Station Manager Gareth Cook gives evidence about arriving as press liaison officer, advising a trapped resident to stay put, bridgehead operations, and FSG call management on the night of the fire.
00:09:39 yes mr. millet no we're going to hit another witness we are we're going to hear
00:09:45 hear Gareth cook thank you
00:10:11 that's my power energy bars trouble was
00:10:16 to return culture the ocean
00:10:20 thank you very much mr. cook just a minute
00:10:24 minute yes thank you mr. cook could you please give the inquiry your full name thanks Garrett cook very good and first of all can I say thank you very much for coming here to give evidence today to the inquiry and assisting insight in our
00:10:35 the inquiry and assisting insight in our investigations we would you appreciate it my questions are intended to be short and simple sometimes they're not either of those things so if you don't understand the question I'm asking you or you want me to repeat it please just say if you want to have a break at any
00:10:48 say if you want to have a break at any stage please just signal but we are intending to have a break at some point I'll flick through the afternoon in any event okay all right thank you now you've provided us with a witness statement date to the 22nd of November
00:11:00 statement date to the 22nd of November 2017 which you'll find in the little bundle in front of you but we tend to work from the screen which you'll find on your desk anyway the reference to it is M et the quadruple 0 of 7 8 8 2 and there's a
00:11:14 quadruple 0 of 7 8 8 2 and there's a further statement dated the 21st of February 2017 which is M et triple zero one two double seven nine have you read both of those statements recently yes you have and can you
00:11:26 recently yes you have and can you confirm that their contents are true yes thank you have you discussed your statement or your evidence you're going to give to the enquiry today with anybody before coming here today now
00:11:38 anybody before coming here today now you've also got some contemporaneous notes the reference to which is a meaty quadruple zero five seven one seven and an exhibit G a c2 which is a lengthy
00:11:52 an exhibit G a c2 which is a lengthy document which is a meaty triple zero once one five seven seven nine which we'll look at in due course and that I think is the exhibit now we'll come back
00:12:06 think is the exhibit now we'll come back to that later just just while I'm on it there and while it's what well we've got it on the screen we've just lost it but well we've got on the screen your statement for the police state of the 22nd of November was
00:12:17 police state of the 22nd of November was made as this right after you did these long notes yes with exhibit Lee's nose it'll come wild up to a point within the incident you'll see it comes to a bit of a stock pathway through and they were compiled
00:12:29 pathway through and they were compiled purely for me to get of timeline and you'll see that we needed okay I was going to ask you did you because they they appear to be a formal lfb product did somebody ask you to provide these
00:12:41 did somebody ask you to provide these statements nothing what's just the why not I worked it that's okay but so did you have access to the template the other absolutely right okay had a nice picture of the fur the Flies who's not a temp like Stan that's a
00:12:53 who's not a temp like Stan that's a standard elevator practice here 10k and can I just start by asking you a little bit about your position on your training could you please give us your your current rank has that today group manager when were you appointed a group
00:13:05 manager when were you appointed a group manager 6th of July so very recent congratulations thank you and as at the 30 14th of June 2017 what was your position I was a station manager working
00:13:16 position I was a station manager working in the Northwest area team as a Quality Assurance officer there's a Quality Assurance officer yes what did is that role involve Quality Assurance is a way
00:13:28 role involve Quality Assurance is a way within the area of making sure that our training practices on fire stations or various other things meet the standards we have 11 service standards within London Fire Brigade which we need to
00:13:40 London Fire Brigade which we need to make sure that we maintain and part that role was for me to go out and audit those and help with putting together various exercises monitoring and assuring them right now those 11 service standards regularly reviewed it's
00:13:52 standards regularly reviewed it's changed now and it's being reviewed currently as well it was in the process being changed at the time but that's something that the service would be able to give you in more detail okay now in your statement you explained
00:14:05 okay now in your statement you explained that you have 20 years service with the lfb yeah right well two five ago so yeah what's in London and Ivan fire risk indeed and I think it's right that in both brigades you've held every
00:14:16 both brigades you've held every operational rank from firefighter through to now group manager yes right you've spent some you spent some time at the Avon fire service could you give us
00:14:27 the Avon fire service could you give us the dates with wit during which you were there yeah first of January 2006 until the 5th of November 2014 right
00:14:39 until the 5th of November 2014 right and what role did you occupy at Ava or rather rock rank or ranks to do holes when you were at Ava crew manager watch bands very much fun as you be okay and
00:14:51 bands very much fun as you be okay and when you returns to the lfb was that to take up the role of station manager it was yes okay so you've been a station manager as at June 2017 for something
00:15:05 manager as at June 2017 for something like just under two years three three three and a half years
00:15:12 yes and I'll page two of your statement you say you've had a lot of training in relation to high-rise buildings was that training as a station manager or two at a lower rank I've received training
00:15:24 a lower rank I've received training throughout the ranks with relation to high-rise fires and obviously as part of my role I've delivered training also right I see and did you have specific training on high-rise buildings from the
00:15:38 training on high-rise buildings from the London Fire Brigade as a station manager we delivered back to basics training which covered high-rise in 2015 I think
00:15:49 which covered high-rise in 2015 I think I've been 2016 you have - monarch - correct but yet no it was 2016 apologies were we delivered that - to our borough which was he's an intern at the time do
00:16:01 which was he's an intern at the time do you are you able to tell us whether there was any difference between the training you've got after you join the lfb from the training that you got when
00:16:12 lfb from the training that you got when you were at even on high-rise buildings generally speaking that it tends to be very very similar the procedures standard operating procedures policy note successor they all tend to be very
00:16:24 note successor they all tend to be very similar
00:16:24 similar they're tender there can't be slight nuances but they're very slight some of the training I received in I even was when I went to the fire service college in Morton and did specific high-rise
00:16:36 in Morton and did specific high-rise training there which was part of their packages as a watchman very useful I was hosted by someone called Andy for Shaw who's a station manager from Merseyside with regards to London we have our policy notes and
00:16:49 London we have our policy notes and coming into the station manager I've passed knowledge tests to show that I understand those and I've delivered trained on them subsequently right in
00:17:02 trained on them subsequently right in terms of your training at the Morton that's the mall turnin in the March fire colleges here fire service College science service college you went there as a watch manager I think I believe so do you have like dates of your training there I'm afraid I haven't I could
00:17:14 there I'm afraid I haven't I could probably find them but I'd have to go back and look right do you remember whether the training you received there at that course post dated or predated the lacan or house fire oh it was
00:17:25 the lacan or house fire oh it was definitely post dated it would have been around 2011 maybe 2000 in my life right okay do you know okay are you aware of age a national policy
00:17:38 are you aware of age a national policy put out by the DC LG in 2014 called the generic risk assessment 3.2 aware of generic risk assessments but I'll just not to point out that I'm aware of them London we worked at the policy within
00:17:50 London we worked at the policy within London right have you ever heard of a fire at Shepherd's court in August 2016 I have it was a 20 pump incident for
00:18:02 I have it was a 20 pump incident for which I was off duty I was going to ask you did you were you there weren't no actually as an operational station manager which you were at the time as you tell us on your dates did you get any training on the lessons learnt from
00:18:14 any training on the lessons learnt from that fire not that I can recall right so you don't ever recall seeing a slide show or any information pack and those I remember that it triggered or assisted with our voice good campaign what goods
00:18:27 with our voice good campaign what goods campaign sorry but I can't remember any sorry okay in yoruba statement at the
00:18:38 sorry okay in yoruba statement at the bottom of page two you talked generally about a familiar ization visits during your time as a watch manager where you trained as to how to conduct them that
00:18:51 trained as to how to conduct them that would when I say during old-timers watch manage I mean any of them that's the place yeah all fire services will have a set if you like prescriptive we use the
00:19:03 set if you like prescriptive we use the LRD the MDT the mobile data terminal to store information and part that information we will gather from what's there so for example as I put here yeah
00:19:14 there so for example as I put here yeah I hope you don't mind me reference in my statement then they do here we would look for access and egress routes building structure construction layout lift bike room those kinds of things and they would form the tactical plan so
00:19:25 they would form the tactical plan so that if an incident commander was retained for example wasn't from the fire station ground it wasn't familiar with it didn't have dinner the Camino ization they can instantly drew up the tactical plan and get to work with that
00:19:36 tactical plan and get to work with that information that's where he's for now you burn your statement there as you just read out building structures such as the construction and layout in your experience as a watch manager having been trained on high-rise fire their
00:19:49 been trained on high-rise fire their firefighting and familiarize ation visits was it your experience that you have to look when you did a familiarization visit at the precise construction and layout no no absolutely
00:20:02 construction and layout no no absolutely not so we will be looking for things that affect us as firefighters and as I say access egress lift motor rooms fire lips where the joy rising mines are the inlets in apparently etc in terms of the
00:20:15 inlets in apparently etc in terms of the construction that wouldn't be something we necessarily be looking for and I'll take you come back you're probably looking to see would we have checked for tired in et cetera I know I can tell you now as a watch manager we wouldn't have been looking for that because it wasn't
00:20:27 been looking for that because it wasn't something we would been aware of particularly was to you all the best bit to the best of your recollection did you have a policy at Aven when you will wash manager which had a list of
00:20:38 will wash manager which had a list of things like a checklist that familiarize ation was it would have to look at I'm sure there would have been something however I couldn't confirm it entirely for you I'm very sorry it's been a few years do you know whether at any stage
00:20:50 years do you know whether at any stage 2006 to 14 when you were a watch manager at at even that checklist included things like the materials on the outside of the building such as cladding no I do
00:21:01 of the building such as cladding no I do not I don't know but I can't recall well I can tell you well what about other materials that might contribute to the risk of fire spread were you asked were you trained to look at things like that again I'm sorry about a car wreck
00:21:12 again I'm sorry about a car wreck although apologies now um you held I think operational ranks prior to gain - even in London at Paddington and and
00:21:25 even in London at Paddington and and indeed at North Kent yes before you move to North Kent what was your what was your rank at North can also before you move to Aven what was your rank at North Kensington a Creamery European and you what were the dates of
00:21:38 European and you what were the dates of your tenure as crew manager at North Kensington North Kensington on the red watts I was there for literally about two months it was a trailer yeah 2005 right do you
00:21:53 was a trailer yeah 2005 right do you recall ever making a visit to rental town I'm not absolutely not sorry I remember going there operationally because Paddington and North Kensington work very closely at the time but I
00:22:04 work very closely at the time but I never went there for a fire only ever attended for things like shiny lips but though it's a very distant memory Yeah right okay now on the night of the incident let's just turn to that you say
00:22:15 incident let's just turn to that you say that you are on 24-hour duty from home and you say in your statement it's at the top of page 2 that you're informed of incidents when there's a sixth pump
00:22:31 of incidents when there's a sixth pump fire over but when I say you're informed I mean you as a as a page station manager manager of Illumina cavity would be informed of a certain intervention right and was that the reason you were paged always pages of press liaison
00:22:44 paged always pages of press liaison officer that night right okay and without me normal all that the normal role for you to occupy the roles that I could not even by that yeah now
00:22:55 that I could not even by that yeah now if we look at these short incident log which is attached 23 of our documents bundles and turn to page 20 turn to page 13 we can see from that that you were
00:23:11 assigned to the incident at about 150 you look at page 13
00:23:24 this is the list of officers and we can see your name oh gee 54 yeah assigned at Oh 1 1528 yes would that
00:23:35 assigned at Oh 1 1528 yes would that correspond with your recollection yes I believe so and just while we're on that we can see that you were on scene status to at 138 sorry sorry sorry sorry I'm so
00:23:46 to at 138 sorry sorry sorry sorry I'm so sorry Michael mobile 2 incident which is status 201 1731 and then on scene status 301 3825 and again do those two times could correspond to your recollection
00:23:58 correspond to your recollection obviously okay now you said a minute ago that you were attending as a press liaison officer what does that rule involved you tell us so press liaison
00:24:09 involved you tell us so press liaison officer we're trained as station managers and other ranks are trained up above me to be able to report back to our press office to make sure that we've
00:24:21 our press office to make sure that we've got a good overall capture picture of what's going on and to deal with any interviews or press queries whilst were there any eyes on with the press officer duty press officer from the survey right and would you encourage the press to
00:24:35 and would you encourage the press to take a particular view or report in a particular way on what you were seeing in front of you sorry could you rephrase yeah would you encourage the press to report on a particular way to film the building or you just leave it to them in
00:24:50 building or you just leave it to them in terms of what what your role is obviously you're there very early in the incident there might be press there there may not right we make sure that we capture images that we can send back to our press office they have a good
00:25:01 our press office they have a good overview especially in today's society with social media we need to make sure that we get that message out there quickly
00:25:07 quickly [Music]
00:25:11 right now in your in your statement you say that you'll roll that was to also to
00:25:26 say that you'll roll that was to also to be a supporting role to the incident commander what did that involve or what would that have involved so which I
00:25:38 would that have involved so which I think to the best part contextualize it so there will be a mobilization of certain officers at certain phases so I think I was informed when this was either a four or six I can't recall
00:25:50 either a four or six I can't recall exactly but I was informed as to press the eyes enough so that means that another officer would have been informed as the monitoring officer as the incident progresses so as the makeups come in their systems messages so to
00:26:02 come in their systems messages so to would they start to mobilize more officers so a six pump fire will will the current member the exact amount but it would probably get to further station managers in a group manager and it will go on from there depending on what they
00:26:14 go on from there depending on what they want from scene with their assistants message it's very common to receive a full pump fire with a monitoring officer of going on to the incident potentially the press officer gets called as well
00:26:25 the press officer gets called as well press officer will make a decision and go to support potentially support that officer with the press side of things if you were to arrive and there was a necessity fugitive undertake another
00:26:37 necessity fugitive undertake another role then you would do that as and when it was good and as it was necessary okay now what's manager Darden you say in your statement and it's just half way
00:26:48 your statement and it's just half way down page three what was the officer in charge yeah and you think I want to say my roles that I put press liaison officer and a supporting role for the incident commander if you were the senior officer
00:26:59 commander if you were the senior officer arriving yeah why not take over okay so for that that's it actually a pretty easy question for me to answer so I've heard the officers that are already there booking in I know that their role was
00:27:11 booking in I know that their role was already to go on as as a monitoring officer so because I knew that when I heard them booked him before me as I walked down I was able to see that one of those officers was there so I carried
00:27:22 of those officers was there so I carried on what press role bearing in mind the scale of the incident very quickly and you'll see that as a statement goes through yes you can you name the other senior officers who you say you knew the
00:27:35 senior officers who you say you knew the Buchta so the first three that were there were mr. mr. Walton Pandey Walton Brett loft and myself I can't remember the exact times right let me see if I
00:27:47 the exact times right let me see if I can help you with that plate if you go to the short insulin Lord attachment to three and turn to page 13 we've got those names there just above yours in
00:28:01 those names there just above yours in fact and I'll use the on scene we have Andrew Wilson on scene at a 140 12 okay we have Brett Lofton on scene at a 130
00:28:14 we have Brett Lofton on scene at a 130 208 yep and we have we have you on scene at a 138 25 yes now when you arrived do you remember whether or not from your
00:28:29 do you remember whether or not from your own recollection Andrew Wilson had in fact arrived now it looks from this as if in fact he arrived at a couple of minutes after you what I will say though is that sometimes it can be quite difficult to hook in void the airway
00:28:41 difficult to hook in void the airway because of a lot of radio traffic so yes your recollection is that those SMS had already I had a brick booking definitely right okay and what about um what about
00:28:56 right okay and what about um what about to Apache Goulbourne he came later yeah he was mobile to incident as we can see at 1:46 so I think able to turn around about what after 2 o'clock anyway
00:29:07 around about what after 2 o'clock anyway do you remember that yeah I do but I'm not sure if or quite exact timeline for the way they can turned up now on let's go to on you're on routes experience that way you we have you here booking in
00:29:22 that way you we have you here booking in as mobile to incident oh 11731 have you live it if you look at it and in your in
00:29:33 live it if you look at it and in your in your exhibit you say that you set off of oh one 24 we peppers justice should look at that this is just your exhibit but to
00:29:44 at that this is just your exhibit but to page one than the exhibit I want to show you is M et triple zero one five seven seven nine yeah so if you go to page one you say we have
00:30:04 so if you go to page one you say we have Taiwan so cheerful yeah we have to expand it on the screen so everybody can see it but figure one is your vehicle app yeah for your your car showing the time of travel between 124 and time of
00:30:17 time of travel between 124 and time of arrival yeah and we can see the 124 decide to take it piecemeal that what 124 is they're just about halfway down where it says Wednesday so that's the time you left where you were is it well
00:30:29 time you left where you were is it well that's at the time that that vehicle was my power or - okay so we've got you booking at as mobile at o 11731 according to the stuff sure there's a lot in the leaving for the incident at O 124 yeah that's seven minutes if I've
00:30:42 124 yeah that's seven minutes if I've improved my Madison's yes this afternoon what were you doing during that period so when you get mobilized what what you should be doing is a senior officer is looking at the map book making sure you
00:30:53 looking at the map book making sure you understand the topography of the area seeing what's there as a press officer I'll be looking at Twitter Facebook various other news things including RT news and checking to see if there's anything coming through immediately right and of course get myself ready to
00:31:06 right and of course get myself ready to get out of that door okay so seven minutes with those things would be about right we have 20 minutes where we're expected to respond right or is hope that you would respond I think
00:31:17 is hope that you would respond I think it's the SM one the first station manager should respond into any misuse we have to check that as well I'm sorry but yeah okay that's 20 minutes between being paged and departing booking status to booking stays through so Mobile
00:31:31 to booking stays through so Mobile States through so when I finished the phone call with control I would book status to then I would go through the part so I need to do and then in one room okay now did you try at
00:31:45 then in one room okay now did you try at anytime after booking in his mobile and oh one 17 131 to find out anything about the building itself no but all I got
00:31:56 the building itself no but all I got from this would be a very vague memory I would have googled the area but I looked at brimful tower itself it would have given me a library image I'd have been gone on to Twitter and checked that to
00:32:08 gone on to Twitter and checked that to see if there was anything coming through fired not inhale fire for Kensington etc but it's so Donna garma freighter I couldn't tell you exactly so apologies did you have access to the mobile date
00:32:22 did you have access to the mobile date what it's the mobile data terminal do you have access to the ORD so don't know I don't did you have access to the vision system via boss so I have got
00:32:34 vision system via boss so I have got what they call remote access but you have to log on and that process takes some time and on this particular night I didn't know spam it's it's something I can't do but as a station emerge it's not an expectation okay would it be
00:32:46 not an expectation okay would it be normal in your experience as a station manager in London turn log on through boss Division if no not so much from a group managers perspective you're monitoring incident if you're a station
00:32:57 monitoring incident if you're a station manager you're monitoring an incident then yes you would look to log on a monitor which would give you the tools necessary to continue and want to avoid that and the main skiing radio but as a station manager whose book status to
00:33:09 station manager whose book status to know right now
00:33:14 on route in your statement yes you say after just below halfway down that you
00:33:26 after just below halfway down that you continue to monitor I continue to monitor my air wave radio yes listening for updates on the developing situation such as the building location and risk assessments and how it was currently
00:33:37 assessments and how it was currently being dealt with did you continue to do that throughout your journey yes and when you are referring to air wave radio is can you just explain is that a
00:33:49 radio is can you just explain is that a direct line to control so the air wave radio is basically a small Tetra handheld very lot of police officers have got air wave radio which goes on to our main scheme so the main scheme radio
00:34:01 our main scheme so the main scheme radio that the fire appliances send their messages through to control from where also on that main scheme with these handheld radios did that mean did that mean that you could hear FSG calls being
00:34:12 mean that you could hear FSG calls being communicated from control to the fire ground not right so what did you hear so through the mainstream radio and I think it references in my status you hear
00:34:23 it references in my status you hear assistance messages you will hear crews asking about rendezvous points or various other things that might might potentially happen so you'll get that that if you like that audible picture
00:34:37 that if you like that audible picture and as I say my style sure will come to it but they were calling assistance messages in very regularly which gives you an overview as an officer attending that you're going into something quite
00:34:48 that you're going into something quite serious yes okay now to say essentially this right in summary you heard pump escalation and standard messages yes
00:35:01 escalation and standard messages yes orderings yeah did you have did you hear a message for persons ported I can't recall if he's in my statement on the it might be no I don't know sorry now in your statement on page four
00:35:16 now in your statement on page four Buddha's turn turn the page you've gone through the bottom of page three the acceleration through the pumps you say
00:35:29 acceleration through the pumps you say at 1:28 the pumps jumped again to 15 to aerials and then again at 1:30 became 20 pumps for 200 years yeah and then you say
00:35:49 has Mike lost his mind absolutely yeah what then you say it was unusual why would you think he'd lost his mind well when I say lost his might have been my lizard a bit flippancy there but as
00:36:01 my lizard a bit flippancy there but as an operational officer for a watch manages to be going to 20 pumps in that succession and I think I'm not sure obviously I will not be chosen the succession how quickly it was you think
00:36:12 succession how quickly it was you think 20 machines that's an awful lot for a watch manager to call Ron so bearing in mind I was going to a fire in a flat as
00:36:25 mind I was going to a fire in a flat as a press liaison officer and I've now got 24 appliances being asked for his assistance I'm thinking well that's a big call Twenties quite a large incident you say you were going to a fire in a
00:36:38 you say you were going to a fire in a flat where did you get that information from so my initial page your message of my mobilisation everything was still set off believed flat 16 right but it was a six pump fire by the time you were
00:36:50 six pump fire by the time you were called on yep so what did you think is going back to step two that flatten of fire six pumps getting the two together what was your what was were your thoughts about that well part of our
00:37:03 thoughts about that well part of our procedure especially a high-rise procedure requires a certain amount of resources so if you have a confirm for in a flat depending on the height of the flat its Bend on the layout of the
00:37:14 flat its Bend on the layout of the building depending on the risk assessment conducted by the incident commander to make pump six for resources and to implement high-rise procedure isn't actually unusual so that's quite standard I would suggest right but six
00:37:26 standard I would suggest right but six to 20 not six to twenty in that space of time absolutely not anything so you then say boom the next paragraph my experience for twenty point four fire
00:37:37 experience for twenty point four fire first came in 2003 at Telstar house yeah and it took a long time to become a 20 for lighty over an hour do you have any clearer collections of Telstar as it was
00:37:52 clearer collections of Telstar as it was in the incident itself let me just ask you where was Telstar house Telstar house was on our 421 patterns ground I believe it was Eastbourne Terrace near paddock railway station where is London Underground head office and in 2003 fire start persons
00:38:07 office and in 2003 fire start persons reported fire started on the fourth floor I believe right we were initially called to an automatic fire alarm activating and there was subsequently fire fire emergency at the time crews
00:38:19 fire fire emergency at the time crews out to withdraw and as a result of an open plan office the fire continued to spread and it's a little kinder effect I think it took out three or maybe four
00:38:30 think it took out three or maybe four floors right was that a high-rise building in the sense of the high rise policy which yes we would look we treated a high-rise building yeah and it sir it was an office block not
00:38:41 sir it was an office block not residential but nonetheless is still horrors burned there's a very exactly the same block in Noel actually although that blocks now gone Telstar houses being right like okay and you then go on
00:38:54 being right like okay and you then go on to say in the statement just before I arrived at oh one thirty four hours a new message is relayed now where did you get the O 134 time from
00:39:08 I couldn't tell you if we went back and looked at my notes more contemporaneous night so I suggest it would be there well let's do that yeah you just go back
00:39:19 well let's do that yeah you just go back to the exhibit it's one five seven seven nine
00:39:31 we have at the bottom of page two your timing yeah one a 38 to booking status 3 yep and I maybe meet we couldn't find
00:39:44 yep and I maybe meet we couldn't find where you got the total of 134 from so I know probably if he goes to the top of the page you'll see I 128 make pubs 1501 30 you see and I 134 make pubs 25 yeah
00:39:55 30 you see and I 134 make pubs 25 yeah fi use to aerials - oh I see yeah so the reference is the reference to 134 is not the time of arrival but that's the message I see now for a rival of
00:40:06 message I see now for a rival of Grenfell town you say in your statement at the bottom of page 3
00:40:17 that you parked on me
00:40:24 sorry I'm so sorry I give you a roll reference you get an h4 halfway down you say I park my car on the corner of grateful Road yes in the location that
00:40:35 grateful Road yes in the location that would not affect the flow of emergency service traffic and be out of the way and I think you showed the location of where you parked in figure 2 on page 2
00:40:46 where you parked in figure 2 on page 2 of your exhibit yes I just keep calling it your exhibit will all know what you're talking about if you go to that there's a I think I'm there yeah that was ready to you Red Cross yeah and it's
00:40:58 was ready to you Red Cross yeah and it's the Red Cross is it yes and if we it's all very easy to see but if you get to the very top of the picture you can see a square with the words Lancaster green
00:41:10 a square with the words Lancaster green to the right of that so you parked essentially at the bottom of the gun fill they work joint treadmill Street yes ok so it's a few minutes walk up to
00:41:21 yes ok so it's a few minutes walk up to the tower Wow I don't think it's a few minutes quays it's not those not as far as it perhaps looks ok and you say your statement just going back to it we're gonna jump on the freight and one to the
00:41:32 gonna jump on the freight and one to the other shop that you pressed 7 on my a wave radio and confirming to the og 54 my call sign was status 3 in attendance
00:41:43 my call sign was status 3 in attendance and that that that's roughly in accordance with what we've seen on this on the si el isn't it now you say that the this is 4 lines up 5 lines up from
00:41:57 the this is 4 lines up 5 lines up from the bottom of the same paragraph I was aware that the command unit had been set up in Bellmore Road I think that's a mistake for Bowman Road yes yeah um and could see the antennas and blue lights
00:42:09 could see the antennas and blue lights flashing are you able on the map we've just been looking at the figure 2 in your exhibit to see where on very more row you can
00:42:20 row you can the job unit is part okay so if we look at the map yeah and you can see that by more road goes to the right of Greenfield Road the command unit was was literally at the entrance today so on
00:42:32 literally at the entrance today so on the IC say on the corner of Grenfell road and boom already I'd suggest you read there okay right and was it allowing access passed down
00:42:44 and was it allowing access passed down below more Road into ground field absolutely yeah okay and do you remember what number that command unit was Charley uniform
00:42:56 that command unit was Charley uniform Ike see you Ike okay you say that we're come out of the transcript you said that with a question mark at the end let me see if I can help you the short incident log has inject used to turn it up but it has cu8 they're arriving at about 1:30
00:43:10 has cu8 they're arriving at about 1:30 and cu7
00:43:12 and cu7 has some slightly on certain arrival time in the moment does it help you your recollection all I know is that the command unit that night was from Islington I believe right because of the
00:43:23 Islington I believe right because of the crew that was on it which was watched by JP Johnson and watch my Jeep at the Langley so you know it's yes now in fact this is Cu 2 which is from Islington
00:43:39 actually arrives late all kinds get sorted out let's look at the short incident log because it may be it's
00:43:51 incident log because it may be it's wrong it may be or recollection isn't right if you look at page 8 of the short
00:44:03 right if you look at page 8 of the short answer that Lord we can see that cu8 status 3 time on scene time as oh one 3048 c7 we don't have a sense of the time for but the time of mobile to incident is 123 CU 8 comes from foot
00:44:18 incident is 123 CU 8 comes from foot foot Fulham and c7 from Wembley so you know and see you - we can see a third of the way down page 9 with a an arrival
00:44:31 the way down page 9 with a an arrival time state is 3 time of Oh 158 so I'm just wondering having shown you that data and all the assumption that that data is correct is that helping with your recollection of what season sort
00:44:42 your recollection of what season sort sorry
00:44:43 sorry dozen alright apologies or only don't worry we'll see how we make it let me make a little bit further but your recollection it is you say I think it's that Johnson and Delaney were there they
00:44:54 that Johnson and Delaney were there they all right that they were on see you too but I've shown you that they only arrived 20 minutes after you did but you can't help I think no sorry when you got to the Cu you say let's
00:45:12 when you got to the Cu you say let's just get back to your statement if you can at page 4 for lines up from the bottom when I arrive you say I could see but watch managers Peter Johnson attended a I'm a person known to them when you say
00:45:26 I'm a person known to them when you say when I arrived does that mean what they asked you when I arrived where okay so where are parts in groennfell rose yup walk down and saw the command yet on the
00:45:37 walk down and saw the command yet on the corner of Bowmore and gravel road yes I can't recall if I continue to walk down towards the incident or if I put my head in the door very quickly and put my roll
00:45:49 in the door very quickly and put my roll boarding I really can't become him I've said don't make my presence known to them so I suggest that I probably did from my statement it's it's very hazy that part okay do you remember talking
00:46:03 that part okay do you remember talking to a watch manager called Dan Marek no do you remember talking to a watch manager called Kent field
00:46:14 okay let's just hold that moment at that point did you try to speak to the
00:46:28 point did you try to speak to the incident commander now I'll set the scene for you there but if you don't mind just very briefly so as I've got on my car of my personal protective equipment on this listen to the radio there was a large amount of
00:46:41 the radio there was a large amount of people running down groennfell rounded shouting and screaming right there was hysteria it was a very dynamic and quite awful situation as I walked down towards
00:46:53 awful situation as I walked down towards the incident and I'd heard Brett booking in as I walked down towards the incident you'll see from my statement I started to take pictures of what was going on with the incident so straight away I knew that we had something quite serious
00:47:07 knew that we had something quite serious there was a thought for me at one point that this has gone up very quickly and the only time I've ever seen something like this before is scaffold knitting we'll put scaffold netting around buildings it catches fire very quickly
00:47:19 buildings it catches fire very quickly it's very dramatic and it goes out very quickly too but as I start to get nearer I noticed that that there was you know this is this was a little bit more compounded so much so I say and then as I came again
00:47:33 much so I say and then as I came again in my statement as I came to what was the lancaster greeting again it becomes mildly hazy I saw a believe I saw Brett speaking to
00:47:46 I saw a believe I saw Brett speaking to Mike Dowden now either saw him on weigh in or on my way back because I went down and took some pictures helped firefighters and in trouble from falling clad in debris and then went back to the
00:47:57 clad in debris and then went back to the command unit after and fielded a call to our press office on the one now I'd love to be really clear about this I'm afraid no con but I saw the incident commander or the incident command Tom Hart my dad
00:48:10 or the incident command Tom Hart my dad and Rosaura station man to speak in to avoid he would already book T so for me is a press liaison officer I know that there's an officer there I knew that this has gone up very very quickly and
00:48:21 this has gone up very very quickly and that we'd have supporting officers very very quickly as well and I needed to ensure that I've got that information back to the press office and also to our duty AC to make sure that this picture
00:48:33 sure that this picture hopefully was distributed to other uncommon officers and I was hoping wherever it needed to go because it was clearly very unprecedented who was the duty ACU at GYC was handy right icnd1
00:48:45 duty ACU at GYC was handy right icnd1 did you speak to him at that not what I did was in the mornings at 7:30 we get a bulletin which tells you who the duty officers are for the day so when you're
00:48:56 officers are for the day so when you're on a 24 G or even if you're on an on duty you know who to get old off and their various roles so I knew that it was an zero so I took the pictures and I sent them to the IC and I sent them to the press office and they're emailed and
00:49:07 the press office and they're emailed and Miss Edna straightaway okay and I've got a question or two about that and but you know I think I think you well I get from what you've told us is
00:49:18 well I get from what you've told us is that you didn't seek to speak to my dad and yourself on the background I honestly can't remember okay I just what I do recall very lucidly was seeing
00:49:30 I do recall very lucidly was seeing someone with Mike and going okay that's where we are even at a distance or did you go up to them and speak to them cool sorry did you make himself known to Mike down do you make your presence known to my dad and women again
00:49:42 presence known to my dad and women again I can't record I'm very sorry okay did you seek to take direction instructions from anybody I can't call given that one
00:49:59 from anybody I can't call given that one of your roles as you've said was to support the incident commander and we've gave to your statement on page four you said again six lines up from the bottom of page four yeah if you were as you say
00:50:10 of page four yeah if you were as you say very much there to support the incident commander can you explain why you didn't approach the incident command or a Sikh and ask them what support they wanted so yeah I mean we're we've we put there to support the incident commander I think
00:50:27 maybe my language is a bit strong there because we all support one another and part of my role as a as a as a press liaison officer who's to support them to make sure there's a press strategy in
00:50:38 make sure there's a press strategy in place or see what they need next it's very hard to describe to you the scene of that incident at the beginning and
00:50:51 of that incident at the beginning and there's a huge memory blame from the beginning of that incident which is why what I've given you in the in the notes that you've got more so I think you've probably got more out more
00:51:02 probably got more out more contemporaneous notes and the notes with the photographs that give you a timeline there maybe perhaps but for this statement looking at it I think in terms of this support be interested in
00:51:14 of this support be interested in commander I'm not entirely sure where you're heading with that so if you will mind them you know I see if I can contextualize a bit more for you sorry well I'm not heading anyway really I'm
00:51:27 well I'm not heading anyway really I'm just asking you really to explain your what what happened given that you say in your statement that you are there very much is there to
00:51:38 that you are there very much is there to support the incident commander yeah my question is given that that was your purpose as you saw it why you didn't go to the incident commander and seek to take instructions or direction from them
00:51:49 take instructions or direction from them I don't know if I did the magazine is why not give not that was your purpose I can't fault sorry I can't call right now you've referred to some
00:52:00 right now you've referred to some photographs that you took the in your report your exhibit let's just go to that these I think on page three
00:52:18 and that I think is a photograph you say you took about 139 can I just ask you mr. cook where we swear we see for these photographs in this exhibit yeah and a
00:52:30 photographs in this exhibit yeah and a computerized sorry a screenshot I suppose you'd call it mm-hmm the time on the screenshot it does that do you take the time of taking
00:52:41 does that do you take the time of taking the photograph from that screenshot not so that so the way that I do it would define that I'd like to find out why I doing this when you import it into the computer when you look at properties
00:52:53 computer when you look at properties which is your box to the right it gives you the date and time that the photograph was taken yes okay say and you took this photograph yourself yes on on what on my
00:53:05 photograph yourself yes on on what on my fire service mobile phone your photos mobile phone okay and then the screenshot of the timestamp for it just taken from taken from where the screenshot in the time stamp is taken
00:53:16 screenshot in the time stamp is taken from what I'll put it through a fiber go computer so I've done is I've put those three images together for you okay and you're satisfied are you that in each case of all these photographs the
00:53:27 case of all these photographs the timestamp is accurate it is accurate at the focus and so I was it helps me to put the notes together okay now at this stage just looking at page three you can
00:53:40 stage just looking at page three you can see the extent of the fire and you can you got of an arrow which points to the south side of the building
00:53:52 south side of the building did you at that stage have any thoughts about whether about the policy that was in place for residents to stay put or
00:54:03 in place for residents to stay put or not staying there did you have any thoughts about whether it might be necessary to change that advice and to move to some kind of evacuation procedure now you took
00:54:15 evacuation procedure now you took another photograph which is fig 4 on page 4 yeah and if we have a timestamp for that at 1:40 and you put an arrow there which is a which is Lancaster
00:54:29 there which is a which is Lancaster green facing west again do you you say in your statement that
00:54:44 your initial thoughts were that if it had gone up quickly it could push up and around quickly push out on the round quick don't know that that's incorrect sorry um what was said there was if he's
00:54:55 sorry um what was said there was if he's gone up quickly poppy come out as quickly and unfortunately it's just not it's not recorded correctly in a statement I see okay did you have any thoughts about internal spread about the risk of the fire baked breaking back into the building you know I've never seen the
00:55:07 building you know I've never seen the fire do that externally on a high-rise building ever so I'm quite happy to say that I was almost in a bit of a state is shocked to see it doing what it did okay now going back to your statement at page
00:55:23 now going back to your statement at page five you say a third of the way down and all the way down you took these you took pictures and you sent the images and say
00:55:34 pictures and you sent the images and say through to the DAC as to the IC sorry yes and thought it might be that's the VA see the Assistant Commissioner and zero yeah whom I knew would be the first to pick up and likely
00:55:46 would be the first to pick up and likely be monitoring by this point including Fig six Lancaster Green I haven't shown you that but identical needs of the purposes of this question my question is
00:55:58 purposes of this question my question is do did you know where Andy Rowe was at the point you sent in these pictures no not so the reason that I sent the I see the pictures is because it was so
00:56:10 the pictures is because it was so impressive and then it been mined up with the assistive messages have been made up so quickly I felt it would be appropriate and beneficial to give him an image overview of what was actually happening
00:56:25 and did you send the pictures well let me ask you this way soon after taking the pictures do you think you sent them to an array very quickly I think yeah right did you
00:56:38 very quickly I think yeah right did you consider trying to contact him to speak to him about what you were seeing that was to Donna me and I think after I took those pictures I can't again I can't recall the exact sequence of events but
00:56:50 recall the exact sequence of events but firefight Danny Brown was trying to operate a covering jet from there at 4 to 1 3 the turns out without her and he was getting quite a lot of debris falling on him so my priority changed to
00:57:02 falling on him so my priority changed to going over to help him get out of the way it's quite hard to maneuver recovering German your own to get him away from that from that danger area okay now you say just about a third of
00:57:14 okay now you say just about a third of the way down page 5 of your statement while stood on the end is still Chester Road I could see the level of our response at that point and took in what the building was doing and the pictures I had taken and thought it was bizarre
00:57:27 I had taken and thought it was bizarre there were not enough of us now when you say there were not enough of us okay let me just answer the question sorry what do you think was lacking we didn't have the resources
00:57:38 lacking we didn't have the resources there at the time because obviously the assistance most has it gone through those machines need to attend get to the RV pay and get themselves to the incident because of the speed of it and
00:57:49 incident because of the speed of it and those appliances needing to attend at the tombola Penniman there's not enough of us at the moment but we knew we had assistance on right what do you think you needed
00:58:02 the incident commander of my decision that he wanted to assistance message about made PUMS 25 years in supplying to make that decision so as far as I was concerned and they did 25 machines in
00:58:13 concerned and they did 25 machines in two or five years at that point yeah did you know what the answer the commander intended to do with those 25 pumps I had not necessarily at that point no no did
00:58:25 not necessarily at that point no no did you try to make your business to find out
00:58:34 now you say in the next paragraph on page five I then made my way back to the command unit and sent my images to them no that's sorry that's not what I said
00:58:48 no that's sorry that's not what I said my only several images - I see run open the press office so that's wrong is it yeah okay so I think you went back to the command unit now which command unit was that it's once on the corner by one right and you
00:59:05 once on the corner by one right and you you say that towards the bottom of the page that you spoke to a man who was on the phone to his wife who was in the
00:59:16 the phone to his wife who was in the tower and you you said the very bottom of the page I took the information down yeah and passed it to the bridge head via a runner that had been set up now let me
00:59:29 runner that had been set up now let me just see if I can break this break this down show were you inside or outside the command unit when you know so he spoke to the gentleman so on the way back to the command unit the gentleman came to me and said someone's on the end of the
00:59:42 me and said someone's on the end of the phone firefighter I could remember it was was standing by waiting who had been sent from the Bridgette at the time and said I now know that he'd been sent from
00:59:54 said I now know that he'd been sent from the Bridgette is a runner I filled it the call the call was a lady I don't know who she was a car remember the flat number she told me that she at the time I believe she said she was
01:00:07 at the time I believe she said she was frightened and she could see smoke when I told her to wait and the fire service would be on their way to you I wrote down the flat number we call it and
01:00:20 down the flat number we call it and passed it to the runner said could you get it to the Bridget for me please and the runner was off right there okay no three things first of all how soon
01:00:33 no three things first of all how soon after your arrival I'm sorry let's try this again says it has seen after sending the photographs to Andi Rome because you've got a x mark yeah 140 did you have that conversation
01:00:45 yeah 140 did you have that conversation do you think with the gentleman yes well it would have been between I won oh yeah I think I won 46 the images went would
01:00:58 I think I won 46 the images went would have been between AI 146 and and I 159 a roundabout that's fine I think why why do you pick a 159 because we went down
01:01:09 do you pick a 159 because we went down to the tower around about 2 o'clock myself for the great manager Welsh right so we've got a roughly the window of about 10 minutes during which you had that discussion think so all right now oh the second thing he said I took the
01:01:20 oh the second thing he said I took the information down what did you take you down on sorry I can't remember was it did you have available to you at that point the forms which are in the no no
01:01:33 point the forms which are in the no no it would have been on my trail image have been on voice or Forest Service notepad run I've got a notepad that'll carry which was later found in the building on lead I think he was found on
01:01:44 building on lead I think he was found on the 10th floor when crews were searching like I don't know what you know I don't know how with that and I think it must have been that yeah okay sorry your notepad itself was found all the tears
01:01:56 notepad itself was found all the tears well I - and you said well after the incident was closed down I was found by you cell Cruz okay so and it hasn't got anything in there that's relevant or supply to his evidence but it's not here to Brittany on that because I'll jot
01:02:07 to Brittany on that because I'll jot down any notes about the press stuff on there
01:02:11 there third thing do you remember who the runner was that her but there was no sorry
01:02:16 sorry sure whether as a true manager or no I believe he's a firefighter but I can't thank you now your advice to the lady
01:02:29 thank you now your advice to the lady was that she should essentially stay put that correct yes yes he told us did you consider at all whether to tell her to leave her flat and make her way out no not at all for me I was aware that
01:02:44 no not at all for me I was aware that assistance was on its way the further crews I was aware that there was obviously a Bridgette because someone had been sent as a runner yeah so that told me that the structure was in place and you know if necessary be a cruiser
01:02:57 and you know if necessary be a cruiser be committed at the point that those pictures were taken of the external facade of the building line and no concept of that you know the effect that that would have on the inside of the
01:03:08 that would have on the inside of the building whatsoever not at all no
01:03:18 do you know how many did you have an impression of weather far survival guidance calls were being received by that by any command unit at that point I
01:03:29 that by any command unit at that point I can't call sorry okay do you know why or did it did you ask yourself why there was a runner at the Cu has an assumption
01:03:44 was a runner at the Cu has an assumption there's a fire survival Guardians calls and they must have known that I just don't know really from but from really truthfully honest I wasn't processing that at the time did you see any system of communication of fire survival
01:03:56 of communication of fire survival guidance in process when you've turned up at the command unit at this point Korriban now at the top of page 6 of your statement you say at approximately
01:04:11 your statement you say at approximately 2 o'clock I was at the command unit I was about to inform them that they would need more press officers the situation was escalating rapidly and I
01:04:22 situation was escalating rapidly and I felt that as an experienced commander they would need as many commanders on the ground as possible and then you say at the same time Richard Welch a group manager had arrived and naturally took over the running of the incident going to the number of appliances being
01:04:33 to the number of appliances being utilized they also increase the rank up to 40 pumps now in your contemporaneous note if I can just show you that first
01:04:46 note if I can just show you that first you say
01:04:51 two-thirds of the way down the first page yeah but you say when I arrived at the command unit GM Welch was booking in
01:05:05 say in your statement it looks as if yes and it be clearly when you got back to the command unit at ur o'clock where was
01:05:17 the command unit at ur o'clock where was he was he already there or was did he arrive after you did
01:05:24 well we're on put G M Welsch which book in E so when you booked into the unit you given me a nominal roll board I understand you there etc so whether he was already there or whether he got
01:05:36 was already there or whether he got there as I got there or has always taken the force of our Gardens call we just discussed I can't remember right now we have him on scene according to the short
01:05:47 have him on scene according to the short incident long there's no need to turn it up at 2:01 5721 that status 3 yeah no 157 21 and you say that about two
01:05:58 157 21 and you say that about two o'clock he was looking in so does that help you with your recollection about precisely what was happening on the command unit when you arrived back at so I mean it gives me a better timeline but it doesn't help with any recollection
01:06:09 it doesn't help with any recollection sorry who else do you remember was at the command unit when you came back to it at that point - about 2 o'clock I remember seeing Pete Johnson no I
01:06:24 I remember seeing Pete Johnson no I don't remember anybody else do you remember
01:06:26 remember station manager Danny Egan do you remember somebody called Anthony Peckham know what about watch manager called Norman Harrison did
01:06:41 watch manager called Norman Harrison did you hear but in your statement you say he naturally took over running of the incident as I've just read to you did you hear him take over as incident
01:06:52 you hear him take over as incident commander I can't recall but I remember him saying Mike pumps 40 and saying cover me which is that's what I already
01:07:05 cover me which is that's what I already recall do you remember that yes where were you when he said I retorted c'mon Jimmy remember that and where was he he just gone to the unit he's just got on to the end he was very very good he was very dynamic he got a very quick
01:07:19 he was very dynamic he got a very quick appraisal I remember that and he was very focused right okay um so let's just see if we can pin this down in terms of time if you would go to the short
01:07:31 time if you would go to the short incident log page 21 in the middle of the page there we've got an O to a 341 I UPG 271 make pumps 25 now that's that's
01:07:44 UPG 271 make pumps 25 now that's that's clearly a mistake I think we all accept that there should be 40 that's Oh to a three so any three minutes after your statement says you arrived and he arrived and then an O two O four twenty informative see you 7gm
01:07:58 O four twenty informative see you 7gm welch now I see now in terms of timing does that assist you with timing when he became when you when he took over as I see and said come on oh that that's the
01:08:10 see and said come on oh that that's the time that it would have been declared I say informing control and other officers and I'm sure the far ground would have been informed well however that's the time that it was locked and if you can
01:08:21 time that it was locked and if you can imagine the amount of radio traffic at the time there could have been some delay in sending the message so the timing the type big there we have the timing in terms of where what the Cu is
01:08:32 timing in terms of where what the Cu is it says there see you seven
01:08:37 do you think that you may be mistaken in your recollection about which see you number it was I went actively I can't comically exactly right okay do you remember any discussions at
01:08:53 okay do you remember any discussions at the Cu with anybody about the wisdom of maintaining the stay-put advice no as a watch manager called Norman Harrison
01:09:05 watch manager called Norman Harrison I've just mentioned to you who recalls in his statement that when he first went to the command unit and that was eight on his arrival he said he thought the statehood advice was wrong do you
01:09:18 statehood advice was wrong do you remember anything like that no okay but
01:09:23 do you remember a DAC called a Lachlan being involved I remember seeing the I see a rocking and I remember seeing di
01:09:34 see a rocking and I remember seeing di Sierra Lachlan speaking to I believe it was my doubting and possibly Brett oft I can't tell you when that was used when
01:09:48 I can't tell you when that was used when I was on my way back into the bit but I came in and out there building a few times so I can't exactly recall but I saw Andy I see a lock in there do you know do you have a recollection of
01:09:59 know do you have a recollection of whether he took over as incident commander at any point no
01:10:06 do you know whether he took over into the corner in survivors incident commander yes but can't recollect him sorry right do you remember how you found out that he'd taken over as a business event
01:10:17 he'd taken over as a business event commander not of the incident obviously owned out of it because if the subsequent performance reviews at command except I can't recall them the night can you think back and remember
01:10:28 night can you think back and remember how you knew that he'd taken over you really saw a color click now do you remember Richard Welch declaring sorry no do you remember the incident being
01:10:39 no do you remember the incident being declared a major incident no okay the short incident log has it being declared a major incident by group manager Welch at 2:06 do you remember do you remember
01:10:52 at 2:06 do you remember do you remember that does that trigger a recollection okay sorry alright do you remember having any discussion yourself with group manager
01:11:03 discussion yourself with group manager Welch about the statement advice or whether it should be changed no okay now turning to a slightly different topic into the tower you say in your
01:11:15 topic into the tower you say in your statement
01:11:21 on page six that and this is the again the same paragraph we were on the first paragraph you say he immediately relieved me of press officer duties and
01:11:33 relieved me of press officer duties and asked that I have made my way with him to the bridgehead to be appraised of the situation yeah did you go with him to the bridge net gesture made you did you go with anybody else no it was just
01:11:46 go with anybody else no it was just Richard on my cell phone no I recall okay do you remember the presence of somebody called Mulholland I know Mick my daughter I don't remember
01:11:57 I know Mick my daughter I don't remember and this one yeah okay I can't recall it right
01:12:06 now
01:12:10 at the end of that paragraph you say having observed the fire on the east side I thought if necessary we could move residents to the west side before evacuations took place does that a
01:12:22 evacuations took place does that a thought you had at the time in other words as you approached the tower and entered the town I think if I recall my
01:12:35 entered the town I think if I recall my inner monologue said it's all on one side if we have a problem with evacuation or if we need to move them to do fire fighting if we work said we could get them at least to another side I can't even really recall its ability
01:12:48 I can't even really recall its ability it's obviously crossed my mind whoever I'll communicator or not I don't know right yeah sorry so it's a is your answer so I said I'm clear when you say
01:13:00 answer so I said I'm clear when you say what you say here in your statement I thought if necessary we could move residents that are you saying that was a thought you had at that time I believe so yeah and what prompted that thought
01:13:11 so yeah and what prompted that thought you know now as the basis for it no I don't know maybe I just looked at it and as a firefighter you of it you you firefighters are incredibly good at common sense and they look at things
01:13:23 common sense and they look at things about arc I made many states Micronesia they don't part my thought processes said it's all in one side of the building at that point yes if it's affecting the inside by we can move into that side and then evacuate I didn't
01:13:34 that side and then evacuate I didn't know right I'm not hundred percent sure okay
01:13:41 but as you say you didn't communicate that fool to anybody not our coracle
01:13:51 as the German it may be necessary I will appropriate perhaps now to take a short break
01:13:55 break clog this it's a convenient time for you yes mr. Jones's well you probably welcome a short break and hook so we'll put now and have ten minutes I'll come back a quarter past three please and
01:14:07 back a quarter past three please and please don't talk to anyone about your evidence well your answer okay thank you very much
01:14:14 very much the I forgot
01:14:21 Yeah right quota for three please
01:14:32 you
01:26:50 right mr. cook Thanks thanks very much
01:27:05 right mr. cook Thanks thanks very much okay mr. cook can we now discuss you and mr. Welch group manager Welch entering the tower in both your statement and in your exhibit you say that the bridgehead was on the second floor what do you what
01:27:19 was on the second floor what do you what do you actually recall you could you recall it big on the second floor when we arrived yes yeah you do can you look at your contemporaneous notes just just
01:27:31 at your contemporaneous notes just just want to iron this out and your contemporaneous notes on the first page you say the bridgehead areas this is right to the bottom the bridgehead area was was the third
01:27:42 the bridgehead area was was the third floor yeah I believe the most manager Louisa to silver was dealing with FSG yeah when you say the third floor I
01:27:53 yeah when you say the third floor I believe when you came to do your exhibit and then your statement did you have a better thought yeah are these contemporaneous notes were written immediately after the incident these were written about to following day so
01:28:05 were written about to following day so easily over 12 hours since I first got there yes I was very tired and very confused and so to a degree my memory would have been slightly oj did there and the reason I'm asking you is not not
01:28:17 and the reason I'm asking you is not not for not just as a memory test but because the bridgehead did move up to the third floor trying to get a timing on that yeah and what I'll come to that precise point in a moment if I can but but before you got to the bridgehead
01:28:29 but before you got to the bridgehead when you arrived in the lobby how soon was that after group manager Welch booked in at the command unit roughly
01:28:42 booked in at the command unit roughly but it would have been quite soon my other notes there's a picture taken from outside yes which for grabs a picture well I was
01:28:54 yes which for grabs a picture well I was gonna ask you about that is this page 10 of your I'm not sure the exact page but I see that shows the breathing apparatus team's going up the two stairs and that's in the lobby area let's look at that that's the exhibit at page 10 yeah
01:29:06 that that's the exhibit at page 10 yeah it's figure 10 yeah there's one there is is that the picture you're referring to mr. cook okay no there's no time stamp on it then I was gonna ask you about that but that's not time to ask you yeah why is there no time stamp on it I don't know maybe a
01:29:19 time stamp on it I don't know maybe a technical difficulty getting this hard stone okay but when do you think you took that picture it would have been really let me try that a question yeah
01:29:31 really let me try that a question yeah how soon after leaving the command unit with fascination willing Minotaur I made it Vanya and you say there when we entered the building watch manager Brian Aoki was on the second floor where the
01:29:42 Aoki was on the second floor where the bridgehead had been set up yeah this is at the start straight base of the stair central stairwell various crews were being committed and the fast survival guidance was coming through yeah now I
01:29:53 guidance was coming through yeah now I want to ask you about the first survival guidance before you got to the bridgehead did you see anybody or hear anybody transmitting fast survival guidance at any point in the body sorry
01:30:05 guidance at any point in the body sorry okay did you see a watch manager on the ground floor writing flats and floor numbers on a wall no did you see or hear a watch manager in the lobby shouting
01:30:17 a watch manager in the lobby shouting fire survival guidance information up to somebody on the second floor balcony okay okay
01:30:24 okay okay now when you say in your notes here the fire survival guidance was coming through is that something you observed at the time you took this picture and
01:30:37 at the time you took this picture and and when when you entered the building or was it something you subsequently learned
01:30:49 it's very hard for me to give you an exact answer a lot room yeah okay one out of the whole thing's incredibly blurry so sir please excuse me yes but
01:31:02 blurry so sir please excuse me yes but when I'd have got to the base of the stairs and first of all the guidance was likely to have been coming to when I said the base the stairs I mean the central stairwell where mr. O'Keefe was
01:31:14 central stairwell where mr. O'Keefe was regardless it was coming through or to picked it up somehow but I couldn't tell you something now Riley sorry okay let's see how we go you were you say your statement page six
01:31:31 you were you say your statement page six second paragraph as we enter the building we were met by watch manager Brian O'Keefe at the bridgehead bridge headers position on the second floor at the base of the central stairwell he was
01:31:43 the base of the central stairwell he was in charge of the bridgehead did you rember that I remember him being there so yeah okay do you remember who was manning the entry control boards at that time I don't remember who'd have
01:31:55 that time I don't remember who'd have been crew indeed it might have been mr. Auburn actually okay now in your contemporaneous notes just to go back to where we were a moment ago
01:32:06 where we were a moment ago and indeed the sentence I read to you the bottom of page one of those you say at the very foot of the page watch manager Louisa the Silvo was dealing with FSG such manager Kensington
01:32:25 w-w-w-w-w-w-wait yes even swm O'Keefe was assisting as was a cm from
01:32:37 was assisting as was a cm from Hammersmith what I wanted to ask you about was what you saw yeah in terms of dealing with FS geez okay so this contemporaneous note here it says there WM Kensington doey W which
01:32:51 it says there WM Kensington doey W which is white watch which shows how confused there was when hot right in this no because Brian's read what tomorrow is night so for whatever reason I couldn't recall that at the time where it says the Bridget area was on the third floor
01:33:03 the Bridget area was on the third floor that was when we'd moved it up to the third floor yes and watch manager Louisa de Silva was dealing with the FS cheese right that will be fine well we'll come back to that then yeah this wasn't the second floor this was the third okay now at the
01:33:15 this was the third okay now at the second floor has just then is looking at your recollection at the second floor was do you remember that weather fan survival guidance information was being
01:33:26 survival guidance information was being recorded anywhere had the bridgehead when you went there no no is it you'd is it you recall that it wasn't or is it there you call that you cop you just can't recall atomic all so right can I
01:33:40 can't recall atomic all so right can I see if I can prompt some kind of a collection with a photograph could he be shown please M et triple zero one three zero seven four which is Jo b8 to Justin
01:33:55 zero seven four which is Jo b8 to Justin at burns statement now that is a photograph which is taken at o2
01:34:06 photograph which is taken at o2 seventeen
01:34:11 of a wall do is does this prompt a recollection of anything you saw when you enter the bridgehead with group manager Welsh okay now on page six of
01:34:26 manager Welsh okay now on page six of your statement just going back to that you say just below halfway down in that second main paragraph when we arrived I saw firefighters ready to commit etc then you could see that you say but I
01:34:38 then you could see that you say but I could also see the Brian and station manager Andy Walton for having some sort of disagreement my understanding was that Andy wanted the bridgehead move but Brian said no ignore the station manager
01:34:49 Brian said no ignore the station manager it's staying I know both Brian and Andy and not wanting to see an open disagreement between two managers in front of the fire fight as I said Andy I've got it go now where do you think
01:35:06 I've got it go now where do you think station manager Walton wanted the British had moved to I don't know but at that point I believe station most water tank over as incident commander and there was obviously a discussion between
01:35:18 there was obviously a discussion between him and mr. Welsh at some point around that but this isn't this is between Walton and and Brian Keith so just just taking it in stages you see don't know
01:35:31 taking it in stages you see don't know where he wanted it moved to when you said to station manager Walton I've got it go yeah do you know what his role was at that point in terms of the chain of command
01:35:42 command no okay was the incident commander at all at that point do you think I don't know I was going off I'm going awful memory with it right it's very vague I know Andy very well and I know Brian
01:35:53 know Andy very well and I know Brian well okay and they're both exceptional officers and it's very common on the fire ground for to be slight frustrations exchanged it really it actually reads far worse than
01:36:04 really it actually reads far worse than it is it's it's a frustration you know it's them
01:36:06 it's them then you got I've got it you go and do what you need to do and when you said to Andy I've got it gay what were you intending to do when you say I've got it what were you going to get home so no
01:36:17 what were you going to get home so no mistakes your manager as well so for me it's like only I've got this you go do we need to do right Brian what we got that I kind of sort of context and what was the upshot of the discussion you had with Brian O'Keefe at that point I
01:36:29 with Brian O'Keefe at that point I remember that story did the bridge head actually move up at that stage or did it stay where it was no because there's a period here around this time where I
01:36:43 period here around this time where I think Richard Welsh had asked me to go and see if there were any other exits or access or egress points around the building so I exited the building again
01:36:54 building so I exited the building again go and see if there were okay okay I'll come back to that in just a moment just to finish off this line in your statement you say at the bottom of page
01:37:07 statement you say at the bottom of page six on the top of at the top of page 7
01:37:12 verse rigid Welsh instructed that the board be kept 100% accurate which board is that now would have been the edge of control board yeah okay and then you go
01:37:23 control board yeah okay and then you go on to say two lines down Brian was doing an excellent job of running the bridgehead so it made sense to let him continue despite me being a station manager yeah and then you say sometimes
01:37:35 manager yeah and then you say sometimes situations can develop where there are too many people with command positions yeah trying to have input and I was conscious I was there in a support capacity yeah and you didn't want to make things worse at that point when you
01:37:48 make things worse at that point when you sent Andy Walton away I've got it go what do you think your role was no okay I'll put some context around that I think the way that the statements been taken
01:37:58 taken isn't quite right right so as as the senior officer I could have become the bridgehead commander and the point that I think I'm trying to make there is that
01:38:09 I think I'm trying to make there is that if you if you over complicate things you can cause issue with handovers and takeovers which could at that point
01:38:20 takeovers which could at that point times risk critical if there are FS G's coming in through our people being committed and the people that are there they're competent doing what they're already doing rather than breaking that at that point I'd support them until the
01:38:33 at that point I'd support them until the time was right to take over is that I see yeah I follow so you said a minute ago then you went outside the tower in order to investigate yeah Richard Welch
01:38:45 order to investigate yeah Richard Welch who told you - yeah to investigate will asked you to investigate which was access or egress routes yeah and you record that at the top of page 12 of your exhibit yeah 15 70 70 not except 79
01:38:58 your exhibit yeah 15 70 70 not except 79 you say group manager Welch asked me this is the exhibit and I'm sorry to flip back and forth the tide sees two documents this is triple zero one five
01:39:11 documents this is triple zero one five seven seven nine yeah page 12
01:39:22 so 12
01:39:32 big 12 it's faking internal internal problem oh I see no I'm sorry exhibit page 12 save the met page for a page eleven
01:39:43 save the met page for a page eleven internally yes and then at the top of the page that you say that you record there but he asked you to check here as neatly is a [ __ ] and then you say
01:39:55 neatly is a [ __ ] and then you say what conditions were like on the outside of the building and if this was the only stairwell you see that do you know why he asked you that question
01:40:08 he would need to know right if there were any other exits that we need to make sure we monitor because there could be people coming out of the building that we wouldn't be able to account for so fine by knowing the exact exit rate
01:40:23 so fine by knowing the exact exit rate one central stairwell etcetera we know that everybody coming through the engine control for the the bridgehead area that were accounting for and that's the only way I see it okay and then you say you
01:40:34 way I see it okay and then you say you went out to gather this information I can only find one stairwell so I then with check out the perimeter of the building and report on the fire conditions so you add outside you went back down through the lobby yeah and that's you know what I put
01:40:45 yeah and that's you know what I put about it that there's that slight time difference there with whether I took over the bridge it or out the discussion or difficult round okay I can't recall exactly understand but the walk round was can you check because for for for
01:40:57 was can you check because for for for mr. Welch he needs a proper appraisal and understanding of of what's going on as I said to be so he'd understands casualties and what we're doing with the briefing at price cruise and so when I went outside of the building I think I
01:41:08 went outside of the building I think I like that this it was falling tide in and it was starting to potentially compromised the ground floor which would have changed our fire fighting tactics dramatically right and you can see from
01:41:19 dramatically right and you can see from that page that you took a photograph of the north and from the north well yeah from and off the north I think
01:41:31 well yeah from and off the north I think of the building about 2:15 and that you've got the time mark for that so you say you're you hadn't been to the bridgehead very long you can you come back out to the building we've have a
01:41:42 back out to the building we've have a time lock that's one thing and I think I'm fairly in and out oh sorry yeah now when you say the text just above the photograph on 360 inspection it was clear that the fire had spread considerably and rapidly just first of
01:41:54 considerably and rapidly just first of all you did it did you do a full 360-degree inspection of the tower yes go around to the South Side's buy the
01:42:05 go around to the South Side's buy the product Children's Park which is west facing and then all the way back around again to the entrance remember correctly around the children's play park and the
01:42:18 around the children's play park and the north side for the cladding that start to fall I think he's in another image possibly on page to us yeah you know that rice and concerns for me but I
01:42:29 that rice and concerns for me but I couldn't see only in there any other exit routes at that level okay so just looking at page 12 which side do you think that was page 12 next page of the
01:42:42 think that was page 12 next page of the exhibit which is a photograph taking the 217 to two minutes later could we go just to the next finish so it just it will help me yes of course
01:42:53 it just it will help me yes of course and that's the photograph also taken a 217 yeah
01:42:57 217 yeah so I'll put down there that that's north side yes sorry it would be north side and if you see with the cladding is falling what concerns whether it would
01:43:08 falling what concerns whether it would compromise the glass that was there if we didn't do something to try and deal with it which as I say would affect how far far attached is considerably right so um you then say on page 13 yeah
01:43:27 so um you then say on page 13 yeah sorry before I ask you about you've described here actually a cellist and photographs of considerable fire spread falling cladding and cutting a a light on on the ground as you've seen it now
01:43:42 on on the ground as you've seen it now in your statement just just keep it there I'll just tell you what your statement says in the middle of page seven you say it that the what you saw
01:43:55 seven you say it that the what you saw suggested a problem with compartment ation did that sir did that was that a thought you had at the time who did your 360 as we've seen from the photographs
01:44:06 360 as we've seen from the photographs did he think at the time that there had been or was now a problem with compartment ation
01:44:17 is that my police statement yes I may be I can see that you're looking quizzical yes sorry Church I did like yeah I was trying to stay on your exhibit but let's go to the statement middle of page 7 if
01:44:33 go to the statement middle of page 7 if you're describing your photographs and you describe thicker 12 which would just looked at on page 12 I so exhibit you have seen it and you say the file had moved up and diagonally very quickly - which to me suggested a problem with
01:44:45 which to me suggested a problem with compact notation my question is did you have that thought at the time that there was a problem with compartment a ssin in the building I don't even recall saying this in my
01:44:58 I don't even recall saying this in my statement and when I look at it now I don't it wouldn't be a term that / - did generally news remember compartment ation I can only say that my police
01:45:10 ation I can only say that my police state was so emotionally distressing that it was very hard sometimes to revisit it so my apologies genuinely apologize no that's right I'm gonna try and work off your exhibit rather than
01:45:21 and work off your exhibit rather than yes sorry about that but the state lease there and I have to ask it yes sure that I'm very sorry like I wish I could help you further but there are things wrong I got really sorry oh yeah no answer did you have on your 360 any
01:45:34 no answer did you have on your 360 any thoughts about now that you could see the spread and speed of spread of the fire whether they should whether there should be any kind of evacuation strategy put into place no I wasn't thinking that okay did you have any
01:45:46 thinking that okay did you have any thoughts about whether the stay-put advice as you understood it to be remained appropriate you know now you you say in your exhibit that this is
01:46:00 you say in your exhibit that this is page 14 of the met number thirteen internally you just look at that that whilst outside I met station manager Pete Wilson done and we had a discussion
01:46:12 Pete Wilson done and we had a discussion did you know Peter wasn't gone okay you know okay where was where was he did it was he out there as soon as you came out or
01:46:20 or after you've done your 360 I don't remember I remember Pete coming from maybe the west side towards the east and I saw him near the play park and I said to him I said Pete I'm worried that more comfortable as a ground floor could we get a couple of
01:46:31 ground floor could we get a couple of machines man to put covering jets to try and protect it the pcj no worries I'll get that done right and he's a guy Pizza a very good officer and it you know we
01:46:42 a very good officer and it you know we speak to each other we've worked with each other for a few years so you know every faith that he would he would make it right happen so to speak now you say in your exhibit in the text just just
01:46:53 in your exhibit in the text just just below the pictures we can see there that you had a conversation with him about it being likely to compromise the ground floor the falling cladding compromising
01:47:05 floor the falling cladding compromising the ground floor and if that happened I'm summarizing you'd have to change firefighting tactics considerably as we'd have to commit from the outside of the building would that involve moving
01:47:16 the building would that involve moving the bridgehead to the ground floor oh absolutely that would involve coming out the building so my concern was that if the ground floor was become compromised by fire we can't have a
01:47:27 compromised by fire we can't have a bridge it there because we have to start up in a safe clean environment from breathing uprights whereas which would excuse me which would mean that we would have to potentially start remotely and go into the building which would extend
01:47:39 go into the building which would extend the time that crews would take to get anywhere and reduce their effectiveness right and then you go on to say at the end at the bottom of that page I then
01:47:52 end at the bottom of that page I then re-enter the building and on arrival at the bridge had a decision had been made to move it up to the third floor I believe yeah do you know who made that decision I would think it would have been mr. Welsh Barr couldn't be sure
01:48:04 been mr. Welsh Barr couldn't be sure okay now if in fact you were thinking that the bridge head should move down to the ground floor because of the risk no no I wasn't thinking of moving it to the
01:48:15 no I wasn't thinking of moving it to the ground floor I was concerned about protecting the ground floor okay yeah when you got to the bridgehead and and learnt that it have been made to the third floor did
01:48:26 have been made to the third floor did you have a discussion with anybody about the wisdom of moving it to the third floor having seen what you'd seen outside so one thing that I did he's any images that I took that you see here or
01:48:37 images that I took that you see here or would show to everybody within the building when I went back to give them a good idea of what was happening with the additions and the progress of conditions and the worst in their conditions so I would have I would have showed people at
01:48:49 would have I would have showed people at the time yeah I see were you involved with so I take a step back so to say where you get to the bridgehead it's still on the second floor is it no it
01:49:00 still on the second floor is it no it would have gone up to the third and I'll come back so I see see see I see so when you say in your exhibit a decision had been made to move it up yeah you got to the second floor it founders had already gone up yeah okay right right
01:49:13 gone up yeah okay right right so you hadn't because does that mean you weren't involved with the actual move from the second to the third I can recall I'll just recall vividly that we were on the third when I came back right do now
01:49:25 do now do you can you help us with the timing of the move up from the second to the third floor how soon after you're taking these
01:49:38 how soon after you're taking these photographs are to 15 to 17 did you come back into the building and find that it had been moved to the set to the third floor
01:49:45 floor it would have been straight away right so yeah okay that's helpful
01:49:57 and while I'm still on this part of your
01:50:02 exhibit just looking at page 12 figure 12 we can just get back to it when you
01:50:14 12 we can just get back to it when you took that at 2:17 did you have any thoughts about where the compartment ation had been breached just looking at what we can see and what you could see
01:50:25 what we can see and what you could see in all honesty I've never seen anything not that before right ever since the trapper were fire there looks like a diagonal knot so it looked
01:50:37 looks like a diagonal knot so it looked to me as though it was the external cladding and there is some I've never I've never seen an incident noise before did you could you see who could you
01:50:48 did you could you see who could you observe whether the fire was breaking back into apartments as it moved across the face of the building or or definitely would have reported that back in noise okay did you in fact report to
01:51:05 in noise okay did you in fact report to anybody what you'd seen as a resulting your while you were going round yeah as I say all of these images that I take that are in this document I took back into the building and I'd use them to all the images here I would use to brief
01:51:17 all the images here I would use to brief the crews that are in there and and any commanders fire sector commander or anyone that came along because it gives you the the situational awareness of how things are changing did you did you try
01:51:29 things are changing did you did you try to radio the incident commander or or Richard Welch if it was he to tell him about what you were saying maybe I don't know I also took a call from the press officer again right and to leave her
01:51:42 officer again right and to leave her that's fine message in the end force this is all coming on the side do do you know getting back to the point about the move of the bridgehead from the second to the third floor do you know how long it took them to get upper floor
01:51:55 it took them to get upper floor more or less instantaneous it's just right don't move our everything's portable ensure control boards any forward information board IEC pack anything that needs to go could be moved
01:52:07 anything that needs to go could be moved really quickly at this time so once you come back to the bridgehead and you find that it's been moved to the third floor
01:52:18 that it's been moved to the third floor pretty well our as you said after you've taken these photographs at around 2:15 2:17 do you remember any difficulty with
01:52:30 2:17 do you remember any difficulty with crews not being able to get above the 15th floor not I can recall I remember there being difficulty with with
01:52:42 there being difficulty with with everything however everyone feeling incredibly frustrated I remember crews been incredibly tired can't remember the exact floors wanna say tired I'm exhausted I thought over the exact floors I just remember
01:52:54 over the exact floors I just remember that conditions worsened and quite every quickly yeah do you remember any discussion at the bridgehead once it once you'd come back to it about about
01:53:05 once you'd come back to it about about difficulties committing crews above the 15th floor sorry okay now moving to the subject of the bridgehead white when it was on the third floor at the top of
01:53:17 was on the third floor at the top of page 14 of your exhibit and that's some 14 internally 15 of the met number you explained there that group manager Welch
01:53:29 explained there that group manager Welch asked you to oversee the britain operations and ensure that entry control boards were kept 100% accurate just to be clear that's once it's on the third floor yes okay now you then say in
01:53:45 the list that then follows that Luiza DeSilva was involved and a call to the way third of the way down you say the FSG calls were being written on the wall
01:53:56 FSG calls were being written on the wall by watch manager - Silvo yeah and that's consistent with what you'd be saw in your contemporaneous note yeah do you know or did you know where the Anessa
01:54:08 know or did you know where the Anessa FSG information she was writing up on the wall was coming from now our karma corn
01:54:13 corn let me see if I can help do you know whether it was coming via radio or through a runner on bits of paper or what what did you observe it was a very
01:54:32 what what did you observe it was a very difficult situation so I can't record that the fine details I'm sorry just can't know okay dude costing on my back then it's difficult when you saw her do
01:54:43 then it's difficult when you saw her do you actually see her writing on the wall yeah there's a picture there's an image of the of the wall that there is and that's that's on the next page just just kind of look at that in a moment but perhaps it helps to look at it now
01:54:54 perhaps it helps to look at it now actually this is page 15 internally this is figure 14 now mr. cook you comfortable carrying on for a moment yeah yeah take a break anytime you like
01:55:07 yeah yeah take a break anytime you like no thanks for asking okay now this photograph which you've referred to we can go straight to this is and if you no need to include the
01:55:18 is and if you no need to include the text just above the picture yeah on page 15 internally of your exhibit you say as the bridgehead was being evacuated I took pictures of the FSG calls that had been written on the wall the time of
01:55:30 been written on the wall the time of this evacuation was 308 approximately now you took this picture did you Gavin you say did and the time of it is as you say oh three away
01:55:41 say oh three away got them the Microsoft screenshots of that yeah there's a what there's a wider picture of that which I'd like to show
01:55:54 picture of that which I'd like to show you which is @m ET triple zero one six one five six two five yeah is that the same information yes you were sort of seeing a watch manager DaSilva right up okay that's when she was writing it do
01:56:07 okay that's when she was writing it do you remember do you remember where she was getting the information from no you don't watch manager Watson this morning said that he was acting as a runner but
01:56:18 said that he was acting as a runner but he was he was distributing pieces of paper to crews giving them their destinations effectively where they were to be deployed do you remember that now you've said it there is a recollection
01:56:30 you've said it there is a recollection but it's very vague right and what is the recollection of what you've just told us seems running with mystified okay and there's lots of that I'm afraid where people will come to me say do you
01:56:42 where people will come to me say do you remember this and then suddenly I do but it's not my memory it's something that someone else has given me if he like okay did you did you have okay you say
01:56:56 okay did you did you have okay you say through the picture those time of the evacuation was a 308 what was the purpose of your taking the photograph do you remember so to make sure that we had all of the information remove the bridge head down make sure
01:57:09 remove the bridge head down make sure that we had all of the information in pitch form so we could make sure that we cross-referenced it and rewrote it if we needed to we'll put it on forward informations whatever we needed to do at the new bridgehead we have that information captured right okay
01:57:23 information captured right okay I'm going to come back to that in a moment because I want to pursue that answer a little bit more in a bit more detail before I do can I just ask you what while you were on the bridgehead how long were you there for already sure
01:57:38 how long were you there for already sure so you does this help that you go to the bridgehead as he told us pretty much up pretty much straight away after coming back into the building having taken the
01:57:49 back into the building having taken the external photographs at 217 and the bridgehead then moves down from the third floor at 308 were you there the whole time will you at the bridgehead on the third floor for that whole period I don't know
01:58:01 floor for that whole period I don't know there were casualties coming down the stairs and all sorts of things going online and you think I'll put it in my notes that what happened with the third floor bridgehead would it's a slightly
01:58:12 floor bridgehead would it's a slightly different entrance to the rest of the floors so she walked up the stairs the door was to the left to the left now I need a break now personnel sorry
01:58:24 now I need a break now personnel sorry literally
01:58:25 literally sorry you've recycle me back seven did a bit with the casual what do you so wait I'm Georgia break now Johnson absolutely yes there's a place yeah sorry no that's quite right you know you worry about
01:58:36 quite right you know you worry about that new take ten days would you like to go in the after seal the class Q and not P so talk to the Royals
01:58:56 just a minute before we break just give me an idea just give me an idea of where
01:59:07 me an idea just give me an idea of where we're getting ourselves I got a fair bit too gay but I'm gonna try and keep it down to no more than 40 more minutes swell it's totally not gonna resume until four o'clock yes and they never
01:59:22 until four o'clock yes and they never want to put this to cook under on Reno no there are number of things I need to choice really yeah well that they know that absolutely I understand that but let me just see if I can keep it as short as half an hour
01:59:33 I can keep it as short as half an hour but and I obviously have there are a number of things I need to try when we resume I think I still need to ask in these comfortable they may you may know
01:59:44 these comfortable they may you may know we'll have to see how we go right well well do deal with that at four o'clock yes very good thank you okay four o'clock
01:59:59 you
02:11:01 [Music] remember stir cooked how you feeling yes I'm fine thanks for that break it's really appreciate mr. millet tells me he's got about 30 or 40 minutes worth of
02:11:15 he's got about 30 or 40 minutes worth of questions so my question is do you feel able to go on collect millions of time as you see things at the moment because if you don't we could always resume tomorrow but you might prefer to finish
02:11:27 tomorrow but you might prefer to finish tonight let's press on Sarah Cho we've see how you get yeah all right thank you very much it's what I function easy much appreciated can I take you back to figure 12 of your exhibit on page 12
02:11:39 figure 12 of your exhibit on page 12 internally yeah just have it in front of you it's the picture that you took there have you said earlier on when we were discussing this together and this is
02:11:51 discussing this together and this is page 193 at lines one to six in the transcript that you you took the images back into the building and use them to brief the crews in there and any commanders far sector commanders can I
02:12:04 commanders far sector commanders can I just ask you casting your mind back but when you got to the bridgehead on the third floor did you show anybody there the photographs of that photograph particularly that you taken outside I
02:12:15 particularly that you taken outside I believe rights believe so the the reason for taking the images were not actually as I've turned out from lying statement but they were as I say there was a
02:12:26 but they were as I say there was a increased situational awareness for the crews operating inside the building did you show that do you remember who you showed those pictures to no I would have showed them to people at the bridgehead
02:12:37 showed them to people at the bridgehead who would have been present I don't know and do you remember the sharing a name you said you don't remember but of the far sector commanders do you have a recollection of showing these pictures
02:12:48 recollection of showing these pictures to group manager Welch no I couldn't I couldn't be ok exact and what about Andy Walton I'll come be exact ok now in your statement
02:13:02 come be exact ok now in your statement use if you go to page 8 of your statement in the middle of that page you describe how station manager Louise of
02:13:13 describe how station manager Louise of the silver had been writing FSG on the wall and then just below halfway down that paragraph you say Richard Welch but instructed me to keep the information up to date yeah and to act as his single
02:13:25 to date yeah and to act as his single point of contact yeah when you say that are you referring to the FSG information on the wall no the information as I recall Green Man
02:13:43 no the information as I recall Green Man is a Welsh was had a lot of things to consider that night and he dealt with him in my opinion very well it's just my opinion but he would have been looking for me to keep him thoroughly appraised
02:13:54 for me to keep him thoroughly appraised of what was happening if there was any changes definitely he was he was particularly interested in making sure I think I've not said it somewhere else that the boards were a hundred percent
02:14:05 that the boards were a hundred percent accurate when you or our firefighters were yes he said that at the foot of page six yeah I think he's the information not to die actually single point of contact so making sure that I
02:14:17 point of contact so making sure that I was taken in as many information streams as I could and giving him concise information for him to process through spans of control right save go into the next sentence as you do in your
02:14:29 next sentence as you do in your statement you say therefore when crews came back down with casualties I needed it they concise debrief from them and to get them out yeah did
02:14:41 get them out yeah did first of all did you do that while you were on the bridge there so again if you if you look at the actual paragraph where it says situation
02:14:54 actual paragraph where it says situation was parented but controlled however the noise levels outside the bridges start to rise which is an indication that people in Kazakhstan by the way down the motions of people go through high roads of person we stayed focused and forthright concentrating the job in hand
02:15:06 forthright concentrating the job in hand that's what that paragraphs about where it says therefore when crews came back there were casualties I need to concise debrief from them and to get them out so there was when firefighters report to a
02:15:19 there was when firefighters report to a bridgid and they walk into a building that's doing that their Adrenaline's naturally high they're ready to go in and do a job which many other people couldn't do and they're charged and
02:15:31 couldn't do and they're charged and ready so part of my job to support those officers on the Bridgette that were already carrying on those operations that died was to keep that bridgehead calm controlled make sure that the
02:15:43 calm controlled make sure that the information flow was concise and that people that didn't shouldn't be there anymore we're out and into the safe area one of the things that I did as well was to break into one of the flats or
02:15:54 to break into one of the flats or contain which number it was and to get breathing apparatus crews to I described it stacking up but to assemble within those flats and we would call them out briefed them and send them on their way
02:16:05 briefed them and send them on their way because it's a very small area very tight compact in those lobbies and it's really important to keep that noise down for those FSG calls that would have been coming through whilst i can't recall the
02:16:17 coming through whilst i can't recall the nature of any of the calls keeping that noise down ensures that that information is exchanged easily and readily that information so because we know so critical to making sure we save
02:16:29 know so critical to making sure we save the lives of people that you know we can easily get this lots of exchanges of information radios cracking in and noise and so that was that that paragraph there if you like or that passages is
02:16:40 there if you like or that passages is kind of more what that's intended to mean well well I'm what I want to explore with you is is your debriefing the crews yeah say first of all
02:16:51 the crews yeah say first of all when a crew came down or whether with or without a casualty yeah were you able effectively to debrief them so what would have been happening where I've said debrief I
02:17:02 happening where I've said debrief I wouldn't have been doing that personally the entry control officers will be doing the briefs in the debriefs so as they come through they'll know where they've been by the nature of what was logged on
02:17:13 been by the nature of what was logged on the board
02:17:14 the board the FSG calls that Luisi would have been dealing with she'd have known where they've been dispatched and that we've been noticed on the board as well so they'll give you a much clearer picture of that the entry control officer debriefs make sure the information is
02:17:25 debriefs make sure the information is relayed to the FSG people that even the FSG and that and that the the information goes where it needs to go one of the problems that we had is that fire Survival Guide is called of this
02:17:38 fire Survival Guide is called of this scale it was was really difficult to deal with and the constant flow of crews in and out in and out in and out with with a really rapidly deteriorating
02:17:49 with a really rapidly deteriorating situation and and the sheer volume of falsifiable guidance it was it was it was a really difficult situation to to
02:18:00 was a really difficult situation to to manage and support people wouldn't and all that supposed to be it's very hard for me to relay that or or portray that to people but it was hard and we did the
02:18:11 to people but it was hard and we did the very best we could to keep it as controlled as we could on the night and the crews that were there doing it with with just fantastic and just just breaking that a little bit when a crew
02:18:24 breaking that a little bit when a crew came down while you at the bridgehead yeah while it was on the third floor yeah the debriefing with the crews a you or was it the we would have in the end your control officer sometimes Brian
02:18:35 your control officer sometimes Brian O'Keefe would have been involved to get that overview that often the crew would report before they got anywhere near the doorway they may have come down shouting that they had a category that would have
02:18:47 that they had a category that would have been intercepted by other crews and take take that person to say fare as quickly as possible give in to medical treatment etc so it's very very very very frantic sure in terms of gathering
02:19:00 frantic sure in terms of gathering information about the mission the rescue mission from the firefighters yeah was was the result of that recorded them by anybody on the bridgehead so the entry
02:19:12 anybody on the bridgehead so the entry control board has a comment box if you like and the entry control officers would be saying that this crew of two this crew of three bracket them off and
02:19:24 this crew of three bracket them off and saying we'll be going to the tenth floor to flat 169 or wherever it may be I'm obviously just made that number up so you know go to there that would also be recorded the FSG information would be
02:19:36 recorded the FSG information would be going through the engine control and they've been directing from there sort of thing does that make sense yeah yeah and did you see anybody on the bridge head recording in any way the results of
02:19:48 head recording in any way the results of a particular deployment did you see it
02:19:57 and when you say a particular deployment he's so of a firefighter deployment of VA deployment into the building when they came down and got their debrief from it with somebody on the bridgehead
02:20:10 from it with somebody on the bridgehead did you did you observe with your eyes and ears yourself anybody on the bridge had recording the results so whether it was successful or unsuccessful exam
02:20:21 was successful or unsuccessful exam what's flats were cleared or or we knew that we rescued somebody I think that the the FSG calls on the wall would have
02:20:32 the the FSG calls on the wall would have been marked off from there right how are they marked I don't know you'd have to ask easy to say oh bugger I would I would say they would have been ticked or crossed out but I can't be did you see that happening I can't be sure I really
02:20:43 that happening I can't be sure I really can't recall that next question is that once a results a concern of a deployment of the particular be a group was known
02:20:54 of the particular be a group was known was it then communicated to anybody outside the bridgehead
02:21:03 I don't know I can't recall I'm sorry okay now in your statement on page ten
02:21:16 okay now in your statement on page ten you refer to in the third paragraph you refer to the fact that at some point you say Pat Goulbourne yeah a group manager
02:21:29 say Pat Goulbourne yeah a group manager arrived at took over management of the bridgehead where was the bridgehead when he arrived do you remember that was on the third floor on the third but Pat arrived
02:21:37 arrived how soon before it moved down to the ground floor did Pat Goldwyn arrive and take and take over I couldn't tell you did he actually take over yes he did right yeah and then you go on to say
02:21:50 right yeah and then you go on to say Andy Walton returned and said they've been a breach the fire moved beneath us and the bridgehead needed to be moved to the ground that law sorry it wasn't an T wall that was Richard Welsh that was right as Magnus question that was Welch
02:22:02 right as Magnus question that was Welch was it right yeah now and at that stage and I said I'd come back to it and I'm now doing say you say you refer to a photograph you took of the FSG
02:22:13 photograph you took of the FSG information yeah but that you said in the last sentence of this very paragraph and that's figure 14 and we've seen this before I've shown you this already that's a 308 you said I think that this
02:22:28 that's a 308 you said I think that this was in order to take the information down to the ground floor can I just show you another picture which came back to it ME ME T triple zero one five six two five can you tell us can you identify
02:22:42 five can you tell us can you identify the individual we see in that picture I just not just a note burn what yeah okay so can we time the move of the
02:22:57 so can we time the move of the bridgehead to the ground floor at about this time 308 yeah it seems to be moving into Catawba with him so yeah I would say okay I mean nothing okay we're mean
02:23:08 say okay I mean nothing okay we're mean you and I can look at and speculate but do you have a recollection of taking this photograph for the purposes of moving downstairs
02:23:18 myself yes yes yeah that was the purpose so it was a game that the evacuation was wasn't although or than pursuing our evacuation but they're moving down in
02:23:29 evacuation but they're moving down in the Bridget wasn't entirely straightforward we've received and I can't remember how but we intercepted i intercepted a fire survival guidance report on the floor
02:23:41 survival guidance report on the floor that we were on and because the crews were moving out myself and group manager Golborne broke into the flat searched ourselves right so it's not to impede with the moving
02:23:53 so it's not to impede with the moving down at the bridgehead okay right so there's there's lots I suppose the point of turn around says a lot going on still
02:24:04 of turn around says a lot going on still you know because I just didn't ask you do you know what happened to the FSG information that you'd photograph that we see in this photograph I believe that
02:24:16 we see in this photograph I believe that it was all communicated back down to the ground floor however later in the incident a notice that there was FSG being written near the entrance but the
02:24:28 being written near the entrance but the main entrance I believe Glynn Williams and Pete worden and the board's themselves with the base of the stairs I can't recall if the FS
02:24:39 of the stairs I can't recall if the FS changer at the base the stairs if well at that point I just can't remember so just to be clear the base of the stairs the wall you were talking about the wall there the Ute the wall being used to record information now when you go into
02:24:50 record information now when you go into the lobby area and you be went through the main the main doors into into Grand Vitara on the left on the wall I believe was where there was some effort jeez I definitely saw them it's
02:25:03 effort jeez I definitely saw them it's like the point of coming down where the information was to transpire so I don't know again [Music]
02:25:10 [Music] maybe watch merger - Silvo would remember okay yeah let me just put a couple of pictures to you when the
02:25:22 couple of pictures to you when the timing isn't right it well as we can do this we could be shown inq two five three which is a photograph of the blobby taken it three sixteen twenty
02:25:36 blobby taken it three sixteen twenty nine and adjusted yeah can you help us with where you think on that in on that picture you saw FST information recorded that had come down from the third floor
02:25:47 that had come down from the third floor yeah so can you see top right someone without a helmet pointing at the wall yes that's Glynn Williams right I believe I might might not be right he
02:26:00 believe I might might not be right he looks like him but I can't quite make out so if it's not Euclid I'm sorry but that looks like where it was written and there are two senior officers with him
02:26:14 there are two senior officers with him one of them I think is there's a watch manager and Watson quite lightly so I said it yeah but some yes we had some evidence this morning do you don't hear the other one was do you know sorry and
02:26:26 the other one was do you know sorry and then the other photograph would be at
02:26:40 it's about the same time a photograph inq 242 this is at oh 3 17 22 adjusted yeah that's the foot is that the foot of
02:26:52 yeah that's the foot is that the foot of the stairs that you're referring to yes right and you see a green wall there do you remember seeing any FSG information recorded on the green wall I couldn't recall and be you know truthful y-yeah
02:27:05 recall and be you know truthful y-yeah would be able to tell right were you aware of the FSG system that had been set up in the lobby once the bridgehead had moved down to the ground floor not now I don't know
02:27:22 the ground floor not now I don't know exactly
02:27:23 exactly okay right I've got a few more separate topics just to cover with you yeah you're right to keep going I'm fine thank you okay in your statement the page 16 you say
02:27:43 this is on still on the subject of FSG I'm sorry I'm not quite changing yet a quarter of the way down that page you say frustration was generally building a
02:27:55 say frustration was generally building a building another example of this was people fundin and Dean Williams starting their information war for the FSGS near the front door away from the bridgehead this was contrary to the system that was
02:28:06 this was contrary to the system that was already in place and being managed by the bridgehead commander can you explain what you mean no I can't I'm terribly sorry but that part the statement that seems like all right
02:28:19 statement that seems like all right there was there were frustrations building because everybody was trying their hardest to do the most that we could and those frustrations are I would say a natural for firefighters that want
02:28:32 say a natural for firefighters that want to do the best to help everybody the information the FSGS near the front door away from the Bridgette correct that's what I remember right contrary to a system that's already being in place and
02:28:43 system that's already being in place and money's brought a Bridgette come on no I don't even recall saying that so I'm really sorry okay that's all right now can I then turn to the subject of smoke extraction on page 12 of your
02:28:55 smoke extraction on page 12 of your statements if you look at the buzzes it's the brilliant long paragraph six lines up from the bottom of the
02:29:07 lines up from the bottom of the paragraph you say it was at the point we moved the bridgehead to the ground-floor that I noticed that the smoke extraction system was not working properly this was situated on the ground floor and visible
02:29:18 situated on the ground floor and visible from the new location of the bridgehead yeah I knew it was not working properly because lights were flashing but there was no time to deal with it can you just
02:29:30 was no time to deal with it can you just tell us where the lights were that were useful flashing no sorry were they inner you were they in a panel or unit no I could tell you I just remember the spike extraction system being there and it looked like it was
02:29:41 being there and it looked like it was near the lift doors if I remember rightly right and it was flashing as if to say I would assume thinking back a fault something like that right and it
02:29:52 fault something like that right and it wasn't working and it wasn't working I could see it wasn't working and there's no time to deal with it so I saw that there was one present because we're always looking for fixed firefighting installations and obviously if a smoke
02:30:03 installations and obviously if a smoke extraction system had been working in the if it was I'm not even sure we were as designed for but if it had been working I'm sure it would have been an assistance do you know whether anybody
02:30:14 assistance do you know whether anybody who tried to operate the smoke extractor system I know that somebody tried to operate a smoke extraction system but it's not from memory that's from knowing what's gone on an inquiry no that's not so yes and so I didn't know okay would
02:30:29 so yes and so I didn't know okay would you open in a normal case expect somebody at an incident someone from the fire brigade lfb had an incident and know how to operate the smoke extraction system well there would be some things
02:30:41 system well there would be some things to take into consideration after smoke extraction system could be automatic and would have been triggered with an automatic fire alarm automatic panel but we do need to manage it because it would
02:30:52 we do need to manage it because it would go in it change it can affect our conditions within there and could potentially make things worse could my cream ever need to be managed right yeah now we've seen from the some of the pictures I showed you that there looks
02:31:03 pictures I showed you that there looks like there was some smoke in the lobby at the time when the bridge had moved down to the ground floor did that indicate anything to you about whether the smoke extraction system was working properly or not I didn't feel that the
02:31:15 properly or not I didn't feel that the smoke extraction system was working and I remember at the time yes there was smoke in the lobby and it did make things more difficult but as I said
02:31:28 things more difficult but as I said earlier crews need to start in what we call safe air so clear clean clear air we weren't able to do that and I think that's that's an indicator of the fact that we were in the building when when
02:31:40 that we were in the building when when actually really we we probably shouldn't have been and when we're doing everything we could to carry on from there you know yeah now at the bottom of page 12 just below the bit I've been
02:31:52 page 12 just below the bit I've been showing you but you at the end of that paragraph in the last sentence you say
02:32:03 paragraph in the last sentence you say that the purpose obvious that's the system is to actuate and draw smoke out of a building and they should have kept the stairwell there it failed what do you say it failed are you drawing a
02:32:15 you say it failed are you drawing a conclusion or do you know why I are going I think that's just a word in it's a statement no I've got no ability to tell you if it failed or not I can just tell you that it wasn't work right now
02:32:27 tell you that it wasn't work right now immediately below that you then turn to the subject of a special entry response team vehicle with a piece of equipment called a positive pressure ventilation fan you discussed calling one up with
02:32:39 fan you discussed calling one up with Richard impact Golborne Richard Welch than yourself and the ceiling of that see the pattern Richard
02:32:48 did you remember actually calling for a PPV I'm really sorry but I need to take
02:32:59 PPV I'm really sorry but I need to take some advice before I comment on this there's a security classification on the things that we do right so I'm terribly sorry okay well you've referred to it in the statement yeah mr. Miller's question
02:33:10 the statement yeah mr. Miller's question is did you did you remember either calling for Lord Duman but thinking about calling for it that cumbia
02:33:26 and let's income statement and I understand that serie right by doing this of a voice he'll apologize or I
02:33:38 this of a voice he'll apologize or I will let me see if I can get to it a different way um can I also you delivered the short incident log and can I take you to the
02:33:51 incident log and can I take you to the time dead tree of 307 56 I'm not gonna ask you that many questions about it I just want to see what you know about it as oh three oh seven fifty six top of
02:34:07 as oh three oh seven fifty six top of page 24 where the message is a turning out message scrt to proceed with PPV to incident now this is in the LF these
02:34:18 incident now this is in the LF these short incident log it's been invited to the inquiry yeah we've had it for a number of weeks I'm assuming that this is something you would be able to help us with do you know anything about that
02:34:32 us with do you know anything about that message nah nah do you recall there's this prompt a recollection of calling for a PPV and it's timing
02:34:49 No do you know whether the PPV arrived
02:34:58 not me he wants to you about the ser t piece of equipment
02:35:05 yeah the PPV did arrive here do you remember when no do you member where it was put yes where I think they tried to use it to clear the ground floor right
02:35:19 use it to clear the ground floor right it wasn't successful I was going to ask you was it effective like no wood wood more PP these have helped no I think
02:35:31 more PP these have helped no I think they would but they're not wouldn't really be qualified to comment who would be qualified to assist us with this question of PPV subject to any I'm not sure I'm sure that someone will be able
02:35:42 sure I'm sure that someone will be able to point my point inquire in the correct Hirsch okay now moving to a different topic page 13 you say in the second
02:35:56 topic page 13 you say in the second paragraph at the same time and this is at the same time as I think the discussion of the PPV from the new bridgehead I began to brief the oncoming
02:36:08 bridgehead I began to brief the oncoming crews who are about to start the new wave of rescues of flat clearances we knew at this point that we would have to start working out of policy now where
02:36:19 start working out of policy now where where were you physically positioned to start briefing those crews do you remember yes so when when crews were coming through the engine control at the base of the stairs I would assist in in
02:36:30 base of the stairs I would assist in in briefing or sort of group brief of people to explain to the firefighters that the conditions were unlike anything we've experienced before and they were
02:36:41 we've experienced before and they were they were to be asked to potentially step into operational discretion which means outside of policy and so therefore they needed to really focus right did you give them
02:36:54 really focus right did you give them fire survival guidance details in other words flats purses as I didn't know you who did you remember No so the brief what was the briefing to the crews you
02:37:07 what was the briefing to the crews you gave them again I think we talked about briefings is as I say it's more about telling the crews almost as a group as opposed to individually so the entry
02:37:19 opposed to individually so the entry control officer will still commit the briefs I want you to do this and when you see that with the incident commander on the Brigitte commodify sets come on I wasn't doing that always in ensuring that the crews were well aware of the
02:37:31 that the crews were well aware of the circumstances that they were about to look into because they were going into extreme danger I see so to summarize your evidence just now are you saying that your briefs were really generic rather than FSG specific yeah they
02:37:45 rather than FSG specific yeah they weren't they weren't specific brief right yeah and do you know where at that stage the VA Andrew control officer was
02:37:56 stage the VA Andrew control officer was getting the specific fast survival guidance details from nurse or you don't okay
02:38:09 do you know or do you remember how at the time the decision was made as to who should be deployed wearing SD ba and who should be deployed wearing edpa that's
02:38:21 should be deployed wearing edpa that's something that the fire sets commander Bridget commander would have devised that planned themselves I can't recall what it was and who was that person that would have been Richard Welsh and Pat Colborne that would have come up with
02:38:33 Colborne that would have come up with that okay
02:38:34 that okay right can I show you a picture which
02:38:47 stay with me
02:38:58 which is a meaty triple zero one five eight one five which is some exhibited
02:39:11 eight one five which is some exhibited to Louisa two silvers witness statement was LDS four and this is a picture taken on and it is believed at the moment the
02:39:23 on and it is believed at the moment the ground floor but we will have to explore that further and you can see on on the wall someone has written above ten EDB a below 10s DBA first of all do you know
02:39:35 below 10s DBA first of all do you know who wrote that there secondly do you remember a discussion about splitting the deployment of EDB a two above floor ten below floor ten SDB edge you
02:39:48 ten below floor ten SDB edge you remember that discover little on page 13 in your second paragraph you do go on to say in the sixth line down from the
02:40:00 say in the sixth line down from the start of that paragraph at that stage I think this is when you'll starting to brief crews the crews were only carrying the s DBA which meant they couldn't go beyond the sixth floor depending on how
02:40:13 beyond the sixth floor depending on how well it was being used didn't say that this at that stage which is a think am i right when the bridgehead on the ground floor is starting to operate how much availability of EDB a did you have do
02:40:28 availability of EDB a did you have do you think
02:40:35 okay was there a time when you suddenly had good availability for a DBA pdbs carried on fire rescue units so as the fire rescue units started to become
02:40:46 fire rescue units started to become available then the EDB I would have come into the lobby area and then they would have been over to one out from there now at one point you decide that you and Pat Goulbourne and Richard wells should dom
02:40:58 Goulbourne and Richard wells should dom be a and go into the tower no no did it make just you yeah right on your own no with a quarry manager Ben Gallagher from Paddington okay and you crewed up with
02:41:10 Paddington okay and you crewed up with crew manager Ben gala who did you pick him or did somebody else pick him now I volunteered and okay okay alright now we have his story we have your tally out time with the telemetry data as oh
02:41:21 out time with the telemetry data as oh four oh four twenty seven does that sound about right to you couldn't tell us origin okay when you say tally out well taking your tally out of your be a kit okay so booking in if you like yeah
02:41:33 kit okay so booking in if you like yeah I four-foot nice how I can if I won't be sure but now in your statement or in your exhibit let say a page eighteen but just go back to that you describe
02:41:49 going up
02:41:56 to the fifth floor in the second paragraph and you say conditions were hot and fire seemed apparent all around we saw another career and I believe it
02:42:10 we saw another career and I believe it was Clint this form on the floor had been cleared what were the conditions are the stairwell like do you remember
02:42:22 so I came to put some context around of it the reason that I wore breathing apparatus was to help the Bridget and fire sector commander by going up and giving them a thorough appraisal of how
02:42:34 giving them a thorough appraisal of how conditions are deteriorating the inside so that was really clearly there was my brief was to go up to try and see what was going on to get a clearer picture crews that were coming down who were thoroughly exhausted and they made a
02:42:47 thoroughly exhausted and they made a decision because I've got a little more incident command experience that I'd be able to give a clearer picture if that was my only duty conditions were were
02:42:59 was my only duty conditions were were poor they'd really really degenerated really degenerate hated it very very quickly on the stairwell is hard to tell because once you're wearing be a
02:43:10 because once you're wearing be a Allrecipes protective equipment you have got some protection yes would it have been respirable I'm not sure I'm genuinely not sure okay and
02:43:21 not sure I'm genuinely not sure okay and then you say on the sixth floor you say that we were told there was a flat that had somebody in it how are you told that
02:43:34 had somebody in it how are you told that was there it was there any communication I can't recall but it would I would I would think it would have come through on the radio at that point or it could have been another crew that had come out and said we've been trying to get in one
02:43:45 and said we've been trying to get in one of the issues that we had was we couldn't I mean we tried very very hard to gain access to the flat but the conditions it was very tight we were using an enforcer the conditions were so difficult that it didn't take very long
02:43:58 difficult that it didn't take very long before you were pretty exhausted okay I
02:44:04 think my question was really about communications how you got that message do you remember how cars I call it now sorry okay okay
02:44:18 sorry okay okay you say at the bottom of page 13 though there were other problems this is your statement I'm sorry other problems arising namely this is with the dry
02:44:29 arising namely this is with the dry riser and you go on to say in the third line the massive problem at Grenfell was that all the floors were compromised so there was no safe place to set it up
02:44:40 there was no safe place to set it up yeah
02:44:41 yeah was there a particular problem with water pressure thing that you've had I experienced no water pressure when I was on the sixth floor the experience you didn't have any low water pressure so
02:44:53 didn't have any low water pressure so not wobbly there was some water but not much so in terms of pressure because the joy riser outlets were within the lobby area so not in the stairwell but in the
02:45:05 area so not in the stairwell but in the lobby itself yes and the lobbies were consumed by fire quite often you were you were asking crews to go in to potentially try and plug into a draw a riser outlet in a compartment that's a
02:45:18 riser outlet in a compartment that's a lie so that compromises quite dramatically also draw a riser systems and I'm not fire engineer my understanding of draw a riser systems is
02:45:29 understanding of draw a riser systems is that we use a couple of outlets and they'll be sufficient when you're trying to use outlets on every floor they wouldn't possibly be sufficient I see okay did you have any particular
02:45:41 okay did you have any particular problems with the mains pressure not I can recall thinking
02:45:57 okay um
02:46:02 now you say you know been Gallaher yeah did he do you remember him ever ever discussing anything with you about a task to go to the roof with ropes Nana I not told her didn't have a bad
02:46:14 not told her didn't have a bad conversation thank you
02:46:22 and then finally just a timing point I think if you go to page 18 of your statement you say after and this is
02:46:34 statement you say after and this is after fixing some poses once it was fixed again we were in a position to move the bridgehead up again to the third floor where it was based initially yeah this water was restored and there
02:46:45 yeah this water was restored and there was a new bridgehead command team of group managers Graeme Spooner and Ali by this point the time was roughly between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. do you remember who
02:46:56 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. do you remember who manned the bridgehead at that point I could remember it was crew in the bridge at night you remember who made the decision to go up to the bridgehead at that point no sorry remember who the incident commander was
02:47:07 remember who the incident commander was at that point no I'm sorry okay do you know whether he was still carrying out rescues at that point No
02:47:23 mr. cook you'll be glad to know I've got no further questions for you and can I just say how grateful I am to you for your assistance coming to the inquiry today and answering my questions it's been most helpful thank you very much well mister I have
02:47:35 thank you very much well mister I have to add my thanks to you as well I'm sorry there's been a disagreeable experience at times but we really do benefit from having your recollection and your account of that evening and
02:47:46 and your account of that evening and they're very good things you've become it thank you very much Parker helps right would you like to use care of the ocean thank you thank you very much indeed I'm sorry we kept you rather
02:47:57 indeed I'm sorry we kept you rather later
02:48:09 yes mr. mr. chairman that is the witness evidence for today tomorrow we have two new witnesses yes we have watch manager Sadler and watch manager de Silva
02:48:21 Sadler and watch manager de Silva morning and afternoon respectively it would I think assist if we took the safe step of starting at 9:30 tomorrow morning if that's not inconvenient to
02:48:34 morning if that's not inconvenient to you witnesses and does that give us a reasonable prospect of finishing yes in that case I think it would be wise to do
02:48:45 that case I think it would be wise to do that I think very much Jenai I don't suppose at 9:30 start is very congenial but it's not if it helps the witness as we thought with mr. cook get through during the day I think it's a good way
02:48:56 during the day I think it's a good way of doing yeah that's very grateful thank you we did it last night in tomorrow thank you very much
02:49:10 you