Grenfell Tower Inquiry testimony from London Fire Brigade firefighters Peter Herrera, Nicky Upton, Benjamin Macalone, and John-Pierre Walshe regarding their rescue attempts on the night of the fire. Critical testimony focuses on Flat 113 on the 14th floor where occupants were left behind after firefighters were told 'no one else' remained inside.
00:00:12 I'm gonna give evidence mr. see what are you so well my mission mad call mr. Herrera thank you very much
00:01:06 these would be awful I just like need something
00:01:10 something I'll do so I'm truly Evenstar she gave me something to change the whole truth nothing but truth thank you very much mr. Aaron do sit
00:01:23 thank you very much mr. Aaron do sit down and make yourself comfortable thank you yes mr. Keamy good afternoon would you please confirm your name for the record Peter Herrera in front of you you will have blue folder and hopefully
00:01:36 you will have blue folder and hopefully behind the first tab you will have your police statement which is dated the first of January this year and behind that hopefully you'll find your contemporaneous note yes have you read both those documents
00:01:48 have you read both those documents recently this morning yes and you confirm that contents are true on the police statement there's a couple of things that are they do they don't fit in exactly but is this more s there yes
00:01:59 in exactly but is this more s there yes well if you can highlight those when we come to the parts yes although yeah them we can deal with it then but you content for both those documents the standards your Upton's think wiring yes could be first deal with some basics if any time
00:02:14 first deal with some basics if any time you fancy a break or need a break rather please say so and if any time my questions are unclear say so and I'll rephrase them now as I understand at the time of the fire you were a firefighter based at Lambeth is that right that's
00:02:26 based at Lambeth is that right that's correct yes I do have 12 years or so experience as a firefighter at that time yes and the appliance who were assigned to on that night the call sign was hotel triple zero a triple to the hotel to to
00:02:37 triple zero a triple to the hotel to to to yes correct you were linked with firefighter orchard who was your be a partner during the course the evening is that right she was not right in the fire gym with me she was a firefighter on a solar fire
00:02:48 was a firefighter on a solar fire station had become detached from her crews as she was driving their appliance yes obviously she became one be a part of that night yes yeah and you were mobilized at zero 137 as does that sound
00:02:59 mobilized at zero 137 as does that sound right I can't tell you exactly but I think so yes you know no there's no precise time for your arrival at the tower but we do have the lfts records of your be a where and your s DB was
00:03:11 your be a where and your s DB was disconnected from the appliance at zero 148 does that sound about right that that Wells proved you and I believe you this homie arrived because we just took them there and then yesterday at work and so there's no time that next to
00:03:23 work and so there's no time that next to no time difference between a rival and two teammates and then you tallied out at the bridgehead at 0 to 26 does that sound about right it could be working it and in the intervening half-hour or so
00:03:34 and in the intervening half-hour or so what were you doing between this connection of the SD be a at 1:48 and telling out at 0 to 26 so taking out for much of the job itself from where I was
00:03:45 much of the job itself from where I was committed to the fire yeah you at the bridgehead yes I'll at the preciate could you please the SDP a was disconnected at 148 yes you tallied out at the bridgehead is 0
00:03:58 you tallied out at the bridgehead is 0 to 26 so then there was no tally in I think you make let's take 10 when you left the entry control point yes it go up the tower that was about 0 to 26 does
00:04:11 up the tower that was about 0 to 26 does that sound about right it does actually and what were you doing in the intervening half-hour well we went to the 14th floor oh you're asked to rescue a family from the flat number 1 1 3 was asking what
00:04:26 the flat number 1 1 3 was asking what did you do between leaving your appliance oh sorry I admitted by the bridge yes basically we we local appliance walk to the tower and
00:04:37 appliance walk to the tower and basically we were told by a watch manager was there by the entrance to either one side or the other and then we were asked to go to the breach edge to wait further of them okay
00:04:50 breach edge to wait further of them okay thank you
00:04:51 thank you now the first topic I'd like to discuss with you is your trip from the lobby to the bridgehead yes okay now whilst you're at the lobby or around the
00:05:02 you're at the lobby or around the bridgehead did you see any assisted evacuations yes we did yes and they included unconscious looking bodies as that right that's true yes and did you see AK Reddington crew assisting of a qyz out of the tower I did yes
00:05:15 qyz out of the tower I did yes and did you see this before you are at the bridgehead or Weiss you were already at the bridgehead no this was in the lobby area before we made it to the bridge hater before you went to the bridgehead do you recall being briefed
00:05:26 bridgehead do you recall being briefed in the lobby by watch manager Glynn Williams no was your first briefing therefore at the bridgehead it was yes
00:05:37 therefore at the bridgehead it was yes yes could I ask Paul to turn up met document quadruple zero five double seven for now if you see that on the
00:05:51 seven for now if you see that on the screen mr. Herrera do you remember seeing this wall chart at the lobby entrance
00:05:57 entrance I remember seeing that's full chart at the lobby incidence when I actually left the incident didn't take any real notice of it as I was exiting but you dare that what that was on the wall yes and if you
00:06:08 what that was on the wall yes and if you can see middle column at the bottom one one three fourteenth yes for want of a better phrase did you clock that entry whilst you're at the
00:06:20 clock that entry whilst you're at the lobby no I didn't know oh I'm sorry sorry sorry I did you told watch mayor gloom Williams was in the lobby when I was exiting that that floor had that that's had been searched and it
00:06:32 had that that's had been searched and it was empty
00:06:33 was empty but before you enter no I didn't know not before not right before your deployment yes fourteen before I deployed I did not see at all not right the next question is before you deployed to floor to floor fourteen did you see
00:06:46 to floor to floor fourteen did you see any four other firefighters coming down from floor fourteen no were you were before you were deployed had you seen any residents trying to lower themselves down out of windows yeah no had you
00:06:59 down out of windows yeah no had you heard accounts of them before you were deployed no now the next bit I'd like to talk to you about is the bridgehead and if I could ask you to turn to page three
00:07:11 if I could ask you to turn to page three of your witness statement now mr. Herrera very helpfully these come up on the screen it might be easier to look at the screen and if I could ask Paul to put up the final paragraph on page three
00:07:31 I'll just ask you you say we left the bridgehead area entry sorry yes we left the bridgehead area entry control point through a door and the conditions change straight away now first of all can you
00:07:42 straight away now first of all can you remember on what floor the bridgehead was at that stage yes this is a part of my notes was actually wrong they say it says on the British says on my notes the breach is on the fourth floor and it was on the second floor thank you and who
00:07:53 on the second floor thank you and who briefed you regarding your task watch major the silver and doing the best you can what precisely did she say to you in explaining the task you were to fulfil she told me that we had to go to the
00:08:04 she told me that we had to go to the 14th floor there was a family in flat one one three that needed rescuing and I actually wrote on the cuff of my
00:08:16 actually wrote on the cuff of my reflective strip of my tunic 1 1 3 with a China graft pencil just just peace of mind born three it's there I know where I'm going and just for the avoidance of dirt are you sure she used the word
00:08:28 dirt are you sure she used the word rescuing maybe it's something I thought I did but yeah they need you but yes rescuing yes well they needed you understood the point of the exercise was
00:08:39 understood the point of the exercise was to bring down the occupants of one montre yet of course now do you remember seeing a forward information board whilst you're at the bridgehead there was one I didn't look at it if I could
00:08:51 was one I didn't look at it if I could ask Paul to draw a map document triple zero one eight seven four nine which is there on the screen is that the FIB remembers seeing but not reading possibly but if i zoom i was always told
00:09:04 possibly but if i zoom i was always told there's a family of three people in one one three and going by what I see there there isn't a family three people on one no you say that watch manage the Silvo
00:09:18 no you say that watch manage the Silvo told you to go to the 14th floor in your statement and you don't need to go to this out I'll put it to you you say that you were to look for a family an adult male female and a child that's
00:09:30 an adult male female and a child that's correct yes just to be clear do you mean a family which consisted of a man woman or child well dey's why I thought that that was the family the family was that three people and when we got there pain
00:09:42 three people and when we got there pain appearances it was a family of three yes and you say that's what I thought you suggest that there was some element there was an element of hesitancy in
00:09:54 there was an element of hesitancy in your answer Paul could you change your mind no certainly when we when we got there and um I actually got to the door before getting there we we left the bridge head and the bridge head was
00:10:05 bridge head and the bridge head was completely from the Bridget onwards black thick smoke you could not see if I can just stop you there just to clarify how many occupants there were could I ask you to turn to your contemporaneous
00:10:17 ask you to turn to your contemporaneous and note and roughly halfway down of that note you'll see I and firefighter orchard from our four to four Soho
00:10:32 victim B I went MBA went to the 14th floor and rescued three persons yes so so that was your canoe that was your understanding when you were writing the
00:10:44 understanding when you were writing the contemporaneous notes of how many people you were directed to a rescue yeah but vital is to attempt competent compensate I can't say a word now notes it was some 36 hours after the event after being
00:10:56 36 hours after the event after being random of a slightly tired but we there was a fourth person on that floor that came down with us
00:11:04 firefighter Orchard says in her statement that she said she thinks she said that six people are in she was told that six people were in flat one one three on the floor 14 do you remember
00:11:16 three on the floor 14 do you remember that at all not all night did you ever take a photograph of your calf upon which you recorded the flat number no not a soul who was your crew manager
00:11:29 not a soul who was your crew manager crew major Ben Mac alone now was he behind you or near you when you were briefed before you were deployed up the tower he possibly could be but basically we were being moved from the lobby to
00:11:42 we were being moved from the lobby to the breach edge so I think he got deployed after I'm not sure he's asked or before so we wouldn't have been there at the same time most probably so you weren't briefed at the same time not same time now now the next topic I'd
00:11:54 same time now now the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is your deployment to floor 14 itself and the timings now the phrase we've been using is tallying out okay I can't see it yet
00:12:05 is tallying out okay I can't see it yet and that's 0 to 26 and tallying in back in when you return to the entry control point to 247 but does that sound about right to you yellow could be yes now a
00:12:18 right to you yellow could be yes now a group consisting of fire fighters Cornelius Murphy and Marion had returned to the bridgehead around 0 to 19 from of a 14th floor did you do you remember coming across them when you
00:12:29 coming across them when you bridge and I'm not sulking I want to now talk to you about conditions on the 14th floor itself now was there a difference between the smoke conditions you
00:12:40 between the smoke conditions you encountered on the 14th floor itself compared to the stairwell no it was the same from bridgeheads just to the 14th floor completely black thick smoke and
00:12:51 floor completely black thick smoke and as you were going up the tower did you try and use your radio if you had one yes and were you what floor did you try and use your radio it could have been on
00:13:05 and use your radio it could have been on the 13th floor and were you able to get through to the bridge head no I don't think so
00:13:11 think so what's the situation that put bluntly the line was dead or was it there was so much traffic you can break through well which we tried to make contact and you try you try to get through no answer you
00:13:23 try you try to get through no answer you just assume they're busy or it's not working and did you have your mobile phone with you I did actually use my pockets did you use it no one's wearing fire gear and gloves it'd be impossible
00:13:34 fire gear and gloves it'd be impossible to take that out of your pocket and operate a mobile phone the only reason was in my pocket because he happened to be there and yet she went up with me when you are actually in the lobby of the 14th floor itself could you make out
00:13:45 the 14th floor itself could you make out the door numbers if you went up very close to the door itself well that's that's this is why we ended up on the 13th floor we ended up on the 13th floor thinking it was the 14th floor we got
00:13:56 thinking it was the 14th floor we got onto the 4th 13th floor and realized the numbers of the doors weren't what we were looking for because we were counting actually went up because we could not see numbers on the actual lobbies themselves and he became apparent we were on the wrong floor then
00:14:08 apparent we were on the wrong floor then we went one floor and found where he needs to be now when you're on the 14th floor itself we were was the smoke density such that you had to get down on the floor in order to sweep round four
00:14:20 the floor in order to sweep round four there was there was no need to get on the floor because the smoke was ceiling to floor there was no he's not you're pointless to do that no is it right to say that you man
00:14:31 no is it right to say that you man your crew manager and firefighter juggins on the 14th floor yes I did yes and you made out the presence of your crew manager by his voice is that right it wasn't easy to avoid stature and I'd
00:14:43 it wasn't easy to avoid stature and I'd blow him I've worked with him now for a number of years now and um yes we discussed with firefighter Cornelius that the kit you were wearing on that
00:14:54 that the kit you were wearing on that night to what extent does the kit you have to wear muffle voices and affect your hearing it does muffle slightly but you can make it you can make out people
00:15:09 you can make it you can make out people you do know and when you spot it your crew manager did you ask him what flat he was searching for when I saw him on
00:15:22 he was searching for when I saw him on the 14th floor I was outside of one one three I said him where have you been I think he told me I can't recall but I said that the people we've come to get out I mean here
00:15:35 people we've come to get out I mean here they won't open the door and what did you do next well basically it was basically we not and shouted again fire brigade we're here to get you down and
00:15:48 brigade we're here to get you down and if I could ask you to turn to page four of your witness statements and it's the bottom paragraph three lines from the bottom you say this in respect to flat 1 1 3 the subject of your task flat we'd
00:16:02 1 3 the subject of your task flat we'd been tasked with flat 1 1 3 I'm not sure which of us knocked on the door maybe it was both of us we were shouting fire brigade and we are here to get you and then turning over the page to page 5 I
00:16:13 then turning over the page to page 5 I think an adult male opened the door but I believe the adult females the first person we assisted out of the flat so maybe she opened the door do you recall that the occupiers of flat 113 were
00:16:26 that the occupiers of flat 113 were initially reluctant to open the door they were yes they were very reluctant to leave basically because they were in safe air clean safe air in that flat and you could see from where we were
00:16:38 you could see from where we were standing in the hall in thick black smoke you could see completely clearly than people silhouettes and and make them out really and fire fire to orchard where was she standing when you were at the door of
00:16:50 standing when you were at the door of flat one one three I'm not quite sure if she sent him to slightly to my right to my left is either her or four aircrew major Mac alone so I'm not sure which
00:17:01 major Mac alone so I'm not sure which one was in either side of maintenance but she was relatively close only a very yes yes she says that the the occupiers slightly opened the door and you effectively made your way through is that a first summary of how you gained
00:17:14 that a first summary of how you gained access to flat one one three it was actually yes how far into flat one one three did you get um I made my way into through what was the lobby stroke from rooms that flat yes and stood stood
00:17:27 rooms that flat yes and stood stood there and try to assess the situation okay and what were the smoke conditions within the flat compared to the Oh clean air they were there what they were no they weren't having major difficulties do you remember saying to your crew
00:17:38 do you remember saying to your crew manager words the effect that then there is loads of people in one month three and they went to come out they won't open the door they won't come out do you remember that I said there's people I don't member saying loads of people but
00:17:49 don't member saying loads of people but I could have possibly said that Louis could be one two three or four I don't know that's why what do you mean by loads it's done that's what may need a okay by this stage what how much air did
00:18:05 okay by this stage what how much air did you have we did break it again checks but um I was pretty confident that I was um we were fine the to the occupiers off
00:18:17 um we were fine the to the occupiers off flat one one three so describe you has been calm but controlled panic would that be a fair description of your demeanor as you enter the flat I could
00:18:29 demeanor as you enter the flat I could have been calm but forceful maybe I wanted to get these people out no I weren't going to hang around and put my cell phone for other crew members in in danger and did any other
00:18:41 in in danger and did any other firefighters come in to flap one on three with you I really can't ask that is that you just don't remember I don't remember like you went into the sitting
00:18:55 remember like you went into the sitting room of flap one one three is that right I believe saying when you went in there was it still cleaner by the time you're in the sitting room it was clean hazy air because obviously the door has been open and we are letting in smoke
00:19:09 been open and we are letting in smoke did you carry out a head count of the people who are in that sitting room no did you form a view as to how many people yes four people two adults two
00:19:21 people yes four people two adults two males one female and a child were lights still illuminated within that sitting room no no I don't think so but you could see through the outside of bumi
00:19:32 could see through the outside of bumi and lighter to dark dark that we win [Music]
00:19:41 now could I ask you to turn to page five of your witness statement and it's the middle paragraph on that page and line four onwards and you say this I saw a
00:19:54 four onwards and you say this I saw a silhouette inside the flat I walked into the flat in this silhouette was an adult male
00:20:00 male I believe who's standing in the lounge area I said Fire Brigade let's go I asked him was there anyone else in the flat he replied no I am the last one I then escorted this man out I did not
00:20:11 then escorted this man out I did not search the flat as this man was clear but there was no one else left in the premises now can you help us we're in the in the lounge was silhouette this
00:20:22 the in the lounge was silhouette this basic this basically happens basically after the the father child and mother became apparent afterwards we we we got
00:20:34 became apparent afterwards we we we got them out of the flats they had left certain those three had gone oh yes so I pushed them out the door I mean I'm not going to I pushed them out the door and handed them over to my colleagues had you seen anyone else leave the flat
00:20:46 you seen anyone else leave the flat other than those three none what was the visibility like in the lounge when you saw the silhouette it was clear but hazy
00:20:57 saw the silhouette it was clear but hazy were you able to make out for example eye color or hair color no I wouldn't snug what was the noise like in the flat
00:21:09 then there was no real noise you know apart from us breathing with our breathing apparatus and talking and there was no real noise did you have your helmet on or off on and what was
00:21:21 your helmet on or off on and what was the distance between you and the man maybe it's where you and I are stands standing a seated right now maybe less and how well could you hear him very
00:21:34 and how well could you hear him very well yes and could you make out for example what accent he had if he had an accent I could yes and what accent did he have middle eastern now
00:21:45 he have middle eastern now you'd been told there were three people in that flat that's why I believe optional yes it was clearly a fourth person in yes given that there were more people in there than you two been expecting would that be a trigger for
00:21:57 expecting would that be a trigger for searching around the entirety of the flats see if anyone else was in there no not really because I thought basically that was B was misinformed no we were
00:22:08 that was B was misinformed no we were sent to rescue a family they said three people it could have been four people the facts weren't in my eyes what weren't snow and you're absolutely clear
00:22:19 weren't snow and you're absolutely clear that when you asked whether there was anyone else in the flat he said no I'm the only one yes and did you ask him to repeat that did you ask him no I didn't
00:22:31 it appears as you left flat one one three there was a discussion between you and firefighter juggins is that right that was yes yeah and what was the subject matter of that discussion we
00:22:42 subject matter of that discussion we enter screws and always with firefighters orchards crew major McInerney left with the female and the but the female and then later the father
00:22:54 but the female and then later the father and child had left I became apparent the firefighter judges were still standing with me upstairs I sort of told him that here has to keep with his own operative
00:23:05 here has to keep with his own operative no no looking going back to the conversation you had with the fort the fourth individual the man in the flat look if I could ask you to turn to your
00:23:17 look if I could ask you to turn to your contemporaneous note which is it meant quadruple zero double five to zero now you confirmed you've read that recently is it fair to say that you don't mention
00:23:28 is it fair to say that you don't mention the conversation with this man in that note it is yet given he gave you confirmation there was no one else left in the flat
00:23:39 in the flat isn't that a sort of level of detail you'd expect to put in a contemporaneous notes or not no not really because the
00:23:50 notes or not no not really because the concept the notes were actions I thought we carried out it wasn't something I thought was going to be used as to record the instant I thought that was being done in the in the bridgehead food
00:24:01 being done in the in the bridgehead food board and sort of or we ate the one point clearly the it would appear that the first time you mentioned the
00:24:12 the first time you mentioned the discussion with the man is in your statement is that is that fair no he might in my statement yes but on that night and the instant no and who else
00:24:24 night and the instant no and who else did you mention the exchange you had with the man when we left and went back to the bridgehead that had moved from second floor to the ground floor lobby I
00:24:39 second floor to the ground floor lobby I said to watch mantas Hill though that some flat one more three was searched empty we walked down to the property out of the lobby through the back doors there as that's always been changed
00:24:51 there as that's always been changed I mentioned to watch manager Williams that that flap was empty and he obviously on that wall chart you had he ticked off that flat was cleared we walked outside where the Elat ambulance
00:25:04 walked outside where the Elat ambulance service were treating these casualties and we met the people that we rescued no and he was on the phone to his brother what come on to that separately that's
00:25:15 what come on to that separately that's why I'm getting to do what we'll come on to that in a few moments at one point I'm asked to make clear on his behalf as the gentleman that he was speaking to his name is mr. Omar al hajjali and he
00:25:27 his name is mr. Omar al hajjali and he makes it clear that he never his account is that he never said that there was no one else left in the flat he says there were several people still behind him in the lounge what would you say to that
00:25:41 no I could see him clearly if there are people standing behind him I would have seen them I've walked into mid lounge and had property he also says that he did not see his brother go out before
00:25:52 did not see his brother go out before him only mr. Tolar B who was the occupant of slap one one three okay what would be your response to that the OEE ijen sees brother leave Oh
00:26:11 we were standing in that Lobby I only saw the four people I saw and I asked him let's go let's go let's go now is this everyone I like I said yes I'm not going to hang
00:26:24 I like I said yes I'm not going to hang around if you've been told this is that flashing insertion emptied not searched but you know who's in there we're there to rescue the doors open let's go and I didn't see any other people if there
00:26:36 didn't see any other people if there were other people obviously over the stage and assist you them to leave that property mr. Arthur jolly walk meter person suggests you that the account of
00:26:48 person suggests you that the account of that conversation is mistaken would your response be effectively that which you've already provided it must have been mistaken while one of our parts yes now if I could ask you
00:26:59 parts yes now if I could ask you following on from what you said about the later account that yet later discussions after you left the term because I asked you to turn to page six of your statement and it's the third
00:27:11 of your statement and it's the third paragraph on that page
00:27:17 and you say this is after you out of the tower as we made our journey done says we we have four residents with us crew
00:27:28 we we have four residents with us crew manager was with the adult female the adult males caring the child the Syrian man who was miss our Charlie with firefighter juggins then myself and far-far firefighter orchard the journey Dan says was not easy there were
00:27:39 Dan says was not easy there were problems with water now you go over the page and you see the bottom of page six the very last three words are the Syrian man and then we turn over the page this
00:27:50 man and then we turn over the page this is again outside you say was then talking his mobile phone whether they recognize us or whether it was because we were LFP he then said my brother is still in there he then went on to say
00:28:01 still in there he then went on to say I'm still on the phone to him he is on his knees praying he also said I was mistaken I remember saying to the crew major oh there seems to be some confusion as I recall Syrian man being
00:28:12 confusion as I recall Syrian man being very clear earlier that no one else was in the flat I said to him don't worry I will sort out I start to think did I miss him as he was praying on his knees I can only presume that his brother got
00:28:23 I can only presume that his brother got left behind did Syrian man think the mixed-race man was his brother and that he initially thought and he had left the flat and only realized the error once outside now is that a first summary of
00:28:34 outside now is that a first summary of the exchange you had with mr. al hajjali outside the tower yes the final few sentences of that paragraph where you say you think mr. Jolley may have
00:28:47 say you think mr. Jolley may have confused the mixed-raced man with his brother is that something that you thought at the time was that a subsequent thought you've know I thought that at the time where I teach exchange conversation outside washes on the mobile phone and that's when I made it
00:28:59 mobile phone and that's when I made it back to the lobby area to and told watch manager Williams that that floor that flat wasn't completely searched and there was a extra person not more people
00:29:13 there was a extra person not more people some aisle awareness they were in that flat and they needed to be assisted no mr. Arthur Jolley says that that
00:29:24 no mr. Arthur Jolley says that that conversation didn't take place which one the conversation we've just been dealing with now they did now could I we track our steps and go back to the tower yes
00:29:37 our steps and go back to the tower yes you came down the tower and you return to the bridge head at the end of your mission now to whom did you report when you return to the bridge head watch
00:29:49 you return to the bridge head watch manages the silver and doing the best you can now what did you say to her I told her 1 1 3 was searched was not so it was empty there's no one left what did you say till set the bridge
00:30:06 what did you say till set the bridge head that it was empty because that had been confirmed by quotes the Syrian man to whom no no he was confirmed by me III believe that that was empty and did you
00:30:17 believe that that was empty and did you did you confirm to the bridge head that you hadn't carried out a final search off flat 1 1 3 obviously this is the whole thing that we were once we weren't told to go and search these flats we
00:30:28 told to go and search these flats we were told to don't there are people waiting to be rescued to be tech to assist it to be assisted down if you were in that situation behind that door waiting to be assisted down you'd be
00:30:39 waiting to be assisted down you'd be ready to go I mean that's that's the only way I can see it you know you if you were in that predicament okay door let's go
00:30:47 let's go could I ask you just to deal with the numbers point yes Paul could you bring up net triple 0 1 5 8 2 4 now if that could be expanded
00:31:01 1 5 8 2 4 now if that could be expanded so that we can see the numbers 1 1 3 open brackets 3 rescues closed brackets
00:31:10 just because it
00:31:15 so it's really unclear I apologize mr. oh it's not coming up terribly clearly I can see it though have you have you got it I want to see it yes there it refers
00:31:27 it I want to see it yes there it refers to three rescues now obviously you brought down four people yes do you know who wrote down that information on the wall I won't be able to tell you did you are you sure
00:31:41 able to tell you did you are you sure you informed the bridgehead that four people had come down yes well no I informed them that that flats had been searched and emptied the three people
00:31:54 searched and emptied the three people that's the information they gave us they must been going on what they had so at the bridgehead they didn't know that four people had come down as opposed to
00:32:06 four people had come down as opposed to the three that there was subject matter of the FSG that's what it seems to be yes but I thought that wasn't relevant at the time because they were just saying there was a family in there I didn't know that fourth person wasn't a member of that family
00:32:30 could I ask you to pour could ask you to turn up met document triple zero one five eight one five
00:32:49 and then
00:32:53 do you recall seeing this that in the lobby area of the bridgehead breach 8 no I don't know say that sorry did you see group manager Williams that
00:33:04 did you see group manager Williams that was it that was in the lobby then if that is there okay not bridgehead now if we look in the right hand column that
00:33:15 we look in the right hand column that has one one two it looks 14 and then 8 p-m yes I can see what you've shown me yes
00:33:27 you've shown me yes did you see group manager Williams watch manger sorry watch manager will write that no did you see anyone right that's no no did you see what manager - Silvo
00:33:43 no no did you see what manager - Silvo right anything now
00:33:52 after you'd met the Syrian man outside the tower yes is it right that you went back into the tower to update them yes I did and sorry to retracting but who did
00:34:06 did and sorry to retracting but who did you speak to when you went back in I supposed to watch major Williams it was in the lobby area on that board I said I know first names he's a friend of mine
00:34:17 know first names he's a friend of mine Glynn yep one one three there's still a person I've spoken to the brother he's on the phone too as a person in there that needs to be rescued and what did he
00:34:30 that needs to be rescued and what did he do with that information first of all did he write it down anywhere I'm not sure he it I can tell you what he told me to do what did he tell you to do he toys it was another sis on find someone
00:34:41 toys it was another sis on find someone else go back up there and get them out and what did you do then I told him I wasn't capable I was obviously no conditions to work but she just come down yes yeah and so what did he then do
00:34:52 down yes yeah and so what did he then do once he said that he said go to the bridgehead until the silver watch my Jitsu earth that that floor isn't searched and to send another crew to
00:35:03 searched and to send another crew to rescue that person okay so you went up to her is that right yes what did she do with that information cause I watched you how you I just passed you on oh I didn't stay around to debate let's take it stage by stage she
00:35:16 debate let's take it stage by stage she passed it on did she write it down no I don't know you don't know I passed on the patient information to her I don't know what she did with it okay
00:35:29 now later on the evening is it right that you joined up with your crew to recuperate so your crew manager firefighters juggins losted Evans and Bloxom and that was outside the Leisure Centre is that right yes yes yeah and
00:35:42 Centre is that right yes yes yeah and did you tell them about the further information you'd gathered from mr. crew manager Mac alone was present when these were happening he suggested to me to go
00:35:54 were happening he suggested to me to go back and inform them that there was a person still left in that flat then because he was there whilst we walked out we recognized people all that's and then we realized there was an error and
00:36:06 then we realized there was an error and were you aware on the night itself of the efforts of myself Charlie trying to get back into the tower no and were you aware of any other FSG calls in relation
00:36:17 aware of any other FSG calls in relation to flat one one three later on the night no when did you first become aware of what had happened to the occupants of flat one one three I became aware of the
00:36:30 flat one one three I became aware of the occupant occupants when I that's evening watching the television and did you discuss it with your crewmates back at Lambeth once you what you found out that
00:36:41 Lambeth once you what you found out that infamous I was I was at home at that time and I found crew major Mac alone and said this is only seen what's on the news they said yes laughs thank you
00:36:54 news they said yes laughs thank you there's a final subject of topic of matters very different and I'd like to discuss with you it's a technical matter it's raised at page four of your statement I don't
00:37:06 four of your statement I don't necessarily need to take you to it but you described how leaky feeders can assist with cons but a more suitable for the underground but why they why first of all what is a leaky feeder leaky
00:37:17 of all what is a leaky feeder leaky feeder is basically a booster box leaky feeder or booster box you can you can place them and it'll help what comes we'll just boost the signal and why are they more appropriate underground as
00:37:28 they more appropriate underground as opposed to well honestly it's more appropriate but they do work well in areas where you don't have an aerial so a signal do you know whether anywhere available or used at Granville Tower on the nice the fire I won't be able to
00:37:39 the nice the fire I won't be able to tell you can you explain what is a radio repeater is that different to a leaky feeder oh they're very similar nothing lately key features can be Cape used with cables to connect one to another
00:37:51 with cables to connect one to another radio radio repeater slightly different in the sense it can't be connected to other devices so right and do you know where there were radio repeaters in use so not not upon getting you explained
00:38:04 so not not upon getting you explained how you in your statement oh you attempted to go back into the turf for a second time yes you were prevented from doing so by watch major we had already been in once yes and why do you think the watch manager wanted fresh wearers obviously
00:38:18 manager wanted fresh wearers obviously um your your your your your fresh your your fuel basically young we spend basically Thank You mr. Herrera Thank
00:38:31 basically Thank You mr. Herrera Thank You those all the questions I've got for you at the moment sir my towers for a five minute break to see if there's any final questions and that I think so
00:38:45 final questions and that I think so we're gonna have a short break now mr. arrow so that mr. Kalia can consider whether there's any other ground that he needs to cover so we'll rise now I think
00:38:56 needs to cover so we'll rise now I think I'm going to say will resume at twenty two three please don't talk to anyone about your evidence to the room and we'll come back and say 22/3 and see if there are further
00:39:07 22/3 and see if there are further questions thank you alright let's give the archer please
00:39:21 right 23 then please
00:52:15 yes Mr curry a few more questions there are sir yes
00:52:41 yes mr. Herrera and I think mr. Cleary does have a few more questions miss Roy thank you very much for coming back just a few more supplemental questions first of all are you aware of the terms of policy 8:03 search and rescue procedures
00:52:54 policy 8:03 search and rescue procedures I must be aware yes are you aware yes and are you aware of the provision that we're a casualty is discovered it's necessary to perform a
00:53:07 discovered it's necessary to perform a secondary sweep of the immediate vicinity are you aware of that provision yes but this will release wasn't so standard search and rescue this was just like an FSG goes to their property these people are waiting for you it wasn't swiftly wasn't a casually
00:53:19 it wasn't swiftly wasn't a casually sweep this wasn't this issue this wasn't a standard on going to a flat where people may be or may not be I'm searching for them they are waiting for me to be rescued you said you saw the
00:53:30 me to be rescued you said you saw the family of three leave yes where were you when you saw them leave I was by the door I actually pushed them towards the exit so at the flat entrance door yes or
00:53:44 exit so at the flat entrance door yes or yes or standing in and push towards the exit where they helped along did you see from where within the flat those three
00:53:55 from where within the flat those three had come from they what they were by that they were actually by the entrance they weren't they could the position be that they come from the bedroom I can't ask that sorry
00:54:10 when did you just to get the chronology right did you see those three leave then did you re-enter the flat and that's when you saw the silhouette is that the
00:54:21 when you saw the silhouette is that the time sequence I didn't exit completely I was always in that hallway entrance to the flat I went to the door body actually physically leave the flat until I physically left
00:54:33 leave the flat until I physically left with the last gentleman you said earlier on that you you were in the middle of the lounge yes so at some stage you went from the exit into the middle of the lounge yes now my question is did you do
00:54:46 lounge yes now my question is did you do that after the three the family of three had left or before they left I'm not sure it could be after they left no mr. Arthur jolly would want me to say
00:55:00 no mr. Arthur jolly would want me to say that you didn't come in to the lounge that you weren't in the middle of the lounge what would you say to that what would be your response I was there and I
00:55:11 would be your response I was there and I saw no I was I did I was I spoke to the gentleman he was there I was there I didn't make this up and I was there in
00:55:22 didn't make this up and I was there in the lounge with him after you had your conversation with mr. hajjali did you have sufficient air to allow you to conduct a search of the remainder of the
00:55:34 conduct a search of the remainder of the flats of the bedroom the kitchen and any other areas I'm most probably did I wouldn't be able to tell you now ox I didn't check because I in my mind that
00:55:46 didn't check because I in my mind that was the last person and we were accessing and we were going so I know no need to check and see how to eat if I had an affair at that time given the conditions you'd encountered on the way up and in the lobby were you yourself
00:55:58 up and in the lobby were you yourself concerned to get down as soon as you could safely slightly yes yes and did that inform the approach you took to getting the people out of flat one one
00:56:09 getting the people out of flat one one three the approaches hook was yeah rapid I wanted these people out there quickly because we are in a thick black smoke locked lobby and it's flammable gases or
00:56:22 locked lobby and it's flammable gases or it could go wrong at any time I just wanted us and the people we are rescuing out of that property as quickly as possible did you have time to conduct
00:56:34 possible did you have time to conduct given the size of flat one one three did you have time to look into the bedroom and the other one possibly could have yet do you want to know what why I did not do this I assumed there was no one
00:56:47 not do this I assumed there was no one in there to search and look for on the basis of what you say you were told yes as far as you were aware were you
00:56:58 yes as far as you were aware were you the last person to leave the flat I was the last person to leave the flat yes so the as far as we're personally you were talking to who you say told you
00:57:10 were talking to who you say told you that there was no one else left in front of you left influenced me yes sir no we left behind me I I left firefighter juggins left down the I left
00:57:21 firefighter juggins left down the I left property firefighters and sugars he was outside followed on and then we left firefighter officers and myself we both left and followed down awaiting for someone in that party to fall to be
00:57:34 someone in that party to fall to be collected to be assisted I in my mind I was the last person to leave that property yes thinking and as the last person to leave that property whilst it was just you did you hear any noise come
00:57:47 was just you did you hear any noise come from any of the rooms within that flat not I did shout loudly five grade come on let's go let's go let's go let's go now very very loudly could I now turn
00:58:02 go now very very loudly could I now turn to the your discussion you had with mr. juggins did mr. juggins offer to do a search of a flat on the floor 14 or floor 14 that Lobby itself no
00:58:15 floor 14 that Lobby itself no firefighter jogging stayed with me when I believed he should have gone with his um be a wearer that's a team you should have left and I said he said to me I said what you doing here he said I'm
00:58:28 said what you doing here he said I'm staying with you because I want to search panting search and find more people
00:58:35 people I said no don't leave with Ben maybe I used different language but may that was damaged lines and before you left that
00:58:46 damaged lines and before you left that flat how would you describe your visibility very very very poor in that the hallway very poor but with and what were what were the visibility conditions
00:58:58 were what were the visibility conditions within the as you were on the threshold what was the visibility looking in you could look into the fact you could see it was clear breeze me clean air obviously the door had been open for
00:59:09 obviously the door had been open for some time now maybe 5 minutes 10 minutes maybe
00:59:12 maybe and obviously that smoke was sleeping but you could still see perfectly given that people were found in flat 1 1 3
00:59:23 that people were found in flat 1 1 3 I found sorry later wrong I was aware that smack I suppose the ultimate point is why didn't you see them if they were in that if you'd look properly that's
00:59:36 in that if you'd look properly that's the thing I didn't see them they they weren't there when I was especially being told that he was the last person there was no need to look my my point of view no that place that flat was empty
00:59:50 view no that place that flat was empty beyond talking to your crew manager about the discussions you've had with you've scrubs a Syrian man in your witness statement did you discuss those conversations with any other officer
01:00:02 conversations with any other officer more senior officer at Lambeth or else worth after the incident yes yes who was that oh we just could we discuss all our all our instance are usually discussed
01:00:13 all our instance are usually discussed and to brought up report around the mess table so all the watch would have been aware of what's on that night mr. Verret thank you very much for your reference today thank you thanks sir yes well I
01:00:25 today thank you thanks sir yes well I thank you as well for coming to give your evidence it's it's variable and we're grateful to thank you very much thank you very much I'm course afterwards please yes Mon what we did at night wasn't just us it's
01:00:40 what we did at night wasn't just us it's Team Alpha so I'm very very very sorry if I've let anyone down or not done watch these was expected of me I'm very
01:00:52 watch these was expected of me I'm very sorry
01:00:54 sorry thank you very like to give in the option
01:01:07 yes sir my call the next witness who is firefighter Nicky Upton yes and as far as you know present arrangements - arrangements just paperwork so well I'll
01:01:21 arrangements just paperwork so well I'll sit in while the paperwork is thank you sir all the knives tears
01:02:17 because the paperwork been ordered is being reject yes yes yeah
01:03:01 I do solemnly sincerely and truly
01:03:05 declare and affirm declare and affirm that the evidence ocean yeah but Social Care should be should be the change of hope
01:03:16 sit down make yourself comfortable all right good afternoon first of all could you confirm your name for the record please Nicky Alton thank you very much for coming on to give evidence of
01:03:27 much for coming on to give evidence of today in front of you you've got a blue folder behind the first tab is hopefully your statement dated the 20th of October 2017 and behind the next tab hopefully is your contemporaneous note and behind
01:03:40 is your contemporaneous note and behind that hopefully then two exhibits that were attached to your statement is that right yeah and have you read those and if you read those documents recently yes
01:03:52 if you read those documents recently yes and you confirm their contents are true I believe to be true and are you content for those documents stand as your evidence of inquiry yeah first of all can I just establish some basic details
01:04:04 can I just establish some basic details first of all at the time of the fire you were based at Chelsea is that right yes and that you'd had seven years experience with the lfp yeah and that on the night you were the driver of Chelsea's fiu unit then the cool sign
01:04:16 Chelsea's fiu unit then the cool sign for that is golf three four six and the other people on the FI you were your be a partner mr. Reddington mr. Codd mr. sign is it mr. Akko okay okay and as to
01:04:30 sign is it mr. Akko okay okay and as to timings is it right that you were mobilized at zero 133 on the road at 136 and at the scene at 147 does that sound about right No um first of all can I first taught me
01:04:43 No um first of all can I first taught me I'd like to deal with this the view of the tower on your arrival um was it apparent that people were trapped in the higher floors I think when I got off the truck and when I was actually when you
01:04:54 truck and when I was actually when you arrived at the timer yes yeah I think took a moment there was a bit of a holding area took a moment to look up at the building and I remember seeing sort of lights from the other floors being shown from the window
01:05:05 shown from the window like people's mobile phone may be being shown from the higher floors and given the nature and extent of the fire did you expect to be deployed as part of an e DBA crew during the course of the evening yes I would have a specify yeah
01:05:17 evening yes I would have a specify yeah now you've hurt their to the holding area did anyone tell you to go there once you arrived at the scene no I think we took our set straight off the track because let's say we knew we'd need them
01:05:28 because let's say we knew we'd need them and went to go and see what we need to do and there was a tree on the corner and we just sort of collated there I think people were being given instructions and stuff from there so we
01:05:40 instructions and stuff from there so we waited there for a minute got got an instruction to go and do something and then went back to there so effectively people went there to be assigned tasks is that right yeah I don't know if it was an official place it was just saw
01:05:51 was an official place it was just saw where we happened to congregate it exactly and it's the hammersmith watch manager Paul Watson who was in charge was it well I don't think he was in charge I think I just remember seeing
01:06:02 charge I think I just remember seeing him and him giving us our first instruction was there a sense when you attended the holding area of any sense of priority being given to particular tasks I think there was lots of people
01:06:15 tasks I think there was lots of people everywhere being given lots of different tasks the first thing that we were told is to go and get as much equipment as we carry which we went and did where we come back there was the aerial ladder
01:06:28 come back there was the aerial ladder needed to be moved and there was hose in the way of that needing to be moved so we helped with moving that out the way there's lots of different tasks and lots of different places did you have any sense when you arrived at the holding
01:06:39 sense when you arrived at the holding area that the early identification of EDB a cruise was a priority so they could be assigned to the be a main control center yeah I think obviously
01:06:51 control center yeah I think obviously from when we first got there the first task was to go and get equipment so yes we knew we would have been needed as a DBA but I wasn't the first thing that we were instructed to do in terms of
01:07:03 were instructed to do in terms of slightly different point but in terms of paramedics do you remember whether they'd established a casualty clearing area at
01:07:08 area at the tower at this stage the first interaction I had with paramedics was when we come back from going to get equipment come back to the tree area there were two paramedics they saw crew
01:07:22 there were two paramedics they saw crew Manchester and Master and had come out of the building and had found two paramedics and said that they were needed inside the building they'd understandably I said that they couldn't go near the building because
01:07:33 couldn't go near the building because debris falling everywhere so we were to bring the casualty out to them which we did and then I think they retreated back to I don't know whether it was an official County casualty handling area
01:07:44 official County casualty handling area but it was a bit further away were you aware of any senior lar staff on duty at that stage did you see anyone it's my knowledge that these two paramedics but I could not told you their rank or anything you mentioned that you were
01:07:57 anything you mentioned that you were commissioned by the hammersmith watch managers collect hose and other forms of equipment and do you think that was the most urgent task for an FIU team that had a DBA given the state of the fire at
01:08:08 had a DBA given the state of the fire at that stage possibly not but I think it was a case of we need we need everything maybe you didn't see the sets on our back that azz as a DBA but we needed a
01:08:20 back that azz as a DBA but we needed a lot of equipment where okay we needed all hands on deck so I think yeah I suppose my long question is given that you were the AED be a crew and did you push yourselves forward to mr. Watson so
01:08:32 push yourselves forward to mr. Watson so that he knew that needy be a crew was there and could be deployed not initially no we went to do the task that we were creeps to but once once we come back we thought maybe it was then actually that we looked up at the tower
01:08:44 actually that we looked up at the tower and so the things were escalating quite dramatically and said to each other we need we need to get but we need to get stop him let's go in that was a conversation you had with mr. Reddington as a variety yeah yeah and how long did
01:08:56 as a variety yeah yeah and how long did it take you to collect the hose and other forms of firefighting equipment I think the first few trucks that we pass were all stripped of again as you'd expect as I think we probably have to go
01:09:07 expect as I think we probably have to go about five or six trucks deep so that maybe would have taken today we were having so about five minutes maybe okay
01:09:18 okay now the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is your entry into the tower and page five of your witness statement in the first substantive paragraph you
01:09:33 in the first substantive paragraph you mentioned there the conversation you intimated to earlier with mr. Reddington but you say that you decided in the second line mr. Reddington said that we needed to be more proactive and get our sets on and
01:09:45 more proactive and get our sets on and go in as we had extended duration breathing apparatus is it right to say that you were never actually ordered to enter the tower that state yeah that's correct so we took off on ourselves
01:09:56 correct so we took off on ourselves knowing that we've got you BA we knew we can be needed in - were you aware of the be a main control area outside the tower run by watch manager Kipling no is it
01:10:11 run by watch manager Kipling no is it fair to say that no officer sought to prioritize your EDB Oh EDB a role before you took it upon yourself to go in the tower not outside of the tower and now inside we were sort of pushed forward
01:10:24 inside we were sort of pushed forward I'd say but not outside so that I recall
01:10:30 do you think you could or should have sought to be deployed sooner than you were as an IDI be a crew getting stays to the fire I don't think there's that much time really between our arrival and
01:10:42 much time really between our arrival and getting into the tower like I say we went to go and grab some equipment and come back and then it was that right okay let's get in there now the looking at the timings themselves the lfb records and respective BA where suggest that the EDB
01:10:55 respective BA where suggest that the EDB a was disconnected from the FIU and 0 150 switched on at 0 228 and then there's tally out at the bridgehead and 0 244 at first blush that seems to be 54
01:11:08 0 244 at first blush that seems to be 54 minutes or so between disconnect and tally out of the bridgehead that's why one that do there's a greater elapse
01:11:20 why one that do there's a greater elapse of time than you you recall is that fair yeah I don't think a lot of that time would have been outside I think once we got into the tower we're even made our way up through I don't really allocated
01:11:33 way up through I don't really allocated where that time was really maybe it was not good to get the equipment that I thought and were you aware of what your fellow Chelsea FRU crew members were doing at that stage yes so initially I
01:11:46 doing at that stage yes so initially I think Alan sign went up on the aerial I think and me and Tom were together and crew magic art and if I fight - okay
01:11:58 crew magic art and if I fight - okay we're together and I believe we were all we all went into the tower together us four and then I think broke up into two separate two had separate the 18s and
01:12:09 separate two had separate the 18s and did you then lose track of where they were
01:12:12 were I know struck at the other two yeah now I'd like to talk about the BA entry and deployment in your trip from the lobby to the bridgehead itself and this is dealt with page five and your first
01:12:25 dealt with page five and your first substantive paragraph your witness statement but we don't necessarily need to go to it now when you dealt with the watch manager in the lobby do you recall one of the watch managers writing FSG details on the walls in the
01:12:37 writing FSG details on the walls in the lobby we're sorry in as in not before before the bridgehead yes cool down could I ask Paul to draw up a met document met quadruple zero five double
01:12:48 document met quadruple zero five double seven four do you remember seeing that
01:12:54 on the ground floor of the lobby and so you didn't absorb any of the content but did the watch manager in the lobby give
01:13:06 did the watch manager in the lobby give you or your team any instructions regarding FSGS no I don't even remember encountering people hoping it's so very hazy that that's me no not that I recall
01:13:17 hazy that that's me no not that I recall moving forward to the bridgehead itself who briefed you on your task and watch matters O'Keefe and silver and what
01:13:28 matters O'Keefe and silver and what precisely did watch matter O'Keefe's tell you to do and we were breached we're going to the 21st floor as a bit confusion here because I've in my head I
01:13:39 confusion here because I've in my head I have there it was twenty first of all and it was flats 183 and 184 and I've since been made aware that my contemporaneous notes may be something I was going to come onto that yeah is it so maybe easy if we turn to your
01:13:52 is it so maybe easy if we turn to your contemporaneous note which is at met quadruple zero five six to five underscore trouble zero warned and we see just roughly below
01:14:05 warned and we see just roughly below halfway down the page you say we were then tasked to go under air and commit to the 21st floor to FSG calls at flats 182 and 183 yeah which do you think is
01:14:16 182 and 183 yeah which do you think is correct now thank you well that makes me doubt myself now in my head since the incident ugly if I've got 183 and 184 but I don't know whoever that's because it rhymes with the 21st floor I'm not really too sure I I
01:14:28 floor I'm not really too sure I I thought it was my 83 and want it for but like I said that's making me doubt myself now I'm like I can't definitively remember the words it would have been watching manager O'Keefe and I remember the 21st floor but I can't exactly
01:14:41 the 21st floor but I can't exactly remember which flats now one of those two options were you given any more detail for example conditions on the stairwell going up to the 21st floor
01:14:53 don't recall do you remember being given any idea of the layout of the 21st floor yeah Wow I don't know who did it but at one point we were taken to a wall on the
01:15:04 one point we were taken to a wall on the left-hand side of their lifts where somebody showed us a map I can't really even remember what was on the wall but somebody did tried to say this is the layout and this is what he would go in
01:15:16 layout and this is what he would go in and did you make any note of wear flats 183 182 it went through one eight four whatever it was were no not Samara I think it was more like where the
01:15:28 think it was more like where the stairwells were where the doors were off the stairwells anything were you given any details as to occupants of those particular flats how many there were any vulnerabilities any children not to my
01:15:39 vulnerabilities any children not to my knowledge
01:15:40 knowledge were you given any idea of conditions within the flats themselves and we did you work were you aware that you'd been
01:15:51 you work were you aware that you'd been specifically deployed to the 21st floor because you were a DBA wearers I I had guests yeah that's why we've been sent up so high it's because we had more of the capacity to get out that high roof
01:16:02 the capacity to get out that high roof with more on but you weren't told explicitly yeah now if I can now talk about your deployment to the 21st floor and you're you're making your way up the
01:16:14 and you're you're making your way up the tower now it's right isn't it that you discovered a casualty at about the 18th floor level is that well I believe to be the 18th floor there was no way of telling the floors and twice myself and
01:16:27 telling the floors and twice myself and Tom had to enter the lobby areas at various floors just to remotely figure out what floor we were on which we found extremely frustrating at the time so it was what I guess to make to be the 18th
01:16:38 was what I guess to make to be the 18th because I knew we I went into the lobby area about flap one 6-4 1-6 something so I and it was a couple of drawers up from that so I was guessing it was the 18th
01:16:49 that so I was guessing it was the 18th and it was a female casualty you found it was yeah yeah she was unresponsive is that she unresponsive she was lying face-up on her back down
01:17:02 she was lying face-up on her back down the stairs apologies for interrupting yes okay and are you able to provide a description of the female casualty you found she she
01:17:20 would you like a break okay and it was only bike getting not really sort of close didn't basically you know touching it with my hands that I could pick her out exactly what she was a woman to
01:17:32 out exactly what she was a woman to start with and she had a black top on and jeans again that's all just made me am really close with my torch and I I would have guessed similary changed me I think in your
01:17:47 similary changed me I think in your statement you were first maybe mid-30s yeah sorry yeah their penis all died mid-thirties something like that yeah asian looking but she might have just
01:17:58 asian looking but she might have just been smoke bucket I don't really don't really know and were you able to assess height or anything like that if you can record and once you were attempting to
01:18:12 record and once you were attempting to move the female casualty you found a child is that right yeah so the female casualty was lying down with stairs and I tried to move her and she wouldn't
01:18:23 I tried to move her and she wouldn't move and I with a bit of investigation with my hands and my torch it came clear that she wasn't moving because her leg was trapped so don't know quite how she'd fallen
01:18:34 so don't know quite how she'd fallen like it but her left leg had gone down between the banisters and her foot was tucked up under the edge of the next platform and I was talking and talking
01:18:47 platform and I was talking and talking and I told Tom the situation that we had and he was talking and we couldn't move her so I moved further up the stairs to try and free her and that's when yeah I came across the child who I believe was
01:19:00 came across the child who I believe was on the platform and are you trained to carry out checks for signs of life in respect of unresponsive casualties yes yeah and did you perform any checks
01:19:13 yes yeah and did you perform any checks on the female casualty no it's like from me sort of pattern are all over and yeah no no I've got gloves on so I wouldn't be able to check for a pulse or anything
01:19:25 be able to check for a pulse or anything like that but you know if somebody's pattern you over if you're if you're alert you're gonna you know say something or respond so she was unresponsive and I couldn't tell whether
01:19:36 unresponsive and I couldn't tell whether she was alive or not and we were able to carry any checks on the child to see whether the child was responsive no again do like I say the child was I dragged her so if she was alert she would have you know come round
01:19:49 alert she would have you know come round but no I didn't take pulse or anything like that and were you able to do you have any first aid kit with you when you're deployed or not were you aware of
01:20:01 you're deployed or not were you aware of any other casualties in the area around that day to floor on the stairwell whilst you were dealing with the female casualty and the child no not on the stairs I didn't go out further than
01:20:12 stairs I didn't go out further than finding the child on that platform I saw dragged her from the platform there was nobody in the immediate area and you took the child down the stair
01:20:25 and you took the child down the stair one and left the female casualty there yeah we decided between us that and the female casualty couldn't be met you she was trapped to such a degree that I mean
01:20:37 was trapped to such a degree that I mean we figured out later we either had to stand up completely or break her legs somehow to get her out and I didn't know the state of either casualty whoever they were a life or passed away but I
01:20:49 they were a life or passed away but I knew that any more time spent on the women who were really struggling to train couldn't free any more time spent on that would have jeopardized the child more so made the decision to take the
01:21:01 more so made the decision to take the child out whom we could carry and you brought the child down to the bridgehead yeah
01:21:10 yeah and who did you brief once you've got back down to the bridgehead I can't remember to finish ibly who aggrieved I mean watch manage O'Keefe the same people would have been at the bridgehead
01:21:21 people would have been at the bridgehead I remember seeing a crew manager from Tooting but I would have passed up we would have passed on that information I also saw a crew on our way down from the 18th floor while we were carrying the
01:21:32 18th floor while we were carrying the child and said to them we've left a woman behind we didn't get to the 21st floor and did you tell the officers at the bridgehead that you hadn't got to the 21st floor yes and were you aware of
01:21:47 the 21st floor yes and were you aware of any actions taken thereafter to get up to the 21st floor and a name you had a second EDB a task later on evening as a
01:21:58 second EDB a task later on evening as a prize yes now we don't need to turn to it it set out at page 10 of your witness statement it was needy be a mission namely search and rescue on the 9th floor is that right yeah and who
01:22:09 floor is that right yeah and who deployed you on that mission Golborne California and can you remember the
01:22:20 California and can you remember the precise words of his instructions or the gist of the words to use in his instructions to you I think it was just ninth floor search and rescue do your best to clear the flats this vegetable but can you help us at what time you
01:22:33 but can you help us at what time you were deployed on that what time you were deployed on that second Dedede a mission I just
01:22:39 I just that's lemon tree days where were you given any information when you were deployed as to any change in the strategy search-and-rescue as opposed to targeted FSG responses so cute when you
01:22:51 targeted FSG responses so cute when you were briefed by mr. Goulbourne were you given any further information as to whether there being a change in strategy ie its search and rescue rather than a direct response to a particular FSG now
01:23:03 direct response to a particular FSG now other than you know the actual brief was search and rescue and no flat numbers were given no I'm based on your experience and having got as high up the
01:23:15 experience and having got as high up the tower as you did on the night just with one other be a partner what were your views on the ability to evacuate the tower when you were there so half to in
01:23:26 tower when you were there so half to in the morning there about well then we'd you been able to what we what were you'll have peace of tennis at all on the feasibility one could you've got to the 21st floor do you think yeah I mean
01:23:38 the 21st floor do you think yeah I mean obviously to to be a where as being tasked with two flats I mean best-case scenario there's one person in each part which is quite unlikely yeah in it I
01:23:49 which is quite unlikely yeah in it I don't know if we've really had a plan of action I think we were just gonna get up there see the situation and see what we were dealing with in hindsight I think the best we could have come up with was because we didn't have a set or anything
01:24:01 because we didn't have a set or anything like that maybe just the stairwells really smoke blog they wouldn't have been able to breathe for long and best I was thinking was get them out into the stairwell get them as far as they could
01:24:12 stairwell get them as far as they could and then assist them the rest of the way in terms of carrying them more as best we could really it wasn't feasible it wasn't really reusable but it was best of a bad situation I suspect I know the answer to this but would it have been
01:24:23 answer to this but would it have been practicable for you to have taken up a spare secondly a set in addition to carrying your own EDB a set it would have been possible it's not it's not
01:24:36 have been possible it's not it's not sort of standard and with every firefighter there having their own be a set not many I was just going to want to give up a VA that there's not sort of a stack of spare ba sets hanging around your chaps
01:24:47 spare ba sets hanging around your chaps who have taken one off a firefighter so that wasn't really yeah that wasn't too feasible and were larger crews than just
01:24:58 feasible and were larger crews than just two required for a DBA work do you think [Music]
01:25:04 [Music] you can't go in more again it depends of how many people you're going up to help what conditions there are yeah I think it's easier working in a crew of two
01:25:16 it's easier working in a crew of two because you've got to even you've got to keep tabs on each other like if there's a crew of four you've got to make sure you know you know you know what where everyone is what everyone's doing make sure that you're all okay so it's harder
01:25:28 sure that you're all okay so it's harder to negotiate over four as opposed to approve - it's not undoable do you have any views on the feasibility of evacuating the residents who were in the
01:25:42 evacuating the residents who were in the tower who remained in the tower half 2:00 in the morning would that have been feasible in your view given the conditions you'll encounter Thomas mass evacuation not without assistance now their stairwells were were unmanageable
01:25:55 their stairwells were were unmanageable if I can you say they're unmanageable first of all were there any obstructions on the stairwell that you encountered going up yeah so I mean firstly visibility past the fourth floor was
01:26:06 visibility past the fourth floor was non-existent and then yeah we I think what a lot of people were doing on their exit from the building was so grab him rags or whatever they could and holding them over their faces and things were
01:26:18 them over their faces and things were discarded all over the place there are many occasions I came across bundles of things which are obviously how to check and make sure they weren't people so yeah there was quite a lot and hoses and other bits of care there was quite a lot
01:26:30 other bits of care there was quite a lot on the way up at least on the earlier floors would it have helped evacuation if firefighters have been stationed on the stair point to help residents been
01:26:41 the stair point to help residents been evacuated down
01:26:45 an assisting that transit down the town yeah in theory if they had the equipment and means to be able to do that but if they just breathing in smoky others do it is still not gonna what quitman do
01:26:57 it is still not gonna what quitman do you think they would have needed if that were to be practicable heard mention and you know seen evidence of these individual face masks that I've that
01:27:09 individual face masks that I've that I've seen since that would have been very very helpful to get anyone's we must making environment even if it's two floors at one floor they're going to they're going to come in to harm so when
01:27:21 they're going to come in to harm so when you're talking about from the 21st floor they would have needed some sort of aid to get them down there so those bits of you know we've got the face mask and their individual breathing supply on those they would have been yeah given
01:27:33 those they would have been yeah given your experiences in the tower say after in the morning would have been practicable to have executed a floor-by-floor evacuation I mean I feel
01:27:49 floor-by-floor evacuation I mean I feel like that's a question for there for the officers really fair enough not my um not my call that one what you can tell is I think you have already is what were conditions like which you would have to
01:28:00 conditions like which you would have to get people through what were they I yes from the full flow upwards we would have been unable to get people out of them it was really really hard smoke logged from
01:28:11 was really really hard smoke logged from the fourth floor up but it's nobody would have been able to breathe just one final question and that's radio comms but what was your experience of the operation of radio comms on the night within the tower I believe radio silence
01:28:24 within the tower I believe radio silence I don't recall receiving any comments whatsoever and did you try and radio back to the bridgehead say when you discovered the casualties at around the 18th floor I
01:28:36 casualties at around the 18th floor I think I tried earlier on when we were lower down the building and received nothing back so and I think because then we'd had silence the whole way out I don't think I tried on the 18th floor no credit just presumed that risk it was
01:28:49 no credit just presumed that risk it was not possible thank you sir those are all the questions I've got for now might ask for a very brief break to see whether they're any supplementals yes it may be
01:29:00 they're any supplementals yes it may be further consideration mr. Knable have some more questions he'd like to put to you so we'll have a five-minute break now and then toss it and come back to
01:29:12 now and then toss it and come back to see where we are you said talk to anyone about your evidence by the rocks in the room and if you'd like to go in the usher will resume at half-past three what it was I think so think so yes what thank you
01:29:23 think so think so yes what thank you very much
01:29:35 right off our streams
01:37:34 so many thanks for the break I'm pleased to say there are no further questions for Miss often well I wonder if we should just invite her in to say that tell her that's them say thank you yes
01:38:01 yes thank you something that mr. Qadir is some time please say there are no further questions for you so just leaves me say thank you very much for attending choir today who happens to be very helpful yes it's good of you to come I
01:38:13 helpful yes it's good of you to come I hope it hasn't been too difficult experience grateful to you for that telling us about your experiences with an entire thank you very much free to go soon yeah sure
01:38:32 so with your permission the sixth witness of the day is Benjamin macaroon yes yes there's a bit of housekeeping but there's a paperwork been organized
01:38:44 but there's a paperwork been organized works been adjusted so hold on thinking
01:38:50 [Music]
01:39:36 after so
01:39:41 the evident social density you should read truth
01:39:47 thank you very much sit down and make yourself comfortable thank you yes mr. Kuhn first well good offer young would you please confirm your name for the record Benjamin McClellan and thank
01:40:00 the record Benjamin McClellan and thank you very much for attending the choir to give evidence today is much appreciated in front of you there's a blue file if you open it and behind the first tab hopefully you'll find your statement date of the 6th of February of this year
01:40:11 date of the 6th of February of this year is that right yeah that's correct yep and if you turn over the page hopefully that's your contemporaneous note yes and if you turn over the final tab there is
01:40:24 if you turn over the final tab there is the exhibit to your statement namely the plan of the Tarrance immediate surroundings that right yes stretcher and have you read those documents recently I have yes and you confirm the contents are true yes my lord show is
01:40:36 contents are true yes my lord show is and your content for those documents to stand is your evidence an inquiry yes I am yes first things I should say mr. Macklin if any time you want to break
01:40:47 Macklin if any time you want to break please say so if I've asked a question which is unclear again police say so and I'll rephrase it dealing first of all with basics is it right at the time of the fire you are crew manager based at Lambeth that's
01:40:58 crew manager based at Lambeth that's right yes and the callsign the appliance you were traveling in was hotel - two - that's correct and you have some 15 years experience as a firefighter is that right that's right yes and in terms
01:41:10 that right that's right yes and in terms of timings on the night you were mobilized that rather the LFP records indicate that you immobilize at zero 137 does that sound right I believe sorry
01:41:21 does that sound right I believe sorry was shortly before is this that appliance book in states to status one so sorry status buns at station yeah so mobile was mobilized then you're
01:41:34 mobile was mobilized then you're on the road and then you arrived yeah the first stage of that when you're mobilized went 0:37 right it was a short I don't think that's correct as such it may have been a couple of minutes before there was
01:41:45 a couple of minutes before there was actually my role now Windsor mobilizes system and you think you arrived at the scene at 0 1 45 or there abouts yeah that sounds about right it may help you get a more death
01:41:56 it may help you get a more death time the lfb records for the PA were indicate that the SD Beek SD be a disconnect from the appliance was at zero 150 yeah how how many minutes
01:42:10 zero 150 yeah how how many minutes before you disconnect it had you arrived you remember I would say that's pretty accurate that was at 45 you set it so yeah I mean we arrived in within a couple of minutes we removed the be a
01:42:23 couple of minutes we removed the be a set from the the appliance so they were turning up with her okay first topic I'd like to discuss with you thought you encountered on your arrival at the tower okay and on arrival were
01:42:34 at the tower okay and on arrival were you aware of any officers who were responsible for allocating tasks to those crews that were arriving at the scene for PA where is yes well that was
01:42:46 scene for PA where is yes well that was believe it's much manager Braun from Beth's eaves of standing at the base of the tower and he was calling for crews basically to be ready to be sent up to
01:42:57 basically to be ready to be sent up to the bridgehead and it was he particularly searching for EDB a cruise I couldn't so he didn't make it known if he was now turning to the next topic which is entering deployment and your
01:43:11 which is entering deployment and your trip from the lobby to the bridgehead at the tower now when you're at the lobby is it right that watch manager Glenn Williams was writing FSG details on the
01:43:22 Williams was writing FSG details on the walls that's right I was on the ground floor just inside the door on the left I believe did you did he give you a bit of paper to take to the bridgehead no if I
01:43:34 paper to take to the bridgehead no if I could ask Paul to bring up met document quadruple zero five double seven four
01:43:42 do you remember seeing that in the lobby I believe it is maybe being constructed at the time so he was serious he was continuously rolling on it as well as we
01:43:54 continuously rolling on it as well as we would made entry through the main entrance again could I ask you to look at the middle column and look at the bottom of that middle column and you'll see there one one three fourteenth do
01:44:08 see there one one three fourteenth do you remember seeing that written on the wall as you were in the lobby I believe it I didn't look at it in that much detail to be fair so is it fair so you didn't absorb the detail out before you
01:44:23 didn't absorb the detail out before you had deployed from the bridgehead did you see another any other firefighters come down the tower from floor 14 from the bridgehead or from the lobby when you in the bridgehead right
01:44:35 lobby when you in the bridgehead right did you see or meet any firefighters coming down from floor 14 prior to that
01:44:46 coming down from floor 14 prior to that this was in because we're the mezzanine floor was we were formed up on the mezzanine cueing there and then we was getting sent from there up to the actual
01:44:57 getting sent from there up to the actual bridgehead which was on my ship and I believe it was on the third floor at a time and it was watch manager Watson from Hammersmith he was detailing crews
01:45:09 from Hammersmith he was detailing crews from that mezzanine floor and insane robber need another crew of two never who ever and that's who actually tasked us with our our brief if you like or a
01:45:20 us with our our brief if you like or a role for where we was going whilst we were there it was casualties coming down I believe I don't
01:45:31 casualties coming down I believe I don't believe we saw fire fighters come past that point they would have only come down to just put out a bridgehead I believe and you think that the
01:45:42 believe and you think that the bridgehead at that stage was on the third floor not the second for is that right that's correct yes could I ask Paul to bring up met document triple zero one three zero
01:45:53 document triple zero one three zero seven four
01:46:02 do you remember seeing those wall markings at the brute at the on the second floor a first in a lift lobby on the second floor no because that they're
01:46:13 the second floor no because that they're separate from the root opening and so you didn't look at the detail going back to an earlier on so you gave who gave you your instructions as to the task you
01:46:24 you your instructions as to the task you were to discharge much Ranger what's under brave I didn't know his surname anatomists I just known as pole from he was the officer in charge of Hammersmith he taught us with he gave us a small piece
01:46:36 taught us with he gave us a small piece of paper and just said there's flat on one one 14th floor and did he give you any detail beyond that he said a mother and child was in the flat and spicy -
01:46:49 and child was in the flat and spicy - Karen report to Richard and did he give you any information regarding conditions in the stairwell conditions in flat 111 no he did say this it was more not just
01:47:00 no he did say this it was more not just to me personally but as a generic to the crews that were along the bridgehead there was a small plane had been drawn of a floor layer on that mezzanine floor nature said I was eight
01:47:11 nature said I was eight you know everyone ever look at that and get an idea of your layer and was it very much entrance from Lobby yes yeah there was no actual details in location
01:47:22 there was no actual details in location of flats it was just literally just and he explained is basically like H shape the floor lay up all to bring up document met triple zero one five six
01:47:34 document met triple zero one five six two five now do you remember seeing that writing on the wall of the third floor it's the bridge head of the third floor
01:47:52 I'm not hundred percent sure to be honest I do remember there being some writing on the wall but that was what I saw when I came down we're not debriefed with the officer in charge of inch of trail said were you aware of the content of that of the
01:48:05 aware of the content of that of the detailed information that was on that come sorry can we zoom in on the 14th floor
01:48:20 I don't know is it yes i doing them seeing that this was when I came back down from the D incident I was debrief with watch bender to sue her so after
01:48:32 with watch bender to sue her so after you this was after have been pinning into up to the 14th floor birthday and she actually I went through where we'd been she crossed off one one one I think
01:48:43 been she crossed off one one one I think that's one one two and she wrote the free rescue on that the thing on the but one one three and if I could ask Paul to bring up one final photograph that's
01:48:54 bring up one final photograph that's that met triple zero one eight seven four nine do you remember seeing this forward information board of the bridgehead no it may well have been
01:49:07 bridgehead no it may well have been there at the time um I don't recall seeing it back thank you very much if I can now go back to the instructions you were given were you and mr. juggins
01:49:20 were given were you and mr. juggins briefed by mr. Watson yes he was yes and did you understand the reference to a lady and child to be a mother and child or were you I said mother and child
01:49:31 or were you I said mother and child we've given any ideas to the gender or age of the child are you sure that you were told flat 111 and not any other flowers yes it was written on a piece of paper
01:49:46 were you aware of what instructions had been given to mr. Herrera and Miss Orchard to go into the oceans no were you aware of any other crews that have been sent up to the 14th floor in
01:49:57 been sent up to the 14th floor in response to FSGS before you will not before us I was committed now if I can
01:50:08 before us I was committed now if I can next turn to the question of your deployment and timings the LFP records suggest or indicate that tally out at the bridgehead was at 0 to 31 and
01:50:19 the bridgehead was at 0 to 31 and tallien was at 0 to 45 does that give us the time frame for your yeah I guess so I lost all concept of time and even in to be honest no the next question I'd
01:50:30 to be honest no the next question I'd like to ask you about is conditions on the lobby of the 14th floor can you when you've got on to the lobby itself can you describe the conditions you
01:50:42 you describe the conditions you encountered the conditions are very poor that the smoke level was was right down to the floor it was the the smoke was
01:50:53 to the floor it was the the smoke was very thick very black and color made visibility of non non zero it was difficult to see your hand in front of your face past the actual smoke itself we although it's not unusual it seemed
01:51:05 we although it's not unusual it seemed particularly sticky okay I'm going to try and clear my face our space at Egypt to be able to see or gauge checks and stuff product and is it did you
01:51:16 stuff product and is it did you encounter another crew on the 14th floor when we first made entrance to the 14th floor I believe I heard and I've a curve and saw a torchlight on the actual floor which is normally they're quite
01:51:29 which is normally they're quite distinctive to what you'd like a light from the torch within the smoke I tried to make contact with it crew but I had no joy and I thought rather than waste time to do that we'd carried on without
01:51:44 time to do that we'd carried on without our brief basically and how far away were you from the other crew you estimate the term it was difficult to say I couldn't see across the lobby because of smoke just for the so thick so I'd know knowing how the distance
01:51:56 so I'd know knowing how the distance we're talking about flat 111 was the door open a jar unlocked the flat to 111 was wide open which I thought was very
01:52:07 was wide open which I thought was very unusual if you're in my mind if you're someone wishing to be rescued from a flat in a relatively place safe place
01:52:19 you wouldn't be having the front door wide open
01:52:21 wide open Elaine all the contents of the lobby into the flat so I thought that was a bit odd in in my experience and did you go into flat 111 was died like entry
01:52:33 go into flat 111 was died like entry firefighter juggins had a thermal image cam room
01:52:36 cam room he was looking searching around the flat and I was trying to radio to entry control to find out if there's any update further information if they've already been rescued or before something
01:52:47 already been rescued or before something like that and were you able to get through it now did you knock on the door of flat 112 we did when in whilst still trying to make contact we eventually
01:52:58 trying to make contact we eventually Patrol I said to forage soybeans will carry on searching anywhere else but here and Mosel Trentino mates should check the rest of the floor by today we knocked on flat one one two would kick
01:53:10 knocked on flat one one two would kick the door it's it's more audible obviously than just a knock from a left hand
01:53:18 hand there was no entry so I said before we had a enforce above us was going to force entry to that one one two which is what we done and was there anyone within flat woman do you know and did you then
01:53:30 flat woman do you know and did you then move on to the next platform on three we came we exited flat one one two and as we was continue on a left-hand wall and as we came a bit further along the corridor then came across another quote
01:53:42 corridor then came across another quote which immediately as soon as I start experiencing like it became apparently it was a firefighter of my own station okay and you recognized his voice or could you recognize his voice and you
01:53:54 could you recognize his voice and you say that you were told by mr. Herrera then there are loads of people there two people in one one three and they won't come out they won't open the door they won't come out stretchers yeah and
01:54:05 they won't come out stretchers yeah and did you ask how many people precisely within flat woman 3 I didn't know he just said that there's loads of people boy I don't know what he has many about it but loads of people is just to me
01:54:16 it but loads of people is just to me it's just everyday talk constant and could you hear him clearly I could yes now it's right that you went into flat woman 3 is that I didn't make him I didn't personally go inside the flat I
01:54:28 didn't personally go inside the flat I was still in the lobby at this time okay was the door to one one three open while she was no it wasn't the door was still shut as far as aware and because he said what wooden block what we going to do so
01:54:41 what wooden block what we going to do so because I wasn't aware of exactly where flat one mumphrey was I just sit him tell him we're getting him out we take him down
01:54:49 him down I can't remember if if I went to the door as well but that is what we done base that you went to the flat to go knock on the door again and say we are
01:55:00 knock on the door again and say we are coming out if not we're going to break the door down and come in and did a lady come out it all happened very rapid the next few moments if I die I remember someone are hearing coughing I see a
01:55:13 someone are hearing coughing I see a lady's coughing and I was in obviously aware straightaway that the people are now exposed to all the smoking conditions on the lobby someone came I felt someone come in
01:55:25 someone came I felt someone come in front of me I've reached out and grabbed it was her her on that I grabbed and it's straight away I just thought well these these people now they're they're
01:55:36 these these people now they're they're proving to all these you know the horrible smell and stuff we've got getting down straightaway and how many did you take down this year I had this this lady Polly arm and I led her over
01:55:47 this lady Polly arm and I led her over to the just stairwell because I was I was quite close to the actual the door I could literally reach out and from where I was standing so go make entry straight onto the staircase so I started
01:56:00 straight onto the staircase so I started proceeding down the stairs over and the lady tripped and fell and I lost physical physical hold on it and continued down the stairs to again
01:56:12 and continued down the stairs to again expecting to find the lady either on the turn of the stairs or we in the vicinity I couldn't fall under associate Turner to stairs I went down the next flight of stairs search on that turn as well and I
01:56:26 stairs search on that turn as well and I couldn't find her so I just assumed that she'd managed to get up pick herself up and carry on and then you went back up to floor floor is that right and you encountered a man coming down yes
01:56:37 encountered a man coming down yes basically of making I can't remember I think it was on the the last flight of stairs before that the 14th floor again someone came and came past me and I took
01:56:49 someone came and came past me and I took I know the only reason I know he's a man is because I must have said something to him like a year or so another and he said I'm getting our gate now and so I said ok well I'm thinking in my mind ok
01:57:00 said ok well I'm thinking in my mind ok he's he's making his own way that's that's great I couldn't believe me and for our judges can probably manage to people with weave on the way out if we come across him on the way down so I went back onto the
01:57:13 the way down so I went back onto the landing to find out where locked with forged jóvenes and also find out with if there's any more people would come down and did you see whether the man was
01:57:24 and did you see whether the man was carrying a child on his back not at that point now I wasn't aware of that and later on it wouldn't say later on when did you become aware of that basically when I I've got another nother
01:57:39 basically when I I've got another nother Koya as well and this is the second is this is that yes the second men escorted him down to the stairs went past the bridge head down to 2nd floor level I
01:57:53 bridge head down to 2nd floor level I believe it would have been to hand over there was some senior officers there that were taking the Calgary's off of us and I saw that I his only assumption at the time going in front of me too he was
01:58:06 the time going in front of me too he was in the corner of stairwell and he had a child on his back they were lifted in the child off of his back and then that's when I was aware that there was a child with them as well so by the time
01:58:17 child with them as well so by the time you got down there were you aware that the woman the child and the two gentlemen had come from flat warm on three I was still unsure of the whereabouts of the woman at that time
01:58:28 whereabouts of the woman at that time okay you return to the bridgehead what did you deep reef at the bridgehead at the bridgehead I went and saw what turns
01:58:39 the bridgehead I went and saw what turns into silver who was she was running on the entry control board of my tally was in I told her basically what we've done we've been up to one one one that was clear and as I was going through her first she was marking it on the ball that you saw a picture of Assoc
01:58:53 that you saw a picture of Assoc I said there as well we brought three people down at that time we don't see didn't wasn't aware of the child yeah and she said he's that clear and I said I can't confirm that because I said
01:59:05 I can't confirm that because I said there's another crew behind us they should be down any me and they can confirm it and did you when you said you can't confirm it did you explain why you couldn't confirm it I can't remember to be honest okay in
01:59:18 I can't remember to be honest okay in Europe it may help if you turn to page 12 of your statement and two lines down from the top
01:59:29 you say boys you say this I confirmed with the entry control board officer three people had been rescued from flat one one three but I could not confirm that was empty as we had asked or two
01:59:40 that was empty as we had asked or two people out from the landing and not search the flat that's correct did you tell them you haven't searched the flat as far as I'm aware I did what
01:59:51 the flat as far as I'm aware I did what I said I didn't make entry into the fray itself so I couldn't confirm that when the other crews came debt or the other crew came down from flat one one three
02:00:02 crew came down from flat one one three did you ask them whether they'd search flat one one three before coming down eventually which is essentially when this was later on outside how many outside when you were resting
02:00:15 how many outside when you were resting on the grassy area by the learn was that right
02:00:24 to be honest no we afterwards we exceeded to build him eventually we had to force our way I never thought of side of it for a window and I don't know
02:00:36 of it for a window and I don't know whether you're going to come onto this shortly I'm not sure that we actually came across this was some time off as well because there was a quart amount of of debris falling if you like from the
02:00:50 of debris falling if you like from the building so he's actually there's a covered walkway and we was taking shelter under there whilst was waiting for a safe moment to get away from the tower and this was always going towards let me Road entrance I believe it was
02:01:04 let me Road entrance I believe it was whilst I was standing there waiting father Ferreira came out of the towers well and then we basically said like we've got to get back to her about
02:01:17 we've got to get back to her about trying to find our way back to her truck to service here yet sister when we eventually managed to get away from the tower as we come up towards the corner of let my road I think I'm sure it's
02:01:28 of let my road I think I'm sure it's like a road station there's our walkway that goes down the side and on the corner there was a guy standing on his phone and I recognized
02:01:40 standing on his phone and I recognized the guy sure from the Bay City was - he was the last gentleman that I brought down from the tail and it was a purple colored shirt because I just remember it because he was right in front of me good
02:01:51 because he was right in front of me good you know the stairs he was on his phone there and it just sort of said to him got your ROI and stuff but he was just on his phone and I carried on walking around but I think I'm not sure what Pete stopped talk to him I not and
02:02:04 Pete stopped talk to him I not and Peters mr. Herrera sorry yes Father you're not sure with him was mr. Herrera there when you recognize this gentleman yes yes yes and how would you describe
02:02:15 yes yes yes and how would you describe the gentleman what did his face look like how tall was he
02:02:22 yes but not as tall as me
02:02:28 it was difficult to explain to be honest I'll not explain difficult to describe I think who's say you spoke to him first did you the I think we didn't speak as
02:02:40 did you the I think we didn't speak as in not just at Euro Chi but with literature as far as I said and What did he say to you he was just on his phone he was just talking his face he didn't really acknowledge myself was he speaking in English on the phone no no
02:02:51 speaking in English on the phone no no and then did you just walk on I carried on round the corner yes where was mr. Herrera during this he was with with me on the side but he's by side with you I
02:03:06 believe so yes yeah and did he say anything to this gentleman he did yes and did you stay with mr. Herrera whilst mr. Herrera is having this company I carried on walking and so you didn't
02:03:17 carried on walking and so you didn't overhear what was said no did you ask mr. Herrera whether he'd searched flat 1 1 3 before he came down no are you aware
02:03:29 1 3 before he came down no are you aware of policy 8:03 that governs search and rescue possibly or when we are to know a number but yes are you aware of the provision that provides that we're casualties being
02:03:41 provides that we're casualties being found a secondary search ought to be carried out of the immediate vicinity are you aware of that provision within the policy yes yeah given that they had found four people or four people have
02:03:54 found four people or four people have been with in flat one one three would you have expected firefighters to have carried out a second research before leaving ordinarily yes in a normal fire
02:04:06 leaving ordinarily yes in a normal fire situation and would you expect them to have carried out that second research even if they'd been told by one of the departing residents that that was everyone was out
02:04:17 it depends how much you believe the president I guess if you if you're taking their word for it you you're it this would by any means there was no way
02:04:28 this would by any means there was no way an ordinary incident I think everybody was more than aware of the time restraints potentially on ourselves with our breathing apparatus capabilities the
02:04:41 our breathing apparatus capabilities the actual conditions within the tail block and the stairwell we're I mean I myself had thoughts of you know what what on
02:04:52 had thoughts of you know what what on earth are we gonna find we're bringing these people down we've got no like a protection for the residents if you like to school them down the stairs it was it was a bit of a
02:05:04 down the stairs it was it was a bit of a I don't think it a rightward a minute but it was a bit of a long shot if you like to try and bring them out as we did
02:05:16 like to try and bring them out as we did without them you know kept seeing Oliver go back to the conversation mr. Herrero is having with the gentleman who's on the side
02:05:25 the side you walked on mm-hmm did mr. Herrera come up and tell you know what to say to you had a gentleman had said to him running up and he said that he ran up to
02:05:36 running up and he said that he ran up to you he run up to me so that guy's brother stood in there he's on the phones him now who stood in the on the 14th floor and that's what mr. Herrera said to yet best of your knowledge yep
02:05:47 said to yet best of your knowledge yep did mr. Herrera say that the man had said there was no one else there wasn't there wasn't so I immediately straight away I tried to get on my handheld radio to relay that information to to someone
02:06:01 to relay that information to to someone because we was in no position to where we were physically we there wasn't anyone local to actual that could use the information if you like so I tried
02:06:12 the information if you like so I tried to contact watchman is sadler I knew who was running the FSG outside and even the bridgehead as well but it was just
02:06:23 bridgehead as well but it was just impossible it was just too much radio traffic
02:06:28 with the information that mr. Herrera brought to you this the gentleman's brother was still within flap what one yeah this is flat one one three what did you do next information
02:06:43 three what did you do next information once we'd also as we've woken up immediately I wanted to get back physically to wear what trainers are certainly was collecting that
02:06:54 certainly was collecting that information for the force of all gods and tell him physically I knew the radios will never run any good so there was a saying to the local
02:07:05 good so there was a saying to the local resident tech when we get back here can we get background sort of the front the tail the other side and one at one of the residents or nudie area well he basically showed us Dora to us back to
02:07:17 basically showed us Dora to us back to where we need to be and do you know what further steps were taken there after to try and get I don't know my throat back later on in the evening is it right that you were recuperating with your crew
02:07:29 you were recuperating with your crew outside the tower so with mr. era juggins Orchard Evans and Bloxom do you remember that well yes we were at some point yes yeah and at that stage did mr.
02:07:40 point yes yeah and at that stage did mr. Herrera I recall the conversation he'd had with the gentleman with in flat one one three no no that the subject never came up to be honestly when did you be
02:07:54 came up to be honestly when did you be did you become aware of the night on what happened to those who've been left behind in flat on one three sorry can you say okay wait did you become aware on the night itself that what happened
02:08:06 on the night itself that what happened to those left behind in flat water not on a night yourself climbing and when did you first become aware of what had happened to them I believe it was a maybe a couple of nights afterwards and
02:08:19 maybe a couple of nights afterwards and how did you find out I think I was watching the news and that's when I came came aware of what you know what happened one final point distinct to the
02:08:31 happened one final point distinct to the topics we've discussed and that's telemetry problems you refers of pages 15 and 16 of your witness statement to manual calculations of breathing times that you were
02:08:43 of breathing times that you were required to carry out because of the difficulties over signal between the be a set and the ECB and did this have an impact on the operations during the night in your view I don't I don't think
02:08:58 night in your view I don't I don't think it had any sort of direct effect if you like I think everybody knew the capabilities of the equipment and their
02:09:11 capabilities of the equipment and their form we'd also been working on manual calculations for a number of well for a long long time before that afford a Newton inventory stuff I mean so we still was aware of you know the right
02:09:24 still was aware of you know the right way the right way the manual way of doing the calculations mr. Macklin those are all the questions I've got for you now that's sir might have a brief break
02:09:35 now that's sir might have a brief break to see if there are any further supplementals yes of course well from time to time it's discovered that there are questions that they asked with having so ask you to leave us for a few
02:09:49 having so ask you to leave us for a few minutes so that this trio can just check the position please don't talk to anyone about your evidence won't arrive to the room and so if you're able to return at
02:10:06 room and so if you're able to return at ten past four or even sooner if there is an absence of questions it may be notify just ask your Russia well can you hold yourself in readiness to be called back on all sources but all
02:10:20 to be called back on all sources but all right
02:10:32 mr. Kinnear I'll say ten past four or sooner if you're ready soon Thanks
02:13:41 yes mr. to brief supplementals with your permission right kid will show you the last mr. Mehta learning to come back it is
02:14:08 Thank You Isaac mr. Kinnaird sure mr. Mackall oh and thanks for your patience I don't know whether you've been listening to mr. Harris Evans previously in in the afternoon but he said that his
02:14:20 in in the afternoon but he said that his account was that mr. Omar al hajjali had told him that when they were still in the flat that there was no one else in the flat flat one one three when did you first become aware that that was mr.
02:14:32 first become aware that that was mr. Herrera's recollection of what he'd been told by mr. Allen adjustment oh yeah I was watching upstairs and had mr. Herrera told you that he went into the lounge of flat warm on three at any
02:14:43 lounge of flat warm on three at any stage
02:14:44 stage no thank you I've no further questions and so that just leaves me to thank you for giving evidence stays very much appreciated thank you very much for coming to give your evidence it's very valuable and you will know free to go
02:15:05 damaged canoe sir we have the seventh and final witness of the day coming up we are just nudging ten past four yeah I think with a fair wind we can complete
02:15:17 think with a fair wind we can complete at half-past four but with your indulgence we may stray slightly over that but I shall strain every sinew to avoid passing over half past four right this is mr. Warren Smith it is Mr Wong
02:15:28 this is mr. Warren Smith it is Mr Wong speak well I'm sure having been waiting to give his evidence he'd like to get it through this afternoon so let's do our best
02:15:34 best I'm sure he will thanks sir thank you Michael mr. Wong's be
02:16:21 I do since I do something sincerely and truly
02:16:28 that the end and Sasha gave us a baby too so we charge the whole tree all true thank you very much we sit down make yourselves comfortable I'm sorry waited so long to give your
02:16:39 I'm sorry waited so long to give your evidence but they're very important processes I hope we can get it through this afternoon good afternoon for the record will you please confirm your name my name's John Pierre walls me and in
02:16:50 my name's John Pierre walls me and in front of you there's a blue folder and if you open that hopefully you'll find your statement date of the 15th of June of this year yes that right yeah and behind that you're contemporaneous note is that right that's correcting have you read those documents recently I've had
02:17:02 read those documents recently I've had look off over dance afternoon yet and you confirm the contents are true there's some inaccuracies but nothing nothing - nothing material nothing immaterial matter do you contend for
02:17:14 immaterial matter do you contend for those documents to stand as your evidence it's this enquiry I am ease now if you need a break please shout if any of my questions are unclear shout and I'll try make them clearer now dealing with basics first you're a
02:17:25 dealing with basics first you're a firefighter based at Shoreditch and were at the time of the fire is that right that's correct and that you've had 17 years experience as a firefighter that's correct and that on the night you had the driver of appliance whose call sign
02:17:37 the driver of appliance whose call sign was Foxtrot 241 correct and that your be a partner on the evening was firefighter lows are very like as to timings the unappeased records indicate that you were mobilized at 0 to 0-5
02:17:49 were mobilized at 0 to 0-5 mobile at 0 to 0-7 and arrived at scene at zero to 21 that sound about right to you that sounds correct yeah and although we'll come back to it more
02:18:01 although we'll come back to it more detail the timings of your BA where the records provided by the LFP suggest you tallied out at the bridgehead at 0 3 0 4 does that sound about right sorry the
02:18:12 does that sound about right sorry the turn tallied out you mean people have used tallied in musical terms I was committed to be a around that time yeah thank you know the first topic I'd like
02:18:23 thank you know the first topic I'd like to discuss with you is you're at the tower you're going from the lobby to the bridgehead yes now do you recall a watch manager writing FSG details on the wall of the
02:18:34 writing FSG details on the wall of the lobby right when you entered the building we were we didn't muster in the lobby we mustered on the mezzanine floor and
02:18:42 and we were waiting to be committed to the bridgehead all I remember is a rather good drawing been done on the mezzanine level floor by a feet previous fire fire
02:18:53 level floor by a feet previous fire fire so which gave the layout where the stairs were where the flats were under stairs which was quite handy I don't recall and did that what did a watch manager give you or any member of your team any FSG instructions on the slip of
02:19:06 team any FSG instructions on the slip of paper in the lobby not in the lobby not on the mezzanine floor it was when we went up we waited for a period of time to be committed and the officers were doing quite a good job
02:19:17 the officers were doing quite a good job of stopping us just because obviously I was keen to help out but there obviously need to be some sort of control of that we waited there for a few moments I
02:19:28 we waited there for a few moments I can't I couldn't tell you how long the crew the other pair from Shoreditch were behind us and we were just talking about we had it we had someone had done very long so there's a lot of conversations about sort of stay calm and take it
02:19:40 about sort of stay calm and take it steady I mean this is big but remember your training so we waited there for a few moments and then we were we were called up to the bridgehead where a female watch managed I think in what I
02:19:52 female watch managed I think in what I think in my statement of the motor to crew manager but isn't she a Kia watch manager and she and and she had to do an FSG slip up a plate remember it was her
02:20:03 FSG slip up a plate remember it was her or the other officer that was there which was a gentleman and I'm afraid we're from the east so West I didn't really know many people so the faces and names and sort I lost on me and if I can
02:20:16 names and sort I lost on me and if I can solve you have the slip of paper in statement you said it read flat one one three 14th floors that's correct assign your post it man were you given any further detail to assist completion of this FSG tasks not Laura corns oh
02:20:28 this FSG tasks not Laura corns oh nothing like conditions on the stairwell conditions in the particular flat we had had crews coming out looking reasonably worse for wear and some of them passed information to us regarding the
02:20:39 information to us regarding the conditions of the stairwell on the stairwell and most notably that there was no marked landings the the numbers were not marked on the landing so the specific information that came from
02:20:51 the specific information that came from Cruz was to tell us to make sure we count the floors because that was vitally important but other than the information not said no details of those are in the flat whether adults men women
02:21:03 are in the flat whether adults men women children not like a calm okay were you told that they'd been a previous evacuation where any some rescues had been made and others had being left in the building a nightmare were you aware from anyone from the
02:21:14 were you aware from anyone from the Lambeth crew indicating that the bridgehead that they had discovered that people have been left behind in flat one one three that information was given some you know when you're at the bridgehead were you aware of the content
02:21:25 bridgehead were you aware of the content of any FSGS that related to flat one one three so I keep Lera fine yes when you're at the bridgehead yeah were you given the details of any other FSGS that
02:21:36 given the details of any other FSGS that related to flat one one three no I was just given the flat number and floor to procedure now in terms of your deployment to the 14th floor the record indicates you tallied you went on the
02:21:48 indicates you tallied you went on the air yeah zero three zero four as you went up the tower mr. Lowe suggests that the stairwell was chaotic and cluttered with firefighting equipment what was your recollection of the
02:21:59 what was your recollection of the condition of the stair was yeah I'd agree with a flat lows account I remember going onto stairwell reasonably clean out until possibly the sixth floor maybe almost definitely
02:22:11 sixth floor maybe almost definitely sixth law because at that point I was counting quite quiet empty we there was lots of lots of hose a few lines of charged hose but some NT hose that
02:22:22 charged hose but some NT hose that rolled up and lots of crews coming down I think how difficult was it to make your way through the equipment on the stairwell it was you know he was impeding it wasn't it wasn't difficult
02:22:34 impeding it wasn't it wasn't difficult to go over too much of it was impeding sort of slow and it's down a little bit and obviously when crews were coming out with casualties the cry occasionally comes out which you've heard before and we crouch down and make sure
02:22:45 we crouch down and make sure they go out we took the inside path from the left-hand side I I did have a tick thermal image camera and I found that that was probably pointless until we got there so because he's just had a
02:22:57 there so because he's just had a handrail to go up now it's right that you were discovered a casualty brand about the 10th floor I'd be quite confident as it was we were counting what I was counting quietly telling you and was it a mother and daughter coming
02:23:09 and was it a mother and daughter coming down yes yes is it possible that the first casualty was just the woman on her own just to give you some context birth mr. Lowe said John helped one person down and we then went back up again
02:23:22 down and we then went back up again and you recall the sequence there I it's possible they weren't together not sure I assumed just from there from the vicinity between them that it was a
02:23:34 vicinity between them that it was a mother and daughter officer that's an assumption I made I just remember there being a small person and a big person okay and you took them they'd back down to the bridgehead did yeah that's how he assisted the older person and what I
02:23:46 assisted the older person and what I seem to be the door I began to help down the stairs until they became they started to become unconscious and you've got them to the bridgehead yes yes sorry
02:23:59 got them to the bridgehead yes yes sorry no we got them as I proceed down the stairs the smoke levels have changed and I began to sort out whether I was at the third floor so I hurried my place and came out on the mezzanine floor that's
02:24:12 came out on the mezzanine floor that's where I handed the casual at someone and did you debrief anyone at the mezzanine or at the bridgehead as to the first of all you've discovered casualties around about the 10th floor no it was just a
02:24:24 about the 10th floor no it was just a cry of casualty someone took that casualty from me who obviously had trust sir then carefully casually I went back and Terry was sorry far far low was only just a few paces behind me and he handed
02:24:36 just a few paces behind me and he handed over his casualty we briefly carried on with the task that we were given we were desperate to do did you report back at that stage the bridgehead that you you hadn't yet completed the task 2 flat 1 1
02:24:49 hadn't yet completed the task 2 flat 1 1 3 answer now we were there was a lot of radio traffic and pecan remember Philo had VA coms but
02:25:01 and pecan remember Philo had VA coms but I only had a handheld radio there was a lot going on on the radio and I felt I don't know though this is retrospective
02:25:12 don't know though this is retrospective but at the time it was just let's just get back up and did you say to the anyone at the bridgehead that because you had brought down the two casualties that it was imperative that further
02:25:24 that it was imperative that further firefighters were deployed up to the 14th floor to assist you in rescuing people from flooding no at that point because men men firefight load had a
02:25:35 because men men firefight load had a very brief discussion when we discovered the casualties that we should get these these people out first we decided that once we've got them out we just go again and we've carry on with
02:25:47 we just go again and we've carry on with the initial task which is what we did and did the conditions on the stairwell suggest to you mr. Lowe that you needed further personnel to get to the 14th
02:25:59 further personnel to get to the 14th floor in order to rescue the occupants of flat one 1/3 now I feel like we were capable we had enough air to make it to
02:26:10 capable we had enough air to make it to complete our original task even given the conditions you'd encountered on the stairwell and both in terms of physical obstruction so and people coming down I guess some of the some of this
02:26:21 guess some of the some of this decision-making I don't know we're very subconscious or just experienced but I guess we thought if we can't get someone from the 10th floor down then we probably won't have a chance getting something 14th floor down
02:26:32 chance getting something 14th floor down so we've got the people from the temp floor down first going up to the 14th floor I just guess I assume that it's that you wanted to complete the task in
02:26:43 that you wanted to complete the task in hand quite desperately so get to the flat on the 14th floor and then consider the conditions no it's right as you went back up the tower you encounter the further casualty at about the 8th floor level is that right again I believe into
02:26:55 level is that right again I believe into two casualties an older woman and a younger child which again I assume to be mother and daughter and mr. Lowe helped the the older woman and you with the guard over your shoulder this caress bring her down and you got back
02:27:07 caress bring her down and you got back down to the bridgehead ahead of mr. Lowe is that right I believe my recollection is at this point the bridge had had been moved because sort of change wasn't where was it yeah so the Bridget had been on on one of the
02:27:19 so the Bridget had been on on one of the landings of the of the floor as we came down the first time the smoke was dropping and dropping floors so then on
02:27:30 dropping and dropping floors so then on the second way down again I'm not going to report to the bridgehead I'm gonna get the casualty out as quickly as possible so I made my way down to the mezzanine floor and I was made aware
02:27:41 mezzanine floor and I was made aware that the bridge had have been moved because of these changing conditions because people in the Bridget haven't got ba so they need to be in safe there so this information was relayed back to us so I made my way to the mezzanine
02:27:52 us so I made my way to the mezzanine floor down the glass stairwell we always met wire I've done on the moment Eva group management : who took casually off of me and who did you debrief as to what
02:28:05 of me and who did you debrief as to what where you'd found the two casualties well once again it's excuse me something
02:28:13 once again it's kind of fire fire sacrilege to leave your PA partner behind but as we were on the stairwell and heading out I was confident that I wouldn't lose lo so I as I had the
02:28:26 wouldn't lose lo so I as I had the smaller casualty and could move quicker I left him behind briefly once it handed the casualties over obviously I now want to get back to firefighter low to make sure that him and cashmere are okay so
02:28:40 sure that him and cashmere are okay so with this I went back up the stairs and I was stopped by an officer I believe it to be for it mentioned works I'm not sure who informed me that I should be leaving and I informed him that I should
02:28:55 leaving and I informed him that I should be going in and I've got went back in we got the firefighter low and we proceeded back down to where the bridgehead had moved now on the ground floor in the atrium and did you debrief anyone at the bridgehead that you hadn't been
02:29:06 bridgehead that you hadn't been what's a complete the absolutely it's the most important information we had I can't remember who who was at the bridgehead but it was a few people obviously it moved at this point is in the process of moving so it's quite
02:29:18 the process of moving so it's quite chaotic and they're taking a lot of information from one place so I made sure that at least one or two people have been told that we didn't make our original task and by the time you'd got back to the bridge at that time how much
02:29:29 back to the bridge at that time how much were you no longer under air in my statement I said that we were low on now what kind of meant was we were too long
02:29:40 what kind of meant was we were too long it's a complete art on the 14th floor and that answers the question I was gonna ask another penalty could I ask you I'm just to final topics first of all hoses at page 9 of your witness
02:29:52 all hoses at page 9 of your witness statements we don't need to go to initially it would help you you sorted out hose lines and you'd not me personally no Tina yeah but you were part of a team that sorted out hose lines but can you remember what time you
02:30:03 lines but can you remember what time you did this was it it would be after so as the same a statement after the VA where we went outside helped out with some
02:30:14 we went outside helped out with some hose and some Jets and then we're asked to go and retrieve some kit to go back into the building I saw this as an opportunity to get back and building the help out so we myself a firefighter
02:30:25 help out so we myself a firefighter Benicia went and got this kit delivered it to the officers inside and proceeded up where I found my crew from Whitechapel Fire Station and my own crew and we it I'm not sure if necessary it's
02:30:41 and we it I'm not sure if necessary it's bent out to us but it was very evident that there was only tomorrow collection two lines of hose in the entire building and the firefighter was needed to carry out on the upper floors so for a period
02:30:55 out on the upper floors so for a period of time we were shutting off all our extend in Lyons we bought a dividing breach up which is a piece of equipment it could split one line into two and just made sure that went as high as
02:31:06 just made sure that went as high as possible so to what extent were these various hose lines what extent were they obstructing the stairwell as normal as hose lines would Xterra there's a lot of uncharged rolled-up
02:31:18 there's a lot of uncharged rolled-up hose what he charged there was I believe there was to charge one from the bridgehead floor and then one must have been from the floor of the fourth floor
02:31:29 been from the floor of the fourth floor maybe in the fire and that was taken up the building we extended both of these up to possibly the thirteenth floor and
02:31:41 up to possibly the thirteenth floor and Werth hose are still being used to fight fires at this stage whilst tidying up I was I don't know the answer to that one final question in respective lobby doors and is it first say that when they were
02:31:52 and is it first say that when they were closed the lobby doors prevented the spread of smoke into the stairwell when we were extending the hose we were we weren't under out so which is it's
02:32:07 weren't under out so which is it's outside of our policy if there's if it's any arrow spray weapons there or chance of any response field we should wear BA we were me and the other crews with me were quite aware that this task along
02:32:21 were quite aware that this task along with the task of search and rescue on the other floors it would have been too much to have ba so we took it upon ourselves to do this without ba sets on
02:32:35 the the conditions were changeable so when we had crews come up the stair would be clear to a point and then we'd have crews come up and make entry off of
02:32:46 have crews come up and make entry off of the stairwell in onto the floors every time they've done that it filled that stairwell up with smoke and clearly to the point where we would push be a cruise into the dawn and ask them to
02:32:58 cruise into the dawn and ask them to shut the door behind them and let clear when the doors were closed was were they effective when the doors were closed their effective us at without without ba on for periods of time and the doors
02:33:10 on for periods of time and the doors were radiating heat but were keeping the smoke back so those are all the questions I have asking you to rise give them the climb I shall give a quick scan of the hearing
02:33:23 shall give a quick scan of the hearing room and I don't see any bids and so in those circumstances given the time yes final call there are no further points be made in those things no one is
02:33:35 be made in those things no one is standing up gesticulating or saying anything so I think it's probably safe to infer that they don't have any other questions to suggest I think so and
02:33:47 questions to suggest I think so and there so that just leaves it for me too Thank You mr. wants before coming to give evidence States be very helpful yes well likewise what's wrong V I'd like to thank you very much for coming along it's very valuable evidence and we're very grateful
02:34:07 so that concludes today's business yes we have further evidence on Monday yes I have no application to make weather on
02:34:18 have no application to make weather on my own behalf or on behalf of mr. millet and to invite you to start at 10 o'clock very good well thank you very much you've done well to get through such a large list of witnesses in the day and
02:34:29 large list of witnesses in the day and we'll break there and resume at 10 o'clock on Monday then please thank you very much