Station Manager Daniel Kipling gives evidence about his role managing BA main control at Grenfell, including resource deployment and communication challenges. Peter Johnson testifies about FSG policy deficiencies and his attempts to create training that was never implemented.
00:12:34 yes mr. Kinnett sir good afternoon man Oh call station manager Daniel Kipling thank you
00:12:57 I do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm
00:13:08 shall be the truth thank you very much you sit down and make yourself comfortable
00:13:21 because would you please confirm your name for the record at Daniel Kipling Thank You mr. Kipling first of all many thanks for coming on to give evidence today as much appreciated in front of you you have a blue folder which hopefully should contain the
00:13:33 which hopefully should contain the following your statement of the 22nd of February of this year and then behind that ought to be an exhibit to that statement which is an annotated map of the area surrounding Pleet our sorry
00:13:49 the area surrounding Pleet our sorry what was the second the second second tab or the final tab so yes and in tab B
00:14:01 tab or the final tab so yes and in tab B hopefully you'll find your contemporaneous notes yes and in particular the back of tab B you'll find the contemporaneous notes which you
00:14:12 the contemporaneous notes which you annotate is that right yes and have you read those documents recently I have yes and you confirm their contents are true yes and your content for them to stand as your evidence the inquiry yes thank
00:14:23 as your evidence the inquiry yes thank you now in respect of the contemporaneous note to which you've annotated and first of all when did you add those notes that would have been I
00:14:36 add those notes that would have been I would have I think I gave my police interview in January or February maybe so it would have probably been December I would say before the police interview and what was the purpose of making those
00:14:49 and what was the purpose of making those notes and it was it was preparation for my police interview I'm just adding other memories to what I'd written on the night that's useful thank you no
00:15:00 the night that's useful thank you no because you've given your statement I'm not going to go through each and every aspect of your state and either other matters have been covered by other witnesses
00:15:07 witnesses like to focus on the setting up of the be a main control arrangements on the night if any of my questions are unclear please say so and I'll rephrase and also
00:15:18 please say so and I'll rephrase and also for any time you require a break please shout now if I could just deal with some basics first of all is it right that you join the lfb in 2010 yes and that in June 2017 you held the same rank you do
00:15:29 June 2017 you held the same rank you do today namely station manager yes and in 2017
00:15:33 2017 what was your particular role and function it's sorry on the day or as that June 2017 what was your role and function ignoring on the night did you
00:15:44 function ignoring on the night did you do a station manager in operational policy no the fire team now in terms of your arrival at the tower and we have your mobilization time at zero one
00:15:55 your mobilization time at zero one twenty six on the road at zero one twenty eight and your arrival at zero two hundred hours does that sound accurate yes on arrival you located the the ICP is that right yes and the and
00:16:09 the ICP is that right yes and the and this was the command unit on Bowmore Road is that right and I'm not sure what rows refresh your memory from the map yeah no I can't actually read this map
00:16:28 if you go to my map yes the command unit which I've done see you brackets ICP if Paul could bring up the exhibit to the statement which is metal zero yes one
00:16:40 statement which is metal zero yes one five seven five zero
00:16:44 yeah there so see you brackets ICP thank you and it's in the bottom row row yes thank you
00:16:52 thank you now if I could turn to your witness statement page five the fifth paragraph three lines from the bottom there you describe the command unit and that there
00:17:03 describe the command unit and that there was loads going on there were senior officers there perhaps three or four station managers to group managers do you remember in are you able to identify the particular individuals within the sea you the only one I can remember is
00:17:16 sea you the only one I can remember is group manager Richard Welsh do you remember
00:17:20 remember policies for pressing this new member weather station manager aloft was in the sea you
00:17:24 sea you a station manager Brett loft was stood outside that's their command unit okay who did you understand the IC to be at the point you arrived Richard Welsh do you remember when you
00:17:36 Richard Welsh do you remember when you were at the Cu hearing any discussion between officers about the continued application of the stay-put policy no did you overhear any conversation
00:17:47 did you overhear any conversation regarding the need to evacuate whether that be total or partial evacuation no I'd now like to talk to you about your tasking in relation to the VA main
00:17:58 tasking in relation to the VA main control and you said page 5 of your statement the six paragraph the group manager Walter asked you to do ba main control at human the exact form of words or the gist of the words that mr. Walsh
00:18:09 or the gist of the words that mr. Walsh said to you I don't remember the exact form of words but it was it was he requested that I did ba main control it
00:18:20 requested that I did ba main control it was brief and did he direct you where to set up the main control he asked me to get a command unit and set it up did he give you any briefing as to how much ba
00:18:32 give you any briefing as to how much ba was at that stage being used as part of search and rescue missions no did you discuss at all the need for any DBA wearer's no did you consider raising the
00:18:46 wearer's no did you consider raising the nifa a DBA whereas with mr. Walsh at the time you arrived I didn't at that stage of the incident because of the messages that I'd heard enroute I knew that there
00:18:58 that I'd heard enroute I knew that there would be a DBA whereas in attendance or certainly enroute and it was it was clear to me that a DBA was going to be a consideration in relation to the FSG calls you heard whilst you're enroute we
00:19:10 calls you heard whilst you're enroute we were able to register what you were driving whether these were on the higher floors of the tower or not sorry the FSG calls yes William to hear those calls no I was concentrating on driving the only
00:19:21 I was concentrating on driving the only information I was taking in on enroute that I can remember is the resourcing information so the mate plants 20 you make plants 40 were you given any briefing as to the number of FSG calls and where those
00:19:34 the number of FSG calls and where those FSG calls were coming from as within the tower no it wouldn't been relevant to the role that he asked me to do and why do you say it's not relevant be a main control is a logistical function and
00:19:47 control is a logistical function and resourcing function that sits behind entry control so it's it's not involved in fire survival guidance it's involved with supplying the bridgehead with the
00:19:59 with supplying the bridgehead with the resources that they need to carry out the tasks that they are required to do as you arrived at 200 200 hours or thereabouts and you were able to see the tower and you saw the extent of the fire
00:20:11 tower and you saw the extent of the fire spread at that stage did you have any thoughts as to whether as DBA was going to be sufficient in order to get higher up the tower I don't recall having those thoughts at the time when I was walking
00:20:23 thoughts at the time when I was walking up to the command unit I wasn't in receipt of all of the incident information and so it would wouldn't have been appropriate for me to have those thoughts without receiving further information at the bottom of page 5 of
00:20:35 information at the bottom of page 5 of your statement at the top of page 6 you discuss there the three stages of BA control could I ask you before we come on to the next questions to look at
00:20:47 on to the next questions to look at policy number four six six and Paul would you be able to bring this up the references are lfb six zeros there we go 173 first of all mr. Kipling are you familiar with this policy yes I am and
00:21:00 familiar with this policy yes I am and if I could ask Paul to go to the bottom of page 32 in terminal 32 within that policy and in particular might I invite you to refresh your memory of points 32
00:21:12 you to refresh your memory of points 32 point one thirty two point two and thirty-two point three
00:21:27 and Paul we'd like to turn over the post @ 32.3 thank you
00:21:36 [Music]
00:21:44 thank you you've read that yes thank you looking at particular 32.1 is it fair to say that the BA main control is essentially about the management and control of ba resources at an instant
00:21:56 control of ba resources at an instant yes and to be clear would you'll roll is officer in charge the ba main control include you making decisions as to committing firefighters under air or not no that would be done presumably by the
00:22:09 no that would be done presumably by the entry control officer at the bridgehead yes and would your role include giving ba whereas any briefing of any nature as to what it would be awaiting them once they were deployed within the town know
00:22:21 they were deployed within the town know the extent when I talk about briefing the extent of my briefing would be to ask the BA whereas to report to wherever they required to report to and then request that they come back into my
00:22:33 request that they come back into my staging area so that they can be well appropriately arrested when they were coming back from the tower did you have any system whereby you were able to debrief those who've been deployed in
00:22:44 debrief those who've been deployed in the tower so you got an idea of what the conditions were like to inform your decision where the e DBA was required for example it it wouldn't have been my decision about whether a DBA was required the decision for committing a
00:22:55 required the decision for committing a DBA cruise into the tower was would have been made at the bridgehead or from the incident commander my responsibility was to provide the bridgehead with what they required if I could also you turn to
00:23:08 required if I could also you turn to page six of the statements and the fourth paragraph on that page the last line you there discussed the equipment that you need and you refer to taking to forward information boards and the telemetry board from a nearby appliance
00:23:19 telemetry board from a nearby appliance with you
00:23:20 with you when you refer to a telemetry board just so I understand your evidence do you mean there an entry control board yes apologies for asking a dumb question but what given the nature of your role has
00:23:32 what given the nature of your role has been in charge of the PA main control why would you need a telemetry board as well and so it just seemed like a good idea for me to have additional VA resources in the staging area where all
00:23:45 resources in the staging area where all the ba resources were going to be and knowing that I didn't want to be in a position where there was a request coming in for a telemetry board and I wasn't able to provide that it was just
00:23:56 wasn't able to provide that it was just a good bit of equipment which was which would potentially have come in useful okay sorry and the other thing about that is has got the aid memoirs in it which I needed my help Jim can you help
00:24:07 which I needed my help Jim can you help us with the admin was what are you referring to there so in the back of talent of the telemetry boards there's a range of prompts or notes that are
00:24:19 range of prompts or notes that are prompts to assist in various different functions of ba entry control ba and one of them that's particularly relevant to main control is a main control aid
00:24:31 main control is a main control aid memoir and do they prompt you as what the requirements are of policy etc is that the type of information yeah it's it's a prompt sheet which says the easier responsibilities is the officer in charge of ba main control going back
00:24:45 in charge of ba main control going back briefly to policy 466 and Paul if I could ask you to turn at page 33 and paragraph 33 point 7 now that refers
00:24:56 paragraph 33 point 7 now that refers there to the ba main control board which it states that the station manager in charge of a ba main control must use to record an update information if we could turn to page 37 within the policy did
00:25:15 turn to page 37 within the policy did you have one of those boards with you on the night I did yep thank you can you briefly explain to us how you work with these boards so this board is
00:25:26 work with these boards so this board is essentially an overall it's an overall record of where where your errors are and how many of them you've got so as I
00:25:37 and how many of them you've got so as I mentioned earlier it's a primarily a resourcing function ba main control so this board is designed to assist in keeping a handle on how many resources you've gotten where they are and also as
00:25:49 you've gotten where they are and also as you can see there's a there's various other parts in it such as the clock is a good example where you can match up the information that is on the bridgehead all the important the relevant
00:26:00 all the important the relevant information that's on the bridgehead to the information that you have where your staging area is thank you if we can go now back to page 6 of your statement and it's the third paragraph last line you we don't necessarily need
00:26:15 last line you we don't necessarily need to go to it but just so you've got a reference point you say you saw station manager loft and you grabbed him for your team
00:26:21 your team where were you when you saw station manager loft at the instant command point and were you aware at that stage that mr. loft had been tasked with managing FSGS and when he'd first arrived on the scene no it wasn't it
00:26:33 arrived on the scene no it wasn't it well you were weather station manager loft had ever formally handed over that role the FSG role to any person at any stage no this this is not an element of my statement of the evening that I
00:26:46 my statement of the evening that I remember very well but I do write in my contemporaneous notes that I wrote that day that I requested station manager loft as a resource probably because he
00:26:58 loft as a resource probably because he was there and I know him and it was given to me thank you I'm now going to turn to a separate topic which is the initial setting up in in cu7 and you explain the rough six the
00:27:10 in cu7 and you explain the rough six the sixth paragraph third line the you found a command unit and you're intending to use that for the BA main control just for the sake of clarity that's the command unit that was parked on Graham
00:27:21 command unit that was parked on Graham full Road is that right if you'd like to refer back to your map which it may be useful for Paul to bring up its menu and the other one is easy it's easy to read on here one five seven three zero so
00:27:33 on here one five seven three zero so sorry when 5 zero
00:27:42 yeah that's the one next to where it says ground floor road and let's see you yeah thank you Tony over the page of page 7 you describe tasking firefighters Gary Moore and James Powell with going into the
00:27:54 and James Powell with going into the tower and with getting as much information as possible about what was going on there do you remember exactly the information you asked them to obtain I can only refer back to my statement oh
00:28:07 I can only refer back to my statement oh yeah I can only refer back to my statement which I believe says yeah so who was in charge of the bridge bridge head the names of the people doing entry
00:28:19 head the names of the people doing entry control how many crews were being committed and how quickly they were going through resources turning to the next topic it's you went into the tower with station mantle off that's right
00:28:31 with station mantle off that's right isn't it I never entered the tower at any point all right you went approached in the vicinity of the tower should put it near to where there were there two people over the carbonic yes and you got to the covered walkway on the south side
00:28:43 to the covered walkway on the south side of the tower to be precise yes and you say looking at page 8 so this is this is after I've been taken off the command unit yes yeah and if to give you some context if I can ask you to turn to page
00:28:54 context if I can ask you to turn to page 8 of your statements in the second paragraph you'd left the command you I knew that I needed communications between the bridge head and myself and told Brett to stay there under this
00:29:05 told Brett to stay there under this covered area which I thought was near to the entrance of the tower and then you go on in the next paragraph to say my plan was to find a place or see you so this is before you rejected as a word
00:29:16 this is before you rejected as a word from the CEO to organize crews and send them to him he could then in turn send them into the tower when they were needed looking at what you say in the statement there is it accurate to say that at this stage you were envisaging
00:29:29 that at this stage you were envisaging having main control split in two stages the first with you at a command unit what you'd found one and the second with loft under the walkway is that a fair summary yes I suppose so my intention
00:29:42 summary yes I suppose so my intention was to have a main control operating where I had the space and we were away from the danger of the falling debris and ideally with a command unit now recognizing that that is going to be
00:29:54 now recognizing that that is going to be a distance from the entrance to the tower
00:29:56 tower I needed to have eyes and ears at the entrance to the tower so that I could have a physical person making that communication with the bridge head the other intention was to have a second I
00:30:08 other intention was to have a second I suppose forward command stage where I could make sure that they would I would run out of BA whereas before that for command area ran out of BA whereas which
00:30:20 command area ran out of BA whereas which meant that the bridge head would always be able to get ba where is so would it have been preferable looking at the system what you were busy at the time to set up the main control under the walkway so they only have one location
00:30:32 walkway so they only have one location no I don't believe it was there was an awful lot of activity going on under that walkway as well as a lot of falling debris I knew that this was going to be
00:30:44 debris I knew that this was going to be a significant be a deployment at times for up to 40 BA whereas in one place it might be helpful if I explained a little bit about what's involved physically
00:30:56 bit about what's involved physically would be a main controls do so be a main control it is responsible for marshaling resources as I mentioned early so you're talking about all of the areas that
00:31:07 talking about all of the areas that you're going to need for the deployment but also there's a servicing function that gets performed so when a set gets used or if you run out of sets spare sets are available so you need to
00:31:18 sets are available so you need to service those sets and you need to be careful about how you service those sets because they need to stay clean and there's also a responsibility on be a main control to ensure that your
00:31:29 main control to ensure that your firefighters are well rested so to do that under the cover walkway with all of the falling debris and activity that was going on it would not have been an
00:31:40 going on it would not have been an appropriate place to carry out that function
00:31:42 function thank you looking at the role of mr. loft
00:31:46 loft how are you intending for him to communicate with the bridgehead was it by radio by mobile by runner ha yeah by runner if radios weren't feasible and at
00:31:58 runner if radios weren't feasible and at that stage had you established how practicable it was to communicate with the bridgehead by radio I had my radio on the command channel I knew that there was a lot of radio
00:32:10 knew that there was a lot of radio traffic going on in the command channel however my request to Bret when I left in there was to make contact with the
00:32:21 in there was to make contact with the with the bridgehead so given the distance between the inside of the tower and where I left Brett that would have been a feasible thing for him to do this
00:32:33 been a feasible thing for him to do this is also happening at the same time as I've sent two fire fighters to actually go to the bridgehead and establish more information about it so I'm still very much in the information gathering stage at this point that's useful because if
00:32:44 at this point that's useful because if we don't necessarily need to turn to it but in the annotated contemporaneous note at the top of page 5 you refer to later on use mr. Saunders as a runner let's say you played a pivotal role yes
00:32:56 let's say you played a pivotal role yes again it may be a question the obvious but what are the advantages of using runners over and above using radios or indeed mobile phones that we've heard about this morning yeah calling Nick a
00:33:08 about this morning yeah calling Nick a runner is under estimating the that it's valuable job that he did for me it's an upholder is probably disrespectful to his right no need to say that because Nick performed a very valuable role for me and there is a for
00:33:22 valuable role for me and there is a for me having a physical link four very important roles where I've got a trusted officer you can go and physically tick talk to the people who I need to get important messages to I know those
00:33:35 important messages to I know those messages then get delivered and then I have that person come back to me and say so if you have a face - sometimes if you have a face-to-face communication with someone it is it's just a much more rip
00:33:46 someone it is it's just a much more rip for a very important job such as VA it's a much more robust way of communicating a message when there is an awful lot of communications going on at that incident when as you were part of the information
00:33:58 when as you were part of the information gathering stage what efforts did you make to identify who's in charge at the bridgehead of the be a staging area first
00:34:08 first sorry the be a staging area at the bridgehead yes that was in my brief - firefighter Moore and firefighter power and I think that they took another firefighter with them as well I can't
00:34:20 firefighter with them as well I can't remember and were you aware that watch manager Watson was in charge of the staging area at that stage I I can't remember the names but when they came back we broke that information down on the probably the forward information
00:34:32 the probably the forward information board did you have cause to liaised with what major watson at any stage during the course of the evening no because I was getting the information on resources directly from Brett he was doing who who
00:34:43 directly from Brett he was doing who who had that communication with the bridgehead and did you have the sake of clarity did you have any direct communications with the bridgehead first of all any officer in charge of the bridgehead not me directly personally no
00:34:55 bridgehead not me directly personally no okay
00:34:56 okay the next topic I'd like to discuss is the setting up of the main control by the Leisure Centre you ended up at spot you've marked on the exhibited map and if Paul could bring that up again it's a met one 575 zero
00:35:21 I think you've marked it with the word benches yeah left of Kensington leisure center is that right yes you explained
00:35:33 center is that right yes you explained that there was a large area to hold crews and you made the decision to set up there how far away were you from station manager loft within eyesight we
00:35:46 station manager loft within eyesight we were then shouting distance if it was necessary probably could happen my understanding is that there was a lot of noise I don't remember any noise but I know that there must have been a
00:35:59 know that there must have been a apologies for jumping around your statement if nothing else need to go to page 9 and it's the second paragraph there the final sentence you refer there to locating a spare Cu that you could
00:36:13 to locating a spare Cu that you could have used that was just too far away and you say I was in an ideal spot and although a Cu would have been useful I felt that having once so far away would not have being practical could you help
00:36:24 not have being practical could you help us can you explain precisely what you would have been able to do had you had the benefit of an orthodoxy you well so a command unit has got various systems
00:36:36 a command unit has got various systems on it which which may assist it I think so for instance CSS whiteboards it's an indoor space it's well-lit and you can
00:36:49 indoor space it's well-lit and you can organize your team that is assisting you just because you've got a room everyone's in the same place yes but it does also have disadvantages your you are in a room so you can't see what's
00:37:00 are in a room so you can't see what's going on and so sometimes that can limit your situational awareness so there were many advantages to being out the front I think it was personally I think that it was a blessing in disguise that we never
00:37:12 was a blessing in disguise that we never moved on to a command unit and situational awareness is one of those matters you refer to in the notes on your contemporaneous note and we don't need to go to it it's at page three again this may be a question of the
00:37:24 again this may be a question of the obvious
00:37:26 obvious but what are the advantages of having full situational awareness when you are in charge of the BA main control when you are performing a sector which I
00:37:39 you are performing a sector which I suppose is a function of of an instance structure it's very important that you maintain a broader view of what's going on at the incident and you don't become tunnel visioned so that's that is what
00:37:54 tunnel visioned so that's that is what we mean by situational awareness it is my responsibility to have an eye on the bigger picture rather than individual details which I will then allocate people to carry out tasks for me and
00:38:06 people to carry out tasks for me and presumably situational awareness is a relevant factor when you're having to conduct dynamic risk assessments for example yes apologies again for asking the question about timing that is to try
00:38:17 the question about timing that is to try and get some fix or able to assist us with the time at which you set up by the leisure center I've I can I can only provide you with an estimate based on my acts actions so if I arrived it - it
00:38:32 acts actions so if I arrived it - it would have taken me at least five minutes to get to put my PPE on and arrive at the command unit it would have taken me at least another five minutes to get on to the first command unit so ten pass - yeah and then I would say I
00:38:45 ten pass - yeah and then I would say I was probably a earliest and that standing in front of the ledger center starting to set up and get all my resources to me and about 20 past 1/2 path - but that would be a guess based
00:38:57 path - but that would be a guess based on the activity that I carried out and time always goes much quicker then you think how did you then communicate to Bo crews that be a main control was located where you were located so when I arrived
00:39:12 where you were located so when I arrived so when there was a bad word be a group there were be a where as around and that was absolutely one of my first tasks once I decided where I was going to do it and there was a watch manager Helen
00:39:24 it and there was a watch manager Helen Christmas who I know from working with her in the past and I asked her to go around the incident grounds and get every single be aware that she saw wasn't engaged in the task and send them
00:39:36 wasn't engaged in the task and send them to me because this is where me control was and I think firefighter Moore will be help me with that as well did you send a message to the ICP that you'd set up a be a main control by the Alisha Center yes I did yes
00:39:48 Alisha Center yes I did yes turning back to page 8 and your witness statement and the final paragraph on that page that you described firefighters more empower coming back with a report about what was going on in the Tower
00:39:58 the Tower can you remember now how long it took for them to go to the tower and return back with the information you'd asked them to collate so it can you repeat that question yeah how long did it take
00:40:09 that question yeah how long did it take firefighters more empower to go to the tower and come back and provide you with the information you directive that they prefer it callate it didn't seem like it took them a long time we're talking do
00:40:20 took them a long time we're talking do you remember in detail what they were able to tell you I I don't remember it
00:40:34 able to tell you I I don't remember it in the detail I'm afraid okay were you handed any piece of paper by no record if I can ask you to turn to page 9 in your witness statement and the first paragraph on that page you say that
00:40:46 paragraph on that page you say that firefighters more in power were able to draw a sketch of the internal layout of the tower that you thought would be useful in briefing firefighters before they went in just to get some clarity over this point are you talking about a
00:40:57 over this point are you talking about a sketch the floor layout here or something broader than that no this is just as this is a common technique that we use it particularly in multiple floor blocks I knew that in order to get to
00:41:11 blocks I knew that in order to get to the bridge head they would have looked at they would have seen a safe floor so I asked them to sketch out what it because often the floor layouts replicated and it was purely so that we could provide the firefighters a little
00:41:22 could provide the firefighters a little bit of background in terms of what they were going in so they had something in their mind before they went to the bridge head to be properly briefed for their tasks you explained earlier on new evidence though the nature and
00:41:33 evidence though the nature and limitations and the briefing and averted comas that you gave to be a cruise before they were deployed were you aware of the state of communications within the tower
00:41:44 the tower human by the state of community person well more particularly whether radio communications were effective or whether they were limited in their extent so for example can go reach the higher educator
00:41:56 example can go reach the higher educator that information did eventually come back to me through the VA crews talking about it when they came out the tower [Music]
00:42:03 [Music] how long into the night can you often set up set half - can you remember no I cut mine sorry I can't remember it would have presumably been when the first bakery started coming back looking at
00:42:15 bakery started coming back looking at page 9 of your statement the third paragraph on that page if I may summarize your evidence you communicated with loft by mister loft by mobile phone every five minutes that he was getting demand for crews from the bridgehead and
00:42:28 demand for crews from the bridgehead and that your role was to ensure that mr. loft didn't run out of be a cruise to send in first of all do you agree that's the first summary of what set out there
00:42:39 sorry I'm just looking for the bed that you just read about let's just look at it if you look at page nine third paragraph on that page start so I called Brett on my mobile phone yeah and what
00:42:50 Brett on my mobile phone yeah and what I'm suggesting to your first summary is this yep yes sorry no sorry I didn't hear your summary I was looking this is what you were reading house sorry summarize you have the communicator with mr. Loughborough mobile phone every five
00:43:02 mr. Loughborough mobile phone every five minutes yes that he was getting demand for cruise from the bridgehead and that your role was to ensure that he didn't run out of be a cruise yes looking at each element of that do you know whether mr. luff was receiving the request for
00:43:14 mr. luff was receiving the request for BA whereas by radio from the bridgehead I don't know don't know do you know how he's getting his information from the bridgehead that's all like I can't remember I'm sorry but I know that he
00:43:26 remember I'm sorry but I know that he was getting information I was getting fairly accurate regular updates from him when he called you would he give you a request for a specific number of ba wearers yes yes and would he specify
00:43:38 wearers yes yes and would he specify that those ba crews should be s DBA or a DBA yes yes did you then have a system for recording which ba where is or how many BA whereas you are sending in
00:43:53 a system for how many we were sending in I knew how many we were sending in I knew how quickly we were going through VA wearers so you monitoring it yes and I knew whether they are SD bi or EDP a
00:44:05 I knew whether they are SD bi or EDP a flowing from that only page 10 of your statement the third paragraph you say that you felt that you had an accurate record of who you were committing with
00:44:16 record of who you were committing with that being a written record or is it just your assessment of the situation well in Nice yes it was a written record but it wasn't a written record of individuals it was a written record of
00:44:28 individuals it was a written record of numbers and types of set so I wouldn't have had the accuracy of of the names of the people that would have taken place at the bridgehead when the PA where has
00:44:39 at the bridgehead when the PA where has returned from their deployment did they report back to you at the main control so you'd come back would that be again something would be managed at the bridgehead they would go through the bridgehead because they would have to
00:44:50 bridgehead because they would have to give their tallies in they would resume ibly do a debrief at the bridgehead and then they would come to my area where they would rest because of the because
00:45:03 they would rest because of the because of the severity of the incident and certainly there were occasions when firefighters were in a very distressed state I couldn't say that every single
00:45:14 state I couldn't say that every single one came back to my area but the majority did thank you could I ask you to turn to page 9 of your statements and
00:45:25 to turn to page 9 of your statements and the final paragraph and I'll let you read it this time instead of racing on
00:45:45 okay we discussed mr. Saunders role as a runner earlier earlier on now you say here that you obviously had a line of communication with the ICU and you say
00:45:56 communication with the ICU and you say in the next sentence that your first message was that you need as many ba resources as they can as they could send now to be clear when you're referring to be a resources here do you mean be a wearer's or spare be a set or what
00:46:12 it would have been wearer's because
00:46:17 because you get an operational support you know that turns up and they have spare sets with them so yeah it would have been I needed BA whereas they were they with a finite resource of that at
00:46:28 they with a finite resource of that at the incident and did you specify that you needed edpa or when you specified that would you give numbers or just say as many as you've got we would give an
00:46:41 as many as you've got we would give an exact time when we believed we were going to run out of ba whereas et Bay or SD ba we would tell them how quickly we were going through them and we would
00:46:52 were going through them and we would tell them how many we would need when that time arrived but again with apologies for asking you a question about timing can you give us a rough estimate as to what time you asked mr. Saunders to take that message to the all
00:47:04 Saunders to take that message to the all that request the ICU I think I write in one of my either my contemporaneous notes or my police statement I write a time when we get low on e DB I was in my
00:47:19 time when we get low on e DB I was in my area not at the incident I think I get down to four and then a large number turn up now that that time is the time that we anticipated running out and so
00:47:31 that we anticipated running out and so it would have been about two to two and a half hours before then
00:47:37 do you member getting any response back from the ICU in response to your request yes yeah we had we have we got replies going back to page 10 the second
00:47:48 going back to page 10 the second paragraph on that page and the first sentence you explain that mr. Saunders handled communication between you and the ICU throughout the night and I would say generally whether you had a good line of communication with the ICU it
00:48:02 line of communication with the ICU it worked yes and did you feel that the messages that have been sent through have been received and you were getting meaningful responses back yes I think the best the best side of that is that when we knew we were going to run out of ba whereas we got a load more ba whereas
00:48:14 ba whereas we got a load more ba whereas we know we never had no point if we run out of the resources we needed you also say may be useful if you can turn to page 12 of your statement the second paragraph third line but after you'd set
00:48:29 paragraph third line but after you'd set up the system mr. Saunders came and told you that there was an air wave channel sorted out for you did you use that channel to communicate with the Cu I believe at this stage that function was
00:48:40 believe at this stage that function was being carried out by sector commander command support and so what you I think was Li drawbridge on the day so I suppose yes it was communicating with
00:48:52 suppose yes it was communicating with you but that that that function had been delegated to another officer again apologies for jumping around your statement but if I could ask you to turn to page 14 and it's the second paragraph from the bottom and the second line
00:49:07 from the bottom and the second line there you say that a resourcing see you had been set up at the same time that the airwave channel was established we have that resourcing see you as cu1 does
00:49:19 have that resourcing see you as cu1 does that sound right I don't know what come on I know it was on a command unit but I don't know what command you know what and that we have an arrival time for 0 to 59 does that sound about right yes
00:49:30 to 59 does that sound about right yes did you make any specific request resources to the resourcing see you well once the resourcing see you have been set up and that function was working our resourcing request went to that CEO
00:49:42 resourcing request went to that CEO the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the arrival of the protective group and again apologies for jumping around if I could as you turn to page 12 your statement where you deal with this
00:49:53 your statement where you deal with this in and the final two lines on that page first of all just to deal with basics P G stands for a protective equipment group is that right yes and they were
00:50:04 group is that right yes and they were bringing additional be a set is that right yes so that sentence the way that's worded I suppose I should explain that a little bit better so operational
00:50:17 that a little bit better so operational support units carry be a main control packs with them those are on a PDA for and when you request a certain number of fire engines you start to get the operational support units and they all carry the main control packs so you'll
00:50:33 carry the main control packs so you'll get those delivered and it's basically a lorry it delivers them but alongside that you also have a respiratory protection equipment logistics officer that will get informed of when it goes
00:50:46 that will get informed of when it goes to a major incident they will get informed that a major incident has been declared and they will then also make decisions to provide those resources to the incident so those combined those two
00:50:58 the incident so those combined those two functions provided equipment to me at my main control point elsewhere in the documents as reference to a be a support unit is that have you heard that phrase
00:51:09 unit is that have you heard that phrase before I think that that's one of those two functions that that's referring to it thank you
00:51:20 now Paul I don't know whether you were able to set up the short instant log which i think is a tab 23 of the documents bundle
00:51:35 if you go to page 24 on the top of page 24 at a 3:05 51
00:51:47 24 at a 3:05 51 that's what apologies mr. Kipling you've probably seen these before but this is the short instant log for the evening and you'll see there is a service request indicating that was a message that was then sent by control to the
00:51:59 that was then sent by control to the incident ground which states see you 8rp unit with s DBA eta 30 minutes RP unit with a DBA aprox 1 hour these have been ordered as the VA support units
00:52:10 ordered as the VA support units first of all just so we understand the terms that have been used are P stands for respiratory protection equipment that's right and so is that the same as the be a support unit yes yes and does
00:52:23 the be a support unit yes yes and does this message trigger any memory with you these these messages can be difficult to in this format can be a bit difficult to understand but my understanding from
00:52:35 understand but my understanding from that would be so what you do end up getting with when the respiratory protective equipment comes to us is vans which have got cylinders in them and I
00:52:48 which have got cylinders in them and I would have thought spare sets as well but we already had lots of spare sets from the OSU's so yeah they the spare cylinders and sets certainly turned up
00:53:00 cylinders and sets certainly turned up at around this time so I would have thought that that is probably what that's referring to thank you if we could pull if we could turn over the page to page 25 and look at an entry for
00:53:11 page to page 25 and look at an entry for 0-3 54
00:53:24 zero if there we go 0-3 5405 this appears to be a record of a request from cu8 and respect of EDB a cylinders arrival do you have any memory of that
00:53:37 arrival do you have any memory of that message
00:53:44 hmm I don't remember that message no but that may have happened because of the resourcing information that we were giving them about how quickly we were
00:53:55 giving them about how quickly we were going through da and they then made a decision that they needed more cylinders do you remember being kept waiting for additional cylinders that you were expecting no at no point to be run out
00:54:06 expecting no at no point to be run out of BA where is that we need it if it gets slightly further down that page so an entry at zero four zero three zero one hopefully we see you can see a message to attend with all a DBA sets
00:54:18 message to attend with all a DBA sets available strike all that's zero four zero three zero one there we go p.m. and then if you can expand that to attend
00:54:30 then if you can expand that to attend with all et ba sets available can you help us with what that message means in particular the last two lines I expect that this message has probably been sent
00:54:41 that this message has probably been sent as a result of the times and the rate than the information that we gave the resourcing function about how quickly we were going through ba wearers and so because of the aunt that because of the
00:54:53 because of the aunt that because of the speed with which we were going through PA wearers I expect they probably sent that message to get as much ba resources down to the incident as possible so that we would have the BA when we needed it
00:55:05 we would have the BA when we needed it does that message go to all the attending appliances that to me looks like a message that yeah that that's me
00:55:17 like a message that yeah that that's me looks like a message that's either gone on the call-out slip to the appliances that that's gone to and it's also presumably gone on over on the main screen radio as a request into control
00:55:29 screen radio as a request into control to request so that gets put on the call slip would you have made the request for that message to be sent you think no I would have sent I would have told whether this was the incident at this
00:55:41 whether this was the incident at this point whether it was the incident command point plan or the resourcing command unit I I'm not sure at what point that changed over but whoever was performing that function I would have sent a message to the command unit
00:55:52 sent a message to the command unit this is the time that we need this many ba wearers and they would have then made a decision to get that many BA where is to me thank you and that's what they did to achieve that okay if we can turn Paul
00:56:04 to achieve that okay if we can turn Paul would you mind turning to page 31 in the short instant log and the time at o4 3801 thank you
00:56:16 3801 thank you and the message passed the control that 60e DBA senders leaving e43 on the bell 36 will be collected next report raw 51 are at barking but currently no transport do you remember that message I
00:56:28 transport do you remember that message I would never I wouldn't have seen that message DAC Fenton notes in his witness statement there was a request made for EDB a whereas made at zero 350 do you
00:56:39 EDB a whereas made at zero 350 do you have any recollection of that how many what exactly was the request he said there was a request made for all EDB a wearers yeah well I again I wouldn't
00:56:50 wearers yeah well I again I wouldn't have seen that request but it doesn't surprise me that that message went because of the requirement 3 DBA and the reason why we needed to get as many idibia wearers to that incident as
00:57:01 idibia wearers to that incident as possible very quickly at this stage is because we had calculated when we were going to run out of existing resources at the incident based on the rate that we were going through them at its height so they are prioritizing getting as much
00:57:15 so they are prioritizing getting as much resort B DBA OPA resource to that incident so that it could meet our deadline that we given them could I now turn to the question of problems with the VA sets that are encountered on the
00:57:26 the VA sets that are encountered on the evening and if I could ask you at this point you turn to page 13 in your witness statement and it's really the second substantive paragraph on that page which starts with the words someone
00:57:38 page which starts with the words someone from peg then spoke to me and said the PA sets which had been delivered weren't working at this stage we were going through 40 BA whereas every 60 minutes which was at the peak of our volume he
00:57:49 which was at the peak of our volume he told me they needed to be plugged into a computer to reset them and it would take some time to do I've since learned that this may be in a misunderstanding that the issue was flat batteries do you now have any more understanding
00:58:01 do you now have any more understanding of what the cause of the problem was was it flat batteries was it something else yes so when when spare sets get delivered to an incident that aren't on the back of the fire engine sets on the
00:58:14 the back of the fire engine sets on the back of the fire engine are plugged in and they're on a trickle charge so that the charge always remains adequate every firefighter that arrives at an incident on a fire engine has a set these sets
00:58:29 on a fire engine has a set these sets that I'm talking about here are the spare sets that arrived without they're not set up but they're in sealed bags and so they're not on the trickle charge so when they turned up my understanding
00:58:40 so when they turned up my understanding is that the batteries were flat it's worth noting that because of the system that we set up where Bret was holding resources before they were sent in and we had resources further back at my
00:58:52 we had resources further back at my marshalling area we actually did have the BSS to commit into the tower this when I was told in the midst of everything going on that the spare sets
00:59:04 everything going on that the spare sets had flat batteries as it was a bit of a surprise but actually its cylinders that we need not spare sets because firefighters all have sets so they go through their cylinders and they can
00:59:16 through their cylinders and they can then just replace this lesson and doesn't use the same set again now it's ended flowing off from that looking at page 13 is the final paragraph on that page you say second sentence somehow by
00:59:30 page you say second sentence somehow by using the two batteries the problem was solved if it was the batteries that run out by using these two we were able to get an additional two sets than at the time then at the time was enough to take resourcing pressure off are you able to
00:59:44 resourcing pressure off are you able to say whether this issue had any impact on your ability to supply resources the bridgehead or not no it didn't more bluntly did it mean that you were not
00:59:56 bluntly did it mean that you were not able to meet the demand for at any pace during the night sorry did did the problem regarding batteries meaning that you couldn't supply I'm never a gentleman I the when the battery
01:00:08 never a gentleman I the when the battery problem happened it's so the system we had in place was that my area where all of the resources where all of the people were where they were resting and where we had fresh people that was the last
01:00:19 we had fresh people that was the last fallback that was if we'd run out of the full of mobilizing area my area was the last fall back or not I desperately wanted to avoid that because we had firefighters in this building so when I say resourcing
01:00:33 building so when I say resourcing pressure I didn't want to run out of where as to send if the request came in for me to send whereas I did not want to run out having said that if my area had run out we still had the forward mobilizing area which wasn't being used
01:00:45 mobilizing area which wasn't being used until it was requested from the bridgehead so we had a number of four backs in place thank you could I now turn to the issue of demand for EDB a and if I could ask you to turn to page
01:00:56 and if I could ask you to turn to page 14 in your witness statement and relates the the first sentence at the top of that page where you say by now I'd received a message saying that we were using a DBA only do you remember who
01:01:08 using a DBA only do you remember who this message was sent from I don't I don't I'm sorry I would guess probably Bret because that was where I was getting most of the information from apology for again for asking your timing question are you able to estimate it
01:01:20 question are you able to estimate it what time you received that message it would be a guess well I don't want to ask you to guess but um if you're able to serve use maybe 220 or 230 as you're
01:01:34 to serve use maybe 220 or 230 as you're setting up time at the ledger center Ritz 330 how long did the position that only e DBA were to be committed how long did that last for can you remember my
01:01:48 did that last for can you remember my memory of it is it's that it was for a few hours
01:01:57 you say that as a result of that you started committing people for a second time in edpa and that's the second sentence of that first paragraph do you have any idea how many firefighters were committed twice
01:02:09 many firefighters were committed twice in the DBA at the time I did but I can't remember now what process do you go through to determine whether it was safe to deploy any DBA crew for a second time
01:02:26 EDB a aware is we will to the best of our ability enforce arrest on them for a period of an hour at least and
01:02:38 period of an hour at least and absolutely not use a DBA whereas on the second where unless we really had to [Music]
01:02:47 [Music] every single one of those firefighters desperately wanted to get into that building to save people so in terms of second where's we were using them we I
01:02:59 second where's we were using them we I we were trying not to use them as much as possible but it was very difficult to not use them because they desperately wanted to get back in I would say that we achieved largely giving at least giving them a rest before we use them
01:03:10 giving them a rest before we use them again and that was the mechanism you used to determine it was reasonably safe for them to do so breathe yeah within safe reasonably safe I suppose yeah what
01:03:22 safe reasonably safe I suppose yeah what system did you have recording who had been committed twice Gary Moore was writing all down for me and we also separated people who had already warned from people who he knew were fresh do
01:03:34 from people who he knew were fresh do you remember an instruction that the bridgehead was only committing a DBA above the 10th floor do you remember an instructions that effect do I remember so I heard a I think in my statement I
01:03:47 so I heard a I think in my statement I write the 11th but that may be wrong by definitely at one point heard that they weren't going above a certain point were you were we or rather were you made aware of any other decisions being taken by the bridgehead about where to commit
01:03:59 by the bridgehead about where to commit be a cruise sorry can you be on questions of course were you made aware white
01:04:06 white Breton oft or otherwise of other decisions being taken at the bridgehead about where to commit be a wearer's no it really wasn't relevant to my role as
01:04:19 it really wasn't relevant to my role as I said before I was it was resourcing resort resourcing that the BA whereas that was what was what I was concerned
01:04:30 that was what was what I was concerned with so the specific details of where people were going and what their briefs were that wasn't my area of responsibility now for the period of a few hours where it was EDB a crews only
01:04:41 few hours where it was EDB a crews only what were you doing with the SDV a cruise arresting them sometimes a request because of because of the nature of the incident it was a significant VA deployment I had all of the personnel resources that you know so if other if
01:04:55 resources that you know so if other if other functions and on the incident grounds such as pumps and pumping were required sometimes the request came to me because I had I had all of the personnel and I also had a lot of s DBA
01:05:06 personnel and I also had a lot of s DBA whereas who were being rested and not used so sometimes that are requests like that came in to me and I released someone for that function was there any point during the course of incident that you receiving requests for BA via mr.
01:05:19 you receiving requests for BA via mr. loft or otherwise that you simply couldn't supply no turning back to page 13 in your statement in the first substantive paragraph seven lines down
01:05:32 substantive paragraph seven lines down you say I had over 40 people and needed to keep them in one place can you explain was this the number of firefighters that you had waiting by the leisure center throughout the incident
01:05:44 leisure center throughout the incident did that number remain constant I'll let you reread it
01:05:58 can you repeat the question yes of course you say you had over 40 people and needs to keep them in one place was that did you have a constant constituency of 40 or did that number very June course the night that number
01:06:11 very June course the night that number varied I apologize is probably a difficult question to answer now but what was the lowest number you had can you remember of people or of certain
01:06:22 you remember of people or of certain types of wearers people well people that start with that I would say once main control was set up I probably never went below 20 I would say and of that 20 can
01:06:39 below 20 I would say and of that 20 can you apportion those between s DBA and the edpa well if you're if you're asked I would you like to know how low are needy be like I got so bearing in mind
01:06:51 needy be like I got so bearing in mind that all points Bret had at least 10 e DBA wearers I at one point got down to 4 but as I got down to for another 20
01:07:02 but as I got down to for another 20 turned up and that was at that 5:30 point which is when we calculated we would get down to 0 in my area well not down to zero but down to minimum now one
01:07:14 down to zero but down to minimum now one of the issues that want the questions that arises from the evidence has been heard thus far as whether EDB a crews were being deployed as swiftly as they could once they'd arrived what system
01:07:25 could once they'd arrived what system did you have in place for ensuring the EDB a crews were deployed as identified and then deployed as swiftly as efficiently as possible well we just we always had from the point when be a main
01:07:37 always had from the point when be a main control was set up we always had at least 10 bae DBA wearers waiting outside the tower to go in as and when they were required so as additional ones turned up
01:07:49 required so as additional ones turned up they came into my resting area but so it would not have been it would not have been necessary to for people to turn up at the incident and go straight into the tower that would have been it needed to
01:08:01 tower that would have been it needed to be controlled and there was always a pool of BA wearers who could go into the tower at a moment's notice more than anything because we have to have emergency crews in case we have a firefighter emergency which had this incident was in extremely likely but if we looking at a
01:08:15 extremely likely but if we looking at a particular example I can take you to the telemetry sheet but I don't think it's necessary
01:08:19 necessary the second EDB a team to arrive at the scene was Chelsea and it was golf three four six
01:08:24 four six they were status three I think it's zero one 47 its members didn't tally out until sometime later and to give you an idea there was misters Upton and
01:08:35 idea there was misters Upton and Reddington at zero to forty four cotton Joseph at zero three zero three and Simon zero three 27 now to the lair there appears to be a delay between edpa
01:08:48 there appears to be a delay between edpa crews turning up and then being deployed what would be your answer to that late concern when you say tally out do you mean tally out of their bodyguard and
01:08:59 mean tally out of their bodyguard and into their into the entry control board yes so it doesn't surprise me that a crew could turner early and not get used for easy ba until later they may have
01:09:12 for easy ba until later they may have been used for other tasks and then once that task was completed they report it to my area in their sets to be sent into the building so just because they were
01:09:24 the building so just because they were one of the first crews to turn up but they didn't use their ba sets until another hour into the incident that doesn't necessarily mean that there won't be a where is in the in the
01:09:35 won't be a where is in the in the building right but it's stiff because I don't know the full picture of the information you're talking about it's difficult to well it's just looking at
01:09:46 difficult to well it's just looking at the basic timeframe there that I think if you could or rather the concern is that you have crews attending say taking Chelsea as an example at zero 147 not
01:09:57 Chelsea as an example at zero 147 not being deployed until at the latest 327 given the urgency of search and rescue given the number of FSG calls there appears to be a concerning delay between
01:10:09 appears to be a concerning delay between arrival and deployment and I sped that the number of questions arise out of here the first one is were you aware of that time gap between arrival and deployment first of all
01:10:20 deployment first of all no I mean there was hundreds of firefighters there for me to know when they arrived and when they went into the tower as individuals I I don't know but
01:10:31 tower as individuals I I don't know but it doesn't surprise me that that happened I know that I was routinely sending BA wearers to the building but in terms of what they did once they got into the building I don't I really don't know about that detail Mr Kipling thank
01:10:45 know about that detail Mr Kipling thank you very much there's all the questions I've got for you now so it might be convenient to take a five minute break see if there are any other final issues arising well we do that in just a moment can I just ask one thing I think the
01:10:57 can I just ask one thing I think the thrust and that mr. canaras question is that on one reading of the data it might be thought that there was a failure to use EDB a resources as swiftly and
01:11:11 use EDB a resources as swiftly and effectively as they were actually available to be used would you have anything to say about that and that would arise from the fact that they appear to have been waiting for the best
01:11:23 appear to have been waiting for the best part of an hour in some cases to be deployed is the data that you're talking about does it are you saying that it shows that at one point there were no EDB hey where is in
01:11:35 point there were no EDB hey where is in the towellette suggested the suggestion could be that EDB a wearers take the Chelsea group arrived at the site apparently ready to
01:11:48 arrived at the site apparently ready to get into action if I can put it like that but didn't go into action for perhaps half an hour 45 minutes or whatever and it might be suggested there
01:11:59 whatever and it might be suggested there was a failure to use that resource as quickly and effectively as could have been done know that I don't think that would be your responsibility particularly because you've explained
01:12:12 particularly because you've explained that you were resourcing but is there anything you'd want to say about a suggestion of that kind just just just purely that I can only assume that they were taken up doing one of the many other tasks that a fire that is required
01:12:25 other tasks that a fire that is required is carried out and just because they've arrived it doesn't mean that they're necessarily going to get used for the a a better reflection of the de BBA resources in the tower would be how many
01:12:36 resources in the tower would be how many ba resources were in the tower that whether VA resources were in the tower or not but but certainly from the point when I set up and my main control we had VA resources we never had a problem with
01:12:47 VA resources we never had a problem with sending de resources into that tower when it was requested so it really be a matter for the bridgehead would it to decide what resources they wanted and
01:12:58 decide what resources they wanted and will absolutely and particularly given the size of that staircase and the difficulty that they presumably would have had getting up into that tower you you are limited to the amount of people that you can send in safely or none of
01:13:09 that you can send in safely or none of it was safe but you know sensibly thank you very much well I think the sensible thing would be for us to have a short break now
01:13:20 break now it may be that after the break there will be some additional questions that council wants to put to you or maybe not we'll see how we go so I'm going to rise
01:13:32 we'll see how we go so I'm going to rise now and we'll resume at quarter past three and at that point we will know where we stand could I ask you please not to talk about your evidence while you're out of the room yes we'll let you
01:13:43 you're out of the room yes we'll let you know if we need any further help okay all right thank you so much we'd like to go to the action
01:13:59 right 3:15 please
01:24:14 yes Mr curry I think mr. Kipling's going to come back in any event and then you can tell us whether there are more questions form
01:24:33 right I think thank you mr. Kipling I didn't know whether more questions or misgiving I please say there are no further questions - yeah sort of raise
01:24:44 further questions - yeah sort of raise your expectations there son thank you very much for the assistance you provide to States been invaluable I'll say thank you very much yes well I'd like to add my thing so that I must say you can your evidence in a very clear way and it's very helpful thank you very much for
01:24:56 very helpful thank you very much for coming thank you good you are free to go
01:25:03 yes sir apologies there's not only gonna be a change of witness by a change of counsel mr. Peter Johnson will be giving evidence next who'll be examined by mr. millet there's the necessary domestic
01:25:15 millet there's the necessary domestic arrangements that need to be made and so might ask that there be a break for 10 minutes to allow those arrangements to be effected and then for mr. Johnson's give up dance you did another 10 minutes
01:25:26 give up dance you did another 10 minutes tewi yes who put his attractively was that what can I say nothing well looks nice today I was sitting at a couple three Thanks
01:37:35 [Music] yes mr. millet mr. chairman I'm back and our next witness is it is Peter Johnson yes picking our station manager Johnson
01:38:09 [Music]
01:38:21 thank you very much mr. Johnson sits adharmic subcultural now yes just a minute Thank You mr. chairman mr. Johnson good afternoon could I please ask you first of all to
01:38:32 could I please ask you first of all to give the Chairman your full name it's a Peter Johnson Peter Johnson and can I begin by thanking you very much for coming to us to give evidence in this inquiry and to assist us with our investigations we really do very much
01:38:44 investigations we really do very much appreciate it if at any stage you need a break just indicate and if it is if at any stage you want me to repeat any question I'm happy to do so okay thank you
01:38:54 you can I ask you first then to take your statement which should be in the first tab in the blue file in front of you or else probably more convenient to look at it on the screen on the desk in front of you on your right this statement is
01:39:07 you on your right this statement is dated the 23rd 28th of March 2018 and it is a meaty triple zero one three two three five can I ask you have you read
01:39:18 three five can I ask you have you read this statement recently yes can you confirm that its contents are true yes it is correct you now we've also got your contemporaneous notes which are @m ET quadruple zero five three four four
01:39:31 ET quadruple zero five three four four which are there also on the screen have you read those recently I have yes and can you confirm that the contents of those are true yes now correct thank you now we've also got some exhibits which
01:39:42 now we've also got some exhibits which run from pmj 1 through 2 p.m. j8 with a number of different m80 references I'll try and take these quickly just I have to read them into the record shop m ET triple zero one six nine seven five one
01:39:56 triple zero one six nine seven five one six nine seven four one six nine seven two one six nine seven one one seven five nine eight one six nine nine seven
01:40:07 five nine eight one six nine nine seven one six nine nine eight one six nine nine nine
01:40:11 nine nine one seven triple zero one seven zero zero one one seven zero zero two one seven zero zero four one seven zero five six seven eight
01:40:23 six seven eight and one six nine seven zero before I turned to my substantive questions can I ask you this have you discussed your statement
01:40:31 statement or the evidence that you're going to give to us with anybody before coming to give evidence today no sir thank you can I begin now there with the position you hold and your training as at the night
01:40:42 hold and your training as at the night of the fire in June 2017 you were watch manager at the command unit at Islington were you that's correct yes but now you're a station manager at Hammersmith is that where
01:40:53 manager at Hammersmith is that where I've actually changed position since this statement was made on a station manager in the option steam in the ops assurance team at Union Street right okay
01:41:05 okay say are you no longer on the command unit no I have not been Entomology for one year right you've been in the LF B is this right for over 25 years I've
01:41:16 is this right for over 25 years I've been in London for 20 years but I've been in London within the fire brigade for 25 years right - take but London for 20 years and I think of those 20 years you were on the command units for five
01:41:27 you were on the command units for five years that's great and you say on page two of your statement that you were given a two to three week OS course this isn't the fourth paragraph down on that
01:41:38 isn't the fourth paragraph down on that page you say you were given a two to three week OS course when you started the role what is an OS course it's operational support course it's as described of in there it's a box
01:41:49 described of in there it's a box IT incident issues makes you understand and give you an appreciation of what the role is hopefully to give you support and training so you can deliver it within the role comfortably I think and
01:42:00 within the role comfortably I think and you did say you do say it involves IT when did you do this two to three week OS course do you remember that would be at the beginning of my time within the command unit so it would have been close
01:42:11 command unit so it would have been close to six years ago now so to the 2012 right okay and where did you do that was that in London oh yes that was at Southwark training centre at that time okay have
01:42:24 training centre at that time okay have you done any refresher courses on OS particularly focusing on IT issues not since then no right now you
01:42:39 can I can I ask you this have you had training on high-rise firefighting in what respect specifically in respect of how to handle fires which breach their compartments
01:42:51 fires which breach their compartments and spread through a high-rise block
01:42:59 specifically within the scenario you mentioned no right have you had any training on fast survival guidance yes what was that training I initially was
01:43:14 what was that training I initially was given the policy as part of the command units when I first started on the command units as it was a new policy asked for advice upon it is that policy 790 as before is in its first draft after after lacan all yes that's correct
01:43:26 after after lacan all yes that's correct I was asked for information upon that which I gave information and feedback from a standpoint from the command units I devised a training package for them for the command units and also for the
01:43:38 for the command units and also for the wider brigade and also had some training also at control that was delivered by control concerning specifically FS G's right have you had or did you ever have
01:43:50 right have you had or did you ever have any training on how to handle multiple FS genes from a within a command unit I devised a training package for specifically dealing with multiple FSGS
01:44:01 specifically dealing with multiple FSGS is that the package you refer to in your statement yes we're going to come to that in some detail in a moment can I just ask you to look at page 5 of your statement before you do on page 5 of
01:44:15 statement before you do on page 5 of your statement you mentioned in the the first paragraph that this is seven lines
01:44:28 first paragraph that this is seven lines down you say I also sat on the far survival guidance policy group and was there to provide feedback and suggestions from a command unit perspective now first of all we're just
01:44:40 perspective now first of all we're just breaking that up when did you join what you call the first survival guidance policy group that would have been around about 2014 thank you what was the first
01:44:55 about 2014 thank you what was the first survival guidance policy group well that may have been a convoluted terminology for previous people that would talk about the changes to a policy or potential changes to a policy that would
01:45:06 potential changes to a policy that would be required as the policy was relatively convoluted and relative complex they wanted different people with different perspectives it's been able to give different perspectives and feed into any potential changes that
01:45:18 feed into any potential changes that would be required it was a number of people group managers namely a few station managers and we'd sit down and talk about our experience with FSG when
01:45:29 talk about our experience with FSG when was the first survival guidance policy group established do you know again I'm Brett in the term policy group it was just the people that had an invested
01:45:40 just the people that had an invested interest in it but it was I don't know when it was established but I was asked to join by group manager Harrington because I had previous experience with FSGS and the previous experience with training and command unit experience but
01:45:53 training and command unit experience but it would have been regularly reviewed every policy that fire brigade has is wrigley reviewed and given a review Dinah says such of that that would be something that you can reference within the original policy when the next review
01:46:06 the original policy when the next review date would be when you joined it who chaired or who ran that group - then it was jointly chaired by Terry Harrington and also Neal was had input within that
01:46:17 and also Neal was had input within that as well remain in your wheels woods with us with us right Neal with us what what rank was Neal with us though both group manages both since retired from lund for McCain and who else sat on that group of
01:46:33 McCain and who else sat on that group of other really ask you this how many other people sat within that group I can only remember myself there may have been other picked in the room but at the time it was just four of us I believe how often did you meet we met a couple of
01:46:45 often did you meet we met a couple of times a union street plus the draft policy was sent out for review and then feedback was given about any recommendations that we would have so on
01:46:56 recommendations that we would have so on a more formal basis track changes were made within the policy and then feedback from myself was given and from everybody else about how we felt it was
01:47:07 else about how we felt it was progressing as a policy if you say met a couple of times at Union Street and then that drafting changes were made it sounds as if is this right that in fact it was an ad hoc group designed as to
01:47:19 it was an ad hoc group designed as to a Mendel study is this right policy 790 but didn't meet regularly every year no that is correct so it was typically set
01:47:30 that is correct so it was typically set up for the purpose of him trying to improve the policy as was first delivered right and policy 790 as it
01:47:47 delivered right and policy 790 as it stood as at the time of the Grenfell fire was reviewed as current as at the 17th of April 2014 was that version the
01:47:58 17th of April 2014 was that version the version that emerged as a result of your input that you've just described which you looked at at Union Street and then sent out for review so what was it that again please April 2014 yeah very possibly yes I see
01:48:12 April 2014 yeah very possibly yes I see okay
01:48:13 okay and can you remember the date of the version of 790 before that I'm sorry now was there anything that prompted the
01:48:24 was there anything that prompted the need or perceived need to review and revise policy 790 which led to its revision in April 2014 now all all policies have a review period upon them
01:48:35 policies have a review period upon them when they are due to be looked at and then it's up to the policyholder policyholder group to review and so that which has been the natural timescales
01:48:46 which has been the natural timescales for the review for that specific policy do you know whether there are any minutes or records of the meetings of this policy group I don't know that answer sorry I'm only asking you because
01:48:57 answer sorry I'm only asking you because having attended the meetings did you observe people taking taking notes people would have made notes yes absolutely to try and get the best policy moving forward was there a formal
01:49:10 policy moving forward was there a formal minute taken all August at the meetings I'm sorry was a long time ago I don't remember that specific meeting further
01:49:18 further did at those meetings did you express any particular views on any particular subject was the entire subject was first of our guidance so why only views would
01:49:30 of our guidance so why only views would have been concerning FSGS and the complexity of of the FSGS okay let me ask the question a slightly different way did you do you recall having did you
01:49:42 way did you do you recall having did you recall having any specific input into the changes that came about as a result of the those meetings the the changes
01:49:55 of the those meetings the the changes that I suggested in the changes that are ongoing because I'm also now currently sitting on the FSG still listed within my department so I'm currently feeding back the changes that I wanted to be
01:50:07 back the changes that I wanted to be made at the time were not implemented and are hopefully going to be implemented soon as I again hopefully will be able to see the implementation of those changes what were the changes
01:50:19 of those changes what were the changes that you wanted to be made at the time but were not implemented I wanted greater clarity into the roles and responsibilities for each individual at the incident I wanted greater clarity on
01:50:32 the incident I wanted greater clarity on what was to be done with the information that was passed from control to the incident ground I want to that greater understanding that the amount of information coming in was potentially
01:50:46 information coming in was potentially going to be too great before an individual or a group of individuals to adequately deal with I wanted an understanding that the policy as it stood adequately could cope with what we
01:50:58 stood adequately could cope with what we dealt with in the past but didn't ultimately look forward enough to anticipate a large-scale high-rise incident they involved multiple calls with potentially multiple capture
01:51:09 with potentially multiple capture casualties you've given us a a very useful list of things that you wanted what led you to want those things
01:51:21 wanted what led you to want those things to be reflected in the policy which wasn't reflected in the policy as it stood at that time so my understand is that the FSG policy was initially brought about because of latinum lack my house fire and
01:51:34 latinum lack my house fire and recommendations that came out from that the like one house fire itself although a great tragedy could have been significantly worse it was horizontal fire spread to a
01:51:46 it was horizontal fire spread to a relatively low rise incident if it had been a high-rise incident then looking at the way that the fire spread and the fire developed my anticipation would be that it could be significantly worse I
01:51:57 that it could be significantly worse I don't feel that the policy at the time adequately took this into account and as such we were not forward-thinking enough and we weren't able to anticipate that
01:52:10 and we weren't able to anticipate that we could have multiple calls multiple if it is greater than what was provided within the policy which was greater provided within the casualty information
01:52:22 provided within the casualty information sheets alone do you know why the changes that you want to be made to this policy in 2014 that weren't implemented I've
01:52:33 in 2014 that weren't implemented I've done on the onset now who did you make the recommendations to that would be to terry harrington and tune in with us right ultimately it would have been
01:52:44 right ultimately it would have been terry harrington that would have moved forward but again you'd have to check with who he would be feeding that back to so it would have ultimately gone with the policy hold up the person has overall control of that specific policy
01:52:55 overall control of that specific policy in 2014 you don't know who that was I don't know who that was no sorry did you just relate it to that have any views at
01:53:08 just relate it to that have any views at the time of these meetings about the adequacy of the training delivered or training packages designed in the light of the lack of house fire
01:53:19 in the light of the lack of house fire in relation to FSG there were none there were no training or there were no changes to the Train there were no training packages at that time that specifically dealt with the delivery or
01:53:31 specifically dealt with the delivery or implementation of FSG incidents did they come to the training later sorry do they come to be training later they come to be trained in later specifically for some offices and command his staff but
01:53:43 some offices and command his staff but in 2014 or when I joined the commanders there wasn't any specific training which was specifically why I was asked to devise a training package it could be used I see as I say we'll come to that
01:53:57 used I see as I say we'll come to that shortly
01:53:58 shortly um can I just turn then to the next topic which is the role of a command unit turning in terms of the role of the command unit you say on page 2 of your statement and this is at the end of the
01:54:11 statement and this is at the end of the second last paragraph that it's the last sentence the main role is to support the officer in charge now can you just
01:54:23 officer in charge now can you just elaborate on that when you say support the officer in charge what does that functionally involve the best way to describe would be to be stopping the officer in charge
01:54:34 be to be stopping the officer in charge to ensure that you can help anticipate and support the officer in charge at an incident to ensure that as we move forward
01:54:44 forward everything is anticipated there's a smooth-running that the anticipation of if the incident was to progress to be larger that would be anticipated if we
01:54:57 larger that would be anticipated if we need to make that even smaller they'll also be anticipated we need to provide messages for the officer in charge and to prompt the individual the individual officer in charge to send a
01:55:08 individual officer in charge to send a message and there was a many different types of messages it's also to enable that the mapping of the incident was correctly done to ensure that the officer in charge had a broad understanding of the incident
01:55:20 broad understanding of the incident would also be able to answer telephone calls from senior officers monitoring officers specialists officers from the council from Lalo's from other
01:55:31 council from Lalo's from other interested parties be the police ambulance mayor's office yes it's a wide-ranging role that takes on different duties that each individual
01:55:43 different duties that each individual incident yes just a couple of short point just for clarification they lay low I think is a local authority liaison officers correct la la yes more
01:55:56 officers correct la la yes more substantively everything you've just described sounds as if is this right that it would require a very close communication between the CEO and the officer in charge of the incident the incident commander it depends on the
01:56:09 incident commander it depends on the individual so that would be the role of the team leader somebody would experience you know there are very experienced good people out there and their people are a little bit newer a little bit greener an anticipation is
01:56:21 little bit greener an anticipation is that the oxygen charge would have a confidence in a team leader and but you are working closely and you are the right-hand man so to speak just so we understand the hierarchy you're
01:56:32 understand the hierarchy you're describing the team leader would be the team leader of the command unit nice correct and if there are if there is more than one command unit in attendance at an incident would there be one team leader with responsibility for all the command units or one team leader per
01:56:44 command units or one team leader per command unit to describe the hierarchy in that it is one individual team leader who has ultimate responsibility over in reality all command units but not in a
01:56:55 reality all command units but not in a hierarchical manner or a senior officer manner but just as a designated first person there now in your statement also
01:57:06 person there now in your statement also on page 2 but in the last paragraph you say that the role of the command unit start is to provide also to provide vector training to watch managers and crew managers and you go on to say that
01:57:19 crew managers and you go on to say that the vector is a computer-based simulation system to simulate an operational incident and assess the decisions of incident commanders at in
01:57:29 how often is vector true well as at the night of the fire in June 2017 to your recollection how often was vector training delivered to watch managers and
01:57:40 training delivered to watch managers and crew managers in London if you're a one appliance station will be delivered once a year for each watch if you're a to appliance station would be anticipated be delivered twice a year but also
01:57:52 be delivered twice a year but also individual watch managers can request for you to come down if you if they need a strap back to training you go on to say that vector systems we used on a
01:58:04 say that vector systems we used on a command unit but have not worked for the past nine years when you say have not worked does that mean functionally were
01:58:15 worked does that mean functionally were not operating or haven't been operated by the words about three years they were very poor system with a very poor IT backup they were outdated when they came
01:58:27 backup they were outdated when they came on the run unfortunately the different IT systems had issues talking to each other I was formerly never trained within the use of the vector systems so as I go onto later
01:58:41 the vector systems so as I go onto later say we stopped using vector it was that the problems with vector and the non use of vectors something that was reported
01:58:53 of vectors something that was reported up the chain in the NFB I mean I only person he said probably 20 25 emails concerning it I'm sure I'm sure other people said it was in a known problem yes
01:59:03 yes did it cause known difficulties in what respect was the fact that the vector systems on command units not working calls particular problems at incidents in your experience at incidents yes not
01:59:15 in your experience at incidents yes not all right did the fact that vector didn't work on the night of the fire on this but I'm assuming didn't work on the night of the fire at grenfell did that cause any problems no so vector is a
01:59:27 cause any problems no so vector is a standalone program that is used specifically for simulated so to put in blunt sounds it's like an Xbox or a Playstation right
01:59:35 right with the technology from the 1980s and it would enable you to be able to run through an operational incident in a safe scenario supposedly that would enable you to as I says they assess the
01:59:48 enable you to as I says they assess the competency and officer in charge in a again on the rear of the command unit it wouldn't have anyway fed into use or required to be used on the night grant Foley I understand understanding was
02:00:00 Foley I understand understanding was that this was a piece of equipment on a command unit itself that is that that's wrong is it no it's not a piece of equipment it's a programmer corner on a hard drive on a computer right where would you normally get the vector training then you would it would be
02:00:11 training then you would it would be delivered on station it would be pre-booked by the command units and we delivered on station by the command unit staff hopefully with a station manager in attendance right now you go on to say in the same paragraph the computer
02:00:24 in the same paragraph the computer system is very important didn't work so off my own back I created tactical decision exercises that we would deliver to watch managers to provide them with a selection of practical exercises for them to run through it is recorded on a
02:00:36 them to run through it is recorded on a diary but there is no outcome on competency or passing stroke failing first of all what were those exercises that you've just described there contain tactical decision exercises are
02:00:48 tactical decision exercises are specifically there to again in a safe environment give the opportunity for an officer in charge of watch commander or crew manager or someone aspiring to be a crew manager the opportunity to be
02:00:59 crew manager the opportunity to be tested or run through an operational scenario and it can range from a high noise incident a car fire a boat sinking
02:01:11 noise incident a car fire a boat sinking grass fire railway crash you could it could take anything that the individual who designs it comes up with really I see and what did you come up with when you say I create you say I created
02:01:22 you say I create you say I created tactical decision exercises can you give us a flavor of the topics which those exercises covered so again I'll create that high-rise incident right I created a duck boat sinking I created a train
02:01:36 a duck boat sinking I created a train then we don't give too many of them away because they'll kind of to be used by the brigade in future but I also used large grass fire chemical incident terrorist incident
02:01:48 terrorist incident a bus into a sorry a skip lorry into a shopping center and have a high-rise incident multiple RTC's have you
02:02:00 incident multiple RTC's have you received do you ever receive any training and how to design these packages no what did you drawn in order to do so 25 years experience of operational incidents you say you did
02:02:12 operational incidents you say you did them off your own back that's right it no one gave you no one said it was frustration over the directors didn't work through the frustration I've never
02:02:23 work through the frustration I've never had any adequate training in vectors it was also for the frustration that the Viktor training itself was if you've been on the fire brigade if you've been in the fire bed for a number of years
02:02:35 in the fire bed for a number of years bearing in mind that as I say my statement Victor's been for nine years and there were a limited amount of incidents you pretty much sure you know exactly what's gonna happen so before before the use in progressions you can say let's send a crew into the back of
02:02:48 say let's send a crew into the back of the house and safe the child that we know is in about bedroom right you say we would deliver them to watch managers to provide them with a selection of practical exercises and how how would
02:02:59 practical exercises and how how would they be delivered with a bid on station by you yes myself and my colleagues would turn up at the fire station in the command unit they've got on the rear of the command unit everything would be put in place pictures call slips and roll players and
02:03:13 pictures call slips and roll players and then we would progress an incident from there so you sounds like a kind of road show that you take around London is that all you do audience oohs it sounds very a lot grander than it was let me ask you
02:03:28 a lot grander than it was let me ask you this wait was this something that you offered to different station managers and they accepted and you came to their premises and it was watch managers but we also did it for people there were planning to become station managers during the promotion process it was
02:03:41 during the promotion process it was delivered extensively for people going for the station measures and groove managers to enable them to be ready for the insert command exercises as which were part of the formal assessment right were your packages that you've described
02:03:52 were your packages that you've described in your statement and now today to us with a quality assured by or approved anybody that's lfb responsible for designing and delivering training I never had any feedback on them now the
02:04:04 never had any feedback on them now the answer to my question no no right can you give us a date range of when you designed and delivered these t DES the
02:04:17 designed and delivered these t DES the date range was basically from that pretty much soon after I started but I didn't formalize it until I would guess January 2016 well I started to make it
02:04:29 January 2016 well I started to make it more in a package and the reason it would be more informal because we would turn up at any station with Victor Victor wouldn't work it would keep crashing the computers wouldn't start up something like that so we'd have to do
02:04:41 something like that so we'd have to do something as you mentioned earlier ad hoc and do drawing on the board and create something from that that we were then deliver to the crews they're sometimes just something that screwed us
02:04:52 sometimes just something that screwed us getting a picture on the TV screen which is something I hear regularly did and then say what do you see where do you want to go from here do you remember when the last training session was prior
02:05:06 when the last training session was prior to June 2017 on these T DS well the area of where grenfell fell wasn't part of my
02:05:17 of where grenfell fell wasn't part of my area that we were responsible for training but I would have done them and I can station diary to inform the correct date but we would do them at once a week or once at or maybe twice at
02:05:29 once a week or once at or maybe twice at all so we would be doing them regularly right especially during promotional rounds when people wanted to get gain more experience we could be doing two a day right now you told us that nobody
02:05:40 day right now you told us that nobody had in the NFB had approved the design or delivery there's been no quality assurance to your knowledge with you were you the only person in the LFP designing off
02:05:51 only person in the LFP designing off your own back these TVs or why that other known air officers none of the same thing no I wasn't a senior I was only a manager at that time that the frustration on around Victor as I said previously was shared throughout the
02:06:03 previously was shared throughout the command units and many different command units would create their own TDA their own
02:06:09 own specific training package to be delivered at station in place of the vector training was anybody responsible in the lfp for making sure that those training packages delivered by different
02:06:21 training packages delivered by different people delivered and designed by different people but consistent so this no so that the last sentence that's on the page there is this station manger was invited to attend but they only
02:06:32 was invited to attend but they only attended on 5% of cases so ultimately the station manager on station that we would be visiting would hopefully be there to assess as a watch manager we are not in a adequate role to assess
02:06:45 are not in a adequate role to assess another watch manager or to give feedback it is would be the responsibility of the station manager to provide feedback on the performance as to the performance of the actual TV
02:06:57 to the performance of the actual TV itself
02:06:57 itself now I had no feedback or formal comments concerning them from anybody no my question was really was there anybody in
02:07:08 question was really was there anybody in the NFB ensuring that there was consistency between your volunteer self design package and other packages also being designed by other people in the NFB and delivered there wasn't but to
02:07:22 NFB and delivered there wasn't but to qualify that you would say that what I was presenting was an incident so it was irrelevant whether I was presenting a good incident or a bad incident so the actual delivery of it
02:07:34 incident so the actual delivery of it itself isn't in my view overly important it would be the performance of the individual during the incident that would be significantly more important and something that would be need to be
02:07:47 and something that would be need to be assessed and it but in terms of so just to harp on on it but in terms of ensuring the consistency of the principles being applied and the
02:07:58 principles being applied and the messages being imparted to watch managers as part of the packages was anybody in the lfb looking at your package comparing them with other packages and ensuring consistency of
02:08:10 packages and ensuring consistency of message not talk now the commodities themselves were for a period of time we had two station managers overseeing us specifically the Comanche news
02:08:22 specifically the Comanche news those roles then got deleted and the responsibility was passed on to thee on station station managers and there was quite a lot of slippage between who had overall control and command of the
02:08:34 overall control and command of the command units and who would be responsible for delivering any QA at all
02:08:42 right now you then go on later in your statement to talk about tactical decision exercises based on subvert our survival guidance can I ask you to look
02:08:54 survival guidance can I ask you to look at page five and look at this topic or subtopic you say the top of that page when I joined the command units the FSG policy was relatively new we've covered
02:09:06 policy was relatively new we've covered that and you then say I've asked I was asked by my station manager at the time to devise a tactical decision exercise based around fast survival guidance this was following the Lachlan house fire I created a large exercise that mirrored a
02:09:17 created a large exercise that mirrored a fire in a high-rise incident to provide a realistic scenario this included numerous FSG calls two to three command units where people were trapped by smoke or heat I delivered this exercise a
02:09:28 or heat I delivered this exercise a couple of times now I've read the last two to you I just want to ask you a few questions about that and what was that is that another tactical decision exercise that you designed essentially
02:09:43 exercise that you designed essentially off your own back even though you were asked by the station manager to do so yes so we jump to give some feet around the word sorry you can carry a miracle
02:09:55 the word sorry you can carry a miracle let me just ask it a different way who was the station manager do you remember that was station manager tej a Jamal who's since retired right where where was he he was location manager he was a
02:10:06 was he he was location manager he was a station manager of the command units along with John Barker okay whose post was deleted right and do you remember when he asked you to devise a tactical
02:10:17 when he asked you to devise a tactical decision exercise based on FSG yeah it was just after I joined and asked for extra work and responsibility and approached him and said is there anything that I can do I'm very keen with a training background I poached him
02:10:29 with a training background I poached him and asked for some extra work and as such I believe that was around November December 2012 to that just when you said you just went onto the sea use right now
02:10:48 do you did you have any help or any input from anybody else at the lfb in designing that exercise not at that
02:11:00 designing that exercise not at that point so you've said late to 2012 who do you receive any training on FSG policy 790 as it then stood 2012 yes no right
02:11:16 790 as it then stood 2012 yes no right did you did you use that the version of effort FSG the FSG policy then current to design your TDE ifs you know it the
02:11:29 to design your TDE ifs you know it the TV is that as I mentioned previously was it's an incident following policies are relevant it's you know I I could come up with an alien spaceship crashes into when we stadium it doesn't mean I'm
02:11:40 when we stadium it doesn't mean I'm following a policy the FSG exercise I created was to test the policy more but it itself was irrelevant it was too it was to provide a realistic
02:11:51 too it was to provide a realistic incident the life of which at that time in London we hadn't experienced and to show that the policy may have had some deficiencies but yes now the exercise
02:12:04 deficiencies but yes now the exercise you created is this right is what we see as exhibit 7 to your statement and it's
02:12:15 as exhibit 7 to your statement and it's some something that I think probably requires a bit of explanation so can you please be showing first of all the first page of that which is a meaty triple zero one seven double zero one
02:12:35 which I don't think is that what I wanted
02:12:38 wanted actually never mind can we start off with a different page triple zero one six nine nine seven know
02:12:49 triple zero one six nine nine seven know is that I think that's the first page of your is is this part of the TDE you're describing yes that's correct right and that is could you just tell us what that is that is a picture showing a pager which is
02:13:01 is a picture showing a pager which is the way that officers station manager and above are mobilized to incidents right and it details there as you say there multiple calls to a fire in long road Arif okay Kent in Kent and we see
02:13:16 road Arif okay Kent in Kent and we see them in London floor mops for yes can you tell us what that is so fonts for that's that should in in reality read flops to which is for a South radio channel but it depends on
02:13:30 South radio channel but it depends on who the yeah and that is incorrect at that specific point okay and others might it was one of my next questions but that that's helpful but the point about flops is what is that is it to indicate to the recipient of the the
02:13:41 indicate to the recipient of the the page message what channel to use that is correct yes so that the station manager or above couldn't turn their airwave radio on and monitor the incident remotely if any messages of incident
02:13:52 remotely if any messages of incident right now it flops for would be used is this right for FSG calls specifically no no that's a North callsign so you got four and two two is the south four is
02:14:04 four and two two is the south four is the North yes but alright then flan ops call it two in the South would be used specifically for FSG calls under this exercise is that right no no that that's specifically there and it should read
02:14:17 specifically there and it should read two but they're specifically there to say what channel to be listening to so that this this printout is to give you a more realistic representation of what an option in charge would be receiving prior to being mobilized to the incident
02:14:29 prior to being mobilized to the incident okay well then the the officer receiving this message would use floor mops for for what - as I mentioned it would be they return it on they'd be listening for any messages monitoring anything but
02:14:40 for any messages monitoring anything but it's not specific for this incident it's all all calls in that geographical area would be handled within that channel so it's basically the main scheme the main scheme yes absolutely yes I say now just
02:14:51 scheme yes absolutely yes I say now just go turning on to one six nine nine nine
02:14:56 again as part of the exercise you designed we see what looks like a hand
02:15:08 designed we see what looks like a hand over sheet and we can see it there's there's got a lot of information in there you in the third paragraph from
02:15:24 there you in the third paragraph from the bottom you say I am aware that control have received one FSG attached sheet details what we've done so far in the exercise what were the attached sheet B it should be within that package
02:15:37 sheet B it should be within that package but it would just detail that they've had one FSG call to the incident right but let's look at the next page
02:15:52 which i think is them is is a is a map yeah I'm not sure that the document was attached were you intending that what would be attached would be a formal fire
02:16:05 would be attached would be a formal fire survival guidance in the package which over which people can you direct us to the page so the details it will be passed over if I can just very yes please do it quickly flick through yes
02:16:23 please do it quickly flick through yes I'm sorry to say that these have coming up perhaps not the most helpful order to us you know for the number the numbering may not be so it varies the if you look
02:16:37 may not be so it varies the if you look at em et triple 0 1702 underscore 0 0 1 yes that's what we're on okay - 1 - 1
02:17:05 so that is the that would be a form a printout that would be not in not with all that information upon it but the definitely the first column would be recreated on a FSG pad and handed to the
02:17:18 recreated on a FSG pad and handed to the individuals so just specifically the number one as he's detail along the what is the second line there right now you've got on that page while we're on it you've got seven slots for seven
02:17:31 it you've got seven slots for seven premises is that is that right that's correct so is it right that this this package would wouldn't cater for the number of FSG calls or number of premises at least the subject of FSG
02:17:43 premises at least the subject of FSG calls greater than seven my understanding is that that is the number on the FS cheat poster yes there's provided veneer within the command units yes did you think that was a sufficient
02:17:55 yes did you think that was a sufficient number to be able to design a a package on FS g4
02:18:03 so if you'd repeat the question yeah do you think I was a sufficient number seven yes if you've got less than seven absolutely if you've got more than seven obviously not my question is really when
02:18:15 obviously not my question is really when you designed this package did you think that using seven as the maximum was appropriate to desire to in order to train people on FS G's not oh you didn't know
02:18:24 know the package as it moves forward would demonstrate the amount of people that would be needed for seven and how how
02:18:35 would be needed for seven and how how difficult it would be with seven I didn't want to do more I mean I could have I could have done thirty if I wanted but it would have only shown how
02:18:46 wanted but it would have only shown how significantly worse it wasn't seven the whole point of the exercise was to demonstrate that seven is a huge number especially the amount of individuals
02:18:57 especially the amount of individuals that were in each property right that's helpful can I then just follow that up and ask you to turn to or be shown MIT triples area one seven zero zero two
02:19:15 I think that's should be one seven zero zero two I think you've got an extra zero in there that's it so I think this
02:19:27 zero in there that's it so I think this is where it starts we have the FSG or the second page perhaps we have the FSG sheets could you take us through this page and just tell us what you're aiming to show or to train the recipients of
02:19:40 to show or to train the recipients of this package okay so about to do that it's big best to describe the way that the TD would be run so we would have one two or three command units depending on the amount of commanders who are
02:19:52 the amount of commanders who are available and depending on what you're trying to demonstrate within the TDE so the the one command unit will be dealing specifically with commander
02:20:03 dealing specifically with commander control another command unit would be dealing specifically with FSG and another command you we didn't specifically with BA main control what I wanted to demonstrate within this exercise was how convoluted and
02:20:15 exercise was how convoluted and difficult that policy was and how resource intensive it would be and how difficult the communication channels would ultimately be demonstrated to conflicts against each other so to run
02:20:31 conflicts against each other so to run through the incident the we would have an individual plane a control operative that would be remote from the incident or remote from the exercise in a room they will be delivering information to
02:20:42 they will be delivering information to the main command unit via hopefully the main Cu critical FSG line and passing the information on that is I believe the first sheet that would be passed from
02:20:54 first sheet that would be passed from control once the officer in charge has taken over Josh in charge turns up gets the information would then go down to the command unit and it's up to them to make the decision there and then do they continue with incident command or do
02:21:06 continue with incident command or do they take over the FSG instead of command incident as well the incident command command unit and as I say it's it flows as an incident and it's all
02:21:19 it flows as an incident and it's all down to it's a linear incident it will always progress in a way yes depending upon how the officer in charge and the support
02:21:30 officer in charge and the support individuals deal with the incident itself but as you can see if you follow the package further on it does get progressively worse with the fire spreading in a upward
02:21:41 with the fire spreading in a upward treachery trapping people by heat smoke and fire yes well look at the pages in a moment just to trace that you know for it you can I just ask you some specific questions on this page yeah um would you
02:21:52 questions on this page yeah um would you looking at the the left-hand column or you've got a set of information that in that left-hand column by which I mean
02:22:04 that left-hand column by which I mean the one in bold in black number of persons location within premises condition within premises etc all the way down to additional information would
02:22:17 way down to additional information would you expect when you design this program all that information to be passed on by control to the FSG command unit again
02:22:29 control to the FSG command unit again this is to demonstrate the policy itself was unrealistic so if you look at the top of the sheet you've got a time of 1213 and as as you progress for the
02:22:41 1213 and as as you progress for the incident it gets later by later later later by minute by minute possibly four or six minutes intervals what was demonstrated throughout this exercise is that the information although 70% filled
02:22:54 that the information although 70% filled in on that she couldn't be adequately passed on in that time period and as such the information was changing so quickly that the information couldn't be passed over its attic Lee adequately
02:23:06 passed over its attic Lee adequately demonstrate how the fire was progressing that was the whole purpose of the time scale and the information so the rest of it that's below it isn't building just for the simple fact that it being
02:23:17 for the simple fact that it being possible to pass the information on within the timescales of what what I dealt was a realistic progression of a high-rise incident so just taking on this page and just looking at the fact
02:23:29 this page and just looking at the fact that on this page we've only got four flats
02:23:32 flats yes are you saying that even with only four flats communications of all this information but difficult yes turns let's let's let's
02:23:45 difficult yes turns let's let's let's tenth flow through this document just help us as we go through if you turn to the next page please this is just wait for it to come up
02:24:10 doesn't it
02:24:14 yes if mr. mr. doc you mr. out if we could just go to the next page in this in this document in other words the next page which follows on from this well that's nothing you've ever look at the one after that right they've got the
02:24:31 one after that right they've got the precise problem is these are out of order on our system there are in order of mine
02:24:35 of mine well that's yes all right perhaps let's let's try this one M et triple zero one seven double zero five I'd thought we've been cued up next but so what does what does that shows
02:24:52 but so what does what does that shows that's a Excel spreadsheet that was enabled you to understand the amount of people who will be deployed it's got a rather crude representation of father Sam but that was to give you an
02:25:04 Sam but that was to give you an understanding of dragging and drop in crews and how many crews you have left available at each incident to be deployed and if you could then go to
02:25:18 deployed and if you could then go to page one seven oh seven one seven zero zero seven
02:25:27 which I think I think if I yes there I think now that gives us I think the total timeline from 12 till 12 11 what
02:25:38 total timeline from 12 till 12 11 what does that what does that show us what would you learn from that so that specifically is my master schedule that would be for myself or it would who would ever ultimately be running the exercise and it's to enable for the three separate combined Eunice has
02:25:49 three separate combined Eunice has color-coded the top bi main control five survival goggle calls and bridgehead and understanding of what minute-by-minute would information would be happening to progress as the TDE moves forward but
02:26:03 progress as the TDE moves forward but again I have to stress that the times slipped massively because in the delivery of this we found that was unreal list it was impossible in fact to pass the information on within those
02:26:16 pass the information on within those timescales now just moving on a little bit what information this is a result of this package what information would you
02:26:29 this package what information would you expect to be fed back from the bridgehead to the FSG command unit I
02:26:38 mean that's that's an impossible question because it would be what actions have already been taken place right it's as I say I to be grandiose manner I was the fire how they responded
02:26:49 manner I was the fire how they responded is isn't relevant I'm still going to keep burning it's whether they okay but it out or not or I may ask it in a different way what assumptions did you make when when designing this package as
02:27:00 make when when designing this package as to the flow of information from the bridgehead about deployments back to the command unit as I said that the timings are I fought really to be adequate I'm
02:27:12 are I fought really to be adequate I'm relatively realistic the feedback that I got from it is that it's impossible right even with just that number of flats it progresses significantly more
02:27:23 flats it progresses significantly more from the original four to fill out the sheet to seven yes and yeah it just got harder and harder and harder
02:27:39 that you say on page 5 of your statement and we made it back into this policy or this this training program later on but you say on page 5 of your statement that
02:27:55 you say on page 5 of your statement that in the last sentence of the second last sentence of the first paragraph just go back to page 5 of your statement can I
02:28:08 back to page 5 of your statement can I just show you the last four lines in fact on the first paragraph you say this training never moved forward this
02:28:20 training never moved forward this training never moved forward as it as was deemed not necessary or relevant and did not want to step over Babcock's who are an external trading provider such decisions were made by numerous people but it was Terry Harrington who
02:28:31 but it was Terry Harrington who ultimately said it wasn't going forward he's a great manager and has since retired now do you know who actually made the decision not to remove your
02:28:42 made the decision not to remove your training package for Babcock's Babcock's made that decision - yes which individual at Babcock's do you know no right
02:28:49 right it was so specifically it's the London Fire Brigade under the training we've played and we've outsourced our training - Babcock's and as such they're responsible for delivering effort well
02:29:00 responsible for delivering effort well any specific training that we require right so your station manager does ask you to devise this package you devised it we have seen it was it ever actually delivered twice it was delivered at least twice maybe three times right so
02:29:12 least twice maybe three times right so it was actually rolled out you know it was tested it was tested it was it was had a dry run a couple of times right and
02:29:26 what and then what happened next - it
02:29:34 didn't happen it didn't go forward we had a meeting with Terry Harrington and Babcock's I believe after an FSA policy group meeting they will agree that it
02:29:45 group meeting they will agree that it was a good package but Babcock's ultimately decided it's something that line of fire guys shouldn't be delivering because it was training and as such we didn't want to be delivering training it's responsibility of that
02:29:57 training it's responsibility of that post at deliver training when you say
02:30:03 did not want to step over Babcock's what do you mean by that as a as I just said we can't deliver training we can deliver our competency but we cannot deliver or
02:30:15 our competency but we cannot deliver or affirmation of competency but we cannot deliver specific training as a fire brigade that is what our training provider specifically is there to do did
02:30:26 provider specifically is there to do did anybody at the lfb seek to persuade Babcock that this training should be adopted yes Terry Harrington tried to I believe Paul Jennings as a day I see now was very
02:30:37 Jennings as a day I see now was very positive he he did the first dry run with me he found it very informative again speaking to him he might have a
02:30:48 again speaking to him he might have a different opinion but it was it was a realistic scenario that delivered exactly as I intended to provide that the FSG policy is a very difficult policy that has many flaws
02:31:04 I think the answer my question is is is no or rather you'd answer my question I think is yes but it failed in other words lots of people in on 5k liked it
02:31:15 words lots of people in on 5k liked it quite a lot of people in gunfight where fortune should go forward Babcock said no right now I'm glad to be able to say
02:31:26 no right now I'm glad to be able to say that we can now find the rest of the of the TD package so I wonder if he could be shown a meaty triple zero one seventh trip double zero to which I think takes
02:31:37 trip double zero to which I think takes us to the to the end of the slide now that at least takes us to
02:31:53 yes that takes us to six flats yes I think as a seventh to be filled in yes but just show us how what that tells us
02:32:05 but just show us how what that tells us in terms of how the FSGS have developed through this training so if I'm correct the original time was 1213 and that was then how it was set as I high rise
02:32:18 then how it was set as I high rise incident so the first sheet that you saw the crew major handover you turn up the crew manager would be sketchy to prompt the station manager to take over and again as I mentioned previously to make
02:32:29 again as I mentioned previously to make the decisions about whether they're going to be on the FSG incident command vehicle or whether they would be the BI main control or ultimately the incident command each sheet that you flicked
02:32:40 command each sheet that you flicked through if you notice that there are items in red and that's differences between the previous information has been passed on and as such it's either getting worse or in some cases getting
02:32:52 getting worse or in some cases getting better and the blue information is new information that was going through this was the color coded to make it sure that the person that was role playing the command as you were the control
02:33:03 command as you were the control individual would be able to pass on adequately the information no just by color code and what was new what would be happening was the time as I mentioned would be slipping so if we started at 12
02:33:15 would be slipping so if we started at 12 13 at 12:35 we wouldn't be anywhere near being able to pass this information over and that was adequately displayed on every every time I displayed this exercise right just in general terms it
02:33:31 exercise right just in general terms it was the purpose of this TV II to demonstrate how challenging and difficult communications would be once you had six fhe calls or was it to train people and as to how to handle communications once he got up to that
02:33:44 communications once he got up to that number in reality was both in reality it was to ensure that appreciation of how difficult FSG was going to be and also have an appreciation that it would be
02:33:55 have an appreciation that it would be nearly impossible for a you know group of people and sometimes we had up to 15 individuals involved with in this TDE it would to show that it's not easy
02:34:08 TDE it would to show that it's not easy and as such potentially that the policy needed to be amended and changed dramatically to ensure that if we did have anything over three or four we
02:34:19 have anything over three or four we could adequately deal with it right to followup questions first of all and you've talked about the amending the policy and your input into that in 2014 so later than this I think yeah but it
02:34:31 so later than this I think yeah but it was the policy policy 790 ever actually amended took to to cater for this kind of volume of FSG calls now and to ensure this kind of communication no there was
02:34:45 this kind of communication no there was a you know the this isn't the only thing that I did surrounding fsj there are other suggestions that came out of this about passing of information concerning FSGS that were forward back in 2014 that
02:34:57 FSGS that were forward back in 2014 that ultimately did not happen right and secondly from your knowledge and experience did FFP or Babcock's
02:35:08 experience did FFP or Babcock's I think Babcock's deliver FSG training which was similar to or to this program that you designed or at least is sought to impart those principles no mr.
02:35:22 to impart those principles no mr. chairman I'm about to move to a different topic and it's now just before half past four I'm happy to use it for two minutes if you want me to but it
02:35:34 two minutes if you want me to but it isn't because no one it's not gonna finish this witness say I'm going to have to come ask the witness through you he doesn't mind coming back tomorrow morning you feel appreciate to chairman
02:35:45 morning you feel appreciate to chairman that we have had some slippage in the timetable which is I think fixed at a pretty steady 90 minutes and I'm trying to work out behind the scenes how to deal with that so in the meantime I'm
02:35:56 deal with that so in the meantime I'm very keen to to finish this witness to more of like that well first question to Johnson
02:36:02 Johnson come back tomorrow morning please of course thank you very much I'm sorry to have to ask you to do that it's wrong that's how it is
02:36:28 yes yes so you've anticipated my question I thank you yes well to be to be blunt and
02:36:42 thank you yes well to be to be blunt and safe I will say another hour and a half because that would cater for any further questions that might come there are a lot of questions which you'll appreciate it which have come from different sources which which we have reviewed
02:36:53 sources which which we have reviewed which we have taken the view have to be asked so mr. chairman I'm sorry for that comes as something of a disappointment to you it's what it does yes
02:37:04 to you it's what it does yes and I'm rather concerned about the way the timetable is no shaping up well I mean are we are for the moment and
02:37:15 mean are we are for the moment and having started mr. Johnson Augustine was finishing very famous Johnson I have to ask you as I said to come back tomorrow yes
02:37:26 yes in the meantime in order to do mr. Walsh's and your concerns about the timetable I will do what I can to see if I can shorten the questions I have for the next two witnesses which is loft and
02:37:40 the next two witnesses which is loft and Wolfington and see if we can finish with and by the end of the day tomorrow but I should say to be absolutely candid I think that may be a push they're important witnesses and I don't want to rush them right well it may be that we
02:37:52 rush them right well it may be that we need to review the timetable but maybe in which case I will take but that's something we we all have to do not an off-the-cuff little seat very good okay
02:38:05 off-the-cuff little seat very good okay anyway I'm pausing because I'm waiting for the usual applications yes yes what in a sense I'm maybe it's not going to
02:38:17 in a sense I'm maybe it's not going to come well I've been pushing at an open door but I'm slightly nervous about asking her for a 9:30 I'm not entirely sure I know what the witnesses availability is for 9:30 but I think that it's it's okay if he comes to
02:38:30 think that it's it's okay if he comes to 9:30 but I just need that hit confirmed I'll be in London from 7:00 if you want to start at 7 we can start now that would that's a tempting offer from the witness yeah I'm going to take my life
02:38:46 witness yeah I'm going to take my life in my hands I may and ask for a 9:30 start mr. chairman yes well but I appreciate it is an exception but we're I think in an exceptional week well it's becoming the rule that's my concern
02:38:57 becoming the rule that's my concern yes I don't think it does suit everyone to start how fast time because many of the people here have other things they have to do and fit and run working day but I think this week or at least
02:39:08 but I think this week or at least tomorrow
02:39:09 tomorrow yes mr. choice and we'll see where we're going I'm very grateful mr. chair all
02:39:20 going I'm very grateful mr. chair all right yes thanks to mr. Johnson up fast I am tomorrow if you wouldn't mind and I have to ask you not to talk about your evidence to anyone overnight okay all
02:39:31 evidence to anyone overnight okay all right thank you so we could like together the astronaut thank you very much
02:39:41 [Music] right how fast nine Turin empties