Further LFB evidence (6 September 2018 Pt 1 of 2)

Full transcript

00:00:00 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing at which we're going to hear from a number of additional firefighter witnesses the morning Slayer good

00:00:13 witnesses the morning Slayer good morning sir may I call mr. Nick Marion

00:00:19 [Music]

00:00:44 are there suddenly sincerely and truly declare declare and affirm the evidence I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth thank you very much mr.

00:00:59 whole truth thank you very much mr. Meredith sit down and make yourself comfortable in you are all right good morning first of all could you please confirm your name for the record i'm nick marion thank you and in front of

00:01:11 nick marion thank you and in front of you hopefully you'll find a blue folder and in that folder the first herb should be your witness statement date of the 17th of January of this year is that right

00:01:20 right yep and behind that and a separate tab ought to be your contemporaneous notes is that right yeah and have you read those documents recently yeah and you

00:01:32 those documents recently yeah and you confirm their contents are true yeah and do you confirm that your content for those documents to stand as your evidence the inquiry yeah no mr. Marion if anytime you require a break please

00:01:43 if anytime you require a break please say so that's a good problem and most importantly if any time my questions are unclear please say so and I'll try and rephrase them so they're clear right for you now first of

00:01:54 they're clear right for you now first of all could we deal with some basic matters first at the time of the fire you're a firefighter based act and is that right yeah and how long have you been a firefighter now coming up to 15

00:02:05 been a firefighter now coming up to 15 years and on the night the appliance in which you were in the callsign was golf two six one is that right yes and on the evening you worked with firefighter Harvey Saunders who was your be a

00:02:17 Harvey Saunders who was your be a partner is that right yes now the LFP records indicate that you were mobilized at zero 120 you're on the road at 0 122 and you'd arrived at the scene at 0 135

00:02:30 and you'd arrived at the scene at 0 135 does that sound right to you yeah now whilst you are enroute and do you recall hearing on the radio that your pump would be an FSG crew I don't

00:02:41 your pump would be an FSG crew I don't remember if I might ask Paul to draw up LFP document quadruple zero one nine one four underscore double zero six four

00:02:54 four underscore double zero six four and hopefully there you'll see at the bottom of the page at 0 135 yep you'll

00:03:06 bottom of the page at 0 135 yep you'll see golf to 6:1 Acton's pump Mader interrupts the CRO attempting to pass the radio message to golf 271 North Kensington's punt ladder saying their work they will take the priority message

00:03:17 work they will take the priority message on behalf of golf 2 7 1 North Kensington's punt ladder who have not responded the CRO passes FSG call information to golf 2 6 1 saying they have a call on the 18th floor with thick

00:03:29 have a call on the 18th floor with thick smoke and they're flat individuals on the 22nd floor was smoke in their flat and a further call to fire on the 20th floor in flat 82 people are also trapped Golf 2 6 1 act and pump matter are still

00:03:43 Golf 2 6 1 act and pump matter are still on their way to walk turn over the page

00:03:48 and see at the top of page the instant and they state they will pass on the information to go up to 7 1 when they arrive but do you remember that napoli

00:03:59 arrive but do you remember that napoli now in terms of the timings of your ba where the lfpp records indicate that the s DBA was disconnected from the appliance at 0 1 31 and tally out at the

00:04:11 appliance at 0 1 31 and tally out at the bridgehead was at 0 1 51 that sound right to you yeah now you've given a detailed statement I'm not going to go through each and every element of that

00:04:23 through each and every element of that but what I'd like to do is just focus on the particular FSG mission you were tasked to complete and first of all can I deal with your ba entry into the tower now first of all do you recall on your

00:04:36 now first of all do you recall on your entry into the tower seeing the forward information board at a second floor bridgehead yes now if I could ask Paul to put up the Met document triple zero one eight seven four nine underscore

00:04:50 one eight seven four nine underscore triple zero one is that the forward information board you remember seeing yeah I remember seeing it I don't remember the information that was written

00:05:00 written and if you see in the middle right hand side what appears to be written 14 floor

00:05:11 side what appears to be written 14 floor yeah

00:05:12 yeah 111 and underneath that written 8 persons do you remember seeing that as you entered the tower now you see their

00:05:25 you entered the tower now you see their flat or rather than numbers 1 1 1 written down and if I could ask Paul to put the forward information board down turn to your own contemporaneous notes

00:05:36 turn to your own contemporaneous notes that met quadruple 0 5 4 7 0 underscore triple 0 1 yeah

00:05:47 triple 0 1 yeah now if you go apologies is always difficult reading hand written notes but if you go roughly halfway down that page you say we went to the 14th floor flat 1

00:05:59 you say we went to the 14th floor flat 1 1 - yeah when you were deployed can you remember we deployed to flap 111 or to 112 can you remember now

00:06:15 now if I could ask you to turn back to your witness statement and page five and the third paragraph on that page on line

00:06:26 the third paragraph on that page on line three you say we were told to effect fire survival guidance rescue calls on the 14th floor this meant that the

00:06:39 the 14th floor this meant that the advice was that it was deemed to be safest to get occupants to stay in their flat we were told to give the residents on the 14th floor on this advice first of all who gave you your instructions I

00:06:50 of all who gave you your instructions I can't remember now down it was it a man or a woman I can remember do you remember whether the individual had a accent an Irish accent for example a common man what further detail were you

00:07:03 common man what further detail were you given regarding those FSG calls on the 14th floor we were just told to give them advice turn understand their flats were you've given any details of the

00:07:16 were you've given any details of the occupants of the flats on the 14th floor no were you given any plans setting out the layout of the 14th floor no and were you told whether there were any children on the 14th floor no were you given any

00:07:29 on the 14th floor no were you given any information regarding conditions for example in the stairwell going up from the bridgehead to the 14th floor no I don't Karen called up and were you given any information regarding conditions

00:07:40 any information regarding conditions within the flats from where FSG calls had been made no I can't now in that extract from your statement which we've looked at you very specifically say that

00:07:53 looked at you very specifically say that you would deploy to give FSG advice to stay put I to remain within their flats could I ask you a few questions about that what would have been the purpose in telling the occupants to stay where they

00:08:05 telling the occupants to stay where they were at this stage at that stage as in other high-rise procedures stay in your flat is generally the safest place to be and was it your clear understanding that

00:08:18 and was it your clear understanding that you were not to bring the occupants of the flats on for putting down I don't remember being told that at all man whilst you were in the lobby or in the bridgehead

00:08:29 lobby or in the bridgehead did you see any residence evacuating the tower I remember people coming down I don't remember it as we were at the bridgehead though and seeing residents coming down were

00:08:43 and seeing residents coming down were they coming at coming down without the assistance of a set can you remember very few well maybe one or two I think I remember seeing and can you remember the the physical condition of the residents

00:08:56 the physical condition of the residents who are evacuating at that time they weren't in a good state it's fast now one kick in can you explain that to them all they were struggling to breathe as

00:09:09 all they were struggling to breathe as they were coming out coughing yeah things like that given what you witness give it the condition of the individuals you witness whilst you are waiting to go up did you think whether it might be

00:09:22 up did you think whether it might be sensible or practical to take up a spare be a set with you to assist people down if that became necessary no not that time what was the point I suppose of the

00:09:35 time what was the point I suppose of the blunt question in going up to the flats on floor 14 to tell them to stay put when that information could have been given to them by the phone I don't know

00:09:46 given to them by the phone I don't know to be honest it's normal procedure in my eyes to tell people to stay in their flats if people start coming out of their flats tell them to go back in and wait for any other advice now in terms

00:10:00 wait for any other advice now in terms of your understanding of the scope of the mission mr. Murphy mr. Cornelius who will hear from latest day both say they were told to carry out search and rescue there's no suggestion that they had that

00:10:13 there's no suggestion that they had that they didn't have instructions to leave occupants there are you sure there was no instruction to bring the occupants down no not to me other thing is that say you're sure there was no such

00:10:25 say you're sure there was no such instruction no I'm not 100% sure

00:10:29 now could I ask you next about your assessment of the conditions on your way up to the tower and if I could ask you to turn to page five again of your witness statement in the fourth paragraph where you say that there was

00:10:42 paragraph where you say that there was smoke on the stairs from the second floor all the way up to the 14th floor so if we had tried to get people out in the 14th floor they wouldn't have made it down now just dealing with that short

00:10:56 it down now just dealing with that short paragraph is that of you you had on the night or is a view you formed later on after your experiences within the tower no that was at the time given that

00:11:08 no that was at the time given that assessment again asked question what consideration did you give to possible means to assist people leaving the tower spare ba sets for example I don't know to be honest was there any discussion of

00:11:21 to be honest was there any discussion of taking up spare ba sets when you're in the lobby or at the bridgehead no given that this was a relatively early stage

00:11:35 that this was a relatively early stage in your journey up the tower how did you know conditions to be so bad further up that it was unlikely that people could come down from the 14th floor I didn't know till I got to the 14th so

00:11:47 I didn't know till I got to the 14th so it's a view you formed after you got to the top yeah did anyone wise you were waiting at the lobby on the bridgehead and in a firefighter coming down to give you any

00:11:58 firefighter coming down to give you any stare or guidance as to what conditions were like first of all in the stairwell going up the tower no I don't remember now you refer here to saying that

00:12:11 now you refer here to saying that conditions deteriorated from the second floor onwards now the bridge head I think at that stage was on the second floor yeah are you sure that the smoke conditions were

00:12:22 you sure that the smoke conditions were as you described from the second floor onward to not say higher up the fifth floor for example yeah it may be in higher third or fourth floor I think I was it's a slightly higher up at the end the bridge head

00:12:35 now during the deployment as you were going up the stairwell did you see a team coming down with a mother and daughter as a vacuous being helped with a spare be a set and mask

00:12:47 helped with a spare be a set and mask now I don't Paul could I ask you to turn up a photo the reference is inked by n cubed

00:12:55 cubed triple zero double zero two four eight - two four nine

00:13:26 well actually we'll just park that this in some difficulty I'll move on to different questions whilst oh we get that sorted could I now turn to what the conditions were like on the 14th floor

00:13:38 conditions were like on the 14th floor itself now as you were going up you notice there was unusual white smoke now did you have a turn off your BA to test

00:13:50 did you have a turn off your BA to test breathing conditions as you were going up no did you turn off your ba wants you at the 14th floor to tip my mask off in a flat I can't linger which one as you

00:14:04 a flat I can't linger which one as you were going up what was had anyone warned you of the scale of the staircases Bret for otherwise know what equipment did

00:14:15 for otherwise know what equipment did you encounter as you were going up the stairwell firefighting media etc I remember there being some hose on the stairwell as you were going up did you

00:14:29 stairwell as you were going up did you encounter any firefighters who were helping residents evacuate no they're not now where you were worth that mr.

00:14:41 not now where you were worth that mr. Murphy and mr. Cornelius were deployed to the 14th floor at roughly the same time as you were yes I don't I don't remember their names but I know a crew was deployed at the same time sighs and were you present when they were briefed

00:14:54 were you present when they were briefed not will you can you did you witness them as you were queuing up to go to the bridgehead I can't remember who they are

00:15:06 bridgehead I can't remember who they are to be honest ok now as you were going up the tower am i right and saying that the ad su sounded yeah now for everyone in

00:15:17 ad su sounded yeah now for everyone in the room can you explain what the ad su is first of all I guess you is a warning system if we stop moving from on ten seconds it sets off an alarm it

00:15:29 on ten seconds it sets off an alarm it can also be set off by yourself there's a button on it that signals that you're in trouble and it's signaled and what

00:15:40 in trouble and it's signaled and what did you do next Maya D she went off I tell the other crew that we were with that was going to go down to entry control and have it

00:15:52 go down to entry control and have it turned off and then we'll come back up when it went off did you try and radio down to the bridgehead to say yeah we don't we let entry control no though it was an accident all it's gone off

00:16:03 was an accident all it's gone off accidentally and were you able to get through to entry control yeah and when you got down to the bridge to entry control did we've given any further

00:16:14 control did we've given any further update as to conditions on the 14th floor at that stage now will you give any further update as to the content of FSGS received from the 14th floor no did

00:16:25 FSGS received from the 14th floor no did you consider given the conditions you encountered taking up a spare ba set to assist persons coming down now apologies if I can go back to the question we asked earlier and whether you saw a

00:16:36 asked earlier and whether you saw a mother and daughter coming down and Paul if you could turn up photos reference 8-iron q Quinn tuple zero two four eight

00:16:51 and then two four nine might be better no I don't think those are the useful references if I can now go to the 14th

00:17:04 references if I can now go to the 14th floor itself and the flats you encountered on the 14th floor it may be useful if we turn to a plan that was attached to mr. Murphy's witness

00:17:15 attached to mr. Murphy's witness statement and that reference is at met triple zero one three zero six four - one

00:17:31 now is it right that the first flat you went to is flat 112 yes I believe so and there as you say in your statement you

00:17:42 there as you say in your statement you found two men with tan skin and their mid to late 30s is that right yes and you say in your statement that they were anxious to leave the flat but you advised otherwise why did you advise for

00:17:54 advised otherwise why did you advise for them to stay in the flat because the stairwell was so smoke logged that I didn't think it was a good idea for them to come through that and if they had

00:18:07 to come through that and if they had elected to leave their flat and gone down in any event given the conditions than the lobby in the stairwell what do you think would have happened I don't think they would have been able to make it to the bottom when you were assessing

00:18:20 it to the bottom when you were assessing whether they should go down the stairs did you take into account their age and likely capacity to get down no do you think it would have been possible to

00:18:31 think it would have been possible to radio down to the bridgehead or the engine control point for a fresh crew of firefighters to be sent up the tower in order to meet any evacuating down from

00:18:42 order to meet any evacuating down from floor 14 halfway or somewhere safer no would that have been helpful I don't believe so Weiss well unless they had unless the

00:18:55 Weiss well unless they had unless the stairwell was clearly smoked or they had their own option supply mr. Omar al hajjali who's one of the gentlemen you met says that he asked about whether

00:19:06 met says that he asked about whether there were any spare masks do you remember that question being asked I do yes and do you remember what was your response I said there wasn't and What did he say to that human but I can't

00:19:17 did he say to that human but I can't under that thank you do you remember it was you were talking to mr. al hajjali he says that smoke came into the flat

00:19:28 he says that smoke came into the flat and caused the fire alarm to go off do you remember that and now is it possible that that happened it is possible yeah now if I can ask you to turn to page seven of your witness statement

00:19:40 seven of your witness statement and it's really the penultimate paragraph on that page the third and I'll read out all of it that sits in the record I think the guy in the flat I'd

00:19:53 record I think the guy in the flat I'd been in came out into the hallway and said that the fire was getting closer I went back into the flat I first went into I saw some smoke to the rear of the flat I was only in there for about 30

00:20:04 flat I was only in there for about 30 seconds the second time I entered I came back out and we made the decision but we decided to move all the people on the 14th floor into one flat the one we deemed to be the safest I don't make who

00:20:15 deemed to be the safest I don't make who actually made the decision now looking back now looking at who made the decision by process of elimination did

00:20:27 decision by process of elimination did you suggest that people should be moved from flat from flats into flat one month three I don't know you can't remember what you died but can't remember I don't know you've got no recollection

00:20:40 I don't know you've got no recollection at all as to who suggested it no was the decision to move everyone into flat one one three was that based on your

00:20:52 one three was that based on your assessment of smoke conditions or because of a fear of not having enough air for you to get back down the tower or what both factors in your decision-making I think it was because the amount of people on their floor if

00:21:04 the amount of people on their floor if they did need to be evacuated they'd all be in the same flat and we'd know exactly where they were given the decision to put people in the same flat one one three did you radio down to the

00:21:18 one one three did you radio down to the bridgehead or try to radio down to the bridgehead the decision that had been made

00:21:21 made I can't run with me Isis do you remember anyone trying to do those no Carla did you you clearly use your radio but the

00:21:32 you you clearly use your radio but the first stage of the deployment to contact the entry control that staging post that you were coming back down with your abs you had started did you think to try and

00:21:43 you had started did you think to try and use your radio later on to inform either the bridgehead or engine or that you're putting everyone in 414 in flat 1 1 3 I can't remember if we did I didn't see honestly

00:21:56 during the night did you have any issues that getting through to the bridgehead using your radio no I think so and so if you could have contacted them you could

00:22:08 you could have contacted them you could have got if you want if you decided to contact the British air entry control your viewers you could have got through the times that I did or we did try and radio foods really control we didn't

00:22:19 radio foods really control we didn't have any problems at the police I should have asked you this at the outset but what type of radio did you have on you I had my handheld radio I can't remember if I had them vo it comes as well some

00:22:32 if I had them vo it comes as well some firefighters have also discussed having mobile phones on them they've emphasized that it's usually only seen officers who are allowed to have them but people do carry them with them did you carry your mobile phone with you on the night

00:22:43 mobile phone with you on the night I think so did you use it at all on the night now have you in your experience encountered any difficulties with radio communications and high-rise concrete

00:22:54 communications and high-rise concrete buildings using the handheld radios or Barry says no not that no radios no okay

00:23:03 can you remember whether anyone raised the possibility of seeking instructions from either the bridgehead or entry control as to how best to deal with the

00:23:14 control as to how best to deal with the occupants of floor 14

00:23:24 now if I can now deal with the question of flat one one three no did you go into

00:23:35 of flat one one three no did you go into flat one one three at any stage show an evening I think I may have gone in the hallway flat one month free and how long were you in the hallway for you remember not very long a minute under a minute

00:23:48 not very long a minute under a minute more than a minute under a minute did you see who was in or who could you see from the hallway he was in flat one one three I can't

00:24:00 was in flat one one three I can't remember next remember seeing a child no how would you assess the smoke conditions within flat wall on three from your perspective in the hallway as

00:24:11 from your perspective in the hallway as I remember the flats were fairly clear of smoke but had you been able when you discuss when you were talking to mr. al hajjali had you been able to assess the

00:24:23 hajjali had you been able to assess the smoke conditions within flat one one two I didn't remember there being much smoking flat one one so Eva what were the smoke conditions from the lobby on floor 14 do you remember the lift lobby

00:24:34 floor 14 do you remember the lift lobby there was some small amount of smoke once you're on floor 14 did the smoke conditions deteriorate remain stable or improve in the lift lobby I felt they

00:24:45 improve in the lift lobby I felt they stay the same

00:24:50 do you remember seeing a gentleman from flat 111 no do you remember seeing a

00:25:02 flat 111 no do you remember seeing a mother and a child and were you able to form a views to how many people were with in flat one one three I can't

00:25:13 with in flat one one three I can't remember to be honest do you remember any discussion in which the number of people within flat warm on three was discussed while she was still on the 14th floor

00:25:23 now you went to back down to the bridgehead that's right yeah when you got down to the bridgehead was it about to be moved from the second floor I

00:25:36 to be moved from the second floor I don't know did any other crews exit at the same time you did from floor 14 I don't believe so how long did it take

00:25:47 don't believe so how long did it take you to get down from floor 14 to the bridgehead I had the conditions in the stairwell deteriorated improved or

00:25:58 stairwell deteriorated improved or remains stable from your first trip up I think over the same as when we first went up when you got to the bridgehead did you debrief the officer in charge

00:26:09 did you debrief the officer in charge that bridgehead is to first of all conditions you'd found in the stairwell yeah so what did you how did you describe those conditions to him I can't remember if we told the option charge I

00:26:21 remember if we told the option charge I think we told her enter each over I can't remember we told but there was we just said it was still very smoke logged on the stairs what debrief did you give as to placing the occupants of the flats

00:26:33 as to placing the occupants of the flats on the floor 14 in flat 1 1 3 I think we told in to control that everyone on the 14th floor is in the same flat did you tell the officer in charge the bridge I

00:26:44 tell the officer in charge the bridge I think myself and firefighter Sanders did yes

00:26:47 yes it would have been important given the FSG course from the 14th floor to have told the bridgehead how many people are in flat 1 1 3 wouldn't it yeah did you tell them I believe we did and how many

00:27:00 tell them I believe we did and how many people did you say were in the flat I can't remember now is it possible or likely that you told them that there are 8 or 9 people still within the flat okarin can you remember the name of the

00:27:13 okarin can you remember the name of the officer to whom you debriefed at the bridgehead and can you even remember whether it as a man or a woman no were you aware of the other crew

00:27:24 no were you aware of the other crew namely Cornelius and Murphy debriefing the officer at the bridgehead no I don't know

00:27:29 know so cool would you please turn up the forward information board at met triple zero one eight seven four nine if that

00:27:44 zero one eight seven four nine if that could be expanded now this is the forward information board and you can see at the top black one one three eight

00:27:55 see at the top black one one three eight people 14th floor do you remember seeing that information being written on the board whilst you were present no I don't remember do you

00:28:07 were present no I don't remember do you remember anyone writing any information on that board after you'd returned from flap one one three no could I ask port would you mind taking that down could I

00:28:18 would you mind taking that down could I ask you to turn up met triple zero one three zero seven four

00:28:26 and that you'll see 1-1 3-8 people 14th floor if i could be magnified yeah

00:28:38 floor if i could be magnified yeah did you remember seeing that being written on the wall no do you remember firefighter Cornelius writing anything on the wall no could I now ask you a

00:28:54 on the wall no could I now ask you a question about training had you been trained that it was best to leave a group of residents on a floor that was already smoke compromised in some flats no well we've always been

00:29:08 some flats no well we've always been told to leave people in their flats and given the nature and extent of the smoke on the 14th floor the lobby given the nature and extent of the smoke in the

00:29:19 nature and extent of the smoke in the stairwell and given the smoke conditions you'd observed is it first summarize irreverence in this way you considered it it was safe to leave the occupants of

00:29:30 it it was safe to leave the occupants of the flats in 414 in flat what 1/3 yeah did you assume that firefighters would later go up to rescue those occupants a

00:29:42 later go up to rescue those occupants a flat one 1/3 what did you assume that the fire would be extinguished oh they could evacuate the residents can evacuate safely in any event on normal high-rise procedures so people staying

00:29:53 high-rise procedures so people staying there flats put the fire out and then we'll tell them if they needed to be evacuated or if they could stay without but in answer if I could press you answer the question I put to you did you

00:30:04 answer the question I put to you did you assume that they would be rescued by later crew yes

00:30:10 did you check as to what had had that happened to them indeed came down

00:30:19 we made later we made aware later on in the night as to what had happened to the occupants of flat one one three no when did you first find out what had happened I still don't know now looking back now

00:30:34 I still don't know now looking back now given the state of the smoke on the 14th floor in the stairwell and given the residents were coming down before you went up do you think it would have been

00:30:47 went up do you think it would have been practical to bring down the occupants of flat one one three at the time you came down in hindsight it was yeah we could have everyone out but again without any

00:30:59 have everyone out but again without any oxygen I still don't think they would have made it down if you'd radioed down for spare ba sets it would have been practicable for a fresh crew to have

00:31:11 practicable for a fresh crew to have brought up spare ba set to bring down the occupants of flat on three oh I don't know

00:31:23 so I've no further questions at this stage might it be possible in the usual way maybe to have a short break 35 minutes to see what they really saw the

00:31:34 minutes to see what they really saw the question as we know it would be a good idea we'll have a short break at the stages to Mary and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room and we'll resume at 20

00:31:47 out of the room and we'll resume at 20 to 11 that'll give you plenty of time let's give the option yeah

00:32:05 right 22 11 inches

00:32:16 you

00:41:11 for mr. Miriam I think they're just a few questions that come to be sure to ask you okay okay miss Marron thank you very much just a few more supplementals first of all you

00:41:22 few more supplementals first of all you send your witness statement that there was no positive pressure in the stairwells at the tower yeah and if it had if there had been such positive pressure there what difference do you

00:41:33 pressure there what difference do you think it would have made conditions in the stairwell you found on the night there would have been including stairwell they would have been no smoking it everyone to us could have walked out and therefore assisted

00:41:44 walked out and therefore assisted evacuation no no you have been told make your way up it's safe to do so if the stairwell was clear of smoke then and following on from that question when

00:41:57 and following on from that question when you are if your understanding of an FSG call is that you ought to go up there and advise the occupants to stay put do you have a discretion but say when you get up to the particular flat you see it conditions are such that the best thing

00:42:10 conditions are such that the best thing to do the safest thing to do is to bring people down is that a discretion that you have and you've exercised in the past yes and I suppose follows on from that question given that discretion why

00:42:22 that question given that discretion why did you decide not to exercise it here in relation to flat 1 1 3 because the smoke loggin was so heavy in the stairwell at that time then I don't

00:42:33 stairwell at that time then I don't think people have been able to get out safely

00:42:35 safely and finally um you said that you were unaware of what had happened to the occupants of flat 1 1 3 and have you received any briefing from anyone as to

00:42:46 received any briefing from anyone as to what happened in flatform 1 3 no had you seen any of the publicity in the press following the fire no had you seen that mr. al hajar mr. mohammad al hajar lee

00:42:59 mr. al hajar mr. mohammad al hajar lee had been the first reported fatality in the town

00:43:04 mr. man thank you very much for your assistance in coming to the inquiry state we're very grateful for your help and those are all the questions I have for you well I've had my thanks to those of Mr Kim here it's been very helpful

00:43:15 of Mr Kim here it's been very helpful thank you very much but you gave the usher those please so thank you the next

00:43:26 usher those please so thank you the next witness is mr. Desmond Murphy I don't know whether there needs to be some domestic rearrangements for standing or sitting but that does need to be some rearrangements of the furniture so much

00:43:37 rearrangements of the furniture so much please well I think the best thing is I'll rise to give you thank you plenty of scope but would you come and tell me as soon it'll get the option to tell me as soon as you're ready

00:43:48 as soon as you're ready well this thank you

00:45:04 you

00:46:40 yes no then mr. Murphy mr. Murphy just before I do I should formally read into the record an exhibit from mr. Warren sir police statement which is metal 0 1

00:46:53 sir police statement which is metal 0 1 5 8 6 5 which is simply a plan and so I do that for me now now call mr. Murphy thank you

00:47:25 please repeat I swear I saw months ago thank you very

00:47:37 I swear I saw months ago thank you very much mr. Murphy because you'd like to keep women standing up yes please yes of course

00:47:42 course good morning would you please confirm your name for the record Desmond Murphy mr. Murphy thank you very much for coming please give Upton States much appreciated in front of you should be a blue folder

00:47:54 blue folder yes and when you open that there should be your police with a statement date of the 21st of January 2018 is that right miss correct yet and behind that ought

00:48:05 miss correct yet and behind that ought to be your contemporaneous noting yes and behind that should be two exhibits the first a plan of the town's immediate surroundings and secondly a plan of the

00:48:17 surroundings and secondly a plan of the 14th floor itself is that right yeah and have you read those documents recently yes I have yet and can you confirm their contents are true they are true apart from a couple of the names have been misspelled but the evidence is is

00:48:29 misspelled but the evidence is is correct yes thank you and you can turn to those documents to stand as your evidence the inquiry yes mr. Murphy at any stage you want a break please do say so there's no problem with that also if any time asks a question which

00:48:42 also if any time asks a question which is unclear the fault is mine and police asked me to put a question more clearly yeah now if we could start off with some basic information first of all at the time of the fire is it right

00:48:53 all at the time of the fire is it right that you were a firefighter based at Kensington that's correct yes and how long have you been a firefighter 20 years and on the night the callsign of your appliance was golf three three one is that right and that on the night you

00:49:05 is that right and that on the night you worked with firefighter Cornelius who was your be a partner and your watch manager was watch manager O'Keefe yes and he was the watch manager who deployed you to flat 111 yes correct

00:49:16 deployed you to flat 111 yes correct now looking at the timings the LF these records indicate that you were mobilized at zerozero 55 you have mobile at zerozero 56 and that you're on scene at

00:49:28 zerozero 56 and that you're on scene at zero one zero eight does that sound right and that correct yeah and turning also to the timings of your deployment under air the LF B's records into the SD ba was disconnected from the

00:49:40 the SD ba was disconnected from the appliance at zero 1:27 does that sound about right and that tally out of the bridgehead was at zero 151 pounds right yes just for those who aren't familiar

00:49:53 yes just for those who aren't familiar with the detail of timings and the tasks you carried out on the night the time difference between your arrival at zero one zero eight and the disconnection of

00:50:07 one zero eight and the disconnection of the FD ba at zero one twenty seven was that the time you were deploying the covering jet that's correct yes and the second period of time between

00:50:21 second period of time between disconnected zero 127 and zero 151 what were you doing in that time period making our way to this bridgehead thank you now the first question I topic I'd

00:50:33 you now the first question I topic I'd like to discuss with you is just the extreme firefighting we carried out on the night now to page three of your witness statement and the first substantive paragraph on that page six

00:50:44 substantive paragraph on that page six lines down you say I was told there were crews tackling the foreign side of the respective flats so me and firefighter Cornelius at the Haitian firefighter days when there are crews within a flat

00:50:55 days when there are crews within a flat we are trained to discharge water around a window and not into the window as this may affect the safety crew inside a course injury to firefighter Cornelius and I were hitting the fire around the window with water it was having no

00:51:06 window with water it was having no effect the flames were continuing to spray presumably you were aiming the fire around the window so as to avoid injuring anyone inside yes correct yes sir I have to give a trigger warning at

00:51:18 sir I have to give a trigger warning at this stage maybe showing very briefly a video which showed the initial firefight outside the tower and so the tower and the show flame and so I'd give this tool photograph oh it's a video or a video

00:51:30 photograph oh it's a video or a video the Bisbee compilation which we've seen before so yes what if anyone feels concerned about seeing a video of perhaps this would be a good time to leave the room well I didn't see anyone

00:51:43 leave the room well I didn't see anyone moving and support is the video setup its mr. Murphy just so I can explain this is a compilation video put together by one of the inquiries experts which

00:51:55 by one of the inquiries experts which shows mobile phone footage of the exterior of the tower and shows the initial firefight and so the purpose of me putting it to you is just so I can

00:52:06 me putting it to you is just so I can see whether certain individuals are you and firefighter Cornelius ISIL and Paul if you could set that up

00:52:17 [Applause]

00:52:34 when you see the jet just started there

00:53:08 no stopping there um it's always very difficult on these things but was that the jet you were operating yes yes and so the two individuals we saw at the end of the zero 1:15 frame that was you and

00:53:19 of the zero 1:15 frame that was you and firefighter consciousness alright thank you

00:53:23 you now can I ask you about the separate topic of your deployment under air and if I could ask you to again to get back to page three of your witness statement inspect eight lines from the bottom of that page you say this watch manager

00:53:40 that page you say this watch manager Dowden told firefighter Cornelius tonight to move back from the tower and go to our vehicle to get breathing apparatus as it was now unsafe to stay in this position this is the only firefighting I did in our vehicle we

00:53:52 firefighting I did in our vehicle we have the standard duration breathing apparatus this is one sandrov option advice were there for approximately 31 minutes firefighter Cornelius and I left the hose and went to get the breathing apparatus now when you were having that

00:54:05 apparatus now when you were having that initial or when watch managed Adhan was giving you that order did you have any discussion with him or with firefighter Cornelius as to whether the fire was penetrating the interior of the building

00:54:17 penetrating the interior of the building can you repeat a question yes when watch manager Dadon came to direct you to go inside the tower yeah did you have any conversation with him first of all as to whether fire had penetrated into the

00:54:29 whether fire had penetrated into the building

00:54:32 did you firefighter Cornelius have a discussion when you were operating the the covering jet as to whether for example compartmentalize that compartmentalization had failed or not

00:54:44 compartmentalization had failed or not well we had quite a few discussions to be honest because the way the fire was reacting when we first proposed one to it was it was something I've never seen before

00:54:55 before the initially when we put the fire the first private time we put the jet on it was felt like we were put an accelerant on to it it seemed to spread the fire and it seemed to make the fire react

00:55:06 and it seemed to make the fire react very aggressively it was crack and poppin normally a cover in jet would be used to push back the heat push back the fire to stop it jump into the next floor above and in this case it wasn't

00:55:19 floor above and in this case it wasn't just coming out of the window the whole of the Warren was alive the whole building was Stein to the fire with actually caught creeping up the side of the building so we had quite a few discussions as shock and disbelief for

00:55:30 discussions as shock and disbelief for what we were seeing it was clearly breached from the window because the fire initially was inside the flat and there was a lot of fire on the outside but when we first put the

00:55:41 the outside but when we first put the gel on there was flames above the window and there was a lot of heat to the lift and down to the left-hand side of the window which seemed to be below the surface behind the panel was it was a

00:55:53 surface behind the panel was it was a very intense heat and to the left of the window was a column that goes right the way to the top of the building that seems to be the base of the fire it seemed very intense in there when you

00:56:04 seemed very intense in there when you and firefighter Cornelius were discussing how the fire was moving and developing yeah did you have any discussion as to how best you could of lfb generally could fight the fire in

00:56:16 lfb generally could fight the fire in order to contain it well as I said when we put their jet onto the foot onto the heat it just seems to accelerate and it it seemed to press spread the heat spread the fire all directions it was

00:56:28 spread the fire all directions it was reacting very violently I did shout across to Mike Dowden that is what we're doing was having no effect and he said to put it under the windows so that's what we did really what that was doing

00:56:40 what we did really what that was doing was stopping it spreading from doubt spreading downwards but our concern was putting it around the window onto the fire it may react in a way that could affect the firefighters inside their apartment were you able to have a

00:56:52 apartment were you able to have a discussion as to how best to get residents evacuated given the way the fire was denied at that point now could I now turn on to be a entry control it's

00:57:04 I now turn on to be a entry control it's again page three of your witness statement and it's the very last line and where you say there's firefighter Cornelius and I spoke with watch manager Keith who's in charge of the bridgehead at this point

00:57:15 at this point and I did not see any other managers he tasked us with a fire survival guidance search and rescue on floor 14 to locate a male who was in flat 111 this male had

00:57:26 a male who was in flat 111 this male had called for firefighters saying could not get out of his flat and he was told to remain in his flat excuse me for firefighters to reach him did you see at

00:57:37 firefighters to reach him did you see at this stage a female watch manager at the bridgehead no he only the only officer I saw was by now Keith at that point dealing with the substance of the

00:57:49 dealing with the substance of the instructions you were given by mr. O'Keefe were you told to search and rescue we were told that there was an FSG called two flat one one one on the 14th floor to me that would indicate

00:58:02 14th floor to me that would indicate find them and try and rescue them did mr. O'Keefe explicitly used the word rescue I believe he did yes yeah and even if he hadn't that would have been your assumption that someone's calling

00:58:15 your assumption that someone's calling and they're in difficulty and it becomes an FSG call that normally indicates they were trapped I had a smoke order fire and they need our assistance either to get him to a safer place or to get them out well what

00:58:26 safer place or to get them out well what information were you given regarding for example smoke conditions in the stairwell and the stairs going out before we left the bridgehead now we've given any information as to smoke conditions on floor 14 itself no any

00:58:40 conditions on floor 14 itself no any detail about smoke far within the flats now if I'm at about the bridgehead the there was no smoke it was clear and as we made our way up the building from about the fifth floor it became like

00:58:52 about the fifth floor it became like smoke and in fourth floor like smoke fifth floor became very very thick ecwid smoke visibility it was reduced another were you've given any detail regarding

00:59:03 were you've given any detail regarding the layout of floor 14 where the flats there were no plans available I've not been in their building before that point I'd now like to talk to you about your experiences going up the stairwell up to

00:59:15 experiences going up the stairwell up to floor 14 now you describe those conditions page four of your witness statements and the first substantive paragraph on that page

00:59:23 page now as you went up the tower do you remember people coming down

00:59:31 my only recollection of passing anyone on the stairs was on a seventh floor we passed a crew from North Kensington on their way down smoke conditions were

00:59:42 on their way down smoke conditions were very very bad there the only reason I recognized one of the firefighters which was fire fight for video is just he's the same height as me we're similar sort of stem so we were having difficulty

00:59:54 of stem so we were having difficulty locating what floor we'll want because of smoke conditions and it didn't appear that every floor had numbered on the walk we had numbers on the wall so date

01:00:05 walk we had numbers on the wall so date videos showed me that underneath the emergency lighting if you put your hand over the lighting and put your torture and there was small numbers underneath that was a 7th floor so from there upwards we were able to gauge our position do you remember seeing any

01:00:17 position do you remember seeing any residents being evacuated - no no not past that point now do you remember seeing any residents evacuating when you're in the lobby or at the bridgehead to be honest at the bridgehead I was

01:00:29 to be honest at the bridgehead I was listening to my brief I was focused on what mr. a fire fire chief water on your own Keefe saw was was given us so no I didn't know could I ask you about the

01:00:41 didn't know could I ask you about the the topic of radio communications within the tower on the night you say in your statement and it's at page five we don't need to go to it unless you want to you said that the radio communications didn't work and just to be clear did

01:00:53 didn't work and just to be clear did that mean the line was dead or just that the line was so busy you couldn't get through to the engine or the bridge the first time we tried to use the kit the communication was on the fifth floor when we got into the heavy smoke area as

01:01:06 when we got into the heavy smoke area as we left the bridgehead there was a crew of two myself and firefighter Cornelius and watch manager O'Keefe told us there was another crew or two that would come in to the same floor with us when we got to the fifth floor in the

01:01:18 when we got to the fifth floor in the smoke one of the other crew whose 80s you went off and they told her so they were going to go back down you have to go back to the bridgehead to get it reset I asked Charlie then to communicate with the bridgehead and tell

01:01:30 communicate with the bridgehead and tell them

01:01:31 them we're now in core 2 and we're going to continue upwards there was no communication it becomes wasn't working and can you remember what floor radio comms that was a fifth of its one we used it yet I also

01:01:42 a fifth of its one we used it yet I also tried with my handheld radio and that didn't work there was nothing you may you may be following the inquiry anyway and you may have seen that firefighters refer to the fact that sometimes they're carrying mobile phones on them you know

01:01:54 carrying mobile phones on them you know it's perhaps not encouraged were people carrying mobile phones on that night these so I don't know I couldn't I couldn't see the guy that was next to me so I couldn't didn't notice anyone using

01:02:05 so I couldn't didn't notice anyone using the phone did you carry a mobile phone that night no did you see anyone in your crew or any of the guys you were with going up to or at floor 14 that used to what try to use a mobile phone no if I

01:02:23 what try to use a mobile phone no if I can now turn to the topic of flat at 111 and if I could turn to the bottom of page four of your statement and you say this we walked a floor 14 or destination floor in the lobby of floor 14 it was

01:02:35 floor in the lobby of floor 14 it was smoky so we shut the door to the stairwell to protect the 14th floor lobby and minimize smoke entering it as we did not know the layout of the floor visibility was poor I suggest the firefighter Kamiya's that we do a left-hand searched I searched

01:02:47 we do a left-hand searched I searched the floor starting off with the flat that we should that we would first find on our left and then moving around the floor in a clockwise direction this is shown in Exhibit D m2 and if I could ask

01:03:00 shown in Exhibit D m2 and if I could ask Paul to bring up exhibit met triple zero one three zero six four - Wow

01:03:14 but is this the plan you were referring to them smurfy yeah yes and flats 111 was the first flat you came across as us correct yes

01:03:29 you go on at the top of page 5 have your witness statement to say that a man came to the door of flat 111 do you recall mr. Murphy having unsuitable on his face

01:03:42 mr. Murphy having unsuitable on his face it was considerably smoky in the corridor when we found the flat I went down onto one neither check there's the number and forced the door my shoulder and as I went in the gentleman was stood

01:03:55 and as I went in the gentleman was stood just inside the door he was he was struggling he was bent over and coughing and did he have soot on his he did yes yes no yes yes his flat was quite heavy

01:04:07 yes no yes yes his flat was quite heavy smoke not and how did he seem to you physically how was his condition how would you assess it he was conscious and breathing he was stood up but as I say he was bent over double um his hand with his stomach coughing so he was

01:04:19 his stomach coughing so he was struggling a bit yeah and you found him what did you do next with him well he I asked him are you okay and he scene indicated yes and he shouted out we

01:04:31 indicated yes and he shouted out we thought he said my kids so Charlie who was beside me went straight through and to search to flare and he said no I said did you know how many kids or I asked him how many there were I caught me but exactly what I said he

01:04:42 I caught me but exactly what I said he said no my keys my keys so that Charlie had just literally sweep the flat quickly come back out so there wasn't any kids because he couldn't hear the gentleman talking and I reiterated that it was his keys he was looking for so

01:04:54 it was his keys he was looking for so you won't we won't need your keys just we don't need to worry about them and we stepped back out of the door into the lock into the lobby and did you only go as far as the hallway into flat 111

01:05:05 as far as the hallway into flat 111 interesting just inside the front door myself yes and from that perspective how would you assess first of all the density of the smoke it wasn't a safe atmosphere did it but to stay in it didn't appear to be any heat in there as

01:05:17 didn't appear to be any heat in there as if they didn't appear that there was a fire on that floor normally if you're close to the fire you can feel the radiated heat obviously we just climbed 14 floors carrying of equipment so we were quite hot

01:05:28 of equipment so we were quite hot ourselves but it didn't feel up here that there was a fire there just it was very smoke dog to me and what was the color of the smoke you remember black very dark gray and black so what did you

01:05:42 very dark gray and black so what did you do next as I as we spoke discussed the confusion over the keys we step by step back out into the lobby and at that point the door next next to us which was the next flat one one to the door opened

01:05:54 the next flat one one to the door opened they were two gentleman at the door one was very very calm everyone was quite distressed and upset and he he said please don't leave us do if you want to

01:06:08 please don't leave us do if you want to break it that's fine are you sure yeah please do say so okay and in respect of mr. Murphy from fat 111 yeah

01:06:19 mr. Murphy from fat 111 yeah where was he worse you are having the discovers holding hold on to tell though how about supporting him yeah and where did what did you then do I looked over the shoulders of the two gentlemen at flat one one two and I could see behind him that their flip flat was was clear

01:06:31 him that their flip flat was was clear it was safer so I suggested that they step back in and keep the door shut and asked him to take mr. Murphy in with them close the door and keep it shot we

01:06:42 them close the door and keep it shot we were going to search the floor me be back for them which they did and next I think you turn you went to flat hundred thirteen itself no continued a left then

01:06:53 thirteen itself no continued a left then searched we went to the next flat which was flat one one three and could you just take us through you found flat warm on through what did you do that yes we knocked and kicked the door shouted out fire brigade the door the door opened a

01:07:05 fire brigade the door the door opened a gentleman probably in each 30s answer the door

01:07:08 the door it was clean air in there as well I asked him was he okay I said yes I said how many people in the flat he said my partner and my daughter so I said to him okay stay in the flat keep the door

01:07:19 okay stay in the flat keep the door closed and then we he did that he shut the door and we move around in a clockwise direction to flap one one four from there thank you when you use the phrase clean

01:07:30 thank you when you use the phrase clean air does that mean absolutely free yes it safe as it doesn't in this room yes you finished it flat one one three are you able to remember how much air you

01:07:42 you able to remember how much air you had left at that stage we we did a gauge check just at the same time that we flat one one two opens Charlie was doing a gauge check and I was checking as well and at that point I asked Charlie to try

01:07:53 and at that point I asked Charlie to try and radio down we were I can't remember the figure but I know we were low on air we didn't have a lot of M&S in the techs then can you remember when you look when you're looking at how much hair you've

01:08:04 you're looking at how much hair you've got left are you able to care at a quick calculation in your head of how much time you've got through experience yes you are normally how we saw was go off about probably eight eighty eight eighty

01:08:18 about probably eight eighty eight eighty bar so you'd normally usually be outside the building when your whistle goes off and we were getting close to whistle at that point but we found more than modern

01:08:29 that point but we found more than modern personally we had went to find originally and I just wanted to check how many people on that floor my thoughts were on the way up is we can't get anyone down the staircase it's to

01:08:40 get anyone down the staircase it's to smoke loads it wasn't safe I didn't know if there was another staircase so as we were searching around the landing we were looking in case there was a second staircase at the other side of the building there wasn't so I had to sort

01:08:53 building there wasn't so I had to sort of try make a quick decision on what was best for everybody and I thought that to put them all into a room that was safe said it all together we needed to go back down quite soon so if we got down

01:09:05 back down quite soon so if we got down and gave clear instructions to the next crew where everyone is that would be quicker for them to come back up him and make a rescue thank you stopping there um I think in your statement you say you

01:09:16 um I think in your statement you say you and firefighter Cornelius discussed what the best options were is that right that might not be quite correct I'd I made the decision and reiterated Charlie what we were going to do and can you remember

01:09:27 we were going to do and can you remember word the Acton crew with you by that stage no not at that stage we were stood on their own and and can you remember whether you discussed your decision with the actin crew they didn't come onto the floor -

01:09:40 crew they didn't come onto the floor - we had swept the whole floor and put everybody into flat one one three and as we were leaving they came onto the floor then and I explained to them what we'd already done we'd search to search the

01:09:52 already done we'd search to search the whole floor found eight people put them into flat three once you've made your decision were you able to radio through to the bridgehead we tried again there was no radio communications with with

01:10:03 was no radio communications with with the berry sets or with our handhelds

01:10:07 given the conditions you encountered were you able to form a view as to how many people were on the floor 14 at the

01:10:18 many people were on the floor 14 at the time you made your decision to move people into flat one one three not until we'd not or on all of the flats and make contact with the people we didn't know obviously we found the first two flats

01:10:31 obviously we found the first two flats then the third one which one one three we tried one one four there was no answer there we keep the door shout it out

01:10:38 out so we then moved to one one five and we found two people in there lady and her son she was very very frightened very upset and if I had you made the decision

01:10:49 upset and if I had you made the decision that it was best that people be moved to flat one one three before you went to flat one one five well no not that at that point because I read put there were three people in flat one one to which we

01:11:01 three people in flat one one to which we were safe there when we walked away from them then they shut the door and in one one free there was three people in there that were in sofa as well so for that moment until we searched the rest of the floor my thoughts were just to check who

01:11:14 floor my thoughts were just to check who else is on the floor thank you know before you left did you ensure that all the occupants of floor 14 were in flat warm on three yes

01:11:26 floor 14 were in flat warm on three yes I did yeah and did you say anything to the occupants of flat when we went to flat one one fired and found the lady with her son she was very frightened then she said please don't leave us alone don't leave don't leave me on my

01:11:38 alone don't leave don't leave me on my own

01:11:40 own my thoughts were then to bring her across the corridor to the flat where the other three people we placed in flat one one two at that point Charlie was checking in flat one one six which was next to that

01:11:52 flat one one six which was next to that kicking the door bang in it there was no answer there so we were confident then we checked all of the flats so I escorted her in her son that crossed the corridor to flat one one to knock the door and they open the door and I looked

01:12:05 door and they open the door and I looked in and it started so it looked smoky in here then I don't know if that was because they've been open and shutting the door or whether there was smoke coming from the outside so I made a decision then to put them all into the

01:12:16 decision then to put them all into the flat next door which was one one three and at that stage can you describe the smoke conditions in flat one one three it was clear what we call safe air and

01:12:29 it was clear what we call safe air and you put everyone in flat one one three before you left to go down back to the bridgehead did you carry out a head count or anything yeah yeah and how many

01:12:41 count or anything yeah yeah and how many people did you counting six adults and two children

01:12:49 and were they all within the living room on the flat wall more they were I was at that point I was speaking to the occupier was one one three and as the others had all gone in they were making

01:13:00 others had all gone in they were making their way in through the flat so I only spoke to them at the door I didn't go into the building I was trying to keep the door closed as much as possible to prevent any smoke getting in there did

01:13:12 prevent any smoke getting in there did you say did you give any words again sorry to go back to this did you give any words before you left yes all the occupants yes and I did I can you help us give other best job and

01:13:23 can you help us give other best job and I know it's difficult I explained to them that our sets we were low on air and we needed to go back down to get to get our cylinders changed I said explain to them if they stay in the flat keep

01:13:34 to them if they stay in the flat keep the flat keep the door shut staying safer where you are other crews would back up to help them tell me I sure didn't know they were gonna get up you went back downstairs

01:13:46 you went back downstairs yes did you see any residents being evacuated down the stairwell as you went yes we did it was again it was still very smoky on the stairs we got to about I think seven maybe a sixth floor and we

01:13:58 I think seven maybe a sixth floor and we caught with in front of me was a member to public it looked like a an elderly lady wearing the bi silver mask on and she was being led down by a firefighter was walking down backwards holding her

01:14:09 was walking down backwards holding her hands so we escorted them down to the to the bridge head it's quite slow proquest going down human with apologies these are lawyer type questions yes I can

01:14:20 are lawyer type questions yes I can Joyce can you estimate how long it took you to get down time timewise the whole evening is difficult to gauge I would say to walk down them stairs comfortably

01:14:32 say to walk down them stairs comfortably in clean air would probably take five or seven minutes it probably took longer than that because visibility was limited we were taking one step at a time about feeling our way down so it could have been maybe eight nine minutes to walk

01:14:44 been maybe eight nine minutes to walk down it's difficult to tell and had smoke conditions in the stairwell deteriorated since you've got a day where it was still thick acrid smoke we couldn't see your hands in front of our face can you remember whether early

01:14:56 face can you remember whether early obstacles in the stairway weather firefighting media or anything else I'm away now no I'd be load a fifth-floor there were I heard there were houses but not from fifth floor upwards I didn't notice anything no you got back to the

01:15:08 notice anything no you got back to the bridgehead yep the records indicate that act and tally back in at 0 to 15 and your end of where is 0 to 119 did act and get back ahead

01:15:21 is 0 to 119 did act and get back ahead of you or after you can remember now if the other crew that we went back down while we were going up the stairs was axon

01:15:32 axon as far as i zoom that they were the same crew that followed us up when we were leaving the floor I don't know with BA sets on and we've smoked it's difficult to see who people are did you debrief mr. O'Keefe again

01:15:45 did you debrief mr. O'Keefe again stirred again apologies it's more than the year of the event but can you do your best remember precisely what yes remember exactly what I said I told him that we'd found the resident in flat one one one he was in a bad can see we've

01:16:01 one one he was in a bad can see we've sweep swept the floor and we found eight people six adults and two children and they're all in flat one one free and safer but they need crews up there now

01:16:12 safer but they need crews up there now and each second sets to get them out first it wasn't safe the city air wasn't safe for anyone to get through that and you particularly said they need a second set yeah yeah I gave that information to

01:16:24 set yeah yeah I gave that information to watch manger O'Keefe and to the right of there when we went upstairs the bridgehead was on the second floor when we came down it had been moved to the third floor so I gave that mission

01:16:36 third floor so I gave that mission information to an ad oh I don't know who he was after I told what's manager O'Keefe and firefighter Cornelius was also given information to crews that

01:16:48 also given information to crews that were doing the injury control board and you told the lady exactly what you told WatchMojo Kieffer's now it's a joke and when I spoke to general sorry yeah yes I told him exactly exactly where we'd been what we've done how many people and

01:17:00 what we've done how many people and where they were Paul could you bring up document triple zero one eight two seven four nine do you recognize this as a

01:17:17 nine do you recognize this as a forwarding for that information board that is a forward information for yes you'll see in the top middle if Paul could amplify that one one three eight

01:17:28 could amplify that one one three eight people 14th floor did you see the forward information board being updated but now admit I didn't notice the board now all if you

01:17:40 didn't notice the board now all if you could take that down and put up met triple zero on two double six three -

01:17:52 triple zero on two double six three - double zero double one apologies that's my fault wrong reference it's met triple zero one three zero seven four

01:18:11 now this is a photograph of a wall you can see there I think it's the floor indicator of the lift do you remember seeing writing on a wall by a lift I

01:18:22 seeing writing on a wall by a lift I noticed that there was writing on the walls I didn't I didn't read or look closely at any of it were you were a firefighter Cornelius writing any information on a wall after you come back down where I don't know were you

01:18:35 back down where I don't know were you aware of the immediate any steps that were taken in response to the information you'd given that the bridge head that descend fresh crews and seconds and I laughter we'd given that information I was confident it was she

01:18:46 information I was confident it was she was delivered and understood and I think at that point we both needed to get out a building then recuperate so we left we left the bridge Evan went outside then were you made aware late in the night as

01:18:59 were you made aware late in the night as to what happened to the occupants of

01:19:03 there's some fun questions mr. Murphy I just got for you which relate to your initial firefighting measures I'll be two minutes is that okay yes you're you

01:19:16 two minutes is that okay yes you're you describe flames moving up the tower and between the paneling and what's the paneling you're referring to you there if you remain if you mean where I said it was like a neon light being turned on

01:19:27 it was like a neon light being turned on it maybe is if I go if you go back to page three of your witness statement

01:19:39 and you described so it's mmm very it's that chunky paragraph you'll see just below halfway there's a sentence which

01:19:51 below halfway there's a sentence which starts within 10 to 15 seconds we saw the flames move up the tower between the paneling and they lit up the building remind me of neon lights being turned on in a vertical panel but between the panel's with bright white hot glare fire

01:20:03 panel's with bright white hot glare fire and spreading rapidly left and right so what I'm referring to there is to the left of the window is a almost a triangular shaped column sticking out from the building which run right the way to the top it seemed to travel up

01:20:16 way to the top it seemed to travel up through that that column and you could you see that the paneling itself was alight it initially looks as if that it was below the surface and it was a white

01:20:27 was below the surface and it was a white glow so I explained it was like a neon light being turned on can you remember whether what's measured out and would have seen that would he be in the position to I see he was stood to my

01:20:39 position to I see he was stood to my left and in a position where he could see both sizes from that corner of the building if he was looking in that direction you may have seen it like and did you discuss what you had seen in the paneling the vivid whitneyhl with

01:20:50 paneling the vivid whitneyhl with witness to don't know when when he gave us our instructions to go and get sits on we did exactly that and lift we didn't we didn't stand around discussion anything mr. Murphy thank you very much for your patience sir marhaus just be

01:21:01 for your patience sir marhaus just be five minutes and just sit there any further questions indeed given the time of morning I wonder whether this would be a good room to have a slightly longer

01:21:13 be a good room to have a slightly longer break if not you know too much of a hurry to go outside anyway thanks we do that and that'll give you a chance to see whether there are further questions I'll be grateful thanks it well we'll

01:21:26 I'll be grateful thanks it well we'll have a slightly longer break and resume at 20 to 12 please don't talk to anyone else about your evidence one we're out of the room and we'll start again at

01:21:37 of the room and we'll start again at twenty of twelve there may or may not be some more questions at that stage you like to go with you

01:21:53 all right 22:12 please

01:25:04 you

01:42:09 yes mr. Canino thank you just a few supplemental questions for mr. Murphy right well then could you ask him to come back

01:42:48 Thank You mr. Murphy I think there just a few more questions to ask you this is Murphy thank you very much for your patience just a few more questions first of all if I could go back to class 113

01:42:59 of all if I could go back to class 113 and before you went back down to the bridgehead yes did you advise any of any or one of the occupants of flat one one three to go into the bedroom can you remember that not like you McCall no can you recall

01:43:11 not like you McCall no can you recall any of the other firefighters mr. Cornelius for example advising the same no no in evidence you mentioned that

01:43:22 no no in evidence you mentioned that when you came back down to the bridgehead you advised mr. O'Keefe that fresh crews need to go up with second sets of BA Paul could ask you to turn up lfb document quadruple zero four eight

01:43:35 lfb document quadruple zero four eight to eight and then underscore zero one six four

01:43:45 and if that photograph could be amplified

01:43:54 and do you recall seeing where you came down a resident being evacuated protected with a second set of PA yes as

01:44:07 protected with a second set of PA yes as we come down it I think it is around the six or six or seventh floor I we caught up with a person resident it was walking down and a pie fight was walking down backwards in the smoke leading them down

01:44:18 backwards in the smoke leading them down and I don't know if that was the person because he was smoked lovely couldn't see very clearly this is around 219 so in May is Harley with you coming down could well be yes yeah yeah and that

01:44:30 could well be yes yeah yeah and that just for the sake of finality that's the type of that's the second ba said that you had in mind when you recommended it to miss a independent set for someone else to put on you when you met mr. hood

01:44:45 else to put on you when you met mr. hood David Padilla when you were going up the tower

01:44:47 tower yeah um did he obviously did you know that they were coming down from the 20th floor I didn't know where they're coming from

01:44:54 from no and in what condition were they when you when you came across mr. Padilla and mr. secret mr. dalgo they were stressed very stressed yeah I'm pretty sure there was a lady issue going off there whistle

01:45:06 was a lady issue going off there whistle was going so one of them was on the morning whistle yeah having seen the condition they were in how did that influence your assessment - first of all as to whether you'd be able to get

01:45:17 as to whether you'd be able to get residents down from the floor 14 it I didn't think of I didn't I didn't think about that to be honest I I noticed that they were distressed so my conversation with mr. Padilla was very short precise

01:45:29 with mr. Padilla was very short precise all I need to know is how to find out what floor we were on and I didn't go and we carried on on our way I didn't really I was focused on our task and they weren't they were on their way out so um one final question was yeah okay

01:45:40 so um one final question was yeah okay thank you

01:45:41 thank you is that um in flats 113 or C there were three adult males would it have been feasible me I mean originally yes they were - no sorry I think I know what's in a child no sorry I guess I wasn't clear

01:45:55 a child no sorry I guess I wasn't clear in flat 130 when you left there would have been three adult males in three I don't most other Jolie brothers there would have been to Philadelphia it

01:46:08 there would have been to Philadelphia it would have been mr. Murphy from flat one-on-one the two brothers from one one to the gentleman from 1 1 3 which is 4 I don't marry yes and three young I should be more precised three younger males

01:46:21 excluding mr. Murphy yes there would have been younger yes yes and would it be feasible to us them to help the task of bringing down the other occupants of flat on one third what were in the

01:46:32 flat on one third what were in the difficult I wasn't prepared to take anybody into that car into that stairwell due to smoke conditions it don't mean to be what's her upset anyone but if I've taken anyone down it would have led into a very early death wouldn't wasn't safe

01:46:45 a very early death wouldn't wasn't safe mr. Murphy those are all the questions I have for you today you know I've concluded by saying many thanks for coming along and contributing so valuable to the inquiry you're welcome yes thank you very much indeed mr. Murphy is really helpful to have your

01:46:56 Murphy is really helpful to have your description of conditions at different points in the building when you were there so that's very good thank you very much longer thank you right you like to go to the ocean so

01:47:10 right you like to go to the ocean so thank you there will need to be a rearrangement to the domestic furniture Rus they might ask you for to rise briefly so that those changes can be made and then once we're back I'd call

01:47:22 made and then once we're back I'd call mr. Cooney the African Tobias who is already too resumed thank you sir thank you

01:55:29 mr. Kinnaird before we take the next witness I understand there's something that mr. Murphy's the last witness would like to say in the context of the hearing so I minded to invite him back

01:55:41 hearing so I minded to invite him back in to say it Thanks

01:56:02 I understand if they understand there's something you'd like to say before you leave the hearing yes there is yes I just like to say to the family members of firm Dennis Murphy and the family

01:56:14 of firm Dennis Murphy and the family members of the other seven residents I came into contact with on the 14th floor I'm very sorry that we couldn't get your loved ones out of the building thank you

01:56:42 you know mr. Kinnear who's our next witness so with your permission might I call mr. Cornelius yes thank you

01:57:40 please repeat after me I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give that the evidence I shall give shall be achieved shall be the truth the whole truth nothing but the truth thank you very much mr. Cornelius we

01:57:53 thank you very much mr. Cornelius we would like to sit down and make yourself comfy yes mr. Kuhn good morning I mean first of all would you please confirm your name for the record

01:58:00 record yes Charles Cornelius mr. Cornelius thank you very much for coming along to give overstates much appreciated you'll see in front of you there there's a blue folder if you turn over the first tab hopefully you'll find your police

01:58:12 hopefully you'll find your police statement which is data the 4th of December of last year is that right that's correct and if you turn over again hopefully you'll find your contemporaneous note correct and if you turn over again

01:58:23 turn over again hopefully you'll find the exhibit to your police statement which is a plan of the tower Anderson media surroundings is that right that's right that's there and have you read those documents recently happen and you confirm their contents are true I do and your content for those

01:58:36 are true I do and your content for those documents to stand as your evidence to the inquiry yes mr. Cornelius as I've said to the other witnesses any time if at any time you require a break please do say so it's not a problem

01:58:47 not a problem now perhaps most importantly if I ask a really unclear question police say so and I'll trying to correct that okay now before we start could we cover a couple of basic matters first of

01:58:58 cover a couple of basic matters first of all am i right that a time of the fire you're a firefighter based at Kensington that's correct and that's how long have you been a firefighter it's about 10 years now and the callsign of the appliance that you're on at the night

01:59:10 appliance that you're on at the night was golf double three one is that right off refute one yeah and I think on the night you worked with firefighter Murphy I did um who was your be a partner correct and your watch manager was watch

01:59:21 correct and your watch manager was watch manager O'Keefe correct and he was the watch manager who deployed you to fast 111 that's right now the LF P's records indicate that you mobilized at double zero 55 you were mobile at double zero

01:59:34 zero 55 you were mobile at double zero 56 and they were on the zenith on the seem rather at zero one zero eight does that sound about right to you yes at about item II also based on the NFB records they indicate that in relation

01:59:46 records they indicate that in relation to your BA where your s DBA was disconnected from the appliance at zero on two

01:59:51 on two eight does that sound about right sounds about right and tallied out at the bridgehead at zero 151

01:59:58 now for those of us who aren't familiar with firefighters in particular the task you carried out on the evening the 20 minutes difference between arrival at 0 1 and 0 8 and the disconnect of the s

02:00:11 1 and 0 8 and the disconnect of the s DBA from the appliance at 0 1 28 was that the time you are operating the covering jet with firefighter Murphy I believe that that would be right yes and the the next difference of 23 minutes or

02:00:24 the the next difference of 23 minutes or so between the disconnect of the VA and tallying out at 0 151 that was you making your way from the appliance to little bit to the bridge head correct thank you

02:00:36 thank you the first topic I'd like to discuss with you today mr. Cornelius is the external firefighting now first question is we've told Wayne the jet only below the window

02:00:48 told Wayne the jet only below the window or above the window we were told at the time to end the jet below the window now as before if I can just give a trigger warning I'm going to ask Paul to put up the Bisbee compilation again yes and so

02:01:02 the Bisbee compilation again yes and so if anyone would not want to see scenes of the initial father then perhaps this at the time that they should leave

02:01:13 because well no one who seems to wish to go to the service or you go Paul if you wouldn't mind playing the complex

02:01:26 [Applause]

02:01:36 [Music]

02:02:14 first question mr. Cornelius were you was that the covering jet you're operating with mr. Murphy I would say it looks like it yeah and it's always difficult you saw two figures at the end of the first set of frames was that you

02:02:26 of the first set of frames was that you and mr. Murphy do you think hard to tell from that but I would have said you okay thank you you've mentioned in your statement that watch my dad addend and deployed you to go into the tower under

02:02:40 deployed you to go into the tower under air and do the falling debris did you have any discussion with Watchmen of Dowden as to the fire penetrating into the interior of the building before you went in we had a quick discussion with

02:02:53 went in we had a quick discussion with Watchmen judge Alton but it was fairly evident what was what's happening outside yeah it appeared as if the fire was spread in under the paneling and the cladding it wasn't clear whether it was

02:03:05 cladding it wasn't clear whether it was actually breaching any other compartments at that point he looked at me as if it was more just under the actual cloud and going up the side of the building and at that time what were your thoughts about the risk of complementation failing in the flats

02:03:18 complementation failing in the flats within the tower and to be honest with you it was hard to sort of gauge what was happening I had never seen anything like that before I don't think many of us had so we kind of had to go under

02:03:30 us had so we kind of had to go under limited information that we had from the outside but as for it breaching the compartments I wouldn't been able to tell at that stage whether that was that was a factor and at that stage to do

02:03:41 was a factor and at that stage to do form any thoughts as to what measures would have to be taken to evacuate residents from the town not really no it was more we were focused on covering jet

02:03:53 was more we were focused on covering jet and trying basically trying to minimize the fire spread as as we put the water on around the window and to the side it was effectively spread indeed the fire

02:04:06 was effectively spread indeed the fire rather than containing it I think you said in your statement and we can go to if needs be but it's at page six on the third substantive paragraph you said it looked to me like it was the gaps between the cladding that were alight is

02:04:17 between the cladding that were alight is that is that a fair summary of what you saw yeah that's correct it wasn't necessarily act cladding panels I could see a light it was the areas around it initially and as

02:04:29 was the areas around it initially and as it developed it seemed that the areas around it or whatever was behind the panels were falling off sort of melting and dropping down to where me and firefighter Murphy was standing on the

02:04:41 firefighter Murphy was standing on the jet in your witness statement you saved from you know again at the bottom of the third substantive paragraph of page six you say this um from outside you could see that the firefighters inside had no

02:04:52 see that the firefighters inside had no idea of what was going on presumably on on the outside what was it that they didn't know that they should have known I mean yes as for not knowing

02:05:03 have known I mean yes as for not knowing it may have been communicated via radio what's happening but I I would imagine from my experience not many people would have expected the fire spread to be happening as quickly or in the way it was from inside the building I certainly

02:05:16 was from inside the building I certainly wouldn't have expected that I was in there when you went in the tower no well the lobby at the bridgehead did you mention the way the fire was performing on the exterior to watch magicky for any other person there I think by the time I

02:05:29 other person there I think by the time I got in there watch manager Keith was aware I was aware of the spread outside there had been a lot of people in and out of the building by that point we did

02:05:40 out of the building by that point we did explain what was happening but but he seemed to be fair failure area of that obviously something wasn't right and did you raise with him the specific point that whilst you haven't seen fire

02:05:51 point that whilst you haven't seen fire penetrate within the building yet is it fair say that you thought there was a risk of that happening very there was a risk but but at that point we wasn't no we didn't we didn't know for sure what

02:06:03 we didn't we didn't know for sure what was happening can I now turn to a separate topic and that's going to entry control we don't need to go to your statement but take it from me that you

02:06:14 statement but take it from me that you say that that page seven on the first paragraph there that the bridgehead was at the third floor at this point when you went in looking back now do you think that's right the reason I put it

02:06:25 think that's right the reason I put it to you is that other witnesses have said it was on the second floor state that that could well be the case yeah I know the bridge had moved at one point why we were we were committed to fire it probably was a second floor

02:06:36 fire it probably was a second floor looking back here and can you remember whether you saw a female watched manager with watch manager O'Keefe at the bridgehead oh and you when you were deployed I didn't at that time right now could I

02:06:49 didn't at that time right now could I next turn to the instructions you have given just before you were deployed and if I could ask you to turn up page seven of your witness statement and it's really the third paragraph on

02:07:00 and it's really the third paragraph on that page as a general rule of thumb mr. Kinesis pulls very quickly at bringing

02:07:11 Kinesis pulls very quickly at bringing the five parts that's always easiest look at the screen and you see there in the statement you say we were briefed by watch matter O'Keefe about a fire Survival Guide in school at 14th floor flat 111 one gentleman on his own we

02:07:22 flat 111 one gentleman on his own we then went through the normal procedure by repeating the brief to him so he would know that we understood what we're doing before we went to the entry control officer to give him our tally now first things first were you told

02:07:36 now first things first were you told expressly by WatchMojo Keefe to search and rescue I don't remember the words search and rescue but we were told it was a fire survival guidance call and

02:07:50 was a fire survival guidance call and with that we would take it upon ourselves to sort of gauge the situation when we reached the 14th floor and flat one one one I'm not sure he may have

02:08:01 one one one I'm not sure he may have said search and rescue but I'm not sure exactly and just to assist you on that answer if I could ask you to turn over the page to page 8 of your witness statement and it's about five lines down from the top you say this my

02:08:13 from the top you say this my understanding of an FSG call is when someone that is trapped in a fire calls the control the control will be on the phone with the individuals and gives the person advice while the control

02:08:24 person advice while the control mobilizing appliance to go and rescue the individual so put bluntly you saw rescues being part and parcel that the job is that a fair summary it is yeah if if we thought that

02:08:36 summary it is yeah if if we thought that was a feasible option then yes at the time you have been you're receiving your instructions from watch mandro Keith did he tell you anything further about other occupants of other flats on flat

02:08:47 occupants of other flats on flat fourteen no at that time it was it was one gentleman in flat on one one that was all we had to go so there were no details I take from that of what the

02:08:59 details I take from that of what the conditions were like in flat warm on one night and you had no details of the condition of the occupant of flat 111 either no can you remember whether there was any guidance given a plan or

02:09:12 was any guidance given a plan or whatever as to what the precise layout was of floor 14 no we had no idea and before we we got there whilst you're in the lobby in the bridgehead waiting to

02:09:23 the lobby in the bridgehead waiting to be deployed did you see any residents evacuating whilst we was in the bridgeheads i did see some residents being assisted down by firefighters and

02:09:35 being assisted down by firefighters and some leaving of their own mains but not not many not not a massive flow maybe four or five can you remember whether any of those resins you saw were coming down with the

02:09:47 resins you saw were coming down with the benefit of a second ba said no not nice for that swine can you remember what the physical condition was off the residence you saw at this stage while those are

02:09:59 you saw at this stage while those are coming down whilst you were waiting at the bridgehead it varied really there was there was I remember one person was was over firefighters showed have been

02:10:11 was over firefighters showed have been broke down and wasn't conscious but there other people who were walking out effectively on their own and seeing such a difference in condition what thoughts

02:10:24 a difference in condition what thoughts did you have as to what the conditions might well be like as you traveled up the town um it was it was hard to say you know obviously it's hard to gauge where then people had come from with

02:10:35 where then people had come from with what floors they they were in or what flats were involved so we obviously we know that there was going to be some smoke but we didn't know to what extent at that stage all

02:10:48 know to what extent at that stage all the way to smoke ended do you remember the Acton crew at the bridgehead I I don't remember them at the actual bridgehead subsequently I learned that

02:10:59 bridgehead subsequently I learned that they were the crew that backed us up but I don't remember having a conversation or seeing them at the actual bridgehead flows from that therefore you didn't have you weren't briefed by WatchMojo

02:11:10 have you weren't briefed by WatchMojo Keefe at the same time you and the afternoon crew no were you anywhere near them or did you sense him near you when sieving your briefing to be honest with you that they were probably in close proximity if they were backing us up but

02:11:22 proximity if they were backing us up but I don't I don't recall them actually actually at the bridgehead the first part I know is when we started going up the stairs and there was a crew behind us the next topic I'd like to discuss

02:11:33 us the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is really conditions on the stairwell as you went up from the bridgehead up to floor 14 you've seen your statement at page 8 and we don't need to go to it unless you want to that

02:11:44 need to go to it unless you want to that you had to make way for casualties coming down is that right there were a few casualties being led down by by firefighters yeah not a lot but but we did pass maybe a couple of people on the

02:11:56 did pass maybe a couple of people on the stairs early on and when you say aided by firefighters were they coming down with the assistance of a second be a set or was it simply physical assistance I think it was just physical assistance

02:12:07 think it was just physical assistance yeah

02:12:12 now as you were going up mr. Murphy said that you met David do do you remember that I I remember meeting firefighters on the stairs I didn't know

02:12:24 firefighters on the stairs I didn't know at the time that was that was Dave but learn afterwards that there was can you remember

02:12:30 remember did they say anything to you about made experience yes it was again it's very hard to hear in a BSA clearly what's what's happening I know that if I fight

02:12:42 what's happening I know that if I fight Murphy and Dave were having a conversation and I think that was was with regards to Dave passing information about how you could see the what floor you want because it turned out if you

02:12:54 you want because it turned out if you sort of covered up the light and shine your torch on the wall and you could just about tailed of the floor number that you were on and so I think it was more him passing that information on so from that point we could tell which

02:13:05 from that point we could tell which floor were you run can remember mr. Padilla saying that they come down from the 20th floor I I don't recall that I and having seen mr. Padilla and the

02:13:17 and having seen mr. Padilla and the other firefighters did they how did they put what was their condition when you saw them when you earned them on the stairs again it's very it's very hard to say with with with someone with the BAC and it's hard enough to sort CFA and

02:13:29 and it's hard enough to sort CFA and with the actual smoke that was in the stairwell it was kind of hard to gauge anything to be totally honest with you be useful again for those who want experience in firefighting what kit

02:13:43 experience in firefighting what kit you've got the be a set on and I've got that on your shoulders what do you have on your head so you wear a face mask I had comms Barry it's called a comm set on so that has an earpiece and a part

02:13:57 on so that has an earpiece and a part that sits on the top of your head obviously you have a helmet as well on top of that and there's a flashing in between them and so you do lose quite a lot of senses and and hearing it is

02:14:10 lot of senses and and hearing it is quite impaired now you mentioned there you had your your radio as you went up the stairwell

02:14:21 your radio as you went up the stairwell did you have effective radio communications with the bridge bridgehead or indeed entry control I did not know I did try fairly early on going

02:14:32 not know I did try fairly early on going up the stairs to contact the bridgehead why my radio and Westby a set and I also tried why my handheld radio which were

02:14:43 tried why my handheld radio which were there on different channels and I think anything why did you need to contact them as you were going on I just wanted to inform them of our progress and what

02:14:54 to inform them of our progress and what we could see to build up a bit of a better picture at the bridgehead of what conditions were like on the stellar did you have a mobile phone with you I didn't unfortunately not oh did anyone

02:15:07 I didn't unfortunately not oh did anyone else on the crew have a mobile phone I don't think fire fire mayor if you did either I'm not sure about the rest the crew and to what extent our radio communications an issue when you're

02:15:18 communications an issue when you're fighting high-rise fires in concrete buildings there's in high-rise concrete building as I should say yeah I mean obviously it's it's paramount to have effective communications I hadn't

02:15:31 effective communications I hadn't experienced that level of difficulty before with the comms they haven't always been perfect it can be hard sometimes to pick up what people are saying and sometimes they don't work can

02:15:43 saying and sometimes they don't work can you remember which floor you're at when you cease to have radio communications I'm not sure it wasn't maybe I would say probably around the 7th 8th floor

02:15:56 probably around the 7th 8th floor I think mr. Murphy said the fifth floor from memories service right yeah it could be that quite possibly again Thank You mr. Cornelius I'd now like to turn to when you get to floor 14 itself was

02:16:10 to when you get to floor 14 itself was the lobby area clearer than this clearer than the stove stairwell it was yet did the lobby area to the flats was a lot clearer than then the stairs

02:16:24 you carried out the search of floor 14 and how what method of search did you employ once you've got into the lobby area floor 40-some before we went

02:16:36 area floor 40-some before we went through the door and to the lobby area we done carried out door procedure which is a fairly standard procedure in the brigade to check conditions inside that area once we got through the door we saw

02:16:51 area once we got through the door we saw that it was clearer and before we went him me and father Murphy decided to follow the left-hand walk my father Murphy went first and I followed him and

02:17:02 Murphy went first and I followed him and the first lap that we came to on the left-hand wall was flat one on one that we were tossed originally to go to okay and you found a gentleman in there how

02:17:15 and you found a gentleman in there how would you describe his physical condition when you found him the gentleman was conscious and breathing

02:17:26 not in a great condition because he looked like he'd taken in quite a lot of smoke and he had sort of sit sit around his nose and mouth and face and was

02:17:37 his nose and mouth and face and was coughing quite a lot as soon as we saw the gentleman we brought him out into the clearer air from his flat because the flat was more smokey than the lobby and that's when I conducted a search of

02:17:49 and that's when I conducted a search of his flat because I I misheard him thought he said that he had children kids inside which transpires B's and keys and given his condition given these

02:18:01 keys and given his condition given these smoke conditions in the lobby in the stairwell would you have been able to get him down with the air that you had left in your PA set in your opinion

02:18:12 left in your PA set in your opinion no definitely not no and why do you say that it would have been hard enough for anybody to get down 14 flights of stairs

02:18:26 anybody to get down 14 flights of stairs in in the smoke I mean the smoke was really thick and you couldn't see your hand in front of your face and so let alone somebody who had heard already taken in a fair amount of smoke

02:18:37 already taken in a fair amount of smoke and wasn't in the best best of health

02:18:41 that was why that was why we decided that wasn't a good call section at that time you found mr. Murphy what happened next

02:18:51 next so I went in conducted a search of the rest of his flat quickly I couldn't see anybody else I came back out and confirmed it that there was no kids

02:19:02 confirmed it that there was no kids inside we then went once I come back out the flat there a few more residents who started to emerge into the lobby area and we were trying to reassure them

02:19:17 and we were trying to reassure them basically and engage what flats they had come from so we continued sort of a systematic search of all the other flats knocking on the doors trying to see who

02:19:28 knocking on the doors trying to see who who was was in and los so he went to from flat 111 we went to 112 113 114 115 is that right oh that's correct did mr. Murphy at any time go into flat

02:19:39 did mr. Murphy at any time go into flat 112 do you remember I think we may have led mr. Murphy into 112 to take him out of the smoke there was more smoke in the lobby area then in flat 112 so initially

02:19:51 lobby area then in flat 112 so initially we there was I believe two gentlemen in there and we had mr. Murphy him with them T and how long was mr. Murphy with in flat 112 do you remember I'm not sure

02:20:03 in flat 112 do you remember I'm not sure time exactly from probably a few minutes and at this stage just for the avoidance of death were you able to have any radio contact with the bridgehead I tried constantly to to contact the

02:20:17 I tried constantly to to contact the bridgehead anyone downstairs telling them that we needed second sets and and what we had found and that we wasn't going to be able to bring the people downstairs this is on both of my radios

02:20:31 downstairs this is on both of my radios and and firefighter Murphy tried as well but no point we had anything it didn't hear any sort of chatter over the radio or anything at all one question that's arisen is what

02:20:45 one question that's arisen is what difference would radio contact have made for you at that stage for me that that it was a big factor it would have given

02:20:57 it was a big factor it would have given me confidence in what I was telling the people that we could send another crew firefighters up or more crews multiple crews with second sets that to me would

02:21:10 crews with second sets that to me would have been a key element in in saving them if you like could I ask you to turn to page 10 of your witness statement and mr. Cornelius at any time you want a break or anything just get just do shout

02:21:22 break or anything just get just do shout don't worry Thanks now the second paragraph on that page you say this is probably easier if I read it out our decision to leave 8 the 8 people in flat hundred thirteen

02:21:33 the 8 people in flat hundred thirteen was because the conditions in the stairwell where there was thick black smoke if any of them inhaled the smoke that individual would not last long and pass out I don't think leading eight people down to the ground floor as an

02:21:44 people down to the ground floor as an option was they can't hold their breath for that long is just leading them to their death and may have led to more bodies in the stairwell blocking the way the better option was to leave them at flat a hundred thirteen where there was clean air and to stay with the crew that

02:21:56 clean air and to stay with the crew that came to assist while we go and get another crew to come up and help them and hoping that the fire would be contained in the compartment and conditions get better one more help will get to them now first of all

02:22:10 get to them now first of all mr. Murphy said it was his decision what's your memory of how the decision was made I believe that to be correct yeah we had a quick discussion but it

02:22:22 yeah we had a quick discussion but it was firefight Murphy's idea and I said yeah I think I think that sounds good and Kimball I realize it's difficult year or so off the events and lawyers ask these questions but can you remember

02:22:33 ask these questions but can you remember the precise words or the gist of the words that mr. Murphy used I would just be summarize any files to say no I knew the exact words but I know flat one one

02:22:45 the exact words but I know flat one one three was wasn't mentioned and it looked like the best option at the time I take from that there was no discussion with the act and crew there there may well have been but not not I remember okay

02:23:00 given what you'd seen about conditions in the lobby and in the flats on floor 14 would you did you consider that if the floor was already smoked compromise

02:23:12 the floor was already smoked compromise that conditions would improve stay the same what a tier 8 it was highly was really hard to sort of judge at the time the lobby did have smoking but but light

02:23:26 the lobby did have smoking but but light smoke mr. mr. Murphy's flat contain more smoke than the lobby area so it's it seemed to us that flat one one three was was was clear I was clean air and that

02:23:38 was was clear I was clean air and that was going to be a much better option and then leading the people into the stairwell and was your decision based solely on your assessment of smoke

02:23:49 solely on your assessment of smoke conditions or was it also informed by the amount of air you had left in your in your be a set I mean I factored both

02:24:00 in your be a set I mean I factored both by things into it but but for me that the option of lead leading the people downstairs that wasn't available to me it would have it wouldn't have been a

02:24:12 it would have it wouldn't have been a viable option at that point so really it was a good smoke and in the extract from your witness statement which we which I quoted you mentioned that you could go down and get

02:24:24 mentioned that you could go down and get another crew to come and help the occupants of flat 113 you don't say it there but you've devoted to it new evidence earlier on would you expect that fresh crew to be carrying secondary

02:24:36 that fresh crew to be carrying secondary ba sets with them if that's the information that we passed over which it was yeah I would have said that would been a a massive benefit to them and

02:24:48 been a a massive benefit to them and aiding the people down the stairs No how long were you in flat 113 before you left to go back down the stairwell um not very long I I was more in the lobby

02:25:02 not very long I I was more in the lobby area than in the actual flat just checking that that we had got everyone that we thought we could into the flat so I I was probably in the doorway of the flat for not a long time and I just

02:25:14 the flat for not a long time and I just tried to reassure the residents that we weren't going and leaving them that we were going down to get more more crews up with second sets and that so yeah

02:25:27 up with second sets and that so yeah we're doing our best as you were insuring that you had everyone you could did you carry out a headcount to count how many people were going into flat hundred thirteen

02:25:38 going into flat hundred thirteen personally no but but it had been mentioned by firefighter Mophie that there was an eight people so we went with that time were you talking to the

02:25:51 with that time were you talking to the residents as they were going from the lobby into flat 113 I was yes and could you hear what the firefighter Murphy was saying to them because I think it's

02:26:02 saying to them because I think it's right and saying he was within the flat yeah I I I could tell he was having a conversation I as I understand it he was reiterating

02:26:13 as I understand it he was reiterating reaffirming the same sort of thing as what I was saying and we did give advice through the people to close the door and to put bed in at the bottom and a door

02:26:24 to put bed in at the bottom and a door and to keep away from as far away from the door and the smoke as they could that's why and what was the distance between you and mr. Murphy while she was

02:26:35 between you and mr. Murphy while she was standing the lobby and he was infirm maybe eating three or four meters yeah and how clearly were you able to hear what he was saying to the occupants of 113 um not not particularly clearly no

02:26:48 113 um not not particularly clearly no does it first say you were picking up the gist of what he was saying Rothman yes did you know that the Acton crew had

02:26:59 yes did you know that the Acton crew had left flat hundred thirteen shortly after you did I was not aware of that I thank you

02:27:06 you now you intimated this earlier on you say a page eleven can go to if you wanted will witness statement that the absence of communications with the

02:27:17 absence of communications with the bridgehead made made you feel that you're on your own and it was scary is that a fair summary of know you felt at the time yeah Italy left you in a predicament really with the choice we

02:27:29 predicament really with the choice we had to make say yeah how terribly about and how did the absence of communication with the bridge inform your decision to

02:27:41 with the bridge inform your decision to place the occupants off for 14 in flat 113 yeah it pretty much left me with no other choice other than to do that my concern in turn to get him downstairs

02:27:54 my concern in turn to get him downstairs as quickly as possible to inform the bridgehead and officers in charge of the situation

02:28:00 situation rather than hanging about and wasting any more time so we're flowing on it's not directly to do with floor 14 but it's a point you raise which is linked to be a equipment I think in your

02:28:12 to be a equipment I think in your statement you consider it would be a good idea for everyone to be trained in the use of EDB a would you've made different decisions do you think on the night if you'd had a

02:28:23 do you think on the night if you'd had a DBA available to you and you've been trained in its use probably probably not it would have probably given me a little bit more time to think but I think

02:28:35 bit more time to think but I think probably without a second set it would have been without effective communications it would have been the same outcome separate topic now the

02:28:47 same outcome separate topic now the question for lobby doors can you confirm that when you shut the door between the lobby and the stairs on the 14th floor that this prevented smoke from entering the lobby from the stairwell yeah that

02:28:59 the lobby from the stairwell yeah that was how I understood it I got through the doors right behind me straightaway as I didn't want this might contaminate me the lobby area it did seem to be fairly effective now turning to a

02:29:10 fairly effective now turning to a separate topic that's you going back going back to the bridgehead from floor 14 can you remember how much air you had left as you left the lobby of floor 14

02:29:21 left as you left the lobby of floor 14 I'm not sure exactly and I we've done a gauge check and again try to communicate this which we couldn't I'm not I'm not sure exactly how much air I had had the

02:29:33 sure exactly how much air I had had the alarm sounded not either I recorded my way left but it was quite noisy in there I don't remember if it did or didn't you say it's quite noisy in there what noise

02:29:45 say it's quite noisy in there what noise what what was causing the noise oh there was people sort of dropping equipment moving about I suppose firefight and taking place people trying to communicate with each other

02:29:55 other we're shouting and things like that as you were going down the stairwell and did you encounter and evacuate being brought down by a firefighter I I did yes and was she

02:30:08 firefighter I I did yes and was she assisted where the secondary PA says I don't know if it was a secondary set or if it was a set that another Wi-Fi had taken off themselves and placed over the the casualty and I can't remember that

02:30:20 the casualty and I can't remember that clearly you get back down to the bridgehead who briefed watch manager okie from what you'd found both myself and firefighter Murphy we took off face

02:30:32 and firefighter Murphy we took off face myself first of all so we communicate clearly and we were yeah pretty desperate to explain a situation and one what happens

02:30:43 what happens starting with you again apologies for asking the question can you give us as much detail as you can of what you you told watch my show Keith yeah I I

02:30:54 told watch my show Keith yeah I I certainly said where we had been what look or that we'd found the initial flat and then the number of residents that we

02:31:07 and then the number of residents that we had found and the flat that we had put them in a flat one one three and I also gave my opinion that we needed second sets up there and the conditions of the stairwell Lucas ended up another crew

02:31:21 stairwell Lucas ended up another crew the same as us would have been fairly futile we would have needed second sester to bring the people down in terms of the number number of people within flat warm on three did you break it down

02:31:33 flat warm on three did you break it down to adults and children I didn't know I just gave a total number so and what total did you give eight you overheard mr. Murphy debrief mr. O'Keefe yeah I'm doing the best you can

02:31:45 doing the best you can what was your memory of what mr. Murphy told mr. O'Keefe effectively the same as what I said he may also have broken it down

02:31:55 down to resolve the ages and that but but yeah and he basically reiterated the same as as why I did do you remember whether the actin crew had reached the bridgehead ahead of you

02:32:07 had reached the bridgehead ahead of you or not I didn't know that the last I saw off the acting crew so my understanding was when we left the 14th floor and they were still there I don't remember them

02:32:18 were still there I don't remember them after de Paul could you um pull up a met document triple zero one eight seven four nine

02:32:41 do you agree that this is a forward information border that is yes but do you remember seeing it at the bridgehead on your return from floor 14 either I'm seeing that tool on denied okay and so

02:32:53 seeing that tool on denied okay and so just to complete the questions looking at the top bit of that photograph you'll see 1 1 3 8 people 14th floor do you remember that being written on a

02:33:04 do you remember that being written on a board at the bridgehead no no could I ask Paul to pull up another met document

02:33:16 ask Paul to pull up another met document which is met triple 0 1 3 0 7 for mr. Conyers do you recognize that photo I do

02:33:29 Conyers do you recognize that photo I do hi I was shown and that white there the Metropolitan Police in mind to you what does it first of all is it a wall at the bridgehead is that right I believe so and you'll see in the bottom right

02:33:41 and you'll see in the bottom right quarter their peers be written 1 1 3 8 people 14th floor do you recognize the handwriting I thought that it possibly

02:33:54 handwriting I thought that it possibly is my handwriting which I said to the police but but I couldn't say a hundred percent waiver that was myself that wrote it or or possibly somebody else at the bridgehead or ng control officer so

02:34:07 the bridgehead or ng control officer so I guess it could have been me but but I'm not hanging on it taking a step back you remember you don't need to take the baby out really you don't need to take

02:34:21 taking back do you remember writing anything on a wall at the bridgehead after you come down from floor 14 not with any real certainty no is it

02:34:34 with any real certainty no is it something you'd likely to have done possibly I mean there is a chance it looked like my handwriting but that there was quite a lot going on at that point and we were just trying to

02:34:46 point and we were just trying to communicate where the people were and what happened so as many people as possible so I may well have but I can't remember clearly were you aware of what

02:35:00 remember clearly were you aware of what happened what steps were taken by mr. O'Keefe on receiving the information for you mr. Murphy to send fresh crews up to flat hundred thirteen um I wasn't

02:35:13 flat hundred thirteen um I wasn't there's a lot going on at that point and we had sort of explained the situation to as many people as possible we also explained it to a station manager who

02:35:24 explained it to a station manager who was at the bridgehead who I don't know his name but after that we we and decided to leave out the way and leave

02:35:35 decided to leave out the way and leave the building we really sort of get outside and get some fresh air when you spoke to the station manager did you pass on to him the same information you'd pass to watch Mario keep that date

02:35:46 you'd pass to watch Mario keep that date exactly the same and was it you or mr. Murphy or the pair of you both of us we who made it we're late in the night as to what had happened to the people within flat hundred thirteen at

02:35:58 people within flat hundred thirteen at night and when did you first become aware of what had happened I had sort of heard conflicting information of a few weeks or months later and but I never

02:36:11 weeks or months later and but I never really fully got to know what happened afterwards there's a final question for you mr. Cornelius thank you for your patience as far and Paul could ask you to put up

02:36:22 far and Paul could ask you to put up document met five seven eight I think it's underscore one

02:36:57 mr. cleanliness it might be there appear to be reference related issues this morning I've got no further questions beyond this final one so that might be an opportune moment for us to try and

02:37:09 an opportune moment for us to try and rip yes there is there's reference problems right and if I could ask you to write me for five minutes okay yeah well we'll take a short break now we've maybe there are small questions well it sounds it'll certainly be one that's right and

02:37:21 it'll certainly be one that's right and then we will see how we get on please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out on the run and should we say quote - what would they'll come

02:37:34 we say quote - what would they'll come back as soon as they tell us they're ready to see us that's right you like to go with the ocean

02:37:48 right well I'll rise now for long enough to sort out whatever problems there are and for you to consider further questions make certain that you get the offer to come and tell me when you're ready

02:37:58 ready well they said thank you thank you

02:43:12 yes mr. Cleary managed to sort out yes mr. Weatherbee was very kind and pointing out it was entirely my error and sure we enjoyed that he didn't

02:43:23 and sure we enjoyed that he didn't disguise his pleasure thank you very much well done anyway thank you

02:43:45 wherever school is I think just perhaps a few questions okay whose committees as a chair so just a few more questions first of all had you known the full extent of the foreign conditions within

02:43:57 extent of the foreign conditions within the stairwell would you've considered a mediate evacuation of the entirety of the 14th floor was necessary I wouldn't have been able to judge at that point it

02:44:09 have been able to judge at that point it would have been hard for me to say and to actually reach this 14th floor of what to do were there any occasions when you were deployed on in relation to FSGS

02:44:20 you were deployed on in relation to FSGS we're automatically you would have taken the second set of BA with you never why is that it just wasn't needed the

02:44:31 is that it just wasn't needed the brigade policy for us to automatically take a second set no with some hesitation about my grip on references Paul could ask you to pull up met

02:44:42 Paul could ask you to pull up met document five seven double eight underscore one

02:45:10 there we go

02:45:15 now this shows 17th floor and you see an FSG written on the wall next to one one three on the left hand side and paul

02:45:30 three on the left hand side and paul magnify that for you yeah and then just you can see just slightly to the left one one three you have 17th floor looks like one for two

02:45:41 have 17th floor looks like one for two FSG and then below one one three encircled you have eight people can you remember whether this was on the wall at the bridgehead at the time you debriefed about flat one one three and by that in

02:45:55 about flat one one three and by that in particular that the record in relation to the 17th floor I don't recall seeing at all I know there was writing on the wall but but as what it read I I didn't

02:46:07 wall but but as what it read I I didn't start to look it Thank You mr. Cornelius those are all the questions I have for you today but the final thing leaves me safe thank you very much for your help it's been very much appreciated yes well

02:46:18 it's been very much appreciated yes well I'll add to that my own thanks mr. Cornelius it's really helpful to hear from people like yourself who were in the tower about conditions are different stages so we're very grateful to you for coming to tell us thank you very much I

02:46:31 coming to tell us thank you very much I know you're free to go

02:46:41 well mr. Kia sir what I was minded to do was to ask you to rise now and then for us to return set ten to two if that's possible yes and then have to commit

02:46:54 possible yes and then have to commit another stop it mr. Herrera are we getting slightly behind the timetable no he says this may be false assurance this way but no we're not I think the next

02:47:06 way but no we're not I think the next witness will take house the longer than the balance of the three but we remain on course to finish a half Passport very good thank you very much right ten - - thank you