Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Further LFB evidence (2 August 2018 Pt 1 of 2)
00:00:01 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing we're going to continue first of all with the evidence of the system is Darby yes thank you very much mr. chairman if the witness could please be
00:00:12 chairman if the witness could please be written and called back
00:00:31 Morningstar you're right to carry on thank you very much yes thank you very much mr. chair mr. bee thank you very much for coming back to us this morning we're very grateful can I ask you to go
00:00:45 we're very grateful can I ask you to go to your witness statement please and go to page five within it and go to the second paragraph which starts at certain levels of incident and then five lines
00:00:57 levels of incident and then five lines down you can see you say eventually I think there were about three or four in the control room with us when we had gone to 40 pumps they took over the
00:01:08 gone to 40 pumps they took over the communication with the command unit on the ground and passed on the FSGS directly to them I think they used mobile phones to do this this was then declared a major incident now we looked
00:01:20 declared a major incident now we looked at this last night and the 40 pumps and the declaration of major incident I just want to go back and look at what wasn't happening in the control room and do you
00:01:32 happening in the control room and do you remember pieces of paper being sent by control room officers to the head table Jason Olaf particularly with FSG on them yes you do do you remember whether that
00:01:44 yes you do do you remember whether that process of sending pieces of paper started before pumps were made 40 which was at just after 2:00 a.m. I was still
00:01:57 was at just after 2:00 a.m. I was still sending I don't remember when the paper started I was still sending messages across that make pumps faulty myself yes I don't where they overlapped or I don't know
00:02:07 know by the time all right um does that mean that it but did you receive pieces of paper no I don't think I did it's possible that someone might have come
00:02:19 possible that someone might have come over with a bit of paper but I remember I was going on the service replace right if you or more likely think as you say JSON Olaf received pieces of paper from
00:02:30 JSON Olaf received pieces of paper from the CR OS does that mean that what was on the piece of paper didn't get recorded as a service request that's correct
00:02:38 correct I see - the control officer made a note on the log but by that time we were getting so many calls it was so busy I think that was the quickest way was to
00:02:50 think that was the quickest way was to write it down on a piece of paper okay no oh I'd like to just to try to get to this by way of an example if I can it is only an example just to try to get the
00:03:01 only an example just to try to get the system in our heads um can I ask you to look at a radio message at Oh 150 734 which is lfb at quadruple zero two seven
00:03:13 which is lfb at quadruple zero two seven one nine and this is for flat 205 on the 23rd floor time - as you can see at the
00:03:26 23rd floor time - as you can see at the top Oh 150 734 to see you aged male speaker go ahead over female speaker charlie uniform 8 the caller in flat 205
00:03:37 charlie uniform 8 the caller in flat 205 on the 23rd floor reports that the fire is coming right up to their flat over now as you see that's time today 150 734 if we look at the short incident log
00:03:54 on which is in the master documents bundle at tab 23 and go to page 20 we can't see at that time mark all around
00:04:06 can't see at that time mark all around that time mark oh 157 any reference to that message and when he's also I think to look at page 21 as well okay then it
00:04:21 to look at page 21 as well okay then it is possible that paper might have been passed to me like I don't really but trying to remember but it's possible that or control office has given me that information right okay and just to be to
00:04:36 information right okay and just to be to be clearer or commit to complete the picture that there is a a service request for flat 205 which is on the
00:04:48 request for flat 205 which is on the incident log at an earlier time and that's a page 19 if I can ask the documents director to go back to that Oh 100 140 47 where there's a service
00:04:59 100 140 47 where there's a service request created for flat 205 person's unable to leave property but doesn't have doesn't have a detail in your radio message that was created by Heather Fox
00:05:12 message that was created by Heather Fox I think yeah and then completed by you at Oh 145 10 so that it is that an
00:05:23 at Oh 145 10 so that it is that an example of where vision sends a radio message to you so Heather uses vision to send you a ready message and then you complete it by sending that message on
00:05:34 complete it by sending that message on right so looking at those two time marks with different information both for flat 205 the later one as I've shown you being on a radio message to see you eight of not being in the short incident
00:05:46 eight of not being in the short incident long that does that show does that help you tell us that in fact you are also getting messages pipe less paper well yeah
00:05:54 yeah on a service request them yes and I came back to thank you getting back to your statement you say as I've shown you that
00:06:05 statement you say as I've shown you that the messages were passed directly to the senior officers who came in and they
00:06:17 senior officers who came in and they were communicating directly with the incident ground do you remember how they were communicating with the incident ground by mobile phone now that was that
00:06:32 ground by mobile phone now that was that was Jason Olaf was it yes and a dream Benson as well and Adrian Fenton as well okay who came in late I think yeah okay now we know from Jason Olaf's evidence
00:06:44 now we know from Jason Olaf's evidence and his phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground at about 206 or at least during a call that starts according to his mobile
00:06:55 that starts according to his mobile records of 206 now I'm happy to show you his mobile records if you want to take it from me that's what they that's what they say and that's what he said in his evidence to us and you say in your
00:07:08 evidence to us and you say in your statement at the same paragraph that at this point all the names and
00:07:23 at this point all the names and addresses had started going on a whiteboard and they relayed this to the ground via ground crews via their phones that's the it I'm struggling to locate
00:07:36 that's the it I'm struggling to locate it in the top of the page it's three-quarters of the way down the page halfway we'll just beyond halfway down that second paragraph you see it's been it's been highlighted for you there mm-hmm know at this point that you're
00:07:49 mm-hmm know at this point that you're referring to at this point do you remember who set the whiteboard system up I I don't know who's who set whose idea it wasn't who set it up but I
00:08:01 idea it wasn't who set it up but I believe Jason Olaf was the one writing on board right and do you know why it was set up yes because the Ray Jose was
00:08:13 was set up yes because the Ray Jose was busy and the volume of calls was astronomical and it was I think it we just felt it was a quicker way of passing the information get importance
00:08:26 passing the information get importance was skipped to get people's locations and passing that across but maybe it were just quicker because because the radio was so busy as well with other stuff were you given any information about the setting up of this system now
00:08:38 about the setting up of this system now okay so what you're telling us is what you observed on the night as it happened okay and how did that affect your role at the time in terms of passing FSG messages to the to the incident ground
00:08:50 messages to the to the incident ground well I was still passed I think we probably overlapped I probably was still passing some obviously with the radio it freed up the radio a little bit too because there was
00:09:01 radio a little bit too because there was office the operational side and the resources that they were requesting so it said of it all being fire survival gun so the radio was able to cope with
00:09:12 gun so the radio was able to cope with the other staff you see was there an overlap of radio messages and mobile messages coming from the control room to the incident ground an oval of paper
00:09:27 the incident ground an oval of paper yeah well let me put it differently first of all did anybody tell you to stop passing FSG messages to the last thing I still if they were sending me messages I would pass right yeah and did
00:09:44 messages I would pass right yeah and did you in fact stop sending radio messages as soon as the mobile message system started I don't think so no that is what you're telling us I think the it was
00:09:55 you're telling us I think the it was really the officer who took the call who will decide whether to create a service request which you would then respond to exactly or to put it on a piece of paper we couldn't come to you or to do Birds
00:10:06 we couldn't come to you or to do Birds exactly yeah yes thank you and we can I think
00:10:14 think pursue that last point you just made to the Chairman by looking at the short incident log if we can get back to that please and go to page 21 you you can see
00:10:28 please and go to page 21 you you can see that at the top of page 21 it starts up with a time mark of a 156 39 with a service request RT for to see you eight
00:10:40 service request RT for to see you eight and then it continues on down the page and just scan your eye if you would down the page to see various service requests on past 2:00 a.m. and particularly past
00:10:52 on past 2:00 a.m. and particularly past 206 a.m. with continued radio service requests on or relating to FSG information do you see say the foot of the
00:11:02 the page you can see 210 service requests party for to see you eight further call related to flat 82 on floor 11 is it you
00:11:13 related to flat 82 on floor 11 is it you did you create or rather did you create that service request it says s ad next your name there sorry which to answer is created now this is completed so I pass
00:11:24 created now this is completed so I pass that over to Charlie uniformed yes I'm sorry create PD is created I'm say sorry or am i right yeah s ad is complete I've passed that over right yeah and then over the page
00:11:41 starting at one can start I think at o2 25 32 well let's started out to a to 24
00:11:55 25 32 well let's started out to a to 24 11 service request created see you 8 flat 1 8 3 21st floor and you could see the details there mm-hmm and that's hjf
00:12:07 the details there mm-hmm and that's hjf which i think is heather false by default the Safari Firefox and then at o2 25 32 you can see the service request is completed by you so it looks as if is
00:12:18 is completed by you so it looks as if is this right that at 225 so sometime after Jason Elif has started his mobile messaging you're still sending radio messages to d2 to the incident ground
00:12:30 messages to d2 to the incident ground yeah I mean yes if I was sent the message there number right just on that page if you run your eye up to the time mark about to 23 33 s ad it says key cu7
00:12:44 mark about to 23 33 s ad it says key cu7 run all FS g calls via cu7 okay that would have come from you yeah the again when we had it earlier i've put on the
00:12:56 when we had it earlier i've put on the glove that china uniform 7 came up and said can you now pass all the calls to me all the FS g calls vehicles but Heidi wouldn't necessarily known that she was
00:13:07 wouldn't necessarily known that she was you know she was just putting its child in for me but it still came to the incident i know where to even though I've I've completed it I have sent it to China from seven as yes that's request thank you so so when we
00:13:19 that's request thank you so so when we see service requests completed party for to see you eight after the time mark of Oh 22333 we can take it can whether they're actually sent to see you so I
00:13:30 they're actually sent to see you so I did yes and it is continuing on through page 23 you can see that there's a service request at o2 4011 about a third
00:13:46 service request at o2 4011 about a third of the way just over a third of the way down that page service request created hjf again heidi fox party for to see you eight just on creation of a service request that's heidi Fox there and that
00:13:59 request that's heidi Fox there and that gets completed this is for flat one five two at o2 4127 you see that now just two
00:14:11 two at o2 4127 you see that now just two questions there first of all it looks as if heidi foxes is completing the service request did there come a time when you you stopped or should have shared no pollution what I DS done is she's
00:14:26 pollution what I DS done is she's probably possibly passed it over on paper but she's logged it so she's made she's written into the log on the service requested the information but to
00:14:38 service requested the information but to stop me having to parse it over she's completed it so I haven't picked it up right and so what she's done he's made sure there's a log of it I see now that I think that's a pattern that we see
00:14:51 I think that's a pattern that we see emerging from this log why might that be well it's quicker to write on on paper I don't know why Heidi's done that but what she's done is this is it's correct
00:15:05 what she's done is this is it's correct cuz she's put it on the Lord yes I see is that is that it was that a rarity was that always that Anna norm she's just no I mean she's just typed into the incident and but pick and and completed
00:15:17 incident and but pick and and completed it herself to stop me sending it because she's she's got a record of it on there is that because on that occasion that Heidi Fox didn't send a piece of paper
00:15:28 Heidi Fox didn't send a piece of paper he's posted a choice note of put instead put television no no no no she would have sent because she hasn't because I haven't passed it so she might have put it on my suit but she may have put it on
00:15:40 it on my suit but she may have put it on paper as well she hasn't passed it on the radiator so she might well have she's just made it but she's made a record of it on the lock yes I see thank you okay and can you then go to page 24
00:16:02 you okay and can you then go to page 24 which is
00:16:07 the court for the way down that page at a 308 36 and there's a service request created there by dr which i think is guessing but is that Debbie rail Debbie real real right and she creates a
00:16:21 real real right and she creates a service request cu8 RT for persons in flat 183 and then that is completed at oh three 1051 by you see you HRT for
00:16:35 oh three 1051 by you see you HRT for persons in flat one five three does that tell us that as late as 3:10 you are still sending radio messages to see you
00:16:48 still sending radio messages to see you aide will see you seven by that stage yes right yes so if Jason Olaf starts sending his mobile messages of 206 on
00:16:59 sending his mobile messages of 206 on and off and it's not a continuum yeah but and you continue to send radio messages to see you seven until see until 3:10 does that mean we've got an overlap period of about an hour and a
00:17:11 overlap period of about an hour and a quarter
00:17:11 quarter yes one hour and ten minutes yes I think the important thing was getting the information wherever wherever it went by up Jason or me they get in the Charlie
00:17:23 up Jason or me they get in the Charlie room seven okay Johnny for mayor getting the information we're just people Oh was there a system in the control room for in for collating and double-checking
00:17:36 in for collating and double-checking what radio messages and mobile messages are being sent in order to make sure there was no inconsistency or duplication no because people were calling him back and obviously speaking
00:17:47 calling him back and obviously speaking to different control officers wouldn't have had time to do to deal with that to do that did you tell Jason Olaf what FSG
00:18:00 do that did you tell Jason Olaf what FSG messages you were passing to the incident ground so that he could record it on his whiteboard no
00:18:08 say it would this would this be right that if we're looking for a record of what FSG messages were sent from the control room to the incident ground you have to put the white board and the
00:18:20 have to put the white board and the radio log together yes
00:18:40 but if you can be shown please lfb quadruple zero two six three six
00:18:59 but this is a message time 203 1455
00:19:07 which says control out and female speaker FM out hmm can you help us with that
00:19:14 that what is that sorry what does that what does that mean in real it means these are team and what I'm still listening to the channel so if they call me up I can still hear them it will still come through but I've just pressed the button
00:19:26 through but I've just pressed the button it's to say I've stopped talking so they know I've stopped I see what does what does anything I'm sorry you should say really and to FN which is the rate it's channel 4 right I've just said effing
00:19:39 channel 4 right I've just said effing with quickly but it's in - it should be an M - FM I mean it's not is that a mark of the fact that that was the end of your radio transmissions no not all of no it just for that moment okay
00:19:52 no it just for that moment okay oh I see right because also I was meant sorry I was monitoring channel 2 so I had to keep pressing the button to come out of channel 4 so that I was
00:20:03 out of channel 4 so that I was monitoring both channels at the same time as well during the time up to 310 that you were sending radio messages to
00:20:14 that you were sending radio messages to see you eight and then see you seven do were you talking do you think - the same person on the command unit or different people um the same person on chanee
00:20:28 people um the same person on chanee formate and then a different person on chinese from sin but the same I would assume the same two people do that I don't remember exactly but that's how I would do it did you did you know or do
00:20:42 would do it did you did you know or do you know who you were speaking to no we just used the callsign their name okay did you get any sense from your radio discussions and they are
00:20:53 from your radio discussions and they are not discussions in the conversational sense either as I understand but did you get any sense of what those persons on the command units were doing with the
00:21:05 the command units were doing with the information you were giving them collating the information passing it to whoever's in charge did you know that that's what they would do well I was assuming that that is what they would do
00:21:16 assuming that that is what they would do it's an assumption if yours you didn't find out from them what you think that's their job
00:21:20 their job yes okay can I then just ask you about a document which you won't have seen
00:21:31 document which you won't have seen before
00:21:31 before but I'll explain it to you it's NFB quadruple zero three one one three
00:21:50 now these are manuscript notes made by Andy Hearn who chaired a control room
00:22:01 Andy Hearn who chaired a control room debriefing on the 24th of July 2017 to review control room activity in the light of the incident and you can see who was who was there at that meeting we
00:22:19 who was who was there at that meeting we can just go back to that but that you are you I think weren't present present no if you go please to page four of that
00:22:30 no if you go please to page four of that note
00:22:39 you'll see that halfway down the page it says SM Olaf arrives offers help opens up line with see you all FS G's passed
00:22:50 up line with see you all FS G's passed this way mobile phone personal mobile no other way with an asterisk next to it and in the light of what you've been telling is the small thing about this
00:23:01 telling is the small thing about this hour or so of overlap between mobile messages and radio messages going to the Instagram we've seen and is it right the
00:23:12 Instagram we've seen and is it right the there was no other way after station manager owner arrived the FSG messages were passed at the incident grand it's
00:23:23 were passed at the incident grand it's quite efficiently the log that I was passing them and I know I passed them so that's not as I was incorrect there wasn't over that yes
00:23:36 can I show you the whiteboards to which what formalism is mr. Olaf set up which she wrote on these are let me just give
00:23:52 she wrote on these are let me just give you the references M et triple zero one eight two two nine
00:24:10 [Music]
00:24:29 but perhaps I can start with a pop I can start with an e an easier document mr. Dawkins directed scrub that request can I show you first of all the start the emphasizes that slightly no tricky if
00:24:45 emphasizes that slightly no tricky if you start with M et triple zero one six nine one two and at the same time M et triple zero one six nine zero six this
00:24:56 triple zero one six nine zero six this have those two on the screen at the same time if we can please
00:25:21 right [Music]
00:25:23 [Music] but now these are V all these are two whiteboards which mr. Olaf told us he was working off on the night and mr. Fenton's did the same do they look
00:25:35 Fenton's did the same do they look familiar to you yes they were in the control room yeah and did you see people writing on the on the board from these boards well yes I
00:25:51 the board from these boards well yes I can't remember the detail of that I mean obviously Jason O'Keefe was writing on there someone else might have been but I don't remember right I was like cuz I
00:26:02 don't remember right I was like cuz I was kind of you know concentrating on why I was supposed to be doing okay it wasn't me any you know that was going on in my in my background right okay um then can I ask you this did you see any
00:26:14 then can I ask you this did you see any other white boards apart from these two no I don't think so okay maybe just if I can just finally run this run mr. Krown Connie can I ask you please to be shown a meaty triple
00:26:26 you please to be shown a meaty triple zero one eight two two nine [Music]
00:26:48 you got a problem Houston Minute Rice okay well that will shorten things because what is that going to be no there's no problem
00:26:59 there's no problem [Music]
00:27:06 standing back from the the activity and were you aware are you aware of any efforts being made by anybody in the in the control room to identify or record
00:27:18 the control room to identify or record or transfer to the insulin ground any emerging themes that were coming out of the FSG calls not really I wasn't
00:27:29 the FSG calls not really I wasn't because I wasn't taking any I was constant it wasn't really having that role I was just concentrating on the radio the messages coming to me okay
00:27:43 radio the messages coming to me okay were you aware of any plan being implemented within the control room to deal with to deal with the very high number of calls that are coming in apart
00:27:54 number of calls that are coming in apart from the white board system that we've seen
00:28:03 well do you remember whether any thought was given to bringing in further staff further control room officers to man the phones all were you aware of any plans
00:28:17 phones all were you aware of any plans to direct calls to buddy and I call buddy control rooms spillover control rooms that might have happened automatically because we do ever like a
00:28:32 automatically because we do ever like a buddy
00:28:32 buddy control room who would take access calls so that might that may well have happened we did happen but yeah and as regards to staff I know a couple of members of staff from other watches did
00:28:45 members of staff from other watches did come in obviously a lot later in the incident but they someone there was two I think that could come in what okay you
00:28:56 I think that could come in what okay you was that did there come a time when you just following up on what you just said about you're on the radio did there come a time when you stopped sending radio message FSG radio messages they would
00:29:09 message FSG radio messages they would have eventually yes thank you I think it was around 3:00 just after 3:00 awesome yes that's what we've got from the short incident not about that an answer that I
00:29:20 incident not about that an answer that I wouldn't have yeah that was it right I'm spending more on if you go please to the short incident log at
00:29:34 but we have it we have a radio message sent at 7:51 24 which is lfb quadruple zero seven three zero seven two
00:29:46 zero seven three zero seven two quadruple zero three zero seven two
00:29:55 [Music] and you could see that time mark from the top that says charlie female speaker charlie uniform 7 Charlie uniform 7 from m2 FM over were you still on the radio
00:30:08 m2 FM over were you still on the radio the controlling the control on top talking to seeing ceremony at 7:51 a.m. no I think I'd gone off duty okay did
00:30:20 no I think I'd gone off duty okay did anybody tell you to stop sending FSG messages by radio when you say you did stop at a run about 310 I don't remember
00:30:31 stop at a run about 310 I don't remember it's possible but I don't remember but if I'd have got a service request I've sent it to me I'll pass it over what I don't remember recall it just some saying that don't
00:30:43 recall it just some saying that don't send anymore I don't recall do you remember that anybody told you to stop sending messages by radio no I know I don't recall that no can I ask you to
00:30:55 I don't recall that no can I ask you to go back to your statement please and go to page six
00:31:16 now in your statement in the first paragraph of page six about halfway down you say I was aware later in the night
00:31:27 you say I was aware later in the night you see that John Smith the senior operations manager had gone around telling everyone that the policy had changed and that they were to tell residents to get out by whatever means
00:31:38 residents to get out by whatever means they could that as safely as possible yeah I cannot remember what time this was nor who actually made the decision but I know from that moment the CRLs Sierras told whichever caller the
00:31:51 Sierras told whichever caller the updated change did you see for yourself Joe SMIL here Joe Smith going around telling everybody of the change in the
00:32:02 telling everybody of the change in the advice yes he did now we know that it was changed in the control room at between 230 and 250 as
00:32:15 control room at between 230 and 250 as the outer limits of the time I say we know that we've been told that by Jason eau-de-vie um Adrian Fenton and and other witnesses but my question is did
00:32:27 other witnesses but my question is did Joe Smith asked you to relay that change in advice to the incident ground at all I can't remember I don't recall did she
00:32:40 I can't remember I don't recall did she ask you to record it on vision if she had or would have done so I don't recall having observed that
00:32:54 having observed that Joe Smith going around telling a body everybody that the advice had changed was there a reason why you didn't record it on the vision system is it something
00:33:08 it on the vision system is it something that you would normally have recorded on the vision system not necessarily me someone might number at that point you
00:33:22 someone might number at that point you can imagine what the room was like and then having to tell people now you have actually got to get out so I don't remember that okay do you know whether any consideration was given to calling
00:33:37 any consideration was given to calling back callers who had been told previously to stay put and now telling them that the advice has changed and they should now do everything they can
00:33:49 they should now do everything they can to leave so to ring I mean I can tell you if you want you just to recall on
00:34:01 you if you want you just to recall on that night then no right it wouldn't be easy to find all the numbers to call those people back and there was still a big queue of nine nine nine calls waiting when you say a big call the
00:34:18 waiting when you say a big call the queue of nine oh nine calls waiting how how would a control room operator see the queue and on the emergency call button that's coming in for emergency call you'll have the number pulls on
00:34:30 call you'll have the number pulls on there I don't remember taking note of them but there was emergency parents waiting right where you were sitting is radio operator would you have obviously
00:34:41 radio operator would you have obviously you said you've had the vision system open in front of you would you also be able to see for yourself a list of queued calls yes it's all on the X system the telephone system which has
00:34:53 system the telephone system which has the radio and a Natalya right okay and so at that moment when and it's hard to remember exactly but when Joe Smith was telling the crs that
00:35:05 when Joe Smith was telling the crs that the advice had changed do you remember roughly that how long this list of numbers was I'm sorry and there was a handful or was it no more than that
00:35:17 handful or was it no more than that right and did did you recognize any repeat numbers that kept coming up but
00:35:28 repeat numbers that kept coming up but anytime now you don't see that the phone number coming in you see that just the amount if what does it say what does it actually say on the on the screen that
00:35:39 actually say on the on the screen that records the X button a red button with it I mean actually you do see trying to I'm trying to imagine it so you would
00:35:52 I'm trying to imagine it so you would see that maybe the top number after that you wouldn't see the numbers the phone number sorry you wouldn't see all the number phone numbers that are in that
00:36:03 number phone numbers that are in that queue but all you would see is the amount of calls waiting I see see I'm just trying to get a visual picture in some way in mind about it's difficult we'll get there
00:36:16 it's difficult we'll get there so you see the the first number then the ones got to the front of the queue yeah and you see that number to you thanks god I'll do it every day and I should
00:36:28 god I'll do it every day and I should know yes I do see the first one yeah and then after that it's just the amount of course I say to that is that does that come up as a number saying ten or four or Fiat for the amount of calls waiting
00:36:41 or Fiat for the amount of calls waiting I see
00:36:43 I see so you get the silence waiting speed to be taken let's come to the front of the queue and then after that it's the number of calls that are waiting they're not the actual telephone numbers of the calls lined up in a queue yeah oh boy
00:36:54 calls lined up in a queue yeah oh boy break up that's very clear thank you did you know for yourself that in fact there were callbacks done during the night just to sum numbers were you aware of
00:37:12 just to sum numbers were you aware of any did God did you hear about all become aware of any calls that have come to the London control room Stratford through other control rooms that where
00:37:26 through other control rooms that where they had called back yeah I'm gonna pass some of them over the radio ever had neither I wasn't taking the call so it
00:37:39 neither I wasn't taking the call so it wasn't really yeah I don't all right now given that you weren't taking calls and you may not be able to help me very much with with this but let me see if I can explore it can I ask you
00:37:51 me see if I can explore it can I ask you to be shown lfb quadruple zero three six two five
00:38:04 now you won't know what this document is but it is the Essex County Fire & Rescue Service log for the 14th of June 2018
00:38:16 Service log for the 14th of June 2018 and if you scroll down or if we have a scroll down to page 4 at the time mark of a 158 I think one's got to go to the
00:38:32 of a 158 I think one's got to go to the bottom of the page you can see a 158 general it says g10 to do
00:38:46 general it says g10 to do Dilli 900 page to inform where it runs that into the next 9 which is have tried
00:38:59 that into the next 9 which is have tried ringing lfb direct that there is no answer we are aware that they have a major high-rise fire as bt glasgow asked if we could take some of the overflow calls as there were too many for their
00:39:11 calls as there were too many for their full back service bt stated if this became a problem for ec FRS at essex then to bring them back on the secure number and they would stop the calls do
00:39:23 number and they would stop the calls do you know did you know that essex was trying to get through to london with overflow calls that have been sent their way by bt glasgow or bt at all I wasn't
00:39:35 way by bt glasgow or bt at all I wasn't I wasn't aware at the time but I know a 60 take a lot of homes for us and they might spoken to them I tried to get
00:39:46 might spoken to them I tried to get through to one of the control officers Block C they would have got in the queue or in my and whether they spoke to officer and officer to watch and pass them over I'm not sure right but there's a reference
00:39:58 not sure right but there's a reference there to the lfb direct line do you know what that is we have a number that we ring direct to get through to Essex and
00:40:11 ring direct to get through to Essex and they probably have the same for us on our X system we can just there's a button for a six the Knights bit but that would just go to the control operator is it a designated line yeah
00:40:22 operator is it a designated line yeah okay do you know why it wasn't what so we don't hear it it would get him the cue that's the thing it wouldn't come up it come over the cue if it's that number
00:40:33 it come over the cue if it's that number right do you have you any idea why there was no answer from that direct line only that it was in the queue right it was taking over call was obvious but I mean
00:40:44 taking over call was obvious but I mean we were really really busy yeah who was manning that direct line do you know no it it wasn't if it what I'm trying to say is that if it's not line I'm thinking of it would have it just goes
00:40:56 thinking of it would have it just goes in with all the other emergency calls no I see okay now if you go on or can be taken on in the document which means I think going up to the time mark of a 2 a
00:41:07 think going up to the time mark of a 2 a 3 it's a similar question go to a 3 I just want to pick it up [Music]
00:41:27 we get some more information there and then I think a little bit further up the page just give you some context
00:41:41 it says under the time mark of o2 o4 g 1o to do duly informed and situation explained he will try and make contact
00:41:52 explained he will try and make contact he suggests that if we get further calls from residents to use the stay-put policy until we can clarify what advice should be given they also ask that we continue to try to contact lfb regarding
00:42:04 continue to try to contact lfb regarding caller from 20:00 on 22nd floor no answer from their FB via direct line but first of all do you happen to know who
00:42:15 first of all do you happen to know who do Dilli is and again at that time and this is an interesting time because it's just before Jason olaf's first mobile call to see you to see you ain't do you
00:42:30 call to see you to see you ain't do you remember at that point the Essex Fire and Rescue trying to get hold of the London control room
00:42:46 and then 208 is finally on this document just a bit just a little bit further up it says G 102 do diddly we'll try and contact lfb via his Nilo line and I
00:43:00 contact lfb via his Nilo line and I should have told you not neither his national interagency liaison officer do do you know that all I've heard of that you've heard of that it says he's taken address details of
00:43:12 it says he's taken address details of caller at the location who was asked for advice did you know at any stage during the night that Essex Frey and Rescue Service were giving advice to grenfell
00:43:23 Service were giving advice to grenfell residents I don't know I probably heard after the night work to be honest with you but not me not at the time I don't know I just I don't know I can't okay
00:43:35 know I just I don't know I can't okay we've just seen the expression Nilo National interagency liaison officer to do you do but what can you explain what the role of that person is well because
00:43:46 the role of that person is well because it became a major incident he might bond to I've got a very good understanding and it's easier Nash he takes a national
00:43:58 and it's easier Nash he takes a national role firm and so if there's a major incident he probably been informed of that I fully I say okay we've slowly saw the major incident because was declared
00:44:09 the major incident because was declared it
00:44:13 a 638 but there stood up there's a reference to NYLO earlier than that so there may be a time mismatch but do you
00:44:26 there may be a time mismatch but do you know who the Nilo in the stratford control room would have been we haven't got a no no no no no okay how does it
00:44:39 got a no no no no no okay how does it work but not in Stratford I mean it might be someone who we could page barn all right okay when a national and a major incident is declared the National Resource Centre is based yeah well in a
00:44:59 Resource Centre is based yeah well in a major incident is declared that does that your understanding trigger the stand up and Nyla's in in regional well I think as I explained yesterday because
00:45:11 I think as I explained yesterday because a major incident the supervisors would be dealing with more with the actions and the notification of who to inform so I'm not too familiar with that right
00:45:27 and then forgive up the document a bit further there's a two time mark of 2:14 and again as Davi you may not be able to
00:45:38 and again as Davi you may not be able to help with this aren t take very long after this a 2-14 keeps scrolling up I think it's on the next page No it runs
00:45:55 think it's on the next page No it runs in reverse order say it yawns the page I think three yes that is a 2-14 a third of the way down the page it says general
00:46:09 of the way down the page it says general on the Greg Theatre of regeneration there there is an emergency fire arrangement paragraph their policy states to stay put unless otherwise advised Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards each
00:46:22 rigorous fire safety standards each front door for each flat can withstand a fire for up to 30 minutes we was this information that you got or you were aware of in the Stratford
00:46:33 you were aware of in the Stratford control room no I don't recall do you know anything about what this is a reference to and it
00:46:49 about what this is a reference to and it would it be normal in a control room for a an area a fire and rescue area other than the area in which the fire is taking place for that Fire and Rescue
00:47:03 taking place for that Fire and Rescue Service control room to have detailed knowledge about about a building like this I don't know okay
00:47:20 have you ever heard of a something called a torque group yes yeah the radio type right if you look at
00:47:32 yeah the radio type right if you look at to the time-lock 216 on the same page while we're on it it says 216 general do daily has tried all the talk groups is not a response in
00:47:45 all the talk groups is not a response in that context can you help us with what a talk group is might be another radio channel Essex which try speak - sorry
00:48:03 channel Essex which try speak - sorry I'm not really it's just sort of another radio channel radio channel ok this it's not a group is it of radio operators all in different areas yes we if we went on
00:48:16 in different areas yes we if we went on to SCC's basics ground for example to help to assist when we sent someone they would we would tell them the talk group so that they could tune in to a6 from his radio I see okay so this is this
00:48:28 his radio I see okay so this is this this is a way of simply a radio channel between fire and rescue service control rooms and believe so a radio channel against radio is to do yes the maker and
00:48:40 against radio is to do yes the maker and that's is that part of the channels 1 to 6 that we've been talking about so far [Music]
00:48:52 [Music] verily they might because we've got the floors yes and that's a much slightly different right channels there's not part of lobbies old London main so let's run these for London yes okay let's see
00:49:04 run these for London yes okay let's see um just one more and one more question on this document having seen it at 2:21
00:49:19 you can see a message general have spoken to lfb they want to know how many people flat number floor number and if far is affecting their flat that deep do
00:49:35 far is affecting their flat that deep do you remember having looking looking at this now do you remember having a conversation with Essex Fire and Rescue authorities control room and discussing those matters okay do you know who might
00:49:50 those matters okay do you know who might have done all he did have that discussion
00:50:13 mr. bee thank you very much I've come to the end of my questions and mr. chairman I think it's probably now appropriate we take a short break yes and in turn you may discover some more well I didn't we may yes what well
00:50:26 more well I didn't we may yes what well that's a good point to have a break it may be there will be a few more questions which are known to Lockwood's ok all right so we'll stop now until 25 to 11 between I wanna get about the
00:50:40 to 11 between I wanna get about the revenue on your options room and then when you come back we'll see whether there are few
00:50:59 right 25 two level monkeys
00:51:10 you
01:04:09 [Music]
01:04:14 well did you just come from Bacchus I I was given some more questions but it does one or two short ones and they aren't they're short so if we can just have the witness back please mr. chairman
01:04:39 right dummy until there's a few short questions we'll see just very few miss Darby thank you for coming back um can I ask you first of all to be shown NFB quadruple zero two four nine
01:04:52 shown NFB quadruple zero two four nine three
01:05:03 and I want just to show you the time first of all this is an O one fourteen
01:05:11 forties not is it a one
01:05:18 four to seven sorry yes Oh 147 on game day 147 30 that on the 14th of June and the operator says the message after that over caller yes on
01:05:30 message after that over caller yes on the 12th floor for people's trapped in flats 96 and 95 and the police have passed over calls saying that the callers are trapped on the 16th and 17th floors over my question is do you know
01:05:42 floors over my question is do you know who received the police calls there could be police calls from the police control room and they would come through
01:05:55 control room and they would come through as emergency calls so the control operators would have taken those and we did have some calls on the police helicopter and that would have been the supervisors right okay that was my next
01:06:07 supervisors right okay that was my next question
01:06:09 question did anybody in them in the control room during the night monitor the helicopter radio channel they monitored the emergency service radio which is on the
01:06:22 emergency service radio which is on the supervisors desk and Lisa Pollock up to come on would I think spoken to the man that I believe so it wouldn't be you know it's not me it's the supervisors and then the supervisor will pass the
01:06:35 and then the supervisor will pass the information to me okay to pass on to the ground right thank you and finally just a question on on resourcing do you know who in the control room on the night was
01:06:47 who in the control room on the night was responsible for resourcing such as getting a DBA to the fire ground that's rude well the fire ground requested was
01:06:58 rude well the fire ground requested was also yes part so is that what you mean yes yes so the fire ground they requested like a DBA in the extra yes
01:07:09 requested like a DBA in the extra yes okay and following on from that then they request that from that that request comes to the control room yes and then the control is it right for somebody in the control room then arranges that erases no Priscilla yes I
01:07:22 arranges that erases no Priscilla yes I know who was it I think it was supervisors sorted that because the call takers were tight that would call taken I believe that Peter may may I stand
01:07:34 I believe that Peter may may I stand corrected but I think it was Peter made yes we think so too and do you know what he did in order to procure gather idibia equipment from Ron London that would be
01:07:46 equipment from Ron London that would be his job I don't know I don't know okay
01:07:55 yes thank you very much miss Davi I have no further questions for you I'm very grateful indeed to you for coming here and assisting us with our investigations so thank you very much and I'd end my
01:08:07 so thank you very much and I'd end my thanks to those of mr. millet and it's been very helpful to hear how the control room works at least from the perspective of the radio operator so thank you very much for coming
01:08:26 yes yes mr. chairman we now have another witness whom mr. Kenya is going to examine yes a fighter Beale and I am
01:08:38 examine yes a fighter Beale and I am going to vacate the lectern for a short time for him to do that yes may be sensible to have a another racial break now while we're is to reorganize yes yes yes all right well I'll rise for
01:08:51 yes yes yes all right well I'll rise for five minutes be back of course of course 211
01:09:03 you
01:13:56 [Music]
01:14:04 good morning sir yes may I call watch manager Stuart bill thank you
01:14:31 [Music]
01:14:45 thank you very much mr. field now again you better sit down so Lacey do that and make us uncomfortable right yes first of
01:14:57 make us uncomfortable right yes first of all would you mind confirming your name for the record please mr. Kenneth field thank you very much for coming on to give evidence today it's very much appreciated now in front of you you'll see a blue folder and hopefully behind
01:15:10 see a blue folder and hopefully behind the first tab you'll find two statements the first is dated the 6th of July 2017 and a seven pages long and then if you turn further in behind that tab
01:15:21 turn further in behind that tab hopefully you'll find your second statement which is three pages long dated the 26th of March is Alastair and if you go behind the final tab hopefully you'll find your contemporaneous note is
01:15:32 you'll find your contemporaneous note is that right that's correct sir have you read those three documents recently yes I and you confirm that their contents are true yes they are and are you content for those documents to stand as your evidence to the inquiry
01:15:44 stand as your evidence to the inquiry yes I know as I've said to other witnesses I'm not going to go through your statements or contemporaneous note line-by-line they're just particular topics I'd like to discuss with you now if at any time
01:15:56 to discuss with you now if at any time my questions are unclear please say so and I'll rephrase them and finally if you feel the need for a break at any time Josh out okay thank you so now if we can deal first of all with basics
01:16:07 we can deal first of all with basics isn't right that you've been in the lfb now for more than 22 years yeah I transferred from sorry forum rescue service which I joined in 1995 by Transparency lfb in 2000 thank you and
01:16:19 Transparency lfb in 2000 thank you and in June 2017 you held the same rank as you do today namely watch manager as that ricer and in June 2017 as you are today that you're placed at Soho and
01:16:30 today that you're placed at Soho and allocated for the red watch that's correct
01:16:33 correct and on the night in question you were mobilized at 0 1:30 on the road at 0 132 and arrived at the tower about 0 146 is that about right that's about right say
01:16:44 that about right that's about right say it now first of all may I ask you just some brief questions about training and first of all what training have you given regarding fires involving external
01:16:55 given regarding fires involving external cladding on high-rise buildings and we don't have a facility within the NFB to replicate an external fire on a tower or a high-rise of any of any of any distinct type and there are training
01:17:08 distinct type and there are training notes to do with building construction and building products and materials that which we will use by means of a PowerPoint presentation that station and then obviously there's other elements and exterior firefighting whether that
01:17:20 and exterior firefighting whether that be recovering jets using aerial appliances to walk cones and the Exide building which we were practically practice that station or other venues so
01:17:31 practice that station or other venues so have you given any particular training regarding the particular risk posed by cladding or on high-rise fires and have you received any such training no now the first topic I'd like to discuss with
01:17:43 the first topic I'd like to discuss with you that relates to the incident is the handover and if I could ask you to turn to your first witness statement and page 3 and it's the sixth paragraph on that
01:17:56 3 and it's the sixth paragraph on that page which is just below half way and it starts with the words at the time we arrived the incident was just been handed over from a North Kensington watch manager to an instant commander first of all do you know that the North
01:18:09 first of all do you know that the North Kensington watch manager to be Mike Dowden yes I do did you know it at the time yes I do and how did you know this was a handover and I've been to the command unit previous to this so it
01:18:20 command unit previous to this so it doesn't sit right with the statement but from leaving the command unit and coming to the southeast corner of the tower which major Dowden was in the process of talking to a station manager myself and
01:18:32 talking to a station manager myself and approximately three other watch managers were standing next to him listening to the information I believe the information that he was giving in was part of a handover okay if I can
01:18:44 in was part of a handover okay if I can stop you there just just taking each element of that first of all you went over to him with three other watch managers I don't know the way that there was watchmakers congregating around him as he was talking to that group of people
01:18:55 people can you remember can you identify those three watch managers and it was definitely obviously myself was there watch - Adler from Lambeth and some quite it may have been watch major Glenn
01:19:07 quite it may have been watch major Glenn Williams joining us but I don't know that for definite and do you know the identity of the station manager - who Mike Darden was handing over I think the station manager water but you say you
01:19:19 station manager water but you say you think is that because do you know him first of all I do know him and since since that incident I've I've been late I've been given evidence I know who now who he was
01:19:31 who he was now by the time you joined the gaggle of watch managers next to mr. Dodd under mr. Walton yes how far do you know first
01:19:42 mr. Walton yes how far do you know first of all can you give us the words or the gist of the words that you overheard mr. Darden's say to mr. Walton much measured out it was in the process of telling him what what the situation that he'd been
01:19:55 what what the situation that he'd been called to originally a fire on the fourth floor I wish they believed to be a kitchen fire and that his prose had come out of the building to find the exterior of the building was alight and the resources that he had in the tactics
01:20:09 the resources that he had in the tactics he did know at that point and the resources that he'd ordered on them what he had him attendants but I never actually I never physically saw the end of that handover or him physically give
01:20:20 of that handover or him physically give the turbines did you hear any discussion of a summary of the conditions within the tower login was there any discussion of the extent to which fire had penetrated from the
01:20:31 to which fire had penetrated from the exterior to the interior of Nevada was there any discussion that you overheard of the system for handling FSGS no sir [Music]
01:20:42 [Music] did you speak to Mike Dowden I said it and was that after the handover had concluded or later on in the evening it was about the same time or maybe just before aerials or happened at the same
01:20:54 before aerials or happened at the same time just and did you initiate the conversation or did he initiate it I think it was mutual so I an instant amante bard or my natural remit or my natural actions at any instant would be to head towards him
01:21:06 any instant would be to head towards him I've been on the command unit already they were busy doing other stuff where I just left one on a roll board I hadn't actually officially booked him properly and came off with a command unit and met
01:21:17 and came off with a command unit and met Mike there than on the southeast corner of the tower and give us the words that we use all the gist of the words that used in the conversation you had with
01:21:28 used in the conversation you had with mr. Darden it would be similar on Eliza Mike what you got what you want me to do where you know what have you done up to now and just the basic would be a very brief very short conversation that
01:21:40 brief very short conversation that wouldn't have been a very detailed and what did he say to you what orders did he give to you he didn't give me any orders because at that point station manager turned up into our conversation and he proceeded to talk to the station
01:21:51 and he proceeded to talk to the station manager about what had happened up to that point and did the station manager presumably Walton give you any orders as tonight so next did anyone give you a briefing as to the strategic objectives
01:22:03 briefing as to the strategic objectives for the firefighting plan I did anyone give you a direction there as to what you were going to do on what you to do once you got there no and as they were carrying out what I believe to be a
01:22:15 carrying out what I believe to be a handover and I was called away by my crew after 2:45 who on the East section or the east side of the building of the tower
01:22:25 tower now before we leave the topic of the handover if I could ask you to turn to your second witness statement at page two they'll come up on the screen and it's seven lines from the bottom you
01:22:39 it's seven lines from the bottom you said when I turned up the initial instant commander was trying to carry out a handover brief just looking at that word trying it tends to give the impression that there were obstacles or difficulties preventing that handover
01:22:51 difficulties preventing that handover discussion taking place but what be your response to that there was a lot going on obviously we I think we all did on mic pumps 20 which we turned up in the early part of those 20 appliances
01:23:02 early part of those 20 appliances there's additional prices to take it to 20 arriving and the exterior the tower was alight from the fourth floor to the 23rd floor on the right-hand section of the East Side so there was a lot going
01:23:13 the East Side so there was a lot going on as natural protocols would could go with an instant of that size the water management handover to a station manager and but everybody was obviously trying
01:23:24 and but everybody was obviously trying to help and get involved and do what had to be done was still a lot going on in our early stages and needed people to take on board and before we leave the topic of the handover did what magic did
01:23:36 topic of the handover did what magic did what manager Sadler contribute anything to the discussion over sir can you remember whether what manager Glenn Williams contributed a moment later the next topic I'd like to discuss
01:23:47 later the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the question of sector command and if I could ask you to turn back to your first witness statement at page 3 the final paragraph and you say there I saw both crews leave my location
01:23:59 there I saw both crews leave my location and make their way towards the main entrance the tower located on the south side
01:24:03 side I was then designated as oh I see in charge of sector 4 which was the east side of the tower I'd attended the command unit set up which is in a mobile truck stationed on Granville Road now if
01:24:15 truck stationed on Granville Road now if we can take a few steps back how long after arriving at the scene did you present yourself at the command unit
01:24:26 we sort of entered someone's grateful road from Bowmore Road stepped off of the truck I'd already detailed my crews to take ba with them on on the route because of the traffic that we heard
01:24:37 because of the traffic that we heard enroute to the fire was obvious they're going to need VA resources of a tower from that point the natural process or pro is going to a command unit or ICP or instant commander to find out what they
01:24:50 instant commander to find out what they needed you to do to assist them and as we walk towards a tower I saw a command unit in Greenfield Road and so I proceeded to that to book in and can you remember what that stage whether it's CU
01:25:02 remember what that stage whether it's CU 7 or CU 8 crew manager merrick was on that command unit he was very busy at the time either on a main scheme radio or a phone taking what Gillespie FSG I'm
01:25:15 or a phone taking what Gillespie FSG I'm writing that stuff down so I didn't actually physically have a conversation with in which he usually would do I left one on the rail boards on the desk so that someone knew that we were in attendance and then I left that command
01:25:26 attendance and then I left that command unit I proceeded on to the fire grounds thank you who designated you the officer in charge in Sector four know what it was by default really more than anything else
01:25:35 else whilst was having a conversation with watch manage Dowden as i said previously my aerial crew which that night was out for 2:45 and had ended up on the east section of the building situated on a
01:25:46 section of the building situated on a grass area located outside the tower and they call were calling to me to say they were having trouble getting a secure water supply and just by natural default
01:25:57 water supply and just by natural default I went towards them so you assumed sector command rather than being designated for that be fenced area no sir can you give us an idea what are the roles what's the role in the principal
01:26:09 roles what's the role in the principal function of the officer in command of a particular sector so within a larger scale incident as obviously grenfell was that it's broken down into different sections or in this case sectors where
01:26:21 sections or in this case sectors where the towers divided up from each side intersect
01:26:24 intersect one two three and four it gives the odds officer-in-charge much better overall control command and control of an incident for you to be able to focus on one specific task area or location and
01:26:35 one specific task area or location and to feed them information back to try and give them a better overall command and control position did you want you to assumed command of that sector did you radio either command unit or the
01:26:47 radio either command unit or the bridgehead to say that's what you've done I send a lot of messages that night via handheld radio and also by runner and I can't remember physically doing
01:27:00 and I can't remember physically doing that so much in your capacities sector commander to whom would you report the incident commander and did you try and get a report through to station manager
01:27:12 get a report through to station manager Walton or a successors at any stage to indicate that you were the sector commander yes sir at one point I need to have I'd like to run in the incident I had a conversation with an ops commander
01:27:23 had a conversation with an ops commander and it had been discussed or confirmed over the radio but I was in sector four I'm running sector four and they were happy to leave that as that was there were a lot of radio messages backwards and forwards but the radio communication
01:27:34 and forwards but the radio communication at times was strange due to the traffic that was on the handheld flight where I'm radios and just going back a step to your when you present it to the command
01:27:45 your when you present it to the command unit can you describe us what the situation was like in the command units at that stage unusually for the incident of that size it was anything other than one officer on it which was watched
01:27:58 one officer on it which was watched managing merrick he was at the desk at the far end of the command unit sitting down and I don't know whether he's on the main screen radio or handheld phone beams furiously writing information down
01:28:10 beams furiously writing information down onto
01:28:11 onto a notepad you can ask you apologies for jumping around but can I ask you to turn to your second witness statement page two and it's roughly halfway down the
01:28:22 two and it's roughly halfway down the page we say I was in charge of the east side of the building and was monitoring the north side of the tower as well did anyone place you in charge of monitoring
01:28:34 anyone place you in charge of monitoring the north side or was it you assumed responsibility our only by location and default and you assumed that position at the same time you assumed command of
01:28:45 the same time you assumed command of sector four I'll see it yes he's been in charge of monitoring the same as being a sector commander it could be seen as that yet but ultimately as the incident
01:28:58 that yet but ultimately as the incident would progress or get larger you'd have a monitoring officer basically sitting on your shoulder monitoring your actions and as if it's the instant would increase that would proceed to vary the
01:29:09 increase that would proceed to vary the different rates in relation to your role as sector commander did you have a monitoring officer with you at any stage unusually oh this instant no not for a very long time and in respect to the
01:29:20 very long time and in respect to the north side the tower would you've had and launching also bespoke to that side
01:29:27 what arrangements did you were put in place or did you have in place to allow you to command sector for the east side and to monitor what was going on the north side how did you do the two jobs I suppose I'm asking why so from the east
01:29:39 suppose I'm asking why so from the east side of the building from that grass area that was on the east side of group Tower I only had to take between 20 and 30 paces to be able to see the north and the south side of the tower and so from
01:29:52 the south side of the tower and so from that position I could see three sides I had no contact the west side at all and the east side is my main focus but obviously as the fire developed and the fire movement went around the building
01:30:04 fire movement went around the building it gave me a good view of the north end of the south side as well thank you going back to your second witness statement page 2 the same paragraph we were looking at the second sentence says where possible I was relaying
01:30:16 where possible I was relaying information back to the command units in the bridgehead but with regards to the burn rate of the fire now first of all how frequently were you able to send information back to the command unit I
01:30:27 information back to the command unit I said information back to command Jenny or the incident commander generically and I did that every time I thought there was something that had changed or was relevant for me to update them on on how that fire was progressing or
01:30:39 how that fire was progressing or maneuvering across the building to give a practical example what changed triggered would trigger a call to the command unit just to give people an idea flavor of the for example why obviously
01:30:50 flavor of the for example why obviously we're trying to send messages by handheld radio which became very difficult as certain periods of time I think then that evening I said possibly three handwritten messages by for a
01:31:01 three handwritten messages by for a notepad and sent a runner one of those was to say that on the I'd noticed on the north side that the fire had then dropped down to the fourth floor my
01:31:13 dropped down to the fourth floor my concerns because I've been told or I was aware that the bridgeheads was on the fourth floor and I wanted to get that information back to the breach heads via the incident commander command
01:31:24 heads via the incident commander command unit or by by the lobby sector to let them know that they might know the smoke may have increased on that floor would you try and communicate directly with the bridgehead using that
01:31:35 directly with the bridgehead using that particular example whether by radio or by runner no it's that's not a new it's not a usual or it's not a usual fire ground procedure and why is this because
01:31:47 ground procedure and why is this because there's the instant command that ultimately needs to know the information now an instant that sighs they put people in place where the results of commander of offices it's been keep their spans of control down to a level that I can deal the information and that
01:31:59 that I can deal the information and that one message about the fire on the north side when it did drop down to the fourth floor I think I like the firefight or the leading firefighter or the crew
01:32:10 the leading firefighter or the crew manager that I designate to do that task set them to the command Gianna but also so you need to make sure 100% that this information goes to the bridgehead and when you use the radio to try and
01:32:22 when you use the radio to try and communicate for example with the command unit were you able to get through more often than not I'd say no no not more
01:32:34 often than not I'd say no no not more often than not it was hit and miss and with the fallback situation than those circumstances be the runner yes did you receive any requests from the command
01:32:46 receive any requests from the command unit for information regarding burn rates far spread
01:32:52 did you receive any requests from the bridgehead for example for any information regarding burn rate far spread can ask you to stay in your second winter statement second page the
01:33:05 second winter statement second page the second paragraph from the bottom and it's the final sentence which reads thus there was extensive external fire spread and an unusual burn pattern could you explain to us what you consider to be
01:33:16 explain to us what you consider to be unusual about the burn pattern okay and so from initially turning up her grim felt our said before the east side of the tower I described as it was in three
01:33:27 the tower I described as it was in three sections horizontally the section one turn three from left to right as I look to it as I face there and the third section from level four to the 23rd floor was alight and it then
01:33:39 the 23rd floor was alight and it then progressed to the second section and then was burning downwards now obviously fire can burn downwards it's more unusual than common and they ended up basically monitoring or observing a
01:33:51 basically monitoring or observing a diagonal line from the top right hand corner on the east side of grenfell tower which was burning down towards the southeast corner and how given your assessment that the fire was behaving an
01:34:02 assessment that the fire was behaving an unusual manner how did that inform your plan for fighting the fire on the north on the east side and really it was unusual I'd not seen it before burn like that we didn't know how water would
01:34:15 that we didn't know how water would react onto the exterior of the building we could see that the exterior cladding was involved it was a light and burning it's almost like a molten line across
01:34:27 it's almost like a molten line across diagonally across the building that was slowly making its way down to the bottom left-hand corner we may come on to it later but there was evidence given by firefighter Brown and the reference is
01:34:39 firefighter Brown and the reference is 29th of June 2018 page 34 line three and he describes when he was directing water from flat 16 on to the cladding he described the waters bouncing off is
01:34:51 described the waters bouncing off is that a phenomenon you experienced from your sector on the east side no I mean the only thing you could you could compare it to is like a warehouse with sandwich panels this obviously got a flammable material just stuck in between
01:35:04 flammable material just stuck in between two metal panels and if you put water directly onto that because obviously it's designed to repel water so where the exterior the building had broken down or deep
01:35:15 down or deep posed enough the water would penetrate either behind the exterior facades and the gap between that and the exterior of the building the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the aerial ladder platform water
01:35:27 you is the aerial ladder platform water supply and first of all the first topic really discusses location and Paul could I ask you to turn up met treble zero one six eight five four and if you could
01:35:48 mr. BAE looking at maybe more helpful looking at the screen above you are you able to pinpoint for us where the ALP from Soho was parked yeah well rather conveniently where the red arrow is on
01:36:00 conveniently where the red arrow is on the east side of the tower and that's the exact location at the ARP and can you describe for us the other sub topographical features on the east side of the tower and so the crew I think
01:36:12 of the tower and so the crew I think that night was temporary temporary crew management Frost and firefight king he was a driver it's been directed that was the only way they could get access there was no access to the north south or west side of the tower
01:36:24 side of the tower Paddington's TL was already in the north sorry in the east South corner directly next to the towers it was basically the only location left to put a large appliance and they shouldn't have had it
01:36:35 appliance and they shouldn't have had it there in the first place because it was on grass
01:36:38 on grass the aerial now to platform weighs 23 tons it's outside of policy to put it off of hard standing and we've made the decision that it being what quite warm the ground was quite hard and it was a
01:36:50 the ground was quite hard and it was a risk that we were sort of prepared to take to set it up the grass verge from where it was sitting sloped down towards the east side of the tower and there was a row of trees between us and the tower maybe three or four trees now given
01:37:06 maybe three or four trees now given those topographical features to what extent could the alp be used to rescue residents from the tower and we were restricted massively from how far away
01:37:18 restricted massively from how far away from the tower that we had we could get with the perfect pitch if you could get right underneath the tower you could get the cage on the ALP to the ninth and
01:37:29 the cage on the ALP to the ninth and outer push maybe the 10th floor from where we were located we can reach the tower with the cage and you described in the witness statement for
01:37:40 described in the witness statement for nature and intensity of the debris falling down or able to amplify for us the describe for us that the debris that's falling down from the tower yes we had to operate in place as
01:37:51 we had to operate in place as of a safe system of work because I was worried about the safety of the crews operate in the aerial obviously I've got a firefighter in a cage which is in a very particular very dangerous situation and the driver at the base of it we sort
01:38:04 and the driver at the base of it we sort of designed a system amongst ourselves for safety both speaking and talking to each other there was six by four six by four feet metal sheets falling off the building regular which of them planed and
01:38:15 regular which of them planed and couldn't predict where they were going to land all of us were covered at certain points throughout the incident we've molten plastic strands the trees for one of a different statement look like those been decorated since or the
01:38:27 like those been decorated since or the end of the incident we've covered in molten aluminium as well at different points that drips off in the tower and there was other debris packing insulation and other plastic that we had fallen off the side of the girder
01:38:39 fallen off the side of the girder turning to a different question now and that's the question of predetermined attendance and is it corrected until recently the attendance of an aryl appliance was a predetermined attendance
01:38:51 appliance was a predetermined attendance requirement for all high-rise buildings yes of course is it correct that until recently attendance of an aerial was a predetermined attendance at all high-rise fires yeah the print the PDAs
01:39:02 high-rise fires yeah the print the PDAs have changed recently for high-rise buildings they were they used to be on them many years ago but they were taken off IQ member when they were taken off you'd have to refer to the LF API of
01:39:14 you'd have to refer to the LF API of when they did that okay and do you recall why I think I wouldn't like to say of cost-cutting exercise I expect okay now can I turn to the next topic
01:39:27 okay now can I turn to the next topic which is the initial your initial observation of the ALP and apologies class who turned back to your first witness statement page four and the second paragraph on that page and you
01:39:38 second paragraph on that page and you say on our arrival I'd seen that my ALP two for five was situated on the east side of the building the quickly identified that had no dedicated pump or secure water supply you say quickly
01:39:49 secure water supply you say quickly identified first did you identify the absence of a dedicated pump or secure water supply before you attended the Cu or after you being to see you because after the see you after on Speights
01:40:00 after the see you after on Speights watch manager down and the crew from alpha to 45 they're basically shouting at me to come over in your mind it's okay and what were they saying is though shouting at you probably couldn't repeat most of it in this room but it was but
01:40:13 most of it in this room but it was but if you give us the gist it was blatantly obvious that they they needed water supply which they didn't have they had no secure water source and they needed help in setting up and getting the oil Peter what did they give
01:40:25 getting the oil Peter what did they give you a summary however expressed of the efforts they've made to locate a water supply before you arrived yes they had they said that they've been there there was I hope we had concerns and I had concerns that obviously there was
01:40:37 concerns that obviously there was already a pumping appliance connected to Paddington's aerial appliance and also there was water going into the building lower that means we're dry wiser so in those circumstances you're very aware
01:40:48 those circumstances you're very aware but if you're then going to set up an aerial appliance you don't want to starve that waters of life because fire fires within the building needed for fire media now flowing on from that answer if you look at the penultimate
01:40:59 answer if you look at the penultimate paragraph on page four you say the two you sent off to MDS I think to find a water supply you said the two empties returned with a two-for-one which just
01:41:10 returned with a two-for-one which just happened to be my appliance and they set to work getting the water supply set up from a nearby hydrant can you remember after you dispatch them how long it took for them to come back with alpha 2 for one maybe five minutes okay Paul might
01:41:24 one maybe five minutes okay Paul might ask you to turn up be l8r quadruple zero triple zero twelve underscore 11 and there we have figured 17.7 from dr.
01:41:37 there we have figured 17.7 from dr. lanes report miss bill I doubt you've seen this before no sir you'll see marked in blue are the locations the hydrants can you identify
01:41:48 locations the hydrants can you identify the location of the hydrant you use supply alpha 2 for 1 or rather the two MDS had identified from that diagram I
01:41:59 MDS had identified from that diagram I believe the hydrogen we used is the blue square above the 85 meters and expectations Laser Center thank you now could I now
01:42:10 Laser Center thank you now could I now turn to the LP itself and Paul could I ask you to turn up lfb quadruple zero one nine one four underscore ninety four and if you could
01:42:21 underscore ninety four and if you could amplify the top box is this a photograph of the same model as alpha two four five I believe so sir yes you mentioned
01:42:33 I believe so sir yes you mentioned earlier on an earlier answer that the maximum reach of this model is ten floors is that right have I summarized it right yeah if you'd if you could get the aerial into sighted position what would we call a clean pitch that you
01:42:44 would we call a clean pitch that you could be directly underneath the area you were trying to get to and knowing floors is achievable ten hour push okay assuming optimal pressure how high could
01:42:56 assuming optimal pressure how high could the jet reach from the cage if you're at the tenth floor so optimum pressure that vehicle requires two thousand two hundred and forty liters a minute of
01:43:07 hundred and forty liters a minute of water they've got to be supplied by dedicated pump at eleven point five bars and statistically it states that from the solicit open in deeds monitor in the
01:43:19 the solicit open in deeds monitor in the cage he's got a reach of an optimum situation of 75 meters okay the cage itself how many people can it accommodate four could it accommodate
01:43:30 accommodate four could it accommodate for example a wheelchair-bound casualty as well as I think the wheelchair is I spies ultimately but we've been more concerned about getting the person out
01:43:41 concerned about getting the person out their wheelchair and into the cage and down safely can I now ask you a few questions about the LP and its use and getting it into position you mentioned earlier on about the need for it to be
01:43:53 earlier on about the need for it to be on a hard standing and to avoid grass assume you find a hard place is stabilizing jacks need to be used as that right that's correct and then the
01:44:04 that right that's correct and then the ladder but the cage platform needs to be raised as well that's great I recognize everything turns on particular circumstances but as a general rule of thumb how long it take to get the LP in position jacks
01:44:15 it take to get the LP in position jacks and then the ladder raised it's only a few minutes it doesn't take me long at all under five let's be set up do you know how long that process took it grandpa'll towered had taken place before you arrived and it took a little
01:44:27 before you arrived and it took a little bit longer because we had a discussion about the hard standing and we tried to put in place that obviously I wasn't ideally happy that it was on grass and it wasn't on tarmac or concrete and I'd spoken to the driver and the
01:44:39 spoken to the driver and the firefighters and they were prepared to even try and extend it and put it up because obviously ultimately they are at risk we put a safe system are working and monitored the jacks they said that
01:44:50 and monitored the jacks they said that we / vo-- any water runoff away from the grass to rent again soft and just monitored it consistently okay is it right that before narrow appliances used as a water tower a risk assessment
01:45:02 as a water tower a risk assessment should be carried out that's correct can you explain how do you carry out that risk assessment in a situation which confronted you at ground for being very difficult to do that but ultimately just like I said we've put in the
01:45:13 just like I said we've put in the appliance on hard standing you do die a dynamic risk assessment and to see what the benefit would be to with your outweighed the risk okay what factors did you have in mind when you carried
01:45:24 did you have in mind when you carried out your dynamic risk assessment and well safety of my crews is my ultimate paramount obviously that there was residents in the building that needed rescuing and we'll see had an external
01:45:36 rescuing and we'll see had an external stare of the building was on fire I wanted to get some more to answer to try and assist or make the conditions better and just trying to get an understanding of what normal practice is but would you
01:45:47 of what normal practice is but would you agree that error appliances wouldn't normally be used for external firefighting in high-rise residential buildings until it been confirmed that there was no longer any life risk in the building yeah you've got to be very
01:45:58 building yeah you've got to be very careful and even on the night of groennfell that you can put if you set an arien appliance up and had optimum pressure and the perfect scenario and
01:46:09 pressure and the perfect scenario and managed to put two 240 litres of water a minute on to that building and the exterior compartments of those buildings had fractured or decomposed you would then change the conditions inside the building there to
01:46:21 conditions inside the building there to mentally whether it be two firefighters or any residents within their own rescue and is it possible that the use of either jets or spray smell appliances
01:46:33 either jets or spray smell appliances can make conditions worse it seems to follow on from what you're saying by preventing hot gases venting etc how'd you do say in a situation like that initially we used as a covering jet so
01:46:45 initially we used as a covering jet so they with the aerial operators would utilize the machine to make it what is one called a water curtain the base of the water cascade down the front of the building exterior you'd be very you'd be
01:46:56 building exterior you'd be very you'd be trying to avoid at all cost to put the Jets straight into a window that say at one of those flats because ultimately you're going to push the fire into the building into the property and then egress into their comment communal areas
01:47:07 egress into their comment communal areas and did all those factors inform the instructions you gave to your crew when they were operating the LP yes it did and just understanding how does that work in the practical situation would
01:47:20 work in the practical situation would you say you were aiming the jet or the spray at a particular floor would you coordinate with the command unit or the bridgehead to determine whether first of all there were any residents there
01:47:31 all there were any residents there knowledge within the flat so you are aiming at all firefighters yeah I mean Owen it's my initial plan we've got I had in front of me was to put a water curtain onto the building I could see the exterior was alive the cladding was
01:47:43 the exterior was alive the cladding was a liar and there was this obviously molten line that was working its way down this building that was my my first thing before I willing to put any water into an individual flat on her floor that would have had to have gone through
01:47:54 that would have had to have gone through the instant come on command Jeannie and confirming the bridgehead that we've been Avenue firefighters in that particular area and has that confirmation secured via radio or via the runner or both ideally hand
01:48:05 or via the runner or both ideally hand her radio that night it was a very busy incident and it would have been a mixture of handheld radio and it would have had to be runners you say it would have been my question is was it we did
01:48:18 have been my question is was it we did you it didn't we didn't have we didn't have the water supply we needed so it never reached that stage of having to speak to the incident command to confirm whether we wanted us to do aggressive firefighting into any floor that
01:48:30 firefighting into any floor that building and so we'll come on to it later but when you improvise using the hose reel yeah would you have informed the incident commander of that improvisation and the start of operation
01:48:41 improvisation and the start of operation of that device ideally yes on that night now I've him there and just ask the inevitable question why why did you decide not to update the incident commander on that occasion with the
01:48:52 commander on that occasion with the issues that I had on that sector I tried probably five or six different things together secure I had a secure water supply but to actually get water into the building effectively I was literally taking things off and going through
01:49:04 taking things off and going through different ideas utilizing different pieces of equipment that we have on the run to then be able to report back to the instant commander to say we had an effective firefighter source on the east side thank you and now want to discuss
01:49:17 side thank you and now want to discuss with you the question of water pressure and if I could ask you to turn back to your first witness statement page five and the second paragraph on that page and it says this once in position as
01:49:29 and it says this once in position as soon became apparent and the lp did not have the required water pressure needed it should use two thousand five hundred liters per minute but the monitors showed that we only had an applet of 383 liters per minute we were not close
01:49:41 liters per minute we were not close enough for that level to even reach the building that so we need to think of an alternative plan and you go on in the next paragraph to say this I did not know exactly why the pressure was that low but it could have been for a number
01:49:52 low but it could have been for a number of reasons and there was nothing I could do at that time about the mains water pressure now you were further to a number of reasons could you set out for us what those reasons were or could have
01:50:04 us what those reasons were or could have been
01:50:05 been okay it's quite common for us to experience low-pressure water pressure sorry in certain areas of London when we're firefighting obviously at that situation where we were we had there was
01:50:18 situation where we were we had there was a pumping appliance already supplying the dry riser into Granville Tower and there was an aerial appliance from Paddington Alford two one three that was already in operation I didn't know I can't tell from looking at the surface
01:50:29 can't tell from looking at the surface whether the main that we've plugged into was their main as well and ideally you utilize the water authority then and - they turn up basically with handheld tablets and they
01:50:40 basically with handheld tablets and they can tell us if there is a better main or about water source near to us that we can utilize them instead of the one that we've made plugged into which will always be the nearest one to the location that you're at when you confront to the problem such as the
01:50:52 confront to the problem such as the problem of low water pressure what are the usual workarounds you'll try to get greater pressure to allow you to fight a far more effectively well initially I wasn't I wasn't overly concerned I mean 383 litres of water isn't isn't
01:51:05 I mean 383 litres of water isn't isn't before that aerial appliance isn't great I could have supplied our did supply a jet from it which was was something and it's quite common for the the Water Authority - in areas lower the water
01:51:17 Authority - in areas lower the water pressure in certain places then they do this for their waste water management projects and to try and conserve leakage when the water three then would turn up
01:51:28 when the water three then would turn up they usually will then have got the ability to then increase the water pressure for us do you know when Thames Water was first contacted by the LFE on the night I'm not sure sir - check the incident log and when we you first aware
01:51:41 incident log and when we you first aware of the presence of water of the scene and I think I put in my statement it was about 4 or 5 a.m. but I'm not hunting for certain on that time I seemed like a long time I'd asked rather resources for your mortar officer
01:51:54 rather resources for your mortar officer and asked whether their homes lair unit had been ordered or whether we had a high volume pump enroute to the area and [Music]
01:52:02 [Music] but obviously when Tim's water did turn up they gave me not particularly great news so we'll come on to that a few stages ahead but when you were confronted with this problem of water
01:52:13 confronted with this problem of water pressure did you seek advice from any other officer as to possible solutions to the problem there was no officer in our area I sent a message I sent messages back the handheld radio back to the commander you
01:52:24 handheld radio back to the commander you need to say obviously we were setting up alpha 2 45 on the e sector for external fire fire and I was having trouble with water supplies and I did this a few times on the radio I wasn't happy with
01:52:36 times on the radio I wasn't happy with the response that I got via the radio and again that sent a message by a runner now to whom with the radio messages directed it would have been generic come on junior or instant
01:52:47 generic come on junior or instant commander ok and what responses did you get that you weren't content with initially I didn't get a response and I think the second message I've got a response to say the water officer NFB
01:53:00 response to say the water officer NFB wall to officer was on so I was going to come over to the area and have a discussion to me about what we can do and did the water officer come over and have a discussion as to possible solution to that service or did you try
01:53:15 solution to that service or did you try and update the bridge headers to the problems you were having with water pressure was that not an issue didn't you'd race with the bridge that wouldn't it wouldn't be my remit to contact the bridgehead Avella given the difficulties you encountered with this hydrant did
01:53:28 you encountered with this hydrant did you take any steps to locate an alternative hydrant yes we did so I'm further up past Kensington Leisure Centre I think the roads are called the Verity close which is the way that the
01:53:39 Verity close which is the way that the appliance was taken in over the block paving they like to expound to further Hyjal further like the way it's quite a long way up the road they'd run I don't know 10 12 lengths of hose into
01:53:51 I don't know 10 12 lengths of hose into from that hydrogen leads when they test the hydrogen they obviously take the plate off the floor connects a stamp lighter and ship here or turn it on as we would call it and they obviously see the water come out so they we could
01:54:03 the water come out so they we could happy that the hydrogen had a good pressure but we never got to connect that hydrogen to our pumping appliance and what was that that over lady at the time the Water Authority had arrived the
01:54:15 time the Water Authority had arrived the three gentlemen I think or their handheld tablets I spoke to him on the wall outside kids in some nature center they said to me there was nothing that they could do to increase the water pressure at that time well I had three eighty three liters a minute coming out
01:54:27 eighty three liters a minute coming out the ground was the best I was going to get and they were more concerns that within the next hour or two hours time the water pressure was going to drop due to the fact that people would be utilizing water within their surrounding
01:54:39 utilizing water within their surrounding premise okay um Paulo sonic can we go back if possible to be la our quadruple zero trouble zero underscore 11 and if we could magnify
01:54:51 underscore 11 and if we could magnify figure 17.7 the alternative hydrant you referred to there can you see it identified on that plan no sir thank you
01:55:06 going back to the search for an alternative hydrant would would you have expected the MDT to have been able to give you locations of alternative supplemental hydrants yeah a usual
01:55:18 supplemental hydrants yeah a usual protocol would be to guard the MDT to the map and it will tell the juicier drivers job they'll identify the nearest location of the hydrants on the MDT that night though the MDT was blank thinking
01:55:34 night though the MDT was blank thinking that through we you over how practicable would it have been to search for someone from the North Kensington station to ask them whether they had any local knowledge of the location of any alternative hydrants and it may have
01:55:46 alternative hydrants and it may have been a golden opportunity but it's not one that we had taken what question which is arisen is when you've asked the water Undertaker here Thames Water to
01:55:57 water Undertaker here Thames Water to reduce the pressure how long does can you give us an idea of how long it takes for the water Undertaker to reduce the pressure following a G say increase sorry increased pressure sorry and it never
01:56:09 increased pressure sorry and it never seems to take that long I couldn't give you an exact time okay now I'm given the water pressure issue you refer to in your statement further need to an alternate for in an alternative plan
01:56:20 alternate for in an alternative plan what plan
01:56:21 what plan did you formulate is it the improvisation in which you use the hose reel yeah so obviously we've got different Jets different branches they as you said the the idea would have been
01:56:32 as you said the the idea would have been to have the monitor on the cage of the ALP working but that's like an open-ended monitor you can't dial it down or reduce the flow rate through it it's open you can read it you can induce
01:56:43 it's open you can read it you can induce the width of the cone to a jet or are widely out to a comb but you can't reduce the flow rates that's like the maximum amount so I tried different things of a ground monitor different branches and it was more luck than
01:56:57 branches and it was more luck than anything else that alpha 2:41 have been brought around by the two guys that have gone off to get them it's a brand new Mercedes with this new high-pressure hose reel that we had on and it uses
01:57:08 hose reel that we had on and it uses less water but still keys gave us a substantial jet it's very similar to put rosenbauer 101 on a 230 litre setting on a four
01:57:17 a four five more hoes okay and how effective was that arrangement once you got it set up and once we got it sent up and it was strapped to the cage it's a little bit Heath Robinson but we were desperate to
01:57:30 Heath Robinson but we were desperate to try and do something to make some sort of stop on the fire encroaching any further down the building the areas that we worked it onto the facade on the outside it seemed to stop it in
01:57:41 outside it seemed to stop it in particular one area we had a gentleman trapped on I doubt between the 11th and 13th floor and we managed to stop the fire spread about a meter away from his window and that was on the east side from the east side can you remember how
01:57:54 from the east side can you remember how long you use that arrangement for in fighting the fire five hours now turn to
01:58:05 fighting the fire five hours now turn to a new topic again linked to the operation of the LP and it's the slow movement you referred to in your witness statement and if I could ask you to turn back to page five of your first witness statement and it's the fifth paragraph
01:58:18 statement and it's the fifth paragraph which starts with the words I then became aware of a problem with the LP itself crew manager Frost was still in the cage and very close to the burning debris still falling down normally the alp has two speeds and they would use
01:58:30 alp has two speeds and they would use the fast beat to maneuver away from danger for some reason only the slow speed was working which meant that it took ages for them to move out of danger and back down to the best of your knowledge is this a problem you'd
01:58:41 knowledge is this a problem you'd encounter previously with this a LP not specifically with that a LP I can't remember a time we usually have a turntable ladder aside and the ILP was a was a spare because
01:58:53 and the ILP was a was a spare because our one was off the service historically there's been an issue with them they do break down and you'd have to speak to fleet why that happens or how oft where it happens but they have they do lockout
01:59:05 it happens but they have they do lockout they're going to slow mode it's I know this to do with the construction of them being two different manufacturers strapped together or a lot but it has historically happened and were you able to solve this problem on the night
01:59:17 to solve this problem on the night nightmare one point which is arisen is whether are you aware that the comm system that the cage was also had also failed due to a faulty transmitter yes
01:59:29 failed due to a faulty transmitter yes yeah and can you amplify what particular problem was and when it started and I don't know what the specific mechanical problem was with it but the the operator
01:59:40 problem was with it but the the operator of the cages I've seen the cage or whatever high up today to me is they've got a speaker set up on their dashboard which then a secondary operates it's in a big chair at the bottom of the ALP
01:59:51 a big chair at the bottom of the ALP ultimately they're in charge of the safety of the crew above and if the the crew in the cage becomes overwhelmed or something happens they can take over at the bottom of those who ride everything and it became quite apparent quite soon
02:00:04 and it became quite apparent quite soon because crew motocross was in the cage and was getting pelted with debris the same as father King he was on the ALP at the base and it wasn't making any action
02:00:15 the base and it wasn't making any action and it didn't look like he was taking actually to move herself away from the danger and we had a quick chat by a fire ground radio I managed to get messy streets and he said that he was having trouble controlling everything well
02:00:27 trouble controlling everything well which time I told him to bring it down or move it away from the tower and did he suffer any injury and Jen and I stood there in what effect did the problem regarding the slow movement of the Vale
02:00:40 regarding the slow movement of the Vale P have on the effectiveness of the firefighting operation why it pushed me towards having an unmanned cage I'm no personnel in the cage because
02:00:52 I'm no personnel in the cage because though there wasn't the facility for them to be able to maneuver that cage out of the way should they should they breach D and again same question in relation to the faulty comm system what
02:01:05 relation to the faulty comm system what effect did that have on the effectiveness the firefighting operation not a lot really because we revised our hand signals and shout at each other mostly okay can I now turn to a set a new topic and
02:01:17 can I now turn to a set a new topic and that's a designation as safety officers east side of the tower and if I could ask you to turn first in your first witness statement to page six nearly halfway down that page you say the ops
02:01:29 halfway down that page you say the ops commander designated me as safety officer for the east side first of all can you remember who the ops commander was at that stage it neither of them can remember what rank he was given you with
02:01:43 remember what rank he was given you with a sector commander what additional duties with designation as Safety Officer bring well ultimately you are in charge of safety of that sector they had concerns at that time that the building
02:01:54 concerns at that time that the building may fail on the periphery and they wanted to put in some sort of span of control over that and it's not usual for I said to the winder to be the safety
02:02:06 I said to the winder to be the safety officer as well but that's what happened on my evening as please put more blunt view what what was the point in designating your safety officer at that
02:02:17 designating your safety officer at that stage was it simply to put in step arrangement should the building fail
02:02:24 when it was designated to me personally I didn't see what the point was because we've been here for such a long time and but there are certain spans of control that the instant commander would have put in and it probably would have been
02:02:35 put in and it probably would have been highlighted on the command unit there was no safety officer in that area and they needed to dis and make someone through that role with the safety officer have any functions in relation to management management handling
02:02:46 to management management handling responding to FS G's so no witnesses sorry with the safety officer have any role in the handling management or responding to FSGS no now in your
02:02:58 responding to FSGS no now in your witness statement you describe seeing people within the tower and calling out for help were you able to pass on information regarding their location to the command unit or the bridgehead and
02:03:09 the command unit or the bridgehead and there when we went obviously we first took over that east side and there was numerous windows where we can see people in on different levels at the top all the way down and a lot of them was
02:03:22 the way down and a lot of them was signalling either by torch or turn the lights on and off where you can see some of them on the lower levels were to run a mobile phone so I've got a question was in front of Anna tangent don't were
02:03:33 was in front of Anna tangent don't were you able to pass on information regarding the location of the people you could see signaling from the outside it's very difficult it's looking at the outside of the building to locate a
02:03:44 outside of the building to locate a floor was hard because obviously didn't start from the ground floor there was a gap you can count from the top down but you've got to know exactly how many floors there are and then from the outside exterior is very difficult to
02:03:55 outside exterior is very difficult to have an exact flat location inside he said a message to say that we've got people on multiple floors that we can see and we were told that they had multiple FSGS in place and we're aware
02:04:07 multiple FSGS in place and we're aware and when you use the radio we're using channel 3 or any other channel to communicate of the five rounds I'll use my hand here ray channel 1 it's up at some point it was
02:04:19 channel 1 it's up at some point it was in the latter parts of that incident and it may have been in his family ops commander came over to give me the additional world as a as a safety officer I believe we may have changed to
02:04:32 officer I believe we may have changed to another channel but I can't thank you would you have supplemented those communications with a runner carrying a handwritten message at all yeah the gentleman that we believe was trapped
02:04:43 gentleman that we believe was trapped between the 11th and 13th floor we had sent messages via the handheld radio for that or I had and we'd obviously watched for numerous hours the fire spread
02:04:56 for numerous hours the fire spread across the face of the building and we'd still managed to protect this one small area so we wrote the details down of this gentleman who sent that to the command unit I mentioned earlier we'd
02:05:08 command unit I mentioned earlier we'd come back to the topic of thames water attendance and if looking still at page 6 of your first witness statements halfway down the page you say it must
02:05:19 halfway down the page you say it must have been about four to five I am when Thames water turned up and they had with them all sorts of kit to test the pressure I was hoping that they would be able to increase the pressure somehow but in fact they were concerned that
02:05:31 but in fact they were concerned that would only reduce further once residents in nearby towers house started using their water supplies did you speak directly with a representative ten years old first time you met Thames Water
02:05:45 old first time you met Thames Water representative what did you say to them i tailed in the experiences that i was having with the water told him that i was having at that time on the back of the brand new Mercedes they've got flow dates of information which was you know
02:05:56 dates of information which was you know very helpful a evening I've told him I had 383 litres of water coming out of the hydrant and obviously I needed 2415 for the alp and it was there anything
02:06:07 for the alp and it was there anything that he could was there a separate mine further away that we could utilize and did you you say he had first bits of equipment with him did you see him carrying out any
02:06:18 him did you see him carrying out any tests no was station manager cook were you work first of all that he was the
02:06:29 you work first of all that he was the officer in charge of the water sector do you have any discussions at any time with station manager cook regarding water pressure I had a conversation with the water officer once maybe twice
02:06:40 the water officer once maybe twice throughout the evening but I couldn't tell you there was stationed major cook thank you
02:06:45 thank you turning on to use of other equipment at one stage in the evening a lightweight portable pump was deployed were you aware of its deployment as well as his
02:06:57 aware of its deployment as well as his deployment in it went into the tower and we were able to form a view as to the effectiveness of it as man not from where our standards would have been
02:07:10 where our standards would have been useful to have had a light weight portable pump on to fight fire on the exterior and I've been in no different position so the 393 litres of water a minute going into an LP P it was going
02:07:22 minute going into an LP P it was going to give me exactly the same as put in 383 liters into the fire appliance the fire appliance if anything it's got more control over it no mr. Beale thank you very much those are the questions I've got for you now so it might be
02:07:34 got for you now so it might be appropriate to have a short break to see whether there are any further matters that need to be covered well given the time it might be appropriate I was slightly longer break than you would otherwise
02:07:44 otherwise I'm gratefulness thanks Anne but you can use it to see whether there any other questions that make something to us that mr. people we're gonna have a break now during the morning come here
02:07:58 break now during the morning come here for two tape course now so we'll stop now we will resume at five to twelve and I'm going to ask you please not to talk about your evidence to anyone while
02:08:10 about your evidence to anyone while you're out on the road yes right now if you like to go - thank you she'll look after you
02:08:25 Thank You 512 Thanks
02:08:37 you
02:24:18 [Music]
02:24:29 yes mr. kair just a few questions but limited ones all right thank you
02:24:49 Thank You mr. Biel until the funeral Chester's larosa mr. bill thank you for your patience first of all if I could ask you to turn to page three of your first witness statement and this really
02:25:00 first witness statement and this really questions concern your observation of the extent of the fire when you arrived at the fire scene you set out in broad
02:25:11 at the fire scene you set out in broad terms it's the middle paragraph on that page what you encountered and you say roughly halfway down the page itself from the point I first saw the fire it
02:25:22 from the point I first saw the fire it was between the fourth to 25th floor on the third section these first and second sections were untouched now when you save the 25th floor by that do you mean the very top of the tower yeah at the
02:25:34 the very top of the tower yeah at the time my time we turn up a green filter I didn't know the number of floors and besser that's a misprint for from me so but by that you mean the very tall floor for the fourth floor to the top floor on
02:25:45 for the fourth floor to the top floor on the third section the right-hand section and often East face you say there further down I would also add that
02:25:57 further down I would also add that between floors four to eight the fire pier to engulf the inside of the flat as well as the outside and so you're absolutely clear that had been internal penetration of the fire on those floors
02:26:08 penetration of the fire on those floors at that stage hundred personas when you say engulfed previous witnesses have used a percentage to describe the extent of fire engaged within a flat using a
02:26:20 of fire engaged within a flat using a percentage so what how would you describe to engulfed and I hope you're not this question but it may be useful to first share it it's pretty difficult for me to give you an accurate percentage of the whole premise or the whole individual flags I couldn't see in
02:26:31 whole individual flags I couldn't see in all the rooms but the right hand set of windows in that third section that room were over the room was behind that window was a hundred percent engulfed in flames and [Music]
02:26:44 [Music] was it again this may be an obvious question to what extent was it clear to you that the exterior the extent of the exterior flame was fully engaged by this
02:26:56 exterior flame was fully engaged by this stage could you repeat that question yes it's not very good question that's why I'm unusual candor I'm not saying
02:27:10 I'm unusual candor I'm not saying anything was it visually obvious that the exterior was alight as the question I've been asked it was visually obvious that the internal flats were alight on
02:27:21 that the internal flats were alight on those sections it was visually obvious that the exterior surface whatever that may have been at that time was alive and you didn't know at that stage whether its cladding or not because I didn't know what it was building steering
02:27:32 know what it was building steering surface was alight and the byproduct with that was molten aluminium and plastic you went on in your statement to refer to Moulton plastic and aluminium pouring down causing the other flats to
02:27:44 pouring down causing the other flats to catch light could you describe for us briefly that process what you saw yeah I don't know from 100% with the word comfortable with the word poor ring now but use whatever you think is is there
02:27:56 but use whatever you think is is there you could visually see from that diagonal line as a section of paneling called light there was a surface flame surface flame line molten molten line
02:28:07 surface flame line molten molten line across the surface that was alight from that the byproducts was aluminium and molten plastic you could visually see it come down the surface of the outside of the facade or drip down in between the
02:28:19 the facade or drip down in between the gap and then it would set light to the bit that was below it okay mr. Beale those are all the questions I have for you finally it leaves me to say thank you very much for tending stairs been very helpful thank you
02:28:31 very helpful thank you well I'd like to add my thanks as well as those of mr. Kinnear he's very helpful to us to hear descriptions first-hand descriptions and find giving us and also here about the questions of other water outside so very
02:28:44 questions of other water outside so very helpful thank you very much for coming on thank you so much so you're free to go we thank together the our chefs you look after
02:28:57 thank you very much mr. Kiir no certainly a witness another witness and another counsel I'm afraid mr. millet will be examining mr. bachelor might may invite you to rise very briefly to
02:29:09 invite you to rise very briefly to arrange for the change of personnel introduced yes thank you I'll rise to find others
02:29:23 you
02:33:41 yes mr. millet mr. chairman we now have our next witness who is crew manager Christopher Bachelder if he could be late to be brought in
02:34:16 [Music] administer shock it should be the truth shall be the truth
02:34:26 thank you very much mr. bachelor sit down make yourself comfy yes mr. mr. chairman no mr. bachelor door can I start by asking you please to give the inquiry your full name yeah
02:34:38 give the inquiry your full name yeah Christopher bachelor right and can I begin by thanking you very much for coming to this inquiry and assisting us with our investigations we very much appreciate it I am I will ask you number
02:34:51 appreciate it I am I will ask you number of questions if you don't understand them all you want me to repeat them or put the question in a different way I'm very happy to do so just say if you need breaks at any time just say or signal
02:35:02 breaks at any time just say or signal and we could take a break thank you now can I start then by asking you to look at your statement that you've provided dated the 29th of July 2017 and you'll
02:35:13 dated the 29th of July 2017 and you'll find that in the first tab of the blue file in front of you we also tend to look at statements and any other documents through the monitor which is on the screen at the back of the bill at
02:35:26 on the screen at the back of the bill at the room or on the desk in front in front of you there this statement is a meaty quadruple 0 75 1 1 and you've also done some contemporaneous notes which are a meaty
02:35:39 contemporaneous notes which are a meaty quadruple 0 5 3 8 8 so far as the statement is concerned looking back at that have you read that recently yes I have and can you confirm that the
02:35:50 have and can you confirm that the contents of it are true yes and have you read your contemporaneous notes recently yes I am okay and can you confirm that you haven't discussed the evidence in
02:36:02 you haven't discussed the evidence in those documents all the evidence that you're going to give to the inquiry with anybody before coming here today I know you contend that those those documents in addition to what you're going to tell us stand as your evidence to the
02:36:14 us stand as your evidence to the Enquirer
02:36:14 Enquirer yes okay now can either start there with a little a little bit of a discussion about your career so far you've been with the lfb I think for over just over
02:36:27 with the lfb I think for over just over 16 years 17 years yes 17 now okay can you tell us exactly when you joined yeah join me in may 2001 may 2001 your current rank is is crew manager is that right yes okay and was
02:36:39 manager is that right yes okay and was that your the rank that you held on the night of the Father yes it was June 2017 and you were I think at that date based of fulham yes and that is I think a one
02:36:50 of fulham yes and that is I think a one appliance station isn't it that's way too young and how long had you been at Fulham on the night of the fire
02:36:57 fire since training school right what post it's film straight off the training right so since 2001 right did you ever receive any training in relation to
02:37:08 receive any training in relation to fires in high-rise buildings yes we have a yes can you just explain in very broad terms what the most recent training you had was or high-rise buildings most
02:37:20 had was or high-rise buildings most recent being most recent to the fire in June in 2017 it would be non current foodie highways policy via PowerPoint never been delivered by any watch
02:37:31 never been delivered by any watch manager to the watch I would have gone over high-rise procedure hallways policy okay
02:37:38 okay and do you have a personal experience of high-rise fire fighting yourself yes I've attended a couple of otherwise fires right in your training did you get
02:37:50 fires right in your training did you get trained on what to look for when they when compartment ation breaks down yes in respect of mainly it fit the fire
02:38:01 in respect of mainly it fit the fire comes out of the window fondly from the compartment where the fire is if it breaks out the window again normally it's not normally standard it's
02:38:12 normally it's not normally standard it's not it's not the biggest of depending on the height that a fire breaks out it's something we look to control through through outside through covering Jets
02:38:25 through outside through covering Jets have you any experience of the exterior of high-rise buildings igniting no have you had any training on the exterior of
02:38:37 you had any training on the exterior of buildings igniting have you had any training on cladding fires in particular
02:38:49 [Music]
02:38:55 have you had any training on safar survival guidance yes we have that is covered in the high wise policy beyond that did you ever do any training on the
02:39:10 that did you ever do any training on the lessons learned from afar in South London in 2009 called blacken all house yes there was some there was a case study presentation to get invited by a PowerPoint the last time I covered that
02:39:24 PowerPoint the last time I covered that okay how long do you think that was before the grenfell tower fire in June 2017 you wouldn't have been that year so every year longer than a year I turn
02:39:37 every year longer than a year I turn them to the events of the night if you go to your statement at the top of page 2 you say that we earn it we were initially deployed to the smell of
02:39:49 initially deployed to the smell of burning on Kensington's ground while we were on route to that call we could hear messages coming out over the radio from the first officers and attendants of Grenfell but kind of just be clear that
02:40:01 Grenfell but kind of just be clear that the smell of burning there was a separate different incident was a separate incident yes and on that night you were I think on Fulham's pub bladder that's right and is that g35 1s
02:40:13 that's right and is that g35 1s courageous and were you riding with watch manager Glenn Williams yes I was yeah and with him firefighters Neil Saunders and Abdul Malik correct and I think all say Dave Hill
02:40:27 while you were on route did you hear a persons reported message after we got yes after he got a call - laughs - what
02:40:39 yes after he got a call - laughs - what got ya
02:40:40 got ya I can't remember exactly when that point was whether we heard over a Maine skiing radio while we were still in attendance at this separate incident yes I think that's when I when we first heard
02:40:52 that's when I when we first heard persons reported rights so if that was the order of events that you actually heard about the fire at Grant filter before you were moment before you were stabilized to it now it's a matter of record from the short incident log we've
02:41:04 record from the short incident log we've got that you were mobilized at about 1:30 missed and we're on route say status to at 133 and at the scene at 145 also it will take some seconds
02:41:16 also it will take some seconds does that accord with your recollection yes it was okay now you say in your statement that
02:41:27 while you were on route you Willis think this is the second paragraph clean your statement you say we received a call instructing us to attend grenfell tower
02:41:39 instructing us to attend grenfell tower as we were traveling there you say we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio we were aware that fire survival guidance was being received we knew that people were trapped in the building this made us sit
02:41:50 trapped in the building this made us sit up a bit as it meant people would need rescuing did you hear any specific FSG information being passed from control to
02:42:01 information being passed from control to the incident ground no I didn't when I was sat on the back of Godfrey 5-1 the evening right where crew manager is normally sat right and when we got the
02:42:12 normally sat right and when we got the order in to attend grenfell I was discussed with my colleagues about equipment that that we would take with us on arrival so although I heard sections locked out coming over the radio I was discussing
02:42:25 coming over the radio I was discussing equipment we'd be taking right did you get any impression from the radio traffic that you could hear about FSG calls about the volume and frequency of these calls being sent by the control
02:42:37 these calls being sent by the control room to the incident ground no at that point
02:42:42 point did the hearing of those calls made you think about the possibility of evacuating the tower okay did now
02:42:55 evacuating the tower okay did now staying on page two of your statements are looking at the next paragraph you say as we were traveling there I caught a glimpse of Granville tower from the road it was like something out of a movie even early on in the incident one
02:43:07 movie even early on in the incident one side of the building is a light the fire already looked like he was going from the bottom to the top I'm uh starting to tree out a little bit then what is just
02:43:18 tree out a little bit then what is just pausing there when you say was going from the bottom to the top could you actually see the flames at the top of the building um well yeah there was a it looks like it was on it was going from it looked
02:43:32 it was on it was going from it looked like it was it was traveling up the building working his way across and up so he's going almost diagonally right we could see it going from the flame off steam looking on and then it was
02:43:43 steam looking on and then it was starting so when I say tree out it was the Spartans come out looking like it was coming out of course of course on side right it's a horizontal spread yes
02:43:54 side right it's a horizontal spread yes okay how far away were you and you saw the turn in such detail as you described it here first time I can say close
02:44:07 it here first time I can say close enough to see you know see what I saw and the way it was it the way it was on that East Side right so it was the East face you saw it first yes it was right but you're not able to
02:44:18 yes it was right but you're not able to say how far away you were okay how long into that well how long before arriving do you think that was a couple of minutes okay did you have
02:44:32 a couple of minutes okay did you have any thoughts at that time about how the fire might have spread like that no did it make you think about evacuation or
02:44:43 it make you think about evacuation or war
02:44:44 war what advice should be given to the residents inside again not at that time line did there come a time later when you had those thoughts thoughts about
02:44:56 you had those thoughts thoughts about evacuation or or advice about the river what should what the residents should be told to do in the course of the night
02:45:07 [Music] now we know that you arrived at that 1:45 or so a.m. and parked and made your way to the tower do you know roughly
02:45:18 way to the tower do you know roughly where you parked the alerts I remember we parked if I had a map of the area I could I could show you but it was he was opposite a upset
02:45:29 was he was opposite a upset Methodist Church right it was the streets the streets were very busy with cars so we knew we couldn't get right up quite directly below the tower up here
02:45:41 quite directly below the tower up here and of course we bearing in mind other machines aerials etc that would need to come on as well so we pot just away enough that feel close enough to the tower
02:45:51 tower but not not directly below it now looking at your statement on page two you say at the bottom of that page four lines up from the bottom outside we saw
02:46:04 lines up from the bottom outside we saw a group of approximately 15 to 20 firefighters some were wearing ba sets breathing apparatus which enables a firefighter to breathe in cleaner in a smoky environment do you remember
02:46:18 smoky environment do you remember whether
02:46:19 whether the EPA says they were wearing were standard or extended on that subject can you remember the first time when you did
02:46:30 you remember the first time when you did see firefighters in EDB a after you arrived on arrival did you speak to anybody not in your crew on arrival no
02:46:46 anybody not in your crew on arrival no we made our way straight to the front of the tower as a watch right did you speak to the incident commander nodded did
02:46:58 to the incident commander nodded did anybody in your crew and speak to the incident commander do you have any recollection of watch manager Williams looking for the incident commander to
02:47:10 looking for the incident commander to speak to him yeah I know Glynn if that he spoke to us it says someone in command
02:47:15 command because straight away he said I'm mopping tossed City to do with Fast Five upon its course you guys carry on in
02:47:26 upon its course you guys carry on in incident our do you remember what did you see watch manager Williams speaking to the officer who tossed him with that no I didn't right where were you standing when Glen Williams told you
02:47:38 you standing when Glen Williams told you that he'd been tasked to do fire survival guidance we were making our way to the front door or the lobby right was it was he ahead of you we just kind of
02:47:51 it was he ahead of you we just kind of went in together and as I'm sort of time literally we didn't go into the lobby and then had to wait for too long for beings come in we kind of went in together okay but you didn't see him and receive his instructions no I didn't
02:48:03 receive his instructions no I didn't know okay um who gave you your instructions at that point directly okay and what were those instructions
02:48:15 and what were those instructions instructions were to make the way to the bridgehead make our way to the young hit in the lobby area and he doing upstairs they would say there was a short queue of firefighters waiting to get
02:48:28 of firefighters waiting to get instructions for different details right you say a short a short queue yes just following that somehow where was the short queue standing do you remember on
02:48:40 short queue standing do you remember on the other world it was before they went into the actual lobby where the bridge head was so he's on the on there's like a stairwell I think on the second floor yes which which was still part the lobby
02:48:52 yes which which was still part the lobby that ground floor lobby was made up from like a balcony yes that's where close you have to see you so there must have been maybe 10 10 10 firefighters there right in pairs waiting to be detailed
02:49:04 right in pairs waiting to be detailed okay before you made your way into the breach head to the bridge head to the pitcher control board okay did they did at that stage did the queue reach as far as the stairs themselves or where all
02:49:16 as the stairs themselves or where all the firefighters you saw on the on the landing orbs balcony yes on the balcony didn't it wasn't trailing down a stairs at that point did you see anybody up there who was organizing them or or
02:49:28 there who was organizing them or or marshaling them in any way yes much manager Paul what you did you know him yes I did okay and you saw him there to do something to thank you no can I ask you to look at a
02:49:39 thank you no can I ask you to look at a CCTV shot which is at inq 256 but we have an adjusted time mark for this as Oh 155 21
02:49:54 mark for this as Oh 155 21 do you recognize yourself in that picture yes I do and the right hand side with the crew manager rank markings on my helmet right
02:50:08 and who else is in that picture watch man chuckling Williams on the left-hand side with the white helmet on yes and firefighter Neal Saunders in the middle okay
02:50:19 middle okay Neal services in VA as well as he yesyes okay no in fact at that stage I think so as much well as the Williams yes he is now this is entry into the tower at 155
02:50:31 now this is entry into the tower at 155 57 adjusted to 155 121 can you account for the ten minutes or so between arrival at 145 or and one fit and entry
02:50:42 arrival at 145 or and one fit and entry into the tower at 155 ten minutes later yeah that would have been collectin are you getting our equipment are they off the machine we took hose we took breaking in gear
02:50:54 we took hose we took breaking in gear branches first-aid kit immediate response kit all off they're all off the machine make sure machines locked up and then made our way to to the front of the cell right okay thank
02:51:08 the front of the cell right okay thank you
02:51:08 you and then on page three of your statement we can just go to that you say at the very top the the bridge head was on the second floor did you go straight up to
02:51:22 second floor did you go straight up to the bridge head on entering the tower yes we did and who went up there with you do you remember
02:51:33 you do you remember I believe my bus I know myself firefire Saunders Pfeiffer hill and and the other firefighters on
02:51:44 hill and and the other firefighters on standby that night Melek yes we went up and I think yeah I think Green came with us at that point and he was in conversation with um watch manager Paul
02:51:55 conversation with um watch manager Paul Watson I see okay did anybody actually instruct you to go to the bridgehead or did you decide that for yourselves you know I was a natural thing to do okay
02:52:08 know I was a natural thing to do okay did you know at that stage who the incident commander was no I did not right now in your statement on page
02:52:22 right now in your statement on page three in the second line you say there was already a queue for tasks when I got there that was a queue of BA whereas was it yes it was right and when you got
02:52:35 it yes it was right and when you got there that was the queue the same size as when he first entered it grow yes we went into the lobby had a look around gah barons right and then when she traits upstairs to join a queue okay the
02:52:47 traits upstairs to join a queue okay the BA was with were they all SD VA or were there any DBA whereas I can't say okay
02:52:55 did you when you got up there did you see what pool so you say there'd action pull Watson came up with you went Ben pull Watson came up with you Paul Watson was already there it was already there
02:53:06 was already there it was already there yeah when you got there what was Paul Watson doing he was um he was giving he was giving crews there their details regarding um where to go right and we
02:53:19 regarding um where to go right and we say giving crews their details was he doing that by word of mouth yes okay did he give the did you see him give crews pieces of paper I didn't see what he he
02:53:32 pieces of paper I didn't see what he he what he gave or what he said to other crews in front of us okay you didn't hear any briefings no he was giving crews in front of you no we were when we were close to being given our
02:53:46 when we were close to being given our orderings there was a it looks like a floor a rough floor plan sketched on the wall on the wall - you - you're - no - all right it'll rust and in a sack wall
02:53:57 all right it'll rust and in a sack wall of the lobby on the second floor yes and then we were trying to have a look at that scare to get a rough idea of what floor layout looks like here and did Paul Watson help you with that when we
02:54:09 Paul Watson help you with that when we got to him when I got to him he said have you had to look at the floor right floor plan I think I think Paul and gloom were together at that point yes and they said oh there's a plan up on the wall have a look at that that's a
02:54:20 the wall have a look at that that's a floor layout and when he briefed you did he did that face to face or did he give you a piece of paper from what I remember face to face right do you know
02:54:32 remember face to face right do you know where he was getting the FSG information from with which to brief you know I don't know okay now in your statement in the third line you you say a firefighter
02:54:45 the third line you you say a firefighter from Fulham at Fulham from Tooting was there so he paired up who was that firefighter Saunders at Saunders okay so do you say at Fulham from Tooting could
02:54:56 do you say at Fulham from Tooting could you just explain yeah he was based at Fulham that evening he was on standby he's um he is his main station is Tooting yes and the same roof - manic as
02:55:07 Tooting yes and the same roof - manic as well I see and you then go on to say Glynn was told that he would be working from the bridgehead so he removed his set and started working there do you remember
02:55:21 started working there do you remember where he went no I'm not sure when he removed he said it was it was around that time when we got got into the lobby we came into the lobby we made our way straight upstairs
02:55:33 lobby we made our way straight upstairs joining the queue yes Gillian ring and spoke directly to Paul Watson and and he he was there when we went through the door to her to the just
02:55:44 went through the door to her to the just intricate roll-off so did he come with you
02:55:47 you no he was still out at door okay was that the last time you saw Glenn Williams that evening I wasn't the last time I saw him that evening I saw him when I came back down today yeah that's
02:55:59 when I came back down today yeah that's the last time I saw him before went up first right okay so he didn't come just to be clear about this gloomy looms didn't come to the entry control officer on when it was on the second floor
02:56:10 on when it was on the second floor either far as on say Dido then I did not I remember him coming with us now you know do you know what he then did after
02:56:24 know do you know what he then did after after that doctor you were committed and know that just just when I came back out again and I saw him on the ground floor
02:56:35 again and I saw him on the ground floor I believe on yeah that that's us lost all my sorting Birds the last time the last time I doubt when I was in the building and as you went through you said that minute ago that
02:56:48 through you said that minute ago that watchman John Watson had had briefed you face-to-face did he give you a flattened floor number to go to he gave us a flat and floor number yes okay but no piece of paper so far as you recall I don't
02:57:00 of paper so far as you recall I don't recall
02:57:00 recall I don't recall now then you say the fourth line of your statement on page three when Neal and I got to the front of the queue we could see there was a list of flats on the wall based on the
02:57:13 list of flats on the wall based on the addresses from which we have fire survival calls there just to be clear the queue is that the queue which ends with Paul Watson giving instructions yes is so that's not the queue at the
02:57:25 is so that's not the queue at the bridgehead wake you at the bridger that's our cue on still on the balcony Don the balcony okay where do you remember was the list of flats that you're referring to their former top of
02:57:37 you're referring to their former top of my head I can't recall exactly my comment right
02:57:45 what was it drawn on the same wall as the wall which had the map on it the layout or a different wall again I'll be
02:57:59 layout or a different wall again I'll be guessing if I said yes it was definitely on the same wall as the map layout which which I can't do right sorry do you remember how long the list was no other do you remember whether the
02:58:11 other do you remember whether the flattened floor number that you were given by Paul Watson was written on the wall Nora did you did you study the list at all I didn't study the listener I was looking at the floor plan I only look at
02:58:23 looking at the floor plan I only look at the floor pan get get bearing off of where we would be going into when we went in through that door okay
02:58:32 did you do you know who done the drawing of thee no numbers on the wall
02:58:49 did you when you got then through to the bridgehead the bridgehead was in the lobby on the second floor that we've had some evidence about that his Quietus
02:59:00 some evidence about that his Quietus when you got there who was running the bridgehead do you remember I can't remember who was running the bridgehead I went directly to the entry control of stuff
02:59:11 to the entry control of stuff who was that much manager he said the silver yes Louisa - silver now did you see a forward information board fair at
02:59:24 see a forward information board fair at the bridgehead no I did not okay did you see any fast survival guidance information written down anywhere at the bridgehead no you didn't see anything on
02:59:38 bridgehead no you didn't see anything on the wall of the bridgehead they would try a picture in to see if it triggers
02:59:47 can I ask you please to be shown [Applause]
02:59:57 a meaty triple zero one three zero seven four
03:00:07 this we've been we've been told that was written on the wall by the lifts in the lift lobby on the second floor does does
03:00:18 lift lobby on the second floor does does this look familiar to you I didn't notice it we're not gonna booked in right you you didn't know we're not
03:00:30 right you you didn't know we're not reported to the entry control officer and then went straight up these stairs now do these names mean anything to you floor 965 so her crew for Stanley
03:00:43 floor 965 so her crew for Stanley Alstead Lee Saunders nelson yeoman yeah their firefighters own names I recognized right is that Saunders the same Saunders do you think no it was Nelson what about Johnson and Ruth's do
03:00:56 Nelson what about Johnson and Ruth's do they them but you don't recognize you don't remember seeing this writing on the wall no I don't know you said a few
03:01:13 the wall no I don't know you said a few minutes ago that you've seen a drawing showing aloud to the floor can I just ask you to be shown em et triple zero one six nine four eight which is
03:01:28 one six nine four eight which is actually an exhibit to map to criminate acceptance a witness statement is that does that look familiar
03:01:41 it could be it could be the same one I saw
03:01:44 saw I made the slit roughly familiar yes and now on the left of that very faintly is a list of what looks like floor numbers
03:01:57 a list of what looks like floor numbers but and there's a little bit of information next to it but then if we can read it very well my question for you is do you remember seeing a list of
03:02:11 you is do you remember seeing a list of floors and some information on the wall next to the the duct of the floor layout diagram that may have been the the markings the the information I mentioned
03:02:23 markings the the information I mentioned in my statement I don't remember specifics about it
03:02:36 No
03:02:39 you were tossed I think as you say in the middle of the first paragraph on page three with going to the tenth floor flat 74 as a fast survival call had been
03:02:51 flat 74 as a fast survival call had been received from this address and you said before that you had told that orally by watch manager Watson and you don't recall seeing an fib let me just show
03:03:03 recall seeing an fib let me just show you a picture of an fib to see if it triggers a recollection can I ask you please to be shown
03:03:32 [Music] when we come back to that take my count
03:03:41 when you were given your briefing by watch manager Watson did it have any details in it apart from the floor number and the flat number
03:03:59 you weren't told anything about the conditions in the in the apartment the flat or on the floor were you told anything about the location of the dry rising main outlets no were you told how
03:04:11 rising main outlets no were you told how many people were in the flat that you were being sent to no did you ask no do you remember whether the details of your briefing were written down afterwards by
03:04:24 briefing were written down afterwards by anybody I didn't say it afterwards right do I remember anybody writing your deployment on a wall anywhere no when we
03:04:35 deployment on a wall anywhere no when we report against your control board that's where MD towers would have been recorded right
03:04:47 you say that you took in your statement that you took a hose a branch and a thermal-imaging camera with you look at that were you instructed to take that
03:04:59 that were you instructed to take that firefighting equipment with you or did you just do that as a matter of course
03:05:05 Connor whoever we were instructed or whether that's just equipment we took up that was in there in the in the bridgehead area that we thought we may need right now we've got your tallying
03:05:19 need right now we've got your tallying out time as to 17 and 12 seconds which we've got from the telemetry data I can share to you if you like but does it sound about right to you by reference to the time at which you
03:05:31 by reference to the time at which you enter the tower it's hard to say I'll say right felt felt like we were in there longer but that's what it says so goodness let me just let me just see if
03:05:42 goodness let me just let me just see if I can pin these down if I could ask you to go to the telemetry data and you're tallying out time
03:06:00 it's a bit that it's a bit lower down the back oh there it is yeah we got it crypto you'd say you're in the blue Fulham yeah underneath Abdul Malik and above Neil Saunders and we have your
03:06:12 above Neil Saunders and we have your tally out time of Oh to 17 and 12 seconds you see that yes on the basis that we've got you entering the tower yeah @o 155 21 as we've seen from the
03:06:24 yeah @o 155 21 as we've seen from the CCTV picture on that basis you tallied out that some 22 minutes after entering
03:06:37 out that some 22 minutes after entering the tower but that sound about right to you yes it does yeah okay what were you doing for much of that 20 minutes we
03:06:52 doing for much of that 20 minutes we were in the queue well firefighters that were going in and Wayne spewed Wayne's be watered really so we're discussing with my colleague well you know what we take with us so we
03:07:04 well you know what we take with us so we were discussing regarding this you know should be equipment you at the bridgehead make sure we take a hose make sure we take a branch and I say well you see what else is there when we get there and wait Swain to be deployed right so
03:07:17 and wait Swain to be deployed right so in essence the time was spent queuing yes was the could you how quickly were firefighters been cooled off the front of the queue to be to be sent up I can't
03:07:30 of the queue to be to be sent up I can't say now really yeah you say no did anybody jump the queue you see I find of us now okay um the picture of the
03:07:41 us now okay um the picture of the forward information board I wanted to show you I can now give you a reference to which is M et triple zero one eight seven four nine e mister documents director if we can just look at that please
03:07:56 this is a photograph taken by taken by the station manager Mulholland which he
03:08:09 the station manager Mulholland which he took on the night do you looking at this do you recognize this does this trigger a recollection of something you saw not
03:08:20 a recollection of something you saw not that I saw a knife okay you don't remember seeing a forward information board like this at Snell second-floor bridgehead know what I'm okay now you then go on in your statement same
03:08:34 then go on in your statement same paragraph page three first paragraph to say we set up our be a mask and then started to make our way to the tenth no from the bridge head on the second floor there was just one set of stairs I was
03:08:47 there was just one set of stairs I was struck up on how narrow the stairs were from the fourth floor upwards it was smoky I think I remember seeing lighting in the stairwell but I cannot be certain most of the doors leading onto the
03:08:58 most of the doors leading onto the stairwell were closed otherwise it would have been much more smoky
03:09:08 how smokey was it on the way up after the fourth floor would you describe the density of the smoke yeah you could we could we could see where we were going but this might as we got past the fourth
03:09:23 but this might as we got past the fourth especially it was it was getting smoky up right last we were as we were moving up each floor it was going to take our smoke smoke was getting I think above each floor really what color was this make it was um it was getting it was
03:09:37 make it was um it was getting it was getting dark so there was it was a gray the gray car oh it wasn't a thick black at that point right it was more of a grainy color okay and once you got to the tenth floor
03:09:48 okay and once you got to the tenth floor which was your destination what was the smoke thickness and color like at that point it was probably the same between between number seventh and tenth and and that was how I described there it was it
03:10:00 that was how I described there it was it was still recent we still had our vision we could still see yeah you could still see him but that was because what the electric light in the stairwells was working is that can't move over the
03:10:12 working is that can't move over the lights were on there or not but we had our torches with us as well okay and what about heat but did you notice any change in temperature as you went up the
03:10:23 change in temperature as you went up the building
03:10:24 building not particularly no it is it was getting hotter it was getting it was getting a little bit hotter but not like a massive change
03:10:32 change maybe nothing really has until we open the door now in the next paragraph of your statement we can just look at it you start by saying as we were going up
03:10:44 you start by saying as we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting casualty casualty as we are trained to do this is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority the stairwell was
03:10:55 give them priority the stairwell was narrow with tight turns that it was very difficult to make space as we could not get our backs flat against the wall as we heard the breathing cylinders on our backs
03:11:04 backs I'll read the rest to you people were desperate to get their casualties out of the building and we were desperate to get up
03:11:10 get up to get more residents out it seemed to take ages for us to give up the building as we kept having to stop and try and get out of the way all the time was trying to get my head around what was happening it was crazy
03:11:22 happening it was crazy now you described there there's the scene on in the stairs specifically do you know how many or roughly how many
03:11:33 you know how many or roughly how many firefighters you passed coming down with casualties say how many it just felt like we would move up the floor and then
03:11:44 like we would move up the floor and then we'd hear the casualty call have to move out of the way try and squeeze into the corner of the stairwell together instead let the firefighters get them casually as quick as possible good and were the
03:11:56 as quick as possible good and were the casualties all being carried or were some of them walking casualties do you think there's a mixture Roza mixture some unconscious state others were being
03:12:11 some unconscious state others were being held up by firefighters right but everyone who I saw come out at that point well with firefighters was anybody that you saw self evacuating no right
03:12:25 that you saw self evacuating no right did you get him did you to stop and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down no so you don't know where the casualties were coming down from no
03:12:38 and you go on to say the next paragraph we can just look at it the stairways of stairway was a complete mess it was littered with pieces of equipment which firefighters had abandoned in order to help people get out of building there
03:12:51 help people get out of building there was also a lot of discarded Clavin I
03:12:56 expect you say this claiming was used by people to wrap around their faces in order to protect themselves from the smoke
03:13:11 the discarded clothing was was that actually on the stairs themselves you see what right okay and was that causing do you remember whether that cause difficulty in getting up and down the
03:13:23 difficulty in getting up and down the staircase not particularly at that point um I just remember noticing a lot of debris on the stairs from the stairwell explained things now you go on to say
03:13:43 explained things now you go on to say firefighters carry a waterproof pencil called a China graph which had been used to mark the floor numbers on the wall from other firefighters if it wasn't for these China graph markings you would not
03:13:54 these China graph markings you would not have known what floor you were on and could you use could you see for yourself any floor numbers which were written up
03:14:05 any floor numbers which were written up there other than in China graph no right
03:14:14 do you know who had put the China graph numbers on the wall no I don't know I remember thinking how grateful and how thankful I was that someone did remember
03:14:25 thankful I was that someone did remember was told who did that did you see whether the China graph had been written over the wall which the building owners might have put the
03:14:36 building owners might have put the number no you say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page verse you
03:14:53 third paragraph on that page verse you finally reached the tenth floor and you then say myself and Neil were the only people there the lobby door was closed
03:15:01 we opened the lobby door to assess the condition as we cracked it open we were met with a rush of thick black acrid smoke was it you who opened the door
03:15:13 smoke was it you who opened the door or was it Saunders my photo Saunders do you think he would have been done given to advance a team so we followed like a very rough procedure of door procedure
03:15:24 very rough procedure of door procedure normally we've talked seizure if you're entering a condition you don't know what's on the other side you would have water with you but as we didn't have any charge water we still use those step
03:15:37 charge water we still use those step door procedures right so who actually open that door our own makes anyway because from here on myself right but we were both there to assess the conditions okay all right and who's that was the floor and the
03:15:52 and who's that was the floor and the daughter floor ten the first door in the stair world that you'd opened is it us than any others no that was the first all
03:16:00 all okay can I then take you back to paragraph one on the same page last sentence where you say most of the doors leading onto the stairwell we're closed otherwise it would have been much more
03:16:11 otherwise it would have been much more smoky on your way up do you remember how many doors you observed were already open no I remember the fourth the fourth floor door was open
03:16:21 open yes and I think the third as well right was that smoke coming out of those lobbies into the stairwell yes do you know did that account for the smoke in
03:16:32 know did that account for the smoke in the stairwell I believed it too right did you see any other doors into the stairwell from lobbies open on the way up no I can remember so no hoses prompting any other doors open I don't remember they were okay when you open
03:16:46 remember they were okay when you open the door to the 10th floor and I let you say you've shuttered immediately did the rush of smoke into the stairwell affect the amount of smoke in the stairwell do they make it worse yes it did much worse if we'd left that door open
03:16:58 much worse if we'd left that door open much worse yeah it was thick black to save him okay if you turn to them to please to page four at the very top you say we looked around for a rising water
03:17:10 say we looked around for a rising water main as we would normally enter a floor in the condition that we found the 10th floor in without water as it is dangerous I think you mean you would not normally enter a floor yeah yeah
03:17:23 normally enter a floor yeah yeah [Music]
03:17:28 say did you look to start with for a rising water main in the stairwell yet quickly really is just a quick run arms round right quickly remember why there's
03:17:40 round right quickly remember why there's no there's no mains in the stairwell they must be solid to lobby right dude okay so would that be something you would normally do you normally expect to find a dry rising main outlet in the stairwell no no not particularly
03:17:53 stairwell no no not particularly depends on out of buildings designed right as to where that um where's that Y rising main outlets will be okay so can we take it that on arrival at the tenth floor you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was no you had to look for it
03:18:06 DRM outlet was no you had to look for it yes okay now you then enter the tenth floor and you say as we can see for in on on page four of your statement in the fourth line that you got down on your bellies you say we got down onto our
03:18:17 bellies you say we got down onto our bellies it was so smoky that our torches wouldn't make any headway the question
03:18:28 wouldn't make any headway the question of smoke is the was was there any part of the smoke that was clear so no neutral plane so smoke all the way down
03:18:43 neutral plane so smoke all the way down to the ground literally the same don't say all the way down was it yes right and what color was that smoke blank black
03:18:53 and you'd go on to say I told Neil to keep hold of my leg and not to let go from the diagram I seen on the bridge head I knew that we had to go diagonally
03:19:04 head I knew that we had to go diagonally from the stair door we enter the lobby crawling on our stomachs
03:19:15 can I just not just say that's a that's high power from the statement realm I told Neil I'd keep hold of his leg Neil led into into the lobby right in a
03:19:26 Neil led into into the lobby right in a diagonal position I kept hold of his leg right when we both went said okay now at this stage you're are you carrying firefighting media no where did you put that the the
03:19:44 media no where did you put that the the role of hose that we had and the branch we left just outside the door right up against the wall just outside the door to that to the tent temporal door okay
03:19:57 to that to the tent temporal door okay so is this right you were entering a smoke-filled Lobby without firefighting media yes would that be normal tonight was it normal No
03:20:12 and your task at that point is this right was actually to find the dryer rising main outlet now our task was to UM help people get out of that all right
03:20:24 UM help people get out of that all right number 74 okay at what point did you realize that you weren't going to be using the firefighting media you brought up with you when we um when we caught
03:20:37 up with you when we um when we caught into the lobby in our head we had to we had school objectives um what's to feel around for any casualty that we could fill or try and find an outlet if we
03:20:50 fill or try and find an outlet if we could right but initially if someone's try to get out there flat and be met by those conditions we were feeding around on the floor for them right so when you
03:21:04 on the floor for them right so when you say from the diagram might seen on the bridgehead I knew we had to go diagonally from the stair door is that is that because you were looking that you thought that was the direction of flat 74
03:21:14 flat 74 we didn't know where flat center for us and I remember from what I remember looking at the diagram I remember it being in a u-shape so our plan was what
03:21:26 being in a u-shape so our plan was what we'd said to each other outside the door was pull in in a diagonal position right and then try and form a sweep I see okay so I was going to ask you which why were you going in a particular direction but
03:21:39 you going in a particular direction but because you were doing sweep as Esther that's why right okay you then say we shut the door behind us to stop the smoke entering the stairwell I didn't get more than 12 to 15 feet when Neil
03:21:50 get more than 12 to 15 feet when Neil said I'm burning it was very hot we couldn't find the water outlet and we couldn't see anything were you looking for the water outlet okay now that was one of the things what we're doing yes
03:22:01 one of the things what we're doing yes you doing both at the same time you're done objective I see and I mean not found the water outlets not found any flat door you then retreat yeah we were shout in you know we were
03:22:14 yeah we were shout in you know we were trying to call out see if we could hear hear a door banging in here hear anything that would resemble someone we could help and and yeah that's the first
03:22:28 could help and and yeah that's the first the first sweep that we did was to the left when we entered in then we came back to the door and then we we went in the other direction I did the same ok ok let's take you back
03:22:43 I did the same ok ok let's take you back that into the diagram that you'd see on the wall which is M et triple zero one six nine four eight
03:23:04 well did you notice when you've been shown that spine watch manager Watson that in the top left-hand corner on the left hand side of the you there is
03:23:16 left hand side of the you there is something that says dry riser no you haven't your night lock that okay did anybody point it out to you no all right
03:23:28 and then if you go back to your statement page for first paragraph I just like to show you something seven lines up from the bottom you say my
03:23:43 lines up from the bottom you say my shoulders everything was hot I was really surprised how hot it was on the tenth floor before we then to date I'd see residents being evacuated from higher up the building and they were
03:23:54 higher up the building and they were still conscious this would not have been possible if they come from the 10th floor did that prompt any thoughts in your head about what this fire was doing
03:24:06 your head about what this fire was doing at that point yeah I remember thinking it is he does someone's someone's escape from that floor and somehow they're flat
03:24:17 from that floor and somehow they're flat doors been wedged open and maybe that's what's caused that heat and smoke right in that Lobby the fire break coming through through that room and that
03:24:30 through through that room and that announced what was really on our heads we can see what we were doing we are t zero visibility we didn't know we were calling into a fire or not
03:24:44 when you say that you saw residents being evacuated in power on the building is that a reference to what you'd said
03:24:55 is that a reference to what you'd said earlier in your statement about seeing casualties coming down with firefighters yes it's a Jessie when you were coming up to the 10th floor how did you know that they were coming from higher up in
03:25:06 that they were coming from higher up in the building and allow spear spear me guess in there come right oh I see okay that was not factual lot as if I'd stopped in I was discussing with them so it's a point of comparison you're making
03:25:18 it's a point of comparison you're making use okay let's see now then you say that you I'm summarizing your your statement here you left the tenth floor lobby and went back out into the stairwell how
03:25:29 went back out into the stairwell how long have you been in the lobby for do you think
03:25:36 it's hard to say there's sweep in one direction came back to the door to and from the other direction it could have been a matter of clear in a matter of
03:25:47 been a matter of clear in a matter of minutes right three four minutes Assad Smith thought metre to say exactly but would it would it have been possible to either crawl or walk quickly round the
03:26:01 either crawl or walk quickly round the lobby and knock on doors and shouts of people let them know what the heat was pushing us back the heat the heat was putting us it was really hot in that floor right okay and you could feel that
03:26:13 floor right okay and you could feel that to your through your PT you could you yes we could right and when you came when you came back out into the stairwell weather conditions the same as is when you'd left the stairwell or were
03:26:24 is when you'd left the stairwell or were they different they'd got a little bit worse from where we had the door opens go in right and then come back out again worse being what smoky smoky yes was it hotter it so very hot to ask so
03:26:37 was it hotter it so very hot to ask so we just come out of that lobby area you then go on to say
03:26:47 in the fourth line third line displays up from the bottom of the first paragraph on page four of your statement I've then radioed to control I eventually received a go-ahead message
03:26:59 eventually received a go-ahead message and explained that we could not reach flat 74 as we required something to cool the gases we really needed water I didn't hear anything back from control this was no surprise as there were two
03:27:11 this was no surprise as there were two or three control boards sir communications would have been chaotic
03:27:16 first of all you say your radio to control does that mean the bridgehead yes every control country rice what channel did you use to do that channel 4
03:27:28 channel did you use to do that channel 4 channel 4 yes right so not channel 6 it could be channel 6 - all right ok and you then say I eventually received a
03:27:40 you then say I eventually received a go-ahead message what is it go ahead message it was a confirmation that they had heard my call - then via nearby my berry set and I was to proceed with why
03:27:52 berry set and I was to proceed with why I had say oh I see so go ahead and speak yes ok and what did you say um I explained as quickly as I could the conditions we were move on that center
03:28:04 conditions we were move on that center move on that center floor and we couldn't gain access to a flat number 74 did you get a response to that nighted okay how long do you think you were trying to get hold of the entry control
03:28:17 trying to get hold of the entry control officer before you got a go-ahead message I remember trying a couple of times right ok do you know whether the message that you dispatched to energy
03:28:29 message that you dispatched to energy control actually got through or not no I don't know
03:28:34 and was can you explain or do you know why the communications were so difficult who knows mixture or fun volume of
03:28:45 who knows mixture or fun volume of traffic right could be a mixture of following the traffic the signal did you have problems with the signal yes yeah
03:28:57 have problems with the signal yes yeah we have had problems with signal in highways and basements before did you tell the engine control officer that you sent the message to that you couldn't locate the dry riser no just that as far
03:29:11 locate the dry riser no just that as far as I remember just that their conditions that we were met with right and that we couldn't gain access to the flat 74 FSU
03:29:21 mr. chairman that is a convenient moment and it may be convenient there is a good point to you good point Oh a brakeman is mr. bachelor all we're gonna have a break now so everyone can get a bit of lunch please don't talk to anyone about
03:29:34 lunch please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it over the break and we'll resume at 2 o'clock please if you might give the address you look after you
03:29:59 thank you very much to top them please [Music]
03:30:10 you