Further evidence from London Fire Brigade Watch Manager regarding operations on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire. Testimony covers training deficiencies, recognition of cladding fire, and management of fire survival guidance calls.
00:06:16 well I'm sorry of that's rather extended interlude for reasons which I split we're all too apparent in the room but we are now ready to start again so you're going to
00:06:27 ready to start again so you're going to call yes I'm going to call watch manager Louisa - Silvo now thank you yes
00:06:53 [Music]
00:07:07 thank you very much you'd like to sit down give her evidence I'm thinking so make yourself comfortable there's a dance and some water if you'd like it thank you thank you mr. chairman mr.
00:07:20 thank you thank you mr. chairman mr. Silva could you please start by giving us your full name yes Louisa Jane dissolve it right first of all can I say thank you very much for coming along today and helping us with our investigations we really do appreciate
00:07:32 investigations we really do appreciate it
00:07:33 it my questions are supposed to be short and simple they're not always like that if you don't understand one or two old any however many you want me to our I'm happy to repeat them or ask the question
00:07:44 happy to repeat them or ask the question in a different way if you need to break at any time just let us know and we can break okay thank you okay and can I please start by asking you to look at your two statements you've done for the
00:07:56 your two statements you've done for the police the first is a meaty triple zero one zero nine one three dated the 7th of February 2018 and the second statement
00:08:08 February 2018 and the second statement is dated the 20th of April 2018 and the reference to that is M et triple zero one three two three three those two
00:08:19 one three two three three those two statements now there have you read them recently yes can you confirm for us of the contents of truth yes okay now I just want to pick up something that you
00:08:31 just want to pick up something that you say in your supplemental statement yes well we've got it which is 1 3 2 3 3 where you and say in the second last paragraph you say it seems that Allen
00:08:46 paragraph you say it seems that Allen Taylor was not at the fire on that night I described the SM as short and bald and Jason told me that he thought that the essay I thought was Taylor is in fact Andy Walton and it can you confirm that
00:08:58 Andy Walton and it can you confirm that yes apologies for that that was my confusion I just associated the wrong name
00:09:02 name right okay have you discussed your statement or your evidence that you're going to give with anybody before coming here today No okay now you also have a contemporaneous note which is referenced
00:09:16 contemporaneous note which is referenced at M et quadruple zero five six three four can you just be shown that is that it
00:09:24 it yeah and it's data the 16th of June as we can see from the very top just next to a signature is that your signature at the top yeah that is my signature
00:09:36 the top yeah that is my signature unfortunately on their day I got the date wrong oh I see okay so it's in fusion it was made on the day of the incident okay right right now we've also got eleven exhibits to your statement
00:09:49 got eleven exhibits to your statement we're going to look at well most if not all of them and I'm just gonna read the numbers into the into the record very quickly they are all M et triple zero and they are one five eight one three
00:10:00 and they are one five eight one three one five eight two four one five eight one nine one five eight one four one five eight one five one five eight one six one five eight two zero one five
00:10:13 six one five eight two zero one five eight one seven one five eight two one one five eight one eight and one five eight two three now can I now start with your career and
00:10:25 can I now start with your career and training of the lfb I think you tell us in your statement on page one that you joined the lfb in 2010 right and you're now a watch manager yes at Chelsea fire
00:10:39 now a watch manager yes at Chelsea fire station yeah that's right and he became a watch manager in 2015 is that right yeah so only after five years with the service yeah right and you say on page one that on the night of the
00:10:52 on page one that on the night of the fire it was only your second tour of duty at Chelsea is that right yes so when exactly did you join Chelsea and I believe adjoining Chelsea on the
00:11:03 and I believe adjoining Chelsea on the 3rd of June 3rd of June yes right okay now if you turn to page 2 of your statement you say in in various places
00:11:14 statement you say in in various places that you've had training on bridgehead procedures who say that in a second line of the first paragraph the first line of the as a plays third paragraph of the third of the way down and again in the
00:11:26 third of the way down and again in the middle of the page just lumping all those together could you just explain for us what training for bridgehead procedures you're referring to yes I'm referring to through firefights that
00:11:38 referring to through firefights that crew manager and wasn't watch manager I have both received and delivered training on bridgehead procedures and that would be in the format of lectures station based lectures as well as
00:11:51 station based lectures as well as incident command of courses that we go on as officers and so that would be when I was promoted to crew manager and to watch manager right and then throughout the year with exercises in the station
00:12:03 the year with exercises in the station based lectures okay and when was the last time you had bridgehead training before the night of the fire I think I had high-rise training via lecture that I delivered twice the previous year
00:12:16 I delivered twice the previous year probably once earlier on in 2017 as well right the bridgehead training that you're referring to is that as a standard part of high-rise training or is it specific to bridgehead management
00:12:28 is it specific to bridgehead management no the British have procedures are incorporated into the high-rise policy right the procedure note that we will go through as part of a lecture okay can you just very briefly summarize the key points of bridgehead procedure that new
00:12:40 points of bridgehead procedure that new receivers will give as part of the high-rise training sure say we would go through what equipment needs to go to the bridgehead right and then the firefighters were set into the dry
00:12:52 the firefighters were set into the dry riser where the backup room is set into the dryer Iser and their procedures around the communications between the bridgehead commander in the incident commander and letting the incident
00:13:04 commander and letting the incident commander know when you're committing crews into a high-rise situation from a bridgehead right all those last two features that you just referred to
00:13:16 features that you just referred to communications between the bridgehead commander and the incident commander and and letting as you just said the incident commander know about committing crews into a high-rise from the bridge
00:13:27 crews into a high-rise from the bridge those communications what's the what's the standard system or method of communication that you are when you get trained on so you'd be using your handheld personal radio right and that
00:13:40 handheld personal radio right and that is to inform the incident commander when you're going to commit crease and that they want you to do that so with the norm be as per the training that when you're about to commit a crew you would use your handheld radio to communicate
00:13:52 use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander yep to confirm that you're about to commit the career okay over which channel which you normally do that channel 1 which is the instant fire ground right okay and would
00:14:03 instant fire ground right okay and would you use that channel again as part of the norm part of the trained norm if I can use an expression would you look would you use that channel to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander yes
00:14:14 bridgehead and incident commander yes okay and with that normally involve also communicating back to the incident
00:14:25 communicating back to the incident commander the results of any deployment of BA wearers into the tap into a high-rise yes so yeah the training would be around the communications yet between bridge check commander and instance model on channel 2 right would you
00:14:37 model on channel 2 right would you normally expect the incident commander to be a link in the communication chain between the bridgehead and the control room about the results of a deployment
00:14:48 room about the results of a deployment yes yeah in theory and yeah information would flow along those lines yep right is that because normally in a normal case
00:14:58 case on which you would get trained the incident command pump is the focal point of the fire ground communication yes I see right in your in your training did
00:15:10 see right in your in your training did you ever have any training on fire survival guidance calls and procedures yes so again there is a policy and procedure note that will be given as
00:15:22 procedure note that will be given as part of a lecture theory base station based for training I also took part in a burrow exercise with Ealing borough in 2016 that was centered around high-rise procedures and
00:15:34 centered around high-rise procedures and fire survival guidance right just healing Burrow right which station was that run out of Germany so I was a watch manager acting Fire Station right which
00:15:46 manager acting Fire Station right which is a part of the borough of ealing that day and that exercise took place that acting fires it back to me okay can you do you remember anything specific about
00:15:57 do you remember anything specific about that that training day I remember the format of the day and that the theme was high-rise procedures and fire survival guidance right and every borough had
00:16:10 guidance right and every borough had their own exercise okay similar lines did you learn anything from that train training day about methods of communication or fire survival guidance
00:16:22 communication or fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground yes so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room the bridgehead commander in another room where the net
00:16:35 commander in another room where the net control officer and then the VA crews would go up to another room and then they would be given information to feedback so it was very much centered around the communication work of handling that job information from guys
00:16:46 handling that job information from guys file guidance calls between the three separate areas and on that training day was anything was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident
00:16:58 its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again and we used the forward information board right and so it was there to use that piece of equipment in practice so I remember using that yeah
00:17:09 practice so I remember using that yeah okay and in terms of the standard approach from on that training day can you just give us the essential methods of communicating sorry recording fast survival guidance information as it as
00:17:20 survival guidance information as it as it moves the reporting yes yep so we were informed at the bridgehead of the information and that had to go on the forward information board as well as the
00:17:31 forward information board as well as the edge control board that was being run by an edge control of staff project and so it was centered around briefing those crews and the flow of information between us okay and in terms of the
00:17:42 between us okay and in terms of the source of the information that you on that training day recorded on the FIB yeah what form did that information come to you in on that day it came over there hand on radio channel one what were you
00:17:54 hand on radio channel one what were you trained did that training exercise look at or train you in the use of control information forms I believe that was
00:18:05 information forms I believe that was used yes the control information sheet was used at what point in the communication chain on that in that training exercise and so what if can't the information would have come to the bridgeheads with that controller information sheet
00:18:17 information sheet I can't report if it was it was probably a mix of radio traffic and the control information sheets right you say mix is it one or the other or one and the other
00:18:28 it one or the other or one and the other probably one and the other I don't recall it was a couple years ago okay all right and and and again just focusing on this Ealing borough Acton station based training date was there a command unit involvement no no the
00:18:41 command unit involvement no no the instant commander for the sake of their exercise within a separate room what and but there was no command unit on that exit okay and who would be a recording again within that training course who
00:18:53 again within that training course who would be recording the far survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room so I believe it was going to the incident commander he was there relaying
00:19:04 incident commander he was there relaying it to us at the bridgehead right and with the incident commander be using the controller yes okay right and did you get in did you get training on operations within the control room no okay
00:19:17 the control room no okay are you familiar with policy or policy no two 790 far survival guidance calls yes okay and the are you familiar with the form of control information form
00:19:28 the form of control information form yeah so okay well let's just make sure we're talking about the same thing if you could just quickly be shown policy 798 tab 5 of the policy bundle this is on page 8 internally and its appendix 2
00:19:43 on page 8 internally and its appendix 2 is that that's what you refer to yes fine
00:19:47 fine we've been looking at worked examples of those this morning and we'll come back to them in due course if we need to and
00:20:01 during your career at London Fire Brigade did you get to hear of a fire at Lac an old house which happened in 2009 yes okay did you ever get any training
00:20:12 yes okay did you ever get any training on the lessons learnt from the fire at Latin or house and so I received the case study training in 2014 when I was the crew manager at Kentish Town and I recall
00:20:25 manager at Kentish Town and I recall receiving the case study right and can you remember what you took away from that training and particular I remember
00:20:39 that training and particular I remember that and somebody had to write the information / bank's information on the wall because I remember thinking about that at a time as being at the ground floor instead I also remember that they
00:20:51 floor instead I also remember that they had to move the bridgehead down because again that was something we had to do on the day but that was all that I remembered around that case study at the time yes ok all right
00:21:05 have you had you heard as as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherd's court in Shepherds Bush which happened in August 2016
00:21:15 2016 no had as at June 2017 have you had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a
00:21:29 fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building no okay did you know or have you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up up clad buildings buildings which have an
00:21:40 clad buildings buildings which have an envelope around them no okay can we then turn to the night of the fire on page three of your statement you will say that on the night of the fire
00:21:53 will say that on the night of the fire you started yours at the top of the page you've started your shift from night shift of 20 hundred hours and then a few lines further down you say when the call came in for grenfell tower we had just
00:22:05 came in for grenfell tower we had just finish up just finished up at the smell of burning at Queen's Gate Gardens and we were mobilized to Grenville tower at 1:30 and arrived 139 I was on the pump ladder was that G 341 yes okay now you
00:22:19 ladder was that G 341 yes okay now you say you were mobilized at 1:30 and arrived at 139 you I think as you say
00:22:31 arrived at 139 you I think as you say with firefighters Ferguson petit and Butler yes there's a fire rescue at far enough are you fire and rescue unit F are you at Chelsea as well as in there
00:22:42 are you at Chelsea as well as in there yes okay and that's is that G three four six and does that hold EDB a yeah how many cylinders does it normally hold and so they have a set each and a spare if they're writing for
00:22:54 each and a spare if they're writing for so carries five carries five right and was that also mobilized with you the same time and so the pump loader was out on a separate incident right and so the
00:23:05 on a separate incident right and so the pump leg was out on the station ground the FO you was status one at the station okay okay um if you look let's just get the time for
00:23:16 if you look let's just get the time for that right if you look at the short incident log which is tab 23 of the documents bundle of page nine
00:23:28 you'll see that the
00:23:38 yes the arrival time of G 346 which i
00:23:50 yes the arrival time of G 346 which i think is the fr year as you said was 147 33 that sound about right to you if that's what the log says I assume it's correct but I can't comment for the
00:24:01 correct but I can't comment for the employ you as a for us Julie do you remember when you arrived that it was there before you or I didn't see them on my arrival I don't okay now on page three of your statement further
00:24:13 on page three of your statement further down in what looks like the second paragraph it's about two-thirds of the but one-third of the way down you're describing what happens immediately
00:24:25 describing what happens immediately after mobilization and you say our initial information was limited I was told on my pager to go to Greenville tower but I didn't have the full address
00:24:34 at that stage there was nothing on the mobile data terminal MDT which is a screen at the front of the appliance just help me with mobilization while you're while you're out of the station
00:24:46 you're while you're out of the station would that normally be done on the watch managers pager and so the incident will come through one watch my own tooth pager but it was that comes up on the MDT screen right that you can then acknowledge that you've received
00:24:57 acknowledge that you've received awareness that the incident and and did you do that did you acknowledge no so the issue I had was that there was no information on the MDT screen but the pager didn't let me to an incident I see okay right and
00:25:17 me to an incident I see okay right and when you get on to say at that stage there was nothing on the mobile data terminal on the way to date on the mobile data terminal MDT which is a screen at the front of the appliance do you mean that that there was nothing
00:25:28 you mean that that there was nothing showing at all or there was simply no useful information no there's nothing showing at all blunt widescreen right is that normal no so normally the incident the address
00:25:40 so normally the incident the address who's who's attending who's attending with you all that information comes up on the MDT screen on roof so that was unusual that it was on the pager but not
00:25:51 unusual that it was on the pager but not on the MDT right was it working when you left Chelsea left the station yes because we'd had several shouts before the grandparents right but what what station did you notice it had stopped
00:26:02 station did you notice it had stopped working only at that stage so like to say the pager alert status of the incident and the fact that there was nothing on the MDT screen prompted me to
00:26:13 nothing on the MDT screen prompted me to contact control to ask them if they could send the incident to the MDT is we hadn't received it right so there's no continue as I say I am it became apparent that obviously they had
00:26:24 became apparent that obviously they had a lot going on and there was a lot of other radio traffic and we did eventually get the information that we needed right okay you in the same paragraph of the statement you say I
00:26:36 paragraph of the statement you say I contacted control on the main radio for more information and proceeded to the incident yeah say the main radio was that the main scheme yes okay so say the
00:26:47 that the main scheme yes okay so say the radio in the can yes right okay and you say you obtained well you say you proceeded to the incident did they give you information about the incident and
00:26:59 you information about the incident and so they confirmed that the pager incident was correct and obviously Micra where he was is this incident for us on the pager so that was confirmed to be so we're good and so we proceeded to that
00:27:12 we're good and so we proceeded to that address and then later on the information to come up on the MDT a later on the information came up on the MTT while he was still on route yes okay when it came up what money was
00:27:23 okay when it came up what money was still on route did that MDT give you any further information over and above what you've been told by control and just that it was a high-rise premises right so on the pager you just get the address
00:27:36 so on the pager you just get the address I'm not familiar with Graham fellows know what kind of premises that would be what but when you get it to the MDT not only do you get a location on the map which is very helpful and but you also
00:27:47 which is very helpful and but you also get told that it is a high-rise incident right with the MDT tell you what the makeup was at that stage it would have told me who was in attendance and who
00:27:59 told me who was in attendance and who had been mobilized with me as part of an attendance right so you could work it you could work out whether at that stage it was a 20 or a 25 pound fire yes did you and so I believe we want to make
00:28:11 you and so I believe we want to make pumps 10 right and also one roof we also have further makeups okay and we did you get that information about the the
00:28:22 get that information about the the further makeups once the MDG had started working yes I believe that okay now you say in the next paragraph of your statement that there was quite a lot of radio traffic mainly from other crews
00:28:34 radio traffic mainly from other crews asking for more detailed information about the call also and then you say two lines down from that on the radio heard that the incident was being made up quickly the more and more appliances were being requested what was do you
00:28:47 were being requested what was do you remember what the pump status was when you arrived or just shortly before you arrived and so I think I heard make comes twenty fairly close to our arrival right and then you say I heard that fast
00:29:00 right and then you say I heard that fast survival guidance calls were in progress how did you hear that and so I heard Gulf 261 take some FSG information right from the control
00:29:11 information right from the control Hurricane staff did any FSG information come to you NAT G three four one can I
00:29:23 show you one or two examples of fire survival guidance being broadcast at that stage
00:29:42 did you mean is asked you did you hear specifically about a call a caller on the 18th floor reporting thick smoke in her flat I can't remember the nature of
00:29:54 her flat I can't remember the nature of the details of that message that was passed from control to Gulf 261 I just remember that it was an FSG call in progress okay how many calls to g26 one
00:30:06 progress okay how many calls to g26 one do you think you remember while enroute and I only heard or intercepted hearing one one okay do you remember one at we've got time to 13640 for saying lots
00:30:20 we've got time to 13640 for saying lots of five wolf our survival guide guidance calls and people asking lots of questions and I can't remember the detail okay
00:30:29 did you understand why control was sending FSG information to g26 one yeah so if say the control room staff will
00:30:42 so if say the control room staff will try and contact the ICP which in this case was gulf to seven months yes if they are unable to call them up if they're not getting any response they will pass that information to a
00:30:53 will pass that information to a appliance that is enroute to then give to that instant command pump on arrival yes and so that's what was going on that okay
00:31:04 and GT from your toilet actin you would recognize and they doubt the callsign g26 one yes it's an act own iam pump letter yeah and the officer in charge was in fact from Chelsea read watch who
00:31:16 was in fact from Chelsea read watch who was standing by accent so yes was interested and from that would you have
00:31:31 interested and from that would you have worked out that g27 one being the incident command pump at that stage was was otherwise occupied yes which is is normal at that stage of an incident and
00:31:43 normal at that stage of an incident and that they the driver go of to seven moment be trying to undertake many tasks simultaneously one of which is time and the radio but equally he's got many
00:31:54 the radio but equally he's got many things to do and that's understandable that that information might need to be passed to a different appliance on route yes did you know that by 1:41 also just
00:32:05 yes did you know that by 1:41 also just a minute or two after you arrived some twenty four fire Survival Guide most calls had been received by control at least twenty four calls whether there's
00:32:17 least twenty four calls whether there's precisely FSG calls or not as another matter have been received by control control even okay now ask you some questions now about your arrival on page
00:32:28 questions now about your arrival on page four of your statement you say just at the top of the page four lines down we
00:32:39 the top of the page four lines down we parked basically at the back of the queue of appliances approximately fifty meters from the tower
00:32:45 do you remember whereabouts in relation to the tower you did park and so I'd like to say there was already a few appliances in attendance so we parked
00:32:56 appliances in attendance so we parked behind those so as to still leave access for any other appliances going through or ambulances for sample I think 50 meters from the tower is probably an underestimation now with
00:33:07 is probably an underestimation now with hindsight and but it was definitely we parked on Grenfell Road and before the junction of Bowmore okay so I passed by mole on my way to the tower right and
00:33:22 mole on my way to the tower right and you say that there was a command unit near to the tower this is just a bit a little bit below about fifth line down about halfway between where we parked
00:33:34 about halfway between where we parked and the tower do you remember which number the command unit was and so that's Charlie in for me at the point you arrived what was the radio traffic
00:33:47 you arrived what was the radio traffic about FSG do you remember and no so the last information I heard of FST information was the Gulf 261 message they received bro time shortly after
00:33:59 they received bro time shortly after that we arrived and I made my way to the come on unit okay can I just get back then to this Acton 261 messaging can I ask you to be shown please the Orr the
00:34:12 ask you to be shown please the Orr the Occupational sorry operational response report at page 61 will start at page 60 which is at o 135 54
00:34:30 and
00:34:34 that says golf 261 Acton's pumped ladder interrupts the CRA attempting to pass radio message to golf 271 north Kensington's pump now they're saying that they will take the priority message
00:34:45 that they will take the priority message on behalf of gold 271 North Karis ponded and then you see and say the CRA passed his FSG call information to go to six Vaughn actions pump divers saying they
00:34:56 Vaughn actions pump divers saying they have a corner on the 18th floor with six making their flat individuals on the 22nd floor with smoke in their flat and the further call to fire on the 20th floor
00:35:03 floor in fact 82 people are also trapped do you remember that trigger a recollection of the detail you would have heard over your main ski radio I don't recall that
00:35:14 your main ski radio I don't recall that being the detail and but I recall hearing it come through and then informing the crew on my appliance of that information right bourbonnais just that they're aware of it if you turn the
00:35:25 that they're aware of it if you turn the page 261 can I just ask you to look at the last paragraph of this section just first my paragraph on the top of that page during the phone conversation it
00:35:37 page during the phone conversation it says that om Norman had an o1 3524 with cu8 the CRO can be heard sending the information to golf two to six months actions pump ladder above now that looks
00:35:48 actions pump ladder above now that looks like a phone conversation or not a radio communication do you know anything about golf two six ones receiving information other than by radio no they would have
00:35:59 other than by radio no they would have only received it by the main scheme radio we're on clients okay
00:36:09 now
00:36:15 going back to your statement on page four you say six lines down from the top of the page I took our nominal roll
00:36:27 of the page I took our nominal roll board and RVE to them the NRB is carried by each appliance and details of who we are and how many crew we have at who that crew are Canada's ask what is an
00:36:38 that crew are Canada's ask what is an NRV is it a board or a piece of paper or it's a metal board right that you can then write on with you trying to grow and it will detail the officer-in-charge and the names of the crew right there riding on that clients and where they're
00:36:50 riding on that clients and where they're from right do you remember which command unit number this was I took my normal rewards the Charter uniform eight it was eight right and do you remember who you spoke you spoke to there when you handed your
00:37:02 you spoke to there when you handed your NR B's in yeah I supposed to watch manager Daniel Merrick Daniel work okay and did he tell you anything about what was happening at that stage about about
00:37:15 was happening at that stage about about fast survival guidance cause I believe he told me that there was FST calls in progress which i said i was i'd heard on route and was aware of okay
00:37:27 route and was aware of okay did you discuss with him how FSG information was coming to the bridgehead no i didn't stop at the command unit for too long no okay dude did you have a
00:37:38 too long no okay dude did you have a discussion with him about how FSG information was coming to the command unit yeah okay did did did he tell you anything else and no obviously at the
00:37:50 anything else and no obviously at the time my priority is to get to the incident commander the fire ground to see where i'm best needed at the time so it was there matter of dropping off my nominal role board so i could then go
00:38:01 nominal role board so i could then go and make myself okay did you know at that stage who the incident commander was i was on the assumption it was still mike Dowden but and but I can't be sure okay
00:38:12 and but I can't be sure okay did you seek to ask who the incident commander was at that stage no okay did you just assumed it was my dad interview I assumed it was and after my
00:38:23 interview I assumed it was and after my intention was to just go and find the incident commander okay whoever that may be right okay now you then say that you walked towards the tower to locate the I oh I see when you got there did you did
00:38:36 oh I see when you got there did you did you find the oh I see no right as a result of not finding the oh I see what did you what did you do and so in my attempt to find the officer in charge I
00:38:48 attempt to find the officer in charge I went to an officer who was wearing at a bar it's similar colors you actually turned out to be a team leader from the command unit right so they also where
00:38:59 command unit right so they also where Attabad
00:38:59 Attabad yes and is that a white Tabard and it's the Kalu - yellow numerous yellow challenges face illumise yellow okay listen but some of its white some of the sliminess yellow the signs of whites
00:39:11 sliminess yellow the signs of whites part of it is the numerous yellow the command Rena do have slightly different tugs
00:39:14 tugs but this was my first officer that I encountered and this was the best conversation I had with someone on the fire ground okay do you remember who that team leader was no I don't know his
00:39:25 that team leader was no I don't know his name
00:39:25 name do you remember whether it was did you remember which command unit he was from no okay how did you know he was from a command unit um we had a conversation and I was saying he wasn't the officer
00:39:37 and I was saying he wasn't the officer in charge but he obviously was from a command unit because they're tough odds his team leader right and and then we had a conversation around what was required okay
00:39:48 required okay what rank do you think he was watch manager he wasn't watching okay
00:39:56 did he have a radio in his hand he was using I don't know if it was in his hands and it's an assumption more than anything that he would have had a handheld radio yet right did you know do
00:40:08 handheld radio yet right did you know do you know this officer no okay never see if I can get this kid to it this way do you know or have you heard of a watch manager called Kent field
00:40:19 of a watch manager called Kent field only since the inquiry has been unfolding okay all right now you then say well let me just ask you as a result of that conversation with this watch
00:40:32 of that conversation with this watch manager what did you do next and so I asked him what what was needed Emily he told me they needed crews with VA sets
00:40:43 told me they needed crews with VA sets and control boards hose and branches and asked me if I could get that sorted and go to the bridgehead okay did he tell you who was operating the bridgehead at that time no I asked what floor the fire
00:40:55 that time no I asked what floor the fire was on and where the bridgehead was located it was quite a short conversation the essential basis of it was that they needed crews and equipment to the bridgehead right now you say in
00:41:09 to the bridgehead right now you say in your statement it's just in the next sentence that we've been looking at in the paragraph we've been looking at as I looked a significant amount of one side
00:41:22 looked a significant amount of one side was alight with thick black smoke rising from it a lot was running through my mind I knew that there would be people trapped in their flats and knew that I needed to get water supplies going and equipment to the bridgehead did you at
00:41:36 equipment to the bridgehead did you at that stage recognize this as a cladding fire no okay what did you think was alight and I didn't have many thoughts
00:41:50 alight and I didn't have many thoughts as to what was the like I was shocked that so much of the East Side was alight that something external was alike and but I couldn't I'd never seen anything like it before
00:42:01 like it before I couldn't associate it to anything in my minds that would be a light will cause that kind of external fire did you have any thoughts at the time about where the compartment ation had failed
00:42:16 no I had thoughts around that an external fire like that may well have spread to inside and to the flats obviously immediately on that East Side
00:42:27 obviously immediately on that East Side but I didn't have any thoughts as to that there would be any failed compartment ation
00:42:37 did you have any thoughts at the time about whether some kind of evacuation should be carried out obvious I think seeing an incident like that and your
00:42:50 seeing an incident like that and your initial thoughts are that people are going to need to leave the building that rescues are going to be required and also knowing that there was five survival guidance in operation already in progress yes I knew that there were
00:43:02 in progress yes I knew that there were people that were trapped right when you got to the entrance of the tower could you see people coming out I don't recall seeing any residents leaving that's not
00:43:14 seeing any residents leaving that's not to say it wasn't have noticed at before okay
00:43:20 and when you say in your statement as I've just shown it to you I knew there would be people trapped in their flats why did you think that and because I'd
00:43:31 why did you think that and because I'd literally heard the bio survival guidance information come over the radio and I'd been informed by watch manage America there was bio survival guidance calls in progress listen it's from that
00:43:42 calls in progress listen it's from that yeah did you think at the time that this fire could be fought and it was a very large external fire I didn't have enough
00:43:56 large external fire I didn't have enough information as to what the spread inside was or the extent of it or their or how quickly it would spread and so I didn't have any thoughts around whether we
00:44:07 have any thoughts around whether we could fight that fire I just know what what we would do what we would try to do
00:44:13 did you see or could you see any evidence of the fire penetrating into flats from the exterior I couldn't
00:44:26 flats from the exterior I couldn't really see in any great detail whether they had whoever had penetrated in there were certainly window size and gaps so the assumption was that it had run yes
00:44:37 the assumption was that it had run yes you say it's the assumption is that your your assumption yes okay you then say that
00:44:51 you and this is half way down the page for that you saw an officer in the front
00:45:02 for that you saw an officer in the front of the block and he said he needed crews with hoses branches and entry control board and ba sets to go to the bridgehead and asked me to organize them do you remember who the officer was no
00:45:16 do you remember who the officer was no was he wearing at a bird of some kind yeah so this is the officer we just discussed it was wearing he was the team leader Rose level command unit wearing that's how about you say team leader
00:45:32 that's how about you say team leader did it say team leader on it I believe today or is it monitoring officer no it wasn't one or two not not more dramatic can i and forgive the what looks like potluck but can I just try and
00:45:43 potluck but can I just try and photograph on you and see if we can see how far we get can I ask you to be shown inq 2:30
00:45:56 which is a photograph now this is a photograph of the lobby from the ground floor taken at 1:30 649 subject to
00:46:09 floor taken at 1:30 649 subject to adjustment at 36 seconds do you recognize the watch manager with the white numbers on the left of the pair of
00:46:20 white numbers on the left of the pair of watch managers in the foreground of that picture I don't recognize them I couldn't give you a name was that the Tabard or type of tavern that you saw on
00:46:32 Tabard or type of tavern that you saw on the officer who gave you the instructions yeah right that's a written white checkered Tabard yes it signifies it was someone from the command genus unfortunately we can't see
00:46:43 command genus unfortunately we can't see what he's got on his back but we make someone else may be able to to do that now was it your understanding that the
00:46:54 now was it your understanding that the bridgehead had already been established yes yes and did you know where um yes so before I entered the building I asked that officer where the fire was and
00:47:05 that officer where the fire was and where the bridgehead have been established okay he told you to me yes he said the fire was on the fourth floor and the bridgehead have been established on the second right was that not information that you'd already got over the MDT enroute no so
00:47:18 already got over the MDT enroute no so you wouldn't receive that kind of information on the MDT right okay and did he give did this officer give you any information about what the plan of action was no right did
00:47:30 what the plan of action was no right did you understand at that point whether the task was one of firefighting or search and rescue or both I was aware that all those tasks were gonna meet going to be needed to be actioned but it's not part
00:47:42 needed to be actioned but it's not part of the discussion we had we had a very quick discussion and then you say a little bit lower down page four that's two-thirds of the way
00:47:54 page four that's two-thirds of the way down I radiate my crew to meet me at the front of the building where were they at that stage and they were still near the appliance or also on their way down right and I had asked them to listen out
00:48:05 right and I had asked them to listen out for me on my radio and so that I could go and see what was required and then I could let them know what it is that we needed to be doing right they even say four lines down from that at this stage
00:48:18 four lines down from that at this stage while still outside the building I passed an e DB a crew he told me that they were eight people trapped on the roof and the EDB a crew who are equipped with lines were going to try to get to the roof to rescue them did you at that
00:48:33 the roof to rescue them did you at that stage we was still waiting for your crew to come with the equipment yes so were you going somewhere or were you standing still I was walking toward the entrance to the building right which is when I
00:48:44 to the building right which is when I came across this EDB a crew who were entering the building right and did you do you remember who you spoke to yes it was Phil weakly Phil would you ever Paddington Paddington yes and did
00:48:55 ever Paddington Paddington yes and did you have a discussion about his mission yes
00:48:58 yes we I know Phil we've worked together before we had a conversation around what it was that him and his crew were going to do and which was to go to the roof to
00:49:12 to do and which was to go to the roof to rescue eight people who were on the roof right that's my recollection of that that conversation that they're you know they were attempting to rescue eight people from the roof and that's why they were taking line equipment with them did
00:49:24 were taking line equipment with them did Phil weakly express an opinion to you at the time about the wisdom of that trip no we didn't get that did you so you didn't express their opinion to him the other way about the wind that trip it was very much a pastor in passing with
00:49:36 was very much a pastor in passing with kind of limitation as to what he was doing okay now at the bottom of the page three lines up you say once I had the equipment I needed I went into the building to find where the bridge had had been established so let me get this
00:49:50 had been established so let me get this right
00:49:50 right did you but when you went into the building did you know or did you not know where the we're the bridgehead was established I have been informed that the bridgehead was on the second floor on the second floor so when you say to find where the
00:50:01 floor so when you say to find where the Bridget have been established you're not looking for it you you knew yes but you had to go and find it yeah this stage I don't know the layout of the building or whereabouts from the second floor they might be so I think I just mean we're on
00:50:13 might be so I think I just mean we're on the second floor they were yes okay now how long do you think it is an estimate I'm asking for how long do you think
00:50:24 I'm asking for how long do you think after you'd arrived at the scene that you've got to the bridgehead within a minute was it a minute yeah okay sorry from getting to the scene or from entering the building getting to the
00:50:35 entering the building getting to the scene ten minutes to it's okay and to get from the ground floor to the bridgehead did you how did you do that
00:50:47 bridgehead did you how did you do that on Fitz following the stab at that time can you tell us how many more give us an impression of how many be aware as there
00:50:58 impression of how many be aware as there were on the it on the stairs under the lobby
00:51:03 lobby I don't recall an exact number that were VA crews standing by ready brought to be committed and where were they standing when you arrived from the second floor
00:51:18 when you arrived from the second floor stairwell backwards through the lobby that second floor balcony right okay and were they cueing down the stairs and I
00:51:29 were they cueing down the stairs and I can't recall how many crews there were standing by at that stage yeah sure do you remember whether there was a watch manager at that state and you arrived on
00:51:40 manager at that state and you arrived on the second floor on the balcony there who was
00:51:45 you were holding or operating a staging post for BA wearers not that I recall okay I was very focused at getting to the bridgehead shop now who was in
00:51:57 the bridgehead shop now who was in charge of the bridgehead when you arrived
00:51:58 arrived watch manager Brian Hickey okay Brian Hickey from was he being assisted by anybody not that I was aware of at that time now okay now on page five of your statement you say five lines down from
00:52:13 statement you say five lines down from the start
00:52:13 the start watch manager at Keith and station manager Taylor we're at the bridgehead with me along with two entry control officers firefighter a burn and firefighter decent all been of North
00:52:24 firefighter decent all been of North Kensington now I just want to ask you about the reference to station manager Taylor I showed you your second statement earlier which said that the
00:52:35 statement earlier which said that the reference to Taylor should be referenced to Walton do do you remember the station manager Walton being there on the bridgehead when you arrived I do remember him being there budget I felt
00:52:49 remember him being there budget I felt at the time that watch commander O'Keefe was in charge of Richard right okay and what was station manager Walton doing when you arrived do you remember I don't
00:53:00 when you arrived do you remember I don't - do
00:53:05 do you remember how long he stays out after you arrived no do you remember the arrival at the bridgehead of a watch manager called Watson exact school watch
00:53:19 manager called Watson exact school watch manager what's that no that's not to say didn't happen I just I don't have any memory watch manager Watson okay right do you have a clear
00:53:37 okay right do you have a clear recollection of station manager Walton being there yes okay you don't know how long he stayed there no I think I save it further on I had a discussion with station manager will 10
00:53:49 discussion with station manager will 10 about removing crews from that initial area that we were trying to work in yes so I remember that exchange with him cause of that okay I don't recall seeing him out actually do you know who the
00:54:02 him out actually do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and sought him the incident commander yes let me ask the question this way when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw
00:54:13 you arrived at the bridgehead and saw station manager Walton do you remember who the incident commander was when you saw station manager Walton at the bridgehead was he wearing an IC Tabard
00:54:24 bridgehead was he wearing an IC Tabard no now you say that on the bridgehead there was firefighter burn and firefighter decent all been what were
00:54:36 firefighter decent all been what were they doing they were in control offices they were acting as defense pcs were they right at that point do you remember as is when you arrived do you remember whether anybody that the bridgehead was
00:54:49 whether anybody that the bridgehead was receiving fire survival guidance call information from anyway and I don't know specifically and on my arrival to the bridgehead I was tasked with collating the FSG information I
00:55:01 with collating the FSG information I don't know who was doing that prior to me and what I was given a forward information board that had information already on it okay did you see any signs of the bridgehead of fast survival guide
00:55:14 of the bridgehead of fast survival guide information having been recorded somewhere just the information that was already on that forward information boy okay okay see somebody handed you a partly completed fib today yes
00:55:27 partly completed fib today yes who was that I don't recall no unfortunately I don't recall who briefed me and to callate the FSG information or hand me the board and I was very focused on getting to grips with what my role
00:55:40 on getting to grips with what my role was going to be and so I don't remember who that was right do you remember who had written on the fib thus far I didn't know who had read that one okay okay do
00:55:51 know who had read that one okay okay do you know how far survival guidance information had been coming to the bridgehead prior to your arrival no you don't know whether it would come by radio or by by pieces of paper
00:56:04 radio or by by pieces of paper I don't know prior to my arrival I don't know okay now on page five of your statement just below halfway down you say that you were asked by an officer
00:56:17 say that you were asked by an officer I'm not sure who to collate the FSG information just highlight that sentence
00:56:27 I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it do you know who that officer was no okay did you know whether it was someone who was already at the bridgehead or somebody from
00:56:38 at the bridgehead or somebody from outside no somebody at the bridgehead okay now
00:56:46 okay now Brian O'Keefe has given evidence to the inquiry already and he heard he said when he gave evidence this was 5th of July page 99 lines 1 2 8 just for our
00:56:58 July page 99 lines 1 2 8 just for our benefit and I give you the gist of it that you were briefed and then accompanied to the bridgehead by watch manager Watson can you can you comment
00:57:11 manager Watson can you can you comment on that you think he's right about it and I don't have any memory to that well again not to say that that wasn't the case but that's not a memory that I have okay
00:57:25 were you given any specific instructions as to how to go about collating the FSG information no okay so in order to carry
00:57:38 information no okay so in order to carry out the task that you were given what were you drawing on the forward information board okay in terms of so how to do it guide what were you what were you relying on so previous
00:57:51 were you relying on so previous knowledge really I know that the foreign information board is used for that reason right and designed for that reason and the information that was already on there I just followed suit
00:58:02 already on there I just followed suit from there it was very much a list good and so I just followed suit with what was there already and you continued with that can you remember whether what was
00:58:13 that can you remember whether what was there already was was was detailed FSG that you would expect to see I don't recall what was there exactly um it
00:58:25 recall what was there exactly um it certainly wasn't the amount of detail that we get from a control information sheet and that can take a lot of detail onto that pieces onto that piece of paper so I'd say it wasn't that amount
00:58:38 paper so I'd say it wasn't that amount but it was more than say the floor and flat number and that less than the amount that you can get from a control information shoe and
00:58:50 was the amount of FSG on the FIB voluminous there are lots of those are a lot of the lots of numbers of flats and floors or no there is a few entries that
00:59:01 floors or no there is a few entries that a handful of entries just listed in China bro
00:59:05 China bro right were you able to form a mental picture comparing what you saw on the FIB with what you'd heard over the radio coming to the incident about whether or
00:59:16 coming to the incident about whether or not sufficient FSG information have made it to the bridgehead by that point I wasn't in a position to be aware of that at the time even though I had heard the
00:59:28 at the time even though I had heard the information on route I didn't write it down myself so I wasn't in a position to be able to sort of cross-reference if that was on there and even as soon as I
00:59:39 that was on there and even as soon as I was briefed and put in position to collate the FST information it all might you know immediately started to to come to me in various ways I didn't have too
00:59:50 to me in various ways I didn't have too much time to question too much about where it had come from I just had to continue with the task as best I could yes now just just taking that little bit further forward in your statement on
01:00:01 further forward in your statement on page 5 you say towards the bottom and this is six lines up from the bottom sorry eight lines up my space we could start when I was handed the board some information had already been written on
01:00:12 information had already been written on it maybe three or four flat numbers floors and numbers of people in each did you have just looking at that did you also have any information about the
01:00:23 also have any information about the conditions such as smoke or fire no no okay
01:00:28 okay you then say two lines down I was briefed to take the board and continue to callate the FSG information I used this board to create lists which already had information on now what was
01:00:41 already had information on now what was the purpose of the collation exercise and so obviously the information comes in from the caller to control and then it's essential that we have that information at the bridgehead right so
01:00:54 information at the bridgehead right so do you say to us sorry it was to just continue making sure the bridgehead had that information or
01:00:59 or information okay and it's the word collate I'm interested in do you really mean record yes yes and then at the stage you took it over and started
01:01:10 stage you took it over and started recording the FSG information how was that information then used to brief crews and so at that stage Watchmen Joe Keith was briefing and committing be a
01:01:21 Keith was briefing and committing be a cruise and he relays with me as to where we need its prioritize be a cruise to go to in my bar today's ever see holes that we had at that time okay now you do you
01:01:35 we had at that time okay now you do you remember once you'd started working at the bridgehead who the first crew you saw get briefed by Brian O'Keefe was to have a particular recollection okay now
01:01:50 have a particular recollection okay now on I just want to jump ahead in your statement to page 12 if I can just ask you something which is out of order in your statement but rather than here at the
01:02:07 at the foot of page 12 you say the state book policy is in place for certain residential high-rise buildings the
01:02:19 residential high-rise buildings the advice is to stay put inside their flats I don't know whether it was in place at Greenville tower and I don't know whether that advice was being given I just knew that FSG calls are being received and people were trapped in
01:02:30 received and people were trapped in their flats in my role I didn't need to know whether a stapler policy was in place or not can I just ask you why you say you didn't need to know whether a staple policy was in place or not sure
01:02:42 staple policy was in place or not sure what I mean is for my role of collecting that FSG information those people in those flats were trapped they were trapped by smoke fire or heat they didn't have an option to leave like that
01:02:55 didn't have an option to leave like that they didn't have an evacuation option at that stage they're telling us that they are trapped and in need of rescue right so I just mean that for them in fact an evacuation plan wasn't a consideration
01:03:08 evacuation plan wasn't a consideration they were trapped okay I see so say does that mean that to you at the time for anybody who was the subject of
01:03:19 time for anybody who was the subject of a what I called a genuine FSG call because they were trapped whether or not stay put was in place was irrelevant and know that it was irrelevant and that the
01:03:31 know that it was irrelevant and that the information those people are telling us is that they can't get down their escape route or their stairwell and that if their flat is not compromised but their escape route is then in theory and as
01:03:42 escape route is then in theory and as far as we're aware they should be safest in their flats so that's where we would regard them to be and they they're in need of rescue because they can't escape down that stairwell video is compromised
01:03:56 down that stairwell video is compromised yes I see now
01:04:04 would it have helped to know if state if stapled advice was still in place in other words haven't been revoked by control or or the incident commander or
01:04:15 control or or the incident commander or indeed anybody else would that not have helped you or organized or prioritize rescues I think by the time I arrived
01:04:26 rescues I think by the time I arrived yes and the amount of FSG calls that we had in progress like to say those people were trapped and at that stage we had no way of alarming residents to leave the
01:04:40 way of alarming residents to leave the building the stairwell was fully in operation of firefighters and firefighting rescues and that in fact having that one stairwell with the firefighting and for evacuation would
01:04:52 firefighting and for evacuation would have was probably there's going to be more dangerous and a higher risk at that stage of the incident and so the stay-put policy makes sense in that they should be safe in their first did you
01:05:05 should be safe in their first did you when you arrived and started the exercise of compose recording the FSG information running entry control and the fiv did you observe anything about how far up the stairwell was compromised
01:05:18 how far up the stairwell was compromised with smoke no not at that stage so we were waiting for it wasn't until firefighters started to return from there be a ways that we were getting more information as to how much
01:05:30 getting more information as to how much of the stairwell was compromised in terms of smoke logging or not these things Mike loved right right okay so this wasn't a discussion you had with Brian O'Keefe when you arrived then I'm
01:05:41 Brian O'Keefe when you arrived then I'm not on arrival but soon after we did discuss conditions and and where the VA crews were to go to whichever Street calls to prioritize that kind of thing right do you remember
01:05:53 that kind of thing right do you remember the first crew debrief that you experienced on a right after arrival no I don't recall um a debrief for the be a
01:06:05 I don't recall um a debrief for the be a crew because I was so only focused on the information coming in to me and get on that forward information board okay well we'll come back to that in due course mr. chairman the witness is been going for an hour
01:06:17 the witness is been going for an hour yes noticed we're not as a particularly natural place into break but maybe maybe good for the witness and for the for us generally to have a show you don't take a break down yeah we've lost quite a lot
01:06:29 a break down yeah we've lost quite a lot of time today and you're probably aware of that I'm sorry we kept you waiting you coming that's okay it comes of hearing them if we had a ten minute break now would you feel able to go on to stop now for ten minutes till four
01:06:48 to stop now for ten minutes till four o'clock I have to ask you to please not to talk about your evidence or anything relating to it well go out of the room and then we'll resume up on top and see how we get on after that
01:06:59 how we get on after that so what yes thank you thank you very much like to go to the auction
01:07:13 just for the benefit of everyone else in the room having lost quite a lot of time earlier on I minded to sit on until half past four or possibly a little later
01:07:24 past four or possibly a little later depending on the witness's ability to cope with giving evidence so I just mentioned that now for your information we resume at four o'clock please
01:07:45 you
01:18:20 [Music] all right mr. Sylver yeah now can I just mention mr. millet is very keen he'll go on as long as I listen that you may
01:18:31 on as long as I listen that you may start to get a feel a bit tired okay so if you reach that point let me know yes
01:18:42 if you reach that point let me know yes mr. survey thank you for coming back can I just ask you whether at the early stages of your involvement of the bridgehead whether you've heard or
01:18:53 bridgehead whether you've heard or overheard a debrief given to watch manager Eric Keith by some crews who've gone up into the tower before about 2:00
01:19:04 gone up into the tower before about 2:00 a.m. specifically can I just ask you did you hear a brief debrief or over here one from crew manager secret or firefighter video or firefighter Dorgan
01:19:16 firefighter video or firefighter Dorgan about a rescue on the 20th floor you don't similar question did you hear or over here a debrief given to watch manager Oh Keith by two firefighters
01:19:27 manager Oh Keith by two firefighters called Hipple or Stern about a trip to the 16th floor did you hear any or overhear any debriefs by any crews
01:19:39 overhear any debriefs by any crews coming down no so early stage yeah I was very focused on the role that I've been given and the information that was on that board and obviously it's very
01:19:52 that board and obviously it's very dynamic chaotic situation at those early stages of the bridgehead so I don't recall any debriefs that took place I was just very much focused on what what
01:20:03 was just very much focused on what what I was gonna have to do broad and how I was going to do that a bad early stage again just trying to cast your mind back did you see any firefighters coming down to the bridgehead with casualties no at
01:20:18 to the bridgehead with casualties no at that stage I didn't see any casualties did you see anybody any residence in fat self evacuating to ask the bridgehead at that stage okay can I then take you back
01:20:30 that stage okay can I then take you back to your statement on page six and ask you to look at the middle of the page you say and in fact it's in two places
01:20:42 you say and in fact it's in two places you say actually in the first main paragraph six lines down the sheer volume of FSG calls coming in this is
01:20:56 volume of FSG calls coming in this is just the first paragraph braider meant that I was receiving information by small pieces of paper two inches by three inches runners and also by radio with just the floors and flat numbers was that so as
01:21:13 floors and flat numbers was that so as soon as you started working at the ECB not not all three no I'd say on the second floor I was receiving information by radio right and certainly and at that
01:21:29 by radio right and certainly and at that stage I was receiving some control information sheets right and but the small pieces of paper and runners was more when the bridge headed moved on
01:21:41 more when the bridge headed moved on okay right so just focusing then trying to keep this chronological yeah at the stage when you're on the second floor before the move of the bridge head of the third floor you say radio yes was
01:21:57 the third floor you say radio yes was which radio was that my handheld radio so is that the means is that the fire ground radio yes my personal handheld radio and which channel was that on initially it would've been on channel
01:22:08 initially it would've been on channel watch of the world yes at some point I changed to channel three did anybody tell you to change the channel three and so I think this was possibly after we've moved up to the third floor when when
01:22:20 moved up to the third floor when when the bridge had have made that a runner had asked me to move to channel three so that I could speak to watch manager Sadler who was outside the tower right okay just
01:22:30 okay just channel just breath so that we could communicate on that channel okay now at the point you started were you in radio communication with watch managers Sadler not straight away now who were you in
01:22:41 not straight away now who were you in radio communication with at that initial point I'm not entirely sure who it was it could have been watch manager Sadler right and to me it was just radio
01:22:55 right and to me it was just radio traffic coming in to the bridgehead to whoever was collating the FST information so I would answer it receive the information and go from there but I'm not entirely sure who that would have been coming from okay do you
01:23:07 have been coming from okay do you remember whether any of that FSU information him directly from a command unit I don't know you don't know okay you say also that that early said you
01:23:19 you say also that that early said you were as you were receiving control information forms which color of piece of paper
01:23:28 of paper did you receive I guess I would say white or yellow okay now
01:23:39 white or yellow okay now [Music]
01:23:46 can I just see if
01:23:55 as I've been sleeping can I just see if you can tell us about when the bridge head moved from the second floor to the third floor we've had some evidence
01:24:06 third floor we've had some evidence particularly from station manager cook that it moved to the to the third floor about 215 or 217 or so now that's what he remembers when what do you remember
01:24:18 he remembers when what do you remember about the timing of the move so I I know that I wasn't at the second floor bridgehead for very long I believe I got hooked into the building at 150 yeah so
01:24:32 hooked into the building at 150 yeah so that was probably roughly coincide with moving to the third floor about 215 okay now before you move to the bridge head the before the bridge had moved from the
01:24:43 the before the bridge had moved from the second to the third floor you said earlier you remember receiving sunken we'll probably white possibly yellow control information forms
01:24:57 let me see if I can show you one or two and see if we can get the timing right can I ask you to go to LSB 1 9 2 2 and
01:25:21 can I ask you to go to LSB 1 9 2 2 and look please at page 33 now this is a I'm
01:25:34 look please at page 33 now this is a I'm going to ask you to assume that this is a white copy this is a this is a of course a photocopy and they're looking to find the original and it's got a 1 on it we'd heard Smet we heard some
01:25:45 it we'd heard Smet we heard some evidence this morning from Paul Sadler that this was his document son which he created it at 2:13 while he was working on the bonnet of a car and he said that
01:25:58 on the bonnet of a car and he said that he sent these to the bridgehead do you remember seeing this document as one of the early documents that you received I don't remember specifically right
01:26:11 I don't remember specifically right receiving that document now do you remember seeing a control information form with the words Paul Sadler FSG outside of them not specifically and again not to say that I didn't move I
01:26:23 again not to say that I didn't move I just it's not bringing any recollection back ok
01:26:26 back ok when you got to the bridgehead and started working did you did you discover or to come to discover that Paul Sadler was working on control information forms outside yes I believe so yeah how did you learn that and again I think I've
01:26:39 you learn that and again I think I've run out asked me to change to channel 3 right so that I could speak directly with Paul on channel 3 ok right
01:26:51 all right now can I then show you a different document which is
01:27:12 just allow me to find the reference
01:27:20 it's a meaty one six nine six seven
01:27:39 now again we heard this morning from Paul Sadler about this this document which is a photocopy I'll tell you what this is this is a photograph taken by Paul
01:27:53 this is a photograph taken by Paul Sadler at 219 he told us of an envelope which he says he sent via run-up to the bridgehead not the photograph the actual
01:28:05 bridgehead not the photograph the actual paper envelope do you remember receiving this document no not personally right and it's possible that's somebody
01:28:17 right and it's possible that's somebody else that the bridgehead did and but personally I don't have any memory of seeing this saying this right don't do you have a memory of being given a bunch
01:28:32 you have a memory of being given a bunch of fire survival guidance details like that some 13 addresses no you don't write
01:28:52 before the move to the third floor before the bridgehead moved to the third floor do you remember how many control
01:29:03 floor do you remember how many control information forms roughly you got no I know let's say the list on the forward information board had a few entries on I perhaps added a further I don't know
01:29:19 perhaps added a further I don't know probably less than ten right and then when we moved the bridgehead I'd say that's huh maybe how many bytes are cut with me okay did you have calls
01:29:30 are cut with me okay did you have calls to write FSG information on a wall while the bridgehead was still on the second floor not me personally no okay did
01:29:41 floor not me personally no okay did anybody write and FSG information on the wall while the British ever stood on the second floor possibly yeah I can't comment on that I just know that I didn't yeah you did you didn't see anybody doing that um I don't recall
01:29:53 anybody doing that um I don't recall seeing anybody I just know that I didn't write now we heard evidence yesterday from watch manager Watson that he acted
01:30:04 from watch manager Watson that he acted not only as a staging post person but also as the link in the chain between receiving or hearing firefighter and fire survival guidance information being shouted up from the lobby to him and
01:30:17 shouted up from the lobby to him and then he was recording it on a wall and then on pieces of paper and sending those to the bridgehead that's what he told us do you have a recollection of a
01:30:28 told us do you have a recollection of a watch manager fulfilling that function before the bridge had moved to this third floor and I recall receiving pieces of paper right before the bridge
01:30:40 pieces of paper right before the bridge had moved to the third floor yes and were those pieces of paper control information forms or were they some the smaller ones you've described in your statement I'd say it was both both right
01:30:52 statement I'd say it was both both right can I then show you
01:31:00 can you please be shown lfb quadruple zero one nine to nine now these are
01:31:16 zero one nine to nine now these are pieces of paper which watch manager O'Keefe gave evidence about and he just so you know the gist of his evidence was that he had received these during the course of the night and had put them in
01:31:29 course of the night and had put them in his tunic or his PPE trousers and at the end of the night he had found them and handed them to the earth through the lfb the second sort of third and fourth from the left are in different handwriting
01:31:42 the left are in different handwriting and what watch manager Watson says that he thought that those two were his handwriting and that those were the
01:31:53 handwriting and that those were the scraps of paper he had taken to use while the bridge head was on the second floor and had sent them to the bridge head do you recall seeing these pieces of paper all pieces of paper like it
01:32:04 of paper all pieces of paper like it it's entirely possible I don't recall seeing those specific pieces of paper right I probably saw 200 pieces of paper floors throughout the time that I was at
01:32:15 floors throughout the time that I was at a bridgehead so it's quite possible even likely I won't be able to specifically remember those two pieces of paper no but in turn do you recall seeing pieces
01:32:27 but in turn do you recall seeing pieces of paper that size and of that type yes before you move to the third floor
01:32:35 I couldn't be certain but I'd say yes okay all right
01:32:43 do you know why radio and written communications were being used to communicate FSG information to the bridgehead no I can only imagine that
01:32:55 bridgehead no I can only imagine that due to the sheer volume of information that was being received that whoever was receiving it by a different means was
01:33:06 receiving it by a different means was trying to get it to me by a different ways right now it's best they could okay do you know where the information
01:33:18 okay do you know where the information on these pieces of paper or the controlled forms that you got would work were coming from no the only information I was confident about that was coming
01:33:29 I was confident about that was coming from was the information I was taking from watch manager Sadler over the radio I knew that was coming from him okay and I knew he was outside the tower and I couldn't have been sure of exactly where
01:33:41 couldn't have been sure of exactly where but this information was coming to me so thickened first through various means that I didn't have much of an opportunity to question where it was coming from or how it was reaching them
01:33:53 coming from or how it was reaching them okay it was just a matter of trying to close it all at the same time as best I could okay when you were rather when was
01:34:04 could okay when you were rather when was still on the second floor when crews were being briefed while he was still on the second floor while they were being briefed to go to certain floors and
01:34:15 briefed to go to certain floors and flats to carry out search and rescue what were you involved in the process of briefing the crews yes and what
01:34:27 briefing the crews yes and what information did you give you personally give the crews so I had that officially information so between myself and watch Mandrake Heath who would give the
01:34:38 Mandrake Heath who would give the briefing in terms of conditions and what he wanted them to do he would liaised with me as to which flats needed and rescues made from so between the two of
01:34:51 rescues made from so between the two of us we would establish where to breathe each crew to right and that would be according to the information that I I had right and did you always get information in terms of conditions in
01:35:03 information in terms of conditions in other words about the conditions in the particular flats where FSG calls were coming from and information coming to me about the flat yes if I did receive any
01:35:14 about the flat yes if I did receive any information about that I would have added it to the board right and in order to help me prioritize which flats need rescues and who is in what order to
01:35:26 rescues and who is in what order to prioritize that but quite often I wasn't getting that kind of information because of the sheer volume of numbers that were coming in and like I say if I did get any information like that I would add it
01:35:37 any information like that I would add it on and we would act accordingly okay did you adopt any form of a system of prioritization only in that if we did
01:35:48 prioritization only in that if we did have any further information regarding children or anyone who was vulnerable we would act on that right and what would
01:35:59 would act on that right and what would you do to act on that so we would try and prioritize the more vulnerable residents and so we did trying to use that as a means of prioritizing but when
01:36:11 that as a means of prioritizing but when we were limited in information and just had flaws and flat numbers often it would be a matter of directing the be a crews to those to those flats as best we could did you have enough crews at first
01:36:23 could did you have enough crews at first to go to every flat or floor for which you had information and so it takes time to brief and commit a crew and simultaneously you've got crews coming
01:36:35 simultaneously you've got crews coming out new needs our debrief as best they can collect their tallies from the empty control board so we were getting crews in as quickly as we could do which was a steady stream of the a crews going in
01:36:47 steady stream of the a crews going in right and there obviously came a point where I had more information than we were able to commit crews is that right when was that
01:37:00 well pretty early on and it was just a matter of giving the next be a crew the next number the next that number okay and so I'd say early on we had more
01:37:12 and so I'd say early on we had more numbers than we were able to commit raised and how long did that deficit of crews last for I mean it was a constant
01:37:23 crews last for I mean it was a constant stream of receiving FST information so at no point could we confidently say that we had a BA crew going every single number that just wouldn't have been possible and but it was we had a
01:37:35 possible and but it was we had a availability of be a cruise but like I say it just takes time to get them crews brief done in as well as crews coming out yes yes I see but it I think my question was really directed to whether
01:37:47 question was really directed to whether or not you actually ran out of BA whereas in other words you had information but you didn't have anyone to give him good no we had a steady stream of available VA workers did anybody ever ask you to prioritize based
01:38:01 anybody ever ask you to prioritize based on information about smoke density within a flat no again if I had that information that an occupant was in a
01:38:12 information that an occupant was in a heavily smoke logged flat and in need of rescue we would have prioritized that but and unfortunately we often didn't have the information okay because it was
01:38:23 have the information okay because it was centered around floors and flat numbers due to the number of think occupants that we had coming in okay and how many firefighters would you send to each flat generally a crew so a be a crew at least
01:38:36 generally a crew so a be a crew at least crews were in twos or threes there was at least a be a crew to attend a question did you ever get evidence of the top floors of the building being
01:38:48 the top floors of the building being most severely affected and leading va rescues more more urgently not in terms of more urgently or in terms I didn't
01:39:00 of more urgently or in terms I didn't have any information regarding their smoke conditions I had information that was FSG calls in progress on the 23rd floor right and my actions that
01:39:13 floor right and my actions that accordingly okay do you remember any information coming from the command unit or via pool Sadler and about two o'clock
01:39:24 or via pool Sadler and about two o'clock in which there is information that the floors twenty one to twenty three are the most severely affected no okay do
01:39:38 the most severely affected no okay do you recall where the crews essentially decided them their own briefs for themselves at any stage no every be a crew was briefed with an MSG location
01:39:52 crew was briefed with an MSG location what was often the case is that they were unable to get to that that flat for various reasons do you remember a crew choosing for themselves to take a be a
01:40:03 choosing for themselves to take a be a set up to some occupants in a flat on floor nine for example now can I just ask you then to get back to your
01:40:14 ask you then to get back to your statement and later five
01:40:21 at the foot of the page you say
01:40:36 using that information I assisted with briefing crews to go to certain floors and flats to search for and rescue trapped residents as per the information I had at the time now just again
01:40:48 I had at the time now just again focusing on the time when the bridgehead was on the second floor do you remember crews presenting themselves to you with pieces of paper which they'd already been given by
01:40:59 which they'd already been given by somebody else with FSG on it no not on the second do you remember that happening on the third floor and you got there possibly yeah okay well we'll come
01:41:13 there possibly yeah okay well we'll come back to that in due course turning to the next sentence as crews came in and out I attempted to update the board to know the progress of each FSG if trapped
01:41:26 know the progress of each FSG if trapped by the effects of fire a member of the public calls nine nine nine and speaks to our control room now I just want to focus with with you on what happened
01:41:37 focus with with you on what happened when they went out they came out about the progress of each FSG at the start of running this task when you were on the second floor what information were you
01:41:49 second floor what information were you getting about the success or failure of crews getting to the flats and floor numbers that you'd committed them to I don't recall specifically but I know
01:42:00 don't recall specifically but I know that any information that would have come back from be a cruise I would have used to update the board would so if anyone was able to tell me where they had come from and what the conditions
01:42:11 had come from and what the conditions were like then I would add it on but a lot of the times firefighters were coming across people in need of rescue on the stairwell or even higher up on routes where they were
01:42:22 even higher up on routes where they were going to and we're having to take casualties as and when they found them and
01:42:26 and would often have to take that person straight out into safer yeah and so we didn't always have the opportunity for a debrief of that kind when you did have
01:42:37 debrief of that kind when you did have the opportunity for a debrief how did you go about doing it so that would have been myself and watch manager okie try and say gather as much information as the kid in terms of where they got to
01:42:50 the kid in terms of where they got to and if they did make a rescue where it came from so that I could make a note of that on the forward information bullet okay now where you got that information what did you do with it I would have
01:43:03 what did you do with it I would have added it to the phone information yes but what sorry won't my fault having added it to the forward information board did you communicate that information from the bridgehead to anybody on the incident ground and no so
01:43:16 anybody on the incident ground and no so given given my role and I was focused on on the role at the FST information and any other officers at the bridgehead
01:43:28 any other officers at the bridgehead so if watch manager keith was aware of information like that he would have passed on information like that as best he could as well do you remember either yourself or watch
01:43:40 do you remember either yourself or watch manager O'Keefe actively communicating with either Paul Sadler all the command unit about the results of any particular deployments I know that I did not and
01:43:53 deployments I know that I did not and the information was coming to me so quickly that if I'd have taken the time to try and update anybody so it's a two-way street of information obviously
01:44:04 two-way street of information obviously the information was coming to me if I'd have stopped to try and relay any of that information going back I'd have missed something coming in right so for me I was prioritizing gathering information and we were for me
01:44:18 information and we were for me personally I was unable to update anybody the information going back did you have any thoughts at the time about how the control room would learn about the conditions within the
01:44:29 learn about the conditions within the lobbies and stare or into individual flats without any information coming from the bridgehead and I appreciate the importance of that information and for
01:44:41 importance of that information and for them to receive the information but choose to the the nature of that incident and the nature of the bridgehead and the firefighters in being exhausted and the difficulty they had in
01:44:53 exhausted and the difficulty they had in giving us any information that it was personally I I was unable to get any information back to control now the question of getting accurate information
01:45:04 question of getting accurate information from the crews I understand and that's a separate questions I'm going to ask you about in a moment but where you did get clear and what you would consider to be reliable information about a deployment
01:45:16 reliable information about a deployment which you added to the FIB my question is really directed at why was that that information didn't go from the bridgehead as recorded on the FIB out to
01:45:29 bridgehead as recorded on the FIB out to the command unit and or back to the control room and it's possible that it was but it wasn't coming from me right so because of my role and gathering the
01:45:40 so because of my role and gathering the information like I said I couldn't stop doing what I was doing when we'd have lost information which which was which I just couldn't I couldn't risk happening in my position it wasn't part of my role
01:45:53 in my position it wasn't part of my role to communicate that that information back it was just a trying to annotate the board that I had as best I could would it have been possible to designate
01:46:04 would it have been possible to designate a firefighter who you had on the bridgehead or indeed to find somebody and task them with positively communicating the written results of the deployment you were recording back out
01:46:17 deployment you were recording back out to Paul Sadler or to anybody outside the bridgehead so that they could send that information back to control with hindsight and possibly yes but at the time we just we and especially on the
01:46:29 time we just we and especially on the second floor we didn't have the resources
01:46:32 resources to do that and we had to prioritize getting VA crews in the rescues that were happening and gathering that information that I had and say to stop and designate that to a firefighter when
01:46:43 and designate that to a firefighter when we needed all hands on deck essentially at that time was just wasn't possible at that time thinking about the difficulties of debriefing crews that
01:46:54 difficulties of debriefing crews that you referred to in that moment again did you have difficulties actually extracting reliable information from returning deployments so across the
01:47:07 returning deployments so across the duration of that night and firefighters were certainly returning extremely exhausted and dehydrated on the verge of passing out I would say they were
01:47:21 passing out I would say they were certainly suffering from heat stress right which affects their cognitive ability and their decision-making and they were certainly in need of medical attention and the best thing I could do for them at that time was to try and
01:47:33 for them at that time was to try and reassure them call them down and get them wards they're getting them oxygen for it so they were in no way able to inform us as to where they've made rescues or how many it was just a matter
01:47:45 rescues or how many it was just a matter of trying to take care of their welfare at that time okay and was that looking back on it was that the invariable experience you had all or that were those just exceptions or no I'd say hot
01:47:58 those just exceptions or no I'd say hot minority sorry and the majority of firefighters were suffering with heat stress due to the the circumstances the travel distance the adrenaline the
01:48:11 travel distance the adrenaline the efforts that they put in were 110 percent every time that their relief to return to the bridgeheads when they had almost no air or sometimes no air left it was visible relief that
01:48:25 no air left it was visible relief that they had made it back and the fact that if they've managed to bring in casualty with them was an amazing achievement so at that point to either try and question the casualty or the firefighter it just it wasn't an option
01:48:37 firefighter it just it wasn't an option so we just couldn't get information back from them that way they needed they need help are you trained in how to spot high metabolic heat stress you know firefighters so training school as a
01:48:49 firefighters so training school as a firefighter you were taught about heat stress exhaustion heat stroke and so it's something you're aware of certainly the elements include confusion dizziness
01:49:03 the elements include confusion dizziness passing out yeah definite so difficulties in cognitive thinking most firefighters needed water needed to be sat down or
01:49:16 needed water needed to be sat down or were collapsing effectively you observed that for yourself - yeah but did you observe the displaying of symptoms of of metabolic heat stress in those bones right okay are you okay to go as mr.
01:49:34 right okay are you okay to go as mr. canals the Chairman whether another five minutes might take us to her how do you feel about another five minutes yeah that's right for even ten depending on what both limbs shows truseq yes yes
01:49:47 what both limbs shows truseq yes yes it's a natural point before them very fine thank you very much thank you [Music]
01:50:00 so continuing on this theme just in terms of timing on page 8 of your witness statement you just jump ahead a moment a quarter of the way down you
01:50:12 moment a quarter of the way down you describe there what you've just been telling us about just now and you say one of the problems I had wasn't with
01:50:23 one of the problems I had wasn't with the system on the wall but with debriefing crews when they came down and then you continue my question there is these conditions that you observe that
01:50:34 these conditions that you observe that you describe here in your statement and you've just told us about identifying metabolic heat stress was was that also your experience while the bridgehead was on the second floor so although I think
01:50:48 on the second floor so although I think it probably did take place on the second floor I wasn't aware of it and it was most certainly brought to my attention when there and breach aid was moved to
01:51:00 when there and breach aid was moved to the ground-floor right where firefighters would come down that stairwell immediately to us at the bridgehead and that was very apparent at that stage right I see okay
01:51:15 okay I should just tell you this to be fair to you that the way you say on the wall it looks from the statement that you're there dealing with the written information when the bridgehead was at the third floor yeah so I just wanted to
01:51:27 the third floor yeah so I just wanted to get a feel for where the bridgehead was when you experienced what you described there which was firefighters returning to the bridgehead in the state of metabolic heat stress or other symptoms
01:51:39 metabolic heat stress or other symptoms and I would say it would happened throughout my time at the bridgehead from from when I initially got there I'd say most of the crews regardless as time through the night experienced that but
01:51:50 through the night experienced that but my main memories is being at its most significant was when the bridge hope is on the ground floor right okay now when we go back to the to page six of your
01:52:08 we go back to the to page six of your statement if we if we can you say a third of the way down no maybe quarter the way down just just after the first reference to FSG calls coming in by
01:52:20 reference to FSG calls coming in by radio and word and my pieces of paper you say another problem was the VA crews normally use channel six to communicate with entry control however this channel is proving difficult throughout the incident there
01:52:32 difficult throughout the incident there was so much feedback on the channel that it was very difficult to use and what were you using that channel or trying to use that channel for so channel six is
01:52:44 use that channel for so channel six is for the inter control officers to communicate with the BAE crews look and that is to ensure their safety as well as the information of what the VA crews are experiencing to give back to us
01:52:56 are experiencing to give back to us right do you know why there was the amount of feedback that you were experiencing no some crews were coming back saying they just went hearing anything across the radios on Channel six other people did report feedback
01:53:08 six other people did report feedback which for a berry set go straight in their air and then they can't remove it or get away from that so we were having a lot of difficulty with communications his feedback with a berry radio a common
01:53:22 his feedback with a berry radio a common experience in your experience and it does happen and generally the berry sets are very difficult to use and they're often unreliable right why they are
01:53:33 often unreliable right why they are reliable in what way and there's problems in there and there's several parts to it so firstly it has to when you rig it has to go on correctly for it to work effectively and bits can get
01:53:44 to work effectively and bits can get dislodged and moved around and then if then they can't hear you or it doesn't work on this particular incident I don't know if it was the sheer volume of crews
01:53:55 know if it was the sheer volume of crews that we had on channel 6 or what right but it wasn't working so where crews couldn't communicate with the bridgehead through there through channel 6 what would they do and so for a lot of the
01:54:09 would they do and so for a lot of the time we were unable to get any communications from them at all which is worrying in terms of safety because we want to monitor their every want to know the location if they get in trouble we
01:54:20 the location if they get in trouble we need to know where to send an emergency crew and but as well as where their firefighting where they think they are finding casualties what rescues are taking place we're not able to get any
01:54:31 taking place we're not able to get any of that information back either right you mentioned in your statement just a little bit further on that you say that left channel 1 which is used for fire ground traffic did you use channel 1 to
01:54:42 ground traffic did you use channel 1 to communicate from the bridgehead to deployed crews the be a Christmas night we use channel 6 okay you saved that left channel 1 but you didn't use it Cerys in channel 1 was effective but it
01:54:54 Cerys in channel 1 was effective but it is for the fire ground it's for the incident commander to communicate with his ops commanders and various other information exchanges if we'd have tried to use that for ba also it just it would
01:55:06 to use that for ba also it just it would have been too much too much traffic on that channel which is why we have a separate channel for be a crews so that the incident commander doesn't have to or the fire ground don't have to be aware of all that information that's
01:55:17 aware of all that information that's going on that's all that radio traffic did you experience difficulties in communicating with crews above a particular floor at any time is there
01:55:29 particular floor at any time is there like a cut-off floor above which you would lose channel 6 communication with BA wearers not that I was aware of I had a general understanding that we were not receiving any information back but
01:55:41 receiving any information back but because of the their nature of channel 6 okay
01:55:48 and now you said earlier on this afternoon that you weren't aware of any information being written on the wall on the second floor of the bridgehead can I
01:56:02 the second floor of the bridgehead can I just show you at photographs but see see if you can help us with it could you please be shown em et triple zero one three zero seven four
01:56:11 [Music]
01:56:22 now I should just tell you that Justin Oh burn firefighter at Boeing gave evidence and he said that this photograph was taken at 2:17 can you do
01:56:35 photograph was taken at 2:17 can you do you recognize this wall writing no no this is the first time you've seen anything like that other than in the
01:56:46 anything like that other than in the inquiry yes but right not prior to that you don't recognize it from the night no okay
01:57:02 now while you are on the second floor still do you have a recollection of any discussion between watch manager O'Keefe let me ask this question a different way
01:57:13 let me ask this question a different way do you remember while he was still on the second floor at the bridgehead the arrival of a group manager called Richard Welch I don't recall seeing and
01:57:24 Richard Welch I don't recall seeing and great manager Welsh until the third floor it's all the third floor for myself personally right deep do you remember hearing or hearing about a
01:57:35 remember hearing or hearing about a discussion between watch manager O'Keefe and group manager Welch at about 2:00 a.m. of where this the subject of IDI be
01:57:46 a.m. of where this the subject of IDI be a Kmart no do you recall any discussion about the need to obtain as many IDI be a as possible kits as possible and I was certainly an
01:57:58 kits as possible and I was certainly an agreement that we were gonna need a DBA and we had a building 24 floors and a DBA is required if there is a travel distance involved and I wasn't privy to
01:58:10 distance involved and I wasn't privy to that conversation or even aware that that conversation was going on I just focused with my role okay when you were deciding on prioritization of
01:58:23 deciding on prioritization of deployments while still on the second floor did the question of availability of IDI be a enter your calculations and again it was a consideration that if we
01:58:34 again it was a consideration that if we were going to need crews to go higher up in the building then easy BA was going to be required and that probably was a discussion myself and watch Mundra keep heads right and that would have been a
01:58:46 heads right and that would have been a statement like we're gonna need a DBA right and any third feather than that I wasn't pretty anything better than that okay all right mr. Chairman I have come to a think
01:58:59 mr. Chairman I have come to a think we'll come to the naxal break yes new topics and it would be right to stop no I think it would think yes thank you know you are going to need to I'm afraid
01:59:11 know you are going to need to I'm afraid I have a to the ultimate disorder to come back I am afraid I am going to mr. Silva I apologize me had had a timing issue this afternoon I'm afraid I'm
01:59:23 issue this afternoon I'm afraid I'm gonna have to ask you to come back tomorrow
01:59:24 tomorrow just for your benefit and for everybody else's and especially the Chairman's I probably got about an hour and a half further questions which way to fake the
01:59:35 further questions which way to fake the rest of the timetable for tomorrow because we heard another witness after that he went be turbulent hope so the witnesses benefit and they need through and that was we can start at 10 o'clock
01:59:46 and that was we can start at 10 o'clock tomorrow and it would be prudent mr. chairman to start earlier but I'm and I think prudence is probably the better
01:59:59 think prudence is probably the better than convenience but I'm in your hands we could say 9:45 that what we could say 9:45 as a compromise how difficult would it be for
02:00:10 compromise how difficult would it be for you to come at half past 9:00 no that's fine I'm tempted to say that soon you come the soon you'll get it with it okay well I think we're all inclined to
02:00:23 well I think we're all inclined to underestimate at the time that the term it takes to give evidence a little say off past nine I'm sorry no that's fine I think the only other thing that says please don't talk about nor evidence overnight that you anyone else and we
02:00:36 overnight that you anyone else and we look good seeing it was mine tomorrow okay thank you thank you very much let's go to the options
02:00:49 good well that's it for today and we'll resume it I'll post my and tomorrow please thank you very much
02:01:06 you