London Fire Brigade evidence examining operational procedures, incident command structure, and firefighter deployment during the early hours of the Grenfell Tower fire.
00:00:23 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing at which we're going to hear more evidence from firefighters yes mister good morning mr. chairman yes we are may I now please call watch manager
00:00:35 are may I now please call watch manager Paul Watson
00:00:46 [Music]
00:01:00 I'll swipe one more tickle that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth
00:01:10 truth thank you very much yes mr. Watson good morning guy stop please by asking you to give us your full name [Music]
00:01:24 my name's paul Charles Watson thank you now in front of you there is a blue file in which you will find a witness statement that you've done dated the 10th of November 2017 and the reference
00:01:37 10th of November 2017 and the reference to death the reference to which is M et quadruple zero eight zero four four and
00:01:45 can I just ask you to look at that have you read it recently I have thank you and can you please confirm for us that the contents are true yep from what I
00:01:56 the contents are true yep from what I see the first place out yep [Music]
00:02:02 [Music] yes have you discussed your statement all your evidence that you're going to give to us with anybody before coming here not now you've also done a contemporaneous note which is also in
00:02:13 contemporaneous note which is also in that file behind it the reference to which is a meaty quadruple zero five two seven three do you recognize that document as yours yes sir it's dated the
00:02:26 document as yours yes sir it's dated the 14th of June 2017 as you can see it from the third line fourth line is that when you wrote it that is correct
00:02:37 you wrote it that is correct okay and I think you've also got an exhibit at MIT triple zero one five six zero six which may or may not be in that
00:02:51 zero six which may or may not be in that bundle but we
00:02:57 it'll be in terms see I think if you've got it yeah is that the real tab sleep that may be the last page that's the
00:03:08 that may be the last page that's the most page there is an exhibit there yeah and then before that there should be seven pages of yeah there are there are
00:03:23 seven pages of yeah there are there are several pages in there okay good thank you now can I start by asking you a little bit about your career and training and you joined the London Fire Brigade in 1992 as you say in your
00:03:35 Brigade in 1992 as you say in your statement
00:03:36 statement that's right to do that's correct and you'll now a watch manager on red watch at Hammersmith bridge when did you become a watch manager 2,000 3,000 or 3 okay and can you just give us a little
00:03:49 okay and can you just give us a little bit of a summary of your career from 2003 from beginning or from 2000 from 2003 which stations to do so Armani sir
00:04:00 2003 which stations to do so Armani sir perhaps for Fred watch okay next one and you've done the usual high-rise training of you I have okay and have you done any posts to the lacrimal house training yes
00:04:12 posts to the lacrimal house training yes there was a package that we done online which I'll have completely at some point before we enlightened house right and what was the remember what was the takeaway message that you got from that learning like all that packages just
00:04:30 learning like all that packages just generally high-rise to remember the fire spread into different compartments in that job from stuff falling down from balconies to just generally really right
00:04:43 balconies to just generally really right people sometime acardo yeah right who designed that package do you know I thought not okay who delivered it two years as a trainee I was a watch manager at that time and I delivered it to the
00:04:54 at that time and I delivered it to the watch right I see so you delivered that you delivered that training yes right now can I turn then to the night of the fire your arrival on the night of the fire at
00:05:05 your arrival on the night of the fire at Grunfeld
00:05:06 Grunfeld your pump was g36 too wasn't it no pump bladder three six one three six one I'm so sorry you're right 361 and that was deployed as part of the initial
00:05:17 deployed as part of the initial attendance to Granville Tower we've went on as a six pump attendance yes but you're you were deployed I think at the time of make up to six yes and that was
00:05:30 time of make up to six yes and that was a Ronnie's thing yes and we have the we have the make up time about 113 and according to the short incident log you were mobile to the incident at 116 26
00:05:41 were mobile to the incident at 116 26 but that sound about right to you yeah and arrived at about 125 oh six okay yeah and you were in charge effectively punchiness and we're riding with you just get this
00:05:53 and we're riding with you just get this out of the way you have firefighters Murray I think Sefton yes Felton yes and Broderick with no e is correct yes and you say in your witness statement on page three if I can
00:06:06 witness statement on page three if I can share to you at paragraph two halfway down you say you knew where grenfell was
00:06:18 down you say you knew where grenfell was I knew that it was one way in and one way out and I knew that access would be difficult how did you know that access would be difficult I've been to other fire calls their fire alarms and on tour
00:06:32 fire calls their fire alarms and on tour three occasions so I moved it was only one room and it's a dead end so if you drive into that dead end you've got me back back out and when you
00:06:43 you've got me back back out and when you arrived on that night did you find access to to be difficult no because what happened as we approached the tower from some way back apartment unfamiliar
00:06:54 from some way back apartment unfamiliar with the road names I've got the driver to stop the appliance and I was going to pull up there some way from the tower so we didn't clog up the whole entrance but one of my own crew managers crew
00:07:05 but one of my own crew managers crew manager Davis who had already arrived at the scene beckoned us down from from where the dead end was so went along and he turned us let sorry brought for us and we pulled up along
00:07:16 brought for us and we pulled up along there some didn't actually go into the entrance which was the main concern okay then you say at the end of the paragraph were just looking at we have aerial appliances which need a
00:07:27 we have aerial appliances which need a lot of space to get in I was conscious of the need not to block their path did you at that stage know that an aerial ladder had been ordered now I didn't
00:07:38 ladder had been ordered now I didn't right
00:07:39 right did you have any thoughts at that time about the needs for aerial appliances to access the tower it will be common practice especially on a high rise to a barrel prices attending right have you
00:07:51 barrel prices attending right have you come and practice at what point in the make up the the incident commander who was first there if the fires if it's have followed up warrants getting an aerial plants feet with all the one also
00:08:02 aerial plants feet with all the one also depending what the severity for is right do you hadn't heard or had you heard about an aerial being ordered I hadn't
00:08:13 about an aerial being ordered I hadn't sure but that at that stage did you come to hear later the venereal have been ordered to put up I was aware the area was attended but I wasn't told at any time I just make that assumption now in
00:08:27 time I just make that assumption now in your statement again on page three you
00:08:33 say that you parked on Bowmore Road and at the bottom of paragraph of page three you say in the second line we walked a
00:08:46 you say in the second line we walked a hundred yards also to the entrance of the building where I saw Mick doubt and callsign g27 from North Kensington fire station did you why did you and park so
00:09:01 station did you why did you and park so far from the tower 100 yards from the tower as I say if we'd have actually approached past micromanager we would have blocked that dead-end room so we've done a right and pulled up probably 20 meters past where it was
00:09:14 probably 20 meters past where it was stood right did you try to park near a a hydrant not okay and were you not thinking that you were going to be doing any active
00:09:25 were going to be doing any active firefighting with water yes but the first appliances there would have filled with water side of things okay now the time of arrival according
00:09:37 okay now the time of arrival according to the short incident log we have puts you at arriving a status three at one twenty five zero six would you agree with that is that it's probably brought the eyebrows project right now back up
00:09:49 the eyebrows project right now back up the statement you you say just half way down on page three in the last line in
00:10:03 down on page three in the last line in my in mind I thought that the external cladding was fully alight that's the last sentence in the third paragraph down on page three which is not
00:10:15 down on page three which is not highlighted there on the screen for you know is that something you've thought of a Tony yes I could see as I approached I
00:10:27 a Tony yes I could see as I approached I could see a fire from now no Twitter 23rd or 24th floor from the full floor all the way up quite a fierce fire and I remember walking thinking how's that possible and I know that all varieties
00:10:40 possible and I know that all varieties are completely concrete so in my own mind awful it must be something that's applied to the outside of the building right it's the only thing could be burning because obviously concrete doesn't burn see you could is this right
00:10:52 doesn't burn see you could is this right you can actually see the exterior material ignited now I could just say a large fire from the 4th to the 24th probably as I've got up to it it was
00:11:03 probably as I've got up to it it was approximately 40 foot wide and it was somewhere four buildings maybe four foot square kind of watch straightaway up how do you ever seen anything like that before not you you refer to the exterior
00:11:17 before not you you refer to the exterior in your answer just now and the exterior cladding or external cladding in your witness statement did you know or think that the building covered in cladding not as I say I know
00:11:29 covered in cladding not as I say I know concrete high-rise buildings are always concrete throughout because that's how they feel yeah so it has to be something that have been fixed to the front fascia off the building that was burning were
00:11:42 off the building that was burning were you aware at the time of previous cladding fires on build high-rise buildings not to the extent that fire I've seen fires where you may have a
00:11:53 I've seen fires where you may have a small panel maybe sort of side up in our window that may catch like a secret panel
00:11:59 panel but this fly went all the way to the top just chasing that lights last help answer a small panel do you remember when you saw fires where you had a small
00:12:11 when you saw fires where you had a small panel on fire just over the years forty years I've been to quite a few high-rise fires and I've seen fire that's left the window of a compartment and got up up to
00:12:23 window of a compartment and got up up to the window above yes so I hope I have experienced that but I couldn't tell you why right were you
00:12:33 do you know about a fire at Shepherd's court in Shepherds Bush in August 2016 I am aware of it because it was my watch you know well first in attendance however I was on the assignment in me I
00:12:44 however I was on the assignment in me I was going to ask you that you weren't there okay do you know what lessons were learnt or takeaway messages were received from that fire for what can understand who's talking to the watch
00:12:55 understand who's talking to the watch after the original flat fire hmm he'd actually jumped up for a fourth loss and so we hoped for a four compartments of life but from what I know each state
00:13:08 life but from what I know each state we've been in compartments and the people above them open smoke login but the people above were generally unaffected it was just that then fire compartment so did you get any training
00:13:19 compartment so did you get any training or hear any intelligence or even gossip about lessons learnt from the Shepherd's caught fire after 2016 but before June don't recall there being any specific
00:13:32 don't recall there being any specific packages however they we did the station carried out what we call a PR own social performance of operations and the senior manager came down and discuss with the
00:13:45 manager came down and discuss with the watch about things that happened and which is common practice on any for pump fire and above right do you know who that was the senior general okay and did the were you ever shown a slide show or
00:13:56 the were you ever shown a slide show or any sort of package of information as really not part of that and as part of that discussion was there any discussion about the risk of the exterior material
00:14:07 about the risk of the exterior material or construction of a high-rise building it can itself igniting I don't know because I've been attending pay all right because although some happens to them no see you don't get involved now on page three of your witness statements
00:14:19 on page three of your witness statements still in the last paragraph on that page you say as I've just read to you that you went to see Mike Dowden or you call him Mick doughten do you know him
00:14:30 him Mick doughten do you know him I do right do you call him Mick I think that's a typing error against Marseille right and you then say at early stage he was in charge of the incident we had a
00:14:44 was in charge of the incident we had a discussion you say and both of us agree that the fire was so big that we needed to upgrade the number of appliances to at least 20 do you remember who
00:14:58 at least 20 do you remember who suggested that the number of appliances should be upgraded when I arrived I've had the short walk to the tower and took an oversight of the step of the fire yes when I got to
00:15:10 the step of the fire yes when I got to the base of the tower O'Connor took a snapshot and it was a snapshot and said to Mike how many machines all week how many appliances I don't recall his answer and I just said to him this is at
00:15:21 answer and I just said to him this is at least 20 just go 20 now right and what did he say I thought we called but he acknowledged that and that's or sin okay and you say that what was
00:15:35 or sin okay and you say that what was sent who sent it remember whoever was driving people so shattered across and somebody else got on the appliance and all the make that all done okay he
00:15:46 all the make that all done okay he shouted across the team well now I was face to face and he shouted across you make it twenty yes and then we went into further discussion about what wanted me to do right okay how soon after your arrival what which
00:15:59 how soon after your arrival what which we as I say have put at about 125 was that discussion minutes literally when we got off the appliance set to the guys grab hugs routing that brightest
00:16:11 grab hugs routing that brightest branches breaking in gear and we walked straight to the town okay and so it was your advice which he essentially followed his own it was yeah and we can
00:16:24 followed his own it was yeah and we can actually see the time at which pumps were made twenty from the short incident log at page 18a don't need to take you to it
00:16:32 to it but it's at one twenty nine forty six it was made twenty with that roughly correspond with your recollection probably grossly okay and what would you
00:16:47 probably grossly okay and what would you what was your thinking as to what you would do with twenty pumps so so my mind my snapshot it had to be clad in a night
00:16:59 my snapshot it had to be clad in a night as I said earlier concrete doesn't bone and my my snapshot said to me that the cladding in between the windows was fully alive from the former to the top and I remember thinking as we know
00:17:13 and I remember thinking as we know summertime some windows maybe I open they'll be smoke logging into that area as well as one or two compartments might catch fire so I'm going to need a quite a big result soon we're going to need a
00:17:25 a big result soon we're going to need a lot of breathing apparatus and that that was the thinking behind that really what was your emphasis on it they
00:17:36 really what was your emphasis on it they forget it this way firefighter numbers and breathing apparatus ORS your emphasis on fire fighting with with water at that point probably both because because I thought was external cladding I still felt that we had a
00:17:49 cladding I still felt that we had a chance of putting it out was where those leading results in improving operators to access higher floors you know now at that stage as you've said in the previous paragraph that the right-hand
00:18:00 previous paragraph that the right-hand elevation of the building was the light from the fourth floor to the top of the building did you have any thoughts at that time when you advised him to make puns 20 about 129 or so about evacuation
00:18:14 puns 20 about 129 or so about evacuation at all didn't have any focus on it but to put some context around that at that time I was a 6 foot points there so effectively we've got six firefighting
00:18:26 effectively we've got six firefighting teams of them six teams I know that at least two of them would have been expelled which would leave five for firefighting teams eight people so in fact like a tower of that size would
00:18:37 fact like a tower of that size would like people wouldn't be easy because as you go here and rightly so the public we're now open their balls and see smoke they bubble to leave and you'd have to escort them down to get in to leave so
00:18:50 escort them down to get in to leave so to start mass evacuating into smoke-filled lobbies would be very difficult to do people don't want to naturally walk into smoke know what
00:19:02 naturally walk into smoke know what information did you have at the time you or advise them to make pumps 20 about the conditions in the lobbies or the stair none but I could see the fire I
00:19:13 stair none but I could see the fire I could see the compartments either side of that fire would get smoke looked so I knew that there will be smoke looking within that building no I didn't know with okay when you go on to say in the next sentence I knew this is in your
00:19:25 next sentence I knew this is in your statement in the third on the third page and the last power I knew that the building would be smoke logged and we would need a high number of firefighters with BA kids to rescue people did you have a discussion about
00:19:37 people did you have a discussion about that with my dad not popular this is just your thoughts it's just my thoughts yeah right in terms of needing
00:19:48 yeah right in terms of needing firefighters with VA to rescue people did you have any thoughts about how when all those ba wear has arrived you would you would organize the rescues so I was given the
00:20:01 organize the rescues so I was given the role and that wasn't part of my role however when I go up to the bridge it is common practice so you fight the fire floor and even leave me in fact you like then flat floor then you've got the two
00:20:12 then flat floor then you've got the two floors above because in general the floor the fire would spread up the immediate floor above and as I
00:20:23 immediate floor above and as I understand that's what watch mine zero Keith was doing which is common practice for us okay and similar question to what
00:20:35 for us okay and similar question to what - the one I asked a minute ago did you ask Mike down if he had implemented a rescue or evacuation plan of any kind knowledgeable is there a reason why you didn't have that discussion because we had a very quick handover I said about
00:20:49 had a very quick handover I said about the making 2020 he done there and any search straight back to me I want you to organize staging right as staging officer I now know why at the time I
00:21:02 officer I now know why at the time I didn't know was that taken back to be honest it's not something I would have thought of at that time but I understand from watching watch manager O'Keefe's interview that he was asking for quite a
00:21:15 interview that he was asking for quite a lot of equipment because we was getting people there and they didn't have branches breaking in gear so that that's why he gave me that role right okay so - your way of understanding at the time is
00:21:28 your way of understanding at the time is it would it be fair to say that the emphasis in terms of planning is more on resources
00:21:33 resources it was rather than what to do with the resources get the resources there as we thought because I was being pulled from or called fall from the bridge shape so
00:21:44 or called fall from the bridge shape so I believe he moved there was a lot of appliances coming on and he once you told the noise that I see now you said a minute ago that you'd had a very quick
00:22:00 minute ago that you'd had a very quick handover did what was there actually a handover of collateral not handover such he told me exactly what he wanted me to do it was no more than 10 seconds and I
00:22:14 do it was no more than 10 seconds and I said I came I'll sort that okay and I left left in them right you left him in as the incident connecting where it will she yes okay now later on in your statement just to jump ahead a little
00:22:25 statement just to jump ahead a little bit if I can ask you to do that to page 11 in the third paragraph down on that page you say for grenfell residents
00:22:36 page you say for grenfell residents would have been told to stay put as you are in your safety area it was that an assumption that you made on the night or was it something you actually knew no
00:22:50 was it something you actually knew no that is standard procedure from what we could from class of liable guidance and a high-rise high-rise compartment is
00:23:01 a high-rise high-rise compartment is normally concrete should give you two hours of compartment a ssin and generally your actual compartment doesn't get smoked look from previous buildings so they would have been psych in that compartment you say two hours
00:23:15 in that compartment you say two hours where did you get the two hours from it's just something I've read from previous previous incidents as it's concrete okay Joe Smith who ran the control room will help run the control
00:23:27 control room will help run the control room on the night of the fire said the her cutoff time post Latin or House was an hour okay maybe that's correct but because then of course you've got the ball the front ball wouldn't be two
00:23:38 ball the front ball wouldn't be two hours maybe that's where that comes yes for the actual construction concrete as far as I can remember from reading previous notes it's two hours okay all right but to just to get back to my
00:23:49 right but to just to get back to my question didn't we put it slightly differently did you on arrival or at the scene actually know what the standing advice to residents was not specifically
00:24:01 advice to residents was not specifically for that building but as far as I'm aware all high-rises are a staple policy all right then you think I want to say in the next sentence on that night I don't know if that policy changed I
00:24:12 don't know if that policy changed I never had that information from it is that right at no stage in the night did you get to hear that a standing advice
00:24:24 you get to hear that a standing advice to residents to stay put had been revoked or changed I never received that much light now given that you were thinking about rescue by multiple ba wearers did you ask Mike Darden about
00:24:38 wearers did you ask Mike Darden about whether he was thinking of changing the policy nothing is there a reason why why you didn't do that because it all happened very quickly I arrived there I'm one of a number of appliance
00:24:49 I'm one of a number of appliance commanders coming on we had a short discussion about making the appliance is 20 and a very short discussion about what he wanted me to do and I left him there right okay then can I turn to a
00:25:03 there right okay then can I turn to a different topic which is a self-contained topic that you cover in a paragraph on page seven just before we move on to the staging and that's the subject of lists if you go to page seven
00:25:17 subject of lists if you go to page seven of your statement and look at the last paragraph you you say when I first got to the scene I remember the lift door being opened it was full of white smoke
00:25:28 being opened it was full of white smoke from just pausing there when did you go to see the lifts is that before or after your conversation with Mike after what
00:25:39 your conversation with Mike after what once I left my pride no more tapping mic on the outside so as I entered the building right and I'm not too sure of the sequence of events however very early going into that Lobby
00:25:52 however very early going into that Lobby I witnessed two fire fighters I've been in the lift door with a drop-down key okay no
00:26:06 and wonder if we can just show you a picture of you entering the lobby and put a time on that can I ask you to be shown inq two to five up on the screen
00:26:30 can you see yourself anywhere in that picture yes that's mating the white helmet right carrying a length of what looks like 45 mil hose yeah that looks
00:26:42 looks like 45 mil hose yeah that looks closer right okay and we can time that at 1:30 exactly in fact once it's
00:26:53 at 1:30 exactly in fact once it's adjusted but if we take off 36 seconds for cameras one to find which we have to do in order to adjust it it gives you at a time of 130 so at 1:30 we know that
00:27:05 a time of 130 so at 1:30 we know that well can I ask you this at that stage did you did you know what the pump makeup was at that point when you entered the building that was just after I'd spoken to Mike regarding my clubs 20
00:27:18 I'd spoken to Mike regarding my clubs 20 so as far as I know it was 20 pump makeup right okay and
00:27:34 after you enter the tower as we see at 1:30 where did you go next several
00:27:45 1:30 where did you go next several things happen as per my statements I'm not sure with the actual sequence of events I remained on the ground floor for maybe 15 20 minutes but quite a lot
00:27:58 for maybe 15 20 minutes but quite a lot happening that time if you want me to explain Orville Wright what point did you go to the lifts I never actually went to the left where the other firefighters standing there without a
00:28:10 firefighters standing there without a helmet
00:28:10 helmet I probably stood around that area and could visually see the lifts for a set of bubble balls oh I see okay so how far from the lift
00:28:22 oh I see okay so how far from the lift were you when you maybe 10 meters or so okay could you do to get a clear view of it or was it yeah I think I recalled the balls being open all right and I witnessed two fire fighters open a
00:28:35 and I witnessed two fire fighters open a lift all I see and when the lift door opened you say it was full of white smoke could you describe it a little bit
00:28:48 smoke could you describe it a little bit more yes in a little bit more detail for us as I open the door a large pop of white smoke came out the top of the lid [Music]
00:28:57 [Music] which possibly unusual it's not something you see all the time right what does that indicate to you about the development of the fire well it showed
00:29:10 development of the fire well it showed that possibly the Leafs were being used and smoke had entered the compartment but the most important thing there the fact that was white smoke and not thick black smoke if it had been black smoke it would have been a lot more of a
00:29:21 it would have been a lot more of a concern right because that that would have meant that it was still hot right I see now you then go on to say in the next sentence but one I made the
00:29:32 next sentence but one I made the decision that we couldn't use the lifts why does that
00:29:38 I think that's taken a little bit context the reason that was put in there as my statement goes on to say later I've I meet a fire rescue unit crew and
00:29:49 I've I meet a fire rescue unit crew and that's where that came in
00:29:57 I'm not sure that it quite helps me understand your evidence and the freight didn't it did you make a decision that you couldn't use the lifts if anybody asked me which they did later on I made
00:30:08 asked me which they did later on I made that decision that they that FIU crew that came up we're not going to usually oh I see so in relation to a particular crew particular car I see okay did you communicate that decision that you've
00:30:20 communicate that decision that you've just described to anybody I don't believe I did okay in the last sentence you say it was not an acceptable risk so
00:30:32 you say it was not an acceptable risk so I made if I still things the correct decision and deemed the lifts out of use I mean again it sounds as if from that evidence that you are making a general prohibition on the lifts being used is
00:30:44 prohibition on the lifts being used is that right yeah but support again to put that in context our bridge shape was on the second floor generally the lifts are only used up to the project is people big bad practice to take the lift pass
00:30:55 big bad practice to take the lift pass the bridge in above the fire we would have been doing in this case did you know that crew manager Chris secret the watch manager from sorry the crew
00:31:07 watch manager from sorry the crew manager from north ken had already tried to bring the lift under control on arrival and had failed nah I didn't know that didn't okay did you know whether or did he form of view about whether the lifts were
00:31:19 view about whether the lifts were firefighting lifts properly so called no because I've never had a drop key which would be no they are fine if but I never actually went over to the weather lips on did you from what you saw think that
00:31:32 on did you from what you saw think that the lifts had been brought under a firefighter control or had not been brought under fire to control would say they wasn't and that's what I was actually opening the lift door was a most to just trying to bring the lift
00:31:43 most to just trying to bring the lift down of the firefighter switch yeah and what did you think about that
00:31:51 as I say it because the Bridget was on the second floor normally we use the lifts to get our equipment say to the tenth floor where the fire is to be loved so to walk up two sets of stairs
00:32:02 loved so to walk up two sets of stairs wasn't really an issue as such did you have any thoughts about the risks posed to residents by having the lift not brought under firefighter control I
00:32:14 brought under firefighter control I didn't not that time like like it now we then move on to the next topic which is the setup of the staging area for BA sets at the going back if we can to page three of your statement you say
00:32:27 to page three of your statement you say at the bottom Mike said that he had set up a bridgehead on the second floor and he told me to set up a staging area on the ground
00:32:38 set up a staging area on the ground floor and I think what you you go on to say is that the bridgehead was
00:32:49 say is that the bridgehead was subsequently moved up to the third floor and then in fact came later down to the ground floor in general terms that's right isn't it that is correct I think a general terms they're just taking that in stages can we start with looking at
00:33:00 in stages can we start with looking at the initial staging area on the ground floor
00:33:04 floor and I think this was when you were first tasked by Mike Darden to set up the staging area can I ask you to look at the next picture which is i and q 2 to 6
00:33:22 the next picture which is i and q 2 to 6 now this is timed at oh one 3331 so just 3 minutes after you come through into the into the lobby and you're talking to some ba wearers junetta days are this VA
00:33:36 some ba wearers junetta days are this VA wears okay and then if you look at the next one which you'll have at
00:33:47 Oh 133 44 which is inq two to seven that one you are doing something you appear to be doing something with the control
00:33:58 to be doing something with the control panel do you know what so just off tile right in there one of my own firefighters radioed me on my handheld and said there's no there appears to be
00:34:10 and said there's no there appears to be no alarm actuate in within the building so said can you see if there's an alarm panel any way that you could actually right now I see okay so what did you
00:34:23 right now I see okay so what did you think that red control box was from memory I believe you had fire panel one so I open the door but it wasn't it was some form of ventilation system before
00:34:36 some form of ventilation system before they got close that door and then I moved across to where the door to the left is there to try and get in there because sometimes they have fire alarm panels in an office but that door I believe was locked so i radioed him back
00:34:49 believe was locked so i radioed him back and said I'm unable to set the fire alarm off I see do you know who that firefighter was do you remember fire fire Felton filling station Felton okay
00:35:05 and did you find out what that control panel actually did now I now know that it was a an extract system but at that time I was looking for a far along panel
00:35:16 time I was looking for a far along panel and didn't really plan up attention to it okay let's just look at another picture this is 2 to 9 you look at inq 2 to 9 we can see the panel open with
00:35:29 to 9 we can see the panel open with something on the ground you know what that thing on the ground is not and was it you who opened the panel I've been open the panel I don't recall if I shut
00:35:40 open the panel I don't recall if I shut the door not bucket I didn't operate anything on the panel you didn't operate anything on the panel did you could you make out what the panel did or was for as I said I've implied a lot of
00:35:51 as I said I've implied a lot of attention because it wasn't was looking for but I seem to remember some wording along the lines of ventilation but right that was like on a plaque on it okay and at that stage what did you what
00:36:05 okay and at that stage what did you what did you do further with the panel if anything I was still looking for the AFA panel are frightening that learn but even if that had been a ventilation
00:36:16 even if that had been a ventilation panel I wouldn't have operated anything it's not common practice unless you're part of management team or fire prevention officer a wooden block right that because we've got a lot of people
00:36:28 that because we've got a lot of people in in their lobbies and I don't know what controls and it can spread fire and smoke around the building so I wouldn't touch it yeah
00:36:40 was it unusual in your experience not to find an AFA in a high-rise such as this I believe so I'm not sure the specifics for this
00:36:53 I'm not sure the specifics for this building but I know other buildings or move kids it was ground we do go to a common area far along IFI which covers all the common areas in the building I can't think of the name
00:37:05 the building I can't think of the name of the more of an assignment but there are several that we attend okay and can I just ask you to look at another picture which is the next one in the sequence 2:30 can you identify yourself
00:37:18 sequence 2:30 can you identify yourself on that picture okay which is which on the right on the right of the white helmet that's great I see and who you're talking to you know no a diver he's got
00:37:30 talking to you know no a diver he's got a command unit looks like a command to knit a pod on but I don't recall was seeing him right does the name watch manager Kentfield mean anything to you I don't think he
00:37:43 mean anything to you I don't think he does not
00:37:46 did you haven't do you remember what discussion you've had with him I thought remember the discussion not if I'm honest I don't even remember meeting him however it would probably to find
00:37:57 him however it would probably to find out what I was doing in there because they come round and plot out exactly what people are doing and where you are you might take that information back to their community yes going back to this question of the
00:38:08 yes going back to this question of the AFA and activating the alarm did you did mr. Felton give you a reason as to why you should be looking for an AFA to act
00:38:19 you should be looking for an AFA to act to activate no he didn't but he sports would have been the same as mine for activating the alarm not mass evacuation because that wouldn't have been in team but some people would have naturally
00:38:30 but some people would have naturally evacuated and at that time in the morning a lot of people would have been asleep
00:38:35 asleep so it would have alerted people so that there was a fire or Sun coming up right do you remember having any kind of discussion with Mike Darden about alarm once I answered the lobby I had no more contact with locked album right having
00:38:48 contact with locked album right having me I've only been having been prompted by firefighter Felton to look for an AFA and activated did you then have any thoughts about whether it was necessary to effect a full or partial evacuation
00:39:00 to effect a full or partial evacuation of the building not not a pulse with that geison as we call it but I do know that the first I know we can see firefighters there but I was the sixth supplier and so on and I know that all
00:39:12 supplier and so on and I know that all the firefighters before had gone up so WatchMojo Keith would have had people going in to assess the situation and bring people out immediately above the fire because that's what we do that's common practice right but after you
00:39:23 common practice right but after you realize that the red box was not in AFA but a smoke control panel did you look further for an AFA yes so the floor to the left I believe that
00:39:34 so the floor to the left I believe that thought was Lots I tried to enter there as I said it's not uncommon for an alarm system to be in a locked office yes but I believe I'm right a sign that was lots
00:39:45 I believe I'm right a sign that was lots and I couldn't investigate any further so I've radioed him back to say I don't think there is analog paneling to build right did you try and get into the room
00:39:57 right did you try and get into the room with the door we see in that picture I believe I'd be then I believe it's Lots but did you find the key to it I didn't know do you know whether anybody else did I
00:40:08 did I I don't know okay [Music]
00:40:15 in terms of the the red panel we can see it open there at the moment and we can get back a picture or two to see you asset do you remember how you managed to get it open up late there was a key in
00:40:27 get it open up late there was a key in the door or it might have just been a farmer sown but I didn't need any it just opened I just was like okay and was there a key to operate the panel within within the panel I didn't look at
00:40:39 within within the panel I didn't look at that okay going back to the actual staging area that you were setting up if you turn to page four of your statement
00:40:50 you turn to page four of your statement you say that effectively the third paragraph and down the staging paste that I became responsible falls on the ground floor and you go on to say it's
00:41:06 ground floor and you go on to say it's my responsibility to hold firefighters there until the bridgehead is ready for them would that require communication with the bridgehead yes it would and did
00:41:19 with the bridgehead yes it would and did you start having communications with the bridgehead yes as I said quite a lot happens when I first got into the lobby but at a very early stage I try to
00:41:32 but at a very early stage I try to contact watch major Keith on the radio and people were because yes we use one channel channel one and if you're talking and somebody else cuts in it
00:41:43 talking and somebody else cuts in it cuts out the transmission and I do recall watch Roger I keep looking over the balcony and we spoke to face-to-face from two floors apart right say
00:41:55 from two floors apart right say initially you were communicating with him face to face yeah he came over the balcony and I recall saying to him do you need anything and he said and up right
00:42:08 can I just take us half step back and look at the picture we saw at inq 2:30 just to do two things with that picture
00:42:21 just to do two things with that picture inq 2:30 but you took you just referred to a balcony just now can you identify the balcony in that picture I can't see it badly but my memory of it it was two
00:42:32 it badly but my memory of it it was two floors up as opposed to one and they saw I'm incorrect there right okay so but in this is it in the same layer same layout it's not correcting signage two floors I'll ask more recollection okay and the second question on that
00:42:46 okay and the second question on that picture then we could see you're talking to somebody in a checkered red checkered circuit or Tabard is the red checkered tab add something that indicates that
00:42:57 tab add something that indicates that that firefighter is from a command unit I believe so okay and did you do you remember having a discussion with that person about fire survival guidance
00:43:10 person about fire survival guidance I don't even recall seeing him in there if I'm honest okay in general terms and we're looking at a time mark of about 136 did you know that
00:43:22 time mark of about 136 did you know that fire survival guidance calls were coming in nah we didn't I wasn't topic you weren't about another game in terms of
00:43:33 weren't about another game in terms of what radio equipment you had with you what what did you have do you remember radio so we have a ham personal taint held which communicates with other firefighters only I believe seeing
00:43:46 firefighters only I believe seeing officers have one that's an ear wave radio which communicates a condition to control but watch manager and beloved only have a personal radio yes so it's all to each other so you only had your
00:43:58 all to each other so you only had your we've called fire ground radio five-man right yes I say okay now in paragraph four on page four of your statement
00:44:09 four on page four of your statement [Music]
00:44:11 [Music] and we'll come back to paragraph three I think in a minute but you say there were members coming out sorry though there were members of the public coming out of the building some appear to have no injuries but many had smoke inhalation
00:44:23 injuries but many had smoke inhalation problems they're just pausing there what did that tell you about the nature and extent of the smoke and fire spread within the building I think the way the
00:44:34 within the building I think the way the police have put this interview together jumps about a little bit and I don't recall seeing many members of public coming past me at this stage I do recall one or two but not many and it's not
00:44:47 one or two but not many and it's not uncommon for people to be evacuating when we're heading in as they're coming out right and at that point as well if they become from the fire floor I know they were to come through some smoke
00:44:58 they were to come through some smoke anyway right okay mr. chairman we're going to go on but I've been asked to take a break every 45 minutes with this witness it's nice to continue yeah how
00:45:12 witness it's nice to continue yeah how do you feel you're not all fine I'm happy to do another 15 for you that's okay so very good for no real let's go until half-past ten and then we'll see how things look very good mr. chairman we will do that the same paragraph after
00:45:26 we will do that the same paragraph after the reference to smoke inhalation problems you you say I made contact with watch manager O'Keefe who was in charge of the bridgehead initially by radio but radio traffic was so busy that we
00:45:37 radio traffic was so busy that we couldn't really speak and then you go on to say he looked over the balcony down towards me and we could communicate face to face do you remember at that stage at
00:45:49 to face do you remember at that stage at early stage what the problem was with communication yeah as I stated earlier if if we're making a transmission which can be heard by the whole fire ground if
00:46:01 can be heard by the whole fire ground if somebody else keys their radio it just cuts the transmission completely solely and there was quite a lot going on outside I could hear people asking / wolves are on highlighter and etc etc
00:46:13 wolves are on highlighter and etc etc and it was difficult to talk to
00:46:18 can you explain what you were communicating about with watch manager O'Keefe about at this point at that point my role was staging and I
00:46:29 at that point my role was staging and I asked him did he need anything as I first came into the building and he replied no he said no so what did you do next as my statement shows quite a lot
00:46:41 next as my statement shows quite a lot happened I had a person running around with an axe an American phone phone it's American far far yes that's my statement that's enough time we call the actual sequence of events now if I can ask you
00:47:01 sequence of events now if I can ask you to look at another CCTV picture and this one is at 13850 and is at inq two three
00:47:18 one is at 13850 and is at inq two three one
00:47:19 one [Music]
00:47:24 do we have the back of somebody wearing a tattered saying monitor or monitoring officer do you know who that is would you remedy that is I believe it to
00:47:39 would you remedy that is I believe it to be station manager loft but I'm not 100% yes and do you remember having a discussion with station manager loft I should just say the time mark for this
00:47:51 should just say the time mark for this is 138 14 as Homs outside the building that's the only time I came out of the building as I said in my statement we've had a guy come into the lobby carrying
00:48:02 had a guy come into the lobby carrying an ax he said there were people threatening to jump at the back of the building so myself and firefighter Marie left the lobby and when he show up and
00:48:14 left the lobby and when he show up and we was both going to go and look but when if he showed me where it was I couldn't leave the lobby sy7 firefighter Laura with him right and I with assets of station manager lost less that's what
00:48:25 of station manager lost less that's what he's doing right I think if we look at the next picture - 3 - it does that coming identify from that the American firefighter yes that was him here right
00:48:38 firefighter yes that was him here right where did he get the axe from you know I cannot assume one of our clients he's I've no idea points and what did you do with him so he came into the lobby again
00:48:50 with him so he came into the lobby again I'm not sure that he came in and saved his people threatening to jump then he came back at some point and he was a bit animated he said to me that where are the exits I need to smash every actually
00:49:02 the exits I need to smash every actually open in the building and started moving about and at that point I just said to him who are you he said I'm American fire fire and I told him out right he
00:49:14 fire fire and I told him out right he couldn't
00:49:15 couldn't it was very animated he wasn't gonna do us any and he could being in there so I removed him from the lobby I'm going
00:49:26 removed him from the lobby I'm going back to your dealings with station manager loft do you remember after this encounter with him outside the building you just looked at whether you had any
00:49:37 you just looked at whether you had any other dealings with station manager laughter during the incident after that not not on record okay now going back to your statement you say on page four in
00:49:48 your statement you say on page four in the third paragraph which I said I'd come back to that you had obtained information about the layout of the building you say in the third line I
00:50:01 building you say in the third line I remember thinking that we needed some kind of sketch so firefighters had an understanding of the layout inside hardly any of our firefighters would have been inside the building before so I spoke to a couple of crew who had
00:50:13 I spoke to a couple of crew who had already been up inside the building and then you go on to say from what they told me I worked out that every floor was identical and there were six flats on each floor crew manager Sefton group drew a sketch
00:50:25 crew manager Sefton group drew a sketch on the wall showing the layout with a little swirl where the flats were on the staircase I knew that there was only one staircase so i briefed cruising the layout ten at a time I've read that all's you at length because there are a number of questions the first is what
00:50:42 number of questions the first is what time do you remember crew managers Sefton drawing the map on the sketch on the wall about another time but this
00:50:53 the wall about another time but this happened when I'd gone up to the second floor balcony and it would have been after they've kind of come out of the job and they came up to me crew manager
00:51:04 job and they came up to me crew manager siftin said that it was a complicated layout he said send your firefighter third
00:51:11 third to look at the layout and I said if you've just been in put it on the wall and then everyone can compute what what you're talking about okay we might be able to do better for you if we start
00:51:23 able to do better for you if we start with them with the exhibit and this is the impact exhibited to mr. Sefton's statement we can look at it it's a meaty triple zero one six nine four eight if
00:51:34 triple zero one six nine four eight if we can just have that picture there it is is that the map you're referring to do you think I thought recall but if
00:51:45 do you think I thought recall but if that's on the second floor balcony that was our map its second floor balcony yes now mr. Sefton and obviously he's given a statement and would have to explore
00:51:56 a statement and would have to explore with him his recollection yeah the same way we're doing with you so I'm not putting to you what he says is gospel but he recollects that he drew it on the wall of the bridgehead he thinks when
00:52:08 wall of the bridgehead he thinks when the British head was on the third floor do you have a recollection about which floor Zach Mac got drawn on I'm not sure
00:52:19 floor Zach Mac got drawn on I'm not sure I'm familiar with that map and I'm looking the bag or whatever it is to the right I don't recall that being named aside possibly that's a different map to what we have on the second floor balcony right okay
00:52:36 okay now you say that that I knew there was only one staircase so I greet the crews on the left on layout 10 at a time where
00:52:48 the left on layout 10 at a time where did you get the information that there was only one staircase from crew manage acceptance right he told you that to be talented and did he tell you that having come down from a aware yes on I knew him
00:53:00 come down from a aware yes on I knew him and the father is with it that just warm I see
00:53:04 I see so just just give us a picture of the encounter where were you when you first saw in firefighter Sefton I was on the second floor lobby so just where there's a door between the Bridgette and the
00:53:15 a door between the Bridgette and the balcony yes and I was stood at the front of our rather firefighters which is where that drawing was pork right there No
00:53:38 we have crew manager Sefton's end of where time at 1:57 and his italian - bodyguard just like these peculiar time
00:53:52 bodyguard just like these peculiar time let's not go with that let's go with the end of where time 157 just before 2 a.m. would that correspond with your
00:54:05 would that correspond with your recollection that you think around that time right but he had warned so if that's when he's collected his tally very efficient because that's how he's able to produce a drawing because he
00:54:16 able to produce a drawing because he open up and sing the lair so we're looking at just to try and piece this together in terms of your movements we've seen you talking to crew stage manager lofted at 138 talking to the
00:54:27 manager lofted at 138 talking to the American firefighter with the axe at 142 and we have crew manager Sefton's end of where time at 157 so between 142 and 157
00:54:38 where time at 157 so between 142 and 157 what did you do you think you did so the first way saw the first six appliances that I lost that wave of my staging area
00:54:49 that I lost that wave of my staging area nice and then I believe as more appliances attended I got quite a lot of people starting to turn up it was still difficult to sort some what's my jerky
00:55:00 difficult to sort some what's my jerky so I'll make a decision to go up to the second floor lobby notes for balcony and South my staging area there so the appliance is coming on and bringing quite a lot of equipment because I've
00:55:12 quite a lot of equipment because I've spoken to crew managed to take this outside and asked him to get the required equipment and we had lot and equipment dumped on that second floor right as well there's lots of firefighting vehicles okay so do you
00:55:27 firefighting vehicles okay so do you know or do you remember how long you were actually on the ground floor for before you moved your staging area up to the second floor I thought not okay when you move the staging up to the
00:55:39 you move the staging up to the second floor was at the time when you met crew manager septum coming down yes while Stoppers stood there and again I'm not sure how long laughter but I remember for a major Sifton coming out and saying to me it was a difficult it's
00:55:51 and saying to me it was a difficult it's quite a difficult layout because it was smoking all day there was a feeling covered everyone was talking about that everyone kept going into so I said put the map on the wall right I see okay
00:56:03 the map on the wall right I see okay at that stage did you have any thoughts about getting an official map from somebody who could supply it by the owner of the building no because my sole
00:56:14 owner of the building no because my sole focus was my staging area as something that would be done from outside for our come on I only come on as opposed to the roller head did you did you think to ask my dad for an official map nah I didn't
00:56:28 my dad for an official map nah I didn't okay
00:56:31 once we managers Sefton had come down and told you the layout it was used that you wrote them you say you drew the map no for a mattress nosotros oh so he drew he drew the mat yes on the table on the
00:56:43 he drew the mat yes on the table on the wall you drew the map then you did you tell you anything else about about the conditions that he'd encountered in the stairwell not specifically the I recall
00:56:56 stairwell not specifically the I recall what about in the lobbies again not specifically I believe he'd been up to fourth or fifth floor but we didn't really have that discussion okay
00:57:11 okay um now
00:57:18 you say that you were briefing crews on the layout 10 at a time
00:57:24 what was that once you got to the second floor
00:57:27 floor who was that while he was still on the ground floor now that was on the second floor that was on the second floor okay when we'll come back to that in a moment before you moved your staging post to
00:57:38 before you moved your staging post to the second floor so while it was still on the ground floor was any further survival guidance information coming to you now no fossil obviously no fossil
00:57:50 you now no fossil obviously no fossil I've gotten to that time anything that was coming in would have gone straight to the project and I was one step back from that okay now on page five of your
00:58:02 from that okay now on page five of your statement you say in the I suppose third paragraph the second main paragraph which starts it was oh damn it dynamic
00:58:13 which starts it was oh damn it dynamic job and then the third sentence second line you say so I decided to move my staging place from the ground to the second floor balcony the reason for this
00:58:24 second floor balcony the reason for this is that I felt that communication between watch manager O'Keefe on the bridgehead and myself would be better the radios weren't working say how long
00:58:38 the radios weren't working say how long did it take you to set up the staging post on the second floor balcony
00:58:46 so once the second wife of firefighters came in and there was quite a few of them we just walked straight up the stairs nobody put any equipment down we took all the equipment and we put it to
00:58:58 took all the equipment and we put it to one side against the wall so that their house etc was there so we could use it and possibly so straight away instantly really once we walk so the time it would take took out two philosophies okay okay
00:59:10 take took out two philosophies okay okay right say so matter of a minute I mean it was like okay now and we've given that you remember then speaking to crew
00:59:24 that you remember then speaking to crew manager Sefton and him writing the map on the wall yes given that we've got his end of where time as a 157 can we put them can you help time your move from the ground floor to the second floor
00:59:37 the ground floor to the second floor maybe five or so minutes before that or as before as I said concept to time I didn't ever watch but just prior to going up to them stairs because once
00:59:49 going up to them stairs because once they put the top of the stairs I was on the radio so my other career manager for a magic Davis to organize that the equipment we needed right because that was my role okay now in terms of
01:00:01 was my role okay now in terms of position I'm just looking at the time this move I'm at my last question before the break or series of questions before the break can I just ask you to be shamed master documents bundled tab five
01:00:14 shamed master documents bundled tab five and this and a plan of building on the second floor which is M et triple zero one two five nine three page 10
01:00:27 one two five nine three page 10 and there it is now there it can be enlarged we've got the the atrium in the southeast of the plan and then the walk away gallery and then you can see
01:00:39 away gallery and then you can see towards the center of the building communal Hall and steps up could you tell us by reference to this plan where you set up your second floor staging
01:00:51 you set up your second floor staging post exactly where it says walk white gallery I saw all the stood and where was 'watch manager Akif and the bridgehead where I believe where it says
01:01:03 bridgehead where I believe where it says steps up and where we use standing do you have it let me ask it this way did you have a clear line of sight from the doorway - yeah I could see him for a depth or line between the two right
01:01:14 depth or line between the two right Worthing's okay so where would the firefighters having come up from the ground floor that where would they mass so where it says what white gathering
01:01:25 so where it says what white gathering underneath there there was a that's what I was all stood in a loin I thought the way down the stairs and above what we're gathering these we're all do equipment was front stall right and then they
01:01:36 was front stall right and then they would go past you would day into the area where the steps up working yes as he required firefighters in BA they would go past me through that doorway into the communal
01:01:49 through that doorway into the communal home to be committed right and he the bridgehead equipment so the BA entry board and the forward information boards where were they I believe they were all
01:02:01 where were they I believe they were all where did work Cecily they was all lined up along there somewhere okay could you see those no not from over stood but I did take one walk in there at some point just to quickly see the setup right and
01:02:15 just to quickly see the setup right and how did you control the BA to stay at that stage once it had gone up to the second floor how did you control the VA where it where as going in so it is called
01:02:26 where as going in so it is called practice for a staging area normally is below the bridge shape but in this for reasons I've stated that I stood at the front where it said so towards the back wall with where the
01:02:37 towards the back wall with where the walkways and the firefighters lined up in a single line in front of me and actually went down the stairs towards the end we had quite a few where is ready to god queueing on the statistic
01:02:48 ready to god queueing on the statistic Ewing just no answer yet and when they got to the front of the queue what did you say to them it depended what stage in the evening initially I'm so sorry initially this is
01:03:00 initially I'm so sorry initially this is it
01:03:00 it so we're accessible by gallery right opposite there is where I've done a sketch yes or got courageous acceptance to the sketch and then I came to the front of that sketch and just briefed
01:03:11 front of that sketch and just briefed them ten at a time or verb was in that vicinity this is where you're going into it's a sign on every level the lips are here there's an approximately six flats and a cupboard or dollar Sheldon okay
01:03:22 and a cupboard or dollar Sheldon okay can you just help with this set with the Sefton sketch was it on the the wall to the left of the wording walk where gallery or above it on Al Arabiya public above it okay so you gave them an idea
01:03:33 above it okay so you gave them an idea of the plan of the building did you tell the BA whereas which floor and a flat to go to at that stage nah okay who did that do you know so it is common for stating just hold the firefighters and
01:03:44 stating just hold the firefighters and if watch man shower Keith wanted anywhere as for the bridge he would call them for a bit cooled them off right very good
01:03:50 very good okay and you say okay and at that stage when you first move the staging area to the second floor balcony as you've just described were you handling any FSG
01:04:03 described were you handling any FSG calls or communications not right Thank You mr. chairman is that's a convenient moment for the break I'm sorry that's how I thought mr. Watson we've gone a little bit over the 10:00 to 10:30 every break time that's probably likely the
01:04:15 break time that's probably likely the break now and I would they yes players have a break for 10 minutes remember resume that talk to 11th all right please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything to do with it let
01:04:26 evidence or anything to do with it let her off the hook thank you very much let's go with the usher please
01:04:37 and we'll resume a quarter to 11 years to come
01:04:49 you
01:16:23 [Music] that's a job yes thank you if we could have the witness back thank you
01:16:34 [Music]
01:16:40 all right mr. Watson is happy to carry on it's good yeah mr. Watson thanks for coming back can I now ask you about the arrival of watch manager Glenn Williams
01:16:53 arrival of watch manager Glenn Williams in your witness statement on page five you say in the third paragraph that's the fourth paragraph that the second
01:17:04 the fourth paragraph that the second last one on that page senior officers were starting to arrive and watch manager Williams from Fulham fire station was on the ground floor and assumed the role of setting up far survival guidance FSG do you know what
01:17:20 survival guidance FSG do you know what time he arrived would you remember what time he arrived roughly I do remember him arriving our Casa de guess it's around 2 o'clock because it was just
01:17:33 around 2 o'clock because it was just after one of my own firefighters had come downstairs 4 to 6 returned we haven't covered that so I believe from the operational response time line that
01:17:44 the operational response time line that was 58 then it was just after that right ok now just just to be able to pinpoint this better we've actually got his arrival time on scene as a 1 55 50 and
01:17:56 arrival time on scene as a 1 55 50 and just four on record that's page 85 of the Orr so it would be after that it was after like a night and how soon after
01:18:07 after like a night and how soon after you moved up to the 2nd floor from the ground floor do you think he arrived
01:18:14 wasn't so long maybe 15 20 minutes for so you'd already been on the second floor 15 or 20 minutes you think that maybe 15 minutes or so yep okay now you
01:18:25 maybe 15 minutes or so yep okay now you say that he assumed the role of setting up fire survival guidance on the ground floor where were you when he assumed that role in a side position second
01:18:38 that role in a side position second floor balcony right now and they were where
01:18:44 where watch Manta Williams was at the front door well he was there right okay could you see him I could clearly all right could you could you hear him I could okay and now you mentioned in the
01:18:58 could okay and now you mentioned in the next sentence group manager Welsh had asked him to do so how do you know that as you say group manager Welch had asked watch manager Williams to set up for
01:19:11 watch manager Williams to set up for survival guidance at that time I wasn't aware it was manager Welch that's retrospectively because I've spoken to watch manager Williams since right I see so you didn't hear a
01:19:24 right I see so you didn't hear a briefing that watch manager Williams received from group manager well then okay when he set up or assumed as he say the role of setting up fire survival
01:19:35 the role of setting up fire survival guidance was he alone or was he with somebody I believe when I looked down there was another senior officer but it wasn't somebody I recognized and you say
01:19:46 wasn't somebody I recognized and you say a senior officer as in a white helmet white helmet okay now I may be able to show you a picture
01:20:03 if you go to before I show this to you do you remember when when you looked down and saw watch manager Williams was
01:20:16 down and saw watch manager Williams was he doing anything when he caught up to me he was stood right at the front door right
01:20:26 right I thought we call him actually doing anything okay after he moved from the front door into the lobby did he do anything next do you remember now that the first time I contact with him he was
01:20:39 the first time I contact with him he was stood at the front door with a handful of FSG forms that's my first right recollection did you communicate with
01:20:50 recollection did you communicate with watch when they watch manager Williams when he arrived to discuss how his role would fit into your role no he didn't
01:20:59 prior to his arriving and starting his management of our survival guidance on the ground floor do you know how far survival guidance information was
01:21:10 survival guidance information was getting to the bridgehead I believe crew manager platter became fast at one point with papers in his hand and when I took
01:21:23 with papers in his hand and when I took that walk into the Brigitte there was a five people there to collect information right that's the only knowledge I had not been formally told anything about a first-year it was only
01:21:36 anything about a first-year it was only from an oversight M&R that you okay so did crew manager matically go past you with pieces of paper where I think you said I believe he did go past me but
01:21:47 said I believe he did go past me but because I just finished the question but we did it while you were on the ground floor
01:21:51 floor only once you got to the second floor I only saw him on the second floor okay Angie just on this do you remember where crew manager battle he was getting the
01:22:02 crew manager battle he was getting the pieces of paper from okay where was he taking them to sort of originally bridgehead but straight past you that is correct because I was on your staging officer I have it right
01:22:17 did you see group manager Welch at all what when you were looking down to the lobby from the second floor balcony not
01:22:28 lobby from the second floor balcony not at that time not okay do you remember when you flip when you first saw Julian Williams do you remember who the
01:22:40 Williams do you remember who the incident commander was not right now in his witness statement Glenn Williams again as I say we'll have to explore
01:22:52 again as I say we'll have to explore this we've hid but he says that he was briefed by group manager Welch in the lobby and then he spoke to you and he agreed with you that you would be the
01:23:04 agreed with you that you would be the middleman between him Williams on the ground floor and the entry control at the bridgehead do you remember a discussion like that that is correct but that was done with me on the second
01:23:15 that was done with me on the second floor lobby and him at the front door okay now can I show you a picture it's inq two four four
01:23:27 but this is the first in a sequence of pictures which we'll look at in due course but that is timed at o2
01:23:41 course but that is timed at o2 15:53 because I think you can quite see it but that's the time we have subject to adjustment once you take off for 36 seconds for the camera
01:23:53 seconds for the camera Oh to 1553 we can see there a firefighter in the white helmet so a watch manager starting to write on the wall do you know who that was from that
01:24:06 wall do you know who that was from that picture now however that is exactly where what's financial Williams was stationed and right and do you remember him writing on the wall I don't do you remember roughly what time he started
01:24:19 remember roughly what time he started writing on the wall I have no recollection of time okay do you remember him starting to write on the let me try it this way how long do you think you've eaten you had been on the second floor when he started writing on
01:24:31 second floor when he started writing on the wall if I can just go back one of my firefighters came down and I gave him to be a six to take him for members of the public on another floor and from reading
01:24:44 public on another floor and from reading the operational response that was Oh 158 and it was quite quickly after that right to ignore recollection okay now you can see on the ground a little white
01:24:58 you can see on the ground a little white object by this firefighters left foot can you have Murrah help with your recollection as to what that might be now I can't okay let's try another one let's try the next one two four five
01:25:09 let's try the next one two four five this is
01:25:10 this is couple of minutes later time to justed at o2 1706 there's the white piece of paper do you know will recognize anybody in that picture yes the person on the
01:25:22 in that picture yes the person on the right is swatch manager Williams that's what's known as Williams right okay and who's on his left you know I had nothing it's someone from the command unit but you don't know don't remember who that okay and if we look at the next
01:25:38 who that okay and if we look at the next one this is time to go to 1717 so just 11 seconds later it is 256 you can see two firefighters there writing on the wall one a white helmet and one looks
01:25:51 wall one a white helmet and one looks like a crew manager from the double black bars on the cap on the helmet do you know do any of that was you know about that obviously that the watch
01:26:03 about that obviously that the watch manager would be watching Roger Williams the crew managed on the raw I don't know okay and do you remember what their sister do you remember what their system
01:26:14 sister do you remember what their system was at this stage about 2:17 that they were using - no but moving further forward I know if you've recorded a lot of information on the wall and was torn
01:26:26 of information on the wall and was torn it up to me as we went if we can look at the next picture I'm sorry before we leave that picture it looks to me as though on the right hand side we can see
01:26:37 though on the right hand side we can see the red door of the box that you were talking about earlier on right yes sir and the door is now open have you any idea when and how it was opened now the time yes
01:26:53 good going back to the picture we're on at 217 this is a 246 sorry this is at
01:27:08 at 217 this is a 246 sorry this is at 217 46 it looks as if but they're looking up do you know what they're looking up at that at I can only presume
01:27:19 looking up at that at I can only presume that he's speaking to me at that time right okay now the crew manager on the Left has got a sheaf of white papers in his hand do you know what those are or did you
01:27:30 do you know what those are or did you know what those are they would have been faster Volvo Gardens Piper's do you know where he got them from know that do you know what this - do you know what the
01:27:42 know what this - do you know what the system was at that time - 17 or so whereby they got fire survival information nailed in okay
01:27:58 just going on then wireless is to 1910 this is an expected to forays we can see some information being written on the
01:28:09 some information being written on the wall just there on the left again is that does that correspond with your recollection as to how far survival guidance information at that stage was being recorded
01:28:20 being recorded Oh - about Oh - 17 yes like that it was all written handwritten on the wall while watching bunch of Williams right okay and I just interject there to the
01:28:32 okay and I just interject there to the right of that picture that firefighter is far from Felton oh okay and they're the six that are sent to no I 158 according to the operational response so whenever he came out that
01:28:44 response so whenever he came out that would be about the timing for you because he's got a member of public you know they I set there yes we could just do this in real time
01:28:58 do this in real time you've got the we've got the timing of that photograph too full rate that is Oh 219 and we have Felton's end of where
01:29:10 219 and we have Felton's end of where time as 206 37 so does that help you fix
01:29:22 time as 206 37 so does that help you fix this in your in recollection and as I said from the operational response to the brigade published he came and collected m6 for me I 158 and it was very soon after that watch
01:29:35 and it was very soon after that watch manager Williams started calling up FSG right
01:29:45 okay right so we can pin it down to them and that stage we've got you on the second floor stop right in the balcony okay now just one or two pictures just
01:30:01 okay now just one or two pictures just is moving forward if we can if we go - OH - 1919 which is 249 we'll just run
01:30:12 OH - 1919 which is 249 we'll just run through these next few pictures quite quickly if we can again who do we see in that picture watch MANET you have Williams to the right right I believe you've got the
01:30:25 right right I believe you've got the member of public with a white helmet there in the middle and you've got firefighter felts and by the looks of that picture on the left firefighter Felton leading out somebody wearing a white helmet Ella be a member
01:30:37 wearing a white helmet Ella be a member of public remember the public like this right and the next one which is 250 which is a Oh - 2006 we can see that for there's an adjusted time we can see very
01:30:49 there's an adjusted time we can see very faintly some information on the wall by date think we're able to read it and you know me the firefighter is in the foreground but I do not not know okay
01:31:00 foreground but I do not not know okay and that the firefighter holding the sheaf of papers is much magical attachment that's what's mental Williams all right and then act moving ahead a
01:31:11 all right and then act moving ahead a little bit further forward let's look at three we go first look at the last one in the 220 220 was photographed - 5 -
01:31:26 again there what what's happening there that's a 220 24 seconds adjusted it looks like um what's Manship Williams he
01:31:37 looks like um what's Manship Williams he but my recollection he was given quite a lot of paper all right when he first arrived and he was recording it on the wall right and then we jumped forward in time to by almost an hour
01:31:51 time to by almost an hour picture inq 253 and this is this is at oh three sixteen twenty nine can you and
01:32:04 oh three sixteen twenty nine can you and you can see the lobby is full of full of firefighters at this stage do you remember that the when the bridgehead was moved to the ground floor tom was
01:32:17 was moved to the ground floor tom was not you don't remember okay and and in at the top of the picture just towards the right where we have seen firefighter they'll watch
01:32:28 have seen firefighter they'll watch manager Williams rather writing on the wall what do we see now so it looks like we're discussing FSG that he's got any
01:32:40 we're discussing FSG that he's got any time possibly or he's pointing to the wall there was a lot of recorded information on the wall and that looks like me I reassured me in the middle and I believe the station managers to the
01:32:53 I believe the station managers to the right will station major wolfing okay and you say station owner to the right to the right place doctor general so with the so if you look at the meet that
01:33:06 with the so if you look at the meet that I believe that's me with the white helmet on the left of that highlight section right and I believe that that would be station manageable fifteen in the other way to helmet I believe so yes
01:33:18 the other way to helmet I believe so yes okay no I'll ask you about him do you remember what time wash and what time station manager Wolfington arrived in
01:33:31 station manager Wolfington arrived in the ground floor lobby not that junik Jimmer what his role was yes once we've moved to the ground and he came in he was collating information for FSG along
01:33:46 was collating information for FSG along in coordination with watch Ranger Williams and he was writing on pieces of paper to give to me right okay we've jumped ahead a bit yeah but I'll come back to that because I
01:33:58 but I'll come back to that because I don't to get too much into that detail just at the moment but just in terms of continuity we can see as you said watch manager Williams there working at the
01:34:09 manager Williams there working at the wall to your recollection did he ever stop working with the fast survival guidance not at that wall no I believe he left the foreground at 4:30 and from
01:34:20 he left the foreground at 4:30 and from my recollection from the moment he got into that door fruits of the time he left he was working on that wall right now we're going to look at in a little bit more detail at the FSG setup before
01:34:31 bit more detail at the FSG setup before we go to that system that you and watch manager Williams in fact implemented I just want to ask you about how FSG is usually set up between control and the
01:34:43 usually set up between control and the incident ground in your experience how is how is FSG normally communicated in a normal incident so generally if we have
01:34:55 normal incident so generally if we have an FSG it's normally singular one so you may be free FSG it comes through from control they they designate it as an FSG has to be generated from them it's given
01:35:08 has to be generated from them it's given via the main sting radio and in this case to a command unit the command unit we then fill out a controlled information form with the details of the
01:35:19 information form with the details of the FSG it would include a number of people floor there on lap number just as a pay see if there are other details if if they had the time to fill it out then
01:35:31 they had the time to fill it out then that would come from the control unit up to the bridgehead and next to the the edge control you would have an FSG post and that the information goes straight
01:35:43 and that the information goes straight to them and then they would take the firefighters from the staging area and into them fire fighters with one specific effort to write know just breaking that onset it's very helpful
01:35:54 breaking that onset it's very helpful into a number of parts first of all command unit would you have a command unit at a particular pump level or would it be when there were persons reported yeah command unit comes on four pumps
01:36:07 yeah command unit comes on four pumps and above and it's behind their persons reported you need both do we do both one and the second question in terms of rakaat what the command unit records
01:36:18 rakaat what the command unit records onto is that onto a control information form as far as I'm aware yes do you know what that looks like I don't you don't it's part of it's an appendix to a polyp the to the FSU policy is that what
01:36:31 the to the FSU policy is that what you're talking about yeah it place of it consists of three pieces of paper I believe they're white pink and green right just to rather than just ask you to do this on the hood
01:36:45 just ask you to do this on the hood let's nail this down if you could just be shown policy 790 appendix to and tap five of our policies bundle it's quickly clear this out of the way
01:37:01 it's appendix 2 which is a page 8 is that a piece of paper which in in normal circumstances is used by personnel on the commands unit to record the
01:37:13 the commands unit to record the adversity information they get from the control room that's correct sir right and there are four color copies white yellow blue and green right it's crazy okay now we're going to come back I think possibly possibly to some of those
01:37:25 think possibly possibly to some of those later but that's the form and then it gets that form is then used to go to the bridgehead that's how is that normally sent it can be sent via radio but I do know in the
01:37:40 be sent via radio but I do know in the case of grim fell it was by runners on that foot but in a normal incident would you use a bit of paper chain or would it be radio communication it might be both just dependency situation or
01:37:52 just dependency situation or circumstance okay and if it was radio which channel would be used normally again if it was a small incident it would probably be to come on channel number one but I don't know the command
01:38:03 number one but I don't know the command unit can use channel free and it depends again proves up at the bridgehead if it was just watch my jerky he wouldn't necessarily change channels and once the
01:38:15 necessarily change channels and once the information gets to the bridgehead how is it recorded there normally a normal incident so we put it onto what we call the forward inflation vault and is that
01:38:27 the forward inflation vault and is that information then fed sorry it's not again but once you have information from the the crews being deployed about
01:38:38 the the crews being deployed about whether a mission is successful or unsuccessful is that information then fed back to control from the bridgehead so yeah one what we would commit a
01:38:52 so yeah one what we would commit a cruise they would gone through the rescue
01:38:55 rescue not like the flag whichever they would be debriefed and then it would be common practice to think that that and how would that what would they be the chain of communication back from the
01:39:06 of communication back from the bridgehead to control again it depends on the size of the incident whether it be by fitting our form or by radio and maybe a runner just depends on the size
01:39:19 maybe a runner just depends on the size of incident okay and would would you expect that control would stay on the line to the caller and provide updating information that
01:39:31 provide updating information that control had received from the incident ground in the normal case as in FSG or as in FSG what sort of public or to ourselves
01:39:39 ourselves no would would you expect that control would stay on the line with the caller and and give the caller updating information as it came from the incident ground that's my expectation right now
01:39:55 ground that's my expectation right now turning to the system that you did set up with watch manager Williams you say from page six at the very top of page
01:40:08 from page six at the very top of page six of your statement having explained FSG policy generally you say but this was different and you go on to say I had
01:40:20 was different and you go on to say I had direct communication with watch manager Williams on the ground floor we began to shout up numbers for flats which needed FSG now
01:40:31 FSG now as today how was that different or how was the system more generally different so on the normal incident the FSG would be directly next to the extra control
01:40:46 be directly next to the extra control officer right on this occasion it was on the ground floor and our Bridget was on the second floor okay and why the need for that difference I don't know do you
01:41:02 for that difference I don't know do you know why the FSG information wasn't being passed directly by the command unit or from the command unit to the bridgehead
01:41:16 did it occur to you at the time that this was a novel different system from what you'd normally expect I mean is fair to say feeling about this at this
01:41:28 fair to say feeling about this at this point but shortly following that it's fair to say that the FSG was like nothing I've experienced before in sheer numbers right when did you first begin
01:41:43 numbers right when did you first begin to experience the F end FSG coming in at once watch manager Williams was at the door and he started calling up to me right
01:41:55 and he started calling up to me right that was my first knowledge of the officiator okay and was it noisy in the lobby area when he started that it was noisy when firefighters were bringing
01:42:07 noisy when firefighters were bringing casualties out there was quite a lot of shouting to clear the stairs for the casualties could you always hear watch manager Williams clearly yes sir okay now when he shouted up to you what did
01:42:21 now when he shouted up to you what did you do with the information he shouted up so at first I didn't realize the sheer numbers of FSG he had and I turned round on that same more worthy that my
01:42:33 round on that same more worthy that my plan was originally and I think I wrote maybe two or three numbers down floors and flat
01:42:39 and flat numbers and it soon become very apparent that that wasn't gonna work because he was giving me too many right so I took my notepad out of my pocket and started writing individual sheets so he would
01:42:52 writing individual sheets so he would called out the person lap number floor number I would recalled it repeat it back to him and then I'll chain it to the firefighters once she gets on I see okay say it you say he shouted out
01:43:05 okay say it you say he shouted out person flat number floor none but when you say person do you mean number of persons yes okay so you did shout numbers of persons did you only it wasn't on every on every officiate that
01:43:17 wasn't on every on every officiate that wasn't the case he was just giving me the flat on the floor number hang on some of them the number of persons did he did he shout up any details about conditions in each battle on each floor
01:43:30 conditions in each battle on each floor no did he shout up any priorities to you did he shout up anything about children or elderly persons now I know he was
01:43:44 or elderly persons now I know he was shuffling the papers on the ground floor so whoever he's done that before he's called but you'll have to ask him but it was done in in from look phonological that as soon as he called them up
01:43:55 that as soon as he called them up whatever that were in calls got the first attendance and the same question what about persons with mobility difficulties I didn't have any sensation
01:44:07 difficulties I didn't have any sensation okay and
01:44:14 was he surprised you could see was he shouting up the information he was recording on the wall yes I did my recollection he had the the forms
01:44:26 my recollection he had the the forms that you've just seen and he was writing them on the wall as he was reading them he would shout them up to me I'd write them down on my notepad hand it to the BA crew give them a short brief and they
01:44:39 BA crew give them a short brief and they was gone and okay that's how we continued at that point now in terms of pictures could you look please at M et
01:44:54 pictures could you look please at M et triple zero one five eight one five this is a photograph which is exhibited to
01:45:06 is a photograph which is exhibited to watch manager Louise of the Silver's witness statement we'll have to explore with her who actually took the photograph it's clearly taken in daylight so not on the night necessarily
01:45:20 daylight so not on the night necessarily or he's not before not during the hours of darkness that she says in her statement and it's page ten for our own notes that this was one of the walls on
01:45:31 notes that this was one of the walls on the ground floor does does that writing or the location of that writing look familiar to you possibly the wall about
01:45:42 familiar to you possibly the wall about recognizer writing but by the sheer amount of writing there I would suggest that was much much of Williams wall now what's manager Williams says and again I caveat this by saying we'll have
01:45:53 again I caveat this by saying we'll have to explore this with him in his evidence when he comes but he says he wrote Oh 2:15 at the top of the wall went which is when he started the process does that
01:46:05 is when he started the process does that first of all does that tally with the timing having looked at the photographs we've seen before of him chatting up at you and starting to write I believe he would have a more accurate
01:46:18 I believe he would have a more accurate gauge on time in the night would fit fair enough now do you remember ever seeing the community room sign removed from the
01:46:33 community room sign removed from the wall next to the door which the Chairman asked you about earlier on this morning now I didn't okay when you got the
01:46:45 now I didn't okay when you got the information well you say you've started writing it off on the wall how did you
01:46:57 writing it off on the wall how did you how did you do that what would you do it weird
01:46:59 weird I took a China profit out which is the sign that you should obviously loser now I wonder if we've got a picture of this just bear with me can I ask you to be shown first of all i NQ two for four now
01:47:16 shown first of all i NQ two for four now I'm so sorry that's not right it's let's try a meaty triple zero one five six two five and this is exhibit four - Justin
01:47:30 five and this is exhibit four - Justin there burns witness statement I may have to come back to this later on this
01:47:41 to come back to this later on this morning but is that the information you started not know else and not that thumbs what the third floor and mine was literally two or three flat numbers
01:47:54 literally two or three flat numbers before were supported I see okay so can I ask you to be shown a different picture which is Jo b8 and the reference
01:48:07 picture which is Jo b8 and the reference to that is M et triple zero one three zero seven four I'm sorry to put these
01:48:18 zero seven four I'm sorry to put these things and you know fish for answers it is that something you recognize no that's not my wife that's not you right so that could be closed how much
01:48:32 so that could be closed how much information do you remember putting up on the wall before you switch to your system of jotting it down on pieces of paper approximately three floors came
01:48:43 paper approximately three floors came free flat numbers but he was still called in them out and I decided it's going to take too long to process so that's why I took my notepad out instead okay
01:49:04 [Music]
01:49:11 can I ask you to be shown inq to five for which I think we looked at possibly earlier and again just let me just try
01:49:22 earlier and again just let me just try this one more time this is clearly done in the lobby and this is later on missus they think of 3:16
01:49:39 you're holding a truly I think that's you in the foreground there in the white helmet is correct you're holding something in your hand can you tell us what that is it looks
01:49:52 can you tell us what that is it looks like a notepad we did change the system when we got to the ground I became more of a runner so I'm sure at that stage if that had happened or not
01:50:03 that had happened or not okay well I'll come back to that and let's let's go let's leave that picture and move away from it when Williams was shouting up to you the information did
01:50:14 shouting up to you the information did he shout having groups or was it one flat floor at a time he called out one floor number one flat number a number of people if he knew because he didn't
01:50:25 people if he knew because he didn't necessarily even okay I repeated it rug in my notepad and gave it to the next Baker I said okay now at the point you were recording FSG information on the wall for which we could so far failed to
01:50:38 wall for which we could so far failed to be able to show you a photograph how did you brief the crews so I'd already give the crews ten at a time a generic wreath at the layer of the building yes and they would have all heard exactly what
01:50:51 they would have all heard exactly what was going on with the FSG because he said to me I'm taking a lot of FSG can you take it I said okay because I had that all my where is there I don't be equipment we needed a new to bridge it
01:51:03 equipment we needed a new to bridge it was behind me and it was it needed to be done urgent because each FSG is placing their rescue so I took what started to relay that wasn't gonna work so I took my pad out done and singly gave that
01:51:16 my pad out done and singly gave that crew that's where you're going take the equipment go to the the vehicle to be committed right okay so do you have do
01:51:27 committed right okay so do you have do you recall handing be a where as a slip for the flat in question yes other and do you remember which you remember the firefighters you handed flats slips to there was so many are
01:51:39 flats slips to there was so many are handed out so it's live so if I was to ask you of any given slip who did you hand it to and when would you be able to help I would have no recollection there were
01:51:50 I would have no recollection there were so many numbers I wouldn't be able to answer that right now but still at the point when you're writing the
01:52:04 point when you're writing the information on the wall and you brief them what did they do with the information do you know when they got to the bridgehead so I'm library force I thought that except wording but that's where you're going it's like that paper don't get
01:52:16 going it's like that paper don't get committed amazing to the engine control whether they gave that paper over hell there I thought like okay but now if we
01:52:27 there I thought like okay but now if we go to page six of your statement to look and look at the third paragraph you say at first I started to write them down on the wall but it soon became apparent that there were too many of them so I changed the process and ripped the floor
01:52:39 changed the process and ripped the floor and flattened on the down in my notebook what's written I had that each firefighting crew called wearers as they were wearing VA keep a piece of paper wooden floor and flat number on it and you go on to you and say they then took
01:52:52 you go on to you and say they then took that's the bridgehead you noted it down on the FIB and then committed the crews I think you've said before but just just for just to be clear how soon do you
01:53:04 for just to be clear how soon do you think after you started writing on the wall did you change the process to write to jotting down to the native s/s right
01:53:15 did you rerecord the information was on the wall anywhere else no the reason for putting on the wall would be to have my own record of that level but I think it
01:53:27 own record of that level but I think it at that point I decided it was more important to get the crews into the bridgetta and getting committed right didn't but once you gave the slip of paper to the BA wearer or the te team
01:53:40 that information went with them did it it did was it were recorded anywhere else other than on the wall in the lobby
01:53:51 else other than on the wall in the lobby so they were to take the map to the bridgehead right and they would have sex at the bridgehead where I was going might be handy the paper maybe not I don't know I was in prison but they
01:54:04 don't know I was in prison but they would have had to have told the bridge shape where they was heading for so it should have been recalled a bit but Bridget right did you yourself make a record of which flats or floor you had
01:54:17 record of which flats or floor you had not given to each furniture that was being done by what range of Williams and the important thing for me was to get as
01:54:28 the important thing for me was to get as many firefighters into that building as quickly as possible tonight I was trying to facilitating it rather than actually run in anything you say it was being done by watch manager Williams but watch manager winners wouldn't know to which
01:54:40 manager winners wouldn't know to which crew the FST information had been handed with it didn't matter which Kroger had a whole line of maybe 2030 wearers and the first two that come up as he called the numbers I was given in the chute right
01:54:52 numbers I was given in the chute right so that was sort of potluck which number lawyers
01:54:56 lawyers I sent to picket and do you know whether the VA where has handed the piece of paper you gave them to anybody at the bridgehead I don't know anything risky now I just want to show you one or two
01:55:07 now I just want to show you one or two slips of paper that watch manager and Keith gave evidence about when he was at the bridgehead can I ask you to look at l FB quadruple
01:55:18 can I ask you to look at l FB quadruple zero
01:55:18 zero nine to nine now do you recognize these pieces of paper do you think so from the left the looking from top-left type of
01:55:31 left the looking from top-left type of free paper for that's my writing okay so Alan that says seven eight nine on balconies yes and 72-73 tenth floor right just help me with on balconies
01:55:44 right just help me with on balconies with what what's that a reference to I don't understand that I was just recording what he was telling me right and handing them to the to the where's we don't see any details therefore
01:55:55 we don't see any details therefore numbers of persons in the on those floors or in in those flats wife that so what would say the other writing I
01:56:06 what would say the other writing I believe to be snow she mention wolfing although I can't confirm that left or I'll skim right but definitely on some of mine and there was a lot of them on
01:56:18 of mine and there was a lot of them on that second floor there were numbers of persons if I was giving that information it was recording I see saved just to be care as if who's writing this is the
01:56:29 care as if who's writing this is the third and fourth from the left at the top of yours as correct and the rest do you say are what station manager Wilson did not that's Pete will from them people for them I believe they are but I
01:56:40 people for them I believe they are but I can't confirm that okay and went to your knowledge where was Pete wolfen than when he was jotting these pieces of paper down so this would have been when we returned to the ground floor
01:56:51 we returned to the ground floor you had later on lien instant right okay thank you
01:56:54 thank you now at the stage when you were handing out pieces of paper to the firefighters were you doing any prioritization now
01:57:06 were you doing any prioritization now that it was literally in number order as he was giving him I was getting attendance okay
01:57:13 now in the third paragraph on page six of your statement you you but you say that they were handing that the paper over so the bridgehead knew what flap
01:57:24 over so the bridgehead knew what flap they were going to and in the last sentence you say the bridgehead marked the number on the FIB and then committed the crew when it was time to do so we've
01:57:35 the crew when it was time to do so we've covered this just a second to game it can I ask you this question how did you know that the bridgehead was marking the number on the FIB in it and then committing the crew accordingly that
01:57:46 committing the crew accordingly that their actual line there is just an assumption that's what would have happened I see okay so you didn't actually see the money man I didn't witness that line right did you ever check to see whether the
01:58:00 did you ever check to see whether the information that you had I was giving them was consistent with the information that they were recording and and the flaws to which they were committing crews did you do that check for the bridgehead yes not now
01:58:16 bridgehead yes not now at the bottom of page 6 of your witness statement you say it would be common practice for crews that are exiting the building to be debriefed at the
01:58:28 building to be debriefed at the bridgehead I wasn't there so don't know if that was done but I did get information from casualties such as where they had come from what flat number they'd been rescued from I passed that information to watch manager
01:58:39 that information to watch manager Williams who wrote it on his wall no just just pausing there and how did you transmit that information to watch manager Williams my recollection ease
01:58:51 manager Williams my recollection ease whilst on the second floor yes I didn't get any of that information a lot of people being brought through or unconscious right when I returned to the ground floor and I became more of a
01:59:02 ground floor and I became more of a runner as opposed to the job I was doing on the second floor I was able to stop some people and then go until more tragic Williams a face to face I see so I see see the communication back to
01:59:16 I see see the communication back to watch manager Williams about the results of deployments only happened once you'd move down to the ground floor from me personally yes but I do recall much much of Williams stopping people at the door
01:59:28 of Williams stopping people at the door to try and get information right but I didn't obtain enough information okay and do you know how much manager Williams was recording the information about the results of deployments now I
01:59:40 about the results of deployments now I don't but he was wrought him quite a lot of informational metal okay let me let me try it with a picture can you please be shown MIT triple zero one five eight one five which is again it's an exhibit
01:59:52 one five which is again it's an exhibit to Louise at a silver statement number five which is the photograph I showed you before if we could just look a little bit more closely at the middle
02:00:03 little bit more closely at the middle column you can see some ticks do you know what do you know what those represent now if you don't and you can see some deletions as well as
02:00:15 see some deletions as well as do you know what that represents no time
02:00:23 when you got information about the results of deployments from casualties did you make your own record of it no it
02:00:35 did you make your own record of it no it didn't I was on the ground floor Dean and I recall specifically as I recall flat 74 and I went over and told Ross Rachel Williams who Nazis walk right but
02:00:49 Rachel Williams who Nazis walk right but do believe there was one or two others a little bit earlier into me a little bit earlier in the incident and we've done that face to face right now well they're still on that picture
02:01:00 now well they're still on that picture can I just ask you you can see there that at the very top of the foot of the picture it says above ten edpa below 10 s DBA do you know who wrote that there I
02:01:16 s DBA do you know who wrote that there I don't know no but I didn't see anybody up other than what range of Williams were an informational network right did you ever see watch manager Wolfington writing FSG information on
02:01:27 Wolfington writing FSG information on that wall he may have done I know he recorded when myself and watch range of Williams left the incident put our times
02:01:38 Williams left the incident put our times down on the wall remember that but I don't recall right once manager Wilson arrived we have him on scene at o2 1258 so that's actually just before the 2:15
02:01:53 so that's actually just before the 2:15 would you also see on the picture do you remember watch manager wolf ndon taking part in either writing on the wall or being involved in fire survival guidance in the on the ground floor
02:02:05 in the on the ground floor I don't recall when he arrived in the lobby but when he did arrive he was I recall him on his radio make him radio
02:02:16 recall him on his radio make him radio traffic to outside which again I can I could assume it was the commander in it but he was once he was there he was quite heavily involved in the FST right
02:02:27 quite heavily involved in the FST right [Music]
02:02:29 [Music] I've gotta turn to a different topic which is you're moved to the ground floor from the second floor but before I do that can I just show you a particular
02:02:40 do that can I just show you a particular document and just ask you whether you've seen it before this is M et triple zero one six nine six seven now this is I'll
02:02:54 one six nine six seven now this is I'll tell you what this is at least what we understand it to be and that this is an envelope which watch manager Sadler was given early on which recorded some early
02:03:08 given early on which recorded some early FSG information and the much manager Sadler was he says acting as a as a forward forward information board outside the tower collating information coming from the command unit precisely
02:03:21 coming from the command unit precisely which one we will have to explore with him before it was sent into the tower and he says that this envelope was sent to the bridgehead as a as a as a piece
02:03:32 to the bridgehead as a as a as a piece of paper do you remember seeing it I have no knowledge at this one but now in your statement on page 8 we
02:03:44 but now in your statement on page 8 we can just go to it
02:03:49 you say in the second paragraph that you were told by a senior officer to move your staging post to the ground floor
02:04:03 your staging post to the ground floor unless a second paragraph second substantive paragraph there was a stage you say when something happened I'm not sure what but I was told by a senior
02:04:14 sure what but I was told by a senior officer to move my staging post to the ground I told him I was involved in FSG he told me to go to the ground floor I left the second floor took the wearer's that were with me were with me to the ground floor do you first
02:04:26 to the ground floor do you first question do you know or can you remember who told you to move to the ground floor I did not by the officer but I believe it to be station manager Walton Walton
02:04:40 it to be station manager Walton Walton do you have any what is that belief based on sorry what is your what is your belief that it was station manager Walton based on because again of our lot
02:04:54 Walton based on because again of our lot of people it was in the lobby what did the senior officers say to you do you remember yeah he tapped me on the shoulder and he said you're moving your
02:05:07 shoulder and he said you're moving your staging post to the ground floor I said to him I'm psyching FSG I can't look to the ground floor and he said to me go to the ground floor did he give you any
02:05:18 the ground floor did he give you any indication as to why he wants you to be mad again okay okay say when you went to the ground floor at that time where was the bridgehead I'm not sure when the
02:05:30 the bridgehead I'm not sure when the project moved between the second and the third no it was outside that night they came facts old on this back track there because I actually went up site was on
02:05:41 because I actually went up site was on the third floor okay now we are trying to get a time for the move to the third floor
02:05:52 floor from the second floor how long after see if we can do this how long after watch
02:06:05 if we can do this how long after watch manager Williams has started recording FSG on the wall in the lobby and shouting up to you do you see the bridge head moved from the second to the third floor I remember the bridge head moving I
02:06:18 I remember the bridge head moving I thought I knew it moved I'm not sure how I knew that but I've got no idea of the timings for before you move to the ground floor do you remember roughly how long the
02:06:29 do you remember roughly how long the bridge head was on the third floor for now
02:06:38 we have some potential evidence about the timing of the move Gareth cook station manager Gareth cook who's going to give evidence later says
02:06:49 who's going to give evidence later says and we'll explore this with him that he says that he moved at about 2:15 which should be very shortly after Glenn Williams started recording on the wall would that be about right I really got
02:07:02 would that be about right I really got no recollection of silence right okay now once did you go up to the third floor when the bridge had moved or did you stay on the third on the second-floor balcony our stay on the
02:07:13 second-floor balcony our stay on the second floor at that point how did you continue to communicate with the bridgehead which was now a floor above you I for that point I was still taking
02:07:29 you I for that point I was still taking the FSG and facilitating it and I was just giving the numbers to the firefighters that come before with the monster Bridget so I have no communication with all of that on my phone and did your communications with
02:07:43 phone and did your communications with and watch manager Williams continue as they had done even though the bridgehead had moved up a floor but they continued right into that point when I was told to go to the ground okay
02:07:58 do you remember how long the bridgehead was on the third floor fall but okay
02:08:07 do you remember whether watch manager O'Keefe asked you to take a photograph
02:08:15 yes he did and if I can just pick this up in your statement of page eight you say
02:08:29 that in the at the end of the second substantive paragraph after you've referred to the move that to the ground-floor
02:08:39 you say just after that another senior officer stood exactly where I had been now just causing that is that on the second floor second floor I met him he was with ten whereas there was no
02:08:51 was with ten whereas there was no explanation the bridge headed now move been moved from the second to the third floor I climbed up to the bridge head on the third floor where I saw firefighters in a queue waiting to go out first
02:09:02 in a queue waiting to go out first having been told to go to the ground floor in the way that your statement says and you've just told us mr. Watson why did you go to the third floor so lost as I explained I was told to go to
02:09:15 lost as I explained I was told to go to the ground floor to take the stage into the ground floor as always kind of the link for the FSG I explained that I still TomSka to the ground so when I got to the ground I spiked to watch a bunch
02:09:26 to the ground I spiked to watch a bunch of Williams and I'll steam who's doing the FSG he said he didn't know so I I said I looked off to my staging post and I went back up to the third floor to
02:09:38 I went back up to the third floor to find out what was happening with their fists you okay when you say what was happening to the FS to you do you mean at the bridgehead yeah because tomorrow on the link had been broken I was facilitating getting
02:09:49 been broken I was facilitating getting back to the project and now we didn't have that link so I went past all of these people up to the third sir to pretend to speak to watch magically right and did you did you have a conversation with him I did what did you
02:10:00 conversation with him I did what did you talk about when I got there I don't know if we actually mentioned what's happening the FSG because virtually as soon as I got there someone said the
02:10:12 soon as I got there someone said the fires below us we've now going to move to the ground and he he then said to me have you got your phone I said I haven't got my phone and he pointed to a wall
02:10:24 got my phone and he pointed to a wall which had a lot of variety which begin I can only presume was FSG but I couldn't photographic foreign and then we all moved to the ground floor okay do you know why he wanted you to
02:10:36 okay do you know why he wanted you to photograph what was on the third floor as I say how can I presume it was FSG and it would be good practice to carried up all the downstairs with you okay dude
02:10:47 up all the downstairs with you okay dude okay can I ask you then just to before we move to the next topic look at
02:11:01 m80 quadruple zero one six sorry one five six two five
02:11:16 now we have I think established but that is the third floor and the three is correct do you remember being asked so I
02:11:28 correct do you remember being asked so I move the princes way do you remember whether this was what Watchmen injury Keith asked you to photograph are done not okay
02:11:40 after you went up to the bridgehead on the third floor and had the conversation with watchman Jerry Keith where did the did the bridgehead then move literally
02:11:52 did the bridgehead then move literally as we got there Sun will set for us below us and we move straight downstairs all of you everybody okay now that's the moment when I'm going to move to the next topic would
02:12:04 going to move to the next topic would you like a five-minute break or you have a talk to me hello just to suggest you might never yes I think five minutes and do a bit mean we had to be very good break now
02:12:21 mean we had to be very good break now until five to twelve empties these don't talk to women about your evidence well we're at thanks alright let's give the ocean five to twelve
02:12:38 ocean five to twelve [Music]
02:12:47 you
02:25:06 [Music]
02:25:15 good comfortable to carry on thank you very much
02:25:18 very much yes mr. millet yes mr. Sean thank you I want to turn now to the subject of the bridgehead moving down to the ground floor in terms of timing I wonder if we
02:25:29 floor in terms of timing I wonder if we can just look at a few photographs together and see if we can fix that but before I do do you have a recollection of roughly how long after you'd started
02:25:40 of roughly how long after you'd started on the second-floor balcony with your staging panel after that the bridgehead moved from the third floor to the ground floor in all honesty as I said I didn't
02:25:53 floor in all honesty as I said I didn't have my fine with me I thought were a watch so no concept of time at all okay now if I can start there by asking you to look at
02:26:04 to look at inq two three four and that is a photograph taken of the bottom of the
02:26:18 photograph taken of the bottom of the stairs by the green wall or the back and the time mark for that adjusted is a 309 forty-seven and we can see a lot of BA
02:26:30 forty-seven and we can see a lot of BA whereas coming down with some equipment including a large bag what would that large bag be that looks like an icy bag soaked with a lot medical equipment in
02:26:41 soaked with a lot medical equipment in it right okay and at a 309 55 just a seven seconds later eight seconds later I in queue 235
02:26:54 eight seconds later I in queue 235 Ricans could you help us there with what we see so you've got a watch manager Keith right on the bottom of the staircase do not recognize any of the
02:27:05 staircase do not recognize any of the other for us okay and at 310 inq 236 that is the lobby can you see yourself
02:27:19 that is the lobby can you see yourself there anywhere I believe that looks like me top middle of the picture there right it does if you remember being in the lobby with that throng of firefighters at around
02:27:30 that throng of firefighters at around that time yes I do right and then if we go to the next picture you can see this is now at 3:00 1120 Control board's are
02:27:44 is now at 3:00 1120 Control board's are in the lobby next to the wall where originally watch manager William should be writing FSG information again does do you remember what was happening at this
02:27:56 you remember what was happening at this at this time what was the timing for this well we have an adjusted time of both 3 11 and 20 seconds for this picture see my recollection was the
02:28:08 picture see my recollection was the answer control board so key if you look to the right that someone's writing my recollection was labels at the bottom of the stairwell and what they so recall that being there right okay
02:28:20 that being there right okay let's look at the next picture then at 2 3 8 now there we have if you look at the part of the wall where we looked at
02:28:31 part of the wall where we looked at earlier with Glenn Williams writing FSG information what what what do we see there
02:28:35 there can you help yeah it looks like he's colliding FSG information on the forms that we looked at earlier and possibly transfer into the wall all right now do
02:28:48 transfer into the wall all right now do you remove at but do you remember do you have a room recollection of that happening I am writing on the wall all night not of that specific point do you have a recollection of anybody writing
02:29:00 have a recollection of anybody writing anything once the BA once the bridgehead had moved to the ground-floor are on a green wall by the stairs so when we moved to the ground floor at one point I became more of a run-up between Glynn
02:29:12 became more of a run-up between Glynn Williams and watch manager our cake okay now let's just see if we can get an idea of that can you look at two three nine the next picture in the sequence which
02:29:24 the next picture in the sequence which is
02:29:24 is taking it it's not it that should be teased actually 39 right let's took a
02:29:36 teased actually 39 right let's took a 240 then so this is taken that the foot of the stairs by the green wall of the bottom and it shows the be a control board there in the bottom left hand
02:29:47 board there in the bottom left hand corner of the picture do you know who that firefighter was in the white helmet
02:29:54 now that I've but I can't recall these night manager looking at the rank markings yeah all right you don't even
02:30:07 markings yeah all right you don't even remember that do you remember that happening but the VA control walls but set up by that green wall at the foot of the staircase that's my recollection that all the barriers set up across the foot of that wall right let's skip on a
02:30:19 foot of that wall right let's skip on a couple more two two two two four two
02:30:30 do you recognize anybody in that photograph yeah so from the left you've got watch manger the silver - silver over there is your most cheese or Chelsea you've got
02:30:42 your most cheese or Chelsea you've got just the nyebern from North Cain right you've been got watchbands are a Keith right and I believe that is good manager Welch that's Welch is it I believe something right okay and can you do you
02:30:58 something right okay and can you do you remember the VA entry control boards and other materials being moved to the foot of the stairs by the green wall there
02:31:09 of the stairs by the green wall there when you shake me the earlier photo with the BI ball against watch bunch of Williams War but recall that but I don't recall all the BI balls being on that wall where I are now right okay and
02:31:22 wall where I are now right okay and given the times I got we've got four these and this one I should say is it Oh three adjusted a three 1722 does that
02:31:34 three adjusted a three 1722 does that help you with your recollection what pronoun should I perhaps a does this correspond with your recollection of roughly when the bridge had moved down to the ground floor as I say timing wise
02:31:45 to the ground floor as I say timing wise I don't know but I remember somebody said defiers Banaras and everybody moved to the ground floor and that's where we operate from after that point right now in his statement station manager wolf
02:31:58 in his statement station manager wolf fund and Pete wolf ined and says that he assisted you after you'd come down to the ground floor can you from your recollection tell us what station manager wolf ins and his
02:32:09 what station manager wolf ins and his involvement was to the best of your recollection one sucker my recollection was I remember him being on the radio quite a lot talking to outside which I can only question was a command to
02:32:20 can only question was a command to or someone with more journey he was I believe taking numbers writing things down he was giving them to me and I was forwarding them on either to the
02:32:32 forwarding them on either to the firefighters or on to watch major our key right now do you know what time he arrived in the ground floor lobby I've
02:32:45 arrived in the ground floor lobby I've recalled a time but I don't believe he was there when we first moved down I think we've moved on a little bit timewise yeah he arrived on the fire ground at o2 1258 and these pictures are now an hour or so later but but but you
02:33:00 now an hour or so later but but but you do remember what time he came to the ground floor to assist with the work you were doing when you arrived at the ground floor I thought no timewise but I think we was on the ground floor lobby
02:33:12 think we was on the ground floor lobby for a short period and then he just appeared right now if we can just go back to
02:33:25 no I've missed on Glee David didn't take it in this order if we can look at your contemporaneous notes I think first of all and look at page three this is where
02:33:37 all and look at page three this is where you cover the move the bottom of page two you say I should just show you this bottom of page two you say sometime late later question mark the bridge head was
02:33:50 later question mark the bridge head was relocated to the ground floor and a gmk group manager came and informed myself would watch manager Williams and station manager Wolff ndon station manager Wolfington but all FSGS were to go to
02:34:02 Wolfington but all FSGS were to go to him then on to the relocated entry control boards first of all do you remember who the GM was yet Mantua that's welched and the relocated entry
02:34:14 that's welched and the relocated entry control boards ended up where do you where they was on that last photo at the fatherlessness right now
02:34:29 what was your understanding about group managers about group manager Welch's role on the bridgehead at or from that point I had no contact with matter Welch
02:34:40 point I had no contact with matter Welch when we got to the ground floor I did witness him briefing crews along with the names come back to me now Pat Goldberg it was also current manager
02:34:51 Goldberg it was also current manager right but I had no sort of personal contacts at that point now coming back to Pete wolf observe you referred to in your
02:35:00 your contemporaneous notes he says in his statement that he was there to oversee
02:35:12 statement that he was there to oversee watch manager Williams and yourself in coordinating fire survival guidance information first of all is that does that accord with your recollection correct
02:35:23 correct okay he also goes on to say that he put information up on what he describes as the beige wall ie not the green wall again do you recall him doing that I've
02:35:35 again do you recall him doing that I've recalled in writing but I know when I left the incident at the end of the end of my time in the incident he did recall that on the wall I witnessed him do that
02:35:46 that on the wall I witnessed him do that so it possibly was writing on the wall okay now just to show you a photograph again this is um this is MIT triple zero one five eight one five which is should
02:36:00 one five eight one five which is should be LD LD s five
02:36:06 there's quite a lot of information that their Pete Wolfington says in his statement that where there was a tick but do you remember what a tick represents I don't because I didn't have
02:36:20 represents I don't because I didn't have any sort of dealings with a bald person okay all right so you say you can't help us with what the ticks or crosses or circles represent on that yeah and can you help us with how much you know about people
02:36:35 us with how much you know about people funders input into the material that we see on the wall the writing on the wall actually physically writing I'm unaware but I was quite busy so he may well have
02:36:47 but I was quite busy so he may well have written on the wall but he had more of a overseeing role as you've just stated right yeah now you were busy what can you tell us what you were doing
02:36:58 you tell us what you were doing once the bridge had it moved to the ground floor and the writing up on the wall continued by Glenn Williams what were you doing
02:37:09 were you doing so I still had kind of a dual role I was still organizing getting EB ba s VBA into the base of the tower equipment is required another direct link with watch
02:37:23 required another direct link with watch manager Brown who was in a holding area outside of the incident so just making sure they've got enough firefighters to send in that was one of my roles and the other role at that point was as FSG was
02:37:37 other role at that point was as FSG was coming in he was giving them to me and I was at this point I was still handing them directed crews to go forward to the vehicle right who was handing you pieces
02:37:48 vehicle right who was handing you pieces of paper that there's two pieces of paper I believe at this point it was especially manageable fatigue wolfen them orphan them right in what form were those pieces of paper had written I see
02:38:01 those pieces of paper had written I see and a lemon ice Pisces so when we looked at the photograph earlier on OLF beat quadruple zero one nine to nine
02:38:12 quadruple zero one nine to nine you most of those you said were station manager Wilson's writing that's only an assumption because at that point I don't recall writing any more papers I was being handed to me and
02:38:27 more papers I was being handed to me and I was it's kind of a dual role I was taken to the wearer's you give them where I was going and I was I believe because I quite a lot of dealings with watch manager okie for that point as well but forward in that on to him so he
02:38:40 well but forward in that on to him so he had an awareness of what we was doing as well okay so do you know where Pete Wilson done was getting the information on the pieces of paper that he was given to you I believe I'm correct in saying it was for his radio did you see him I
02:38:53 it was for his radio did you see him I did Sam uses right now on his radio did he see him recording on paper what he was getting over the radio now I didn't but I did witness him using his right yard wherever or not we still
02:39:04 his right yard wherever or not we still had people coming in with supply but I'm not sure did you handle at that stage that stage do you handle any fast survivable guidance information in the form of control information forms
02:39:17 form of control information forms there's formal appendix to control information no staging me stand was I given a formal place of play right okay they say still the office that was a bad question for there no stage okay now did
02:39:31 question for there no stage okay now did you receive any debriefing from crews descending or from casualties being brought out about the conditions in the tower all success or failure of rescues at this stage now where you sort of set
02:39:44 at this stage now where you sort of set up at the base of the tower yeah where the stairs were the bridge hey the effectively would have been stopping crews but has they came through and we now had a side entrance rather
02:39:56 and we now had a side entrance rather than the front entrance because the amount of debris coming down I did actually physically stop two or three people to find out where they come from right and then went to direct face-to-face with watch manager Williams
02:40:09 face-to-face with watch manager Williams to give him that information so could that baby's walking okay and did you see him up take the wall with the information you gave him I don't recall okay you don't know what system he used
02:40:21 okay you don't know what system he used to like my second bar now he was writing on that wall as I was telling do you know what did you see what he then did with the information you were giving him about about the conditions in the town
02:40:33 about about the conditions in the town you don't know you didn't see him communicate that on to the two none on unit or something else no would you were you able to keep tabs
02:40:46 no would you were you able to keep tabs on FSG callers who actually managed to get out without being rescued at that point I believe all the residents coming
02:40:57 point I believe all the residents coming out will being brought out by three a cruise all right and the actual login of the FSG would have been more what watch manager Williams able to add more of a overall view of that okay now do you
02:41:14 overall view of that okay now do you remember at any stage any stage whether before or after the bridgehead was moved down from the third floor to the ground floor that crews being told that crews
02:41:26 floor that crews being told that crews were struggling to get above the 11th floor our heart wasn't I didn't have that emotion not do you remember whether you got information that they were struggling to get above the 15th floor now the game that would have been more
02:41:38 now the game that would have been more the bridge shape and the they could watch all instant commanders that work near the projector right okay now on page 9 of your statements you just go to
02:41:54 page 9 of your statements you just go to that you say
02:42:01 in the third paragraph Welch and wolf ndon had a discussion and the decision
02:42:13 ndon had a discussion and the decision not to go above the 10th floor was changed to a maximum of the 15th floor were you were you privy to that discussion I was aware of that
02:42:25 discussion I was aware of that discussion but I wasn't privy to the information that was possible how are you privy to the discussion be standing there and they just when they were talking so where that originates
02:42:36 were talking so where that originates from at this point I was still directly giving firefighters information on where they was going and I overheard who I now
02:42:48 they was going and I overheard who I now know to be manager Welch say to somebody we're not going to plug the temp and I just give him a crew ticket effectively
02:42:59 just give him a crew ticket effectively to the 11th and Nobles they'd already been to to the engine control and I was just starting up at the bottom of stairs pulling their muscle and I asked him did you say we're not going above the temp
02:43:11 you say we're not going above the temp he said yes and I said I'll better stop that crew because they're going to the 11th he said to me that I shouldn't be committing anyone I told him I wasn't
02:43:22 committing anyone I told him I wasn't committing anyone because to my mind I've been doing this same format all night so that crew was stopped by then
02:43:33 night so that crew was stopped by then I think just after that I gave him some more which came from station major wolf Athena I gave him some more FSG fully five in total and it was all
02:43:47 FSG fully five in total and it was all above the temp and he said to me I told you we're not going above the temp so I gave them back to station manageable for them they're not he asked me what they
02:43:59 them they're not he asked me what they were and I said we're not committing above the temp and I recall them going on to his radio and inquiring and saying can this be recorded but we're not going
02:44:11 can this be recorded but we're not going above the ten he then left me and went to have what I would call the tactical meeting with group manager Welch and at that point and it was quite short from
02:44:23 that point and it was quite short from my recollection it was changed to the 15th so we was very committing back up to the 15 well you told why the decision
02:44:35 to the 15 well you told why the decision was made by group manager Welch not to commit above the 10th I wasn't but what I would say he would have had an overall view or he would have been debriefing firefighters coming down so they had an
02:44:47 firefighters coming down so they had an overall view of the fire situation and he also would have had an overview from outside of what was happening so whereas I was kind of blindfolded to what was
02:44:58 I was kind of blindfolded to what was happening outside I made contact other than my just a generic to be cleared was this the first time that you'd become aware that entry control wasn't sending VA crews above the 10th floor tomorrow
02:45:09 VA crews above the 10th floor tomorrow at election yes do you know did you did you know how long they've been operating that policy for before you found out about it I found none okay now in you
02:45:20 about it I found none okay now in you say
02:45:25 in the third paragraph that there was this discussion at that stage you were more of a runner did you talk to group
02:45:36 more of a runner did you talk to group manager Welch directly or did you only deal with people fronting on this on this question of deployment above the 10th 950 floor I'm probably going to - so so that happened there
02:45:47 so so that happened there once I'll stop that program to the 11th he then instructed me all their fish cheese to go direct to him right I see okay now in the previous paragraph where
02:46:00 okay now in the previous paragraph where you've you covered this what you've just told us in your evidence about pieces of paper don't go into great manager Welch you say that my impression was in the last line that he didn't agree with Welch's decision that's he wolf ndon
02:46:12 Welch's decision that's he wolf ndon didn't agree with Welsh's decision how did you get that impression the fact that um he went strike on - he's right now to say he wanted it recorded at this time right do you know at this point who
02:46:24 time right do you know at this point who the incident commander was not right who did you think the incident commander I had no idea because we've talked in now maybe three hours into the incident right whatever it was okay do you know
02:46:37 right whatever it was okay do you know that stage what the status of the FSG so I believe the status of advice - residence was nada do you know what whether the stake would have been
02:46:48 whether the stake would have been changed or not okay
02:47:02 can we I wonder whether we can time this by looking at some of the notes that watch manager Eric Keith introduced into
02:47:14 watch manager Eric Keith introduced into evidence and we've looked at already a couple of times this morning that's NFB quadruple zero one nine to nine if we could just go back to that we've looked
02:47:25 could just go back to that we've looked at these a few times now this morning but if you look at for example the second one in from the left you've got flat 111 to 115 all on the 14th floor
02:47:38 flat 111 to 115 all on the 14th floor time 204 10 does that help you with your recollection of when this decision not to go above the 10th as was made no not
02:47:50 to go above the 10th as was made no not really
02:47:51 really as you can see from that was getting barber a lot of places a pipeline which were being forwarded on and I wasn't really looking at numbers to think though explain okay and what about any
02:48:03 though explain okay and what about any of the other pieces of paper for example the 11th floor flat 82 3 persons for 30 and 15th or the 15th floor at 4:20 does
02:48:17 and 15th or the 15th floor at 4:20 does that again do those help you with your recollections to win this discussion night that's why my sorry all right now [Music]
02:48:38 say just to just to clarify one thing if you could go to again is one more one more time to m ET triple zero one five eight
02:48:49 time to m ET triple zero one five eight one five look there's a number of times like probably covered this with you but at this point in the in the night and we're talking about floors you can see
02:49:01 we're talking about floors you can see there at the top of the picture somebody's written above 10 EDB a below 10s DBA do you remember seeing that being written on the wall label during
02:49:13 being written on the wall label during the night I don't remember that being recorded but at the point when we was towards the sort L into the incident I don't remember there being a lot more a
02:49:24 don't remember there being a lot more a DBA than there was SD bi because that was part of my role and I was in contact with watch manager outside and I was
02:49:35 with watch manager outside and I was constantly asking him for more ad bi as a as opposed to standard duration right now
02:49:45 station manager Wilson dinners has given us a statement and he says and again we'll have to explore it with him that it was he who write those words above 10 and a DBA below 10 s DBA does
02:50:01 above 10 and a DBA below 10 s DBA does that accord with your recollection or you don't know one way or the other I don't recall that been put onto the wall okay
02:50:29 now we've had evidence from control room staff Joe Smith who is the senior operating manager operations manager in
02:50:40 operating manager operations manager in the control room on the night and from DAC Adrienne Fenton who is also in the control room on the night and and they've told us that information that Cruz was struggling to get above the 15th floor was a factor in their
02:50:52 15th floor was a factor in their decision or their own decisions has changed the FSG advice from stay put to get out which we may well have been
02:51:03 get out which we may well have been between 2:30 and 247 in the in the night does that tally was what I've just told you tally with anything that you can
02:51:14 you tally with anything that you can recall as I said earlier timewise I'm very vague with times if they're right
02:51:25 very vague with times if they're right about that and crews weren't being committed or or having difficulties getting above the 15th floor at let's say by latest 247 that would be before
02:51:37 say by latest 247 that would be before the bridge had moved to the ground floor on the basis of what we've looked at earlier would you agree with that it's possible but just to reiterate what my role was staging and facilitating FSG so
02:51:50 role was staging and facilitating FSG so to bridge hey what about a lot more overview of what was happening both outside and firefighters coming down right
02:51:57 right do you remember whether there were any disagreements or other disagreements between the FSG team that's you Glen Williams and Pete Wolfington and members
02:52:09 Williams and Pete Wolfington and members of the the bridgehead team as it were as we've just explored in my statement when I was told we're not going about the team fight Dave the papers back to
02:52:21 team fight Dave the papers back to station major wolf again who went straight on to his radio to the command unit eyewitness at once he'd sent in a message he walked over and had a wild
02:52:33 message he walked over and had a wild call the tactical meeting with Mansa Welch and the decision was then changed back to the 15th now watch manager William says in his witness statement that there was a
02:52:45 witness statement that there was a verbal conflict his words between you and group manager Welch at about between 4:00 and 4:30 in the night and the reason is because he says that there was FSG information being shared directly to
02:52:58 FSG information being shared directly to group manager Welch without the station without watch manager Williams is knowledge I think they help with that that's I bet not sure I think the the
02:53:09 that's I bet not sure I think the the conflicts as he puts it was when group manager work said to me I shouldn't be committing anybody and right which I'll reply that I'll not come in anybody ok
02:53:20 reply that I'll not come in anybody ok so it's that same discussion I believe so I see okay you don't have any recollection of any independent later or different disagreement with group crew manager Welch do you know so the only other point thing so that's not that
02:53:34 other point thing so that's not that crew and then as explained earlier when I was given another five FS geez and I gave them two major Welch he looked at
02:53:45 gave them two major Welch he looked at them handed me them back and said I told you I'm not going above the temp right which is the point when I go back to station major wolf daily record it on the radio okay
02:54:00 and at the point when you were doing this running that you were doing between the wall and the bridgehead now on the ground floor were you recording any of
02:54:11 ground floor were you recording any of the information that you were getting yourself anywhere I wasn't not ok can I just show you a picture of
02:54:26 the green
02:54:31 which
02:54:42 you just give me a lemon I will fight for you
02:54:51 it's M et triple zero one five eight one six
02:55:03 in your role as runner on the ground floor do you remember seeing anybody writing on the green one is this the
02:55:14 writing on the green one is this the wall next to where the ancient Roller set up at the heights of the stairs base of the stage yes so again I'm not sure what was recorded but I don't recall watch my drug Keith we called in stuff
02:55:28 watch my drug Keith we called in stuff on there right do you know when the recording of writing on this wall started I believe as as soon as we got
02:55:40 started I believe as as soon as we got to the ground floor right now Louisa da Silva has said in her witness statement and again we'll explore it with her but she says that the writing won 8-3 daughter 21 or 22 which was was her do
02:55:56 daughter 21 or 22 which was was her do you have a recollection of her putting that up there none right and what about 1/5 with a big ring was 1/5 318 for this do you have a recollection of that
02:56:07 recollection of that now that ok now yep let me just ask you one or two questions about a particular particular event
02:56:24 firefighter Lawson has said that they came down and said they couldn't get people down from the 18th floor and the telemetry data for tallying in for that
02:56:37 telemetry data for tallying in for that firefighter was at 227 do you have a recollection of being told at any stage of difficulties getting people down from the 18th floor the interesting you're
02:56:50 the 18th floor the interesting you're talking about hard I recall okay do you remember charlie batter be telling you
02:57:02 remember charlie batter be telling you anything about difficulties getting people down from the 18th floor none the only recollection I have which is in my statement I took a radio message from
02:57:13 statement I took a radio message from channel 1 from a bi crew so they switched from channel 6 to 1 they said that was on the tenth floor they had members of the public with them
02:57:24 they had members of the public with them I believed to be from flat 74 they said they needed assistance so I took that message I told them I was on the ground
02:57:35 message I told them I was on the ground floor lobby and went over to watch manager okie told him he then made a radio transmission to another crew and then people was successfully rescued
02:57:59 and do you know whether that information was recorded by watch manager a key for anybody else when you take people's recorded - at that point I can't
02:58:11 recorded - at that point I can't remember what kinds of Williams was still there or it was slash man of war 15 because what's range of Williams left quite early but it was it was recorded that I believe on his board because I
02:58:22 that I believe on his board because I took your information back because actually verbally spoke to them people right when you see his wall which lies in the lobby entrance will not not the staircase
02:58:33 staircase okay the beige will not the green will bite walk is right okay
02:58:45 so you recall you recall that do you I don't because I actually spoke to them residents when they came out and I believe they're in my statement right thank you
02:58:58 and do you record what do you recall a blood says go back to that wall or a picture of that wall at goodbye we were looking at at least one five eight one five probably the clearest version of
02:59:12 five probably the clearest version of that we've got do you can you help us identify where on this wall that information was recorded as I said my
02:59:25 information was recorded as I said my recollection was they told me though the firefighter said I was on the tenth floor and the residents said they come from flat 74 yes which is looking at that he's down the bottom of that first
02:59:36 that he's down the bottom of that first list tick-tock it's like free from the fossil I see okay that's it is it right I found this it looks like there's a separate list I was going to ask you info because the middle of the central
02:59:47 info because the middle of the central list has 70 floor 74 on the 10th as you can see there next year with VA and then
03:00:00 can see there next year with VA and then information with Jessica so maybe they've hung the phone up and called back they're going because they've been recorded again yeah that's what it looks like but again you left the check with
03:00:13 like but again you left the check with automotive Williams as equals kaleil your name for my story and if I could just ask about one more you can see in the second column on this same
03:00:24 the second column on this same photograph what are the flat one eight one five two appears to be deleted
03:00:31 eighteenth appears appears to be deleted looks big
03:00:41 do you know anything about that in all honesty other than flat 74 to my recollection I actually sponsored in people and sent that message back to
03:00:54 people and sent that message back to that particular officer and wore other numbers during them though I took so many numbers I don't recall right thank
03:01:05 many numbers I don't recall right thank you very much okay
03:01:15 and on page eight of your statement you refer to a the fact that you gave two
03:01:30 refer to a the fact that you gave two prepared ba sets to two of your own firefighters for a woman and a child building repair it's on page eight if you could see second paragraph down I'm
03:01:41 you could see second paragraph down I'm sort of summarized what you were you said there do you remember which firefighters this was yet firefighter Felton who's based at Hammersmith and
03:01:53 Felton who's based at Hammersmith and who else I'm not so sure I know he took two sets to prepared sets right but he was with another firefighter a lot in life okay and is that the photograph we
03:02:04 life okay and is that the photograph we saw earlier I believe that was then actually exiting the building yes but this happened on the second-floor balcony yeah do you know whether that
03:02:15 balcony yeah do you know whether that was the result of a fast survival guidance call that had gone through you or not I don't know okay okay you also say in that
03:02:29 just a paragraph in that in the statement you send the second line I don't know what floor they were on but the crew couldn't get them down as it was to smoke logged who told you that
03:02:40 was to smoke logged who told you that the floor they'd come from was to smoke logs so this this was quite a pertinent moment for me I now know this to be 158 from the
03:02:51 I now know this to be 158 from the operational response from the brigades brigades printed that's so my own firefighter came down he said I need to sex and I said to the next two people
03:03:04 sex and I said to the next two people get started up and he said no no I need to be ACS so I said what you need them for
03:03:10 for he said the stairwells to smoke looked to get people down and it was quite a sort of telling moment really that the escape route were using is now smoke
03:03:21 escape route were using is now smoke locked so I am I gave him the two sets and I now know that the crew from Paddington was up in the flat with these people on the night floor and we
03:03:33 people on the night floor and we successfully brought them down and was this after firefighter 13 had come down to the bridgehead from from a deployment yes he'd already been deployed and I believe the crew radioed them to come
03:03:45 believe the crew radioed them to come down and collect assess right now we have him with an end of wear time sorry I should ask me first when you have a
03:03:57 I should ask me first when you have a discussion with him had he ended his where no he was still in VI he took two prepared sets in he didn't shut down and when she tried back upstairs no I see right
03:04:15 okay and did he pee he then come back down again when I didn't see him return I was
03:04:26 again when I didn't see him return I was quite busy I don't know if that was the point when the FSG had started or not but I was very concerned and I didn't even see that people come back out right
03:04:37 even see that people come back out right but I do know that we successfully brought two people out okay
03:04:50 so that you think that was one flat one five eight how do you remember that it was flat one five eight particular now I've been inside I just know retrospectively that it was the ninth floor I don't know the flat number you
03:05:01 floor I don't know the flat number you don't know you don't know if I don't know that one okay right okay well thank you very much mr. Watson very very helpful and very grateful to you for coming to give evidence I wonder where
03:05:12 coming to give evidence I wonder where they're giving it given the time you might just take a five minute break not by way of encouragement but but just by way of me being able to make sure I've covered everything in my notes mr. chairman looks we do that mr. was yeah
03:05:23 chairman looks we do that mr. was yeah we'll break for just over five one five minutes and then just a minute to see if he's left anything out and then probably it's alright
03:05:34 it's alright we'd like to give the ocean views
03:05:40 like I say 20 to 1 was too little yes that's very good position thank you
03:05:53 you
03:10:38 [Music]
03:11:07 Fortson yes yes thank you this wasn't just a couple of questions first of all I wonder whether you could be shamed please photograph two to nine inq two to nine now this is ten time-stamped
03:11:24 nine now this is ten time-stamped perhaps 137 and adjusted it's 136 27 you
03:11:37 perhaps 137 and adjusted it's 136 27 you see that the AAV control panel open my question was whether you could identify who else we see in that picture the
03:11:48 who else we see in that picture the black guy is on one watches for tomorrow that's Marie as if the other two we don't know and in the on the right hand side of the picture there is a
03:12:00 side of the picture there is a firefighter there assisting and some of the old crutches coming out of the building do you know who the firefighter is I thought no but these are try knee that's what the diamond represents don't
03:12:11 that's what the diamond represents don't tell me right thank you you gave an answer earlier on your evidence this morning about well I was asking you about the distribution of the
03:12:22 asking you about the distribution of the slips that you were giving to firefighters at the staging area and the context was on this when you were on the second floor did you consider whether a FSG sheet or
03:12:38 did you consider whether a FSG sheet or the old slip of paper should be given to an e DB wearer or an SD b-1a wearer against a similar statement the line crew from Paddington came through quite
03:12:52 crew from Paddington came through quite early into the FSG and I do distinctly remember either FSG to the 21st floor and I stopped that EDB I wrote and said to them I've got an
03:13:03 EDB I wrote and said to them I've got an FSG can you take it and he told me no they've been tasked to go to the roof yeah
03:13:10 yeah and he asked me where the lift was and that's where the discussion comes in about not using the lid but I wasn't able to use them so I to go back to using standard Eurasian because that's
03:13:21 using standard Eurasian because that's all by having the line at the time right on the question of the the using the crew to go to the lip the roof did you try to speak to my dad about the wisdom
03:13:32 try to speak to my dad about the wisdom of that trip I didn't because at that time I didn't know who had all sat and in pain
03:13:40 in pain we've got to realize it was a big incident there was a lot going on a lot of things I would have known or there John
03:13:46 John so to intervene there are a lot of life because we kind of sector eyes and so to intervene in a decision that's been made wouldn't be my place as a staging
03:13:57 wouldn't be my place as a staging officer before the bridge had moved to the ground floor or rather I'm sorry before you move to the ground floor do you remember what availability there
03:14:10 do you remember what availability there was for EDB a so on the second floor it was limited if at all on the ground floor it was quite well results right
03:14:21 floor it was quite well results right okay that's my recollection do you remember roughly when the EDB a where has turned up in numbers definitely on the ground floor but timewise I'm not sure obviously in close
03:14:33 timewise I'm not sure obviously in close contact as I said with a holding area and we did keep having a discussion we need to eat leave you as opposed to s DBA so I would suggest as it arrived we was transferring to in DB I wasn't right
03:14:47 was transferring to in DB I wasn't right once we at the apply the village and once you have the availability was there a system for deciding who should be sorry
03:14:54 sorry system for deciding which IDI v8 where a wearer should be deployed as opposed to which s DBA whereas linked to a particular we'll take if my memory serves me as
03:15:08 we'll take if my memory serves me as there was a lot of EDB at this point as always getting FS cheese almost going straight to them as opposed to the SD be a right okay but it's a it's a when you use the word potluck mr. who got the slip this
03:15:20 potluck mr. who got the slip this morning does that refer to decisions as to whether you send Edie Bao SD be a know everybody in more line at that point was SD bi but when I say potluck I do remember to two floors 23rd floor and
03:15:35 do remember to two floors 23rd floor and 21st floor and I tried to give the FSG to the EDB a crew who couldn't take it because I was tossing it's weird and I remember having a conversation with the
03:15:46 remember having a conversation with the pair that was going into the 21st floor and there they kind of said are we going to get up to 21st floor and I just I remember distinctly saying something you can only do it you can do because that's
03:15:59 can only do it you can do because that's all we've got at the moment yeah so you task to an SD be a crew to go to the 21st floor yes I think even though they only had SD be a because that's all
03:16:11 they only had SD be a because that's all we had ups as long we heard at the time okay
03:16:13 okay thank you yes thank you very much mr. Watson thank you very much for coming to give evidence I've got no further questions for you and I'm extremely grateful to you for coming to the inquiry today and assisting us thank you
03:16:25 inquiry today and assisting us thank you could I just add in one last thing you said okay yes I do okay so that's cool I would just like to say so a man and a woman in the fire brigade it was in that Lobby we was all
03:16:36 brigade it was in that Lobby we was all there for one sole reason to save as many voices as we could and we all know that building have been burning for many hours still loses its tensile strength
03:16:47 hours still loses its tensile strength at 650 degrees and we all know that that building could come down but we stayed there
03:16:54 there I certainly stayed there till that FSG ceased and I would suggest to availa Mormon stood in that Lobby it must have been on everybody's mind and I just want to say we were safe once
03:17:07 and I just want to say we were safe once all reason so rescue as many people as we could well thank you very much indeed and as mr. millet said we we're really very grateful to you for coming to give your evidence there's a lot of evidence
03:17:18 your evidence there's a lot of evidence surrounding the handling of the FST calls and as you can tell from the documents you've been asked to comment on it's not always easy to piece it together
03:17:26 together so we're particularly grateful to you for coming along to tell us you're part of it
03:17:30 of it Thanks so thank you very much indeed thank you thank you right you like to go to the ocean
03:17:44 well I missed a minute that's a convenient point to break that it's the V point break yes and that's right and we have from station manager Gareth cook this afternoon and looking at my notes
03:17:57 this afternoon and looking at my notes I'm confident that we should be finished before the end of the afternoon even though it may be quite a long afternoon right so should I say - it's not it took me two o'clock yes thank you in that case we'll break now and resume
03:18:08 in that case we'll break now and resume at 2:00 o'clock please thank you
03:18:19 you