Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Further LFB evidence (5 September 2018 Pt 1 of 2)
00:00:02 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing in a moment we're going to resume mr. Johnson's evidence but before we do that I think mr. millet has
00:00:13 we do that I think mr. millet has something he wants to say yes mr. chairman thank you very much I should just say that after some overnight discussion with the lfb and the Chairman the team has been able to put the
00:00:24 the team has been able to put the evidence of pete wolf ndon back a few days to Tuesday the 11th of September and reject the timetable so that we're now going to ask mr. O'Neil Dave O'Neil
00:00:36 now going to ask mr. O'Neil Dave O'Neil to come on the 26th of September we hope that doesn't disturb people's planning we're extremely grateful to the NFB for their assistance in enabling us to reject the timetable in that way the
00:00:49 reject the timetable in that way the simple reason we've had to do that is because the timetable for this week has become rather clogged up and we don't want to rush the evidence or drop any particular lines of questions that seem to us to be relevant so I just sought to
00:01:02 to us to be relevant so I just sought to make that clear so that everybody knows where we are thank you very much so we can allocate to Johnson to come in yes thank you
00:01:15 [Music]
00:01:38 good morning mr. Johnson it was dis do sit down and make yourself comfortable thank you yes it's Johnson good morning thank you very much for coming back to us and I hope it hasn't caused too much
00:01:49 us and I hope it hasn't caused too much inconvenience so I know yesterday I've got a couple of short follow-up questions on the evidence you gave yesterday about training and they are short but they're really by way of clarification in your evidence and for
00:02:02 clarification in your evidence and for the transcript it's at page 204 at line 17
00:02:05 17 you mentioned Neal withers as the person that you made your recommendations to in relation to changes to policy at this FSU 790 and who did well what was Neal
00:02:17 FSU 790 and who did well what was Neal withers his position at the time excuse me I'm not familiar with position was he wasn't in isolation to him it was he was a good manager who was senior to me at the time so it would have been the
00:02:28 the time so it would have been the people ultimately who were the policy holders for that specific policy so it would be the specific group oversees that policy in my command uuugh and I think you told us yesterday you weren't you didn't know who they
00:02:40 you weren't you didn't know who they were
00:02:41 were well it's the department I'm currently in so it's a operational response but can you give us some names now or back then like that I don't know that then now it's Julianne Spooner and Peter crucial yeah the net but back then I am
00:02:54 crucial yeah the net but back then I am not aware of that and do you know what Neal withers does now he's left London Fire Brigade and I believe he's working for the lifeboat Association right and
00:03:05 for the lifeboat Association right and at the time do you know which committees or policy group tarik Harrington and Neal withers wood were members of I don't know now thank you now you
00:03:16 don't know now thank you now you mentioned also and this was at pages 232 to 31 of the transcript that Badcock were responsible and solely responsible for of delivery of training my question
00:03:28 for of delivery of training my question is were to your knowledge was Babcock also solely responsible for deciding what went into a training package it's a it's a slightly more complicated than
00:03:39 it's a slightly more complicated than that the brigade kind of put a bid in for what is required it's a long process there is a cost to it which is a cost to the brigade which Babcock's my agree to or may not
00:03:51 which Babcock's my agree to or may not agree to and as such the training course is then designed there's consultation over what is inserted is it going to be adequate is it not going to be adequate
00:04:02 adequate is it not going to be adequate there's a Backson force but it's a it's a long process that can take I would suggest a minimum of one year to complete right my question is when
00:04:14 complete right my question is when designing the training was Babcock guided by the NFB as to the needs and requirements of the service yes it was but ultimately they're within go away
00:04:25 but ultimately they're within go away design the package and then ultimately there would be a conversation about whether it was adequate or not and the changes could be made thank you very well
00:04:34 well now can I now turn to a different topic which is command unit facilities on pages three and four of your statement
00:04:45 pages three and four of your statement you've described the command unit and the physical facilities or electronic facilities that it's a place to have and I just want to ask you to elaborate on a few of them first of all if you could look at page three of your statement that's two-thirds of the way down you
00:04:57 that's two-thirds of the way down you refer to at the top put laptop this is the second entry down in your list and you say there is a Toughbook laptop that
00:05:08 you say there is a Toughbook laptop that is designed to be used during operational incident and taken out and fleet feedback live information to the command unit that has never worked how
00:05:19 command unit that has never worked how is it supposed to work using the laptop so it works in conjunction with the element below which is the mesh node which is kind of a secure Wi-Fi network
00:05:31 which is kind of a secure Wi-Fi network you can pass information and it has to be able to secure Wi-Fi network and a dedicated localized network that enables information to be passed from a remote
00:05:42 information to be passed from a remote computer back to the main computer which would be on the CEO I see and who is who is meant to feed live information back from the incident who operates it it
00:05:54 from the incident who operates it it could be anyone so if you look at something at a simple incident it would be not the team leader it would be the map person that's responsible for mapping the incident so they can map it and then everything that they find
00:06:05 and then everything that they find everything that they come across could be fed directly instantly onto CSS whilst walking around with a remote laptop would it enable with a lap with
00:06:16 laptop would it enable with a lap with the the tough netbook combined with mesh node enable an incident commander to communicate directly with for example the control room I said difficult question because it
00:06:28 I said difficult question because it depends what program that controller using so control have different programs that they use to pass information on please vision that yeah yes they do so
00:06:39 please vision that yeah yes they do so the vision isn't available to pass specific information or notes across if you follow me so the the initial idea of
00:06:50 you follow me so the the initial idea of the introduction of the tough books was that there be to use CSS and CSS will be able to be constantly updated whilst out so you can update CSS but control
00:07:01 so you can update CSS but control wouldn't be able to update CSS because it would mean go into a different screen and a different operative it would have a complicated matters significantly I thought it was tough book used on the
00:07:14 thought it was tough book used on the night of the ground fell fire at the incident I've never used a tough book on an operational incident in my career they've never been operationally ready to be working oh I see so they weren't never they weren't available at all on
00:07:26 never they weren't available at all on these scenes they were on there but he wouldn't operate in an operable state yes right I see and mesh node was that also available on the night of the flaw he's never worked if they if mesh node
00:07:40 he's never worked if they if mesh node and Toughbook had been available on the night of the file I know this is a hypothetical question to some extent but what would what what use could have been made of them I fail to see how any
00:07:51 made of them I fail to see how any technology could have worked better than the way that the brigade works on that night okay CSS which is another item in your in your shopping list fourth one down come
00:08:04 your shopping list fourth one down come on support system you say that it's designed to record every tactical or strategic decision that the officer-in-charge makes these decisions are held on a central server at Union
00:08:15 are held on a central server at Union Street called the goal server it doesn't work in any large incidents and if it does not record them the decisions are not recorded and it is worthless do you just to clarify do you do say that actually the CSS is is never useful at
00:08:29 actually the CSS is is never useful at any large incident at a large incident so for a large my definition of large intestine would be anything over six appliances and I'd say no it's it's useless right what just just to be a little bit more particular when you say
00:08:42 little bit more particular when you say it does not work at any large incidents do you mean that it's not it doesn't functionally operate at a large incident or is there's just no point in using it because of the nature of a large incident notice that the first point its
00:08:54 incident notice that the first point its it doesn't functionally work due to IT issues continuing IT issues where it's been unable to deal with information a large incident you have a lot more
00:09:05 large incident you have a lot more information coming in as you can appreciate than a smaller instrument therefore the IT systems on the ECU's just struggle significantly and you could be spending twenty minutes doing
00:09:17 could be spending twenty minutes doing something and then it would crash and you'd have to restart the computers and that would be a continuing theme that is in it my knowledge still current to this night is that something in your own
00:09:28 night is that something in your own personal experience just my experience when everyone has ever worked on a command unit yeah right have you been at a large incident as you define it over six pumps and had these kinds of problems with the CSS yourself I went to
00:09:40 problems with the CSS yourself I went to the previous largest incident in London which was the closing opposite the closing ceremony of the London Olympics and CSS never worked there it didn't work on the night grenfell ever did you
00:09:53 work on the night grenfell ever did you did you try to use it I turned it on and off three times two computers to try and get it to work and then the distraction of trying to turn it on and off was just so great that it was decided just to not
00:10:04 so great that it was decided just to not bother anymore and just plow ahead without it but I was confident it wouldn't works in a way because my experience is that it just doesn't work past six appliances do you have a recollection of the CSS on
00:10:17 recollection of the CSS on it's cu8 let's start with that one crashing at any stage I was going to see you seven which is when these command units yes
00:10:28 units yes now I don't have a memory of it crashing because it never started right okay we may have to come back to that just in terms of what it might be able to do does it pick up vision entries it does
00:10:40 does it pick up vision entries it does yes yes it does and you say in this part of your statement that it is designed to recall every tactical or strategic decision that the officer in charge
00:10:51 decision that the officer in charge makes is there anything else it records as well as the vision entries yes so as a as an idea it's fantastic and you can record video points you can record
00:11:02 record video points you can record points that anyone makes you can record key decision locks tactical decisions you have a timeline that you can pop the gate and set prompts for the future to
00:11:14 gate and set prompts for the future to enable you to anticipate things to happen and you'd have a a reminder icon that would be present you can upload documents to it and it's a very useful
00:11:26 documents to it and it's a very useful tool on the smaller incidents for debriefing purposes because it has a timeline and everything is a date and time stamped as you progress throughout the incident so it's a very useful tool
00:11:39 the incident so it's a very useful tool to see how how well an incident commander performed and also how how the decisions were made at a correct time and you know potentially you can back out of a rationale between behind the
00:11:50 out of a rationale between behind the decisions as well what was to your knowledge was training on the use of CSS is that's the right expression delivered throughout the NFB in the period leading up to grand film it was delivered to me
00:12:03 up to grand film it was delivered to me five years prior and two other command unit staff within their first initial weeks
00:12:10 weeks there is no continuation training right five years prior to grand film yes but it's it's a system that you're expected to use daily it's a system that you are expected to refresh yourself on
00:12:21 expected to refresh yourself on continually and it was something that I'd attempt to use every incident sometimes it was successful some sometimes it boolean sometimes unfortunately it did let us down right you then go on to in
00:12:35 let us down right you then go on to in your list to describe the webcam facility and you say that doesn't work yeah who in who is intended to be using that webcam facility so again you can
00:12:47 that webcam facility so again you can record certain decisions you can record a tactical coordination group meeting TC gem or silver meeting and or you could just record somebody coming on given you
00:12:59 just record somebody coming on given you some vital a vital piece of information that needs to be recorded who had intended to be looking in remotely at what the webcam is picking up so that the webcam in reality is more designed
00:13:12 the webcam in reality is more designed for a recording purposes rather than for people to remotely monitor the CSS itself is you have the facility for anyone remotely to monitor the whole whole program so the whole program is
00:13:25 whole program so the whole program is one of the better word a package of other local programs within it so if a large incident is occurring prior to someone attending someone monitoring remotely excuse me they can log on to CSS and see what's happened or if it is
00:13:38 CSS and see what's happened or if it is a large incident and you're expected to be going to attend this large incident as a relief potentially then you can see what's happened what would be anticipated what would be expected what kind of thing you'll be would be happening and photographs will be
00:13:50 happening and photographs will be uploaded as well to give you an idea of what you've seen and what you can what you're expecting to see to give you a kind of a tactical decision in your brain and start to think about what you can offer when you arrive would it have
00:14:03 can offer when you arrive would it have been functionally possible for those in the control room to access the web cam facility if it had been working in order to see what was happening on the incident ground obviously depending on
00:14:15 incident ground obviously depending on whether the webcams place yes/no for something like that for something like that you'd probably need a Stryker camera oh you mentioned Stryker camera in your first in your first item in your
00:14:26 in your first in your first item in your shopping list on a tripod that raises up to a height of 20 feet is that is that used regularly in the brigade or well it doesn't work so now you say it doesn't
00:14:38 doesn't work so now you say it doesn't work what what is it about it that doesn't
00:14:40 doesn't again it was an IT glitch it was tested it's a fantastic piece of kits military-grade kit used for remotely monitoring incidents and you can place
00:14:51 monitoring incidents and you can place it somewhere walk away safely and knowledge that it will record you can tilt it you can zoom in you can zoom out unfortunately due to the IT systems that were installed on the command units it
00:15:03 were installed on the command units it never worked can you elaborate a bit what was it about the connection between the IT you have to speak to RIT our IT systems don't get to the pond but I mean I was
00:15:15 don't get to the pond but I mean I was involved in testing of it's a fantastic fantastic camera I was very impressed by it but ultimately it never worked
00:15:27 you then go on in your shopping list over the page we've discussed vector to mention a webmail service and video player and you say that is very
00:15:38 player and you say that is very temperamental and could you just elaborate for us what is the webmail service and the video player that excuse me again that enables offices or anyone
00:15:49 me again that enables offices or anyone with an email account to log into webmail remotely most officers have a all offices have a mobile phone and they can send and receive emails you could
00:16:00 can send and receive emails you could send in a picture email a picture in and they get it up onto the screen which would give you a better understanding of what you're seeing for example the video player again due to restrictions and due
00:16:11 player again due to restrictions and due to the fact that we were run in a very outdated version of Windows the it didn't quite have the correct permissions sometimes to view video
00:16:22 permissions sometimes to view video right you say it's very temperamental yeah what do you mean how is it so I remembered as a period of five or six months a few years ago where we had no internet access on the command units and
00:16:35 internet access on the command units and it would just not work we continually sent requests for it to work because sometimes there incidents we can get vital information is required via the
00:16:47 vital information is required via the internet by Google or via the planning or for just give you a better understanding of the incident and if we had no internet access you had no webmail service then that would then
00:16:58 webmail service then that would then puts on the back foot and then you talk about whiteboards and pens yeah those did work yes yes
00:17:17 can I just now ask you some questions on policy number five for one and I'm pausing only because I'm not sure that's made it into the policy under what everybody else has if the reference is
00:17:29 everybody else has if the reference is lfb quinn tuple zero two three two
00:17:40 and I want to ask you first of all are you familiar with this policy yes this is the one reviewed as current as a 15th of April 2014 and it's owned by the head
00:17:51 of April 2014 and it's owned by the head of incident command policy and operations review team just to be clear that wasn't was the ace a team in which you sat or was it that is the that is a two non-korean is continually and were
00:18:03 two non-korean is continually and were you on that team in April 14 know what kind of sausage when did you join that team may the fourth this year this year yeah okay now first of all are you
00:18:19 yeah okay now first of all are you familiar with this policy yes
00:18:31 right
00:18:35 can I ask you to look at
00:18:44 yes it's like I asked you to go to lfb two three three five five I'm sorry I just realized that what's on the screen doesn't appear to be the 2014 version
00:18:56 doesn't appear to be the 2014 version mr. Johnson say could you just bear with me
00:19:07 they're left be two three three five five this is the one the boys in force at the time they're converted has gone back to April 2014 we thought we were on
00:19:20 back to April 2014 we thought we were on now repeat the question I will are you familiar with this policy the one that was reviewed as current as at April 14 and was in force at the time of the
00:19:31 and was in force at the time of the Grenfell fire I'm familiar with it but I wouldn't say that I know it the baton now can I ask you first of all to turn to internal page three which is also page three of
00:19:49 page three which is also page three of the exhibit
00:19:56 and it describes the functions there of an incident command pump and there is on the next page a picture three two
00:20:14 picture of three one in fact as well and a 3-2 just above three two there is a photograph of a command unit and that three two it says the command area is
00:20:26 three two it says the command area is accessed by a door located on the near side of the vehicle body the near side of the vehicle also incorporates an external 32 inch touchscreen that can display all of the information available
00:20:37 display all of the information available on the internal computer systems this provides a briefing area for crews and officers at an incident now and there's the picture underneath it which
00:20:49 there's the picture underneath it which shows three or two firefighters and up watch manager standing by what looks like the external screen first of all was this facility something which was
00:21:02 was this facility something which was available or in force at the time of the grenfell however the briefing Oh from that screen yes I finally ever seen it once on on any incident I've ever been
00:21:13 once on on any incident I've ever been on and it wasn't used a crime film that wasn't used at Brentford was it physically available yes right is there a reason do you know why it wasn't used at grenfell the command unit
00:21:25 wasn't used at grenfell the command unit that I was on specifically was significantly remote from the scene right to give a briefing there would be unrealistic and by the time anyone would have been committed to the incident
00:21:36 have been committed to the incident due to the travel distance information could have changed or the operational plan would have changed significantly potentially right what internal computer
00:21:47 potentially right what internal computer system you just helped me what internal computer system on the CU is reflected by this external touch screen so it can
00:21:58 by this external touch screen so it can be any computer systems on the see you it's right it's so touchscreen it's the same as what you can see here you can put whatever you want on there if it's on the see you I see and I think you said so far as
00:22:12 I see and I think you said so far as you're concerned it wasn't what you wasn't used by you on the night it wasn't used by anyone on the night anybody else in the night was it actually physically working do you know or yes it would have been working absolutely okay would it have helped if
00:22:26 absolutely okay would it have helped if it had been used in any way I can't think of any scenario that would have been a benefit okay now at 3.8 if I could just ask you to look on to the
00:22:37 could just ask you to look on to the next page page five the policy has a paragraph headed incident communications and it goes on to say the CU has the
00:22:48 and it goes on to say the CU has the following communication facilities and then we see third third bullet point down a leaky feeder cable for enhancing radio communications at subsurface incidents or where communications are
00:23:01 incidents or where communications are difficult do you know whether leaky feeders were available on command units at the time of the fire generally yes they were do you know whether they were used on the night yes I do they want
00:23:14 used on the night yes I do they want they weren't now do you know why they weren't because that's since been superseded by a repeater system a radio repeater system so are you saying that in 2017 leaky feeders were not used
00:23:28 in 2017 leaky feeders were not used repeaters were I believe repeaters were put in place but I can't attest to their success okay well we'll come back to radio communications shortly just just continuing with this policy for the
00:23:40 continuing with this policy for the moment can you look at the next bullet point please mattel field telephone and cable for point-to-point wired communications do you know if the Cu you were on had a metal field telephone the
00:23:52 were on had a metal field telephone the Cu that I arrived on did at see you - yes s correct I can't attest to whether they there was one available on the CEO I was working on but I would assume that
00:24:03 I was working on but I would assume that it would be there yes did you know whether it was used or not to the best of my knowledge it was not used but again I can't see any circumstance where it would have been used and would have
00:24:14 it would have been used and would have been a benefit right it might be suggested that it might be of use in communicating directly with the bridgehead from from where from the command unit and that addition would have been too
00:24:25 and that addition would have been too great
00:24:25 great what distances does it over what distance is does it work believe and I wouldn't swear on this but I believe it's about a hundred meters and the the
00:24:37 it's about a hundred meters and the the from the command unit to where the bridgehead was was significantly further than 100 meters we had up to three four hundred people walking over there area
00:24:48 hundred people walking over there area we had hose we had appliances we had a significant amount of falling debris we had a huge amount of water to deploy that in that situation would have been
00:25:00 that in that situation would have been wholly unrealistic and I didn't put the second part of the bullet point to cable for point-to-point work communications does that show that this is actually a essentially a kind of land line it's a
00:25:14 essentially a kind of land line it's a cable it's a little physically if you can imagine a second world war film where someone's winding up oh yeah I know it is is similar to that okay now then you it then says in the next bullet
00:25:26 then you it then says in the next bullet point a downlink capability to view images from the MPS helicopter do you know whether that was working on the night it was working yes was it used the
00:25:40 night it was working yes was it used the signal was scrambled by the MPS was there any way which the sea you could know what the police helicopter was was
00:25:51 know what the police helicopter was was doing yes if they done scrambled it I repeatedly asked for it for the the image to be available when they said it's transmitting it's on this channel it's on another Channel they tried it on
00:26:02 it's on another Channel they tried it on at least to see use but unbeknown to us the MPs had to scrambled it without making us aware of that when did you discover that they'd scrambled it
00:26:13 discover that they'd scrambled it possible might um frame is very hazy but I would suggest around 10:00 half-past ten in the morning right
00:26:26 how did you find out that the MPs had scrambled be off I mean so the frustration with the CSS is that CSS isn't going to work sometimes the the downlink the heli tele
00:26:40 sometimes the the downlink the heli tele as it's called wouldn't work you try it two or three times you give up out of frustration there is no way specifically to know whether it's an IT failure on our side or if it's a failure within or
00:26:51 our side or if it's a failure within or if it has been scrambled by the MPS I asked three or four times different police officers of different ranks can we get it and they said this transmitting if I'm being told it's
00:27:03 transmitting if I'm being told it's transmitting and I've tried you know two three four times the assumption is that it's a problem our end rather than that they haven't unscrambled it did somebody
00:27:16 they haven't unscrambled it did somebody tell you that the MPs had scrambled the message they did around half past ten years who was who told you I don't have the name of that individual but it was a
00:27:27 the name of that individual but it was a member of the police service I would suggest inspector rank or above it was that at a meeting no I believe that came on and said if you can try at least Helle tell you now it has been scrambled
00:27:39 Helle tell you now it has been scrambled you can view it now so quite later on in the day we had facilities to view the holy tele so the officer police officer came onto the command unit and told you
00:27:50 came onto the command unit and told you that that's correct you say I would suggest inspector rank or above you do you remember it's I don't remember if you lined up two hundred police officers in front me there's no way I could pick
00:28:02 in front me there's no way I could pick any of them but I would suggest it wasn't expecting ranking above due to the the high ranking officers that were on the command you're near that time right
00:28:16 now
00:28:23 is that an expanding of a MPs heli tele message something you've experienced before gram film in in truth know if
00:28:37 before gram film in in truth know if they may have done it previously but again it could have been an assumption that a in reality I've used there five or six times in the past and every time I've used in the past it always worked
00:28:50 I've used in the past it always worked so there is no way to assume that it would have or even consider that it's been scrambled it's the access to the heli tele itself is not something that's
00:29:01 heli tele itself is not something that's available to the lay person on the street it is a dedicated channel and repeater of of what the helicopter is
00:29:13 repeater of of what the helicopter is viewing from live pictures do you know why the MPS scrambled like a daily message did you ask I think my
00:29:24 message did you ask I think my frustration at that time was just to move on and see if we can benefit from what we're seeing right did you raise the facts as you've just told us that
00:29:36 the facts as you've just told us that the MPs had scrambled the message with anybody at the NFB no it may have been recorded by the locust who was kept an
00:29:47 recorded by the locust who was kept an account of what was going on the command unit but I can't I can't confirm that right the law ggest no we have a name for the loggers at an early stage was Jackie McConnachie that's correct at this stage 10:30 in the morning was it
00:29:58 this stage 10:30 in the morning was it still Jackie McCulloch II believe so yes okay and do you know who else or can you remember who else was was party to or listening to the conversation you had
00:30:10 listening to the conversation you had with this inspector or senior police officer I don't the scrambling of the message they he wasn't a conversation I believe he just come on tried to CSS now I'm sorry as you were trying hell he tell you now she'll be working I tried
00:30:23 tell you now she'll be working I tried it he was working and he said to press my knowledge oh yes sorry about I was scrambled and then that was the end of the conversation right did anybody else hear that conversation or is it just you in this senior police
00:30:35 or is it just you in this senior police officer really I can't remember anyone was there other than myself but other command units were trying to access Haley tele so it wasn't an ice it wasn't
00:30:47 Haley tele so it wasn't an ice it wasn't just myself that was trying to access it I know that the FSG command unit was trying to access heli tele and the they just gave up because I couldn't access
00:30:58 just gave up because I couldn't access it what about the control room do you have any knowledge about that I have no knowledge of the control room that
00:31:13 finally in the bullet point list on page five of this policy under paragraph three eight it says a message conferencing facility for all users actively logged in to an incident accessed via the CSS conferencing system
00:31:28 that was something I think you referred to before but who would be the people intended to use that facility normally it was never used it was it was a nice to have it was kind of a chatroom for
00:31:40 to have it was kind of a chatroom for people on the command units at an incident but in reality it would have been easier to contact people via the mobile phones on the rear of the command units right could it have been used for
00:31:54 units right could it have been used for communications between either of the command units cu8 will see you seven and the bridgehead no the bridgehead didn't have any any CSS access what about the
00:32:11 have any any CSS access what about the Cu to see you means of communication would could've been used for that yes would it have been useful I can't imagine a scenario it would have been I
00:32:23 want to turn then to a related issue which is IT at the top of your statement on page four you say that there
00:32:37 on page four you say that there historically been connectivity issues
00:32:42 and particularly you say there are dead spots in certain areas in London which affects the signal and comp and connectivity rendering the whole computer system useless are those
00:32:54 computer system useless are those problems that you've identified here and in the next paragraph of your statement problems which you yourself ever raised with an FB senior management yes all senior management you did who can you
00:33:06 senior management you did who can you tell us anyone that would listen that would be able to so we we had a large turnover of staff from the day that I joined I was raised in as its mentioned proc below that connectivity report it
00:33:20 proc below that connectivity report it probably more be more beneficial to mention the connectivity reporter report itself was designed for the sole purpose of is it working is to see you working now if it was always working
00:33:33 working now if it was always working then you wouldn't need to create a pro forma to ask that question I don't I don't ever need see the need to contact my garage to tell them my car's working but the amount of force that were
00:33:46 but the amount of force that were continually happening with the command units was that there was a pro forma started and every time you went to an incident you had to tell them whether it was working or not and as it says in my statement around 40% of time it just
00:33:58 statement around 40% of time it just wouldn't work right you say three lines up from the bottom of a second paragraph second main paragraph on page four the connectivity report was reintroduced some years later for CSS it sounds from
00:34:11 some years later for CSS it sounds from that as if it was introduced and then taken away and then reintroduce so familiarity breeds contempt within the amount of emails that people were sending if you're if you keep sending
00:34:22 sending if you're if you keep sending the same email 20 times in a two month period and nothing's changed there's not really a great excuse me there's not really a great need to keep sending that
00:34:33 really a great need to keep sending that email they've got the evidence they need but it's unfortunate not being acted upon so we were told to stop sending the connectivity reports and then as it's mentioned they're due to a change in
00:34:46 mentioned they're due to a change in management a change in senior management it was requested that more connectivity reports were started and were sent again when were they reintroduced I can't give you that date I would has it guessed roundabouts end of 2015 2016 right and
00:35:01 roundabouts end of 2015 2016 right and to your knowledge was there a system for dealing with those issues that are raised in connectivity reports so connectivity reports yes should be recorded and sent as it's been mentioned
00:35:14 recorded and sent as it's been mentioned continually by other people our IT system our IT department isn't renowned for dealing with issues and as such all
00:35:25 for dealing with issues and as such all of the issues are reported by various people weren't there with weren't sorted and to this day are repeated do these IT issues - in your own personal experience ever adversely
00:35:37 personal experience ever adversely affect command unit performance at an incident yes can you give us something some instances I'll give you a 40 percent of every incident I went on the CSS didn't work the whole purpose of CSS
00:35:48 CSS didn't work the whole purpose of CSS is to record the officer in charges decisions is a recording tool it's a accountability tool and as such if it doesn't work then it's it's it's it's not doing rates designed for that's not
00:36:01 not doing rates designed for that's not to say that the crew themselves won't perform it to a high level and they can record decisions using the whiteboards using the headline board but the CSS program itself was very poor and had a
00:36:13 program itself was very poor and had a continual habit of failing and are those issues you experienced things that you raised in connectivity reports once they
00:36:24 raised in connectivity reports once they were reintroduced I did it originally and I did it when they were reintroduced Matt can I now turn to the night of the fire
00:36:30 fire which starts on page six of your statement now on that night and we could take this quite quickly you were writing see you - that's correct and you with watch manager Patrick Delaney yes that's
00:36:43 watch manager Patrick Delaney yes that's correct
00:36:43 correct and you were the team leader I think of see you - that's correct now 3/4 of the way down page six you didn't say that when you started your shift at 2100
00:36:54 when you started your shift at 2100 hours you started up the systems and you say in the third line there you began the shift by testing the equipment on the appliance we test all the computer systems that are relevant such as CSS
00:37:05 systems that are relevant such as CSS hella tele internet access we started up the systems and it should we had connections to all the relevant programs
00:37:12 now just pausing there is it is it the case of all the IT systems that are supplied on your cu2 worked effectively
00:37:23 supplied on your cu2 worked effectively at that point at that point in the bay so within each command unit we were in each fire station we have a closed Wi-Fi network so we were testing it upon Wi-Fi
00:37:34 network so we were testing it upon Wi-Fi we were not testing it with a cellular signal okay did that include to that test include the Toughbook the mesh node and the no we never test a Toughbook they were only kept on there for security reasons
00:37:46 only kept on there for security reasons the mesh node doesn't works never works never been trained on how to use it so I wouldn't test him okay now you then go on to say in the
00:37:58 okay now you then go on to say in the next paragraph however it turned out that a Grenfell and other large-scale incidents these systems did not work due to the server and the 3G signal not being able to handle the amount of information and high number of logins at
00:38:10 information and high number of logins at one time and just breaking that down a little bit what which exact systems worked when you tested them at the base but but didn't work when you've got to
00:38:21 but but didn't work when you've got to the incident CSS didn't work at the incident and and again I wasn't on my command unit so yes I was on another command unit I was on Wembley's CSS
00:38:34 command unit I was on Wembley's CSS didn't work on Wembley's heli telle did work on Wembley's but ultimately the the signals scrambled internet access was intermittent and did ultimately work as
00:38:46 intermittent and did ultimately work as I did receive emails concerning the incident right
00:38:56 now you say that due to the server and the 3G signal not be able to handle the amount of information that cause problems were the problems capacity
00:39:09 problems were the problems capacity overload for this incident all were they intrinsic failures of design and performance in those electronic it's the latter it's the latter and we've all it
00:39:22 latter it's the latter and we've all it is there anything you want to add to what we've we've discussed earlier this morning about those in order to elaborate on so I'm no IT expert I'm relatively clued up on IT issues but I'm
00:39:35 relatively clued up on IT issues but I'm no expert I'm just repeating what I've been told it may be that ultimately there's someone completely different but my understanding is that the server the signal the amount of and from my
00:39:46 signal the amount of and from my experience anything above a sixth pump incident it just has a complete meltdown and calm handled it now you were assigned to the incident at 138 hours and you were mobilized to a 25 pump fire
00:39:59 and you were mobilized to a 25 pump fire that is essentially what you say on page seven and if you go to page nine of the short incident log please which is attach 33 of our
00:40:19 page 9
00:40:25 we can see
00:40:31 that cu2 was mobile at OU 140 hours it's about a quarter of the way down that page has gotten report we've got it
00:40:43 page has gotten report we've got it highlighted there and then on scene at 0 158 45 does that sound right to you yes now on page seven of your witness
00:40:55 yes now on page seven of your witness statement you say that when you've got to the incident you parked on Walmer Road roughly was that from the tower artist to make
00:41:07 that from the tower artist to make probably as it says he must have 150 to 200 meters and yes I mean your statement
00:41:21 200 meters and yes I mean your statement or the bottom of page 7 says that about 150 or 200 meters after that which looks like it's after you go through the
00:41:32 like it's after you go through the traffic apologies yet so yes but probably 300 meters I mean I did have a Google Maps Patriot which would better describe the exact distance okay now you
00:41:45 describe the exact distance okay now you you knew I think that there were already two command units on scene yes did you know where they were part no did you know what they were doing
00:42:01 I didn't category no they were doing but I know what would what would have been expected of their role to be and has always been at any incident I've been to which is to do the main it's in the
00:42:13 which is to do the main it's in the command and for a secondary one to be FSG right at that stage a point of arrival at 158 did you have any idea of
00:42:25 arrival at 158 did you have any idea of the volume and intensity of FSG calls at the time of arrival yes I remember here in the radio on the way to the incident and a number of FSGS being passed across
00:42:38 and a number of FSGS being passed across I believe I grabbed a pad to make secretary notes encased as has happened in the past control can contact and oncoming appliance you know in my instance will be most likely or see you
00:42:49 instance will be most likely or see you in case they started to ask us points off I believe I made some rudimentary notes in case when I arrived the information had not been correctly recorded right do you remember what
00:43:03 recorded right do you remember what happened to that pad all those secondary notes I left on the on the see you it was discarded ultimately you wouldn't you wouldn't be able to read it we were
00:43:14 you wouldn't be able to read it we were traveling as speed and it would have been very roughly written right do you remember the kinds of things you wrote down I believe it's flat numbers and
00:43:25 down I believe it's flat numbers and persons right and you were writing those down as you heard them over the is this right the main scheme right yes that's correct
00:43:34 correct I see who was driving Alania so you were able to grab a pen yes and you say as you did a moment ago that they would have been discarded
00:43:46 that they would have been discarded what do you mean discarded and left in the CEO all destroyed i I can't actually remember specifically but my my best
00:43:59 remember specifically but my my best best recollection would be that would be left on the see you and see you too because people were answering the information it was being passed on to somebody I can't remember specifically
00:44:10 somebody I can't remember specifically who but it was been if it wasn't been answered then I would have been able to take the information and use it in a more in a useful fashion what would you have done I would have taken over the
00:44:22 have done I would have taken over the FSG or assisting with the FSG can I join it
00:44:24 it on arrival yes not remotely no right okay now on arrival did you know what
00:44:36 okay now on arrival did you know what you would be tasked to do aDNA did anybody have overall command of the use and deployment of the now three command units in attendance at just before 2
00:44:47 units in attendance at just before 2 a.m. so you can repeat the question yep did anybody have overall command of the use and deployment of all three command units at this point I'm not sure I
00:44:59 units at this point I'm not sure I understand the question well let me try it again
00:45:02 it again you have three command units now in attendance yes you're the last to arrive ask you're the third to arrive yes just before 2 o'clock yeah see your knowledge was anybody overseeing how all three command units should be used no button
00:45:16 command units should be used no button in there is no one to do that wrong that's not a role that is expected within the fire brigade or one I'm familiar with so who decides which
00:45:27 familiar with so who decides which command unit does what so the initial command unit which is tipped out would be the incident command unit you've also got the option that if so and FSG is carrying on it's up to the officer in
00:45:38 carrying on it's up to the officer in charge to redesignate potentially the command unit to take the role of FSG and if FSG is occurring then the second command you will be mobilized that second command unit can then come on and
00:45:50 second command unit can then come on and do exclusively FSG or vice-versa if that role has been passed on due to the incident and the size a further command unit is ordered to support the other
00:46:01 unit is ordered to support the other command unit and then further kamon units are tipped on on dependent upon the size their role is to support the other command unis I see so did you assume being the third to
00:46:14 so did you assume being the third to arrive that year or roller beers in a support role absolutely right so no one told you to do that that was just a natural assumption from your experience oh right that that is our role just
00:46:25 oh right that that is our role just okay did you leave what when you left see you two having parked it you tell us that you went from there to check in at
00:46:36 that you went from there to check in at the command unit do you remember which number that was at that stage we initially went to Fulham's command unit because it was the first commander he came across there was a few people outside but as we were command unit in
00:46:48 outside but as we were command unit in individuals it is normal for us to just go on and introduce ourselves it was very obviously that was being set up for another reason and that being the FSG I asked I remember who exactly
00:46:59 FSG I asked I remember who exactly possibly Dan Marek where the main Cu was because we had to book in and he says just around the corner and that's when I went to womenís command unit cu7 right
00:47:10 went to womenís command unit cu7 right now there may be a bit of confusion between Wembley and Fulham here so we need to explore that in just a moment just before I do can I ask you how long did it take you to go from Cu to where you parked it to the first command unit
00:47:22 you parked it to the first command unit that you went to I would say the walk probably took four four or five minutes four to five minutes four to five minutes yes and did you leave anybody on the command unit or did was it empty
00:47:35 the command unit or did was it empty when you left it it was empty it was locked up it was secured me and Pat walk together to the incident ground where did he go he came with me he came with you was he with you at all times no I believe it's written in my statement he
00:47:47 believe it's written in my statement he he'd kind of disappeared he got given another task what went out to look for a task yes and I didn't see him again until the next day we'll come back to him later he does reappear in the story and can I now turn to develop a similar
00:48:02 and can I now turn to develop a similar topic which is your check-in and become at the first command unit now on page 8 of your statement you say it's paragraph 3 in the middle of the page that you
00:48:13 3 in the middle of the page that you walk past the leisure center on grand on grenfell road we came across cu7 the command unit from Wembley and you say on this command unit was Norman
00:48:24 say on this command unit was Norman Harrison and asked him if that was the main command unit to which he said no we were directed around the corner to see you ate the command unit Fulham this was the main command unit at
00:48:35 Fulham this was the main command unit at the time now how soon after you arrived did you get to see you 8 apologies I've
00:48:47 did you get to see you 8 apologies I've got see you I can see you 7 around the wrong way there I was wondering about yes no that's so silly just to be clear you went to see you 8 first yes the command unit yes you found Norman
00:48:58 command unit yes you found Norman Harrison on cu8 yes and he said that that cu7 was the command unit and with UNC certain yes right so we could
00:49:11 UNC certain yes right so we could essentially swap cu7 to see you ATM apologies I got confused no that's they wondered about that that's that's very helpful now just focusing on Norman Harrison did you see what he was doing on cu8 at the time he
00:49:24 what he was doing on cu8 at the time he will see you right buddy also returned back to see you 7 he was gathering information taking notes from one command unit to the other to prepare to set up the FSG see you right so when you
00:49:36 set up the FSG see you right so when you arrived is it is it talk to take this this way is it right that cu7 was going to be set up for the FSG calls and information was being carried taken across no cu8 was being set up full of
00:49:52 across no cu8 was being set up full of if we call it Fulham and Wembley to Fulham was being set up Norman Harrison was on Fulham's command unit yes and I went around the corner ultimately which was come on you I was on all evening which was Wembley's command unit yes I think there is this
00:50:07 command unit yes I think there is this confusion here so full of as cu8 yes Wembley is cu7 correct you go first to see you 8 as you just told us yes first of all him yes Fulham yes and my
00:50:21 first of all him yes Fulham yes and my question is on the Fulham command unit yes what was happening what was Norman Harrison doing he was moving backwards and forwards from that he was on the phone he had a phone glued to his ear that's right as did Tony Peckham and I
00:50:33 that's right as did Tony Peckham and I believe our sort down Merrick there yes and they were preparing to start that command unit up Fulham as the main FSG quadrant right what
00:50:46 as the main FSG quadrant right what about cu7 do you know what was happening with that so we walk around the corner from from Fulham into Wembley's command unit where they were hurriedly writing
00:50:58 unit where they were hurriedly writing information down and trying to copy as best they can via photographs mobile phone photographs of stuff that had been recorded up into that point right now why were they doing
00:51:14 that point right now why were they doing that because it so the because the initial command unit turned up would have been Wembley they wanted to change command units and have a dedicated
00:51:27 command units and have a dedicated command units as I mentioned earlier if numerous command units are mobilized it is up to the officer in charge to designate what is what is what if you've only got one there then you can try and
00:51:40 only got one there then you can try and do both functions at the same time with something on the scale of granite or then that would definitely been advisable now you just say we're clear
00:51:53 advisable now you just say we're clear when you arrived at the first command unit you went to you say you saw it being set up for FSG calls were people actually handling FSG calls I believe
00:52:05 actually handling FSG calls I believe there was somebody on the phone who was that that was I believe Norman was on the phone that's the only individual that I remember being on the telephone you mentioned a moment ago dan Marek and
00:52:17 you mentioned a moment ago dan Marek and Tony Peckham yes what were they doing again I saw them walking backwards and forwards I had a great conversation with Dan and Tony when I went on to the other command unit I said you need me on there
00:52:29 command unit I said you need me on there and even know we're on top of this we've got this right you say walking backwards and forwards between where were they looking between the Sukumar units it was proximately 50 meters between the two
00:52:41 proximately 50 meters between the two command units right which one from your recollection which was nearer the tower cu8 will see you seven it will be full of cu8 right now
00:52:54 you vent you then went you say you went went to the - round the corner this is this is the middle of the same page page eight to see you ate the command unit
00:53:05 eight to see you ate the command unit from Fulham this was the main command unit at the time we walked onto Beimel Road and found see you ate now that is
00:53:19 Road and found see you ate now that is that to the best of your recollection being the second unit you visited was that the one doing FSGS or setting up for ever's jeez or was that the one the
00:53:30 for ever's jeez or was that the one the second command unit that I went to yes which should reach cu7 was the one that was doing incident command and FSG at the same time FSG and incident command at the same time yes
00:53:41 time yes did it come only to do FSG or only to do incident command after a time I I don't know the answer to that question right who did you see there on the second in
00:53:53 who did you see there on the second in command unit and your Lachlan was their dad Marik was their Tom good or was there at that period of time right did you see group manager Welch in
00:54:06 did you see group manager Welch in awkward you didn't know did he ever arrive when you were on that see you I never saw group major Walsh that evening except at the base of the tower right
00:54:18 except at the base of the tower right what about station manager loft I didn't see such mention loft you know him I do yes you do he'd be able to recognize him if I traveled in moving this morning what
00:54:31 what but I take it that wasn't the first introduction no no did anybody give you any command instructions when you arrived at the second command unit Nolan Command you know I asked where the
00:54:45 Nolan Command you know I asked where the team leader was and they said they were out on the eastern of ground and as such I said his only thing I can do and I believe I answered the radio was quite
00:54:56 believe I answered the radio was quite frantic at that time and I was answering the radio messages right and you do say that in your in your in the next paragraph I just wondered mr. chairman we began from just about an hour ago
00:55:08 we began from just about an hour ago start exploring this topic a little bit more is that a convenient moment for a break or we can come and we can carry on happily if we need to I'm totally fine if you want to carry a weaken well should we try going a bit longer than
00:55:20 should we try going a bit longer than seven and give ourselves a slightly longer brisker certain certainly certainly and we do that so yes thank
00:55:35 just before we do I wonder if we can just iron out this clip this CU 7 c u8 full and wembley possible confusion Joe we've had other evidence about the roles
00:55:46 we've had other evidence about the roles of each and how one changed to the other and I just wonder looking back at your statement
00:55:51 statement I'm sorry sorry I yeah I am correct so apologies in your statement you are correct right in my statement I'm correct and please disregard the confusion from prior I've just remember
00:56:02 confusion from prior I've just remember because I went to Wembley the following night and the command unit which was the main FSG command unit was there but was locked so apologies for any confusion so exactly that's very
00:56:13 any confusion so exactly that's very helpful I didn't have to work too hard I don't know how it happened I'm reading the last few days and it just must have no case myself so that was clear the first one you go to was see you seven letters being set up for s crazy and
00:56:24 letters being set up for s crazy and whether the oh I see command unit yes various now on that unit you say in your in the last paragraph on page 8 pass and
00:56:35 in the last paragraph on page 8 pass and I introduced ourselves to see you eight say we were from Islington and asked what we can do the officer in charge at the time is an dear Lachlan do you know
00:56:46 the time is an dear Lachlan do you know how long he'd been there when you got onto that command unit I don't know okay you then say also on the command unit was watch manager Dan Marek Tom good or and a couple of others whom I did not know or remember then you say I answered
00:57:00 know or remember then you say I answered the main scheme radio for that firfer for the first few minutes using channel flow mops for and you explained that I was receiving fire survivable call
00:57:12 was receiving fire survivable call information from our control room concerning people within the tower now first of all it was anybody else doing that receiving FSG information from control when you arrived when I arrived
00:57:26 control when you arrived when I arrived yes oh you ate other than the other than see Norman with a phone who was talking I believed to control I didn't seem to be on the command unit doing that now that was on cu7 though
00:57:38 doing that now that was on cu7 though that's correct yes when you got to see you ate which is I think what you're talking about yes paragraph who did you see dan also taking FSG calls from yes so
00:57:50 dan also taking FSG calls from yes so that Dan Merrick was in the process of moving BOTS from one commanded units with the other which would have left the command unit without any Cu personnel so I was the person that said I'll take
00:58:02 I was the person that said I'll take over the radios or or just without speaking just took over the radios IC and say they were moving from coa to c7 to do FSG is what you've said I think I
00:58:16 to do FSG is what you've said I think I hope fairly why did you take over the FSG call receiving function B because there wasn't anybody else to do it at that time that so the incident command
00:58:30 that time that so the incident command Cu is very obvious and the role of that and the FSG command during it is very obvious but there would be a period of time between the two for them to be set up and I know that just by helping out just by moving for them moving between
00:58:42 just by moving for them moving between the two and myself taking the radio there it would be for a short period of time before the other command unit would be set up as a main FSG so I stepped in which for a period on that I would
00:58:54 which for a period on that I would assume or would expect to be no more than one or two minutes how long was it in the end no more than one or two minutes so how many FSG calls do you think you dealt with well i leaved i can
00:59:07 think you dealt with well i leaved i can imagine i would have written down maybe two right what would you have written them down on on the FSG pad that's the quadruple occurred multicolored that's a real information form that's great
00:59:20 what then happened to the pieces of paper that you wrote that information down on they were passed on to once the FSG command unit was ready to be set up
00:59:31 FSG command unit was ready to be set up I believe Dan Merrick came back and I said look I've got these you need to look at these yeah yeah so you handed them to down there yeah behind it there was a lot of repetition so maybe this
00:59:42 was a lot of repetition so maybe this information had been passed on previously so I'm not sure but I think then may have said oh yeah we've got that one let me have the information for that specific call right do you remember any information for specific flats I do
00:59:56 any information for specific flats I do not know how to attack flats you don't do you remember any in generic information four particular flats changing or being updated in the period of time as I said there was a very brief period of time where there very little information what
01:00:09 where there very little information what as you were a very little amount of flats that were highlighted a period of time right did you receive those messages by the
01:00:21 did you receive those messages by the you said by radio yes so that's you were sitting at the radio control ok square you in the sea you as I went on the radio is being called and then I didn't
01:00:32 radio is being called and then I didn't sit down but I just grabbed it and spoke and said John uniforms tonight
01:00:39 did you send any informative or any other radio message at that point I devised an informative message for the OCR Lockland right
01:00:58 getting back to this question of the written down FST information on one of them sheets did what color was the sheet that you gave down Marik the top sheet is white so I was up last like all the
01:01:10 is white so I was up last like all the information to him because he was the individual responsible and the CEOs responsible and then it's up to them and the officer in charge of the officiate to disseminate the colored pieces of paper but as I said I believe he said to
01:01:22 paper but as I said I believe he said to me we've got that one right as in we've got the information already on concerning the individual when he filled out the form do you remember writing a time mark your itemized diamond there again I don't
01:01:33 itemized diamond there again I don't remember any specifics about writing that down and again it is was briefly repeated okay if evidence or information had all been passed on and do you know what happened
01:01:44 what happened what what Dan Merrick did with the pieces of paper he took him to see you you don't know what happened to know after that I never attended that see you for the rest of the evening right from what you could observe on cu8 when you
01:01:57 what you could observe on cu8 when you arrived on it it was anybody in radio contact with the bridgehead I did not serve anyone on in radio contest I gone I've got one step and I couldn't see
01:02:08 I've got one step and I couldn't see further than that it was it was a hectic scene it was a busy sink busy scene right
01:02:16 going onto page 9 of your statement in the third paragraph you say there that
01:02:28 the third paragraph you say there that um you saw watch manager Kent field coming on to the command unit and you say he wasn't in a good state he was struggling to walk bright red in the face and under an extreme amount of
01:02:39 face and under an extreme amount of stress and you say that that was due to the heat and dynamic incident and clearly needed to sit down and recover first of all was this before or was this
01:02:50 first of all was this before or was this after watch manage American group manager Goodell had gone to see you seven that was after was after do you know whether watch managing Kent field actually went into the tower I believe
01:03:04 actually went into the tower I believe he did yes giving you did do you know well let me ask you this are you trained to identify signs of metabolic heat stress in firefighters specifically as a
01:03:17 stress in firefighters specifically as a Cu personnel yes and well as a member of the London Fire Brigade yes you are and from what you know from that training and your own experience did you think that not Kent
01:03:28 experience did you think that not Kent feel the suffering from people from diet metabolic heat stress I know now they had an underlying medical condition that was not metabolic heat stress I said can we wait to talk about that do you know
01:03:39 we wait to talk about that do you know where he had been or what had been doing he's been on the instant of ground trying to gather information that would assist him within his role as a team leader right do you know why cu7
01:03:56 leader right do you know why cu7 was chosen to be the FSG command unit I don't you don't you then go on to say in your statement in the same paragraph I
01:04:10 your statement in the same paragraph I discussed with mark whether he wanted me to take over and become team leader for the main command unit cu8 we agreed that this would be for the best and that was then my role to facilitate the officer
01:04:21 then my role to facilitate the officer the officer in charge for the time I was there when you say facilitate the officer in charge do you mean support her staff yes right and then you say you would reduce yourself to Deputy
01:04:32 would reduce yourself to Deputy Assistant Commissioner an da Lachlan and explain to him that I was taking over the team leader role on the command unit did he agree I don't believe there was
01:04:44 did he agree I don't believe there was any question about not accepting right that there was no questioning and so far as you could observe what was da CA Lachlan doing he was listening to radio
01:04:59 Lachlan doing he was listening to radio messages listening to incoming information he was after I formulated a informative message it gave it to him he was try and get a map and a plan he wants to try and get an understanding of
01:05:10 wants to try and get an understanding of the overall incident itself leaving aside the very few FSG calls that you handle when you first arrived on cu8 do you remember whether you or anybody else
01:05:22 you remember whether you or anybody else on cu8 handled any further FSG calls after that I don't believe we did once cu7 took over running FSG calls did you
01:05:34 cu7 took over running FSG calls did you on cu8 alter your knowledge anybody else on cu8 get any updates from cu7 continued about FSG calls continually friend the night right how was that done through what means a communication all
01:05:46 through what means a communication all communications it was available to us so it be mobile phone be radio been mainstream radio using the phone ops channels right was there a was there a problem with communication where it was
01:05:57 problem with communication where it was it smooth and seamless between us in the atomizer yes specifically I can't remember I'm fully aware that they had any incredibly hard job an incredibly
01:06:09 any incredibly hard job an incredibly important job one that would not have been beneficial by me interrupting them to get updates on something that was information that was available elsewhere
01:06:21 information that was available elsewhere and what did you and your team do on cu8 with the FSG information that you were continually getting from season it was taught that the officer in charge to
01:06:32 taught that the officer in charge to ensure that he could update the incident plan and did you update the officer in charge with that information continually was that you who did that yes it would have been myself or it
01:06:44 yes it would have been myself or it could've been so I could evolve that task to another member of this EU that was working on soybean right when it was you what did you tell the ACO Lachlan or the officer in charge again the effort
01:06:58 the officer in charge again the effort it wasn't that the bulk of my information was not coming from the other see you it was coming from the bridgehead or from intermediaries or from the marshalling offices it wasn't
01:07:11 from the marshalling offices it wasn't coming from that see you how did the officer in charge update the incident plan using FSG information or updates that had come from cu7
01:07:25 it's a that's a very complicated question the officer in charge of themselves has an overall control of the incident and they have devolve responsibilities for each sectors as has
01:07:36 responsibilities for each sectors as has previously been discussed in these hearings the officer in charge at that point will be able to increase personnel to certain areas increase the amount of
01:07:48 to certain areas increase the amount of the brigade presence if we need to redirect resources that would something that the officer in charge can do as well but it's not done solely as the
01:07:59 well but it's not done solely as the Austrian charges decision it is done within the command structure within the FSG with the bridgehead with the lobby sector with the marshaling sector with the bi sector with Barry main control sector and again with the FSG sector
01:08:12 sector and again with the FSG sector that's a lot of sectors thank you for the officer in charge to to oversee and brief well we've been ops q there was there would be responsibility of an ops
01:08:23 there would be responsibility of an ops commander which di see a locker and later became yes but the prior to him becoming an ops commander well let me ask you this was when he became ops commander who was oh I see that would be
01:08:37 commander who was oh I see that would be a see Andy Ryland dear a pride man you ro taking over as incident commander then so we're talking about the period between two 15 or so and
01:08:48 between two 15 or so and and perhaps 2:44 would have to explore those times with with others perhaps but but at that time what did da CEO Lachlan do by way of making use of the FSG
01:09:00 do by way of making use of the FSG information in in in updating his plan how did things change based on that information i I can't specifically answer to that question that was a
01:09:11 answer to that question that was a question need to put two very I say look all I know is that as described that the huge amount of information coming in needs to be collated and passed on and then I say Lachlan was performing at a
01:09:22 then I say Lachlan was performing at a very high level in an incredibly difficult situation right who is the contact point on cu8 for receiving FSG information or information about FS
01:09:34 information or information about FS cheese from cu7 was that you was there anybody else as the team leader potentially it would any Cu person on there and how did you as team leader pass that information to DAC
01:09:48 team leader pass that information to DAC a Lachlan in that period of time due to the setting up and June to the great amount of information di CA Lachlan would just had the information and let them set themselves up let themselves
01:10:00 them set themselves up let themselves get into a position before they're ready to pass the information on excuse me
01:10:08 would I be the person yes I possibly could have been the person I have a very poor memory of the time of the sei Lachlan been in charge for me it in my
01:10:19 Lachlan been in charge for me it in my memory it lasted minutes okay dear do you remember whether da CA Lachlan or and ero when he took over is instead commander reacting in any way to FSG information and changing the plan
01:10:32 FSG information and changing the plan whether its deployment or whether its resourcing or anything like that in order to deal with the updated information as it had come from cu7 again that's a very that's a complicated
01:10:44 again that's a very that's a complicated question because the information coming in specifically to him wouldn't enable him to specifically change the information so if they would need it to
01:10:55 information so if they would need it to be a resources to be redirected you'd have to understand well what was horses are currently deployed what are those resources what resources do we have in reserve what resources are what
01:11:07 have in reserve what resources are what is the plan have those so for example if someone have been sent to floor 15 but had been redirected to floor 12 by discovering somebody then that feeds back into the plan the officer in charge
01:11:18 back into the plan the officer in charge it is someone that takes an overall much more strategic view of the incident while burning getting caught in the minutiae of specific singular FSG calls
01:11:30 minutiae of specific singular FSG calls were you aware I'm just asking you for your own experience and memory who are you aware of any difficulties of communication about FSG deployments VA
01:11:44 communication about FSG deployments VA deployments of responsive FRG FSG calls coming back from the bridgehead in sorry in what respect well let me ask a question slightly different way were you
01:11:55 question slightly different way were you aware of any difficulties in getting information from the bridgehead about the success or failure of any deployments there were communication difficulties throughout the evening for you different parts yeah but were you
01:12:06 you different parts yeah but were you aware of any gaps in information about particular deployments in response to FSG information you had there was kept some information about every single thing due to the huge amount of
01:12:19 thing due to the huge amount of information coming in we had 100 hundreds of people with vested interests with information that each individual felt was vitally important how that
01:12:30 felt was vitally important how that feeds into the tactical plan how that fits into the oxygen charges is something that needs to be collated but yes there were communication problems four out of the nine which has already been explored throughout this hearing yes mr. chair we again turn to a
01:12:43 yes mr. chair we again turn to a different subject or slightly different subject and I'm conscious that the witness has been going for an hour and a quarter yes brave enough I think the witness might mmm
01:12:54 mmm carry on well it's also the transcribers anything yes of course all right well we'll have a break now
01:13:09 yes we can okay we'll have a caution ours break come back at 11 o'clock please and courseden talk to anyone for evidence right thank you very much right
01:13:22 evidence right thank you very much right to give the option to me eleven o'clock
01:13:35 to give the option to me eleven o'clock isn't it
01:28:51 right
01:28:54 yes why should we have mr. Thompson back room please
01:29:11 yes we're happy to continue every afternoon mr. Johnson thank you very much for coming back to us can I ask you to look at page 9 of your statement please and go to the bottom of the page
01:29:24 please and go to the bottom of the page where in the paragraph which starts shortly after that three lines up from the bottom you say I composed another informative message stating that assistant commissioner and ero are taken
01:29:35 assistant commissioner and ero are taken over as the officer in charge of the incident this was composed to inform control and others across the incident ground can I ask you to look at the what
01:29:47 ground can I ask you to look at the what we call the second hour o RR which is a lfb composite document which is lfb quadruple 0 for 8 to 8 and go to page 208
01:30:17 and at two 3917 as we get to it it's lfb quadruple zero four eight two eight internal page 208 document number
01:30:30 eight internal page 208 document number 209 the document page 209
01:30:59 yes it's actually the next next page
01:31:04 thank you that's lovely now at 2:30 917
01:31:14 that is my choice can you get back if we can just go back at page 239 17 we see just half way down the page you say it
01:31:25 just half way down the page you say it says cu8 send informative message to the radio operator at Brigade control charlie uniform 8 informative message from DAC O'Laughlin fire on all floors from 2nd to 27th floor large number of
01:31:38 from 2nd to 27th floor large number of persons involved FSG calls being dealt with major incident declared high-rise procedure implemented TL a LP e DBA main control f SG r a monitor v jet safety cordon in place tactical mode
01:31:49 safety cordon in place tactical mode Oscar Charlie uniform 8 over is that your message I believe so yes and at the foot of page 9 you say that a
01:32:01 and at the foot of page 9 you say that a Siro came on board and assumed command and you sent another informative message to say he taken charge if you turn on to page 2 1 8 in the same document or if you could please be shown that 2 1 8
01:32:31 that's it to 1/8 you can see at 2:43 51 a third of the way down the page there's
01:32:42 a third of the way down the page there's an informative message to the radio operator acted great control charlie uniform ate fewer information AC and zero is now incident commander of this incident tactical mode Oscar Charlie uniform 8 is again is that your message
01:32:54 uniform 8 is again is that your message yes right
01:32:57 and then there's another message actually sent earlier on which says that DAC are locked in this the officer in charge and that if you go to page 144 if
01:33:08 charge and that if you go to page 144 if you can please be shown page 144 of the same document I just want to ask you whether this is yours as well
01:33:37 Paige wonderful for
01:33:42 doing this
01:34:00 that's - it's the next page think you just change you share in the next page
01:34:12 we can see that as both on the previous bottle to the rigors page table the
01:34:23 bottle to the rigors page table the previous page to 11:48 see you a sends informative message to the radio operator at Brigade control charlie uniform a DAC a locking is now officer in charge of this incident DSL often
01:34:34 in charge of this incident DSL often charlie uniform 8 over again is that your informative message I never leave so now you don't think that's yours no do you know whose it might be it would've been mark in thoughts mark Enfield was was not Kentfield on the
01:34:47 Enfield was was not Kentfield on the radio at that stage I don't believe I was on the command unit on contest to that I see say you don't think that at this stage to 11 you were yet on see you 8 that's correct
01:35:00 you were yet on see you 8 that's correct right I see alternatively he could have got over what channel 10 and informed someone to send that message but I'm confident I didn't send that message now
01:35:13 confident I didn't send that message now we could take that we could take that off the stream they moved a different different point in your statement at the top of page 10 you refer again to the
01:35:25 top of page 10 you refer again to the CSS and you say in the third line there it wasn't working hadn't worked during the entire incident I said I'd come back to this can I ask you to look at a
01:35:36 to this can I ask you to look at a document which is M et triple zero one eight two four six
01:35:55 which is or should be when it comes onto the screen and arrays decision log taken by a Jackie McConnachie and it's in fact an exhibit to her statement I just want
01:36:08 an exhibit to her statement I just want to show you this see if you remember anything about it it's M et triple zero one eight two four six
01:36:34 I think that the problem is community and let me try different we've got a different reference at MIT quadruple
01:36:45 different reference at MIT quadruple zero five four zero four this document appears in a number of places say it may be that that particular reference isn't right that's it that's the document and if I can ask you to go to the time mark
01:36:59 if I can ask you to go to the time mark at 403 which is on page three
01:37:19 at
01:37:23 in fact one can get back a page I'm sorry that's a different reference one get back guys back one page not having much luck this morning that's it
01:37:37 much luck this morning that's it now that in the entry three from the bottom at a 403 it says commands port system has gone down do you remember
01:37:50 system has gone down do you remember being at a meeting when this was recorded no you don't do you remember anything about the CSS system or a CSS
01:38:02 anything about the CSS system or a CSS system going down it so when I first went onto command unit in between taking telephone calls and radio calls I tried
01:38:13 telephone calls and radio calls I tried to get CSS to start turn it on turned it off a few times it's been approximately 220 2:30 in the morning right but as I
01:38:25 220 2:30 in the morning right but as I said I'm a statement it it never it never worked that may have just been a formal recording of the fact that it has gone down right okay but you can't help us further with that why it was a record
01:38:39 us further with that why it was a record at that time probably just to formalize the fact that it has it wasn't working right now you then say that you moved on to the headline board on cu8 I just want
01:38:51 to the headline board on cu8 I just want to show you a number of photographs if I can just to see if you could help us with them and if you if you can't we'll just move swiftly on first of all could you please be showing em et quadruple zero eight seven two two
01:39:07 now this was on see you a deer does this look familiar to you yes what is it you know it's the headline board which
01:39:18 know it's the headline board which details who's in charge and the sector's right and can you just explain the sectors for us there so you've got a bi sectors at the top there
01:39:30 you've got a bi sectors at the top there you've got the AC obviously who's the into command of do see a lot one who was incident optical manda you've got the names in left hand side watch major hall who was at the RVP
01:39:41 who was at the RVP a group major Pugsley who was for investigation then you have Sanders and Kipling who were in the be a sector marshalling secretary have Foster and again you have another relief Harvey
01:39:55 again you have another relief Harvey piece of this this would have been later on the incident this wasn't an early early on headline board you also have a water sector which again is is there such mention cook who directly is
01:40:06 such mention cook who directly is reporting to do a magic God born and gradual Walsh I see two and roughly what time do you think this was this would have been I would say that it I'm confident us after 6:00 a.m. after
01:40:18 I'm confident us after 6:00 a.m. after 6:00 a.m. turning to the next photograph its 872 for quadruple 0 8 7 2 4
01:40:34 do you know what that is it's headed flow mops one that's it can be expanded a little bit there then this was on seeds well first of all do you remember
01:40:46 seeds well first of all do you remember this being on see you ate it looks as if it's a net right next to the ball yo-yo so removable whiteboard those kits next to the headline board right you know he was writing on this that's not more right in I do know whose it is I do not
01:40:59 right in I do know whose it is I do not know and you can see on it that somebody had written or recorded where as turnover query cylinders and then next
01:41:12 turnover query cylinders and then next to that press area and then above that in blue 36 EDB a sixty a DBA OS 50 Barling can you help us with that that would be a running total of a DBA
01:41:25 would be a running total of a DBA wearers and OS is outside fifty Barling
01:41:33 yes is that that would just be a running total that have been pressed on but to me that looks like a mind map so it would be the individual row that would be the best person to attest to what
01:41:44 be the best person to attest to what what that means to that individual I would suggest to be a significantly senior officer AC or above right and the connections between just help me there's
01:41:56 connections between just help me there's there are some errors at the top starting on the right c7 f SG @ ro ro c u8 I CV I assume that means incident command vehicle yes
01:42:07 command vehicle yes and then ro ro flops one Cu SC is that right SC CS or slls what is that whereas we looking through on the left at the top of the second arrow which links cu8
01:42:21 top of the second arrow which links cu8 by Flom ops one to something else see you something
01:42:28 there
01:42:32 can you just help us with what that's cu is it looks like Cu one so it's your BCC which is would be set up at control yes at Stratford DAC failure say Benton yes
01:42:44 at Stratford DAC failure say Benton yes group manager leader who was it got ops next to his name in the control room sorry his GM leader in the jobs in the control room what I didn't seek revenge
01:42:56 control room what I didn't seek revenge later that evening so a group manager leader is a person not of not a role no yeah he's Steve leader yes team leader okay and then yes do you want what does
01:43:09 okay and then yes do you want what does that mean
01:43:10 that mean SCC I don't know I've never seen those initials before but it just details what would be bcc would be remotely planning and will remotely be preparing to come
01:43:22 and will remotely be preparing to come on to the incident right can you help do you know whether cu8 was in radio contact with any see you other than cu7 yes which we were in contact with the
01:43:35 yes which we were in contact with the Marschallin see you which see you was that I don't know the exact number of it it may be in my notes but it was being run by a little bridge the IC drawbridge right and was that look looking at this
01:43:49 right and was that look looking at this does this would help your recollection as to which number it was it looks like it's Cu 1 SC SC s can you help with that I can't know right C 1 we Lucien so
01:44:05 sorry the Edmonton year possibly Edmunds embark on confirm no okay it looks from this as if cu8 was in contact with c7
01:44:16 this as if cu8 was in contact with c7 and Cu one and Cu one was in contact with the brigade control center is is that how you remember it I was in contact with every Cu that was available
01:44:27 contact with every Cu that was available every co-operative that night the officer in charge the ops commander people on the bridgehead I woke to up was 150 people a evening and I believe that they also
01:44:38 evening and I believe that they also spoke to upwards reach individual 150 people as well okay on the bottom right hand corner of this board we see in brackets with a tick over it Glenn Williams III five one watch manager can
01:44:49 Williams III five one watch manager can you tell us anything about that he left the incident she does that why that was recorded up there yes it would be for wrongful purposes right looking at the
01:45:01 wrongful purposes right looking at the next slide then can I ask you to look at eight seven two five M 18 quadruple zero eight seven two five what do you know
01:45:13 eight seven two five what do you know what that is yes that's a number white board and on it is d'oeuvre which is the abbreviation for diesel there's two Bramley road for OS use or prescient support units right and then there's a
01:45:25 support units right and then there's a list of appliances that would need d'oeuvre and in Hotel free--free alpha who would be responsible for shuttling d'oeuvre back and forwards from a petrol station right now on the right hand side
01:45:36 station right now on the right hand side we see two things first of all we see fib board with an arrow yes what what does that indicate that's where the FID board was the full information board and that is just to highlight the fact that it's there but
01:45:47 highlight the fact that it's there but that's not specific to that even that would be there forever who do you say that would be there forever does that mean that there was that was a permanent yes
01:45:55 yes piece of writing on the CEO yes to see use were sometimes stowed differently for certain items equipment so that would be if somebody was standing by
01:46:06 would be if somebody was standing by some from another station needs to find a fit board they know where it was by the side to fit board I see it was there a fit board on the seat on cu8 I I really can't remember it wasn't my to see you I wouldn't have done or been
01:46:18 to see you I wouldn't have done or been responsible for the invent inventory but something you can certainly find out right the second thing on the right hand side is for the most part redacted but
01:46:29 side is for the most part redacted but do you remember what it was that looks a like a list of telephone numbers for stations stations can I ask you to be shown the next photograph which is quadruple zero eight seven to six
01:46:44 can you tell us what this is yes so again this looks like something that our senior officer has done for preparation and mind map for prompts of how they're gonna be moving forward with
01:46:56 how they're gonna be moving forward with the incident so again this would be as you have marshalling you've got reliefs so you've also got question mark next I was six hundred hours so to recount my previous statement of the Assumption there would be that that's prior to oh
01:47:07 there would be that that's prior to oh six hundred hours and relief spare appliances people so it's it's about its prompt to remember it's the sort of thing that could have been recorded by CSS but it's a lot more direct and
01:47:20 CSS but it's a lot more direct and visible representation of what is to be happen and what's expected to be happened and karofsky there to look at eighty seven thirty seven
01:47:37 can you just tell us what that is
01:47:42 that is a CSS screen right showing a map of the area do you know what does this
01:47:58 of the area do you know what does this show us or does this help tell us that the CSS Anse cu8 was actually used no that that's just shows at a time I don't know if that specifically on the date
01:48:09 know if that specifically on the date it says incident says connection which we assume that is connected whether it's populated or not is a completely different story so whether that was fully researchable or rather it's just a
01:48:20 fully researchable or rather it's just a picture what's quite common is that you turn it on and all you've got is just the picture nothing so none of the appliances would be populated which should automatically occur if that's the case to load up 120 appliances and
01:48:31 case to load up 120 appliances and personnel would have taken two people up to three or four hours right
01:48:40 looking at the next paragraph if I can move on eight seven three eight should be in the next secret that next one in the sequence what does I think we've had some
01:48:51 what does I think we've had some evidence before about what this this shows us but it also seems from the window that it's daylight by this stage but what do we see in that picture you can see the two tough books you can see
01:49:03 can see the two tough books you can see all the normal row boards there are in attendance I see say there's red things on the Left those um nominal real boards are they so the red things we have the
01:49:14 are they so the red things we have the rack in which has previously been explained we have the rack in where the boards are to be placed and next to those we have the red things with the blue heading yes excuse me which
01:49:26 blue heading yes excuse me which signifies that they off of all of appliances and then they have the name the number of the individuals that are on their say-so
01:49:38 on their say-so is there a distinction between the the ones with the blue sitting underneath the tough books and those with the yellow in the racks yeah they're yellow they're officers you're there are officers okay right and said what happens when somebody comes and presents
01:49:50 happens when somebody comes and presents themselves I say somebody when an officer comes and presents themselves to the sea it can be anyone it doesn't have to be remember the fire brigade that can book in so it can be somebody right and do they get given a red no no senior
01:50:04 do they get given a red no no senior officers have all got a normal row board which is a responsibility to hand in every appliance has a normal role board luckily you've got the window there so the window would normally you'd be booking in and there would be an LED
01:50:15 booking in and there would be an LED display above the window saying booking in area and then you would pass the board on say who you are what your role was a wide potentially you've been called on to this incident you can either wait outside or you could be
01:50:27 either wait outside or you could be called on to be briefed or forwarded on to the inside but who would fill in the normal role board with eat with the boards need to be done a change of watch the offices number I board obviously their name doesn't change so that
01:50:38 their name doesn't change so that remains but every shift the number of boards you have a day and a night board and the day boards are filled in shifter I'm not 30 or he actually
01:50:50 shifter I'm not 30 or he actually actually were they are prepared by the off-going watch for the oncoming watch in the station yes I see so they're already prepared because you looking at the CEO you just hand it in yes next picture please which is
01:51:02 yes next picture please which is quadruple zero eight seven three nine can you help us what does what does that tell us
01:51:09 tell us structure engineer districts surveyor that was an individual it was it to be coming on now interestingly up on that
01:51:21 coming on now interestingly up on that we can see on the right Oh 247 AC ro yeah what what does that tell us that would be potentially the time that AC ro booked into B officer in
01:51:34 time that AC ro booked into B officer in charge
01:51:35 charge do you know who wrote that up there that's not my handwriting no but do you know I do not know no do you don't as it is no right oh there isn't information on there
01:51:46 oh there isn't information on there isn't familiar to me even I know both Steve personally jawbridge but right and do john allen underneath the word structural engineer district severe it does that tell us that john allen walls
01:51:58 does that tell us that john allen walls the structure internship engineer districts event I don't know you don't next picture please which is quadruple zero eight seven four zero and another
01:52:14 zero eight seven four zero and another whiteboard on the see you what does that tell us do you think that so a lot of that is my handwriting can you tell us which the the red on the lower
01:52:26 which the the red on the lower two-thirds on the right hand side which is twelve F are you 36 palm for Ariel adenine a seven eight Jim one commissioning one I see on the layout at
01:52:39 commissioning one I see on the layout at the bottom is that your handwriting that's not my handwriting notes for to me and on the left hand side you FSG
01:52:46 well SBA sorry can I just interrupt you and ask you what does ba out signify do you know no idea okay so I can choose please carry on
01:52:56 so casualty yes a casualty would be Cass CAS would be how many casualties we would have had trying to keep a running total at that putt at that point in time
01:53:07 total at that putt at that point in time right
01:53:07 right where were you getting that information from do you remember from various sources so as you can appreciate not just myself in isolation on the main Cu but other C's we're getting different
01:53:18 but other C's we're getting different numbers from different places so what we were trying to do is callate them to try and get the most rounded figure the most accurate figure that we could write and
01:53:29 accurate figure that we could write and it says in blue FSG 133 a 58 C and does that
01:53:38 that so that would be 135 133 adults yes thirty-eight children giving you a total 171 in total below that is a casually handling it with casually handled in area and 115 people that would at that
01:53:50 area and 115 people that would at that point be unaccounted for and that's not to say that the two figures should be added to give one hundred and 1571 it could be the 115 are taken from the hundred seventy well do you remember first of all who would have written that
01:54:02 first of all who would have written that on that's my handwriting that's your handwriting do you remember roughly when and during the night you would have written that up there if we could zoom back out again please yes so again that would be that
01:54:18 please yes so again that would be that was there could be between six and ten that the the amount of casualties we had confirmed was relatively low for quite some time unfortunately I see and where
01:54:29 some time unfortunately I see and where were you getting that information from that you recorded there so that we come back from the bridgehead that could be coming back from the main FSG see you as well it's a combination and they
01:54:40 well it's a combination and they themselves could be passing this information from the bridgehead back to the main FSG command unit and vice versa so it's kind of a loop plus we had a significant amount of people
01:54:51 we had a significant amount of people that were runners that we're passing on information from the incident ground themselves you said in that last answer that you would be getting back information from the bridgehead yes deep what was the method of communication by
01:55:03 what was the method of communication by which the bridgehead was communicating with you in Cu aid there was a multitude of different types of communication I use handheld radios we tried to use flops one and I believe
01:55:14 we tried to use flops one and I believe we use mobile phones as well so you tried to use flops one did he succeed we did intermittently but again with the amount of people with an interest in
01:55:25 amount of people with an interest in using that it could some sometimes become overloaded and as such we would resort to other methods of communication do you remember who you spoke to personally on on the bridgehead yes that's why I said many many different
01:55:37 that's why I said many many different people at the bridgehead aspects Brian O'Keefe
01:55:39 O'Keefe I spoke to Pat Golborne I have one specific memory of speaks back old one which is doing he mentioned to me about the the impossibility of going past a
01:55:50 the the impossibility of going past a certain floor which was the floor do you remember I can reference my notes but I believe it was floor 11 right I'd rather confirm it we've been here
01:56:03 I'd rather confirm it we've been here but I remember specifically the phrase that we cannot humanly go past floor 11 with the capabilities and sets that we have right during what you did with that
01:56:14 during what you did with that information I asked a group mention Golborne now the IC girl want to hold on to the line the AC was talking I interrupted him and gave that
01:56:25 interrupted him and gave that information to the AC right do you think that was recorded in the log by Jackie McCulloch yes now do you know whether
01:56:36 McCulloch yes now do you know whether that information was passed back to the control room
01:56:44 I am not worth it was passed by tonight then finally in the run of pictures quadruple zero eight seven four one well
01:56:57 quadruple zero eight seven four one well I think that probably tells us everything we need to know is there anything you would like identify on that picture it's an air-conditioning unit bother than that everything else is no
01:57:08 bother than that everything else is no way to ask you whether that was working it was it was good right another turn back to your statement if I can and ask you to look please at the bottom of page
01:57:19 you to look please at the bottom of page 10 in the penultimate paragraph you say there was issues with radios early on I
01:57:32 there was issues with radios early on I had asked for channel 2 to be switched on across the incident ground and I'm sorry mr. documents directory it's the top of them part of the text we've got on the screen there there was issues
01:57:43 on the screen there there was issues with radios quite early on you say I'd asked for channel 2 to be switched on across the incident ground using ACU repeater which enables channel 2 to be
01:57:54 repeater which enables channel 2 to be utilized and giving us an extra channel on the handheld radios normally we have 10 radio channels but really only have 9 channels as channel 2 is only available if you turn it on at the command unit using the Cu repeater we asked for that
01:58:09 using the Cu repeater we asked for that to be switched on but it did not work we've always had issues with that specifically first question what were those issues that you were referring to there I didn't work the radio channel -
01:58:22 there I didn't work the radio channel - would wouldn't work did that impact in any way on your ability to perform your role on the night no Howard channel 2 have assisted if you had been able to use it
01:58:35 I can't imagine a scenario where it would have been a benefit right who did you request should deploy the Cu
01:58:46 you request should deploy the Cu repeater I can't remember Bob I know it was somebody from another command unit maybe somebody from would cite command unit who came along and asked for this for the repeater and but again as you
01:59:00 for the repeater and but again as you can appreciate on a incredibly busy now I can't remember the specific person but they came and asked for the repeater but you refer to with the Woodside command unit is that Edmonton no it's all site isn't everyone yeah yeah right
01:59:14 all site isn't everyone yeah yeah right which number is that you know six don't act on that then you don't need only what effect to the use of the repeater
01:59:25 what effect to the use of the repeater have the so as I say the women my evidence channel 2 is only available when a CEO is in attendance so it just gives you an extra video channel so we would be able to turn it off turn channel 2 on and have an extra radio
01:59:37 channel 2 on and have an extra radio channel but having an extra radio channel with all the previous explained ways of communication just gives another way that potentially information could
01:59:49 way that potentially information could be passed across but what I found to see any benefit of having one extra radio channel right I think you've just answered the question that I asked before but can I just focus on the
02:00:00 before but can I just focus on the question I did ask which was about repeaters yes what assistance would what what effect would the use of repeaters have had if they had been working oh it
02:00:13 have had if they had been working oh it would have enabled channel 2 to be working I see ok so the channel 2 itself can only be turned on by the Cu yes as you said we'll see you in attendance you flick a switch chance who works with the
02:00:24 flick a switch chance who works with the radio engineer attending the hope and the goal there was that he could fix whatever the deficiency was and to enable the channel 2 to be working he couldn't and was the use of the air wave
02:00:40 couldn't and was the use of the air wave radio to communicate with the bridgehead considered I believe was used was used was it used effectively yes right now you say in the
02:01:02 effectively yes right now you say in the same paragraph just halfway down we asked I also asked for someone from radio workshops to attend they want to say normally a certain at a certain
02:01:13 say normally a certain at a certain number of pump incidents we were way above that they would send a radio engineer to us to attend assuming there would be interference with radio communications they did send someone out on that night I believe the engineer had
02:01:25 on that night I believe the engineer had a look at this issue and said he couldn't do anything first of all is it is it normal it does sound as if it is that that over a certain number of pumps you work on the assumption that the
02:01:36 you work on the assumption that the radio communications will be interfered with yeah that that might be I might be
02:01:47 with yeah that that might be I might be explaining it credit within my notes at a large incident you'd have a greater demand upon radio channels so a radio engineer would be able to come out and assist if there were anticipated any
02:01:58 assist if there were anticipated any issues I see would have been would it be normal at a large incident which I think you've defined they were six pumps I'd yeah I don't arge incident for a radio engineer I
02:02:10 arge incident for a radio engineer I don't believe is about 60 pumps I believe is above that I believe is 10 and above Bolivar but that's something that could be I could feed back to you is that a pot it's a mobilization yes policy yes right PDA okay and does
02:02:26 yes policy yes right PDA okay and does that tell us that that it's normal to dispatch or have ready at least a radio engineer absolute that sergeant students I see now you say you asked for someone from radio workshops to attend can I ask
02:02:39 from radio workshops to attend can I ask you to look at page 25 of the short incident log
02:02:54 just to see if we can get a handle on the timing of that 340 420 yes 355 home
02:03:14 yes we've got three 5504 the initial call went in at 344 344 you say that let's look further up the page 344 12 is
02:03:26 let's look further up the page 344 12 is that what you're referring to yes do you remember that yes and that sounds about the right time you requested one first is yes okay and do you remember all know what time one arrived I do not know it
02:03:39 what time one arrived I do not know it was it was daylight it was daylight okay well if week we might be able to pin this down a bit a bit more closely if you go down to zero 355 which is the
02:03:52 you go down to zero 355 which is the service request bottom of the same page a 350 504 service request see you a request urgent attendance of radio
02:04:03 request urgent attendance of radio engineer to assist with channel 2 for fire ground now that that's the service request we've had some evidence of our Hadees get completed if you move on to page 32 of the short incident log and
02:04:16 page 32 of the short incident log and look at time the time mark there on that page for 505 1802 service requests completed see you request urgent and
02:04:27 completed see you request urgent and attendance of fire a radio engineer to assistant channel 2 for fire ground does that time Oh 5 1802 correspond with your
02:04:38 that time Oh 5 1802 correspond with your recollection as to when the radio engineer arrived would nor would it be before that well that that request is for someone to attend so yes yes so that if what you're
02:04:53 attend so yes yes so that if what you're saying and I'm not familiar with the book and in process for the radio engineer but potentially like that could be the time it was daylight right let me see if I can just just put one more time
02:05:05 see if I can just just put one more time mark to you if you go to page 14 of the short incitive log ooh exactly halfway down the page we see our w-2
02:05:17 Donovan Robert who is status - it looks at it looks like at 403 in other words
02:05:33 at it looks like at 403 in other words mobile - incident would that be with that correspond with your recollection go for a three that's his mobilization time there's no he's attendance to her
02:05:45 time there's no he's attendance to her hasn't gotten attendance on it hasn't gotten attendance now you've got a left time but not an attendance - yes it's got an available time understand estate what I'd call the status to time but mobilized or mobile to incident yes
02:05:58 but mobilized or mobile to incident yes but he I can't say what time he got they put it in his self does not so time he got there and I don't know if the individual wedding individual was coming from me but fair enough does the rate does the name Robert Dolliver mean anything to you no I can describe the
02:06:10 anything to you no I can describe the individual but I don't I don't know his name
02:06:12 name okay do you know who briefed him he came to I spoke to him newspaper him what did you ask him to do to get radio channel two working and see if he can improve any other issues that we have on the
02:06:24 any other issues that we have on the fire ground concerning communications right and what did he what did he do do you know he went away for a period of
02:06:35 do you know he went away for a period of time come back and says nobody could do do you know what he did I don't know but he did know okay when he said there's nothing you can do what did you say who did you say anything I expressed the
02:06:47 did you say anything I expressed the urgency that we need to increase communications that it was hampering our efforts he said no man I can do did you did anybody hear that conversation or
02:06:58 did anybody hear that conversation or will you alone other than himself now right did you report what he told you to the OIC yes cough the night there Jess right but that would have been an tiro but it yes
02:07:09 that would have been an tiro but it yes and what did only red do about that do you know I don't know we if the radio engineers tells us he can't do anything then unfortunate we have to accept that
02:07:21 then unfortunate we have to accept that as as faint what we can't go to his bosses who's got a magic one that can make the radios work that's that's the evidence that we've been given right
02:07:39 you set the bottom of the page this is page 10 of your statement at the time of grenfell the command eunice did not have handheld filing radios Motorola handheld
02:07:51 handheld filing radios Motorola handheld radios is there a reason for that do you know there was a security issue storing him on the appliances right what was the nature of that security issue we did
02:08:03 nature of that security issue we did have anywhere secure to store them when we were on visits I see on physical security yes I see and so how cruise on sea is expected to be able to communicate with the
02:08:14 be able to communicate with the bridgehead normally in a normal incident of I hand have radioed back and is that also the case with communications with the other sea use for the one so you to
02:08:31 the other sea use for the one so you to talk to a novice yet you yes handheld radius and a typical 10 and anybody on the incident ground yes same again channel 10 yes yes now you say in the second line of page 11 of
02:08:43 say in the second line of page 11 of your statement the commissioner Danny coughin in the end gave us her handheld radio as we needed it desperately which was very nice of her do you remember when that was I do not
02:08:55 do you remember when that was I do not it was approximately I would suggest half-past four why do you suggest that because the I remember it was light she asked her staff officer Kelly Foster
02:09:07 asked her staff officer Kelly Foster I've got the correct name correct to go and get further radios to assist us right did that mean that she was then without a radio yes
02:09:25 now on pages 11 and 13 of your statement and I'll take this quickly and summarize it if I can you say that incident command channel that was used was Flom
02:09:40 command channel that was used was Flom ops one across the fire ground is that is that right you confirm that yes I
02:09:54 is that right you confirm that yes I believe so yeah
02:09:57 do you know when that became the command channel I do not know would that be the normal fall back channel to use or was that an exception it was a total
02:10:08 that an exception it was a total exception of an incident the likes of which I've never seen before and no one I've ever met has ever seen before we were adapting as best we could using every item of equipment we had do you
02:10:21 every item of equipment we had do you need an air wave radio to access this
02:10:25 and we've heard evidence before that in fact only senior officers station managers and above have personal air wave radios does that mean that from ops one was only accessible by officers of
02:10:38 one was only accessible by officers of the rank of station manager and above at that time yes it's qualify that the phone ops one is also accessible on every appliance but obviously the moment
02:10:49 every appliance but obviously the moment the radios themselves are fixed in the front of the cab and not being able to be mobile yes yes you say at that time you mean do you mean at that time during the incident or at that time generally
02:11:00 the incident or at that time generally at that time junior right I think you also had to borrow and Eros air wave radio says to be able to communicate with other see years possibly possibly
02:11:15 is the see you does the command unit have is it supposed to have an air wave radio of its own so it has an air wave radio in the front it has an air wave radio in the rear right at the time it
02:11:26 radio in the rear right at the time it had two portable handheld radios but were not on the run at that time right
02:11:34 do you remember how long you've had and Eros radio for I know that Katie foster went and got an extra battery we were it
02:11:47 went and got an extra battery we were it was a considerable period of time that I had both the commissioners and the ACS radios do you remember what channel radio communications were taking place between cu8 and the bridgehead again we
02:12:02 between cu8 and the bridgehead again we used many different forms communications while in a specific channel right as I spoke earlier I believe I spoke to pack out one on a mobile phone right where he passed information over to me but again
02:12:14 passed information over to me but again we were using every form of communication so we would have used flown ops one if which I believe they did have an air wave radio up there yes being packed old one being a senior
02:12:26 being packed old one being a senior officer yes and Richard well she was up there as well yes they would have had our radios actually they would have been able to communicate or by air wave from ops one with the command units yeah so it's it's not assumptions that the
02:12:38 it's it's not assumptions that the individual would take an air wave radio onto an Instagram with them I don't have to because it's a relatively expensive piece of equipment and they could be involved in wet conditions which could make the radio wet so I can't I can't a
02:12:51 make the radio wet so I can't I can't a turn weather one individual had a radio or not that's something that would have to be followed up with those individuals right I see okay do you know for a fact whether yourself weather group manager
02:13:04 whether yourself weather group manager Welsh and group manager Golborne actually used air wave radios from the bridgehead to communicate with cu7 or cu8 I'm confident that they did yes okay
02:13:16 and without have it on flops one yes
02:13:23 now at pages 12 to 13 if they were your statement you refer to Pat Delaney
02:13:35 statement you refer to Pat Delaney setting up a radio path and somebody inside the incident and will someone at the base of the tower that's at the bottom of page 12 and over to page 13 and you say that was somewhere half
02:13:49 and you say that was somewhere half someone halfway between command unit and the command unit itself to pass messages back in a four-way communication channel due to the high usage of radios at the incident we use channel 10 on my
02:14:00 incident we use channel 10 on my handheld radios which is a command unit specific channel and then you go on to describe flops one as well and floors for I just want to ask you about the Delaney radio path do you remember when
02:14:14 Delaney radio path do you remember when during the incident that was established no as I said I like to learn so it wasn't something I was aware of during the incident it was something that I learned later in the Pat Delaney told me
02:14:25 learned later in the Pat Delaney told me concerning what he had set up I see do you know how it worked yes so he would be one person in the tap as he said say one person passing information on someone at the base of the tower somewhere halfway between the tower and
02:14:37 somewhere halfway between the tower and then possibly somewhere closer to the FSG see you and then ultimately they would pass that message on to the see you
02:14:51 what was the purpose of setting up this four-way radio communication part we have to appreciate is that graph will tower itself was a Faraday's cage it was impossible to get communications in and
02:15:02 impossible to get communications in and out due to the construction due to the metal cladding on the outside radio or specifically handheld radio signals would be bouncing off wouldn't be able to travel very far so to overcome this
02:15:13 to travel very far so to overcome this pat the Laney set up a a route that would be able to overcome it I'm so sorry to asking you you said something that sounded like a Faraday cage yes did you say that I did what do
02:15:26 cage yes did you say that I did what do you mean by that Faraday cages if I've got to upgrade is a way to stop electronic signals getting into an area you don't want it to get into it's a sign to tone you it sounds
02:15:39 into it's a sign to tone you it sounds as if you know or all knew that Grenfell tower was such a structure it is that right I know it now I know that it was clattered in metal I know that there was
02:15:50 clattered in metal I know that there was rebar continually throughout the concrete construction which is metal which would have bounced off and I know there's a huge amount of metal in surrounding area which means that the signals himself won't be able to
02:16:01 signals himself won't be able to necessarily permit eight through the structure would that be with that sort of information about that sort of structure be something that that a would
02:16:12 structure be something that that a would that would be reflected on the operational risk database or the mobile data terminal No
02:16:24 do you know whether the pack Delaney system what you know of it improve communications into the tower yes it did do you know why it wasn't used earlier
02:16:35 do you know why it wasn't used earlier on in the incident because it was it was resource intensive you've got the potential to use Chinese whispers they'd have to get the correct persons available I believe he used cu operatives who are competent and
02:16:46 operatives who are competent and confident on the radio so that they can pass it in it wasn't until he had the the right people with the right skills at the right time been able to deliver the right message do you know it's
02:16:57 the right message do you know it's channel do you know for yourself which channel he was using I don't I don't know but my belief would be there would be channel 10 utilizing which is the command channel for cu personnel which
02:17:08 command channel for cu personnel which would utilize that channel and the other individuals that were on that channel do you know who else which other individuals watch managers etc we were involved in his in his full way part I
02:17:19 involved in his in his full way part I don't ask a question you have to ask for mr. Delaney I see okay
02:17:31 do you know whether any FSG messages were passed to or from the tower via that radio path no it's a it's a closed
02:17:42 that radio path no it's a it's a closed channel that is specifically for a brigade personnel there's no way that I remember the public will be able to interrupt it when I say FSG messages what I mean is information between
02:17:53 what I mean is information between members of the brigade about FSG no I I don't understand how they could pass that information on to someone in that chain right could that be could that
02:18:06 chain right could that be could that chain have been used for example in order to communicate FSG information or outcomes about deployments to and from the tower there's every possibility that
02:18:20 the tower there's every possibility that it could be utilized right do you know whether it was the best my knowledge no right you know why that was again that something I'm not aware there was specific communication issues between the bridgehead and the FSG command unit
02:18:32 the bridgehead and the FSG command unit as something that would have to be asked of those individuals I'm going to turn to a different topic which is the change in stay-put advice now in your contemporaneous notes you say and I'll
02:18:48 contemporaneous notes you say and I'll just ask this to be put on the screen it's a meaty quadruple zero five three four four and if I could just show you page three
02:19:09 you say
02:19:16 that this is a third paragraph down the FSG advice was still to stay within the flat I received a call from I believe
02:19:28 flat I received a call from I believe control informing me that this advice have now changed I seem to remember that the officer of the day had given the decision to tell all callers on the line that they should now exit the building
02:19:39 that they should now exit the building my first question is how were you contacted you say I received a call what was it on telephone on the see you yes see you ate yes these are the telephone
02:19:51 see you ate yes these are the telephone was that the mobile telephone on the CEO or is it a different one they were only mobile telephones on the CEO are okay yeah but it's as well I say Mobile on the CEO is it one that's fixed to the CEO or can you move around outside and
02:20:03 CEO or can you move around outside and see you with it my belief is it was a fixed handheld mobile phone but do you remember who you got the call from and it you say
02:20:14 got the call from and it you say controlled you rember who it was actually through know at the time I believed it was the officer of the day but it may have been the officer of the
02:20:26 but it may have been the officer of the watch I am 99% confident it was a male which would lead me to believe that would be more likely to be the officer of the day right and
02:20:38 do you remember even if roughly what time that was there's 242 that's not roughly why do you say 242 because I've read the
02:20:49 you say 242 because I've read the incident log I've asked Jackie McConnachie what my memory was it was significantly later so my memory is is untrustworthy within timescales due to the traumatic incident I wrote and
02:21:00 the traumatic incident I wrote and everything by I remember specifically asking Jackie what time it was because I believed it to be somewhere in original half past four but I believe is 242 okay
02:21:11 half past four but I believe is 242 okay so in fact I think the answer to my question is you don't remember what time it was and you refresh your memory later by reference to other records I remember specifically the conversation ahead and I remember that the that conversation
02:21:23 I remember that the that conversation and that date/time stamp is 242 right okay our transcript of the decision log
02:21:38 okay our transcript of the decision log taken by Jackie McCulloch he actually starts at 247 with auntie Rae taking over not at 242 so I wasn't you're referring to a different document no no is that document where wherever time is
02:21:49 is that document where wherever time is really move in there that was recorded by Jacqueline Condor Heroes it's not 242 then I apologize whatever time is recorded by her that is the time that I said but it like I say I wanted I asked
02:22:01 said but it like I say I wanted I asked her specifically because my memory was that it was significantly later okay all right we won't need to take time up on asking you about that document the document speaks for itself can you
02:22:13 document speaks for itself can you remember any details about the conversation that you had with the officer of the day that was very matter-of-fact I didn't need more information other than that they've changed the policy advice right I passed
02:22:26 changed the policy advice right I passed on to the officer in charge again I interrupted him it was a matter of urgency is possibly the most one of the most important messages he's received that evening Ryan has such a passed on to him and then I believe was passed on
02:22:37 to him and then I believe was passed on to the FSG see you do you remember speaking to DAC Fenton in the BCC about the change in advice I believe it that that may have been the person I was
02:22:48 that may have been the person I was spoken I spoke to do you remember whether he asked you for permission to change the statement advice or do you remember the conversation at it what was he just
02:23:00 conversation at it what was he just telling you that that's what was happening my recollection party you mentioned in that is that he
02:23:12 party you mentioned in that is that he told me but I'm now questioning that and he may have asked that question and as such I can't confidently give you a
02:23:23 such I can't confidently give you a direct answer but as they told him my statement I believed at the time that he had told us that that's what was happening rather than ask him for permission okay let's see if we can just
02:23:35 permission okay let's see if we can just push this a little further do you remember whether having had that conversation with you remember to be Daz Fenton potentially did I say potentially bit DAC Fenton you left it on the basis
02:23:47 bit DAC Fenton you left it on the basis that you would get back to him or was it because it was it of once and for all it was a definite article it's a definite answer there was no need to get back to him I would I've assured him I spoke to
02:23:59 him I would I've assured him I spoke to the officer in charge while state information came in to form in the information to come it was the person in the BCC you were speaking to about the change in statehood by still on the phone when you spoke and when you told DPS AC ro it was happening
02:24:11 DPS AC ro it was happening yes I see and what a day Ciro say do you remember okay he said okay did you did you relay that back do you remember relaying that back to yes the BCC yes I see so is essentially a three-way
02:24:23 see so is essentially a three-way conversational conversation to the one I had with pack our board concerning not being able to go past what I believe to be the eleventh floor
02:24:37 do you know it is a fact that it's not recorded on vision or all our short incident log do you know why that might be the conversation with DRC Fenton and
02:24:49 be the conversation with DRC Fenton and whether the change in the statehood advice because it wasn't on a recordable device he wasn't on Flom ops one it wasn't on the Maine scheme radio and he wasn't sent by CSS so it was sent potentially by a mobile phone that isn't
02:25:01 potentially by a mobile phone that isn't recorded do you know why it wasn't sent out as an informative message yes because remote people can't send
02:25:13 because remote people can't send informative messages the only person who send informative messages you're in charge right now and Eero says in his statement that he's given to the police
02:25:25 statement that he's given to the police which we've seen and will obviously explore this with him but he says that he asked the see you to contact control and ask them to stop giving stay-put advice if they still were do you do you
02:25:38 advice if they still were do you do you remember that is that what you remember I don't write do you have a comment on that there were three other people on that command unit that may have sent that message may be discussing the
02:25:49 that message may be discussing the concession with them they may have a an answer those that they were the ones that send that message leaving aside the question of messages do you actually
02:26:00 question of messages do you actually remember being asked by Andy row to get hold of control yourself and tell them to stop giving stay-put advice are you talking about
02:26:11 advice are you talking about specifically stay put advise were to change the FSG advice because there's a wide difference that is a I'm gonna say so a good question which I'm not able to answer but let me ask you what are you
02:26:23 answer but let me ask you what are you remember of what Ali Road said I'm sorry but I cannot so the question if you don't understand the actual terminology well it's person would let's take both he says I asked Cu to contact control
02:26:34 he says I asked Cu to contact control and ask them to stop giving stay-put advice if they still were now how everyone interprets that does that trigger a recollection in your mind as to Andy Rowe
02:26:45 to Andy Rowe said no right but but against a part of us is different to FSG advice so to change the FSG advice is fine maybe a a
02:26:56 change the FSG advice is fine maybe a a cero was passing information on to inform people that are carrying out stay-put advice which is different to FSG advice yes they need to get out and case maybe the individual hasn't
02:27:07 case maybe the individual hasn't considered it yes no I absolutely the FSG advice change do you recall being asked by and ero to contact control and ask them to change the FSG advice at all no control rang me to say that they are
02:27:19 no control rang me to say that they are changing here first you advise but that's it yes thank you now different topic again if you go to page 13 this comes back to this question
02:27:31 page 13 this comes back to this question of 11th floor we looked at earlier on I just want to finish that one off if I can on page 13 in the second paragraph from the bottom you say in the second
02:27:44 from the bottom you say in the second line I remember a cero was sitting on the rear of the command unit when I took a radio call over the handheld radio from group monitor Goulbourne telling me he was asking Cruz to do more than is physically possible to get past the 11th
02:27:56 physically possible to get past the 11th floor
02:27:58 floor do you remember the approximate time of this I don't but again you can check check of ikana keys instant log and it will have the specific time right do you remember whether you or anybody else
02:28:10 remember whether you or anybody else will see you eight passed that information on to control I've no recognition of contact of control right in that you've never a collection of it
02:28:24 in that you've never a collection of it do you recall talking to see you seven and telling them to speak to control about that
02:28:35 I have no recollection of that no no do you remember receiving any other updates which relate to the inability to reach particular flaws or relate to any decisions not to go above certain floors
02:28:47 decisions not to go above certain floors from the incident ground yes yes could you it was constantly changing that the distance travel that they could achieve what floor they were going on to they were going the bridgehead was going
02:28:59 they were going the bridgehead was going up and down due to conditions improving and then worsening and then improving again crews were told not to go above certain floors and then ultimately due
02:29:10 certain floors and then ultimately due to confusion due to as has already been displayed within the hearing the numbering of the floors people would go higher than would be expected people
02:29:21 higher than would be expected people would be told to go to a certain floor and wouldn't be able to get to that floor because they were diversity to rescue individuals that were coming down this was constant information that was coming back did do you remember whether
02:29:35 coming back did do you remember whether any system was put in place or any any communications method was set up in order to keep control abreast of what
02:29:47 order to keep control abreast of what floors couldn't be accessed by crews so that they could pass that information on to anybody calling from floors above that limit I don't remember that
02:30:00 that limit I don't remember that conversation - right is there any reason why control but that that would have been after the stay put in the FSG advice would have changed yes so so controlled advices for them to get out
02:30:12 controlled advices for them to get out anyway so us saying that we couldn't get to them I don't understand I thought what why that would be passed on to individuals no I understand I think you
02:30:23 individuals no I understand I think you in that last answer you you put the timing of this these difficulties of about not accessing floors as after the change in the FSG advice so I believe so
02:30:35 change in the FSG advice so I believe so yes we can be coming be confident about that
02:30:39 that if you give me the exact time that judgment going to keep recorded the time the the stay-put advice was changed then i feel significantly more confident well I could say I can tell you that her
02:30:50 I could say I can tell you that her first entry is at 2:47 and that does record maps we should look at it because it's obviously something you can see you should see refer to it if you could please go to AC quadruple zero five four
02:31:02 please go to AC quadruple zero five four zero four look at look at page one I just want to make sure there's no confusion about about this we see the top first time mark is it o 247 a cero
02:31:17 top first time mark is it o 247 a cero takes over and receives handover from DAC a Lachlan a cero records decision to deviate from fxg advice being delivered to FSG callers by control staff and advise people to make efforts to leave
02:31:28 advise people to make efforts to leave the building two five seven offspring five minutes out yeah so that's that that's what you refer to yeah are you saying that that's that after that time yes it was it was difficult to reach but
02:31:41 yes it was it was difficult to reach but yes I mean that was relatively early on within the incident and the conversation pack our bond was significantly lighter than that okay
02:31:59 at a different topic again I wanted to ask you a plans and plans of the building the bottom of page 14 of your statement you say that there was a
02:32:14 statement you say that there was a tactical coordination group meeting between various organizations during that meeting and I'll quote a cero that asked the council to provide plans of the building including the internal
02:32:25 the building including the internal layout it is vital we have plans as mentioned when I was talking about 720 visits that there was no detailed information or comprehensive notes of the building layout from London Fire Brigade aspect nothing regarding access
02:32:36 Brigade aspect nothing regarding access exits firefighting media all we had was a recent photograph that was taken and then you go on to say a female representing the council said she would
02:32:47 representing the council said she would get the internal layout plans for us and was working on it about 45 minutes later I went on to the incident ground inspect at the same female asking for an update on these plans she told me she'd not yet found the plans and are still working on
02:32:58 found the plans and are still working on it
02:32:58 it a TCG meeting later that morning a Siro asked the female for the plans and they still weren't present ACR expressed this will be a big thing that when asked for one thing the council couldn't provide
02:33:09 one thing the council couldn't provide it well leave that on one side can I just ask you some specific questions about all of that first of all what time do you remember was that in first reference to the plans of the meet of
02:33:21 reference to the plans of the meet of the tactical coordination group meeting I don't have that time but that would be recorded within the TC GM knows right do you know whether and ero was the first person to request plans or heard anybody requested them before that he was the
02:33:32 requested them before that he was the first person to formally ask for the plans within ATC GM but questions had been asked by to best my knowledge Norman Harrison and Mark Enfield concerning plans and also I was asked to get plans from the MDT right do you know
02:33:47 get plans from the MDT right do you know what the outcome of Mark Kent fields and Norman Harrison's requests for plans was well they didn't get them which is why we specifically asked for them in the
02:33:58 we specifically asked for them in the TCG M yeah yes do you know why they didn't get them because the individual that was supposed to be supplying them just
02:34:09 just couldn't do the one thing we asked her to do do you know who my field of law Harrison past no um just came back a moment then to them to your last answer
02:34:20 moment then to them to your last answer but one about the time recorded in the TCG em notes could you please be shown again quadruple 0 5 4 0 4 turn to page 5 so we can really pick
02:34:32 turn to page 5 so we can really pick this up in those notes if you look at time mark of Oh for 53 Oh
02:34:45 time mark of Oh for 53 Oh page 5 I think
02:34:55 page four
02:34:59 if you look at a 453 it it's the last entry there cu staff report building plans should be in the fire box in Lobby that that's the first entry we've been
02:35:11 that that's the first entry we've been able to find in that in that log do you know whether there was any reference or any meeting about it any earlier than that at that time Oh for 53 so yeah I do remember that it was issues concerning
02:35:23 remember that it was issues concerning the firebox and 5 volts not necessarily being fully stocked with what should be there and I believe that's the information that will be passed on from the council that don't worry about it the plans are in the box now you
02:35:34 the plans are in the box now you referred to a recent photograph that was taken in your statement of which I just read out to you do you you know what that photograph was off of from the MDT well no you say in your statement the pensive look at it it's
02:35:46 statement the pensive look at it it's page 15 second line all we had that yes that's fair enough that's from the m.d taste and MDT wasn't fully populated right do you remember
02:35:59 fully populated right do you remember what the photograph was of it was a printful tower prior to the cladding being installed or the exterior yes right that's the best of my recollection okay but that you said that was on the
02:36:12 okay but that you said that was on the MDT was it yes right do you remember whether the plans that you kept asking for were actually ever given to you
02:36:24 I never saw them you never saw them okay
02:36:29 see if I can give a time on on it page 18 of your statement second line or second sentence so I second paragraph as businesses are in it's a single sentence
02:36:40 businesses are in it's a single sentence you say we still have not received any plans of the building layout from the council by this point now the point you're referring to it is if you look at the previous paragraph you see in crew
02:36:53 the previous paragraph you see in crew manager Shaun Murphy discussing with Ernie Rome about an individual who had fallen on Shaun Murphy so by this point
02:37:06 fallen on Shaun Murphy so by this point can you help I wasn't about what time that might have been well I remember specifically going out and speaking to the lady at around half
02:37:17 and speaking to the lady at around half past 7:00 right and I remember speaking to her again to try and find out where the plans were significant later would have been potentially half past nine and the answer was the same right what was the
02:37:29 answer was the same right what was the name of the council officer who was asked to fix the things on that I don't know the name of my refer tourists and the lady did the fact that you didn't have planned to your way you're in the in your recollection did that hamper any
02:37:40 in your recollection did that hamper any search-and-rescue efforts the the plans themselves would have fed into the operational plan is a vital part and a vital role detailing fix installations
02:37:51 vital role detailing fix installations and detailing everything within the building it would detail the pipeline of gas of water where electricity were it was vital we needed those plans is there
02:38:02 was vital we needed those plans is there any specific way in which not having those plans hampered the brigade search and rescue efforts a green film for search and rescue the layout of all the flats were the same but specifically the
02:38:15 flats were the same but specifically the layout of utilities the isolation points for all the utilities that would all be marked on the plans the fixed installations the joy visor the wet riser the smoke vents the fire doors
02:38:28 riser the smoke vents the fire doors all of that would be detailed on the plans
02:38:30 plans we were waiting upon right so in terms of what not having the plans prevented the brigade from doing devoutly lady
02:38:41 the brigade from doing devoutly lady mcguire relates to specific location of specific valves taps points like that yes and and i mean i i've not looked at
02:38:52 yes and and i mean i i've not looked at the detail plans of grim filbert i do know that it was extensive building work that went on and if something had changed if the as you go higher there were different layouts of flats that's
02:39:03 were different layouts of flats that's something that would definitely of aided our crews yes they could then refocusing on my question did the fact that you didn't have plans hamper the search and rescue efforts in any way I would say yes
02:39:13 yes in what way if we can't isolate items if we can't operate smoke vents if we can't isolate joy Rises where the doors are that's potentially gonna make the incident significantly worse if the
02:39:25 the incident significantly worse if the incidents getting significantly worse that's gonna affect our crews it's going to make the response time significantly greater and it could put them in greater danger and the individuals inside the property great in greater danger turning
02:39:36 property great in greater danger turning to a final topic list of residents and if I can ask you to look at page 19 of your statement in the second paragraph there you say we were desperately trying
02:39:48 there you say we were desperately trying to find a list of the residents inside the tower I received a call from somebody saying he had a potential list of residents which the command units could cross-reference and tally who had been rescued at 13 18 hours I received
02:40:01 been rescued at 13 18 hours I received an email from station manager Vince Bell which contained a list of residents and you go on to explain what happened to
02:40:12 you go on to explain what happened to that email trail my question is first of all can you receive can you can you recall who you received the call from stash manager Vince Bell no sorry let me
02:40:24 stash manager Vince Bell no sorry let me get in the sir first sentence of that paragraph you say I received a call from somebody saying you had a potential list of residents did you receive the call from Vince Bell I believe so right can
02:40:35 from Vince Bell I believe so right can you recall whether a list of residents was actually requested continually right and who made that request was that Vince
02:40:46 and who made that request was that Vince Bell oh now that would've been the I see I see okay
02:40:56 were you aware that group manager Goodall had received a list of residents from the council I was not ordinarily would you have
02:41:08 I was not ordinarily would you have expected a list of residents to have been obtained earlier absolutely would you expect a list of residents to be held on site in some way normally no you you wouldn't know mr. Johnson you've
02:41:25 you wouldn't know mr. Johnson you've been very patient with my questions and I want to say thank you I've come to the end of my questions I think now is an appropriate moment for a break there may or may not be I just follow up I just say something I just wanted to say that
02:41:37 say something I just wanted to say that any negativity so I'm any negativity that kind of cost yesterday with the brigade was completely blown out of the water by Maya the efforts of my team and everyone I worked with on the evening
02:41:48 everyone I worked with on the evening from the Commissioner to the AC to everyone else and I'd like to recognize the admiration the pride that I have for working for London Fire Brigade and how brilliantly everyone did on a evening with the sole purpose to save life and
02:42:01 with the sole purpose to save life and provide the best for the people in London thank you very much thank you well mr. millet doesn't have any more questions himself we'll take a short
02:42:13 questions himself we'll take a short break now it's possible that other questions will emerge during the break so I'm going to ask you to be ready to come back if we need to ask through any further questions if we don't need to
02:42:25 further questions if we don't need to come back I'm saying though I'm grateful we are to you for coming to give us such a wide-ranging
02:42:32 thank you we'll resume at 25 past twelve and better if you don't talk about for
02:42:43 and better if you don't talk about for the time being would you like to give me a show and then
02:42:46 then great yep
02:42:57 mmm-hmm like 25 costume
02:54:31 well mr. Lee's I gather you may have small questions from a surprising array of sources very short questions yes all right yes well you better get mr. Johnson back in
02:54:52 the no mr. Johnson I'm sorry to have to ask you to come back and there are a few more questions for you now you're gonna have difficulty because they've rearranged the furniture for the next witness it was this blindness if do you mind standing just for the gratitude
02:55:06 mind standing just for the gratitude we've expressed previously continues to apply
02:55:09 apply I have very short questions for you first of all you told us quite a lot about the CSS on the Cu can I ask you can one normally use the CSS to access the vision log only for that specific
02:55:23 the vision log only for that specific incident so for that specific incident is it possible therefore to get on on the Cu to the vision log and see what
02:55:34 the Cu to the vision log and see what informative and other messages have been passing from say control to the insulin ground you can but you can also do that using what the internet interface for our hot wire and look on to boss vision
02:55:47 our hot wire and look on to boss vision to an OB you to access it so there's two different places that you can access it right would you need for the latter of those would you need access to the Internet yes was there access to the internet
02:55:58 yes was there access to the internet from see you seven or eight on the night yes I accessed email which is only available via the internet and intranet which is a in Bill Internet service right do you know whether the so far as
02:56:11 right do you know whether the so far as you know your to the best of your recollection on cu8 the CAS the CSS was used or usable to access the vision log no it wasn't the CSS wasn't working at
02:56:23 no it wasn't the CSS wasn't working at all but the computer itself would would have been able to use vision so is your can i summarize it this way as far as you know the CSS if it had been working
02:56:34 you know the CSS if it had been working would have been able to get onto the to access the vision log but it wasn't working so you couldn't yes right my second question relates to the fire box
02:56:45 second question relates to the fire box did you know whether there was a fire box diagram for home I was just informed that there was a fire box and other plans were in there that's all I did not foresee a fire box or LFP boxes is
02:56:56 foresee a fire box or LFP boxes is sometimes called that wasn't my role and I was so removed from the incident other than going in a couple of times it wasn't something that I witnessed do you know who told you that there was a fire box and the plans
02:57:08 that there was a fire box and the plans were in there I believe to best my knowledge was Mark Kentfield mark Enfield if Mark can filter told you that the fire box was there and had plans in it
02:57:19 it can you explain what why it was necessary to keep pursuing the plans with the council until to the knowledge there were no plans in there right thank
02:57:32 there were no plans in there right thank you very much that's it thank you well mr. Johnson it's I'm glad say they're not too many extra questions that once again thank you very much I'm coming to give us our evidence it will be very helpful and now you are free to
02:57:44 be very helpful and now you are free to go thank you thank you so would you like to go to the up show let's see we've already rearranged the furniture we have mr. chairman I'm very happy to take the
02:57:55 mr. chairman I'm very happy to take the night the next week the next witness immediately yes or I'm happy to take an early lunch now and come back at 1:30 I think we'd be best to start very good
02:58:19 this
02:58:46 [Music]
02:58:52 the solitude shall be the truth the whole truth thank you very much mister I got you happy standing to give your NY I
02:59:04 got you happy standing to give your NY I mean they say so everything really for you yes mr. Miller mr. loft first of all I ask you please to give your full name to the Chairman yeah it's Brad Ashley left Brett Ashley North thank you and
02:59:16 left Brett Ashley North thank you and can I start by saying thank you very much to you for coming to us and assisting this with our investigations in this inquiry we really do very much appreciate it my questions are intended to be short and simple but if you have
02:59:27 to be short and simple but if you have any difficulty in understanding them or want me to rephrase them in any way I'm very happy to do so if you want to break at any time you need only indicate okay can I please ask you first of all to
02:59:38 can I please ask you first of all to take your statement which should be in the either and the blue folder in front of you or as we normally look at it on the left on or on your right and my left on your screen in front of you
02:59:49 on your screen in front of you yeah it's stated the 31st of October 2017
02:59:53 2017 and it is a meaty quadruple zero five seven five one eight so we've read that into the record have you read it recently I have this and can you confirm that its contents are true by is now we
03:00:06 that its contents are true by is now we also have your contemporaneous note which is referenced a meaty quadruple zero five two nine four have you read that recently I have yes and can you
03:00:18 that recently I have yes and can you confirm that the contents of that are true as well yes yes and there are also thirteen photographs that you took on the night which your exhibits v lo2 213
03:00:29 the night which your exhibits v lo2 213 and if you don't mind I'll just read the numbers into the record that's a meaty triple zero one five six four four one five six three three one five six oh seven one five six two eight one five
03:00:42 seven one five six two eight one five six zero one one five six three five one five two six four three one five six zero five one five six three eight one five six one four and one five six four
03:00:53 five six one four and one five six four seven and
03:00:54 seven and five six five four have you discussed your statement or the evidence that you're going to give to us today with anybody else before coming here today no I haven't thank you can I start them with your role in your
03:01:06 can I start them with your role in your training as at the date of your statement I think you'd been in the lfb for 23 years or so that's correct yes and you are currently a station manager I am and you're based at Chelsea I am yes
03:01:17 yes and in June 2017 I think you were a station manager is this right based at Stanford yeah I was basis there more I moved to Chelsea in the August in August 2007 Superstock have you ever received
03:01:29 2007 Superstock have you ever received or delivered training on fighting high-rise fires yes I have many times over the last 20 odd years we've had training at stations as a station
03:01:43 training at stations as a station manager a couple years ago we did what we called back to basics training I believe as being mentioned before yeah we're obviously helped facilitate it as station manager more specifically did you ever receive
03:01:54 more specifically did you ever receive or deliver training on high-rise fires that covered the subject of the ignition of the facade no didn't are you aware of a fire a shepherd court in August 2016
03:02:07 a fire a shepherd court in August 2016 I'm aware of excess again the news it was on the news but that's as far as mine did you ever give or receive any training on the lessons learned from Shepherd to court in a living did you
03:02:19 Shepherd to court in a living did you ever give or receive training in strategies for full or partial evacuation of high-rise bêlit billed at residential buildings no button did you
03:02:30 residential buildings no button did you ever receive training about the circumstances in which you can you would consider implementing any kind of evacuation of a building which have a stay put policy in place no not on can I
03:02:43 stay put policy in place no not on can I then turn to mobilization and arrival at grenfell on the night of the fire in your statement on page 2 you say in the first line that you were on a night
03:02:54 first line that you were on a night shift on that night and was using the camping out facility at full-on fire station
03:03:00 and you were awake because you are monitoring another incident in Oxford Street and you received a pager message mobilizing you to the incident and we have a time for that of oh one 1528 now
03:03:13 have a time for that of oh one 1528 now we have that in our short incident longer they need to go to it but does that ring a bell with you yeah that's what that sounds right it does yet now you then you say you control you called control and we've got a summary
03:03:24 called control and we've got a summary of that conversation in the new operational response report for the second hour can I show you that please
03:03:39 and I'd ask you to go to page 28 in that document or 29 in the electronic version
03:03:50 document or 29 in the electronic version mister documents director
03:03:58 it's it's it's lfts quadruple zero four eight to eight and if you go to page
03:04:09 eight to eight and if you go to page twenty nine electronically twenty-eight internally of that document the time like oh it's the it's the page before that's it it's a 11721 and this is the
03:04:23 that's it it's a 11721 and this is the summary I want to ask you about it says SM loft cause brigade controller says he's been paged to a sixth pump fire CRO Peter daddy confirms he is the first SM
03:04:34 Peter daddy confirms he is the first SM he then informs SM loft the golf to one two seven one with watch manager Downton Golf 272 and golf three three one are all in attendance goal three six one three six two and alpha-2 12 are on the
03:04:46 three six two and alpha-2 12 are on the way he then says that the second sm is Walton and the group manager GM is Patrick Goulbourne he continues to say we have s/m Daniel Egan assigned as s
03:04:57 we have s/m Daniel Egan assigned as s FSO and SM cook as PLA SM loft asks that if it has gone straight to six pumps CRA dougie says it's a standard fire three pumps first then sends a message back
03:05:08 pumps first then sends a message back the six pumps on one HP for high-rise assembly off ask how many calls been received
03:05:12 received CRA done he tells them you have four calls altogether SM lot asked to be showing the status as status - yeah I've read it all out to you it's rather a lot of information there but is there any
03:05:23 of information there but is there any part of that which you think might be wrong I so according to that I was told I was the first si as far as I was aware I was the second because that he at the
03:05:37 I was the second because that he at the time though I wasn't aware I was a second but I didn't know that I just heard Andy walk and go out before I made that call yes and then when I was told he was on that incident I then assumed I was the second s him even
03:05:49 assumed I was the second s him even though they tell about the first yes say do you think that your reference in your statement that you were the second SM might be a mistake that will be from
03:06:01 might be a mistake that will be from knowing that an you Walton was called before me so I knew I was the second at the time of sea control at the time when they were making the mobilizations they had me down with the first right do
03:06:12 they had me down with the first right do you remember control informing you that you were in fact the first lesson I can't remember that date okay to be clear on what the first sm means was it
03:06:24 clear on what the first sm means was it your understanding when you spoke to control as recorded here that you would be taking over from watch manager downton on arrival as the most senior
03:06:35 downton on arrival as the most senior person present if if I'd been the first station owner to arrive then that's normal procedure would be the first senior officer to arrive would take over and being called as the first SM on a
03:06:46 and being called as the first SM on a page are you might not necessarily get there first because there may be another stage manager that feature to it I think it's there before you okay and on the way to the Institute did you think that
03:06:57 way to the Institute did you think that you were going to be taking over incident command I didn't for the simple reason I know that stage remains were walking had already left film before I made the call say he had a good three four minute head start on me I see did
03:07:08 four minute head start on me I see did you speak to Andy Walton before you left for the incident before I left the incident I left before the incident oh no I didn't know you'd already left before you'd already gone I set up okay
03:07:19 before you'd already gone I set up okay now we have a record that you asked control to book you in a status two and we have a time for that of a 19-15 and
03:07:33 we have a time for that of a 19-15 and that that's the short incident on at page 13 I didn't need to go to it but again does that accord with your recollection status to mobile to incident at a 119 but yeah that would do because some I've been paged at 117 and
03:07:46 because some I've been paged at 117 and then cut them in his phone call with control right and our conversation would have been staged to versus those two now we also have an arrival time status 3 for u of o 130 208 let's talk that's
03:07:57 for u of o 130 208 let's talk that's also page 13 of the short incident on again
03:08:00 again does that accord with your recollection that does yes okay now in your statement you say that must see you from Fulham
03:08:15 you say that must see you from Fulham that was behind you on route this is about two-thirds of the way down the page it's not very easy to navigate
03:08:26 page it's not very easy to navigate because of their name a paragraph breaks and only one but if you go to just below halfway down the page you say after the references were timed in 1:30 the command unit from Fulham was behind me
03:08:38 command unit from Fulham was behind me and had not yet been set up the command yer fulfil of is cu8 dude do you have any recollection histor who was who was
03:08:49 any recollection histor who was who was running that come on to unit I'm not at the time now of since become aware who it was that was actually in charge of it which I spoke to Nolan yes well we'll
03:09:00 which I spoke to Nolan yes well we'll come back to that you then say seven lines up from the bottom of the page there was very little smoke but they were smoke coming from the top of a building initially I thought but it was
03:09:12 building initially I thought but it was the netting or it was netting on scaffolding that had caught fire this happens a lot and I've seen this many times in my career but usually this type of fire gets out very quickly however I
03:09:23 of fire gets out very quickly however I knew the amount of fire appliances had increased steadily so I could tell this was probably not the case this wasn't a run-of-the-mill fire was was that a
03:09:34 run-of-the-mill fire was was that a thought you had at the time that this probably wasn't a fire involving netting or scaffolding yes it was that was my new that was my initial thoughts when I first I didn't see the incident until I
03:09:45 first I didn't see the incident until I was literally parking up in Bowman Road right and because of other high buildings around so my first initial thought when I saw it was that it wasn't he was netting on the sides but I not
03:09:56 he was netting on the sides but I not quickly dismissed that because he when the mate pumps 25 by that point yes realized it fairly quickly it was a fleeting thought really right but when you did dismiss it yeah what do you
03:10:07 you did dismiss it yeah what do you think it then what I see well we had serious fire he'd made pun 2:25 just before I cook teen and so I knew it was gonna be very resource-intensive we need a lot of firefighters there to assist
03:10:18 a lot of firefighters there to assist with it and I knew that originally it was a foreigner flat on the fourth floor my message had told me so I knew we had more than just that so it was definitely
03:10:29 more than just that so it was definitely more substantial but if it wasn't nothing what did you then think it was it was that had ignited and was on fire um from looking at the building straight off its you could see the fire going from the fourth floor when there was
03:10:40 from the fourth floor when there was fire spread all the way up the outside of the building up to about twelve the middle and then it sort of jumped across to the left-hand sides as I'm looking at the East face which was then almost to the roof on that side yes so
03:10:52 almost to the roof on that side yes so far as I could tell it was it looked like there was something on the outside of building that was a life right did you give any thought to the possibility that the the cladding exterior rain screen on the building was on fire
03:11:04 screen on the building was on fire I can't remember having the actual thought but I'm sure that caught someone at some point because what else could there be on the outside it's burning right have you got have you did you have
03:11:15 right have you got have you did you have experience of cladding fires rain screens igniting nothing like that no you've never seen something like that before not till now at the bottom of page two of your statement you you say I
03:11:29 page two of your statement you you say I could see that this was more than a flat fire as it seemed to be in multiple premises
03:11:41 where were you standing when you observed that the fire seemed to be in multiple premises initially I was where I parked up and Bowmore it was which was right by the CUA
03:11:53 right by the CUA I walked down Greenville Road and yet quite good view of the building from there and you could see the East face was quite well a liar whether I had that thought at that point where it might be
03:12:04 thought at that point where it might be a bit later on when I realized he was inside the building there's not just the outside I'm not sure so he could have been that initial thought but it could have been a little bit later on after I spoken to what do you say a little bit later on how much later or five ten
03:12:17 later on how much later or five ten minutes right so it was fairly early on it was obvious he was moving the building and what did you see yourself to lead you to think or know that there
03:12:30 to lead you to think or know that there were farzam within flats as opposed simply to being on the outside um well where I said before where you could see the the cladding on the outside the like going up you could see basically there
03:12:43 going up you could see basically there was fire within some of the flats next to where the cladding was alight so you could search you see it was burning inside the building right so is this is this right that you you knew there for but let me let me ask you this at the
03:12:55 but let me let me ask you this at the moment you arrived at the base of the tower did you know by then was that the fire penetrated into individual compartments again I don't have an actual recollection of thinking that at
03:13:06 actual recollection of thinking that at the time but it it would must have been it was obvious to me fairly quickly whether it was at that point a little bit later I'm not sure now
03:13:18 you say on page three of your statement at the top that you didn't give your role board in because the system hadn't
03:13:29 role board in because the system hadn't been set happened then you say I went straight to watch manager Mike doubtin from North Kensington fire station how soon was that after you had booked in status 3 at 1:30 - well I'd have booked
03:13:43 status 3 at 1:30 - well I'd have booked in on my air wave radio then I've got my PPE on my fire gear cetera and then I would have looked to see where I could see the use of monitor was I mean it'd have been a walk down Greenville roads
03:13:55 have been a walk down Greenville roads where Mike was standing so no more than five minutes probably not even that long right did you know that Mike Darden was incident commander yes I did who told you I was told by control when I
03:14:08 you I was told by control when I definitely got the pager message and as far as I was where I had to changed and my was also wearing needs to come on its head after that point so that's the call we've saw earlier on the incident on the Orr 117 would Mike with Pete duddy yes
03:14:21 Orr 117 would Mike with Pete duddy yes yes and you say in the next sentence what Mike Darden informed me that there had had been a far on the fourth floor and they had put the fire out however he
03:14:32 and they had put the fire out however he had seen the far traveling up the outside of the building and was asking for extra resources he was unsure if they were fires in other flats his initial thoughts were that we would get to the roof and put water into the tower
03:14:43 to the roof and put water into the tower from the top did it did he are you quoting here from what he told you to the best of your recollection I am yes right so when he said to you I'm not
03:14:56 right so when he said to you I'm not sure if there were other fires in it all there are fires in other flats did you say anything to him in response again that might that might help in my recollection of when I saw fire will
03:15:07 recollection of when I saw fire will realize that as far as within the flats I may not seen it at that point right and then after I've spoken to him and then we'd noticed it after that that would make more yeah making sense so you don't recall correcting him and
03:15:18 so you don't recall correcting him and saying and though there are fires in fact I don't know now also on page three we've just seen it he says well you say
03:15:30 we've just seen it he says well you say his initial thoughts were to get to the roof and put water into the tower from the top just on that did you yourself have any thoughts about this proposed course of action not at that time no room only having just arrived I'm still
03:15:44 room only having just arrived I'm still trying to get a bit of awareness of what was going on rain so I was this is what Mike had to tell me and that was one of his suggestions did you have any discussion with Mike Dadon about that proposal no that time there there not
03:15:57 proposal no that time there there not any time actually did you have any thoughts herself about how that proposal might be achieved in practice I could see the reasoning behind it but seeing how the fire quickly sped up the front
03:16:08 how the fire quickly sped up the front how practical that would have been without having more information about conditions inside I wouldn't have been able to basically that's one
03:16:25 is that that practical proposal something that you had ever experienced being deployed before not so now so this was a novelty was it yeah it was it was a using the equipment we've got
03:16:37 a using the equipment we've got obviously with line risk you don't that doesn't get involved in fires at all but being such an incident as it was never been seen before it was a no idea that that could have worked depending on what
03:16:51 that could have worked depending on what the situation was like inside the tower how could it have worked you know well the problem with the cladding is it's designed to keep the rain out and water out so by putting water against it all it's going to do is he's thrown water
03:17:04 it's going to do is he's thrown water straight off it again so you're not actually gonna get to the fire itself well by getting to the top or at least to any of the breaks within the cladding you be able water down the inside of the cladding which we now to put out the
03:17:15 cladding which we now to put out the insulation that was actually burning there not the metal on the outside right how much did you yourself know about this precise or even in general terms the construction and design and
03:17:27 the construction and design and materials which constituted the cladding that you could see on fire in front of you at that point I didn't as the incident went on you could see that we had loads of metal sheeting coming off the tower that was dropping to the
03:17:39 the tower that was dropping to the ground and you could see the insulation that was burning underneath it so not at that time I knew about the insulation inside but it became apparent as the incident went on did there ever come a time when you thought that Mike Darden's plan about
03:17:52 thought that Mike Darden's plan about getting to the roof and putting water on the roof well from the roof down was feasible
03:17:58 feasible no it wasn't it was it was a nice idea at the beginning but with the spread of the fire and alcohol just never gonna happen
03:18:12 in your contemporaneous notes if I can just ask you to look at those
03:18:30 you say it's right at the foot of the page you say in my 23 years as a firefighter I've never witnessed fast bread like this the speed at which its spread meant we were always chasing it
03:18:42 spread meant we were always chasing it and never had a chance to extinguish it it's paper I'm sorry I gave the references page two I'm sorry I'm getting ahead of the of the screen it's
03:18:55 getting ahead of the of the screen it's at the bottom of page two I'll repeat it again just for the record in my 23 years as a firefighter I've never witnessed fast spread like this the speed at which had spread meant we were always chasing it and never had a chance to extinguish
03:19:07 it and never had a chance to extinguish it
03:19:13 that thought that you recorded in your contemporaneous note was is that something that you appreciated on arrival or is that just a summary of your thoughts throughout that's a summary my thoughts at the end of it at
03:19:25 summary my thoughts at the end of it at the time I don't ironically I don't think it was it's happening so quick I didn't have time to have that thought so many sense yeah it was it was definitely when I was lights
03:19:36 was it was definitely when I was lights my ropes up notes up at the end of it it's like yeah I've never seen that before
03:19:40 before did you have any discussion with Mike Darden about whether you should be focusing on firefighting or whether you should be focusing on search and rescue at the time when Mike was talking to me
03:19:53 at the time when Mike was talking to me he had he had everything in place for high-rise Hovis procedure he had we know I know he had jets in there we had bhai crews in there he told me they had a couple of FSG calls at that point and so
03:20:06 couple of FSG calls at that point and so I knew that both was happening at that at that time we were doing we were firefighting and we were also doing rescues or at least if it wasn't actually rescue it was going to the places where the FSGS have been made
03:20:18 places where the FSGS have been made from right
03:20:22 you you say he had you say he told you he had a couple of FSG calls at that point yeah I believe he did the best of your recollection that the word couple
03:20:33 your recollection that the word couple is that your impression or did he use those words do you know I can't remember to be precise I know it wasn't anywhere near how many even started to come through a little bit after that on route
03:20:45 through a little bit after that on route to the incident did you pick up over the main scheme radio any impression of the volume and intensity of FSG is beginning to come in not so no the only the only radio message I remember was the makeups
03:20:57 radio message I remember was the makeups I don't remember hearing any other messages at the time right do you know how mmm what means a communication Mike Dunn had come to know about those FSG calls I know what would you know what he
03:21:10 calls I know what would you know what he was doing about them as far as I know he'd passed the information to the bridgehead and they were actually in them from there do you know how he passed that information to the British I don't know you don't we'll come back to
03:21:23 don't know you don't we'll come back to this in a moment just on these discussions did you have a discussion with him as I say about firefighting or evacuation or which should be prioritized no not that time right now
03:21:36 prioritized no not that time right now in your statement on page three you go on to say just after the reference to the roof that we've just looked at still at the first paragraph on that page you
03:21:47 at the first paragraph on that page you say we had a general discussion as to our next course of action and it was decided that watch manager done would continue with his role and that as we
03:21:58 continue with his role and that as we had started to receive faster Bible guidance calls I would start running this now let's just break that down if I keep if we can first of all did UN Mike Darden discuss his overall tactics he
03:22:13 Darden discuss his overall tactics he told me told me what we had in place at the time he told me the reasons why it made it up to 25 was because he knew we need a lot of BA because of scale and the speed of the fire also knew we had
03:22:25 the speed of the fire also knew we had some fire by the guidance cause on they weren't on the floors where the fire was it was further up the tower so we knew we had quite a lot of smoke travel at least I'm obviously we could
03:22:36 travel at least I'm obviously we could see on the front the actual fire spread so the actual next course of action was at that point was really to carry on with what they were doing which was
03:22:47 with what they were doing which was getting crews in there up to where FSGS were and making a decision there with a net take them out or not the actual the actual what I say start to receive four
03:23:00 actual what I say start to receive four plus five I saw oval Gardens cause that was when what's manager came filled from command genic over to me with a big list or a full list of calls they'd had
03:23:11 or a full list of calls they'd had through and it was sort of that point that we knew we had a serious number of FSGS and it felt appropriate for me to take that and that might carry on doing what he was doing the main reason being
03:23:24 what he was doing the main reason being that I knew there was an upper station manager not far away that would then be able to assist Mike with the instant and take over that while I concentrated on the FSG okay I've got to break that on sit down a
03:23:35 I've got to break that on sit down a little bit when we come back to watch magic Kent fields document in a moment before I do you you said in that answer that the task was to carry on what they
03:23:48 that the task was to carry on what they were doing getting crews in there up to where FS cheese were and making the decision whether to take them out or not just focusing on that was that what was
03:24:00 just focusing on that was that what was the plan that end up to two that you might possibly go to a flat where an FSU was coming from but nonetheless leave the octopus in there was that part of the story it does it does happen
03:24:11 the story it does it does happen instance it has happened before you get you'll get someone phoning up believing they're trapped by fire quite often will happen these will be smoke travel within the building in the meantime the crews
03:24:23 the building in the meantime the crews have put the fire out and you then go there to reassure the residents that fires out the smoke will clear you're gonna be fine where you are and you leavin there obviously at this situation that wasn't the case and far
03:24:34 situation that wasn't the case and far as we know it's but quite rapidly right say although that was the plan are you saying that in fact once crews got into the buildings they did not carry out the
03:24:45 the buildings they did not carry out the plan of leaving people where they were as far as I know yet right did you support what Mike Duggan was telling you about his overall plan yes it was a the
03:24:59 about his overall plan yes it was a the plan that was in place at the time was was working as best it could and the issue we have with the plan was didn't have enough resources at the time but right because of the makeup in such quick succession and the speed of the
03:25:10 quick succession and the speed of the fire and as I've sort of said the end of my statement that we were chasing it because it was traveling so quickly we just need to get resources there quicker it was quickly good and the resources coming there as quick as they could was
03:25:22 coming there as quick as they could was the depth just to come back to the question owners on the moment again was the priority to use the resources for search and rescue or was the priority to use the resources to fight the fire it was I would have said it would have been
03:25:34 was I would have said it would have been a bit of both because the quicker you can put the fire out the less people have to risk you right did you did you notice when you first went to Mike Dowden and started having this discussion with him whether occupants of
03:25:48 discussion with him whether occupants of the tower were self evacuating I didn't have that conversation I do remember some people hung residents coming out the building Evert didn't pay that much
03:25:59 the building Evert didn't pay that much attention to it - they did they did you observe whether they were suffering from the effects and I don't know see I knew there were people coming out but I didn't really I don't remember seeing
03:26:10 didn't really I don't remember seeing what fulfil his memory right you said you saw some residents coming out was it a stream or a but they're coming up now at that point it was only one or two there wasn't many when I first arrived did that tell you anything about the
03:26:22 did that tell you anything about the nature of the conditions inside the building not from assuming them come out now did you discuss the stake hood advice with Mike Darden moment when you first went to hear me
03:26:34 moment when you first went to hear me did you discuss the possibility of full or partial evacuation no did you consider declaring a major incident was the base senior officer present no I didn't have that Thor now does even even
03:26:47 didn't have that Thor now does even even have a discussion with Mike Dowden about that neither
03:26:56 but is it correct that the normal procedure would be that you as the senior officer present so far as you were concerned would take over as I see absolutely yes yes and whose decision
03:27:09 absolutely yes yes and whose decision was it for you sorry whose decision was it for you to take over FSGS and leave mike running the incident it was my my initial thoughts when I was heading
03:27:20 initial thoughts when I was heading towards Mike was I was going to take over knowing I was the first SI having a conversation with Mike on what was in place that was still primarily gonna that was going to be more parts gonna do
03:27:31 that was going to be more parts gonna do but then when we got the large list of FSG calls come through why can i it was a joint agreement really that he was happy to carry on doing what he was doing
03:27:42 doing I've caring with EFS J's because we know we had lots resources on the way and there would be other people to assists within minutes right and so I think what
03:27:56 within minutes right and so I think what you're saying is that it was seeing the list and the volume which meant that FSG calls were actually more important than defensive and absolutely yeah yeah nice life is always priority yes I fully did
03:28:07 life is always priority yes I fully did you feel that did you feel confident that it was appropriate for Mike garden to retain control of the incident at that point yes because there was only
03:28:18 that point yes because there was only Mike and myself what felt like I mean me and Mike outside of the building and I was confident that you would be able to carry on doing what he was doing until
03:28:29 carry on doing what he was doing until another arrest item enter right and were you aware that station manager Walton was was either shortly behind you or her I know I know he was already he had to
03:28:42 I know I know he was already he had to be not far away so because he left he can't out fooling with me as well and I heard him leave before I before I did so I knew he couldn't be far away were you in touch with him I wasn't is there a reason for that
03:28:53 there a reason for that time I didn't have a chance to give him a ring and find out where he was did you tell Mike Duggan that station manager Wilson was also on route I did sating I knew there was a stay within minutes of me I should be here
03:29:06 within minutes of me I should be here any moment did you have any thoughts about what rolled station manager Walton might take up when here my initial thoughts would he would then take over in charge of incident because I was doing with FSG and go from there I see that was your
03:29:20 and go from there I see that was your thought yeah what happened to that thought what will actually happen when he arrived you may be as far as I know yeah he did he I spoke to him briefly when they saw it yeah face to face how much me and I said
03:29:33 yeah face to face how much me and I said I think I said to him I was still in charge
03:29:35 charge can you go and talk to Mike much as we did okay mr. chairman is one o'clock is that a convenient moment yes I think it is we're gonna have a break now mr. Lotso you and others can excuse me get
03:29:46 Lotso you and others can excuse me get some lunch I have to ask you not to talk about your evidence or anything relating to it well you're out of the room and will resume at 2 o'clock