by make by seeking to make the wrong people pay

02:28:34 the mhclg has access to the same material we have they can see the government's failings and they can see that the government failed to regulate

02:28:45 failed to regulate the mhclg needs to wake up to its own responsibilities within government having seen the material that is um available on the inquiries

02:28:55 inquiries relativity website which allows us access to the documentation and they can see that this material identifies the fact that the government needs to radically alter its stance to leaseholders

02:29:08 so those are our submissions on behalf of team two in relation to multitude well thank you thank you very much mr steen

02:29:17 steen um

02:29:18 um well you are the last person from whom we are expecting to hear during the course of these closing statements we're very grateful to you for what you've been saying to us this afternoon

02:29:30 saying to us this afternoon uh in just a moment we shall rise but before we do that it's probably helpful if i say that the inquiry will not be sitting tomorrow

02:29:41 not be sitting tomorrow we shall resume next week when we shall start with opening statements in relation to module five module four having been deferred until a later stage

02:29:53 having been deferred until a later stage in the proceedings so on monday as i say we shall start module five with opening statements from those core participants who wish to make them thank you very much

02:30:05 wish to make them thank you very much we shall rise at that point and resume at 10 o'clock on monday next week thank you

02:30:42 you