Station Manager Michael Mulholland (ORT officer on duty) gives evidence on incident command changes, FSG coordination, and the chaotic early stages of the Grenfell response.
00:00:09 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing and we're gonna hear from further firefighters yes mr. chairman we are good morning and we now get to hear
00:00:20 are good morning and we now get to hear from from Michael Mulholland
00:00:57 thank you very much mr. Mulholland good morning yes mr. edit mr. Mulholland good morning good morning um can I just ask you please first of all to give us your
00:01:08 you please first of all to give us your full name Michael Bennett Mulholland right and I want to say first of all thank you very much to you could you pause a second could you hear I know
00:01:21 pause a second could you hear I know don't worry about the microphone because the old place enough if it's working it should be green it is showing green all right might have to ask you to keep your
00:01:32 right might have to ask you to keep your voice up that's fine because not only do people need to hear you in the room but the I can't they be doing the transcription Thanks yes that's right I
00:01:43 transcription Thanks yes that's right I was about to thank the witness mr. Mulholland thank you very much first of all for coming here today to give evidence to assist us with our investigations we do very much appreciate it my questions are intended
00:01:54 appreciate it my questions are intended to be short and simple and they often don't work out that way so if I if you want me to repeat a question and very happy to do say and if you need a break at any time just signal and we can take
00:02:05 at any time just signal and we can take a break
00:02:08 can I ask you please first of all to take your statement which is M et quadriga zero seven eight six five now you'll have it in the blue file in front of you at the front but what we tend to
00:02:21 of you at the front but what we tend to do is examine it when we go to it by looking at the screen and there's a monitor on your on your right on the desk which we can look at as well and as
00:02:32 desk which we can look at as well and as to that statement have you read it recently yes and can you confirm that its contents are true yes okay now can I just ask you to look at the first paragraph of the
00:02:45 to look at the first paragraph of the witness statement three lines down where it says this statement does not purport to be complete and for completeness and accuracy it must be read in conjunction with the interview transcript having
00:02:58 with the interview transcript having having read the statement recently are you satisfied that the statement doesn't emit doesn't omit anything of importance that you would like to tell us sorry
00:03:09 that you would like to tell us sorry could you
00:03:10 could you yeah can you confirm having read the statement recently that your statement doesn't leave out anything important that you would write no that you would like to tell us no it doesn't leave anything out like okay are you satisfied
00:03:22 anything out like okay are you satisfied that it reflects your best recollection of the events that it covers yes okay have you discussed your statement or the evidence that you're going to give to us today with anybody before coming here no
00:03:34 today with anybody before coming here no okay now you've got some contemporaneous notes as well which are dated the 14th of June and those are Emmie T quadruple
00:03:46 of June and those are Emmie T quadruple 0 5 to 1 8 1 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 and you also have 39 exhibited photographs
00:03:59 you also have 39 exhibited photographs I'll just read out the references to those that's a meaty triple zero one eight seven one three two triple zero one eight seven five one have you looked
00:04:10 one eight seven five one have you looked at those photographs recently I only saw them recently when they were submitting into evidence right okay I'll come to ask you about step one or two of those later on
00:04:20 later on okay can I start by just asking you some questions about your position and the function of the ort you're currently a station manager at Tooting and one's
00:04:31 station manager at Tooting and one's worth aren't you and no not any longer I was a station manager to them once I gave my statement arrived since taken up a new post as borough commander I have a something for them right and since April of this year April this year
00:04:43 since April of this year April this year I can't forgive me as at the 13th 14th of June 2017 you were I think station manager of Wimbledon yes how long would you be in the station
00:04:55 how long would you be in the station manager at that date approximately 3 years 3 years ok now in your statement you say in the second paragraph on page
00:05:06 you say in the second paragraph on page 2 that you're also part of the operational review team the ort and you say in the third paragraph on page 2 that you as the ort we attend
00:05:24 that you as the ort we attend operational incidents to audit against policy and procedure best practice and help incident command you can see we've highlighted those words up on the screen for you as to that connects tasks first
00:05:38 for you as to that connects tasks first when when you refer to auditing against policy does that mean that the ort has a monitoring and compliance function
00:05:48 yes but the I can probably frame it slightly better than that that's probably a little bit brief so we audit against policy on procedure we attend incidents and we carry out social
00:06:05 incidents and we carry out social systems of work firefighter safety we can guide a voice support the incident command chain and as another team or officer we see outside the inside command chain and
00:06:16 outside the inside command chain and we're not part decision making process right so when we audit that incidents were an experienced group of offices and our auditing against policy and procedure for our experiences is done through direct observation so we're a
00:06:30 through direct observation so we're a presence on the fire ground where we can capture operational learning looking to like to drive an organisation improvement basically in simple terms does that mean that you go to an
00:06:41 does that mean that you go to an incident where and the ort team is required by the number of pumps made up and well perhaps we can stop there and yes sorry yes we do but we it's
00:06:56 yes sorry yes we do but we it's mandatory for us to attend a fire call at worn sticks pumps or more when the internet goes eight pumps or more that triggers a second now what's the officer to attend so yes anything over six pumps
00:07:09 to attend so yes anything over six pumps broadly speaking on a track naughty officer we do attend upper incidents but in terms of fires they may be on and when you say auditing against policy does that in essence mean that you go around an incident ground making sure
00:07:21 around an incident ground making sure that the operations are compliant with lfb policies as written yeah yes right when you do that do you generally record
00:07:33 when you do that do you generally record observations that you make on the incident ground as you're there no not not always no do you do it sometimes yes occasionally I mean what we use is we'll
00:07:46 occasionally I mean what we use is we'll make some notes or we'll do it maybe post incident one of the other tasks we have as an LRT officer is when we capture the learner and we'll excuse me
00:07:58 capture the learner and we'll excuse me well identify learning points we have a database in the London Fire Brigade and in process database where that information can be put onto the database
00:08:09 information can be put onto the database where we've identified trends yes and we're learning but any far over six pumps attracts a internal review of performance review of command
00:08:21 performance review of command and those learning points will be brought that from a terrific review of command where an independent chair sits and the install be discussed with the innocent commanders of that incident and
00:08:34 innocent commanders of that incident and then any learning taken from that would appear on the InP database the donor can come from that could be individual team organisation or it could be something to do with equipment within the fire service right if it comes down to
00:08:47 service right if it comes down to personnel that report will go to that individuals line manager I see that to be actioned well you refer to an i and an i MP I think we've got a good I think
00:08:58 an i MP I think we've got a good I think we have the ones for Grandville in the bundle if I can just ask you to be shown tab 30 which is lfb quadrakill zero three one one four just very quickly just to see if we can capture what
00:09:10 just to see if we can capture what you're talking about that is the IOP report for grant to tower the incident ground for tower is that the sort of document that you're referring to when you talk about an incident that would be that would be
00:09:24 incident that would be that would be what the document would look like once we had finished that at PRC process it's very similar to that but you would enter it onto the ym PDS system music similar
00:09:35 it onto the ym PDS system music similar to that did you have input into the creation of this document we didn't know we we will me carry out our realm effectively we're a reporting tool for
00:09:47 effectively we're a reporting tool for the organization incident so we will come back and put that onto the system needs to be checked by that the IP team okay to accept it and it gets passed on
00:09:58 okay to accept it and it gets passed on to the relevant Department yes in your statement when you you say you help incident command just go back to that again how do you achieve that how do you go
00:10:10 how do you achieve that how do you go about health millions of income and I'd rather go back to what I'd said originally actually about guide advise and support right that's simplifying it somewhat really okay but and it can be
00:10:22 somewhat really okay but and it can be in a myriad of ways it really depends on the incident then it's been element of adaptability right with what we do have an are wrong but generally it you know
00:10:33 an are wrong but generally it you know it can be that we're going out onto the fire ground to confirm the instructions that's been given are actually happening that structures are in place we asked our developer social systems of work she
00:10:44 our developer social systems of work she visits naturally a got a lot particular Largent's and it takes a while for you to get things in place units that happened just in not two minutes it's something that you practically do but
00:10:55 something that you practically do but you can take awhile to do that and that can also happen with an escalation of incident we've got more officers coming up and then you stop putting them into positions to strengthen the command
00:11:07 positions to strengthen the command structure yes I see so if you in simple terms is the AR T's role to assist an incident commander to comply with policy where you observe that he or she might
00:11:19 where you observe that he or she might not be complying with policy yes yes but not excited be the incent commanders decision to
00:11:30 decision to you know make an incident up or no yes I probably would be there to assist and guide if asked for requested right okay and that would that would then
00:11:42 and that would that would then inevitably feed into the decisions made by the incident commander would it and potentially yes I mean if we were going out on a fire ground for example and I
00:11:53 out on a fire ground for example and I was coming back and I was giving updates the incident commander you're hoping that the updates you're giving him would enhance his situation awareness of the incident and that hopefully date his decision making progress in moving a
00:12:05 decision making progress in moving a tactical plan forward is the role of an ort or vor T set out in any policy or procedure document I'm sorry is the role of the ort set out in
00:12:16 sorry is the role of the ort set out in any policy or procedure document there is an our team now yes okay now do you have training to be or did you have training to be a member of the ort yes I
00:12:29 training to be a member of the ort yes I can it's something you have to within the organization posts are advertised so you have to give an expression of interest right once that's been accepted
00:12:40 interest right once that's been accepted you have to set a knowledge test once you've passed knowledge test you have a period of shadowing with existing party
00:12:51 period of shadowing with existing party officers that have been fully functional rather for quite a long time that would take for several months during that shadowing period we also have to sit through a Shannon period of the
00:13:02 through a Shannon period of the performance review commands that I previously spoke about to be attend notes as well and at the end of that we have to have a level-3 in Santa Monica sighs riot if
00:13:16 a level-3 in Santa Monica sighs riot if you pass that and you get on there you come a functional absolutely Artie is there is there a minimum level of seniority but above below which you're
00:13:30 seniority but above below which you're not qualified to be a member of the ort a broadly speaking it's station managing and group managers that are in Yama teak does that mean that anybody being admitted into the LRT would have good
00:13:43 admitted into the LRT would have good experience of being an incident commander yes now you were in the ort on the night of Grenfell had you had
00:13:58 the night of Grenfell had you had training on high-rise fire fighting policy and first survival guidance policy 633 and 790 yes I've had training
00:14:10 policy 633 and 790 yes I've had training on highways policy most definitely over a number of years as a junior officer I probably had high rice training at fire
00:14:22 probably had high rice training at fire service college in Morton Amash and then as I've gone through my junior officer promotions high-rise training which is obviously outside the high-rise training
00:14:33 obviously outside the high-rise training you would have done it at station and then as a senior officer station manager and high-rise training yes again and I
00:14:44 and high-rise training yes again and I like to remember on one of my we do incident management assessments we have to do that as a requirement in the fire brigade every year you have to attend
00:14:56 brigade every year you have to attend units of management courses provided by our external training provider back book and
00:15:02 and were attending one of those where the actual simulated incident I was given by the training provider was a high wasn't right have you ever had training on how to fight a fire on the exterior of a
00:15:13 to fight a fire on the exterior of a building well no I mean other than couple other than using covering jets
00:15:24 couple other than using covering jets and an error appliance pertinent no specific training on the on the exterior of the building have you had did you ever get any training either generally or as part of the ort in how to approach
00:15:37 or as part of the ort in how to approach a fire where the material on the exterior has ignited when the fire is spreading no I've never I've never attended an innocent worthy exterior
00:15:50 attended an innocent worthy exterior skin ever hooligans acknowledged in my career so not having any training on that sorry to answer your question remembers for him and have you ever had any training on FSG communications I've
00:16:03 any training on FSG communications I've had FSG training that I've done locally when it stations and when we've attended an incident Mont course where there's
00:16:14 an incident Mont course where there's been an FSG incident I've not had any
00:16:19 centrally program to training that has taken place in the fire boat I wasn't in that role of people that came out was
00:16:30 that role of people that came out was and assigned it
00:16:33 did you ever have any training on how to go about affecting a full or partial evacuation of a residential high-rise block none now in your statement in the
00:16:48 block none now in your statement in the third paragraph on page two and I'm sorry that it's quite difficult to navigate around but it's I counted the third one down you say that in relation
00:17:01 third one down you say that in relation to your position on the ort yes that generally you liaised with the monitoring officer that we've captured
00:17:12 monitoring officer that we've captured it now yes it's the second line you say we will highlight any learning that comes out of the jobs but we generally run of incidents liaised with the monitoring officer can you just explain what the role of the monitoring officer
00:17:24 what the role of the monitoring officer involves yes okay that's actually putting up written very well to jumped into things there so yes the modern officer of a job is effectively of a
00:17:38 officer of a job is effectively of a monitor an officer on on most jobs so we just talk specifically about fires it's not making it a bit easier for pump fire you will have four machines will attend
00:17:50 you will have four machines will attend and then a station manager will attend that as a monitoring officer and that officer will be responsible for making contact it's a commander and effectively
00:18:03 contact it's a commander and effectively guide advise and support them in the rather undertaking during that incident and obviously at the incident needs more resources and it gets escalated that one officer would then
00:18:16 escalated that one officer would then take charge of that job and then another monitor officer would be ordered on to the incident to monitor the new incident commander okay and how does the
00:18:29 commander okay and how does the monitoring officer role relate to the function that the ort preferred is the Manik was home as I said earlier on as we because we sit outside the innocent come on chain
00:18:40 come on chain we're not a decision maker that's guide advise and support the monitor officer really is the first point of call for the incident commander so it's about you
00:18:51 the incident commander so it's about you know you need to allow your staff to come and we need to trash yourself better training so ultimately what we do is as an artsy officer I would speak to
00:19:02 is as an artsy officer I would speak to the monitor and officer rather than the incident commander because if you do that you've now got two people talk with the innocent commander so I would have
00:19:13 the innocent commander so I would have observations possibly or I might speak arrived in the introduced except that's on the fire ground I'm like I said one officer is there anything you've picked up yet that you need a dress in are you
00:19:24 up yet that you need a dress in are you happy with the tactical plan and we'll have a brief conversation about that and I might dolphin action something for them rather than having that been that conversation directly with the IC right because a dead dealing with more
00:19:36 because a dead dealing with more pressing things so drawing an imaginary line wool between the ort and the and the incident command structure which you said you sit outside yes so the monitoring officer is part of that
00:19:47 monitoring officer is part of that command structure but the and the ort observes and assists from outside that yes we would we were to feed him that like that about that level yes okay no yes
00:20:07 on the night I want to turn to the call-out to grenfell if I can on the night of the fire at Grenfell tower you were designated as the ort officer righteous that's what you say in your
00:20:18 righteous that's what you say in your statement is that I think that's a reference to the rotor system for the LRT isn't it yes yes yes and I think you also say that group manager Matt Cooke Matthew Cooke was also on the rate of
00:20:30 Matthew Cooke was also on the rate of that night yes he was okay in the third paragraph on page two you see that you say that it was it's mandatory for an
00:20:46 say that it was it's mandatory for an ort officer to go to an incident with six or more appliances you see that that's similar yes and if he does it against an eighth pump that triggers to
00:20:57 against an eighth pump that triggers to air off the officers to attend was this why you were mobilized because the incident had been made six yes we were originally we already paged for the make
00:21:08 originally we already paged for the make pumps six and did you have your airway first all as a station manager do you have an air wave radio I do you do did you have your air wave radio on and with
00:21:20 you have your air wave radio on and with you after you received your mobilization message yes I did okay did you hear any information over the air wave radio or any other radio you had with you bit about who the incident commander was when you were
00:21:32 incident commander was when you were mobilized and the information I had before I left its guidance and was what try to doubt images of commander okay did you get any information about the
00:21:43 did you get any information about the location of the incident command pump the location it is yeah no okay
00:21:55 in your statement on page three if I can turn to that you say in the fourth
00:22:06 turn to that you say in the fourth paragraph down that when control of an incident changes the change is relay to everyone in attendance at the fire now how is that normally done so best
00:22:20 how is that normally done so best practice would dictate if you attend an incident and you take over as a new incident commander you can send a message of control over the main scheme radio sent to an audience and commander
00:22:31 radio sent to an audience and commander and then transmit a message over the handheld five around radio channel one saying that the name of the new commander right and what happens if
00:22:43 commander right and what happens if there's a lot of traffic on the main scheme all the all the fire ground radio
00:22:50 it's not normally a problem on the on the main scheme there could be issues on channel 1 if channel 1 was very very busy right can I just ask you to look at
00:23:02 busy right can I just ask you to look at your contemporaneous note at the very beginning of that we just flip to that you say right at the very start I
00:23:15 you say right at the very start I received the ordering at home as I am a flexi officer and proceeded to the incident on mp6 after Steve West ort shadow called a shadow calling control
00:23:28 shadow called a shadow calling control of assigning us to incident um I just want to ask you about shadow can you explain what the role of an ort shadow is yes sorry that submissive
00:23:40 is yes sorry that submissive colloquialism we using the brigade as I explained earlier on about my trainings been ort officer so you have several months a doe in the fully on the run fungal RTI's Steve saari group major
00:23:53 fungal RTI's Steve saari group major West was carrying out that role on my rotor with my and grip magic cooker it's always easy he's an orphan he was shadowing you yes which means he was in training him complete his training I see did you have
00:24:08 complete his training I see did you have a discussion with Steve West yes Steve actually rang the page into control okay and were you on route when you had that
00:24:20 and were you on route when you had that discussion no what did you have a discussion with group manager Welch while you were on route to grenfell
00:24:35 like but let me help you out this slightly unfair actually we just go down into your contemporary estate a little bit lower down the page you say I also had a
00:24:46 lower down the page you say I also had a conversation with Jim West ort shadow and group manager Welch on route to the incident to incident I felt that there was a significant incident in procession
00:24:58 was a significant incident in procession so could you might having shown you that design then yes do you have a recollection of vitalization a vague recollection yeah it would have been it would have been very brief because
00:25:09 would have been very brief because obviously we're driving to the instant on earth no blue lights and do you have a recollection about what you talked about I I believe it was effectively
00:25:20 about I I believe it was effectively that about what is going on because it was escalating quite quickly yes okay and it was a case of firm see you there right now arrival at Greenville tower we
00:25:31 right now arrival at Greenville tower we have a status three time arrival time for you Matt grenfell of Oh 150 136 a.m. and that's the LF B's operational
00:25:44 and that's the LF B's operational response report at page 81 now they need to take you to it that's what it says my question is does that sound about right to you yeah that was sounding for that right right yeah now you say in your statement that the
00:25:59 now you say in your statement that the fire looked at abnormal to you and I'll just show you that it's right at the very bottom of page three you say
00:26:11 very bottom of page three you say I took it this is the second line I took a picture of the building to try and gather my thoughts it looked abnormal to me as the fire was rising vertically going up the face of sector three and it's a sector for a
00:26:22 sector three and it's a sector for a sector three when you say it looked abnormal can you just expand on that what do you mean by that yes okay well
00:26:35 what do you mean by that yes okay well first they are never in my career seen the outside of the building a life like this building was alike and it was I
00:26:46 this building was alike and it was I suppose the best word to describe it was spitting flame or burning embers off off the front face of the building and it
00:26:57 the front face of the building and it you know traveled incredibly quickly and I just the I'd never ever seen anything like him and you obviously knew there was a significant you know significant problem with the building right did you
00:27:10 problem with the building right did you have any thoughts about what it might be that was a night no I'm not if I'm honest I think my first original thought was probably 99% of tower blocks we go to in London a
00:27:21 of tower blocks we go to in London a concrete and concrete doesn't catch by and obviously this is my first view of this is when I was some distance of like you know as I got nearer and obviously in some escalate I realized it was
00:27:32 in some escalate I realized it was something fixed the outside of the building but I I didn't know what it was that could be burning that quickly you never come across an a cladding fire
00:27:45 you never come across an a cladding fire in your career I've I've come across a cladding fire or UPV sections but nothing to the severity this was was burning at night when did
00:27:58 this was was burning at night when did you come across a upv section fire - a callback accurately of four or five years ago probably but
00:28:12 of four or five years ago probably but it it was the bottom part of a window so the fact of the pop the panel was could've been a whole window but they put au PVC solid panel in that they
00:28:24 put au PVC solid panel in that they extended outside the front face that court night but excuse me on that occasion the fire stove in the compartment was dealt with it didn't got the exterior the building like this was
00:28:35 the exterior the building like this was well I'm on the subject have you heard of a or had you heard as at the night of the grenfell tower fire or they fire at shepherds caught in Shepherds Bush I had heard of it yes and had you heard of
00:28:50 heard of it yes and had you heard of anything particular about Shepherd's court well I didn't attend the incident I mean would be not a peer group with a discussion about Shepherd's court and
00:29:03 discussion about Shepherd's court and that the fire had spread up a few floors I haven't seen the official report from the fire investigation team post incident but yes that I believe had
00:29:14 incident but yes that I believe had travelled three floors but again compartment ation I understand help me out know enough for us to get in and put the fire out on those floors right and in the discussions you had about
00:29:26 in the discussions you had about Shepherd's court after chiapas called happened which was August 2016 was there any discussion about the risks posed to
00:29:37 posed to well the risks of fire spread posed by exterior cladding no nor that Tom don't think and you never had any is this
00:29:52 think and you never had any is this right you didn't never got any training on the lessons learned from Shepherd's court no
00:30:08 in your in the same sentence you refer to sectors sector four and sector three at the point at which you
00:30:19 sector three at the point at which you arrived heard sexualization of ected like right it's a little further sector four and sector three is that that was what does that a reference so that's
00:30:30 what does that a reference so that's just to I thought that might help with context that when I was getting wind of user okay
00:30:36 user okay people know that meant but I'm happy to explain that if you need me tell ya it's not our sector for sector so obviously I've seen some of the inquiry so maybe it might be easier to to set the three
00:30:47 it might be easier to to set the three within the north side the building and set the forward with the east side
00:30:56 right
00:31:01 now in your statement on page four just take you to it you say in the second paragraph at the very bottom of the second paragraph I wanted to make
00:31:16 second paragraph I wanted to make contact via the incident commander all the monitoring officer and establish if the command unit was there because that is my first port of call can I just try
00:31:27 is my first port of call can I just try and be clear are you talking here about the incident command unit sorry to repeat that so is I when you refer to the command unit are you talking about the incident command unit yes yes did
00:31:40 the incident command unit yes yes did you find out who was the incident commander when you arrived
00:31:48 no when I arrived I was still under the impression that the incident commander was watch measured out right when you arrived did you go straight to the
00:31:59 arrived did you go straight to the command unit not straight to the command unit I I've went on to the fire ground via the ledger center onto the green
00:32:11 via the ledger center onto the green which would have been on to the east side right and a quick look took a few observations and I started walking down towards Grenfell road right there was a
00:32:24 towards Grenfell road right there was a Cu part there but I knew that was Wembley's I asked a I believe it's a couple of firefighters I can't be sure that we're seeing you ate was and they pointed me back out the way I came so I
00:32:36 pointed me back out the way I came so I think we went out the way I came I'm not sure what role I turned into but I came into the top of biome water out and see you ate was there parked on the corner were you looking for cu8 and in
00:32:47 corner were you looking for cu8 and in particular I was because on route I'd heard control call cu8 and January the first squad you they will take up the instant command okay did you hear any messages going from control to see you
00:32:59 messages going from control to see you eight which were far survivable guidance messages I vaguely have erection recollection sorry of it going to see
00:33:11 recollection sorry of it going to see you I I have more recollection of it FSG calls going to appliances right will we see you eight do you remember who the officers weren't see you seven first of all did you see any officers it's you
00:33:23 all did you see any officers it's you seven no okay with perceive seven occupied I didn't go to see you seven okay and who when you say you got to see you eight yes do you remember who was on
00:33:34 you eight yes do you remember who was on board see you eight when you got there and I don't remember the name of the firefighter or the watch officer but it was only one command unit operative on
00:33:45 was only one command unit operative on the unit when I got on there there's nobody else on the unit right at the time you arrived were you aware of any other officers present other than Mike
00:33:56 other officers present other than Mike down
00:34:01 probably can't honestly answer that but Begley I would have heard people booking in the stateless 3 but my expectation would be because that incident had gone up so quickly our PD I used trigger
00:34:12 up so quickly our PD I used trigger officer mobilizations so I was confident there were senior officers on the way right did you did you take step to find out who they were and when they might arrive and only when I got to see you
00:34:26 arrive and only when I got to see you liked right and you got on to see you ate well let me just ask you before I go there you think refer in the paragraph we're looking at in your statement to
00:34:37 we're looking at in your statement to making contact via the incident commander all the monitoring officer when you refer to the monitoring officer there did you know that there was a monitoring officer on the fire ground or were you just assuming that there would
00:34:48 were you just assuming that there would be because of the number of pumps whether was they'd always be a monitoring officer on the fire ground I wasn't assuming they'd be there because it was a cordon limiter than annoy and most of the senior officers
00:34:59 annoy and most of the senior officers would be traveling from what we call a camp out base or home right sometimes sometimes EMI might get there before but ok instant commander C says the answer
00:35:10 ok instant commander C says the answer to that that you you didn't know whether the monitor a monitoring officer was that yet there get correct sorry ok now can we then look at the location of the
00:35:21 can we then look at the location of the incident command unit we've discussed that a little bit just now you say you think you went to see you seven first in the next paragraph
00:35:32 and then and then you went to see you ate yeah and do you remember when you got to see you ate how many people were
00:35:47 got to see you ate how many people were there roughly and there was one who was that
00:35:51 that do you know the command unit operative the command unit operative what one of the botch offices that writes the command unit so ok do you know who that was I don't recall their name no sorry
00:36:02 was I don't recall their name no sorry ok
00:36:04 ok how long after you arrived and and the status 3 do you think you arrived at the command unit we're come on unit 8 I
00:36:15 command unit we're come on unit 8 I think the best best time skylark and give I have myself approximately get on
00:36:26 give I have myself approximately get on the commander around 2 o'clock okay so probably maybe I don't know I 8 to 10 minutes after getting there right because sorry to provider that joins
00:36:37 because sorry to provider that joins continuing yes okay so when I got onto the command unit Lux there was one co-operative on there I asked him where
00:36:49 co-operative on there I asked him where the team leader was he said to be the team leader was out on the fire ground trying to make contact with the incident commander we did have another brief conversation but I can't really remember
00:37:00 conversation but I can't really remember the detail of that right and then I went over to the TV screen on the command unit which is a command support system to see if I could start looking at the
00:37:11 to see if I could start looking at the list of officers that are attending and I would say within probably 30 seconds to a minute after that group manager Welch and station manager loft came on
00:37:22 Welch and station manager loft came on to the command unit okay did the CSS work I didn't get seal the officers from my
00:37:33 I didn't get seal the officers from my recollection and the green light was up in the top corner right which would indicate that it's active right okay no that was on cu8 yes see you like this
00:37:44 no that was on cu8 yes see you like this okay but you didn't get the information off the CSS at that time no okay no just dealing with who you encountered and have you ever heard of all met station
00:37:58 have you ever heard of all met station manager met at Muroc Dan Merrick station match America's first manager yes have you know what was that what was watch
00:38:13 you know what was that what was watch manager Merrick the officer you saw on cu8 and I know he works in the color it could have been fatal but it was I don't have erection at the recollection
00:38:24 have erection at the recollection they've been watching badge America now you refer to a team leader and you couldn't see the team leader is the team leader someone senior to on the on the
00:38:35 leader someone senior to on the on the see you it's normal that no he that's a that's a rollover that's allocate between them so they write a maximum of three or a minimum of two on the command unit they're both watch managers it's
00:38:47 unit they're both watch managers it's just a role they allocate themselves on on different shifts I see and what does the team leader do it some a team leader initiative would go out and make contact unison commander try map fire ground
00:39:01 unison commander try map fire ground come back and then he would assist the incident command afternoon throughout the incident as it escalated with you know the command support function did you ever find out who the team leader
00:39:12 you ever find out who the team leader for cu8 was I have subsequently found out I didn't tell them not who it was
00:39:20 and you say subsequently I might as well ask you okay sorry operators watch magic Kent filter Kent
00:39:35 now you say in your statement as you've just told us that within a few minutes of arriving on the Cu Cu 8 group manager Richard Welch and station manager Brett loft arrived at the Cu you remember that
00:39:49 loft arrived at the Cu you remember that do yesterday yes okay do you remember whether they were talking about anything and they were up in a conversation when they came on to the unit I didn't I wasn't privy or couldn't hear what they were saying as they were getting on okay
00:40:01 they were getting on okay now you you say in your statement and it's you can just a little bit below
00:40:14 it's you can just a little bit below halfway down on page four we just get that paragraph expanded after the conversation that you didn't hear what they were talking about you say at that
00:40:27 they were talking about you say at that stage is picking it up in the middle Richard Welch was effectively the most senior ranking officer there so he took charge of the incident sort of ask you a little bit about that um who did you
00:40:41 little bit about that um who did you understand that Richard Welch to be taking charge from what treasurer dad one which registered out yes he did you
00:40:53 one which registered out yes he did you have any understanding about what and station manager lofts role was at that point because of course he was senior to watch manager doubt him yes he was but
00:41:06 watch manager doubt him yes he was but at that point wit obviously a dynamic incent unraveling in front of us that was clearly escalating it was probably at 25 pump fire there yes so Richard Welch being the GM would trump
00:41:20 Richard Welch being the GM would trump the station manager in terms of insult come on no one so the expectation would be that the GM would take that not the SM right did you know when the station
00:41:31 SM right did you know when the station manager loft had arrived at the incident ground no did you ask yourself the question were wise Mike Garden still the incident commander given that he's only
00:41:43 incident commander given that he's only a watch manager when station manager loft is here I wasn't aware of any previous communications at that mean obviously prior to my arrival I wasn't
00:41:54 obviously prior to my arrival I wasn't it I wasn't surprised that watch merged out and was in charge of a 20 pump fire because he it made the call for two air pump fire in so much as the incident that escalated so quickly that as those
00:42:07 that escalated so quickly that as those incremental messages or as the incremental messages when there would be senior officers on roof so I just thought it was that over some of the scene officers had attended yet or maybe they had made contact might Dowden and
00:42:21 they had made contact might Dowden and possibly had taken over but I hadn't heard
00:42:24 heard verbally over radio that was in unison commander so by nature that idea forward to the fact that I still felt watched major dadums Ensenada okay did Brett loft say anything about what his would
00:42:36 loft say anything about what his would you hear Brett loft said anything about what his role at that point was um I didn't speak to Brett loft if I'm honest I directed all my attention at that point to which he'd vote did you hear
00:42:50 point to which he'd vote did you hear any mention of station manager Andy Waltons involvement at that stage no now we have a booking in time for him the
00:43:02 we have a booking in time for him the status three at the command unit as one forty and twelve seconds did you know that he had arrived on the incident ground at that point no I
00:43:14 incident ground at that point no I hadn't seen Andy before not until I got to the fire ground that I stopped seeing more officers okay so you weren't aware that he had arrived before group manager Welch no I knew he had been just putting
00:43:26 Welch no I knew he had been just putting a bit of context on you he had been paged to attend the incident so I knew he was enroute but I didn't I wouldn't have been aware unless had physically heard him booked state was three on his
00:43:37 heard him booked state was three on his air wife but we do that bar are called signs and sometimes I can Trevor will call signs the officer said weren't necessary they're cool so I'd miss it necessarily correlate with their name no
00:43:49 necessarily correlate with their name no I see that and did you know we have a booking in time for Andy McLaughlin DAC Andy McLaughlin as 154 and 30 seconds that's the time we have for him arriving
00:44:01 that's the time we have for him arriving and being status three did you know that DAC McLaughlin had arrived before group manager Welch and sorry its enemies O'Laughlin sorry just said in my statement is
00:44:13 sorry just said in my statement is backhoe locking it so locking it then no I didn't know but obviously the size of the insert at that point would have generated the paging of the Deputy
00:44:25 generated the paging of the Deputy Assistant Commissioner so I knew there would be one enroute and before I'd left I hadn't
00:44:31 I hadn't - that information from control or from state west 6a can we summarize it this way that you weren't aware of any handovers of incident command from Mike Darden - Andy Walton and then from Andy
00:44:43 Darden - Andy Walton and then from Andy Walton - DAC a Lachlan you won't know okay now we have a record in the short incident log of Richard Welch taking
00:44:55 incident log of Richard Welch taking over and confirming his taking over as incident commander at o2 o4 20 are they need to show to you it's because you want to see it but does that time sound
00:45:06 want to see it but does that time sound about right to you yeah sounds fairly out - I mean that would that would time with I think the timestamp I have of me arriving on see you I am Richard in sorry pretty major Welch and such much
00:45:17 sorry pretty major Welch and such much loss coming on on that unit as quickly as that yes right that were you clear in your mind as to who had been and who was now in fact in Samantha I was clearing
00:45:29 now in fact in Samantha I was clearing my mind the watch Madrid Alden was the instant commander because I hadn't been tell her otherwise and I was more than clearing my mind off the conversation the group managed to Welch that he was
00:45:42 the group managed to Welch that he was now lien said commander because we sent that message while we was telling the command unit and that went back to control right did you see hear or observe any hand over between Mike Allen
00:45:53 observe any hand over between Mike Allen and Richard Welch no would it be normal for there to be no handover between incident commanders at an incident no it
00:46:06 incident commanders at an incident no it wouldn't be normal but there was nothing normal about this incident right I think we needed to start getting a great control in the incident and Richard took
00:46:22 control in the incident and Richard took on the responsibilities at the level that he's at within the organization to take charge of that incident do you know did you know whether Mike darling would
00:46:34 did you know whether Mike darling would be aware that he had been relieved of incident command in favor of group manager Welch I think by nature the
00:46:50 manager Welch I think by nature the incident when you've gone down to the tower you would have come across wiped out and outside so Richard would have had the experience to bump into me and
00:47:01 had the experience to bump into me and then tell him that I would think but I don't know that the necessity was to get a great number of control down that tower that time and that was the right
00:47:12 tower that time and that was the right decision to make would it not well it would it be important though for my gun to know that he had been relieved of incident command yes it would it it would have happened
00:47:26 yes it would it it would have happened at some point it was critical that we got a more senior ranking officer down on DS that far grant did you yourself
00:47:37 on DS that far grant did you yourself take any steps to find out whether Mike down knew that he was he was being relieved of incident command and being replaced by a Richard Welch and we're sorry we are jumping
00:47:50 sorry we are jumping a little bit here because there is an up a little bit of my statement that will slow this conversation up a little bit should I say
00:48:06 would you yes I'm serious I'm a specific election about Mike Downton my dad's home the message the message went over the radios yes I can't confirm whether
00:48:17 the radios yes I can't confirm whether that was acknowledged on channel one right no
00:48:31 in your statement you say that you and Matt and then all of you had a discussion about there being a major incident and this is
00:48:48 the bottom part of page four of your statement and you picked it up but it's being picked up there but it candidly by documents director can I just ask you
00:49:00 documents director can I just ask you can you just tell us what that discussion involved yes it's gives a little bit of context map arrived on the command unit not long after I had we've group major West and
00:49:14 after I had we've group major West and unrooted insert group magic Kirkuk and icy road had had a conversation about giving consideration for major incident
00:49:25 giving consideration for major incident it was great mantid cooked myself and group manager but which to be fair had that conversation right okay and following that conversation Richard
00:49:37 following that conversation Richard Bennett's and commander decided that he was in the declaring a major incident and that message was also sent over to main skiing over here yes and what factors did you take into account or did
00:49:48 factors did you take into account or did you observe Richard Welch taking into account when deciding that this fire was a major incident I think obviously it's have been made up
00:49:59 I think obviously it's have been made up at that point I Richard to contrition maintenance and up to forty to forty that's a significant fire for us in in London yeah and I think the time of day
00:50:11 London yeah and I think the time of day the amount of his chuckles it was stolen coming and the amount of people and residents potentially at building that's why we're done major incident did you
00:50:24 why we're done major incident did you know at the time that the police have themselves declared a major incident just after 1:30 no
00:50:40 just came back to the egg that the question of hand over from Mike Dowden I think you've told us that there wasn't effectively and handover from Mike doubt and of incident command to Richard Welch
00:50:52 and of incident command to Richard Welch would it be important or would it would it not be important for them to have a handover say that Richard Welch could essentially take over seamlessly from from 9,000 yes best practice would be
00:51:05 from 9,000 yes best practice would be that you had it that you would have a handover most definitely and it's something that we encouraged was done you know the best of our abilities depend on how dynamic an incident is but Richard Welch never went to light doubt
00:51:17 Richard Welch never went to light doubt in his innocent calendar was there a risk then that Mike that Richard Welch would not receive from my dad and all the information that he would need to start and take on the role of incident
00:51:29 start and take on the role of incident commander no because I think when Richard Welch got to the fire ground there was a conversation with my dad and
00:51:40 there was a conversation with my dad and my dad I was aware that he'd been put in to run the fire scepter right at this point when Richard Welch declares a major incident and pumps 40 did you know
00:51:53 major incident and pumps 40 did you know whether da cero war or Commissioner Danny cotton were enroute AC ro and sort of they basically row and no I didn't
00:52:07 of they basically row and no I didn't know they were on route but again as I explained the real with it but the PTAs we have for the incremental you know they would have been notified so I can't say hundred said they Robin rewind you they were on route because of the precise is incident yes now at the top
00:52:21 precise is incident yes now at the top of page five of your statement you say I imagine pretty early on that K and C would have been informed it triggers a lot of established working parties
00:52:32 lot of established working parties support networks local hospitals that kind of thing when you say it triggers is that a reference to the declaration of major incident yes is okay and were
00:52:45 of major incident yes is okay and were you aware whether in fact K and C Kensington and Chelsea had been informed that there was a major incident no no I had no contact the kind see throughout
00:52:56 had no contact the kind see throughout the course of the evening right you then go on to say that group the Richard
00:53:08 go on to say that group the Richard Welch task Steve I think at Steve West with getting the methane massive message and then you explain what methane is in your statement could you just explain in
00:53:22 statement could you just explain in simple terms for us what methane it what it does what's the effect of sending out a methane message it so the methane messages is a effective sentence and a Crim for a message that we send from the
00:53:35 Crim for a message that we send from the fire ground wants you to Claire the major incident and that's about letting all the other pretty light responders know it's a recognized message that you know assets have been the protocols of Joint Working amongst emergency services
00:53:48 Joint Working amongst emergency services so that would go to the police and ambulance control rooms and they would be aware that we've now declared it a major incident right and one of the
00:54:00 major incident right and one of the letters in them in the acronym is number and type of casualties do you just scroll down you can see the methane
00:54:11 scroll down you can see the methane stands for major incident exact location type of incident as the th's hazards a is access n is number and type of casualties and ears emergency services present and required
00:54:23 present and required do you know what the contents of the methane message worth for number and type of casualties no okay however the meth a message be broadcast
00:54:37 however the meth a message be broadcast what media would medium would be used to broadcast immediately famous yeah that would go over the bank scheme radio main skin to control so it would go to control and then control the depth
00:54:48 control and then control the depth disseminate it would they yes from there to the other responders correct I see okay small point the calamities again is
00:55:01 okay small point the calamities again is right in the control room would they respond to a methane message or would they respond to a declaration of a major incident or do the two always get together sorry Kara peanut yes
00:55:14 together sorry Kara peanut yes in so far as you know with the control room respond to the declaration of a major of a major incident or will they respond to the methane message that would follow it well they would respond
00:55:28 would follow it well they would respond to both so you write the Declaration of major incident would get more vehicles mobilized and the methane message in
00:55:39 mobilized and the methane message in that which had already declared a major incident the maintain message is to enhance if you're not situation as you know a snapshot what we've got to just
00:55:52 know a snapshot what we've got to just go the main scheme right yeah and that would be repeated back to whoever incentive mercy what does that what does the control room do at the moment an incident a major incident is declared do
00:56:04 incident a major incident is declared do you know I don't know sorry I don't know
00:56:10 we then turn to the arrival of da CEO Lachlan and you cover that in the next paragraph in your statement you say we were starting to build a tactical plan
00:56:22 were starting to build a tactical plan when DAC and ei Lachlan arrived on the unit and can you explain there what you mean by the tactical plan so that this
00:56:33 mean by the tactical plan so that this was a very brief discussion and we'd start talking about getting some station managers down to the tower and stop putting a command command structure in place that would have been you know getting hold of her or meeting up with
00:56:44 getting hold of her or meeting up with watch major Dowden to get information off of him and then just to progress the incident on but while we were having a discussion about the ICAO Lachlan came on to the command unit right what was
00:56:59 on to the command unit right what was the plan that you were beginning to put together at the moment he arrived we were discussing about getting down to the terrace which he could with a couple of station managers and start up there with some structuring and make sure that the other water supplies have been which
00:57:12 the other water supplies have been which they already were because it seemed that at the preferred my site and just make sure that we were getting ba into that building as quickly as as expedient as we could okay who was involved in formulating that
00:57:23 who was involved in formulating that plan apart from you that was a discussion with the it's a command chain if you like at that time who is that group mentorship Welch and myself and
00:57:35 group mentorship Welch and myself and RIT magic map cook nice but like I said if this didn't conversation didn't take long because Angelo Lachlan came on to the Union yes okay when you were
00:57:47 the Union yes okay when you were discussing that plan and I know you say you didn't get very far with it did you consider what to do about the stay-put policy no not at that time right did you
00:58:00 policy no not at that time right did you consider the possibility of implementing a full or partial evacuation of the building no now we have da CEO lachman's arrival on the command unit as 0 150 430
00:58:15 arrival on the command unit as 0 150 430 now that's a soft time it's and it's not a confirmed time but does that sound about right to you sorry could you repeat the officer's name and the time yeah well actually I'll show you the reference in the in
00:58:28 I'll show you the reference in the in the it's page 81 it 84 you can just be shown that this is an l FB product
00:58:40 shown that this is an l FB product documents a report and they source the time as best they can and own 51 54 30
00:58:51 time as best they can and own 51 54 30 if you see 2/3 of the way down the page it says echo 6 dacl document arrives at Grenville tower and it goes on oh well
00:59:03 Grenville tower and it goes on oh well but he does not book in with control on the radio or phone and spoke for busy and he doesn't want to interrupt the FSG calls and as the source of that information is his own breakfast his
00:59:14 information is his own breakfast his phone and his own witness statement but can does that trigger a recollection with you as to the time at which he arrived
00:59:25 it difficult to answer he may would have arrived at the incident right that he wasn't on the command unit okay and you then say in your statement
00:59:36 and you then say in your statement distinct fingers go back to your statement the same paragraph next sentence
00:59:51 you say as DAC he became the incident commander and he assumed command he asked Richard to go to the bridgehead to run it for him to tackle the far as best
01:00:02 run it for him to tackle the far as best we could and effectively take on the fire sector I then left the command unit with Richard Welch now was there a handover between Richard Welch and DAC
01:00:13 handover between Richard Welch and DAC allotting yes in so much as I was I saying
01:00:21 saying now you're gonna be I see I mean we didn't have significant amount of information about the fire ground I believe that Andy was walking to the
01:00:33 I believe that Andy was walking to the command unit had observed what was happening so I believe he probably moved in that way but you would have to ask and it's clear firm that was typically how long roughly had Richard Welch being
01:00:45 how long roughly had Richard Welch being incident commander when da co Lachlan took over incident commander I mean roughly
01:00:55 five minutes revives five six minutes I would say maybe less okay Wendy ACA
01:01:07 would say maybe less okay Wendy ACA Lachlan took over incident command was a message sent on the main screen radio or or by RT fall back to the vector control
01:01:18 or by RT fall back to the vector control I don't know I can't confirm that okay okay um we've been gained from just over an hour and mr. Mulholland are you happy to continue for a further 15 minutes or
01:01:29 to continue for a further 15 minutes or so what would you want to bring now so we'll have a break nerves okay yes yeah we're doing great now ten minutes do you think that before yes
01:01:40 ten minutes do you think that before yes well in that case we'll the right with you mr. minute yes absolutely all right I'm gonna stop now just over ten minutes starts again in quarter to eleven that's right and please things to
01:01:51 eleven that's right and please things to talk to anyone about your evidence like to get the option
01:02:05 all right we'll start again it cost to love Jesus
01:02:17 you
01:15:34 he's always way I think yes mr. chairman say
01:15:54 all right miss Flo would really scary oh yes good yes mr. Willard its miss Mahalo thank you very much for coming back to us first of all can I just tell you what we have in the record so we can fix it
01:16:06 we have in the record so we can fix it about da CEO Lachlan's taking over we have a radio message to control time dat o to 11:48 which says
01:16:17 control time dat o to 11:48 which says that da CR Lachlan is now officer in charge to 11:48 does that roughly recollect with a chime with your information best I can recollect I don't
01:16:29 information best I can recollect I don't believe I was on the command unit when that message went I'd probably led to command you in a couple of minutes before that so right did you hear it did
01:16:40 before that so right did you hear it did you hear the message I don't recall hearing it coming now did you know at the time then that dacl Oakland had taken over incident command yes because I was on the command unit
01:16:51 yes because I was on the command unit and witnessed the conversation between him and crew major Welch I see saying that he was gonna take over job and send Richardson to the hotel right the reference to the message is lfb
01:17:04 reference to the message is lfb quadruple zero two one five one can I go back to a statement then please and ask you to look at page five you say in the top quarter of that that you asked Steve
01:17:20 top quarter of that that you asked Steve to run Richard Welch tasks to Steve with getting the methane message then you explain what the methane message is I don't think you say there that that Steve actually sent the methane message
01:17:33 Steve actually sent the methane message my question is do you know whether it was actually sent now I can't confirm that how would a methane message if sent be recorded generally that would be
01:17:46 be recorded generally that would be written down on a message pad on the command unit right we had to the comms officer on the command unit and they would send the message over the main screen where would it be recorded
01:17:58 main screen where would it be recorded in the own vision my understand yes my understanding said that that message went to control and control receipt it
01:18:09 went to control and control receipt it there would be a record of it some way right if it was sent there'd be a record of it yes okay now we don't actually
01:18:22 of it yes okay now we don't actually have a record of it at least in the short incident log does that surprise you it would surprise me if we didn't
01:18:36 you it would surprise me if we didn't have it if it was sentient yes now you say in the paragraph that starts just after the methane message and then
01:18:47 just after the methane message and then we looked at this before the break we were starting to build the tactical plan when you were discussing the tactical plan with Richard Welch and Matt Cooke
01:18:58 plan with Richard Welch and Matt Cooke were you aware of any existing tactical plan no so so far as you were concerned this tactical plan that you were starting to build was the first tactical plan that there was is that right and so
01:19:13 plan that there was is that right and so I could you repeat that yeah that the tactical plan that you were beginning to discuss with Richard Welch and Matt cook when dacl Aachen arrived was the first tactical plan you knew about for the incident is that
01:19:26 knew about for the incident is that right
01:19:27 right yes by only so much as exciting on the fire ground so I think the previous attendance and watch was doubt and what a very tactical plan they were implementing at the time now you then go
01:19:38 implementing at the time now you then go on to say that
01:19:42 he has an da Lachlan asked Richard to go to the bridge had to run it for him to tackle the far as best we could and effectively take on the far sector
01:20:01 did dacl documents say anything about how to fight the fire no adaptive sir
01:20:11 did you gain any understanding about what DAC a lot me I thought about the nature the nature of the fire I think his initial thoughts were that
01:20:24 I think his initial thoughts were that it was a very serious incident yeah but beyond that beyond that did you get any understanding of what da C's understanding was about what the what was the light and why no okay did you
01:20:39 was the light and why no okay did you have a discussion with DAC a Lachlan about what you thought was a light and why not me personally not okay was there any discussion that you saw heard or
01:20:50 any discussion that you saw heard or observed in any way about with a with a DAC a Lachlan about the statehood policy no not that time not about time and what about evacuation know that believe so
01:21:03 about evacuation know that believe so now you refer to the for the fire sector what was the fire sector that you refer
01:21:14 what was the fire sector that you refer to there in your statement well the fire set was effectively from the third floor to a 23rd it's the whole
01:21:27 the third floor to a 23rd it's the whole building affected me effectively yes had there been any sector ization at the stage at which dacl ottoman arrives I
01:21:40 stage at which dacl ottoman arrives I don't believe so not that I've been told off do you remember when sector ization was applied to the best of my knowledge
01:21:51 was applied to the best of my knowledge when great major Gulch went down to the tower I'm not saying that it wasn't already being put in place there was
01:22:03 already being put in place there was order I mean Richard Greek major workers got into the tower before I did when I arrived there was order there [Music]
01:22:13 [Music] so Richard a fairly went to take over the fire scepter okay now DAC a Lachlan has given us a statement or rather he's given the
01:22:24 statement or rather he's given the police a statement which we've seen in which he says that any in the first of the discussion he had with you and group manager Matt Cooke and he says that he asked you to make sure things were safe
01:22:38 asked you to make sure things were safe and working well and help you command and oversee or help him command and oversee the incident and make sure things were in place that's more or less
01:22:50 things were in place that's more or less verbatim what he says in his statement does that is that is that consistent with your recollection of the conversation you had with him
01:22:58 I have a recollection of the conversation now don't remember that much detail of that okay can you remember anything about what da
01:23:10 can you remember anything about what da Co Lachman said to you yeah other than yes to go down to the fire ground with Richard in support in that you know in
01:23:21 Richard in support in that you know in the early stages he was anything he needed in terms of resources and making sure that we were effectively getting attack on the fire and get to as many of those FS she cause as we could was that consistent with your continuing in an
01:23:33 consistent with your continuing in an ort capacity or was that you now getting involved with operations I think I was still in my party capacity at that point
01:23:45 still in my party capacity at that point we thought I was in my a lot II capacity at that point as a job when an on I think was more adaptability required
01:23:56 think was more adaptability required right but at that point I was going down in my RT capacity is that how you understood group manager yesterday I see a lot ins instruction yes okay
01:24:12 you then say that you left the command unit with Richard Welsh did anybody else go with you my recollection is it was
01:24:25 go with you my recollection is it was myself and grit major Welch initially I think great magic cook fall out shortly offers some distance behind us I don't recall anybody else walking down to town
01:24:39 recall anybody else walking down to town me at that point now there are two cooks there article which cook was it who I'm referring to sorry GM cook that's Gareth know that I'd be mad
01:24:50 that's Gareth know that I'd be mad sorry that's Matt cook not Gareth cook okay so at the time of Grenfell sorry busy mix-up at the tomogram Phil Gareth cook was a station manager you're going to leave now subsequently a quick
01:25:02 to leave now subsequently a quick voucher look Mike it's my mistake but you your recollection is that so far as any cook went with you it was Matt yes not directly with this but you know that
01:25:14 not directly with this but you know that behind us somewhat okay can you can you tell us how much further communication you then had with dacl often and throughout the rest of the incident
01:25:30 I had more contact with doco Loughran it's hard to say how much contact ID I mean on several occasions I would have had to contact him and given him updates
01:25:41 had to contact him and given him updates or okay now then can I ask you please to turn to the middle of page five of your statement where you say cu7 was assigned
01:25:53 statement where you say cu7 was assigned as the FSG unit they would have an FSG coordinator who would run that and we'd be collating all the information on the FSG calls that were coming in from control and then you go on to explain
01:26:09 control and then you go on to explain what they would do login the information from the call location where they are and this would then be passed to the incident commander said he had an idea of where we were and to the far sector
01:26:20 of where we were and to the far sector where we were committing ba so they could tell the crews where they needed to go and depending upon which floor prioritize where to go I've read that all's you have been a number of
01:26:31 all's you have been a number of questions about it and when did you learn that cu7 had been assigned as the FSG unit
01:26:45 I'd find that very difficult to get to home I was told by my colleague group magic cook that cu7 have been asanas FSG
01:26:56 magic cook that cu7 have been asanas FSG command unit with grip range of griddle as the FSG coordinator and assisted by station major Egan what time-wise at
01:27:10 station major Egan what time-wise at Sakura Tori so sorry no please continue and Tom was I find it very difficult but again I'd like to think that a message may have been sent to say that cu7 more accepting FSG calls all they were a
01:27:21 accepting FSG calls all they were a first-year unit so that might be able to time stamp if it helps yes and can I ask you then to be shown at 23:00 which is the short incident log
01:27:35 and
01:27:39 we go please to page 22
01:27:48 you can see 22333 there's a message si D
01:28:00 you can see 22333 there's a message si D key cu7 runnel FSG calls buyer see you now that's the short incident log which is the record of the message coming from
01:28:12 is the record of the message coming from the control room by radio it appears and the time mark is what I want to show you it's Oh to 2333 would that be consistent
01:28:24 it's Oh to 2333 would that be consistent with your recollection as to when you discover that cu7 was the FSG unit it's it's feasible yes I I do have trouble with some of the timings but if that's
01:28:35 with some of the timings but if that's what's going on the SE is feasible that's the time though
01:28:43 now you refer to the efest coordinates where FSG coordinator being there's a
01:28:55 where FSG coordinator being there's a group manager Goodall yes um do you know what that would involve what what would coordinator involved and well some would
01:29:09 coordinator involved and well some would be responsible for collecting that information that comes in through control hope for trying to get some order sensing that and get that to
01:29:22 order sensing that and get that to Bridget why means so that the FSG calls could be actioned as quickly as expediently as possible right just breaking that down a little bit in terms of what you would expect what would be
01:29:36 of what you would expect what would be the communication link from the control room to see you seven normally normally it would be done by you did my phone as
01:29:48 it would be done by you did my phone as a phone there's a phone and command you to do that you can visit direct there's a direct line into control just dedicate from the command yet so they could do
01:29:59 from the command yet so they could do that or you can change radio channels on the main scheme radio in order to do that if that was designated our both of those means of communication recorded
01:30:15 I believe I've got very limited knowledge of control if it comes through on their main system then I think it's
01:30:27 on their main system then I think it's probably recorded on the Hardison so maybe it goes our main scheme radio would be recorded right I'm talking about communications between the control room and cu7 yes this FSG information being passed
01:30:41 yes this FSG information being passed between cu7 and controlled by main scheme that would be recorded too I'm not quite sure if they use the phone on the command unit whether that the phone
01:30:52 the command unit whether that the phone it contacts in control I'm not certain about you have to probably get from control did you see for yourself the communication communications between the
01:31:05 communication communications between the control room and cu7 on the night no I didn't come see you some didn't go on to see you something okay and then the next link in the chain how would you normally expect the personnel on cu7
01:31:19 normally expect the personnel on cu7 to record the FSG information that they were getting from control on a controller information form and then what would they do with that control information form that would be excuse me
01:31:32 information form that would be excuse me written out by whoever's taking the information and the step would be kept on the command unit ordinarily transmit the message by radio but you've also got
01:31:45 the message by radio but you've also got a hard copy of the FS G chord as well you say you didn't go on to the on to command unit second did you come to know
01:31:56 command unit second did you come to know during the night of how FSG messages were coming in to see you seven coming
01:32:07 were coming in to see you seven coming in to know I assume they're all coming from control did you come to know during the night how messages were being sent FSG messages were being sent from command unit seven to the bridgehead
01:32:20 command unit seven to the bridgehead that was by runners and rheya a mix of both
01:32:25 both how much detailed you did you come to know about that
01:32:30 I guess enough detail to know that they were the two forms of what was happening so once group manager cook had informed me that cu7 had been set up as FSG I
01:32:43 me that cu7 had been set up as FSG I went into the tower to observe that that system and process was happening did you come to discover that there was a watchman at your standing outside the
01:32:55 watchman at your standing outside the tower collating FSG information and sending it into the tower No
01:33:08 now you say that you left the bridgehead and you did just be on the paragraph we're on you say Richard Welsh continued
01:33:20 we're on you say Richard Welsh continued on into the building while I attempted what we call a 360 to try and establish what was going on now could you just tell us what a 360 is yeah effectively
01:33:32 tell us what a 360 is yeah effectively that's just me it's one taken for my situational awareness taken observation to fire grounds we definitely say we try and even that why not be around we walk around the fire ground so it's it's you
01:33:43 around the fire ground so it's it's you know a term we use it's a 360 right when you how far did you get I wasn't able to say I went from the Southside round I went round to the playgrounds the west
01:33:57 went round to the playgrounds the west side is water north I wasn't able to get back round the north side because there was too much material and debris playing off the rebuild at that point so I went
01:34:09 off the rebuild at that point so I went back round to the south side and then walked up the east side have a look did you have a fire ground radio with you I did did you have an air wave radio with you yes could you hear any messages coming over it at that time on both on
01:34:23 coming over it at that time on both on on either
01:34:24 on either I heard messages on my handheld radiographer but not my oh by Friday what did you hear any messages on your fire ground radio about about an in
01:34:39 fire ground radio about about an in particular that sticks in your mind while you were doing on 360 not at that point I mean it was it was still at that point very very dynamic and there was an awful lot of people so that the radio
01:34:50 awful lot of people so that the radio traffic on channel 1 was very heavy when you were doing your 360 or partial 360 as far as he could get did you have any thoughts about full or partial
01:35:02 thoughts about full or partial evacuation of the tower at that point not at that point because I hadn't got into the tower I needed to get a an awareness of what was happening and what we were doing right could you see for yourself whether
01:35:13 right could you see for yourself whether the fire had penetrated into flats that was difficult to say at the time [Music]
01:35:22 [Music] obviously I wasn't familiar with the block at all and looking up from being quite close to the tower I wasn't sure whether it was all windows and balconies appeared like it had got into the tower
01:35:36 appeared like it had got into the tower maybe in a couple of flats but that was really the only observation I had at that point once you got back did you have any information as to the
01:35:48 have any information as to the conditions of smoke or heat or fire inside the building at that point that night did you seek any information as to the conditions within the building at
01:35:59 the conditions within the building at that point not at that point but then I had my handheld radio on the 5-iron channel channel one I would probably have picked up more of that on channel 6
01:36:10 have picked up more of that on channel 6 which is the VI channel so no right did you switch to channel 6 to try to find out what the VA crews were saying that night because at that point we were still trying to establish the very firm
01:36:23 still trying to establish the very firm and yell options get down to the tower set up the fire sector right and start committing bi and get as much information is good to make an attack on the fire and gets as many FSG moves as
01:36:34 the fire and gets as many FSG moves as we could right what did you what did you learn from your partial 360
01:36:42 that we did have a very very significant incident and [Music]
01:36:54 I was still perplexed at how
01:37:01 the building could be burning like that on the exterior and I think one of my thoughts that point was there must be flammable blanket wrap around this
01:37:12 flammable blanket wrap around this building Holland you comfortable carrying up yes yeah I'm fine yeah just the tracking of the fire it was nothing I've never ever
01:37:23 the fire it was nothing I've never ever seen anything like that in my whole career I I don't think cumulatively with the hundreds of years of experience we have that fire ground out no I don't think anybody else had ever seen what
01:37:35 think anybody else had ever seen what was happening
01:37:39 you go on to say in your statement at the bottom of the page I then went into the building to see Richard Welch at the
01:37:50 the building to see Richard Welch at the bridgehead and it's I've tried to give you a paragraph number it's not very easy it's about different four-fifths of the way down and we've got it there which can you say which at that time was on the third floor
01:38:03 do you know how long the bridge had had been on the third floor fall when you went in just to give us an idea of a timeline I don't I mean that that's the best recollection elaborate it was on
01:38:14 best recollection elaborate it was on the third floor okay I don't know how long it had been on the third floor and you say a few lines down
01:38:25 third floor and you say a few lines down from that I got up to the third floor and there were two watch managers alongside Richard entry control was there and we had committed VA crews extensively into the building of that stage I obtained an update from Richard
01:38:37 stage I obtained an update from Richard so I could feed back to command unit as the radios weren't working very well can you remember what the content of Richard Welch's update was well obviously it was
01:38:51 Welch's update was well obviously it was very dynamic at that point there was still a lot bi been on that mezzanine landing being fed up the stairs
01:39:02 Richard's update at that point was that we were getting crews in to the building up to some of their fish gene pools and I observed ivory shoulder I was talking
01:39:13 I observed ivory shoulder I was talking to me that the entry control boards were populate with tallies which would tell me that the air crews were committed
01:39:22 and I basically just asked him that it would appear that we were going to be very intensive that maybe major mentioned that slightly late on my statement but it was more about the
01:39:33 statement but it was more about the resources for me now it's about driving forward the resources to help with that plan going forward to get into that building and get as many people as we could
01:39:43 could did you did you discuss the possibility with Richard Welch about EDB a the need for a DBA
01:39:53 so it's a bad question can i rephrase the question did you have a discussion with Richard Welch at that stage about the need for a DBA no but I think the term has been
01:40:05 DBA no but I think the term has been fairly experienced offices because we gon make pumps for tea we knew then have a certain amount of if I use on it so it would happen we would have a DBA in attendance to you a nice did you have
01:40:18 attendance to you a nice did you have enough idibia in attendance at that stage did you think
01:40:27 it's hard to quantify their nothing I mean we had EDB a there whether they were actually committed at that time I don't know there was more if I use ask
01:40:39 don't know there was more if I use ask for one of us is the Internet's claim more and more edpa came but the GPAs only carried on fr use so at that point I hadn't noticed this is a best of my
01:40:52 I hadn't noticed this is a best of my recollection of don't believe a DBA or commit to that time did you have a discussion with Richard Welch about how far up into the tower you could get cruise with with SDV a standard not at
01:41:04 cruise with with SDV a standard not at that point no did you update Richard Welsh with what you had seen on the outside of the tower as I am your partial 360 yes I believe so what did
01:41:15 partial 360 yes I believe so what did you tell him I told him that the from when I derived the fire it now tracked round to the north face I was burned across that face of the building and
01:41:30 across that face of the building and that was pretty that was pretty much it we sell obviously getting worse did you observe how far survival guidance information was coming to the third floor bridgehead so I observed
01:41:45 third floor bridgehead so I observed when I went into the to the tower there was a watch manager on my left hand side lobby watch went up Williams and he was passing information up to watch range of
01:41:56 passing information up to watch range of Watson was on and you know about do you so remember that do you yes yeah visibly remember seeing it to him their neighbor
01:42:07 remember seeing it to him their neighbor you know and what I can't recall the exact detail was saying but it was a watch range we didn't just passing something watch watch center back and then watch range of Watson was going into there was a single door on the
01:42:19 into there was a single door on the mezzanine second floor mezzanine he was going in through there to hand on the FSG information scope the Bridget and at the bridgehead did you observe for yourself how the entry control
01:42:32 for yourself how the entry control officer all the what all the the bridgehead commander were recording FSG information
01:42:41 I don't remember physically taking up how they were recording it from memory are I recorder fit being there the verb
01:42:53 are I recorder fit being there the verb so what will automate facial board I'm sorry I beg your pardon for an information board no I that was left to Richard to do that detail I didn't in that comment section with him at that time did you see any
01:43:05 with him at that time did you see any far survival guidance information being written on the wall by the bridgehead on the third floor
01:43:16 the honest answer is I can't recall at that time I went back in the building a later date and saw right in the wall so
01:43:27 later date and saw right in the wall so I am honest I can't say was it that first time our wedding but the buzz drawing on the water third thought do you remember when you got to the bridgehead how FSG information was coming to those at the bridgehead from
01:43:42 watch manager Watson use my watch major Watson up to the bridgehead and that was Ben
01:43:48 Ben that information was being disseminated into the entry patrol officers to break the crazy to commit the building who was bringing the FSG surprised you saw at that point to the bridgehead was it
01:43:59 that point to the bridgehead was it watch manager Watson or was it the crews themselves have been given information not comp and all that did you have any discussion with Richard Welsh about the
01:44:10 discussion with Richard Welsh about the communication chain for FSG
01:44:20 no not at that point that thing we did
01:44:24 in your statement you saying I've just read it to you that you obtained an update from him see you say so I could feed back to command unit as the radios weren't working very well first which
01:44:36 weren't working very well first which command unit are you referring to is that c7 or cu8 then I see you like I see you so I would I would go back into my feedbacks predominantly for at this incident would go back to the incident
01:44:47 incident would go back to the incident command vehicle right not cu7 and at that stage did you know who was running cu8 sorry as in given his innocent
01:44:59 cu8 sorry as in given his innocent Kamal's know who was running cu8 who was in charge of cu8 at this point when you're having your update from Richard Welch at the bridgehead how Lachlan was incident commander I see so he would be
01:45:12 incident commander I see so he would be state he would be based on CUA with you yes
01:45:15 yes oh I see yeah then you say the radios weren't working very well what was your experience at that point of the radios I think best of my recollection that point it was just the
01:45:27 recollection that point it was just the amount of traffic that was trying to be transmitted over the channel right which can chat one source so there's the fire ground fog right right that now you then say the top of page
01:45:40 that now you then say the top of page six ago statement that you returned to see you seven and you say when I return to c7 Tom good all have been tasked to run the FSG which then told me that we
01:45:51 run the FSG which then told me that we were beginning to get further structure in place at that stage when you returned to see you seven could you see who was who was running FS G's in there no sorry
01:46:05 who was running FS G's in there no sorry this this is if this is actually an anomaly in my statement now I was wondering and I was giving the police I think I was verbalizing the information I've been given from June grip magic cook so great magic cook told
01:46:18 grip magic cook so great magic cook told me that Seenu 7 had been tasked as FSG right vehicle and that that's how I had that information that Britt magical bean salsa fish G so we get info a structure in place and that station major Egan was
01:46:31 in place and that station major Egan was assisted him that's group manager Matt cook group management Mack yes okay and I see so you as you said before you're in your oh sorry I suggested a
01:46:42 in your oh sorry I suggested a somebody's in a statement yeah okay did group manager Matt cook tell you what structure for FSG cu7 was was running
01:46:53 structure for FSG cu7 was was running what the system was no only that he was in charge of it and he was facilitating it and Micah say I went into the lobby that early stage to make sure the system
01:47:06 that early stage to make sure the system and process was starting to work mostly it was so it was so dynamic it was so dynamic that that information had to get
01:47:20 dynamic that that information had to get the Bridgette so we can be a cruise does that building okay for me just so I'm clear they in your statement you describe what's happening with FSG in the first three lines of that paragraph
01:47:32 the first three lines of that paragraph and you say good all had been tossed around the FSG which then told me that we were beginning to get further structure in place he was being assisted by Dan Egan who is station manager and
01:47:43 by Dan Egan who is station manager and they were feeding information from FSG see you into the lobby is do I take it from what you've just told us that all of that in that in your statement is
01:47:56 of that in that in your statement is something you were told by group manager Matt cook you rather than seeing it yourself
01:48:05 yes Ruvo the last bit about the lobby I obviously observed that bit because that was a bit that I picked up on the FSG chain on us from the lobby go into the
01:48:16 chain on us from the lobby go into the bridgehead right and I know I've asked you this before would just revisiting it did you become aware at some point during the minute that a watch manager
01:48:29 during the minute that a watch manager was operating on a car bonnet and then bins under the cupboard area a system of collation of fire survival Gardens information which was then being run into the tower by a runner no I didn't
01:48:47 you say in the next sentence my role was to continue to revisit the fire ground and report back to the command unit again I'm assuming that cu8 did you report back to the command unit what
01:48:58 report back to the command unit what you'd learn from group manager Matt Cooke about the first survival guidance methods or system that you've described in your statement there now I didn't I
01:49:11 in your statement there now I didn't I group magic cook would probably have relate that to see you ate if he had to be present when that had been established as the fire I saw the guide unit when you say my
01:49:25 I saw the guide unit when you say my role was to continue to revisit the fire ground and report back how did you report back and when I could over the fire ground radio Charlie 1
01:49:37 predominantly it was face to face having to leave the tower and go back to command unit to give situational updates since any instant come on chain so when you couldn't get contact through the ready you run up you run up and down
01:49:49 ready you run up you run up and down with you walk up and down yeah I would try and move as quickly as I could you
01:49:56 know at the top of page
01:50:02 six just in the next sentence in fact you say the thread the whole of my notes reflects this I was back and forth back and forth either checking the tactical plan was in place supporting other
01:50:13 plan was in place supporting other sectors or carrying out a task I may have been assigned such as giving resource update and so on you're describing here I suspect the whole night is that right
01:50:25 I suspect the whole night is that right yes encapsulating it yes probably boy what was the tactical plan as it evolved that you're referring to there
01:50:43 I think tactical plan Illinois
01:50:49 obviously was predominated to tower obvious reasons it was just initially I think to extinguish the fire best we
01:51:02 think to extinguish the fire best we could and get to as many fhg calls that we could physically get to to help as many residences could during that dire situation as it went on there was an
01:51:16 situation as it went on there was an element I think of fighting the fire to get to the FSG cause and then later on
01:51:27 get to the FSG cause and then later on as much as we could in terms of putting the safety and for our own personnel it was a rescue mission did you ever become
01:51:38 was a rescue mission did you ever become aware of any particular plan to get information about deployments of ba wearers back to the control room in some
01:51:49 wearers back to the control room in some way sorry could you repeat that yes let me see if I can get it this way can I ask you to look at LFE 790 which you
01:52:02 ask you to look at LFE 790 which you told us earlier you were familiar with from training
01:52:08 oscar's look if you would please paragraph nine which is on page five in Germany
01:52:20 Germany this is paragraph nine of the effort of FSG 719 this is visit the additional version which was current as of April 2014 as far as we know current as of the
01:52:31 2014 as far as we know current as of the night of gravitons house fire nine says communication with control and para nine one says it is vital the controllers kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG pool the fact that
01:52:42 to resolve each FSG pool the fact that control is aware of the actions being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to energy callers but first of all what were you aware of or live to this policy
01:52:56 were you aware of or live to this policy requirement as at the night of the dreadful town fire I am aware of that policy document yes
01:53:06 did your tactical plan or did the tactical plan that you prefer to involve a plan by which control was kept informed of the actions being taken to
01:53:17 informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call as per paradigm one of this policy I wasn't aware that
01:53:29 one of this policy I wasn't aware that control weren't being informed you weren't aware that they weren't being informed tonight did you take steps yourself to make sure that paragraph 9
01:53:42 yourself to make sure that paragraph 9 was 9 1 was being complied with in your role as ort
01:53:53 the honest answer is no because at that stage of the night
01:54:03 it was critical to have that incident resourced as much as we could to address
01:54:15 resourced as much as we could to address the firefighting tactical plan and to have the resources ready to be deployed to try and get to as many people as we could ignoring the thoughts that are is
01:54:27 could ignoring the thoughts that are is - osório so that was my focus at that time and I'd lean that to be critical
01:54:40 ignoring the firefighting tactical plan for the moment and just focusing on deployments to try to get as many people as you could was it important or in the
01:54:52 as you could was it important or in the words of the policy vitally to keep control informed about the results of particular deployments so that control would know to be able to advise callers
01:55:03 would know to be able to advise callers about whether crews were in fact on their way to rescue them or not
01:55:14 it may have helped I think
01:55:20 I think your map FSG calls we were having at that point to collect that accurately transmitted that back to control with the amount of calls that they were
01:55:31 the amount of calls that they were taking would have been a very very difficult task and I'm not sure
01:55:44 how accurate the information might be that would go back
01:55:53 to your knowledge did anybody set about a task of trying to establish whether paragraph nine one of the policy was
01:56:05 paragraph nine one of the policy was being adhered to not to my knowledge note did to your knowledge did anybody
01:56:17 note did to your knowledge did anybody try to establish a system of ensuring that paragraph nine one of this policy was adhere to
01:56:29 I think initially when I went into the tower that I observed sorry not when I first went to tower at some point when I
01:56:41 first went to tower at some point when I was in the tower when there was rescues being affected and residents coming out I did observe watch manage of Williams
01:56:54 I did observe watch manage of Williams have a conversation either with a crew or a resident and that was recorder on the wall so maybe I've made the
01:57:07 the wall so maybe I've made the assumption that details were being recorded and being sent back but I think the difficult thing for me is I didn't
01:57:20 the difficult thing for me is I didn't stay in one place on that fire ground and I couldn't take over every single role and I didn't sit within the FSG come on chain so
01:57:36 does that answer the question
01:57:45 paragraph 92 of the policy requires that informative messages from the incident ground should contain Peluso contain an
01:57:57 ground should contain Peluso contain an update on progress relating to those specific FSG calls by both flat pass number to could avoid confusion do you know whether anybody took steps to find
01:58:10 know whether anybody took steps to find out whether the messages the informative messages from the incident graham did contain the information required by the policy here I don't know the answer to
01:58:23 policy here I don't know the answer to that but I think you'd be best placed asking someone that was on the instant command vehicle if that is that way I'm not aware of the messages that went on that night the 9-3 says the outcome of
01:58:37 that night the 9-3 says the outcome of every FSG call must be communicated to control and against that same set of questions - did you to your knowledge do you know whether anybody took any steps
01:58:49 you know whether anybody took any steps to ensure that the outcome of FS chief every FSG called was communicated to control from the incident ground
01:59:03 no I don't but again
01:59:15 I've never expected to ever go to Williamson where we have over 130 FFG calls my interpretation of that policy
01:59:32 would be
01:59:37 they would be difficult to manage that amount of FSG course at one single incident
01:59:49 did anybody attempt to discuss the idea of standing back and looking at whether or not the outcome of particular
02:00:01 or not the outcome of particular deployments was sent back to the control room and and trying to work out whether a system could be imposed for getting as
02:00:14 a system could be imposed for getting as much information back as possible and I didn't
02:00:19 didn't again you may be able to ask the officers at one cu8 and they may be able to backfill that and give some clarity
02:00:30 to backfill that and give some clarity on that but not from not from where I was in the tower watching the process their first G's coming in and the
02:00:41 their first G's coming in and the residents coming out as ort whose tasks you told us earlier this morning was to audit compliance with policy was it not
02:00:55 audit compliance with policy was it not your role the artis team's role to do their best to ensure that paragraphs 91 to 93 as we've looked at in policy 790
02:01:06 to 93 as we've looked at in policy 790 were complied with
02:01:18 Paulie and
02:01:22 and however
02:01:27 at the risk of sounding repetitive
02:01:34 normal incident
02:01:37 that's probably using the wrong word I'd expect to deal with three or four fish cheese max which is quite an easy thing to do
02:01:51 I think sheer number of FSG information that we had was
02:02:05 very very difficult and I'm probably on the Senate very very difficult to process and I felt it was more important
02:02:17 process and I felt it was more important to get into that building to get to as many people as we could and try and contain a fire to allow us to do that
02:02:37 was there a point in time which came when you thought that the number of FSG calls would defeat any application of
02:02:52 calls would defeat any application of this policy
02:03:05 they significantly challenged it
02:03:12 but it might be something you have to look at as a learning piece
02:03:21 it was difficult perhaps I can put the question forgive me for putting it slightly more we blunt me did the O our team give up on securing adherence with
02:03:34 team give up on securing adherence with this part of this policy before they'd even tried
02:03:42 see that's a little unfair to say we gave up
02:03:48 ah Kasai
02:03:51 it was challenging I wasn't in the bridgehead overtime of many other roles to carry out on fire ground in terms of event updates I
02:04:03 ground in terms of event updates I wasn't sitting within the immediate FSG come on chain
02:04:11 so I don't know I don't think we gave up on it
02:04:19 can I get back to the command structure you on page six of your statement you
02:04:31 you on page six of your statement you refer
02:04:36 you described bumping into Matt cook outside the tower and just so I can show you where in the statement you say that it's it's it's three paragraphs from the bottom
02:04:53 and he you say he told you that Andy Reb had been made incident commander yes yes do you know roughly what time that was
02:05:04 do you know roughly what time that was I don't but again I'm sure message was sent over the radio we're saying that I see rose dancing commander he says that would give us 10 they are right about
02:05:15 would give us 10 they are right about that and there's an informative message confirming that he's I see that 200 244 and just for our reference it's page 23 of the short in state law do you remember whether that cooks information
02:05:28 remember whether that cooks information to you was before or after the informative message uh I genuinely don't know how all I can assume is it that the point that happened that matter had made
02:05:39 point that happened that matter had made me been back at cui after doing a task and had found that information out so when we came together at supper Greenfield Road he informed me of that
02:05:50 Greenfield Road he informed me of that did or do you remember whether and that cook told you anything about a change in the stay-put advice
02:06:03 yeah Matt cook didn't tell me this they put a change but I from best of my recollection it wasn't at the same time as this information exchange it was it
02:06:16 as this information exchange it was it when was it you remember
02:06:25 still SIA
02:06:28 of say approximately 10 to 15 minutes after that right okay
02:06:38 was there a discussion on any of you of that change on any of the occasions when you went back to see you eight to update them so it could you pick yep sorry it's
02:06:51 them so it could you pick yep sorry it's my fault if it's a it's a bad question did that was the subject of a change in the statehood advice mentioned by you or discussed with you on any of the occasions when you went back to see you
02:07:03 occasions when you went back to see you eight to update them no because Matt sorry great mansion cooking for me at stake but changed I believe I was coming back in from the
02:07:15 I believe I was coming back in from the west side at that point when I saw him in the southwest corner he told me that the FSG advice sorry stay put a voice
02:07:26 the FSG advice sorry stay put a voice and changed and he'd been into the tower and he did informed Bridget they changed right I may have acknowledged it when I went back to see you wait to say you
02:07:37 went back to see you wait to say you know I I know I'm aware it's now changing the residents are coming out now if we go to your statement on page eight I can just run forward to that and
02:07:48 eight I can just run forward to that and look towards the bottom of that page and you can see that you I'm sorry it's about seven lines up from the bottom you
02:08:01 about seven lines up from the bottom you say at this point we had s DBA on the fourth or fifth floor and EDB a crews on the 11th firefighting and conducting
02:08:13 the 11th firefighting and conducting search and rescue in my mind from what I was hearing we are now starting to penetrate further up the building so I went back to given up that update to the incident commander I believe this that this update was
02:08:25 I believe this that this update was recorded
02:08:27 recorded can I just be clear was this an update to see you eight yes all my all my updates
02:08:34 updates you a incent come on down right and was this information information that you'd taken directly from the bridgehead do you think yes could you remember who at the bridgehead I cover exactly who but
02:08:46 the bridgehead I cover exactly who but it would have ever been group major Welch or group magical ball one of those two people have no one else right okay do you remember where the bridgehead was at that point
02:09:02 thinks ground floor okay
02:09:10 now we've we've got a record in and eros log if I can just ask that to be shown to you that's MIT quadruple zero five four zero four and it's page three can I
02:09:31 four zero four and it's page three can I just ask you to look at that you've got a that there's a time mark of oh four twenty to just about a quarter of the way down the page Mick Mulhall and mmm gives up to cruise up to tenth floor in
02:09:45 gives up to cruise up to tenth floor in EDB a SD a B that should be SD be a fourth and fifth floor seventh eighth and ninth floor considering using aerial EDB a is being used quickly is that the
02:10:01 EDB a is being used quickly is that the update that you're referring to do you think that you're referring to in your statement
02:10:09 it could be if I'm honest I don't ever remember mention anything about an aerial but that like that that could be feasible that's my update the fact I'm
02:10:23 feasible that's my update the fact I'm having a few issues with time this is probably helpful because I did do quite a few updates back to the command yet so hopefully that timestamp will help in terms of time so yes it is feasible just I'm not the aerial is I've done have a
02:10:37 I'm not the aerial is I've done have a recollection of mention any about an area but it's wouldn't have been possible to be cleared do you do does this mean that the tenth floor was the highest floor being reached by VA
02:10:49 highest floor being reached by VA whereas at this time
02:11:00 I would suggest yes but for clarity up for clarity but we need to speak to group major Walsh or grammatical born but I would say yes are you saying yes
02:11:14 but I would say yes are you saying yes because you remember it or are you saying yes because I've shown you the document I remember being told it the fact that you've put 422 on there and
02:11:25 fact that you've put 422 on there and okay
02:11:27 okay the crews you're up to the tenth that would suggest that that's where they were in the build at that point do you have any recollection of being told of finding out that crews weren't of being deployed above the 15th floor at any
02:11:38 deployed above the 15th floor at any point I have a vague recollection of a
02:11:50 point I have a vague recollection of a conversation with group major watch I won't there with the timestamp it for you I will be able to tell you it was on the ground floor lobby and I believe I'd gone to get an update or see if they
02:12:03 gone to get an update or see if they were all right and I think a crew had just come out I can't be hundreds in shorts a 15th or 13th ok the crew formed him there was like a furnace up there do
02:12:17 him there was like a furnace up there do you happen to remember where which station the crew had come from you don't know who the crew were no the BI crew weren't present at that point it was
02:12:28 weren't present at that point it was probably moments after they'd moved off right
02:12:35 mr. millet how are you getting on very well I've got about 15 or 20 minutes left I'm just wondering whether it would be good to have a break yes it's a silly little mystery gambling industry good time yes perfectly would
02:12:47 industry good time yes perfectly would you like the brain are misspelled on what we've been doing another hour and delica will break down in this end and the slightly longer great resume at talk
02:12:58 the slightly longer great resume at talk talk talk to anyone about forever right give the option
02:13:14 right twelve o'clock of Jesus
02:13:24 you
02:31:33 I think the witness is on his way missed a minute
02:32:02 right all right miss Mulholland I've been happy to keep going thank you sorry have we not got turned
02:32:16 thank you sorry have we not got turned on
02:32:16 on apparently I'm inaudible I'm now audible right can I ask you please to be shared a picture which is a meaty triple zero five seven seven four
02:32:39 now this is a photograph of the wall which watch manager of Williams was writing on and he was writing for survival guidance information on it at
02:32:51 survival guidance information on it at the very top of the wall it says you'll see above 10 EDB a below 10 SD PA and watch manager Williams told us that he
02:33:02 watch manager Williams told us that he didn't write that he thinks that was Pete Wolfington watch manager Wolfington do you remember that trigger a recollection in your mind about a
02:33:14 recollection in your mind about a division between EDB a deployments and SD VA deployments I remember seeing it on the wall it doesn't trigger right a
02:33:27 on the wall it doesn't trigger right a memory of however divvying up the deployments nook okay
02:33:37 okay now in your statement can I just take you back to something earlier which I have I'm sorry failed to put to you and should have
02:33:48 failed to put to you and should have done if you go to page three of your statement and just below halfway down you've got a description of fire
02:33:59 you've got a description of fire survival guidance calls of what they are and prioritization there and then in the
02:34:10 and prioritization there and then in the next paragraph you you say I don't remember how many we actually took but I do remember enroute there were several FSG calls relayed to the fire ground I
02:34:21 FSG calls relayed to the fire ground I was trying to keep a mental note of the number because I was driving and couldn't write anything down nor did I wish to pull over as I needed to get to the incident as soon as possible I probably counted seven or eight on my
02:34:33 I probably counted seven or eight on my fingers as I was driving to the best of my recollection I would say most of them were between the 10th and the 22nd floor now giving you the whole of that but to give the context of my question when you
02:34:47 give the context of my question when you say to the best of my recollection I would say most of the movement team that was 10th in the 22nd floor was that information that you were receiving while enroute it was information that
02:34:58 while enroute it was information that has been transmitted over the main scheme radio while you were on route yes right now
02:35:06 did you evaluate that information or did you use that information when putting
02:35:17 you use that information when putting together your tactical plan
02:35:24 I'm sorry my tactical plane or wall drugs acting like my own it was it was using so much as that information had
02:35:36 using so much as that information had been passed already into the tower and crews had already been committed to the
02:35:47 crews had already been committed to the tell me can I just explore that a little bit from your from your knowledge and your involvement was the information that most of the FSG calls were coming
02:35:58 that most of the FSG calls were coming from floors between 10 and 20 - was that information used in developing an overall tactical plan or strategy
02:36:11 overall tactical plan or strategy I wouldn't say most of the calls were coming between floor and tenon so attempt in 22nd maybe that's poor language just in that
02:36:23 maybe that's poor language just in that step up a snapshot in time I'm route to the incident best of my recollection 7fs cheapens I heard you know seem to be within those floors I
02:36:34 know seem to be within those floors I think there was FSGS coming in on other floors as well yes from what we've can we've seen it's correct to say that at
02:36:45 we've seen it's correct to say that at the time you were on route most of the FSG calls were between the 10th of the 22nd floor so not I'm not seeking to challenge that or correct correct it in any way but on the basis that that's
02:36:56 any way but on the basis that that's correct
02:36:57 correct my question is did that information the fact that FSG calls were but were coming in from from the top half of the building if you like feed into the
02:37:09 building if you like feed into the tactical plan that was being put together
02:37:14 yes in so much as once you have that FSG information we will commit be a cruise to those flats as quickly new speed in years we can so yes it would take part
02:37:25 years we can so yes it would take part of a tactical plan but does that mean that there was some kind of prioritization of rescues on the higher floors as part of the tactical plan that you were developing what there was
02:37:40 you were developing what there was prioritization after I've got there I don't think I could outs you honestly I'm sure there was but obviously this was me on route so I couldn't confirm
02:37:51 was me on route so I couldn't confirm that happened but I'm sure there would be I mean everybody that serves as a navigator realizes how important and
02:38:03 navigator realizes how important and significant FSG Portus yes and they'll do the level best to get to where they can get to if they can get it so I guess
02:38:15 can get to if they can get it so I guess an ops to your question I'm sure it was five I wasn't at the incident so I can say to you hundred percent yes happened as part of this tactical plan being developed based on in part this
02:38:26 developed based on in part this information FSG calls from higher floors what thought was given to the need to have the right number of edpa whereas
02:38:38 have the right number of edpa whereas there
02:38:46 thought was definitely given to a needy bi whereas there geographically our ETB own front on appliances carried on all
02:38:58 own front on appliances carried on all fo use strategically placed across the London area so they may have longer travel times but I believe there was a
02:39:11 travel times but I believe there was a message sent at some point to make if I use 10 and obviously as the incident escalate or some time during its incident I think we had our whole entire
02:39:23 incident I think we had our whole entire protective equipment group of air supply at the job so I don't believe any point there was an issue of us not having enough or running out of ba whether that
02:39:36 enough or running out of ba whether that be s TBI or a DBA we were discussing prioritization a minute ago prioritization of FSG calls do you know who well first of all do you know
02:39:48 who well first of all do you know whether any prioritization of FSG calls was taking place to your knowledge
02:39:58 I can't speak for cu7 because as I said earlier I think I see something I recall over here in a conversation in
02:40:10 I recall over here in a conversation in the lobby between Margit Williams and I can't remember sorry the other person but he had control information forms
02:40:22 but he had control information forms right and they would look at the information on it and trying to get information on to the on the wall it's a prioritized to send up a bridgehead who would you have expected
02:40:35 bridgehead who would you have expected to be taking responsibility for prioritization of FSG calls
02:40:48 again
02:40:52 it's a very difficult question to answer in an ideal world fairly normal incident that would probably sit with your FSG coordinator in terms of how his brief
02:41:04 coordinator in terms of how his brief people to do that but their level of called who were getting in was just I think we'd ever witnessed before we've never had to deal with anything on this and the system in terms of transferring
02:41:20 and the system in terms of transferring to Bridget was working that information was going to Bridget is there a policy or at least a practice if not a policy
02:41:33 or at least a practice if not a policy as to who normally is responsible for a prioritization of multiple FSG calls
02:41:41 again I would say that again it would sit with an FSU coordinator but I guess
02:41:52 how do we
02:41:56 I don't understand necessarily how we describe multiple every quarter I think it'd be a much easier task to undertake if you have several right hmm you get 135 that makes that task
02:42:11 you get 135 that makes that task significantly more difficult
02:42:15 can I then ask you to look at page six of your statement we're about a third of
02:42:29 of your statement we're about a third of the way down you refer to Richard wells requesting more BA
02:42:37 more BA if you see the paragraph starts and just to be fair to you or give you the the full context you say I got back into the building and got back up to see Richard Welch again I believe that was still at
02:42:50 Welch again I believe that was still at the third floor at this point we had a conversation about how he was making progress I established there was only one staircase and it was quite narrow and then again I had another conversation with Richard about the a
02:43:02 conversation with Richard about the a because it was becoming very clear that it was going to be BA intensive and we were going to chew through a lot of reading rapid breathing apparatus he requested more BA so I left the building to see whether we had set up a ba sector I saw there were
02:43:15 had set up a ba sector I saw there were 80 DBA where is standing there just pausing there where were they where was they were standing out so at that point there had been a Martian area right
02:43:26 there had been a Martian area right outside the south entrance and this is an estimation I think it was approximately 20 VI whereas standing outside but there was also be aware is
02:43:39 outside but there was also be aware is that inside the tower that hadn't been committed so that about it needs more ba I hope that's not interpreters in we haven't got any bi we did which it's
02:43:50 haven't got any bi we did which it's about me going out and again about how I was resource in the Bridget ID incident planned so I spoke to the DBA cruising got them to go into the Bridget okay
02:44:03 got them to go into the Bridget okay just let's just take us in stages first of all who was well was anybody marshalling the EDB a where is in the marshalling area yes there was
02:44:16 marshalling area yes there was do you know who it was it was watch manager
02:44:25 I'm not having to discern I think he might be much amount of brown but I'm not 100% certain on that is that Stewart Brown yes right did you have a
02:44:37 Brown yes right did you have a conversation with much manager Brown if it was him
02:44:45 I've they could remember a conversation Bob I can't recall the detail of it I'm sorry were you able to identify who the 8va
02:44:57 were you able to identify who the 8va wearers were or anyone did you speak to the age or one of their number now I
02:45:09 the age or one of their number now I believe that compensation watch bunch of Brown I just said I did so please be aware as in say the Bridget right and they followed me and and what happened
02:45:23 they followed me and and what happened next did you take them up to the bridge head yes well no actually I didn't take them to the Bridget it was obvious because there was still a line of bi wearers on the mezzanine
02:45:38 line of bi wearers on the mezzanine floor
02:45:38 floor and I just told them to follow the line up to the mezzanine floor write a report to good measure box name that you become a building okay did they join the back of the queue they Mel
02:45:52 of the queue they Mel they may well have done after I spoke to grimmer group manager Welsh I told him to go and speak this group major well chief I think major work she decided not to deploy them that would be his call run the fire sector right the Weber's group managed to Welsh standing at this
02:46:04 group managed to Welsh standing at this point was he at the bridgehead well I didn't see him when I went back into the tower so I'm gonna make the assumption that he was at the bridge hedges though and just trying to get a time mark on
02:46:17 and just trying to get a time mark on this discussion with the 8ba EDB a whereas at that point were you aware of who the incident commander was
02:46:30 yes and Dachau rockland I'm sorry big important time step
02:46:43 it's can be difficult is there any other times yet that we can look at to help with yes
02:46:51 with yes we're told that and ero became incident commander at 242 for also people take a few seconds do you think that this
02:47:04 few seconds do you think that this discussion with these edpa wearers was before or after that it's difficult to answer I would say maybe before okay
02:47:43 you [Music]
02:47:49 [Music] now can I just ask you to look at the at the paragraph nine of your statement
02:47:59 they are page I'm so sorry penny mr. Chung you're quite right page nine of your statement in the third paragraph that you you say and it revisited the bridge head again to find out how things
02:48:14 bridge head again to find out how things were going they told me the conditions were still challenging for the crews and I asked them what their resource 'men requirement was because we were using a DBA and s DBA and whether there would be any challenge for us in terms of still being able to do that and under turn
02:48:26 being able to do that and under turn they told me they would need 20 e DBA and 15s DBA an hour they currently have s DBA on the sixth and seventh floors and idibia on the eleventh and twelfth floors now do you remember from at the
02:48:45 floors now do you remember from at the top of your head what sort of time that revisitation of the bridge head took place
02:49:03 [Music]
02:49:07 no I don't I don't have an exact time in the de bridge it was definitely on the ground floor right well let me just see if I can help it's not a memory test
02:49:18 if I can help it's not a memory test then perhaps me bit unfair on you and asking you to remember it if you go please - mr. Rose logged yes AC Rose log which is MIT quadruple zero five four zero five and go to page four
02:49:43 that is not it right
02:49:51 five that's it page four at the top you'll see a start a time mark of oh four fifty three resources update mmm
02:50:02 four fifty three resources update mmm resources updates this is you I'm assuming mmm currently using 20 times e DBA and 15s DBA per hour neither beyond the eleventh and twelfth floors st-pierre on the six and seventh
02:50:13 floors st-pierre on the six and seventh floors does that help you with the timing yes that would be that would be a good example of one of the updates are
02:50:24 good example of one of the updates are provided to AC rope and as in locust on the command unit and I would have to say that that's a write an accurate reflection of that happening now when you say using twenty a DBA and 15s DBA an hour is that the rate of
02:50:36 15s DBA an hour is that the rate of deployment governed by the available wearers or is it the rate of use of the equipment that's my business that I I
02:50:50 equipment that's my business that I I think it's more a projection of what they thought they were going to use there was obviously still be ie in the tower I think that was a
02:51:02 in the tower I think that was a projection given so we could start future planning for be a resources needs to come on in terms of getting charged senators back and all that so that yeah
02:51:14 senators back and all that so that yeah I think my projection of thirty five an hour right okay and it says e DBA on 11th and 12th floors does that help us or you recall how far up in the building
02:51:27 or you recall how far up in the building at that point any IDI any be a where you DBA or SD be a was getting Albert I would suggest that indicates that they were twelve right okay
02:51:41 were twelve right okay now immediately just picking up while we're on this if I just pick something up with you you say in the last or someone says in the last line there I think this is the longest who's logged this Cu staff report building plans
02:51:54 this Cu staff report building plans should be in fire box in lobby do you remember there being any discussion about about looking for building plans in the fire box in the lobby another time
02:52:03 time did you know whether there was a fart box in the lobby but don't recall seeing a fire box and it'll be did you look for one no I didn't personally know right with that one but that not being
02:52:15 with that one but that not being important as part of an overall tactical plan to see if there was a fire box and and see what its contents oh yes ordinarily you'd like to think that the
02:52:27 ordinarily you'd like to think that the first creature driving would have that tear on arrival tactics I think the great respect at five o'clock in the morning I guess I'll try them plans
02:52:42 morning I guess I'll try them plans we've been more useful maybe earlier on if they've been obtained yes I'm not sure what how that would have helped to have a necessarily tactical plan no good
02:52:53 have a necessarily tactical plan no good that leads to another question what do you know what prompted the discussion about building plans being in the fire box no I was in the command unit so I
02:53:08 box no I was in the command unit so I can only
02:53:08 can only that that that conversation was recorded around the time that I'd given my update but look my update generally was given by the from the door do you I don't know
02:53:21 by the from the door do you I don't know who who would have been having a conversation about the foot of page 9 you say just above the list of of senior
02:53:34 you say just above the list of of senior officers you say I again did my own ort evaluation and set out the structure and
02:53:46 evaluation and set out the structure and then you list the structure and where did you get that information from do you remember about the structure yes so that structure would appear on the command
02:53:58 structure would appear on the command unit on the command support system right but then going around the fire ground you could then observe directly observe that those officers were in place and
02:54:10 that those officers were in place and carry out those roles right I believe that something I did simultaneously with my colleague group magic cook right and when you say it's something I did does that mean it was you who put that command structure in
02:54:22 you who put that command structure in place
02:54:22 place knocked out vidiian some command responsibility sorry that's probably poor choice of words I see okay so who did incident commander which incident commander put the structure that you've
02:54:34 commander put the structure that you've referred to there in place do you remember no I don't a minute it could be incremental because obviously as instant increases and you get more and more officers some of that could have been
02:54:45 officers some of that could have been put in by Dachau Lachlan and then it could be further strengthened by a Serie A cero put it all and you'd have to talk someone's on cu8 - yeah get
02:54:57 someone's on cu8 - yeah get clarification on that and you'll sit the bottom there there's a reference to command support DAC drawbridge do you know when he appeared on the on the incident ground
02:55:08 on the on the incident ground time-wise night I mean I'm sure it'd be on the end of incident no I'm not sure what time that drawbridge arrived no what was his role so his role was he
02:55:24 no what was his role so his role was he was on a command unit remote from the job and effectively had a logistical role so he would be an overseeing this was - this would be off the back bar major incident in terms of supporting
02:55:37 major incident in terms of supporting back-of-house business as usual crews coming back on the following morning how he would have deployed to the incident so he was in he was involved in doing resources marshaling the relief plan and
02:55:51 resources marshaling the relief plan and bi he would open up all those communication links to talk to those people to make sure that was still going on in the background to help was all sensitive I see and you refer to this I
02:56:04 sensitive I see and you refer to this I think at the top of page 10 in his statement where you in the forth alone say that the back of the house support was running did you use that expression just now what is back of the house it's probably a poor explanation from me
02:56:18 it's probably a poor explanation from me it's just a pale it's not the front line of NFB it's about us super nail you know like I say our resources you know the
02:56:29 like I say our resources you know the shift change coming up the next morning you have to look at where the appliances we're gonna come we're having relief how we're gonna get reliefs in what officers we had available it was doing all that pre-planning for hours ahead yeah and
02:56:43 pre-planning for hours ahead yeah and was that's you say there's another command unit was that cu1 yes it was okay and that was I think on Bramley road is that right that rings a bell
02:56:56 road is that right that rings a bell camps and so now we've got we actually have an arrival time of seed for Cu one of OU 259 of 36 seconds of just before
02:57:08 of OU 259 of 36 seconds of just before 3:00 a.m. do you remember when it was that you first went to check on them or to check with them I don't remember the
02:57:22 to check with them I don't remember the time I do remember coming back from Cu one at one point and given an update to AC right so that may well be logged on his lobbies that helped got ID I don't
02:57:33 his lobbies that helped got ID I don't think I'll be able to get a time what was the line of communication between cu8 which was where Andy Rowe was and the rest of the commanders and and Cu
02:57:44 the rest of the commanders and and Cu one on I'm not sure I think fire I think by radio but I can't I can't confirm
02:57:55 by radio but I can't I can't confirm that right
02:58:03 now on page ten two-thirds of the way down you explained me that you were relieved by group manager Simpson and group manager Kane I think is that right
02:58:16 group manager Kane I think is that right yes yes and we've got their arrival times as zero 721 a.m. on the 14th of June and that's in lfb no document
02:58:27 June and that's in lfb no document number two does that sound about right to you possibly at that stage I remembered it was daylight yeah okay I'm
02:58:38 remembered it was daylight yeah okay I'm not gonna be able to give you any more accurate and you say your statement unbeknown to us and just say this is two-thirds of the way down page 10
02:58:51 two-thirds of the way down page 10 unbeknown to us
02:58:57 if I think it's off the screen in fact at the bottom there say the lot looking at the last paragraph that's on the screen which starts we weren't results intensive if you gave three lines down
02:59:08 intensive if you gave three lines down it says unbeknown to us upon their arrival they too conducted a walk round to establish situational awareness before the handover was carried out we informed a sea road that we were going
02:59:21 informed a sea road that we were going to conduct a handover and then took group manager Simpson a group manager came on a walk around the fire ground which took quite a while as they had taken quite a lot of information on that
02:59:32 taken quite a lot of information on that walk did you explain what the tactical plan was at that stage
02:59:46 we spoke about tactical plan I think there might have had that information of cu8 before we wait walk around but we certainly spoke about still commit into the building and working up the floors
02:59:58 the building and working up the floors right to get to the flats you refer that lower down to what the priorities of the
03:00:10 lower down to what the priorities of the incident commander we're just in the second last line there you say we literally did the whole ground with them and basically highlighted what the current tactical plan was resourcing what the priorities of the incident
03:00:22 what the priorities of the incident commander were and the status of the incident relief what were the incident command priorities that you explained to them at that point we were still trying
03:00:36 them at that point we were still trying to get up the tower at that stage and I can't remember what floor you're on but the priorities were to get into as many facts as you can extinguished as much of the fire as we could because there was
03:00:48 the fire as we could because there was fire breaking out in different flats to try and do that still keep an eye on the the FSG cause even though they'd stopped
03:00:59 the FSG cause even though they'd stopped believing that point they were searching going on and the bit about the incident relief
03:01:13 I'm not sure at times I thought of that I'm referring to the fact that maybe the instant relief hadn't been completed was being completed was from memory they put
03:01:24 being completed was from memory they put in a 20 or 25 relief I think that might be a lot of reference in there okay so when you refer to incident relief do you mean pumps being replaced by a new one customs yes okay would you just give me
03:01:36 customs yes okay would you just give me one second
03:01:52 and can I ask you to look please at your exhibits now you've got 39 photographs as you've exhibited I'll just have the
03:02:04 as you've exhibited I'll just have the first of them the first page up on the screen if I can I'm sort of asking one or two general questions about these doctor these photographs and then one of these specific questions first of all
03:02:16 these specific questions first of all and all these exhibits which you have the photographs you took yes okay what did you take them on on my back you
03:02:27 did you take them on on my back you everything now they're all different photos or many of them are different photographs are you able to tell us what kind of time frame you took them in
03:02:46 the latter parts of the incident so let's give an estimation I would say
03:02:54 made for two four and six okay I'm not hundred sensor I don't know where the photographs at the time stamp on them not the ones we've got no okay
03:03:05 on them not the ones we've got no okay but that bests my knowledge out to give it approximation I would say maybe around that time yeah now what prompted you to take these photographs that was an instruction I
03:03:16 photographs that was an instruction I got from the Kushner Commissioner asked me to go out and try and take as many photographs it's not good right and at the bridgehead in stairwells which is an
03:03:29 the bridgehead in stairwells which is an unusual request we do generally take the photographs at larger incidents for post incident debrief for learning and
03:03:40 incident debrief for learning and obviously I'm sure you know the severity this incident maybe to think about using it for you know possible outcomes a thorough investigation but I'm
03:03:51 thorough investigation but I'm paraphrasing there I may be putting words in someone's mouth
03:03:59 and did you take them all but roughly the same time on earth as it were a photographic turf yes pretty much I didn't I didn't stay in the building very long it was literally a whirlwind
03:04:13 very long it was literally a whirlwind snap snap snap snap snap snap to capture it
03:04:17 it obviously I took some pictures of the Bridget that was still been utilized and still quite busy so I had to pick my moment yeah so it was literally getting
03:04:28 moment yeah so it was literally getting take the photographs best I couldn't and get out can I ask you to look please first at M et triple zero one eight
03:04:39 first at M et triple zero one eight seven four nine
03:04:48 what is that that is a board information board right now do you remember where you took the photo to that photograph of
03:05:02 you took the photo to that photograph of the forward information board no there's
03:05:14 the forward information board no there's a white wall behind it yes so I would suggest it's probably in the ground floor lobby yes well if an but I can't
03:05:25 floor lobby yes well if an but I can't be a hundred certain no well we may be able to get there slightly more easily can you go please will be shown please any t triple zero one eight seven two four
03:05:36 four [Music]
03:05:42 I'm I think I could probably answer this question myself but I'll ask you anyway is that the same for an information board that we've seen in the previous picture I've just shown you it would be
03:05:55 picture I've just shown you it would be difficult to say to you 100% but I I think it's feasible to say that could be the same you know what it might be you know the two halves yes if you then go
03:06:07 know the two halves yes if you then go please to
03:06:22 inq since not in this list but inq 253
03:06:51 I'm say so to it that's that is my failure to remember all the numbers - 39 - 35 - 35
03:07:08 now we know that that's watch manager Keith descending the stairs at unadjusted time of 3:10 coming down from the third floor bridgehead turbo ground floor bridgehead we've established we've
03:07:20 floor bridgehead we've established we've had some evidence I should say about about that and what is what can you see or do you know what watch manager keith is carrying in his left hand that
03:07:30 information for drives and looking in the next picture if you want to show you which is 2 5 8 NQ 2 5 8 just to see if
03:07:41 which is 2 5 8 NQ 2 5 8 just to see if we can establish a sequence yes that's you can see that there is a firefighter with something there in his left hand
03:07:52 with something there in his left hand under his left arm still got a yellow trim on it what is that and you help us identify what that is it it looks like a
03:08:05 identify what that is it it looks like a forward information board yes and then
03:08:11 and then if you look please Pat if you show please inq 259 and just have that
03:08:22 show please inq 259 and just have that focused on something leaning against the white wall there can you can you help us identify that
03:08:36 yes does look out there it's a color of the photo and it doesn't look like a fool in fresh Borneo I went it's a hundred percent because the top colors normally the band across top somebody
03:08:50 normally the band across top somebody bright than that but right it's feasible lilies I wouldn't know sir home for senators but and when you going back to
03:09:01 senators but and when you going back to the photograph that M et triple zero we have both of these up if we can that's inq the inq we've just had and this picture does that just the previous
03:09:13 picture does that just the previous picture I showed you I am cute two five nine
03:09:20 nine does that help you recollect where the forward information board in the left hand picture was when you took that
03:09:32 hand picture was when you took that picture you said it's meeting against the white wall on the ground floor and looking at the right-hand photograph does that help it helps this it's on the
03:09:47 does that help it helps this it's on the ground floor I wouldn't be able to say that the picture on the left is the board that is the picture on the right I think that'd be impossible for me to okay and let me have one more go this
03:10:01 okay and let me have one more go this way please to M et8 what 187 33
03:10:11 that is but what is what is that
03:10:32 this is one of the photographs I think you took
03:10:36 okay yes does that help you identify the the film forward information board leaning against the wall on the ground floor that was shown in the previous
03:10:49 floor that was shown in the previous picture on the right hand side well at all
03:10:52 all it helped me does it expand it all now it could expand yes why do we have it expanded to show the top of the top of
03:11:03 expanded to show the top of the top of this the for an information board I don't remember
03:11:18 it it could be I mean I can't make out this recess here on that a nun pointing the board sorry I can't my captain recess on the picture on the left so it could well be the same right could
03:11:29 could well be the same right could obviously be the same board yet and if you compare that sort of great an equal to the wreath is the recess the gray shaded area on the left of the photograph you're talking about it's
03:11:43 photograph you're talking about it's similar okay don't calm again it will notice I hadn't said that I think it's feasible it could be that water right I wouldn't be able to confirm that hundred percent okay
03:12:03 mr. Mulholland I'd I've got no further questions for you thank you very much I'm very grateful to you for coming here and assisting us with our investigations it really is very helpful thank you and
03:12:14 it really is very helpful thank you and I'd like to add my thanks as well because all the evidence we obtain is really very helpful in piecing together the overall picture so thank you very much for coming on to do I've seen a
03:12:27 much for coming on to do I've seen a signal from below though there may be a question very well I was just about to say you're free to go mr. Mulholland but it looks so you may not be marry me ah
03:12:39 it looks so you may not be marry me ah so jest yeah mr. chairman may I suggest I'm sorry I did think that I'd get all these but we take a break now for lunch and well I I think the witness would
03:12:52 and well I I think the witness would probably quite like to know that he can get it away I'd rather take them I think can we keep this one two five you know absolutely rights isn't the will they
03:13:06 absolutely rights isn't the will they take five minutes so council can get themselves organized so we'll come back at ten to one and if there any more questions well I think it's best to deal them there
03:13:31 they will break for five minutes then back at ten to one kiss
03:13:42 you
03:19:32 where I suspect some more questions have been found has they missed a minute yes so I shall do my best to ask them and acknowledge Li as possible mr. Mulholland on his way I think
03:20:05 [Music]
03:20:10 well mr. small Holland I'm sorry they've found some more questions to ask you stop it I have not too much right yes yes thank you very much mr. Matt for
03:20:21 yes thank you very much mr. Matt for your patience now first of all can I ask you to look at the the telemetry data that we've got in it in our master
03:20:35 that we've got in it in our master documents bundle tab one this I'll tell you what this is before I ask you about it this is a spreadsheet compiled by the
03:20:47 it this is a spreadsheet compiled by the lfb derived from all the electronic data collected from all the BA sets in use at Granville Tower on the night of the fire and I'm just helping you with it it runs
03:21:00 and I'm just helping you with it it runs across from the left to the right on the left hand side you can see what kind of breathing apparatus has been used you've got the station the wearer if known and then running across the page
03:21:11 known and then running across the page from there got the vehicle charge of disconnection times the switch on button tally out and then of them other matters that it used to ask you about including
03:21:22 that it used to ask you about including initial pressure logged on to ECB etc and then you've got the Italian time final pressure at the end of where time can I ask you just to look at the
03:21:33 can I ask you just to look at the section 5 be a time line 5 where we begin to see the bulk of e DBA and we've marked idibia with it there
03:21:44 and we've marked idibia with it there has been marked in in orange the EDB a wearers and you can see that the first two on that page of Chelsea in Houston and then there's a group of about 10 I think
03:21:55 think et bien whereas below that from various stations Houston Battersea Chelsea than Basseterre again if you look just
03:22:06 than Basseterre again if you look just taking one or two examples if you look at the Houston crew of the three for Euston Brooks more Qasim and Joseph you've got a time for disconnection from
03:22:19 you've got a time for disconnection from the vehicle charger just taking Brooks at to 1843 he's an e DBA wearer
03:22:30 who disconnects from the vehicle at that time and is switched on at 303 and tallies out at 305 which is about 45 minutes now if if I'm right that that
03:22:45 minutes now if if I'm right that that demonstrates that that there is a period of time from disconnection of the equipment the media equipment from the vehicle it was that it was being carried
03:22:56 vehicle it was that it was being carried in to this to the tallying out time of the crew on a deployment of 45 minutes or so
03:23:06 that that is a period of 45 minutes can you explain from what you saw new on the night why there was a period of 45 minutes between disconnection of the
03:23:19 minutes between disconnection of the equipment from the vehicle on which he was carried and the deployment of the EBA wearer
03:23:31 and one could say the same I think about a lot of the other EDB a where as you can see disconnection times and around
03:23:43 can see disconnection times and around the same sort of time mark and the same sort of delay period about 40 minutes deep does this trigger a recollection in the way in what those dee dee ba crews were doing between disconnecting their
03:23:57 were doing between disconnecting their equipment from the vehicle and getting deployed no I wouldn't know what time Houston but the incident I don't know
03:24:11 Houston but the incident I don't know where they parked their vehicle I can't sir I can't explain the time but I didn't really have anything to do with the BIE sector it could have been they
03:24:22 the BIE sector it could have been they were held there for a while before called on to the the bridgehead before we need to maybe get more accurate answer from one of the other sectors that were doing be Ike
03:24:33 that were doing be Ike when you saw the 80 DBM a whereas outside the tower as you told us earlier on did you have a discussion with Anna you told us you had a discussion with watch manager Braun about about them did
03:24:45 watch manager Braun about about them did you have a dist was a part of that discussion about how long they had been waiting okay were you aware enjoy even in general terms about any delays in getting edv a wearers into the tower and
03:24:59 getting edv a wearers into the tower and not that was brought to my attention now okay can I just ask you a couple of equipment questions at the foot of page
03:25:09 six of your statement you refer
03:25:14 to a discussion you've had with Richard Welch about the benefits of getting positive pressure ventilation down to the sea and you explain that it's
03:25:25 the sea and you explain that it's effectively a big fan what would be the bet well what were the benefits of a PPV or just to go out to context the reason
03:25:38 or just to go out to context the reason we had a discussion about PPV was the smoke was starting to pull in the staircase and going down to the ground floor lobby right so I can't quite
03:25:51 floor lobby right so I can't quite timestamp this for me when we had this I think this before to beyond the end of instant report because I tell you so the conversation with Richard because the smoke was coming down a staircase I
03:26:04 smoke was coming down a staircase I think very soon if not before this is around the time the project moves the ground floor so I'm not a hundred sensor and if this conversation at the third floor ground floor and we need strong
03:26:18 floor ground floor and we need strong clearly smoke because we were worried about the possibility of Bridget
03:26:29 about the possibility of Bridget being compromised so I left the bridgehead went back to the command unit spoke by Ciro gotten permission for PPV
03:26:42 spoke by Ciro gotten permission for PPV I was instructed to ring the AC feminine with BCC to request it this I did a report back to AC ro but had been ordered and sometime later it arrived at
03:26:57 ordered and sometime later it arrived at the incident it didn't give us the effect we hoped it would give us I think just a little bit context around this PPV in London isn't carried on frontline
03:27:10 PPV in London isn't carried on frontline appliances and none of the operational firefighters are trained in PPV we have trained operatives subject matter experts if you want they will actually arrive with the equipment and they will
03:27:23 arrive with the equipment and they will set up and get it to work for you that didn't work and as a result of that there was a conversation between group manager Welsh and group manager Goldman to smash the windows right in the ground
03:27:36 to smash the windows right in the ground floor lobby to try and alleviate the smoke conditions that we're experiencing we have a time mark in the short incident log for the turning out message
03:27:50 incident log for the turning out message of PP for PPV to incident of oh three oh seven 56 which is I think but does that does that does that consistent with your
03:28:02 does that does that consistent with your recollection if that's if that's on the log and that summons been Autobot controls and that would be a accurate reflection of it's just
03:28:11 and the PPV arrived do you remember who they arrived with I think in your state would you say it arrived yes they arrived with station manager Wainwright
03:28:28 arrived with station manager Wainwright station major hardened well and I think watch major Wilson we have a arrival time for station manager Harding of 415
03:28:39 time for station manager Harding of 415 Oh 4:15 does that sound about right to you if that's on the log from control yes
03:28:46 yes however it's not hands on the it's on the lfb oh that's oh no you know official don't with it that's fine might worth be pointing out the I believe
03:28:57 worth be pointing out the I believe station major hardened would probably have come from its home address and somebody else would have brought the ppb so those times may overlap somewhat in terms of it so I'm not disputing it
03:29:09 terms of it so I'm not disputing it Carden wasn't there that time but there's a possibility the PPV might not be right Janet Leigh it could have been oh just calm Tom step at pppp you could could the PPV have been used to clear
03:29:20 could the PPV have been used to clear smoke in the single stairwell in the building do you think potentially but as I explained it's not on the run any frontline appliances so no personnel in the part of a better trained in
03:29:31 the part of a better trained in utilizing PPV operation incident right we have trained staff I don't know how many of them honest that we have got some such matter experts that do that
03:29:43 some such matter experts that do that right and they bring it to the incident and they would control the PPP right do you know why it took an hour for the ppb to arrive no don't and
03:29:55 to arrive no don't and right can I listen ask you one more question about equipment in your statement you say on page nine in the
03:30:06 statement you say on page nine in the second paragraph [Music]
03:30:16 which starts comms communications via radio had become an issue and we were telling all officers in the command chain to change it to channel 2 on the radios it was that your decision to
03:30:29 radios it was that your decision to change the channel to whose was it you know I don't know for definite on the shimmied it was probably an instant come on right well then you say again Matt
03:30:40 on right well then you say again Matt Cooke and I divided the ground and went around to some of the sector commanders to relay this message this was with the agreement of the command unit we also dispatched leaky feeders into the stairwells to assist with comms it was all fairly dynamic with leaky feedings
03:30:54 all fairly dynamic with leaky feedings could you just explain what a leaky feeder is yeah sure that's that was an assist for comes from that's a misinterpretation to leaky feeder is something that we use in relation to our
03:31:07 something that we use in relation to our telemetry equipment so it's basically a simple terms it's a transformer with a antenna on it it can receive the signal and you can put a repeater further up
03:31:19 and you can put a repeater further up that boosts the signal to help keep the signal live before telemetry equipment didn't did it work did The Dispatch of leaky feeders into the stairwells give give some assistance on telemetry from
03:31:32 give some assistance on telemetry from on anything well it doesn't work for comms right we just worked for telemetry once I don't I didn't hear anything coming back saying it hadn't worked all
03:31:43 coming back saying it hadn't worked all there was issues of the territory okay
03:31:54 and what sort of time do you think you dispatch leaky feeders in to assist with it's about telemetry I really can't say
03:32:06 it's about telemetry I really can't say ardently what do they normally carried on leaky feeders you get them on the F I use right so therefore user there
03:32:17 use right so therefore user there they were they would have been available for start to use how many did you need to dispatch into the tower I believe there's only one oh right
03:32:31 we smoked followed you'll be pleased to know I think that I've got no further questions for you and I think that is that my mother lied repeat what I said
03:32:44 that my mother lied repeat what I said before I'm very grateful to you for coming along today and assisting us with our inquiries it is very much appreciated yes well I know said I'm not going to repeat what I said earlier but you know that we are very grateful to you for coming along giving this water
03:32:56 you for coming along giving this water and now you are free to go thank you very much
03:32:59 very much [Music]
03:33:09 thank you for five parts tooand mr. sho-me yes the next witness will be at five past two and I don't know whether we'll finish her this afternoon and I'm some degree of doubt about CW let's sail
03:33:21 some degree of doubt about CW let's sail again Thank You five plus two
03:33:32 you