Evidence from Crew Manager (Paddington Fire Station) regarding early firefighting operations, evacuation attempts, smoke conditions, and equipment limitations during Grenfell Tower fire.
00:00:09 good morning everybody welcome to today's hearing we're still on firefighter evidence so in a moment we're going to call first quite a long list of firefighter witnesses for today so right mister can
00:00:21 witnesses for today so right mister can you yes sir good morning there first of the seven witnesses we have today is crew manager Ben Gallagher thank you
00:01:28 thank you very much please go ahead take a seat and make yourself comfortable yes we just came here good morning I'm first of all can you confirm your name for the record
00:01:38 record Ben Gallagher good morning mr. Gallagher thank you very much for coming on to give evidence today first of all you should have in front of you a blue folder and if you open it up to the first tab in that folder there will be
00:01:50 first tab in that folder there will be your statement data the 11th of January of this year is that right yes fact and if you turn to the next tab in that folder there should be your
00:02:01 folder there should be your contemporaneous note yes that's correct and if you turn over a final tab there should be a pro forma appendix a
00:02:13 should be a pro forma appendix a following on from your contemporaneous notes
00:02:21 yeah that's quite thank you and have you read those documents recently yes and you confirm that contents are true yes and you contend for those documents to
00:02:33 and you contend for those documents to stand as your evidence the inquiry yes said it now mr. Gallagher I'm not going to be going through every line in your witness statement just drawing out particular topics and in particular your experiences on the three times you enter
00:02:45 experiences on the three times you enter the tower on the night if at any time I ask a question is unclear say so and I'll try and put it properly and clearly but also if at any time you want to
00:02:56 but also if at any time you want to break police say so it's not a problem okay now if we could start with some basic information first of all at the time of the fire it's right that you are a crew manager stationed at Paddington fire station yes that's correct
00:03:08 fire station yes that's correct and at the time of the fire you had 11 years experiences of firefighters that right yes that's correct and on the night you rode on the pump ladder appliances call sign was alpha 2 1 2 yes sir now as to timings the lfp
00:03:23 1 2 yes sir now as to timings the lfp has given us some records which indicate that alpha 2 1 2 was mobilized at 0 1 15 mobile at 0 1 17 and arrived at the scene 0 1 26 to those timing sound about
00:03:36 scene 0 1 26 to those timing sound about right to you ah yes and finally in respective timings the LFP has also given us records of your s DBA where which indicate that the s DBA was
00:03:48 which indicate that the s DBA was disconnected from the appliance at 0 1 25 and that your initial tally out of the bridgehead was 0 142 again does that sound about right yes I can't remember
00:04:00 sound about right yes I can't remember to be honest ok the first matter I'd like to talk to you about is your first entry into the tower and if I could ask you to turn to your witness statement mr. gallica is probably easier you'll
00:04:13 mr. gallica is probably easier you'll see next to your screen and Paul the document manager will flash up your statement and it's probably easier to read on then expand the relevant extract I'd like you to look at could I last ask you to look at the last paragraph from
00:04:25 you to look at the last paragraph from the last line on that page and you say this I went in the front lobby of the building where a watch manager was positioned I do not know his name I asked him what he needed
00:04:36 asked him what he needed he said just hold fire for a minute now are you able to identify the watch manager now no I'm not was it clear to you at the time why he
00:04:47 was it clear to you at the time why he asked you to hold back for a minute it that normally happens because their information gathering so it could be detailed correctly can you remember
00:04:58 detailed correctly can you remember whether there were any other crews going up at the time wise you were being asked to hold fire for a minute and now he was the only person I saw now if I could ask you to turn over the page to page 5 of
00:05:11 you to turn over the page to page 5 of your statement you say I asked him if the lifts had been secured he told me they hadn't so I said no worries I will get that did the watch manager indicate that he did not know whether the lifts
00:05:22 that he did not know whether the lifts had been secured yet I think to be honest he just said something along the lines of yeah go go and try and secure
00:05:36 lines of yeah go go and try and secure the lifts yeah after I after I'd said it he said he agreed so I don't know if he was there first of all see he didn't give you any explanation as to why they might not have been secured already no nothing else now you went to the lift
00:05:49 nothing else now you went to the lift and you say that you are pretty sure that you used your drop key to secure the lifts are you sure that you used your drop key and that there wasn't a key already in place now I use my drop
00:06:01 key already in place now I use my drop key buy or suppress the button as well when you operated the drop key did you feel or hear and click no I can't remember but that's not unusual were you
00:06:13 remember but that's not unusual were you satisfied that the key was turns the fire-control on position
00:06:20 no all I know is that the lift the lift um came down all the doors open so whether it went into fire lift mode or not I can't a and you can't remember whether fire control light came on or
00:06:32 whether fire control light came on or not and that okay now in the third paragraph on page 5 you describe what you've intimated there the fact that you open the the left opened and a quotes a great big
00:06:43 left opened and a quotes a great big plume of black smoke came straight into me first of all can you remember which lift opened and from which lift the plume of smoke came out I believe it was the right hand side one given the plume
00:06:57 the right hand side one given the plume of smoke came out what did you think at the time that this indicated about the likely smoke conditions within the tower to be honest I just I just media that it
00:07:09 to be honest I just I just media that it was very strange that the lift was full of smoke it at the time it seemed as though the the smoke came down as the door was opened
00:07:20 door was opened so I actually actually thought that it was maybe in lift shaft and the next question is did have you encountered that phenomenon before is it unusual to
00:07:31 that phenomenon before is it unusual to have such a great big plume of black smoke and load from the left when you open it never to the amount that came out now at the time did you think what this may happen what the effect might be
00:07:42 this may happen what the effect might be on evacuation of the building no I didn't and did you take any steps to stop the lifts being used now I just
00:07:54 to stop the lifts being used now I just remembered I was with watch manager and I just remember saying well we won't be using the lifts then and then we went back out into the lobby and then things just move quite quickly from there so
00:08:05 just move quite quickly from there so there wasn't native thought didn't we did you see the watch manager do anything to stop the list being produced when you are still within a site isn't now now you then went outside the tower
00:08:19 now now you then went outside the tower if that's right and if I could ask you to turn to page 6 of your witness statement paragraph there I'm you described going outside of the tower to check the back of the building and that
00:08:30 check the back of the building and that you saw people shouting out from different floors but it's difficult to make out from which floor now around that time do you recall mr. Tillotson coming to the view that there needed to be an early evacuation no there was a
00:08:44 be an early evacuation no there was a nominee with such sort of pandemonium from up in there the windows that it wasn't a conversation and we were having trying to we were trying to keep people calm from down there and just explain
00:08:56 calm from down there and just explain that we were coming to get them do you remember having any conversation or indeed just overhearing mr. Tillison talk to anyone else about the need for evacuation at this stage in the evening I didn't know now you say it again page
00:09:11 I didn't know now you say it again page six you have a witness statement in line six of that top paragraph that in response the occupants shouts you a firefighter from your machine another from Hannah Smith quote shouted to them to stay where they were and asked what
00:09:23 to stay where they were and asked what flap they were in what information did you do with the information that was shouted down to you from the occupants within the tower to be honest I think it was probably a little bit fruitless
00:09:34 was probably a little bit fruitless shouting that because we just could not hear them or understand them or I couldn't anyway could you tell whether the the other firefighter from your appliance or whether the firefighter from Hammersmith were able to make out
00:09:46 from Hammersmith were able to make out was being shouted I don't know now if I can turn to the bridgehead after you'd inspect at the back in front of the tower is it right that you went to the bridgehead yes it's quite and at
00:09:59 to the bridgehead yes it's quite and at that point was the bridgehead giving out orders to search and rescue no we we went to the bridgehead there was quite a
00:10:10 went to the bridgehead there was quite a there was a think I think it was five of us we went to the bridgehead so where it was was very small so no I wasn't right at the front so I don't know what the discussion really was that was mr.
00:10:23 discussion really was that was mr. Tillotson one of the five that went up to the bridgehead at that time he see us how far in front of you was he if he was in front of you maybe two meters could you hear what he
00:10:34 maybe two meters could you hear what he was saying to those in charge of the bridgehead I just heard him explain that there's people hang hang out at the back of the tower I'm shouting for help and we needed to go up again and he was
00:10:46 we needed to go up again and he was emphasizing search and rescue is that a fair way to describe yes yes and so in his statement mr. Thomson says he recalls a conversation with much mojo
00:10:57 recalls a conversation with much mojo key from which you said quotes we need to get hold of this now we need to get in there and start rescuing people does that accord with your memory sorry who said that mr. Tillotson talking to mr. O'Keefe at the bridgehead it would
00:11:10 mr. O'Keefe at the bridgehead it would have been something along those lines yes yeah mr. Wolfe endure James Wolfe and and I should say I think you call him Wolfie yeah suggest that it was crew mounted Tillotson who decided to
00:11:21 mounted Tillotson who decided to undertake the search and rescue to which mr. O'Keefe said to find you crack on does that accord with your memory yes that's correct given what you'd seen outside did you think it was necessary
00:11:32 outside did you think it was necessary to take any secondary sets of ba equipment with you and no we wouldn't take a second but we wouldn't say second sets unless sir we were going to find out other
00:11:45 we were going to find out other firefighters or if there was a firefighter emergency or yeah we had missing firefighters we wouldn't take her spare set now because I think one of them I don't know whether you watched last week's evidence but one of the questions was is it ever automatic that
00:11:58 questions was is it ever automatic that you take up secondary ba sets and from what you're saying the only time it would be automatic is in the event of a missing firefighter is that right yeah or if we were detailed as an emergency crews so that would be a crew standing
00:12:10 crews so that would be a crew standing by in case something happened so you would have a spare set with you did you receive any specific instructions in relation to specific flats that in
00:12:21 relation to specific flats that in relation to any FSG calls no were you given any details regarding conditions in the stairwell no we've given the plan or a layout of the lead from now put
00:12:34 or a layout of the lead from now put bluntly is it fair say was just a question of you cracking on yeah to be honest yes
00:12:44 it's always difficult particularly in the context of a hearing room to fully convey the atmosphere within the tower are you able to describe for us but your
00:12:55 are you able to describe for us but your memory of the conditions of the bridgehead state of or guy organization whether it was calm or not it seemed
00:13:06 whether it was calm or not it seemed relatively calm to be honest at the time there was a witch manager keith was there and another firefighter who I don't know running the board it was just
00:13:17 don't know running the board it was just very tight and cramped so I'm yeah it just things move very very quickly from from when we when we got there and commented Tillotson put forward what
00:13:29 commented Tillotson put forward what he'd he was suggesting everything just moved quite quickly but it was it was whereas you can't to be on a second I'd now like to turn to at the time where you went under air and into the tower
00:13:40 tower now you tallied out it I'm 0 142 did you see any firefighters or residents coming down the stairwell before you reach the 6th floor no as you went up the tower
00:13:54 6th floor no as you went up the tower between the bridgehead in the 6th floor were you entering on each Lobby on each floor and banging on each flat door remember we we went up to where the alia
00:14:07 remember we we went up to where the alia was the fort where the fire floor was and then we went because the residence of the bat looked as though they were higher than the 4th floor so we then went sort of tried to go systematically
00:14:18 went sort of tried to go systematically from there and work our way up banging on all the doors yeah and so when you say systematically you'd go onto from the fourth floor up just be clear so we go to the fifth and so that they weren't
00:14:29 go to the fifth and so that they weren't very big lobbies at all yeah so we we'd knock on every single door you know loudly saying we were and if people came out if they were able-bodied or young
00:14:43 out if they were able-bodied or young when we were directing them down the stairs or we we let a few people down the stairs what was smoke conditions like on the fourth and fifth floors during that process at the time - I
00:14:55 during that process at the time - I don't know about a fourth I don't but if we don't
00:14:58 we don't fourth it was quite um it's difficult to tell what floor to long because there wasn't any signage can you remember that's that sort of strategy yeah but there wasn't there wasn't smart logging
00:15:09 there wasn't there wasn't smart logging at this stage can you remember this stage in evening was the lighting working in the stairwell yeah I believe it was yes do you remember what if any hoses and
00:15:22 do you remember what if any hoses and equipment were lying in the stairwell as you went up to the sixth floor no you reached the sixth floor and banged on
00:15:34 reached the sixth floor and banged on the doors getting people out again did the process you follow it wasn't the same that you've followed on the fifth floor
00:15:41 floor systematically going around each the flats on each on the sixth floor yeah I mean occasionally we got stopped and because people were already out of their flats can we do it and down baby yeah that was pretty much when you were
00:15:53 that was pretty much when you were banging on the flat entrance doors can you remember what you were saying died London Fire Brigade you need to get out can you remember precisely how many people evacuated from flats on the sixth floor not can do you remember mr.
00:16:09 floor not can do you remember mr. Tillison same words the effect you have to get out now if you don't you won't get out now I don't you know we were in a crew of five so we were spread out a
00:16:20 a crew of five so we were spread out a little bit and doing different doors at different times so would you do you agree that that was advice that was
00:16:31 agree that that was advice that was sensible at the time
00:16:36 to be honest I hadn't seen when when we arrived it looked like it was too flat so light from the outside so I had absolutely no understanding of what the
00:16:48 absolutely no understanding of what the conditions were like to be honest in the whole block until we until we exited you say at page 7 ooh your witness statement we don't need to go to it unless you want to that there was quote some nice
00:17:00 want to that there was quote some nice green handrail close quotes did this help you to lead people down the tower yeah definitely you could just tell them to follow the handrail the grammar you mentioned in your witness things on page
00:17:12 mentioned in your witness things on page 7 that firefighters started to come down were they with residents or were the firefighters on their own it was a mixture some some would just go obviously cuz they move a lot quicker
00:17:23 obviously cuz they move a lot quicker and they'd go straight down I know those no others there because there was some elderly people when people who weren't necessarily on able-bodied you you'd have to help them down here and can you remember what
00:17:34 down here and can you remember what condition the residents were in those who were evacuating at that stage I think is very confused and because of the timings very tired and yeah we're a
00:17:45 the timings very tired and yeah we're a bit bewildered with what was happening here and came up with whether any of the residents who are evacuating were wearing secondary ba sets or whether they had masks on their face linked to in you you don't remember
00:17:56 in you you don't remember now none of them were in Attica can I now turn to conditions as you went further up the tower from the sixth the ninth floor first of all could you describe for us the smoke conditions and
00:18:08 describe for us the smoke conditions and the visibility you encountered between the sixth and the ninth floors it was all pretty clear to be honest until
00:18:19 all pretty clear to be honest until until we got to the ninth floor will be founded to there lady and her daughter and then I remember standing in there in
00:18:31 and then I remember standing in there in the lobby door to the stairwell and and I looked I was sort of fitting in and out and I looked out and it seems to get some white smoke quite hazy and I
00:18:43 some white smoke quite hazy and I remember
00:18:44 remember there's smoke coming up the smoke coming upstairs and then I looked again and then it was pretty much pitch black
00:18:56 then it was pretty much pitch black coming up the stairs so the white had turned to black yes and quite quickly from the sounds of it yeah it was literally a case of kami and I said what I said I went and looked again and in the conditions for that like that
00:19:07 the conditions for that like that Australia and it had it become denser you mentioned the white smoke was hazy was the black smoke denser in terms of visibility yes now in your statement
00:19:19 visibility yes now in your statement give the reference over on page seven and three lines up from the end of the main paragraph on that page you refer to the stare procedure can you describe for us where this their procedure is step
00:19:33 us where this their procedure is step procedure is a procedure you'd use if you were to make sure that the stairs were safe and they weren't going to collapse and you'd basically come down on your front and you'd sweep with your
00:19:46 on your front and you'd sweep with your feet I'm facing up with sorry and you'd sweep with your feet and you'd be banging with your hands just to ensure that what you were walking on was solid okay I know and moving debris if there
00:19:57 okay I know and moving debris if there wasn't need to be on the stairs now I'd now like to talk to you about the ninth floor and the rescue made there of the the mother and child and first of all you've helped us with conditions on the stair were you reached the ninth floor
00:20:09 stair were you reached the ninth floor and did you go into the lobby of the ninth floor yes and can you describe the smoke conditions as you found them then what that was when the conditions got
00:20:23 what that was when the conditions got worse than the stairs the lobby I think their lights the lights of the lobby weren't working and to my recollection that they didn't seem to only smoke
00:20:34 that they didn't seem to only smoke damages or any smoke in the lobby at that time who alerted you to the presence of the mother and child can you remember no no it was it was from my crew but I don't know who particular sir
00:20:46 crew but I don't know who particular sir but you hadn't opened the relevant flat door no could ask you to turn to page 8 of your witness statement and it's second main paragraph on that page where
00:20:59 second main paragraph on that page where you say this I went with another firefighter who I can't remember to find out where the dry riser was because 99 out of 100 time they're in they are on
00:21:12 out of 100 time they're in they are on every single floor and we had a look in the hallway which was pitch-black just from the darkness not through smoke we found it in the back corner and I immediately knew this would be a problem because every door on the floor we have
00:21:24 because every door on the floor we have plugged the hoses into will be open now at first are you saying that as the doors were open to allow firefighters to use hoses on each floor this meant that the smoke would inevitably spread
00:21:36 the smoke would inevitably spread through the building yes because you'd have to open their lobby doors to cap that because we go from a floor below the hose were therefore come out of that
00:21:50 the hose were therefore come out of that floor and it would have to go up the stairway into the next floor and then the only way to get it through those doors is for them to be open yes and if I could ask you just for the sake of completeness to turn to page 28 of your
00:22:01 completeness to turn to page 28 of your witness statement and it's the first main paragraph on that page you said this in grim feel even though I said it wasn't the complicated lion lay out in the pitch black we still had to look on
00:22:12 the pitch black we still had to look on the floors to find the outlet it seemed a funny place to be right next to someone's door at the other side of the building from the stairwell which meant by working to policy and running a hose up one from the floor below keeping the
00:22:23 up one from the floor below keeping the door open on that floor running the hose up the stairs onto the fire floor which meant keeping that door open also so if that fire was then to breach that room flat on the fire floor and come out into
00:22:34 flat on the fire floor and come out into the hall bats make would travel through down the hall and out that door and back up the stairwell and now have you compromised your stairwell which someone might say happen in Granville there seem to be a bit of smoke on the stairwell
00:22:45 to be a bit of smoke on the stairwell again is that a would you agree yes that's exactly what I was getting at yeah
00:22:53 the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the evacuation of the mother and child from the ninth floor now as I'm on the base of your statement mr. Tillison ordered mr. Benson and James Wolfe
00:23:04 ordered mr. Benson and James Wolfe intent to stay in the flat with the mother and child is that right yes and that they were in flat 65 is that right I don't know their number and he and you would then go down to the
00:23:15 he and you would then go down to the lobby to get spare sets of BA is that right oh no I knew she went down with it I got from Hamas notice they still don't know its name it's terrible but wood
00:23:27 know its name it's terrible but wood smoke hoods have been useful as well in this instance to have obtained yeah they would have they would have helped us out a lot in that instance do you carry any with you
00:23:35 with you no does any lfb appliance carry smoke hoods no follows on that presumably that you've never had to use smoke hurts
00:23:47 you've never had to use smoke hurts nothing to evacuate and consequent flow from that you've never had to use them in training or any other simulation now presumably you then return to the to the
00:23:58 presumably you then return to the to the bridgehead and did you update the bridgehead as to what you found and what the plan was note the timings of when we found the mother and the child
00:24:09 found the mother and the child realistically at a point where we should have been turning around and coming back out so it kind of changed everything and no to be honest we came through I came
00:24:21 no to be honest we came through I came through the lobby the lobby side the where the bridgehead was out onto where the mezzanine was and just immediately said that I need to be a sets now which
00:24:34 said that I need to be a sets now which in hindsight for them to hear that would probably be a little bit strange and you're speaking to mr. Dowd and so no I to be honest I don't know actually who
00:24:45 to be honest I don't know actually who that was I can't remember I believe I thought it was at a time but no I'm not sure actually who that was it was a watch manager who are speaking to but I don't know if it was mr. Beldon
00:24:56 don't know if it was mr. Beldon can you know if you spoke back to you did he have an Irish accent can you remember that it's mr. O'Keefe for example no it wasn't him okay and so you said you wanted a second set of BA what did the water managers say to
00:25:09 of BA what did the water managers say to you I said we wanted what to be a set it's not second yeah set to be a sets and then the watch manager said what he
00:25:20 and then the watch manager said what he rightly should say is where where are they tell us where they arm will send two more VA worse but because because
00:25:33 two more VA worse but because because we've been up and down so many times and we we felt we knew that layout and the worry for me was that because there was no signage anywhere we wouldn't find
00:25:45 no signage anywhere we wouldn't find them and I was just very aware that we'd left two people two people from you know my watch in the in the flat with with
00:25:58 my watch in the in the flat with with the casualties so it seemed a much better idea as if we've just got them and got on with her what we needed to do as quickly as possible so um they were very hesitant and they kept saying just
00:26:12 very hesitant and they kept saying just tell us where they are just tell us where they are and then I believe the quencher Tillotson came down he's boat I was I was speaking to a couple of firefighters saying give me assets and I
00:26:24 firefighters saying give me assets and I think commander Tillotson spoke to the watch manager and then they they they gave us uh sets which I know was probably very difficult for them to do but they yeah they goes their cents and
00:26:37 but they yeah they goes their cents and so did mr. Tillison say when it suggested that a fresh crew be sent up did mr. Tillerson say some words the effect of that is not going to happen does that sound - Oh what with a fresh coat I don't know but would you
00:26:51 coat I don't know but would you recognize watch majeure Watson do you know if him first of all I suppose to the first question no I don't he been on the red watch for a year and a half I was on the Bruce before that and it's
00:27:03 was on the Bruce before that and it's like I'm starting a new job you know you don't
00:27:06 don't everybody on that water today but the upshot is that you obtained to be a sets as out writers and you went back up to floor nine and to flat 65 in particular yes and can you describe for us the
00:27:17 yes and can you describe for us the conditions on the stairwell as you went back up to the ninth floor it was it was heavily smart logged there lie in the stairwell was helping us but it was heavily smiland you return to flat 65
00:27:31 heavily smiland you return to flat 65 you were able to evacuate the mother and child is it right that the mother had obeyed the be a set and the child was given the spare mask attached to mr. Benson's ba says yeah we we are yeah we
00:27:46 Benson's ba says yeah we we are yeah we came into the flat and to be honest I hadn't actually seen who the lady in her room at door sir so was a bit taken aback because the
00:27:58 so was a bit taken aback because the daughter was so young and my first thought was I don't know how we're gonna fit put a set on this girl and we just sort of we just had it had a second and
00:28:09 sort of we just had it had a second and I just remember saying to Harry that he was gonna have to he was going to have to carry her and we'll stick the mast because he had quite a lot of air left
00:28:20 because he had quite a lot of air left we'd plug him a stranger to his set and and the lady coos put the cell on and it was I mean if definitely in hindsight they were very they were very very calm
00:28:33 they were very they were very very calm it was probably mean they might be very calm themselves but I'd probably put a lot that down to father's Wolfen didn't better than what they were saying to them while still waiting and do you have
00:28:44 them while still waiting and do you have any training for learning how to you know put on secondary ba sets on people it may be smaller than firefighters or even children is it possible to have for that
00:28:54 that no we just practice with other firefighters that's and that's to be honest that's who they're for and have you have you had previous experience where you've had to puts a mask on a child's face in order to oh no
00:29:07 child's face in order to oh no absolutely not now the next topic I'd like to turn to is return to the bridgehead now you tallied out at 0 to 17
00:29:16 17 did you explain to anyone to do debrief any one of the bridgehead what had happened in relation to flat 65 and now I didn't have no yeah did you hear a
00:29:28 I didn't have no yeah did you hear a quick debrief between crew manager Tillison and the station manager at the bridgehead I think yeah I think they um I think they did have a debrief but I do
00:29:40 I think they did have a debrief but I do over here is a no idea what was said do you remember any other discussion at the bridgehead regarding the use of BA sets to assist the evacuation of residents no did you raise it with anyone at the
00:29:52 did you raise it with anyone at the bridgehead no oh to be honest everything was moved so quickly as soon as we came through we had to get our breath and I think it was a bit of a shock from all of us what was happening because we'd seen them we'd seen their the fired
00:30:04 seen them we'd seen their the fired obviously reached up by their it's a 9th floor because the flames were coming past the window when we were in there but I think everyone was a bit shell-shocked because we weren't expecting that and then then whilst we
00:30:17 expecting that and then then whilst we were there not it was a Paddington's fyu crew came through the door with another casualty and then sort of their priorities went to that thank you now if I can now turn to your second
00:30:30 now if I can now turn to your second task you're allocated on the night and you described at page 14 of your witness statement witnessing an incident involving station manager Gareth Kirk and I can take you to it may be easier to be press ahead you say that Gareth
00:30:42 to be press ahead you say that Gareth cook is a doer he had volunteered to go up to carry out a situation report which to us having been up was nonsense the situation was every single floor was alight but obviously for those senior officers at the bridgehead which I think
00:30:53 officers at the bridgehead which I think it was a group matter level in fairness to them they need a bit more information than we were providing to them now to be clear just taking each element of that was it you or group manager cook who
00:31:05 was it you or group manager cook who said the brief was nonsense what the brief that we were given yeah no no no one said it out loud I was just you know
00:31:17 one said it out loud I was just you know in hindsight thinking that it was I mean you saw what happened and it was just so explain it what nothing was said at
00:31:29 so explain it what nothing was said at the time it wasn't it was the correct brief that we were that we were given but it almost seemed fruitless if you know what I mean yeah it wasn't said
00:31:40 know what I mean yeah it wasn't said that anything was nonsense at a time that was just me it's your enhance of collecting of yeah that's right and again this may be a reflection of the event but what information do you think the senior
00:31:51 information do you think the senior officers that bridge had needed that they didn't have what would have assisted them do you think I've ever seen RT so when you say looking at final bits of that paragraph maybe ease if I
00:32:02 bits of that paragraph maybe ease if I ask you to turn to a page 14 of the witness statement and the first substantive paragraph on that page and it's really the last sentence and you say but obviously for those senior officers of the bridgehead which I think
00:32:13 officers of the bridgehead which I think it was a Greek major level in fence them they needed a bit more information than we were providing them when you were giving the statement can remember what you had in mind what information they
00:32:24 you had in mind what information they were missing which they needed I think I was just trying to be fair to be honest I think obviously the information they were getting was it was very different
00:32:36 were getting was it was very different to be at the bridgehead than to watch it outside it was it was almost like two
00:32:47 outside it was it was almost like two different job and a lot of high-rise incidents are quite similar to that the bridgehead is supposed to be in a safe place and safe air and you don't always get a full picture and I would imagine that what was coming down was a
00:33:01 that what was coming down was a description of what was going on outside and they were they probably just wanted to get clarification but unfortunately what was coming down was the truth did
00:33:13 what was coming down was the truth did you ever hear any information coming from outside the tower to brief the the officers in charge of the bridgehead as to how the fire was spreading on the exterior
00:33:22 exterior jemelle by the hearing no I usually wants you to know you us there was still stuff going on you were just getting on with your tasks I wasn't paying any
00:33:34 with your tasks I wasn't paying any staying at page 14 and looking at the penultimate paragraph on that page you describe the briefing for the second task you were deployed to take and you say that yourself and Gareth cook were given a brief quotes which was something
00:33:47 given a brief quotes which was something like just let me know what you've got up there tell me what's going on because by this time there was no communication anywhere nothing and the air wave was flooded due to the number of firefighters there's one channel really
00:33:58 firefighters there's one channel really for BA users now I suppose my first question is what further information did group magic Goulbourne need at that stage I don't know are you able to be
00:34:12 stage I don't know are you able to be more precise as to the particular task you were required to do this time what exactly what was put there just go up and try and find out what's going on and
00:34:24 and try and find out what's going on and to the best of your memory those the words that group magical Zhaan said to me you weren't directed to a particular floor or a particular flat on the floor at that stage were you given any
00:34:36 at that stage were you given any briefing regarding conditions in the stairwell no I know I think because I had already been up I think that was sufficient in size I would say but no I
00:34:51 sufficient in size I would say but no I wasn't giving anything extra now in your witness statement you described going up to the 12th floor it may help if I ask you to turn to the top paragraph on page
00:35:02 you to turn to the top paragraph on page 15 and you say this from the second line onwards we made it to I think the 12th floor there's no one else on that floor and the lobby it was warm there was a smoke layer which was a
00:35:13 there was a smoke layer which was a little bit low and pitch-black it was clean no fire in the hallway we banged on all the doors but there was no answer nothing we stepped back to the stairwell and I said the situation is we just need to clear every floor and the
00:35:25 just need to clear every floor and the only way we can really do that is to put the doors in and make sure there was no one there we had to check especially at that time of night it was the middle of the night people may still be asleep not even a broken people do place earphones
00:35:37 even a broken people do place earphones in and could be enjoying their sleep unaware of what was going on around them now in relation to the search you recommend it be carried out there what
00:35:49 recommend it be carried out there what training have you received to search in this way that you recommended all RBI training is usually down to search and
00:36:00 training is usually down to search and rescue and searching searching a room or such a compartment and the process of breaking in doors to check whether anyone was in there that's the process you're trained to carry out is that right it normally we wouldn't put a door
00:36:16 right it normally we wouldn't put a door in unless we had water especially in a high-rise what on this occasion why did you think it was the necessary steps to take because it wasn't because I had
00:36:28 take because it wasn't because I had already been outside and I'd seen the state of the of the building you knew that it was a hundred percent of life there was no way you could get water onto every single floor because you can't pump that much water up to see
00:36:41 can't pump that much water up to see then supply a hose of every single floor you wouldn't you just wouldn't get that water up there so it come it sort of got to a point where it was just a case of get every single person out as quickly
00:36:52 get every single person out as quickly as possible and so we had to we didn't have a choice it was just leave the door and hope that no one's in there or put
00:37:03 and hope that no one's in there or put the door in and make sure no one's in there as she went round his flat how did you'd mark that each on the door the walls whatever that each flat had been searched and was clear we didn't we
00:37:14 searched and was clear we didn't we didn't have anything you didn't you say you didn't have radio comms at this stage how are you recording what record was being made of the flats and the floors that you're clearing which could
00:37:25 floors that you're clearing which could then be relayed back to the bridgehead when you got back down there or when you had comms if we if we clear the floor gone round every single door arm and
00:37:36 gone round every single door arm and done it and we'd have relayed that back just by coming back down to the bridgehead but if because it was no signage or anything it was very difficult to relay any of real information to say that a certain floor
00:37:47 information to say that a certain floor is cleared we didn't we had no way of recording
00:37:50 recording I'm flowing on from that if I could ask you to look at the final paragraph on page 15 of your witness statement we're dealing here with the debrief on your return from the 12th floor and you say
00:38:03 return from the 12th floor and you say that quotes Gareth reported there's pretty much flour on every floor we haven't got water up there properly we just need to keep searching to see how many people we can get out and we couldn't get past the 12th floor at this
00:38:14 couldn't get past the 12th floor at this stage can you remember now did station manager cook mention anything to the bridgehead officers about having sufficient equipment to put doors in no
00:38:25 sufficient equipment to put doors in no no I don't know you can't remember no ID to be honest I stayed for a bit of the briefing and then I had to take a seat you didn't had anything to know and it
00:38:36 you didn't had anything to know and it was sort of you know you had a station manager speaking to a group manager and he was a person that was sent to get the information so that's I let them get on
00:38:48 information so that's I let them get on with it
00:38:48 with it one point that's arisen is can you carry out a search and rescue effectively without having water at this stage in the evening yeah absolutely did you want
00:39:00 the evening yeah absolutely did you want mr. cook say anything about the need for firefighting media to deal with the situations you found on the 12th floor can you remember I remember saying to um
00:39:13 can you remember I remember saying to um I could manage to Golborne just about having made sure we need to get hose onto every single floor but to be honest I think that was a bit of a pipe dream
00:39:24 I think that was a bit of a pipe dream now turning to near final topics now mr. Gallacher you're the third time you went under air and if I could ask you to look at the bottom of page 17 of your
00:39:35 at the bottom of page 17 of your statement on the top of page 18 and where you describe the instructions for your third task and your statement says this when it was our turn to go up there was four of us Pat Goldblum gave me the
00:39:47 was four of us Pat Goldblum gave me the brief and I think it was probably the most useless but the most honest correct brief I've ever had he said I don't know what the is going on I need you to go up there and tell me what is going on and he said we have fire survival calls
00:39:59 and he said we have fire survival calls coming from a 14th floor and we haven't heard from them for ages and they won't get past the twelfth he said quite simply I need you to go up and excuse me and you just go up there and see if you can put higher
00:40:10 see if you can put higher it was totally 100% the correct briefing I remember saying look what we'll go to the 12th if we can go any higher we will go higher systematically - to the 13th than the 14th it was irrelevant
00:40:22 the 13th than the 14th it was irrelevant telling him that but we didn't get past the twelfth floor now at that stage were you aware of the flat numbers of any FSG calls that related to 14th floor or above no do you know where the group
00:40:35 above no do you know where the group manager Goulbourne was receiving any information back from crews who've been trying to get to the 14th floor and above I don't know you've got to the
00:40:46 above I don't know you've got to the 12th floor I think I'm right in saying and you describe the conditions you encountered on page 19 of your statement you then came back down to the bridgehead won't you a back at the
00:40:57 bridgehead won't you a back at the bridgehead did you explain to a group magic Goulbourne that you hadn't been able to put out the fires on the 12th floor yeah yeah I said that there was
00:41:08 floor yeah yeah I said that there was pockets of fire I mean it was so late in the day to be honest when we went into flats most of them at that level were completely just shells I mean I didn't
00:41:19 completely just shells I mean I didn't even have external walls so there were just pockets of fire in there that wasn't really affecting the rest of the building by that stage
00:41:34 just dealing with further matters arising from the night as you sat reflecting after the event did you have any further thoughts about this the need
00:41:47 any further thoughts about this the need to carry secondary BA sets when you're going responding to FSG calls to assist residents back down the tower no not secondary PA sets no you can't I
00:41:59 no not secondary PA sets no you can't I mean they're heavy enough as it is to to walk up that high carrying it a PA set is it's just it's just a lot of work
00:42:10 set is it's just it's just a lot of work it's a lot of hard work and you'd be not very effective when you got there especially if you didn't need it now flowing off from that question I can go to it but at page 24 of your witness statement in relation to Edie ba you
00:42:22 statement in relation to Edie ba you mentioned the fire service wanted et ba for everyone but you say why put yourself under that strain it is ridiculous is you're on when I if I ask you the question what do you mean by that it's the answer you've just given it's a it's an additional burden to
00:42:34 it's a it's an additional burden to carry and that you dig yeah I just and it's just my personal opinion we deal with 99% of fires with s DBA quite
00:42:46 deal with 99% of fires with s DBA quite effectively and a DBA is a lot heavier it's a lot heavier and there's people people can use it and you use it if you have to it's not a problem but there is
00:42:58 have to it's not a problem but there is no need for everybody to everybody to have that because you just won't be as effective it will have it will have a negative effect in a lot in most of our instance I feel you explained in your
00:43:10 instance I feel you explained in your statement how you used to do a yearly wear for a DBA but no longer and you say again a patron for quotes if you want to be trained wearing e DBA you have to try and arrange that for yourself close
00:43:21 and arrange that for yourself close quotes do you know when the change happened can you remember no not off the top of my head can you remember why now one year we were doing them and the next
00:43:33 one year we were doing them and the next we went after the first deployment within the tower is it fair to say that your view is that the state policy was no longer viable at that stage oh yeah a
00:43:44 no longer viable at that stage oh yeah a hundred percent air would you therefore have evacuated the residence and if so how would you've gone about it well for the whole block
00:43:55 gone about it well for the whole block how did you've done it if stay-put was no longer viable what would you have done that's given your experience short of a some sort of a alarm for the
00:44:07 of a some sort of a alarm for the building or some evacuation signal I don't really see how you could ever sure go into every single floor like we tried to and every single flap there is no way
00:44:18 to and every single flap there is no way you cannot you can evacuate a building of that size would you been able to execute a partial evacuation do you think at that stage a word to be honest
00:44:31 think at that stage a word to be honest that's what we are trying to do when we first went up there that's what we were going systematically because obviously the fire travels up so we were trying to get the next floors and it was only really when we came out and realized the
00:44:44 really when we came out and realized the extent of what happened is that you should have been the whole building yes mr. Gallagher at this stage I've got no further questions much house for a brief break to see if any further points have
00:44:55 break to see if any further points have arisen
00:44:55 arisen yes well there's gonna we do find from time to time the traditional questions crop up after mr. Cannella thinks he's finished so we'll have a five-minute break
00:45:06 break and then ask you to come back and see whether there thank you please don't talk to anyone about your evidence thank you very much so if you go with the astronaut will resume it 10 tulip
00:45:31 I take you five minutes as on yes tend to
00:51:09 yes now us position some brief supplementals for your Commission's yes there were
00:51:55 and give us together I think a few additional questions okay sorry Alex thanks for your patience first of all location the dry riser where would you expect risers to be in a
00:52:06 where would you expect risers to be in a building of this kind to be honest they can't be on where it was they can be but it's just not the best place for it to be and I think I lose it in there it
00:52:19 be and I think I lose it in there it seemed very from the outside it seemed a very modern building and even on the two mezzanine levels when you went in it all seemed quite modern but the further you went up it seemed like a very old block
00:52:31 went up it seemed like a very old block and the dry I wouldn't expect the dry rises to be on floors outside people's flats you'd expect them to be I expect it to be in the stairwell there should
00:52:42 it to be in the stairwell there should be some sort of far fine Lobby so we can keep the smoke logging down to a minimum in a building such as this where you had
00:52:54 in a building such as this where you had fires on multiple floors are you saying it would it's impossible or practically difficult to get water to every floor upon which there's a fire a decent
00:53:05 upon which there's a fire a decent pressure I've never done it but a decent pressure yes it would be very very difficult to get that to every single floor when you're at the bridgehead both
00:53:18 floor when you're at the bridgehead both before and after your three deployments under air did you hear anyone asked for secondary sets to take up to the tower to help evacuation of residents no your
00:53:31 to help evacuation of residents no your third and final deployment this is one I'm afraid one there's loyally questions doing the best you can can you remember the time roughly or as precisely as you
00:53:42 the time roughly or as precisely as you can at which you were deployed in town but it was definitely after the deployment the second deployment you went up with mr. Kirk oh yeah a hundred percent yeah came it was a it was
00:53:54 percent yeah came it was a it was starting to get light okay mr. Gallagher those are all the questions I've got for you final thing is say simply thank you for coming along today it's be very helpful yes I'd like to add my thanks to
00:54:06 helpful yes I'd like to add my thanks to that you did three deployments up in the tower which is perhaps a bit unusual isn't it yes that's very impressive thank you very much for coming to tell us about evidence will be very useful
00:54:17 us about evidence will be very useful thank you thank you very much but you like to give the action on your feet again
00:54:35 yes sir the next witness is firefighter Theresa orchard I'm not aware of whether there needs to be a rearrangement of domestic furniture that doesn't and so many of your permission to court yes of course thank you very much
00:55:53 some ways since energy declare
00:56:10 thank you very much sit sit down and make yourself comfortable
00:56:17 right yes first of all would you be able to confirm your name for the record it's Teresa Orchard first of all missiles many thanks for coming along stairs very much appreciated in the blue
00:56:29 stairs very much appreciated in the blue folder in front of you if you could open it to the first tab you should find your statement data the 16th of January right oh you still got this together if you
00:56:44 oh you still got this together if you move on try to ahead through the full of Holly deals is behind it
00:56:58 don't worry miss or to it Thompson because it and it will also come up on the screen to your right so you might find that more useful thank you miss
00:57:09 find that more useful thank you miss orchard me and technology don't work and appears that I can't work files either apologies
00:57:13 apologies the first statement is the born date of the 16th of January 2018 hopefully behind the next app you'll find a contemporaneous note and behind
00:57:24 find a contemporaneous note and behind that hopefully an exhibit to your witness witness statement which was a map showing the tower as a media surrounding area is that right yes and have you read those documents recently how'd you confirm that contents are true
00:57:36 how'd you confirm that contents are true there's one thing in there specifically that I don't recall in your statement yes in the police statement ok if you
00:57:47 yes in the police statement ok if you could flag for me book in a few questions I could get some preliminary sorted first if you could flag for me what that issue is then we can take it from there ok now or you content subject that caveat for those documents to stand
00:58:00 that caveat for those documents to stand as your evidence the inquiry yes ok now at any stage if you want a break police say so if at any stage my question is unclear again just say so and I'll rephrase now you
00:58:13 just say so and I'll rephrase now you mentioned in your witness statement there was a point that you didn't recall would you be able to show us in your witness statement at the point you're referring to you there so it's on page six
00:58:29 and it's the third paragraph warmish starts I could not see the numbers no by the time I had gone what does the error
00:58:43 the time I had gone what does the error so it says that is when I stopped at flat 94 I have no idea where that's I've don't become days I see I was going to ask you a question about that thank you
00:58:55 ask you a question about that thank you so should I just delete that sentence yes thank you Miss Orchard thank you very much now the questions I'm going to be asking you today we'll focus on the
00:59:06 be asking you today we'll focus on the FSG in relation to flat 113 on the 14th floor now if I could deal with some basic points first just to give us some context first of all at the time of the
00:59:17 context first of all at the time of the fires that write you a firefighter station to Soho ok and at the time of the fire you'd been with the lfp for 8 years and that you drove the pump appliance on the night and the callsign
00:59:29 appliance on the night and the callsign of that pump appliance is alpha 2 for 2 yes and although your base that's Soho for the purposes of the FSG called flat 113 it's right that you were partnered
00:59:42 113 it's right that you were partnered with firefighter Herrera escaped and just so that we can get some context in terms of timings the LF B has provided us with records which indicate that you
00:59:53 us with records which indicate that you were mobilized at 0 1:30 we were on the road at 0 136 and there at the scene at 0 147 does that sound about right to you yes
01:00:04 yes now the LF B's also provide us with timings in relation to your SD be a where and they indicate that you tallied out at the bridgehead at 0 247 is that right well there about I really have no
01:00:18 right well there about I really have no idea
01:00:18 idea okay now just to provide us with some context of what it was like when you arrived on the night you arrived at zero 147 you tallied out at the bridgehead to
01:00:31 147 you tallied out at the bridgehead to enter the tower under era zero 227 what were you doing in the the time between those two events so when we arrived as I was driving had to then put
01:00:43 arrived as I was driving had to then put on my fire kit and my be a set and then I made my way to the to the to the tower whereupon I saw the queue of BA wearers
01:00:56 whereupon I saw the queue of BA wearers so I just joined that queue now if I can go to dealing with the first topic and that's your so entry into the tower and if I could ask you to turn to page three
01:01:07 if I could ask you to turn to page three of your witness statement I miss altered as you see with others from easiest to look at the screen and Paul will magnify the relevant extract to the statement for you but looking at page three of your witness team it's the fourth
01:01:18 your witness team it's the fourth paragraph third line you describe there in the third line have been called into the holding area yeah can you remember what's that holding area inside or
01:01:29 what's that holding area inside or outside the tower inside inside do you recall an officer writing FSG details on the lobby walls the lobby walls no I don't recall that did he give you a bit
01:01:42 don't recall that did he give you a bit of paper to take up to the bridgehead do you remember them could I ask Paul to bring up a met document quadruple zero five double seven four
01:01:56 now do you remember seeing this writing this wall chart when you're at the lobby no I don't and so it flows from that if we look at the middle column and the
01:02:09 we look at the middle column and the second entry from the bottom where it says be a 1-month 314th it follows that you didn't register that entry there and
01:02:22 you didn't register that entry there and if I could ask you to pull to turn us to the right-hand column I think it's the third entry from the bottom where it says 1 1 2 14 8 P again I see you didn't
01:02:39 says 1 1 2 14 8 P again I see you didn't register that entry either no I didn't did anyone seek to draw your attention to the writing's on the walls of a long name before you were deployed from the bridgehead did you see any other
01:02:51 bridgehead did you see any other firefighters coming down from floor 14 did you overhear anything or did was anything past you as to what they'd found on the 14th floor
01:03:02 found on the 14th floor no again before you were deployed were you aware of residents trying to lower themselves out of out of the window using tide sheets no isn't now the next
01:03:15 using tide sheets no isn't now the next stage I'd like to ask you about is when you're actually at the bridgehead now in your witness statement it's paid for and the 7th paragraph you say you think that when you were deployed the bridgehead
01:03:26 when you were deployed the bridgehead was on the third floor is that a fair summary of your of your memory and I think that might be I think I don't know which is correct is the correct memory
01:03:39 which is correct is the correct memory but I think it was on the second floor but I'm not sure okay I'm not absolutely sure either way okay that's use and as you went up from the mezzanine to the bridgehead do you recall seeing these
01:03:51 bridgehead do you recall seeing these wall markings and if I could ask Paul to bring up met document triple zero one three zero seven four
01:04:08 do you remember seeing those at any stage I don't know and it follows therefore if Paul could magnify the writing on the bottom right hand quarter where it says 1 1 3 8 people 14th floor
01:04:20 where it says 1 1 3 8 people 14th floor you don't because again did anyone draw your attention to that if I could ask
01:04:31 your attention to that if I could ask Paul to put up another photo at this stage which is met triple zero one five six two five do you
01:04:45 triple zero one five six two five do you remember seeing this at the third floor no I don't do you remember a female officer writing on the wall at any stage no I don't know thank you final question of these types Paul can
01:04:58 final question of these types Paul can ask you to put up met triple zero one eight seven four nine
01:05:07 this is a forward information board I think I'm right in saying do you remember seeing that at the bridgehead whether on the second or third floor no I don't and you wouldn't have registered
01:05:19 I don't and you wouldn't have registered the information in the top section of that list okay thank you now the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the instructions you were given at the bridgehead I think in this in your
01:05:31 bridgehead I think in this in your statement you described the situation as chaotic but the female officer gave you instructions was clear is that a fair summary of your your evidence absolutely yes and if I could ask you to turn to
01:05:42 yes and if I could ask you to turn to page four of your statement and its really the fifth paragraph on that page you say I think she said six people in flat one one three on level 14 she said
01:05:55 flat one one three on level 14 she said they were all right they're not all right now we need to get them out Pete wrote some details on his sleeve now I think my first question is are you sure that the female officer referred to six
01:06:07 that the female officer referred to six people I'm very confident that's what she said yes could I ask you to turn to your contemporaneous note and pull the reference is quadruple zero there we go
01:06:19 reference is quadruple zero there we go five six one eight zero one and if you look roughly halfway down that page it's a paragraph which starts at the bridgehead we were given our brief My
01:06:31 bridgehead we were given our brief My partner and I were asked to go to flat one one three on level 14 and the sister family who were inside down to floor level you don't mention the number sixth there but are you still fairly certain
01:06:45 there but are you still fairly certain that the number six was used by the officer yes
01:06:53 did you see mr. Herrera write the flat details and the number of people within the flat on his calf I don't know what he wrote but I saw him writing on his car face did you write the flat number
01:07:07 car face did you write the flat number on your calf now I don't know did you write the number of people with them
01:07:12 well do you know crew major Michael Onan and firefighter juggins I don't know them that well I I may know them by sight but I don't know them by name
01:07:24 sight but I don't know them by name do you remember being behind or in the vicinity of any other crew that was tasked to report to have carry out an FSG on the 14th floor so I can you say
01:07:36 FSG on the 14th floor so I can you say that again yes of course when you're waiting to be deployed at the bridgehead do you recall any other crew being deployed in relation to an FSG from the 14th floor no I don't now
01:07:48 14th floor no I don't now turning now to your actual deployment to the 14th floor and timings the lfp records indicate you tallied out at 0 to 27 and tallied back in at 0 to 47 and so
01:08:01 27 and tallied back in at 0 to 47 and so it appears that would you agree were dealing with a 20 minute time period that deals with your trip to the 14th floor Simmons were you aware at this day
01:08:12 floor Simmons were you aware at this day so just before you deployed that a group of firefighters Cornelius Murphy and Marian had returned to the bridgehead from the 14th floor no and once the female officer had given
01:08:24 no and once the female officer had given you your brief were you given any further update before you were deployed up the town now I'd like to talk to you now about the conditions that you encountered on the stairwell as you went
01:08:35 encountered on the stairwell as you went up is it fair to say that as you went up from the bridge up to the 14th floor visibility was difficult yes and what color was the smoke and it's just don't
01:08:46 color was the smoke and it's just don't smoke I don't recall what color you don't recall it being white changing to black or anything like that as you went out no did you leave any equipment on the stairwell at any stage on the way
01:08:57 the stairwell at any stage on the way out yes
01:08:58 out yes and what did you leave I left an enforcer and why did you leave it because it was extremely heavy and it was slowing down our progress and am i
01:09:09 was slowing down our progress and am i right in saying that because of the the difficulties presented by the conditions and the difficulties identifying each floor numbering that initially you went to the wrong floor I don't think we went
01:09:22 to the wrong floor I don't think we went to the wrong floor I think we went to went into lobbies to check the floor numbers will peak didn't actually to be more specific and looking at page six of
01:09:34 more specific and looking at page six of your statement your earlier correction and if we go back to that it's the second substantive paragraph on that page you say that in my parrot by the
01:09:45 page you say that in my parrot by the time I'd gone back with the blue other times I'd lost where the door was that I'd come in so you've got then try and find your way back to it this is when I stopped at flat 94 that was quite a scary moment yeah that a flat mindful
01:09:57 scary moment yeah that a flat mindful bit I don't know you just didn't doesn't doesn't I don't recall saying that at all okay
01:10:06 by the time you got to the 14th floor how are you feeling exhausted is it right you have to stop and catch your breath definitely is now looking out
01:10:18 breath definitely is now looking out conditions on the 14th floor what was the difference between the conditions you encountered on the stairwell and in the lobby on the 14th floor I think
01:10:31 the lobby on the 14th floor I think they're pretty similar actually and when you're in the 14th floor lobby what was your visibility like how far forward could you see into the lobby in terms of couldn't really see any
01:10:42 terms of couldn't really see any distance there I haven't just sort of crouched down and get right to the door to see the numbers on the door and how close up to the doors did you have to go in or inches yeah were you able to make
01:10:56 in or inches yeah were you able to make out kumara MacLennan and juggins when you arrived at the 14th floor lobby I couldn't see who they were but we saw the other team about him
01:11:09 what equipment were you wearing on your head my helmet than my flashing and my be a mascot hissing and so would you agree to the equipment muffles the
01:11:20 agree to the equipment muffles the voices of those who are speaking yes and to what extent does it affect what you're able to hear well it would kind
01:11:31 you're able to hear well it would kind of like disguise their voice but you can make out the words but you have to raise your voice are you able to make out the voices of different individuals it doesn't I didn't recognize the voices
01:11:43 doesn't I didn't recognize the voices okay and did any of them tell you that they were searching for flat 111 and they didn't tell me that they did they tell you that did anyone say that they'd
01:11:55 tell you that did anyone say that they'd been into flat 111 no did they give you any details as to which floor which flats had been searched and who was within any of the flats not to me them so Pete was by the team leader so they
01:12:10 so Pete was by the team leader so they may have given him some information that I didn't hear how far away was Pete from you he would've been just a couple of steps ahead of me now turning to flat 113 itself
01:12:23 now turning to flat 113 itself you found the flat but is it right that the occupants were reluctant to open the door yes could you hear what they were saying yes and were they talk and was it
01:12:34 saying yes and were they talk and was it Pete Herrera who was talking to them I could hear what they were saying well we were outside the flat it's not what you mean but let's first of all what were they saying so when we arrived at the
01:12:45 they saying so when we arrived at the door we're knocked on the door and said that it was the fire brigade and they wouldn't answer the door but they were saying I think we said you need to come
01:12:57 saying I think we said you need to come with us and they said we're not coming out we're not coming out did they say why they didn't want to come out I can't I couldn't be clear on that name and is it right that mr. Herrera went eventually got into the fair they
01:13:09 eventually got into the fair they eventually opened the door and Pete went in and the female voice instantly said shut the door shut the door they're quite obviously very frightened
01:13:23 they're quite obviously very frightened so I pulled the door up just enough that it wouldn't let smoking and so did you stay on the lobby site or the flat side of the side to the lobby side and is it
01:13:36 of the side to the lobby side and is it right that you could hear mr. Herrera talking I could hear them talking I couldn't be clear what they were saying and you say in your statement that mr.
01:13:47 and you say in your statement that mr. Herrera was talking to them for about three or four minutes does that sound about right you may have been even less than that though and is it fair to say then that you couldn't make out any of the conversation no could you hear any
01:13:59 the conversation no could you hear any other voices apart from mr. Herrera's you refer to a lady I I could hear voices but I couldn't tell whether it was more than one person talking all the same person talking or it was just
01:14:11 same person talking or it was just voices
01:14:18 did you meet MacLennan and juggins before or after mr. Herrera went into flat hundred thirteen before did you hear or do you recall hearing mr.
01:14:29 hear or do you recall hearing mr. Herrera tell mr. Mackall onin and then there is loads of people in one month three but they won't come out they won't open the door they won't come out I don't recall that now do you recall any
01:14:41 don't recall that now do you recall any conversation between mr. Herrera mr. McLennan only record conversation when we a conversation I don't know what it was when we first met another team on
01:14:52 was when we first met another team on that floor when we first made entry to that Lobby and did they give any indication as to how many people were in particular flats no
01:15:07 if I can now talk to you about the contact you had with the occupants of flat one one three mr. Herrero you think was in the flat for three to four minutes maybe less even less time
01:15:19 four minutes maybe less even less time than that was he on his own in the flat in the sense was he the only firefighter in the flat during that far as I was aware yes is that usual unusual to go in
01:15:30 aware yes is that usual unusual to go in on your own in that situation I would say unusual but it was an unusual circumstance did the fact that you could
01:15:42 circumstance did the fact that you could hear him suggest that he hadn't moved far from the flat entrance door I couldn't say and given that it was
01:15:53 couldn't say and given that it was unusual were you tempted to go in and I was about to go in yeah and he came out no he didn't come out be sorry that one of the occupants came out yeah and did
01:16:06 of the occupants came out yeah and did you as how many occupants came out past you can you remember as far as I could see it was three okay who was the foot how would you describe the first document to have left I would say the
01:16:17 document to have left I would say the first one was an adult carrying a child male/female I couldn't say for sure but it by the size of the silhouette I would say it was male and the second individual was he was I think another
01:16:29 individual was he was I think another adult shorter are you able to say whether male or female I couldn't say for sure though and the third person - was the childhood the first person was
01:16:41 was the childhood the first person was carrying you didn't see a fourth individual no I did not
01:16:47 as they left did you or Pete go after them so we both so they ran out of the
01:16:58 them so we both so they ran out of the flat basically I tried to stop them so that they would come with us sort of thing but they've gone so pink Pete came out and then we made our way out of the lobby expecting to catch them up but we
01:17:13 lobby expecting to catch them up but we didn't see them indeed as mr. Herrera presumably Wendy did you have any chance
01:17:25 presumably Wendy did you have any chance to see no because I was trying to you know as the people came by me yeah it was very fast and as the people came past me I was trying to you know talk to
01:17:37 past me I was trying to you know talk to them and so I didn't see inside you can see whether there was smoke or did you ask Pete how many little worried did you
01:17:48 ask Pete how many little worried did you ask Pete how many people were within the flat I didn't know I didn't did he tell you how many people are in the flat did you ask whether he'd carried out any sweep or search to the flat no I didn't how would you describe mr. herrera's
01:18:01 how would you describe mr. herrera's demeanor was he calm not calm what well I don't know him very well so I really couldn't say but was he in a
01:18:12 I really couldn't say but was he in a panic looking at the extremes was he panicking or was he calm I can't what somewhere in between somewhere in between I think where do you record mr. Herrera shouting mr. juggins that mr.
01:18:25 Herrera shouting mr. juggins that mr. juggins had not followed his be a partner downstairs to him Jim did you ever hear that exchange did you overhear mr. juggins saying anything to mr. Herrera no for you left the 14th floor
01:18:38 Herrera no for you left the 14th floor no I don't look did you ever did you see or witness any conversation between mr. Herrera mr. juggins on the 14th floor after the residents had left I don't recall
01:18:51 you set page 8 of your statement the second substantive paragraph first line I wasn't concerned about the air I had the actual tasks was pretty
01:19:02 the actual tasks was pretty straightforward there's nothing we had not been trained to do no sense if you were in control and not panicking and could have carried out a sweep of the flat if you'd been able to is that a
01:19:13 flat if you'd been able to is that a fair observation and I think that question is answered that his statement is an answer to the police questions sort of thing rather than you know
01:19:24 sort of thing rather than you know obviously it wasn't a straightforward task because of the circumstances I think what I mean is it's it's a task
01:19:36 think what I mean is it's it's a task that we've been trained to do sort of thing that actual task would would have wouldn't have been straightforward and we wouldn't have been relaxed about it
01:19:47 we wouldn't have been relaxed about it in any way did you after that you've seen the three residents leave you say I think they went quickly yes did you
01:19:59 think they went quickly yes did you think at that stage should I go in and check and sweep the flat I know are you familiar with the terms of policy 8:03
01:20:10 familiar with the terms of policy 8:03 on search and rescue yes we can take you to it if you if you want but paragraph 7.1 see there says that when a casualty is discovered it's stated that the
01:20:23 is discovered it's stated that the firefighter should perform a secondary sweep of the immediate vicinity yep do you think that provision was relevant to the situation you found here on flat one one three no I think that is
01:20:34 one one three no I think that is regarding a smoke atmosphere smoking atmosphere where you can't actually see around the casualty the idea of being if there's more than one person there they usually stick together and you might
01:20:46 usually stick together and you might pull out one casualty that you find and another one maybe just an arm's length away that you can't see because of the smoke so in a clear atmosphere obviously
01:20:57 smoke so in a clear atmosphere obviously you just look around and see yes given the smoke conditions you'd encounter in the lobby and I think I'm right in saying you said you didn't go
01:21:09 right in saying you said you didn't go inside and can see within the flash yeah how could you be sure that smoke conditions weren't deteriorating within the flat and because of her saying shut
01:21:20 the flat and because of her saying shut the door shut the door so it would make me assume that the air was clear in there and they didn't want the smoke to go in if I can now to turn to your return to the bridgehead before you do
01:21:31 return to the bridgehead before you do is just clear you described seeing three people come out of the flat pretty quickly yes did you see anyone else come out of the flat to the river
01:21:45 out of the flat to the river no I don't think so it's possible because it was very smoky but I don't think anybody else came out that day thank you if we couldn't deal with your returns the bridgehead did you debrief
01:21:57 returns the bridgehead did you debrief anyone at the bridgehead on what you found on the 14th floor so Pete gave the debrief and whilst he was doing that I wasn't really listening to him because I
01:22:09 wasn't really listening to him because I was more concerned that the floors weren't numbered and I want to tell the waiting be aware is to be aware of that and to count the flaws so they didn't waste time or have to open doors
01:22:21 waste time or have to open doors unnecessarily to find the floor that they were going to Paul could I ask you to turn up met document triple zero one five eight two four
01:22:36 now does it flow from what you've just said that you didn't have any contact with every control yes again do you recall seeing this know if Paul could
01:22:50 recall seeing this know if Paul could amplify where it says one one three three rescues sometimes amplification works as here it doesn't but did you not
01:23:05 works as here it doesn't but did you not register the convey information that area was was heavily populated food wasn't but in your view when you come down there had been three people who
01:23:16 down there had been three people who left that flat as far as I could see yes
01:23:23 after you've got down did you discuss what you'd encountered on flat warm on three worth with any other the crew members or any other firefighters no
01:23:37 did you discuss with mr. Herrera whether he'd carried out any sweep of the flats or doors no I did not I didn't when we came down okay I'm not clear on what happened but because I'm not from Pete
01:23:51 happened but because I'm not from Pete station you know he I don't know where he went but I went to off on my own such thing so after you quit the bridgehead is it right that you had no further
01:24:02 is it right that you had no further contact with mr. Herrera on the night that's clean okay
01:24:13 do you recall just one point just to Tessa did you join up with members of with mr. Mack alone and juggins Herrera Evans and Bloxom outside the leisure center were you part of that so
01:24:27 leisure center were you part of that so much later on yes as I've definitely stood with a firm firefighter blocks him I was just and a couple of my fellow
01:24:44 I was just and a couple of my fellow crew members from Soho but I don't remember I don't call he was there from Lambeth do you have a conversation with mr. Herrera possibly but definitely not about what we've done so he didn't you
01:24:59 about what we've done so he didn't you he didn't say any stage in your hearing that a man who'd been in the flat had said to him there were no people left behind no when you're talking with
01:25:11 behind no when you're talking with firefighter Bloxom did she say anything along those lines that P her name on the night do you recall any conversation with a firefighter in which that conversation with mr. Eric be retold no
01:25:27 Kanaskie you'll be pleased to know final section of questions just a range of issues that arise out of your statement page 9 of your of your witness thing we don't need
01:25:38 your of your witness thing we don't need to go to this you discuss the water jet and you say that you're instructed to help operate the water jet um first of all human beware this jet was set up and it may assist you if porpoise up they
01:25:51 it may assist you if porpoise up they exhibit to your witness statement which is met
01:25:53 is met triple zero one seven three six zero
01:26:07 miss otters you'll see there's a bigger screen behind you I don't know whether you're able to stand up and point where the water jet the instructor top rate was was positioned
01:26:29 thank you so in near the the Aramark ramp to the left of the town can you
01:26:40 ramp to the left of the town can you describe the effect the operation that jet had on the spread of fire sorry I think it was more the jet was more dealing with falling debris that was
01:26:53 dealing with falling debris that was landing on a on a sort of shelf above the first was first floor ground floor and so extinguishing that more than I
01:27:05 and so extinguishing that more than I mean we were trying to try to move a fair distance from the building so thanks and there's debris falling into the playground as well you discussed and you discuss in your statement and
01:27:17 you discuss in your statement and discarded hoses in the stairwell do you remember how much and what type of firefighting media was left in the stairwell no yes and finally what was your experience of
01:27:29 and finally what was your experience of radio communications on the night we knew before we went in that there was no radio communication so I think we didn't use it and who told you okey we saw
01:27:45 use it and who told you okey we saw those are all the questions I've got for now so I don't know whether the usual applications for it may be given the time in the morning a longer break may be necessary well I'm gonna suggest 10
01:27:56 be necessary well I'm gonna suggest 10 minutes is that gonna be thank you so nothing great we're gonna have a break now it's all good for just over ten minutes during that time mr. Knievel discover whether he has any further questions you'd like to ask you so I'll
01:28:09 questions you'd like to ask you so I'll ask you not to talk to you or anyone about your evidence when there are in the room and we'll resume at 20 to 12 and see what more here if anything Thanks all right so you'd
01:28:20 if anything Thanks all right so you'd like to go to the ashram man
01:28:34 22:12 please
01:41:42 few more questions mr. Kane three supplemental sir good
01:42:20 in just a few more questions this'll just thank you very much for coming back are just a few supplemental as the chairman indicated first of all at page 8 of your statement you referred to the
01:42:32 8 of your statement you referred to the fact that at Soho and this is in the fourth paragraph we are really busy with AFA automatic fire alarms they're often high up in the building it's not quite used that kind of journey how normal is
01:42:44 used that kind of journey how normal is it in your experience to have a phase in high-rise buildings I don't know how to
01:42:55 high-rise buildings I don't know how to answer that question it's a regular occurrence okay can I now talk to you about flat one one three yes now you are clear in your
01:43:07 three yes now you are clear in your evidence that when you were briefed by the watch manager that you were told there were six people in flat one one three you're equally clear in your evidence that only three people came out
01:43:18 evidence that only three people came out did that inconsistency occur to you at any stage on the way down to the bridgehead it occurred to me
01:43:32 it occurred to me immediately you know when Pete came out and that was it it occurred to me buy copic or whether I just thought it or said anything I'm asleep I did you said when it occurred
01:43:45 asleep I did you said when it occurred to immediately did you raise that point with Pete before you left the 14th floor I don't think zone a is it possible you say you don't think so is it possible
01:43:57 say you don't think so is it possible you've raised it yeah it's possible bad don't think I did did you raise it with him as you went down no did you raise it first of all with him once you got to the bridgehead no did you raise it with
01:44:10 the bridgehead no did you raise it with anyone of the bridgehead okay given that you were deployed on an FSG that concerns six people yes and on your evidence you only saw three come out
01:44:21 evidence you only saw three come out isn't that the information the ports have been given to the watch manager in charge of the bridgehead my assumption was because three people came out of a
01:44:33 was because three people came out of a smoke-free flat area environment that that was all that was in there that they weren't the only people in there I was
01:44:45 weren't the only people in there I was slightly confused but as I haven't been in the flat I couldn't really know
01:44:59 when you got down to bridgehead you said that you were concerned to update them on the difficulties regarding seeing floor numbers yes now are you clear that there's no further detail you gave at
01:45:10 there's no further detail you gave at the bridgehead as to what had happened on floor 14 this is you are you sure you gave no further detail and what happened I'm pretty confident this that's correct and you didn't give any information regarding the people the numbers who'd
01:45:23 regarding the people the numbers who'd come out of flat one more three not that I would call name given only you'd only seen three come out given you were deployed to bring that six would you
01:45:39 deployed to bring that six would you have mentioned the need for a sweep to have taken place either - Pete Herrera when you got back down to the bridgehead did you raise that with him no I didn't raise that with him did you
01:45:51 no I didn't raise that with him did you raise that with anyone at the bridgehead the officer in charge for example no I did not did you raise it with anyone after you left the tower itself no I did not
01:46:03 Mississauga thank you very much for your questions those are all the ones I have so it just leaves me safe thank you very much for your evidence today yes thank you very much for coming to give the ribbons and
01:46:14 much for coming to give the ribbons and you're now free to go
01:46:28 yes so with your permission Mac called crew manager role called yes thank you
01:47:59 thank you very much miss gods sit down and make yourself comfortable first of all would you be able to confirm your name for the record please thank you very much mr. Codd for coming along to
01:48:10 very much mr. Codd for coming along to give evidence there's much appreciated in the folder in front of you there should be a blue folder in front of you behind the first tab there should be your statement dated the aging for November 2017 that's correct and if you
01:48:23 November 2017 that's correct and if you turn over to the next tab there should be your contemporaneous note that's correct
01:48:28 correct have you read those documents recently this and you confirm their contents are true yes and do you content for those documents that stand as your evidence the inquiry yes now the questioning I will have for you
01:48:40 the questioning I will have for you today will focus on your 2e DBA tasks on the night if at any time you need a break share it if any of my questions are unclear say so and I'll try and rectify the matter okay now if we can
01:48:52 rectify the matter okay now if we can deal with some basics first of all it's right that you are a crew manager and development based at Chelsea dates correct and at the time of fire you'd been a firefighter for eight years is that right good and that you were in
01:49:05 that right good and that you were in charge of Chelsea's foreign rescue unit on the night correct and the callsign of that FIU is Gulf 346 the other people in your fi unit were mr. reddington mr.
01:49:19 your fi unit were mr. reddington mr. Upton or miss optimizing sector mr. sighn as a mr. okay that's correct now in terms of timings the LF P's records indicate that you mobilize at zero one thirty three mobile at zero 136 and
01:49:33 thirty three mobile at zero 136 and Status three at zero 147 does that sound about right to you now in terms of SDP a were or IDI be aware should say EDB a
01:49:44 were or IDI be aware should say EDB a disconnect from your appliance is zero 148 and tally out at the bridgehead at zero three zero three okay does that sound about right to you there thank you mr. Cod it would help I think you've
01:49:57 mr. Cod it would help I think you've just kept your voice up I think you probably also can man it just so that everyone can hear and most in particular the transcribers now if I could turn to the first topic the time which you entered into the
01:50:10 the time which you entered into the building now initially you went to the command unit to hand in your nominal role board is that right based groups and did you expect your crew to wait for you before going into the building my
01:50:22 you before going into the building my crew I met them at the base of the tower where the rest of the be aware is were all in a queue waiting to go into detail when you were at the sea you were you
01:50:34 when you were at the sea you were you told whether there were any other fi use at the scene by that stage I wasn't aware of any no did any when you're at the command unit or indeed when you went
01:50:45 the command unit or indeed when you went to the tower denne senior officer suggests that there was a need for EDB a deployment to the higher floors no where were you given any instructions by any senior officer whilst you're at the command unit no did
01:50:58 whilst you're at the command unit no did you discuss with anyone there what the priorities were in terms of the firefighting and rescue mission no were you aware of the identity of the incident commander when you arrived no
01:51:09 incident commander when you arrived no no you went to I think the holding area near the entrance to the tower next is that that's correct now we can go to them if you need be but know your notes
01:51:20 them if you need be but know your notes say that you are asked to get hose and breaking in equipment from the appliances other members of your crew said it was a more general deployment did you have any view as to whether this
01:51:32 did you have any view as to whether this was the best use of EDB a crew resources on first arrival I don't have the fuel on that night and but the equipment was
01:51:44 on that night and but the equipment was needed so we just want to go to the equipment did you meet the Paddington EDB a crew soon after your arrival at Matar no I saw them coming out of the
01:51:56 Matar no I saw them coming out of the tower did you have any discussion with them no no as we understand it mr. Reddington took a proactive view with the station manager at the tower and
01:52:08 the station manager at the tower and said this is your only fiu crew where F are you and we need to get in there did you overhear that conversation yes I think and is that a fair summary of
01:52:19 think and is that a fair summary of what mr. Reddington said like I said we saw Paddington's crew coming out and so the adage fear did you do you know who the station manager was at the entrance to the tower who mr. Reddington was
01:52:30 to the tower who mr. Reddington was talking no I don't sorry am i right and seeming that the discussion took place at the entrance that her or was it within the lobby inside the attack at
01:52:41 within the lobby inside the attack at the entrance to the tale were you given any briefing by the station manager who was at the entrance of the tower with whom mr. Reddington was talking not
01:52:53 before in the lobby stage did any senior officer seek to prioritize the deployment of edpa not armed aware of that now could I now turn to the VA mg
01:53:10 that now could I now turn to the VA mg when you enter the tower under an your deployment now is it right that you lost contact with your crew in the reception area of the tower I lost contact with two more crew yes
01:53:23 I lost contact with two more crew yes and did you go then straight once you are in the tower did you go straight to the bridgehead or was there how much time did you spend waiting if you were waiting I can't recall now when you got
01:53:37 waiting I can't recall now when you got to the bridgehead is it right that it was on the third floor at this stage yes and can you describe for us what the smoke conditions were that you found just light smoke in there at a time did
01:53:50 just light smoke in there at a time did you see any casualties being brought down whilst you're waiting either at the lobby of the bridgehead no can you give us an idea of what the conditions were
01:54:01 us an idea of what the conditions were like at the bridgehead I think you've described them in your statement graphically as a battle scene yeah there was a lot lot of people a lot of
01:54:13 was a lot lot of people a lot of information being passed about as well I think other witnesses have used the phrase organized chaos what would you say to that description
01:54:25 say to that description fair statement could I ask Paul to bring up your contemporaneous notes met quadruple zero five six two four and there you'll see point 17 you say there
01:54:39 there you'll see point 17 you say there was a lot of confusion with LC v ground level and bridgehead very bad comms first of all what or who is LC to refresh your memory there I have no idea
01:54:54 refresh your memory there I have no idea it's actually I see it could be instant come on
01:54:57 come on not help soon if it were I see desert help you in your recollection may be a shape or form no when you say very bad coms could you
01:55:08 no when you say very bad coms could you expand on that view please that is referring to our handsets etc that the radios there was no communication through the radio etc that's referring
01:55:19 through the radio etc that's referring to that not not referring to communication between people okay doing the best you can clearly you felt it was
01:55:30 the best you can clearly you felt it was sufficiently important to record it in your contemporaneous note there was a lot of confusion around Louisville and bridgehead well given the activities that were conducted at ground level in the bridgehead what do you think else
01:55:42 the bridgehead what do you think else what confusion do you think you had in mind that this could be the confusion we've SDB I and II DBA not sure of what was required at that time okay
01:55:56 was required at that time okay now you also said in your witness statement and we can go to if needs be that there were quotes loads of governor's deploying crews on FSG tasks can you describe for us how firefighters who have been allocated that FSG tasks
01:56:09 who have been allocated that FSG tasks or been detailed for their FSG role when we got to the bridgehead we were tasked of an FSG where what floor and what room
01:56:21 of an FSG where what floor and what room to search and for search and recovery and each crew that we're not was given a different task to do can I ask Paul to bring up met triple
01:56:34 can I ask Paul to bring up met triple zero one
01:56:35 zero one 5 8 1 9 now do you recall seeing this writing on the wall at the 3rd floor no do you recall what manager - Silvo
01:56:50 no do you recall what manager - Silvo writing on the wall of the bridgehead at the time you were deployed watch manager silver was the same distance that you are from me so she could well have been
01:57:01 are from me so she could well have been writing on the wall but did you witness it not did you recall her writing on it do you have any member named dick now can I ask you about your instructions when you were deployed is it right that
01:57:14 when you were deployed is it right that you have partnered with someone called John yes do you remember his surname London watch manager silver I believed you were foreign to firefighter Joseph from Houston does that ring a bell at
01:57:26 from Houston does that ring a bell at all yes I said Joseph now the lfb telemetry records indicate that you tallied the heat tallied out at zero three zero five and tallied back in zero
01:57:37 three zero five and tallied back in zero three twenty does that sound as if he was the man with whom you were partners yes given the state of the fire when you arrived at zero on 47 and the actual
01:57:48 arrived at zero on 47 and the actual height of the tower itself do you think you couldn't should have been deployed as an as an IDI be a crew before zero three zero five yes could you have
01:58:01 three zero five yes could you have volunteered yourself sooner do you think I don't thinks I'm not why not because like I said paddington or way in there
01:58:13 like I said paddington or way in there and when we turned up it seems seconds before we got deployed anyway so by the time that when you put time to eat it's totally different now the instruction
01:58:25 totally different now the instruction you were given was to go go to the 22nd floor were you given any other detail as to the flat that you had to go to or flat so you have to go to on the on the 22nd floor yes we were detail the flat I
01:58:38 22nd floor yes we were detail the flat I couldn't tell you the number
01:58:41 did you record the flat number could have been one five nine I'm not sure sorry mr. Joseph said that his task was
01:58:52 sorry mr. Joseph said that his task was to get to the 21st floor and search flat one five nine does that have any recollection no what man - Silvo stated that in her statement she briefed you
01:59:03 that in her statement she briefed you and firefighter Joseph to go to the 23rd floor flats 204 and 205 does that ring any bells in terms of any other detail in your instruction were you told how
01:59:15 in your instruction were you told how many occupants would be within the flat to which you were designated not were you given any idea of what smoke conditions were like on stair while going up or you've told the east getting
01:59:27 going up or you've told the east getting smoky but we we knew that anyway like we've given detail of any FSG calls that had been received in relation to that floor nor for that floor like any other floor i knew of FSG calls been taken in
01:59:43 floor i knew of FSG calls been taken in a general sense or yes we've given any idea just for the voids of doubt as to whether there are adults or children within the flat that was subject to the FSG none
01:59:58 we brief there's a possibility of the occupants may have left the relevant flat nothing did you notice when you're at the bridgehead were those any system
02:00:10 at the bridgehead were those any system to record the deployment of EDB a cruise in response to FS cheese it would be the same as ich SD b i okay now in terms of your deployment to the 22nd floor itself
02:00:23 your deployment to the 22nd floor itself dealing first with conditions in the situation on the stairwell you say in your statement there was smoke from the sixth floor onwards is that right yes correct and how would you describe
02:00:34 yes correct and how would you describe that smoke very thick black smoke and you lost visibility and for some and you didn't realize that for some time that mr. Joseph wasn't with you is that is
02:00:45 mr. Joseph wasn't with you is that is that right I lost him on one of the floors we saw a firefighter coming down with the casualties and I swear I do believe that I lost him and when you
02:00:56 believe that I lost him and when you realize you lost him you pet have carried on alone regardless first of all why did you carry on is that rice that first summary of your evidence yes why
02:01:08 first summary of your evidence yes why did you go on alone because I had a task to do and one of the things that's come through the evidence we've heard thus far as the importance of be a cruise staying together given first of all do
02:01:23 staying together given first of all do you agree with that in normal circumstances yes and so why did you decide to protect that perceive regardless given this of the normal importance of be a cruise staying
02:01:34 importance of be a cruise staying together because this wasn't a normal fire would you been able to bring down casualties on your own looking at the practical side I did but given the smoke condition by the
02:01:47 but given the smoke condition by the time you got up there and back down being able to bring them down safely I suppose it's the question that people have in mind in normal circumstances possibly not now in terms of radio
02:01:59 possibly not now in terms of radio communications what was your experience of radio communications as you went up the tower I had no rodeo communication at all did you have no radio comms from the very
02:02:10 you have no radio comms from the very start or did it disappear as you went up the tower can you help us on I not sure okay now if I reach floor 12 and African ask you to turn to page four of your
02:02:22 ask you to turn to page four of your witness statement and it's four lines from the bottom you say this as I've gone up the stairs I got to the landing I was just about to turn the turn to the next flight of stairs when these three
02:02:33 next flight of stairs when these three kids appeared two girls who I think were oriental and a young lad who I think was mixed heritage the oldest one just cuddled me I think out of relief it was really weird they had no signs of smoke inhalation and they weren't and they weren't
02:02:46 and they weren't and they weren't coughing did they say which flat they'd come from or which floor they'd come from no did you ask them at saw nub now
02:03:00 from no did you ask them at saw nub now if I could ask Paul to bring up met document one six zero seven to underscore double zero forty three
02:03:30 now that isn't the reference I was after but look I'll come on to this mr. Codd again but you took the three individuals back down to the bridgehead is that right that's correct and what did you
02:03:43 right that's correct and what did you what update it what debrief did you give him the bridgehead that I didn't like the objective and did you at that stage that you asked the were you able to on
02:03:55 that you asked the were you able to on the way down we were able to get any informations whether three individuals which flat had come from which floor they'd come from no from them and am i right in thinking that they'd run on
02:04:06 right in thinking that they'd run on they weren't able to give you that information as far as well I got to the bottom someone had taken them out before I could ask any more questions no if I
02:04:20 I could ask any more questions no if I could ask you to turn to the top of page 5 of your witness statement my apologies I'm back trotting slightly going back to where you're on the stairs just after you've met and the children
02:04:32 just after you've met and the children you just mentioned that children weren't coughing it was freaky I didn't take my set off it was like when you go deep diving and it goes really quiet that's what the building was like a sort of
02:04:43 what the building was like a sort of silence
02:04:44 silence I could hear crackling every now and then and the heat was so intense I could hear banging on the doors he was a split second when I thought do I take the kids down or should I let them go down on their own and find out what the banging
02:04:55 their own and find out what the banging was and I took the kids down when you say you heard banging on the doors I know these are difficult questions given time has passed can you remember on
02:05:06 time has passed can you remember on which floor those doors were being banged was it the floor in which you were on somewhere around the 12th floor it was quite hard to work out where died before but from but I would surmise it
02:05:17 before but from but I would surmise it was the floor that I was on did you putt when you were going down the stairwell did you pass any of these evacuates to firefighter Joseph at any stage do you
02:05:28 firefighter Joseph at any stage do you think not and you're absolutely certain about that yes on their way down could any of the evacuees walk freely played without assistance all three of them
02:05:40 without assistance all three of them call through
02:05:43 now you get the bridgehead you tallied out at zero 317 is it right that by the time you got down there the bridgehead moved to the ground floor that's correct
02:05:54 moved to the ground floor that's correct yeah and you told them answer to a previous question you told them that you hadn't been able to get to floor 22 is that right ace correct were you given any update as to what the position was
02:06:05 any update as to what the position was in relation to the FSG called in relation to the 22nd floor no no one notable characteristic of your evidences you described that it was freaky to use
02:06:16 you described that it was freaky to use your words that when you met the three individuals on the top floor they weren't coughing did you explain that at the bridgehead that you did encounter them they didn't seem to be coughing no I didn't do you
02:06:31 seem to be coughing no I didn't do you think that information was relevant to the ability to get people down from the tower that you did encounter three individuals who didn't appear to be experiencing respiratory problems I
02:06:42 experiencing respiratory problems I don't think so no and why not and the reason I used the word freaky was because I didn't expect to see anyone walking down as I was walking up and
02:06:53 walking down as I was walking up and especially for children on their own Paul could you put a met document triple zero one five eight one five do you
02:07:06 zero one five eight one five do you remember seeing these markings on the lobby walls at any time on the night not so none of the information would a registered with you no no
02:07:23 in relation to the three casualty of three vacu means you'd brought down did you have any contact with them later on them the night no I didn't see em anymore
02:07:31 anymore did you know what had happened to them no were you able to establish the in fact the the the females had come from floor 22 no do you recall speaking with
02:07:47 floor 22 no do you recall speaking with one of them or hearing them speak to another firefighter to tell them that there were a number of people left on the 22nd floor in flat 193 no and you're
02:07:58 the 22nd floor in flat 193 no and you're certain you didn't overhear a conversation I see them once I turned down did once you were talking about yourself communication as other firefighters want you to come down did
02:08:09 firefighters want you to come down did you talk to any other firefighters whether the bridgehead or outside as to who hadn't been able to complete their FSG missions but how far they'd got and
02:08:23 now if I could ask you to turn to page 9 of your witness statement it's 12 line 12 the lines down
02:08:37 you say this on the 22nd floor there's a family v that I never got to I didn't know until about a week later the BBC
02:08:49 know until about a week later the BBC put gravel Tara and put faces the floors I spoke with Lou about it I don't think I could have got up there the visor on my helmet is all blistered and I didn't even have it danced it shows the heat in
02:09:00 even have it danced it shows the heat in there and first of all is the Louie referring to their watch magic to silver yes and why did you think you couldn't have got up there alone because I
02:09:12 have got up there alone because I brought the three children down and if I hadn't have met them the heat was getting intense and so the reason that
02:09:27 getting intense and so the reason that you couldn't got up there was a combination of encountering the casualties and the smoke conditions you encountered on the way up and the heat correct now when I asked you earlier on
02:09:38 correct now when I asked you earlier on given that you decided to go off on your own
02:09:42 own could you reflecting on the answer you gave to that question given you had gone off on your own do you think it was safe for you to have done so to try and get
02:09:54 for you to have done so to try and get to the 22nd floor given the conditions that were later encountered at the time I still going by yes it was would it ever sister do you think if EDB aid
02:10:05 ever sister do you think if EDB aid teams were deployed in larger numbers so instead of two for example there were four would that have helped matters
02:10:13 no what why do you think that he sees hearing twos and it is in a bigger group could you expand on that please you were
02:10:24 could you expand on that please you were my second way there was a team of four of us and it just gets harder to like monitor everyone as standard for two people to a TBI did you mention the
02:10:36 people to a TBI did you mention the freaky nature of that you encountered the three individuals and not showing any respiratory problems to anyone else at the bridgehead or to any other firefighters not now you had a second DD
02:10:48 firefighters not now you had a second DD be a task in the evening is it right that you were later redeployed with Chelsea crew members Upton and Reddington and a another to go to the 12th floor stew a search and rescue days
02:10:59 12th floor stew a search and rescue days correct you what were the details of the briefing you were given in relation to that second EDB a task it was a search and recovery can you help us with the words that we use to or the gist of the
02:11:11 words that we use to or the gist of the words that we used sorry so basically go to the 12th floor search search the rooms and look for casualties and at
02:11:22 rooms and look for casualties and at school and lay out of building can't remember who briefed you know remember what rank the white helmet or above hey everybody watch manage or above and did
02:11:35 everybody watch manage or above and did you tell the individual who briefed you of your unsuccessful mission to the 22nd floor no your tally out time for this mission is 0 5 22 and tallien at 0 5 50
02:11:48 mission is 0 5 22 and tallien at 0 5 50 47 does that sound about right to you possibly yeah and can you explain to us how your search on the top floor was carried out just take us through each step so we use just the internal
02:12:02 step so we use just the internal staircase again and we I do believe we've got to the 12th floor as a team of four and as we went into what I would class as a communal hallway for the
02:12:15 class as a communal hallway for the flats we then came across a cache tree in the doorway one of the crew who's no more dunk knows a DSU actuated and I had
02:12:27 more dunk knows a DSU actuated and I had to send him down but before we did send him down we confirmed it if the casualty that was lying on the floor was conscious breathing or had a pulse and they didn't have a pulse at
02:12:41 pulse and they didn't have a pulse at the time
02:12:43 the time and on returning to the bridgehead who did you debrief who whoever was there a bridge a that song again thank you remember what you said either the words
02:12:54 remember what you said either the words or the gist the words similar to what I've just said yeah okay did you mention at this stage your first unsuccessful mission to the 22nd floor as part of
02:13:05 mission to the 22nd floor as part of your debrief I would have already said that when I came down the first time on my first way but I didn't mention it again not when you went back on your second EDB a task would it have helped
02:13:16 second EDB a task would it have helped have had a thermal-imaging camera do you think no and why do you say that and
02:13:27 think no and why do you say that and because he was searching recovery we when we've done a normal be a search pattern which we're trying to do it was very dark and even a tortures weren't
02:13:41 very dark and even a tortures weren't beneficial when would it be useful to have a thermal-imaging camera thermo injury camera is useful but at that time I didn't think it was to us in what circumstances is it useful in any
02:13:52 what circumstances is it useful in any fight a circumstance but at that time we we were picking up stuff on the stairways as we went up not breaking in equipment and at the time there wasn't a
02:14:05 equipment and at the time there wasn't a thermal imaging camera to pick up so we just went up as a team for thank you miss got those are all questions I've got for you there may well be some others so sir might I ask you to rise for five minutes usual usual five
02:14:18 for five minutes usual usual five minutes ring thank you yes just a couple will break for five minutes just so that mr. Kaneko can check whether any further questions he needs to ask you please don't talk to anyone but your
02:14:30 please don't talk to anyone but your evidence one arrived in the room and we'll be back in at twenty twelve thank you might like to give the ostriches
02:14:46 good 2412
02:17:28 you
02:20:27 well mrs. canal sir and please say there are no supplemental questions and so no circumstances mr. cord is free to go right um
02:20:37 right um I wonder whether he should he's waiting to come in usually just bring him in for a moment and we'll clarify the position
02:20:56 then mr. cover I asked that you come in but all we have to tell you is we don't have any more Christmas for you thank you well let me ever be a relief my dinner but thank you very much for
02:21:07 dinner but thank you very much for coming to give our evidence it's a great help
02:21:09 help thank you you are free to go you can thank you yes mr. clear
02:21:25 thank you yes mr. clear so the fourth witness this morning I'd like to call is firefighter Katie foster yes thank you
02:21:37 [Music]
02:22:14 [Music]
02:22:26 thank you very much sit down and make yourself comfortable yes would you please confirm your name for the record yes it's Katie Foster good morning miss Foster first of all thank
02:22:37 morning miss Foster first of all thank you very much for coming along today it's very much appreciated now the focus off my questions this morning are going to be on your FSG mission to the 18th floor and that's the principle match I'm going to ask you to deal with yeah now
02:22:49 going to ask you to deal with yeah now that's done can we turn to the procedural matters and in front of you is a blue folder and if you could open that up
02:22:56 that up hopefully behind the first tab is your statement date of the 27th 28th of December of last year is that right yeah and if you turn over to the next tab
02:23:08 hopefully you'll find your contemporaneous notes is that right yep that's correct and if you turn over to the final tab hopefully you'll find the exhibit to your police statement which is a floor plan of the 18th floor of the
02:23:20 is a floor plan of the 18th floor of the tower is that right yes that's correct and if you read those documents recently yes and you confirm their contents are true I do there's a a slight mistake on my behalf about my training that I've
02:23:33 my behalf about my training that I've just got the venues wrong for the duration I was there for so I was at Park Royal for three weeks and Harrow for two rather than the other way around but you know just to get that right now please yes yes just to think it's on the
02:23:47 please yes yes just to think it's on the first page of your witness statement on the third paragraph yes
02:23:57 and do we swap Park roar for Harrow and vice versa yes a pot boil was the second venue but it was three weeks and her Oh was the final two weeks good thank you
02:24:08 was the final two weeks good thank you very much
02:24:10 very much subjects that amendment you contend for a statement contemporaneous note and exhibit standards your evidence inquiry yep now if any my questions are unclear
02:24:21 yep now if any my questions are unclear please say so and I'll try and get it right and rephrase them so they're clear secondly if at any time you need a break please say so it's not a problem now first thing I'd like to do is just cover
02:24:32 first thing I'd like to do is just cover some basic information with your face all right first of all at the time of the fire you were a firefighter based at Willesden is that right yes that's correct
02:24:40 correct and that you were a probationer who'd started 2 May 2017 yeah that's correct so roughly 6 weeks before the fire yeah I passed out roughly six weeks before I think I believe and the appliance you're
02:24:52 think I believe and the appliance you're in on the night the callsign was golf two eight one is that right that's correct and that you're be a partner on the night whereas firefighter Greg Lawson yes that's correct and also part of the crew were crew
02:25:04 and also part of the crew were crew manager cardi a watch management sorry watch magic Rd firefighter Tom Welsh and is it crew manager easy yeah that's correct
02:25:12 correct now as to timings lfb records indicate that you were mobilized at zero 126 mobile at zero 128 and at the scene at 0 140 does that sound about right to you
02:25:25 140 does that sound about right to you it does you now in terms of timings the best DBA were again the lfb records indicate that the FDA was disconnected from your appliances zero 143 switched on at zero 142 and you tallied out of
02:25:38 on at zero 142 and you tallied out of the bridgehead at zero 153 again does that sound about right it does yes thank you now it appears that you switched on the be a set at 142
02:25:50 that you switched on the be a set at 142 and tallied out of the bridgehead of 153 does that switching on 11 minutes before you tally dad does I have any consequences for the amount of air you have oh no it's I'm simply just to turn
02:26:02 have oh no it's I'm simply just to turn the cylinder on so you already basically once you've received your brief let's go straight under a so I was just I think because I've come straight out of training it was something that we were quite used to doing so okay yeah now can I the first
02:26:15 doing so okay yeah now can I the first topic I'd like to discuss with you today is your entry into our under air and your deployment generally and we don't need to go to it but at page five your witness statements you describe on
02:26:27 witness statements you describe on arrival that you you made your way to the bridgehead was this you mr. Lawson mr. Welsh and mr. Eden yes I think just the four of us I think I remember you
02:26:38 the four of us I think I remember you mr. Welsh and mr. Eden appear to have been deployed at zero 159 whereas you were you tallied out it 0 153 do you know why there was a six-minute
02:26:49 know why there was a six-minute difference can you remember no I think there was quite a large queue and waitin to go in so I think me and firefighter Lawson worth before them and there may
02:27:00 Lawson worth before them and there may have been another crew behind us for the reason for the delay I think how would you describe the degree of organization of the bridgehead
02:27:12 it was quite from I remember quite hectic um obviously not having much experience since training it was there's just people everywhere but yeah I guess
02:27:25 just people everywhere but yeah I guess it's something not the same as training so now if I could ask you about your instructions can you remember who it was who gave you your instructions I don't recall was it a man or a woman it was a
02:27:36 recall was it a man or a woman it was a man did he have an Irish accent I don't recall it was he wearing white helmet he was yes now if I could honestly turn to page five of your witness statement and
02:27:47 page five of your witness statement and it'll come up on the screen which may be easier for you miss miss Foster and at page five the first substantive paragraph on that page lines one two three you say this I was paired with
02:27:59 three you say this I was paired with firefighter Greg Lawson and after gained through internship control we were given our brief by an officer wearing white helmet I did not get his name or rank our brief was that there is fast 5 of survival guidance call on the 18th floor
02:28:12 survival guidance call on the 18th floor we were to go up and see who is there the fire survival guidance called relates to a resident on the 18th floor who was currently on the phone taking advice from controller his name I do not know about what course of action to take
02:28:24 know about what course of action to take I don't know what advice was given at the time but I remember thinking to myself it was a long way to go with the standard duration breathing apparatus as opposed to on a fire rescue unit where
02:28:36 opposed to on a fire rescue unit where you have extended duration breathing operators where to cinders which provide air did you know if were you told to the
02:28:49 air did you know if were you told to the occupant was currently on the phone or was that your assumption I don't remember actually whether it was just what I'd assumed or not okay and are you
02:29:03 what I'd assumed or not okay and are you able to help us with any more detail that you were provided when you were given your instructions at the bridgehead and I remember just as what I've said in my statement it was quite brief no sort of flat numbers or how
02:29:17 brief no sort of flat numbers or how many people it was just go skating floor and see who's there basically and were you given a plan or a layout of the each floor on the tower no but I can remember knowing and assume
02:29:29 but I can remember knowing and assume from what you've said you weren't given any details about any occupants who had vulnerabilities or disabilities anything of that nature okay and when you refer to use the phrase FSG did you understand
02:29:40 to use the phrase FSG did you understand that you were to try and search and rescue was that your understanding of your mission we weren't given those specific instructions so that wasn't my complete understanding I think from my
02:29:53 complete understanding I think from my perspective was that me and Greg were to go up and see make a sort of risk assessment from there and see what we would do with what we found given his relative seniority I think mr.
02:30:06 given his relative seniority I think mr. Lawson's was in the brigade for 20 years or so would you have left it to Greg to assess whether a rescue was viable or not once you got there am i definitely I think
02:30:18 think followed Greg but obviously on my life experience but I think we both sort of made decisions together it wasn't just I'm gonna follow
02:30:29 together it wasn't just I'm gonna follow what Greg says I think we're both very happy with our decision to say and did you expect more detail than the briefing um I think I would've done yes and did
02:30:40 um I think I would've done yes and did you ask any further question you've given your instruction to do ask any sort of supplemental questions to get more detailed or oh no I remember okay did Greg I don't remember okay now in
02:30:55 did Greg I don't remember okay now in the last three lines of the paragraph I I just quoted for the record you refer that you say that you remember thinking to yourself it was a long way to go with this DBA
02:31:07 just are you alright yeah did you raise your concern or that observation with Greg before you were deployed know that I would call at that time now do you
02:31:19 I would call at that time now do you remember him saying everything either to you or to the officer giving you the instructions of the bridgehead know
02:31:29 with the fact that you'd already had your PA set on for 10 11 minutes would that have affected your ability to get up to the 18th floor no um so when you turn the cylinder on you operate her first breath button
02:31:41 you operate her first breath button which will only then allow you to breathe once you actually put the mask on so it won't actually affect what's inside the cylinder now that answers
02:31:53 inside the cylinder now that answers flows to another question you were deployed up the stairwell and I think you decided not to put your masks on at the beginning of your ascent yeah one issues people of are interesting
02:32:05 one issues people of are interesting this weather that affected in fact you didn't have your masks on to that effect the fact that your cylinders were on did it have any talk dirt hair as affected it use up or conserve air I know we were our aim
02:32:19 or conserve air I know we were our aim was to go up as far as a recruiting clean air before we actually started breathing through our sets just because we knew we've got a long way to go so we didn't want to use air that we
02:32:31 didn't want to use air that we potentially might not have needed to before we entered in the smoky atmosphere and is it right that the ascent of the 18th floor took you about five to ten minutes I think so it could
02:32:44 five to ten minutes I think so it could have been less it could be more it's just yeah and can you remember radio comms
02:32:49 comms do you remember trying radio comms on the ascent up to the 18th floor I don't recall on the way up do you remember hearing radio traffic as you went up no you got up to the 18th floor
02:33:04 went up no you got up to the 18th floor and what were the conditions like on the 18th floor lobby can you remember you couldn't see your hand in front of your face so thick like smoke and in terms of
02:33:16 face so thick like smoke and in terms of temperature I can't really remember how hot it was
02:33:21 and as you get into the 18th floor lobby you describe in your statement of the visibility so poor that you had to get down on your knees is that right to try and make out where the flat the flats were yeah I think I
02:33:34 the flat the flats were yeah I think I remember the the door numbers being quite low down and so it was impossible to see them from standing but it was I'm so quite difficult even getting that close now at this point Paul could I ask
02:33:46 close now at this point Paul could I ask you to bring up the exhibit - miss Foster statement which is met Chapel zero one five eight zero seven and I think this is a a hand-drawn plan you
02:33:58 think this is a a hand-drawn plan you made of the eighteenth floor and you provide it as an exhibit to your witness statement I think in your statement you described starting at the bottom
02:34:11 described starting at the bottom left-hand corner of that plan going around the flats one two three four five and six in that order yes now you go to flap wand which for
02:34:22 yes now you go to flap wand which for the record is flat one five wand what did you find there the door was locked
02:34:28 locked and there was no answer and were you shouting as you went round bang quite loud as well on the doors and what were you shouting its fibre gage come to the
02:34:41 you shouting its fibre gage come to the door basically the next flat you went to is flat two which is flat one five two am I right in saying that the occupant a woman answered the door and opened it
02:34:52 woman answered the door and opened it she did yes and who was closest to the flat entrance door was it you or Greg I believe it was great and did she speak to Greg or to you or to both of you I
02:35:05 to Greg or to you or to both of you I can't remember did you go into the flat yeah we both into the flat and can you describe for us the conditions within the flat clean
02:35:16 us the conditions within the flat clean air there were no signs of fire affecting the flat so it was completely different to the to the lobby area and
02:35:27 different to the to the lobby area and how many people did you see in the flat fall and where were they concur and first of all can you describe for us adults children one adult one female adult and three children and could you
02:35:39 adult and three children and could you see any internal doors within the flat I don't remember seeing any doors which could it could be wrong but that was my recollection and after you entered into
02:35:53 recollection and after you entered into flat 1 5 2 flat 2 did you close the flat entrance door we did it and can you remember now how effective that was at preventing smoke from the lobby penetrating into the flat I would say
02:36:05 penetrating into the flat I would say very effective did you talk once you got into the flat did you talk to any of the occupants we did we know you did both of us did okay
02:36:16 did we know you did both of us did okay first of all what did you who did you talk to you first of all um the adult and what did you say and I don't remember saying an awful lot I just
02:36:27 remember saying an awful lot I just think I remember um the the lady saying that asking us if they were going to die so it was just trying to reassure her
02:36:39 so it was just trying to reassure her for her children's sake and that was all I really remember saying and did Greg talk to her he did yes thank you remember what he said to her the only
02:36:51 remember what he said to her the only that I really remember is about advice before we went to leave the flat which would have been to put blankets along the door
02:37:02 again and that was that that was the entire to the conversation he had her that was in the flat was it it was probably more because we went in and we were actually able well we took our masks off just because again we wanted
02:37:15 masks off just because again we wanted to save as much air we could you say in your witness statement at page seven the top paragraph the penultimate final
02:37:26 top paragraph the penultimate final lines probably useful if that's brought up for you didn't
02:37:39 you mentioned there the advice given by Greg to put towels on the front door to stop smoke coming in and then you and Greg left the flat is that right yeah
02:37:50 Greg left the flat is that right yeah that's correct as you left it Greg say anything to the woman occupy the flat other than what I've put in my statement I can't
02:38:01 I've put in my statement I can't remember did you say anything before you left to her okay you then left him like you say that the decision did make sense missus there was
02:38:13 decision did make sense missus there was full of smoke that visibility was bad therefore would be impossible for us to get the family down the stairs without going unconscious we also need to see who else was on the 18th floor was that I thought you had the time or is it a
02:38:25 I thought you had the time or is it a later thought you've heard once you've been reflecting on the events at the time and did either you or Greg clarify with the woman what the flat number was
02:38:36 with the woman what the flat number was I don't remember can you remember asking I don't remember asking myself for now you don't recall Greg asking nice okay did you or Greg
02:38:48 Greg asking nice okay did you or Greg tell the woman whose decide what you were going to do next after you've left her I don't know if we said that we
02:38:59 her I don't know if we said that we needed to check the other flats but other than that I don't think so did you say anything along the lines that the two of you would be back to take her down no and what did you expect
02:39:12 take her down no and what did you expect would happen to her whilst you were searching the other flats I think we could only really go on what information we had at the time because we entered
02:39:26 we had at the time because we entered the building when only one side the the tower was alive and the fact that we'd come out of a smoke-filled lobby that you wouldn't have been able to breathe
02:39:37 you wouldn't have been able to breathe in her flat seemed to be the safest place to leave for the time being did firefighter Lawson say that you would both come back
02:39:49 Lawson say that you would both come back and check on her after you checked the other flats I don't recall okay did you you did go back though to to check on her before you left I floor 18 - I don't recall
02:40:00 you left I floor 18 - I don't recall that either okay you left flats - and then you went to flat three is that right yes and what did you find that and Greg was in front
02:40:11 did you find that and Greg was in front of me but a gentleman opened the door where he poked his head round we asked how many people would be in the flat it's which he replied there was five is
02:40:26 it's which he replied there was five is a very quick conversation from I remember and it was the same guidance from the previous flat just two to keep blankets by the doors if possible and
02:40:41 blankets by the doors if possible and it's always difficult estimating time and I think in your statements being referred to 20 seconds or so do you think it was shorter longer how long do you think the conversation took place I think it was probably roughly about
02:40:54 think it was probably roughly about right just because I think smoke could have started pouring into the flat by if it was too long of a conversation and it
02:41:05 it was too long of a conversation and it was Greg who was talking to the male occupant of flat 3 was it yes and where were you standing in relation to Greg I think just behind his sort of left-hand
02:41:16 think just behind his sort of left-hand side and what the smoke conditions like in the lobby at that state and the same as the as before so thick black smoke and very very poor visibility could you
02:41:30 and very very poor visibility could you see the gentleman who opened the door yes
02:41:33 yes just because there was light coming from the door and I could see him saw where he'd poked his head around the corner how far did he open the door was it it's
02:41:44 how far did he open the door was it it's like inched open or was it more with it broader than that I would probably say about that far so not from my recollection so not very far do you think he would have been able to see you
02:41:55 think he would have been able to see you from where he standing probably not and it's right that you never wedding you never went
02:42:06 that you never wedding you never went into flack through a desert and could you see what conditions were like in the flat I'm seeing the backlight personally no matter you did Greg asked how many
02:42:18 no matter you did Greg asked how many adults and how many children work within that five I don't recall that question now with that type of information assisted later search-and-rescue efforts
02:42:30 assisted later search-and-rescue efforts if you if you were unable to take the family of five down not really sure on that one actually
02:42:41 that one actually why are you uncertain and I don't I don't know I think just knowing that there were five people would be enough
02:42:52 there were five people would be enough information for them but it could have helped knowing that there were children in the same and you remember with the Gregg clarified the precise flat number with the gentleman I think you're right
02:43:04 with the gentleman I think you're right in saying the next fact you looked at was flat for which had an open door was it physically open or was it just simply unlocked can you map closed but unlocked you remember I think it was open and
02:43:16 you remember I think it was open and when you looked in I think it's fair to describe your evidence it was pitch-black full of smoke and you carried out a sweep mean great search the flat yet and how did you search it
02:43:28 the flat yet and how did you search it can you explain to us the method you used in searching flat for it's not deposed to happen but we both went in and we both decided it would be quicker
02:43:39 and we both decided it would be quicker to search if we split up so I went I think I went on the left hand and Greg went on the right hand wall and then we would meet and then decide whether we thought it was empty
02:43:52 decide whether we thought it was empty and and you both you both confirm there's no one in there yes and you went to the next flat which is flat five again the door was open is that right yes was it physically open or was it
02:44:03 yes was it physically open or was it simply closed and unlocked I think physically I can just because of the amount of smoke that was in the flat and again the conditions were similar to those had encountered in flat for his own right
02:44:14 encountered in flat for his own right finding you came to flat six the door was closed is that right it isn't and in your statement you state that you experienced increased heat standing by
02:44:27 experienced increased heat standing by the door was it apparent from that experience that there was a full-blown fire engaged in flat six or not that's what I expected
02:44:40 what I expected yeah I forgot to us good it did you have a thermal-imaging camera with you we didn't know now once you've finished thirteenth at the flats four and five where there were
02:44:51 flats four and five where there were open doors did you close the doors behind you I don't remember did you at that stage want you to complete at the circuit of all six flats did you discuss whether it
02:45:04 all six flats did you discuss whether it was practicable to evacuate the residence in flat two and three and I recall that we came back to the stairwell and then began to try and
02:45:17 stairwell and then began to try and radio down to the bridgehead which were unsuccessful and numerous occasions I think in your statement you say seven times it was quite a few times yeah and
02:45:30 times it was quite a few times yeah and I think we just I think we both knew that it was not practical to take nine people down even
02:45:43 practical to take nine people down even even one person just because of the conditions and the knowledge that we had that we weren't aware the whole building was a lie well while we were in there so we had to go on the information we had
02:45:55 we had to go on the information we had and when you were trying to radio down is it right that you use both channels one and six yes one point one question a query that's a written is would it be possible
02:46:06 that's a written is would it be possible to have gone back to flats two or three and asked to use their mobile phones would you be able to even if you'd have access to those phones would you been able to contact the bridgehead or anyone at the bridgehead
02:46:17 at the bridgehead using those phones not at the bridgehead because we wouldn't have contact details for those people now once you carried
02:46:28 for those people now once you carried out the search of the six tracks on the 18th floor is it right that your be a bar was getting lower it was here and was the limited amount of air that you had left was that a factor in your decision to return to the bridgehead yes
02:46:41 decision to return to the bridgehead yes it was was there a discussion about leading the occupants of flats two and three down in a snake line when I stood with mr. Lawson are you sure about that
02:46:56 did you discuss whether there were any other firefighters coming up the stair who could help take down the occupants of last two and three on that floor I don't recall having conversation about that we can cover this earlier but just
02:47:10 that we can cover this earlier but just put the point squarely did you go back and tell the families and flats two or three what you were planning on doing or what they should expect I personally don't remember going back to the flats at all no the conditions on
02:47:25 to the flats at all no the conditions on the way down I think you described visibility as bad and that you were sweeping the floor and leaning on your back foot to avoid falling is that a first Sun roof it's easy and you say
02:47:37 first Sun roof it's easy and you say that you heard children screaming at about the 12th floor and you turned back to see whether you could find them yeah is that and could you find anyone and now we weren't able to I think we went up another floor
02:47:50 up another floor by that point the screaming had stopped and again our cylinders are getting quite low so we've made the decision to turn around and when you went back to
02:48:01 turn around and when you went back to following the voices as it were did you go from the stairwell into the lobby around the 12th floor did you go that far to see whether you could hear weathers when the sounds were coming from I didn't personally I'm not sure
02:48:13 from I didn't personally I'm not sure whether great did because he was in front of me when we turned back round I'm described in your witness statement that the back of your neck felt like it was burning did that burning sensation
02:48:26 was burning did that burning sensation start around the fifth floor as you indicate in your statement or did it start
02:48:30 start higher up can you remember now I think it was about the fifth floor it could have been higher but I'm sense of my surroundings were great so and on your
02:48:42 surroundings were great so and on your way down is it right that you saw a woman in a burka headscarf with a cloth over her face been carried out yes thank you remember where you saw her I'm mindful of the answer you've just given
02:48:53 mindful of the answer you've just given purpose I think it would be about I think it was the fourth or fifth maybe just around there cuz I know there was a bit of a queue to come out with the building that was quite a lot of firefighters trying to get out so now
02:49:04 firefighters trying to get out so now you got back to the bridgehead was the bridgehead on the third floor at this stage do you remember from I remember and the LFP docks indicate bursar you tally back in at 0 to 28 I think that
02:49:17 tally back in at 0 to 28 I think that sounds about right for what you said earlier on can you describe the conditions the situation the bridgehead when you got back down there as in visibility or smoke or just no fair
02:49:29 visibility or smoke or just no fair point you described in your statement as being like mayhem it was yeah there was just people everywhere and I think by that point there were more be a boards and I wasn't really sure where my tally was so and trying to find that was a bit
02:49:42 was so and trying to find that was a bit bit hectic who debrief to the officer and the officer at the bridgehead was that you or Gregor did you both do it as we came down we were met by an officer in a white helmet I don't
02:49:53 in a white helmet I don't and as we were beginning to debrief he said for me to just go and get my Italian closed down and great stayed there and to draw a map on the wall okay before you were sent off to do other
02:50:05 before you were sent off to do other things can you remember what Greg said to the officer about what he'd encountered on the on the 18th floor um I think we said that we'd come from the 18th floor but then by that point he'd
02:50:16 18th floor but then by that point he'd asked me to go close down did you see firefighter Lawson drawn Ward information relating to the flats in on the 18th floor no not personally did you know that's
02:50:28 no not personally did you know that's what he'd done later on yes and did he tell you yes he did and did he tell you what he'd written the information that he'd written I think just a rough floor
02:50:39 he'd written I think just a rough floor plan and how many people we'd found in each flower did you see what he'd written on the wall no
02:50:53 if I can out talk about so some various matters that related to after you come down after the tower after you left the
02:51:04 down after the tower after you left the bridgehead did you did you know what steps have been taken to go up back to the 18th floor to deploy fresh crews who you're aware of what steps are taken as in did anybody go back yeah I wasn't
02:51:15 in did anybody go back yeah I wasn't aware neither did you go back to the bridgehead when it's on the ground floor later on evening I didn't return back
02:51:27 later on evening I didn't return back into the tower after I left from that particular way in your contemporaneous notes you refer to an e DBA crew which you passed before deploying to the 18th
02:51:39 you passed before deploying to the 18th floor do you think larger crews I a crew of four of EDB a wearers would have assisted rescue efforts Pacific Lee in
02:51:50 assisted rescue efforts Pacific Lee in relation to the 18th floor it could have done but then again I think it would have been on those particular firefighters decision as to what they
02:52:02 firefighters decision as to what they would do as well whether they thought it'd be safe enough to take them out of the of their flats I hope you don't mind giving you a probation or were at the
02:52:13 giving you a probation or were at the time of activation if I just has a brief question about training and didn't page five your witness statement you explained that you only had limited training on FSG as the training course is not as long as it used to be but do
02:52:24 is not as long as it used to be but do you know how long the course used to be seventeen weeks I believe and how long did you what training how long in terms of days did you get on all hours did you get on FSG as part of your course
02:52:38 [Music] probably not very long I think for my memory I think it was just a sort of not a quick conversation but is because it's mostly dealt by the from control it's
02:52:52 mostly dealt by the from control it's not something that we had a lot of training in page six of your witness statement you say that you and firefighter Lawson didn't have any breaking in gear now and mindful you
02:53:04 breaking in gear now and mindful you your approbation of six weeks standing at the time but did your training indicate that you would normally carry and breaking in gear on brief such as this and I know it's for when you set up
02:53:20 this and I know it's for when you set up a bridgehead do you take certain items of equipment and brightening gear as one of those I guess yeah it would have helped you know in our tasks and how
02:53:34 helped you know in our tasks and how would have helped to gain entry to the flats that we came across that were locked and do you know why you didn't have breaking in gear with you and I
02:53:48 have breaking in gear with you and I think myself and my colleagues from Willesden took certain amounts of equipment to the bridgehead and I think we just we then took bits of that and we
02:54:00 we just we then took bits of that and we didn't have any of the breaking in gear with us particularly miss Foster I'm really grateful for your help sir may we have a standard 5-minute break slightly intrude into the lunch and then
02:54:11 slightly intrude into the lunch and then they don't you and slightly later yeah for those I'm sure we're supposed to would like to finish her evidence before lunch if she can so we'll bill break for five minutes get mr. Kinnear a chance to decide
02:54:24 get mr. Kinnear a chance to decide whether there are further questions he needs to us and then we'll come back at one o'clock does it arrive yeah that's why thank you and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence under option
02:54:47 right we'll resume at 1 o'clock makes it
02:55:03 you
02:59:18 you
02:59:44 just a few supplemental so yes
03:00:02 I think there are a few more questions miss Foster yep respond sir thank you very much for your patience and first of all can ask questions in relation to flat - yes now you were aware as I understand it that
03:00:13 you were aware as I understand it that there were children within the flat is that right yes did you discuss with Greg whether because there were children within the flat their evacuation ought to have been prioritized I don't recall having that
03:00:25 prioritized I don't recall having that conversation though did mr. Lawson raise it I don't at that stage would it have been practicable to have evacuated the two children as a matter of priority
03:00:39 from the conditions in the stairwell I wouldn't have deemed it as safe to take anybody out so now at that stage can you
03:00:53 anybody out so now at that stage can you remember how much air you had left in terms of maybe eases but percentage of the the cylinder content I don't remember I just remember that Greg had less than me but I can't remember how
03:01:07 less than me but I can't remember how much know what when you left the occupants and their children within that flat what was your plan what were you going to do in relation to them what
03:01:22 going to do in relation to them what were your intentions we wanted to search the rest of the floor them just to be aware of how many people were there we
03:01:35 aware of how many people were there we didn't make a specific plan for that flap did you think or assume that someone a separate crew would come back and rescue them that was my my thinking
03:01:47 and rescue them that was my my thinking yes
03:01:51 given the conditions you encountered on the stair while going up given the conditions you encountered on the 18th floor lobby itself and given where they
03:02:03 floor lobby itself and given where they were located I on the 18th floor if they rescued later would they still not have encountered smoke and difficulties it's not greater difficulties and I think
03:02:21 there was there were times in the stairwell where the smoke seemed to clear so that would have been more appropriate so I'm not that anybody would know when that was to happen
03:02:33 would know when that was to happen knowing from that whilst you're on the 18th floor lobby did the smoke conditions deteriorate improve or remain constant remain constant
03:02:48 given the conditions you experienced on the 18th floor were you concerned about fire spread rapid fire spread or smoke spread to flats 2 & 3 not at the time I
03:03:01 spread to flats 2 & 3 not at the time I think leaving the building and turning around to look up at it and realizing that the whole building was a lie I was quite concerned after that so I didn't
03:03:13 quite concerned after that so I didn't catch the last bit Cerebus and there's competing external noise okay and when I turned around to look back up at the building and I obviously wasn't aware at the time when I was in there what was going on so when I turned around and saw
03:03:25 going on so when I turned around and saw that it was all relying that then became a bit of a worry for me what made you believe that you'd have enough time to get down the pourtant debrief to the
03:03:36 get down the pourtant debrief to the bridgehead and then for another team to get up to the 18th floor before smoke or fire overwhelm flap 1 5 to sit flat - what made you think there was enough
03:03:47 what made you think there was enough time for all that to be we like I said we were going on what we knew and we weren't aware of any changing conditions
03:03:58 weren't aware of any changing conditions ourselves because of lack of radio communications and not physically being able to see ourselves so we weren't actually aware what actually happened outside is it is it fair to summarise
03:04:11 outside is it is it fair to summarise your evidence this way that you assumed that the lady and her children would be safer within the flap and tried to get them out yes that's correct and for the reasons you gave earlier yes ask for it now can I ask you final set
03:04:24 ask for it now can I ask you final set of questions that's relation to flat 3
03:04:29 did you get a sense when you were overhearing the conversation between the man and Greg that English was his first language yes and he says that he could
03:04:41 language yes and he says that he could he'll explain himself clearly and understandably from what I could hear yes did you get the impression that he wanted to talk to you and Greg to explain what his situation was I'm not
03:04:58 explain what his situation was I'm not really sure do you remember him asking for your help I don't remember that name do you remember him saying that he had two children with him in the flat I don't remember that name do you remember
03:05:09 don't remember that name do you remember him saying he wants to get out I don't remember that myself 9 do you remember Greg saying that there was fire on the other fire was on the other side of the
03:05:20 other fire was on the other side of the building and he wasn't too worried I don't recall that name do you remember him asking Greg the question how long will it take you to get me out no I
03:05:34 will it take you to get me out no I don't recall that sorry ok is it that you don't recall it or it didn't happen can you can you be more certain
03:05:44 I can't say whether it did or didn't happen so I don't know it's a tough one because I was behind Greg and not actually having that conversation myself that would be something I'd be able to answer but I didn't hear it so and can
03:05:58 answer but I didn't hear it so and can you remember apologies this is this a mega lawyer type question can remember how long the exchange lasted between Greg and the gentleman who lived with inflammatory and I think like I said my
03:06:11 inflammatory and I think like I said my saving is quite brief so maybe 20 to 30 seconds
03:06:14 seconds that's just my memory miss Foster thank you very much for the evidence you've given today your help is very much appreciated those are all the questions I have thank you very much for coming to
03:06:26 I have thank you very much for coming to give your evidence it's very helpful difficult
03:06:30 difficult thank you very much feel free to go as you might give the option
03:06:43 well that's a convenient point mr. can here it is my invite you to return at ten past two and then we can commence with firefighter Gregory Lawson yes thank you room thanks a tempest - thank
03:06:54 thank you room thanks a tempest - thank you