Further LFB evidence (4 September 2018 Pt 1 of 2)

Full transcript

00:00:22 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing at which we're going to hear first of all from mr. Myers and then from some other firefighters mr. Miller

00:00:33 from some other firefighters mr. Miller mr. Ciampa exist before I just hit mr. mark coming in well as gain to ask the witness to stay out but it doesn't matter okay you come in mr. Mudd

00:00:55 morning I think mr. millet wants to say one or two things before you resume your evidence yes yes thank you mr. chairman mr. chairman what I wanted to say arises out of some submissions made by mr.

00:01:07 out of some submissions made by mr. Weatherbee yesterday about disclosure of documents by the inquiry and I only say this in light of some of the things that have been reported about those

00:01:18 have been reported about those submissions in the press yesterday I just want to make one thing crystal clear it is not and has never been the approaching is inquiry to keep any relevant documents from anybody the

00:01:29 relevant documents from anybody the process in relation to disclosure of documents in relation to which the figure of 378,000 documents has been given relates almost exclusively to the

00:01:41 given relates almost exclusively to the phase two documents which are still in the process of review for relevance review for deduplication and then has to go through what may or may not be a complicated redactions process before

00:01:54 complicated redactions process before they are ready to be disclosed to court participants if that process is ongoing we will update the public and the families and all court participants as

00:02:06 families and all court participants as soon as we can with the precise figures as to where we've got to but I would reject us having the suggestion that the percentage of four or five percent such as was banded about yesterday of

00:02:17 as was banded about yesterday of disclosure represents anything like the total of documents which will be disclosed to the core participants in due course so with your permission mr. chairman what I propose to do at a convenient point in the near future is

00:02:29 convenient point in the near future is to provide a short update as to disclosure including Phase two disclosure as so that nobody is in the dark for those who may not be fully in

00:02:41 dark for those who may not be fully in the picture can you give us any information about the extent of disclosure in relation to the documents that are relevant of one so far as I know almost all of those

00:02:52 one so far as I know almost all of those have been disclosed insofar as they haven't been disclosed it is because they're still being received from the lfb and reviewed by the police and coming to us after that process pursuant

00:03:04 coming to us after that process pursuant to the MOU but as matters stand the process is ongoing in relation to matters that are coming only from the lfb I think on a fairly minor basis

00:03:15 lfb I think on a fairly minor basis there aren't very many and I don't believe but we can check and so far as there are ongoing statements and exhibits coming to us from the police that is because they are only being generated by the police and given to us

00:03:26 generated by the police and given to us as they come all right thank you very much

00:03:30 much but as I say mr. chairman I will update the the inquiry as soon as I can with the precise position thank you mr. Meyer thank you very much your patience now

00:03:42 thank you very much your patience now can I get back to where we were yesterday can I take you please to page 10 of your page 11 of your witness statement and I'd ask you please to go

00:03:55 statement and I'd ask you please to go to the bottom of the page and you say there when I found mr. Welch he was on the second floor mezzanine area he had the actual bridgehead and the VA

00:04:06 he had the actual bridgehead and the VA entry controls set up on the fourth or fifth floor but I didn't need to go up there can I just ask you what was group manager Welch doing when you encountered him there at that particular moment I

00:04:18 him there at that particular moment I think he was in the process process of assessing whether it needed to be moved to bridgehead in amongst virtual mayhem of a million

00:04:31 in amongst virtual mayhem of a million duties and a million things that he needed to consider so there were lots and lots of firefighters arriving there were people coming down the stairs seeking advice from him it was having to

00:04:43 seeking advice from him it was having to update the command unit with progress to you know the the list of things that were he had to do then at that particular moment we've asked a monk's assessing whether the bridgehead was

00:04:54 assessing whether the bridgehead was safe enough to continue where it was obviously our kind of procedures suggest that if it's not a breathable atmosphere we should move the

00:05:05 breathable atmosphere we should move the bridgehead and I think that's what he was in the process of doing there were five or six people around him seeking information and asking questions on a variety of things that were going on at

00:05:17 variety of things that were going on at that moment right did you notice who was actually briefing VA Cruz as to which flaws they were to be they were to be deployed to I think that was being done

00:05:29 deployed to I think that was being done at that particular time on a different floor on the the fourth or fifth floor right the my actions were limited to when you get to the top of the lobby

00:05:41 when you get to the top of the lobby where the mezzanine floors were there was a small staircase that led up to the stairwell that goes throughout the building so most of my work was limited to there at the early stage right I went

00:05:55 to there at the early stage right I went up to I went up to the sixth floor I think to assess what the atmosphere was like and I went up to the fifth floor I believed to to ever again to have a look

00:06:07 believed to to ever again to have a look at what operations were going on up there I had a quick look and then came back down and so that that kind of measured in area and that was the point when we started everything started to

00:06:18 when we started everything started to move back down move back down to that measuring floor so that we were commanding operations from that particular stairwell just inside the door above the mezzanine floor just

00:06:29 door above the mezzanine floor just following up on that last answer if I can you say you went up to the sixth floor roughly what time was this or relating to the tight your time of arrival two o'clock to ten I would say

00:06:42 arrival two o'clock to ten I would say after about ten or fifteen minutes of arriving there were there were a lot of firefighters that were kind of arriving

00:06:53 firefighters that were kind of arriving at that particular pinch point because obviously we'd made pumps 25 the message possibly outside was to send everyone up to the bridgehead which everyone thought

00:07:04 to the bridgehead which everyone thought was on the fifth fourth or fifth floor so everyone was heading up there and it just became rather congested so when we're looking to move the

00:07:15 when we're looking to move the bridgehead one of the tasks that group keep referring to group manager world species is debt now uh I'm referring to group manager wealth because that was his obviously his rank at that time he

00:07:27 his obviously his rank at that time he asked me to go and have a look at what the atmosphere was like at the stairwell is tariffs are we could get people without breathing apparatus I think it was evident that we were using a lot of

00:07:39 was evident that we were using a lot of air supply to get up to the higher floors and any kind of way that we could limit that by using the safe air that we could which we should look at that I

00:07:52 could which we should look at that I want to add a quick look and I've said got as far as the six and thought now you need breathing apparatus beyond this point and then came back down and that's at the point where the mayhem of that pinch point needed addressing and then I

00:08:05 pinch point needed addressing and then I was given that to ask of kind of being a doorman okay can I just then just ask you once you follow-up questions about the conditions in the stairwell when you enter Polly you've put the time at you say I think ten or fifteen minutes after

00:08:16 say I think ten or fifteen minutes after arriving so would that be between two fifteen or say or to twenty twenty two to twenty five if you arrived at two or two ten as you told us yesterday it's

00:08:30 two ten as you told us yesterday it's extremely difficult for me to give you at any times because as I said as ridiculous as it might have sounded I arrived it was dark and the next thing I know I went outside and it's like any time frames in between then I was on

00:08:43 time frames in between then I was on also pilot dealing with just issue after issue and I had no concept of time so you know odd I can only estimate I can only estimate what were the conditions

00:08:54 only estimate what were the conditions of the stairs like so far as the air was concerned and the air was by by policy that we you know we look to apply I

00:09:08 that we you know we look to apply I would say that the stairwell wasn't a breathable atmosphere however you you could go up to it you did a vision you could see you can see quite clearly up

00:09:22 could see you can see quite clearly up to about the sixth floor obviously there was a very strong smell of fumes so even though it might look clear it might not necessarily be clear so I think the decision not to take any

00:09:34 so I think the decision not to take any action to get nearer to the six without breathing apparatus would have been the right one so when we move the bridgehead or when Richard moved the bridgehead back down onto the the mezzanine level I

00:09:45 back down onto the the mezzanine level I think that was entirely appropriate because of the hazards a risk that there in a stairwell to people without breathing apparatus did you look into any of the lobbies well Richard was already in a lobby in one of the on the

00:09:59 already in a lobby in one of the on the fourth or fifth floor when I went up had a quick look where the lift shaft was there was some space up there but it was quite you know you could see there was smoking and those those particular areas where the flat doors are right about this time are you

00:10:14 doors are right about this time are you sure that the lot the bridgehead was where you say it was or was the bridgehead on the second or perhaps by then the third floor the the layout of

00:10:29 then the third floor the the layout of the of the building isn't isn't as clear as as it looks in my opinion so the the small doorway at the top of the

00:10:40 small doorway at the top of the mezzanine level whatever the first whatever the first flats through a staircase were whatever floor that was that's where I think it was watch

00:10:53 that's where I think it was watch manager Brown was working there along with along a lot of other firefighters now whether that was the fourth the third I don't think it was the second because the mezzanine floor would have

00:11:05 because the mezzanine floor would have been you know if you went in through that top doorway you would have been higher than the second I think so it may be it was the third or fourth but it was the first floor where residents flats

00:11:17 the first floor where residents flats were whatever floor that was right now

00:11:22 what did you understand or rather who did you understand to be giving crews their briefs which reflects of the FSG advice that was coming in who was giving

00:11:33 advice that was coming in who was giving them their briefs do you remember no I can't I can't answer that question because a lot can I do all I can do is assume that it was Richard where it was liaison with FSG in order to brief staff

00:11:45 liaison with FSG in order to brief staff to go up it may have been the only of other officer no it was Gareth cook it might have been him but I don't know their correct answer that question right well the crews being tasked by those

00:11:58 well the crews being tasked by those organizing the FSGS Oh were they on the ground floor or were they at the bridgehead when they were being tasked so I could you repeat you were the crews being tasked by those organising FSGS on the ground floor

00:12:11 organising FSGS on the ground floor or were they at the bridgehead now again the clearest memory of God is probably

00:12:22 the clearest memory of God is probably slightly later an incident where where the the FSGS would be managed by pete Wolfington and crews were being briefed but that was on the ground floor right so I'm aware of some actions that might

00:12:33 so I'm aware of some actions that might have happened higher up maybe on that top mezzanine date but I'm not exact I'm not exactly clear as to what what was happening there but I definitely know that on the

00:12:45 there but I definitely know that on the ground floor Pete Wolfington and Glenn Williams were managing and briefing crews from the ground floor level using one of the upright walls to hang all of their paperwork and notes on did you

00:12:57 their paperwork and notes on did you observe any crews actually being instructed to go to a particular floor at any time

00:13:08 Richard Welsh was briefing crews to go up to certain floors and I believe Pete Wolfe internal or Oakland Williams whoever was managing FSGS at that stage

00:13:20 whoever was managing FSGS at that stage were briefing crews to go up to the floors to deal with those FSGS that they had received did you okay did you see or hear those bring any of those briefings

00:13:32 hear those bring any of those briefings no because I'm on the I'm on the mezzanine floor which is two kind of floors up looking down over the balcony at the crews below who were at the FSG

00:13:43 at the crews below who were at the FSG briefings that we've been below two floors I wouldn't have heard the detail of the briefing I see did you notice whether they were given pieces of paper the crews were given pieces of paper I can't honestly answer

00:13:57 pieces of paper I can't honestly answer that they the only bits of paper I knew a record like you're on Pat Golborne holding bits of paper that I think he got from the FSG team but that was

00:14:09 got from the FSG team but that was slightly later do you recall any discussions about between other between you and group members Goulbourne or or people fundin or anybody else running

00:14:21 people fundin or anybody else running the bridgehead as to how to deploy the BA resources so as to maximize their impact and effect yeah later

00:14:34 impact and effect yeah later slightly later when when then group manager Golborne was in charge of the resort charge of the PA resources that have gone up to the floors I definitely witness detailed briefings

00:14:47 I definitely witness detailed briefings then prior to that you have to appreciate that we were in a transitional kind of situation that we had to move a bridgehead move B entry control and start maybe getting some

00:15:01 control and start maybe getting some some more organization and commander control on the ship huge numbers of firefighters that were coming into the building that needed briefing and also dealing with the people that were coming

00:15:12 dealing with the people that were coming out that had vital information so collecting information on one hand it so used to brief other crews to go up was happening and our witness group manager Welsh doing that amongst

00:15:25 group manager Welsh doing that amongst all of the mayhem and and yeah what was your actual brief at that time on in other words when you first arrived at the bridgehead well when I first arrived

00:15:36 the bridgehead well when I first arrived like I said it was it's very chaotic around around group manager Welsh and sometimes it takes a few minutes to see what's going on and get a feel of what

00:15:48 what's going on and get a feel of what you can do to you know effect to be effective as a as an officer arriving and helping in that in that moment so you know at one point for a few minutes I stood back and watched what group

00:16:00 I stood back and watched what group manager while she was doing and who he's briefing and getting a feel for what was happening of course while that's happening more and more firefighters are arriving that want to get to the floors the place is getting more congested and

00:16:13 the place is getting more congested and I think the natural response of of group manager well she would say that we need we need to stop this and that's when I got the brief to go up the doorway that was at the top of the second floor the

00:16:24 was at the top of the second floor the top mezzanine level and stop anyone coming in that didn't have a brief from him or a beef from FSG he all weren't contributing to the to the ICS plan if

00:16:35 contributing to the to the ICS plan if you can imagine someone outside of the the resourcing that was going on outside of the building must have still thought that the bridgehead was on the fifth or

00:16:46 that the bridgehead was on the fifth or second third floor and were briefing people to go up there so there were lots of people arriving in breathing apparatus sets not under air just walking up the stairs to get in to want to help because you know the

00:16:57 to help because you know the professional attitude of every single firefighter saw that night they just wanted to get in and do the best that he could so there comes a point as managers well we have to kind of say well we all want to go in and do the best we can but

00:17:09 want to go in and do the best we can but we need to do it in a controlled managed way and while that pinch point was happening at that top stairwell it probably wasn't as effective as it could

00:17:20 probably wasn't as effective as it could have been so in order to stop that group manager of gaming the job go on like a door person on that door don't let anyone through okay did you at any time observe a group a

00:17:31 did you at any time observe a group a watch manager particularly watch manager Watson briefing be a cruise on the mezzanine the better than other words the balcony which overlooks the lobby if

00:17:42 the balcony which overlooks the lobby if that was the watch manager that was in charge of ba entry control or no no then I'll be on see that would that scene is a picture of him I don't know who that what Simone's watching is me and faces

00:17:54 what Simone's watching is me and faces names

00:17:55 names fantastic okay well we will see what we can do about that thank you in the meantime can I show you I will ask you about page twelve you say at the second

00:18:09 about page twelve you say at the second paragraph on page twelve two-thirds of the way down that paragraph while managing the doorway to the stairs you say I also created a pool of BA whereas on the landing level yeah when group

00:18:22 on the landing level yeah when group manager world's needed people he would shout down I need to in BA or I need for MBA and I would let foreign who would go up to be briefed so it first of all it looks from that as if they that their

00:18:33 looks from that as if they that their briefing would happen after you'd let them through and not before you let them through now so the the way that of worded that probably doesn't take a time

00:18:45 worded that probably doesn't take a time constraint into that is what's happening I did create staging area for ba where is at one point it was on the top second floor level but then he got that

00:18:59 second floor level but then he got that goes quite congested and as as we were retreating more I took that state that kind of staging area down to the ground floor so that kind of way of worded that

00:19:12 floor so that kind of way of worded that probably isn't correct and that the initially it was on the same floor that that top mezzanine floor so when group manager Welsh needs someone we're on the same level and the stage theories behind

00:19:25 same level and the stage theories behind me and I take the next four whether we wanted s DBA or edpa and then the next forward would go on and then we'd all kind of move up the stairs again that started to be probably not that

00:19:37 started to be probably not that effective so we moved in down to the ground level and that's where I could divide then the two groups of BA wearers and non ba whereas red eats as kind of resource whatever the

00:19:49 eats as kind of resource whatever the needs were of the bridge yet you say in that last answer that you would take for the next floor whether we wanted s DBA or EDB a just just focusing on that who

00:20:01 or EDB a just just focusing on that who made the decision as to whether to call for EDB a wearers or s DBA wearers it was group manager Welsh until group manager girl born took over that that

00:20:14 manager girl born took over that that that particular task okay do you know how he came to his decision as to which to choose EDB ARS DBA well I think you probably have to ask then that I can only assume you didn't have a discussion

00:20:25 only assume you didn't have a discussion with them about it did you no all right no I think I could at hazard a guess but it would be better it's for you to hear it through him from no don't don't guest it did did to group manager Welch or laterally

00:20:36 laterally Goulbourne ever asking you to prioritize grouping gathering IDI be a whereas as opposed to s DBA wearers well there were two there were two groups beside each

00:20:48 two there were two groups beside each other they lined up separately in the day yeah I see so you could just call off as you meant it and you know it would be a group there group there I need four of you on two of you whatever it might be just go back if I can in

00:20:59 it might be just go back if I can in your statement please to paragraph eleven you you you say in the third paragraph on that page five lines up from the bottom four lines up right but

00:21:11 from the bottom four lines up right but and this is back to communication from the second balcony I spent quite a lot of time shouting at them from that balcony as I had to communicate with

00:21:22 balcony as I had to communicate with them on several occasions so I knew exactly what they were doing now that they there is people fronting and he who we now know Lynn Williams of peak Lynn

00:21:33 we now know Lynn Williams of peak Lynn Williams my question is what were you communicating to them find out what flaws they were committing to because I

00:21:44 flaws they were committing to because I think again I'm the memory of what I would have shouted down other than one particular occasion I can't I don't recall but and I know that they

00:21:59 I don't recall but and I know that they were sending people up to a variety of floors and so was Richard so it may have been that Richard was asking me to find out what floor they were committing to so that we didn't double right you know

00:22:10 so that we didn't double right you know double attain the same floral room so as we were getting information back from the BA crews that were coming down and I think he was constantly trying to tie up so that we did not overlap and you know

00:22:21 so that we did not overlap and you know to be as efficient as we can I see so summarizing it is it sounds as if and tell me if this isn't right that Pete Wolfe ndon and Glenn Williams were

00:22:35 Wolfe ndon and Glenn Williams were giving crews their briefings as to which floor to go to you were finding out what those were but leaving it ultimately to group managers Welch and then Goulbourne

00:22:46 group managers Welch and then Goulbourne actually to make the final decision as to where to deploy them

00:22:55 yes yeah

00:23:03 now on pages 12 to 13 of your statement you say the bottom of 12 and at the top of 13 that group manager Welch was

00:23:17 of 13 that group manager Welch was getting information back that some flaws will say well alight that the probability of anyone being alive was next to zero so he didn't want crews going up there and you go on to say

00:23:29 going up there and you go on to say group manager box told me that he wouldn't be sending the crews he was managing above a certain floor as it was too dangerous for our crews to be sent to the top floors then you go on to say

00:23:40 to the top floors then you go on to say two lines on from that I don't know when he told me that or exactly what floor it was but it was around the 15th floor and just a couple of questions about that but first of all did he tell you that in

00:23:52 but first of all did he tell you that in person

00:23:52 person yes he did and was was it your understanding that he thought that there were no active FSG calls from above lays

00:24:03 were no active FSG calls from above lays that floor all those floors again I I don't know the answer to that question all I know is that he had made issues and that the 15th floor above that was

00:24:14 and that the 15th floor above that was too dangerous if it was the 15th floor to commit any more crews whether he got the information from the crews that were coming back down right and then using that to make his you know we kind of

00:24:28 that to make his you know we kind of like to use the information of crews that are coming down to brief crews that are going out so if the information was so risk critical that he felt we didn't want to come anymore crews above that

00:24:40 want to come anymore crews above that then that was what was related to me whether we were acknowledging FS G's above that particular floor that would be a question for group manager works

00:24:51 be a question for group manager works very well that works do you know from your knowledge yes or no whether he checked the position about whether they were FSG calls above the say 15th floor with the officers managing the FS cheese

00:25:04 with the officers managing the FS cheese on c7 or in the lobby again now he would have to answer that one I'm I don't know what his communication links were with the FSG come on Yin

00:25:16 the FSG come on Yin again I can hazard a guess I'm pretty sure we did but I can't I didn't witness that so I can't answer that question with the same follow in relation to checking with the control room correct yeah yeah now on on page 13 of your

00:25:29 yeah yeah now on on page 13 of your statement you you say I had to stop a crew going up to the you say I had to

00:25:41 crew going up to the you say I had to stop a be a crew going up as despite group manager world's telling me that he didn't want anyone going above the 15th floor they were still being committed to floors above that level now do you remember when that took place during the

00:25:52 remember when that took place during the night again quick timings from here you know it would have been obvious ly prior to Pat girl born and taken over

00:26:03 prior to Pat girl born and taken over the role of you know of Bridget staff be a management it would have been possibly half an hour into the incident from when

00:26:16 half an hour into the incident from when I took up my role that's helpful going on then to the next page page 14 in your statement just picking that up

00:26:28 in your statement just picking that up further and you say from that point on Pete Wilson didn't send any rescues I'm sorry this is the second paragraph didn't send any rescues to FSGS that

00:26:39 didn't send any rescues to FSGS that were above a certain floor he wouldn't have sent any firefighters above that level and would have focused on when the most savable life force which was on the lower floors this was the first

00:26:50 lower floors this was the first interaction that I had in saying how things went at the bridgehead I don't remember how long I've been a position for when this happened it might have been 20 to 30 minutes or an hour you is that the same point time point that you just referred to the moment ago in your

00:27:02 just referred to the moment ago in your answer about I'm saying about half an hour

00:27:05 hour yes so previous to that paragraph I think of worded it in a way that I've observed I've observed the FSG crews

00:27:16 observed I've observed the FSG crews have gone above the 15th floor I've already been briefed from group manager Welsh that you didn't want anyone going above the 15th floor is too dangerous

00:27:25 dangerous so obviously there may have been a he hadn't got around to brief in the FSG cruise to that effect yet so you know why I to take like an immediate action

00:27:36 why I to take like an immediate action to stop the cruising going up there because it was too dangerous

00:27:46 do you recall a general withdrawal of the stay-put advice being announced no I didn't have a command role at this

00:27:57 didn't have a command role at this incident I wasn't there to support so I wouldn't have been in the information loop or the communication loop that sort of decision all that sort of information

00:28:14 now you say at the bottom of 13 page 13 in your statement just going back to the question of communication if I can you

00:28:26 question of communication if I can you say in the last paragraph there it was a bit of an issue and I should just show you I think the end of the paragraph before you say I told people from do not commit any Cruz above the 15th floor

00:28:38 commit any Cruz above the 15th floor group energy wealth just told me he doesn't want any Cruz above that level as it's too dangerous again first is this is this the same Tyson right yeah in time fine when you say it was it was a bit of an

00:28:50 when you say it was it was a bit of an issue for a while as Pete had a list of FSGS to manage which are probably on 1516 17th and higher floors you say probably is that speculation on your portal did you did you know have a

00:29:01 portal did you did you know have a reason to say it was on though they were on those floors

00:29:10 she had a word the reply it was kind of obvious that he had okay obvious from what from the fact that he still wanted

00:29:21 what from the fact that he still wanted to commit above the 15th floor from the fact that all floors were you know initially involved with FSG you know the actual detail of how many calls on each

00:29:32 actual detail of how many calls on each floor and where we were of dealing with each one you know I wasn't privy to that information so I can say it's an assumption that you wanted to go up but the fifth the 15th floor I said because

00:29:45 the fifth the 15th floor I said because it was so passionate when I stopped it yes you then say that you then say that

00:30:00 yes you then say that you then say that that people Thunder this is three lines up from the bottom also have an issue with me stopping those crews going up to those floors did he What did he say to you do you

00:30:11 did he What did he say to you do you remember well I just wanted to inquire why or stopping people obviously in a support role you're not in a command decision making position so with the I

00:30:24 decision making position so with the I supposed to the emotions of the night the the the attitude of every single person that wanted to get into the incident and get up and save life to suddenly kind of say well no we're not going to do that it's going to be a very

00:30:36 going to do that it's going to be a very emotional decision so and I could see that I could see that Pete was so kind of dedicated in what he wanted to do to get people up to start rescuing people and wasn't aware that group manager work

00:30:48 and wasn't aware that group manager work works didn't want anyone to go above the 15 and I was it was very obvious that there was an issue and we you know we exchanged words for for a few moments

00:30:59 exchanged words for for a few moments and then again it was it was it was obvious that the only way that we were going to resolve this in a quick and efficient way was for me to advise Peter go and speak to cook manager works which he did and that was a matter of second

00:31:12 he did and that was a matter of second stroke maybe a minute and when he came back everything was clear we move forward so in the next sentence you say he's been tasked to do that I'm sorry going back to where we were at

00:31:24 I'm sorry going back to where we were at the second it's line of the last paragraph on page 13 perceive got it he say he's been asked to do that by the FSG command unit yeah communication was so difficult but whatever group manager was thinking wasn't communicated to the

00:31:36 was thinking wasn't communicated to the command unit which wasn't fed to the FSG team it wasn't flowing like you would expect it to how would you expect the information to flow between group manager Welch and and station manager

00:31:49 manager Welch and and station manager Wilson

00:31:50 Wilson well again the environment was completely unprecedented we had more radio traffic we had more people more

00:32:01 radio traffic we had more people more workloads than we've ever experienced before now if we would go to one rumor light in the same building then you would expect a really fluid exchange of information between the incident commander the person that's working at

00:32:14 commander the person that's working at the bridgehead and the FSG command it's all triangulated where the the channel to that we can implement for command and control sometimes even channel one on our radios is quiet enough for us to be

00:32:27 our radios is quiet enough for us to be able to communicate effectively from a command and control perspective on that night there was so much radio traffic it wasn't it you know it wasn't as easy as it as it could have been right and was

00:32:40 it as it could have been right and was that affecting the search-and-rescue process did you think at the time no because the search-and-rescue process was about getting as many people up to the floors as we can as quickly as

00:32:52 the floors as we can as quickly as possible

00:32:52 possible now we had the the right amount of resources there we were we you know the staging area was always kept up - up to a must have had about 20 or 30

00:33:03 a must have had about 20 or 30 firefighters waiting to get in we had guys that we were committing to the teams that were committed to the floors that we knew were safe enough to to commit to and we were doing the best

00:33:15 commit to and we were doing the best that we could to affect his many rescues as we could using the resources that were had the communication of it was very simple very brief and I think was the best that we could have do under

00:33:27 the best that we could have do under those circumstances

00:33:33 did you yourself consider the need to report group manager Welch's decision about not committing floors not

00:33:44 about not committing floors not committing FSG I'm sorry not committing via a cruise above the 15th floor and response to FSG calls did you report that back to the commander unit yes that stage of cu7 yes that's not my role to do that your

00:33:57 yes that's not my role to do that your role to do that were you actually in the command structure yourself as I said earlier was there support to the bridgehead I wasn't in the command I wasn't in a command role right and did

00:34:11 wasn't in a command role right and did you think at the time even though you weren't in the command structure that that decision should have been communicated back to see you 7 it is

00:34:23 communicated back to see you 7 it is notably be normal if we had good lines of communication and were working under the normal conditions that is that would naturally happen that's it can I then

00:34:34 naturally happen that's it can I then ask you to look at page 15 of your statement in the middle paragraph there and where you say at the start around the time that the bridgehead was being moved down another group manager group

00:34:46 moved down another group manager group manager Pat Gould born then arrived it was quite comforting to see someone I know turn up knowing how they form now you say you go on to say and I'm

00:34:57 you say you go on to say and I'm summarizing it that he was given a brief by group manager Welch and you go on to describe it it's to assess each floor and then start committing crews to each

00:35:08 and then start committing crews to each floor which is probably what we should have been doing for the last hour did you see that

00:35:18 was that right the group manager Welch briefed group manager Golborne so yeah I mean when when when that girl born

00:35:29 mean when when when that girl born arrived we we work under span of control of five things you know you can manage quite comfortably group manager well

00:35:40 quite comfortably group manager well shed well probably in excess of twenty thirty things to manage so when group manager Goulburn arrived and can take could take over once you know a large

00:35:51 could take over once you know a large section of group manager well she's work which is normal normal practice for us it became easier and more more focused the the problem is that I didn't have

00:36:03 the the problem is that I didn't have all the information from group manager Welsh about everything that was going on that he was doing because I didn't need to know that so when when I say we should have been doing that from the start we may well have been doing that

00:36:15 start we may well have been doing that from the start but it wasn't that a bit of detail that group manager Welsh had given me so he may well have been committing to each floor and he may well just handed that over to Pat Golborne

00:36:26 just handed that over to Pat Golborne but that the actual information in the data all wasn't shared with me when group manager Golborne arrives I'm involved I can hear the briefing and go group manager Golborne gave me quite

00:36:38 group manager Golborne gave me quite detailed thing that he wanted and and from that point on we went on in a more focused way right I see when you say in your statement that you needed to assess

00:36:50 your statement that you needed to assess each floor and then start committing crews to each floor what what exercise was involved in that in that assessment well that wasn't happening before well

00:37:02 well that wasn't happening before well it might burn up him before that's my point so crews coming down and getting information from the ba crews that are coming down getting as much information as we can from the sources that we have that's what we do to make decisions to

00:37:15 that's what we do to make decisions to go forward so group manager Golborne would have been lazing with the FSG team would have been liaison with any source of information he could get before

00:37:26 of information he could get before committing crews then to the floors and order to prioritize them we kind of we both kind of agreed that we should work from the point of the most dangerous point in that building where

00:37:37 dangerous point in that building where we can't go beyond we should start from there and work backwards but by just just focusing on but not my question a little bit more perhaps what do you say

00:37:48 little bit more perhaps what do you say needed to assess each floor and then start committing crews to each floor do you mean by that that you would take the information from crews that have been in the building and we're arriving back at the bridgehead yes and use that as the

00:38:01 the bridgehead yes and use that as the basis of your assessment as to where to send people next maybe not a basis but a contributing factor contributing fact yes okay how do you say that probably should have been happening which is probably what we should have been doing

00:38:12 probably what we should have been doing for the last hour Gigi was it your view at the time that there was inadequate assessment of information coming from a cruiser riding back at the bridgehead no

00:38:23 cruiser riding back at the bridgehead no as I said earlier I wasn't aware of the details of what group manager work she was doing he may well have been doing that and then getting exactly the same information from the cruise coming down that group manager Golborne was gained right that's why I asked you what why do

00:38:37 right that's why I asked you what why do you say which is probably what we should have been doing for the last hour it's probably a poorly written by me because the suggestion there is that this was a change and that there hadn't been enough

00:38:48 change and that there hadn't been enough assessment the change is that that one group manager well she didn't I wasn't aware of how he was doing what he was doing because I didn't need to know at that particular time when group manager

00:38:59 that particular time when group manager Golborne came along I was involved in knew the detail of how he was going to move from that point forward so yeah that what I've written there doesn't really reflect it doesn't it describe well what turn what I've experienced now

00:39:12 well what turn what I've experienced now on just moving ahead on page 16 of your statement in the middle paragraph third paragraph down you say at the start group manager of gold vault asked me to get two pools of BA whereas together now

00:39:24 get two pools of BA whereas together now but my question is is is that something that happened only once he arrived or had there been two pools or two parallel lines as I think you described earlier before group manager Goldman's arrival

00:39:36 before group manager Goldman's arrival well the thing is that initially there weren't as many Ely berry wearers as there were later on an incident so there would have been there would have been a

00:39:49 would have been there would have been a each particular beer has got a different color cover on their breathing apparatus so there would have been a some orange you know and standard ba would have been

00:40:01 you know and standard ba would have been a different color and would have been probably a lot more of them and because we needed the EDB eyewear is to go up to the more further points of the building

00:40:14 Minh have as many as we wanted initially when they started arriving I was then able to make dedicated separate pools rather than just a corridor of a few

00:40:26 rather than just a corridor of a few different colors yes now just on this pools first of all was this creation of these separate pools before or after the bridgehead had moved down to the ground floor remember I was pooling the the I

00:40:40 floor remember I was pooling the the I was pulling the teams before we move down at the ground floor lawyer you started that before you move down exactly then continue after you move yeah and you say just if I can ask you to look at your contemporaneous notes

00:40:52 to look at your contemporaneous notes and go to page 2 and answer to question 13 but once you actually do you say I created two pools of BA whereas idibia

00:41:03 created two pools of BA whereas idibia SCBA sorry I'm thinking that too quickly if you look at that and you say I ensure their health but I had a healthy number

00:41:14 their health but I had a healthy number maintained in each pool in liaised with SM water and in order to maintain numbers

00:41:22 you say earlier on just this morning that just now that you at the beginning there weren't that many EDB a whereas as they were later on did

00:41:34 EDB a whereas as they were later on did you always have a healthy number in each pool or the start was that were there not enough edpa where's um I think I don't recall searching around for edpa

00:41:47 don't recall searching around for edpa where is there was always there was always enough to commit but to be really kind of I suppose comfortable you always

00:41:58 kind of I suppose comfortable you always want to have a lot more resources standing by than you actually need and then that was a position I wanted to get to so yeah I never had to say a group manager Welsh org Oh gobo and we haven't

00:42:10 manager Welsh org Oh gobo and we haven't got those those crews there was always enough resources but a more comfortable position that being is to have you know I still have a lot more ready and available so what one of my tasks that I

00:42:23 available so what one of my tasks that I was given was to estimate how many we've been using up to that point in the last I think it was 30 minutes and what I've done how many were using so that we could NS that my tammany were all gonna

00:42:34 could NS that my tammany were all gonna need gone forward and using those rough figures make sure that had enough reserve to support that now continuing

00:42:45 reserve to support that now continuing with this text in your contemporaneous note you say when GM Goulbourne requested a team I would dispatch the required number of be a type to the EC Oh ready for briefing going back to the

00:42:59 Oh ready for briefing going back to the point we were on earlier on that briefing I think was you said earlier being done actually by Glenn Williams and Pete Wolfington and then by GRU

00:43:11 and Pete Wolfington and then by GRU Andrew Welch or later Golborne as opposed to the entry control so FSG rescues would have been briefed by Buffington and Williams and crews that

00:43:24 Buffington and Williams and crews that were going up dealing with a more systematic approach of each of checking each floor and and making sure that each floor was systematically searched would have been conducted by a group manager

00:43:35 have been conducted by a group manager world

00:43:35 world which then was taken over by group manager Golborne the be entry control officer would have been briefed as to some of the detail have we how we achieve that now again you'd have to

00:43:47 achieve that now again you'd have to speak to group manager a Golborne and Welsh to see what they were advising the be entry control officer to to detail them again I can hazard a rough guess what they might have said okay but I

00:44:00 what they might have said okay but I think the point I get out of this is this right is that the briefing was also contributed to by the entry control officer yes it's a team it's a team thing on the bridgehead you know the

00:44:12 thing on the bridgehead you know the separate jobs that we are all involved in in supporting and controlling and maintaining the safety of all the staff that get into them ba so we're all out a little bit to play in in in committing a

00:44:24 little bit to play in in in committing a crew up into an upper floor but the overall responsibility and direction the kind of strategy of oh we're going to do it would have been done by the bridge a commander which is Welsh at one point and then then delegate it to

00:44:36 and then then delegate it to Golborne for the latter part you say in the same paragraph there that you liaised with station manager Walton in order to maintain numbers that's numbers of edpa where's yep

00:44:48 of edpa where's yep how did you communicate with station manager Walton with my radio until there were points where it was to where the

00:44:59 were points where it was to where the radio traffic was too busy and because he was regularly coming into the for a to check my what my needs were I was able to use both radio and face-to-face

00:45:11 able to use both radio and face-to-face giving a request in about what I needed and it wasn't just be a whereas it was all fit of equipment that I needed I would ask him to get it and then he would go outside and arrange that and

00:45:22 would go outside and arrange that and have it boiling whether it was people equipment that was that was what he was doing kind of a support role to me as well as everyone else that was asking him to do things did you experience any

00:45:33 him to do things did you experience any communication difficulties by radio with station manager Walton um only not nothing no nothing that affected what we

00:45:44 nothing no nothing that affected what we were doing so if I couldn't get through to him it was matter of a minute or so before he was back in the for a any way and I could speak to him face-to-face was there a time when you ever became aware that there were or might have been long

00:45:56 there were or might have been long queues of idibia wearers who had unplugged their sets from their vehicles but were waiting for deployment for some time

00:46:03 time and so I staged an area for my idibia where as I made the lift shaft on the ground floor I put everyone in there so I knew where they were and when I need

00:46:14 I knew where they were and when I need them I would come and you know would come a request another for another two so I'll use the the staring the the lift entry on the ground floor is my staging area

00:46:23 area I believe outside there were also more edpa wearers waiting to come in and top up my staging area which station manager Walton would have been you know would

00:46:34 Walton would have been you know would have been helping me with that with maintaining a really healthy amount of resources ready to commit to the upper floors

00:46:49 on page 19 of your statement just moving to a different topic they can you say in the fourth paragraph that you went out

00:47:02 the fourth paragraph that you went out to do a 360 of the building I'm summarizing what you say they're an update group manager gold born as to

00:47:14 update group manager gold born as to what you've seen and to continue with the resource management exercise did you did you brief group manager gold born as a result of what you found yeah and what

00:47:26 a result of what you found yeah and what did you tell him again exact detail I don't remember but the the rough message was carry on were what we're doing

00:47:37 was carry on were what we're doing because it's still evident from outside the building that fire hasn't taken over the the whole of the floors below the 15th now in that paragraph which is to

00:47:51 15th now in that paragraph which is to say the fourth one on page 19 you say we decided together that I should do this that's a 360 as we thought it would be beneficial due to the poor communication link with the command structure can I

00:48:05 link with the command structure can I just ask you about what you mean by can poor communication link with the command structure you just elaborate again I think I think the actual what

00:48:18 think I think the actual what communication was going on between group manager Golborne and the command unit he would be a better place to answer that my my impression was that bearing in mind I'm tuned in to channel 1 which was

00:48:32 mind I'm tuned in to channel 1 which was a very busy channel which wouldn't really have supported effective communication because so many people needed talk to each other group manager Goldwyn might have been on channel 2 but

00:48:43 Goldwyn might have been on channel 2 but I'm not aware of that and that he may have had a really good communication link but I just wasn't aware of that so

00:48:52 to get to get me to go around and do the 360 it just it just felt like we were woods because we were so committed and you know what we wanted to do to get as

00:49:04 you know what we wanted to do to get as many people in as we could rather than relying on an external opinion because that opinion would only be one dimensional what you could see from the outside it would be better for me to go

00:49:16 outside it would be better for me to go and get that opinion so I did a very quick 360 looked at the fire damage came back in with I suppose a some support and information for Pat to decide what

00:49:28 and information for Pat to decide what you wanted to do from that point onwards so when you say command structure I think that last answer you mean the command unit yeah which command unit was would that be the FSG command unit or

00:49:39 would that be the FSG command unit or the insulin computers in the command unit okay the insulin community and who at that time when you decided to do the 360 for these reasons was was running the incident command unit remember now

00:49:56 the incident command unit remember now that the factual answer is no right but I'm pretty sure it was AC rubber by then right okay and you say in the same

00:50:09 right okay and you say in the same paragraph just continuing we were doing the best we could three lines up from the bottom we were doing the best we could but we were not getting anything back about whether what we were doing was a good job whether to carry on as we

00:50:21 was a good job whether to carry on as we were doing or not on two occasions I returned and said yes it's good carry on but first of all getting anything back again would that be feedback from AC row in the command unit is that what you're

00:50:33 in the command unit is that what you're talking about Jenn yeah general general feedback from I'm only other oh I'd say officer I mean it this is a particular phase of the incident and later on we we

00:50:47 phase of the incident and later on we we get some good information because more offices are there more officers have arrived and we're getting more opinions and more structures starting to kind of evolve around the incident so I'm

00:50:58 evolve around the incident so I'm talking about probably a window whereby we won't get in every bit of information that we would probably of light but that did improve as the incident went on

00:51:09 did improve as the incident went on right and when you say I on two occasions I return and and said yes it's good kerryanders does that mean you went to the command unit no no I went and did a 360 OC to

00:51:21 unit no no I went and did a 360 OC to get a better picture about where the where the fire and the damage in the file you know what was a light what wasn't a lie right I see say in general terms were you satisfied that that a

00:51:32 terms were you satisfied that that a Siro knew what was going on at the bridgehead in terms of deployment or did you think that he might think there were gaps in these information again you'd have to

00:51:43 these information again you'd have to speak to group manager Golborne about what information heroes had because that that I'm not involved in that that chain of command all that that chain of communication in on the next page page

00:51:58 communication in on the next page page 20 you you say that after doing and I'm

00:52:09 20 you you say that after doing and I'm summarizing but after doing one of the 360s and seeing the top 10 floors being 100% engulfed in flame and the Sun was starting to come up this is a quarter

00:52:20 starting to come up this is a quarter the way down that page you say going on I told group manager Gold Bond about what I'd seen and advised to not commit any more crews to these floors I said

00:52:32 any more crews to these floors I said that if the fire hasn't got the people up there the heats got them and if the heat hasn't gotten the fumes there wouldn't be no oxygen up there now how

00:52:44 wouldn't be no oxygen up there now how did you make that just that assessment was it two people just by looking yeah I think and was a decision made by group manager gold born as a result of that as

00:52:57 manager gold born as a result of that as a result I believe so yeah when I did that 360

00:53:04 that 360 what I saw was flames at every single window on the top 10 floors I saw you

00:53:15 window on the top 10 floors I saw you know I saw a situation that I didn't think was compatible with life and because of that and because of the information that we were getting back from the crews that were going up there that together with the fact that we

00:53:29 that together with the fact that we asked to I think I think that got in contact with FSG or even even Merton control to see if we were still communicating with anyone above the 15th floor and when you put those three

00:53:40 floor and when you put those three things together that's what made us we'll make that myself agree that going above going to the top ten floors was not safe because we've got a responsibility to our staff as well to

00:53:53 responsibility to our staff as well to ensure their safety so that was one of the difficult decisions that we had to make that night was a decision made as a result of what you saw not commit any crews above the tenth floor not purely

00:54:06 crews above the tenth floor not purely on just why so it was those three factors we agreed before it went out that I'm sorry then you're quite right I'll interrupt you and just put the question again was a decision made on

00:54:19 question again was a decision made on those three factors actually not to commit crews above the tenth floor up from what I would call yes yes yeah and you say the Sun was starting to come

00:54:31 and you say the Sun was starting to come up now would that be about the time that decision was made yes cuz when I went at you did that 360 and noticed that it was slightly brighter than my previous one so that kind of let me know that the Sun

00:54:43 so that kind of let me know that the Sun was imminent so may have been about four o'clock

00:54:49 final question the final set of questions on page 30 of your statement you tell us that there were difficulties with the communications if I could just

00:55:02 with the communications if I could just show you the second main paragraph on that page will actually I'll show you the first paragraph first of all there were communications issues you say at grenfell because of the sheer amount of

00:55:13 grenfell because of the sheer amount of PEEP of people that needed to talk to each other and you go on and explain that and then in the next paragraph you say

00:55:26 in the third line there may have been some signal problems on the night as we set up the repeaters these are a special bit of kit on the fire and rescue unit that helps you to take the strength of

00:55:37 that helps you to take the strength of the radio signal further into the incident

00:55:39 incident we have those placed at certain places around the incident but whether it helped or not I don't know I don't know you set these up I must have been involved as I remember the crews carrying them you go on now just a few

00:55:50 carrying them you go on now just a few questions about that but first of all when you talk about signal problems can you tell us what type of signal problems you encountered I didn't encounter

00:56:02 you encountered I didn't encounter signal problems but the be a communications the B engine control and the officer that was communicating with the crews that were gone up the floors may have my only contribution to that

00:56:17 may have my only contribution to that was to suggest that we get the repeater set up because as I said earlier I've been to the Shepherd's Bush fire where communication was quite difficult so it just seemed right to get the repeater

00:56:29 just seemed right to get the repeater set up so I again asked on the Andy white one - sir - get me some repeaters and then brief one the BA ad bay cruise to go up and put them in the appropriate positions apart from the volume sheer

00:56:43 positions apart from the volume sheer amount of people that needed to talk as you put it apart from that were there any other signal problems that you knew about not that I'm aware of right what were the repeaters they they

00:56:56 right what were the repeaters they they just allow our communications to extend beyond what they currently might be so if you wanted let's say if you were in a concrete box and you wanted to speak to

00:57:09 concrete box and you wanted to speak to someone that was around one of the corners the if you put a repeater on that corner then it will you know a carry on your signal and carry on the strength of your signal so that you have better communication it's clear and it's

00:57:20 better communication it's clear and it's not broken up do you remember where those repeaters were set up in the building exactly where no but I would have briefed I would have briefed the crew where they were best being placed

00:57:32 crew where they were best being placed and it would have been yeah it would know it would have been so that they were effective in communicating to all of the floors were we were we were still committing crews to yes thank you just give me one second

00:57:50 on page 19 of your statement if I can just ask you to go back to it you say in

00:58:02 just ask you to go back to it you say in the second the first paragraph actually the lifts weren't being used anymore so this created a big space outside then for me to use as the holding area to put firefighters which I fill that Whitney

00:58:14 firefighters which I fill that Whitney DBA whereas many can you describe that a little bit more in your own evidence this morning just focusing on the use of the lifts you go on to say in the next paragraph I don't know why we weren't using the lifts in a high-rise block you

00:58:25 using the lifts in a high-rise block you will have one lift designated as a fire lift and then you go on to describe what that is and then in the last sentence you say I think I was under the impression that it wasn't working or broken as it wasn't being used it might

00:58:37 broken as it wasn't being used it might have been fine that is the position that first of all did you ask anybody about whether the lifts were capable of being used well again in hindsight we wouldn't

00:58:53 used well again in hindsight we wouldn't have used the lift because of the smoke that was in the in in the you know in in the whole of the building so you couldn't you couldn't use that lift in a safe manner so whether the decision say

00:59:04 safe manner so whether the decision say to not use the lifts was taken earlier on because of that the smoke encroachment that would have been in the in the lift shaft yeah I mean I that's that's one one piece of information I

00:59:16 that's one one piece of information I didn't have that night which other officers may wellif when you say you couldn't use that lift in a safe manner are you making any assumptions about whether the lift was a firefighting lift

00:59:27 whether the lift was a firefighting lift in the strict sense yep or a fireman's lift or had no firefighting functionality what assumptions are you making about a finalist yeah finally which we start with a firefighter who runs up and down delivered to the

00:59:40 runs up and down delivered to the bridgehead so if the bridges moved down to to the lower floors because it's you know they were on the ground floor anyway then it would suggest that it was

00:59:51 anyway then it would suggest that it was to smoke

00:59:52 to smoke above there to use the fire lift say you're saying are you that just summarizing what I think your evidence is if these lifts had been functioning as fire fighting lifts they couldn't have been used safely anyway it was an

01:00:04 have been used safely anyway it was an old yeah it was an old an old-style building I wasn't aware if it was a old-style fire lift or whether it was a firefighting compartment and one more newest style file if oh yeah I wasn't

01:00:15 newest style file if oh yeah I wasn't wearing that detail I'm just assuming that it was too smoky as well we didn't use it or it was defective so just to press the question once more sorry even if it had been a functioning firefighter lifts up to the mark let's

01:00:28 firefighter lifts up to the mark let's assume that like are you saying that they couldn't have been used safely anyway if it's smokey you can't use it

01:00:39 mr. mark thank you very much you'll be glad to hear that I've come to the end of my questions I just want to say thank you very much for your patience in answering them and to your for your contribution to our investigations thank

01:00:50 contribution to our investigations thank you very much thank you mr. millet it's obviously good be convenient to have a shorter aps point you need me to ask mr. Maier to come back no further questions

01:01:01 Maier to come back no further questions mr. chairman hi Dave

01:01:04 I don't believe I do but perhaps the right way of approaching this rather than invite anything is not release mr. Marr formally but to let him go out of the room and not having come back at

01:01:16 the room and not having come back at when we do resume a message can be got to him yeah well mr. mayor I think the upshot of all that is that you probably have finished giving us all the evidence that you captain for which we of course very grateful it'll be very helpful to

01:01:28 very grateful it'll be very helpful to us and we're gonna have a break now anyway

01:01:31 anyway can I ask you please not not to leave the witness room until you get a message from the usher saying that you are certainly free to go it's just possible something may arise which thank you

01:01:44 something may arise which thank you thank you very much

01:01:58 no we need a brief break yes a changing over time that we change tire change every time for witness changeover time for cancer yes so we're 22 11 be alright

01:02:10 for cancer yes so we're 22 11 be alright is that give us enough time I'm I believe it would thank you thank you very much rightful all rise until 22 them

01:13:51 yes mr. Canino gaged has an ex witness oh yeah yes and first of all that i should confirm that mr. Mitas free to go yes thank you thank you very much yes much I call Alan Moore

01:14:18 [Music]

01:14:23 I'll stay home and watch it go the evidence I shall give will be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth

01:14:34 truth thank you very much mr. Moore sit down and make yourself comfortable thank you yes mr. Kuhn um first of all would you please confirm your name for the record Alan Moore and hopefully in front of you

01:14:45 Alan Moore and hopefully in front of you have a blue file and if you turn to the first tab in that file hopefully you'll find a statement you prepared for the police is that right that's correct and if you turn further into that file

01:14:57 if you turn further into that file hopefully you'll find two contemporaneous notes behind the next tab yes and if you turn on again hopefully you find exhibit AJ m2 which is a map you drew that's correct

01:15:10 is a map you drew that's correct and finally a jm3 behind the next tab which is a plan of the tower is that right that's correct thank you and have you read each of those documents recently I have and you confirm that their contents are true yes

01:15:21 confirm that their contents are true yes and your content for those documents to stand is your evidence inquiry I am Thank You mr. Moore before we start if at any time you need a break the police say so that's not a problem

01:15:32 police say so that's not a problem thank you secondly if I put a question to you that's unclear please say that's unclear and I'll do my best to make it clear thank you now very helpfully you provided the statement I don't intend to

01:15:44 provided the statement I don't intend to go through all of it with you the particular point I'm concerned to discuss with you today is FSGS and your role in the handling of FSGS now if I can just establish some basic details

01:15:55 can just establish some basic details before we start and first of all you joined the NFB in 1987 is that right yes and you're recently retired yes and so in total you have 30 years service or so yes and at the time of the fire

01:16:08 so yes and at the time of the fire you're a watch manager of Chizik assigned to read watch is that right that's correct and on the night you were mobilized as 0 1 26 you were mobile at 0 130 and at the scene at 0 139 does that

01:16:20 130 and at the scene at 0 139 does that and about right to you I thought it was a bit earlier but isn't it but if you take that from the data provided by the NFB that's not about right now first of

01:16:33 NFB that's not about right now first of all can I ask you just by way of background your arrival at the tower and if I ask you to turn to page five of your witness statement and the third paragraph fourth line now that will also

01:16:46 paragraph fourth line now that will also come up on the screen as well mr. Moore so it's up to you which you find more convenient is on the screen or on paper in front of you that's the third paragraph fourth line you say I remember asking Mike that's

01:16:58 you say I remember asking Mike that's Mike Dowden what do you want in your contemporaneous notes you stated that you were asked to supply as much hose as possible now looking back now can you remember whether you suggested the

01:17:09 remember whether you suggested the provision of more hoses to watch manager Dowden or did he order you to avoid more hoses on the rifle I told Mike roads remain on the appliance Ray goes on and

01:17:20 remain on the appliance Ray goes on and I would approach the tower and find out what we wanted it means of equipment personnel I saw Mike Dowden I already knew because he used to be a chintakaya station I said to Mike what do you want

01:17:33 station I said to Mike what do you want and he said I don't know I've done everything and before he could continue I said well it's good I'll do apologize just kidding shitload hose up here and branches because we're gonna need it

01:17:44 branches because we're gonna need it okay and he was going to say but I didn't interrupted him he'd built who's doing building blocks to the procedure into place and what plan did you have in

01:17:55 into place and what plan did you have in mind to you what purpose were you going to put the hoses to on my rock on my rifle because I could see that we were gonna need hoses a lot more hoses there were no hose outside no house in and

01:18:07 were no hose outside no house in and there were people running up with hoses up the road and as I walked up so I would my crew to bring it all the hose all the branches and if they saw anyone else coming towards us out without hose

01:18:19 else coming towards us out without hose or branched and and lucky PA and that was for internal and external firefighting is nice yes now at page 5 of your witness statement three lines from the bottom of that page

01:18:31 three lines from the bottom of that page you refer to burning plastic like a spiderweb material falling onto your helmet do you know what that material was at the time I didn't it was just like like a spider's web

01:18:44 like like a spider's web it was covering everything and advisor and ensuring it could just you could just pull it off it was just a brief limiting material I think was coming down from above and turning over the

01:18:56 down from above and turning over the page to page 6 of your witness statement and the third paragraph on that page you refer to smashing glass falling from quite a height put bluntly did you assume at the time that the windows were

01:19:07 assume at the time that the windows were falling out of many flats the point when I heard the shattering glass I was in the foyer area with an adult female casualty we were about to egress the

01:19:21 casualty we were about to egress the building and I heard of all of glass coming down I stopped the ladies and leaving held on to her and I thought that the building

01:19:34 to her and I thought that the building was coming down as soon as it stopped I saw the exit and I said to her run run we ran together and we ran onto the green and the side elevation sector - and did you think the glass was falling

01:19:47 and did you think the glass was falling windows basically yes and yes and given it was windows falling out did you have any thoughts at the time us what the implications might be for the likelihood

01:19:58 implications might be for the likelihood of fire re-entering or entering the building again sorry given that the windows were falling out what thoughts did you have as to what the best means was of firefighting given that fire

01:20:09 was of firefighting given that fire would be able to get back into the tower from the outside if the windows were I remember thinking if the windows were breaking and falling that it's gonna make it much more difficult for us to ingress and egress the

01:20:21 for us to ingress and egress the building and we'd have to reevaluate reassess how I'm treating the building and did you discuss that with what's manager doubt them at any time no I didn't see Mike after that okay and

01:20:32 no I didn't see Mike after that okay and did you discuss those issues with any other senior officer no and did you discuss the possibility of full or partial evacuation of the tower with any other senior office now

01:20:43 other senior office now staying on page six looking at the penultimate paragraph on that page and lines three to five you refer to checking on the ALP and the TL ladders

01:20:54 checking on the ALP and the TL ladders looking back now how would you assess the effectiveness of the LP in fighting the fire on the evening there was when I I was asked to supply a salt water

01:21:08 I was asked to supply a salt water supply to an aerial platform which was positioned on the grass area at sector 4 where the fire started

01:21:18 i supply to manage to secure a machine or to the crews to find the alternative supply because the Rope runs supplies they were originally on that was set in

01:21:29 they were originally on that was set in position there was another TL to the left to the building if you look through every sort of the fire point that machine was attempting to get up

01:21:40 that machine was attempting to get up due to the amount of debris coming down it was deemed that it was not going to be possible to stay in that position it was Harris again and by that time it was been possible to spec and machine out so

01:21:52 been possible to spec and machine out so it's half backed under the mezzanine floor to the left of the tower and left in section and what remains in operative could get it up usually every could I

01:22:04 could get it up usually every could I now ask you about fire survive UNS guide with survival guidance calls and you really start to deal with us at page seven of your witness statement and if I can ask you some general questions first did you at any time report to the

01:22:18 did you at any time report to the command unit cu8 no did you receive any briefing regarding the number of FSGS no did you receive any briefing regard

01:22:30 did you receive any briefing regard the system for communicating FSGS from the command unit to the bridgehead no now first of all if I can ask you about

01:22:41 now first of all if I can ask you about your assessment of the seriousness of the situation at page 7 of your witness statement the file final paragraph 2 lines up from the bottom you say this in my mind I was thinking to myself I know

01:22:53 my mind I was thinking to myself I know we aren't going to be able to get firefighters very high up in this building looking at it you could see where it was going you cannot put a crew up the tower 20 floors above the fire my

01:23:04 up the tower 20 floors above the fire my first question is is did you consider whether evacuation given that assessment was a sensible step to take that wasn't in my remit I was watch manager and my duty was outside there were other

01:23:17 duty was outside there were other officers injured in command in charge than decision they would make giving you a view in the advice you gave to watch manage doubt and to get more hoses available both our internal and external firefighting can you explain to us what

01:23:30 firefighting can you explain to us what risks are posed by having hoses on stairwells in the interior of the tower the hoses were never on the stairwells and they were stacked outside the main

01:23:41 and they were stacked outside the main entrance for crews that weren't being committed anything to take with them and were you aware of the availability of EDB a at the time when you first

01:23:52 EDB a at the time when you first attended the scene I didn't know what the availability was at the time when I first attended oh I've seen it would have been ordered on do severity divided and so it follows from that you weren't aware of any system for prioritizing EDB

01:24:05 aware of any system for prioritizing EDB a to particulars now unrest panic now the next matter I'd like to discuss with you is the handling of FSGS and going back to page 7 the second paragraph it's line 13 onwards apologies

01:24:18 paragraph it's line 13 onwards apologies is very difficult to count down but you say this there wasn't a dedicated appliance and crew dealing with the FSG calls which is one guy on his own he didn't even have a vehicle he was

01:24:29 didn't even have a vehicle he was leaning on a parked car receiving all the FSG information from the phone and writing it down onto a the pod consisted of plain a4 white sheets of paper now if I could ask all to put up a photo of the man leaning on

01:24:46 to put up a photo of the man leaning on the car form it

01:24:54 now you'll see is that the car you were referring to there mr. Moore no if not

01:25:02 can you remember what cut type first of all what make of car with iconic do either the figures leaning on that banach look familiar to you

01:25:14 no can you recognize whether either whether any of those two individuals is the man that you say was the guy dealing with the FSG calls I can't be sure what

01:25:26 with the FSG calls I can't be sure what I thought the car was fair the back than that there is a there is another photo which I might ask Paul to put up to see what this assists it may not now you'll

01:25:42 what this assists it may not now you'll see in the foreground is firefighter Charlie battle you'll see a head is that the head of the gentleman who has red eyes leaning on the cornice I possibly

01:25:55 eyes leaning on the cornice I possibly and for the angle of this photograph and look like that could be the car now because it seemed further back from the fire okay passed it did you late do know

01:26:07 fire okay passed it did you late do know that did you know the guys name no no have you heard the name Paul Sadler no in terms of the system ins then operating for the management of FSGS

01:26:20 operating for the management of FSGS you said in your statement second paragraph line 16 onwards I said to the CM taking these calls oh you're right he said I don't have a clue I said would you like a hand he replied year

01:26:31 would you like a hand he replied year and I said you write it down and I'll take it beyond that exchange was there any other discussion of the system for handling FSG calls no been inappropriate

01:26:44 handling FSG calls no been inappropriate to interrupt the guy cause he was on the phone and he was writing things down the only thing I told him was to write the flat number and then the floor number as well

01:26:54 in my mind it was a developing with hire and we need to know which law they're on generally FSGS are dealt with as them when received and provably deployed just

01:27:07 when received and provably deployed just to be clear so there was no he gave you no explanation as to how he was communicating the FSG calls that nallett do you remember whether the if i can call him the guy simply that's the term

01:27:18 call him the guy simply that's the term you use in your statement jumbo the guide was taking the FSG messages via mobile phone was at by handheld radio I believe it was a mobile phone is that

01:27:29 believe it was a mobile phone is that normal in these situations no that it would have would have been knowing our radio and on the fire ground I was ashamed over in the radio but if it been

01:27:40 ashamed over in the radio but if it been only command you know it would have been the turquoise all the appliance have been that telephone okay and do you know where the calls were coming from from control or from the point unit I did not know about and were you standing close

01:27:52 know about and were you standing close to the guy so that you could hear what was the subject of the message that was being passed on I couldn't hear what was being said on the phone and I could hear I could see him writing down and I just pointing it that number floor I realize

01:28:07 pointing it that number floor I realize it's difficult more than year after the event and time can play tricks but can you remember how long after you arrived at the scene that you went up to the guy and started to assist with the handling of FSG calls

01:28:24 within within a half an hour of arriving at belief 45 minutes

01:28:34 and so if you arrived safely say Cleveland at 22 - it would be sometime after 2 o'clock about they're not saying enter now you agreed that you would take

01:28:45 enter now you agreed that you would take pieces of paper to the bridgehead for him and in particular you advised him to write down the flatten numbers on on those sheets of paper is that right yes now if I might ask Paul to bring up lfb

01:28:57 now if I might ask Paul to bring up lfb quadruple zero one nine double to underscore 33

01:29:10 first of all have you seen that document before it's not my writing but it would have been one of the they possibly is one of the ones that I took to the

01:29:21 one of the ones that I took to the bridgehead when you say possibly is it possible or is it likely are you able to give us a steer on that obviously more than likely yes okay and that is it

01:29:33 than likely yes okay and that is it right that you took the messages to the bridgehead on the second floor I believe it the second floor yes at that time where any other people that involved as runners taking mess FSG calls from the guy at the bonnet into

01:29:46 calls from the guy at the bonnet into the bridgehead not that I was aware of I returned back to the guide now that you

01:29:57 returned back to the guide now that you say that over the page you don't necessarily have to go to this that you think when you hand it over the slips you handed them over to someone called Brian Brian O'Keefe price let me write delete that correct yeah did you know Brian O'Keefe before the earth and do

01:30:10 Brian O'Keefe before the earth and do you remember what there was a female watch manager also there at the bridgehead I believe there was yes and Jeannette would you know her a name for example

01:30:21 not offhand down I remember when you're at the bridgehead handing over the FST slips did you see what system was in place for deploying search-and-rescue teams

01:30:31 teams I sold firefighters waiting to be committed and being Britain's forever I'm being briefed so I admit they were being hell within one position movement always be briefed and then were

01:30:43 movement always be briefed and then were being committed to the incident and can you remember whether there were any EDB a wearers at the time waiting to be deployed I can't remember that well in did you get any sense there was a prioritization of deployments for

01:30:56 prioritization of deployments for example to the high floors not at all - way off factor we did you have any sense as to this system for recording the results of search and rescue missions

01:31:07 results of search and rescue missions sorry could you field equation when you are at the bridgehead did you have any sense did you witness over here any system for the recording of results of search and rescue missions that being deployed in response to FST calls no I

01:31:19 deployed in response to FST calls no I did not no I'm not going to go to a separate topic there's been a piece of paper described as an envelope that is attracted a degree of interest I just

01:31:31 attracted a degree of interest I just want to see whether you've seen it before and after could also ask Paul to put up this document has been variously described as an envelope or a piece of paper first of all have you seen this before no

01:31:46 you'll see roughly at the top the words Brett loft I see at the time you're assisting with the running of FSG calls who did you understand to be the

01:31:57 who did you understand to be the incident commander the commander I was aware the Joaquin's commander thank you

01:32:09 do you remember whether the the other FS geez you touch the fire ground could have been written on control information forms or not rather than the white sheet we've just seen oh I can't become one

01:32:21 we've just seen oh I can't become one each time now what detail do you know a member of the any of the FSGS you took from the car bonnet to the bridgehead

01:32:34 the actual details are now or flat numbers all casual all casualties I didn't know I didn't really look at those I took those we collected them in lower floors to higher floors and until

01:32:47 lower floors to higher floors and until the bridgehead explained it these were lower to higher we'll come on to that later but do member for example any FSGS in relation to flat to 0-5 on the 23rd

01:32:58 in relation to flat to 0-5 on the 23rd floor no not as well did you yourself receive any FSG calls no whether by mobile phone or handheld radio no not

01:33:09 mobile phone or handheld radio no not long until the topic you referred to earlier on the prioritize it the prioritization of FSG zone likes discuss with you and be most useful if you turn

01:33:20 with you and be most useful if you turn to page 8 of your witness statements and the third paragraph on that page it's five lines I think from the bottom of that paragraph you say that on first

01:33:31 that paragraph you say that on first entry to the tower it explains the firefighters at entry control the paperwork I was given than was FSG calls for the lower floors the tower now in order images

01:33:43 order images might find this two more that is easier to spot the passage on the screen okay because they'll highlight it and load it up for you taking any better yeah thank you thanks sir providing the

01:33:56 yeah thank you thanks sir providing the lower floors had you decided a system prioritization for the bridgehead it wasn't a decision I made I was going

01:34:08 it wasn't a decision I made I was going to put into place it was seeing developing fire and here in the radio messages coming back so no difficulty getting from I believe is the 11th to

01:34:19 getting from I believe is the 11th to 12th floor the crew celebrates it because he in going any higher the FST guy didn't know which cause were coming

01:34:30 guy didn't know which cause were coming first was unsure so I said well let's just do the lower too high and we let the bridgehead sort out where they've got people and they could make the ranch the decision pretty open shot instead

01:34:42 the decision pretty open shot instead commander

01:34:46 and do you know what happened to the slips that concerned FSG calls from the higher floor so they simply push at the bottom of the pile of slips that you handed over to the bridgehead know when

01:34:57 handed over to the bridgehead know when I handed over these I said these are in floor lower to the higher floor level they were unsure of which calls are coming first and they would collect them I assume there and did you say that -

01:35:10 I assume there and did you say that - what manager a key for it yes yeah I talked and my turn I drove piranha Keith that these were lower to higher floors as we were unsure which the guide was unsure which called me first and give

01:35:22 unsure which called me first and give him circus sausage the crews experiencing on the higher floors and the breach head would know where that crews were and they could make a judgment which that someone was near

01:35:33 judgment which that someone was near that floor little easier for them to go rather send another crew past image cozy up door and once you'd explained that did mr. O'Keeffe say anything in response to you they thanked me from say

01:35:44 response to you they thanked me from say a good idea and that was

01:35:54 turning to page 9 of your witness statement the second paragraph and again it's probably helpful if you look at the expanded bit on the screens probably easier you say I made my way back towards the fire taking FSG cause

01:36:06 back towards the fire taking FSG cause her previously speaking spoken to an assistant before he had collected more FSG calls onto a pad that being put into floor order lower to higher and if I might ask Paul to put up met one five

01:36:19 might ask Paul to put up met one five seven three one underscore one

01:36:31 one five seven three one underscore one

01:36:43 now is that the list of calls that you're describing there in your statement I've never seen a sheep

01:36:56 you have no recollection of seeing that fee do you recognize the handwriting no could I turn to again page 9 of your witness statement and the second

01:37:07 witness statement and the second substantive paragraph four lines down you say this but on your return from the first entry to the tower a black guy he came up to me as I was doing this and said he was on the phone to his brother who's in the fire there's a fire brigade

01:37:19 who's in the fire there's a fire brigade borough commander or Deputy Assistant Commissioner he came up to where we were standing I said to the black guy can he get out which the DAC said are you talking to the brother the guy on the phone said yes the DAC replied that

01:37:31 phone said yes the DAC replied that turned to get out and get out now and first of all do you know the identity of the borough commander of DAC us I doubt him could I ask Paul to put up a photo of a DAC

01:37:59 is that the gentleman not that I recall the gentleman that the senior officer that approached while I was doing the application with the crew manager was in

01:38:10 application with the crew manager was in full fire helmet and was literally understood listened into the phone call and said if you speaking keep our chance to get out and get out there if I can

01:38:21 to get out and get out there if I can now change topic and turn to your second and final entry into the tower I'm staying at page 9 of your witness statement and the third paragraph you say this I then made my way back to Graham filter deliver the FSG pay corpse

01:38:33 Graham filter deliver the FSG pay corpse the entry control officers on the bridgehead I went back into the turf for the second time via the main entrance on the South elevation to deliver the FSG calls upon entering I noticed that the bridgehead had moved on the first

01:38:44 bridgehead had moved on the first occasions I went the bridgehead was located on the second floor there now had been relocated the grandfa on the mezzanine level inside the tower the times approximately zero two hundred

01:38:55 times approximately zero two hundred hours now we know that the bridgehead was moved to the ground floor at or after zero three zero nine you said that you started helping out with the FSGS

01:39:08 you started helping out with the FSGS around about ten twenty past two in light of that do you think your approximation of the time there are zero two hundred hours is right or not no

01:39:20 two hundred hours is right or not no giving that evidence no and at the time

01:39:26 cloud just flew

01:39:30 when you came in the second time to the town the second and final time to whom did you deliver the FSG slips on that occasion

01:39:38 occasion there were assistants there all right now remember this luis silva was the entry control officer there were assistants to her quite a few people around her there's some sort of senior

01:39:52 around her there's some sort of senior officers standing with her and I handed it to may have been Brian O'Keefe maybe another officer and explain to them exactly saying what I've done before again pros yeah prioritization lower

01:40:05 again pros yeah prioritization lower first yeah at that stage when you taking the second clip of FSG calls had the guy on the bonnet been able to make any

01:40:17 on the bonnet been able to make any effort of ordering them according to the time they've been received given that he was obviously dealing had been dealing with him for a long period of time but it not that I was well because I when I went back to the car and was approached

01:40:31 went back to the car and was approached by the black gentleman he'd already has another pole ready for me to go after we told him she's like his brother out and get out now I took the next throw out

01:40:44 get out now I took the next throw out the next door pay for help

01:40:48 and when going back to your second trip to the bridgehead and at that stage did you receive any information regarding the results of the search and rescue missions that had been deployed in

01:41:00 missions that had been deployed in response the first clip of FSG cause you sound a little did you ask for any updates on the position no I had no need to and why did you have no need to what

01:41:11 to and why did you have no need to what in my remit my remit was to supply the information to enable the crews to carry out the rescues and I'd I've completed mine um could I ask you now to turn to

01:41:23 mine um could I ask you now to turn to page 15 of your witness statement and it's the first substantive paragraph on that page

01:41:37 and you said line 6 looking back I also think that the FSG method that was used wasn't right if there is a small fire in a block of flats there wouldn't be that many fire appliances the dedicated for

01:41:49 many fire appliances the dedicated for excuse me for dedicated fire clients dealing with FSG would have been really close to building this couldn't happen at ground fault hours have so congested with vehicles saying that I do think we done the best we could FSG calls but

01:42:01 done the best we could FSG calls but just to help us understand your evidence there

01:42:04 there what is your essential concern regarding the operation of the FSG system on the night I think that my mode think thought

01:42:15 night I think that my mode think thought then was it we would have been closer with that more structured plan but given the actual fire totally unprecedented we were at leaping and we had to wait live

01:42:27 were at leaping and we had to wait live because we hadn't that live will be lost more lives can I now turn to your role as the sector Safety Officer which you

01:42:38 as the sector Safety Officer which you deal with that pages 11 to 12 of your witness statement first of all just to get basics right am i right in assuming the sector one was the south face of the tower yes do you remember the rank of

01:42:49 tower yes do you remember the rank of the officer designated you as a sector safety officer yes what was that rank I see and you wrote

01:42:57 again apologies for the difficult question can you remember the time of the evening when you were ordered to assume that role it would have been shortly after I took

01:43:08 it would have been shortly after I took the last of the FSGS to the appreciate so sometime after 10 past 3 or thereabouts all this approach by debo and said that

01:43:21 all this approach by debo and said that I lead you as a safety officer yeah and were you taking that role over from anyone no I was say key officer of the initial safety officer

01:43:32 initial safety officer what briefing if any did mr. roat give to you did the ingress to the building was through the main entrance that was young infants and ingress we had at the time crews needs to be deployed across

01:43:47 time crews needs to be deployed across which was an effort building mound of debris and hose

01:43:54 I was standing under a warm plate and the entrance of the flats were here literally distance for myself to you I was protected by the concrete stairwell

01:44:06 was protected by the concrete stairwell I initially cruised up building up being sent to me I was putting crew to fall across looking out looking up go under

01:44:17 across looking out looking up go under the walkway hoping for make sure there's no debris or clear enough to get cross and goes and they went across and the next lot I'll get ready

01:44:28 next lot I'll get ready so were you tracking reporting on fire spread in summary as one of your functions I'd main my main role as Safety Officer was the safety of the crews and post to encode and residents

01:44:41 crews and post to encode and residents of the building I deployed people across into that short building and they were designated further tasks than the opposition side and in order to

01:44:52 opposition side and in order to discharge that function did you have to keep an oath I'm assuming you'd have to keep an eye on fire spread which you'd have to take reviews to where the fire wars says not to put crews in danger yes so if I saw anything on the outside I

01:45:05 so if I saw anything on the outside I was right going across to the extra building and tell them it's coming down because I remember looking when I first took that role the fire started to come

01:45:16 took that role the fire started to come was coming down the building rather than go up and I remember looking and thinking why are you coming down because you got to go far oh you got we don't come down no but it was continually

01:45:27 come down no but it was continually coming down and near on several occasions came back to me and told about being reported across if I can ask you

01:45:40 being reported across if I can ask you questions about that did you report solely to mr. Rome's now to fire spread know who else did you report to the option to the people stand in the doorway of the entrance to the building

01:45:53 doorway of the entrance to the building and if I saw any fella president I Castle to gentlemen it was eventually rescued waving the white piece of cloth

01:46:04 rescued waving the white piece of cloth and that was reported across to the bridgehead and - and eros whirls on numerous occasions and heroic and out and asked what we got this guy yet but

01:46:15 and asked what we got this guy yet but we had but we were chased him we were monitor from the above mezzanine and who was your point of contact to the bridgehead it was literally whoever I could get

01:46:27 it was literally whoever I could get hold of because there was so many firefighters standing in the actual mezzanine area and I could only fail to cross there's come what's coming and what's not and so it was basically you

01:46:40 what's not and so it was basically you shouting it you weren't relying on radio you just shouting it was there was too much radio traffic we've just you stayed on the radio you had been blocking the airway so it was

01:46:51 had been blocking the airway so it was much easier to shout across okay now turn to a very different topic and that's vents under the Mensah neem and if I could ask you to turn to page 12 of your witness statement the fourth

01:47:02 your witness statement the fourth paragraph and forth the line no that will be expanded for you and you say you discuss their conditions at or near the main entrance to grateful

01:47:15 at or near the main entrance to grateful tower at about 0-3 3003 14 you say this I remember around this time there's a lot of wispy gray smoke one second there was smoke the next it would be clear now and again there would be a thick black smoke that would come out

01:47:26 smoke that would come out the vents under the Mensa mean now if I could ask Paul to put up BL a quadruple zero four five three one and if you see

01:47:40 zero four five three one and if you see in the middle of that photo of those the vents that you were referring to that's the bench yeah all right can you describe for us how the smoke was coming out of the vents it was noticeable flash

01:47:52 out of the vents it was noticeable flash notice it because when I looked before there were there were no smoke issuing their and quite randomly would just puff out with smoke sometimes just a wish

01:48:03 out with smoke sometimes just a wish then there's sometimes a lot of thick black smoke would come out then it seemed to go away and then they come back again and was there any sound associated with the emanations I never

01:48:15 associated with the emanations I never hear that because it was so much noise around me and was there any regularity to the smoke coming out no if I say it was random it one minute it was there

01:48:26 was random it one minute it was there next when it wasn't do you remember any active ventilation system working on the night no again opposed to going to a very different topic now a page 11 of

01:48:38 very different topic now a page 11 of your witness date in the first paragraph you described a man climbing out of a window by by a sheet and if just for your reference its page 11 and the first paragraph on that page um first of all

01:48:52 paragraph on that page um first of all timing are you able to give for us in a rough-and-ready basis the time the evening which you saw the man it should have been

01:49:02 have been Marshall Safety Officer so sometime after that sometime after yeah and 10 + 3 xx posterior of us are you sure it was

01:49:13 3 xx posterior of us are you sure it was the 12th floor and he was on as I explained to the police officer took my statement and it was one of the higher floors it was I seemed higher than the

01:49:25 floors it was I seemed higher than the guy that I've seen with the piece of cloth waving yes I was 12 11 to 12 so higher at high floor not allow of law and well how did

01:49:38 floor not allow of law and well how did you count the floors up when you were trying to get estimators well it's just very difficult because initially people saying it was a 22 storey building and then it was it was fair that was twenty

01:49:49 then it was it was fair that was twenty four storey building there are other rumors of the 20 20 stories but counting from the ground floor with a mezzanine area if you count it up it didn't seem

01:50:01 area if you count it up it didn't seem to bring through as there was like one - coming down it was given a different figure so we assumed it at the ground floor would have literally two floors so then we counted up and that's why we found a guy at night so he was hired

01:50:13 found a guy at night so he was hired this guy and so there we get it was definitely higher than the other gentleman yes you discuss with in your statement we'll come on to next cool um did the man climbing down by the she definitely make it into the floor below

01:50:25 definitely make it into the floor below there was he came down and I remember saying to myself and I said out loud don't don't do it just don't do it he came down and the

01:50:36 just don't do it he came down and the window below him he managed to put himself say set inside the window and got in there was a second person got onto the blank or sheet whatever it was

01:50:50 onto the blank or sheet whatever it was and I saw we moved out quickly our skin was falling or turned away when I looked back it wasn't now so I assumed he'd fallen I wasn't sure

01:51:01 fallen I wasn't sure and did you report what you've seen to anyone yes I totally shouted across to the mezzanine thought to protect our scenes this guy that's about the level of 12th floor and that he got into that

01:51:13 of 12th floor and that he got into that flat and within seconds of me telling and that make him aware of it there was a big Russian fire come out that window that he'd gone into and

01:51:25 that he'd gone into and in my experience I assumed that you'd open the front door and give an oxygen to a fire which is here in that flower or outside that flat and it came out annoying

01:51:35 annoying a hugely perished could I turn to a different topic again and that's the question of the helicopter and could ask you to turn to page 14 of your witness

01:51:46 you to turn to page 14 of your witness statement and is the first substantive paragraph on that page six lines down and you say this this led us on to talking about the helicopter the circling grant will turn and you go and

01:51:58 circling grant will turn and you go and say I think this helicopter gave false hope to people I think people in the tower thought they were going to be rescued from the building by a helicopter like what happens in films first of all could you see anything in

01:52:09 first of all could you see anything in the way people were responding at windows or otherwise that led you to the view that false hope was being generated there are a lot of members of public where I was and cited safety officer and

01:52:22 where I was and cited safety officer and they were all shout from the helicopters are coming they're going to get them out by any company couldn't get them off the roof and from where I was I couldn't see people looking out at windows now but

01:52:34 people looking out at windows now but the other side they could have been we would hear people and point and see people shouting points of the helicopter they hire me and to my right which was

01:52:47 they hire me and to my right which was the initial and just as a for the sake of clarity is your view that the helicopter was insufficiently close to affect how the fire behaved it you seen

01:52:59 affect how the fire behaved it you seen it we got closer it would have helped situation but it's stay the distance that in my mind it gave folks hope that they were going to be rescued from the building's roof

01:53:12 turning to a different topic now and that's the question of exposed hoses and if I go to page 13 of your witness statement the first substantive paragraph you describe hose has been

01:53:23 paragraph you describe hose has been heavily exposed to debris and resorting to laying bits of debris and rubble over the new hoses to try and protect them does the LFP have measures equipment

01:53:34 does the LFP have measures equipment they're designed to protect hoses in so that you don't have to rely on putting rubble etc over that now we have medium we had one retired but we had hose rents

01:53:46 we had one retired but we had hose rents which just protectively a vehicle to drive it over hoses in there exposed to road traffic we're carried on the appliance so it's a mall that make do and protect once we

01:53:59 mall that make do and protect once we lay two new hoses I said put just project every on top and stop anymore whatever we come down for meet in the hose you direct have a bit outcome a

01:54:13 couple of questions have arisen just in respect of FSG calls themselves and I know what you say that you you can't remember the detail but do you recall being given any information regarding

01:54:25 being given any information regarding flat 175 no do you remember any information regarding flat 142 no the final questions for you mr. Moore I'd

01:54:37 final questions for you mr. Moore I'd like to ask her relate to your early assessment of the seriousness of the situation

01:54:42 situation now given your assessment that we discussed earlier would you agree that there would be difficulty getting people down from the higher floors yes now did you make that observation to

01:54:55 now did you make that observation to anyone whether to a senior officer or to anyone at the bridgehead when you hand it over the FS cheese slips I think that already been assumed by people that are in the building because severity of the

01:55:06 in the building because severity of the smoke travel

01:55:10 what would have been would there have been a better system to one that prioritized FSG calls on lower to higher floors that could have been used on the

01:55:21 floors that could have been used on the night do you think my opinion my own personal opinion the crews were of an extreme difficulties and they tried their best but to get to a higher but

01:55:34 their best but to get to a higher but the higher floors was becoming more and more difficult you just smoked out all the heat so no I think we try to rescue

01:55:46 the heat so no I think we try to rescue and we did as many people as we could and I think going to the lower floors or not when you say lower floors I'm talking about 9/10 up which there was

01:55:57 talking about 9/10 up which there was easier to not easier it has been more beneficial to rescue those people would rather go past those people and then rich coming down and those people would

01:56:09 rich coming down and those people would not be there no more when if you were handling the FSG slips over at the bridgehead did you assume that the control room were telling residents that they were being told they're going to be rescued sorry could you repeat what

01:56:22 rescued sorry could you repeat what assumptions were you making about what was being told by the control room to callers were you assuming there were those callers were told that they were going to be rescued I would assume that the control officers job is to reassure

01:56:36 the control officers job is to reassure people and tell them to help us on the way and it was on the way we were doing our best and we did more than others what would it be the advantages and disadvantages of telling those are on

01:56:48 disadvantages of telling those are on the higher floors simply to get out in hindsight

01:56:54 hindsight there have been I think a lot more casualties and why do you think the stairs would have become people who had overcome with smoke much more quickly that would have just one stairwell it

01:57:08 that would have just one stairwell it would have blocked stairwell it would make rescues more difficult Miss Moore thank you very much for your help today those are all the questions I have sir might ask for a brief break for five

01:57:19 might ask for a brief break for five minutes just to see if there are any other matters which arise and then yes well it seemed to me that we'd reach the point where we might have a slightly more generous but you keep unless you

01:57:30 more generous but you keep unless you tell me we can't afford the time so we've got a number of witnesses to crack through and if we could have a five-minute break or say a ten minute but I think we should say Timothy would

01:57:42 but I think we should say Timothy would like that

01:57:43 like that I'm grateful disruptive is too much not too much mr. Walz thank you very much it's just possible there may be some more questions for you we're going to have a 10-minute break in any event so

01:57:54 have a 10-minute break in any event so she would hang on to see whether we need to ask you back yes but if we don't I'd like to say thank you very much for your coming to give our give us your evidence

01:58:05 coming to give our give us your evidence it's always very helpful thank you so thank you very much I'd like to give the oceanology

01:58:20 right well we'll break for 10 minutes until 20 to 12 please thanks

02:10:36 yesican yeah so thank you for that I have no further questions there are no further questions for mr. Alan Moore and so may I ask him to be released yes of course thinking so with that might I now call firefighter Gary Moore yes thank you

02:11:07 awesome

02:11:11 [Music] Optim solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth the whole

02:11:25 shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much mr. Naidu sit down make yourself comfortable thank you good morning mom first of all thank you for coming over to give evidence today is

02:11:36 coming over to give evidence today is much appreciated would you please confirm your name for the record he's Garry Moore thank you and hopefully in front of you've got a blue folder which is open and hopefully open at your statement that you provided

02:11:49 open at your statement that you provided to the police date at the 2nd of November 2017 this one's Allen Smith did she's not mine to move further on in the father okay sorry checking the file I don't

02:12:02 okay sorry checking the file I don't know whether your name is written on a tab at the side

02:12:16 don't worry mr. Moore we'll help is on this way it's up on the screen well I can say you might find it more convenient to use what's written on the screen because it can be blown up yeah make it easier to read

02:12:28 make it easier to read yeah that's fine Thank You mr. Moore sorry about that that's okay um do you confirm that's your statement yes and have you read it recently yes as it are the contents true

02:12:39 recently yes as it are the contents true other than a few typos but yeah and are you content for the statement to stand as your referenced inquiry I am thank you know if anytime you want to break just shirt

02:12:50 break just shirt there's not a problem with that if at anytime my questions are unclear police say so and I'll try and rephrase them the faults mine not cause okay now what I'd like to do today is focus on your

02:13:02 I'd like to do today is focus on your role in the operation of the VA main control arrangements and the issues arising from that now first of all may ask some basic questions just to

02:13:13 ask some basic questions just to establish some background first of all it's right that you were a firefighter employed by the lfb before retiring in November 2017 yes and how long had you been a firefighter for 30 years and at

02:13:24 been a firefighter for 30 years and at the time of the fire you were based at Park Royal is that right that's correct and you held the rank of firefighter at that time yes and on the night you were assigned to read watch yes and you are

02:13:35 assigned to read watch yes and you are the driver of golf to 9:1 a standard fire appliance yes and your crew consisted of temporary watch manager Phillip Turk see firefighters power grant and Worley is that right that's

02:13:46 grant and Worley is that right that's correct it's always difficult with timings but does it sound right that you were mobilized at 0 1:30 and arrived at GT and Grenville tower at 0 149 does

02:13:57 GT and Grenville tower at 0 149 does that sound about the center that rank you know the first topic I'd like to discuss with you is your first contact with station manager Kip length and if I might ask you to look at page three of

02:14:09 might ask you to look at page three of your witness statement and through the wonders of technology this will be amplified for you mr. Moore and it's the second substantive paragraph on that page you say this as soon as I was in KITT I began to make my way towards the

02:14:21 KITT I began to make my way towards the scene and was met by station manager Kipling at one of the Mountain News he immediately asked me for help he told me that he needed help with setting up be a maid control that would normally be run off one of the command units he tasked me with grabbing

02:14:33 command units he tasked me with grabbing two colleagues to assist to go to the bridgehead to gather information on how many ba units we had how many were in the building how many involved in the incident how many persons vocal to commit who in

02:14:44 many persons vocal to commit who in control etc now first of all mr. Moore and can you remember now how soon after arriving you were grabbed by station manager Kipling we are pulled up with

02:14:55 manager Kipling we are pulled up with the appliance did the rest of the crew went off uh obviously I was always drive and I didn't have my kit on so I put before I get on supper been about five

02:15:06 before I get on supper been about five minutes of arriving I was walking down a road and was met by station magic hit me so about five to two or there abouts yeah thank you and had you at that stage

02:15:17 yeah thank you and had you at that stage being expressly directed to report to the command unit to report no but normally you would normally the OIC of the Machine would you'd pull up he would

02:15:28 the Machine would you'd pull up he would come in handy in a nominal role port and then come back and give you your jobs where tasks or whatever they want to do obviously that night was a bit the

02:15:39 obviously that night was a bit the machine just starburst we pulled up and know everyone was off and running okay staying on page three looking at the final paragraph you there described going to the tower with a firefighter Barca and you stayed in the foyer was

02:15:51 Barca and you stayed in the foyer was firefighter Barca went to the bridgehead now on firefighter Parker's return did you ask him what he'd been told at the bridgehead regarding the information

02:16:02 bridgehead regarding the information sought by mr. Kipling yes he'd written it all down okay and did you discuss the information he'd been provided with I didn't discuss it with him he just gave it to me and we win went back and found

02:16:16 it to me and we win went back and found station manager Kipling and what did he do with what had he written it down on was it a pad was it a single piece of paper what I don't know bigger one of those two things yeah okay

02:16:27 those two things yeah okay and did firefighter Barker refer to any request for a DBA whereas coming from those in charge at the bridgehead none

02:16:37 did you discuss with him on the way back from the bridgehead the need for a DBA no given you could see the tower from

02:16:49 no given you could see the tower from outside did the need for IDI be a cross your mind as I saw possibility that might be needed to do course or a thought yes it did because of the size of the building and obviously the

02:17:00 of the building and obviously the condition that was in at the time and obviously going upstairs we're in VI will seriously knock down your set if you're wearing standard bringing a trace did you raise that point with station

02:17:12 did you raise that point with station manager Kipling on your return from the from the tower or might have done I'm not sure remember can you remember where the firefighter Barker raised it with mr. Kipling in your hearing back from

02:17:24 mr. Kipling in your hearing back from your witness team it appears that that was your first and only time inside the tower is that right that's correct now the next topic I'd like to discuss is the setting up of the be a main control

02:17:35 the setting up of the be a main control now first when you left the tower you found that station manager Kipling it set up the main control on the grass outside the Sports Centre is that right initially we was in a command unit when

02:17:47 initially we was in a command unit when I first met him he took me to a command unit and we were going to set it up in there so then he asked me to go and find sue colleagues to help which I did and when I come back he'd gone so then it

02:18:00 when I come back he'd gone so then it was a task of trying to find out where he'd gone to and then I found him on the brass area so it's a small centre and if Paul you could turn up met document triple zero one six eight five four and

02:18:12 triple zero one six eight five four and if you could magnify the area in the immediate vicinity of the tower you'll see mr. Moore there's this big screen above your head are you able to identify

02:18:23 above your head are you able to identify for us where you find station manager Kipling setting up there be a main control is there anywhere on there where the sports injuries or the ledger centre

02:18:36 the sports injuries or the ledger centre as it was in front of that on the grass area wherever that is if you could zoom at slightly it's probably going to be more helpful you see Kensington leisure center there on the right hand side yes

02:18:48 center there on the right hand side yes you see the word East would be used to the tower yeah it was on the grassy area there thank you now turning to page four of your witness

02:19:00 now turning to page four of your witness statement third substantive paragraph you say there that you've never previously been responsible for operation of the main control and this wasn't the job usually done by a firefighter not usually now why isn't it

02:19:11 firefighter not usually now why isn't it a role usually carried out by fire normally done by the command unit staff I think God's obviously they got he said a normal Winston they've obviously got a lot more time to do it and a lot more

02:19:23 lot more time to do it and a lot more resources to do it but not that night and so was your understanding that the more senior officers who would usually do the tasks were otherwise engaged yeah wouldn't be normally a senior officer but just a command unit staff would do

02:19:35 but just a command unit staff would do it had you received any training at any stage as to how to carry out this rob who's better at 30 years ago but did you remember that training I suppose it's a person well yeah yes or

02:19:48 suppose it's a person well yeah yes or no it was caught some of it was quite self-explanatory you just filling the boxes now you say that station manager Kipling had attained some resource sports and in your witness thing when

02:19:59 sports and in your witness thing when you fir took control boards are these the same things as the resource boards yeah and the information you first wrote on the control boards was this the information that firefighter Park had been provided with of the bridgehead

02:20:10 been provided with of the bridgehead some of it was yes and some it was what I'd gathered myself what information did you gather yourself basically how many whereas we had there in standard bi how

02:20:24 whereas we had there in standard bi how many whereas we had in a TBI and how many spare cylinders we had of both and how many times so far that the the firefighters had worn into the tower

02:20:37 firefighters had worn into the tower which we take into account so from the very outset you had in mind EDB a where as has been necessary our feet know was already being used and at the answer what information did

02:20:48 and at the answer what information did you have us to weather and if so how many fi use were on site at the time I didn't know how many F are used for there is there a means of finding out how many fi use were on the scene um I

02:21:00 how many fi use were on the scene um I imagine it would have been year would you have contacted the command unit for example I didn't have any direct contact with the command unit station magic Hickman might have done

02:21:12 station magic Hickman might have done and asked how much was I know later on in the incident he did request more adb i and ii DBA is e DB ar e da PA sorry

02:21:25 i and ii DBA is e DB ar e da PA sorry ar e DBA cylinders readily identifiable yes have different color and what is that color here orange would have got an orange cover and SD ba are yellow was a

02:21:39 orange cover and SD ba are yellow was a station manager loft involved at any stage in the setting up or operation that be a control board did you come across a station manager loft at any stage during the during the night

02:21:50 stage during the during the night the next topic I'd like to discuss is that find detail of your role on the evening that's all right no station manager Kipling says that he deployed you to ascertain names numbers of crew and a rough plan of the tower

02:22:02 of crew and a rough plan of the tower does that sound about right to you yes and how did you go about finding crews they were lay in front of me and various

02:22:13 they were lay in front of me and various types of dress so willfull Rove the grass they congregated on that grass frontage him she knew between the ledger center in the town and had you divided them up into s DBA whereas or EDB a

02:22:24 them up into s DBA whereas or EDB a wearers known as Aldo was just all scared how do you go about ensuring that BA crews reported to you so that you knew what resources you had to deploy in

02:22:35 knew what resources you had to deploy in his very difficult there was they just wanted to get in every single one of them was desperate get into that town so it was quite hard to keep an out of them keeping them in one place and keeping your resources together how

02:22:48 and keeping your resources together how did you manage the allocation of - calls for assistance from the beer from the bridgehead so the call would come through from the bridgehead - Dan Kaplan he would then give me what I need

02:23:01 Kaplan he would then give me what I need X amount of X Y I said all the girl won't find them bring them back dan would brief them and then over to parts of the bridgehead and was that the same process you identified for locating EDB

02:23:13 process you identified for locating EDB a cruise yeah exactly the same did you try and corral EDB a cruise separately from the others in the grass area in front of the term no because those when I was obviously being

02:23:24 those when I was obviously being committed and they come out again you couldn't your turn around and early some here some there yeah it's just easy to let them get on they did it odd enough time as it is did you find a rough plan of the tower

02:23:36 did you find a rough plan of the tower to assist your operations now what did you use them I've just basically drew a very with a Shauna golf pencil just a

02:23:47 very with a Shauna golf pencil just a just a tower and entrancing where we was in relation to that and that was based simply on what you'd observed yes since your daddy was a year did firefighter

02:23:59 your daddy was a year did firefighter Barker assist with any further detail that he'd elicited from the bridgehead firefighter Barker and for firepower they were helping servicing the assets so when when the crews come out from the

02:24:11 so when when the crews come out from the tower their sets would need servicing they would go over to them where they were give him a fresh cylinder and anything else that they need it but were you required to give any form of briefing to the crews waiting to be

02:24:23 briefing to the crews waiting to be deployed no were you responsible taking any form of debriefing from the crews once they've returned from any deployment within the town no mr.

02:24:34 deployment within the town no mr. Kipling describes station manager loft relating information to him and station manager Saunders then running between the command unit and the point you are at were you also as past the process

02:24:45 at were you also as past the process taking notes of information that being passed to station manager Kipling no were you taking any notes of any purpose during the course of the night now other than the ones

02:24:56 than the ones sort of getting bi numbers getting wearers together that's all I was recalling the resources were you involved in providing any rescue briefings to be a cruise at the entry

02:25:07 briefings to be a cruise at the entry control board point now do you know who was not that not that the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is communication of ba requirements from the bridgehead to you and page five

02:25:20 from the bridgehead to you and page five of your witness statement the first line you say station manager Kipling was receiving requirement orders by phone and radio from the bridgehead saying how many where as they needed and would then

02:25:32 many where as they needed and would then ask me to get the numbers of firefighters required to gather and register and advise when they're ready to deploy was there a particular individual terse with the radio in phoning station magically at the bridgehead that you're aware of I don't

02:25:44 bridgehead that you're aware of I don't know okay

02:25:45 know okay um is it usual to use mobile phones as opposed to handheld radios in circumstances such as this not normally but so the communications was playing up

02:25:58 but so the communications was playing up that night and what are the advantages of using a mobile phone as opposed to the house operators must be a stronger signal better signal have you ever based

02:26:09 signal better signal have you ever based on your experience what use is made of mobile phones within fighting fires and high-rise towers for example or situations where the radio reception isn't ideal policy we're not supposed to carry them as firefighters senior

02:26:22 carry them as firefighters senior managers are out their phones but under policy we're not supposed to carry mobile phones people do yeah can you remember what time the bridge had first asked for a DBA to be obtained had it be

02:26:34 asked for a DBA to be obtained had it be done before or after that you were tasked with your role at the main control center

02:26:42 can you remember whether station manager Kipling suggested that bridge had whether a DBA was necessary or imagined he got on him got the information back from the Bridgette then request you may

02:26:54 from the Bridgette then request you may be bi thereafter thereafter yet staying at page 5 of your witness statement the first paragraph four lines from the top you say the station Magic Kipling went through two

02:27:06 station Magic Kipling went through two radios and mobile phone batteries I've never known anything like it my radio ran out during my deployment but I just continued on working off word of mouth from that point to receive information of what was happening and being directed

02:27:18 of what was happening and being directed by station much at Kipling when you refer to word of mouth there do you mean that firefighters were updating you face to face on ba requirements firefighters coming from the bridgehead now our main

02:27:29 coming from the bridgehead now our main sort of down keeping communicating with me if he wasn't far if he wasn't around then they'll come back and see me rather than trying to get a hold of me of all rightie overs neither of us around radios working and presumably mr.

02:27:44 radios working and presumably mr. Kipling was moving around yes Fronteras see it wasn't in 16.9 knowledge on that ok did you receive any updates or orders from the command units at any stage

02:27:55 from the command units at any stage during the night regarding say the need for a DBA whereas more now we are waiting as far as I'm aware we didn't have any contact with a command unit it certainly you why didn't not receive now

02:28:06 certainly you why didn't not receive now can I now turn to the question of the initial deployment of crews now the first EDB a deployment was the panning ttan FIU team and they were deployed to

02:28:17 ttan FIU team and they were deployed to go to the roof and were you aware of that now I think the second EDB a-team was from Chelsea and I'll just take you through some facts you see understand

02:28:29 through some facts you see understand the context Gulf 346 had been status 3 since 0 136 but its members at tally damn at 0 to 44 were you aware of the Chelsea team been on site I was lights

02:28:44 Chelsea team been on site I was lights running incident I don't know that's why mom was there not I've been in the bridgehead I don't know presumably therefore you're unaware that between

02:28:55 therefore you're unaware that between arrival and then presenting themselves to you they've been put on other duties were you aware of that given the the apparently so time between 0 136 and zero 244 how

02:29:09 so time between 0 136 and zero 244 how did you ensure the EDB a crews are identified and deployed as efficiently and as swiftly as possible what he was worth basically did we're just a results

02:29:20 worth basically did we're just a results point so we would get that the bridgehead would ask for X amount of standard duration vo errors X amount of EDB o whereas we would just deploy them

02:29:31 EDB o whereas we would just deploy them to the bridgehead maybe down to the bridgehead on how they deployed from that point on so there's no point of contact liaison with you and that point of contact identifying edpa as they arrived to notify you if their arrival

02:29:43 arrived to notify you if their arrival on the scene no they wouldn't no they would just call everyone sort of congregate together because normally it's run from a control unit so you'd all be out sorted a control unit but

02:29:54 all be out sorted a control unit but obviously this was slightly different thank you Manimal Holland said in evidence that he found EDB era 8e d eb da whereas not in use he says simply

02:30:06 da whereas not in use he says simply standing there after his second trip into the tower did mr. Mulholland take this point up with you or anyone within your earshot no are you aware of any other instance where they were unused numbers of EDB a

02:30:19 where they were unused numbers of EDB a whereas not not so could I now turn onto the question of the adequacy of s DBA in this circumstance and page 5 of your

02:30:31 this circumstance and page 5 of your witness statements and the third substantive paragraph and you say this and quite quickly it became apparent that standard B A's were just not enough I think it was about 0 to 30 0 to 45 that we stopped using them the sets were

02:30:43 that we stopped using them the sets were running out too early as soon as the firefighters were getting up the floors they were having to come straight back down unable to carry out any rescues of firefighting we desperately needed EDB A's and we're waiting for qualified area units and kits to arrive

02:30:55 units and kits to arrive apologies for asking an obvious question first

02:30:57 first but how did the infest insufficiency become apparent to you because they was just say a crew to toss to go to whatever floor they just wasn't

02:31:08 to whatever floor they just wasn't getting to that floor they was getting so far and so I'm a whistle was telling in the ceremony come back at him although most were coming past that and ignoring it yet I still couldn't reach

02:31:19 ignoring it yet I still couldn't reach the force cuz of the missions and how far they have to travel and this is what they were telling you on their return from the tower yeah would or indeed should it have been obvious that s DBA wouldn't be sufficient given the tower

02:31:31 wouldn't be sufficient given the tower had 24 floors and the nature and extent of the fire spread yeah you say stopped using s DBAs at 0 to 30 or thereabouts

02:31:42 using s DBAs at 0 to 30 or thereabouts just to clarify are you saying that from 0 to 30 or thereabouts you solely deployed EDB a units I believe it did for a while but I don't think they carried on using it but the SBB I but

02:31:53 carried on using it but the SBB I but what's on that was I don't know and so what was done with the S DBA cruised them but that was arrested and was a West Indian ik were you deploying you DBAs only to those firefighters who'd

02:32:05 DBAs only to those firefighters who'd been trained in their use oh yeah you've got you've got to be trying to maybe be able to use it yeah we heard some evidence in July that the differences

02:32:16 evidence in July that the differences between s DBA and e DBA weren't so great it's not massive but you have to do the course but you didn't deploy anyone even had the training as the key point didn't know and did you ask whether there were

02:32:30 know and did you ask whether there were people willing to do it that's that's what I was coming to given the day before hiring ways to do put an ad be a set on yeah not trying it yeah and so did you say was it a rote path you asked

02:32:42 did you say was it a rote path you asked each crew who wanted to be deployed do you are you sure it wasn't as you do that

02:32:46 that said how did you verify old like they have a sticker on the side of their firefighters tell me so identify them as a DVI where's one point which is arisen

02:32:57 a DVI where's one point which is arisen is the question so the best thing was do edie pas provide more protection against heat than SDPs are you able to help another I think you don't know or you're not go down there's a same firefighting

02:33:09 not go down there's a same firefighting gig it's just a different set turning to the next question of redeployment of EDB a crews at page 6 of your witness statement on the third substantive paragraph you say that EDB a crews were

02:33:21 paragraph you say that EDB a crews were going in two or three times are you able to summarize for us the risks that are caused from repeated redeployment yes obviously hate stress massively and what

02:33:36 obviously hate stress massively and what are the problems that caused from heat stress just so four people's worth year usually get in there you could do you don't know what you're doing you lose your bearings to get yourself lost so

02:33:47 your bearings to get yourself lost so yeah it's a it's a big thing did you see any evidence of that and in terms of crews return I didn't I didn't see a actual webbing it Sophie but David there was a crews there I've been working very very hard strain yard if I

02:34:03 working very very hard strain yard if I can now turn to the question of batteries and do you recall a problem with the telemetry batteries being flat on the DBA supplied cylinders yes I did

02:34:15 on the DBA supplied cylinders yes I did the say sorry that is sets Arianna sets yeah we we I don't know what's on was but then had been ordered on some extra sets because there was qualified people

02:34:28 sets because there was qualified people there that could wear it I just needed assets aware and when the sets arrived the batteries were flat on on the sets but apparently that is how they should be you're not you apparently no that's

02:34:41 be you're not you apparently no that's no that's what there was salinas morning and did that did that did the problem the flat batteries cause any problem in terms yes what delight cuz then we had to get some charge batteries and how

02:34:52 to get some charge batteries and how much time did it take you to get the charge batteries on

02:34:57 but half an hour 40 minutes maybe and what kit policies is another obvious

02:35:09 what kit policies is another obvious question so apologies but what kit do you have that enables you to charge are they on the appliance not only easy yeah normally the sets on the appliance so it's plugged in so the minute you take

02:35:20 it's plugged in so the minute you take it out it's ready to go but these were new fresh sets that made you put it together so you had to put the set together put the battery in put the cylinder on put a cylinder cover on and

02:35:31 cylinder on put a cylinder cover on and then you're ready to go but obviously the batteries that they've supplied was was flat and the when you came across the the issue regarding the flat

02:35:43 the the issue regarding the flat batteries was that at the time where they'd been the order only to deploy EDB a cruise or was at the time but nobody was yeah and so during that time was the simple reality that no II DBA crews were

02:35:55 simple reality that no II DBA crews were deployed at all no because we did have the ones there that were there already where their sets were working fine it was just the new sets that turned up on the OSU in your

02:36:06 sets that turned up on the OSU in your view therefore did the problem with the flat batteries cause any delay in deployment of EDP a cruise yeah yeah do you recall any similar problems with VA

02:36:17 you recall any similar problems with VA covers not being available on some cylinders yes ii owned that the new sets that turned up only I wish you didn't have any covers and what's the consequence of that basically so they

02:36:29 consequence of that basically so they they the crews that were deployed that round means inside that's our when they came out well he then had to take their sitting to cover off and give it to the fresh crew or a different room for them

02:36:41 fresh crew or a different room for them to be able to progress into the Bridgette and did that cause any delay yeah are you able to estimate for us now this of extent of the delay though quite a yarn it's open a couple of minutes

02:36:52 a yarn it's open a couple of minutes each time to come out but they're still at the like page 8 of your witness statement 3 lunch and the bottom you say there are only 16 units and the brigade that have these the EDB a units only 10

02:37:03 that have these the EDB a units only 10 were at the fire how did you know how do you know that though only 16 units in the brigade with et pas I'll think I'll being told that ourselves told that when I was making my

02:37:14 ourselves told that when I was making my statement okay it's not something you knew at the time I know roughly how many that was Bohlander again staying on page 8/3 substantive paragraph you say II DBA

02:37:25 8/3 substantive paragraph you say II DBA systems give extended breathing time and would have made a difference again could you explain to us the precise nature of the difference you think would have been achieved by having wider availability of an ADB I set just last a lot longer than

02:37:37 an ADB I set just last a lot longer than a standard duration set so obviously giving you longer time to work in it I now want to turn to a separate topic and that's the operational support unit now

02:37:50 that's the operational support unit now just by way of background Gulf 25 alpha ceilings operational support unit arrived on scene at 0 114 or 42 were you aware the location of that OSU when it

02:38:04 aware the location of that OSU when it arrived at scene no is it right that the OSU carries a variety of additional equipment consumable resource packs fuel water ba Sanders etc it does yes

02:38:16 water ba Sanders etc it does yes did you know whether the OSU is carrying anything else on the night would it of carry d DBA I'm not sure but did you

02:38:29 carry d DBA I'm not sure but did you have any contact with any OSU during the course of the night no the next topic I'd like to discuss with India the final one is the question of state pert and if I could ask you to turn to page 10 of

02:38:40 I could ask you to turn to page 10 of your statement and the final line of the final final paragraph

02:38:47 you say I personally think that we would have got a lot more people out if we had said early on to get out my first question is this when would you have given that advice don't see as far as

02:39:01 given that advice don't see as far as policy goes it's controlled to get the advice to change and my sort of personal opinion of that it should be the incident commander who makes that decision early doors

02:39:13 decision early doors so whenever the incident commander films that we should change this but whoever it they're made any difference or not it's hindsight sir and would you have

02:39:26 it's hindsight sir and would you have given your 30 years experience would you've considered evacuation total or partial but saw when the yeah I suppose at the time I did and I'm thinking black now sort of burn being what she'd

02:39:39 now sort of burn being what she'd inquiring stuff like that finding out there was only one staircase it could iterate the whole more law problems so I think you just dug damned if you do damned if you don't

02:39:50 damned if you don't and is the fact that there's only one staircase a piece of information you only learned after the idea TM used you referred to the fact that on the night you thought about evacuation yes

02:40:02 you thought about evacuation yes what was your precise thought on the night on it just the way that the tower was behaving the way the fire had gone up

02:40:10 up these people need to get out I need to get out now and when did you have that thought was I'm turning up or later on pretty much just yeah I'm sorry enough

02:40:20 sir yeah did you raise any concerns regarding the application of stay put with any senior officer any station of course the evening

02:40:29 evening no mr. Moore thank you very much for your help

02:40:33 your help if sir

02:40:36 if sir I could have possibility of five minutes to see if there only further questions yes Monte's for that and then it sounds as though that could well be all the

02:40:47 as though that could well be all the questions we need to ask and but there was a possibility when people check that there might be a few more so we'll have a five-minute break and let you know whether we need to ask you to help the

02:40:59 whether we need to ask you to help the city all right thank you if we don't let me just say thank you very much for coming along to help us to happen to

02:41:17 coming along to help us to happen to know whether the next witness is standing or sitting phrase um he's sitting he's sitting or well if I say 20 past it's easier to work to her grateful

02:41:31 past it's easier to work to her grateful thanks secret all right well I should rise in the tool twenty past you know see whether we need mr. Moore back or whether we can start another witness thank you

02:52:00 yes it's clear now I understand that there are no further questions from mr. Morel that's right so he can be released so he could be released and there's our next witness so the next witness I'll be

02:52:11 next witness so the next witness I'll be calling is firefighter Jason King I'm taking him slightly out of order for this reason that this morning when Mr Kipling attended he referred to his contemporaneous notes upon which he'd

02:52:22 contemporaneous notes upon which he'd made his own manuscript beautiful notes yet they hadn't been disclosed those notes don't in our view materially alter matters but for the sake of completeness

02:52:34 matters but for the sake of completeness I've asked that those note to which mr. Kipling has added his own manuscript notes should be disclosed the CPS as soon as possible today so they can have an opportunity to consider themselves

02:52:45 an opportunity to consider themselves and if necessary raise any further questions they may have arising out of that and so that is the reason for the quick swap of witnesses yeah so in those circumstances I'm grateful to mr. King

02:52:56 circumstances I'm grateful to mr. King right thinking that if I could call him

02:53:15 I swear to God the evidence I shall give the truth the whole truth thank you very

02:53:28 the truth the whole truth thank you very much King sit down make yourself comfortable I'm sorry Sonia we'd like to take you out of order and I'm grateful to you for thank you

02:53:38 thank you would you please confirm your name for the record yeah it's Jason mark King Thank You mr. king you have the rare value of being a witness called before he was due to be programmed and I'm very grateful for you coming down I'm so

02:53:49 grateful for you coming down I'm so swiftly and also very grateful the help you're going to give the inquiry first of all hope is a blue file in front of you and in behind the first tab

02:54:00 front of you and in behind the first tab hopefully as your witness stated witness statement dated the 10th of November 2017 is that right that's correct and then if you turn the next tab hopefully you'll find your contemporaneous note that's correct and thereafter turning to

02:54:12 that's correct and thereafter turning to the next tabs you'll find six further exhibits that you completed for the purposes of your statement is that right that's correct have you read those documents recently yes and you confirm the contents are

02:54:23 yes and you confirm the contents are true yes and are you content for those documents to stand as your evidence the inquiry I am now mr. King you'll be aware that we've heard evidence from what manager Beale and I don't tend to

02:54:35 what manager Beale and I don't tend to go over the matters we raised with him and so really I'd like to focus on three things with you today and first of all the operation of Sao Jose LP secondly your involvement with residents and

02:54:46 your involvement with residents and thirdly your own entry into the tower later on in the night now if any time you require a break please share that's not a problem if any question I ask you is unclear please shout that's my fault

02:54:58 is unclear please shout that's my fault and I'll rephrase it so it's clear okay thank you now first of all may I establish just certain basics how long have you been a firefighter for eight years and have you always worked for the

02:55:10 years and have you always worked for the LFP as a firefighter in answer yes and in June 2017 you held the same rank as today namely firefighter that's correct and that you were based at Soho yeah

02:55:21 and that you were based at Soho yeah that's right and that you've been trained to operate aerial appliances for two years that's correct and so by now you've acquired three years experience in their operation yes that's correct

02:55:33 in their operation yes that's correct we have the globalization type Renata's zero 131 on the road at zero 133 and from the LF B's GPS data arrival at a0

02:55:45 from the LF B's GPS data arrival at a0 152 does that sound right to you yes am i right in thinking that you were driving this so Jose LP on the night that's correct and in terms of the operation of an ALP what are the duties

02:55:57 operation of an ALP what are the duties of the driver and initially get to the correct place the scene of operations and then once at the scene of operations to pitch and deploy the aerial ladder in

02:56:11 to pitch and deploy the aerial ladder in the most appropriate position thank you now I'd like to talk with you first of all about the your arrival at the tower and if I could ask you to turn to page 2

02:56:22 and if I could ask you to turn to page 2 of your statement and the second paragraph on that page fifth line down you say this display on the screen

02:56:33 you say this display on the screen because it's possible to easy to read Thank You senator and there you say as we made our way in via Lancaster gate

02:56:45 we made our way in via Lancaster gate into road called sill Chester Road there's actually more by luck than judgments we ended up being the only access point that we could have used for our appliance I remember we arrived at a police cordon and they were able to point us in the right direction and helped to remove a

02:56:57 right direction and helped to remove a bollard to allow us access then we were sorted there by the letter center and first of all could I ask Paul to bring up the map which is at met triple zero one six eight five four no Chester Road is

02:57:10 eight five four no Chester Road is marked on that map can you show us first of all where you brought the ALP in yeah you'll see so Chester Road at the top of the screen there yeah over on the

02:57:22 the screen there yeah over on the right-hand side of that screen where it says eight point seven your m long zooming meters we came down past the Methodist Church there and they're sorry and they're very sorry no not from there

02:57:34 and they're very sorry no not from there ignore that arrow so in the very top right of the screen there's the Methodist Church yes okay so we came down that road and then turn left there's a there's a

02:57:47 and then turn left there's a there's a there's a road just on the corner there so we turn left which is facing down yep we drove through there and then we came in alongside the Academy there went into

02:57:58 in alongside the Academy there went into where it says East so some way down that road this correct and where were the bullets that you removed all the bollard rather um I believe where it says post thank you when you say this was the only

02:58:12 thank you when you say this was the only access point you could have used can you explain why you couldn't have accessed the tower from any of the other sides

02:58:19 that's there's more in hindsight I should say but having had the benefit of hindsight I think we'll find that grenfell walk the road at the bottom there was lined up with normal pumping

02:58:32 there was lined up with normal pumping appliances and Paddington's turntable ladder was blocking access on one side because it was already sighted and there

02:58:43 because it was already sighted and there was no access to the other two sides of the building via roadway so that was pretty much any place we were left with I'd like to first topic reload lights discuss with you is the setting up of

02:58:54 discuss with you is the setting up of the ALP itself and on page three of your witness statement looking in the first substantive paragraph you say that you parked and crew matter frost went to book in with the Cu was you look for

02:59:05 book in with the Cu was you look for somewhere to pitch the aerial do you remember which command unit he went to I'm afraid I didn't say which c'mon unit he went to Paddington's Errol alpha two

02:59:16 he went to Paddington's Errol alpha two on three was already parked up is that right that's correct and you indicate where a alpha two on three wars part on your exhibited map which has it met Chapel zero one five eight zero two and

02:59:29 Chapel zero one five eight zero two and Paul I'd be grateful if you could bring that up if possible

02:59:39 and is it right that alpha to 1/3 was parked on the east side yes I believe sir and I think is it some part some

02:59:50 sir and I think is it some part some three meters from the tower itself

02:59:54 answer yes thank you turning back to page three of your witness statement the second substantive paragraph four lines down you say we had no other option

03:00:05 down you say we had no other option other than to pitch on the grass again can you explain for us why that was your only option at the time yeah because having a sir whilst temporary Cremona

03:00:16 having a sir whilst temporary Cremona Frost was dropping our nominal roll board to the command unit it's my job then to decide well not not decide but have a look around the building to see where the best pitch was normally we'd hope to pitch on the corner of a

03:00:29 hope to pitch on the corner of a building so that we could access to different sides to it on this occasion around grenfell tower there was a as a playground running around two sides of

03:00:40 playground running around two sides of it with a 6-foot metal fence which stopped access it stopped us being able to get close to the tower there was a walkway with which Paddington's area was

03:00:51 walkway with which Paddington's area was already in use and so the only other side that was left was where the Kensington Academy was so the actual side that we were left with we even

03:01:04 side that we were left with we even though that was behind three trees was was on the unmade ground on the grass on the east side of the building and what are the the risks and problems that flow from setting up on grass for the ALP

03:01:16 from setting up on grass for the ALP well we're we're taught and trained not to set up on on May ground purely because of the weight of the jacks and of the entire appliance with any unmade

03:01:29 of the entire appliance with any unmade ground also with the risk of water softening the ground obviously that's what I suspect that's probably why the main reason is that you shouldn't pitch on on minecraft and how close would you

03:01:40 on on minecraft and how close would you say you need to be in a building in to achieve optimal height so I'm gonna rephrase that question for myself yeah of course how close to a building do you have to get in order to get the highest

03:01:51 have to get in order to get the highest reach of the ladder well the ladder can reach almost directly above the turntable below it so but it does project about 24 meters outwardly and if you're able to achieve

03:02:02 outwardly and if you're able to achieve optimal height how high could you reach with the monitor assuming you also had optimal water pressure so with optimal work with optimal pressure and given

03:02:14 work with optimal pressure and given them the maximum amount later each through the ground monitor we'd expect about 75 meters projection and I think in your witness statement you say that you thought you're about seven meters from the tower that's does that remain

03:02:26 from the tower that's does that remain your estimate yes can I ask you to rather Paul would you mind bringing up lfb six zeros one eight nine so it

03:02:40 lfb six zeros one eight nine so it should be the lfp policy eight to two on operational use of appliances first of all are you familiar with this policy answer yes and if Paul could I ask you

03:02:53 answer yes and if Paul could I ask you to turn to paragraph four point one nine page six

03:03:02 and if I could just let you read para for 1-9 to yourself mr. king

03:03:17 yeah on the night we were able to carry out a risk assessment before operating mail P antsy s and what did that risk assessment involve well within the risk

03:03:28 assessment involve well within the risk assessment what we would have probably normally done is set up and ensure that it was a fully functioning aerial data platform make sure we had enough water to get the machine working properly as

03:03:40 to get the machine working properly as it happens due to the issues that we had on the night it never quite came to us needing to implement that safe system of work and that dynamic risk assessment but throughout the process of setting

03:03:52 but throughout the process of setting the Machine up we would have been constantly dynamic risk assessing the situation and would you agree with the statement that air appliances would not normally be used for external firefighting and high-rise buildings

03:04:04 firefighting and high-rise buildings until it's been confirmed that there's no longer any life risk in the building yes that's correct and to ask I'm afraid an obvious question why is that so ya know that essentially what happens when you put

03:04:17 essentially what happens when you put water onto an external well essentially when you use the any aerial appliance but the area will add a platform on that night you you create a water curtain

03:04:28 night you you create a water curtain which essentially could push the products of combustion through a building and therefore affect areas within that building that weren't previously affected and was that a

03:04:39 previously affected and was that a consideration you had regard to before starting to operate the LP on the night ANSI yes and how do you assess whether there is any risk to life within the building on the aspect of the building you intend to

03:04:51 aspect of the building you intend to direct the water jet out answer yes but where do you get your information from to ensure that whether there's anyone okay more the flats behind the exterior

03:05:02 okay more the flats behind the exterior you're trying to aim the Jetta what's her given the vantage point that we had we could we could very obviously see that there were persons involved and that we in if we were to put water in

03:05:14 that we in if we were to put water in there then we would need to make sure everyone was aware that we're about to do so that's not to say as well that we can't use the a or P as a covering jet and so

03:05:24 and so can apply water without directly affecting people but that will be done on the instruction and after confirming with the incident commander how long did it take you from her after arriving at

03:05:35 it take you from her after arriving at the scene to secure the water supply set up the LP and start operate it and approximately seven minutes want you to connected the hose in the cage to water

03:05:46 connected the hose in the cage to water and you set out at page 4 of your witness statement and it's the thirteenth line from the top you describe crew manager frost getting into the cage don't necessarily need to go to

03:05:57 the cage don't necessarily need to go to it unless you want to in your contemporaneous note you also say that firefighter Allen's sign was also in the cage with him is that right answer yes

03:06:08 cage with him is that right answer yes and what role what was a firefighter sign doing in the cage at the time sometimes it's just at the cage can hold

03:06:20 sometimes it's just at the cage can hold up to four people so believe he got in there just to assist temporary crew major frost can you explain how far up the tower the cage at reached when you became aware that there was a problem

03:06:31 became aware that there was a problem with water pressure so so we tested the water at the bottom and it seemed to be of sufficient pressure in order to lift him it was pretty much a gradual

03:06:44 him it was pretty much a gradual assessment that as the higher the cage went up the less the water pressure was there so it was almost like a continual process did you go up sufficiently high so there was no water at all did it get

03:06:56 so there was no water at all did it get that severe the problem on CS at what height by reference to floor or meters did it get so that no water was coming out at all I would say approximately fifteen one five meters you say at

03:07:09 fifteen one five meters you say at paragraph five of your statement and we don't necessarily need to go to it that the aerial can take up to 2,400 liters eleven point five bars of pressure but that you were getting about 381 liters

03:07:20 that you were getting about 381 liters and what would you say is the flow required to reach the optimal height of water supply so that sounds like an exam question no so can you rephrase it for me out

03:07:31 me out yep what flow is required to get to the optimal height what pressure do you need so if you have the optimum litres per minute going through the ground monitor then at the base you need 11.5 bar and

03:07:44 then at the base you need 11.5 bar and at the top of the 32 meter ladder be five point eight bar pressure okay and what flow of water would you get at the five point eight bar point so that's the

03:07:55 five point eight bar point so that's the flow water yeah to tell you the two thousand four hundred fifty liters of flow net thank you much manager feelin his statement says that your area wasn't close enough to that required pressure level for the water to reach the

03:08:06 level for the water to reach the building is that consistent with your recollection answer yes do you recall who was operating Paddington's turntable and Ida yes I do is it firefighter Chris Reynolds and

03:08:18 is it firefighter Chris Reynolds and crew manager Daniel Harriman okay and did you speak to other than about water pressure problems only later on in the

03:08:29 pressure problems only later on in the incident when I was wearing proving a practice inside the tower and I saw far too Reynolds and we had a brief discussion about that okay did you discuss any water pressure problems with Raymond Keane did you know him at Paddington I do know five are keen and

03:08:43 Paddington I do know five are keen and some of the best of my knowledge no did you ask which hydrant that the Paddington's turntable ladder had been attached to answer no I'm turning at

03:08:58 attached to answer no I'm turning at page 4 of your witness statement the last paragraph and fifth line down and you say that the ladder was stuck in the slower mode out of the two available speeds was this the case as soon as crew

03:09:10 speeds was this the case as soon as crew manager Frost has started to operate the ladder as far as I'm aware yes was this a problem that you'd come across before with this particular ALP I wouldn't be

03:09:22 with this particular ALP I wouldn't be able to specify it was this specific al paper in previous aerial ladder platforms that I've used this has become an issue what point did you realize that you're unable to communicate with Coomera Frost via the inbuilt comm

03:09:34 Coomera Frost via the inbuilt comm system very early on in its deployment so as soon as he got in the cage and started to move up we normally do a little comms before he heads up and he wasn't

03:09:45 before he heads up and he wasn't reported responding at that point what's the workaround that you devised to get round the fat being built comm system wasn't working it wasn't normally we would revert to the fire ground radios but as you can

03:09:57 the fire ground radios but as you can imagine the fire began fire ground radios were were quite busy so we've just reverted to shouting at one another did you have a loud hailer or anything like that to magnify and could have

03:10:08 like that to magnify and could have accessed one but didn't need one person actually was the problem with the comm system something you'd come across previously and answer now turning back

03:10:21 previously and answer now turning back to page five of your witness statement eight eight lines down you explained the problems with water pressure to watch manager Beale and that he gave you a note to take to the command unit is that

03:10:34 note to take to the command unit is that right that's correct which command unit did you take this - was it cu8 on Bowmore Road to be honest I'd I don't recollect but it was the one

03:10:45 I'd I don't recollect but it was the one that was nearest the pump that far-far cane was pump operating on I believe but who do you speak to when you got there

03:10:58 who do you speak to when you got there for want of a better description a white helmet I don't know okay what did you say to him or her I think I was one of

03:11:10 say to him or her I think I was one of two notes that I physically took to the command unit that night so depending on which note you're referring to the first one regarding the water pressure and yeah I don't know who I spoke to but I

03:11:21 yeah I don't know who I spoke to but I spoke to somebody on there male female I believe male okay

03:11:29 what response did you get from the white helmet we heard several discussions with several different people at the times oversee the lack of water pressure was

03:11:40 oversee the lack of water pressure was becoming an issue so I think given my sort of vague recollection I think that we were told that a water officer will be over to our sector soon and that we would be able to discuss that further with them were you given any form of

03:11:54 with them were you given any form of proactive advice as to workarounds that could be tried in order to increase water pressure no we to be honest we had already exhausted all practical advice that the collectively we could have it hope to

03:12:05 collectively we could have it hope to achieve them now we were relying really on the better water pressure coming from an external agency or the redirection of of other water supplies I'm flowing on

03:12:16 of other water supplies I'm flowing on from that answer I think what manager buildings evidence said that you tried to find an alternative hydrant and he thought the one you found was on Verity close does that accord with the old memory answer yes is it's not a normal

03:12:30 memory answer yes is it's not a normal practice if if one particular hydrant isn't being sufficient enough then which Island farmland a bit bit more of a distance away in the hope that it's not on the same mind was that before or after mr. frost winds indicate can you

03:12:43 after mr. frost winds indicate can you remember that would have been after because at the ground level that we had a reasonable water supply now deal with the question of setting up the hose reel on the cage again page five of your

03:12:56 on the cage again page five of your witness statement in the first big paragraph nine lines from the bottom now you described the solution you came up with which was to summarize to fix them out for two for one's high pressure hose

03:13:07 out for two for one's high pressure hose reel onto the AL Pease cage and to operate it remotely from the bottom the ladder I know it's difficult can you remember what time in the evening you came up with this device no I'm afraid I

03:13:19 came up with this device no I'm afraid I don't ok and can remember how long after you'd first try to operate the aerial in the normal manner you successfully achieve this workaround it would be an

03:13:30 achieve this workaround it would be an estimate but I would say approximately half an hour after we realized that the normal ground monitor wasn't going to work you say using your improvised system.you the aerial could reach 10

03:13:42 system.you the aerial could reach 10 floors up the building in your contemporaneous note you say that you're able to control the fire from below the ninth floor which one of those recollections you think is more accurate

03:13:53 recollections you think is more accurate as in between the ninth or the 10th well originally it was the ninth and then through further adjustment of our new process we added the ceiling hook to it which gave us approximately 11 meter and

03:14:06 which gave us approximately 11 meter and a half two meters of throw which probably took it up to the 10th you refer there to throw can you explain what that is it's just the projection of water from the hose real branch onto the

03:14:20 water from the hose real branch onto the building and what's the is the tenth floor was the tenth floor the highest extent of a throw you thought you could achieve on the night it was that well I

03:14:31 achieve on the night it was that well I would say we we possibly got sea elevenths at one point I think I think I might know in my statement

03:14:41 can I ask Paul to and put up on the screen an extract from dr. lanes report and his B lar and eight zeros to page 63

03:14:54 let's figures five point six seven five point seven zero

03:15:02 now you said in your witness statement that you can see the two sides that you managed to apply water to using the high-pressure hose it may assist if you look at the very big screen above your

03:15:13 look at the very big screen above your head can you indicate which parts of the tower they are on the photos so I think that may be more of a collective way I think if you look at Paddington's

03:15:25 think if you look at Paddington's turntable ladder I wouldn't want to comment on what exactly they hit but they look like on the left hand side of the building on this bottom left hand corner so looking at Figure 5.68 can you

03:15:38 corner so looking at Figure 5.68 can you identify for us just on this photograph if you need to stand up and just point where's the turntable ladder I believe it's coming to pop yes do

03:15:51 I believe it's coming to pop yes do stand up and just point it's probably easy so just under the legend which says flat 16th ok so we were able to put

03:16:08 flat 16th ok so we were able to put water on this side

03:16:13 now going back to your statement page five and it's again the first long paragraph four lines from the bottom you say that you remained in position for

03:16:24 say that you remained in position for the next two or three hours and that during this time you would ask anyone in command to walk by to get you more water pressure so that you could use your bigger hose did any of the people you spoke to get back to you solutions to

03:16:36 spoke to get back to you solutions to your problem not solutions but answers too so we we spoke to several people about water supplies included within and

03:16:47 about water supplies included within and representatives from a water company and they they told us that that was the best way we're going to be getting if I can stop you there just dealing with the lfb

03:16:59 stop you there just dealing with the lfb officers you asked can you remember which officers came back to you to give you a response I can't remember and the specifics but I know we spoke to senior

03:17:10 specifics but I know we spoke to senior officers with water officer tabards operations commanders tabards pretty much anyone that would be able to assist us we're getting more water on that area

03:17:21 us we're getting more water on that area and did they give the same advice or did different officers give different advice as to what the possible solutions could be or the position was there is no further advice thank you and you

03:17:33 further advice thank you and you referred to advice from the water company which was this was as good as it's gonna get in summer is that right that's correct here did you try and get

03:17:45 that's correct here did you try and get back to the command unit to raise your concerns regarding water pressure again after your first visit still after our first visit we were told that water officer will come and see us having spoken to that water officer that was

03:17:57 spoken to that water officer that was the answer we got so I felt no need to go back to the command unit as you applying water to the building were you in communication with the incident commander or with the bridgehead to check whether crews inside the areas

03:18:09 check whether crews inside the areas that you were focusing on only via my sector commander so I would report to my sector commander who had passed that on to the incident commander and who is your sector command are you dealing with what to manage appeal generally how

03:18:22 what to manage appeal generally how effective do you feel the system was that you adopted for controlling fire on the part of the building you were focused on I think given the limited water supplies it was as effective as we could hope for one point

03:18:35 effective as we could hope for one point that's been raised a question that's arisen ISM do you think that operating the LP and the way you did with the reduced water pressure was that the most effective use of that resource yes I

03:18:47 effective use of that resource yes I don't believe it was quick has given the amount a latest per minute we were getting out of the hydrant and through the fire engine that was the best application of the water onto the building I'd know not to turn on to a

03:19:00 building I'd know not to turn on to a different topic and that's your involvement with residents within the tower and again going back to page five of your witness statements and the bottom paragraph and we describe they're

03:19:11 bottom paragraph and we describe they're looking up at the tower as you're operating the aerial and seeing several people in flats waving their mobile phones did you pass on information regarding the location of those residents to the incident commander

03:19:23 residents to the incident commander again via the sector commander yes okay did you pass any information directly to the bridgehead answer no did you have

03:19:34 the bridgehead answer no did you have any dealings during the course of the night with the bridgehead whilst you are operating the ALP on tonight you also described again turning over the page to page 6 of your witness statement the

03:19:46 page 6 of your witness statement the first substantive paragraph using water to protect a resident you could see at his window on the 11th floor and you explained that in order to gain the extra height you used a ceiling hook as an extension you refer to in an answer

03:19:57 an extension you refer to in an answer earlier on starting with basics what's a ceiling hook it's it's a piece of equipment at all frontline fire engines carry or

03:20:10 all frontline fire engines carry or pumping appliances carry it's essentially just a long metal pole with a slight right angle piece of metal on the end right at the end of it which we

03:20:21 the end right at the end of it which we use normally for pulling down ceilings so I believe it was made primarily to to force through rotate through 90 degrees and then pull a ceiling down can you explain for us briefly what you did in

03:20:33 explain for us briefly what you did in order to

03:20:34 order to enable you to reach up to the 11th floor using the ceiling hook so my colleagues lashed off using their personal lines they tied physically tied their ceiling

03:20:46 they tied physically tied their ceiling hook to the cage of the aerial and then tied the host or branch onto the end of the ceiling hook just purely to gain the advantage of the extra meter edge of the ceiling hook and what steps you take

03:20:58 ceiling hook and what steps you take before applying water around the man on the 11th floor to ensure that he wouldn't be injured by the application of water I believe that was referred to the incident commander via a sector

03:21:09 the incident commander via a sector commander okay so you have no direct dealings with incident commander answer no the penultimate topic I'd like to deal with you is your entry into the

03:21:21 deal with you is your entry into the tower itself if I could actually turn to page seven of your witness that was in there at the first line you describe reporting to the be a holding area with crew manager Frost having heard calls on

03:21:33 crew manager Frost having heard calls on your radio for be a wearers and you say that you did this three times before you allowed him because they were wanting only to commit EDB a wearers is that a first summary as yes the first two times

03:21:44 first summary as yes the first two times is it right that you went to the be a holding area by the leisure center that would be correct and you remember what time this was I apologies it's difficult question I know but doing the best you can on now I don't remember what time

03:21:58 can on now I don't remember what time and the third and final time was you went to a holding area and that was near the entrance the tower itself is that right

03:22:04 right yeah on the third time we bypassed the main holding area and made our way direct to the secondary staging point which was up near the base of the tower underneath the walkway put bluntly you

03:22:15 underneath the walkway put bluntly you avoided the main holding area when it's an entrance to enhance your prospects of getting in is that fair that's fair okay but again just for the sake of

03:22:27 but again just for the sake of completeness can you remember now what time it was you gained entrance to the tower and the more direct holding area no I doubt that you say it was cream at

03:22:39 no I doubt that you say it was cream at America called you in

03:22:43 you know if by this point the policy of only committing idibia wears had been stopped were you aware of that I assume it must have been because I was wearing

03:22:54 it must have been because I was wearing s DBA I was surrounded by SDP eyewear is turning at page 7 of your witness statement again 13 lines down you describe entering the lobby on the ground floor and you say that you waited

03:23:05 ground floor and you say that you waited there quite a while and first of all do you know what time it was again when you entered the lobby apologies for asking the question but no unfortunately I don't have a record the only thing I say is it was daylight

03:23:16 only thing I say is it was daylight can you remember now how long you were waiting there was earth in total I think we were held at 3 different staging points before it was our turn to go in so it would have been a vague time but I

03:23:29 so it would have been a vague time but I don't actually not have it the time to give you do you know who tasked you was replacing burst hoses from the LPP

03:23:37 that night and was the initial task with or without the breathing apparatus to replace the burst house without as I'm

03:23:49 replace the burst house without as I'm send it next you were then sent up to the bridgehead and it was then on the fifth floor is that right to the best of my recollection yes and if I could ask you to turn to the top of page 8 of your

03:24:00 you to turn to the top of page 8 of your statement and you say there that your crew was tasked with searching flaws 6 7 8 & 9 we don't need to go to it unless you want to your contemporaneous note page to about 10 nights from the bottom

03:24:13 page to about 10 nights from the bottom Stacey you're tasked with firefighting as well as searching looking back now what's the more accurate summary of the tasks you were ordered to complete well I think a more accurate summary would be

03:24:26 I think a more accurate summary would be to just confirm some of the information that said so we arrived at the bridgehead and whilst we got briefed we were it was G was just after the

03:24:37 were it was G was just after the handover to a new station manager and so I think the station manager just wanted to confirm the information that he'd received and so he used the first two crews that he had to just double-check

03:24:48 crews that he had to just double-check what he'd already been told so we were told to firefight but essentially double-check that all rooms on the floors we were briefed had been searched

03:24:59 had been searched I was the station manager Kasim only gives you the briefing yeah that's correct okay apologies for jumping ahead in your witness statement going ahead to page 9

03:25:10 witness statement going ahead to page 9 the second line you say that something had gone very wrong for there to be no organized search procedures and no internal firefighting on the six to eight floors at that stage in the instant can you explain for us what kind

03:25:23 instant can you explain for us what kind of system we you would have expected to be in place at this stage yeah with hindsight I think that this this I would rather of reworded that statement I

03:25:34 rather of reworded that statement I think that what we were actually doing is confirming as I just said with for the for the benefit of station manager caz manly that in fact there had been organized search procedures but the fact

03:25:45 organized search procedures but the fact that the bridge had had been moved several times and that there was various information on different places within the incident including the forward information boards I just think that we were really double-checking that the

03:25:57 were really double-checking that the information that even given was correct and there were so many crews there it was a pretty reasonable thing to do to just use the toes to cruise just a given clarity and when you were committed is

03:26:08 clarity and when you were committed is it right that you were committed with fire fighters Reynolds and crew managers Pierson Harriman does that sound right in two separate Cruiser two so I was committed with crew major PFC and crew

03:26:22 committed with crew major PFC and crew manager Harriman and firefighter Reynolds were committed separately okay looking at the final patter sorry

03:26:33 looking at the final patter sorry looking at the first paragraph on page eight now you describe getting to the seventh floor and if I may summarize your evidence you see pockets of fire that you needed water to extinguish there's a hose on the floor next the dry

03:26:44 there's a hose on the floor next the dry riser but and they branch can you explain how you're able to operate the hose without a branch put the fire out yeah again not not within policy but there were fairly small pockets of fire

03:26:56 there were fairly small pockets of fire so we just held the female couplings at the end of the hose and just turn the water on from the riser main and just pretty much just painted it out excuse me you say that you radio down

03:27:08 excuse me you say that you radio down for a brand but numbers available does that mean that you were able to make contact with the bridgehead for them to tell you that no branch was available to the best of my recollection I don't think I've contacted the bridgehead at

03:27:20 think I've contacted the bridgehead at that point but I tried to didn't get response and then continued looking at page 9 of your witness statement the top second paragraph you describe seeing

03:27:31 second paragraph you describe seeing Suri's toilet area ladder as you left the tower

03:27:34 the tower can you remember now what site of the tower the sorry ladder was on yeah they they pitched directly adjacent to us was it applying water at that point they

03:27:46 was it applying water at that point they were using the same extinguishing media is us in the high-pressure hose reel from Mercedes mark 3 were you able to make an assessment how effective the application of water from the sorry

03:27:58 application of water from the sorry ladder was at that state I think at that time to be honest I was more pleased that they hadn't found a different position to pitch or to a different

03:28:13 position to pitch or to a different system with which to apply water and how that sounds selfish but it was more of a confirmation that where we pitched and what we'd used was the best available had you thought earlier on the evening

03:28:25 had you thought earlier on the evening whether it was possible to guess a latter of the extent of the soaring ladder at all answer no to my knowledge I didn't know that if there was a taller ladder and sorry there's one final

03:28:39 ladder and sorry there's one final question we don't need to go to it but at page 8 in the second paragraph you mention a body on the stairs did you move that body at all no I did not Thank

03:28:50 move that body at all no I did not Thank You mr. King I have no further questions for you sir given the time we're at I don't know whether mr. king would prefer to have lunch whilst under oath mr. king

03:29:06 to have lunch whilst under oath mr. king would like to finish giving his evidence within

03:29:12 what I said do you think there might be some more custard yeah well I'll rise for a couple of minutes thank you sir people can then consider whether there

03:29:23 people can then consider whether there are any further questions for you thank you sir and then we'll try and get you through before we break for lunch oh thank you very much all right we'd like to give the auction that please

03:29:38 well what the rather than say precisely when I'll come back and I'll invite you to send the usher to fetch me as soon as already

03:31:26 thank you sir thank you just some brief supplemental questions we're here they've known them two or three minutes yes

03:31:44 I think there may be a couple of questions miss king thank you for your patience first of all can you remember what the reach was of the Surrey ladder by reference two floors or meters I

03:31:55 by reference two floors or meters I [Music]

03:31:56 [Music] think in hindsight I think I had an extra 10 meters but I'm not sure about I'm afraid final said questions dealing with gas but you'd heard that the gas

03:32:07 with gas but you'd heard that the gas had been turned off who told you that and can you remember when I don't think I made reference to being told that like I say it's absolutely convinced that a number of hours into the fire there was

03:32:18 number of hours into the fire there was what looked like a self-propagating flame clear yellow in color burning in the center of the 8th floor why were you so convinced that it was it was more it

03:32:31 so convinced that it was it was more it should have been blue but but I was concerned after that amount of time and by that point I think we'd been there about 10 hours that there were still things sounds a bit more but but there

03:32:42 things sounds a bit more but but there were still things catching fire and because normally you'd have expected it to have burnt out by then and so the fact that there was still visible flames still keep coming out of that particular area the building led me to believe that

03:32:54 area the building led me to believe that perhaps it was gas a lot thank you I've no further questions thank you that's it well mr. king thank you very much near done dad we've been able to finish more evidence before we break for lunch we

03:33:05 evidence before we break for lunch we don't have any more customs for you thank you very much indeed for coming to give us your evidence and filling in your little part of the jigsaw so just

03:33:18 your little part of the jigsaw so just before you rise earlier earlier I advise this mr. Kipling's contemporaneous notes the one he'd added yes his own notes too

03:33:29 the one he'd added yes his own notes too had been disclosed we have hard copies available should CPS wish to have those and we can provide them now so they can review them over lunch my experience is that when people have to review things

03:33:41 that when people have to review things over lunch they do get lunch I didn't get the review done does anybody need more than the usual one hour for lunch

03:33:50 if it says the notes aren't aren't lengthy and I suspect lunch will be sufficient for people to form a view which is supposed to be unhelpful all

03:34:07 which is supposed to be unhelpful all right right so I'll say five for two please

03:34:11 please nice thank you