Further LFB evidence (26 July 2018 Pt 1 of 2)

Full transcript

00:12:31 good morning mr. southern good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing as you can see we're going to hear further from the facility the next williams de silva last night we were about to go up

00:12:45 silva last night we were about to go up to the bridge head on the third floor yes they can I now turn to that subject could you please go to your witness statement of page six and halfway down page six you say when we were on the

00:13:02 page six you say when we were on the second floor I don't know when a call came to move the bridge head to the third floor I didn't make that decision I'm not sure who did I was conscious

00:13:14 I'm not sure who did I was conscious that I needed to take the FIB with me and that the entry control officers couldn't miss anyone going in or out there's a constant stream of crews been committed and then returning I wanted to be sure that we could move without anyone getting a mist from either of the

00:13:26 anyone getting a mist from either of the boards you say either of the boards at the point there of moving up did you have two boards or more than two boards it was at least two boards roughly three

00:13:39 it was at least two boards roughly three okay and those are the fi fi B's are they oh sorry no and nobody had to control boards right now I see okay how many fi bees did you have at that stage just the one just the one yeah okay at

00:13:53 just the one just the one yeah okay at the point of moving up from second floor to the third floor in what form was the FSG information that you moved with you

00:14:05 FSG information that you moved with you at that point I had the forward information board which I was collecting the information on and that's why I took with me okay okay there wasn't any writing on the

00:14:17 okay there wasn't any writing on the wall which you had to copy down and take out not that I had written right and now okay now you say that in the next paragraph that

00:14:31 paragraph that in the third line the same officers were on the third floor bridgehead with the addition of Greek Mataji Goulbourne and station manager cook just looking down there in terms of the timing of the move

00:14:46 there in terms of the timing of the move where they were they there before you arrived or did they go up to the third floor with you I couldn't be sure for certain and I'm certain that they were there on the third floor right whether

00:14:59 there on the third floor right whether they were with us at the second floor I don't report okay what would Goulbourne and cook doing do you know I think group manager Golborne

00:15:10 manager Golborne was sent to be bridgehead commander and I don't know what station manager cooks role was at that time and he was certainly present on the third floor right now just in times of the movie in

00:15:23 right now just in times of the movie in terms of timing of the move we've got a number of candidates about so about two 15 to 20 sort of range seems to have been what we've been told so far just

00:15:34 been what we've been told so far just asking you do you remember whether at the time of the move you had heard whether the incident had become a bit declare a major incident I wasn't aware

00:15:45 declare a major incident I wasn't aware of that name right at the time of the move did you know or had you heard that group manager Welch had been declared to be the incident commander I was roughly

00:15:59 be the incident commander I was roughly how long do you think you'd been running the bridgehead on the second floor before you moved up to the third floor it's very hard to get timelines on on this sort of thing but I wasn't on the

00:16:11 this sort of thing but I wasn't on the second floor very long so I've been noted as entering the building at 150 if the bridge had moved it's a 215 220 that that fits with my recollection okay now

00:16:25 that fits with my recollection okay now when you started running the bridgehead on the third floor

00:16:37 we're crews coming to you with slips of paper with FSGS on it yes they were and do you know where they got those slips

00:16:48 do you know where they got those slips of paper from you know at the time I'm smooth hindsight now yes at the time I believe most of the firefighters just said that they've been handed to them on

00:16:59 said that they've been handed to them on the way in to the building right and what size were those slips not very big at all we have them little pocket notebooks that a lot of officers carry they were about that guys just maybe

00:17:12 they were about that guys just maybe like two inches by three inches bigger than that maybe I think we looked at a couple of days yesterday let's just go back to this if we can this is lfb one

00:17:25 back to this if we can this is lfb one nine to nine

00:17:28 [Music]

00:17:34 and these but LFE $1.99 thank you that's great and these just to go back to the

00:17:46 great and these just to go back to the use and I think I said this yesterday are slips of paper that watch manager Keith found in his tunic or trousers are at the end of the night and some of the times you can see on those are later there are two in particular but I just

00:17:59 there are two in particular but I just want to ask you about it which is this third and the fourth from the left are those the kinds of slips of paper with FSG on information on them but you remember receiving when you started at

00:18:11 remember receiving when you started at the bridgehead on the third floor and so I don't recall them specifically those exact pieces of paper I think as I said yesterday many many pieces of paper came through where I was on the bridge heads

00:18:24 through where I was on the bridge heads but it was that size that kind of amount of information would it's it's correct yes okay so in terms of what you could see physically would it are you saying

00:18:35 see physically would it are you saying that they would and they would appear at the bridgehead with a people with a piece of paper and it's handed to you yes okay and what would you do with the piece of paper and I would make sure

00:18:46 piece of paper and I would make sure that the information on pieces of paper were also on my wall because by then I had the wall in progress right okay let's let's look at the wall chat see if we can get this

00:18:57 the wall chat see if we can get this timing right but but um your wall I think is LDS

00:19:07 various places with LDS too and let's look at before I show you this let's go

00:19:18 look at before I show you this let's go up alright never mind is this what you refer to as your wall yes right now this is just of just for the record to be clear is this on the third floor yes

00:19:30 clear is this on the third floor yes right now just tell me the best best of your recollection what happened when you first arrived on the third floor and what what did you start writing on

00:19:41 and what what did you start writing on the wall so when we got to the third floor yes and we had to be sure we took everything with us so the inter controllers had the inch control boards all the personnel moved and this is why

00:19:52 all the personnel moved and this is why I was still trying to get crews in and out of going in and out of the tower up up the stairwell yes it became apparent to me around this stage that my forward

00:20:03 to me around this stage that my forward information board was not going to be large enough for a suitable or the amount of information that was coming in it did some slight yeah did that occur to you right at the start of the move to the bridgehead on the third floor it was

00:20:16 the bridgehead on the third floor it was around that time so at the arrival of the bridgehead it became very apparent that this was gonna be ongoing the the flow of information I was guessing wasn't gonna be limited and stopped it

00:20:29 wasn't gonna be limited and stopped it became clear that that was going to be continuous and it was coming in very thick fast constant relentless yeah so I realized that this forward information board there's gonna be nowhere near big enough

00:20:41 there's gonna be nowhere near big enough to hold this amount of information if it was gonna keep coming at that rate good at which point I started writing on the wall okay

00:20:47 wall okay now you haven't had to do that on the second floor no I hadn't and so what was the difference between being on the second floor of being everything on the third floor in terms of the flow and form of arrival of information to you so

00:21:01 form of arrival of information to you so the flow of information was similar in that it was constant right and what became apparent on the third floor was that it was going to continue to be constant and that this board information

00:21:12 constant and that this board information board was

00:21:12 board was and I needed something bigger and something that was gonna be more useful visually but for everybody else the bridgehead rather than just this board

00:21:23 bridgehead rather than just this board that is a lot smaller than that wall okay I just said that I'm clear and I know we touched on this yesterday but the pieces of paper a little two by three pieces of paper I thought you said you weren't getting them while you were

00:21:34 you weren't getting them while you were on the second floor but you did start getting them when you on when you were on the third floor so it's difficult to try and distinguish what happened on which floors and it's possible that I

00:21:45 which floors and it's possible that I was receiving pieces of paper from the crews on the second floor yeah I definitely was receiving them on the third but it is possible they were coming in from the second as well okay and I think you say you don't know who

00:21:57 and I think you say you don't know who was giving the crews these pieces of paper no could you could you see or hear anybody shouting frot from outside the

00:22:08 anybody shouting frot from outside the bridgehead while it was still on the second floor too to watch manager Eric Keith no and when you got to the third floor you then as you say rate this information up what did you start with

00:22:20 information up what did you start with so as soon as I had made the decision that I needed to come away from the court information board and onto the wall I wrote the floor numbers from three to twenty three vertically going

00:22:34 three to twenty three vertically going up as you can see so I started with that and then as the time went by added flat numbers and information as I received it okay then can you remember just looking

00:22:47 okay then can you remember just looking at this photograph what see what what sequence you were writing the further information in as you received it do you

00:22:58 information in as you received it do you have any recollection of where you started and so logically speaking I just went from left to right so if I received a piece of information for the 12th

00:23:10 a piece of information for the 12th floor for example I'd write sit next to the 12th and then if further information came about the 12th floor I would add it to the right of that and then you can see that I've just gone on from left to right right dude just

00:23:22 from left to right right dude just looking at the list perhaps I didn't quite put the question right looking at that list now do you remember which the first number was no do you have you any idea of which of the earlier numbers which are the later numbers that you

00:23:33 which are the later numbers that you added

00:23:36 not specifically and although 204 and 205 were one of the earlier ones right and that's the more because I remember asking a crew to go there early oh you do do you yes right

00:23:49 there early oh you do do you yes right would sue not for arriving at the third floor was that do you think I think it was quite same right do you remember which crew it was you asked to go to the

00:24:01 which crew it was you asked to go to the 23rd floor yes um I asked pre manager coach he was a Chelsea red watch so my own watch and he went with firefighter

00:24:12 own watch and he went with firefighter Joseph of Houston they were wearing a DBA and I asked them to go to 204 and

00:24:23 DBA and I asked them to go to 204 and 205 on the 23rd floor early on right to my arrival there ok now we can just

00:24:35 my arrival there ok now we can just follow that up a little

00:24:40 and while I'm digging out the document I'll use the time we are taking your question do you have a specific memory of sending them in particular I do

00:24:51 of sending them in particular I do because the 23rd floor is so far away from where we were at the bridgehead and for the residents there were people there I felt we're very vulnerable being

00:25:07 there I felt we're very vulnerable being so far away and I was very keen to get a crew to them as it was the top of the building and they had nowhere else to go so I recall briefing that crew to go

00:25:21 so I recall briefing that crew to go there because not just for the residents but also for the firefighters that was a very high risk that I was asking them to undertake in the conditions that we were faced with and asking them to go to the

00:25:35 faced with and asking them to go to the top made me very uncomfortable in asking firefighters to do that but I was aware that if we didn't get to the top sooner

00:25:47 that if we didn't get to the top sooner rather than later that that was we had to make we had to try but that was our chance okay can we just look at the

00:25:59 chance okay can we just look at the telemetry data chef please now if you go down to be a timeline 5 which is the fifth chunk of information I should just

00:26:10 fifth chunk of information I should just tell you what this is you would have seen this document performance mr. sorbet but but this is a spreadsheet which is derived from all the underlying data which was collected from the VA

00:26:21 data which was collected from the VA sets which we used on the night so and it's been it's been deposed too so it's in evidence in the inquiry and we're assuming that it's correct but obviously if you can point anything out about it

00:26:32 if you can point anything out about it that's not correct then that's that important but so far we were assuming it's correct if you look down you can see Royal Cod Chelsea b DBA who tallies

00:26:46 see Royal Cod Chelsea b DBA who tallies out at oh three oh three and some way underneath that Houston Joseph John

00:26:58 underneath that Houston Joseph John EDB a nine one three eight we also invited there who tallies out at oh three oh five and forty one seconds now

00:27:11 three oh five and forty one seconds now they haven't been put together as a pair by the data it looks as if Cod was paired with rulings and Joseph was

00:27:22 paired with rulings and Joseph was triode with Brooks and more costs but just first of all you looking at that are you are you I'm confident that you did pair those two together yes and you

00:27:35 did pair those two together yes and you can see on the wall I wrote Cod and Johnny yes next to the 23rd floor the kids

00:27:41 kids I did not cuz I know them both right I'm serving with both okay they definitely went together I think probably the confusion is because they're from different stations right normally you

00:27:52 different stations right normally you would pair with someone from your own station that you were riding on that appliance with Ritter but in this occasion they were both there and available and they definitely paired together right now they tally out which

00:28:06 together right now they tally out which which we understand to be the pulling out of the tally from the the bodyguard at oh three a three and a 305 as we've seen does that correspond with your

00:28:22 seen does that correspond with your recollection so for me personally I thought I had thought it was earlier but I spent seven and a half eight hours at the bridgehead so time the time line for

00:28:36 the bridgehead so time the time line for me can be a bit sketchy so I'd probably say that is accurate and I had thought it was a bit earlier than that it's probably just my confusion because I worked there for so long okay was the brief to that crew to go to 204

00:28:51 was the brief to that crew to go to 204 and 205 to your knowledge the first time a BA crew had actually been asked to go to that floor it was the first time I

00:29:02 to that floor it was the first time I had asked anyone to go to that floor yeah obviously I didn't arrive until sometime into the incident I don't know what happened prior to that and I didn't

00:29:13 what happened prior to that and I didn't have a chance or an opportunity to ask or inquire about that but due to the constant flow of information and crews that we had going on at this time do you remember whether if you had been if you

00:29:29 remember whether if you had been if you had been in receipt of information about FSGS on that floor you had enough EDB a equipment available to be able to send crews up there I don't know if we had

00:29:40 crews up there I don't know if we had enough

00:29:41 enough we certainly obviously we had a crew available yeah and that the fact that they were from two different stations and I knew that I knew we had at least two edpa appliances we certainly needed

00:29:55 two edpa appliances we certainly needed more obviously the purpose of a DBA is the travel distance so in order to reach those higher floors we were definitely going to need easy ba and this was a discussion we had that we were going to

00:30:07 discussion we had that we were going to need a lot of a DBA yeah do you remember a discussion or having any thoughts about difficulties of the deployment to the high floors because you didn't have enough edpa and i think we were just

00:30:21 enough edpa and i think we were just making use of what we did have so we had SBS DBA crews that we were briefing when we did have a DBA crews we briefed them to go higher right we had a steady flow

00:30:35 to go higher right we had a steady flow of be a crews but whether we had enough from e DBA I don't know how many a DBA crews there were in the lobby I wasn't able to see that from where I was right

00:30:47 able to see that from where I was right so I don't is it and I don't want to put an idea into your head but it is it possible that one of the may be put in a different way do you recall there being a problem in deploying crews to higher floors because

00:31:00 deploying crews to higher floors because you were still waiting for a DBA equipment to arrive on mass I don't I don't remember there being a problem as such but my role of the FS tree

00:31:12 such but my role of the FS tree information that wouldn't really be something that would be a part of my role to assess the resources right

00:31:20 sticking with floor 23 since it's the one you've identified us do you think one of the earlier you think one of the earlier ones you wrote up there it's not only a memorable ones remember me okay

00:31:31 only a memorable ones remember me okay can you explain the circles around those two flat numbers so what what I had to

00:31:45 two flat numbers so what what I had to do here was something that we've received no training on receiving this many FSG calls often we get an F of G

00:31:56 many FSG calls often we get an F of G call you commit a B a crew to it as a priority what the situation we were finding here was just because overs or we were briefing a crew to go there doesn't mean that they were necessarily

00:32:08 doesn't mean that they were necessarily making it there so I had to come up with some sort of way to try and identify that someone had been sent there but hadn't necessarily made it right so what I started to do with ticks per if we'd

00:32:21 I started to do with ticks per if we'd sent a be a crew there right circles if I'd receive further information so the circles for 204 and 205 for example is that I received further pieces of paper

00:32:35 that I received further pieces of paper to that flap or further radio traffic or further information from crews right so I think initially I put a line through 204 205 because I'd sent a B a crew

00:32:48 204 205 because I'd sent a B a crew there later on as the incident developed um I went to ticks because I didn't want the line to look like they've been gone searched and

00:32:59 like they've been gone searched and rescued okay so then for that I had a cross okay I think I follow so early on you you

00:33:11 think I follow so early on you you crossed through the flat yeah thanks to me I'd sent a be a crew there yes I had a line for it right and then later on you followed up you you change that to crossing out to a tick system because I had to adapt to the fact that

00:33:23 because I had to adapt to the fact that crews weren't making it when I didn't want to confuse anybody that flat had been cleared and the circle represented some sort of further information so it's so it's it

00:33:36 further information so it's so it's it was a way to signify to me and others that those flat numbers were still important right if I was receiving numerous pieces of paper with the same flat number on I'd circle it said signified to myself and others that

00:33:49 signified to myself and others that we've still got we still got a problem here we've still got calls coming into this one there's so much secular cannot kill just focusing on the the deployment of rail cordoned John and Joseph to the

00:34:03 of rail cordoned John and Joseph to the 23rd floor can I just ask you to get back to the telemetry data we see an tech court a trial calm I think for this purpose we see them tallying out at a

00:34:15 purpose we see them tallying out at a 303 24 for him and then we've seen him tallying in to bodyguard at 320 156 and similarly John Joseph tallying in at a 3

00:34:27 similarly John Joseph tallying in at a 3 2014 - they're both wearing edpa and that would mean that they were on there for only 15 minutes or three also what

00:34:39 for only 15 minutes or three also what does that tell us about what would that tell you about how far they got and initially that tells me that that crew were working very very hard the

00:34:50 were working very very hard the conditions that they're in in their fire kit carrying equipment with EDB a sets on that way more than SCBA and to go up that amount of stairs right I've asked them to go means they would have been

00:35:03 them to go means they would have been breathing a very heavy rate using that air consumption as best they could but inevitably in what is quite punishing conditions for them that the

00:35:15 punishing conditions for them that the amount of time that they had until even for an ad bas set they need enough air to get down themselves let me just even get a bit this week do you know whether they made it up there or not and with hindsight I don't think

00:35:28 or not and with hindsight I don't think they did but at the time I wasn't aware of their debrief you weren't okay that was my next question did you take a debrief from them not from them personally I think they've made rescues

00:35:40 personally I think they've made rescues and as we've discussed before when straight out with those rescues to take those casualties to to medical care so you think they on their way up to the 23rd floor intercepted rescues and came

00:35:52 23rd floor intercepted rescues and came down earlier yes which is quite a was a common thing for a lot of the crews we were briefing them to go to certain flats on their way there they were coming across casualties

00:36:04 there they were coming across casualties and stairwells people calling for help people huddled together in certain places where they just had to try and rescue who they could it was in front of them so often weren't able to get to

00:36:17 them so often weren't able to get to where they were briefed to go because you you take you rescue the casualties in front of you yes and I think that's what happened in that case okay just just a couple more things on that and

00:36:29 just a couple more things on that and specific deployment what can you tell us about the fact that their initial pressure take ground cod was two at one point 48 mm-hmm and its final pressure

00:36:42 point 48 mm-hmm and its final pressure of two a 350 66 and similarly John Joseph initial pressure two seventy six point seven four and his final pressure one for 903 looking at those figures

00:36:56 one for 903 looking at those figures would you say that they've managed to get to the 23rd floor and back again no I would say that looks like they've encountered a casualty who was in need of rescue on the way right and did what

00:37:07 of rescue on the way right and did what they had to do which was to bring those casualties yeah now going then back to the photograph of your list on the wall what one five eight one nine can you

00:37:19 what one five eight one nine can you tell us how having what can you tell looking at that whether you had updated the wall to reflect the fact of the possible fact that we're looking at which is that they didn't get to the

00:37:30 which is that they didn't get to the 23rd floor as deployed but had encountered a casualty on the way so at the time I wouldn't have known that for sure right as we discussed yesterday the difficulties of us receiving information

00:37:44 difficulties of us receiving information back as to where crews had located casualties or what they had or hadn't managed to do because they were making the rescues that they could on the way

00:37:56 the rescues that they could on the way they had no idea what flats they were in or floors because they had zero visibility and so I can I didn't know for sure whether they had or hadn't got there but certainly the further

00:38:08 there but certainly the further information that I was getting and therefore circling the numbers suggested to me that they hadn't they hadn't got that do you know whether having circled

00:38:21 that do you know whether having circled 205 to go for once whether you recycled them or whether there was a system for as it were when further information came

00:38:32 as it were when further information came in multiple times you could display multiple revisions it doesn't look like I've circled anything more than once so I think I probably would have received the initial number put the number on the

00:38:44 the initial number put the number on the wall received further information circled it possibly received further information after that and probably looked or seen it was already surfboard and it's Anna left over can you explain

00:38:57 and it's Anna left over can you explain why into looking at 205 you've both put a cross through it and put a tick on it and it's possible I sent I'm not affair the crew

00:39:07 the crew that accounts for the tick ID or that might just be part of the circle looking at it right that's possible okay I don't

00:39:22 at it right that's possible okay I don't recall specifically no okay just before we leave that floor at the at the bottom

00:39:35 we leave that floor at the at the bottom of the wall to the look to the right you can see in slanted writing something that looks like Lambeth well then it looks like Lambeth P for 23rd floor flat

00:39:47 looks like Lambeth P for 23rd floor flat 205 do you know who's writing that is No

00:40:06 you you don't know who's writing that is sorry that's right you don't know who's writing that is no it's not yours it's not mine Jenny who else was writing on the wall with you and so there was

00:40:19 the wall with you and so there was myself Justin Oh burn and Alex decent Albin who were running entry control boards and you normally have one inch control officer per inch control board I think at this stage they had four boards

00:40:32 think at this stage they had four boards on the go right so that is a lot of work for two people and they did an exceptional job yep I wouldn't be surprised if that was one of their writing because of the sheer volume of

00:40:46 writing because of the sheer volume of information and our our and keenness to not lose any of that information that I would imagine that might have been one

00:40:57 would imagine that might have been one of their handwriting because the inch control board would have got there's not a big box to write information there and we're also keynes and not lose any information and there was just so much

00:41:09 information and there was just so much that i would imagine they may have made some notes themselves can I just ask you then to look again at this telemetry schedule Jeff I'm sorry mister okay can

00:41:20 schedule Jeff I'm sorry mister okay can you just help me with something I think I understand the system you've described and you mark on the wall when you sent a crew up but the crew then

00:41:32 you sent a crew up but the crew then encounters somebody else who needs help so they bring that person down well the only way you would know that they hadn't got to their objective I only if I saw

00:41:43 got to their objective I only if I saw them face to face and they were able to say to me in passing I didn't get there and that did happen sometimes and then I'd be able to brief the next crew to try again to continue making efforts to

00:41:56 try again to continue making efforts to that specific flat but quite often the firefighters were exhausted and in need of help themselves or taking casualties straight to medical attention so

00:42:07 straight to medical attention so sometimes you were told something the world yes thank you sir and mr. Silva I asked you to go back to the telemetry data and it's partly follows

00:42:20 telemetry data and it's partly follows up the Chairman's question but neatly links with my next one I think you'll see in the third timeline just about halfway down the telemetry page if we

00:42:32 halfway down the telemetry page if we could just have that be a time line three mister documents direct and that's just how you do that there you'll see a Lambert crew and this follows on from

00:42:44 Lambert crew and this follows on from the question about Lambeth people flat 225 you can see that the Lambeth crew and white you are an SD be a crude

00:43:04 but a little bit I think the next slot down that's so if you gave it's very difficult seal the screen but if there's a there's a Lambeth proof you can have

00:43:15 a there's a Lambeth proof you can have for all of that set section Evans Bloxom and Herrera who were tallied out at o2

00:43:27 2400 to 26 that could that be the crew who was sent at an early stage when the

00:43:41 who was sent at an early stage when the bridgehead was at the third floor up to the 23rd floor that's possible and I had only been at Chelsea at all so one week ish so I'm not familiar I wasn't

00:43:53 ish so I'm not familiar I wasn't familiar with the firefighters in the surrounding area in terms of knowing their names or who they were or where they were from right so I I don't know what are you what I'm trying to get at

00:44:04 what are you what I'm trying to get at is showing you the telemetry data is it it is it possible that in fact the first crew you deployed early on on the 3rd

00:44:15 crew you deployed early on on the 3rd floor to the 23rd floor was a lattice lambeth crew that is possible but I don't recall it record I only have a memory of crew manager card and

00:44:26 memory of crew manager card and firefights jaded because because I need them right and but that is entirely possible it just might be that I don't report okay now going back to your statement on page 7 but before I do that

00:44:37 statement on page 7 but before I do that that's what you just i should just finish off do you have any specific recollection of any of these other flat numbers or floors or details we see on the picture at 1 5 8 1 9 pictures

00:44:53 yes thank you I don't want to spend lots of time on each floor and flat but it look looking at them you've got you've

00:45:05 look looking at them you've got you've got flats you've got ticks you've got circles you've got some crosses you've explained those it's 18 there seems to be a plus next to it didn't what's that

00:45:16 be a plus next to it didn't what's that on floor a team yes I don't know about and mother and child no flat number you

00:45:29 and mother and child no flat number you that was you writing though yeah that that is my writing and so again if obviously at some point that information got to me

00:45:39 got to me via one of the ways that information was coming and so I've added that on there whether that was by paper by radio or by face to face debriefing with crews

00:45:50 face to face debriefing with crews coming down or crews coming in who have been told something by a resident leaving okay then I've added it up there as best I can and looking at fifteen we've got

00:46:02 can and looking at fifteen we've got something looks like WH next to it what what might that be I don't I don't remember specifically and I think that WH is probably West Hampstead again in the same way that

00:46:15 Hampstead again in the same way that I've written Claud and Johnny it's just a sort of personal note for myself I think I might have made a note that West Hampstead crew had gone to the 15th floor right

00:46:27 floor right okay and then you crossed out eleven what is that 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 something

00:46:39 what is that 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 something is that only and then 1 1 3 there's got a tick through it the gave me chases for the deployment to that flat yeah and then 1 2 - he seems got 2 ticks

00:46:50 got 2 ticks there is that because there was a second deployment that's possible and then further information around it far in kitchen you've written next to that do you remember which flap that relates to

00:47:03 you remember which flap that relates to no again there was just so much information coming to us at this stage and the bridgehead is chaotic and noisy

00:47:14 and the bridgehead is chaotic and noisy and we're best this information was getting added where we had it it was so important to us and so imperative that any piece of information we were receiving was going on the wall or being

00:47:26 receiving was going on the wall or being noted somewhere absolutely that's what we were trying to do yes and exactly this is an incredibly important document to the Enquirer it doesn't learn I'm

00:47:37 to the Enquirer it doesn't learn I'm asking lots of questions about it but it's going down 14 you've got 111 115

00:47:46 again 112 113 again then it just 113 looks like it's been given to both floor numbers 15 and 14 can you explain that

00:48:00 numbers 15 and 14 can you explain that so all I could do at this stage was write down the information I was receiving right so at some stage I've received that 1 1 3 was on the 14th

00:48:11 received that 1 1 3 was on the 14th floor

00:48:11 floor right and at some stage I perceived that it's on the 15th where possible we would have tried to clarify this but all we could do all I could do or say this is

00:48:23 could do all I could do or say this is my handwriting and was to just keep writing down the information I was receiving as I was receiving it and on on 14 next to 1 1 3 with a tick in it it

00:48:35 on 14 next to 1 1 3 with a tick in it it says in brackets 3 rescues do you remember how and what that was about so I think one of the debriefs we did manage to get from firefighters was that three rescues had taken place from one

00:48:47 three rescues had taken place from one one three right that's what the information suggests to me however I think although there had been three rescues I think they had they had said

00:48:59 rescues I think they had they had said that there was also more people trapped in that flat do you remember that and I don't I don't recall it very clearly but I do have a memory of three rescues from

00:49:11 I do have a memory of three rescues from one one three but that wasn't it right a lot of firefighters were going into a room where there were several people and were only able to rescue as many as they

00:49:23 were only able to rescue as many as they could carry or lead and we're having to make very difficult decisions in the spur of the moment to try and rescue who they could and I think that was one of those examples where they managed to

00:49:35 those examples where they managed to rescue three but we're trying to tell us that there were more in that flat which is why I haven't crossed one one three but they haven't said they've made three rescues and if that flight is clear

00:49:46 rescues and if that flight is clear they're telling me they've made three rescues but there's more to be done there and there's another one one three next to it with it what what looks like a tick and a circle around it say what

00:49:59 a tick and a circle around it say what would that tell us one month three for me it's very significant throughout the incident I don't know how many pieces of paper I received with that number on but

00:50:10 paper I received with that number on but it stands out in my memory a lot and obviously even from this picture you can see we've had information that it's on the 14th that it's on the 15th I've sent crews there we've had rescues there I think I've written it again on

00:50:22 there I think I've written it again on the side because I'm still receiving information about it we're still sending crews there so for me that is it was a significant number that stayed with me

00:50:33 significant number that stayed with me for some time victory just pursuing a little bit further do you recall further deployments to

00:50:44 do you recall further deployments to flat one one three I would have after the three rescues yes and so following that information and again because I was receiving so much information about that

00:50:55 receiving so much information about that flat I believe I did send more crews to one one three and but as I've said before these crews although briefed to go there were often either were unable

00:51:08 go there were often either were unable to due to the conditions being smoked logging zero visibility fire preventing them to get their heat or on a lot of occasions taking casualties that they

00:51:20 occasions taking casualties that they found on the way rescuing people who needed help on the way in the stairwell yes who needed assistance so quite often they weren't able to get to despite their best efforts weren't able to get

00:51:33 their best efforts weren't able to get there do you remember any specific individual firefighters that you deployed back to flat one one three [Music]

00:51:50 do you remember firefighter warms be all firefighter low being deployed what about London fist and Maine those names but now again yeah because I was new to

00:52:04 but now again yeah because I was new to Chelsea I didn't recognize many faces right can we try four more firefighters on you Herrera who I now know to me Lambeth but at the time I wouldn't have

00:52:15 Lambeth but at the time I wouldn't have known okay didn't know all about in the Kalinin no so I know Chelsea where were stations and I know Euston because that was my first posting as a recruit okay

00:52:26 was my first posting as a recruit okay what about orchard no poor juggins no again you I now know you no not this time

00:52:34 time you don't recall specific deployment now can I just show you because you said that there were constant calls coming through for four flat one one three do

00:52:46 through for four flat one one three do you recall seeing this document and that isn't one nine six eight l FP 1 9 6 8

00:53:03 page page 44

00:53:10 now this is a control information forum

00:53:25 with a time update of 321 on it

00:53:35 which was found in cu7 at the end of the incident is this something that you

00:53:46 incident is this something that you think you might have might have seen by way of a further FSG information to the bridgehead that is possible I don't

00:53:57 bridgehead that is possible I don't recall it specifically and like I said I was receiving a lot of information around 1 1 3 and then on a greater scale a lot of information providing every

00:54:09 a lot of information providing every other flap in that building it's possible that that came past me but I couldn't confirm one way or the other I don't recall seeing it but that's not to say I didn't okay okay let's try the

00:54:22 say I didn't okay okay let's try the next page page 45 please and that looks like the blue copy I have it's blue at

00:54:33 like the blue copy I have it's blue at the same document but someone's written on it flat one one three four person left in building do you remember seeing this document or seeing a blue ever

00:54:44 this document or seeing a blue ever seeing a blue control information form with writing added to it again it is possible I just can't recall and literally received hundreds of pieces of

00:54:55 literally received hundreds of pieces of paper okay in the course of eight hours let me just just to see this one with one more bit of material if you go please to your seventh exhibit which is

00:55:09 please to your seventh exhibit which is M et triple zero one five eight two zero

00:55:13 now this is this is what this is the green wall we're going to come to it later but I just want to ask you something about it now if you remember but let me take a slower

00:55:26 if you remember but let me take a slower run up to this do you remember writing on the green wall as opposed to a beige wall yes I wrote on the green wall and this is where and the bottom of the stairwell on the ground floor right now

00:55:40 stairwell on the ground floor right now we'll come to it but do you remember writing on that wall once the bridgehead had moved down from the third floor to the ground floor yes right now looking at it you can see on the right-hand side

00:55:55 at it you can see on the right-hand side of the picture that

00:56:07 difficulty on this coffee kept can you see up on the right-hand side

00:56:19 we're by the shades of sharps of sunlight right on the heart to the right in the margin two-thirds of the way down there's someone has written 1 1 1 1 1 2

00:56:33 there's someone has written 1 1 1 1 1 2 and then 1 1 3 with a ring rounded and a woman fall next to it do you know who read it quite possibly could have been me right but I couldn't say for certain

00:56:46 me right but I couldn't say for certain as at this stage as I'm sure we'll get to a few of us will write them on the green walk whereas the third floor is mostly me that could have been me okay

00:56:58 mostly me that could have been me okay but I couldn't tell you for sure okay going back to the the beige picture if I can show me that m81 eight one five

00:57:10 can show me that m81 eight one five eight one nine just pursuing one or two more of these

00:57:22 on the 15th floor you've got we looked at one to two which is written on the beige wall next to 15 where it says firing kitchen and it's been circled and

00:57:35 firing kitchen and it's been circled and you've got two ticks there and then a circle and then a.m. it's been written again with a line underneath it and a

00:57:47 again with a line underneath it and a circle round it do you know why it was written again and so again much like 1 1 3 I I would imagine that I've received further information and circled the

00:58:00 further information and circled the initial 1 to 2 but then received more information whether that be from firefighters or from what residents or radio traffic or pieces of paper and that it's now starting to stand out to

00:58:13 that it's now starting to stand out to me very significantly that in the same way as 1 1 3 I've written it again I'm underlining it I'm surfing it our intent is to just capture as much information as we can and stress where the most

00:58:27 as we can and stress where the most information is coming from let I think I've made an effort to really signifies myself and others that this flat is is in need of help them with trying to get

00:58:38 in need of help them with trying to get crews to it ok and what does the underlining mean again probably just me and my frustration that despite sending crews to certain flats I'm still getting

00:58:50 crews to certain flats I'm still getting information about certain numbers and I probably just underlined it because I'm try it well the bridgehead crew everybody and the firefighters they're trying to get to certain places but

00:59:01 trying to get to certain places but they're unable to due to various reasons ok

00:59:05 ok do you remember tasking a particular crew with a rescue to that flat flat 1 to 2 I don't have any specific memory as to tasking a crew or who that crew would

00:59:17 to tasking a crew or who that crew would have been but I know that it's it's obviously a number that's become very important to me very a very thorough through flow of information coming to me

00:59:30 through flow of information coming to me about that flat that I would have continued to brief crews to try and get there we would have continued to make efforts which would get to these flats that we were still receiving information to okay do you

00:59:41 receiving information to okay do you remember briefing firefighters Peres and Dwyer no do you remember them updating you on on the rescue of somebody they'd

00:59:52 you on on the rescue of somebody they'd found in the stairwell no okay okay not to say it didn't happen I just those names don't mean anything okay one what about not all firefighters

01:00:03 okay one what about not all firefighters not all since the incident I know your fire person at NASA lives but not at the time now but all about Whitley say which firefighter Whitley no no okay do you

01:00:15 firefighter Whitley no no okay do you remember getting a debrief from Louisville and Whitley no I don't I don't recall it again it's not to say it didn't happen it's just that I think I was so overwhelmed there was so much

01:00:27 was so overwhelmed there was so much going on that although things made sense at the time with hindsight with memory I just I don't recall that Laurie do you remember where you receive

01:00:38 Laurie do you remember where you receive the information fire in the kitchen from no I would have written it on the wall because I received it I can't tell you how I receive that we may to spend a

01:00:49 how I receive that we may to spend a minute to see if we can thread that together and it could be witness please be shown LF be quadruple 0 1 955

01:01:02 now this is a yellow slip that isn't to say that you didn't receive the white version but that says 15-floor one two

01:01:14 version but that says 15-floor one two two two people three dogs across town and then two people three dogs farside fire in kitchen that's the that's the

01:01:26 fire in kitchen that's the that's the yellow form do you remember seeing either that yellow form or a white version of it no you don't remember you

01:01:37 version of it no you don't remember you don't remember at all or I don't recall seeing that again it could have I just can't recall each individual piece of paper can we look at the next page

01:01:48 paper can we look at the next page please page two it should be the blue version of that and someone has written on the blue version Oh 247 in stairwell updated bridgehead do you remember

01:01:59 updated bridgehead do you remember getting an update at the bridgehead at around 247 about somebody in the stairwell related to that flat identical

01:02:10 stairwell related to that flat identical okay

01:02:24 there's a deployment of Nuttall and Whitley to flat one to two @o 240-250 there 46 dude you don't remember tasking

01:02:37 there 46 dude you don't remember tasking them to go to that flat do you know okay

01:02:51 just just continuing one or two other numbers on the beige wall let's zip triple zero one five eight one nine are

01:03:03 triple zero one five eight one nine are there any other specific numbers that stand out to you as what you would say were important to you now looking at them I'd all to rush you to this because it's important to say take your time but

01:03:14 it's important to say take your time but let's just work down to term I think we got down to the 14th floor but are there any others above that you'd want to draw our attention to as having specific meaning or recollection for you the only

01:03:26 meaning or recollection for you the only memories I do have obviously I think WH is West Hampstead yes to remind me I'd sent a crew from West Hampstead there again I think because I recognize them

01:03:37 again I think because I recognize them from when I served a kentish town I think that's why it was significant to me the FFA is firefighter emergency that's significant to me but in regards

01:03:50 that's significant to me but in regards of the flats all I can say is any information that reached me at the bridgehead went on that wall it was my sole task was to keep that all accurate

01:04:01 sole task was to keep that all accurate and I did my utmost keep it up to date in in the conditions in the environment we were in right going back to the

01:04:12 we were in right going back to the telemetry data check be a timeline for

01:04:19 just above the bottom there we've got two West Hampstead ba whereas and Tanner Martin 4 and Matthew Tanner are being from West Hampstead SD ba whereas

01:04:30 being from West Hampstead SD ba whereas being deployed at roughly a 255 does that trigger a specific recollection about about that deployment

01:04:41 about about that deployment 4:15 and not about freaking them to go to floor 15 what I remember about that is I recognize them like I say because

01:04:52 is I recognize them like I say because of my time at country town so they were firefighters who are familiar to me right and what I do remember is firefighter Tanner asking me if there'd

01:05:04 firefighter Tanner asking me if there'd be water there when he gets there any firefighter going near or into a fire is will take water that is our baseline but

01:05:19 will take water that is our baseline but our own safety and I remember him asking and I remember having to say that it was unlikely that there would be any water for him to take with him into those conditions and these are firefighters

01:05:31 conditions and these are firefighters who have seen the building that they're entering and I remember having to say to him it was unlikely there'd be water and that he was to try and effect rescues to FSG flats with significance makes that's

01:05:44 FSG flats with significance makes that's putting them in so much risk I'm sorry I seem to be going backwards up the tower again but there's another one stands out floor 19 flat 161 you've got a tick

01:05:57 floor 19 flat 161 you've got a tick round it will take next to it so that I think looks like you made a deployment to that flat and then to out do you remember getting that information does

01:06:08 remember getting that information does that trigger anything no again the information would have come to me I'd have added it to the wall it looks like similar to one one three someone's they've told me to or out but that's not

01:06:20 they've told me to or out but that's not all that there's more people there so I haven't crossed it through right okay do you remember being told that people had left 161 and gone elsewhere in the building I don't recall that okay

01:06:32 building I don't recall that okay there's no record of anyone in 165 on that floor do you remember do you remember not getting a record from someone in 165 or not I don't I don't

01:06:45 someone in 165 or not I don't I don't recall

01:06:47 okay um let me just show you again very quickly a control information form if

01:06:58 quickly a control information form if you go please - LF b19 - - that has

01:07:11 one six one nineteen floor ten people on it it doesn't appear to have made it onto your wall do you remember seeing a control information form or a slip of

01:07:22 control information form or a slip of paper with that information on it ten people I don't I don't recall seeing it like I say if it if it had made it to me I would have updated the world would I was very focused on that that system

01:07:35 was very focused on that that system that I had to try and put in place okay and in the next in the next page paid which is one nine to two page three I'm

01:07:49 which is one nine to two page three I'm sorry this one out sorry page too if you don't mind my fault right page two one six four again nineteenth floor

01:08:02 underneath it it says one person and then from see you list does that mean anything to you okay and then the next page page three is 165 and for some

01:08:17 page page three is 165 and for some reason someone's put seventeen on there two hours one baby does that does that trigger any recollection about anything on that floor okay that's got an updated

01:08:30 on that floor okay that's got an updated time of 3:20 that maybe that by that stage you've moved down to the ground floor yesterday okay all right we may be able to perceive that when we get to the ground floor mr. Sylver we've been going an hour just

01:08:43 mr. Sylver we've been going an hour just about do you like a break or you have and 50 minutes well we'll break for 10 minutes then and come back at 20 to 11

01:08:55 minutes then and come back at 20 to 11 and he's staying talk to anyone about your evidence all right 20 to 11 degrees

01:09:17 you

01:21:33 [Music]

01:21:47 all right ready to carry on good thank you very much okay thank you for coming back now

01:21:54 back now can I just continue to ask you about one or two flats if I may we won't take long over this but I just want to make sure I just covered it tonight I have to cover 23rd floor first of all

01:22:09 I have to cover 23rd floor first of all we have a recollection for mr. Auburn that there was a deployment to the 23rd

01:22:21 that there was a deployment to the 23rd floor of firefighters Allison Bell and right at around 208-210 and that was when the bridgehead was still I think on

01:22:32 when the bridgehead was still I think on the second floor is that right yes the bridge never would have still been on the second floor do you recall a deployment to the 23rd floor when you were on the second floor and the

01:22:44 were on the second floor and the bridgehead was on the second floor not that I recall but my role at that time was to take this forward information board and gather collate the information yep so my role into assisting with

01:22:57 yep so my role into assisting with briefing crews as to which flats they were going to didn't really come into play until the third floor okay

01:23:08 okay do you remember briefing May one's worth crew to go high in the building I don't recall and again I'm not familiar

01:23:20 don't recall and again I'm not familiar with it I wasn't familiar with the firefighters in the area at that time okay and so I have no memory a more general question do you know of any firefighters being committed to the to

01:23:33 firefighters being committed to the to to that floor 23rd floor at the time when you are operating the bridgehead on the second floor I don't recall that but you you should be aware that I've come

01:23:45 you you should be aware that I've come into a situation on the second floor that is already in full flow they've got watch manager Keith they've got entry control systems their briefing crews and I've come into the middle of that and I've got to get a hold of what

01:23:57 that and I've got to get a hold of what I'm doing and that forward information board and where my role within this bridgehead is so it's quite possible that those briefings were going on and crews are being deployed and but Juicer

01:24:09 crews are being deployed and but Juicer me coming on later to them I don't I don't recall it I wouldn't have been a part of it just yet okay um I'm coming

01:24:20 part of it just yet okay um I'm coming back to flat one one three which I think you said was something that was was very significant to you it's the first of all a general question were you ever told that firefighters who went to that flat

01:24:32 that firefighters who went to that flat were told by people that they did rescue that there was nobody left in it you remember do you have a recollection of getting that information I don't

01:24:43 getting that information I don't remember that no okay okay now

01:24:48 there were two firefighters Murphy and Cornelius and I think we are going to hear from one of those later in the inquiry but you can say we'll explore this with them but but they say that

01:24:59 this with them but but they say that they were deployed to a response in in response to an F s g2 flat one one one do you remember a deployment of

01:25:11 do you remember a deployment of firefighters Murphy and Cornelius to flatten one one one which had got on the 14th floor again I don't I didn't know the firefighters personally at the time

01:25:22 the firefighters personally at the time so I don't recall briefing them obviously in terms of the information I had and crews that were being deployed places I was keeping track of that

01:25:33 places I was keeping track of that information but I don't recall that specifically look at that crew do you remember being debriefed or being told at the bridgehead by returning crews that that firefighters had moved the

01:25:47 that that firefighters had moved the occupants of 1 1 1 into 1 1 3 okay do you recall the occupants of any other flats on the 14th floor being moved into

01:25:58 flats on the 14th floor being moved into flat 1 1 3 okay do you recall being told that they were in fact eight people in flat one one three like you say any

01:26:10 flat one one three like you say any information that did reach me I am made sure I made a note of such as the three rescues but it was clear to me that that wasn't all the rescues required okay in

01:26:21 wasn't all the rescues required okay in there and as a result of that or perhaps not as a result of that do you remember briefing firefighters to go to flat one

01:26:33 briefing firefighters to go to flat one one three to look for a family I don't recall briefing anybody but I know that if we had had information back to say there were further people in that flat we would have then sent the next be a

01:26:46 we would have then sent the next be a crew or the next available be a crew to that flat with that information right do you remember being told that there was an adult male or female child in that flat no specifically

01:26:58 child in that flat no specifically specifically if I had have been I would have right no right do you remember briefing to firefighters and the names are McAllen and juggins

01:27:14 and the names are McAllen and juggins but we are they think they mean anything to you but do you remember briefing to firefighters to go to the 14th floor to rescue a lady in a child in flat

01:27:25 rescue a lady in a child in flat one-one-one again I don't recall and all I can say is the flow of information and the crews being committed was steady and

01:27:37 the crews being committed was steady and relentless and constant for hours it would be very difficult for me to remember specific briefings or flats no and it's maybe difficult but do you

01:27:48 and it's maybe difficult but do you remember learning that a deployment to flat one one one which had been made was inflected employment to a flat which had been emptied and the occupants in been

01:27:59 been emptied and the occupants in been moved to one one three

01:28:10 can I just finally on this just ask you to see let's see a document this is LF being 196 eight page 17

01:28:32 now this is a 3x2 piece of paper of merely asking is this a piece of 3x2 paper paper of the kind that you would

01:28:43 paper paper of the kind that you would be receiving when you were operating the emperor control board when the bridgehead was on the third floor or even on the ground floor certainly the size of paper and obviously we've

01:28:56 size of paper and obviously we've established yes that the size of paper was coming to me I don't recall receiving many pieces of paper that had names on or ages you don't but that's not to say that it

01:29:10 don't but that's not to say that it didn't again had I received that information I would have updated crews the bridgehead the wall right okay good

01:29:23 the bridgehead the wall right okay good you don't really you don't recall that piece of not specifically again over 100 maybe 200 pieces of paper across my palm that night only and then going back if

01:29:34 that night only and then going back if we can to the picture of the beige wall at triple zero one five eight one nine

01:29:42 that there is a there are two pieces of writing on again related to the 14th floor I just want to ask you about the first is if we can pan out the first is

01:29:56 first is if we can pan out the first is right at the bottom that someone is written vertically what looks like Shoreditch p4 xiv 1 1 3 do you know who

01:30:07 Shoreditch p4 xiv 1 1 3 do you know who that was

01:30:12 no again much like the other parts of the writing on that wall what possibly could have been an inch control officer and just above well to the left of that

01:30:24 and just above well to the left of that my space it is someone has written one one three with a circle and then a fourteen next to it and then something next to that first of all do you know who that was Jade you know how that writing got there

01:30:35 Jade you know how that writing got there no can you help decipher one what that is next to the fourteen can you you decipher it well can you do any better

01:30:47 decipher it well can you do any better than weekend no all right do you remember a shortage crew being deployed to the 14th floor to go to flat one one three not specifically we have a

01:31:02 three not specifically we have a shortage crew being deployed at about three o'clock I just I just think the chances of me remembering the crews by name or even location when there was no

01:31:14 name or even location when there was no over you know a hundred deployments of be a cruise to flats with paper across ours I understand and then in the middle

01:31:26 ours I understand and then in the middle we've got a looks like a football one one three floor fourteenth Lambeth PL pump ladder and then something written

01:31:38 pump ladder and then something written above that flip fourteenth can you help with do you remember that all can you help or can you do no better than us no I mean it wasn't it's not my writing so

01:31:49 I mean it wasn't it's not my writing so I can come in and then finally I'm sorry buy this finally on the very far right it says Lambeth fourteenth floor looks like flat one one one again can I ask

01:32:00 like flat one one one again can I ask you just to tell us you have a put that there yeah again not my writing and write any yeah I wouldn't want to speculate it yeah alright I'm fine

01:32:11 speculate it yeah alright I'm fine can I then go finally back to the top of your list here or you put Cod and Johnny you gave evidence earlier about the 23rd floor that that is where you sent them

01:32:24 floor that that is where you sent them now in fact roll Cod has given us a statement and he says and just for our own records it's paid for that he was briefed to go to the 22nd floor do you

01:32:42 briefed to go to the 22nd floor do you think that that might be right looking at where you've actually written his name my recollection is that it was the

01:32:53 name my recollection is that it was the 23rd but I could be wrong again given the the sheer volume of crews and information and the rather impossible

01:33:04 information and the rather impossible task that we were trying to achieve at the time and it is possible it could have been 22nd or 23rd

01:33:13 either way it was toward the top which was unlikely they were going to reach but we were endeavoring to try I remember briefing him that it was

01:33:24 I remember briefing him that it was unlikely he was going to get there but as an officer he'd have a better judgment on conditions and safety and efforts and air and I remember that was

01:33:35 efforts and air and I remember that was part of my brief to do what he could to get where he could towards the top right okay

01:33:42 okay he also says that he received the briefing to go to the 22nd floor when the bridgehead was on the 4th floor and you can you comment on that and I would say that the bridgehead for me was never

01:33:54 say that the bridgehead for me was never on the 4th floor but the confusion for many people firefighters crews ourselves memory I think many of us have sort clued where things happened over time as

01:34:07 clued where things happened over time as opposed to when that statement was taken okay now can I just ask you something about prioritization you said yesterday in your evidence and just for our

01:34:18 in your evidence and just for our purposes this is page 220 at line 6 to 15 and you said that you were try and prioritize the more vulnerable residents and you said you did try to use

01:34:30 and you said you did try to use vulnerability as a means of prioritization now at that statement even when we were looking at this we were looking at when the bridgehead was on the second floor can I just ask you

01:34:41 on the second floor can I just ask you that was that generally the case even after you moved to the third floor you were try and prioritize the more vulnerable residents yes and again when we moved to the ground floor and as a

01:34:52 we moved to the ground floor and as a whole though all of those people at the bridgehead were trying to prioritize that information and the FSG cause according to the information that we had

01:35:03 according to the information that we had which was often limited but where possible we would certainly try and prioritize by the kitchen okay and is that something that you remember agreeing with watch manager a Keith um I

01:35:16 agreeing with watch manager a Keith um I certainly know that myself and watch commander Keith were on the same page throughout the incident we worked closely for that seven or eight hours that we were at bridgehead and so I imagine we would have had a discussion

01:35:27 imagine we would have had a discussion around prioritizing or or the limited information that we did have regarding anyone who a child children babies we

01:35:39 anyone who a child children babies we certainly would have discussed that we need to get crews to those places you okay can I just put to you something that he said in his evidence and for our purposes this is the transcript for the

01:35:51 purposes this is the transcript for the six of July page 163 line 16 to 22 21 16 to 21 and he said that every FSG call

01:36:03 to 21 and he said that every FSG call had the same level of prioritization and that a priority would be normally proximity to the fire or density of smoke and that was that was the gist of

01:36:15 smoke and that was that was the gist of his evidence is that the way you remember it so I think what he means there and what we were trying to achieve is that every FSG call was important every piece of information we're

01:36:26 every piece of information we're receiving was important and we were everything was a priority but even as as he said proximity to the fire and other factors would certainly shape the way in

01:36:41 factors would certainly shape the way in which we briefed crews right but every episode was important and every flap had crews directed to those flats it was just difficulty in getting crews to each

01:36:54 just difficulty in getting crews to each of those flats okay

01:37:08 can I ask you just on the question of priorities to look please at lfp 192 to page 15

01:37:25 now I'm afraid I don't have a time for this but this is a yellow control information form sheet from mr. Sadler's

01:37:41 information form sheet from mr. Sadler's work done on the car bonnet and then the business but outside the tower and he said that the yellow version went back to VCU and somebody has written priorities over in ink over the copy

01:37:56 priorities over in ink over the copy version of a list of flats one nine for floor 11 20 floor 23 201 floor 1182

01:38:07 floor 11 20 floor 23 201 floor 1182 floor 16 133 m floor 22192 do you remember receiving a list of flats or information about a list of flats in respect of which someone had told you

01:38:19 respect of which someone had told you they were priorities I don't recall seeing that piece of paper no that's not to say that that information didn't reach me in another way perhaps by radio and what I could say if I had have

01:38:31 and what I could say if I had have received it I would have written it down my aunt okay do you remember receiving a white piece of paper with this

01:38:42 white piece of paper with this information on it it under additional information a lot a list and then being told some somehow by radio perhaps that those those flats were a priority I

01:38:53 those those flats were a priority I don't recall okay do do you remember whether somebody else outside the bridgehead was was doing prioritization or do you think it was you and watch managerial Keith and I don't I don't

01:39:05 managerial Keith and I don't I don't know what was happening outside in the tower

01:39:09 tower I had my role I was focused on what I was doing and what was an extremely difficult situation and a sheer volume of information that I was very task

01:39:20 of information that I was very task focused on what I was doing that if they were prioritizing outside the building I I don't know okay but really what I'm trying to get at is whether when firefighters presented to you their pieces of paper you prioritize them with

01:39:32 pieces of paper you prioritize them with with Brian O'Keefe or whether they came Oh

01:39:35 Oh already prioritized I don't recall them already being prioritized again that's not to say they weren't it's just that I don't recall anyone saying this is a

01:39:46 don't recall anyone saying this is a priority every once every flatten floor they had was important and significant and an SSG that we were trying to get to I don't recall any talk outside of where

01:39:58 I don't recall any talk outside of where those crews come in about priorities okay all right can i mentor to a different topic which is moving the bridgehead to the ground floor oh and if

01:40:11 bridgehead to the ground floor oh and if you go back to your statement please a page 10

01:40:26 you say

01:40:36 that the bridgehead moved to the ground-floor and can I just pick it up at the bottom of that page you you've

01:40:51 at the bottom of that page you you've got a photograph

01:40:58 I'm sorry before I do that I'm sorry at the point of moving to the ground floor the photograph of the beige wall we've just been looking at was was photographed by somebody yes on the

01:41:12 photographed by somebody yes on the third floor did you remember who that was I I know it wasn't me and because I know I didn't have my phone on me right at the time and I was aware that when it came to

01:41:23 and I was aware that when it came to moving to the ground floor I needed to take this information with me right off the importance of that so I knew that I didn't have my phone I recall speaking station manager cook but who did have a

01:41:34 station manager cook but who did have a phone right and he indeed says he took a picture of the wall at 308 okay and would that be without timing roughly correspond with your recollection about when the bridge had moved from the third floor to the ground floor that sounds

01:41:45 floor to the ground floor that sounds feasible or could it it's hard to pinpoint a time but that sounds entirely ok can I then just put the picture to him that he says he took which is M et triple zero one five seven seven nine at

01:41:59 triple zero one five seven seven nine at page 16

01:42:05 now there it is we told us that it was 308 because the screenshot from his phone the info from his phone says that

01:42:17 phone the info from his phone says that he gave evidence about that the reason I'm showing you that is because that my question is is that the last of the most up-to-date record of FSG on the wall on

01:42:28 up-to-date record of FSG on the wall on the third floor of the bridgehead before it moved down it's hard to tell from the picture but is there anything that strikes you looking at it that you might

01:42:39 strikes you looking at it that you might think would might indicate that it wasn't the most up-to-date version

01:42:45 nothing stands out to me but when I asked Gareth cook to take the picture it was just before we moved right okay so

01:42:57 was just before we moved right okay so we'll work on the basis that that's them so the latest record of FSG as it stood at 308 that you had at the bridgehead no is it there was no update on the wall

01:43:09 is it there was no update on the wall after that time not that I recall not that I recall I have no memory to that I do remember in that we were going to me they asked him to take a picture right we knew and you moved now then you've got down to the ground floor

01:43:20 you've got down to the ground floor did you really record or record the information on the photograph we've just seen anywhere when you got to the ground floor no so I didn't have the phone or

01:43:34 floor no so I didn't have the phone or the picture right so I didn't recreate on the ground floor what I had on the third floor did anybody somebody must

01:43:45 third floor did anybody somebody must have done there is a version of my third floor wall on the ground floor but that wasn't me right let's explore that can

01:43:59 wasn't me right let's explore that can you go to your own exhibits and I'd like just I'd like you to look please mr. Silva at exhibited leather which is met triple zero one five eight

01:44:14 which is met triple zero one five eight two three

01:44:28 yes now this is an introductory could you just by reference to this photograph just identify where that the FSG was

01:44:42 just identify where that the FSG was being recorded once you moved the bridgehead down to the ground floor so when we came to the ground floor and directly in front of where those stairs

01:44:53 directly in front of where those stairs end yes

01:44:54 end yes it's where I was stood to the right of me was Brian Hickey and to the left of me at some point I'm not entirely sure when but watch manage Morrison of

01:45:07 when but watch manage Morrison of Wandsworth was working Morrison yes right and we all had writing on the wall

01:45:18 wall the ground floor was very much a collaboration of of many personnel at the ground floor but directly at the bottom of those stairs somebody had recreated a version of the

01:45:31 somebody had recreated a version of the picture of the third floor which I then continue to add to throughout our time on the ground floor but I can't tell you who started that okay I just know that

01:45:42 who started that okay I just know that it wasn't me right and can I just show you an image or two from the CCTV camera that we have which shows the bottom of those stairs first of all Janice waiting

01:45:57 long I don't think did you go please - inq 253

01:46:18 I'm sorry I'd sir - 400 - 43 I'm say so - yeah that's - fine - that's so - four three is alright and can you

01:46:34 so - four three is alright and can you identify yourself in that picture it looks like I am top-left mid-conversation okay no helmet no helmet no and somebody

01:46:49 no helmet no helmet no and somebody looks like they're writing or is that a crew manager writing on the wall they are the rank markings of a crew manager yes right do you know who that was

01:47:00 yes right do you know who that was no okay and let's get that picture off the wall and go to 253

01:47:16 do you recall anybody in the bridge and when the bridge that came down writing on the white wall where the firefighting without the helmet is pointing so I

01:47:30 without the helmet is pointing so I recognize the second in from the left to be watch manager kevin williams of berlin okay um but i had no awareness

01:47:41 berlin okay um but i had no awareness supporters what was going on on that wall at that stage all right they're going back to the information that was you say copied from the photograph onto the walk the green wall can i ask you

01:47:52 the walk the green wall can i ask you please to look at em et triple zero one five eight two zero

01:48:00 [Music]

01:48:09 um

01:48:16 now these probably better to have a look at that first of all there's a second photograph I want to show you um do you know who wrote the information in the

01:48:28 know who wrote the information in the middle well let me ask you this way where do we see the information that come down by phone as it were I by the survivor photograph from the third floor to the wall down here in the lobby so I

01:48:41 to the wall down here in the lobby so I believe it to be the information on the right so it would be what's on that last column on the right and further over that's not in that picture right now the

01:48:53 that's not in that picture right now the further over that's not in that picture we might get from another photograph which is M et triple zero one five eight one seven which is exhibit eight to your statement is that it yeah it's difficult

01:49:10 statement is that it yeah it's difficult to tell I know but the perfect is it okay so to me that looks like a recreation of what we had on the third floor but in the opposite order in there the lower floors are at the top and

01:49:21 the lower floors are at the top and whoever's written it out was written low-to-high whereas I did vertically going up yes yep okay it looks like it ends at

01:49:37 yes yep okay it looks like it ends at the bottom with 18 with the 18th floor so it looks to me like it goes 12 13 14 15 and then slightly over is 16 17 and

01:49:50 15 and then slightly over is 16 17 and then slightly over is 18 19 but again I didn't write that but that's how I understand it right do you know who did write it no you don't remember that

01:50:01 write it no you don't remember that when you came down physically we've just seen you in there was that writing already there I don't recall specifically my concern at the time was that we're having to

01:50:13 at the time was that we're having to move the bridgehead again and crews that were coming in and out and I'm moving into control at this stage from the third to the ground and trying to inform those crews that we were moving but

01:50:25 those crews that we were moving but obviously the difficulties we're having with comms meant that we couldn't tell them and that is a big concern that they'll come to the third floor won't know where we are good and as well as getting all four inch control boards

01:50:37 getting all four inch control boards that are in use that point down and the people down and not wanting to lose any information or information coming in and out from crews that I don't recall if

01:50:48 out from crews that I don't recall if when I got to the ground floor that was already on the wall or not no how longs it take you to come down from the third floor to the ground floor and set up the bridgehead there and from the from the

01:51:00 bridgehead there and from the from the point of moving it wouldn't have taken very long at all less than a minute from the third floor to the ground floor moving into a bridgehead we would have just taken the equipment and then from the minute of leaving to setting up would have been a

01:51:12 leaving to setting up would have been a minute two minutes right but it's the picking the point where you're going to make the move so that no information is lost no crews there waiting to be

01:51:23 lost no crews there waiting to be committed if we can get a crew in we would have done that the same as if there's a crew coming out that needs to retrieve their tallies you want to be sure they've done that can you then help me

01:51:38 if you go back to the telemetry data and look at the a timeline v towards the

01:51:50 look at the a timeline v towards the middle or just below the middle of that section if you just follow me with a tally out column you can see that there's a gap between 306 55 and 324 33

01:52:06 gap of about 18 minutes or so between the deployment of a Euston firefighter because identity we don't know oh it's

01:52:20 because identity we don't know oh it's not shown here and the deployment of a pair of BA wearers from Battersea up 3 24 33 do you see that yes do you explain

01:52:32 24 33 do you see that yes do you explain that gap

01:52:36 I think what what you need to understand is is the physical move obviously walking from a third floor to a ground floor is quick but the actual things

01:52:50 floor is quick but the actual things that happen around that like getting crews their tallies back before we move setting up new information setting up in a new area establishing who's where and

01:53:01 a new area establishing who's where and doing what and that we've got everything takes time yes so that that could account for the delay and but for me I it wasn't I was pregnant and I can't

01:53:15 it wasn't I was pregnant and I can't account for it anymore than it does take time to ensure that the crews are either coming in and out of being and from the board

01:53:25 board and the actual physical move to the ground floor I mean do you remember an 18 minute pause and deployments around that time is there anything in the

01:53:37 that time is there anything in the comments box I mean if you look along that line it's got some very unusual entries not recorded initial pressure naught final impression naught

01:53:49 naught final impression naught I'm just wondering whether the comments might expand a break in the to emphasis it it may it's Joe let him we don't have a comment spot here we can find out but I want to get the witness's recollection

01:54:00 I want to get the witness's recollection of whether this can be whether she remembers a break in there I don't recall a delay and we were very conscious of getting crews in and

01:54:11 conscious of getting crews in and working and to those FSG callers as as quickly and as effectively as we could what so I don't recall a delay none of

01:54:22 what so I don't recall a delay none of us would have wanted a delay where we didn't have crews in the building it was a constant flood of VA crews to really try and do the best we could with what we had in the second stance we had okay

01:54:33 we had in the second stance we had okay coming back then to this system of recording the FSG on the wall we looking out can I ask you then to get back to the green wall and the photograph with one five eight to zero

01:54:56 looking at that we can still see crossings out circles and ticks in various places did you continue to

01:55:07 various places did you continue to operate the circle crosses and tick system that you'd operated when you were recording the information on the wall when the bridge head was at the third floor so I imagined that I would have

01:55:18 floor so I imagined that I would have but I was only concerned I only wrote or added to the bit on the right and the other picture of further over to the right this picture here of any of these

01:55:32 right this picture here of any of these numbers names stations flat numbers floors was not predominantly me although obviously a couple of bits are relevant to me right

01:55:47 and can you look then perhaps we'll have both photographs off at the same time yes I think actually there only but I

01:55:58 yes I think actually there only but I think they're the other way around them is that right yeah yeah that's that's correct

01:56:05 correct okay did you do you know who wrote so looking at the one on the right I think we've we've covered you said that was you writing the as it were the columns and the material on the right what about

01:56:17 and the material on the right what about what's on the left of the right-hand picture and of the of the floor numbered yes or it's the same column of figures that we see towards the right of the

01:56:31 that we see towards the right of the left hand picture of the scenery so I would have added flat numbers to the floors as we received information information throughout the incident if

01:56:43 information throughout the incident if that's where you mean the flat numbers to the floors right yes that some of that will be mine but not all of it okay and again where were you getting that information from again it was still

01:56:54 information from again it was still coming by pieces of paper and face to face with firefighters who had seen things from outside and were physically coming in to tell us what they could see right as well as radio traffic and

01:57:07 right as well as radio traffic and information that crews were bringing down I'd say right were you still getting radio contact when the bridgehead had moved down to the ground floor if I was it was minimal and but

01:57:19 floor if I was it was minimal and but it's possible and I can't be sure you remember any nothing stands out in my memory but you remember where you would you remember where the radio

01:57:30 you remember where the radio communication was coming from so any I only recall having radio communication we've watched bunch of Sadler like that I can't I'm not I can't put a time on as to when that would have stopped well

01:57:43 to when that would have stopped well when we would have stopped doing that by radio it was certainly still coming in on pieces of paper okay looking at the photograph on the left

01:57:55 looking at the photograph on the left you can see that somebody wrote 1/8 I think it's you actually because you say in your statement at the top of page 11

01:58:01 11 you wrote 183 daughter 21 or 22 you see that yes in your state when you say you rate that J know where you got that information from no I don't recall at

01:58:13 information from no I don't recall at this time it would have been a piece of information that came in that was significant and I've written it largely

01:58:25 significant and I've written it largely to keep track of it 21 or 22 must be the floor but I don't recall where that information came from right now okay

01:58:37 information came from right now okay because it's not on the base wall on the third floor that we were looking at when when the bridge head was there so that could have come in at that time right and then you also say in your

01:58:51 right and then you also say in your statement that you wrote where we see 153 18th and and you say that you

01:59:04 153 18th and and you say that you received that information from a firefighter that came down from the tower and informed me of someone in need of rescue there so you when you did your statement for the police did you have a clear recollection of that I had a

01:59:15 clear recollection of that I had a memory yes of one of the pieces of information that we were able to get from a firefighter was that there was still someone in need of rescue at 1:53 on the 18th floor Road I must have been

01:59:29 on the 18th floor Road I must have been present for that debrief and in the attempt to capture that and absolutely not lose that piece of information I've just written it largely on the wall and

01:59:41 just written it largely on the wall and circled it right and I think then following crew coming in was briefed to then go there

01:59:50 and writing things on the wall like that makes it easy visually to point to the crew so it's clear to them and their mind where it is we're asking them to go so you remember it being a debrief or

02:00:02 so you remember it being a debrief or not the record of a deployment I couldn't be certain but they were obviously were certain pieces of information that did come from a debrief and I think that was one of them right

02:00:15 and I think that was one of them right do you remember the deployment but first of all first of all do you member the firefighter who debriefed you who don't remember which station he or she came

02:00:26 remember which station he or she came from was it a single firefighter you've got this debrief on I don't know who donate and roughly how long have you been on the ground floor when you wrote one point 318th

02:00:37 one point 318th on the wall do you recall I don't know

02:00:42 do you remember whether you communicated what whatever that means one five 3/18 to the outside world not personally right I didn't have the line of

02:00:53 right I didn't have the line of communication myself to anybody outside of the tower and it would have been something the bridgehead crew would have been aware of but personally I didn't

02:01:06 been aware of but personally I didn't have a means of communicating to outside of the tower so no I did not communicate that information but what was important was that we've got the next crew to go there based on that information and that

02:01:18 there based on that information and that certainly did happen you say you didn't have a means of communicating to outside the time I thought you said you had a radio contact with booth much manager Sadler

02:01:27 Sadler sorry that's misleading I mean I did have a line of communication with him at that stage the incident like I said I don't know if I was in communication with Paul Sadler I just mean that in our

02:01:39 with Paul Sadler I just mean that in our in the chain of command as it is my task my role at the time was not to to communicate that that information or to anyone outside of the tower but also due

02:01:51 anyone outside of the tower but also due to just the sheer nature and the he and the communications and the debriefs and the cruise and the impossible nature of what we were trying to achieve handling the information we

02:02:04 to achieve handling the information we had and briefing crews to get in became imperative and that is why we weren't able to get that information back out of

02:02:15 able to get that information back out of the tower

02:02:17 the tower do you recall whether it was possible in general to obtain an effective debrief

02:02:29 general to obtain an effective debrief from returning crews once the bridge hadn't come back down to the ground floor I think as I said yesterday a lot of the firefighters returning from their

02:02:40 of the firefighters returning from their efforts were extremely exhausted passing out in we were trying to get them water take off their tunics their sets reassure them get them oxygen they were

02:02:52 reassure them get them oxygen they were collapsing and certainly suffering with heat stress many of them especially the GBA wearers who had worked very very hard as did every firefighter some often

02:03:04 hard as did every firefighter some often not having any air on on arrival back to the bridgehead and that I think as I said yesterday questioning them at that time when they're confused and they're

02:03:15 time when they're confused and they're overheating just just wasn't something we were able to achieve and their their welfare and the rescues that they had committed and were more important there

02:03:28 committed and were more important there were just the thing that was important at the time rather than trying to question them where inevitably they often didn't know where they collected these casualties from and so due to the

02:03:41 these casualties from and so due to the heat stress there was confusion and difficulties in that

02:03:46 you know do you know whether there was anybody at the bridgehead but you could see or hear who was communicating such information that you did manage to get from returning crews to anybody outside

02:03:59 from returning crews to anybody outside the tower I don't know myself by the time we got to the ground floor the command structure had widened a bit more it was no longer just myself and watch

02:04:10 it was no longer just myself and watch my Android Keith we had group manager Golborne station manager Kirk obvious dear come down from the third floor we had great manager Welsh in position there so at that stage possibly and they

02:04:21 there so at that stage possibly and they they were communicating I don't know I don't know what other people were doing I can only comment on my own rather yes I'm just picking out up if I in your statement on page 10 halfway down you

02:04:33 statement on page 10 halfway down you you do refer to gold warns presence at the bridgehead in particular June when he came to the bridgehead did you carry

02:04:44 he came to the bridgehead did you carry on doing what you were doing before were their first cheese yes okay and he came to the bridgehead when it was still on the third floor I think is that right yes he was president that prior okay then he came down with you and continue

02:04:55 then he came down with you and continue to do what he was doing is this right when you walked the ground floor okay and what about group manager Welch what was his role at the bridgehead when it was on the third floor I don't know I was very much concerned with my own role

02:05:06 was very much concerned with my own role okay and whatever I couldn't comment no what about when it moved to the ground floor what was his role now again i'm aware of his presence i was aware that he was a group manager and raising with

02:05:18 he was a group manager and raising with great bunch of Golborne and myself and watch Mindray Keith and I couldn't tell you as to his specific role right

02:05:33 now just just looking at page 10 of your statement just below halfway down after the reference to Google's presence at the bridgehead you say group manager Goulbourne got offices together - at the

02:05:44 Goulbourne got offices together - at the bridgehead for further briefings and I maintain my position there assisting wherever possible hours into the incident there was a plant made to clear each floor one by one so we could confidently Sage clause clear in an

02:05:56 confidently Sage clause clear in an orthotic or manner and you say that was hours into the incident do you know what time that was implemented that no sorry actually I think I was in is is accurate

02:06:08 actually I think I was in is is accurate as I can be good for the seven or eight hours and code was there the majority was spent on the ground floor so it would have been at some point okay do

02:06:19 would have been at some point okay do you know who the incident commander was at that time that plan wasn't instigated do you remember whether it was daylight

02:06:26 so we were standing having so the further briefings certainly went into the daylight hours right but I can be specific on times okay

02:06:38 specific on times okay do you remember what floors you were able to search in this way at this time the plan was implemented I think when that plan was implemented they certainly

02:06:50 that plan was implemented they certainly cleared and could confidently clear some of the lower floors right and be sure that those lower floors were cleared but at the same time we were trying to fight

02:07:02 at the same time we were trying to fight the fire and other tasks that were taking place and we'd had fire fire emergencies missing crews so there was still although things had taken a larger

02:07:13 still although things had taken a larger command structure and we had a bit more of a plan to implement here there was still a lot of other things going on and it was still a very intense environment that we were trying to work in should you know why this system was

02:07:26 in should you know why this system was implemented I don't know why I wasn't a part of the decision-making there I was just aware that it was a plan that was being placed right

02:07:38 can I just ask you to look at two photographs which both exhibits to your statement early LDS for and LDS 5 and that's met triple zero one five eight

02:07:51 that's met triple zero one five eight one four and one five eight one five you could put both of them up on the screen as possible

02:08:02 [Music]

02:08:10 No

02:08:14 first of all do you know who took these photographs no do you know where this

02:08:25 photographs no do you know where this wall was do you recognize it with hindsight since the event yes at the time no okay at the time no and I think I can ask a

02:08:36 at the time no and I think I can ask a hindsight question do you know where it where it is in the tower yes so I understand this to me on the left of the entrance to the tower this is on the Left wall right watch man Joe Williams

02:08:49 Left wall right watch man Joe Williams of Philip was ok and that door is a daughter what do you remember and so it leads out to the way crews were coming in and out under the riot shields right

02:09:01 in and out under the riot shields right this isn't that isn't somewhere I went until I left the tower at 8:00 8:30 okay now we can't see a sign which says

02:09:14 now we can't see a sign which says community community room do you know what happened to this did you know what happened to that sign okay looking at the wall it says above 10 EDB a below 10

02:09:27 the wall it says above 10 EDB a below 10 s DBA do you remember any plan or instructional decision to deploy EDB a above the 10th floor and st be able over

02:09:38 above the 10th floor and st be able over below that floor yes I was aware that that was a plan that we were implementing again I wasn't a part of the decision-making I was aware that

02:09:50 the decision-making I was aware that that was the case do you remember roughly when that plan was United I'm sorry but do you recall any decision not

02:10:03 sorry but do you recall any decision not to deploy crews above the 11th floor

02:10:08 no I I don't recall there being a specific statement that we're not going above there anymore I recall us having difficulties getting

02:10:19 I recall us having difficulties getting above certain floors but that was because of heat and fire as opposed to a order okay and do you remember telling

02:10:32 order okay and do you remember telling or communicating that that problem back to a command unit belong to you that we were having difficulties getting past a certain point yes yes so those those further briefings I referred to is when

02:10:44 further briefings I referred to is when M myself Brian Keith Pat Golborne Richard Welsh which exchanged information Russians that certainly would have been a part of it that we were firefighters

02:10:55 a part of it that we were firefighters were commenting that they were struggling to get past certain floors due to heat and fire heat and fire all right can I just see if I can pin this down to some times can I ask you to look please at a photograph at M et triple

02:11:09 please at a photograph at M et triple zero one five nine two five

02:11:19 yes now this is a photograph which station manager Egon told us a bit about and it's it's a photograph of one of the

02:11:30 it's it's a photograph of one of the whiteboards which was maintained in cu7 throughout the night all through the book from an early point in the night and you can see that in black writing on

02:11:43 and you can see that in black writing on the right hand side it says from SM we think that's wolf ndon oh ohs 4:25 be a

02:11:54 think that's wolf ndon oh ohs 4:25 be a cruise committed to 15th floor and then Oh 4:45 be a cruise only committed up to 11th floor not 15 do you recall that

02:12:06 11th floor not 15 do you recall that there was difficulty getting above the 15th floor at about Oh 4 25 so about an hour after the bridge head had come down to the ground floor it's very difficult to pinpoint any particular times but I

02:12:20 to pinpoint any particular times but I just know that we were still definitely at that time still had FSG calls in progress

02:12:26 progress still attempting to make rescues what trying to get firefighters as as far as we could do safely or as far as they were able to there is a distinct desire

02:12:39 were able to there is a distinct desire amongst all of the offices at the bridgehead there we had to push on keep trying

02:12:44 trying do the best that we could with the conditions the firefighters are being faced with ok very same question in relation to the second of those a 4:45 only committed up to the 11th floor is

02:12:55 only committed up to the 11th floor is that a does that tally with your recollection about difficulties with Heaton's and fire about at around that time again I can't pair time on it I

02:13:06 time again I can't pair time on it I don't know okay do you know who would have communicated the difficulties back to the command unit from the bridgehead no that

02:13:18 unit from the bridgehead no that wouldn't have been my role in fact you know whose role it would have been no okay you didn't see anybody doing that do you know no not physically again not to say it didn't happen I just was focused with the wall and the

02:13:29 focused with the wall and the information and the brief and accrues and any other actions that have been that were going on were outside of my role so I wasn't focused on them right

02:14:17 No

02:14:19 on page 8 of your witness statement you say near the bottom of the page at some

02:14:34 say near the bottom of the page at some point I remember going to the fourth floor stairwell who you say having heard firefighters shout the word casualty and was struggling to get them down from the

02:14:45 was struggling to get them down from the fourth floor I went up and helped bring casualties down do you remember at what point in the night that was so it was

02:14:59 point in the night that was so it was from obviously we were on the ground floor the bridgehead was on the ground floor but it would have been a time into that but I couldn't put a time on it

02:15:10 that but I couldn't put a time on it right okay when you went up were you wearing ba no right what were the conditions like in the stairwell that you encountered up to the fourth floor at that stage and smoke-filled but

02:15:24 at that stage and smoke-filled but obviously lighter the knit the closer to the ground was it still breathable and I was I was able to breathe but it was a quick move to try and assist the BA

02:15:36 quick move to try and assist the BA crews that were struggling with not only their own air supply and efforts but we'll say with casualties they were trying to bring down right and how many

02:15:49 trying to bring down right and how many casualties do you think you helped bring down and not not many a handful obviously different stages may be here

02:16:00 obviously different stages may be here today three or four maybe five different stages it just if we heard fire fighters on their way down or knew they were on their way down we would try and run up

02:16:11 their way down we would try and run up to help them know in how exhausted they would be and to hand a casualty to fresh pair of hands it's beneficial to the crews and the casualty so that happens maybe three four five

02:16:24 so that happens maybe three four five times would for me personally other other people were doing the same thing yes do you remember the firefighter who the firefighters were that you went to assist with casualties no state they

02:16:35 assist with casualties no state they were under air no no are there any particular casualties you remember you could describe for us I remember a young

02:16:46 could describe for us I remember a young girl and maybe teenage years

02:17:02 okay I'm just going to show you one more photograph and that's it's exhibited to your statements before we look at thread guys how you getting on it's my last question set of questions would you like

02:17:15 question set of questions would you like I mean maybe sentence but I think to take a very short break before you know that's okay let's let's carry on yes yes they should be short yes thank you can I

02:17:27 they should be short yes thank you can I ask you to look at your first exhibit LDS one which is M et triple zero one five eight one three now this has been described I think by you as on for the

02:17:42 described I think by you as on for the thirteenth page of your statement as as the fourth floor wall do you know who

02:17:53 the fourth floor wall do you know who took this photograph No

02:18:00 I think you say it's not your writing and you didn't write anything on the fourth floor okay do you know when the bridge had moved to the fourth floor no

02:18:11 bridge had moved to the fourth floor no that was after I had left okay do you know who relieved you and watch manager Cobb Beth of Whitechapel watch

02:18:23 manager Cobb Beth of Whitechapel watch out I believed me from the ground floor bridgeheads did you give him a hand over as best we could at that stage yes and obses wasn't in charge of the bridgehead I gave him a

02:18:35 in charge of the bridgehead I gave him a hand over is best i kidded what we'd been doing and at that stage the all FSG calls had ceased so for me a lot of my

02:18:47 calls had ceased so for me a lot of my role and the information I had although still important and my handover would have been what I'd done but that these calls so I'm told

02:18:58 calls so I'm told and now what sayst okay and in terms of timing watch manage of God by think the calls that eqp relieve you from your

02:19:09 calls that eqp relieve you from your post at about about nine o'clock in the morning would that Brooke without tally with your recollection so my recollection was around 8:30 9 o'clock in the morning and I believe I heard

02:19:21 in the morning and I believe I heard Paul Paul Sadler say it was slightly earlier yesterday yes which is possible and but for me I had thought it was about 8:30 9 o'clock that myself and watch banjo key left the bridgehead at the same time right

02:19:36 that state the bridgehead was on the underground fuel still yes right okay

02:19:45 sorry there is one one more question sorry

02:19:48 sorry on page 11 of your statement you refer in the middle of the paragraph to a fan and you say at some stage of fan was turned on which circulated smoke through

02:19:59 turned on which circulated smoke through the ground for bridgehead area and you say that made life difficult do you are you able to recall what time that was roughly no in the in the early hours

02:20:13 roughly no in the in the early hours then it was possibly dawn was this fan brought in from outside or was it a fan which was integral to the building I don't know and I don't know what caused

02:20:26 don't know and I don't know what caused the lobbying to fill with smoke and all I was aware was that it had filled with smoke we've discussed it i'm formed group mandigal bore and that it was becoming too much right and that was

02:20:38 becoming too much right and that was when we broke windows in order to only sit again for ventilation oh I see so it's not was it you're not saying that some fan was brought in which was I don't know if you don't know what caused

02:20:50 don't know if you don't know what caused that

02:20:50 that thank you very much mr. slowly thank you I don't know further questions for you I just want to say thank you to you for being so helpful I'm very grateful to you for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations and

02:21:04 assisting us with our investigations and you needed half a minute I think current any more person mr. chairman has observed the pink slip being handed to me I'm not yes I'm not I'm afraid quite able to let you go so if we have a

02:21:15 able to let you go so if we have a five-minute break about what I think out is that sufficient we've got the time of day when we will only have yes would it trouble you to have a slightly longer break now and then come

02:21:27 slightly longer break now and then come back in case there are any other questions no whatever suits you well it will break now until five to twelve we can make arrangements for as possible

02:21:38 can make arrangements for as possible unit time yes and then will they have certainly further questions and for lucky you anyway why five to twelve and no talking to but for evidence further out okay thank you thanks so much let's

02:21:51 out okay thank you thanks so much let's go to the other

02:21:58 right five to 12 in please [Music]

02:22:08 you

02:36:18 all right mr. Silva we'll see if mr. minutes got some more questions it's just one or two therefore first of all um can I just ask you a general question

02:36:30 um can I just ask you a general question when crews were deployed to the higher floors in the building was there any discussion or thought about whether they should instead of being sent just to do rescues say just to knock on the doors

02:36:42 rescues say just to knock on the doors and alert residents to the conditions and to tell them to get out if they can and so personally that wasn't part of

02:36:53 and so personally that wasn't part of the brief owers detailing rescues to specific flats I know that a lot of firefighters would do that anyway and but obviously in this case they were

02:37:04 but obviously in this case they were also directed to certain floors and sand flats and as to I can't comment as to what actually happened okay can I just ask you to look at the photograph we

02:37:15 ask you to look at the photograph we looked at before which is M et triple zero one three zero seven four which is exhibit 8 to Justin Oh burns witness statement triple zero one three zero seven four we looked at this yesterday

02:37:28 seven four we looked at this yesterday and I know you told you said that you you didn't this wasn't your writing and you didn't clearly part in this do you know whether there was any system for capturing this data in order to be able

02:37:41 capturing this data in order to be able to move it to the third floor so that you could continue to have it with you so not for myself personally because because it wasn't my own writing and I would imagine that if it wasn't already

02:37:53 would imagine that if it wasn't already part of my own port information board I took with me but then the intra control officers would have had a note of it on their boards would all I can say is is that if we had the information we would

02:38:05 that if we had the information we would have taken it with us okay no he looked at this this morning but just I just want to get a little bit more clarity at the moment that you moved from the second floor Bridge head to the third floor bridge head was your forward

02:38:16 floor bridge head was your forward information board full or were there still gaps in it it was filling it wasn't full right I should point out that there are different sides to the foreign

02:38:27 different sides to the foreign information board and I was just using the blank side as opposed to the casualty information on the high-rise besides there's various sites to the board information board so in terms of the blank side it was feeling rapidly

02:38:40 the blank side it was feeling rapidly right but wasn't full when we moved from second to third now okay can you give me an estimate of how many and it is an estimate of how many FSG messages you had recorded on the FIB at the point you

02:38:52 had recorded on the FIB at the point you loot you moved to the third floor when

02:39:04 loot you moved to the third floor when you are operating the bridgehead on the third floor where the entry control boards which are different from the forward information boards you neighbor others day were they also being filled

02:39:15 others day were they also being filled with information so the edge control offices would take the cruise and they would note the cruise and where they'd want to right so they've got a very

02:39:27 want to right so they've got a very small box of remarks where they would make a note of where they've been briefed to go to and what cool sign they were using so therefore which station those crews were from right and that's the kind of comments that they would

02:39:39 the kind of comments that they would take on the board like to say it's only a very small box and did that information on the edge of control board as opposed to the wall or the FI beans did that get recorded anywhere

02:39:50 did that get recorded anywhere permanently like a photograph or a piece of paper where the information was written down not that I'm aware of right and what would happen when a crew came back to the bridgehead

02:40:01 back to the bridgehead with that information and a new crew tallied in what would happen so the crew receiving their tallies back what would happen to the information and so the nature of a China broth and the plastic

02:40:12 nature of a China broth and the plastic cover on the edge control board would mean that it would be wiped off so then free up the space for the next crew brought to go in okay okay

02:40:22 when crews presented to you the bridgehead with pieces of paper whether they were control information ball white forms or whether they were two by threes

02:40:34 forms or whether they were two by threes how long did you have that piece of paper but first of all did they give you the piece of paper and so it would have been accommodation some crews handed it to me some crews showed it to me some

02:40:48 to me some crews showed it to me some crews yeah just put it out in front of all of us so it wasn't always handed into my possession right and some crews would have taken it with them right so

02:40:59 would have taken it with them right so yeah there was there would have been a variation across crews for that right and how long did you get to either have hold or look at these pieces of paper

02:41:10 hold or look at these pieces of paper and not long because of the you know the the pressure and the intensity and the quick turnover of crews and the

02:41:21 quick turnover of crews and the information that was flooding in throughout the night that wouldn't have been long because we would have been keen to get crews in as quick as possible

02:41:28 possible and crews out and update information so it wouldn't have been long and those pieces of paper that weren't taken with by the crews with them what happened to

02:41:39 by the crews with them what happened to those I don't know did you give them - did you keep any yourself and so like say I think some crews took it with them so I don't know what happened to that and after that and then I don't know

02:41:54 and after that and then I don't know about the ones that might have been handed to me I don't know what happened to those right did you give them to brown a O'Keefe not that I recall no they obviously the ground floor there was a point where we were students in water and if they got dropped later on

02:42:06 water and if they got dropped later on and then they'd have bent they'd have been lost but that would have been after they've been recorded on to the wall right okay

02:42:18 yep okay thank you very much now I think that really is it okay no further questions so can I say once again thank you very much for coming and helping us with our investigations there Welland that I'd

02:42:32 investigations there Welland that I'd endorse that it's been very helpful to have your evidence because understanding what was going on in relation to fire survival guidance course is not entirely straightforward so thank you very much for coming to

02:42:43 so thank you very much for coming to tell us all about it right like to give the ocean

02:42:49 [Music]

02:42:56 yes just a minute yes now our next witness mr. chairman is watch manager peckin I think it would be sensible to have a five-minute break so I couldn't

02:43:07 have a five-minute break so I couldn't as well oh yes and get things organized there if that's convenient to you it might say ten paths that would probably give you enough time I think it would yes that's very good thank you I'm quite

02:43:19 yes that's very good thank you I'm quite well I rise until ten past twelve

02:43:30 you

02:48:57 yes it's two minute yes mr. chairman our next witness is watch manager Anthony Peckham

02:49:39 [Music] thank you very much it's picking but you might prefer to sit down yet make yourself comfortable yes thank you very much yes let's win it mr.

02:49:51 you very much yes let's win it mr. pickle good afternoon can I please ask you first of all to give me inquiry your full name Anthony John Peckham thank you can I thank you for first of all very much for coming here today and in assisting the inquiry

02:50:03 here today and in assisting the inquiry with its investigations it is very much appreciated my questions are intended to be short and simple but if you don't understand them all I get them wrong or you have any difficulty with them please just ask

02:50:15 any difficulty with them please just ask me to repeat it or put it put the question another way and I will happily do so okay if you need a break at any stage just tell it let us know or and we'll find out some other way and we

02:50:27 we'll find out some other way and we will break it's no problem on your desk in front of you you'll have a blue file at a screen monitor on your right we tend to work from the monitor but if you

02:50:40 tend to work from the monitor but if you want to look at the papers in front of you as well at any time then feel free to do so now in your blue file you'll find a witness statement that you've done dated the 29th of November 2017 and

02:50:53 done dated the 29th of November 2017 and the reference to that is a meaty quadruple zero seven eight eight nine have you read that statement recently yes can you confirm that the contents

02:51:05 yes can you confirm that the contents are true yes have you discussed your statement or the evidence that you're going to give to the inquiry today with anybody before you came here today we've

02:51:16 anybody before you came here today we've also got your contemporaneous notes

02:51:19 our MIT quadruple zero five four to zero which we just have the foil on the screen if you could just confirm that they're yours and they're dated the 14th

02:51:34 they're yours and they're dated the 14th of June 2017 yes right can I start by asking you about your position and some questions about training yeah that you are I think currently a watch manager had Islington

02:51:45 currently a watch manager had Islington yes and was that your position as at the night of the 14th of June 2017 my substan substantive rank was crew manager at that time

02:51:56 manager at that time but so I was acting up to watch manager right and whether you promoted to watch manager right and you say in your

02:52:10 manager right and you say in your statement that you've been on the command unit at Islington for the last three years yes is that right does that mean if you only work on the command unit yes right and as at June 2017 how

02:52:28 unit yes right and as at June 2017 how long had you been a crew manager

02:52:38 approximately eight years eight years yeah prior to 2011 I think you were in active service on the run as you call it

02:52:50 active service on the run as you call it yes right and can you explain what training you received as an active firefighter in relation to high-rise firefighting just in general terms from

02:53:04 firefighting just in general terms from being a firefighter through to my role on the Cu or specifically on the see you well let's take the the the first phase as an active firefighter we we are

02:53:18 as an active firefighter we we are obviously we keep up-to-date with the operational notes as read those regularly we would do drills and some

02:53:29 regularly we would do drills and some simulation over the course of years and there's the operational notes change we

02:53:40 there's the operational notes change we would obviously look at those and discuss the impact of any changes that may or may not have happened over the the previous years yes and as a officer

02:53:52 the previous years yes and as a officer on the command unit what would you get any specific training on attendants of high-rise fires not not specifically now

02:54:03 high-rise fires not not specifically now we'd have to keep up to date you know the note the high-rise procedures but no specific training other than things that

02:54:15 specific training other than things that might be related to it like sector ization and things like that okay can you explain for us what a command unit ism does okay it's um it's it's a truck

02:54:29 ism does okay it's um it's it's a truck with resources on it such as radios that will cover all all the all the command

02:54:40 will cover all all the all the command and fire ground and main scheme radios it has computer screens on it that we've got a command support program that

02:54:52 got a command support program that allows us to map the area give us the hierarchy of officers enhance communications

02:55:03 communications Whitehall's to tobias to distribute for sector commanders we can all go

02:55:14 sector commanders we can all go resources from there so it's a base really to work from so resources command right communications looking at the

02:55:26 right communications looking at the equipment yeah particularly the communications equipment that a CU has an LF bc you don't know which number does it have something called a CSS or can command support system yes it does

02:55:39 can command support system yes it does and kick what does that consist of okay so to assess a program that allows us to

02:55:50 so to assess a program that allows us to observe or map or like the map of the incident on it we should do

02:55:58 Vincent week so we can plot where hydrants are it also tell us what machines and officers are in attendance or will be in attendance and then we can

02:56:10 or will be in attendance and then we can make a hierarchy who's in charge who's under them who's monitoring and then resources so like a tree if you like a command structure

02:56:21 tree if you like a command structure right but we can change we can take screenshots of that as it changes but we can capture this suit key decisions we have a key decision log but that we can

02:56:32 have a key decision log but that we can capture the decisions on we can we can put cordons in place we can overlay

02:56:47 put cordons in place we can overlay cordons

02:56:48 cordons but would it be used ever to record incoming or outgoing fire survival guidance information not on the CSS are

02:57:03 guidance information not on the CSS are you aware whether a command unit has something called a remote striker camera I'm aware of it what does it do what does it do well since I've been on a

02:57:16 does it do well since I've been on a command unit it's never been used right and as far as I'm aware has never been in operation what would it do if it were to be used couldn't Sarah his summoners never worked right right to my

02:57:28 summoners never worked right right to my knowledge anyway no that's fair enough and are you familiar with something called a Toughbook laptop I'm familiar with it does it is it Alma C is it on ACU it was then it's not now it wasn't

02:57:42 ACU it was then it's not now it wasn't the time of the fire was it I believe so yes do you know why that it was taken off because they were never use it right it's often on the unit they've never been working never operated or never operational I believe right my knowledge

02:57:56 operational I believe right my knowledge what if it did work what would it have done we could you could use it remotely so you get CSS and use it remotely from

02:58:07 so you get CSS and use it remotely from the command unit it's my understanding right but we've never never been trained in the use of tough books what right would they be able to be used for recording and communicating far

02:58:19 for recording and communicating far survival guidance information I'm not understand sure but not to my knowledge

02:58:24 knowledge right have you ever heard of something called mesh node yes what is it mesh nodes not some awkward describe to

02:58:46 let me let me see if I can leave you a bit with this good dear is it something which would enable you to create a Wi-Fi network on the incident ground is there

02:59:01 network on the incident ground is there anything that you know of which the NFB had in its command units or indeed any other appliance which would enable the creation of a Wi-Fi network on the

02:59:13 creation of a Wi-Fi network on the incident ground no does or did on the night of the fire AC you have a webcam facility in your

02:59:27 AC you have a webcam facility in your lab right there webcam facility yes so an ability to put a camera up out onto the incident ground to record visually

02:59:38 the incident ground to record visually and ordered and or at least visually what was happening in real time I linked Juvenal Inc yes ok the link yes there is that facility right do you know whether it was used on the night of grant old town

02:59:54 there was a link to the heli towing yes yes that's the depart from a webcam link to the heli tele do you know whether there was a webcam link more generally no right can I ask a general question

03:00:08 no right can I ask a general question about Cu equipment was there a robust way in which a command unit could instantaneously and reliably communicate accurate fire survival guidance

03:00:21 accurate fire survival guidance information that officers on the sea you were receiving from control to the bridgehead without relying on radio or pieces of paper only by use of a runner a physical

03:00:34 paper only by use of a runner a physical person other than radio definitely a physical person right so I see so the three ways of communicating between the ECU and the bridgehead yeah were radio

03:00:47 ECU and the bridgehead yeah were radio pieces of paper by via a runner is that right and a runner who would transmit an herbal aural message yes yeah so no

03:00:59 herbal aural message yes yeah so no electronic communication between the Cu and the bridgehead at all now is there a reason why that is

03:01:09 I'll answer that it's never been never been there right isn't it maybe has never been needed right now on page 2 of your

03:01:20 needed right now on page 2 of your statement you say four lines or three lines down but I want is for lines and the vehicle is equipped with maps policy

03:01:31 the vehicle is equipped with maps policy documents and the ability to create organizational charts and the ability to provide far survival guidance can you just elaborate and explain what you mean

03:01:43 just elaborate and explain what you mean when you say that the vehicle can provide fast survival guidance yeah when fire survival guidance is in place

03:01:56 when fire survival guidance is in place an extra come on unit is usually mobilized

03:02:00 mobilized together with senior officers and clients to provide extra support and to carry out the role of fire survival

03:02:11 carry out the role of fire survival guidance so it's a dedicated machine and crew first that specific task like when you say carry out the role of fire

03:02:23 you say carry out the role of fire survival guidance yeah is that does that mean giving the guidance what does it mean simply acting as a chain in the communications link yes a chain a link in the communications chain from control

03:02:34 in the communications chain from control from control yes so is the idea that the sea you will simply receive messages from control and pass them to somebody at the precinct at

03:02:47 pass them to somebody at the precinct at the bridge here right

03:02:52 can you tell us what is the standard process for communication with control or from control usually radio and what

03:03:03 or from control usually radio and what channel would that be it can be various channel only three or depending on what it is specifically for this fire survival guidance but we off with

03:03:14 survival guidance but we off with operate on channel two and four generally right boys and goats rather channels depending and looking at the link between the control room and the

03:03:27 link between the control room and the command unit you say no that's normally a radio link yeah and is that between a radio operator in the control room and a radio operator in the command unit

03:03:39 radio operator in the command unit that's correct and the radio itself would be you said are the channel three or possibly two or four would that be the main scheme radio yes right and that radio link with the

03:03:54 yes right and that radio link with the would the the messages going back and forth be recorded I don't know all right

03:04:05 forth be recorded I don't know all right we certainly wouldn't call tomaron whoever control we call them I'm aware on the see you folks have got a radio receiver and transmitter what other equipment communications equipment do

03:04:18 equipment communications equipment do you have on the sea you which would enable you to communicate with or taking munication from the control room we have a mobile phone right each come on unit has a mobile phone right and has mobile

03:04:30 has a mobile phone right and has mobile phones hardwired as well okay so there's right so you've got the radio you've got the mobile mobile yeah and you've got a

03:04:41 the mobile mobile yeah and you've got a handheld a handheld yep what mobile which is that you say hardwired so we've got yeah we've got a lot like a cut like you'd have a car phone it's why density into the command unit right it's essentially a mobile

03:04:53 unit right it's essentially a mobile phone with a mobile phone number but it's hardwired into the that's not battery-operated and the the can I just explore the difference between the mobile and the hardwired

03:05:06 between the mobile and the hardwired mobile does the mobile that you use use a different line or different network to communicate with or from the control room from the hardwired mobile yes we are we have different providers and what

03:05:22 are we have different providers and what I believe they're following a fire in an orange right and which is which the hardwired is that is that Vodafone

03:05:34 hardwired is that is that Vodafone they'll start to - on the command unit yes one of each was also got they handheld which believe is codified right

03:05:46 handheld which believe is codified right and the hardwired Mobile's are they do they ring or link to a specific number in the control room or can you call anywhere with those well the hardwired

03:05:58 anywhere with those well the hardwired mobile phones that you've got on the command unit do they do they ring through to a specific line in the control room or can you call anywhere with them did you call anywhere everything okay and of those calls recorded I don't know

03:06:11 and of those calls recorded I don't know and the mobile itself is it like an ordinary mobile yes a bit like we've heard and some evidence about Brigade Mobile's is that one of those that just sits in the command unit the guide it

03:06:24 sits in the command unit the guide it depends of G officers without their own mobile phone we the command unit has its own own mobile phone right a team leader would generally have on in all times but

03:06:36 would generally have on in all times but the apply appliance would have its own mobile phone okay now that deals with communications between the control room and the see you and I want just to ask you about communications between the Cu

03:06:48 you about communications between the Cu and the incident ground in a normal case how would F s G information be communicated from the command unit to the bridgehead usually we buy right

03:07:07 the bridgehead usually we buy right young firm ready if if communications are sufficient yes perhaps I wasn't very clear ignoring the runner or and ignoring the pieces of paper yeah in terms of verbal communication if I can

03:07:20 terms of verbal communication if I can oral communication if I can use that expression you say radio yeah is it what kind of radio is that okay so we have the fire ground radio on the command

03:07:32 the fire ground radio on the command unit right as well and you're communicating if somebody was at the bridgehead what would they be using to receive your communication they will be using a

03:07:44 communication they will be using a handheld radio and what channel would that normally use that depends on what was dedicated at a time okay and would you normally communicate with the bridgehead directly or would you go

03:07:56 bridgehead directly or would you go through the incident commander or somebody else on the fire ground you would go sort of breach ahead directly

03:08:06 do do you have any experience personally as someone who's based on the command unit or of dealing with fire survival guidance calls that incidents previous

03:08:17 guidance calls that incidents previous to service to grant will turn out you know so for the the three years or so that you worked on the CEO at is links and you never handles any fire survival guidance no calls right is the

03:08:30 guidance no calls right is the management of fire survival guidance calls on a command unit something that you were you ever received any training on other than reading the note no we need them note what made of fire

03:08:42 need them note what made of fire survival guidance seven know the policy set the policy seven Maria writing is not okay we've read you read what did you read that as part of your as part of any specific command unit training or

03:08:53 any specific command unit training or generally no it's something that generally we should be aware of who's right and in your command unit training did you ever do any live exercises involving high volumes of fire Survival guidance calls I personally didn't know

03:09:06 guidance calls I personally didn't know did you personally didn't do your knowledge does the lfb run specific command unit training involving live exercises where there are high volumes

03:09:19 exercises where there are high volumes of FSG calls I can't can't comment on me when you say high level I can't comment on what that was but there were specific

03:09:33 training courses run at control with commands previous but I just happened not to be on duty

03:09:46 not to be on duty at that time right do you know when those were running it would have knock I can't search it would have been within the three years that I was there

03:09:58 the three years that I was there okay I can't give you dates I just know that I missed I missed the actual attendance racehorses okay so within the three years prior to prior to today or prior to Grenville

03:10:09 prior to today or prior to Grenville prior to go making do you know where those training courses were given I

03:10:20 those training courses were given I believe it was Merton Merton yeah their control staff okay so as a live exercise that would be there wouldn't be a with

03:10:33 that would be there wouldn't be a with you involving a tower or anything like that it would be in the control rooms that is that I'm not aware of the specifics I'd like to turn next to the

03:10:47 specifics I'd like to turn next to the call-out to grenfell tower on the night of the fire if I can yeah on the night of grenfell tower you I think we're on duty at Islington yeah you were reposted

03:10:59 duty at Islington yeah you were reposted to Wembley because of lack of staff I think that's correct and that happened at about 10 o'clock at night yes and your appliance that night at Wembley was cu7

03:11:10 cu7 is that right that's correct and who were you posted on to see you seven width that Night Watch manager Harrison watch manager Harris not Norman Harrison yes I was he permanently based at

03:11:21 yes I was he permanently based at Wembley or did he come with you from Islington now he was permanently based at Wendy okay who is the other see you officer permanently based on see you seven at Wembley do you know

03:11:38 on the phone okay now if we can look at the short incident log please at page 8

03:11:56 boom we can see that cu7 was assigned at one 1528 does that sound about right -

03:12:11 one 1528 does that sound about right - yeah yes and we can see that the cu7 is mobile - incident at 123 again does that

03:12:22 mobile - incident at 123 again does that sound about right your state as your status - time that seems a little long but we maybe didn't press state as to straight away let's go to ask you yes if

03:12:36 straight away let's go to ask you yes if it's eight minutes yeah that seems a little long right now on page two of your statement just below halfway down you say we traveled in our command unit

03:12:52 you say we traveled in our command unit seven vehicle with Norman Harris and driving we both had some idea of where the location was but we also utilized our MTD machine and DT machine yeah

03:13:04 the journey was approximately 10 to 15 minutes travelling using our emergency Bell yeah that if that's right that would mean that you would have arrived at gruntal tower at about between 133

03:13:18 at gruntal tower at about between 133 and 138 if the state is - time is is correct of 123 could be about right it was my perception of it I couldn't say

03:13:31 was my perception of it I couldn't say how accurate I was right I'm on route let's see if I can pin this down a bit better did you hear the order for make pumps 25 yes you did

03:13:42 pumps 25 yes you did yes you on route for you yes yes we have a make pumps 25 1:31 also say would that again would that help you with your recollection of

03:13:54 that help you with your recollection of of arriving you know I'm pretty sure we heard 25 we're on route right the howls soon after you heard may poms 25 do you think you arrived I couldn't I can say

03:14:06 think you arrived I couldn't I can say it wasn't long bye

03:14:15 at the I don't need to turn this up but for your knowledge the operational response report which has been prepared by the LFP for the first hour of this

03:14:27 by the LFP for the first hour of this incident the page 72 gives an arrival time based on GPS data of 140 204 again with that sound about right

03:14:40 with that sound about right [Music]

03:14:42 [Music] when you say rival time yes is that a spoken state as 3 or is that us just arriving in the vicinity well we've got a problem with the short incident log in

03:14:53 a problem with the short incident log in terms of booking status 3 because and you don't need to get back to it it says on scene at 2150 which would you own any of you can't be right if you look at the

03:15:06 of you can't be right if you look at the feds go to it then if you look at the the operational response report at page 7 to to show this to you

03:15:21 we're sorry 78-71 in fact 71 78-71 internally 72 in the exhibit you can see

03:15:32 internally 72 in the exhibit you can see that there's a soft time there and in italics at Oh 140 204 at around this time cu7 Wembley to see you book status 3 in attendance of Greenville tower they

03:15:43 3 in attendance of Greenville tower they are the second to you in attendance sauce

03:15:46 sauce estimated time using GPS data okay so they've got your booking status 3 but not actually booking it under the in the log it's taken from the GPS data well I

03:15:58 log it's taken from the GPS data well I want to just try and get clear with you is whether you remember that that is around the time that you arrived I could I can't say for sure I know that it will you know once we was very close to the

03:16:10 you know once we was very close to the tower it wasn't a place of just pulling up and I'm getting off we had to you know there was a lot going on and we had to find a reasonable place to park it

03:16:22 to find a reasonable place to park it was very tight to maneuver vehicle so it could have taken us another five minutes easily from what we would say being on scene to actually parking up a

03:16:35 scene to actually parking up a reasonable spot and a safe spot and a place where we could be utilized so [Music]

03:16:43 [Music] that's the best often if you you know ask the time thank all right we've quite before as you could have been on scene a while in but actually the time you've

03:16:54 while in but actually the time you've got parked up it could have either been another five minutes the time we parked up cycling yes I see would you normally book status 3 before or at the same time as you parked or after again that does

03:17:07 as you parked or after again that does depend on the incident there's the majority of incidents you pull up there is no there isn't an issue Park in an hour probably as a matter of course press status very straight away I may have waited in this

03:17:19 straight away I may have waited in this instant quite possibly upon my part I don't remember pressing state history but I may have delayed it due to the fact that we hadn't parked up you refer

03:17:33 fact that we hadn't parked up you refer as we've just seen in your statement you're usually using the MDT the mobile data terminal or route yep

03:17:41 do you remember what information you've got on it enroute about Graham filter

03:17:47 now it was mainly the final journey in the roads leading in Supreme Court out it was used for but it's a route finding

03:17:59 it was used for but it's a route finding yeah right not about specific data on the tower the makeup the layout the construction app what did you expect were you looking for anything on the MDT about what the standing advice to

03:18:11 about what the standing advice to residents was I wasn't mad what did you find anything on the MDT about what the standing advice to residents was no now you say in your statement that

03:18:29 there was heavy radio traffic it's a third of the way two-thirds of the way down you say and it's all page two during the traveling to the sea the

03:18:40 during the traveling to the sea the radio traffic was transmitting a heavy increase in pumps called to the location listening to the messages I was feeling confused I've never heard the response to an incident so rapidly increase I

03:18:51 to an incident so rapidly increase I don't recall hearing anything about the incident or casualties you say or even a description of the incident unfolding did you hear any FSG calls in progress

03:19:07 we are what we wouldn't hear them we would we would actually hear the call sorry let me put it differently did you hear any radio traffic about FSG calls

03:19:20 hear any radio traffic about FSG calls do you remember I believe we we understood FSG was in progress do you remember hearing any specific radio transmissions from

03:19:32 specific radio transmissions from control to a pump g27 one as confirming persons reported no do you remember hearing any radio transmissions to a

03:19:44 hearing any radio transmissions to a pump g26 one Acton's pub bladder about a fire on the 20th floor for example no do you recall any radio transmissions from

03:19:55 you recall any radio transmissions from control again to Acton's pump laddered g26 one to the effect that there were lots of survival for survival calls and people asking lots of questions at the

03:20:09 people asking lots of questions at the bottom of page two of your statement you say that the first sight of Grenville tower you had you say came from approximately one mile away I had a view

03:20:20 approximately one mile away I had a view of the building from half way up I could see that it was already two-thirds of light and then you go on to say and they were bits falling from the tower at this time I couldn't see what this was but there was definitely

03:20:31 this was but there was definitely something falling from the building and then you go on to say I could see it was burning fast it appeared to be going outside in by this I mean that the fire was burning from the outside of the

03:20:42 was burning from the outside of the building and then entering to continue that was what what was while you were on route was it yes okay at that stage did

03:20:54 route was it yes okay at that stage did you have any particular thoughts about what might be happening no did you have any thoughts at that stage and I

03:21:05 any thoughts at that stage and I appreciate this is a mile away and prior to arrival about whether about whether the building's compartment ation was was holding

03:21:21 it's difficult to answer because I've never never seen high-rise or any other fire to be honest react like that and so

03:21:35 fire to be honest react like that and so obviously I subsequently know it was plated but at that time it didn't occur to me I'm not giving it any thought so

03:21:46 to me I'm not giving it any thought so it was confusing to me to see a tower burn lilac what did you think might have been falling from the building a part of the building it was part of what that

03:21:57 the building it was part of what that was I had no idea but it was certain parts of the building were falling away right come and just follow something up there rising out a bit on page 6 of your statement you say towards the bottom of

03:22:08 statement you say towards the bottom of the page I recall seeing footage of a fire in a high-rise building in Dubai previously yeah and you go on to say on this occasion the fire appeared to stay on the outside of the building the

03:22:19 on the outside of the building the building was on fire and a pit fall away rather than penetrating inside your recollection of the dubai fire was that something you recall what recalled on

03:22:33 something you recall what recalled on the night

03:22:34 the night no so this is after the event as yes on reflection okay do you remember when you saw or heard about the dubai fire I

03:22:45 saw or heard about the dubai fire I remember watching it live I'm telling her right was a big mistake I think it was a new year new Year's and I work yeah but they were a number in fact in

03:22:56 yeah but they were a number in fact in Dubai but you remember which one it was yours Megan did you remember which there were a number in Dubai exterior fires do you remember which year this one was I don't know a recent

03:23:09 year this one was I don't know a recent thing okay it was definitely I'm almost sure it was New Year's Eve right when you really got to Grenfell tower did you have any thoughts about

03:23:20 tower did you have any thoughts about how similar that or different this was from the dubai fire you've seen on television I thought I don't recall comparing it on the night okay now you arrived and you say in your

03:23:31 okay now you arrived and you say in your statement that you parked about 150 to 200 yards away from the tower yeah that's the third of the way down page three let's just have that up there can

03:23:42 three let's just have that up there can you can you tell us where and I'll show you a map which we've taken some of the witnesses earlier too sergej ob1 just Justin Oh burns first exhibit not get

03:23:54 Justin Oh burns first exhibit not get that up it's it's met triple zero one three zero seven eight now yep that's it that's north north north at the tops out at the bottom and the tower is the

03:24:06 at the bottom and the tower is the square you can see in the middle of the map they're using that do your best the best you can can you tell us where cu7 part

03:24:20 I think was up Grenfell walk mistaken so ok groveler walk is a covered area to the south side of the tower so there is

03:24:32 the south side of the tower so there is space underneath it but do you know where had roughly you depart

03:25:02 yeah pop Mike have the road they're actually looking at the building supply so we might get a road but it was I'm sure it was on green field wall Chris's rent ban about there halfway up right so

03:25:16 rent ban about there halfway up right so you think he was the southeast southwest of the building yes right just picturing it in your mind do you think when you

03:25:27 it in your mind do you think when you went to park you actually went past the green front entrance none of the tower no he didn't because to get to ramp you would have had to have done that it do you approach it

03:25:39 have done that it do you approach it from grenfell road from the south east I can't I couldn't tell you the name of the road we approached it from but maybe

03:25:53 the road we approached it from but maybe I'm getting confused with the map but okay well okay well little bit I know where it was in relation to see you

03:26:04 where it was in relation to see you right well it's going to ask you yes as you say in your statement on page three a third of the way down that you passed Fulham's cu8 yes do you know where you did that well where did they Park it you

03:26:16 did that well where did they Park it you know well that they were like an aside so I might be looking it in the wrong way around the map but we passed cu8 on the side road and impart sort on the

03:26:30 on the side road and impart sort on the hill as you walk down to grenfell town right okay I think cu8 was parked on Bommel Road at the a junction of grenfell Road they see stuff at Cycle Hire station yes

03:26:44 Hire station yes so here yeah yes greg's all right yeah

03:26:58 so here yeah yes greg's all right yeah okay right now I think you went initially to see you aged didn't you yes

03:27:08 why did you go there first because I'm reporting you would normally go to first see you and the team leader and ice what

03:27:21 see you and the team leader and ice what what they needed from us okay no so that's normal policies yes you weren't instructed to go there no we would make herself known that we were in attendance right and then they would tell us what

03:27:33 right and then they would tell us what was needed from us okay did you know that cu8 was already in attendance because we passed it yeah only because you passed it what did you hear it on the radio okay which would

03:27:48 hear it on the radio okay which would you have got the any kind of message that see you a turd had gone status three either over the radio or on the MDT we would have got it if we'd have

03:28:01 MDT we would have got it if we'd have heard it yeah who with sirens going I don't know you don't always hear every single message let's in Sony some detail is missed okay but normally you would

03:28:15 is missed okay but normally you would expect the fact that cu8 had arrived on the state's three to be to be radiated to you not to ask directly now it would have been they would have sent a message

03:28:26 have been they would have sent a message to control - yes control no they worthy isn't command vehicle and control would then do what would that message dis technology right then no to send any

03:28:39 technology right then no to send any subsequent radio traffic to them okay and would you receive that would you receive notification of that acknowledgement No okay do you were you aware when you

03:28:51 okay do you were you aware when you arrived who the incident commander was wasn't did you take steps to find out no why is that why did you not think to

03:29:02 why is that why did you not think to take steps to find out who the I see it wasn't a priority do you remember what the incident command pump was when you

03:29:13 the incident command pump was when you arrived

03:29:15 arrived it would have been charlie uniform right okay

03:29:22 mr. maryk are you familiar with Daniel Merrick yes okay do you know him other than from this inquiry would work together on occasions okay now I'm going

03:29:34 together on occasions okay now I'm going to ask you about him in a minute he gave evidence at the gist of which was that Cu aides never formally took over as ICP and that I see the ICP remains g27 one okay Jim up do you have

03:29:47 remains g27 one okay Jim up do you have a arraign recollection about I have no recollection of the message being sent the ICP had changed okay now looking at

03:29:58 the ICP had changed okay now looking at your statement a third of the way down on page three you say at this time that's going to see you eight and you say Dan Merrick was taking FSG calls on

03:30:10 say Dan Merrick was taking FSG calls on the truck

03:30:14 what was the truck come on unit Charlie for my eighth yes but did you hear or see a Dan Marek taking FSG calls at cu8

03:30:28 see a Dan Marek taking FSG calls at cu8 yes he did what was he taking them on what piece of equipment on see you ache was he taking those calls on ah was it the radio do you think or was it

03:30:39 was it the radio do you think or was it one of the mobiles I actually can't remember what what he was using okay do you remember who else was on cu8 when

03:30:51 you remember who else was on cu8 when you arrived not now no I thought I can't recollect you there was I can't pick out faces did you go to see you ate with

03:31:04 faces did you go to see you ate with watch manager Harrison he ever yeah so both of you arrived at will see you ate at the same time did you yes

03:31:15 does the name watch manager Kentfield give me the 90s who's he and he's a come on unit operative and full of full of yes and was he on see

03:31:28 full of full of yes and was he on see you ain't when you arrived I've been actually I believe I believe he was team

03:31:39 actually I believe I believe he was team leader right for icon I'm not hundred percent sure that was my interpretation but my mark was team leader at a time we call him mark you

03:31:52 leader at a time we call him mark you quite familiar yes okay what's magic pencil no no no observe stood in your use of his first thing because I didn't realize you knew yes okay say and then he was team leader um

03:32:08 okay say and then he was team leader um a small recollection I can't say for sure but he's mine I seem to remember thinking he was team leader right no was he physically on cu8 when you arrived

03:32:20 he physically on cu8 when you arrived with Norman Harrison I want to see comical how did you discover that he was team leader on cu8 I said I believe us I

03:32:34 team leader on cu8 I said I believe us I saw him come back at some point I saw him at some point on the meet on the command unit cu8 yeah okay what about station manager Egon do you

03:32:47 what about station manager Egon do you remember seeing him at sea you ate her first time she laughs would you know who he is yes okay do you remember seeing him at sea you ain't know I can't say

03:33:01 him at sea you ain't know I can't say for sure

03:33:02 for sure he arrived status 3 at 1:58 does that help you try and recall whether you saw him on the cu8 if

03:33:15 recall whether you saw him on the cu8 if you're asking me can I definitely say for sure the answer is no no what I'm asking you what you remember the best you can yeah I don't remember him being

03:33:26 you can yeah I don't remember him being on see you I know that's not to say he wasn't on it but I can't remember his birthday

03:33:30 birthday I was pretty task-focused almost immediately when I got on to that young me and so there's a lot going on my parish peripheral sound and vision so

03:33:42 parish peripheral sound and vision so there was a lot going on haider I was tasked focus so it was hard for me to pick out detail what went on from my short time and see you ain't yes understand loonies try a couple of more

03:33:54 understand loonies try a couple of more names with the effect do you remember group manager Goodall being on cu8 at any stage for sure actually

03:34:06 yes you do yes and what about group manager Welch Richard Welch now there are over here and now we have a record

03:34:21 are over here and now we have a record of group manager Welch taking over as I seen at o2 o4 and 20 seconds do you have any recollection of group manager Welch

03:34:35 any recollection of group manager Welch taking over as I see do you remember any handover taking place and in handover between incident commanders taking place

03:34:46 between incident commanders taking place no okay

03:34:49 no okay do you remember seeing you know someone called Andy Walton station manager Walton place to action we have a record

03:35:02 Walton place to action we have a record of a major incident being declared from cu8 at O 206 do you remember that no were you on cu8 at when a major incident

03:35:13 were you on cu8 at when a major incident was declared do you think no way I thought I was okay I don't remember I don't remember the major ins have been declared so I can try you okay where I was now you say in your

03:35:25 where I was now you say in your statement

03:35:29 halfway down page three you say at this time I can't remember if I was using the FSG phone or radio but I began assisting Dan Merrick and taking messages did you

03:35:42 Dan Merrick and taking messages did you do this immediately you were arrived at see you ate pretty much yes right didn't anybody ask you to do it or did you just volunteer to do it I think I volunteered down Marik what was pretty

03:35:55 volunteered down Marik what was pretty much inundated with calls icon with replica whether he handed me the phone or radio or I took it but

03:36:07 or radio or I took it but there's pretty much to assist him now you say your statements as I've just shown you I can't remember if I was using the FSG phone or radio the

03:36:18 using the FSG phone or radio the reference of the FSG phone there is that the reference to the one of the two mobiles that you describe for us earlier in your evidence this morning to be

03:36:29 in your evidence this morning to be honest I'm not sure what I was using right is this a bit blurry right do you remember whether somebody was using the radio on cu8 I would be surprised if

03:36:43 radio on cu8 I would be surprised if they wasn't Tom say for sure okay seemed likely we'd be using both phones and not the radio right do you remember how Dan

03:36:58 the radio right do you remember how Dan Merrick was taking the calls

03:37:04 sorry lab right yeah was he using the phone or was he using radio as eyesight I can't clarify him who was using what do you remember how Dan Merrick was

03:37:17 do you remember how Dan Merrick was recording the messages that were coming to him

03:37:24 [Music]

03:37:28 he was I seem to remember him writing him down but I can't recollect on what I would I would assume it would be come on

03:37:41 would assume it would be come on information but it's not something I took a lot of know itself like just I could see was inundated with calls so I didn't really play a lot of bean salad -

03:37:52 didn't really play a lot of bean salad - what he was writing down and on what no could you see him writing there it's not something my recollects right that's not something I would have paid attention to

03:38:03 something I would have paid attention to okay when you started to do you remember Dan Mary sending information to the

03:38:15 Dan Mary sending information to the bridgehead in any way I do not know okay when you started to assist down Mary can you explain exactly what what it was you were doing my recollection was I was taking calls

03:38:27 my recollection was I was taking calls from control right so you were taking calls from control and was dan Marek also taking calls from control yes right was there anybody else on cu8 at that

03:38:39 was there anybody else on cu8 at that time who was also taking calls from control not someone knowledge right so just the two of you as far as I'm aware okay and were you taking messages that

03:38:51 okay and were you taking messages that we're coming in separately to those that he was receiving at the same time what I were separate yes so they wouldn't have been from the same

03:39:03 wouldn't have been from the same personality parents oh okay Andy did you record the messages that you were getting from control I would have recorded in some way if you remember how

03:39:15 recorded in some way if you remember how you record 200 Carmichael it's exactly now I would have recorded them you'd have written them down just sort of written down do they remember what on I don't know do you remember whether you

03:39:28 don't know do you remember whether you handed pieces of yourself handed pieces of paper to runners from cu8 I didn't personally hand them to run us right now do you remember assisting Dan Merritt

03:39:41 do you remember assisting Dan Merritt recalled the calls that he was taking or did you leave him to do that I can't remember do you remember what watch manager Harrison was doing on cu8 No

03:39:57 now when Dan Mary gave evidence he said that some of the information that was coming in when he was on cu8 you'd started to record on whiteboards do you

03:40:09 started to record on whiteboards do you remember recording information on whiteboards

03:40:18 I don't remember writing on any bald in cu8 okay that was a result didn't are to have no recollection of that right we're

03:40:30 have no recollection of that right we're going to break in just one moment but can I just show you a photograph to see if it it triggers a memory a sure can I ask you please to go to met triple zero one five nine three zero

03:40:41 triple zero one five nine three zero which is tab 41 of our

03:40:52 this is a photograph taken of a whiteboard done on cu8 before the move to see you seven yeah do you recognize

03:41:03 to see you seven yeah do you recognize this what's not more writing so you're writing Mary does it does just looking at this photograph trigger a recollection about how FSG information was recorded on cu8 know that that

03:41:16 was recorded on cu8 know that that doesn't look familiar to me okay where were you where were you standing in cu8 when you were when you were dealing with these calls I was opposite down Marik in

03:41:28 these calls I was opposite down Marik in one of the chairs on the back right so you actually within the the room that I guess not standing outside on the step now you don't recall this whiteboard at

03:41:39 now you don't recall this whiteboard at all from cu8 I'll report the ball or I don't recall what was on it anyway okay let me put it a bit more generically though do you record does this photograph trigger a recollection that

03:41:53 photograph trigger a recollection that FSG information was being recorded in cu8 on a whiteboard does that signify well there does it trigger a recollection in your mind that that that is how FSG information is being recorded

03:42:05 is how FSG information is being recorded on cu8 oh I have no recollection of that at a time now you've shown me that then obviously that is how it was being recorded but I did not record out on the

03:42:17 recorded but I did not record out on the on the board right okay let's try a couple of other pictures and mr. chairman maybe just do this before she's Carol I think the otherwise we're in the middle of things can I just ask you to be shown three further pictures

03:42:33 first of all net quadruple zero eight seven three nine [Music]

03:42:44 now that's a whiteboard that came from cu8 do you remember that

03:43:01 no doesn't look familiar to me right can I show you eight seven four zero does that look like a whiteboard that you

03:43:14 that look like a whiteboard that you recognize on cu8 these balls are up the driver's end if you like I come straight on the truck went to the rear of the

03:43:26 on the truck went to the rear of the truck I wrote they don't look familiar and I wouldn't have looked at them okay then finally photographs eight seven four one there are like we see this is

03:43:42 four one there are like we see this is CSU eight-foot those two white boards there as you say they're both up the drivers in yeah you don't write you don't recognize I entered the truck I

03:43:54 don't recognize I entered the truck I mean pretty much straight to the back right before I left

03:44:03 okay fine and how long did you spend on cu8 before moving to see you certainly do you remember it's hard to say but it didn't feel very long at all in my head

03:44:15 didn't feel very long at all in my head I've got five ten minutes maximum but I couldn't be mistaken right thank you very much mr. chairman yes before we

03:44:28 very much mr. chairman yes before we brothers can I just say listenings mr. Peckham's evidence I think I'll find a little diagram layout of the interior of the command unit I infer from those

03:44:41 the command unit I infer from those photographs that it's got benches round a large rectangular area but maybe that's not the case I don't know whether we have any photographs of the interior

03:44:52 we have any photographs of the interior of a command unit we'll see what we can do

03:44:55 do otherwise we could ask mr. Peck in just to draw a rough diagram yes because we could do that can I do that thought when you really do get something like well they're gonna have a break now mr. Peck

03:45:06 they're gonna have a break now mr. Peck until they can all get some lunch I have to ask you not to talk about your evidence please or anything to do with it over the grate and ask you to be back at ten past two please

03:45:17 at ten past two please ten past so ten past two music you'd like to give the usher

03:45:31 good temples to them please

03:45:42 you