Evidence from Denise Welch, government liaison officer from the Department's Resilience and Emergencies Division, on her role during the Grenfell fire response.
00:00:28 Good morning everyone. Welcome to today's hearing. Today we're going to hear from the first of a group of civil servants from what used to be known as the Department for Communities and Local
00:00:39 the Department for Communities and Local Government. Yes, Mr. Matra. Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, members of the panel. Could I please call Miss McManus?
00:00:55 Good morning, Mr. McManus. Uh, you're going to affirm, I think. Is that right? I am. Yes. Thank you. Well, the words are there on the screen. Would you read them out, please? Thank you. I do solemnly, sincerely, and
00:01:06 Thank you. I do solemnly, sincerely, and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Thank you very much. Please sit down. Make yourself comfortable there.
00:01:16 there. Thank you.
00:01:24 All right. Good. Yes, Mr. Archer. Good morning, Miss McManis. Can I start by thanking you for attending today to give evidence to the inquiry and for your insistence with our investigations.
00:01:35 your insistence with our investigations. Just a few words by way of introduction, if I may. Could I invite you please to keep your voice up so that we can hear you clearly. It also helps not to nod or shake, but to say yes or no because nods
00:01:46 shake, but to say yes or no because nods and shakes don't get picked up on the transcript. If any of my questions are unclear, please say so and I will happily rephrase the question. Lastly, if you feel you need a break at any time, please let us know. Is that all
00:01:57 time, please let us know. Is that all okay?
00:01:58 okay? Yes, that's lovely. Thank you. I'm going to turn to your statements next. You've made two statements to the inquiry and these will appear in the in front of you on the screen. Could I please uh take you to them now? your
00:02:09 please uh take you to them now? your first uh witness statement which is CLG1309725.
00:02:15 Uh we can see on the right hand side there it's dated the 18th of March 2019. If we go to page 30 of your first statement we can see a signature there. Is that yours?
00:02:26 Is that yours? Yes it is. Could I take you to your second statement? That's CLG30739.
00:02:34 And we can see again on the right hand side uh that there is a date. It's dated the 26th of October 2020. Did you electronically uh sign this witness statement which we can see on
00:02:45 witness statement which we can see on page 13?
00:02:47 page 13? Yes, I did. Have you had an opportunity to read each of your statements recently? Yes, I have. Thank you. Now, you have recently communicated uh
00:02:58 Now, you have recently communicated uh to the inquiry a number of clarification matters to your statements. Is that right?
00:03:02 right? It is. Yes. Um, we can deal with those if relevant during the course of my questioning today, but can you confirm to the best of your knowledge the contents true?
00:03:13 contents true? Subject to that? Yes. Well, Miss Mc Mcmanus, the focus of my questions today will be on the following topics. Um, firstly, your background and role. Secondly, the role of the
00:03:25 role. Secondly, the role of the resilience and emergencies division, your role in actions in the response to the Grenfell Tower fire and any reflections that you may have to share with the inquiry. So, turning first then, please to your
00:03:37 So, turning first then, please to your background and career history. Is it right that you have been a civil servant since 1984? Yes, I have. At the time of the fire, you were a resilience adviser. Is that correct?
00:03:49 resilience adviser. Is that correct? I was. Yes. Uh this was within the resilience and emergencies division was it?
00:03:53 it? Yes.
00:03:54 Yes. The resilience and emergencies division was known as DCLG red or simply as red was it?
00:04:01 was it? It was. Yes. Uh is it right that red sat within the department for communities and local government DCLG as it was known at the time of the fire? Yes. at the department uh DCLG included
00:04:14 Yes. at the department uh DCLG included the word housing in its title in 2018 to become known as the department for housing, communities and local government, MHCLG. Is that right? Uh the Ministry of Housing, Communities
00:04:25 Uh the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. Yes. The department has since been uh rebranded to become the Department for Leveling Up Housing and Communities, DLUC. Is that right? It is. Yes. We've had a lot of name
00:04:37 It is. Yes. We've had a lot of name changes. Well, during the course of my questioning today, I'll refer to the department as DCLG as it was at the time of the fire. It also happens to have the least number of letters in it. Um, is it
00:04:48 least number of letters in it. Um, is it correct that you became a resilience adviser in October 2011? Uh, yes, that's correct. Uh, was this when D when RED was formed? Uh, it was about 6 months after RED was
00:04:59 Uh, it was about 6 months after RED was formed.
00:05:00 formed. So, at the time of the fire, you were a resilience adviser for just over five and a half years. Is that right? I was with one slight clarification on that at the exact time of the fire I was
00:05:11 the exact time of the fire I was actually on temporary promotion. Um so I was uh what we term ahead of resilience at that time that had only been since uh May of of that year. Um and it included
00:05:23 May of of that year. Um and it included uh additional um duties. So rather than the specific resilience advisor duties, I had more of a managerial role as well at that point. We will come to uh touch upon that. Um
00:05:37 We will come to uh touch upon that. Um before your resilience advisor role in two October 2011, did you have any prior experience of civil contingencies? Not civil contingencies as such. Prior
00:05:49 Not civil contingencies as such. Prior to 2011, I worked in the fire directorate um working on uh human resources issues and equality and diversity within the fire service. So I worked within an emergency service
00:06:01 worked within an emergency service context but not specifically resilience. And at the time uh that you provided your second statement to the inquiry on the 26th of October of 2020, you were in
00:06:12 the 26th of October of 2020, you were in the temporary post of head of regional resilience in RED. Is that right? Yes, that's right. And do you still currently work uh within RED? I do. Yes. What is your current role? I'm a
00:06:23 What is your current role? I'm a resilience adviser and uh I specifically work with London Resilience Forum and uh more broadly across the southeast. Well, focusing on your role then at the
00:06:35 Well, focusing on your role then at the time of the fire. Um as we've already established, you were a resilience adviser. Is it correct that you covered three geographical locations, those being Surrey, Sussex, and London? Uh I
00:06:46 being Surrey, Sussex, and London? Uh I did just prior to the temporary promotion with the temporary promotion that actually I was in during at the exact time of the fire. Um I was responsible for the the whole of the
00:06:57 responsible for the the whole of the southeast along with uh my job share partner Linda. And and so does it follow from what you said that you were not a resilience adviser for those same geographical
00:07:09 adviser for those same geographical locations throughout your time as a resilience adviser from October 2011? um it was a a steady progression of uh assuming responsibility. So when I joined in 2011, I was part of our as a
00:07:22 joined in 2011, I was part of our as a resilience adviser, I was part of our emergencies management team that does the central role that um runs our operations center. Um, and because I've been brought in at that time
00:07:33 been brought in at that time specifically to support on the Olympics, which obviously was the following year, um, I had a supporting role in working with, uh, London Resilience Forum. Um,
00:07:44 with, uh, London Resilience Forum. Um, towards the end of, uh, 2012 and into the beginning of 2013, I then took on the uh, Surrey Resilience Forum as well. And then in 2016 when one of my
00:07:56 And then in 2016 when one of my colleagues retired I took on the Sussex Resilient Resilience Forum. So it was a a gradual progression. Um and up until um May uh 2017 um I was the supporting
00:08:13 um May uh 2017 um I was the supporting resilience adviser in London. We had a main resilience adviser but she retired in May 2017. So, does it follow from what you've just said that you assumed responsibility as a resilience adviser for London in May
00:08:26 a resilience adviser for London in May 2017?
00:08:28 2017? Uh, in May 2017, I took on responsibility as head of resilience for London and the Southeast, but I already had responsibility as a
00:08:40 but I already had responsibility as a resilience adviser. So, at the at the slightly lower level, I'd had that since um since early in my career in 20 in 2011, beginning of 2012. So, so ju just to clarify then when when did you become
00:08:52 to clarify then when when did you become a resilience adviser for London? Right. I became a support resilience adviser for London in uh the end of 2011. I became the lead resilience
00:09:03 2011. I became the lead resilience advisor in May um May 2017 just prior to my temporary promotion. It happened around the same time. Um so um and I then continued to
00:09:16 time. Um so um and I then continued to be resilience advisor for London after my temporary promotion. Thank you for that clarification. Um focusing on your resilience advisor role for London for a moment. Um you say in
00:09:29 for London for a moment. Um you say in your statement we don't need to go to it at the moment. Uh but because of the size and complexity of London and the additional meetings requiring attendance that role was shared between two
00:09:40 that role was shared between two resilience advisers. Is that right? Yes. Uh was there anything unusual about that?
00:09:45 that? Um it isn't how we supported all of the local resilience forums around the country. Um there are um those that have less complex setups uh and less complex
00:09:58 less complex setups uh and less complex risks but London because of its nature and because of the the the size and complexity which I think you've already heard from uh from other witnesses uh it was considered that two resilience
00:10:09 was considered that two resilience advisers at at my grade grade seven um were necessary. Can you tell us if that's still the case today? Um it's uh it is currently um and
00:10:22 today? Um it's uh it is currently um and it has been um yes consistently since that time that we've had two grade sevens working with London with uh the
00:10:33 sevens working with London with uh the option to have support from uh others within the division as well. Do you consider that two resilience advisers for London is sufficient? Um it's certainly very helpful to have
00:10:44 Um it's certainly very helpful to have two. It gives you much more flexibility with engagement covering meetings. Um so it is it's it's a very effective way of ensuring that uh they get the coverage
00:10:56 ensuring that uh they get the coverage and support that they need. Uh you've told us that at the time of the fire uh you were also acting head of uh resilience for the southeast and that you shared uh that role with your
00:11:08 you shared uh that role with your colleague Lynn Daikin. Is that right? That's right. Um can you uh just assist us with how your dual roles worked uh in practice at the time of the fire? Yes, absolutely. And it it clarifies a
00:11:20 Yes, absolutely. And it it clarifies a bit about the uh resilience advisor role. Um at the the time what we did was we used it um the opportunity to have it as a job share. So both Linda and I were
00:11:32 as a job share. So both Linda and I were both resilience advisers. I for for London, sorry, and Sussex as we've described, she for Nottingham and I think Norfolk. Um, so we shared the head of resilience job.
00:11:47 so we shared the head of resilience job. So she worked on it half of her time and I worked on it half of my time. And then for the other half of our time, we retained our roles as resilience advisers. So we were doing both the the
00:12:00 advisers. So we were doing both the the six job, the grade six job, head of resilience half of our time and then the grade seven job the other half of our time.
00:12:09 time. Right. I'd like to ask you u we'll come on to um the we'll come on to the roles in more detail in in a moment but I'd like to ask you about the structure and hierarchy of of RED please as it was at
00:12:20 hierarchy of of RED please as it was at the time of the fire. Um did Dr. Joe Far then director general for local government and public services have oversight of RED? She did.
00:12:29 She did. Was Julian Kay the director of RED? She was.
00:12:33 She was. Um Katherine Richardson was the deputy director of RED? Was she? She was. Yes. Uh can you assist us with how RED was structured below the deputy director level? Um below the deputy director we had five
00:12:46 Um below the deputy director we had five heads of resilience. Um and they are uh grade six level civil servants who uh had a geographical portfolio. Um so we
00:12:58 had a geographical portfolio. Um so we are though we are a national team. Um we have uh a team that's based in Bristol for the southwest. Uh the London and Southeast team is based in in London. We
00:13:09 Southeast team is based in in London. We have uh an east team, a Midlands team and a North team. Uh and I think at the time the Midlands team was called the central team, but it's essentially the same thing. Um and
00:13:21 it's essentially the same thing. Um and they had uh offices in uh in Birmingham. Um the East team worked out of London because that was geographically most sensible for them. And uh there's an office in Leeds which the north team
00:13:33 office in Leeds which the north team works out of. and it's still the same uh general geographical spread. Now um we the
00:13:41 the uh fifth
00:13:43 uh fifth um well the other head of resilience that we had at the time was the head of emergencies management uh uh a gentleman named Robert Mason and he didn't have geographical responsibility but he did
00:13:55 geographical responsibility but he did have responsibility for our operations center and that core role um that that we run as well. And then below the heads of resilience
00:14:06 And then below the heads of resilience there were geographical teams. Um so um each area had resilience advisers doing similar role that I was doing with London, Surrey and Sussex but for their LRF areas. Um and uh a small number of
00:14:22 LRF areas. Um and uh a small number of uh support staff who helped us with more administrative uh matters as well. Um, Katherine Richardson in her statement to the inquiry confirms at the time of the fire there were 30 red employees, many
00:14:35 fire there were 30 red employees, many of whom were resilience advisers. Does that accord with your recollection? Yes.
00:14:42 You've um you may have already answered this question, but you've referred to geographical locations. Um, was it the case that resilience advisers were assigned a geographical location in line
00:14:53 assigned a geographical location in line with local resilience forums across the country?
00:14:55 country? Yes. Um and at that time um they would have uh one or one or two uh resilience forums in the same way that that I did. But yes, based on those geographical
00:15:07 But yes, based on those geographical areas,
00:15:08 areas, the inquiry has heard evidence about uh local resilience forums and you deal with this in your statement. Also, um are they groups of category 1 and two responders within a given locality that
00:15:19 responders within a given locality that meet periodically um to facilitate and enhance coordination and cooperation at a local level? Yes. It includes some who are not category 1 and two responders such as DCLG. Is that
00:15:32 and two responders such as DCLG. Is that right?
00:15:32 right? Yes. And military as well. Um we will uh come on to the interplay between RED and the uh London Resilience Forum in particular uh in a moment. But
00:15:44 Forum in particular uh in a moment. But uh before we do, I'd like to focus on the role of the resilience and emergencies division. Um, I'd like to take you to the emergency preparedness statutory guidance document that you
00:15:55 statutory guidance document that you referred to in your statement, uh, and in particular, chapter 13, and that's at CAB4533.
00:16:05 It's dated March 2012, and it's titled support and challenge. If we can turn to page 13,
00:16:16 uh, we can see at paragraph 13.26, 27
00:16:21 27 an overview of uh the role of DCLG is given. It says the resilience and emergencies division helps responders identify for themselves the risks they face, mitigate those risks and manage
00:16:34 face, mitigate those risks and manage the impact of risks that materialize including through liaison with central government departments. It then goes on at paragraph 13.28 28 uh to list out the
00:16:45 at paragraph 13.28 28 uh to list out the ways that DCLG will do this. The Reds department, forgive me, will do this as act as a critical friend. Question rationale, suggest alternatives, share good practice and support local planning
00:16:57 good practice and support local planning activities. Provide a support mechanism helping local partners develop an appropriate response capability. Brokering advanced mutual aid agreements between areas. Make links between local
00:17:08 between areas. Make links between local responders and the lead government departments. supporting crossboundary strategies, protocols and procedures whilst ensuring a close fit with both the needs of government in a national emergency and the needs of the local
00:17:20 emergency and the needs of the local responders and support local and national exercising helping to ensure lessons learned are effectively shared across the relevant uh partnership.
00:17:31 across the relevant uh partnership. What did you consider the core function of red to be? Um the core function is pretty much as as set out here. So it is that engagement with uh the local
00:17:44 that engagement with uh the local responders at the multi- agency level. So that's what the local resilience forum covers um to help and support them in uh developing their plans, assessing
00:17:56 in uh developing their plans, assessing their risks, undertaking their exercises um and particularly in helping them to understand any government guidance that might come out about particular risk or
00:18:07 might come out about particular risk or capabilities. Uh helping them to communicate back to government about any issues that they have concern on. um and helping to clarify um what what the
00:18:20 helping to clarify um what what the expectation is. Uh and in general terms um being with them at their key meetings to understand what their key issues are, but also as a whole um RED was there to
00:18:33 but also as a whole um RED was there to um ensure that central government heard the local voice on resilience issues. Would it be right to say that RED sought
00:18:44 Would it be right to say that RED sought to achieve uh these functions through resilience advisers on the whole? Yes. Uh through resilience advisers.
00:18:51 advisers. Um well then let's look at the responsibilities of resilience advisers which you've uh alluded to already. Um, could we go to your first witness statement? That's CLG1309725.
00:19:03 statement? That's CLG1309725. And if we go to page two, paragraph 7.
00:19:15 Um, at paragraph 7 here, you set out um the main responsibilities of a resilience advisor. Um so a supporting local resilience forums
00:19:28 so a supporting local resilience forums and their members in planning for emergencies in accordance with the cabinet office guidance emergency preparedness. LRFs are groups of category 1 responders within a given locality. You then go on to explain when
00:19:40 locality. You then go on to explain when they meet and what category 1 responders and category 2 responders are. Um at B you go on to say contributing to the development of national policy for a particular resilience capability for
00:19:52 particular resilience capability for example site clearance. Uh we work closely with other government departments ensuring local interests are represented in their relevant policy development. And then at C if an
00:20:03 development. And then at C if an emergency is declared acting as government liaison officer. This role involves acting as a central government representative at meetings of the strategic coordination group SCG,
00:20:14 strategic coordination group SCG, supporting local responders and acting as a link between them and central government and/or undertaking a role in the red operations center which would which could include drafting briefings
00:20:25 which could include drafting briefings to inform ministerial decision-making. The Grenfell Tower fire was declared a as a major incident at a very early stage because of its impact.
00:20:36 stage because of its impact. Uh could we therefore break down a resilience advisor role into two parts? The first part being a pre-emergency phase dealing with A and B as you set out in your statement and an emergency
00:20:47 out in your statement and an emergency phase dealing with that section C. Would you agree with that? Yes.
00:20:51 Yes. Um I'd like to um delve a little deeper then into each of those. The pre-emergency and um the emergency phase. uh focusing
00:21:02 and um the emergency phase. uh focusing firstly on pre-emergency and the assessment of risk alone. Uh you refer in your statement we don't need uh to turn it up now um but provide that you provide information about
00:21:14 that you provide information about national risks to the LRF which they needed to plan for. Uh can you assist us with how that would in particularly in London how that would be done? Um well
00:21:25 London how that would be done? Um well the national risk assessment is a central uh government um development which I think you um the inquiry will
00:21:36 which I think you um the inquiry will already have heard a little bit about from I think from Katherine Hammond. Um so that is the process by which uh cabinet office civil contingency secretariat works with central government departments to work out what
00:21:49 government departments to work out what the key national risks are that's produced into the national uh risk assessment and that is available to local resilience forums for them to look at the national risks and to consider
00:22:02 at the national risks and to consider how those risks might affect them in their area, how they might manifest in their area. um a lot of of risks will be ones that you will see particularly for London in
00:22:13 you will see particularly for London in in their area but some um may not be. So for some parts of the country there are specific things about uh coastal flooding, east coast to uh coastal flooding and things which are very
00:22:25 flooding and things which are very specific to their areas but are a big national risk. Um and in other areas obviously if you're in the middle of the country that's of no relevance to you at all. So um that national risk assessment
00:22:39 all. So um that national risk assessment is something as I say which is made available uh to uh resilience forums and which London would have had available to them. Um and what cabinet office do when they uh bring out the the risk
00:22:51 they uh bring out the the risk assessment is they also uh have a tendency to hold workshops which are available to uh LRF members to understand um how the risk assessment's working to give them the opportunity to
00:23:03 working to give them the opportunity to work through that um process in order that it will inform their thinking. What we do within red as resilience advisers is um we we work alongside the LRFS to
00:23:18 is um we we work alongside the LRFS to um help them to think about the risk in their area but also to um answer questions if there are more questions about how does this work? What exactly does this mean? We are their bridge back
00:23:30 does this mean? We are their bridge back into central government uh in order to get more of those answers uh things answered. Um, also if there are key risks which other areas are working on,
00:23:41 risks which other areas are working on, we can make that bridge between the the two areas so that they can talk more about how they're approaching their particular risk and talk through that. So we're there to support them in a
00:23:53 So we're there to support them in a number of ways. It's not our decision what their final risk is. That's a local decision based on this information, but we're there to support them in the process. uh when you um provide this
00:24:04 process. uh when you um provide this support and are available for questioning by the uh London Resilience Forum in this particular example that I'm asking you about uh how how would that be done? Would that be done at local the London Resilience Forum
00:24:16 local the London Resilience Forum meetings that take place as we've heard from Mr. Heatherington three times a year I believe it was. Um risk is usually dealt with uh at a specific risk
00:24:27 usually dealt with uh at a specific risk meeting and a risk working group. And in London they do have uh a what they call LRAG which is the London risk uh I think assessment group and that works through
00:24:38 assessment group and that works through what risk for London might be and brings the practitioner level um expertise to looking at risk. Um and we engage with that process as well. Um attending those
00:24:51 that process as well. Um attending those meetings and um if there are clarifications to be made um we can help with that either directly in the meeting or obviously taking that information away speaking to cabinet office or
00:25:03 away speaking to cabinet office or others. So it could be another lead government department that actually owns that risk I think as as has has been discussed before and we can also reach back into other government departments
00:25:14 back into other government departments to get more understanding and bring those back. Um so it's it's at that level that that we specifically help with that support on risk. So, so could I just um clar clarify then the uh a
00:25:27 I just um clar clarify then the uh a resilience adviser for red somebody like yourself for example would attend the local the London resilience forum meetings would they? Yes, we we would we'd attend several kind of resilience forum meetings. So
00:25:39 kind of resilience forum meetings. So the executive level which is normally I think referred to as the London resilience forum which is where all the senior people red does attend there and it's usually my deputy director that
00:25:51 it's usually my deputy director that attends that supported um by um one of us in in the the London team within RED and you mentioned um the London Resilience Program Board earlier in your
00:26:02 Resilience Program Board earlier in your evidence and a subset of the London Resilience Program Board I believe is LRA Is that right? Yes, that's right. And we we attend both of of those.
00:26:14 You um mention in your statement, we don't need to go to it uh right away. Um about capabilities. Um can you assist us with what uh
00:26:27 Um can you assist us with what uh capabilities are? Do they inform risk? Um capabilities are um how you deal with risk. So if you um have a a risk so for
00:26:41 risk. So if you um have a a risk so for instance I mentioned east coast tidal surge for want of of picking one. So the risk there is that there will be uh a massive inundation of of water and
00:26:54 massive inundation of of water and people will need to be moved from their homes. So the capability that goes with that is evacuation and shelter. So it's the how you do the things that come out
00:27:06 the how you do the things that come out of the risk. So they don't they don't inform the risk as such. The risk informs what capabilities you might need. Um but what the uh what the risk
00:27:17 need. Um but what the uh what the risk also uh does is it um and there was there was mentioned the other day of planning assumptions. So alongside your risk, it's also what impact is that risk going to to have. So what what level
00:27:30 going to to have. So what what level does that mean? So in the example I've given you for east coast tidal surge um there are many thousands of people who might need to be evacuated. So therefore the the capabilities around that are how
00:27:43 the the capabilities around that are how do you evacuate these large number of of people? Do we have the capability to do that?
00:27:49 that? Right. Um well thank you for explaining that. um three of your colleagues who have provided um statements to the inquiry who were either resilience advisers or head of resilience themselves um have explained in their
00:28:01 themselves um have explained in their statements what capabilities they led on. Uh Lindakin says in her statement she led on evac evacuation and shelter. Uh Robert Mason, who as you've already told us was head of the emergencies ma
00:28:12 told us was head of the emergencies ma emergencies management at the time of the fire as well, uh says in his statement that he was responsible for specific risks owned by DCLG on the n national risk register such as the
00:28:23 national risk register such as the sudden influx of British nationals into the country. Uh and Kate Head in her statement says that she was responsible for a cluster of environmental capabilities such as extreme weather, animal disease, and plant disease. Uh
00:28:35 animal disease, and plant disease. Uh did you have a capability which you led on? Uh I did my uh I had two at that time. One was industrial action and the other was site clearance.
00:28:48 Can you help with how many capabilities there were? It's a very good question. Um I don't know specifically but there are and and
00:28:59 know specifically but there are and and now I'm I'm stretching somewhere in the region of 30. Um there is there is a list of them. Um but it's it's a number. Um and as you will have noticed from
00:29:11 Um and as you will have noticed from what you've read out, there's a difference between uh some of those capabilities which are um the things that we do to make things better. So the evacuation and shelter and some of the
00:29:23 evacuation and shelter and some of the items that you've uh talked about which is um more around the risk. So uh whether um industrial action was more around the the risk but then you how do
00:29:36 around the the risk but then you how do you deal with that? What does it look like? So there a variety of things all of which comes under our capability headings and would have had a lead within uh the division as uh expressed
00:29:48 within uh the division as uh expressed there.
00:29:49 there. Now I think you've answered this already um but did responsibility for those capabilities feed into the risk assessment work that red was involved in? It's it's parallel with it. So that
00:30:00 in? It's it's parallel with it. So that the risk is the what might happen and what's the likely impact and the capabilities. Look at that that impact and then how how you need to deal with
00:30:12 and then how how you need to deal with it, what abilities you need to have to deal with it. I'd like to turn to emergency planning next if I may. Um you say in your
00:30:23 next if I may. Um you say in your statement we don't need to go to it unless you'd like me to take you to it. Um, but prior to uh the 14th of June of 2017, your May day-to-day work involved attending meetings of LRFS and
00:30:35 attending meetings of LRFS and supporting LRF partners at a strategic level in their emergency planning duties. How did you support the London Resilience Forum with their emergency planning duties? Um as I've uh described
00:30:48 planning duties? Um as I've uh described already, this is uh through engagement either in their working groups such as the risk working group but um others including uh for instance their humanitarian assistance um evacuation
00:31:00 humanitarian assistance um evacuation and shelter. Um where they required central government input. Um a lot of the development work uh was done was done by local practitioners based on their intimate knowledge as emergency
00:31:12 their intimate knowledge as emergency planners about how things should be done. Our input was much more on um what the government aspect of that might be, what government guidance was, whether there was a likely change to legislation
00:31:23 there was a likely change to legislation that might affect um the way that they planned or um particular um aspects of of the way that they planned. Um and
00:31:35 of the way that they planned. Um and we would engage as I say in working groups but then we would also engage with the program board where there is an overview of all the the plans and the capabilities and there is a uh an
00:31:47 capabilities and there is a uh an operational discussion about how all of that works and again we bring uh central government information into that. uh sometimes we'll take away uh questions for that for other government
00:31:59 for that for other government departments to feed into that process and then ultimately um taking part in the executive level meeting which is uh termed the LRF meeting or the LRF exec
00:32:10 termed the LRF meeting or the LRF exec um which is where the strategic uh leaders get together to uh see the uh the information that's put to them on the work that's been done and either approve plans or ask for further work to
00:32:21 approve plans or ask for further work to be done and take the strategic forward view of how London resilience should be developed. I I would like to um drill a little uh deeper into that if I may. Um let's go
00:32:32 deeper into that if I may. Um let's go to your um first witness statement please. Page three at paragraph 10.
00:32:42 Um you say this um we assisted in particular in the formulation of multi- agency emergency plans and in the case of London pan London emergency plans.
00:32:54 of London pan London emergency plans. These are overarching plans for general emergency procedures and specific plans on capabilities such as mass fatalities, evacuation and shelter and flooding to either prevent or mitigate the impact of
00:33:07 either prevent or mitigate the impact of an incident. They are developed by working groups which involve representatives of category 1 uh responders including in London the London bursers. Um are you um referring
00:33:19 London bursers. Um are you um referring here when you talk about uh pan London emergency plans? Uh are are you are you saying that that's the same as multi- agency plans or are they something different? Um I think that uh sentence
00:33:31 different? Um I think that uh sentence was to describe both what we generally do with multi- agency plans when we consider the majority of LRFs and how that works through in London because uh London arrangements as you've already
00:33:42 London arrangements as you've already heard are slightly different to others because it's such a large area and you've got the um uh the local resilience forum which covers the area but you've also got burough resilience
00:33:54 but you've also got burough resilience forums as well. So it is more complicated than other areas. That's why I talked about the pan London plans. They are their multi- agency plans, but um they are done for a bigger area with
00:34:06 um they are done for a bigger area with more complexity than we might see in other areas. So that's why I put those two definitions here. So would this have included the humanitarian assistance framework for example?
00:34:16 example? Yes.
00:34:17 Yes. Uh and when you uh mentioned uh working groups, um was this the local authorities panel? Um I did also attend the local authorities panel but the local
00:34:28 authorities panel but the local authorities panel is not a working group. Um that's uh a separate and again strategic level group but that is specifically looking at local authority resilience issues rather than multi-
00:34:41 resilience issues rather than multi- agency resilience issues. Um and we attended their meetings again to provide information about what central Lond uh what central government was doing in the
00:34:52 what central government was doing in the same way that we did for the LRF executive meeting. Now you say here in your statement that we assisted in the formulation of multi- agency emergency plans. Uh how would a
00:35:04 agency emergency plans. Uh how would a resilience advisor for London assist in the formulation of overarching plans? in very much the way that I've described to you bringing that additional information, additional clarification,
00:35:17 information, additional clarification, um wider context and also helping with uh sharing. So um we will share between LRFS if one particular LRF has developed a plan which perhaps due to an exercise
00:35:30 a plan which perhaps due to an exercise or an emergency h has been proved to be either very effective or that they've had to make changes to. we will share that as well with uh resilience forums
00:35:41 that as well with uh resilience forums um to uh enable them in their planning too. So it's very much that kind of um supportive informative um and sharing role that we have.
00:35:52 um and sharing role that we have. Um you say in your statement also um that you did not approve any emergency plans. Is that correct? Yes.
00:35:58 Yes. Uh would anyone within RED approve any emergency plans? No.
00:36:03 No. Uh can you explain why that is? Um that's not how uh either the legislation, the regulations or the guidance were was set up. Um that was not the role that we were given. We were
00:36:14 not the role that we were given. We were given the role to support but it was for local resilience forums to um satisfy themselves uh through uh a multitude of of different support mechanisms that
00:36:26 of different support mechanisms that their plans were effective um as required.
00:36:33 required. So it would be the responsibility of the London Resilience Forum would it to approve their plans? Yes.
00:36:43 Um I'd like to um ask you next about review of plans. Um I appreciate there's a little bit of overlap between these areas, but I'm uh trying to unpick it as
00:36:54 areas, but I'm uh trying to unpick it as best we can. uh what involvement did DCLG red have in the three-year cycle review or of any review of pan London plans for that matter?
00:37:05 plans for that matter? Again, it really is very much as I described. So um in order to keep um plans current to make sure that they took account of um any any changes as I
00:37:17 took account of um any any changes as I said changes in legislation but also uh changes in uh local arrangements or any um information coming from uh real
00:37:28 um information coming from uh real events or exercises. Um a cycle of of relooking at plans uh was advised um and
00:37:39 relooking at plans uh was advised um and uh in general terms plans would be looked at um every every 3 years and we would take part in that process with the working groups. So, it's very much along the lines of how I've just described
00:37:52 the lines of how I've just described there are most LRFs have have plans for all of their uh risks and capabilities. So, what we would be doing now would be
00:38:04 So, what we would be doing now would be refreshing those. There aren't very many plans that are taken from scratch, never having been developed before. So, it it is very much as I've described already really.
00:38:16 really. Um, so RED wouldn't uh formulate plans. You said that they would assist. Yes, absolutely. We we assist um local resilience forums um and and partners
00:38:27 resilience forums um and and partners have their own emergency planners who are skilled in in this area. We bring that other dimension that um information from government and that reach back into
00:38:38 from government and that reach back into the departments and so red wouldn't approve any plans and they wouldn't review any plans. Is that right? Uh we wouldn't approve them and we wouldn't ask to re review them. We would
00:38:50 wouldn't ask to re review them. We would take part in the uh natural cycle of review that uh the LRF undertakes.
00:39:06 Do you um consider the role of the resilience advisor in the London resilience forum was effective? Yes, I think we brought um a lot of of
00:39:17 Yes, I think we brought um a lot of of support. We certainly brought um uh knowledge of what was happening elsewhere and we had that key role of being able to uh access other government
00:39:28 being able to uh access other government departments, ask questions, um bring information. So I I think it is was and is an effective role. I'd like to ask you and you've uh
00:39:40 I'd like to ask you and you've uh referred to it already. You've mentioned the burough resilience forum. At the time of the Grenfell Tower fire, was red involved at that BRF level? No.
00:39:49 No. Is it now? Um we engage with them on um particular set pieces that they do. Um so we uh if they have uh working days where they
00:40:01 they have uh working days where they will come together, we will go along um a so that obviously we can meet those involved so that they understand a bit more about what we do but also to um
00:40:12 more about what we do but also to um contribute on any particular key points that they might want um additional information on. For instance, most recently um one of my colleagues spoke
00:40:23 recently um one of my colleagues spoke to the um London uh Burough Resilience Forum chairs about the national strategy review. So since this change or can you tell us
00:40:35 So since this change or can you tell us when did this change take place? Um it's
00:40:41 it's it's been a gradual change but certainly after 2017 when we had more resourcing to enable us to engage more more widely uh it's been easier to um attend these
00:40:55 uh it's been easier to um attend these meetings.
00:40:58 So was this um after June 2017 or before it um
00:41:05 it um in terms of resourcing? In terms of resourcing, it was after was that uh resourcing addressed as a result of the fire or um a number of of issues. Um certainly
00:41:19 um a number of of issues. Um certainly 2017 as a whole as people will recall was a a very difficult year. Uh and uh there was a review of uh how well resourced we were to deal with uh that
00:41:32 resourced we were to deal with uh that number of emergencies. And so since the um gradual um infiltration of RED into the BRF level
00:41:43 infiltration of RED into the BRF level um how would you say it's been working in practice? Um well our our main form of uh involvement with London LRF is still through uh the main overarching multi-
00:41:57 through uh the main overarching multi- agency um format. Um I believe we do have more visibility um at at the local level not only through um
00:42:08 level not only through um th the kind of meetings that I've described to you but also also through attendance exercises um and uh we were attending burough some
00:42:19 um and uh we were attending burough some burough level exercises even prior to this and I I mention in my uh evidence that for instance uh the uh pandemic exercise.
00:42:29 exercise. Yes, I'm going to we're going to come on to that.
00:42:31 to that. I will preempt that then. Um that's a good good segue into um exercises. So these plans and these multi- agency plans, pan London plans that we've just been talking about, uh
00:42:42 that we've just been talking about, uh they would be tested, wouldn't they? Yes.
00:42:45 Yes. Um and red resilience advisers would take part in those tests or or exercises as well, wouldn't they? Yes.
00:42:52 Yes. Um I'd like to ask you about some of those exercises. you've just uh alluded to some of them. Um, if we can go to your second witness statement, please. That's CLG30739.
00:43:06 And if we could go to page two, paragraph 8, please.
00:43:14 Uh we can see here that you say I attended the major live exercise known as exercise unified response on the 29th of February to the 4th of March 2016
00:43:25 of February to the 4th of March 2016 which simulated a building collapse onto an underground station and trains in London. I was also involved in exercise signis. Is that how you say it? Yes. a national level tier 1 iie
00:43:36 Yes. a national level tier 1 iie involving ministers exercise that took place from the 18th to the 20th of October 2016 to test the UK's response to a pandemic influenza. I took part in
00:43:47 to a pandemic influenza. I took part in London's part of this exercise which included tabletop exercises at burough level across all London burs to test the pandemic influenza plans for London.
00:43:59 pandemic influenza plans for London. We're just um pausing there before I take you on to paragraph nine of your statement exercise unified response that you mentioned there in 2016. Uh what was your involvement in that exercise?
00:44:12 your involvement in that exercise? Um I was involved in some of the government input to the development alongside u my colleague who led for us at the time on London. Um and very
00:44:25 at the time on London. Um and very specifically I had an interest in this particular exercise in my uh lead on site clearance capability and we were developing or had developed at that time
00:44:36 developing or had developed at that time some new guidance for local partners. Um and one of the uh items that was tested out through this was the effectiveness of that guidance as it translated into
00:44:49 of that guidance as it translated into London's um framework. So did you take part in the live aspect? I did. Yes. Can you tell us how many members of RED attended to the best of your knowledge?
00:45:00 attended to the best of your knowledge? Um overall um we probably had about I think 10 of the team who had some involvement or other um we had uh two of
00:45:14 involvement or other um we had uh two of the leads in in London. So um they took a uh a major role particularly in what they call XCON which is the uh overall
00:45:26 they call XCON which is the uh overall um overview of the exercise and how well the exercise is working and um taking the part of the government liaison officer. Um but we also had others who took part in um
00:45:40 took part in um uh simulated uh operation cell side of things as as well. So there were I mean as say it's I I would say it was about that number because we had several
00:45:52 that number because we had several people moving in and out of the exercise. I didn't actually have a a list of how many did engage. Um you you mention here at paragraph 8 of your statement a tabletop exercise. It may be obvious, but c can you tell us
00:46:03 It may be obvious, but c can you tell us what that would involve? A tabletop exercise is sort of as it as it sounds. Um, you are uh given in you'll sit around a table, you're given information, and you talk through how
00:46:16 information, and you talk through how you might deal with that. So, you simulate it, but only using paper, not using actual people out doing it. And that can go from um as I say a a small
00:46:27 that can go from um as I say a a small discussion of what would we do next right through to using the papers to say right this is the scenario that's just happened I would be asking my team to do this how does this this work and
00:46:39 this how does this this work and actually testing plans in that way but it doesn't require um a whole setup and actual people doing the Would you be able to say how many of members of red attended that Um
00:46:53 members of red attended that Um the particular one that I'm referring to, the pandemic influenza one there, I I was our red representative for for that. Um if for a tabletop, it would be
00:47:04 that. Um if for a tabletop, it would be unusual to have more than one person from from red there because we don't we're not simulating lots of different roles.
00:47:11 roles. Uh we can see at paragraph nine of your statement, I was also involved in exercise safer city on the 12th of January and 9th of February 2017. Uh this tabletop exercise considered the
00:47:23 this tabletop exercise considered the effect on London of a severe weather event in category 1 and two and category 2 responders attended to identify key impacts and test the effectiveness of response plans in such a situation.
00:47:36 response plans in such a situation. What was your involvement in this test? again taking the government role that's usually what we do in any any kind of exercise is we simulate what we would do if this were the real thing. Um but also
00:47:49 if this were the real thing. Um but also it gives us the opportunity to uh bring that wider experience round around the table but it is very much trying to simulate what would happen in those
00:48:01 simulate what would happen in those those conditions if it were a real emergency. When you say government role, do you mean the government liaison officer role? And we we'll come on to that in due course. Are you able to say
00:48:12 that in due course. Are you able to say of this exercise safer city um exercise? Uh how many members of RED attended or was it you alone again? Um I believe that on one day I may have been there on my own, but I think on the
00:48:24 been there on my own, but I think on the other day I had another colleague with me. I'm not totally sure which colleague that was, but I think I had someone shadowing me for one of the other days.
00:48:35 shadowing me for one of the other days. Um, now your colleague Linda in her second statement, I wonder if we could go to that. That's CLG30742,
00:48:46 page 2, paragraph 7.
00:48:55 Uh she says this um the last resilience exercise involving local responders and government before the Grenfell Tower fire took place on 17th of May 2017. The
00:49:07 fire took place on 17th of May 2017. The exercise simulated a nuclear emergency. The exercise covered how to evacuate a population away from a nuclear leak, how to contain that leak, and how to ensure efficient communications with the rest
00:49:18 efficient communications with the rest of the country. It was an opportunity for RED to revise the MHCG emergency response plan. Um she then uh goes on to list uh three other members who attended
00:49:30 list uh three other members who attended or took part I should say in that exercise. Can we take it that you didn't?
00:49:35 didn't? No, this this one was actually based around Suffukk which is an area that Linda led on as resilience advisor. So um that was outside my area. So I wouldn't have attended that unless they
00:49:47 wouldn't have attended that unless they had needed additional support because we do work across teams as well when necessary obviously. Well, turning then to RED's own internal uh training. Um is it right that you were joint RED lead on
00:49:59 it right that you were joint RED lead on exercises and training capabilities with Lind Adakan? During that time that we were um on temporary promotion to head of resilience. Yes. At uh paragraph nine of this statement
00:50:12 At uh paragraph nine of this statement that we're looking at now. No, forgive me. The first Lindan's first witness statement. If we could go to CLG30419
00:50:22 please and page two paragraph nine.
00:50:31 Uh we can see there on the second line um the sentence starts training was delivered in multiple forms including formal induction training revision exercises in relation to the DCLG
00:50:43 exercises in relation to the DCLG emergency response plan and debriefs after RED responses to reflect on lessons learned. We also arranged RED training days, held training sessions within team meetings and ran a mentoring
00:50:54 within team meetings and ran a mentoring program. There were additionally mock resilience exercises where a simulated RED response uh were required. Do you agree with that list of training? Is there anything you would wish to add?
00:51:06 there anything you would wish to add? No. That that's fairly comprehensive covering of what we were doing. Is it right that members of RED were strongly encouraged to undertake voluntary training through the Emergency Planning College known as EPC?
00:51:19 Planning College known as EPC? It was an option that was uh open to us. Um and yes encouragement was given if there were particular courses there that people felt would enhance their
00:51:30 people felt would enhance their capability. Now did you undertake EPC training? Um I have uh undertaken one course with the EPC and I've also been a subject matter expert on another course with the
00:51:42 matter expert on another course with the EPC.
00:51:43 EPC. Uh your own training with the EPC. Can you recall what year that took place in? Uh
00:51:47 Uh actually that was that was very recent. Most of of my training prior to that was in-house training.
00:51:59 According uh to Katherine Richardson in her statement uh I I don't propose to take you to it but uh we've referred to it already. She said that at the time of the fire there were 30 employees of RED
00:52:12 the fire there were 30 employees of RED and she says that there were between 30 to 50 staff uh within RED. I I'd like to show you a a spreadsheet now. It's CAB3014793
00:52:26 and it's a spreadsheet of uh central government attendance at EPC training.
00:52:37 Now if we could go down to row 119 that's where we can see um DCLG
00:52:46 and we can see there um workshop supporting multi- agency risk assessment um 206th of uh February 2014 two
00:52:57 um 206th of uh February 2014 two attended. Can you see that? Yes. Um the next line on the next row 13th of May 2015 if we can go across slightly to the next column
00:53:08 slightly to the next column that's it we can see one attended. Yes.
00:53:11 Yes. And on the 29th of April of 2016 we can see one attended. Yes.
00:53:18 Yes. Um
00:53:20 Um so
00:53:22 so four people in in three years. Yes.
00:53:26 Yes. Considering attendance was strongly encouraged. Would you agree this was a rather poor uptake? It is low numbers. There were other um central training that was on offer as
00:53:38 central training that was on offer as well um which more staff would have taken up but yes it isn't a particularly high number. Do you consider that members of RED received adequate training at the time
00:53:49 received adequate training at the time of the fire? Yes, they um required training that um gave them an understanding of their roles and there was a lot of on the job
00:54:00 roles and there was a lot of on the job training at that time. Uh has the approach to training changed at all since uh 2017? Yes, we have taken uh a much more uh
00:54:13 Yes, we have taken uh a much more uh professionalized approach to our training. um much more structured um and that's something which um we are in the uh in the process of developing further
00:54:24 uh in the process of developing further um the work that Lynn and I did during this period was um was moving in that direction very much to make it a more structured process um than it had been
00:54:36 structured process um than it had been previously um but it has had variations over the years.
00:54:45 Um I'd like to um next turn to the emergency phase. We've spoken talk we've spoken about the pre-emergency phase that RED is involved in. I'd like to move to the emergency phase. Um RED's
00:54:57 move to the emergency phase. Um RED's role in an emergency is encapsulated in DCLG's emergency rep response plan and I'd like to turn to that now. CLG 405657
00:55:09 I'd like to turn to that now. CLG 405657 please.
00:55:17 Uh this plan is version uh 3.4 and we can see at the bottom it's dated June 2017. Was it therefore the version that was in place at the time of the fire?
00:55:28 was in place at the time of the fire? I believe so. Yes. Um could we turn to page 54 please?
00:55:35 Uh we can see here a diagram titled model of the reporting structures and roles within a full-scale operations center.
00:55:44 center. Um we can see um at the top of this diagram a a duty officer who then uses their judgment to consider presumably whether they notify the
00:55:55 presumably whether they notify the deputy director, the duty head of resilience or the head of the emergencies management team. And we can see there there's a number of actions that flow from that. Uh the most serious
00:56:07 that flow from that. Uh the most serious of which being resources insufficient to deal with the incident. Uh which then leads to the issue of an emergency notice. Can you see that? Yes.
00:56:14 Yes. And the issue of an emergency notice then leads to activation of an operation center. Can you see that? Yes. And we can see there at the bottom of the page the activation uh the
00:56:25 of the page the activation uh the operations center forgive me uh would comprise of a response director, a response manager, an operation center manager and then there are various there are four situation cells that we could
00:56:38 are four situation cells that we could there are four cells that we can see there. The first being a situation cell, second a policy cell, briefing cell, analysis cell. Uh uh they feed into um
00:56:49 analysis cell. Uh uh they feed into um government, central government. Would that be right? Yes.
00:56:53 Yes. Safe for sage. Um
00:56:57 Um yes. Uh so just to explain that I think the information from ourselves would be going into the briefing for for Cobra.
00:57:09 going into the briefing for for Cobra. We wouldn't provide information directly into Sage. um that that's done in a in a different way. Um now each of these um act each of
00:57:21 Um now each of these um act each of these cells that we can see here um has an action card um which is effectively a document that sets out the parameters of that particular cell. Is that right?
00:57:33 that particular cell. Is that right? Yes.
00:57:33 Yes. So by that I mean a situation cell would have an action card explaining what that situation cell is about. Yes. Uh we can go to page uh 22 please of this document. Uh and here
00:57:46 of this document. Uh and here we can see a list of roles and cells uh which have accompanying action cards. So we can see the response director um so on and so forth.
00:57:57 on and so forth. Uh when dealing uh with the response um
00:58:05 so I I will come on to deal with those action cards in more detail in due course when dealing with the actual response uh to the Granfell Tower fire which is where I'd like to now uh turn.
00:58:18 which is where I'd like to now uh turn. So on the uh 14th of June, you fulfilled the role of duty head of resilience, didn't you? I did. Yes. Uh there is no action card as we can see
00:58:29 Uh there is no action card as we can see on the screen in front of us um in in this emergency response plan for that role, is there? No, there isn't. Uh can you uh assist us with why that
00:58:40 Uh can you uh assist us with why that was? uh one hadn't been developed and in fact uh it has only very recently been developed um due to discussions about the fact that it was absent from our suite of documents.
00:58:51 suite of documents. You say that it's um only been done recently. Uh we're talking about events in 2017. Can you assist with why it's taken some time to come to fruition? Um my view on this is that the
00:59:05 Um my view on this is that the understanding at the time was that uh duty head of resilience because it was drawn from the regional head of resilience role that people within that role would would understand what they
00:59:17 role would would understand what they needed to do. Um that's my take of of why there there wasn't one there. Um but obviously we um we have considered that or our senior leadership team has
00:59:28 or our senior leadership team has considered that in more detail recently and one has been developed. Can I take it by the development of one now that uh there's an acceptance that there should have been one at the time of the fire? I think we all agree it would be
00:59:40 I think we all agree it would be helpful. Yes. Um now that uh on the night of the fire, it was your first night fulfilling this role, wasn't it? It was.
00:59:53 Did the absence of an action card um considering this was your first night in that role hinder you in navigating your role at all? I don't believe so. Um I had a lot of
01:00:04 I don't believe so. Um I had a lot of experience of working with duty heads of resilience. I'd been a duty officer myself on many many occasions um and I had seen the the role that they performed and what they did. Um so I I
01:00:17 performed and what they did. Um so I I don't believe it held me back. Um I would comment that someone coming new into that role having a piece of paper is always useful. It's reassuring. Um but I didn't feel that I was lacking in
01:00:30 but I didn't feel that I was lacking in the knowledge that I needed to undertake the role.
01:00:33 the role. So we have already established at the start of your evidence that at the time of the fire you'd been a resilience adviser for about 5 and a half years subject to um the temporary promotion
01:00:44 subject to um the temporary promotion role that you undertook. Yes. Um what training did you receive for this specific duty head um duty head of resilience that that you that role that you played that evening?
01:00:55 you played that evening? I had no specific uh training other than as I've explained observing and working with others
01:01:10 in your um first uh statement. Uh we can take you to it now. CLG1309725
01:01:19 page 4 paragraph 14.
01:01:28 Um you say there right at the bottom of the paragraph it's the the last two lines. I had worked on over a 100 emergencies before Grenfell. This had included acting as a GLLO, a glow I
01:01:39 included acting as a GLLO, a glow I believe, uh when there were floods in Surrey in 2014, working as an operations center manager during the migrant crisis at Cala in 2015, and working in the operations center during the Manchester
01:01:51 operations center during the Manchester and London Bridge attacks in 2017. Is that right? Yes, it is. How many times had you acted as a globe before?
01:02:02 before? Um I
01:02:05 Um I I couldn't tell you precisely a significant number both um as uh dialing in as a duty officer and undertaking the government leaison officer role there
01:02:17 government leaison officer role there and uh in my own region and in in other regions as well but I've never actually added that up. Now, in line with the emergency response
01:02:28 Now, in line with the emergency response plan, there were also two duty officers who were on duty that night. Is that right?
01:02:33 right? Yes.
01:02:34 Yes. Uh, one of those duty officers was Denise Welch. Is that right? Yes, it is. Um, had you worked with her before? Yes. Um, I'd worked with Denise since she joined Red.
01:02:45 she joined Red. How would you describe her level of experience as of June 2017? Um, she was uh very experienced. She had been involved as a government liaison officer in a number of emergencies, some
01:02:58 officer in a number of emergencies, some of them quite significant and uh most recently to this she had been one of the duty officers uh on duty on the night of the Manchester Rena bombing.
01:03:09 the Manchester Rena bombing. So at the um time of the fire, Miss Welch had been a number a member of RED, forgive me, for just over three years. Would you agree with that? Yes. Um she says in her statement and
01:03:23 Yes. Um she says in her statement and let's go to it. Um CLG30737
01:03:28 please if we can go to page three and paragraph 12
01:03:39 the third line down. My first ever week as a red duty officer was during uh storm Desmond in December 2015 where there were significant flooding impacts
01:03:50 there were significant flooding impacts in Cumbria and Lanasher. I performed the role of GLOW as well as providing support to the weekend operations center. I was also on duty for the Manchester Arena bombing in May 2017
01:04:02 Manchester Arena bombing in May 2017 working through the night as part of a duty team to pull together the latest situation updates to hand over to the red operations center in the morning. Further, I was deployed as a government liaison officer following the London
01:04:13 liaison officer following the London Bridge attack in June 2017. Um, so the first time she held a duty officer role was in December 2015. Is that right?
01:04:24 that right? Yes.
01:04:25 Yes. And so at the time of the fire, the her experience spanned a year and a half. Would you agree with that? As a duty officer, yes, I would agree with that.
01:04:36 with that. Um, Miss Welch uh outlines here two occasions where she performed the role as a glow. And uh if we go to paragraph 11, please let's go up slightly. Um she
01:04:50 11, please let's go up slightly. Um she says it's a last sentence at paragraph 11. At the time of the Grenfell Tower fire, I had been a resilience adviser for around uh 9 months. Can you see
01:05:02 for around uh 9 months. Can you see that?
01:05:02 that? Yes. Um, considering these matters, so far as you were concerned, do you still believe that she was an experienced duty officer?
01:05:11 officer? She was she'd had uh a lot of involvement in some quite crucial incidents and had dealt with them very well.
01:05:20 well. Do you consider she was an experienced glow?
01:05:24 glow? Um, yes. Um I I guess my my answer to the the previous question would be the same.
01:05:35 be the same. Let's go to um paragraph 14 of her statement please. It's just uh further down this page. Um she says this. At the time of the fire, there was no specific
01:05:47 time of the fire, there was no specific training for red duty officers. Before my first duty shift in December 2015, I arranged to run through the duty officer action card with an experienced
01:05:59 officer action card with an experienced colleague to ensure I fully understood the role. The action card set out practical information such as how to transfer the duty number to your phone and how to automatically forward emails
01:06:11 and how to automatically forward emails sent to red control to your own inbox as well as providing an overview of the duty officer's responsibilities both during normal business hours and out of office hours. Um can you assist with why
01:06:24 office hours. Um can you assist with why that was the case that Miss Welch didn't have training? We didn't at that time have a formal duty officer training um package that that we rolled out to duty
01:06:36 package that that we rolled out to duty officers. Uh there was uh general training on uh government liaison uh expectations and what that role would
01:06:47 expectations and what that role would involve which was developed by some of my of my colleagues prior to Linda and I taking on this but not a specific duty officer one. Uh the description that we can see here
01:06:58 Uh the description that we can see here that Miss Welch gives an informal read through appears to be rather basic. Would you agree with that? Yes. And that's something which we've done a lot since then to uh
01:07:12 done a lot since then to uh to improve. Uh and we now have a specific duty officer training program. Can you assess assist with whether Miss Welch received training as a GLOW?
01:07:23 Welch received training as a GLOW? Um
01:07:25 Um I
01:07:27 I can't say specifically. I know that glow training was available at the time that um Miss Welsh was was working with us. I don't recall whether she was on one of those courses or not.
01:07:39 those courses or not. Would you agree that there was a lack of specific training for the duty officer role at the time of the Grenell Tower fire?
01:07:45 fire? Yes, I would agree with that. And would you agree that that's deficient? Uh at the time, yes, I would agree. Uh turning to the action card for her role that morning then please if we
01:07:57 role that morning then please if we could um go back to CLG 40 5657 please at page 44
01:08:14 we can see there at the top uh this is the red duty officer action card. Is that right? Yes. Uh and it says role. You are the initial contact between DCLG and other
01:08:25 initial contact between DCLG and other organizations for developing incidents and the route through which incidents are escalated to senior staff. You will be on call throughout your duty officer period involving including being
01:08:38 period involving including being available outside of normal working hours to receive telephone calls and undertake a range of duties. You will be expected to dial into strategic coordinating groups as government liaison officer, dial into
01:08:50 liaison officer, dial into teleconferences relating to LRF preparedness activity for rising tide emergencies and be prepared to provide ministers, senior management, resilience and emergencies division, RED and lead
01:09:01 and emergencies division, RED and lead government departments with situation reports on the local consequences of emergencies. You may also be required to provide briefing for ministers, senior officials for any crossgovernment
01:09:12 officials for any crossgovernment discussions which are arranged out of normal working hours. Uh does that uh summarize to your knowledge the role of the red duty officer?
01:09:24 officer? Uh yes, as as it was then. Uh moving on to um the first notification then. Uh Miss Welch was first contacted by the Cabinet Office
01:09:35 first contacted by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingency Secretariat about the fire. Is is that right? Yes, that's right. Uh you received a telephone call from her at 3:30 on the 14th of June. Is that
01:09:47 her at 3:30 on the 14th of June. Is that right?
01:09:47 right? Yes.
01:09:48 Yes. Um you say at paragraph 23 of your first witness statement, we don't need to go to it unless you'd like me to take you to it. um that you asked her to speak to the home office duty fire officer to ask
01:10:00 the home office duty fire officer to ask for further information. Is that right? Yes.
01:10:03 Yes. Uh and we can see here an email. I'd like to take you to CLG 48000.
01:10:13 If we could go to page three, please
01:10:20 towards the um bottom of the page after the uh press test banner, uh an email on the 14th of June at 4:29 from David
01:10:31 the 14th of June at 4:29 from David Norris of the Home Office. Uh the inquiry has received evidence from the home office confirming that Mr. Norris was the fire duty officer that night. Is that your understanding? It is. Yes. Uh, and he says in this
01:10:43 It is. Yes. Uh, and he says in this email at 4:29, "All with thanks to Denise Welch in red, I've just been informed of a significant fire in in a 24story high-rise
01:10:54 fire in in a 24story high-rise residential tower, Grenfell Tower, Latimer Road, West London.
01:11:01 Uh, we can then, uh, go down at page four. We can see an email at 4:13
01:11:11 sent by Miss Welch to the home office fire duty officer uh where she advises him of it. Uh just to confirm then was the first
01:11:23 Uh just to confirm then was the first time so far as your your understanding is concerned was the first time a fire a fire duty officer of the home office was aware of the fire was when Red informed them. As far as I'm aware, yes. Uh
01:11:35 them. As far as I'm aware, yes. Uh would you have expected them to be aware before read? They often are. Um given their role in fire, they are um there is an
01:11:46 fire, they are um there is an expectation um that they are informed of any fires of note and we quite often get our notification about fires directly from them. Um so it is less usual that
01:12:00 from them. Um so it is less usual that it is this way around.
01:12:05 Um, I'd like to uh ask you next about contact with London Resilience. If we could go to your first witness statement, uh, page seven at paragraph 24, please.
01:12:25 Uh, we can see here at paragraph 24, you say, I rang the London resilience team. Uh, just pausing there. The inquiry has heard about uh the London Resilience Group, which used to be known as the London Resilience Team. Can we take it
01:12:37 London Resilience Team. Can we take it that this is the London Resilience Group?
01:12:39 Group? Yes.
01:12:40 Yes. Um and they confirmed that a major incident had been declared and there would be an SCG at around 5:00 a.m. I asked Denise to dial in in her capacity as duty officer undertaking the GLOW
01:12:53 as duty officer undertaking the GLOW role. Uh can you recall with whom you spoke at the London Resilience Group? I can't recall and I I didn't have anything specifically, but in my mind
01:13:06 anything specifically, but in my mind I'm thinking it's Matt Hogan, but I'm not at this point completely sure. The inquiry has heard evidence that Matthew Hogan was the London Resilience duty manager that evening uh and Toby
01:13:18 duty manager that evening uh and Toby Gould was the strategic adviser. Uh does that assist your recollection? Yes, that that seems reasonable. Then uh what was your per what was the purpose of your call to the London Resilience Group?
01:13:29 Group? um was to get any further information and to understand if an SCG was going to be held and therefore whether uh we could attend and uh understand more about uh what was taking place and um
01:13:43 about uh what was taking place and um how things were progressing. Um I would add that again with the point about um the uh hearing from the fire duty officer, it is more normal that we
01:13:56 duty officer, it is more normal that we would also hear about an event in London from the the London uh resilience group particularly of this uh nature. Um so this was obviously the other way round
01:14:09 this was obviously the other way round to how it often is. So it was unusual that you had not heard directly from the London Resilience Group for for this scale of emergency. Yes.
01:14:21 Well, I'm about to move on to a topic that is not going to be quick. I know it's a little early, but it might be in a a convenient moment to have a break now.
01:14:31 now. It's not particularly early and it's certainly convenient. So, we'll do that. Uh, Mr. McManus, we have a break during the morning and uh, this is obviously a good time to take it. So, we'll stop now. We'll resume, please, at 11. And I
01:14:45 now. We'll resume, please, at 11. And I have to ask you on this and other occasions when you leave the room while you're giving evidence, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it. All right. Thank you very much. Would you go with the usher, please?
01:15:06 Thank you very much. How fast 11 then please
01:31:54 [Music] would you ask Miss McManus to come back in please? Thank you.
01:32:07 Right,
01:32:14 Mr. Manners, ready to carry on now? Yes, thank you. Thank you. Yes, Matra, just before the break, uh, Miss McManus, we were talking about events in the early hours of the 14th of June. Uh, and
01:32:26 early hours of the 14th of June. Uh, and we've spoken about, uh, Miss Welch who first notified you, uh, and who then went on to notify the home office fire duty officer. Um, is it right to say
01:32:37 duty officer. Um, is it right to say that you appointed Miss Welch as the government liaison officer, the GLOW, uh, for the 5:00 SCG that morning? I did.
01:32:46 I did. Was there any reason why you asked Miss Welch to assume this role rather than assuming it yourself? Uh, it is usual for the duty officer to take that role rather than for the head
01:32:57 take that role rather than for the head of resilience to take that role. I did have a discussion with her to make sure that she was um content to do that that she felt comfortable in doing it and she did. Um and as I say that is the normal
01:33:11 did. Um and as I say that is the normal procedure that we would take.
01:33:15 Could I just clarify one matter? Is it ordinarily the case that a resilience advisor uh would only be uh someone who would be suitable for a glow role or
01:33:26 would be suitable for a glow role or could anybody working uh within RED who wasn't a resilience adviser assume the uh responsibility of being a GLOW? Uh anybody within RED who undertakes the
01:33:37 Uh anybody within RED who undertakes the role of a duty officer um is um suitable to undertake that glow role. Uh, and that's our expectation out of ours that they will do that.
01:33:50 ours that they will do that. Um, I'd like to take you um to your first witness statement, please, at page 23, paragraph 95.
01:34:07 We can see here you say the following. The focus of our role in red is the collection and sharing of information and to this end the operation center is set up. We are not emergency responders.
01:34:19 set up. We are not emergency responders. Globes are not based at the scene of the emergency but remotely with other gold responders at the strategic command center. Our role to provide strategic information and signpost as necessary
01:34:30 information and signpost as necessary where the responder organizations can get wider help and support. Glows obtain relevant information from SCGs. Uh you say here that glows are not sent
01:34:42 Uh you say here that glows are not sent to the scene. Can you explain why that is the case? Um when uh the operations for an emergency are set up, the gold
01:34:56 emergency are set up, the gold um operations, so the strategic coordinating group is usually at a designated center um which is called the uh strategic coordination center which
01:35:08 uh strategic coordination center which is set up specifically um to um provide the support necessary for all of those strategic leaders who are coming together. Um it is uh normal
01:35:21 are coming together. Um it is uh normal for the people at the the level below so the silver level to either be with them or more colloccated to the uh emergency but at that gold level at the strategic
01:35:33 but at that gold level at the strategic level it is not on the scene of the emergency. So would a globe be considered gold level?
01:35:41 level? Yes.
01:35:46 Um it makes reference here to a strategic coordination center uh in your um statement. A strategic command center, forgive me. Um is that the same
01:35:57 center, forgive me. Um is that the same as a special operations room or is that something different? Right. Special operations room is something specific to London and to the Metropolitan Police. It's what they call their center near Lambbeath um where
01:36:09 their center near Lambbeath um where they um bring together people. It's mainly for metropolitan police service um uh arrangements but has the facility to have multi- agency there too. So it
01:36:22 to have multi- agency there too. So it it's a very specific London name. Um but um in to all intents and purposes the um sor as they call it strategic operations
01:36:34 sor as they call it strategic operations room has tended to be the strategic um coordination center. And was that the case uh in the response to the Granfell Tower fire? Yes, it was.
01:36:46 Yes, it was. And would there be capacity and the facility for a GLOW to attend the saw? Yes. And uh in um at a later point, we
01:36:57 Yes. And uh in um at a later point, we did uh deploy a glow specifically down there.
01:37:01 there. So, Miss Welch was first notified of the fire at around 3:30. That's right, isn't it?
01:37:06 it? Yes. Uh the first SCG took place at 5. Uh would it be fair to say that there was a window of opportunity for her to attend Saul? uh there was and I thought through that
01:37:18 uh there was and I thought through that at the time. It is not normal for our duty officers to travel partly due to practicalities because our duty officers can be covering any part of the country but also uh because of the nature of uh
01:37:32 but also uh because of the nature of uh what they're they're doing and the fact that it's it's a small team covering um at that that point. Dialing in is the most effective and the quickest way. And as you'll see from my um uh my evidence
01:37:46 as you'll see from my um uh my evidence as well, I also considered that traveling uh into London at that that time of the morning was not um a a sensible thing to be asking um the uh
01:37:57 sensible thing to be asking um the uh government leazison officer to do. Uh would you accept that there are advantages to being present and having face-to-face communication with other members of the SCG in and out of the meeting?
01:38:07 meeting? Yes, I would accept that. Um, let's go to the department's emergency plan again, please. Uh, and that's at CLG45657.
01:38:18 If we could go to page 40, please. And it's the action card again for the duty officer. Oh, forgive me. The government liaison officer role.
01:38:33 The government liaison officer action card. It says there in the heading deployed to a strategic coordination co strategic coordination center. It then goes on to say for the role you
01:38:45 It then goes on to say for the role you have been deployed as government liaison officer to a strategic coordination center and S sec SEC. Your role is to support the local and national emergency management arrangements before during
01:38:58 management arrangements before during and after an emergency by providing a government presence at the local level. You will attend strategic coordinating groups SCG meetings and will act as a
01:39:09 groups SCG meetings and will act as a single point of contact through which communications to and from central government flow. It then goes on to say in the penultimate paragraph there the final line. You may also need to prepare
01:39:21 final line. You may also need to prepare the SCG chair for dialing into a COBRA meeting to update ministers directly. In the blue banner we can see there it says before departure uh make sure you
01:39:33 says before departure uh make sure you have with you your laptop, Blackberry, so on and so forth. It then goes on to say at the second uh bullet point confirm the location of the SEC depending on the location of the
01:39:44 depending on the location of the incident. It may be it may not be established in the usual place. It then goes to give advice on arrival. Uh you should introduce yourself to the SCG chair so on and so forth.
01:39:58 chair so on and so forth. Uh would you agree that this um action card for the GLOW role as we can see in the title and as we've seen set out here is based on a scenario where physical
01:40:09 is based on a scenario where physical deployment would take place to the SEC. Absolutely. Yes. That that's always the preference when you are um taking part as government lea excuse me as a
01:40:22 as government lea excuse me as a government liaison officer to be there in person. It's a slightly different um case when we are dealing with duty officers um because as I've explained
01:40:35 officers um because as I've explained duty officers are working out of hours um often covering areas of the country that they are um not in or not familiar with. Um
01:40:49 with. Um and this is specifically talking about the government liaison role in general terms.
01:40:55 terms. Yes. which you had appointed Miss Welch to be for the 5:00 SCG. Is that right? Yes.
01:41:00 Yes. So this is the role that she was fulfilling at that time. Yes.
01:41:03 Yes. A role where it was envisaged she would be deployed to the SEC. Um if I could explain further um that is the uh first default is uh to be
01:41:14 the uh first default is uh to be deployed. It is perfectly common for us to ring in as government liaison officers remotely. This is done on many occasions and certainly by duty officers
01:41:26 occasions and certainly by duty officers that is the most normal way of doing it. If it looks like it's going to be a projected incident, we would definitely um look to have a government leaison officer there. Um and that is a role
01:41:40 officer there. Um and that is a role most usually taken on by the resilience adviser for that area. Could I invite you to look at Katherine Richardson's first witness statement, please? CLG30412.
01:41:54 And if we could go to page uh 27, paragraph 105 of her statement.
01:42:04 Uh she says the following. I have also thought long and hard about whether the department could have done more sooner. For example, should RED have had people on the ground immediately following the fire to gauge the adequacy of the local
01:42:16 fire to gauge the adequacy of the local response? In truth, in almost all cases, local responders have effective emergency response plans and are able to ensure that emergency relief is properly managed. In those cases, central
01:42:28 managed. In those cases, central interface can negatively affect central interference. I think that's the interfer, forgive me, central interference can negatively affect the local response. I can see that in
01:42:39 local response. I can see that in retrospect it would have been better if a glow had been physically deployed to the scene earlier to get a better understanding of what was going on and what was needed. I do not think that I
01:42:50 what was needed. I do not think that I or the department would necessarily have done anything differently. We had not dealt with a disaster of this scale in living memory and even an experienced red globe present on the ground would have struggled in the first few days to
01:43:01 have struggled in the first few days to have distinguished between the sort of chaos that would ordinarily be expected following a major disaster and chaos caused by poor organization. Furthermore, for the reasons I explain
01:43:12 Furthermore, for the reasons I explain above, I do not think it would always be beneficial to have observers on the ground. However, following the series of incidents in 2017, including the Grenfell Tower fire, RED officials are
01:43:23 Grenfell Tower fire, RED officials are now urgently physically deployed to the site of an emergency whenever it is considered appropriate. In addition, since the Grenfell Tower fire, the Globe's role in identifying signs of
01:43:34 Globe's role in identifying signs of overstretch in a local response has been uh formalized.
01:43:41 Could I just um clarify one matter with you then? Uh as Miss uh Richardson says in her statement here, the current position or the current position before she left uh DCLG Red uh was that a glow
01:43:57 she left uh DCLG Red uh was that a glow was not only uh deployed to the strategic coordination center but is now physically deploy deployed to the scene of an incident. Have I understood that right?
01:44:07 right? No. So if I could clarify on that, I think when um Katherine is referring to the site of an emergency, she means the area in which the emergency is happening. So for instance, she is talking about Ssbury, she is talking
01:44:19 talking about Ssbury, she is talking about wherever that might be at the um strategic coordinating center. We would not send a glow actually down to the the scene of an emergency. Um, it's not our
01:44:32 scene of an emergency. Um, it's not our role to be there as a responder and we would get in in the way because someone would feel that they needed to take care of us. Our role is to be round that table having those discussions. Um,
01:44:45 table having those discussions. Um, absolutely her point about face to face makes makes a huge difference, but she's not actually referring to being at a crash site or being she's talking about the area in which the emergency is
01:44:57 the area in which the emergency is taking place. And so, um, having seen what Miss Richardson says in her statement, uh, have you since reflected, uh, that deployment of the blow at that early
01:45:08 deployment of the blow at that early stage to the SEC at saw, uh, would have been beneficial in order for DCLG RED to have eyes on the ground as it were. I have reflected on this um and I think
01:45:20 I have reflected on this um and I think that um certainly what I would have considered would have been helpful at that point is if there had been any indication that actually things were not
01:45:33 indication that actually things were not going in in the direction that they should have been that we would have brought in people earlier possibly with the intention of sending someone down to the strategic coordination center. Um
01:45:46 the strategic coordination center. Um and I have I have thought that through. The indications we had at that time didn't bring me to that conclusion on the night. We've discussed the role of uh Miss
01:45:57 We've discussed the role of uh Miss Welch, the first duty officer. Um who was the second duty officer? Um Jose Espanra. Uh did you call upon uh him to assist?
01:46:09 Uh did you call upon uh him to assist? Um I didn't. At the time we were tracking uh one major meeting the SCG but it was always possible that other meetings such as mass fatality meetings
01:46:20 meetings such as mass fatality meetings could be called. Equally it's also possible that we could have had uh concurrent incidents called in. So engaging both
01:46:31 engaging both of the duty officers at that time didn't seem to to be sensible. And as you'll see in my evidence, I felt that it was was worth giving him the opportunity to
01:46:42 was worth giving him the opportunity to sleep on for a while and therefore be fresher for the um for the morning and for whatever support would be needed then.
01:46:50 then. And for completeness, we can see that at CLG30445
01:46:58 and email that you sent at 5:25 that morning. Denise is on London call currently. Nothing for you to do currently. So,
01:47:09 Nothing for you to do currently. So, hope you get some sleep. Is that right? That's right.
01:47:15 Now, in your um first witness statement, forgive me if we can go back to that again. Uh page seven, paragraph uh 22, please.
01:47:29 Uh we can see there at the uh very final sentence of paragraph 22 you say this. On seeing the footage I immediately recognize the seriousness of the
01:47:40 recognize the seriousness of the incident. Appreciating the severity of the incident as you express here in your witness statement. Did you consider the additional support uh would have been of assistance at this early stage of the
01:47:52 assistance at this early stage of the response? My thinking was still as I described to you. Um, and in recognizing the seriousness of the incident, we do get uh calls on uh a number of incidents
01:48:05 get uh calls on uh a number of incidents including fires um which um don't necessarily uh require our uh intervention or or support. Um, it was clear to me that
01:48:18 support. Um, it was clear to me that this was not one of those fires, that this was one where an SCG would be called and that we would need to know more about what was going on and would need to communicate that and offer
01:48:29 need to communicate that and offer support.
01:48:33 Did you consider asking Miss Welch to remotely attend the SCG meeting at 5 and perhaps deploying the second duty officer uh to the SEC? Uh I I didn't think uh of doing that
01:48:46 Uh I I didn't think uh of doing that because my main aim for the first SCG was to get an understanding of what was going on to see what might be the next step. Uh and certainly one of the next
01:48:57 step. Uh and certainly one of the next steps that might have been open to me if it looked like things were not uh in any sense under control would have been to escalate that further, ring Katherine Richardson, possibly bring in others and
01:49:10 Richardson, possibly bring in others and possibly think about deployment. Can you assist us with when a GLOW was deployed to the SEC? Um I I can't I'm afraid it's when I was no longer on
01:49:22 afraid it's when I was no longer on duty. So I'm not specifically sure when when that did happen.
01:49:28 Um I'd like to ask you next about your communication with the wider red team. In terms of information sharing, we can see here at CLG30446
01:49:41 uh an email that you sent
01:49:50 It's an email you sent at 5:55.
01:50:08 It's CLG 3030446.
01:50:14 That's right. Um, it's an email that you sent at 5:55 to Redd uh Katherine Richardson, the department's executive team and minister's offices providing details of
01:50:25 minister's offices providing details of the incident. Um, now you were made aware of the fire at 3:30. Was this your first communication to the department's executive team and minister's office?
01:50:36 executive team and minister's office? Um, I believe it was. I can't be absolutely certain, but I believe it was. Can you assist us with why there was or was there any reason why you waited until 5:55 to email them?
01:50:48 waited until 5:55 to email them? Uh no. Uh well, yes. Um gathering the information necessary. I was also um making phone calls during this time. um speaking obviously to the London
01:50:59 speaking obviously to the London Resilience Group and others and considering what was the uh the right information to put forward
01:51:09 in this email we can see if we go down the page slightly under issues for DCLG um it says the following you wrote the following fire policy is now a home
01:51:20 following fire policy is now a home officer uh responsibility however DCLG um build regulation colleague
01:51:27 colleague will have policy interest in this incident. Parallels are being drawn in the media to the fire at Lacanel House Tower Block in Campberwell, London in 2009.
01:51:41 Uh these were the issues um that were identified and highlighted to ministers and senior management at DCLG. Uh fire safety, focus on lacanol. Uh there was at no stage uh reference here to the
01:51:53 at no stage uh reference here to the recovery effort, was there? Uh no, at at this stage though uh we do look at recovery very uh very early on. Um my focus was on ensuring that those
01:52:05 focus was on ensuring that those colleagues who might need to contribute to any wider briefing um or any understanding of the situation were were flagged up. Um
01:52:17 flagged up. Um and I I didn't at this point uh speak about recovery. Can you assist us with why that was? Um, well, these were the things that
01:52:29 Um, well, these were the things that struck me at the time that needed uh focus. But in addition to these um you have evidence of uh phone calls that I made in in the I was going to say early
01:52:41 made in in the I was going to say early morning, but it was slightly later early morning. So around about 8:00 uh to uh building uh uh regulations colleagues but also to building safety colleagues
01:52:53 but also to building safety colleagues but also to colleagues in housing um to um put them on notice that this had happened and to give consideration and that was our first step into what
01:53:05 that was our first step into what recovery might involve and might and we'll come on to those um slightly later emails in a moment. Um but we can see here if we um seven lines up from
01:53:18 see here if we um seven lines up from the bottom of the email uh reference to two rest centers.
01:53:26 Can you see that? If we go to the email at 613 please. So if we go up the page,
01:53:36 forgive me. If we go to CLG30447,
01:53:43 it's the next in the sequence.
01:53:50 There's an email here at 6:13 that we can see um and at the top it's from uh Miss Welch uh to MHCLG Red um at 613. Um
01:54:03 Miss Welch uh to MHCLG Red um at 613. Um and seven lines up from the bottom of that uh can you see where it says two rest centers have been opened. Local authority LA is that what LA stands for? Yes.
01:54:12 Yes. Uh did not have their locations and a further three premises have been have opened their doors to evacuees. Uh was this a concern at the time?
01:54:25 Uh was this a concern at the time? Um actually it was a it was a very positive note at the time the fact that rest centers were being opened uh that there were um other premises that being made available in the very beginning of
01:54:38 made available in the very beginning of of an emergency when uh evacuation is necessary. Um quite often um what those responding and particularly the police who are responsible for uh the the cord
01:54:49 who are responsible for uh the the cord and what they do is they find an appropriate building in order to move people in. And that's what's called a um a survivor u reception center. And then
01:55:01 a survivor u reception center. And then as um as things move forward then the designated rest centers which the local authority will have in their area will be opened up in order that people can
01:55:12 be opened up in order that people can come for longer term uh support. So, um, this this to me was a positive sign that people were on the ground, that they were making the arrangements that needed
01:55:23 were making the arrangements that needed to be made. And though we didn't have the names of their locations, to be honest, in the first SCG, that's not uncommon um because that's a a level of operational detail that we don't always
01:55:35 operational detail that we don't always have. we ask for it and uh you'll see in the the later report we do have that information but that's often something that is not initially available. Did you know that uh David Kerry the
01:55:48 Did you know that uh David Kerry the contingency planning manager um who represented the RBKC at the SCG at 5:00? Did you know him uh from your work with the London Resilience Forum?
01:55:59 the London Resilience Forum? Um I don't think I knew him uh particularly well. I may well have have met him at meetings. I do meet quite a lot of people at at meetings, but I don't specifically remember.
01:56:11 don't specifically remember. I'd like to move on to your um correspondence then with the fire duty officer, David Norris. If we could go to CLG40's
01:56:20 CLG40's 8000. It's an email that we've uh seen before, but I'd like to take you to page two on this occasion.
01:56:32 [Music] at 6:30. We can see here uh you emailed uh him.
01:56:43 Yes. and uh you provide him uh the readout that had been circulated by Miss Welch at five of the 5:00 SCG to which he
01:56:54 at five of the 5:00 SCG to which he responded asking you if we can go up to page one at the very bottom at 6:48.
01:57:05 So we go down to the bottom, we can see the can can you see that the final email on the page 648. Um, what would what would be your sense of CCS interest here given sensitivities around London? Could
01:57:17 given sensitivities around London? Could they call a Cobra?
01:57:21 And if we uh
01:57:25 we can see your response. If we go up at 6:50,
01:57:32 you say, "Not sure. Maybe a home secretary meeting. I will ask CCS." Did you ask the CCS? Um, I suspect I did. I don't have any
01:57:44 Um, I suspect I did. I don't have any evidence one way or the other and I I don't actually recall at this point. Can you recall who you spoke to within the CCS?
01:57:53 the CCS? As I I can't recall whether I did or not. No,
01:57:58 not. No, the the main point of contact that I had uh within CCS during that night was Stuart Waywright and he and I did speak on several occasions, but whether it
01:58:09 on several occasions, but whether it would have been him that I would have raised this with, I don't know. Uh you can't recall any details of the conversation with whether or not there was discussion about Cobra or a home
01:58:21 was discussion about Cobra or a home office secretary meeting? No.
01:58:28 I'd like to move uh to an email next that you received uh from the office of Joe Farah at 705. That's CLG42860.
01:58:47 And we can see at the middle of the page here at 7:05,
01:58:56 uh,
01:58:59 it's the middle of page two.
01:59:06 the email at 7:05. Can you see that? Yes.
01:59:10 Yes. Um, and what uh is being asked here, what it says here is, "Thanks, Jill. I presume we will also be involved in any recovery issues. We are due to brief the
01:59:22 recovery issues. We are due to brief the Secretary of State is that this morning on another issue, but uh we can make sure he is updated as well.
01:59:34 If we can then uh move on. Well, let me ask you this whilst we're here at this email. Um I presume we will be involved in any recovery issues. Uh what did you
01:59:45 in any recovery issues. Uh what did you understand uh her to mean uh as lead government department for recovery on um specifically uh issues to do with the built environment and those that involve uh uh local government. uh
01:59:59 that involve uh uh local government. uh that's what I took it uh to mean in her inquiry and and certainly that's what I was responding to that we are were likely to be the government department for that.
02:00:09 for that. If we go up the page to the next email at 707
02:00:14 at 707 uh we can see your response you say yes this will almost certainly be a local authorityled recovery. Uh it may be obvious but what did you uh what did you mean by that? um because it
02:00:26 what did you mean by that? um because it affected um as I say it was within um a city environment. It's uh local authority building, local authority tenants. Um
02:00:38 tenants. Um the idea that it would be any other than the local authority leading on recovery is unlikely. Um and the local authority does lead on the majority though not all
02:00:49 does lead on the majority though not all recoveries. So you don't make any uh reference here to what involvement DCLG DCLG red might have in the recovery phase do you?
02:01:00 have in the recovery phase do you? No.
02:01:02 No. So far as you were concerned at this stage that it was uh solely down to the local authority. Is that a fair characterization? Um, no, I didn't go into any detail about what it would be,
02:01:13 into any detail about what it would be, but if it's a local authorityled recovery, we would have some involvement either in red in providing um recovery liaison officers, which we we do uh when
02:01:25 liaison officers, which we we do uh when there are recovery coordinating groups or indeed for the department given the uh the fact that it's local authority and that's the departmental um um
02:01:36 and that's the departmental um um responsibility. I'd like to go back to the department's emergency response plan, please. That's CLG40 is 5657. And if we could go to page 41,
02:01:53 bottom of the page under the heading recovery shift change,
02:02:00 it says this. Running alongside the emergency response will be activity to return the local community to normality. This activity is known as recovery and a local recovery working group will be
02:02:12 local recovery working group will be established to start this working train. Once the emergency response reaches a point where demands on the emergency services are becoming less intense, a local decision will be made to transfer
02:02:24 local decision will be made to transfer responsibility for the incident from the strategic coordinating group to the recovery working group. You may well find that you the GT uh will be required to attend initial recovery working group
02:02:37 to attend initial recovery working group meetings. However, it is unwise for the same team to cover both response and recovery and action should be taken to stand down the government liaison team and put alternative arrangements into place as soon as possible.
02:02:52 Did you consider given the facts response and recovery act in tandem, it might have been appropriate to identify what actions GC DCLG might be involved in in the recovery phase?
02:03:05 in in the recovery phase? Um we were still very much in the response phase at this point and the consideration for us uh with regard to recovery was very much around uh the uh
02:03:17 recovery was very much around uh the uh building regulations issues or the building safety issues and housing issues and those were ones that we picked up um that I picked up uh reasonably early that that morning to
02:03:29 reasonably early that that morning to engage with our policy colleagues around that. What about uh DCLG needing to scale up its resources? Is that something that you considered? Yes, absolutely. And that was why I was in communication uh fairly early that
02:03:41 in communication uh fairly early that that morning with uh with Rob Mason who uh is our uh emer was our emergency management team leader and set up the op center to talk about setting up our
02:03:52 center to talk about setting up our operations center to um widening uh the pool of people within red who would be involved. Well, we'll come to the operations center uh in in due course.
02:04:04 operations center uh in in due course. I'd like to ask you this. Who did you understand the lead government department to be at this stage? Uh this would still have been home office because it was still a response to a fire.
02:04:15 to a fire. How would uh RED's response differ in practice in an incident where it was the lead government department as opposed to an incident where it was not? Um the main way that it would differ would be
02:04:27 main way that it would differ would be to have more um policy colleagues from other parts of the department involved um feeding in information directly to the operation center. In effect, this
02:04:38 the operation center. In effect, this actually happened very very quickly because of the the nature of of what the recovery was going to be for this. But certainly that would would have been the situation when an operation center was
02:04:49 situation when an operation center was set up if we were lead. It wouldn't have affected the way we as RED and government liaison officers operated because we would still have been doing the same job for our department that we
02:05:01 the same job for our department that we would do for any other department in providing that link into government because in that sense we work across government not just for as it was then DCLG.
02:05:12 DCLG. I'd like to um ask you about a few further emails that you sent that morning. Um, if we could go to CLG30443,
02:05:25 page one at the bottom of the page, it's an email at 408.
02:05:36 You say this at the end of the first line, we will need to put a note. Assuming that means together, short form for together. Uh, yes, I Yes. at uh very least and
02:05:48 Uh, yes, I Yes. at uh very least and will need to include building ress colleagues as I suspect there will be an investigation CFR. What does that stand for?
02:05:55 for? That's the chief fire and rescue advisor.
02:05:58 advisor. Uh should be letting know ho home office. Home office. No. Can you start jotting down details so we can start pulling notes together again? If we uh go two me two emails up
02:06:11 again? If we uh go two me two emails up at 4:33
02:06:13 at 4:33 uh we can see an email that you send uh and the second sentence of which says this. I think we can wait until we have more from London but I'm looking for building ress contacts so we can give
02:06:24 building ress contacts so we can give them a heads up. Uh you mention in your email at 555 and we've seen it before. I can take you to it again. and it's CLG 4's 2860
02:06:38 it again. and it's CLG 4's 2860 page 3
02:06:45 under issues for DCLG um DCLG building regulation colleagues may have policy interest in this incident. Uh and again at CLG42860
02:07:00 trying to follow it as uh chronologically as possible at 712 an email the first in the chain.
02:07:11 Uh we can see here I think our colleagues in building roads will need to be engaged. I have emailed uh Bob Leum their DD but what what what do you mean by DD? Is it
02:07:22 mean by DD? Is it that's deputy director? So the same level as Katherine, but do not have mobile numbers. I'm assuming that means. Yeah.
02:07:29 Yeah. Uh so hoping he will be in early in case policy lines are required uh from them. Uh next at CLG30453,
02:07:43 please. and it's an email at 8:07.
02:07:53 Uh we can see you say here um you will have seen our updates on this incident. I would expect there will be requests for policy input from our from ourselves on the building regulations angle on
02:08:06 on the building regulations angle on this incident. Uh and we can see the response um at 811 uh here at CLG 42867
02:08:17 at page two
02:08:25 uh where the response from Brian Martin uh it's the third uh paragraph. It's important for our ministers to understand that DCLG carries significant policy responsibilities for fire
02:08:37 policy responsibilities for fire protection standards and for social housing.
02:08:42 housing. Uh you respond uh to this email. It's the first email in the chain at the top there confirming that coms are looped in.
02:08:54 in. And again at CLG30455
02:09:07 uh we can see in the second uh part of that email I'm looking for lines from building regs and housing colleagues. Perhaps understandably there was the
02:09:20 Perhaps understandably there was the need to engage your housing colleagues and the building regulations and policy side of the department. But would you uh but would you say what would you say to the suggestion um that your focus was
02:09:32 the suggestion um that your focus was more on building regulations at that time than questioning what the local authority was doing or having an eye to the recovery? Uh no, I would say that um
02:09:43 the recovery? Uh no, I would say that um I was very much focused on what was happening at the instant. Um clearly there were considerations that would need to be taken into account by the department and there would be briefing
02:09:54 department and there would be briefing that was needed and part of our role within RED um and part of the operations center role which we were simulating in a very light touch way overnight uh is
02:10:06 a very light touch way overnight uh is to ensure that um those policy areas that have um any input to provide um do provide that and that any briefing that goes up to any of our ministers
02:10:18 goes up to any of our ministers um covers the full range of issues that might be there. So this was me setting uh in train some questions for others to to cover and that obviously developed
02:10:29 to cover and that obviously developed later into both the the very in-depth um work that the department did on that side and also the in-depth work that was done uh for housing as part of the
02:10:40 done uh for housing as part of the recovery. But certainly for me that was part of the role but the key thing was what was happening um on the ground and was was there um any support that was
02:10:51 was was there um any support that was needed there or did it look like things were as far as a response is concerned moving in the right direction. Well, we've seen here from about 5:55 in
02:11:02 Well, we've seen here from about 5:55 in the morning to after 8:00 several emails that you sent. Uh would you accept that none of those emails contain any reference to the recovery phase?
02:11:13 reference to the recovery phase? Um as such I was still concentrating on the response phase. So the SCG was still running. We were waiting for uh a readout from that to understand what uh
02:11:25 readout from that to understand what uh what more was happening u whether there was anything else required from us. Um and this was um uh as far as I was concerned this was information that would be required as early as possible.
02:11:38 would be required as early as possible. Um and in a in a sense when you're looking at this looking at a a response holistically understanding what has happened and how this is
02:11:50 what has happened and how this is affecting the area and more broadly uh with regard to how it might affect other areas is in essence um how you move through the stages into recovery.
02:12:02 through the stages into recovery. There isn't in these emails that I've taken to you taken you to uh any uh consideration or any evidence uh that there was consideration given to the local authorities ability to deal with
02:12:13 local authorities ability to deal with the incident given its scale. Um at at this time the information that was coming back through seemed that they they seemed to be coping well that they didn't seem to have problems and that
02:12:24 didn't seem to have problems and that they had mutual aid that was being provided to them. And it wasn't as as you would have seen, it wasn't until much later that I discovered that they had been turning down offers of mutual aid.
02:12:39 Had you spoken to anybody from the local authority? It would not be our normal activity to speak to people right in from the local authority right in the middle of a
02:12:51 authority right in the middle of a response. Um because as Katherine commented in her email um people are very focused on what they're doing. If there had been help and support that
02:13:02 there had been help and support that they would had required certainly I would have been engaging with them about how we were providing that help or support but that had not been asked for hadn't been indicated. Um, and so at
02:13:16 hadn't been indicated. Um, and so at this point, um, I would be more likely to be speaking to the London Resilience Group than, uh, to the local authority
02:13:27 Group than, uh, to the local authority just to to gain update. Did you speak to the London Resilience Group?
02:13:32 Group? We we had done, but um, at this particular point, we knew that people were all in the SCG, which was the the key focus, and they would have been supporting that. So, at this point, no, I wasn't on the phone to them.
02:13:45 I wasn't on the phone to them. Um,
02:13:45 Um, I'd like to, um, ask you about those SCGs. Um, we've discussed the first SCG took place at 5:00 followed by an SCG at 6:30. Uh, you received, uh, the
02:13:58 6:30. Uh, you received, uh, the following request. I'll take you to it. CLG 4's at 62, 802, forgive me. And if we can go to page two,
02:14:13 And if we can go to page two, it's an email at 651.
02:14:17 It's CLG 48002.
02:14:32 Uh, if we could go to the email at 651, please. It should be on the middle of page two.
02:14:47 Uh we can see here uh the Can you see the email at 652? 651, forgive me. Yes.
02:14:54 Yes. Um we can see there um it says the following. It's an email from Stuart Wayright who you mentioned was from the CCS who you had contact with. Is that right?
02:15:04 right? Yes. Um a and here um he's emailing you saying number 10 have requested an update by 7:45. Can you send through your latest understanding?
02:15:15 your latest understanding? Um if we can scroll up to page one, you respond at 9 minutes past 7
02:15:23 uh confirming it's in the first line there. The SCG is still running, but our most recent information from London's call is as follows. and you set out a a
02:15:34 call is as follows. and you set out a a readout there. Could I take you uh next to CLG3018772
02:15:45 please?
02:15:52 Uh we can see here an email at 8:40 uh you circulated a readout from the 6:30 SCG uh to CCS red and the home
02:16:03 6:30 SCG uh to CCS red and the home office and in that in the first line you say please read the readout from 6:30 SCG glow currently in 8:30 SCG. So we will provide further information
02:16:14 will provide further information following that meeting. Um, so you were sending an update from the 6:30 SCG at the time that the 8:30 SCG was was
02:16:25 the time that the 8:30 SCG was was already underway. Is that right? Yes.
02:16:28 Yes. Now, this incident was fast moving and the pace of information sharing was important, wasn't it? Yes.
02:16:34 Yes. Uh, the consequence of the readout of the 6:30 SCG not being circulated uh by the time the next one had begun meant that there was a delay, wasn't there? Uh
02:16:46 that there was a delay, wasn't there? Uh it meant that it was slower than I would have liked. Yes. Was there any reason for this? Uh the SCG meeting was quite longunning. Um Denise then needed to um bring the
02:17:01 Um Denise then needed to um bring the the notes that she had made into into a a shape that she could share. Um and she did that uh just prior to the uh the next meeting um which he then passed on
02:17:13 next meeting um which he then passed on to me. I checked it through and uh to make sure that it it read okay, that people would understand it and then forwarded it on.
02:17:25 Uh let's go to CLG 30 at 9725. This is your um witness statement. Uh
02:17:38 This is your um witness statement. Uh your first witness statement, paragraph 44, please.
02:17:59 Um, and we can see here at paragraph 44, you say, "At 7:51 p.m. I signed off and my role as duty head of resilience was taken by Kate Head to ensure I got rest
02:18:11 taken by Kate Head to ensure I got rest overnight. Uh have you since reflected on that and is there any correction you want to make? Um I was um asked about this and the um
02:18:22 Um I was um asked about this and the um only um email evidence we have is that it was actually Joe Gillespie who took over that that role. um and uh the the
02:18:33 over that that role. um and uh the the timing
02:18:35 timing wasn't quite clear. So um it suggested that that that was 1751. Um to be perfectly honest, it's really difficult to know because in my mind um
02:18:47 difficult to know because in my mind um Kate did take that role on but there is no uh no specific evidence and the evidence we have suggests this and and and so the point there being that you were on duty uh you were still
02:19:00 that you were on duty uh you were still working at 7:51 on the 14th of June. Is that right? Yes. Um, I'd just like to, um, take you to paragraph 40, just up the page of your statement. Just the first sentence
02:19:12 your statement. Just the first sentence of paragraph 40, which says this.
02:19:17 Um, I asked my job share, Linda, to take over as response manager, which he did at 9:30.
02:19:25 at 9:30. Uh can I just clarify that you don't mean that you went off duty and then came back on duty sometime later that you just handed over your role.
02:19:36 you just handed over your role. Right. So if I can clarify obviously overnight I had been doing all of this role from home. Um at this point I handed over the response manager bit. So I've got two roles going on. I've got
02:19:48 I've got two roles going on. I've got the response manager role, but I'm also still um head of uh resilience for duty. So, at this point, I've handed the response manager role to Linda Down. So,
02:20:00 response manager role to Linda Down. So, she's taking forward the response. Um I still had the head of resilience for duty. So, if if another uh incident had occurred, I would still be responsible for that. But during this time, I then
02:20:13 for that. But during this time, I then was not doing any other work to do with uh the response. Um, I was getting dressed and getting ready to come into the office and then came into the office to work as far as I recall. And then I
02:20:25 to work as far as I recall. And then I think I go on to give evidence about various other things that I did that day which were supportive of the response but not in a response manager role. Well, could I take you to CLG 48026
02:20:40 and take you to page three, please?
02:20:50 Uh, we can see here an email. I believe it's the second email on the page. 10:41 is the time of the email. Uh, it says
02:21:01 is the time of the email. Uh, it says here, "Readout of 8:30 London SCG circulated from Denise Welch, 14th of June, 10:41 to MHLG Red.
02:21:13 June, 10:41 to MHLG Red. Uh were you aware that the readout of this meeting the 8:30 SCG was only being circulated to read at 10:41? I stepped away from this particular part
02:21:24 I stepped away from this particular part of role by then. So I I wasn't aware of what was happening around that. In fact, at that time I suspect I was probably traveling into the office, but I'm not exactly sure on timings.
02:21:35 exactly sure on timings. Would you accept that's a quite a considerable delay? Um it is uh a long time from the start of the meeting but what I don't know is how lengthy that meeting was or how much detail there
02:21:47 meeting was or how much detail there there was to transcribe.
02:21:51 Could I take you uh to CLG 48026? Oh, forgive me. It's the same the same document, page two.
02:22:03 document, page two. It's the last email on the page.
02:22:11 11:10. Uh we can see here uh that the 8:30 SCG readout is then circulated at the bottom of page two uh to Katherine Hammond of
02:22:25 of page two uh to Katherine Hammond of the CCS to Stuart Wayright of the CCS to Redd uh and so on and so forth. Um, do you know why there was a a reason for the delay in circulating this to the CCS
02:22:37 the delay in circulating this to the CCS at 11:10?
02:22:40 at 11:10? No, I I can't give you any insight into that, I'm afraid. Do you consider, Miss McManus, that Red fell short here in communicating information to the CCS promptly?
02:22:51 information to the CCS promptly? Uh, we were keeping CCS well in uh informed in general terms, as you'll have seen. U for instance, where I didn't have SCG readouts. Um we uh
02:23:02 didn't have SCG readouts. Um we uh provided the um the the comm's readouts. Um I would say that the the timings here do look a little lengthy. I it may well be that they had other communications
02:23:14 be that they had other communications ahead of this, but I really can't comment. So I I don't know at this point.
02:23:18 point. You would accept that RED was the conduit, wasn't it? It was it was designed to inform central government CCS of what was happening on the ground, wasn't it? Indeed. Yes.
02:23:32 I'd like to take you uh to your first witness statement, page 10, paragraph 36, please.
02:23:45 And we can see there it's six lines down from the top of paragraph 36. You say usually other government departments are not involved in SCGs as it is RED's role to represent the whole of government at
02:23:57 to represent the whole of government at these meetings and make sure everyone who needs to see the information is getting it. However, due to the nature of the incident and the need to communicate key lines at extremely short notice to the ministerial meeting on the
02:24:08 notice to the ministerial meeting on the Grenfell Tower fire, it was agreed that CCS could listen in to SCGs that day to expedite their receiving of information for the commonly recognized information
02:24:19 for the commonly recognized information picture known as
02:24:24 We can see if I can take you to it. CLG at 408026. So, back to the email that we were just looking at at page two and this time to
02:24:35 looking at at page two and this time to the email at 11:43, please.
02:24:40 Uh, we can see here an email from CCS to MHLG read. Hi, I'm looking to dial into the SCG meeting at 2 today, not to say anything,
02:24:53 meeting at 2 today, not to say anything, but to make sure we have the most upto-date information to go in the which will be issued in advanced of the 4:00 uh ministerial. Uh we can go up the chain to the final
02:25:06 Uh we can go up the chain to the final email on page one, which is sent from you at 12:50.
02:25:15 And it says this, Lynn, are we really fine with this? Can we not give a readout in time? Just a thought. And then going up uh to the email at 124
02:25:27 then going up uh to the email at 124 1324.
02:25:29 1324. Uh you again emailing uh Lynn Dakin, your colleague. Hi Lynn. We could send the numbers. I'm assuming that means the numbers through without waiting for full readout. Phase report back from mass
02:25:41 readout. Phase report back from mass fats group. Is that the mass fatalities group?
02:25:43 group? It is. Yes. It gives them good basic numbers for their draft. As Sunny has confirmed, bit difficult and possibly unnecessary to say no, but very unusual
02:25:55 unnecessary to say no, but very unusual exclamation mark. Um,
02:26:04 was it uh, as you say in your email here, unusual for the CCS to request to listen into those uh, SCG meetings? Uh, in my experience, yes.
02:26:16 Uh, in my experience, yes. Has that ever happened before to your knowledge? Um, I think it has on one or two occasions, but I I couldn't give you specifics. Uh, do you consider that the delay in
02:26:27 Uh, do you consider that the delay in red circulating information from the SCGs played a part in the CCS wishing to listen into those SCGs? I think they had some very um crucial deadlines and obviously they were
02:26:40 deadlines and obviously they were concerned to make sure that that they got that information. As you can see from my emails, I suggested some alternatives that that might also be helpful. Um, but it was agreed that that
02:26:51 helpful. Um, but it was agreed that that was the the right way to go. the the exclamation marks at the end of line two suggest that you didn't entirely approve of what was being suggested. Is that right? Um it's it would have been my view and
02:27:03 Um it's it would have been my view and it is still my view that we ought to be able to provide them with information in a in a timely fashion. Um and it's not something that we do. But the the key thing and as I said
02:27:16 thing and as I said at this point, the important thing is getting the information through. And if that's one way of doing it, then that's fine.
02:27:25 Uh, I'd like to, um, ask you about something you say in your, uh, witness statement. It's your first witness statement at paragraph 37, please. That's page 10.
02:27:42 uh you say this uh from these early SCG readouts and information coming in from BBC 24-hour news, I was getting the impression that the response was properly coordinated. I was not picking
02:27:54 properly coordinated. I was not picking up any problems. It was still a live incident with the fire still going on and so the focus was on what the fire and rescue service uh was doing. Uh you go on uh onto the next page at paragraph
02:28:06 go on uh onto the next page at paragraph 38 to say this. RED mainly relies on information coming from SCGs and follow-up discussions with local responders. Whilst it was not RED's role to monitor the news or social media, I
02:28:18 to monitor the news or social media, I felt it would be useful to gather additional information about the ongoing situation by keeping an eye on media reports.
02:28:28 reports. Can I just understand uh what you're saying here? Were you given the impression that the pro that the response was properly coordinated by the local authority because there were no
02:28:39 local authority because there were no reports otherwise or was it that you saw positive reports on the response in those early hours of the 14th of June? Uh there was nothing that I was seeing that was suggesting that the uh the key
02:28:52 that was suggesting that the uh the key issues that the local authority would deal with were not being dealt with. Um, and
02:29:00 and given that we positively ask in the SCGS if there is any help and support that's required and we weren't being told that that there was, those are the things that I was taking as being positive and
02:29:12 that I was taking as being positive and that things were on track. So the absence of anything negative uh equated to a positive. Is that have I understood you correctly? uh the absence of anything negative in the media but um
02:29:26 of anything negative in the media but um no no request following um what would be our usual uh approach in the SCG is there any help that required which is it's a it's a general offer to everybody
02:29:38 it's a it's a general offer to everybody around the the SCG table not specifically just to the local authority um and that's the kind of thing that we monitor and as you will have seen from CCS they were very keen to know whether
02:29:50 CCS they were very keen to know whether anybody um particularly from fire, police and ambulance were asking but local authority is amongst that as well. So um sorry that was a long way of of saying negative from the media but um
02:30:03 saying negative from the media but um from positive in interaction in the SCG. Well, would you uh would you agree here that your sources of information, one being the SCG readouts, the other being
02:30:14 being the SCG readouts, the other being uh BBC news reports um was an insufficient way for RED, the resilience and emergencies division of DCLG to have been gaining situational awareness?
02:30:27 been gaining situational awareness? Those um through the SCG is our usual and normal way of gaining situational awareness. We have uh developed that more recently but that is to take into
02:30:39 more recently but that is to take into account things like uh uh media reporting and things like that which is done through our situation awareness group but that wasn't how we did that at the time. Um but the SCG definitely is
02:30:51 the time. Um but the SCG definitely is our our main form of information. And by this point uh there had still not been a globe deployed to the strategic coordination center was there? No, but
02:31:02 coordination center was there? No, but we had um a a glow deployed um remotely and that I say that is quite common practice.
02:31:12 practice. Uh remotely but unable to assess the situation or speak to others outside of the SCG.
02:31:20 the SCG. Um yes, in in terms of not being at the SEC and engaging. Um but that has to be put in perspective that um that
02:31:32 put in perspective that um that engagement isn't necessarily always available at the SEC either. But um in this case, you're you're right. It was only over the phone. She wasn't there in per person.
02:31:43 per person. Can you help us with uh what Red was doing to speak directly to the local authority at this stage? Um, I've explained already that we wouldn't at at this stage have been ringing the local
02:31:55 this stage have been ringing the local authority direct.
02:32:01 I'd like to um move on please to ask you about the emergency notice. Um, in your first witness statement, please I'll take you to page 11,
02:32:12 please I'll take you to page 11, paragraph 41.
02:32:19 uh you say the following. The official emergency notice was put out at 8:39. This puts the rest of the department and wider government on notice that matters
02:32:31 wider government on notice that matters might be escalated and red reserves might need to be brought in. Red reserves are people who work in other parts of the department who can be released to work on urgent red projects.
02:32:43 released to work on urgent red projects. Well, we can I can take you to an email here at CLG42875,
02:32:51 please. And at page two,
02:32:57 the bottom of of page two, uh, we can see an email here from Katherine Richardson at 9:18, uh, to you saying, Jill, can you put out
02:33:09 uh, to you saying, Jill, can you put out an can you put out an emergency notice before you hand over? Do you have access to the shared drive CC and Kate and Joe in in case not? Uh then going up uh on the bottom of page one at 9:25 we can
02:33:23 the bottom of page one at 9:25 we can see
02:33:25 see an email uh from your colleague Kate Head. Was she also a resilience adviser within RED? She was a head of resilience. I'm grateful. Um a and she says this,
02:33:37 I'm grateful. Um a and she says this, you'll uh she sends the email to you as well as Katherryine Richardson and CC's in Joe Gillespie. Um are we expecting a red response that requires a full operations center? Is that what OPs
02:33:49 operations center? Is that what OPs stands for? Yes.
02:33:50 Yes. And ongoing work passed today for this incident. I asked to understand whether we need to issue an EN emergency notice at this point.
02:34:03 Is that right? Uh yes, it is emergency notice. Did you um consider that Red's response would have been over in a day or is that what you understand uh Miss Head to be
02:34:15 what you understand uh Miss Head to be saying here? Um I think she just wanted to get a full feeling for whether it would be a full operation center with all the things that that involves. Um, and you looked
02:34:27 that that involves. Um, and you looked at the uh schematic to see what that involved or maybe uh a a lesser operation center which we could have contained within red and therefore not requiring the emergency notice and as
02:34:39 requiring the emergency notice and as she hadn't been on duty overnight, she hadn't seen the full extent of what we were talking about. Uh you had and you respond, we can go up
02:34:50 Uh you had and you respond, we can go up uh and see your response at 9:32. Uh you say this difficult to know at moment maybe more maybe more about wider departmental issues but Rob is that Rob
02:35:02 departmental issues but Rob is that Rob Mason
02:35:03 Mason it is
02:35:04 it is felt and opsy operations center felt right. I've asked Lynn to be response manager for now. Um FA is taking on glow for now. We will let her have battle
02:35:15 for now. We will let her have battle rhythm if there is one.
02:35:20 Was it the case that you were unclear as this email suggests that a full operation center was required on the morning of the 14th of June?
02:35:33 morning of the 14th of June? The thought that was in my mind was whether this would actually be a response that would be continuing or whether it would be a recovery recovery
02:35:44 whether it would be a recovery recovery that would be continuing and what the structure might might be for that. I rang Rob Mason who um has been uh head of EMT uh since I think November 2011 um
02:35:58 of EMT uh since I think November 2011 um to ask his advice on on this. And uh we both came to the conclusion that actually it was sensible to set up an operation center
02:36:10 operation center uh and have the full um facility there. um on the basis that if that then for some reason wasn't required it is much easier to move back from that but it
02:36:22 easier to move back from that but it made sense to do that. You refer in your email to again wider departmental issues. Um does this refer to the building regulation side again
02:36:34 to the building regulation side again and housing and housing. Uh you had uh received had you not the SCG uh minutes the readouts of those SCG meetings?
02:36:45 meetings? The the first two. Yes. Uh you had uh seen the BBC news reporting as you mentioned in your witness statement of the incident. Is that right? Yes.
02:36:55 Yes. Uh you yourself acknowledged in your witness statement that this was a serious incident. Is that right? Yes. um you must have at this stage appreciated uh or in fact you didn't um that there
02:37:07 uh or in fact you didn't um that there would be significant involvement from the department DCLG who was to lead uh as lead government department in that response in in the recovery phase forgive me
02:37:18 forgive me um in the recovery phase and I think that's the key to to this here um because particularly with the departmental issues moving over to that whilst we can still run an operation
02:37:29 whilst we can still run an operation center to report. It's um a much wider mechanism as you will have seen from all of the other witnesses that you have been talking to from from the department. It became something much
02:37:41 department. It became something much bigger um in recovery and the uh Grenfell team grew from from that. What about the assistance that central government might need to provide to
02:37:52 government might need to provide to those affected as as part of the recovery? Yes, that would all be taken into into account.
02:38:05 Um, I'd like to take you uh to the actual emergency notice which we can see um at CLG402876
02:38:16 please.
02:38:25 Uh we can see here an email uh sent by DCLG red at 9:39 subject emergency notice. Uh good morning all. Please see the attached emergency notice regarding
02:38:36 the attached emergency notice regarding the Grenell Tower fire. You say in your witness statement that you believed the um emergency notice to have been issued at 8:39. You would accept that um I think there was a time stamp issue when
02:38:48 think there was a time stamp issue when in fact it was uh sent at 9:39. Is that right?
02:38:51 right? Yes, absolutely. Can you assist us please with why uh three SCGs had by now been convened a and only then an emergency notice was
02:39:02 and only then an emergency notice was sent out.
02:39:08 The the timing of it um was when those that were coming in to set up the operation center could uh were were available to to do that. Um, it is a
02:39:21 available to to do that. Um, it is a decision for Katherine as to when that goes out and obviously as you've seen from the email, she asked for that to be issued.
02:39:32 Could I um take you to next the actual uh emergency notice which we'll find at CLG 48012.
02:39:45 Uh this is the uh resilience and e emergencies division emergency notice 1217.
02:39:52 1217. Uh it says here at in the first paragraph in accordance with the department's emergency response plan with effect from 8:00 on the 14th of June 2017 resilience and emergencies
02:40:03 June 2017 resilience and emergencies division has activated an operation center red control to coordinate the response to Grenfell Tower fire. Uh we know because we've just seen that in
02:40:14 know because we've just seen that in fact uh the operations center hadn't been set up at 8:00 had it. The um the initial part of it um Rob
02:40:25 The um the initial part of it um Rob Mason was in the process of setting it up but I couldn't give you the exact timing on that. Well well let's go back to your emergency response P plan please. That's CLG45657.
02:40:38 And if we can go to page uh 54. or it's a schematic that we saw before.
02:40:48 Uh we can see there um issue emergency warning in orange and then issue an emergency notice in red and then you can follow the arrow which leads to activate
02:41:00 follow the arrow which leads to activate operation center. Uh is it right that when an emergency notice is issued that's when the operation center is activated? No. Um this is this is very much a
02:41:11 No. Um this is this is very much a schematic. Um they aren't interdependent. This is the way that we notify others that it's happening, but the actual activity of calling people in um getting people set into their roles
02:41:23 um getting people set into their roles isn't um dependent on the emergency notice being issued. So these would have been happening independently of each other. Well, could I take you back then to CLG
02:41:35 Well, could I take you back then to CLG 42875,
02:41:37 42875, please? at the top of page one.
02:41:43 This is an email sent at 9:32 by you uh where you say, and I've read it before and I'll read it again, difficult to know at the moment, maybe more about wider departmental issues, but Rob felt
02:41:56 wider departmental issues, but Rob felt an opsy felt right. Uh would you agree that it sounds here as if there was still some discussion about whether or not an operation center would be set up? Um at this time at 9:32
02:42:09 Um at this time at 9:32 um my understanding is that Rob Mason had already started setting one up. Whether it would continue might have been more more to the point whether that would um be sensible to keep it going
02:42:21 would um be sensible to keep it going but he had already start um started that and in fact handed over the initial work that he'd done to Lindadkin when she became available. Um C could I take you
02:42:33 became available. Um C could I take you back uh to that emergency notice please? That's CLG408012.
02:42:47 And we can see here under operations center senior staff
02:42:56 uh the response director accountable for overall strategy is Katherine Richardson. That was the deputy director. Uh the response manager accountable for the operational
02:43:07 accountable for the operational management of DCLG's response is Robert Mason. Uh Robert Mason wasn't on duty at that day, was he? He wasn't due to be on
02:43:18 that day, was he? He wasn't due to be on duty that day. Uh by dent of uh the fact of his experience and the fact that he was my um line manager when I was in EMT before I took temporary promotion. He
02:43:29 before I took temporary promotion. He was the person that I rang for advice. Um he took the decision that he would work for that that period um set things up and then hand them over. So he wasn't
02:43:42 up and then hand them over. So he wasn't on duty for the rest of the day. Would you have expected an emergency notice to name a response manager who was not on duty?
02:43:49 duty? Um I I understand that the intention here was that this would indicate who the response manager would be ongoing
02:44:00 the response manager would be ongoing and this is a role that um Rob Mason usually took but I I didn't draft it so I can't comment any further than that. I'd like to um turn to communications uh
02:44:12 I'd like to um turn to communications uh by you on the evening of the 14th of June, please. Um at 6:04 that evening, if I can take you to CLG 42999.
02:44:32 Uh we can see here an email at 604 uh from you to Katherine Richardson uh possible speaking note for 6:15 call uh
02:44:43 possible speaking note for 6:15 call uh speaking note uh and then you go on to say and the fourth line down heartened by response from London councils who are looking to support Kensington and Chelsea with offers of accommodation.
02:44:55 Chelsea with offers of accommodation. Uh we can see the subject matter uh was an urgent briefing request. Uh, did this relate to the secretary of state call with the mayor of London at 6:15? Yes, it did.
02:45:06 Yes, it did. Uh, you say heartened by the response from London councils who are looking to support Kensington and Chelsea with offers of accommodation. Uh, where did this information come from? From my understanding and um, further
02:45:19 From my understanding and um, further down the email chains, I think you can see that um, I had asked the London Resilience Group for input um, so that we could understand what what lines might be helpful. Um, and I would
02:45:31 might be helpful. Um, and I would believe that that particular line certainly is is likely to be a line provided by them.
02:45:43 Uh, looking down, we don't see that uh email between uh you and the London Resilience Group about uh numbers.
02:45:54 Resilience Group about uh numbers. Uh but this related to the call between the secretary of state uh and the mayor of London. Were you aware of any concerns that were expressed in that meeting regarding uh the local authority
02:46:07 meeting regarding uh the local authority response by the secretary of state or the mayor? No, I didn't take part in the meeting itself. I was just doing the pre-briefing. Would
02:46:17 Would you have expected information of that nature that there was concern about a local authorities's uh response uh to have been information that was fed back to Red?
02:46:27 to Red? Uh yes, that that's something if um there's something that might affect the response that we as the conduit into government could support on then we would expect to see that.
02:46:41 Um I'd like to move on uh please to the 15th of June. So moving on in time uh on the 15th of June you had uh time off that day but did do some tasks later in
02:46:53 that day but did do some tasks later in the day. Uh if we could uh go to please CLG uh 3020191.
02:47:06 [Applause]
02:47:10 It's an email at 3:10 uh from you to the Beck, that's the RBKC Beck, and it confirms in the first sentence that I have just spoken to Stuart Priestley.
02:47:23 have just spoken to Stuart Priestley. Um, were you aware that he was the council silver responsible for the operational response at that time? Um, I expect that I I did and that would
02:47:34 Um, I expect that I I did and that would have been why I might have contacted him. Um, I can't recall at this distance.
02:47:41 distance. Can you assist us with why it was that you contacted him? Um because the support being offered by the post office uh was by way of uh providing a local uh
02:47:53 uh was by way of uh providing a local uh branch which could be opened to uh provide u funding to um those who had been uh evacuated. Um and it was
02:48:05 been uh evacuated. Um and it was obviously funding for the um local community was something which uh Kensington and Chelsea were dealing with direct and it made sense to join them together.
02:48:15 together. Did you discuss anything else with Mr. Priestley? Not that I recall. Did you ask him how uh the local authority was coping? Uh I don't recall doing that. Um and
02:48:29 Uh I don't recall doing that. Um and that kind of uh general situational awareness isn't something that I would necessarily have been gathering at that point, but I I don't remember the I might have asked him how how things were
02:48:40 might have asked him how how things were going, how he was how he was doing, but I don't recall. Do you not consider how a local authority was dealing on the second day of a response to ask them how
02:48:51 second day of a response to ask them how they were doing would be good situational information for Redd to obtain? Um, as I say, I don't recall quite what I did say to him or what information passed apart from this about
02:49:04 information passed apart from this about the post office and the situational awareness side of things was being dealt with by another part of of the um the operations center. Um, so direct stuff
02:49:16 operations center. Um, so direct stuff coming in from the SCG. Was there any wider discussion about the help uh the need for help or offers of support uh that Mr. Priestly uh may need or or was receiving.
02:49:28 or or was receiving. I I don't recall. Um I'd like to move on then please to events on the 16th of June. Uh what role were you fulfilling that day?
02:49:40 were you fulfilling that day? Um on the
02:49:42 Um on the 16th of June which was the Saturday just working through my day on the Friday. on the Friday. Um on the Friday I was uh doing um some general
02:49:56 Friday I was uh doing um some general work in support of the response more specifically around uh briefing side of things and some other work that those who were uh involved in the response were not able to take forward.
02:50:09 were not able to take forward. uh you uh you say in your statement, I can take it take you to it if you uh want to be referred to it, but that around 11:00, Robert Mason asked you over the phone to recommend an effective
02:50:21 over the phone to recommend an effective strategic leader to head up the rec recovery work and you suggested John Baradel. Uh, you then sent a a follow-up email which we can see here CLG30504.
02:50:49 Is that what this uh email that you sent to Robert Mason at 11:37 was about? Yes. Can you uh give us any context to this
02:51:00 Can you uh give us any context to this request uh by Mr. Mason for an effective strategic leader? I wasn't given any specific uh context. Um it was literally a phone call about could I think of
02:51:12 a phone call about could I think of anybody who might be appropriate for for this role. I wasn't given any background into the discussions. Um and it was only later that I discovered what what had
02:51:23 later that I discovered what what had led to those discussions. So you didn't ask him why are you asking me for names for a strategic uh leader? Uh I
02:51:36 Uh I I asked whe what sort of context and what sort of skills they were looking for. Um but um
02:51:46 um I didn't ask specifically why. It was clear from the phone call that what was needed was some information quite quickly rather than a discussion.
02:51:58 Well, forgive me. How were you able to suggest names if you didn't understand the context of what those names would be being put forward for? because they he did ask specifically someone strategic
02:52:10 did ask specifically someone strategic who could lead a recovery of this this nature. I mean it was obvious from the discussion that he was referring to the recovery in London rather than anything else. Um so that was obvious and hence
02:52:21 else. Um so that was obvious and hence the names that I suggested but um the the context of how that came about I he didn't give me and I didn't ask about um that specifically
02:52:32 that specifically but your understanding was that it was for somebody to lead a recovery in London. Yes.
02:52:42 Why did you um suggest Mr. Baradel? Um he is somebody who uh I have uh worked with before. Uh I am aware of uh the
02:52:53 with before. Uh I am aware of uh the roles he's undertaken. Um and I knew of his um uh effectiveness as a uh as a as a leader in London and he seemed uh a
02:53:06 a leader in London and he seemed uh a sensible choice. At the time, were you aware that the London Local Authority Gold Resolution had been uh triggered the evening before
02:53:17 had been uh triggered the evening before and its formal activation was anticipated on the 16th? No, I didn't at that time. What do you think about Red's situational awareness at the time considering you were proposing someone
02:53:29 considering you were proposing someone to provide expertise who was already down at the town hall providing support? um
02:53:37 um from looking at the information that's come from from this um he the role that was being suggested was um
02:53:48 was being suggested was um slightly different to the role that he has. And I know that there's been some discussion already about um the difference between the role that he originally took and the one that he finally took. Um, and that would be my
02:54:02 finally took. Um, and that would be my understanding because it is significantly different to normal gold arrangements. And was the fact that Mr. Mason was asking you for names in
02:54:13 Mr. Mason was asking you for names in the first place unusual? Yes.
02:54:21 Would you um have expected uh something as significant as Mr. Baradal being involved uh or the uh mutual aid agreements being activated on the at the
02:54:33 agreements being activated on the at the end of the 15th of June uh have be would would be something communicated to red.
02:54:44 I would have thought that in in general terms, yes, those items would have been. I don't know that they weren't in general terms. Um because as I say, what
02:54:55 general terms. Um because as I say, what was being discussed on the Friday morning was significantly different to what had been set up on the Thursday night.
02:55:05 night. So So what was your understanding of what had been set up on Thursday night? I I I didn't I wasn't working in the the operations center on Thursday night. So my situation awareness might not have
02:55:16 my situation awareness might not have been um that focus, but it doesn't mean that Reds wasn't. What was your understanding of uh Friday morning then? Um it was clear that they were looking
02:55:27 Um it was clear that they were looking for someone who could come in and and take a grip of what was going to be an extensive likely to be an extensive recovery. someone who had uh good um
02:55:39 recovery. someone who had uh good um resilience and uh management and leadership skills and that's why I gave the the names that I did. Um I'd like to take you uh to an email.
02:55:52 Um I'd like to take you uh to an email. It's CLG 48439 please.
02:55:59 please. Page one, an email you circulated at 2:49
02:56:06 on the 16th of June. Uh, and if we, um, go down at page two, uh, we can see other issues.
02:56:18 uh, we can see other issues. Can you see that? Yes. Uh, and it says here, "Government liaison officer GLO Glow uh raised minister's concerns following visits to the scene, including local authority
02:56:30 the scene, including local authority coordination, victims access to cash, distribution of donations, information available to residents, availability of counseling services. Glow reminded SCGs of government offer of help and support
02:56:42 of government offer of help and support to all multi- agency partners. Contact and requests can be made direct glow or through red control email. Uh reading uh page two here uh it appears that these
02:56:54 page two here uh it appears that these were concerns of the minister after attending the scene that morning. Would you agree with that? Yes.
02:57:01 Yes. in the minutes of that um SCG uh which we can see at MOL6036
02:57:14 page 3 under DCLG
02:57:21 it says at 1:30 a f further cross-governmental meeting will take place chaired by Nick Herd um specifically on London On local authority issues, the Secretary of State
02:57:33 authority issues, the Secretary of State has a number of concerns. These involve access to cash, donations, and information uh for these survivors. Would you accept uh that this is the
02:57:44 Would you accept uh that this is the first time at any one of these SCG meetings since the incident uh since the SCG started uh that records of concerns expressed by DCLG are noted? Um I I
02:57:57 expressed by DCLG are noted? Um I I couldn't uh confirm definitely on that because I haven't looked through the um the minutes of the the other SCGs. I can certainly take you to them, but it
02:58:08 I can certainly take you to them, but it might be more expeditious for me to ask this. Uh would you accept uh that having looked at those earlier SCG uh minutes, there are no records of concerns raised
02:58:19 there are no records of concerns raised uh by uh by the GLOW in those SCG meetings? I'm happy to to take that as uh as confirmation then in which case my answer would be yes I think to the
02:58:30 answer would be yes I think to the original question would you um accept that it was the role of the government liaison officer who was present at those SCGs to report back
02:58:41 was present at those SCGs to report back to the SCG any concerns that the department may be having. Yes.
02:58:48 Yes. And can I just caveat that slightly? uh report back to the SCG and also um potentially raise with the um any of the partners specifically.
02:59:02 Uh and just very briefly uh whilst we have this document in front of us uh we can see at the um forgive me not this document if we could just go back to CLG
02:59:13 document if we could just go back to CLG 408439
02:59:16 408439 the email that we were looking at before that you circulated uh we can see the email was sent at 249 uh and it says the first line of the
02:59:27 uh and it says the first line of the email for completeness this is on page one please see below the key issues raised at the 11:00 SCG. Why had the speed of information sharing uh had not improved by this time?
02:59:43 I don't think I can uh can comment on that at this point. I don't I don't have anything that I could identify for you. Miss McManus, in your view, how was the
02:59:54 Miss McManus, in your view, how was the operation center functioning at this time?
02:59:58 time? It did seem to be functioning uh well. Certainly there was information that was um passing through and indeed it was our government liaison officer who was one of the first to to pick up along with
03:00:11 of the first to to pick up along with the SED chair on issues centrally and I know these were reported back to Katherine Richardson and I believe she refers to those in her statement as well.
03:00:23 well. Mr. Chairman, would that be a convenient moment for a break? Yes, it would. Thank you very much. Well, I think we ought to have a break now so we can all get some lunch. We'll stop there, Manners, and we'll resume,
03:00:35 stop there, Manners, and we'll resume, please, at 2:00. And as I said before, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. All right. Thank you. Thank you very much. Would you go to the usher, please?
03:00:56 Thank you very much. 2:00 then, please. Thank you.