Detailed operational evidence from Station Manager Loft about FSG (Fire Survival Guidance) coordination and breathing apparatus deployment during the critical early hours of the fire.
00:00:11 yes so we'll have this lost battery yes mr. chairman thank you very much
00:00:28 right to kill me yes good thank you yes thank you very much for coming back to us and before I continue with the prover in your discussion with Mike Downton can I get back a little bit and your look at your trip to the incident which finished
00:00:42 your trip to the incident which finished with your arrival at the incident at about 1:00 at 1:30 208 when you when you when you were programmed in as status 3 didn't what communications equipment did
00:00:54 didn't what communications equipment did you have with you on route on route I had my air wave radio switched on channel 4 listening pretty messages I had my handheld radio in the car with me I don't believe what switched it on
00:01:06 me I don't believe what switched it on at that point right and were you able to listen to the main scheme radio I did hear some mysteries for the moon scheme you know I'm aware now that I didn't didn't hear all of them do - I don't
00:01:18 didn't hear all of them do - I don't know what reason I just didn't pick up on messages that were coming through well would you picture would you have used your air wave radio to pick up main scheme breath messages yes yes and that
00:01:29 scheme breath messages yes yes and that would be channel 1 channel 4 sorry sorry channel 4 a main scheme channel 1 yeah right do we looked earlier on about whether you heard any FSG calls on route
00:01:42 whether you heard any FSG calls on route can I just put one to you to see if it triggers a recollection because just before you arrived could you please be shown the short incident log page 18
00:01:57 and gay please just below halfway down to the time mark of 130 138 which is before your status or showing the status
00:02:08 before your status or showing the status 3 131 38
00:02:20 you see service requests created G 271 further call to safe fire on 20th floor also people trapped now do you recall
00:02:34 also people trapped now do you recall either specifically all generally that message or that kind of message now I don't know remember the most gentle you don't so if I was to ask you about any specific messages LFS G messages coming over the route the
00:02:48 LFS G messages coming over the route the the RT four would you have any recollection now I don't remember any any FST messages but I do remember a couple of makeups I don't know why they is but they stick in my mind right now
00:03:04 is but they stick in my mind right now just ask just focusing on what you were being asked to do when you say that Mike Dow to ask you to start running the FS jeez what precisely did you understand
00:03:16 jeez what precisely did you understand Mike damn to be asking you to do McCain it wasn't my asking me today because it was joined to a discussion and undecided between the two of us and that's why I would do Brandon
00:03:27 would do Brandon my role was gonna be to take the FSG calls to pass them on to the Bridgette so they can actually and hopefully resolve those FS geez did you understand
00:03:39 resolve those FS geez did you understand that there was any system already in place for running the FSG calls not I was aware of only that the messages were being passed to the Bridgette how did you think you were going to receive the FSG information from control
00:03:50 receive the FSG information from control what by what means the community by at that point I had watch men - Kim fields from the command unit was taking the messages from control I'm not sure that was by radio or by phone they would
00:04:02 was by radio or by phone they would write them on a full paper and bring them over to me where I was right then I was relaying a motion up to the Bridgette oh you say that
00:04:13 how did you know that that was the system when you when you first decided with Mike Dunn to take over the running of the FSG I did it online all I know was the messages I was getting the FSG
00:04:24 was the messages I was getting the FSG information from collagenous staff so the only way they would have got that would have been through control to their radio or their mobile right now you say you were getting the information from
00:04:35 you were getting the information from command unit staff how are you leaving aside the piece of paper which will look will we may look at in the moment seeing it depending on whether we can identify how how else were you getting information from the command
00:04:46 getting information from the command unit staff at that point at that point there wasn't any other rights the other way now okay now let's just taking it in taking it stages did you know that FSG
00:04:58 taking it stages did you know that FSG messages had been sent by radio to g27 one at that time I didn't know because I've missed I hadn't heard those mysteries on the radio obviously since
00:05:10 mysteries on the radio obviously since they're not found out that they did okay I didn't at that time I know did you know that
00:05:15 know that FSG messages have been sent to the actin pump ladder I didn't man okay did you know at that time that watch manager Marek on cu8 had started receiving fgs information by
00:05:27 started receiving fgs information by radio from the control room no I didn't did you know that it cu8 was involved in FSU's at all only from the fact that watch manager was sent over from the
00:05:39 watch manager was sent over from the command unit and given the list to me that's just at last come to that you say in your statement as you've just said to us now in pape in on page three just
00:05:51 us now in pape in on page three just below halfway down as I was standing outside the tower just about two-thirds of the way down the page as I was standing outside the tower
00:06:07 I was approached by a colleague from Fulham you see just on the screen out six lines up in the bottom as I was standing outside the tower I was there I was approached by a colleague from
00:06:18 was approached by a colleague from Fulham at about 1:30 a.m. with a list of FSG calls a station manager generally has to deal with FSG calls now just pausing now on the timing given the
00:06:29 pausing now on the timing given the discussion we've had so far about your time of arrival your walk to the tower discussions with mine do you think that that 1:30 a.m. is right now that would have probably been about 2 minutes later so about 1 140 it's about 140 ok and
00:06:43 so about 1 140 it's about 140 ok and then you say the station manager generally has to deal with FSG calls this I believe is on a piece of an a4 piece of paper I cannot recall his name if he would have come from the command unit now you now say that it was Mark
00:06:55 unit now you now say that it was Mark Enfield yes what's led you to remember that I remember recalled it afterwards and I knew I didn't know who he was but I couldn't recall his name at the time and to in statement right now
00:07:16 before we look at the detail of that in a minute did you understand your role was to take FSG information coming to the command unit and get it to the
00:07:29 the command unit and get it to the bridgehead in simple terms yes rather than being involved in taking FSG information from control directly yes the way this is yeah the way the system
00:07:41 the way this is yeah the way the system worked at that time was it was I had a in effect had a radio operator talking to control who would then get me the information and that leave me free to pass that information to the bridgehead to get it to where it needs to be in
00:07:53 to get it to where it needs to be in your discussions with Mike doubt and did he give you any indication or did you discuss how he thought you should go about getting the FSG information from
00:08:04 about getting the FSG information from the command unit as that information came in
00:08:08 came in no that wasn't discussed did he did he have any discussion about how you should then transfer that information to the bridgehead and I told him that I would first whilst him who was on the bridge
00:08:19 first whilst him who was on the bridge his which was what's meant to O'Keefe and who I Lynn spoke to and then we decided like told him we would use channel 3 on the handheld radio slow so we had to clear line of communication
00:08:30 we had to clear line of communication because channel 1 was being used on the instagrams and drivers hear that song as well okay are you familiar with FSG policy 7.90 I'm familiar with it yes were you familiar with it on the night
00:08:41 were you familiar with it on the night and catharsis right there we are training on it do you think not I recall only from lectures done at station when I was stationed most so nothing all
00:08:53 I was stationed most so nothing all right
00:08:54 right can I ask you to be shown here please
00:08:59 which is tab 5 of the policies bundle and I'd like to just direct your attention to paragraph seven point six which is on page four and that says as
00:09:13 which is on page four and that says as soon as resources allowed the IC should give priority to appointing a dedicated officer known as an FS g coordinator minimum role of SM to collate record and retain all the information on FS g calls received and the subsequent actions on
00:09:25 received and the subsequent actions on the incident ground the IC is briefing to this officer must explain the communication lines and the limits of authority when you and Mike Dunn were
00:09:36 authority when you and Mike Dunn were discussing your taking over the FS g role did you have this part of this policy in mind I know that FS J's were dealt with by station managers and
00:09:48 dealt with by station managers and whether it was in that exact role or not I can't remember did you have in mind that the FS not the policy requirement that the FS g coordinator was callate recorded and retain information yes that
00:10:01 recorded and retain information yes that was the command J was writing down the information so I knew we had a copy of that information from the start right well explore that in a moment but when you took over the role I think your
00:10:12 you took over the role I think your answer is you didn't made that the coordinators job was to collate record and retain information yes is that that's right well you also aware that there had to be communication lines with
00:10:23 there had to be communication lines with the IC and an understanding of the limits of your authority yes would you know what those communication lines were going to be with the IC at that point no because because of the
00:10:34 that point no because because of the dynamic situation we were in anyway and how things were so fast flowing that would have been something I would have discussed with possibly Andy Walton or someone another officer that came on so
00:10:45 someone another officer that came on so I could have that link between the OSE and myself did you come to have a discussion with the incoming I see about lines of communication did you ever have that discussion while you were running the FS jeez no I didn't I say do you
00:10:57 the FS jeez no I didn't I say do you know why not time I think it was it was a guy was busy with past no information up the chain by the time I sort of had chance to do that sort of
00:11:09 I sort of had chance to do that sort of thing I mean taken off being given to someone else to deal with did you have any discussion with Mike Darden as to how you were going to record retain and collate the FSG information - no I
00:11:20 collate the FSG information - no I didn't he just left it to unity yeah and similarly did you have a discussion with him about how you were going to keep him informed for his incident commander now where were you away where
00:11:35 commander now where were you away where were you going to be physically based in order to carry out that room I stayed where I met Mike really which was sort of on the corner of the east and south face of the tower in that part of ground
00:11:48 face of the tower in that part of ground for roads because it was I'm not sure why I didn't go back - come on Jimmy and I could have done because that's what was good information was coming from yes
00:11:59 was good information was coming from yes but I stayed where I was in their area while I was doing that I was also carrying out a few other tasks not only
00:12:10 carrying out a few other tasks not only sort of unofficially I was keep an eye on like that sent over that it was there I made sure safety officer got put in places where we needed one right I was answering questions people were asking me but it just it just ended up me
00:12:24 me but it just it just ended up me staying in that spot I didn't bring up about ecology at that point will it follow from what you've just said that you weren't in fact 100% focused on running the FSG calls I wouldn't know I wouldn't say that I would say you've got
00:12:36 wouldn't say that I would say you've got a natural break in between parsing information up and they were receiving it and let you know they've received it and also a break from when I was getting more information from the command unions me so there were natural gaps where
00:12:48 me so there were natural gaps where there wasn't any information being passed through yes and you say you don't know why you didn't go back to the command unit would you does that mean that you would accept that actually that was the more appropriate place for you
00:12:59 was the more appropriate place for you to be when running the FSG calls at the time yes I didn't occur to me because of what everything else that was going on around the incident and but ideally that
00:13:10 around the incident and but ideally that would have been a better place to have been located from where you were located to the southeast of the tower on the outside and how by using what equipment
00:13:22 outside and how by using what equipment were you going to be able to record retain and collate FSG information well I had all the information I had was coming through the command unit on the piece of paper on the paper I have with
00:13:34 piece of paper on the paper I have with me so I knew where the Fleck what the flats were any information that were to come back I would have written down against those numbers XI but as I've said in my statement at one stage we
00:13:45 said in my statement at one stage we didn't realize we were getting flat numbers and we were getting numbers of people but we didn't know what floors over right now let's see if we can identify the Kentfield a4 piece of paper and call it that in shorthand first of
00:13:58 and call it that in shorthand first of all do you remember how many flat numbers were on that piece of paper paper I don't I can only estimate around 8 or 10 can I ask you to be shown please m ET triple 0 1 6 9 6 7
00:14:16 and perhaps we can just expand the piece of paper does this look familiar to you it does yes in what way is that familiar
00:14:29 it does yes in what way is that familiar to you the the numbers I don't remember having my name on the top of it before but I know the numbers some numbers are quite familiar I remember it's flat 205 we did the first one
00:14:42 do you remember whether you say it's a piece of a4 paper we've had evidence from watch manager Sadler that it came in on the envelope but maybe it doesn't matter what do you remember I just
00:14:53 matter what do you remember I just remember it on a piece of paper on a on a clipboard and do you know where mark Canfield got that from who he got it
00:15:04 Canfield got that from who he got it from I only know he came from the command unit I didn't ask him exactly how he'd got the information that no that stage you're talking to Mike Downton I think as he told us with the
00:15:17 Downton I think as he told us with the timing of your being given that piece of paper be at the time of that initial conversation with Mike Darden more less a would have been probably minute or so after I started speaking to him so it
00:15:28 after I started speaking to him so it was towards the end of the conversation anyway okay and then it turned out right what did you do with that piece of paper that's where you made the decision that I would take the FSG and Mike would
00:15:40 I would take the FSG and Mike would carry on doing what he was doing and that's one of contact it's much mandroid Keith switch to channel 3 he told me had lots of FSGS and then I started passing the information absolute rigid right
00:15:52 the information absolute rigid right when you say use contacted watch manager area Keith on channel 3 and started passing information up to the bridgehead does that mean that you were passing this information on this piece of paper
00:16:03 this information on this piece of paper in that method to him as far as I know yes so your memory is that you got on channel 3 and passed these addresses and flats to watch manager Keith by radio
00:16:16 flats to watch manager Keith by radio yes as far as I remember it was if they look familiar I would say it was those fish ages what did you do with a piece of paper after that you think I
00:16:27 piece of paper after that you think I kept hold of it and eventually when I was tasked with different activity I took it back on to the command unit who did you give it to your memories I can't remember sip of 8-bits wonder come on
00:16:39 remember sip of 8-bits wonder come on zing do you know what happened to the piece of paper after that I don't know are you familiar with the role but I've let me start are you familiar with watch manager Sadler I know of course when to
00:16:50 manager Sadler I know of course when to saddle up but I didn't don't actually member seen him they evening at that stage ok what did you observe at this time when no Marc Enfield gave you this
00:17:03 time when no Marc Enfield gave you this piece of paper what did you observe him to be doing so I can rephrase that yeah what what was Mark Enfield doing apart from giving you a piece of paper um he
00:17:14 from giving you a piece of paper um he he was it come from the Comanche in it he had this board with me with him he told me it got Montpelier fresh juice and I'm not entirely sure what else he
00:17:25 and I'm not entirely sure what else he was doing at the time because he soon left me I went back to the margin I see was he on the radio or would you he had a radio with him as well yes I don't know if he was speaking to you or not but our conversation was supposed to
00:17:36 but our conversation was supposed to first you send the last answer and this may be a transcription error you say he had this bored with me he'd come from the command unit he had something with him what was it that was a clipboard
00:17:47 him what was it that was a clipboard that had the piece of pipe on it oh I see so that's what he goes to me right um did you receive any other pieces of paper at that point when you were standing or after you started taking
00:17:58 standing or after you started taking over running the FSG calls from your vantage point that's the right word I'm outside the town believe he gave me another piece of paper with more FSGS on it sort of five minutes
00:18:10 it sort of five minutes also not chemically horse up here let me see if I can try another one this is one nine six eight lfb trip quadruple zero one nine six eight page 28
00:18:34 does that look familiar to you
00:18:42 it doesn't look familiar no but it doesn't mean to say I didn't receive it I might just not remember do you recall receiving any written FSG
00:18:53 do you recall receiving any written FSG information or lists from an officer an officer from pub lettered a 261 from Acton now I don't
00:19:12 did you speak to anybody at control when you started setting up her first jeans no I didn't just I don't know whether we
00:19:23 no I didn't just I don't know whether we can get back to the policy policy 790 mister documents director if we can just have that back again tab five of the policy bundle I just want to ask you
00:19:34 policy bundle I just want to ask you about paragraph seven point seven in the policy it says that one of the first actions of this dedicated officer that's
00:19:46 actions of this dedicated officer that's FSG coordinator should be to speak by telephone to a supervisor at control to gather the latest information on the progress of FSG calls the names of
00:19:57 progress of FSG calls the names of callers may be passed to the incident ground by telephone to aid identification contact can be established through the officer of the water control first did you were you aware on the night of that policy
00:20:08 aware on the night of that policy requirement I don't remember that you don't do so did you have any thoughts about getting holder cook and control
00:20:19 about getting holder cook and control directly and obtaining FSG information directly from control now I didn't because I knew the information was going forward to the command unit we had a talk okay
00:20:28 talk okay and he then just came back to your statement if you go to page four say and this is third line down on that page the
00:20:42 this is third line down on that page the command unit kept giving me pieces of paper with details of FSG fruits and this links to something you said a
00:20:54 this links to something you said a moment ago in your evidence today does that mean that there was a continuous flow to you of pieces of paper from the command unit I can't remember how many there was but at the time you felt like
00:21:06 there was but at the time you felt like as soon as I given all you've motion at one piece of paper I got another one where it was that that many really comical right it was was pieces of paper the way in which you were getting
00:21:18 the way in which you were getting information from the car yes it was here and who brought you those pieces of paper far as I remember was 'watch motorcade filled just not much manager Kent fielder were there any
00:21:29 much manager Kent fielder were there any others I cannot I can't remember that that there may have been a quorum Emma and how long were you receiving these pieces of paper from mark Enfield for it
00:21:43 pieces of paper from mark Enfield for it could have been no more than 15 to 20 minutes right only because I know that around about two o'clock I was given
00:21:54 around about two o'clock I was given another task to do and you stopped doing FST and that's when I go back gave it back to the commands in here okay so focusing on therefore this 20 minutes slot between 1:14 2 a.m. yep how
00:22:07 minutes slot between 1:14 2 a.m. yep how many pieces of paper do you think you receive rough even roughly two or three yeah it may have been more and what form with these pieces of paper were they all
00:22:18 with these pieces of paper were they all a for ever although for ya and they literally had flat numbers number of people involved some have floor numbers but by that time what got my taking a photograph of the floor numbers and flat
00:22:32 photograph of the floor numbers and flat numbers from the lobby which had the details of what floor which flat was on so I could work it out and pass the absolute Ridgid yes and we come to that
00:22:48 did you ever speak to anyone in the command unit by radio not I recall her right
00:22:56 right did you know which command unit number it was that was sending you this message yeah I was come on Jimmy I was right you never took any messages from 7:00 then I seven hadn't been set up at that point
00:23:11 were these a full pieces of paper plane or were they for any of them control information forms as far as I can remember they were all plain they're all playing yep did you ever get any slips
00:23:26 playing yep did you ever get any slips of paper which were does it we're farming slatebook slips no no they were all on 8th for right now getting back into your statement at page 4 in the
00:23:41 into your statement at page 4 in the next sentence three lines and four lines down from the top of that page you say at one stage there were reports of eight people on the roof and residents trapped in flat 205 would that information have
00:23:57 in flat 205 would that information have been on one of the slips of paper passed to you yes right just on the babs on I remember flat so if I was the first one
00:24:08 remember flat so if I was the first one I sent up to bridge ed and also I remember the eight people of roof because it didn't seem to see my sort of thing you would have expected okay I wonder if I can just ask you to look
00:24:20 I wonder if I can just ask you to look at a document lfb quadruple zero one nine two two and turn to page 33
00:24:58 this is a control information form which has flat 205 on it I know you said they were all they four pieces of paper but
00:25:09 were all they four pieces of paper but might that be the piece of paper you you saw no it wasn't a spare I had had a list of different flats on it wasn't just the one flat rice paper
00:25:20 it was plain paper as well but you're clear about that idea right okay do you
00:25:31 clear about that idea right okay do you remember anything or any more detail about the situation in flat 205 who was there no the only information I had was what flat it was and how many people
00:25:42 what flat it was and how many people involved I mean some of them had the floor as well but from that I don't know any more information from where had and why does that one stick out in your your mind particularly only because it was the first one first one on my first
00:25:53 the first one first one on my first piece of paper I see so just I just have to remember that one
00:26:10 do you have any specific recollection or even general recollection or other flats and floors other than remembering that
00:26:23 and floors other than remembering that you received the list which we looked at
00:26:27 simple answer no there was I had so many I did in that first initial ten minutes so here is the first one I sent the others do you have any specific
00:26:39 others do you have any specific recollection of any any updates about particular flats coming to you during
00:26:50 particular flats coming to you during the 20 minute period you were running these FSG calls no I had no information come back for Bridget and that's all right in relation to these a four pieces of paper and the information on them you
00:27:03 of paper and the information on them you told us what you did in relation to the first one they signed a yellow picture that we saw in relation to that in relation to the others what did you do with the FSG information on the place
00:27:15 with the FSG information on the place they all stayed once I passed information on I kept them on the board and they all went back to the command unit one sites related to that wrong person you say they kept small together you kept them all together and then did
00:27:28 you kept them all together and then did you hand them to anybody on the see you it was one of the command staff I continued to write did you pass the information on those other pieces of paper to the bridgehead yes how did you
00:27:39 paper to the bridgehead yes how did you do that by radio on turn three I see so you never sent any pieces of paper into the bridgehead yourself all right did
00:27:50 the bridgehead yourself all right did you have a system for recording what information you had received from the CEO independently of the pieces of paper that you had now I didn't now on page
00:28:01 that you had now I didn't now on page five of your statement in the second line just following up on that you refer - fire safety guidance paperwork you say I picked this up at the bottom of page
00:28:13 I picked this up at the bottom of page four for completeness group manager Richard Welsh directed me to be in charge of the breathing apparatus crews BA and group manager Tom Goodell was told to take over the first survival calls I handed the fire survival the
00:28:25 calls I handed the fire survival the fire safety guidance net but sorry I'll be that again I handed the fire safety guidance paperwork on a board to the command unit I went to the ledger Center
00:28:37 command unit I went to the ledger Center had you been using a board to record the FSG information that came to you now that that board I was referring to it was a clipboard that a piece of paper on so they were all on that one clipboard
00:28:49 so they were all on that one clipboard so I literally just had an eye for clipboard with a four piece of paper on it so he went right just follow that up a little bit more the when Mark Canfield came to you with the first one we referred to earlier yep with the flat
00:29:02 referred to earlier yep with the flat 205 at the top did he hand you the board clipboard or did he take a piece of paper out of the clipboard give you the piece of paper and take the clipboard away now he handed me the piece of paper on the board itself writing over the
00:29:14 on the board itself writing over the next piece of paper coming on he gave me the piece of paper which I then put on the board I thought and then subsequent pieces of paper all on the same box here so then that board was then given to the command unit I thought so you didn't you aren't using a forward
00:29:26 so you didn't you aren't using a forward information board wasn't there or any other poster or something like that no right
00:29:43 can I ask you to be shown photograph at a photograph at MIT triple zero one five nine three five
00:29:59 while we're on the subject of boards do you recognize this item I know support information board but I've not seen that port before no right
00:30:10 I've not seen that port before no right okay
00:30:21 now just going back if I can to the way which communicated with the bridgehead on page 2 of your statement page 3 of
00:30:34 on page 2 of your statement page 3 of your statement about nine lines up from the bottom of the page you say I informed the to watch managers on the bridgehead Loki from - Silvo that I had
00:30:45 bridgehead Loki from - Silvo that I had FSG calls be sorted out radio communications initially we spoke on channel 1 it was decided we would use channel 3 purely for FSG and this would leave channel 1 rather radio traffic and
00:31:00 leave channel 1 rather radio traffic and can you explain did you have an actual conversation with either watch manager Akif all much manager - SilverHawk both of them about radio communications only
00:31:12 of them about radio communications only to first of all make contact and tell them I was there gonna deal with it first G and then I told them that we need what I told watch manager O'Keefe because what phone did to silver wasn't
00:31:24 because what phone did to silver wasn't that there at that point and I said I was gonna use channel 3 for FSG because of the radio traffic on channel 1 so that's when we switched over right because unison your statement you
00:31:38 right because unison your statement you say you informed not just O'Keefe but also DaSilva yeah that's that's Malcolm ym time lines a little bit confused I know I realize now that mr. silver wasn't there at that point but she arrived a little bit later
00:31:49 point but she arrived a little bit later but I never saw the very intense week there was another officer there on the bridgehead running entry control at that early stage durable who that was no I don't does the name dis decent
00:32:00 no I don't does the name dis decent organ ring a bell with you it rings a bell Janos a North Kent in it's on Jerome having any conversation about fire survival guidance communications with no now after that
00:32:16 communications with no now after that initial conversation did you actually use channel 3 to communicate FSG information yes you did yep and that was that which individuals specifically do
00:32:27 that which individuals specifically do remember speaking to to start whether it was watch Mary Keefe and then after I'd been into the tower take the photo the lifts the lift floors and then come back
00:32:38 lifts the lift floors and then come back out again and that's when I started talking to what related to silver right we've also gone up to the bridge at that point it was that all within that first 20 minute period yes I see
00:32:50 did you use any other method of communication I think so you didn't know I didn't is not confirm that okay did you know whether any other fast Bible guidance information was going to the
00:33:01 guidance information was going to the bridgehead other than by you I was not aware of any others now did you see what assumptions did you make about you being the sole sourcing of course we're still fairly early stages we were we still
00:33:13 fairly early stages we were we still hadn't got that much there and we're resources and what we did have was going straight in with briefing that practice sets on so as far as I knew the only way
00:33:24 sets on so as far as I knew the only way most was getting up there was from the command unit to me Bridgette can you explain why the FSG information that you were passing or wasn't being passed on
00:33:37 were passing or wasn't being passed on directly from the command unit to the bridgehead just at the time I suppose when it started there wasn't enough resources in place at the Bridgette to be able to take those and by having me
00:33:49 be able to take those and by having me as an intermediary so to speak we then left the commanding crew to sort out the instakill and stuff as well as take the calls from control which then obviously left me to give them away information
00:34:01 left me to give them away information Bridget why wasn't it possible for somebody to be on the command unit occupying the role you were occupying and doing say by radio directly with the bridgehead as you were that's again as
00:34:13 bridgehead as you were that's again as we referred to earlier I could have done that I've been on the command unit myself so it was a possibility yeah so essentially would it be right to look at it you are essentially part of the command you could but you just happen to be sitting up by the tower rather than
00:34:24 be sitting up by the tower rather than in the vehicle yeah it smells good yeah and I think you mentioned it earlier all about the photograph of the floors and
00:34:37 about the photograph of the floors and flat numbers yes let's just see if we can identify that I think it's your second exhibit it's a meaty triple zero one five six four four it's first of all look at that is that what you're
00:34:51 look at that is that what you're referring to that is is Elias and where was that where was that in the tower it was on the wall of the lobby in the lift lobby myself now I have another photograph to show you it could be
00:35:04 photograph to show you it could be witness please be shown inq quinn tuple 0 302
00:35:31 this is a photograph taken on camera five of the CCTV camera system at Grenfell and it has an adjusted time of
00:35:43 Grenfell and it has an adjusted time of oh one forty nine forty nine first of all is that you that is indeed yes and what are you taking a photograph off of the previous pictures you're saying thank you very
00:35:54 pictures you're saying thank you very much and just in terms of the timing does that sound correct and in terms of when you went into the town took a photograph and came out again that would do yeah right so was it but in that twenty minutes
00:36:05 so was it but in that twenty minutes earlier and what did you do with that photograph I used that when I was getting the information from the command unit any flats didn't have a floor number on I was over-served work out which floor it was from the picture I've
00:36:17 which floor it was from the picture I've taken Road does that mean that some of the information you were getting from the command unit on pieces of paper had flats been no floor numbers yes that's right
00:36:24 right right
00:36:35 now on page four of your statement you say in the fifth line down whilst I was
00:36:46 say in the fifth line down whilst I was at the front of the building I began to be approached by groups of people that were friends and family of those in the tower they were speaking to the moment mobile phones
00:37:05 and you go on to say after some detail I didn't speak to the person on the phone as I did not want to be distracted from
00:37:16 as I did not want to be distracted from my job I was approached by a couple of other people with similar calls but again my advice was the same I did not speak to any members of the public on the phone I just felt that I had to get on with my job and my question is did
00:37:30 on with my job and my question is did you take any information from these people who had approached you no I didn't know were you able to pass on what you had been told by them to the bridgehead in any way no I didn't I got
00:37:43 bridgehead in any way no I didn't I got very little information from them because I didn't want I didn't want to bypass our recording with us as they they come to me and got lost in translation somewhere they had no record
00:37:54 translation somewhere they had no record of it anywhere else whereas if they found 909 I spoke to control it have been a written record of where they were and what their situation was I'm going
00:38:05 and what their situation was I'm going to turn to a different topic which is
00:38:10 the role of station manager Andy Walton can I start by asking you to look at your contemporaneous notes and go to page 2
00:38:28 at the top of page two you refer to going into the lobby to photograph a floor numbers and we've seen that and
00:38:40 floor numbers and we've seen that and then you say more calls were received and passed on so that that the Furze I think to you is this right that refers
00:38:51 think to you is this right that refers to you going back outside and continuing to receive pieces of paper from Marchetti put them on the clipboard pass them on to the bridgehead by radio yeah okay yeah then you guys sit then you go
00:39:02 okay yeah then you guys sit then you go and say during this som Andy Walton arrived and I asked him to the A's with the watch manager g27 now we have an arrival time the full station manager
00:39:13 arrival time the full station manager Walton of oh one forty so is it right that I'm just taking that as read that this arrival of Andy Walton you're
00:39:24 this arrival of Andy Walton you're referring to would be then or just after then that's when I saw Andy Walton around the town where I was I say it was
00:39:35 around the town where I was I say it was that was after I came out the lobby so obvious oh it's probably nearer 150 grain saw him when you say arrived you refer do you mean arrived with you
00:39:46 refer do you mean arrived with you personally physically or arrived on scene that's when I actually saw him by the tower so I spoke to him physically right face-to-face given that this was after the photograph well y'all faked it
00:39:58 after the photograph well y'all faked it you're taking the photograph at oh one forty nine forty nine was it around about that time shortly after that time there for that use first saw him yes he would have been yeah right that's very helpful
00:40:08 helpful so what did you and station manager walls and have a conversation very brief it was just literally along the lines of
00:40:21 it was just literally along the lines of signs around he can he go and talk to Mike because Mike still in charge and I'm dealing with FSG that literally it that was it okay did Mark did did Andy
00:40:32 that was it okay did Mark did did Andy Walton ask you who was in charge of the incident he may have done I can't recall that but I know once we'd spoken once he spoken to me we knew that he was going right because you as you
00:40:44 he was going right because you as you say you told him Mike's in charge right do you know what he did next he went and spoke to Mike Belden and started to get handout do you know whether he did get
00:40:56 handout do you know whether he did get in fact get a handover I am NOT not entirely short I don't remember any messages saying that any woman was now at the OIC now first one of those I
00:41:09 at the OIC now first one of those I heard was for the first time I heard there's been a change when it was growing wealth yes but two or four yeah as it turns out that's about right what so you did the fact that you didn't hear
00:41:22 so you did the fact that you didn't hear about a change of I see tell you anything about who remained as incident commander after you saw MD Wharton well
00:41:33 commander after you saw MD Wharton well I know that Andy Walton was going to talk was going to take over from like so in my mind any woman was now gonna be the OIC right the fact I hadn't heard a mister on the radio I wasn't that concerned about because the radio
00:41:44 concerned about because the radio traffic was it was quite busy anyway do you did you find out what Andy Walton actually did after he'd gone to see Mike down and take a handover from him um I
00:41:56 down and take a handover from him um I don't know the details now okay turning on to a different topic do you remember a firefighter from North Kensington
00:42:09 a firefighter from North Kensington being there called Justino burned I know Justin but I don't have any clear reflection that know where I saw I know
00:42:20 reflection that know where I saw I know I did see him but I don't know where it was now he says that he had a conversation with you after he had come out of the tower having gone up to one
00:42:34 out of the tower having gone up to one of the higher floors with two other firefighters they knew firefighter people and great managers Stern who had been asked to rescue a man on the 16th floor do you remember that a
00:42:47 floor do you remember that a conversation with just in there burn about that subject no I don't do you remember the disk trigger a recollection any discussion with any firefighter
00:42:58 any discussion with any firefighter about a bed-bound man on the 16th floor who needed rescuing I don't remember discussion but I do have a recollection of a bit bad person
00:43:09 have a recollection of a bit bad person on the 16th but I don't know where I had no the information from but is it somehow all right is this something that you recall knowing on the night ORS and something that you think you might have
00:43:21 something that you think you might have learned later no something on the night but I can't recall whether it was someone told that to me or it was one of the messages I passed up the bridgehead got the message back on the bridge I'm not sure okay but I think you said you
00:43:33 not sure okay but I think you said you had no recollection of this exchange with firefighter a bird no you don't say it didn't happen they do I don't say didn't happen as I said when I was at was bottom of the tower there when I was
00:43:44 was bottom of the tower there when I was passing the FSG I was doing other small toss as well right so he could have been on us any information up while it was telling me and just didn't remember right do you have any recollection about
00:43:58 right do you have any recollection about any details of any specific calls a specific FSG information that came in during your 20 minute or so period managing FS jeans other than the pieces
00:44:09 managing FS jeans other than the pieces of paper no you don't remember any details about conditions in flats or persons or numbers of persons other than nope it's not from the information I was passing up I wasn't getting the
00:44:21 passing up I wasn't getting the information back from a bridge aid because obviously the the volume of information going to them meant they were busy deploying people and I was getting information back at that point my but I'd only been 20 minutes anyways
00:44:32 my but I'd only been 20 minutes anyways home do you remember any firefighter coming out of the tower having had a wear a be a where and talking to you about a deployment they just done no you don't get back to your statement so I
00:44:51 don't get back to your statement so I can ask you please to give back to page four
00:44:59 you say on that page in the paragraphs second four bottom which starts the officer in charge was initially station manager Andy Walton but was replaced by
00:45:11 manager Andy Walton but was replaced by a group manager Welch we talked about that and he then go on to say that Richard Welsh arrived on scene and asked me if we had firefighters above the fire
00:45:22 me if we had firefighters above the fire level without water I hadn't thought about this as we'd be busy with FSG calls but I realized that we did have firefighters above the fire level without water I know firefighters were dealing with
00:45:33 I know firefighters were dealing with FSG calls they were checking on residents above the fourth floor and bringing people out of their properties if they could now my first question is how did you know that you had
00:45:45 how did you know that you had firefighters above the fire level without water just by the sheer number of calls we'd had if history calls
00:45:56 of calls we'd had if history calls knowing the amount of crews they would have needed to go up there that they wouldn't have been enough water supplies to reach those crews to take so it was a it was an assumption on my part right
00:46:07 it was an assumption on my part right but as far as up once it was sort of highlight to me by Fremantle Welsh it sort of made sense I thought well yes there's a very high probability I couldn't officer I couldn't be hundred
00:46:18 I couldn't officer I couldn't be hundred percent sure I didn't know no high probability that was the case yes at that time after the arrival of group manager Welsh which was the same we've got had gone around about two two o'clock 204 doesn't matter for present
00:46:31 o'clock 204 doesn't matter for present purposes you were still standing outside the southeast corner of the tower where I was yes at that time what could you see the state of the building on fire um spray fire I obviously I can't and I
00:46:45 spray fire I obviously I can't and I can't recall exactly how it was at that time and I know obviously caught steadily worse as the evening went on but I don't know what it was did did anything of what you saw give
00:46:56 did did anything of what you saw give you any information as to how firefighters were above the level of the fire but without water no I wouldn't -
00:47:08 fire but without water no I wouldn't - did you have any information yourself about the conditions inside the tower such as in the lobbies and in the stairwell no I heard nothing from inside the tower so I was unaware right did
00:47:20 the tower so I was unaware right did anybody report to you about the success or failure of any particular deployments of be a cruise in response to FSG information that you had been sending to the bridgehead no no I got I got no
00:47:33 the bridgehead no no I got I got no information back about the FSGS I passed up did you seek any information from the bridgehead about science or failure of deployments I didn't because I was still busy parsing information to them which was obviously the priority was to get in
00:47:44 was obviously the priority was to get in motion to them I've didn't didn't receive anything back there I didn't ask for it back either do you remember receiving any information from anybody about the successful failure of any deployment while he was still handling FS chuckles
00:47:56 while he was still handling FS chuckles no I didn't okay now getting back to this exchange with group manager Welch where did that take place that was on
00:48:07 where did that take place that was on the southwest corner mr. Danes and he was still there yeah now in the final paragraph on that page you say that group manager worlds declared the far as a major incident for TPF as the file is now at the top of the tower now we have
00:48:21 now at the top of the tower now we have that in the short incident log as occurring at o2 Oh 638 and just for the transcript that's at page 21 and there's need to turn it up it showed us coming
00:48:33 need to turn it up it showed us coming from cu8 does that mean what we asked you at that point had you gone back to see you eight but the
00:48:44 gone back to see you eight but the command unit or were you still outside the tower
00:48:49 the tower I honestly can't remember the information about the major instantly fall to come fire I remember getting the information but it was more from while I
00:49:00 information but it was more from while I was hearing around the instant ground as opposed to directly from group major Welsh right so I'm not insure sure where I was at the time when I when I found that improvised now did you ever see group manager Welch on cu8 what did you alias see him outside
00:49:12 cu8 what did you alias see him outside the tower when you first saw him I believe it was only outside the tower because that's where he asked me to go back to the command unit hand over the
00:49:23 back to the command unit hand over the FSG to the Koala junior staff and stop set up behind main control the reason I asked you is that this bit is this group manager Welch in his witness statement and clearly reckon we'll have to explore
00:49:36 and clearly reckon we'll have to explore this with him but just well you're here he says that when he arrived at cu8 he had he would he had been told that you were the officer in charge
00:49:51 do you know anything about that no that's the first I heard a little and he says that that was immediately after the
00:50:02 says that that was immediately after the major incidents declare okay now I don't know nothing about that right do you remember
00:50:13 do you remember seeing or observing group manager world is receiving any handover from anybody no I don't you didn't give him a hand over no I didn't have it do you remember being asked by
00:50:26 have it do you remember being asked by group manager Welch for the information based on or using the decision-making model a DMM no that's how the only
00:50:38 model a DMM no that's how the only conversation I remember having with Green Mountain Welsh was asking about the crews above the fire floor and asking me to go back to the Marge init right and that was all outside the town that's all that sort of Tallis were you
00:50:50 that's all that sort of Tallis were you aware at any time the group manager Welch thought that you were the sort as we can tell thought that you were the officer in charge of the incident no that was the first heard of it just told me now right when you spoke to him did
00:51:03 me now right when you spoke to him did he ask you who the ISEE was he may have done but I can't recall obviously I did know at the time so I would have told him to speak to Andy Walton right
00:51:29 so would I be right in thinking that group manager Welch never actually said to you I am taking over command until you know you didn't know you clear about that yes absolutely now going to your statement on page five
00:51:44 now going to your statement on page five you say we've looked at this sentence in the second line but I want to look at the first sentence you say again it starts at the bottom of page four but
00:51:55 starts at the bottom of page four but group manager works directed me to be in charge of the breathing apparatus crews and group manager Tom Goodell was told to take care of the fire survival calls um where was that discussion that as far
00:52:09 um where was that discussion that as far as a remember that discussion was above the tower what I can set our and in my statement I say the groom engine good or was told takeoff our survival that was information found out late so I didn't
00:52:20 information found out late so I didn't know that on the night I discovered that afterwards so I see I know all I knew was I was giving the fire survival goddess back to come on junior and was being asked to help set up be a nice a
00:52:32 being asked to help set up be a nice a job let's see if I can clarify this thing yep you have a conversation with Richard Welch it comes to you the base of the tower yes yes that's right and he
00:52:43 of the tower yes yes that's right and he tells you to take over take charge of the breathing apparatus crews yes but he also tells you to go to see you ate yes that's right is it yes he asked me to go
00:52:54 that's right is it yes he asked me to go to see you wait and hand the fire spoiler guard and stuff over to the command unit and then to help don't keep in stock manager set up the brick mattress main control right and what
00:53:06 mattress main control right and what your reference to group matter Tom Goodell taking every fire survival calls is something you weren't you weren't privy to that conversation between him and Richard wells no I didn't know that at the time that was he was taking over bill did statement added that's that's
00:53:19 bill did statement added that's that's that's clarified that did you ever have any when you've got to see you eight wasn't asking this way did you go to see you eight next I did yes who did you see on see you eight when
00:53:31 who did you see on see you eight when you got there I can't remember names or faces even if I'm I'm I gave the paperwork I had to one of the staff on the command unit I also gave my mobile
00:53:43 the command unit I also gave my mobile at the time because they had the picture of the flat numbers etc but who that was I couldn't do what are you sure it was see you 8:00 and not 7:00 to see the way yes okay what were people doing on cu8
00:54:00 yes okay what were people doing on cu8 when you got there to be honest I don't really recall and I was busy there was lots people on there doing whatever they were doing but didn't really didn't get
00:54:11 were doing but didn't really didn't get that far onto it to take that must notice really walk assume we just give him what I've over the emotion I had and then going to setting up Bailey main control okay do you remember I think I may have asked you this before but in
00:54:22 may have asked you this before but in the Oscar together do you remember who you handed the pieces of paper the FSG pieces of paper to on CUA I don't remember nah just might was one of the come on stuff okay I don't know who
00:54:33 the come on stuff okay I don't know who and then what happened next after that after that myself and down keeping went to command unit seven which was part in Greenville Road the whole unit was
00:54:47 Greenville Road the whole unit was switched off at that point and neither of us knew how to start up a generator to etc but States remained Anika Saunders is with us and he used to become a unit so he was able to get it
00:54:58 become a unit so he was able to get it up and running just after that was done we then got told that was being used for FSG so we need to go and find somewhere else and that's where me and down went down to the tower first of all who told
00:55:11 down to the tower first of all who told you to go to see you seven I don't know I believe that was I believe the general when
00:55:18 when brief was to find a command unit and use that for the only main control right and that was the closest one to go it were and who told you that it was going to be used for FSG let's say Co 7 was going to
00:55:29 used for FSG let's say Co 7 was going to be used for FSG I gained I can't remember who was there but it was someone else that came it although we were about sir use it we don't know that it was not do you remember this stage
00:55:43 it was not do you remember this stage the involvement of or any involvement of DAC in Lockland no you don't remember seeing him on I don't move scene without that stage now he didn't seem all either come on
00:55:55 now he didn't seem all either come on you know that doesn't mean he wasn't there so come on July 8 was quite busy so may have been there but I don't recollect seeing him right
00:56:08 do you remember observing or being present in any briefing given by DAC McLaughlin to group manager Goodell about FSG and how I don't do you
00:56:20 about FSG and how I don't do you remember that you weren't involved I would say I remember I wasn't I wasn't involved I didn't give any hand over to anyone about the FSG apart from giving the information back to the command staff but my question was whether you
00:56:31 staff but my question was whether you were involved in or observed any hand over at any discussion between DSC O'Laughlin and group manager good modulars to know right now at the bottom
00:56:44 modulars to know right now at the bottom of page four top of page five which as we've seen you were told by group manager Welch to be in charge of the be a cruise do you remember exactly what group manager Welch told you that you
00:56:55 group manager Welch told you that you would be doing no not uh not any specifics just that myself and Dan were to run be a main control and make sure
00:57:06 to run be a main control and make sure we had enough PA resources so there's a resourcing job is it yes Wesley now station manager Kipling in his witness statement recalls that it was he he Kipling who asked you to
00:57:17 was he he Kipling who asked you to assist him with be a cruise and not well not very well as far as I can remember I was asked by Blue Mounds or else to do
00:57:29 was asked by Blue Mounds or else to do it join me with mr. Kiptyn right
00:57:34 and that that instruction you say was given to you with no one else present is this right at the foot of the tower when you were out there as far as I remember yes yeah okay now station manager
00:57:46 yes yeah okay now station manager Kipling also says that he took you and station manager Saunders to go and set up the a main control in the second command unit I think that that that talents with your recollection you just
00:57:58 talents with your recollection you just told us that's right as it comes Nick Saunders what was what have you been doing up to that point you know I don't know that's the first time I saw him right in terms of the system that you
00:58:14 right in terms of the system that you have in place for be a main controlling you say in your statement and this is page five in the second paragraph we can just look at it you say any firefighters that turned up this is the first line
00:58:30 that turned up this is the first line any fighters outside the ledger center any fire fighters have turned up were instructed to put on there be a set and any that were trained in EDB aides are same and then you explain what a DBA are
00:58:43 same and then you explain what a DBA are and then you say the crews were told to put on their breathing apparatus and SM damn Kipling was organizing them I was communicating with SM down Kipling to get the crews in how did the
00:58:57 get the crews in how did the firefighters know that they had to go to the leisure center to avoid to where ba I'm not sure how that happened but the message would have got out to any
00:59:09 message would have got out to any oncoming crews that that's where they needed to deploy to that's probably done when they when they're each machine booked in at the come on Jimmy it means help to take their crews to
00:59:21 it means help to take their crews to notice Anna do you do you remember whether any general message was broadcast from control on the main scheme radio informing all crew
00:59:34 scheme radio informing all crew that they had to muster the ledger center no I don't know how would but do you have any recollection of any general message gang or you who are you just assuming that that's how it was done
00:59:45 assuming that that's how it was done no I have no recollection any message but I'm assuming that has appliances return me up they were told to report to the rear center right says did the did the firefighters know that they had to
00:59:56 the firefighters know that they had to bring their ba sets with them from their appliances when going to the letter center they would have done use if they were told they're going to notice enter they would have been told to take those services right so you don't remember anybody turning up for that one I've been told to get back to their appliance
01:00:07 been told to get back to their appliance and get one I may have happened but I don't recall though now in your in that same paragraphs as we just see you say that down Kipling was organizing them you were communicating with him to get
01:00:19 you were communicating with him to get the crews in when you say that dang Kipling was organizing the be a cruise what was he doing well dome was at the news center with the Bo main control he was basically had the at the Martian
01:00:33 he was basically had the at the Martian area for all the SDP I need to be SS that he had him I was down near to covered walkway and as the boots head
01:00:44 covered walkway and as the boots head cooked down won't be I close I then spoke to Dan to get him to send more down to where I was so I had more supporting to the bridgehead when I wanted it did did they come a point do you remember whether when the bridge
01:00:56 do you remember whether when the bridge had stopped committing standard breathing apparatus screws into the tower I know there was what I couldn't have when it was how was it communicated to you how was that decision or event communication the only way I knew about
01:01:08 communication the only way I knew about it was they were asking for a DBA they didn't want any SD be a crews in there they asked me to send you need to get the crews do you recall if there was a point which came when the bridgehead stopped committing any be what be a
01:01:20 stopped committing any be what be a where's above a certain floor I don't know that doesn't ring a bell but no doesn't
01:01:27 doesn't now did there come a time when the mustering and deployment of ba where is moved from the leisure center to underneath the walkway to the south of
01:01:38 underneath the walkway to the south of the tower that sort of happened from the start because we had a few we had a few PA cruise down the walkway any ready before we set up the o main control so wants to help Bo main control anyone
01:01:50 wants to help Bo main control anyone else went to leisure center and then we used all those under the walkway first so something in the Ridgid yes it was this initially where you were based in your role as be a coordinate initially
01:02:01 your role as be a coordinate initially yes right and then you moved I went around to the west side of the tower yeah I've got on playground later on yes
01:02:13 and to be clear when you deployed them did you actually go with be a cruise into the lobby to be sentenced up the building or did you just send them from
01:02:25 building or did you just send them from the initial base under the walk away no I stayed under the walkway and send them through - okay do you were you communicating with the bridgehead at that stage yes all those yes by radio I
01:02:37 that stage yes all those yes by radio I wrote you which channel channel one channels one yeah do you remember that stage this is once you took over deployment and the VA crews who you were actually speaking to at the bridgehead no I can't recall it was um yeah it was
01:02:51 no I can't recall it was um yeah it was more than one person but I couldn't recall who it was right Andy Walton may have been one of them don't know anyone was one of them so I write because I remember having a conversation we do and
01:03:02 remember having a conversation we do and what were these conversations - these communications about literally he'd call me down and say we need another another three four crows or to STP a or a TBA have you got them can you send him right
01:03:14 have you got them can you send him right and then I'll send him in see what what message would you communicate to him I would say oh those those crews are on their way and then I would then speak - don't keep him to say I need never know
01:03:26 don't keep him to say I need never know to replace him back down all right so where was down Kipling physically located it was over by the nerve center right I was under the cover walkway and then legs rolling around in the West Park on the west side of the tower at
01:03:38 Park on the west side of the tower at one stage it was easier for me and down to communicate on mobile rounds because their video traffic was so heavy so we used our Mobile's for evening
01:03:49 used our Mobile's for evening at each other okay so what sort of time did you arrive under the wall under the covered walkway in order to carry out your task of be a deployment that
01:04:00 your task of be a deployment that probably wouldn't be any more than
01:04:05 tomorrow okay at that time did you notice a watch manager collating FSG information on a car bonnet yeah I don't know if it was then but I do remember
01:04:16 know if it was then but I do remember that happening at some point under there but I couldn't tell you whether that was a straightaway or later on right did you notice of watch manager doing the same exercise on the top of dust bins
01:04:27 exercise on the top of dust bins underneath the walkway at a later point I just remember people they're doing the FSG best buy kuhn what they were actually on no such you ain't even
01:04:38 actually on no such you ain't even talkin carp on it or you ain't involved in that event slavery did did you notice when you did look at them what they were actually doing I didn't take that much notice of what was happening though as I
01:04:50 notice of what was happening though as I was tossed focused on my task I was doing I could see they were writing down numbers but I didn't get involved in whatever could you see them could you
01:05:02 whatever could you see them could you see at least this much did you see them deploying on sending runners into the building do you remember that so I can't remember the exact name there were a lot of people running around all over the
01:05:13 of people running around all over the place as expected so I'm guessing yes they could have been runners but I don't Pacific with all that man now going back to the system for formative BA how long
01:05:24 to the system for formative BA how long were you under the walkway for deploying ba words into the building again with time I it's very difficult
01:05:36 time I it's very difficult [Music]
01:05:37 [Music] the time when how long I was under there it was put about an hour in sight to just explain the system then is this right it's tell me if this is wrong but
01:05:49 right it's tell me if this is wrong but that you essentially would have crews waiting under the walkway yeah there's the sort of initial store and then you would cool down a supply of be a
01:06:00 would cool down a supply of be a particularly DBA whereas from the letter Center hasn't when your supply ran low yes well is that I mean I got that right that's right yeah yeah so I would send my the people I have with me would be the ones to replenish bridgehead and
01:06:11 the ones to replenish bridgehead and then I'd get more from their Center to replenish the forward holding area as it's all became so we always have had close to send him to the bridge ever when they won't even yes okay now you've
01:06:24 when they won't even yes okay now you've exhibited a number of photographs at the scene outside the tower as you were marshalling the BA and those are some of them have been reproduced in the new operational response report and I just asked you to look at that
01:06:42 with page 210
01:06:51 in fact it's it's internal to internal 211 and exhibit reference to 12
01:07:07 and we have a
01:07:12 that's where the photographs are the time start timestamp does start on page 210 internally 211 exhibit number 241 if
01:07:23 210 internally 211 exhibit number 241 if you get back a page which one goes back to page one can see foot a black page 241 in italics with an asterisk SM Loft
01:07:35 241 in italics with an asterisk SM Loft is under the cupboard walkway outside the South elevation whilst there he takes two below photos of the be a team's waiting to be committed into Grenville tower and then over the page back to the page these two photographs I
01:07:47 back to the page these two photographs I think of those or among those that you exhibited is that right that is yes can you describe for us the scene we can see it visually a long queue of BA
01:07:59 see it visually a long queue of BA wearers first of all how far back under the walkway to the left of the left-hand picture does that you extend so that Q those photos as you can see adversity
01:08:12 those photos as you can see adversity next to each other so you've got the cue from the door yeah it comes all the way back out to the back that is actually the firefighter nudists are some left don't photos over is the end of the Q and the Q just snakes rounds to the door
01:08:25 and the Q just snakes rounds to the door so that's the whole Q that's the whole Q is it ready is yes now I can only I can see and this is just mean to two officers in white helmets there's one in the foreground of the left hand picture of the middle ground who is that
01:08:38 of the middle ground who is that I don't know blood out of you know because I'm taking you're taking effect yeah right technology is it would be a good trick but it wouldn't you
01:08:49 good trick but it wouldn't you even defeat me do you know the other white helmet where it is in the in the distance okay no not without a better photo I couldn't tell you there wasn't no no do you remember having assistance
01:09:01 no no do you remember having assistance from other watch manager or senior more senior officers I remember what Ranger Stuart Brown from Battersea he was he was there there were other watch miners
01:09:13 was there there were other watch miners round I couldn't remember who who they were and what was Stuart Brown from Battersea doing do you remember just
01:09:26 Battersea doing do you remember just generally assisting with me and the queue and making sure we had enough equipment to take into the bridgehead if it was requires which is in those photos you can see you can see a pile of hoes
01:09:37 you can see you can see a pile of hoes there might be say cannon is needed yes mr. chairman it's maybe an appropriate point for us
01:09:48 appropriate point for us break I haven't were very far to get but I think probably we've been going along
01:09:56 it would be yes yes I know I only have about 15 more minutes of 20 more minutes to go witness things to it yes at any
01:10:07 to go witness things to it yes at any rate now he's dead
01:10:15 while you're around room number was zero at twenty past three all right
01:10:32 like 25 Street please [Music]
01:18:51 right happy to continue mr. no absolutely sir very good yes mr. minute Thank You Russian was still off thank you for coming back to to us just a few tidy up questions from the last evidence you've given this
01:19:02 the last evidence you've given this afternoon um when you spoke to anybody at the bridgehead and and passed on FSG information to the bridgehead by radio as you said you did yeah did you receive
01:19:13 as you said you did yeah did you receive any confirmation back from them that you've got your message yes yes I'm not sure I've got my what do they say to you to indicate that they'd understand it they've repeated back to me that was yet general a little B
01:19:25 me that was yet general a little B vitamin E major Souter when you were running FSG in that 20 minutes also slot that you described to us earlier it was any decision being made by anybody as to
01:19:37 any decision being made by anybody as to prioritization of FSG cause I don't know the only the way I did it was I literally went start the top of list worked way down and because I don't
01:19:48 worked way down and because I don't think there was any prioritization for simple reason it wasn't that much detail to the contrary do you remember sorry miss Monica do you remember being asked by anybody to prioritize or ask
01:19:59 asked by anybody to prioritize or ask the bridgehead to prioritize deployments on the basis of information about smoke density now don't you remember receiving any information about relative smoke density in any of the plants not for
01:20:10 density in any of the plants not for those calls man can I ask you to look at a document which is BA sorry LF B quadruple zero one nine six eight at
01:20:21 quadruple zero one nine six eight at page 29
01:20:29 this is [Music]
01:20:33 [Music] a piece of paper found on but one of the command units after the incident does does this document look familiar to you it's an a4 piece of paper no it doesn't
01:20:46 it's an a4 piece of paper no it doesn't why does this one not look familiar to you and the other one um I figured you'd look further the main reason it's got too much information on it we'd like to never had that much information on the information I gave up to the Bridget now
01:21:03 information I gave up to the Bridget now in one of your exhibits you've got a photograph it's photograph aged that sort of shape to you it's a meaty triple zero one five five nine five now this is a photograph I
01:21:19 nine five now this is a photograph I think taken by you is that right yes my question is do you know which side of the tower that is the photographing that is the east side only because the ALP is
01:21:32 is the east side only because the ALP is there you're starting to get to yeah do you know what time you took that photograph I don't know no was time stands by corner what the times Devon was you seen no it's time-stamped yes have you got but is that timestamp
01:21:44 have you got but is that timestamp information available it is you should be with the yeah with the evidence should be with the evidence if not it's not I can't get it he was around about
01:21:55 not I can't get it he was around about foz and I was around about four o'clock ish right okay I mean it looks from the photograph to the untutored eye that light was coming up but then this would be facing west so yeah but you think you think from
01:22:09 so yeah but you think you think from it's about four o'clock I think so yes what made you go out and take photographs at 4:00 at 4:00 in the morning to be honest I can't remember right
01:22:22 before I get back to be a kind just ask you to go back to an exchange we had earlier this afternoon about a bedridden man on the 16th floor if you and I know
01:22:35 man on the 16th floor if you and I know this is a hypothesis but if mr. burns a recollection is correct and you were told about a bedridden man on the 16th floor while you were still collating fs
01:22:46 floor while you were still collating fs cheese what what would or should you have done put terms of procedure I would have automates all the information was at Bridget first of all no cause
01:22:58 at Bridget first of all no cause Justin's come past Bridget whether you tell them or not and if you had to then I will able to preach had to either prioritize or send resources to it right
01:23:09 prioritize or send resources to it right but make sure the bridgehead knew about it right now apologies for chasing what maybe I hear but let me just see if I can see if we can get something nailed down could you
01:23:21 can get something nailed down could you go please to the second hour Oh are our LFP quadruple 0 for 8 to 8 and turn to page 86
01:23:38 now in the middle of that page we've got a time mark of a 13850 again in italics with an asterisk which means that it's not it's not a hard time but it says the SM loft approaches the main door and
01:23:50 SM loft approaches the main door and talks to watch manager Paul Watson do you recall a discussion with Paul Watson at around that time Oh 138 it's very shortly after you arrived no I have no
01:24:02 shortly after you arrived no I have no recollection of that at all I have spoken to mr. Watson since and since then and we still don't know what we spoke about so it doesn't really help him Fred okay looking at that time
01:24:15 him Fred okay looking at that time do you recall and it's does this look as looking at this trigger any recollection about any discussion with any any other firefighter about any other topic at that point at that point in the tower
01:24:30 now going back to the question of the supply of BA was there any point I'll either one you were managing the aim from under the walkway at all when you
01:24:42 from under the walkway at all when you moved around to the west side of the tower later on as you described in your statement did they come any time when you were receiving requests for breathing apparatus from the bridgehead that you couldn't supply no no I always
01:24:55 that you couldn't supply no no I always had enough resources to me no daman that was their right and were the requests that you were getting from the bridgehead specific as to whether it was
01:25:08 bridgehead specific as to whether it was to be s DBA or e DB a yes yes specific yeah it needed to be because obviously with a DBA they would have wanted them for further travel within that hour and
01:25:19 for further travel within that hour and anything else could be nobody has to be isolate have made sure they got the right resources into our place and what was the means of communication about that subject with the bridgehead that was by handy Rodya which channel channel
01:25:31 was by handy Rodya which channel channel 1 channel 1 yes did you do you recall any difficulties in communication with the bridgehead no time in the night yeah occasionally cause it'd be a lot of radio traffic sometimes you'd have to come
01:25:41 come three or four times to get reply and I wouldn't always hear hear them calling me right
01:25:46 me right I'm just because of traffic I was on radio did that cause any difficulties or delays in dispatching ba where's from your holding point outside the tower up
01:25:57 your holding point outside the tower up to the bridge head not like in the corner right did anybody ever complain to you that there was a delay in dispatching ba whereas up to the bridge in Oakland now in see if I can iron
01:26:13 in Oakland now in see if I can iron something out in your statement on page six if I can ask you to look at the six line down in the statement on page six when you say after the reference to the
01:26:25 when you say after the reference to the the biggest dis you've been falling debris
01:26:27 debris say you had approximately twelve or fifteen firefighters at a time waiting to go into the tower in the staging area of the playground walkway we had 40 or 50 firefighters waiting to go in I just
01:26:39 50 firefighters waiting to go in I just want to try and understand the relationship between those two numbers the 12 or 15 where were they
01:26:47 this is once we move down to the west side of the building where the covered walkway was we were between that and the playground of the site there was a open
01:26:58 playground of the site there was a open walkway to the west side entrance that they've made into the tower and we had crews waiting to go in we queued up along that wall and then everyone else was back of the playground on the west
01:27:10 was back of the playground on the west side waiting to be deployed to there Kim says we almost had mad at her station had a holding area where everyone was sitting and then when we knew we had a few more to go in because of that stage we would take them into a time with
01:27:23 we would take them into a time with police shields we had him lined up ready to go into the building I'm just trying to get to the book 12 or 15 firefighters at a time yeah is that like it was that at the front we're ready to go that was
01:27:36 at the front we're ready to go that was that was at the front the cue ready to go into the building yes and then the other 40 50 were in the holding area on the west side on the west side of the building and did that move from the under the wall one of the walkway yes because of the
01:27:48 one of the walkway yes because of the difficulties of the debris yes that's what I said what could a time as that move right so at that stage even after
01:28:00 move right so at that stage even after the move to the playground you were still getting your ultimate supply of PA whereas from the legend yes I'm still kind of laser sensor but instead they're going to under the cover walkway they
01:28:13 going to under the cover walkway they were going through the underground carriages and out the rear exit they've got their into the west side supply area into the play area and then from the player you call off twelve or fifteen at a time with you yeah and then they would
01:28:24 a time with you yeah and then they would walk down the side load garages towards screenful terror self and then we'd be taken into a time entrepreneurship right so by that stage essentially you have three groups big store by the ledger
01:28:37 three groups big store by the ledger Center smaller store or pool in the playground and then the ready to go group twelve or fifteen at the front of the cube
01:28:43 the cube Palmer almost yet it was it yeah the crew means to go in we're all part of that area which was became sector tones at one stage now we know from the short
01:28:56 at one stage now we know from the short incident log that the incident was made up to to fi use of 136 six if I use a to 11 and 10 F are use at 216 and we can we
01:29:11 11 and 10 F are use at 216 and we can we don't need to get to the short incident log for that I'm summarizing it for you did that provide you with a sufficient flow and supply of EDB a for the incident i yes for though I never had
01:29:24 incident i yes for though I never had any any shortfalls and whatever was needed with which head we were over supporting so you don't recall any gaps or delays and supply no
01:29:39 did you recall the time when you as you were waiting for the initial what was there a delay in waiting for the initial supply of you DBA we're not like on my corner right did you ever send a message
01:29:54 corner right did you ever send a message to Dan Kipling asking for a DBA whereas only again I may have done but I don't recall that right and in terms of
01:30:08 recall that right and in terms of waiting times were you satisfied that be a crews were not spending too long waiting to get into the tower that were being deployed in a timely manner difficult to tell because I have so many
01:30:19 difficult to tell because I have so many firefighters there all the time and it's difficult to tell how long they've been been there for but there was a steady flow we're going in so I wouldn't have said anyone was waiting you to know we
01:30:35 said anyone was waiting you to know we have some telemetry data which shows making sure T if you like that some firefighters would unplug their sets from their vehicles but only tally out
01:30:46 from their vehicles but only tally out in other words pull their tallies out of there be a sets an hour or so later assuming that that is correct on the telemetry data it would mean that people were waiting to go into the tower
01:30:58 people were waiting to go into the tower with with P DBA sets for up to an hour but that did that caused a problem don't don't remember being a problem at the time though because that would have been when they've taken them out of the
01:31:09 been when they've taken them out of the appliance gone to the letter center they've been sent from there to the tower and then obviously wins the Bridget needs it then being sent in so
01:31:20 Bridget needs it then being sent in so it's it's quite yeah it's quite possible these have been real do you remember being involved with or listening to or hearing any instructions about specific
01:31:33 hearing any instructions about specific deployments being given to be a cruise you know
01:31:36 you know do you remember observing who was giving instructions to be a cruise no the obvious that was all happening inside in the bridgehead and I was outside I didn't see anything or hear
01:31:47 outside I didn't see anything or hear anything did you did you go into the tower even into the lobby at any stage after you've taken over command no yeah the only time I went into the tower was to take that photograph
01:31:59 to take that photograph yeah I'm never winning matterr after that I had no reason to mr. luff she'll
01:32:12 that I had no reason to mr. luff she'll be glad to hear I have no further questions for you so I just want to say thank you very much for coming along and assisting with us with our our inquiries they came they're very appreciative and we're very grateful thank you thank you
01:32:23 we're very grateful thank you thank you are you confident that there are no further questions that might need to be asked yes I think it's a question of sharp now forever hold your peace well
01:32:36 sharp now forever hold your peace well it sounds though that the end of it there's a lot thank you very much indeed for coming to give your evidence it's really helpful to know you're free to go thank you very much well yes mr.
01:32:50 thank you very much well yes mr. chairman I'm grateful to you for allowing me to catch up and I now embarrassed to say that we have an hour in hand which I'm able to employ use for the other than outside this room well
01:33:01 the other than outside this room well it's demonstrated that you were right to call off mr. Hoover well I think so but let me show the time could be put to the news 5 everyone in different ways
01:33:12 the news 5 everyone in different ways yes so I apologize for that before rising a little early we have a full roster for tomorrow yes mr. mr. Kenya we'll be taking those with us tomorrow
01:33:23 we'll be taking those with us tomorrow we've got kind of full day we have siding for seven firefighters - yes well you heard we've got no one else to hear a problem today we'll resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow with another batch of
01:33:36 o'clock tomorrow with another batch of firefighters so you look forward to seeing you all then thank you very much thank you