Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Further LFB evidence (11 September 2018 Pt 2 of 2)
00:00:17 Yes, Mr. Mill. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Can I now call uh station manager Pete Wolfendon? Yes. Thank you.
00:00:44 Yes. Repeat after me, please. I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth.
00:00:53 truth. I swear by almighty God, the evidence I give shall be the truth. The whole truth and nothing but the truth.
00:00:58 truth. The whole truth and nothing but the truth.
00:01:00 truth. Thank you. Very good. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson. I didn't sit down and make so comfortable. Yes, mister. Just before we start, I'd just like to um pass on my deepest sympathy to all those family and friends
00:01:12 sympathy to all those family and friends um who lost loved ones in this tragedy, and I hope you get what you want and need from this inquiry. All right. Thank you. Sorry.
00:01:19 Sorry. Thank you, Mr. Wolfington. Before we start, can I ask you please to begin by giving us your full name? Peter Frederick Wolfendon. And uh can I begin by thanking you very
00:01:30 And uh can I begin by thanking you very much indeed for coming to the inquiry, giving evidence as you're going to and assisting us with our investigations. We really do appreciate it. Thank you. Uh I say this to all witnesses. My questions are intended to be short and
00:01:42 questions are intended to be short and simple. Sometimes they're not. If you don't understand a question or you would like me to repeat it, I'm very happy to do so or to put the question in a different way. Um similarly if you need
00:01:53 different way. Um similarly if you need a break at any time then just signal and we can take a break. Can I ask you please to start by looking at your statement uh dated the 4th of June 2017
00:02:04 statement uh dated the 4th of June 2017 uh which will be on the screen on the right on the desk in front of you and also in a blue file if you want it in paper form in front of you on the desk. It's ME017428
00:02:16 and it's dated the 4th of June 2000 2018 I should say 18 I can correct that. Have you read it recently? Yes.
00:02:25 Yes. And can you confirm for us that its contents are true? Yes.
00:02:29 Yes. We also have two exhibits. Uh the first one is ME017596
00:02:36 which is a map of the area which I think you've marked and secondly a photograph of the wall on the ground floor which is ME0159
00:02:46 ME0159 17597
00:02:48 17597 which we'll come on to. Can I ask you this? Have you discussed your statement or the evidence that you're going to give to us with anybody before coming here today? No.
00:02:57 No. Now, I'm going to begin with some questions about your position. I'm right in thinking, am I that you've been in the LFB for nearly 30 years? Yes.
00:03:05 Yes. And in June 2017, you held then the same rank as you hold today, namely station station manager. Yes.
00:03:14 Yes. And in June 2017, you were based at Henden. Yes. Yes. And you say in your statement on page two um second paragraph from the bottom
00:03:23 bottom uh that uh you went back to being station manager on the fire safety team uh after that was after temporary
00:03:34 uh after that was after temporary promotion to temporary group manager. Can you just tell us what does this fire safety team do? I was the fire safety team leader and the fire safety team there's um there was 10 investigating
00:03:45 there's um there was 10 investigating officers and they they're responsible for um fire safety. And how many people are in the fire safety team? How many people were in the fire?
00:03:55 fire? In my team there was 10 uh in total I think there's just over 250. And did you have a specific role on the fire safety team? I was a team leader. And what does that involve? Uh I look after the um the team. Um I
00:04:07 Uh I look after the um the team. Um I authorize their their payments. uh I vet their um reports uh and I'm still an operational firefighter. I'm still an operational senior manager. Right. Do do you or did you attend
00:04:19 Right. Do do you or did you attend incidents in the capacity as a fire safety team leader? Um I think two I was only there for a six-month period. And what is the job of a fire safety
00:04:30 And what is the job of a fire safety team leader at an incident? um just to to look after the for the uh in the investigating officers, the ILOS's
00:04:41 ILOS's um and to pass the information back to senior managers in the fire safety team. Right
00:04:47 Right now, can I ask you just one or two questions about training? Um, have you ever received as an operational officer at the LFB training in
00:04:59 officer at the LFB training in strategies for full or partial evacuation of a high-rise residential block?
00:05:05 block? Um, yes.
00:05:07 Um, yes. And could you identify for us some detail about that training? First of all, when did you start getting training on those strategies? these the training would be to do with the um it's not
00:05:20 would be to do with the um it's not residential, it'd be large blocks of uh offices and they have a partial or full evacuation um process for the for the blocks. So, it's
00:05:31 process for the for the blocks. So, it's more to it to do with um commercial properties and that was while I was in the fire and safet fire safety team. Right. Um, other than in the fire safety team, uh, what when was the last time
00:05:44 team, uh, what when was the last time before Granfell that you received operational training, um, on the subject of evacuation? Well, we do TDEs constantly and we do as
00:05:55 Well, we do TDEs constantly and we do as senior managers, we do um, a lot of TDEs for um, uh, for new senior managers. Um and we'd also do actual or we have done actual um practical training. I think it
00:06:09 actual um practical training. I think it was the last time practical training was about four years ago in Barnet. Um that was for and that was for um the local authority um had a disused tower block and we we
00:06:21 um had a disused tower block and we we played with that for a couple of um couple of months. Right.
00:06:23 Right. So all the um Barnet crews there's four watches. They all receive practical training. That was four years ago. I said the TDES um probably once or twice a year,
00:06:32 a year, right? And in in those TDEEs, does any of the training exercises that get done involve evacuating fully or partially a building with only one means of e exit
00:06:45 building with only one means of e exit like a single staircase? No,
00:06:46 No, they don't. No. Right. Do you recall ever receiving or delivering training on a slideshow called the tall buildings facads which
00:06:58 called the tall buildings facads which was um prepared by the LFB in the autumn of 2016 following the fire at Shepherd's Court in August 2016? I have seen it. You have?
00:07:08 You have? Yes.
00:07:08 Yes. Did in the context of this inquiry or prior to?
00:07:11 prior to? Prior to.
00:07:13 Prior to. Right. But but maybe we can just look at it to refresh your memory. Um Paul, could you put it up? It's LF. There it is. Very good. Um, right. Is that the document that I was that you were referring to? Yes.
00:07:24 Yes. Right. Can you just explain to us in what circumstances you first came to see this document? Um, it's part of our ongoing training. We're supposed to keep our skills um up and part of it is we we get um
00:07:37 and part of it is we we get um electronic training packages which we have to keep um a breast of and it's one of those packages I believe. In that last answer, who's the Wii you're referring to? Senior officers. It's a senior officer pack. Um, senior officers have to do
00:07:48 pack. Um, senior officers have to do their own training. So, station managers, border managers, right? So, uh, do you remember how it first came to you? Was it was it part of a training day or a um electronic
00:08:00 a training day or a um electronic package, computer based package or or it's a computer based package and you have to set time in your own day to in your own calendar in your own diary to actually um read through it. Right. So can you help us uh with the
00:08:15 Right. So can you help us uh with the extent of the distribution of this document in the LFB? I'm sorry. I wouldn't have the phone. Right. Um when you got this and first looked at it, were you with people on a
00:08:27 looked at it, were you with people on a training day or did you look at it? I was just there in the office on my own probably.
00:08:32 probably. Right. Um well, let's just look at the um uh let's look at it. If you can turn please to
00:08:42 page 25 of the slideshow.
00:08:53 Um you'll see there there's general conclusion uh
00:08:59 uh I don't want to read it out to you but um the the need to understand what products are being used in the facade system and their fire behavior and if they're used appropriately meet the relevant guidance these could affect the
00:09:10 relevant guidance these could affect the way fires develop and spread in in a building. that general conclusion is would it be right to say that when you attended Grenfell on the night of that fire in June 2017, you were aware of
00:09:21 fire in June 2017, you were aware of these these principles, these conclusions? I was aware of the of um there's been fires beforehand in um buildings with cladding on them. Um yes,
00:09:35 buildings with cladding on them. Um yes, I was aware of it. Right. And did you consciously use the knowledge that you got from this slideshow uh in the decisions any of the decisions you made on the night of that
00:09:46 decisions you made on the night of that fire?
00:09:48 fire? The fires there's been there's been a couple of fires that I was I was made aware of where cladding cladding has um has been the fire. One was in France and one was in I think in the Middle East
00:10:00 one was in I think in the Middle East where the cladding ignited um the cladding went up the face of the building and burnt off. when I was standing outside um Grenville for the first time I think it's about half 2:00 quart 2 I looked at the burning building
00:10:12 quart 2 I looked at the burning building and I thought I I came to the same conclusion I thought well if it's if it's if it's just an excing building it will just burn off that that was my assumption straight away okay well we may come back to that but
00:10:23 okay well we may come back to that but just focusing on this training plan did you make any assumptions one way or the other uh as at the night of Granville Tower about how widespread this learning on this page of this slideshow was within the LFB operational front
00:10:35 within the LFB operational front officers.
00:10:36 officers. No. Right. Do you remember whether these general conclusions were were widely known in the LFB or whether they were kept more
00:10:47 the LFB or whether they were kept more narrowly to a a particular type of officer?
00:10:51 officer? I wouldn't be able to say. I don't. Now, let's turn on to um your mobilization and arrival at Grenfell. Uh on page four of your statement in the second substantive paragraph, you say
00:11:02 second substantive paragraph, you say your pager went off at around 1:10 on the night of the incident. We've got your mobilization time at just about 15 minutes after that at 012642.
00:11:14 Um I don't need to show you that, but does that sound about right to you? Um the 110 was a mistake. The page went off at 126. It was 126. I've subsequently seen the um transcripts of my phone and the first
00:11:26 transcripts of my phone and the first phone call I made to control was at 1:30. So 126 of the page correct and we have your status two time as just after that at 0131 20 uh 58 again. Does that sound about right to you?
00:11:37 that sound about right to you? Yes.
00:11:37 Yes. Right. Now you I think called control and you were told that the incident had been made up of 20 pumps. Yes. And we have a time for that call uh
00:11:48 Yes. And we have a time for that call uh at 0 012946 again. Does that sound about right? I think the 01 um Yeah, it could be. It could be.
00:11:57 could be. Well, let me just see to clarify that with you if I can. If you look at the short incident log which we've got at tab 23 of the bundle.
00:12:08 Um if you if you go to
00:12:18 Uh page 18
00:12:23 18 uh we can see the service request at 0129
00:12:27 0129 46 of make pumps 20. Mhm.
00:12:31 Mhm. So does that help you with your recollection as to when you might I was paged um at the when it made pumps 10. I was paged before the make pumps 20.
00:12:39 20. Right. So I received the pager. Um by the time I get dressed, come downstairs, phone of control. Um control confirmed it was no longer a 10.5, it was a 20.5.
00:12:50 it was no longer a 10.5, it was a 20.5. Uh and you had a I think you say you had a conversation with control. Yes.
00:12:54 Yes. Did they tell you anything else other than what the makeup was? Um no, it was a very um brief conversation. If a if a instance's gone from 10 pumps to 20 pumps in the space
00:13:05 from 10 pumps to 20 pumps in the space of two minutes, Yeah.
00:13:07 Yeah. they, you know, they need resources. So I don't um keep them talking and you could hear in the background they were very very busy. So I just made um went straight to status 2 and I made my way to the incident.
00:13:18 to the incident. Do you remember who you spoke to in the control room? No, there's no names. They're just a person. I don't know. No. And what what line did you call them on? Was that your brigade mobile or your um brigade mobile? Um yeah. Straight through to control.
00:13:29 through to control. Right. Uh and you left uh and drove to the incident. Yes. What communications equipment did you have with you? Um the main scheme radio, we've got a
00:13:42 the main scheme radio, we've got a a mobilizing radio. We kept the mobilizing radio on in the car as I drove across. Right. What about your a is that your airwave radio? The the airwave. Yeah. Sorry. Yeah. And you also had your fire ground radio with you.
00:13:52 with you. The fire grounds in the boot. I I wouldn't start that up until I actually got to the incident. Very good. Now, um you have marked on your exhibit, your map, where you were when you first saw the tower. If I could just ask you to look at that. It's me
00:14:04 just ask you to look at that. It's me 017596.
00:14:14 Uh, and uh, if you can just help us identify where it was that you parked
00:14:21 by reference to this map. Um, where it's got the first pumping appliance. Yes, I parked
00:14:38 Yeah, I parked just behind that. The first pumping appliance. I think I came under the um Westway. Um that's when I first saw the um the fire. Um I tried to get round to the back of the
00:14:49 tried to get round to the back of the incident to where the control unit was. I couldn't make it around the back, so I drove back to near the near the westway and I made my way down to the incident. I see.
00:14:59 I see. And um just just if we can just pan out from that picture for the moment, you've called that the first pumping appliance. Uh what you've got something on the southeast of the tower marked in a in a
00:15:11 southeast of the tower marked in a in a rectangle there. Could you just tell us what that says? Um what about that? Sorry. Well, you've got the tower in the middle of the picture and to the southeast of the tower.
00:15:22 the tower. Yes.
00:15:22 Yes. Below right, it says something. You you put an arrow to it and there's some writing there. Oh, sorry. Now if you go if you go back you know where the X is the you want to point on the where the X is here that's where I end up parking the car.
00:15:34 where I end up parking the car. Ah right right the first pumping appliance that was um although that was uh Kent Towns pump ladder
00:15:41 ladder right?
00:15:41 right? Yeah that's where I pumped. Did you realize that the first pumping when you say first pumping appliance what you mean the first pumping appliance around the back of the incident? Right. When you say first do you mean the first
00:15:51 the first that was the first appliance that um attended the rear of the incident. the most of the incidents um they made pumps 20 and most of the appliances attended this road
00:16:01 this road right
00:16:02 right what what led you to think that the first pumping appliance parked there where you've marked it because I walked down the I walked down the pathway and I followed it down to where it was parked right
00:16:12 right I've only marked it the first pumping appliance cuz that was the first one that was actually um made it to the west side of the property of the tower block you mentioned Kentishtown a moment ago yes Kentishtown's pump I believe it was
00:16:24 yes Kentishtown's pump I believe it was right did you know that in fact the first pumping appliances at the scene were from North K. No, no, this was the face pumping appliance on the west. The police officers, this is part of the interview. The police officers were asking me um
00:16:36 The police officers were asking me um what was on this side and they said, "Well, the first pumping appliance got down there was Ken's town." So they marked it as the face pumping appliance, but it's the face pumping appliance on the west side of the of the building.
00:16:48 of the of the building. The all the other appliances were on the east side, I believe. Now, in your statement of page five, in the third paragraph from bottom, you um you say you you explain where you parked.
00:17:01 you you explain where you parked. Uh and then you say this was at approximately 1:45 hours. Um
00:17:06 Um I believe the time should be wrong. It should be about um I think it was just past 2:00. Yes. Well, in fact, we've got your status two time in the short incident log as 21258 and that's page 13 if you
00:17:18 log as 21258 and that's page 13 if you Okay, that'll be the right time then, right? Okay. Um then outside the tower page six third paragraph you say um that and you
00:17:30 paragraph you say um that and you describe how on arrival you you heard or saw that the left hand side you say was totally ablaze from about the third or fourth floor. Yes.
00:17:40 Yes. All the way up or third to fourth floor all the way up to the top with a lot of debris falling down. F first of all did you have any thoughts at that stage about compartmentmentation
00:17:51 at that stage about compartmentmentation and whether it had been breached? Um no as I said before the the only um experience I've got of um full cladding fires is what I say the one in France and one in Dubai was the fact that they
00:18:03 and one in Dubai was the fact that they just burnt to the roof and then burnt away. Um they didn't enter the building because the um the construction didn't allow it to go into the building. So I expected sorry when I first saw
00:18:14 So I expected sorry when I first saw this I expected it to part of me expected just maybe gets to the top it will just burn off. Um I did expect that on
00:18:22 on from what you could see at this time. Did you see any signs of the fire having penetrated into the inside of the building at any point? I was standing on the um west side and
00:18:33 I was standing on the um west side and all I could see was down the um the edge of the north face and it was the north face burning from the top from about the third floor to the top. So I couldn't actually I had no angle to see into the property into any
00:18:44 angle to see into the property into any of the properties. I just saw it burning off. Yes, I see. And the debris that was coming down, it was like a debris field um at the base of the north tower that looked it was um it was all cladding based. You could see
00:18:56 it was all cladding based. You could see it was bits of um metal and um various um cladding products. Okay. How far away from the tower were
00:19:07 Okay. How far away from the tower were you at that point when you had those thoughts?
00:19:12 thoughts? um 20 30 m right but on the west side. Yes, on the west side. Did you at that stage have any thoughts about um what the advice should be to residents who are calling from inside
00:19:24 residents who are calling from inside the stay put strategy uh and uh whether there was a need to affect an evacuation? Um
00:19:33 Um I was thinking about yeah I was thinking about it at the time but u my assumption would be that the um each individual property would be a self-contained um property and could could cope with the
00:19:45 property and could could cope with the with an external fire. I didn't expect it to for the fire to go into the properties. There was we had we've had fires before lac where open windows can give access and it was a very warm um
00:19:57 give access and it was a very warm um June June morning. So I expected someone thought of um um flats maybe to catch light with it with with an open window but I didn't expect every every single flat to be affected. No I didn't.
00:20:10 flat to be affected. No I didn't. Now on page six of your statement where we we are still if you look down to the fifth paragraph you say I could hear people saying that
00:20:22 you say I could hear people saying that there were people that needed to get out.
00:20:26 out. Who were the people saying that? As I walk down the um park me car and I d I walk down next to the um the westway. There's like a long
00:20:37 the um the westway. There's like a long um it's like a foot path and on the right there's two um fourstory maze nets and on the left there's a raised um walkway which goes adjacent to the um
00:20:49 walkway which goes adjacent to the um rail railway lines. I believe there was people up there on the on the um on this walkway and they were just it was very very eerie. They were just they were saying things like, "Oh, they need to get out. I can see somebody. I can It
00:21:01 get out. I can see somebody. I can It was a very um It was just strange." There was quite a few people, 20 30 people maybe on the on the walkway because they were they were on the walkway higher than me. They could see the fire because I was walking next to
00:21:12 the fire because I was walking next to the fourstory um the maze. I still couldn't see the fire at that time. Right. And having heard them from their vantage point saying that people inside
00:21:23 vantage point saying that people inside the tower needed to get out, did you think again about evacuation and the need to change the stay put policy? It was always something to think about.
00:21:34 It was always something to think about. Um I No, I still had a firm belief that, you know, the tower would um the fire safety of it would would stay um stay intact. you know, these separate dwellings would would actually be five.
00:21:47 dwellings would would actually be five. And you walked over to the tower and I think on um the uh in the fourth paragraph of um your statement, you um say um the fifth
00:22:02 statement, you um say um the fifth paragraph rather, you say you could see 135 ladder. Is that a is that a 13 1.5 m ladder?
00:22:07 ladder? Yeah. 135 ladder. And you say it's was pitched on a walkway on the east side. Do you mean the east side? No, it was the south side subsequently. Okay.
00:22:17 Okay. Now,
00:22:19 Now, can I pick the m matter up at your journey to the command unit? Um, on page 11 of your statement, if you look at the third paragraph down,
00:22:33 if you look at the third paragraph down, you say, "I then made my way outside to the command unit on Grenville Road, which was the fire survival guidance unit." Command unit and crewed by a burough commander and a watch manager. I've marked on the map where the command
00:22:44 I've marked on the map where the command unit was. Um if we can go back to um the map that we we looked at earlier on uh which is your first exhibit. Could you just uh point us
00:22:57 you just uh point us point out the command but just where your marker is just to the left of the marker. Yes. So where it says fire survival CU? Yes. Not on Grenell Road. Right. And I think you've also marked just below that
00:23:08 think you've also marked just below that to the to the south of it another little um rectangle on the corner of Bowmore Road and Grenfell Road. Yes. What is that? That's another command unit, but that was the uh control command unit.
00:23:21 was the uh control command unit. Okay.
00:23:21 Okay. I believe. Yes. Now, um when you first went to the command unit, which one of those two did you go to? I had to walk past the I was I was making for the command um command units,
00:23:32 making for the command um command units, which was the one in the red box, but I was stopped by the group manager when I got adjacent to the fire survival CEO. Right. Okay. So, just so we're clear, the one in the at the bottom of the
00:23:43 the one in the at the bottom of the picture with the red box is CU 8 and the one above that CU7. Yes.
00:23:48 Yes. Is that that that's Yes. Okay. Now,
00:23:54 Now, um
00:23:55 um why did you go to CU7 at that stage? Well, it's just that I was walking. You had to walk past it to get to the main Right. Our pol our procedure is you you
00:24:06 Right. Our pol our procedure is you you you um have a board and you have to um even though I was logged into this into the site um into the instance with control because of book status 3, the board still should go to the command unit. Um so I was I was walking up to
00:24:19 unit. Um so I was I was walking up to hand in my board and I got adjacent to the um to the CU7 and group manager Tom Goodall said he um he stopped me. About Okay. About what time do you think
00:24:32 About Okay. About what time do you think you arrived at CU7?
00:24:37 It would probably be um after 3:00. After 3:00. I couldn't be certain, but well after 3:00.
00:24:42 3:00. Okay. Let's see if we can track it down. Um when you got to to CU7, did you know who the incident commander was? Um yes. Who?
00:24:53 Um yes. Who? It was Andy Row at the time. Andy Row.
00:24:55 Andy Row. Yes.
00:24:55 Yes. Right. Okay.
00:24:59 Now, you say that there was a burough commander. We just looked at it in your statement. Uh, and a watch manager. Um, do you know who either of those was? Tom Goodall was the bur manager.
00:25:10 Tom Goodall was the bur manager. Tom Good was the That's the Burough Commander, is it? Yes.
00:25:13 Yes. Right. And, uh, and who was the wash manager?
00:25:16 manager? I couldn't recall. Do does the name Daniel Merrick Merrick ring a bell with you? No.
00:25:22 No. Right.
00:25:27 Now in the next paragraph on page 11 uh you say uh the burough commander asked me if I was doing anything and I said no. So I was instructed to go inside the
00:25:39 no. So I was instructed to go inside the tower to the lobby area and oversee two watch managers who were coordinating the FSGs.
00:25:45 FSGs. Um
00:25:47 Um and then you explain what FSG is. Now, first of all, what did you understand uh when the burough commander, that's group manager Tom Good
00:26:00 commander, that's group manager Tom Good as you've told us, what did you understand when he said that the watch managers were coordinating FSGS? Uh my understanding was they had a system in place um but there was only
00:26:12 system in place um but there was only two watch managers at the time. So our general practice is to put more senior PE personnel in a uh at high responsible areas. So they just he asked me to go
00:26:23 areas. So they just he asked me to go down there and basically just talk to them, oversee them, give them give them assistance, but it sounded like there was a system already in place. You say it sounded like um
00:26:34 You say it sounded like um it was Yeah, that's what that's the reading I got. What do you think? Okay. Just following that up. You say my understanding was they had a system in place. Did Tom Good tell you what that system was?
00:26:45 system was? Um,
00:26:46 Um, I can't remember. Did Did he explain anything about how fire survival guidance information was coming first of all into the command unit from the control room? Did he
00:26:57 unit from the control room? Did he explain that to you? Um, he did, but um the details I can't remember. I saw at the time um the board, you know, the whiteboard you um in the CU7 that had already been
00:27:09 in the CU7 that had already been populated and it was very very neat. So it it had all been um it was getting collected in that in that unit. So um yeah, I could see it was getting done.
00:27:20 yeah, I could see it was getting done. Did you go did you actually go on to see yourself?
00:27:22 yourself? No, I didn't set foot on it. So you didn't go up the steps into the into the vehicle, but from where you were standing outside it you could how clear did you have you can see the whiteboard very clearly. Did you see who and how officers on the
00:27:35 Did you see who and how officers on the CU were receiving uh messages from control?
00:27:38 control? I didn't know also and I just saw Tom and one of the watch manager. Right. Okay. Now, did you get any explanation from Tom Good about how fire survival guidance information was
00:27:50 survival guidance information was leaving that command unit and going into the tower? He may have said, but I can't remember. Right.
00:27:55 Right. Sorry. Um, did you see runners taking pieces of paper out of command unit 7? There was no one there at the time when I was I was speaking to him. Right.
00:28:06 Right. Did Tom Good tell you that the anything about the means of communication at all with the fire ground? Um, it was just go down and support these two watch managers. That's the only thing I've got on my mind. It was
00:28:17 only thing I've got on my mind. It was it was a I made the statement about a year later and so that's the only thing I can remember. Understand. Did Tom Good mention anything about a watch manager who was was or had been
00:28:28 watch manager who was was or had been collecting fire survival guidance outside the tower um on a watch on a car bonnet or
00:28:35 bonnet or It wasn't on the car bond. They were still on the floor when I went past. I did see them. Okay. Well, I can't I can't remember being specifically told about them by Tom. Okay.
00:28:43 Okay. He probably did, but I can't remember. Did Tom explain to you what the watch managers in the lobby were doing with the fire survival guidance information that they were receiving?
00:28:54 that they were receiving? I can't remember again. No. Now, in your statement on page 11, in the third main paragraph, um you
00:29:05 um you um
00:29:09 you said you say um
00:29:16 that I'm sorry, I've given you a wrong reference as the fourth main paragraph. when you're describing FSGS um you say um that they come in and they take call and take as much information
00:29:27 take call and take as much information from them as possible and give them advice and then it's the last sentence I'm interested in via mobile phone they in turn communicate the information to the fire ground in this case the FSG command unit.
00:29:38 command unit. Yeah.
00:29:39 Yeah. Uh
00:29:41 Uh do you mean that the the control usually uses a mobile phone to communicate with the fire ground? I believe what I meant in that that um sentence is when I've
00:29:52 in that that um sentence is when I've done it before, I've done FSG before. It it it's generally over the mobile phone because um station managers all carry mobile phones and it's a lot easier than getting involved with the um fireground radios. I believe that's what I meant by
00:30:04 radios. I believe that's what I meant by that.
00:30:05 that. Right.
00:30:06 Right. In this case, mobile phones weren't being used. Now, let's just be clear. Used by the by control room or used by staff officers on the command unit. Which do you mean
00:30:19 on the command unit. Which do you mean um by anybody? Right.
00:30:21 Right. The fal gardens I've done in the past have only been have been small instance three, four, five people max and everybody um everyone's demanding information. So it's a lot easier to
00:30:33 information. So it's a lot easier to phone people up on on on mobile phones if you've got station managers based there than it is to try and get on the radio ask for ask for information from watch managers. So in the past we've generally done it with mobile phones. Nice. In your experience, as it was
00:30:46 Nice. In your experience, as it was prior to the night of Granfell Tower, what was the highest number of fire survival guidance calls you handled or managed at a single incident? Do you remember?
00:30:56 remember? Um, five, I believe. Five. And which incident was that? Can you remember? It was an incident in a tower block um uh in Kilburn. It was on Alpha 41 West Hamster's ground. Um, but what it was,
00:31:09 Hamster's ground. Um, but what it was, it was a shootite. So there's lots of people calling saying the trap there was no danger of fire spread or anything. So it was it was a lot easier. But the the panic and the um the need for
00:31:20 panic and the um the need for information from people at the incident from control and from senior managers who are at the incident who are monitoring is is quite tremendous. It's this the stress level
00:31:31 tremendous. It's this the stress level is when you get a fire survival guidance call even just for five people. It's it's it's a very stressful and very um very noisy situation. people shouting. It's
00:31:43 It's And that was with five. That was with five. And when was that? Um 3 years ago maybe. So a couple of years or so before grandfather. Yes.
00:31:55 Yes. Um just going back to this sentence in your
00:31:58 your your statement about via mobile they in turn communicate information to the fire ground. I think you you've said and clarified that actually it the control room can use a mobile and the officers
00:32:09 room can use a mobile and the officers on the CU as well. Yeah, that was a description of fire survival guidance that the the people who taken the statement asked of me. So I've given the my you know my um interpretation of what my experience of
00:32:20 interpretation of what my experience of fire survival guidance rather than what happened on the night. Right. Um is the is the radio used by the control room to communicate FSG information? They they they use every means possible. They got handheld radios. got um
00:32:33 They got handheld radios. got um still on page 11 of your statement three paragraphs up from the bottom you refer to an electronic system to record FSGS and you say this is called the CSS you
00:32:44 and you say this is called the CSS you say I'm familiar with command units but couldn't run one I'm told they're not that reliable um sometimes in a black spot it does not work sometimes it will not log on when you say I'm familiar
00:32:55 not log on when you say I'm familiar with command units do you mean familiar with CSS
00:33:00 with CSS because I'm a senior manager, I'm supposed to um at my place at bigger instance would always be on a command unit. So I have to be aware of what command units can do and can't do. The CSS is an electronic system based on the
00:33:12 CSS is an electronic system based on the command units um which has different files. One of the files is a fire survival guidance file. Um as I say, I I don't like using them. I'm
00:33:23 as I say, I I don't like using them. I'm I'm more of a um I like to see it up front. Alex, so you know the whiteboards is easier for me, but it's a system that we can use. Um, it wasn't being used this night. Uh, if I've understood your statement
00:33:35 Uh, if I've understood your statement right, when you say they are not that reliable, you're referring to the CSS. Yes.
00:33:39 Yes. Rather than the command unit itself because where we park and how we park is the density of London, it it's difficult sometimes to get a good signal. Yeah, I see. That's what I meant. Sorry. It was it to your knowledge well known in the LFB at
00:33:53 your knowledge well known in the LFB at the time of Granfell Tower that these CSS systems were not that reliable? I I'm I don't know. I couldn't answer that.
00:34:00 that. Okay.
00:34:01 Okay. My experience of them is it's been a bit unreliable with me that's all. Okay.
00:34:10 And you say as you've just told us um in the next paragraph you repeat the point that they are notoriously unreliable. Um however I like using the manual method with pieces of paper.
00:34:21 manual method with pieces of paper. That's the way I've operated over the years. So a command unit which is using a whiteboard does not phase me. I think a lot of people would have some sympathy with with that. But um does that does that when we break that down does does
00:34:33 that when we break that down does does that mean that even when the CSS system is up and running the officers on the command unit such as yourself would still record FSG information on pieces
00:34:44 still record FSG information on pieces of paper?
00:34:45 of paper? Um there is a there's a backup system. We've got the CSS we can record on CSS and then we've got the um we've got like a whiteboard um encapsulated
00:34:56 a whiteboard um encapsulated piece of paper as a backup. Generally you'd always you know use the encapsulated paper because you have to annotate it so quickly but it it works on both systems the CSS and the um and
00:35:07 on both systems the CSS and the um and the backup system. Yes. And
00:35:11 Yes. And would it be right in thinking therefore from what you've just said following it up that the CSS isn't an alternative to the to pieces of paper you use you would use both?
00:35:21 use both? You can do yeah you can do if it's um if it's if it's available. Now at the bottom of page 11 of your statement in the last paragraph you you say that the command unit communicate
00:35:33 say that the command unit communicate the information to the bridge head by way of handheld radio. I think that this method was used at Grenfell. Um, when you say I think this method method was used at Grenfell, what what
00:35:46 method was used at Grenfell, what what what do you think? I just couldn't remember. That's that's why made the statement. I can't remember.
00:35:50 remember. Right.
00:35:50 Right. Um,
00:35:51 Um, did you see or hear or observe in any way uh FSG information being communicated to the bridge head by radio?
00:36:01 radio? I think I did. I think I did, but I can't remember to be certain. Right. Okay. Now, um, you're I I think talking in the first sentence in that paragraph about what
00:36:12 sentence in that paragraph about what what's normal when you say the command unit communicate the information to the bridge head by way of handheld radio. Are you telling us that's your normal that's what would be normal? That's what you'd expect. Yeah, that's what I'd expect. Okay. Um, have you ever experienced
00:36:25 Okay. Um, have you ever experienced yourself a command unit using runners uh to pass paper fire survival guidance to the bridge head instead of or in addition to using the radio? As I said,
00:36:36 addition to using the radio? As I said, when you get a fire survival guide in court, it's very chaotic. Um, that time when I had the um the five people, no one was in danger, but there's people running everywhere because everyone demands information.
00:36:48 demands information. I could I could see where it'd be relevant to use runners. In that incident at Kilburn you'd referred to where there were only five FSGs, was radio and written FSG information used?
00:36:59 information used? Yes.
00:37:00 Yes. Right.
00:37:03 Right. Um,
00:37:10 when when you were told there were watch managers in the lobby who needed your assistance and you were told that by Tom Good, what did you understand the purpose of having those watch managers
00:37:21 purpose of having those watch managers there was? Um it was just to pass on the information from the um fire survival guidance calls to the uh to the crews to ensure that
00:37:32 to the uh to the crews to ensure that you know crews actually acted on the fire survival guidance calls. That was my understanding.
00:37:41 So in essence was it a a like a liaison between those watch managers who were collecting and giving instructions to the crews? That's right. Yes. That was what you
00:37:52 That's right. Yes. That was what you understood your role. That's what I understood. No. And David, they were doing the leazison. I was going to go down there and um support them in any way I could. Right. Now, if we turn to page 12, we move we move, I think, to the topic of
00:38:04 move we move, I think, to the topic of you you're making your way back to the tower from the command unit. Um,
00:38:13 can you say in the second paragraph
00:38:17 uh on page uh 12 um near to there were a crew and watch managers fielding FSG calls. I did not speak to them but they would have been speaking to people on the phone and passing the information on
00:38:29 the phone and passing the information on in front of some open garages by the entrance was another body. Now just looking at the first sentence there near to there were a crew. Uh can you just can you just clarify what what the there
00:38:40 can you just clarify what what the there is?
00:38:42 is? Um near to the tower. Um right now perhaps the best way of doing this would be to go back to your first exhibit in the back. What's the sentence before then? Have you climb? You say um perhaps I should have shown
00:38:54 You say um perhaps I should have shown you this. I handed my nominal roll board in and made my way back to the lobby area via the covered walkway. I could see that the turn a turntable ladder had been parked by the entrance. It was not working. I have not where it was on the map near to there where a
00:39:06 was on the map near to there where a crew and watch managers fielding FSG calls.
00:39:09 calls. It was under the there's like um a covered um walkway right adjacent to Grenful Tower. Right. Well, let's just look at the I I wanted to show you your first exhibit which was the map. So, if we go to that,
00:39:20 which was the map. So, if we go to that, can you help us identify more precisely where on the map the the the watch manager and crew?
00:39:29 and crew? We've got the X for handing over the body. next door to it there's um there's an unused TL. It was in between the um the two in between the circle with the X and in between the square.
00:39:41 with the X and in between the square. There was um it was right about there. Right. And when you went you saw them That's right. back there. And you mentioned earlier in your evidence this afternoon that you saw them on your way back to the tower at that stage. I walked past them. Yes.
00:39:52 I walked past them. Yes. Where
00:39:53 Where where were they under the walkway? They were under the walkway. Um they'd had um whiteboards on the floor. Um they were mobile phones and they were making notes on the uh on the boards.
00:40:07 notes on the uh on the boards. On the board and the boards were what? What kind
00:40:09 What kind the boards that were on the floor? They had boards on the floor, right? Whiteboards. White were they? I was I was going to Were they whiteboards or forward information boards? Forward information boards. But yeah, I said white. You know, they were white and
00:40:19 and right now when you saw them um are you able roughly even roughly to tell us what kind of time that was? I really wouldn't. I'm sorry. Okay. And how long after the briefing
00:40:32 Okay. And how long after the briefing that you received from Tom Good on CU7 was that?
00:40:35 was that? Two or three minutes, right,
00:40:37 right, to walk down the road. And when you saw them, did you stop and talk to them? No, they were far too busy. Right. H how many of them? Four people were there. I believe there was four.
00:40:48 was four. Right. Okay. Could you see what they were actually doing apart from managing the paperwork in front of you? Could you see? They were on they were they were holding radios or phones to their ears um and making notes on the I didn't see
00:41:00 um and making notes on the I didn't see what notes they were making but they were making notes on the board. At that stage did you notice any runners either coming to them from the CU with paper or going from them into the tower with bits of paper?
00:41:11 with bits of paper? I didn't see anybody now. Right.
00:41:14 Right. I don't recall seeing anybody saw there was a lot of personnel running around in all in all um directions but no I didn't notice anybody.
00:41:27 Did did you consider how what they were doing as far as you could see fitted into the coordination of FSG calls that you were being asked to go and help with?
00:41:38 to go and help with? Um I didn't at the time. I just thought they were a separate unit, an older unit of dealing with FSG. That's that's what I assumed. They might have been there before the command units set up or vice
00:41:49 before the command units set up or vice versa. I don't know. Right. You say you didn't at the time. Did there come a time when you did understand what they were doing? Um, no. When I was speaking to the two watch managers in the uh in the lobby,
00:42:00 watch managers in the uh in the lobby, they were getting information. Um, there's a lot of information they were getting. I assumed some of it was coming from them. You assumed? You didn't find out? I assumed. I didn't know. I didn't find. Well, we'll come to that.
00:42:13 Now, you move then into the ground floor lobby of the tower. And if you go to your statement at page 12 and look at the fourth paragraph, you say
00:42:25 you say uh
00:42:31 that um
00:42:36 you thought it was about 3:00 a.m. Now, let me show you the paragraph because it's it's not that clear. Um you say the run was only about 20 ft. I
00:42:47 you say the run was only about 20 ft. I could see stuff falling down. It did not fall at any great speed. By now, I think it was about 300 a.m. I think that's um a wrong time. Yes. Right. What time would you put on this?
00:42:58 Right. What time would you put on this? I wouldn't be able to put a time on it. I really wouldn't. Okay. Now, at this point of your statement, it's not crystal clear what what you're doing. You said in the paragraph before that you prepared to run across to the main door, but are you
00:43:09 run across to the main door, but are you you're describing here, are you? Your entry into the tower? Yes.
00:43:12 Yes. In order to carry out the task that Tom Goodle had given you. Yes.
00:43:14 Yes. Yeah.
00:43:16 Yeah. Now
00:43:21 uh we we have a time for when the bridge head was moved down from
00:43:29 from the third floor to the ground floor. Um Mr. Wolfington and that started at about we think on the evidence we have so far at about 3:08 in the morning.
00:43:40 at about 3:08 in the morning. Um when you entered the tower did you what did you see um by way of movement of the bridge head if anything the bridge head was fully um up and
00:43:51 the bridge head was fully um up and functioning on the ground floor right
00:43:54 right that's what I saw okay
00:43:58 okay the entry control boards and the senior officers were were working from the ground floor they were already working with us yes right okay do you know how long the bridge head had been on the ground floor for when you
00:44:10 been on the ground floor for when you entered the lobby. No, I didn't ask. Now,
00:44:16 Now, in the next paragraph in your statement, this is the fourth one from the bottom, you say, "The entry control board, ECB, was set up in the ground floor lobby, whereupon I found the watch managers I was looking for. I now know them to be
00:44:28 was looking for. I now know them to be watch manager Glenn Williams from Fulham and watch manager Paul Watson from Hammersmith, and they had been there for about an hour or so before I arrived." Yes. um that hour or so before you
00:44:41 Yes. um that hour or so before you arrived. Is that what they told you? Yeah, I I believe so. But I think that was including the time at the original bridge head. Yes.
00:44:48 Yes. Which was on the third floor now.
00:44:51 now. Oh, that's that's where I took it to mean. They'd been Yeah. They'd been not just in they weren't in the lobby for for an hour. They'd been at the lobby and the previous bridge head for an hour.
00:45:01 hour. Right.
00:45:03 Right. Did you know or did they tell you which of them Watson or Williams had had been up to the bridge head? Um, no, they didn't say. No.
00:45:13 No. Now, we heard some evidence from watch manager Williams when he came to give evidence here in July that he wrote 0215 on the wall of the lobby on the left hand side um at the time when he started
00:45:27 hand side um at the time when he started to receive FSG information. So,
00:45:31 So, that's right. Yeah. So about an hour after that, just using that as a time. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Probably right there.
00:45:37 there. Would put you at about 3:15, which is after the bridge head started to come down.
00:45:41 down. Yes, it would. Does that sound about right? That sounds about right. Yes. Okay.
00:45:45 Okay. Now, we can I think do a little bit better than this so far. Um, we've got some CTV CCTV material showing watch manager Williams standing by the wall with two officers in white helmets. And
00:45:57 with two officers in white helmets. And could Paul, could the witness please be shown? I NQ 000000 253.
00:46:28 um which we've also got just in case it's that it's tricky at IAQ303. We could use both but that that will that will work. Now um
00:46:40 will work. Now um this has a an adjusted time mark on it of 031629
00:46:45 of 031629 taken by camera 4 inside the lobby. Now um just to help you with this watch manager Williams thought that the person to the left of him well let me let me
00:46:57 to the left of him well let me let me let me try this way. Do you recognize uh the individual without the white helmet standing at the top of the picture pointing at the white wall? Yeah, he's that's the watch manager Williams, isn't it?
00:47:08 Williams, isn't it? That's Glimmer, right? Good. Now, um he said he thought the person to the left of him uh was um watch manager Watson and the person to the right uh was you.
00:47:20 and the person to the right uh was you. Do you think that's right? Yes, that's probably right. Right. Can you help us? Do you know what's happening here? Um I don't know. He's pointing to the wall where there was some um writing on the wall. He's probably explained what
00:47:31 the wall. He's probably explained what was what he'd written down and what we were doing, right? His processes. Now, you say he's probably is that your recollection? Um from looking at because I know that's where the right was on the wall. We we
00:47:42 where the right was on the wall. We we started annotating um that that side of the wall. He's pointing to it. So I'm just assuming there now in your statement still on page 12 at the bottom of the page last paragraph
00:47:53 at the bottom of the page last paragraph we just nip back to that
00:48:01 um you say the watch managers explained it's the last paragraph the watch managers explained that they were taking information from the FSG command unit and writing them on the wall to the left
00:48:12 and writing them on the wall to the left of where we were standing towards the smashed windows.
00:48:18 Uh if I can now ask you to look at INQ 304
00:48:25 304 and all these numbers have five zeros. Uh
00:48:32 this is a CCTV picture taken at an adjusted time of 032308
00:48:41 from camera 3. And it shows a firefighter uh standing wi with what looks like papers in his hand. If you can just if
00:48:52 papers in his hand. If you can just if you can just magnify that, Paul. Uh on the left hand side of the picture. Uh no, left hand side of the picture by the sign which says Grenville Community Room there.
00:49:04 there. Uh there's a we can see crew manager. There's a crew manager. You can tell it's a crew manager from the double black stripes on the helmet. Yes. Do you know who that was? No.
00:49:15 No. Right. And what was that crew manager doing? Do you remember? I don't know. It looks as if he was standing with papers next to watch manager Williams writing on the wall. Um, now there's another officer without
00:49:27 Um, now there's another officer without a helmet. Uh, might that is that you is the question. That looks like me. Yes, it looks like you. It looks like you're from Yes, it uh
00:49:39 uh in the statement you referred to um taking information from the FSG command unit and writing them on a wall. Um we can see the crew manager with what
00:49:50 we can see the crew manager with what looks like slips of paper. Do you remember h having seen this picture how information was coming to the wall? In what form it was coming to the wall?
00:50:01 the wall? I don't. I'm sorry. I know. Um I remember the watch manager had a radio and he had um a lot of slips of paper. I couldn't recall where the slips of paper came from.
00:50:12 came from. Right.
00:50:12 Right. I thought he was writing some of them down, but it could have been a runner. Right. Did you see any Did you see the crew manager or watch manager Williams transposing fire survival guidance information from
00:50:23 fire survival guidance information from pieces of paper onto the wall? He started to and then it got very chaotic.
00:50:28 chaotic. Right. At what point did he stop? um not long after probably writing writing these down maybe half an hour 20 minutes after these right
00:50:35 right at first he had time to write and then after that there was no time to write so it didn't appear to be any time okay now if you turn your turn the page in your statement to page 13 we can take
00:50:46 in your statement to page 13 we can take that picture down um and go to page 13 of your statement third paragraph down you say
00:50:55 you say um watch manager Williams told me that they had a process in place in which watch manager Williams would receive the information via radio from the command unit outside. The information would be written on a piece of paper chit and
00:51:07 written on a piece of paper chit and handed to watch manager Watson. He was then handing the papers to individual crews as they queued up to go to the bridge head. Yes.
00:51:17 Yes. Now
00:51:20 f you you say that the information would come in by via radio from the command unit.
00:51:26 unit. That's probably an assumption. I was going
00:51:28 going I know he had a he had a radio but it's probably an assumption on my part that it was coming by radio right
00:51:34 right um watch manager Williams in his evidence I'm summarizing it but talk he talked about paper slips coming to him from runners yeah I saw the paper slips and I saw him
00:51:45 yeah I saw the paper slips and I saw him collecting them all but um right I just assumed that a lot of it was him on the radio and him writing it down I didn't realize that they were coming through
00:51:52 through you say you didn't realize at what what point did you realize I never did obviously did you ever see any runners delivering? I can't remember seeing anybody. The um the lobby area was really congested um
00:52:04 the lobby area was really congested um really noisy. I didn't notice anybody.
00:52:10 Uh you say in your statement that the information, as we've just seen, would be written on a piece of paper and and handed to watch manager Watson.
00:52:21 handed to watch manager Watson. Yeah.
00:52:23 Yeah. And then
00:52:26 And then um he would then hand the papers to individual crews. Um who do you know was writing the information on a piece of paper?
00:52:33 paper? I don't know. As I say, it could mean these these chits have come by runner. I assumed it was um watch manager Williams.
00:52:41 Williams. Right. I see. And who was handing the chits to watch manager Watson? Did you see
00:52:46 see uh Mr. Watch Manager Williams would hand them to watch manager Watson? What man watch would walk away, find a crew who didn't have who hadn't been allocated to the task and hand the the chit to the um crew, confirm the crew with the crew
00:52:59 crew, confirm the crew with the crew that you know the details on it, floor, flat, people, you know, how many people and he'd give them the chit and then he'd walk away. You saw him do that, did you? Um, it was very uh Oh, sorry. I don't
00:53:13 Um, it was very uh Oh, sorry. I don't think I did see him do it, but that's what was happening. How did you know? Because that's what they told me they were doing. As I say, the queue for people what it was very very congested. He'd just take slips and disappear and
00:53:24 He'd just take slips and disappear and he would say he would go to the front of the queue
00:53:27 the queue and get the first crew that didn't have a job and allocate the job. So I see. So you knew cuz he told me that's that's right. That's what I wanted to find out. Okay. Now, um
00:53:39 if you go
00:53:49 uh yes, when you say that watch manager Watson was handing pieces of paper to Cruz,
00:53:57 Cruz, um where exactly was the bridge head located on the the ground floor at that time When when he was doing that, the officers in charge of the bridge bridge head and the ECB boards were
00:54:09 bridge head and the ECB boards were located behind the glass wall. Do you know where the glass wall was in the glass door on the ground floor? They were located the other side of the glass wall.
00:54:17 wall. Right.
00:54:17 Right. And the the crews were asked to queue up along the glass wall and then get um fed through the you know siphon through the door, given them given the task and and
00:54:28 door, given them given the task and and they'd go. Did you see uh a a station manager or other officer of of of rank standing by the entrance, the glass door
00:54:39 standing by the entrance, the glass door entrance uh at the head of that queue giving them instructions? I think M Cook was there at the time. Mak was in the area. That's all that's all I remember. What about Do you recall the
00:54:51 What about Do you recall the involvement? I don't know what he was doing. I automatically assume that he's he's um he's part of the OT team which is um part of the team that uh monitors operational incidents. I just thought he
00:55:02 operational incidents. I just thought he was he was doing his his role as an OT officer.
00:55:04 officer. Right. I see. Matt Cook offation was it officer um operations review team. OT.
00:55:10 OT. Yes. I assumed he was just doing that role.
00:55:13 role. Do you remember the involvement of station manager Nick Matt? I can't remember seeing Nick Matt at the bridge head. Do you know him? Yes, I do know him now. Okay. I might, but I can't remember.
00:55:25 I might, but I can't remember. Do you remember seeing watch manager Watson go through the door and talk to the entry control officers about the deployments?
00:55:36 deployments? Um, I don't recall seeing them go through.
00:55:38 through. Right.
00:55:41 Right. Do you know if watch manager Watson had any system or method for determining what kind of BA crew should be deployed in response to a particular fire survival guidance call, whether EDBA or
00:55:54 survival guidance call, whether EDBA or SDBA.
00:55:56 SDBA. Um, he didn't pass that on to me. No, I think he just he he just basically said he was given to the next crew. Right.
00:56:04 Right. Now, in your statement, still on page 13, in the next paragraph, four paragraphs down, you say, "My understanding was that he," that's
00:56:15 understanding was that he," that's that's I think watch manager Watson should have been informing the officer in charge of the FSGs, who would in turn commit crews. Um, who is uh the he there? Is that
00:56:28 Um, who is uh the he there? Is that Watson? Mer Watson. Um, who was the officer in charge of FSGS as you described it there? Um, my understand is that um, F watchman
00:56:40 Um, my understand is that um, F watchman Watson should have been going to the bridge head and talking to the committing officer. I probably got that wrong. Officer, the committing officer um, would that just just help me with with in general
00:56:52 just just help me with with in general terms who who that would be normally that would that be the offic um, glass door? I believe I I thought at first it was um uh group manager Welsh, but it turned out to be group manager Goldburn.
00:57:03 group manager Goldburn. Right. You say you thought at first, but it turned out Did you Did you yourself undertake an investigation as to exactly who was in charge of of the bridge head at that time? This was the when I first got there.
00:57:14 This was the when I first got there. Yes. Um No. Right.
00:57:21 I was told shortly afterwards that um group manager Welsh was the uh ops um commander. And just exploring this this a little bit further when you say that
00:57:32 a little bit further when you say that watch manager Watson should have been informing the officer in charge of the bridge head. Are you saying that watch manager Watson wasn't actually doing that?
00:57:43 that? the process they put in place which they said was working didn't go via the office in charge of the bridge head but they said it was a it was a process that was working and it was such um huge
00:57:55 was working and it was such um huge numbers of FSG and flats to search and such huge confusion he said the system was working they've been using they were using the system on the third floor uh
00:58:06 using the system on the third floor uh at the original bridge head and when it came down they automatically assumed it was it was still working and they carried on with the same system I follow
00:58:14 I follow and
00:58:14 and because the system was they said the system was working um I to I took their word for it and left with that and was there a problem with that system to to to your well um the only problem I foraw was
00:58:26 well um the only problem I foraw was that the office in charge used committing crews to go upstairs um people are already turning up with jobs I've got to go here I've got to go here I did explore this with with um
00:58:37 here I did explore this with with um both the watch managers and they said no it's okay that it's been working Okay. Okay. Well, so a crew would line up and say, "Just before you get a job, hold on. I've got to Sorry, I've got to um I've got me FSG. Here's this chitter paper. I've got
00:58:49 FSG. Here's this chitter paper. I've got to go to this floor." And then they they go to that floor. That that's their job. They would go off to that floor. When you first arrived to do the job that Tom Goodle had given to you, did you did you
00:59:01 Goodle had given to you, did you did you go to the bridge head and find out for yourself how fire survival guidance or how deployment instructions based on fire survival guidance was actually getting to the bridge head? No.
00:59:12 No. Is there a reason why you didn't? Um, it was there was difficult access to it. It was behind these glass doors. The Yeah, I think it was just an access
00:59:23 Yeah, I think it was just an access thing. you know the glass doors were there and then the watch managers already said the system's fine it's working
00:59:27 working and they were quite happy for it to carry on
00:59:29 carry on right
00:59:30 right I took their word for it so so what was your assumption about what uh Richard Welch or Pat Gulbornne were actually doing by way of instructing crews to do deployments at
00:59:41 instructing crews to do deployments at that stage what was they were doing I had no assumption over it I I just believed what the the watch manager was saying that the jobs were going up to the um to the crews and the crews were were acting on the jobs
00:59:52 were acting on the jobs I see So essentially your assumption would this be would I be summarizing your evidence right that your assumption at the start was that the instructions to individual crews were being given to
01:00:04 to individual crews were being given to them by watch manager Watson and they were essentially being waved through by um group managers Welch and Gilbborne. Yes.
01:00:12 Yes. Right. Uh now that that understanding obviously changed at a later stage or did it not? Yes,
01:00:19 Yes, it did. We'll come we'll come to that.
01:00:25 Now, uh, on page 13 of your statement, in the sixth paragraph down the top, are we going to come back to page 13,
01:00:36 are we going to come back to page 13, Mr.
01:00:36 Mr. Uh,
01:00:38 Uh, I suspect we probably are now. Well, there's a sentence that I'd quite like to understand better than I do at the moment. Um, about twothirds of the way down,
01:00:49 Um, about twothirds of the way down, perhaps a bit less. you you say there Mr. Wolfendon they said that the system was working and so I started to jot things down and populate the wall. Now we've seen photographs of the wall. I
01:01:01 we've seen photographs of the wall. I think I would like to know what you say you wrote on the wall. So we we are good. We're coming to I I Yes. And if we don't you get to it in your own time so long
01:01:13 you get to it in your own time so long as you do get to it. Uh well let let's let's ask let's let's I'm concerned that I might not. So let's let's cover that now. Um would you like to answer the chairman's question? I can do it by you need to see you need to see the
01:01:25 you need to see you need to see the correct picture for which I don't have under my hand. There's no doubt you do. Well um necessary reference. Yes. Um can I ask you please to be shown uh ME quintuple0 sorry quadruple 05774.
01:01:47 I think it's fair to say, isn't it this photograph was taken quite late in the day?
01:01:53 day? Yes.
01:01:54 Yes. So, it won't necessarily have looked like that in its entirety when you saw it,
01:01:59 it, but subject to that. Yes. Well, there are a number of different photographs and I'm happy to to show you a different one. Um, the chairman is right. This is this was
01:02:10 chairman is right. This is this was taken yes
01:02:11 taken yes at some stage in the daytime because we could see sunlight coming through the south
01:02:16 south windows in the tower. But we can look at another one as well. Perhaps we should have both up at the same time just to um answer the chairman's question and some of my own on the same point. ME0175
01:02:27 of my own on the same point. ME0175 [Music]
01:02:29 [Music] 97.
01:02:36 I I I think that's the same photograph or taken at the same sort of time. One is a more closeup and clearer version of that.
01:02:43 that. The one is the full wall. Yes, exactly. The one on the left, the one on the right hand side is the full wall. Appears to be the full wall. Now,
01:02:51 Now, uh
01:02:54 uh at this initial stage,
01:02:58 where were you getting the the FSG information that you started to write down?
01:03:02 down? From water manager Williams. From water manager Williams. So, how is he communicating that to you? Is he He was getting the chits and I said, "Just call them out and get the chits." Well, these pieces of paper that you've got, call them out and I'll write them
01:03:13 got, call them out and I'll write them down.
01:03:14 down. Right.
01:03:14 Right. Uh, and the right hand. So, yeah, I'd say about 50% of that I probably wrote, maybe more. Yes. Now, the one on the right, the photograph on the right, I think, is your exhibit. You've exhibited into your
01:03:26 your exhibit. You've exhibited into your statement. Um, but may maybe better to look at at the left hand picture because it is a bit clearer. Now I just want to explore with you what you wrote down and when if we can.
01:03:37 when if we can. Let me give you something first by way of a guide. It was watch manager Williams evidence uh that he wrote the middle list first. So if you see FSG at 215, that central column
01:03:51 215, that central column uh is what he wrote down first uh with starting with BA tick F 205 and there's a 23rd and then UK um and then he said that
01:04:04 and then UK um and then he said that when that space was filled up he started on the list on the left hand hand side and that was the list you then also wrote on with him. Yeah, I probably just carried on with it.
01:04:12 it. Is that consistent with your memory? Yes, that that's now he thought and again I'm just giving you a potted version of what he's told us. He thought that the point at which you started writing on the list could
01:04:24 you started writing on the list could have been for the entry 173 20p.
01:04:29 20p. Now we need to we need to expand that a little bit but it's it's about 2/3 of the way down there. That's right. Yeah, probably correct. Well, I I've s I've told you what he
01:04:41 Well, I I've s I've told you what he said in your own mind. casting your mind back. What do you say about that? No, that's probably correct. Yes. Okay. Looking above in that same column of figures, do you
01:04:52 in that same column of figures, do you see anything else that could be your handwriting, do you think? Um,
01:04:59 not that I recognize now. Do you remember inserting any numbers between the numbers uh that Glenn Williams had written in that column? No,
01:05:09 No, I didn't alter anything that was already there. We just I just carried on with um the same format. Okay. Now, do you have any memory of where you might have got that
01:05:20 where you might have got that information from? I believe it was from what Mander Williams
01:05:24 Williams again him reading out from a chit. Is that right? as you have told us before. Right now, let me ask you to look at a document
01:05:33 document um which you may not have seen before which is LFB quadruple01968.
01:05:40 And I'll tell you what it it is. It's a a a collection of control information forms and other documents. Um and I'd like to go to page 44 if I could please
01:05:54 like to go to page 44 if I could please and also to 45. Now 44
01:05:59 Now 44 um
01:06:02 is marked at 0321. So I think on what you've told us about the time you would be there um flat 123 floor 1513 floor 14 line gone dead
01:06:15 floor 1513 floor 14 line gone dead additional information call from CU. Uh now if you go back to the wall uh and the reference quadruple 0 5774
01:06:31 uh and the reference quadruple 0 5774 list to documents director just have that on at the same time or perhaps it doesn't matter. Um if you look at that um you'll see that the information transcribed on the top of the left hand list if we just if we just expand that a
01:06:44 list if we just if we just expand that a bit
01:06:55 says 11314
01:07:02 and there's some writing next to that. Can you help us with that? It may not be your writing, but you perhaps expand that even further. I think it says line dead.
01:07:13 dead. Yeah, lying dead. Line dead. And then 1 2 3 15 line dead. Now
01:07:22 Now those are before the entries that you tell us you think you made. But as a time marker, does that help us time when you think you started writing on that
01:07:33 you think you started writing on that wall?
01:07:33 wall? It could be. Yeah, it could be. Right.
01:07:38 Right. Do you remember receiving in your own hands
01:07:42 hands forms such as are filled out there? Not at that stage. No. Did you later? Yes.
01:07:48 Yes. At what point? Um when it was confirmed that we the fire brigade weren't going above the 11th floor
01:07:59 floor right
01:07:59 right or the 10th floor right you say you say 11th floor later on I took the chits to um group manager Welsh and handed the chits to him. Okay. Right. That's that's that
01:08:10 him. Okay. Right. That's that's that it's that that event. We're going to come to that. Yeah.
01:08:13 Yeah. Right. Now, just continuing with the wall in terms of the various markings on the wall, watch manager Williams gave evidence that the the BA, if we just look at
01:08:25 if we just look at uh that that column of marks in what looks like the middle set of data on the wall.
01:08:34 wall. He said that he he it indicates that he had passed the information to watch manager Watson who had confirmed that it had been passed to a BA crew who had
01:08:45 had been passed to a BA crew who had then taken it to the bridge head. That was his evidence and I'll just give the transcript reference for really for our own purposes. It's um 30th of July 2018 at pages 104 to 106. So we can find it
01:08:57 at pages 104 to 106. So we can find it later. That is in essence what he said. Is that consistent with your recollection? Yes. Oh yeah. And was there any system in place for checking where the bridge head was in
01:09:08 checking where the bridge head was in fact sending the crews at the stage which you started writing? No.
01:09:13 No. No.
01:09:15 No. So again, was this just an assumption that what watch manager Watson was giving the crews was being acted on by the crews? Yeah. They assumed that what they'd started um the hour or two before it, whatever it was, was was continuing.
01:09:28 whatever it was, was was continuing. That was the assumption. Now sticking with this picture, you can see uh that the BAS have in some cases ticks next to
01:09:39 the BAS have in some cases ticks next to them.
01:09:42 them. Do you remember who wrote those ticks there?
01:09:45 there? I don't. It could have been me. It could have been you. Could have been me. Yeah, but I don't remember.
01:09:50 remember. Okay. Um you explain in your statement if I could just take you forward to page 15.
01:09:59 Um, and this is your this is your statement where you're actually giving information about this photograph
01:10:08 you say two two um
01:10:13 um in the second last paragraph you say um on the photo some of the flat numbers have ticks next to them that indicates that crews have been sent by us to that flat.
01:10:23 flat. When you say sent, does that mean sent or does it mean that they successfully reached the flat? Um, I'm I'm assuming um
01:10:36 Um, I'm I'm assuming um a Watchman Williams had actually found a crew to give the chit to. It doesn't confirm that they'd gone to the flat. Right. And then if we can just follow that through a little bit, two paragraphs up on page 15 in your
01:10:48 paragraphs up on page 15 in your statement, you you say uh
01:10:54 uh the
01:10:56 the um in the second line, crews were then to feed information back to those controlling the boards with their results. And if people were found, a line would be put through the information to show that the task was complete. There were not many lines being put through. You go back to the
01:11:08 being put through. You go back to the the picture photograph 5774. Um, we can see lines through one or two of the flats in the middle column.
01:11:18 column. Did you put lines through there? I can't remember. I may have. In the left hand column, we can see lines put through flat 73 twice.
01:11:26 twice. Yeah.
01:11:27 Yeah. Um, can you help us with with that? First of all, who who put those lines through there? Do you remember? Uh, I don't know. Okay. And would that be different? Would the would the elimination of a piece of
01:11:40 the would the elimination of a piece of FSG with a line be the same as a tick or different from a tick? Um, my understanding be that those people were out. There was no longer a need for
01:11:51 longer a need for So you put a line through it so it couldn't be repeated. Um, it was probably repeated. Maybe William, Mr. Williams put the first three down. I started again and we just duplicated a chit
01:12:02 chit possibly.
01:12:03 possibly. Okay.
01:12:04 Okay. But my understanding if a line went through it the BA crew had actually got there or the people had come out. Right. So so that would tend to reinforce the idea that a tick meant deployed but not successfully deployed.
01:12:16 deployed but not successfully deployed. I think what there was there was there was a lot of confusion and a lot of duplication of information. Yes.
01:12:22 Yes. Around that period. Um and there was some doubt whether crews had actually was being given a task. So the ticks were I I believe
01:12:33 a task. So the ticks were I I believe the ticks in my mind the ticks were that the we've definitely given give this one a task. We confirmed this one's got a task. How that was confirmed I can't remember.
01:12:43 remember. Now in your statement on page 15 at the bottom of the page you say if a crew was sent to a floor but for whatever reason did not get there the system was that they would tell the bridge head who
01:12:54 they would tell the bridge head who would in turn tell my watch managers that a crew would be redeployed. But as I've mentioned often this wasn't happening. No.
01:13:04 No. Now was that information in other words failure of a deployment and the fact of redeployment
01:13:15 and the fact of redeployment recorded anywhere on the wall the photograph of which we've got on. Um again I don't know. I can only assume that that's what the t you know the ticks were for. Somebody hadn't gone in the first place and we we redeployed
01:13:26 the first place and we we redeployed somebody else. But again, that's probably an assumption. It was Do you do you know? I I don't know. No, sorry. I don't know. Okay.
01:13:33 Okay. I'm assuming that's what
01:13:36 what was well what was the means of communication by which uh you say the bridge head would tell um well pass that information on to the to the watch managers.
01:13:49 to the watch managers. Um it'd be verbally to watch manager Watson when he was issu allocating the um the tasks. That's that's my assumption. It it would go through to um
01:14:00 assumption. It it would go through to um watch manager Watson. How much of this paragraph is your assumption? How much of it is is what you actually saw or observed on the night?
01:14:13 Um it's probably an assumption, right?
01:14:15 right? A lot of it's an assumption, right? That's what that's what that's what I would have expected to happen. Some some feedback to come back. Right. I did you actually see for yourself anybody at the bridge head Pat
01:14:27 yourself anybody at the bridge head Pat Gul or Richard Welsh actually telling uh watch manager Watson about a failed deployment and a redeployment. I can't remember now. I can't remember the havoc.
01:14:40 the havoc. Going back to the picture five um 5774 if we can because the clearest version we've got. Do you remember what BA meant in the in both columns but the middle
01:14:52 in the in both columns but the middle column and also on the left hand side? I just assume it's a BA BA um crew was sent.
01:14:57 sent. You say again you assume but do you have a recollection? I've got a recollection. No, sorry. Okay.
01:15:03 Okay. And why would you have a tick and a BA? I said before, we'd allocate a job. Um, and there's a lot of confusion over the double um going back and trying to trace
01:15:16 double um going back and trying to trace where the jobs had gone. You know, you go back to the side of the board where you've got 273s um which crossed off. So, we went back and tried to clarify whether people had got jobs. So the ticks were I believe to
01:15:29 got jobs. So the ticks were I believe to clarify that a crew had received that chit and was on the it was allocated to that task. Yes.
01:15:36 Yes. It was like it is a way of double checking
01:15:38 checking right
01:15:38 right because it did get very confusing for a small um for a period of time right now to see I see if I can help you out here. Watch manager Williams' evidence was that a tick next to a BA
01:15:50 evidence was that a tick next to a BA where you had both meant that BA wearers had been committed in response to a particular FSG call and had successfully reached the relevant floor. That's what that's I wouldn't know about the relevant
01:16:01 I wouldn't know about the relevant floor. No, I wouldn't know. Um Right.
01:16:04 Um Right. It might be his understanding. It it it wouldn't be my understanding. That that's as I thought. Now, in your statement at page 15, in the third paragraph from the from the bottom, I'm sorry to dot around on that page, um you
01:16:19 sorry to dot around on that page, um you say that, um you you put a line through information and that meant the flats had been searched and were clear. Um you you've told us that you you can't remember who
01:16:30 told us that you you can't remember who put those those lines through, but where were you getting that information from? Do you remember? It's just um what what we've done in the past when we do CDAS when we do things um um like an old
01:16:42 when we do things um um like an old house was the same thing. They put a line through when they were we confirmed that that um property had been that dwelling had been searched. I just assumed it was the same thing. Just just following that up a moment.
01:16:53 Just just following that up a moment. This whole system of of transcribing fire survival guidance information onto a wall within the building, is that something that happened at Lackl House? Yes. Is it common practice to do that
01:17:05 Yes. Is it common practice to do that where there are more than where there's more than one resource whatever whatever resources you've got and when you've got that many calls right walls a lot better than a forward information board which are only about this this small yes the incident you attended where you
01:17:18 yes the incident you attended where you had five FSG calls the Kilbert incident you told us about did you use the walls for for
01:17:22 for for FSG the the incident was closed down a lot very very quickly because it was confirmed it was a shooter like there was no danger so basically the information went back just tell the people you there is no danger of fire and we're you for the next summer, you
01:17:34 and we're you for the next summer, you know, next half hour ever. We will ventilate the properties or ventilate the common areas. So there's no there was never a danger. We never really set the set the system up. Were you at Lacel House? Were you at the incident?
01:17:45 Were you at the incident? No, not the incident. Had you ever attended an incident where you'd actually use the walls to record FSG information? Um no, this was the first the first one. So going back to the answer you gave earlier on about it
01:17:56 answer you gave earlier on about it would be normal to put a line through. Is that is that an established practice in your experience? And that's what I would assume. If there's a line through it, that that that's um flat or that task has been completed.
01:18:07 task has been completed. Right.
01:18:07 Right. If there was a tick next to it or if there's an asterisk or it wouldn't mean that, you know, it' mean that the to me it mean that the um the task would still be open.
01:18:16 be open. I see.
01:18:17 I see. So, it's my assumption that yeah, a line through would be the task completed.
01:18:23 Um there's very few got lines through them.
01:18:26 them. Yeah. Now I if you go back and I'm sorry to ask you to keep dotting around in this statement but go if you go back to page 14 of your statement
01:18:37 page 14 of your statement um you describe the system the chit system
01:18:42 system and you say in in the second paragraph on that page in the in the second sentence on their return the crews should have told the bridge head what they had done and then you say this in
01:18:55 they had done and then you say this in the next paragraph my assumption was that the crews were told that if they could not get to the floor they were tasked with, they were
01:19:07 floor they were tasked with, they were to tell Pat Goldborn or the ECB and tell them what they'd done. Now, when you say when you say there that it was your assumption, did anybody
01:19:19 that it was your assumption, did anybody tell you that this was the arrangement in place for debriefing crews? No.
01:19:26 No. Did you personally debrief any crews that you saw coming past you? Did you see watch managers Watson or Williams debrief any crews? We spoke to crews. Um we didn't debrief
01:19:38 We spoke to crews. Um we didn't debrief any crews. Um we spoke to crews because um Mr. Watson and Mr. Williams Watson Williams they were after um had their task been allocate had their task been
01:19:50 task been allocate had their task been completed. So, as crews were coming out and as um casualties were coming through, they were trying to get look where where did you come from? If it was a casualty, where'd you come from? If it was a crew, what flat did you get to or
01:20:01 was a crew, what flat did you get to or what where did you get to? Most of the people coming out, especially as it as it got later and later were um were in a dreadful state. Um and most of the crews
01:20:12 dreadful state. Um and most of the crews were in a dreadful state and unable to really um give us much information. Um it was more to do with the state of the crews and the state of the people leaving the propert leaving the um
01:20:23 leaving the propert leaving the um leaving the tower block. It was more to do with that than what it was to do um it wasn't an infectual debriefing system. The crews the people were just really in a bad state. A lot of them
01:20:35 really in a bad state. A lot of them were unable to talk. Yes.
01:20:37 Yes. But we were trying we were trying to get you know what flat especially the um the casualties. What flat have you come from? Where have you been? You know things like that. But the communication was virtually zero.
01:20:48 was virtually zero. Right. Were there cases where you could obtain that information from the crews or the casualties? Um,
01:20:56 Um, not really because it was a because it was a bridge head. It was a bridge hedge. It was a it was a staging area to throw crews up, you know, to to to f personnel through, fresh personnel. They wanted the um the people in the, you
01:21:09 wanted the um the people in the, you know, the the the used crews and and the and the casualties out to the property as soon as possible, I suppose. and they just basically they fied went straight through and out out of the um building to the triage center which was um around
01:21:24 to the triage center which was um around the corner. Do you remember any occasion when you did succeed in getting I think 73 might have been an occasion when we got we got a confirmation that you know
01:21:35 you know it was clear there was a lady came out and and a gentleman came out and they did shout in it you know the the name of the flat or the number of the flat but as you say there wasn't many lines through because we just couldn't get the information but the ones we did get information we did try and
01:21:47 information we did try and Right. And you would try and rec you would record that on the wall would you? Yeah, we try and record on the wall. Right. Okay. Now,
01:22:01 um we turn to a slightly different topic which is um a new system, the arrival of a new system for for managing FSGS. Um, in his live evidence to the inquiry,
01:22:13 Um, in his live evidence to the inquiry, watch manager Williams started talking about a new system for collecting FSG information that you'd all implemented. And I want to ask you a bit about that. Before I do, perhaps this is the
01:22:24 Before I do, perhaps this is the appropriate time to ask you, do you need a break or are you comfortable to continue?
01:22:28 continue? I was going to ask you, we've been running for an hour and 25 minutes. Yes, I'm happy to take Would this be a convenient point? It would for me it would. I I'm keen that the witnesses also and others too who might like a break.
01:22:40 and others too who might like a break. So true.
01:22:40 So true. I think we'll take a break now, Mr. Wolfindon. Um, only for 10 minutes. Thank you. Um, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while they're out of the room. Um, we'll start again at 20 3.
01:22:52 room. Um, we'll start again at 20 3. Right. If you'd like to go with the usher,
01:23:03 right, 20, please.
01:34:29 that.
01:34:32 Yes. Could you ask Mr. Wolfendon to come back, please? Thank you.
01:34:42 All
01:34:58 right, Mr. Wendon, ready to carry on? Yes, good. Thank you for coming back. Um, just before the break, I was about to put to you some evidence we've had in the past about a new system of
01:35:10 the past about a new system of communicating FSG information to the bridge head. Uh, and watch manager Williams told us in his evidence, and the transcript reference, I should just say, is 30th of July at page 153.
01:35:22 say, is 30th of July at page 153. uh and I'm summarizing but what he said was that under this new system which started at about 4:00 a.m. uh you had a direct line of communication with the command unit CU7 by radio
01:35:35 command unit CU7 by radio um and that he would then transcribe the information that you were getting over the radio onto the wall generally. Is that consistent with your recollection?
01:35:46 that consistent with your recollection? Um
01:35:50 it sounds plausible but I can't remember right
01:35:53 right that's why I keep on when I was give the statements in June this year I kept on saying that the radio we used radio I think that probably where it comes from so yeah it could have been it could have been there
01:36:05 been there can I ask let's see if we can do this by reference to some pictures and see if the pictures trigger a recollection that way can I ask you please to be shown I inq inq 305 5 305.
01:36:25 Now, uh we might be able to get a bit a more enlarged version of this, but this is uh a CCTV picture taken on camera 4
01:36:37 picture taken on camera 4 at an adjusted time of 40305.
01:36:42 Uh, and it shows watch manager Williams standing with his back to the what I can call the FSG wall talking to a crew manager. And then I can you identify you
01:36:53 manager. And then I can you identify you in that picture? Yes, I'm on the radio. You're on the radio, right? What were you doing on the radio? Um,
01:36:59 Um, I don't know. Probably communicating to the command unit. Right. Do you know who that crew manager was?
01:37:07 No, I don't recognize them. Did you have discussions with him? I can't remember. Right. Um if we could look at the next picture, uh which is 306.
01:37:20 Uh we can see this is taken camera 4 at an adjusted time of 040345.
01:37:29 Uh can we see you in that picture
01:37:34 as a clue? Um somebody is talking to manager. Looks like you. Uh, and again, are you on the radio there, do you think?
01:37:42 think? Well, one of us is. It looks like Mr. Williams on the radio, but I can't I can't tell. Do you remember handing your radio to watch manager Williams? Well, that crew manager to the left, that's um crew manager from White
01:37:54 that's um crew manager from White Chapel.
01:37:55 Chapel. Um, I can't remember handing the Sorry, you asked me who the crew manager was. Um, I can't remember who the uh who was talking to now. I assume it's all with the command unit from the FSJ,
01:38:06 the command unit from the FSJ, right?
01:38:08 right? Do you remember whether you handed your radio to watch manager Williams? I don't remember. I really don't remember.
01:38:14 remember. Right.
01:38:14 Right. I might have.
01:38:21 You don't remember the crew manager from White Chapel's name? It's no slip my memory. I do know him, but
01:38:31 but Right.
01:38:32 Right. I'm not going to stand here and try and prompt you until I have something to prompt you with. Um if we can look at the next picture 307 uh we can see uh watch manager Williams
01:38:43 uh we can see uh watch manager Williams there in his customary wall position uh with a with what looks like a well what what was he holding? Do you remember in his hand? I can't remember. Um now we can you identify you in that
01:38:54 Um now we can you identify you in that picture?
01:38:55 picture? Yeah, I'm standing in the middle. Right. And just to say this is camera forward at an adjusted time of 0403 53. You're in the middle. What are you holding?
01:39:04 holding? Um a pad. What's on the pad? I don't know. What What would you be using a pad for at that point in the night? Uh, making notes. I don't know what the
01:39:15 Uh, making notes. I don't know what the I don't know what notes I would be making.
01:39:17 making. Did you f written FSG information in paper form into the bridge head from the wall?
01:39:23 wall? Not from the bridge. Not into the um I don't recall. I could have I could have written um information down on the pad, but I don't recall doing it. Sorry. Right.
01:39:37 Do do you remember at this stage whether you actually went into the bridge head past the glass wall? I remember speaking to um group manager Gold Boomer on an on an occasion but I
01:39:50 Gold Boomer on an on an occasion but I can't remember where. I assumed it must have been around the back of the glass wall because I don't think he he didn't come the other side for quite a while. No, we'll come we'll come to that in a moment just because we I think we might be able to help with that a bit. Before
01:40:01 be able to help with that a bit. Before we do, just moving on with this exercise. If you turn please to a to um 308.
01:40:12 I inq 308. This is camera 4. Adjusted time of 040538.
01:40:18 Um can we see you in this picture? Yes, I'm drawing on the wall. And what are you drawing on the wall? Um I can't remember. Must be FSG details.
01:40:28 details. Yes. And what are you are you where well where from? Where are you transferring? I really don't know. It could have been from a radio. It could have been from um a t of paper. I don't know. What are you holding in your left hand?
01:40:39 What are you holding in your left hand? Do you think?
01:40:42 Do you think that looks like a radio? Um I don't know. Can we enlarge the the picture Paul, please?
01:40:49 please? Uh no. Other way around. We just enlarge there. That doesn't really help that much, but
01:41:01 It looks like a radio, right?
01:41:03 right? Or it could be a pad. Do you remember receiving messages over the radio? FSG messages. I really don't. Right.
01:41:10 Right. Sorry.
01:41:14 And can I just ask you, sorry, while we're on that picture, keep that picture there. Let me just try something with you if I can. Could I ask you to be shown again? Uh
01:41:25 shown again? Uh me
01:41:27 me 5774.
01:41:31 See if we can. So it's underneath the rubbed out patch. Sorry,
01:41:35 Sorry, it looks like it's I was writing underneath the rubbed out patch. Well, I was about to ask you that. I think it is. There you can see the rubbed down patch. Do you looking at both those pictures simultaneously on the screen? Do you do
01:41:46 simultaneously on the screen? Do you do you think you can help us with what you were writing down? If you could increase the um magnification on the on the right hand one.
01:41:52 hand one. On the right hand one. Yeah.
01:41:56 Yeah. Where the box is and and the writing underneath the box. I see. Just increase the magnification. That looks good. It right. I see. So what just to repeat your answer, what what on that right
01:42:08 your answer, what what on that right hand picture do you think you're writing down?
01:42:11 down? I think it might have been that um watch manager Glenn Williams has left the bridge head. Uh, I think it could be that one. I don't I think it's too far down to be the box.
01:42:30 This is if you go to the photograph on the left hand side, we can see that he's still there. Yes.
01:42:34 Yes. And it's an adjusted time of 040538. Whereas you've got watch manager G. Williams left bridge head at 0430. has. Yeah.
01:42:43 Yeah. So, in light of that, I I just question your last answer. Would you like to have an about it? Mr. Williams got a a phone call from his wife. He had to go. It's around that time. But the other the things above it
01:42:55 time. But the other the things above it um
01:42:58 um 7th, fourth floor, 11th floor. I don't remember writing them down. Do you know whose handwriting that is within the box? No, I don't put a line through me. Se um sevens.
01:43:07 sevens. I don't think it's mine. You don't think it's yours? Who do you do you remember a box being there? Um,
01:43:17 Um, not for sure. It must have been there cuz I wrote I wrote beneath it, but I don't know who wrote um that one in.
01:43:22 in. Okay.
01:43:23 Okay. It it wasn't me, I don't think. Okay. Well, we've tried I think our best with that, but um I wonder if we've got another one more thing. I don't quite give up. If we go to meet 0157,
01:43:36 give up. If we go to meet 0157, sorry, 17597
01:43:42 uh for the right hand photograph instead. I just want to Yes. That in fact what we've got there will will do. Looking at the writing underneath the
01:43:53 Looking at the writing underneath the smudge bit. Mhm. and and below the bit about watch manager Williams leaving. Do you think there's any information there which would tally with what we see you writing on the wall in the left hand?
01:44:04 hand? If you um if you expand it I'll probably be able to Yes, let's expand it a bit more.
01:44:11 Try that.
01:44:22 No, I can't I'm sorry. I can't make that up very well. All right. Well, thank you for thank you for
01:44:26 for sorry
01:44:27 sorry for for trying to assist us. Now, um if I can go
01:44:35 uh on to page to the next photograph at 311.
01:44:44 This is camerafor again take and the adjusted time for this picture is 041650.
01:44:52 Now, this shows uh watch manager Williams and watch manager Watson on radios. We can see them uh and you with something in your hands.
01:45:03 something in your hands. Yeah. Writing I'm writing down something on a notepad right now. Could you describe what's happening in that picture? What are you doing?
01:45:09 doing? Um I'm writing down something that information's coming in. Um right.
01:45:14 right. It could have been fire survival guidance calls. I don't know. I can't remember. Sorry. Okay.
01:45:18 Okay. It probably was. A and was this the time that the messages or around this time that messages started coming in to watch manager Williams and Watson by radio
01:45:29 manager Williams and Watson by radio directly from the command unit. It looks like that. Yes. Right. Roughly. Yeah.
01:45:36 Yeah. And do you remember whether it was both of them, Williams and Watson, or only one of them at a time taking messages by radio from the command unit? I can't remember. Okay. Um,
01:45:49 Okay. Um, can you explain whether this system that we can see in operation here differed from the system you you found when you first arrived in the lobby when the bridge head was there?
01:46:01 bridge head was there? Um,
01:46:03 Um, we're still getting information right now on our ch and hopefully passing it on. So, the only the only difference in this in the system was where the information came from, I assume. So, it came via radio and the other the other system
01:46:14 other system I don't know where it came from as I said before. Right. Probably by runners, but I don't know. I see. Okay. And um these radios were they what what what radios were they? Handheld radios. Fireground radios.
01:46:26 Handheld radios. Fireground radios. They're fire ground, not airwave. No, fire ground. Right. And was there do you recall any difficulties that either watch manager Williams or watch manager Watson were were experiencing
01:46:37 were experiencing receiving communications? I can't if if there would have been difficulties, we would have tried another system. So we probably it was probably working fairly okay, right?
01:46:51 Did you or either of those two officers tell anybody at the bridge head that you were adopting a new approach in the way you were receiving information
01:47:02 were receiving information from?
01:47:03 from? Not the overall command unit. No. Okay. Now, in his evidence
01:47:09 evidence earlier in July to the inquiry, station manager Daniel Egan told us that you were acting as a conduit, he said, of FSG information coming from the command
01:47:20 FSG information coming from the command unit to the base of the tower. Would that be an accurate description of your role at this point? Probably. Probably. Yes. This point being about 4:16 in the
01:47:31 This point being about 4:16 in the night. Right now c can I then ask you to look at a a document? I think we can take this photograph off the screen and look at LFB quadruple01929.
01:47:49 And
01:47:56 this was exhibited to uh watch manager O'Keefe's witness statement and we explored it with him and with watch manager Watson. Yeah, that looks like my handwriting. Oh, now which what's what's your
01:48:07 Oh, now which what's what's your handwriting? Most of it does the sevens. I don't cross sevens, right?
01:48:11 right? Um yeah, that looks like mine and it's probably from that notepad you just said.
01:48:16 said. Now that's helpful. He his ev his his his evidence sorry watch manager Williams's evidence was that the these documents were from the time that you were operating the what he called the
01:48:27 were operating the what he called the new system you taking FSG information directly from the command unit through the radio um or with them on the radios that there are two different handwritings there we've got uh the two
01:48:40 handwritings there we've got uh the two slips on the top left that's your handwriting is it yeah I don't yeah it looks it appears to be I don't cross my Sevens, right? And then the one on the very far right and the four on the bottom. Are those yours?
01:48:51 those yours? It looks like. Yeah. Right. And can you do you remember seeing the other two which are not your handwriting? No. Don't appear to be. Okay.
01:48:59 Okay. Sorry.
01:49:01 Sorry. Watch manager Watson said that the third and fourth boxes at the top were his handwriting. Okay. And he thought the rest could be yours. It sounds as if the rest are. It looks like it is mine. Yes. Okay. Now, um,
01:49:16 the list of flats that we see on these little chits appear to be grouped by floor number. This was that a a a new system.
01:49:29 This was that a a a new system. Well, let me ask it this way. At what point when you were involved did grouping FSG information by floor number start? probably around about this this occasion then that's the only I can
01:49:41 occasion then that's the only I can assume
01:49:41 assume right I see did anybody tell you to start grouping FSG information by flaws I believe it's how the information came across in the command unit so I would assume the command unit would group in it
01:49:52 it I see you say you assume but do you do you actually have I don't know for certain now right okay if the M if if I was writing it down in that order that' be the the order it' come over the radio so I assume maybe
01:50:05 come over the radio so I assume maybe the command unit I see okay what did you do with with these slips of paper? Um, I really can't remember. Oh, I just
01:50:16 Um, I really can't remember. Oh, I just I can't remember. Sorry. Uh, because watch manager O'Keefe says that he found these in his tunic at the end of the night. So, they got to the bridge head somehow. Do you remember
01:50:27 bridge head somehow. Do you remember how?
01:50:31 I don't. I'm sorry now.
01:50:41 You I mean you didn't retain them. No.
01:50:44 No. So you must have given them to some you must have given them to somebody. I assume so. Yes. But you don't know. No, I don't remember. Right.
01:50:53 Did you have any direct discussions from from your recollection direct discussions with watch manager O'Keeffe at the bridge head at or after about
01:51:04 at the bridge head at or after about this time say 4:00 a.m.? Yes. I can't remember. Can't remember. Now, can I take you to your statement and turn to a slightly different
01:51:15 and turn to a slightly different subject? um at par page 17 in the second paragraph.
01:51:25 Well, I'll start at the first. Actually, I probably ought to start at the foot of page 60 just to give you the full context.
01:51:37 Uh you you say in the second last paragraph, the crews were receiving different information. sort of second last paragraph. Um, crews were receiving different information by
01:51:48 were receiving different information by the time they got to the ECB and were being told to fight fire as a priority from what I heard. When watch manager Watson found out what was happening, he told watch manager Williams and myself. Watch manager Williams went to the
01:51:59 Watch manager Williams went to the bridge head and the situation became quite emotional. And then you say what? Watch manager Watson said to group manager Welch, you're not following this the system he was using. And and Welch responded by
01:52:10 was using. And and Welch responded by saying, you're not committing cruise, we commit cruise. watch manager Williams was told to back off. There seemed to be miscommunication over the top of the next page.
01:52:21 next page. There see there seemed to be miscommunication in the ECB in that the ECB were telling crews to fight the fire whereas FSG watch managers were trying to find people. We were told that crews
01:52:32 to find people. We were told that crews had not been doing FSG equals for the last hour. It was a communication breakdown and got very verbally heated between watch manager Williams and group manager Welch.
01:52:43 manager Welch. Now,
01:52:47 I just want to explore a little bit of that evidence. I've read it all to you, so you've got the full or most of the context. Going back, if I can, to page 16 of your statement.
01:53:07 you
01:53:10 uh say in the middle of that page uh that it it soon became obvious that information wasn't being fed through and this led up to this discussion. Starting with that,
01:53:21 with that, what was how was it obvious that information wasn't going through to the bridge head?
01:53:29 Um I assume when we got told that the um the FSG we had um the FSGs weren't getting acted on. Who told you that? Do you remember?
01:53:40 you remember? It was a conversation um with either myself and um Mr. Williams um group manager Welsh. I assume it came from group manager Welsh,
01:53:51 Welsh, right?
01:53:52 right? I assume
01:53:52 I assume you assume that's but you don't remember. Is that is that what you're telling?
01:53:56 telling? I'm trying to remember. Um
01:54:00 yeah, I think it was group manager 12 said we haven't been for the last hour we haven't been going above the uh the 11th floor. right now you say
01:54:11 you say as a result in the next this is the paragraph I started reading to you um group manager Welch had made the decision that no BA
01:54:22 Welch had made the decision that no BA crews were to go above the 10th floor whilst we were handing chits to crews ultimately we had no control over what the committing officer Welch of the British was actually doing at what point did you discover
01:54:35 at what point did you discover uh that although you were handing chits to Cruz, the committing officer, group manager Welch wasn't necessarily simply waving Cruz through with that
01:54:46 waving Cruz through with that with that conversation with Mr. Williams and I'll stand there and Mr. Welch and myself.
01:54:51 myself. So, um
01:54:55 So, um let's see if we can time this. Uh uh uh
01:55:03 did you f first of all did you hear this discussion? You were actually party to it, were you? I must have been. Yes. Right now let's see if we can time this with you in it. can allow you first to
01:55:14 with you in it. can allow you first to be shown INQ332
01:55:28 inQ 332. Now this is
01:55:33 yes a photograph taken on camera 2 with an adjusted time of 034020.
01:55:42 Uh, now I'm not sure that we see you in this picture. Can you just confirm one way or the other for us? No, I I can't see myself now. Do
01:55:54 No, I I can't see myself now. Do No. Do Do you happen to know? Well, first of all, help us where this is. This I think this is this this is behind the glass door and the glass barrier at the base of the stairs.
01:56:03 stairs. And this is where the bridge head was at that time. This is where the bridge head was set up. Yeah. Right now we I think we can identify Louisa Dilvo there in the photograph in the bottom left hand corner. Do you know who was kneeling
01:56:15 corner. Do you know who was kneeling down pointing at one of the ECBs? No, it would have been another watch manager I believe but I can't remember. We I think I can identify Brian O'Keefe standing um as one of the two officers
01:56:27 standing um as one of the two officers on the left. Yeah,
01:56:28 Yeah, there who was on his right, you know, or his left, our right looking at the picture.
01:56:33 picture. I don't know. Sorry. You don't know. Now then um what I want to focus on really on this picture is the group of individuals on the right hand side. First of all, who are the two
01:56:44 First of all, who are the two individuals facing us? Do you know? Uh that's group manager Gold Bloom and um Richard Welch. Right. And and who is it with his back to us? Do you know? It looks like it's um watch manager
01:56:56 It looks like it's um watch manager Watson.
01:56:57 Watson. Yeah, Watson. Yeah. Right. Uh
01:57:03 we have we we have a we can do better by send by 6 seconds. If you go to 333 same camera um this is another PL another
01:57:15 camera um this is another PL another picture taken at 034026. So as I say 6 seconds later can you now identify
01:57:24 identify uh the individuals on the right hand side?
01:57:27 side? Um,
01:57:28 Um, we've got Pat Goldborn, I think, in the middle there. Watch Manager Silva and it looks like um, Watchman Watson. I don't know who the other watch manager is. You think it's Watson, do you? Is that Watson? I
01:57:40 Is that Watson? I we Well,
01:57:41 we Well, oh, no, that looks like um, Mr. William. Is it
01:57:44 Is it Williams? Williams. Lim Williams. Right. Sorry, I've had to prompt you a little bit with that. Is that what we thought, but wanted to get your your recollection. My question really is having seen these two pictures, does this does this ring a bell about a heated about the timing of
01:57:56 bell about a heated about the timing of a heated discussion? I mean, could this be the heated discussion? No, the heated discussion was in the actual lobby. It was in the actual lobby. The one that I witnessed was it was in the lobby outside. Right. I see. Okay. So, bearing with me
01:58:09 Right. I see. Okay. So, bearing with me then just just or indulging me if you if you would. Um if you turn to INQ 334
01:58:17 and again you may not know anything about this and if you don't then just please say we can see in this picture and this is camera 2 at 3404 um watch manager Williams it's clearly him talking to Louisa D Silvo and
01:58:30 him talking to Louisa D Silvo and justiculating. Do you know anything about a discussion between them? No.
01:58:36 No. right now going back to your statement if we can and I've shown this to you. Um,
01:58:49 uh, you have talked about in the third paragraph up at the bottom the decision about not going above the 10th floor. Can I show you a different paragraph, same page, second paragraph on that
01:59:00 same page, second paragraph on that page, you say, um,
01:59:04 um, I think it was GM Welch who made the decision that no one without EDBA should go above the 10th floor. I was made aware of that and so wrote it on the wall as a reminder. And just so that we've got that clearly
01:59:15 And just so that we've got that clearly there, it we can just be shown 5774 again
01:59:21 again just so there's no doubt about it.
01:59:36 You can see someone's written on the wall above 10 EDBA below 10 SDBA. Is that you?
01:59:41 that you? Yes.
01:59:41 Yes. That's the picture you're referring to right now. Do do you remember roughly what time that decision was made? Um I don't. I asked um I communicated to
01:59:54 Um I don't. I asked um I communicated to the command units at one point when we found out that the crews were not going above the 11th. I communicated with the command units and asked them to write down said look as from this time as from now because we didn't have any any way
02:00:05 now because we didn't have any any way of um of knowing the time. No, we didn't have I didn't have watches on or anything. So I asked the command unit to write down from this time um no crews above the 11th or no crews above the 10th.
02:00:16 10th. Right.
02:00:16 Right. So they I don't know whether they would have um
02:00:20 have um wrote it up. I don't know whether they did write it up, but I did ask them to do it.
02:00:24 do it. The reason there's no time on it cuz I didn't know what the time we did know what the time was anyway or we we had no way of telling the time at the time. Do you remember whether your writing
02:00:35 Do you remember whether your writing that down arose out of a discussion you had yourself with group manager Welch? I could have. I might have. Yes. Right.
02:00:44 Right. At that stage, did you give any consideration to whether you needed more EDBA wearers? Um I didn't give the consideration.
02:00:57 Now it was around the same time that that I think we had the um no one above the 11th
02:01:06 11th floor. Right.
02:01:14 So, just to be clear, h how were you made aware that crews weren't going above the 10th floor? Um, I believe I was I was informed by the um either group manager Welsh at the
02:01:25 the um either group manager Welsh at the times group manager Lisa Dak now or um group manager Goldburn. Do you know why the decision not to commit crews above the 10th floor was made?
02:01:33 made? Um I didn't at the time. Um subsequently I I've heard that the crews couldn't get past the 11th. right now. Watch manager conditions were so um the conditions
02:01:44 conditions were so um the conditions were so fierce from the 11th upwards they just couldn't get past it. Now watch manager Watson gave evidence that he overheard group manager Welch telling a BA crew that they weren't
02:01:55 telling a BA crew that they weren't committing crews above the 10th floor and that he then Watson raised that with you.
02:02:00 you. Yeah, it probably was. Yeah, but yeah, you're right. Yeah, sorry. That's that sounds plausible. Yeah, that sounds plausible. Okay. And the transcript reference for that is 24th of July 18 at pages 105 to 106. Now when
02:02:12 July 18 at pages 105 to 106. Now when that issue first came to your attention, did anybody go to the bridge head to speak to them about it? Um
02:02:22 Um I can't remember. I definitely spoke to people and Mr. Williams definitely spoke to people and um Mr. Watson I can't remember whether that was before or after the heated conversation. The
02:02:34 or after the heated conversation. The the it wasn't a heated conversation. It was a an impassion conversation between Mr. Welsh and Mr. Williams. Heated is your word. And I know. Yes. It it we'd already had, you know, three people
02:02:47 we'd already had, you know, three people fall out of the building. It was a confirmed um fatal fire. The pressures and the stresses on these individuals was absolutely huge. And I could see from um Mr. Williams that he he took a
02:02:59 from um Mr. Williams that he he took a personal um how could I put it? He took it personally that you know these were his people to save you know these were his chits they weren't just pieces of paper he was handing out he knew the meaning he he felt the meaning of these
02:03:11 meaning he he felt the meaning of these pieces of paper that that was people's lives you know and that's why I think the conversation got heated
02:03:18 heated Mr. Welsh wanted he was um the ops commander at the time. He wanted to put some um well I don't know why but he I assume he wanted to put some control over it and the two of them had raised
02:03:30 over it and the two of them had raised arguments but it was only out of passion. It wasn't over over um I think it's just out of sheer passion for Mr. Williams. No I understand Williams. Yeah I understand that. Um just just see if we can help with with
02:03:42 just just see if we can help with with some timings. Can I ask you to be shown INQ 312 312.
02:03:58 Now this this goes I think a little bit further
02:04:02 further uh forward in time. This is camera 4 at an adjusted time of 04705. Can you see you in that picture? Yep. Right in the middle. And what are you holding?
02:04:13 And what are you holding? Um a pad. pad of paper. Yes.
02:04:15 Yes. And a pen. And again, we we see the other two watch managers on the radio. Uh where were you going, do you think?
02:04:26 going, do you think? I can only assume in the direction that was towards the the glass door which led to the bridge head. Yes.
02:04:33 Yes. Uh and at the next picture which is only a minute or so later uh 313 IMQ 313
02:04:44 uh this is at a camera 3 at an adjusted time of 041848 sorry 041812 I'm sorry 041812.
02:04:55 sorry 041812 I'm sorry 041812. Um, now we we see a watch manager uh
02:05:03 uh or or an officer in a white helmet in the middle uh of the lobby there walking towards
02:05:11 towards the doorway. Watch manager Williams and him with his right arm raised. I don't think Mr. Williams had his raised arm to him. I thought he he had his raised arm to group manager Welch
02:05:23 his raised arm to group manager Welch who was behind. Right. You're in this picture next to group manager um watch manager Williams, aren't you? There on the left writing something down the path. So wherever you'd gone perhaps to the bridge head in the previous picture at
02:05:35 bridge head in the previous picture at 04705 you come back to the wall and we see watch manager Williams calling what looks like well you tell me. I don't think it's him. I think he's if you go behind that person you got group
02:05:46 you go behind that person you got group manager Welsh who's about to walk across.
02:05:48 across. Ah so thank you. That's my um understanding of it. That's very helpful. I was wondering. So that person that watch manager there in the white helmet. Do you think that's Welch?
02:05:57 Welch? I think that's a station manager. Think that's why do you say no the group manager's Mr. Welch is further back the two two stripes? The person with the single stripe that's a station manager. Right. Thank you. That so the by the
02:06:09 Right. Thank you. That so the by the hose that's the station manager. That looks like a station manager. Do you know who that happened to be? Um no.
02:06:15 Um no. Okay. Uh and then the the other white helmet there we see is is group manager Welsh.
02:06:19 Welsh. It appears to be Welsh. Yes. Yes. Now then um uh if if we look at the next picture which is camera 3 adjusted time of 041813
02:06:31 time of 041813 we'll have both on at the same time and the next one at o uh INQ 315 which is camera 4 at 041 1819 both adjusted times.
02:06:53 Now, uh, we've got those up there. That appears, and I don't want to prompt you, but that shows you and watch manager Williams in
02:07:04 shows you and watch manager Williams in discussion with an officer in a white helmet.
02:07:07 helmet. Yes.
02:07:08 Yes. And being handed notes, it looks like. Would that be right? I think we I think we were handing the notes to the group manager. I'm not too sure whether they were coming from the group manager or we were actually
02:07:19 group manager or we were actually issuing the notes. Now, can you identify that senior officer in the White House? Um, yes, that's at the time it was a group manager. He's now a um a DAC group manager Welch, it appears to be. You think it's Welch? Yes.
02:07:29 Yes. Right
02:07:30 Right now,
02:07:32 now, there's a to be clearer about this. There's a there's a picture at uh uh INQ356
02:07:42 INQ356 um which is taken camera 4 at an adjusted time of 041 1832. um which is only uh about
02:07:55 uh about 20 seconds later. Uh what we can see I think group manager Welch walking now away from you. You're partly obscured by his wife Helmet and
02:08:06 partly obscured by his wife Helmet and you've got watch manager Williams next to him.
02:08:10 to him. So that confirms does that is that right that that would confirm watch manager Welch as that group manager you were talking to? Group manager Welch. Yes. Yes.
02:08:18 Yes. Yes. Uh now looking at all of those pictures, so 312, 313, 314, 315, and 356 we've seen, um does this help us time
02:08:29 seen, um does this help us time the discussion uh
02:08:34 uh first of all about
02:08:38 whether watch manager Watson's instructions to Cruz was actually being passed on? It it would be around about that time. And was that the same time as the heated discussion passionate discussion about
02:08:49 discussion passionate discussion about not getting I can't say for certain but it was around that time. Yes. Right. Were they two separate discussions or were they one single discussion about No, it's two separate discussions from my memory. Right. And did both happen in the lobby?
02:09:01 Right. And did both happen in the lobby? Yes.
02:09:01 Yes. Are you sure about that? I mean um I'm asking you to recall it does from from my memory um the heated discussion was in the middle of the lobby. That's what I can remember.
02:09:13 the lobby. That's what I can remember. Could be mistaken. Okay. And and the discussion about you say was separate about FSG calls FSG instructions being given to crews not being acted on by the bridge head. Was
02:09:24 being acted on by the bridge head. Was that was that this this discussion do you think? I think it might have been prior to that because um the group manager appears to be walking away with some of the chits. Yes. I see of the So it appears to be after the
02:09:35 of the So it appears to be after the I see. So
02:09:36 I see. So it all happened around roughly the same time and it was um it was a very strange feeling.
02:09:40 feeling. Right. Okay. But but at any at any rate to would it be right to summarize your evidence on these pictures in this way that that here is a discussion between you uh Williams and and Welch um about
02:09:54 you uh Williams and and Welch um about FSG calls at this time which leads to him being given chits and walking away. It appears to be like that. Yes. Okay. Do you know what happened to the chits of paper that you and Watson gave
02:10:05 chits of paper that you and Watson gave to watch manager sorry group manager Welch then? No.
02:10:09 No. Okay.
02:10:12 Okay. Do you just to go back to what you've called the heated discussion and I'm sorry to keep using the word the passionate discussion about the 10th floor. Do you remember whether that was before or after group man um after watch
02:10:23 before or after group man um after watch manager Williams left?
02:10:28 It has to be before, wouldn't it? Before he left, obviously. Right.
02:10:31 Right. So, we've got an outer boundary of of
02:10:35 of right
02:10:38 right now.
02:10:40 now. And I'm sorry to keep bombarding you with photographs, but can I ask you please be to to be shown INQ 321
02:10:51 cuz I think this might take what you just told us about the separate discussion about the 10th floor which you said happened in the middle of the lobby a little bit further forward. This is uh camera 3 at adjusted time of
02:11:03 is uh camera 3 at adjusted time of 050743.
02:11:07 And perhaps it doesn't. But here we see I think you in the middle of the of the lobby talking to to two white helmets with black stripes. Two looks like two group managers.
02:11:19 looks like two group managers. Does this ring a bell with you? Um no.
02:11:23 Um no. Right.
02:11:31 Yeah, if if you look at 338 INQ 338,
02:11:36 this is an adjusted time of 050812. So
02:11:43 So about 30 seconds later, different camera.
02:11:48 camera. Does that help? I know the people, but I don't know what we were discussing. Okay. Can you just I I think we can identify the people, but just help us do that. Um
02:11:59 that. Um um I think the top one's Nick. The one on the right above me is Nick Mai, I believe. Group manager Welsh. Yes.
02:12:04 Yes. Group manager Gold Bloom. Yes.
02:12:06 Yes. And um
02:12:08 And um Mr. Watson in the background. Yes. Uh and you don't remember what you were talking about? I can't remember, but I would assume it was well have to be an FSG because
02:12:19 was well have to be an FSG because that's all we were dealing with. We weren't dealing with anything else, right?
02:12:23 right? Now, going back to your statement, we could take these pictures off the off the off the screen. Uh, you say in the middle of that page,
02:12:36 um, he look he then looked at me and that's group manager Welch. Yeah.
02:12:40 Yeah. Took three pieces of paper and said they would try and get above the 15th. By this point, I knew the likelihood that everyone for whom I had chits in my hand would be dead. This was at about 5:00 a.m. for the past hour without
02:12:53 5:00 a.m. for the past hour without watch manager Williams, watch manager Watson, and myself knowing, no one had been getting up to the 15th floor. Now, just on the photographs we've been looking at in the the chits in group manager Welch's hands that we looked at
02:13:06 manager Welch's hands that we looked at uh in the in those photographs timed at um
02:13:13 earlier on. So 418 419 which we looked at.
02:13:19 at. Do you think that 5:00 a.m. is right? No. No, possibly not. Okay.
02:13:23 Okay. I was um Yeah. And you then say for the past hour without watch manager Williams and watch manager Watson and myself knowing no one had been getting above the 15th floor. Yeah.
02:13:34 Yeah. To be clear, how did you know that it was for the past hour? We were told I believe Mr. Will Mr. Watson was told. You believe Mr. Watson was told? How? Yeah. And then Mr. Watson told us.
02:13:45 Yeah. And then Mr. Watson told us. So who who was he told by? I I assume it would have been either M um group manager Gold Bloom or group manager Welch when you was did did he tell you that before you had the discussion with with
02:13:56 before you had the discussion with with group manager during it? I can't remember. Did you discuss with group manager Welch yourself why no one had been getting up to the 15th floor? Yeah,
02:14:06 Yeah, you did.
02:14:06 you did. Yes.
02:14:07 Yes. At what point was that? Was that during this discussion? was we we'd come to we'd been told it was it's very vague or it's not very vague it's it's hard to be precise on times
02:14:18 it's it's hard to be precise on times because um there was no way of telling times um we were told that no one's gone above the 11th floor um I communicated that to the command unit and said look no one's gone above
02:14:30 unit and said look no one's gone above the 10th for some reason can you note it that no one's gone above the 10th um and then shortly after that I had a conversation with Mr. Welsh. Um, sorry, group manager Welsh and said, um, what
02:14:41 group manager Welsh and said, um, what about these people? And I held out these these chits of paper. Um, and Mr. Welch said, "Well, no one's gone above the 11th." Oh, no one's got No, he said, "No one's gone above the 10th." Sorry for the confusion. I said,
02:14:53 10th." Sorry for the confusion. I said, "Well, all these people are above the 10th." Um, so he said, "Okay, we'll try and get to the 15th." But apparently the crews um at that time
02:15:04 But apparently the crews um at that time the the cruise find it very difficult to go above the 11th anyway. Did you state of the crews coming down at the time it just confirmed that the
02:15:15 at the time it just confirmed that the conditions up there on the stairs and in the lobbies must have been absolutely horrendous. But yeah, I had a conversation with Mr. Welsh and handed him the sheets and he said, "Okay, we'll try and get to them."
02:15:26 said, "Okay, we'll try and get to them." And he took the sheets off me.
02:15:30 Did that answer your question? Did you Well, let me try a different question. Did you ask group manager Welch why no one had told the FSG team in the lobby um of the fact that for the past hour?
02:15:41 um of the fact that for the past hour? I can't recall doing it. I can't recall doing that. I was just reticent to the fact that they hadn't. Right.
02:15:46 Right. I didn't want to know why. I just it was just when someone said they weren't going above. I can't be specific because the 10th was mentioned. The 11th was mentioned. No one's going above the 11th and I'm not committing people above the
02:15:58 and I'm not committing people above the 10th. There was two um there was two things mentioned um and when we heard that me and Mr. Watson and Williams we just had a a feeling of utter and dread. It was like because all the sheets jits of paper in our hands were all for
02:16:12 of paper in our hands were all for the 11th and above. So it was quite okay let let's telling moment let's see if we can it took a while to to get our breath back after that and then start doing stuff if you know what I mean. Yeah. No,
02:16:23 stuff if you know what I mean. Yeah. No, I understand. I understand that. But just to go back to my question, did did you actually ask group manager Welsh why no one had told you in the lobby, the FSGT?
02:16:33 FSGT? I don't believe I did. I can't remember. I can't remember doing so. Okay. And what about the decision not to commit above the 10th floor? Do you know how long the bridge head have been operating that policy before you found out about it?
02:16:46 out about it? I couldn't be couldn't be absolutely certain, but a conversation around of we haven't we haven't gone above the 11th for the last hour anyway. Right. It it's it's in my memory, but who said it and when they said it, I can't
02:16:57 it and when they said it, I can't recall.
02:16:57 recall. Okay. Well, let me try a couple of pictorial pieces of information to see if this triggers a recollection. First of all, can I ask you to go to the photograph at me quadruple05776
02:17:20 now?
02:17:23 It's not easy to see it because it's partly obscured by the yellow wires on the very far right of the wall by the door jamb there. But can you see under the yellow wires? We could perhaps have
02:17:34 the yellow wires? We could perhaps have it magnified, please. It says 0430. No one above 15.
02:17:42 First of all, ah,
02:17:44 ah, does that
02:17:46 does that do you remember how that writing got there?
02:17:49 there? I don't. Did you write it? I myself. Yes, I myself. Did do you looking at it? Do you Does this trigger a recollection?
02:18:01 It doesn't. Uh I know I wanted to record it somewhere. I did definitely phone up the command unit and ask him to say at this point we're not going above the 10th, but I could well have done it because I understood I wanted to record
02:18:13 because I understood I wanted to record that was an important piece of information and I wanted to try and be as accurate as I could. But as you said, my um my times have been out a lot. So I must have asked someone for the time. I would have if I would have been given
02:18:24 I would have if I would have been given that information that was something I would have wanted to record, right? So I may well have done so. Okay. Now um and that was that related to your discussion with group manager Welch?
02:18:35 discussion with group manager Welch? It could well have been. Yeah. Okay.
02:18:39 Okay. Now can I also also ask you to look at um there are various versions of this but um let's go to uh ME015925
02:18:56 which is an exhibit of uh station manager Egan. It's his deeg just for our transcript. We also have this at ME015634
02:19:08 this at ME015634 and that says this is and this is a whiteboard in CU7. Um and it says if we look at it from SM Wilford middle of the photograph at 0425
02:19:21 at 0425 BA crews committed to 15th floor
02:19:26 and then ditto under SM Wolfon at 0445 BA crews only committed up to 11th floor not 15.
02:19:36 not 15. Now, do you remember either of those communications with the with I remember the second communication? Right.
02:19:43 Right. Definitely. But by was that made the first one as well by radio?
02:19:48 by radio? Yeah. It would have been by radio. Um or it might have been face to face cuz uh
02:19:52 cuz uh Mr. um sorry station manager came down to the bridge head when we told them that there was a limit of how far I can't remember exactly. I'm sorry. There's a limit to the number of floors they were going to. Um down Mr. Egan
02:20:05 they were going to. Um down Mr. Egan station manager even came down to bridge head and came into the um came into the lobby cuz he was very upset with it
02:20:16 upset with it upset with the that's a bit a good enough word. He was it upset him. So he came down to have a talk and I believe he spoke to um um the the instant commanders at the time. what group
02:20:29 commanders at the time. what group manager Welch and well I I thought I assumed group manager Welch in charge but apparently it was um all the way through it was group manager Gold was in charge of the actual bridge head and the fire sector and I was told
02:20:41 head and the fire sector and I was told later on the group manager Welsh was there as um sector commander um operations operations commander but he chose to stay at the bridge head rather than so that to support um Mr. in gold.
02:20:54 than so that to support um Mr. in gold. I say it's a very very stressful time for everybody and
02:20:58 and but information like that I I used to work in a fire investigation team and it it's key to record accurate information I believe and that that was only my attempt to try and get some accurate
02:21:09 attempt to try and get some accurate information down. So the times 0425 and 0445
02:21:13 0445 hopefully they're accurate but I don't know I didn't have a a watch. Yes. Now, station manager Egan told us that he recorded this on the whiteboard because it's what he got from you.
02:21:24 because it's what he got from you. Yeah, I asked him to Well, I asked him to make sure he made a note. So, can we tie together the first entry there? 0425 VA cruise committed to 15th
02:21:36 there? 0425 VA cruise committed to 15th floor with with what you'd written on the wall of 430. Yeah, probably. Yeah. Okay.
02:21:40 Okay. What did I put on the other one? It was on the wall 0430. Now,
02:21:46 Now, uh,
02:21:48 uh, can I ask you to go back to your statement
02:21:55 and look at the bottom of page 17 on the top of page 18, you say, "However, I do not know for sure who made the decision. I'm of the view that
02:22:06 made the decision. I'm of the view that the mixup started before I arrived. when the bridge head was moved from the third to the ground floor. Something went wrong during that move resulting in the error. First of all, what's the decision that you're referring to there?
02:22:18 that you're referring to there? Uh probably is the um you know the FSG system of we were told that you know no one had been doing FSG for the last hour. We're not going above the 11. I assumed it was that decision. And what's the mixup that you're
02:22:30 And what's the mixup that you're referring to? Um I was talking to watch manager Watson after the fact. Um, watch manager Watson was the opinion that the system was
02:22:42 was the opinion that the system was um, watch manager Watson and Williams both had the opinion that the system was working perfectly well when the bridge head was on the third floor. They assumed that when the mixup happened when they came down the um to the ground
02:22:54 when they came down the um to the ground floor and I was it was of their opinion that that's when the mixup happened and no more fire survival guidance or the fire survival guidance um system had
02:23:05 fire survival guidance um system had broken down. i.e. here's your chit go to the floor
02:23:08 the floor right so the mix up being being precise being the fact that is this right that the officers in command of the bridge head were themselves deploying crews and not paying attention to the information
02:23:20 not paying attention to the information that the crews had in their chits that's what I was told I see now we were told that by group manager Welch as well you you were told that at what point by
02:23:31 you were told that at what point by group
02:23:31 group I can't remember to be certain on the night sorry
02:23:34 sorry on the night oh yes Yeah. Yeah. Around about the 4:00 mark. Half four mark. Right.
02:23:41 Now,
02:23:44 in his evidence, watch manager Williams said that as a result of a discussion with the bridge head, you radio the command unit to to find out what FSG information they had on a floor by-floor
02:23:56 information they had on a floor by-floor basis.
02:23:58 basis. Uh, and then compare it to the FSG information that you'd recorded on the wall.
02:24:02 wall. Do you remember doing that? No, you don't. He his evidence was that the command unit had a lot more information that you than the information reflected on the wall in the lobby. Again, is that
02:24:13 on the wall in the lobby. Again, is that something you recall? No, but it's it wouldn't it wouldn't surprise me. Right.
02:24:22 Can I ask you to look at again at ME trip quadruple 05776?
02:24:40 Um, there's a grid. Do you see there's a a grid or tower-like thing on the image on the uh which will be on the right hand side of the of the wall in the center of
02:24:52 side of the of the wall in the center of our picture there. Um, by the number 94 in brackets. Um, now watch manager Williams said that he thought that information was the list
02:25:03 he thought that information was the list that he had started to transcribe based on FSG information that you had received back from the command unit and then he he he stopped because he left. What's your recollection of that grid there?
02:25:16 your recollection of that grid there? Um, the grid I I wrote the grid up and it was an attempt to get some sort of um control of information and awareness what was going on. So the idea being was
02:25:29 what was going on. So the idea being was to um clear floors. So when a floor's being cleared, I BA crews have searched the u the whole floor. We can strike a line in it say right. So we've got some sort of
02:25:41 right. So we've got some sort of guidance of of where we're progressing with the um with the search. Now looking at the two entries cleared cleared for floors 405. Someone's written 0402 next to number four and O
02:25:52 written 0402 next to number four and O 0430 next to number five. Was that you? I don't think so. I can't recall doing it.
02:25:58 it. Does that tell us that this grid was in place by 402? Well, it would do. Yes. Yeah. And do you know why no further floors were marked as cleared or any other information?
02:26:09 information? We could never ever confirm what floors was was searched, right?
02:26:12 right? The from 11 from the 11th floor upwards, including the 11th floor, every every floor was was an inferno. It was it was a nice thing to it was again
02:26:25 it was a nice thing to it was again going back to Lacol done it and you put down the time you you've searched the floor and it gives you some some sort of um record of how you progress with the instant but we never we could never ever use it.
02:26:35 use it. Right. We never cleared a floor above the tent.
02:26:40 the tent. Now I've got one or two more photographs to put to you just to ask you whether they help with your recollection. Can I ask you to be shown INQ 316?
02:27:01 Um,
02:27:10 we can see you. I think we can all now assume that it's you standing um by the door. This this I should just say this is camera 4 at 0439.
02:27:19 0439. Mhm.
02:27:20 Mhm. 40 adjusted. Uh there is an OT officer wearing the familiar red and white checkerboard tabard taking photographs of the FSG
02:27:33 tabard taking photographs of the FSG wall in the lobby with his phone. Do you remember that? Do you remember an art officer? No. You don't know who that was, do you? No.
02:27:41 No. Right.
02:27:43 Right. Um
02:27:45 Um there's another picture immediately behind it 317 and unhelpfully his back is to the camera. Um but you're talking to him. Uh if we just go to it there if we can just
02:27:56 if we just go to it there if we can just enlarge the picture. You you appear to be on the radio and there is an OT officer.
02:28:01 officer. Yeah.
02:28:02 Yeah. There this is at a time mark of 044138 as adjusted on camera 3. Can you help does it? No, does it? You don't know who it is.
02:28:13 does it? You don't know who it is. Uh
02:28:16 we get a clearer view of his face possibly uh in 319 INQ 319 camera 2 foot of the stairs by the bridge head at 044321.
02:28:29 Does he does he look familiar? Can you identify him?
02:28:40 No. I'd be guessing if I don't.
02:28:43 don't. All right. Well, then we'll we'll we'll we'll leave it at that.
02:28:49 Well, there's another photograph. Actually, there is one more. I'm sorry to keep persisting with this because it may be important. I inq 320. We could see the art officers officer taking photographs in the bridge head.
02:29:01 photographs in the bridge head. Um it looked like um Mick Moholland. Michael Moholland. Right. So, the last one was Jackpot. Um you think that's Mholland? Right. Thank you. we can tie that information back.
02:29:13 you. we can tie that information back. Um, do do
02:29:16 Um, do do you know whether any of these pictures relate to the the discussion about committing the cruise um above or not not above the 10th or
02:29:28 um above or not not above the 10th or 11th floor? I can't remember. I'm sorry. I wouldn't know. Um, now different subject going back in time. Um, station manager Egan gave evidence that um, after you had arrived
02:29:40 evidence that um, after you had arrived at the incident, before the stay put advice was, as it were, formally revoked,
02:29:46 revoked, um, he had a discussion with group manager Goodall, uh, that they should be telling people on the phone to get out and then he said he says he said the same thing to you over the radio and you agreed with him.
02:29:57 agreed with him. Do you have any recollection of that conversation? I've got a vague Yeah, vague recollection of it. Yeah. Right. Where were you when that happened? That that Sorry.
02:30:06 Sorry. At the bridge head. At the bridge head. Right. Who uh And was that where was the bridge head at that point? Oh, on the ground floor. It was always on the ground floor when I was there. I see.
02:30:16 I see. But the bridge head didn't move to the ground floor until after 3008. Uh but his recollection is that the conversation with you was before the
02:30:27 conversation with you was before the state put was revoked and um although the timing of that is something we're still investigating. You can you have I did have a conversation but I my recollection of it it was in the um I was in the bridge head. It was over the
02:30:38 was in the bridge head. It was over the radio.
02:30:38 radio. Right. He also said that he was that you were trying to you he Sorry, I'll start again. He gave evidence that you were trying to put pressure on the bridge head commander to get crews into
02:30:50 head commander to get crews into specific flats. I may well have done. Do you have a specific recollection yourself of that discussion? No, I don't. Sorry. Did you actually put pressure on the bridge head commander to get crews into specific flats at any
02:31:01 get crews into specific flats at any point?
02:31:01 point? I don't know. I would have. Right.
02:31:05 Right. I would have hoped it did. From what you could have seen, did you think you should have been telling people to evacuate? It it goes back to the system. when we got told no one above the 11th. Um it's
02:31:18 got told no one above the 11th. Um it's got this really weird feeling of of um a total dread that all these people's you know these chits you hold in your hand
02:31:29 chits you hold in your hand um there's no way of getting to them. So then you start thinking of what else can we do? What else could we have do? Um, I thought about because Danny had raised
02:31:40 I thought about because Danny had raised this, she could just, you know, tell him to get out, get him to get out. And I thought about that, but I thought if we've got firefighters in full BA equipment um struggling to get past the 11th floor with with BA with with their
02:31:54 11th floor with with BA with with their training in in groups in teams and with hoes, you know, what chance did people stand on the 20 23rd 24th floors in a pair of slippers and and their
02:32:05 in a pair of slippers and and their dressing gowns? It was hard to it was I was still under hope that we could get to them and bring them out, but to have a rush of, you
02:32:16 them out, but to have a rush of, you know, to try and have a possibility of a rush of people on very very narrow tight stairs.
02:32:22 stairs. And at the time we we'd lost a lot of hose at the top. We we taken hose up to the the higher floors. Um and a lot of the hoses are burst. So the the stairs were like a a mini river. There was it
02:32:33 were like a a mini river. There was it was just a torrent of um of water coming down. So you had the noise of the you know the noise of this river of water. The screams and shouts of crews trying to communicate to each other whistles
02:32:44 to communicate to each other whistles off of off the um off the bassets the roar of the fire. I thought was it wise to turn around and tell people just to leave their leave their um properties and make a dash for
02:32:55 their um properties and make a dash for the for the stairs. I was lucky I never had to make that decision. I really uh but I I thought about it and I still haven't come up with a decision in my own mind. I
02:33:07 with a decision in my own mind. I haven't resolved what I if I was the office in charge what advice would I what would you would I have done and I still haven't resolved it. It's when you above the 11th floor those stairs as as one of the um person said
02:33:18 stairs as as one of the um person said today it's just a chimney. All you're getting is thick black oily smoke and a couple of lungfuls unless you're on your hands and knees crawling down the stairs. a couple of lung falls would
02:33:30 stairs. a couple of lung falls would make rend you unconscious and probably kill you the you know so it was a big you know
02:33:37 you know weighing that against the opportunity to get crews to actually knock on a door put their BA set which some of the crews were doing that they were they were taking the BA sets off putting them on casualties bring them down because
02:33:49 casualties bring them down because they're used to thick smoke they you know they they took the punishment rather than the individuals we just try they just it was hard to I couldn't make the decision. I really couldn't. I agreed with I agreed with
02:34:01 couldn't. I agreed with I agreed with Danny. It's you know something's have to be done cuz we're not going above the 11.
02:34:05 11. Um but it was it was tough. It really was tough. And I can imagine you know the two officers in charge the two group managers
02:34:14 managers to have that on their shoulders and you know must been hell. I didn't have an answer for it. Sorry. I agreed with him because we weren't going to get up at what carnage that would
02:34:26 to get up at what carnage that would have would have um ensued on the stairs and there was still a possibility even when I left I left the um the tower at 7:30 maybe 7:30ish and I went outside and I was still convinced that there was
02:34:37 and I was still convinced that there was people in a in in the um flats with the door closed and the windows closed that were safe that we get to them you know still at 7:30 8:30 in the morning and
02:34:48 still at 7:30 8:30 in the morning and then I went outside and looked up and every single um flat above the 11th floor on the site we were on was just a a blackened charred mess. Every single flat was was
02:35:00 charred mess. Every single flat was was 100% burned out. So yes, thank you for that description. On that last piece of that last statement, does that mean that in fact you weren't
02:35:12 you weren't getting any information while you were inside the tower and what was actually happening or visible from those outside the tower?
02:35:22 Um there was yeah there was there was an awareness but there wasn't awareness of of what
02:35:29 of what had actually happened and um Pat and Richard had been in that tower for four you know four hours 5 hours fighting the fire doing everything
02:35:40 hours fighting the fire doing everything they could to save life trying to and I don't think they fully understood I I didn't really fully understood until I went outside and saw him but to have every single above a time to have every
02:35:51 every single above a time to have every single um property um 100% damaged by fire is if we had a fire tomorrow on on a 10th floor block of flats and it was uh
02:36:02 floor block of flats and it was uh two-bedroom flat. It was 100% a light and as person reported that would be to us that would be 10 machines. We'd have 10 at least minimum 10 machines and we had every floor we had six is it six or
02:36:13 had every floor we had six is it six or eight flats per floor from the 11th to the 23rd and every single one of them was 100% light virtually or was going to be 100% light. It was an impossible position
02:36:26 It was an impossible position but some people made brave decisions and I think that was and Danny's was a brave decision to say look you know to push that you know we have the all out evacuation. Can I thank you for that but also just
02:36:37 Can I thank you for that but also just move on to just one or two very short final topics. Um the first is is is to ask you about some specific a specific flat. Do do you have any specific
02:36:49 flat. Do do you have any specific recollection about fire survival guidance in relation to any specific flat? Is there any one that stands out in your mind?
02:37:01 mind? No, not that I can not that I can think of. Can I can I just see if I can ask you to help us interpret the wall then in relation to one particular flat. Um can I can I ask you to be shown 5774
02:37:14 can I can I ask you to be shown 5774 again? Met quadruple 0 5774.
02:37:22 Uh and uh I just want to look at the left hand column with you where we see uh
02:37:32 uh 112
02:37:34 112 148 P. Three three up from the bottom there.
02:37:38 there. 112 148P.
02:37:41 112 148P. Uh the 8P. What does that signify? Eight persons. Now, do you remember whether that's your
02:37:52 Now, do you remember whether that's your entry on the wall there? Uh it looks like it is. Yeah, I assume it is. Yes. Glenn Williams thought didn't remember and thought it might be you. Um it hasn't got a BA or a tick next to it. Does that mean that there was no deployment of a BA crew to that?
02:38:05 was no deployment of a BA crew to that? No, that that that would have resulted in a chit. The information was coming off the chits and it would have been a chit and it would have been passed on. Do do you remember whether or do you remember eight persons being
02:38:18 remember eight persons being um trapped in flat 112 or 113? No,
02:38:24 No, you don't. No. Sorry. Now,
02:38:30 Now, if you look at the right hand side um of that picture, there's a another grid to the left hand side of the 94. If we could just expand that.
02:38:47 And that starts at floor 15 looking at the very top. 1512 1112.
02:38:53 1112. The flat numbers rise or the floor numbers rise as you go down. Um
02:38:59 down. Um why did it start on that floor? Do you know? Why did it start on 15? I I couldn't say. Is that your writing? Um, it looks like my writing. Yeah, it could
02:39:10 it looks like my writing. Yeah, it could be.
02:39:13 We were told at this time as as the incident was progressing, people were were clustering in flats. They were coming out of neighbors and going into flats, right? I think it hence the eight people, I believe.
02:39:26 hence the eight people, I believe. Do do you know why 113 or indeed 112 aren't shown aren't shown in that right hand grid which starts at the 15th? Again, I'm assuming that the people from 112 um 120 and 124 had um gone to 122
02:39:41 112 um 120 and 124 had um gone to 122 for refuge, right?
02:39:42 right? That's my assumption. Okay.
02:39:44 Okay. From the information you've just shown me, but no, I can't really I can't tell you for certain. Did you ever learn that um only four of the eight residents in flat 113 were evacuated? No, I never learned that.
02:39:55 No, I never learned that. No.
02:40:01 Um final line of questions. Do C can I ask you to look at your statement at pages 9 and 10.
02:40:15 Now, uh,
02:40:21 uh, on page nine, from the second paragraph on down the page and over onto page 10, we see a long description by you of a male lie that
02:40:35 description by you of a male lie that you came across lying on the ground by the playground. Uh uh and
02:40:43 Uh uh and you have marked on the map where the man fell as you say just below the halfway down the page. Can we go back to your first exhibit which is your map and just identify where he fell
02:40:57 where you say he fell.
02:41:02 Would you just do that for us? Blend a bit please.
02:41:10 Um to the left of the tower there's a circle.
02:41:13 circle. Yeah,
02:41:14 Yeah, that's it. Now,
02:41:17 Now, just in terms of timing, did you see this man before you went to see uh Tom Goodle in CU7? Yes,
02:41:24 Yes, you did.
02:41:27 Now, you arrived, I think, on scene at about 2 210 212. Um we have you have your times for that. How long after your arrival at the incident do you think you
02:41:39 arrival at the incident do you think you saw the um the male in the place where you've marked it on the map? I I really couldn't be certain, but I would assume around about 40 45 minutes maybe.
02:41:50 maybe. Right. Now, that's assuming that I'd gone to the um uh the lobby area around about 3 3:20. Okay. Are you are you able to tell us
02:42:01 Okay. Are you are you able to tell us what sort of condition this man was in? Um he'd fallen from a from a a great height. Um to me just um to the left to the right
02:42:12 to me just um to the left to the right of that we where the circle is there's a there's a covered um balcony walkway on at the first floor level for the tower and we were standing underneath that when the we heard the thud. Um but no he
02:42:25 when the we heard the thud. Um but no he to me he was he looked um quite dead. Did he have both his limbs? His legs. He had all his limbs. All his limbs. All his legs. Yeah. You are you had a clear recollection of yours?
02:42:35 yours? Oh, very clear. The person who lost the ly um that person came out of the south tower. Southw mean the south side. South side of the tower. Sorry. Yeah.
02:42:46 South side of the tower. Sorry. Yeah. Uh Mr. Wolfton, I I want to say thank you very much for your evidence. Um it's been extremely helpful and I'm extremely grateful. The the norm is that we we stop, but there may be questions which
02:42:57 stop, but there may be questions which filter through to us from somewhere which I would want to put to you. So I'm going to ask the chairman. Mr. Chairman, may we have a 5m minute break uh just to make sure uh before we release. Yes, it it's possible that there may be
02:43:08 Yes, it it's possible that there may be a few more questions. So we'll have a short break, but please don't talk to anyone about your evidence again when they're out of the room and we'll come back at 25 to 5. Thank you. Right. Thank you very much.
02:43:27 Right. 25 to five.
02:49:09 Yes, Mr. Minister
02:49:13 as ever. Yes. Well, let's ask Mr. Dendon to come back.
02:49:39 Thank you, Mr. Wolfman. And I think there are a few questions. Ju just very few. Um, first of all, when you arrived uh and saw the exterior of the tower on on fire and you told us
02:49:51 the tower on on fire and you told us earlier in your evidence today that you didn't think that the fire had actually penetrated the flats. Can I ask you this question? What steps, if any, did you take to communicate with those
02:50:02 take to communicate with those firefighters inside the tower to try to get from them an impression of the conditions within the building? Uh, at that time I took no steps. Did it occur to you to take any such steps? the whole firefighting um side of
02:50:14 steps? the whole firefighting um side of the uh operations were all run from the front of the of the building which was the south side. Yeah, south side. The only reason I went around the the west side um was because I heard a radio message saying there's
02:50:26 I heard a radio message saying there's no one around there's no on the other side which I assumed was the west. So that's why I walked around and but there was very little we we could do. There was no um uh there was no firefighting we could do. There was no rescues we
02:50:37 we could do. There was no rescues we could we could mount. Um so I didn't communicate to anybody. You didn't. You didn't. Who was the incident commander when you arrived? Did you think?
02:50:45 think? Uh, I thought it was Richard Welsh. Right. Did you speak to him on arrival? I didn't speak to anybody. I just went round round to the um to the west side and um
02:50:57 and um just started doing some actions there. Why did you So, you were basically self-instructed. Is that right? There was a radio message when we to go around to the um the command unit. The
02:51:09 around to the um the command unit. The road was blocked. They'd ordered 20 machines and it just just blocked everything. And when I was waiting to get down there, I heard on the radio and I had to park me somewhere because I was in a narrow street which couldn't be parked there. I heard on the radio
02:51:20 parked there. I heard on the radio there's no one around the other side. So I assumed
02:51:25 I assumed I just assumed upon myself to go around the other side and and see what we could do. But there was very little we could do. That ended up being the um that was the west side. That ended up being the the main triage center, I believe. But
02:51:36 the main triage center, I believe. But firefighting wise and stuff like that and the radio traffic was absolutely was was horrendous. So I didn't want to chape up and just say, "Oh, by the way, I'm around this side and there's nothing to report." Did you take steps to find out what uh
02:51:48 Did you take steps to find out what uh the tactical plan for firefighting or or rescue?
02:51:51 rescue? It didn't. No, it didn't concern what we were doing. It wouldn't have affected what we were doing, so I didn't. Right. Okay. Thank you very much. I have no further questions. Can I just say thank you very much. We're very grateful and appreciative of your coming to the
02:52:04 and appreciative of your coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations. So, thank you very much. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Wolfin, can I add my own thanks to you? It's uh it's quite a business coming to give evidence for such a long time. So, I'm very grateful to you.
02:52:15 time. So, I'm very grateful to you. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you. Right. You free to go. Would you like to go with the usher, please?
02:52:30 Well, Mr. Chair, this is it for the day. I imagine it is. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for sitting just a little bit late to absolutely to finish this witness. It's important to do that if we can. Yes. And uh there is there is no need to
02:52:42 Yes. And uh there is there is no need to depart from the usual time table for tomorrow morning on this occasion. Thank you. I'm glad to say so. Um we'll all be pleased to know that we still sit again at 10:00 tomorrow then. 10:00 tomorrow, please. Thank you.